dc.contributor.author | Dernevik, Joakim | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-21T11:23:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-10-21T11:23:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-10-21 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2077/83753 | |
dc.description.abstract | Meta-ethical pluralism is a recent set of theories claiming that multiple of the
currently relevant meta-ethical theories can be correct at the same time. I will focus
on a pluralist analysis of moral motivation that claims that speakers have different
concepts of moral opinion, and defend this from an objection that it fails to account
for meta-ethical disagreement as the parties are speaking past each other. In this
paper I develop a way to respond to the objection by claiming that the disagreement
can still be accounted for. The disagreement, I claim, is still present as the relevant
parties both believe, and intend to communicate, that only one of their answers can
be correct at the same time (the claim that pluralism is false). Pluralism can therefore
still account for the disagreement, as the presence of disagreement seems to
depend on non-pluralists holding beliefs that make their positions incompatible. | sv |
dc.language.iso | eng | sv |
dc.subject | practical philosophy, meta-ethical pluralism, moral motivation | sv |
dc.title | Pluralism and Disagreement Can moral motivation pluralism survive meta-ethical disagreement? | sv |
dc.type | Text | |
dc.setspec.uppsok | HumanitiesTheology | |
dc.type.uppsok | M2 | |
dc.contributor.department | Göteborgs universitet/Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori | swe |
dc.contributor.department | Göteborg University/Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science | eng |
dc.type.degree | Student essay | |