| dc.description.abstract | This study deals with the effects of authoritarian regimes on state capacity or the
quality of government (QoG): do some types of dictatorship (military, monarchy,
single-party or personalist) perform better than others? More importantly, which are
the mechanisms through which different authoritarian rulers produce better
government? The paper argues theoretically, first, that single-party regimes are more
responsive to citizens’ demands than other types of authoritarian rule because they
have a structured mechanism to channel citizens’ “voices” (the single party). As a
consequence, they will provide QoG following societal demands, which are low in
low-income countries and high in high-income ones. Second, the effect of the other
relevant authoritarian types – monarchies and military regimes – is exclusively
conditional on rulers’ self-interests. With short-sighted rulers, monarchies and
military regimes will tend to under-provide QoG. In contrast, when monarchs and
military rulers have long-term horizons, these types of authoritarian regimes will have
a positive effect on QoG. Employing a sample of over 70 authoritarian countries from
1983-2003, we find empirical support for these interactive effects. In single-party
autocracies, the higher (lower) the average income, the higher (the lower) the QoG;
while in monarchies and military regimes, the longer (shorter) the government’s time
horizon, the higher (the lower) the QoG. | sv |
