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Not Even for Merriment - Economic Concentration and Institutions


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Titel: Not Even for Merriment - Economic Concentration and Institutions
Författare: Olander, Petrus
E-post: petrus.olander@gu.se
Utgivningsdatum: 13-aug-2018
Universitet: University of Gothenburg. Faculty of Social Sciences
Göteborgs universitet. Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten
Institution: Department of Political Science ; Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Delarbeten: Olander, P. (2015) Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior. In: Carl Dahlström and Lena Wägnerud (Eds.), “Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government”. Palgrave

Olander, P. (2018) Issues of Concentrated Interests - Economic Diversification and Institutional Quality. Unpublished manuscript.

Olander, P. (2018) Cursed Concentration? The oil curse, economic diversification and the cohesion of elite interests. Unpublished manuscript.
Datum för disputation: 2018-09-07
Disputation: Fredagen den 7 september 2018, kl. 13.15, Torgny Segersedtsalen, Vasaparken
Examinationsnivå: Doctor of Philosophy
Publikationstyp: Doctoral thesis
Serie/rapport nr.: STUDIER I POLITIK Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Göteborgs universitet
156
Nyckelord: Institutions
economic diversification
Sammanfattning: Institutional design is often argued to be an expression and an instrument of the will of powerful interests. In this dissertation, I examine the impact of diversification and changes in the economy on institutional outcomes. I argue that for elites to achieve the outcomes they desire, they must act collectively something that is easier in settings where elite interests are uniform and stable. When interests are more diverse or when the set of relevant actors and interests are more in flux, ... mer
ISBN: 978-984402-6-3
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/56564
Samling:Doctoral Theses from University of Gothenburg / Doktorsavhandlingar från Göteborgs universitet
Doctoral Theses / Doktorsavhandlingar Statsvetenskapliga institutionen

 

 

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