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dc.contributor.authorJohansson-Stenman, Olofswe
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-06swe
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-09T11:16:17Z
dc.date.available2007-02-09T11:16:17Z
dc.date.issued2001swe
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465swe
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/2851
dc.description.abstractKaplow (1996) and others argue forcefully in favor of using the standard cost-benefit test alone, without any distributional concern, given "standard simplifying assumptions." This paper, on the contrary, demonstrates that distributional weights, equal to the social marginal utility of income, should be applied in cost-benefit analysis, given weak separability in public goods instead of in leisure. This result holds for linear as well as non-linear income taxes, and whether they are optimal or not. A correspondingly modified Samuelson rule is derived and more general policy recommendations discussed.swe
dc.format.extent22 pagesswe
dc.format.extent67824 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenswe
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economics, nr 35swe
dc.subjectpublic goods; distributional weights; equity and efficiency; separability; cost-benefit; optimal taxationswe
dc.titleShould We Use Distributional Weights in CBA When Income Taxes Can Deal with Equity?swe
dc.type.svepReportswe
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economicsswe
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
dc.gup.epcid2150swe
dc.subject.svepEconomicsswe


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