dc.contributor.author | Beck, Adrian | |
dc.contributor.author | Kerschbamer, Rudolf | |
dc.contributor.author | Qiu, Jianying | |
dc.contributor.author | Sutter, Matthias | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-17T12:55:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-17T12:55:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-03-17T12:55:30Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1403-2465 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/22132 | |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of
credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction
price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue
that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the
promise is broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An
experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most experts make
the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior;
and (3) higher interaction prices increase the commitment value of
proper promises. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers in Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 436 | en |
dc.subject | Promises | en |
dc.subject | Guilt | en |
dc.subject | Trust | en |
dc.subject | Credence Goods | en |
dc.subject | Experts | en |
dc.subject | Reciprocity | en |
dc.title | Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services – Theory and Experiment | en |
dc.type | Text | en |
dc.type.svep | report | en |