Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Bureaucracy, Politics and Corruption
Most comparative studies on corruption are geared towards the analysis of factors dealing with the selection and the incentives of actors taking policy decisions in a state. With few exceptions, such as Rauch & Evans (2000), ...
Parties, Congress, and the Stock Market
Recent literature in both finance and political science has identified a series of systematic patterns in the way stock market responds to significant political events. The lack of a common theoretical core as well as ...
New Public Management as Trust Problem: Explaining Cross-country Differences in the Adoption of Performance-related Pay in the Public Sector
This paper aims to explain cross-country variations in a paradigmatic element of NPM reforms: the shift from low-powered incentives (i.e. flat salaries) to high-powered one (i.e. performance-related pay systems). The paper ...
Does Democracy Produce Quality of Government?
This paper analyzes the effects of political regimes over state capacity or the quality of government (QoG): do democratic states perform better than authoritarian ones? Previous studies on this puzzle point to a nonlinear ...
Why Bureaucracy? Political Power and the Emergence of Autonomous Bureaucracies
Why some bureaucracies are autonomous regarding personnel policies? New Political Economy approaches to public administrations tend to explain bureaucratic autonomy as a result of the political exchange between citizens ...
Do You Believe Me? Public Sector Incentive Systems in Japan, Korea, Spain, and Sweden
This paper presents a theoretical hypothesis for understanding the success of performance-related incentives in the public sector, based on insights developed in the private sector. The paper argues that incentives are ...