

Bugs and Bureaucracies

Institutions, Administrative Autonomy, and the Governance of Antibiotic Resistance

Daniel Carelli

Göteborg Studies in Politics 185

2024

Avhandlingen baseras på följande delstudier:

Pierre, Jon, Daniel Carelli, and B. Guy Peters. (2023). The Four Worlds of Politics and Administration in the EU: How Institutional Arrangements Shape the Struggle over Antibiotic Resistance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 0(0), 1-28. Epub ahead of print.

Carelli, Daniel, and Jon Pierre. (2024). When the Cat is Away: How Institutional Autonomy, Low Salience, and Issue Complexity Shape Administrative Action. *Public Administration*, 102(1), 207-221.

Carelli, Daniel. (2024). Ignorance is Bliss? Enhancing Public Awareness of Antimicrobial Resistance Through Collaborative Administrative Governance. Unpublished manuscript.

Carelli, Daniel. (2024). Drivers of Transnational Administrative Coordination on Super-Wicked Policy Issues: The Role of Institutional Homophily. Unpublished Manuscript.

Akademisk avhandling för filosofie doktorexamen i statsvetenskap som med tillstånd av samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Göteborgs universitet framlägges till offentlig granskning fredagen den 14 juni 2024, kl. 13.15 i Torgny Segerstedtsalen, Universitetets huvudbyggnad, Vasaparken 1, Göteborg.



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Carelli, Daniel. 2024. *Bugs and Bureaucracies: Institutions, Administrative Autonomy, and the Governance of Antibiotic Resistance*. Göteborg Studies in Politics 185, edited by Johannes Lindvall, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 711, 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden. ISBN 978-91-8069-779-8. ISSN 0346-5942.

Abstract

This dissertation investigates how variations in civil service arrangements among European states impact concerted governance over antibiotic resistance. Through four standalone research papers, it demonstrates that different institutional setups and degrees of administrative autonomy result in different governance outcomes. Consequently, concerted governance is deeply rooted in the institutionalized structures of domestic politico-administrative arrangements. However, the findings also suggest that even modest administrative reforms have the potential to disrupt the prevailing order. Crucially, the dissertation reveals that granting extensive latitude for action to senior civil servants and experts, driven by epistemic and collaborative values, creates favorable conditions for cross-sectoral and sustained governance. This holds true at both domestic and international levels. The dissertation contributes to the longstanding debate on administrative autonomy and political control, offering new insights into how these crucial factors should be configured for effective governance of collective action issues.

Key Words: Governance; Administrative Autonomy; Antibiotic Resistance; Institutions.