ExecutiveAppointmentsunderLegislativeOversight
Abstract
A largeliteraturearguesthattheexecutive’sappointmentpowersmaybestowthem
with asignificantpolicyadvantageagainstthelegislature.Inpractice,however,the
legislature mayalsodeployavarietyofinstrumentstostrikebackatopportunistic
executives.Inthispaper,weusefivedecades’worthofdatafromtheSwedishgovern-
menttoinvestigatewhethertheexecutivemightadapttheirappointmentstrategies
to legislativepressures.Wetakeadvantageofavastsystemof ad-hoc commissions
that theSwedishministershavedevelopedovertimetotracktheirsensitivitytothe
parliament’sideologicalcomposition.Wefindthat,whiletheministersgenerallyover-
sample appointeesfromtheirownpartisanranks,theoveralldistributionofpolitical
appointeesalsotendstoshiftalongwiththeparliament’sbalanceofpower.Inline
with recenttheoriesofinterbranchrelations,ourresultshighlightboththeexecutive’s
penchantforbureaucraticopportunismandthelegislature’sconstrainingreach.
Link to web site
https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2023-03/2023_4_Dahlstrom_Holmgren.pdf
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Date
2023-03Author
Dahlström, Carl
Holmgren, Mikael
Publication type
article, other scientific
ISSN
1653-8919
Series/Report no.
Working Papers
2023:4
Language
eng