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The interconnection between executive shareholding and firm performance


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Title: The interconnection between executive shareholding and firm performance
Authors: Ståhl, Rex
Issue Date: 15-Sep-2017
Degree: Master 2-years
Series/Report no.: Master Degree Project
2017:76
Keywords: Management Remuneration
Executive Shareholding
Long-term Incentive Programs
Agency Theory
Stock Market Performance
Abstract: There has been a long standing debate regarding how firms can alleviate the agency problem and align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. In this study, we theorize that if firms can incentivize executives to act more like owners as opposed to agents, it will lead to better performance of the firm. We hypothesize that there are two approaches how this may be achieved. The first is when the executive has a substantial shareholding in the firm. The second is when the firm employ... more
Description: MSc in Innovation and Industrial Management
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/53756
Appears in Collections:Master theses

 

 

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