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dc.contributor.authorBeck, Adrian
dc.contributor.authorKerschbamer, Rudolf
dc.contributor.authorQiu, Jianying
dc.contributor.authorSutter, Matthias
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-17T12:55:30Z
dc.date.available2010-03-17T12:55:30Z
dc.date.issued2010-03-17T12:55:30Z
dc.identifier.issn1403-2465
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/22132
dc.description.abstractWe examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is broken, and guilt is exacerbated by higher interaction prices. An experiment qualitatively confirms our predictions: (1) most experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices increase the commitment value of proper promises.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers in Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries436en
dc.subjectPromisesen
dc.subjectGuilten
dc.subjectTrusten
dc.subjectCredence Goodsen
dc.subjectExpertsen
dc.subjectReciprocityen
dc.titleGuilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services – Theory and Experimenten
dc.typeTexten
dc.type.svepreporten


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