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dc.contributor.authorLührmann, Anna
dc.contributor.authorRooney, Bryan
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-22T12:50:28Z
dc.date.available2020-04-22T12:50:28Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/64134
dc.description.abstractStates of emergency grant chief executives the power to bypass democratic constraints in order to combat existential threats. As such they are ideal tools to erode democratic institutions while maintaining the illusion of constitutional legitimacy. Therefore, states of emergency should be associated with a heightened risk of autocratization – a decline in a regime’s democratic attributes. Despite this theoretical link and the contemporary relevance of both autocratization and states of emergency, no prior study has empirically tested this relationship. This paper tests this relationship using data on sixty democracies for 1974 to 2016. We find that democracies are 75 percent more likely to erode under a state of emergency. This evidence strongly suggests that states of emergency circumvent democratic processes in ways that might inspire democratic decline.sv
dc.description.sponsorshipThis research was supported by Vetenskapsrådet [grant number 2018-016114], PI: Anna Lu ̈hrmann and European Research Council, Grant 724191, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden as well as by internal grants from the Vice- Chancellors office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. We are grateful for Philipp Toenjes’ and Sandra Grahn’s skillful research assistance.sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperssv
dc.relation.ispartofseries85, 2nd Editionsv
dc.relation.urihttps://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/31/1d/311d5d45-8747-45a4-b46f-37aa7ad8a7e8/wp_85.pdfsv
dc.titleAutocratization by Decree: States of Emergency and Democratic Declinesv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.type.sveparticle, othersv
dc.contributor.organizationV-Dem Institutesv


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