|dc.contributor.author||Lewis, David E.||
|dc.identifier.issn||1653 - 8919||
federal government spend
huge sums buying goods and services
the public sector.
Given the sums involved, strategic government purchasing can have electoral consequences.
In this paper, we
suggest that more politicized agencies show favoritism to entrepreneurs in key electoral constituencies and to
firms connected to political parties.
We evaluate these claims using new data on United States government
contracts between 2003 and 2015. We find that executive departments, particularly more politicized
wide offices, are the most likely to have contracts characterized by non
and outcomes, indicating favoritism. Politically responsive agencies
but only those
give out more non
competitive contracts in battleground states. We also observe greater turnover in firms receiving government
contracts after party
change in the White House, but only in the more politicized agencies. We conclude that
agency designs that limit appointee representation in procurement decisions reduce political favoritism.||sv
|dc.title||Agency Design, Favoritism and Procurement in the United States||sv
|dc.type.svep||article, other scientific||sv