Most comparative studies on corruption are geared towards the analysis of factors dealing with the selection and the incentives of actors taking policy decisions in a state. With few exceptions, such as Rauch & Evans (2000), ...

Scholars have emphasized the importance of having a “Weberian bureaucracy” for the socio-economic development of a country, but few attempts have been made to measure public administrations according to their degree of ...

It is often stated that the public sector should be separated from politics and that an isolated bureaucracy, in this sense, is less prone to corruption. The cornerstone of such propositions is that the activities of ...

This paper aims to explain cross-country variations in a paradigmatic element of NPM reforms: the shift from low-powered incentives (i.e. flat salaries) to high-powered one (i.e. performance-related pay systems). The paper ...

Why do officials in some countries favor entrenched contractors while others assign public con-tracts more impartially? According to the research, such variation responds to differences in political institutions, economic ...

There is a large and growing interest in the prevailing cross-country differences many well-functioning institutions, such as judicial independence and high quality laws, and desirable social outcomes, such as a low ...

This paper presents a theoretical hypothesis for understanding the success of performance-related incentives in the public sector, based on insights developed in the private sector. The paper argues that incentives are ...

This paper engages in the debate about how different ways of organizing relations between politicians and bureaucrats affect corruption. Research has established robust correlations between the political autonomy of ...