Decentralisation; the road to better Quality of Government? A comparative case study of Multan and Larkana, Pakistan
Abstract
This paper investigates whether an institutional reform such as decentralisation results in improved quality of government (better service delivery and less corruption) to the final users –the citizens and at what expense?
In the context of developing states, evidence suggests that decentralisation not only results in aggravating both regional disparities and the capture of local government by local elites.
An apt case study is that of Pakistan, where both conditions are present; decentralisation of government took place and the presence of local elites capturing local governments within the smaller cities of the provinces. It recreates the conditions of a ‗natural experiment‘ since decentralisation was introduced in 2000 and rolled back after a decade. Also, we can compare the effects of different compositions of local elites over service delivery, i.e. are they able to capture government to their own benefit? Or on the contrary is government closer to the citizens?
This is a comparative study focusing on two similar cities known for their elite capture: Multan and Larkana. The quality of government is to be measured through the service delivery of education, health care and law enforcement. The results from the empirical data shows an interactive effect between decentralisation and the structure of the local elite: the result is multifaceted: increased regional disparities, increased quality of services, and contrary to theory –increased corruption. Where the local elite is made up of more than one clan, there ensues competition effectively delivering an improvement of services. Whereas, in a monopoly situation the overall effect of decentralisation results in stronger capture of local governments.
Overall, in Multan, the three services have improved. However the citizens‘ perception also highlights an increase in corruption. The structure of the local elite in Multan is such that Multan has a number of local elites that are at ―loggerheads‖. This is evidenced by the number of families as well as the division of its members of National Assembly within the city. It is the stronghold of the present Prime Minister Gilani.
Larkana on the other hand has suffered in all three sectors. Education – a lot of ―ghost schools‖ overshadow an efficient education system preventing children from going to school; healthcare has not reached the final users as was planned; and the law enforcement has not shown signs of improvement it was meant to, while corruption has become rampant. The city of Larkana is the stronghold of a single clan - the Bhutto family.
Degree
Master theses
Collections
View/ Open
Date
2012-01-05Author
Varraich, Aiysha Kanval
Series/Report no.
IAGG
Language
eng