| dc.description.abstract | State weakness is often emphasized as a key determinant of democratic breakdowns. However, previous studies
have failed to appreciate how different aspects of state weakness pose different challenges. Against this
backdrop, we examine the relationships between two fundamental dimensions of state capacity (coercive
capacity and administrative capacity) and different modes of democratic breakdown, i.e., incumbent-driven and
nonincumbent driven takeovers. We propose that coercive capacity mainly enables containment of rebels and
coup-plotters, which reduces the risk of nonincumbent takeovers. Conversely, we expect that administrative
capacity mainly serves to prevent executive aggrandizement, which reduces the risk of incumbent takeovers.
Global analyses of democratic breakdowns between 1789 and 2020 support only the second expectation.
Coercive capacity, reflected by territorial control and military personnel per capita, usually drops below
accepted significance levels for both modes of democratic breakdown. In contrast, indicators of meritocracy,
impartial public administration, and predictable enforcement that proxy administrative capacity show a
significant, negative relationship with the risk of democratic breakdown, but only for incumbent-driven
takeovers. | en |
