I Politikens Tjänst- Hur tjänstemän överbryggar informationsdiskrepans

Abstract

The democratic delegation process begins with elected politicians who make decisions on political issues, while bureaucrats are responsible for implementation. The Principal-agent theory suggests that this delegation chain can be weakened by information asymmetry between the politician and the bureaucrat, leading to bureaucrats effectively making the decisions. Swedish municipalities can be described as having a large information asymmetry between politicians and bureaucrats, but earlier studies show that these bureaucrats are interested in making politicians decide and are rather perceptive to politicians' wishes. This raises the question of how bureaucrats bridge the information asymmetry and put politicians in charge. To explore this, this study will conduct interviews with both bureaucrats and politicians in Swedish municipalities. The results highlight three strategies that bureaucrats use to address information asymmetry. The first focuses on educational ways for knowledge transfer. The second restricts information based on politicians' views of what they consider valuable. The third strategy also imposes restrictions on information, but it is not influenced by politicians' views, making it rather ineffective at bridging information gaps. The study develops the principal-agent theory by acknowledging the bureaucrat's role in minimizing information asymmetry and the need for active strategies. The study also contributes to the field by identifying strategies that can be used to bridge information asymmetry. Further the study suggests a new way to perceive informing strategies from the former focus on content to a more comprehensive perspective where content, form of delivery and time are considered.