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dc.contributor.authorAmbec, Stefan
dc.contributor.authorCoria, Jessica
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T14:16:47Z
dc.date.available2011-09-27T14:16:47Z
dc.date.issued2011-09
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/27064
dc.descriptionJEL classification: D62; Q50; Q53; Q58sv
dc.description.abstractWe examine the choice of policy instrument price, quantity, or a mix of the two when two pollutants are regulated and firms’ abatement costs are private information. A key parameter that affects this choice is the technological externality between the abatement efforts involved, i.e., whether they are substitutes or complements. If they are complements, a mix policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on the other is sometime preferable, even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mix policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.sv
dc.format.extent30sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economicssv
dc.relation.ispartofseries517sv
dc.subjectpollutionsv
dc.subjectenvironmental regulationsv
dc.subjectpolicy mixessv
dc.subjecttaxsv
dc.subjectemission standardsv
dc.subjectasymmetric informationsv
dc.titlePrices vs Quantities with Multiple Pollutantssv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.type.svepreportsv
dc.contributor.organizationDept of Economics, University of Gothenburgsv


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