EU LEADERSHIP AND SANCTIONS

A comparative analysis of EU's crisis response during the Russia-Ukraine conflicts of 2014 and 2022

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Abstract

The research field on international political leadership is a rich field focusing on leaders as individuals, at institutions and relations between leaders and followers. The literature regarding political leadership in the EU has its focus on supranational and intergovernmental leadership. During the last decades of crises facing the EU, how leadership is demonstrated and how it comes about have seen changes. There are plenty of studies focusing on a single leader in a crisis or different actors willing to take on leadership in a crisis. However, there are not too many comparative analyses regarding leaders in different situations. This study focusses on comparing the leadership, when implementing sanctions, demonstrated by Angela Merkel in 2014 during the Ukraine crises and Ursula von der Leyen in 2022 during Russia's war of aggression towards Ukraine. The study used a qualitative content analysis to study the leadership demonstrated as well as demand for, and supply of leadership to understand who took on a role of leadership in a crisis. Both leaders demonstrated more than one type of leadership and when studying the demand and supply there were also some significant differences whereas the supply was reluctant from Merkel while the demand was not completely clear when studying von der Leyen. This opens up for how it further needs to be studied how the demand and supply effects what actor takes on a leadership role.

Contents

1. Introduction

The Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the Russian war of aggression towards Ukraine in 2022 are similar crises that faced the EU during the last decade. Even though the crises are of different dignities the effect they had on the European security order was of similar dignity to its time. A main difference in the crisis's response was the leadership. In 2014 Angela Merkel led the EU towards sanctions against Russia and in 2022 it was Ursula von der Leyen. Two actors representing different institutions of the EU leading the Union towards the same goal. What is interesting when looking at the leadership response is that it was these two actors, especially the Commission in 2022, that occurred as leaders. The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is a policy area where the member states traditionally have high competence and the Commission little. However, the tool of sanctions connects the CFSP to the policy area of trade where the Commission has high competence. A need for continuity resulted in the creation of the European External Actions Service (EEAS) and the High Representative with the Lisabon treaty. This was meant to create efficiency within the CFSP as well as a clear representation in foreign policy matters (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017). The crises response during 2014 and 2022 however, shows that the leadership within the CFSP is not completely certain to fall on the High Representative and the EEAS.

The field of political leadership contains a wide range of literature. Further, the field focusing on the political leadership within the EU also has a wide range with a focus on different actors and different policy areas. The literature provides frameworks to study the occurrence of leadership by looking at collective action problems and the creation of institutions as well as by studying the relations between leaders and followers. There is also research on how leadership is demonstrated in times of crisis and how leaders act to contain the support of their followers. The reason for the wide research field on leadership is due to the leadership values that influence the power structure of EU. The EU is structured with many forms of checks and balances where different actors and institutions have competencies to take on leadership in certain areas while in others having very few. In some cases, actors can also have split competencies within certain policy areas. This creates a structure where the question of leadership naturally will vary between policy areas but also opens up confusion about who is to be the leader (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2020; Kassim, 2013). Therefore, it is of interest to further study how collective action can be mobilised when facing a crisis, who can do it and further how to do it.

The current research field contains many explanations for why certain actors take on leadership roles. There are also studies on the leadership of Angela Merkel during the crisis of 2014 and Ursula von der Leyen during the crisis of 2022 separately. However, there is not much research comparing the two. During a crisis, there is a need for collective action, but there is uncertainty on what enables a specific actor to mobilise collective action, who that actor is and how leadership is demonstrated.

1.2 Aim

In this study, I aim to contribute to the field on political leadership in the EU and to study how leadership comes about and how it is demonstrated. This will be done by focusing on the leadership in the 2014 Ukraine crisis and Russia's war on Ukraine erupting in 2022. I will contribute to the field with a comparative analysis made possible due to the similarities of the two crises. This will further be understood by looking at how solutions to collective action problems can explain the leadership during the crises. The Leadership in both situations regarded the implementation of sanctions on Russia. Already in 2014 during the annexations of Crimea sanctions were placed on Russia and in these the sanctions implemented in 2022 were built upon (Cardwell & Moret, 2023:1). This study therefore aims to contribute to the research on political leadership by adding to the field on the leadership in processes when implementing sanctions. The following research questions have been designed for the study:

What can explain who takes on the role of leadership in a situation of crisis?

What type of leadership was demonstrated by Angela Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen respectively during the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022?

1.3 Disposition

The study is structured by starting with concluding the previous research field on leadership and crisis management. Firstly, how leadership is theorised broadly in the research is brought up to then focus on studies in political leadership in a wider sense. After that, it goes into the research field of political leadership on a European level focusing on supranational and intergovernmental leadership. The previous research ends with research on political leadership in crises. Then a theoretical framework is set up resulting in theoretical expectations creating four thematic categories and questions that will make up the analytical framework for the analysis. Following the analytical expectations, the material and method of the study will be presented. The analysis will deal with each leader structured by the four thematic categories before discussing the findings and putting them into a wider scientific field as well as discussing it in the concluding part of the study.

2. Previous research

The second part of the study will first approach the main theoretical themes within the research on international political leadership followed by how types of leadership have been studied. The research field of political leadership is, and the first two parts aim to conclude the parts of the field that will be helpful for the study. Then research on leadership within the EU will be studied focusing on supranational and intergovernmental examples of leadership. To conclude the second part of the study there will also be a shorter part on studies of leadership in crises.

2.1 Theorizing leadership

There are two main theories when studying international political leadership, an institutional and a social constructionistic approach. Leadership is to be understood as how actors can be mobilised towards a common goal where the different theories present an explanation of how an actor can be in a position of leadership as well as how their leadership is formed.

Social role theory understands leadership as the relation between actors. Expectations of leadership and what is required are determined by the relationship between followers and a leader. Aggestam & Johansson (2020:5) describe how it is central to the social view on leadership to study situational and contextual factors based on attitudes, expectations, institutional prerogatives and history to be able to study and understand leadership. Leadership is thus created by demand and formed after the expectations of followers. This theoretical framework encompasses both a leader's view of oneself as well as followers' perceptions of the leader (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019; Aggestam & Johansson, 2017).

Institutional theory presents three different aspects rational choice, historical and sociological. In difference to historical and sociological institutionalism, the rational choice approach builds on the view of the relation between actors and institutions (Hall & Taylor, 1996:963). Hall & Taylor (1996:950-952) describes how actors have set preferences, which they then act upon to maximize. Actors' behaviours are therefore based on how to maximize their own gain. When actors then face problems common with other actors, they face what is called a collective action problem (Brennan & Brookes, 2013; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Young, 1991). When facing collective action problems actors then create institutions, due to demand, in which rules are set up as frameworks of how to collectively act to solve the common problems. These institutions are given certain resources to form positions of leadership (Brennan & Brooks, 2013:164-165; Schoeller, 2020:1098; Tallberg, 2006:17). The leadership within these institutions is expressed through what Young (1991:82) describes as institutional bargaining which is the process in which the institutional frameworks are created and developed. This study will further use rational choice institutionalism to study the leadership of Merkel and von der Leyen because it presents tools how to study their leadership based on them as representatives of institutions.

2.2 Styles of international political leadership

Young (1991) is a seminal text when studying political leadership styles. He describes the occurrence of leadership as a way to deal with the obstacles facing institutional bargaining. To be able to study leadership three types are presented. These are structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership. The main actors when studying leadership are the collective actors such as member states, companies or international organisations, however, Young (1991:281) also stresses the importance of taking into account the individual when studying leadership. Young (1991:286) argues that it is important to formulate forms of behaviour to be able to study leadership and not to study it based on the outcomes of institutional bargaining.

A consensus within the research on political leadership is the importance of the individual as mentioned by Young (1991) but also by Nye (2014) and Parker & Karlsson (2013) who also contribute with perspectives on types of leadership. Nye (2014) when studying the emergence of the USA's international leadership during the 20th century concludes with two leadership styles. Leadership according to Nye (2014:123) is to be understood as structural both looking at hard power such as military and soft power such as culture but the focus on materialistic resources and cultural influence is argued to be combined with the leadership style of the individual leader. Parker & Karlsson (2013:582) combine previous definitions of leadership and conclude four components, the leader, the follower, the type of leadership and the goal of leadership opening up both an institutional and a social view on leadership. They also mention what is explained as the supply of and demand for leadership. Similarly, they combine previous researchers' definitions of leadership types into four categories, structural, directional, idea-based and instrumental (Parker & Karlsson, 2013:585).

Taking into account these three texts, four types of leadership can be concluded. The first of these types of leadership is structural leadership which is characterised by its focus on material resources and how these can be translated into leverage in bargaining processes. It also enlightens the asymmetrical relations between actors and how structural leadership navigates how different actors have asymmetric gains from institutional bargaining (Young, 1991:288-289). Parker & Karlsson (2013:585) contribute to how material resources can help create incentives similar to how Nye (2014) describes how transactional leadership creates incentives through a *carrot-and-sticks* approach to reach solutions to collective action problems. The second leadership style is entrepreneurial style. It is characterised by the action to invent creative solutions for collective action problems by clarifying bargains surplus. Parker & Karlsson (2013:858) describe it as putting together deals. Contrary to mainly focusing on the asymmetry of the gains of institutional bargaining the entrepreneurial leadership is focused on agenda-setting, drawing attention to the importance of the issue at stake as well as to innovative policy options and the broker role (Young, 1991:293-294). The third style is the intellectual style which focuses instead on the process of creating a narrative to shape the perspective of actors in institutional bargaining. Due to the nature of intellectual leadership, it works on a different timeline than structural and entrepreneurial. Parker & Karlsson (2013:858) calling it idea-based leadership, describes how it focuses on naming and framing policy solutions. The

style has similarities with transformational leadership focusing on how a leader strives to form a follower's narrative and willingness to move towards a specific goal (Nye, 2014). Directional leadership is the fourth example and is characterised as leading by doing and focusing on how a leader can inspire followers to take action (Parker & Karlsson, 2013:586). Similarities can be made with Nye (2014) definition of transformational leadership in a way to inspire followers to share the same values and thus act accordingly. What can be concluded by these leadership styles is that leadership can be based on aspects of materialism, processes and ideas in a setting of institutional bargaining to create formal or informal institutions to solve collective action problems. An important note mentioned both by Young (1991) and Parker & Karlsson (2013) is that a leader seldomly only executes one style of leadership but a combination of a few which will be helpful when studying leadership styles.

2.3 Leadership in the EU

2.3.1 Supranational leadership

The Commission
The leadership of the Commission is something that has been studied a lot. Kassim (2013:151) describes how the Commission through the Rome Treaty was given a mandate to act as a leader regarding the initiation and enforcement of policies. The leadership of the Commission is described as a combination of a structural approach and an agent-cantered approach which is called an interactionist approach to leadership (Kassim, 2013:152). This approach focuses on the role of the Commission in institutional frames where decision is made collectively to create solutions that are beneficial for everyone. There is also an environmental aspect to the interactionist approach where the historical, institutional and social environment affects the institutions. This interactionist view is together with individuals' attributes which then results in the type of leadership expressed by the Commission (Kassim, 2013: 152). Similarly, Baracani (2023:1452) describes how the individual matters when studying the leadership of the Commission. However, when adding a crisis, the field hit by the crisis plays a role in the possible response by the Commission due to the number of resources that could be allocated. The leadership that could be expressed by the Commission is therefore dependent on the resources described to it by the institutional framework.

During the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 Ursula von der Leyen, president of the Commission, took on a role of ideational agenda-setting leadership in a policy area that the Commission had a very limited agenda-setting role in (Baracani, 2023:1452). Anghel & Jones (2023:768) study how the agency, the view of oneself as a leader, both of the EU but also by actors within the EU-framework was affected by the pandemic and Russia-Ukraine war. The question of leadership is connected to the competencies given to different actors by the treaties and who is given the competence to take on leadership in different situations. Anghel & Jones (2023) and Deters & Zardo (2022) mention how the Commission during a crisis tends to act as a brokering part, meddling during disagreements but also actively pushing towards extended

collaborations within the EU's framework. The leadership by the Commission can therefore be explained both as something that falls within its competence and also something that becomes prevalent in situations of crises where there is a need for leadership.

Another aspect of the occurrence of leadership by the Commission is presented by Ferrara & Kreis (2022) who study the effects the last decades' crises have had on the question of leadership within the EU. When studying the crises effects on European integration Ferrara & Kreis (2022:1356) mention how in addition to competencies role in the creation of the grounds of leadership, policy heritage or path dependency also affects the occurrence of leadership. The accumulation of actions within past policies and when it comes to crisis response, EU's response and success regarding the Covid-19 pandemic gave the Commission high competence when it came to crisis response. Recent crises show how the Commission has taken on the position of a leader with relative ease which strengthens the explanation of the successful crisis response as a result of institutional history. When studying leadership Cardwell & Moret (2023) study how the EU as one unity is a leader against third countries where the Commission is the leader. Cardwell & Moret (2023:4) present a different definition of leadership when looking at sanctions. They put forth a view of leadership as a process with a focus on leaders, followers, activity of leadership and the objectives of sanctions. When studying the Commission there is therefore also a field studying the Commission's leadership outside of the EU and not only towards EU-actors.

2.3.2 Intergovernmental leadership

Presidency

The studies of leadership by the Presidency are not as broad as the ones on the Commission. Tallberg (2006) contributes to the field by explaining leadership by the Presidency as institutional leadership based on the materialistic gains available to member states through institutional collaborations. The leadership accounted to the Presidency is based on the need for common institutions to solve collective action problems through agenda-setting, negotiation and representation. This has resulted in member states participating in closer and more extensive collaborations. Leadership by the Presidency is described as formal leadership in the form of agenda management and representation (Tallberg, 2006:45). Tallberg (2006:207) further concludes the leadership assigned to the Presidency as leadership created from a demand for and a supply of leadership. These findings open up for studying leadership out of the demand for leadership as something opening up for the creation of new or development of current institutions.

Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP

The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the High Representative when introduced with the Lisabon Treaty were expected to perform leadership within the CFSP in certain areas to contribute to the continuity of the foreign policy. The areas that were delegated to the High

Representative were agenda-setting, chairing of meetings, implementation of policy as well as external representation along the lines of horizontal, vertical and organisational dimensions (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017:1206). Aggestam & Hyde-Price (2020:8) mentions how this delegation of formal leadership to and EU-level, challenged the state-based practice of leadership within the CFSP.

The Lisabon-structure resulted in two examples of leadership demonstrated by member states. Firstly, a structure where member states collaborate through networks, which is to be concluded as cross-loading (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019:516; Elgström, 2017:225). This can be described as a structure where a member state or a group of member states influence other member states in certain policy areas and thus horizontal leadership. Cross-loading within the CFSP often focuses on internal policy building such as Sweden's recognition of Palestine (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019) or the Nordic's focus on gender equality or the eradication of poverty (Elgström, 2017). A common characteristic of cross-loading structures is that they are informal examples of leadership within institutional frames. The type of leadership can also vary where Elgström (2017:229) describes how the Nordic countries showed an ideational leadership style while Aggestam & Bicchi (2019:519-520) have a bigger focus on directional leadership.

The second example of leadership expressed by member states within the CFSP is in crisis situations. This type of leadership tends to be executed outside of the EU's institutional framework. It is characterized by diplomatic action and brokering. One example is when French President Emmanuel Macron visited Moscow before the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022 in an attempt to negotiate and deescalate the situation to avoid any military aggressions by Russia (Anghel & Jones, 2023:772), or the leadership role taken on by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel during the Ukraine crisis in 2014 (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2020). The Leadership between Russia and the EU also contributes an example of individual leadership taken on by individual member states. The relationship is characterised by Russia not acknowledging the leadership of the EU and instead engaging in bilateral collaborations (Nitoiu, 2016).

2.4 Leadership in crises

Boin et.al. (2017:3) describes that leadership in a crisis is based on the expectations of the citizens in a national context. The citizens require a clear pathway out of the conflict and that leaders minimize the damage of the crisis to the biggest extent possible. When the damage of a crisis is as little as possible the crisis response is well. Furthermore, Boin et.al. (2017:14) and Backman & Rhinard (2018:262-263) state tasks for strategic crisis leadership connected to information, communication, action and future preparation. This creates a framework where leadership in crisis/ conflict easily can be studied.

Boin & Rhinard (2023:657-658) when studying the leadership and crisis management by the EU states that the policy on dealing with the crisis is a relatively new research field. Through

the lens of the EU's institutional response to the crisis, three additional aspects of analysing the EU's management of the crisis are presented. What is concluded is that the leadership in these aspects differs between the EU institutions where the task of detecting and understanding a crisis as well as mobilizing resources are put on the Commission while the responsibility of decision-making is put on the Council. Regarding EU's institutions as leaders during crisis management, there is also literature on the emergence of member states, either individual or in groups, taking on the leadership role in situations of crisis. This type of leadership is characterized by states acting outside of the frameworks of the EU institutions. The question on European political leadership is also mentioned by Müller & van Esch (2020:1052) where they mention a form of leadership-crisis within the EU as a result of the relatively big number of crises that faced the union during a short time. They put forth a view of how the Commission's position to lead has been challenged by the crises and resulted in expectations of member states (Germany) to take on the role of a leader instead. As a result, the leadership within the CFSP as well as leadership in crisis response both show different leadership outcomes where the Commission as well as member states take on the role of a leader.

2.5 Research gap and contribution to the field

The research on international political leadership is wide and contributes many useful analytical tools to analyse leadership, both how it emerges and how it is demonstrated. The field is split between two main theoretical explanations, whether leadership emerges through institutional capacity or if it is a result of the social relations between leaders and followers. A consensus within the field however is that leadership also needs to include the aspect of individuals to comprehend how it emerges, who takes on leadership and how it is demonstrated. This opens up further research when studying leadership in a European context. In the context of this study individual leaders will be understood as representatives of institutions and traits/ behaviours as a consequence of it (Young, 1991). Not as individuals where aspects of background, gender or personal traits affect leadership.

The field of research on leadership in a European context is also rich in studying actors and styles of leadership. Leadership can be supranational or intergovernmental and also happen within the EU's institutional framework or outside of it. A reoccurring discussion is the demand for and the supply of leadership within a certain situation. Also, situations of crises have shown different outcomes of leadership where aspects of institutional history have been provided but also failure to supply leadership where other actors instead have taken on the role. Often there are studies on the style of leadership and demand-supply of a leader in one situation, in some cases the different actors trying to be a leader, but not as much comparative between different leaders.

This study will therefore contribute to the field by analysing the leadership of Angela Merkel in 2014 and Ursula von der Leyen in 2022. The situations called for leadership and had similar outcomes with the implementation of sanctions. Still, different actors took on the role of

leadership. I will contribute to the field by combining aspects of leadership styles with research on how leadership emerges through demand and supply. This will be done by analysing the leadership in implementing sanctions on Russia to closer understand why a certain actor takes on a role of leadership and how that leadership is demonstrated. The similar situations of crises make the leadership comparable, something that hasn't been done with the leadership in these two crises.

3. Theoretical framework

The third part of the essay is the theoretical framework which will end up with formulating theoretical expectations. These will form questions that will be used as an analytical framework to study the empirical material. To be able to answer the research questions I will draw from the framework of how analyse demand and supply used by Schoeller (2019) and the leadership styles presented by Young (1991) and Parker & Karlsson (2013). The leadership styles were also used by Scholler (2019) together with his casual understanding of how styles are formed. These however will not be used due to it resulting in a too comprehensive analysis that does not fit in the time frame of this study. Therefore, I will combine the theoretical framework on the creation of leadership through demand and supply by Scholler (2019) and the understanding of leadership styles presented by Young (1991) and Parker & Karlsson (2013). This combination of the two theoretical approaches to leadership will help to answer the research question of how leadership emerges. It will also help answer the research question of what type of leadership was demonstrated in the crisis situations. Therefore, by combining the two theoretical approaches political leadership can further be explained.

Demand and Supply will further be explained through a perspective of Rational Choice Institutionalism and theorised how it can be understood and further analysed. Then the definitions of leadership styles drawn from Young (1991) and Parker & Karlsson (2013), that will be used in the study, will be explained before presenting the theoretical expectations of the analysis.

3.1 Demand

Scholler (2019:28) describes how leadership emerges when there is a collective action problem that correlates with incomplete institutions. This is the ground on which leadership in situations of crises can emerge. To have leadership emerge there needs to be two steps completed. The first of these is a demand for leadership. Demand can be understood as the costs for a group if the status quo, without a leader, remains (Schoeller, 2019:29). Demand builds on that institutions are supposed to cover the need for a leader in creating solutions to collective action problems and to share knowledge. When an institution is uncapable of solving a problem the need for a leader to prevent or create regulations to deal with collective action problems increase. When the need finally is big enough demand for leadership appears. Therefore, leadership is a result of incomplete/ inefficient institutions or the pure lack of institutions to deal with collective action problems (Schoeller, 2019:28-29).

When looking towards the creatin of demand it can be indicated by how a leader mentions the costs of not succeeding but also the gains by success. This encompasses how the previous institutions could not solve problems, what it risked resulting in but also what solutions the leader aims to reach.

3.2 Supply

Supply of leadership is the second step required for the emergence of leadership. Schoeller (2019:29) describes how supply is created when an actor measures the individual gains and losses of taking on a leadership role or not. When the material gains are viewed to be more than the losses an actor takes on a role of leadership. Supply is therefore created by a collective actor and the potential gains and losses for that actor individually and not the collective. In the situation in which an actor measures the gains bigger than the losses there is an existence of a leader's surplus and thus leadership can emerge (Schoeller, 2019:31).

When there is more than one potential leader, the power resources are what determine who takes on the role of leadership. The actor with the most power resources will have the opportunity to create the most comprehensive solutions. Schoeller (2019:34) names three types of power resources. *Materialistic power* is connected to economic and military capabilities, *institutional power* focuses on agenda management, veto-rights, procedural rights and executive competencies and lastly *ideational power* is connected to information, credibility and legitimacy. The leadership surplus' that is needed is then based on the amount of power resources the actor has regarding the policy area. When studying the supply-side of the emergence of leadership, there also needs to be power resources available to the leader. This can be understood both through the solutions a leader presents but also through contextual factors regarding the position of the leader.

3.3 Leadership styles

Four styles of leadership will be used. Three out of the four styles that Parker & Karlsson (2013) conclude can correspond with the styles presented by Young (1991). Structural leadership has the same name, while Young's Entrepreneurial leadership is similar to Instrumental leadership, and Intellectual leadership to Idea-based leadership. The last style that Parker & Karlsson (2013) write about is Directional leadership. Central to *Structural leadership* is the asymmetry of materialistic resources, having strong ties to transactional leadership, and how a leader uses the calculations of possible outcomes to reach a problem solution. In *Entrepreneurial leadership* the focus on creating new creative solutions is central to being able to act as a broker within leadership negotiations. *Intellectual leadership* focuses instead on the creation of ideas, to be able to find a common normative/ understating view of the problem is therefore central. Lastly, *Directional leadership* focuses on how leaders act to inspire others to do so, therefore being very transformational, and the actions of the leader and how they are portrayed are therefore central.

When looking at how leadership styles have been used in studies Baracani (2023:1454) gives an example when studying the leadership of the Commission taking into account power resources, policy capability as well as resources of information and ideas and how that results in a certain leadership style. In a similar manner Aggestam & Hyde-Price (2020:18-19) also studied the leadership style of Angela Merkel and concludes the prevalence of two leadership styles. When analysing leadership styles, it will therefore be helpful to realise that different

styles often co-exists and can balance each other. In both cases, the main focus has been on the actor, the Commission and Germany, but what differs in this study is the main focus on the individual and individual leadership. Young (1991) explains how individuals represent an actor, they are not to be seen as acting freely but as a prolonged arm or the face of a collective actor.

3.4 Theoretical expectations

Based on the theoretical framework four themes can be concluded to use when applying the theories on the empiric material. These are *context, demand, supply* and *leadership styles*. The contextual factors of the analysis will mainly be found in the secondary material. This is necessary for understanding the situation in which the crises erupted as well as understand what position each actor had in relation to other actors (Baracani, 2023:1456). It will therefore be important to focus on social and political factors clarifying potential institutional limitations, as well as situational expectations on the actor. When analysing demand, supply and leadership style the primary material will be used and each of the themes will have certain questions designed to find indicators in the text. The question making up the analytical framework has therefore been designed to find indicators of power resources, leadership strategies and institutions on formal/ informal institutions on a basis of encircling the demand for and supply of leadership.

What can be expected on the basis of the theoretical framework is therefore that demand can be expected in a crisis when there is a lack of institutions that results in a large cost for actors. This demand will therefore be characterised by the need for policy development, institutional development and the provision of knowledge when there is a lack of it (Schoeller, 2019:32). The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the Russia-Ukraine war of 2022 can both be argued to have created a demand for leadership. Taking it further the last decade of crises has created a demand for leadership where the Commission in many situations have taken on a role of leadership creating a form of institutional history (Anghel & Jones, 2023). This could be described as a demand for leadership in crises situations that have led to the creation of informal institutions and thus demand can be expected in situations of crises. The theoretical framework will therefore be formed into two questions which will be used to analyse the material to analyse the existence of demand.

- What costs do the crisis mean for the EU's collective actors?
- What positive effects will be gained from the leadership of the actor?

Supply can be expected when there is an actor willing to take on the cost of leadership creating a surplus. It as requires the presence of power resources. When there is a demand, and a supply leadership may emerge however if neither demand nor supply is missing there might instead be an absence of leadership. The Lisbon treaty resulted in a change regarding who had institutional power, at the same time the request for Germany to take on an active role within the CFSP could be expected to result in ideational power. The Commission can be expected to show signs of having materialistic power due to their economic competence. The structure of the CFSP but

also the method of using sanctions creates an expectation of the possible supply from different actor in a crisis within CFSP. These two questions will therefore be applied on the empiric material.

- What power resources are available to the leader?
- Is there a leader surplus?

Leadership styles will be analysed by looking at questions of how the leadership is demonstrated and what type of solutions are presented for the problem. These will be presented in table 1 below. What can be expected is that the type leadership styles will depend on two factors. Firstly, on the method in which leadership is demonstrated and secondly, on what basis solutions are formed.

	How is leadership demonstrated?	What aspects are solutions based on?
Structural	Negotiating	Asymmetric relations of resources between actors in a negotiation
Entrepreneurial	Brokering	Creating creative and constructive solutions
Intellectual	Forming narratives	Narrative created on ideas by the leader over time, adding a longer time frame for the leadership
Directional	Taking action	Focus on taking action to encourage other to do the same. Solutions can therefore take on different forms

Table 1: Analytical framework with indicators of leadership style.

4. Method and material

4.1 Material

The empirical material of the study is made up of both primary and secondary literature. This is important for the study to be able to capture not only the demand, supply and leadership style but also the contextual factors. The secondary literature is made up mainly of Aggestam & Hyde-Price (2020) and Baracani (2023) who studied the leadership of Angela Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen respectively. In some cases, news articles will also be used complementary to the two main texts. It will be used to understand the social and political situation in which the crises erupted as well as which expectations that faced the actors who took on a leadership role. The secondary material is pre-interpreted and therefore has set preferences that can affect the result of the study. The benefits of having a description of the context of the situation that already takes into account relevant factors are beneficial because it gives more room for focusing on the comparative aspects of demand, supply and leadership style.

The primary literature consists of speeches and statements during plenary sessions and press conferences. Due to the primary sources being speeches it is important to understand in what context they have been held as well as to what audience. This created some requirements for the speeches. They had to be held within a relevant time frame of the crises and also in a setting relevant for the speaker to perform leadership. The time frame was therefore set for the speech and statement to have happened within one and a half initial crises. To a start I aimed to have limited selection, of speeches in Europe to a mainly European audience, to be able to draw more secure conclusions (Essiasson et.al., 2017:226). The limitation had to be softened up a bit. This was a result of it being hard to get the full material of speeches mainly by Angela Merkel as well as the speeches and press conferences during 2015 successively shared less light on the Ukraine crises as one of many regarding the EU's security. The broader selection therefore required more reflection over the setting of the speeches making up the primary material of the study (Essiasson et.al., 2017:226). The usage of speeches is beneficial because it gives the opportunity to analyse how leadership is based on how it is expressed and not based on its effects of it. However, speeches are highly dependent on the setting of the speech but also that it conveys the view of the speaker and therefore leave other views untouched.

The material of Angela Merkel consists of two speeches, one made in the Bundestag on March 13th, 2014 and during the Munich Security Summit February 2015, a press conferences with Barack Obama from 2014 and 2015 and a press conference after the G-7 summit in Bavaria 2015. The two press conferences with Barack Obama are to some extent questionable regarding leadership towards the EU, however, the geopolitical relevance the US has in the sanctions against Russia can still be argued to be relevant due to the setting of the press conferences. In a similar manner the press conference from the G-7 summit can be argued to have similar questionability as the press conferences with Barack Obama but the same relevance when it comes to the actions against Russia. Collectively the material will show how Merkel interacted

with other stakeholders as well as contributing to a nuanced picture of her leadership. The material with Ursula von der Leyen consists of three speeches and statements, two during EP plenary sessions and one during a NATO summit as well as a conversation during the Munich Security Conference from 2023 together with finish Prime Minister Sanna Marin. These four sources contribute to a nuanced picture of how von der Leyen acts over time as well as how she interacts with other stakeholders.

4.2 Method

The selected methodology for this study was a qualitative content analysis using predetermined themes to analyse speeches by Angela Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen. The chosen methodology was deemed appropriate due to the capacity of qualitative content analysis to capture the central aspects of a text. In line with the framework outlined by Essiasson et al. (2017:211-213), relevant segments of the speeches were extracted to infer the central aspects of the texts. The choice of a qualitative content analysis also has some weaknesses regarding the interpretation of the occurrence of demand, supply and leadership styles and therefore requires a reoccurring discussion of what it actually can mean (Essiasson et.al., 2017:232). The chosen method also has some limitations. It does not fully comprehend what some statements and words mean in a specific context. Boréus & Bergström (2018:81-82) describe how a word or concept can have a certain meaning for the speaker but a different for others, something that is connected to a discourse-analysis. The leadership and implementation of sanctions could also be studied through process-tracing. Essiasson et.al. (2017:130) describes how the method focuses on the process and not the outcome, something this study does when looking at the speeches demonstrating leadership rather than the effects of the sanctions. However, the process of using process-tracing was deemed to grand for the time frame of the study and the resources available.

The analytical framework comprised questions related to four thematic categories, reflecting both an understanding of how leaders interacted with other stakeholders during crises and questions aimed to explore aspects of leadership emergence and style. These themes contributed a framework within which the main research questions could be addressed (Essiasson et al., 2017:216). The ensuing analysis, as characterized by Essiasson et al. (2017:213), can be compared to a systematic approach. Themes were concluded to structure key analytical components of the texts, identifying contextual factors as well as indicators in the speeches of demand, supply, and leadership styles. The contextual factors and the open approach of the question are meant to enable the texts to speak for themselves and not to control what is being studied to exclude some relevant aspects which can be a weakness of the chosen method (Boréus & Bergström, 2018:80).

The analytical framework incorporated questions or aspects associated with each theme derived from the theoretical expectations. The analytical framework adopted is similar to a mixed approach (Essiasson et al., 2017:224), incorporating both open-ended and determined answers to the questions as well as a frame in which contextual factors could be recognised. This duality was reflective of the relation between contextual factors and the demand and supply within the

leadership emergence context, wherein more determined answers were evident regarding leadership styles. This nuanced approach mirrored the nature of the research questions, with one pertaining to leadership styles leaning towards predetermined answers, while the other remained more open-ended.

The study was conducted with an actor-cantered approach and proceeded in four steps aligned with the predetermined themes. This methodological choice aimed to systematically analyse the texts, so that it would be easier to single out the most relevant parts of the speeches to enable the central aspect of them to be identified (Essiasson et al., 2017:213). As each theme was structured with analytical questions or aspects, the analysis of them was done somewhat differently. The contextual theme primarily drew from secondary literature, seeking to identify social and political aspects within the crises setting. The Demand and Supply themes were shaped by open-ended analytical questions grounded in theoretical expectations. The Leadership Style theme encompassed aspects of each style being analysed by more predetermined questions.

5. Results

This part of the text will look into each of the crises separately. It will tackle each thematic category of the analytical framework starting with contextual factors followed by demand, supply and finally leadership style. Shorter reflections of the thematic categories might occur when it is necessary for understanding the findings otherwise the main discussion will be presented in the conclusion.

5.1 Angela Merkel

Birkenstock (2014) describes how the Ukraine crisis in 2014 was a chain of events and escalations. It started already in 2013 when the Ukrainian president made decisions to move closer to Russia which resulted in nationwide protests. The response to the demonstrations escalated and reached its zenith in the end of February when the Ukraine president was removed from office by the Ukrainian parliament. Birkenstock (2014) further describes how troops of unknown nationality, at the beginning of March take control of key strategic points. A referendum was set by the military personal on the future of the peninsula, a referendum that was later moved to March 16th with a majority in favour of leaving Ukraine, tightly followed by Putin signing a pact taking the peninsula into Russian possession. Similar pro-Russian groups tried to do the same in eastern provinces in early April where armed conflicts broke out between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian groups continuing in the months that followed.

5.1.1 Contextual factors
Aggestam & Hyde-Price (2020:15) describe how Germany faced both internal and external pressure to take on a leadership role. Thus, the existence of political factors as well as societal factors. The crises that had faced Germany and the EU before 2014 had resulted in a situation where there was room for leadership as well as a need for effective response to crises. Within the EU there were also signs of decreasing solidarity between member states pushing into the social factors. Internally German political elites also put pressure on the national German government to take on a leadership role. This was a result of external pressure on Germany to take on a role of leadership, both by European collective actors but also by trans-Atlantic partners (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2020:16). The critique was mainly on the passive role Germany took within the CFSP even due to its seminal role as an economic and political actor in the world. When further looking at the leadership by Germany during the Ukraine crisis in 2014 Aggestam & Hyde-Price (2020:15) mention how the German leadership is the result of internal and external challenges that have resulted in Germany taking on a role of leadership. The internal challenges are a result of the eastern and central enlargement of the EU and how the solidarity between member states has decreased while the crises that had faced the union have resulted in an increased demand for an effective response. Aggestam & Hyde-Price (2020:19) conclude how the leadership role taken on by Germany reached over three policy areas regarding diplomatic negotiations, crisis management and EU sanction policy where the emerging leadership happened due to internal and external demand rather than Germany actively seeking the role.

The leadership was also described as successful and used informal leadership instead of using the formalised paths of the CFSP. In an article from The Guardian (2014), it was also mentioned how the relationship between Merkel and Putin was the most elaborate than with any other world leader for Putin's part. There were therefore also what can be described either as diplomatic relations or interpersonal relations that need to be taken into account.

5.1.2 Demand

When studying the demand for leadership the first indicator was regarding the cost of remaining without leadership and that becomes clear when analysing the texts. A common remark that Merkel makes is how the globalised world uses methods of solving conflicts peacefully, where certain values are a guarantee for freedom and peace. Institutions are created to uphold these values and structures. It becomes clear when she during her speech at the Munich Security Conference, states that Europe always will stand up for these values as well as how Europe wants to shape its security with Russia (Merkel, 2015a) including a will for peaceful solutions. The cost of the crisis is how these values are set to the test. The crisis in Ukraine is described as a test of the European security order, as well as the values of territorial integrity something she stated during the press conference in Washington together with Barack Obama (Merkel, 2014b). A prime example of the costs the status quo has for Europe can be found in her speech in the Bundestag where she says, "*It is in this context, fellow members of this House, first in Georgia back in 2008 and now in the heart of Europe, in Ukraine, that we are witnessing a conflict about spheres of influence and territorial claims, such as those we know from the 19th and 20th century but thought we had put behind us.*" (Merkel, 2014a). It becomes clear how the cost of not solving the crisis is the risk of great war in Europe, the whole world and thus a threat to the international order.

There were also signs regarding what positive affects her leadership would have. There is a clear advocacy for institutional solutions to the crisis. In the Bundestag Merkel (2014a) describes how states in the world will achieve less alone than if states work together, a clear call for collective action solutions. In a similar manner she mentions how OSCE fills an important role during the discussions with Russia and at the same time talks about how Europe always will stand up together with a goal to of restoring the peace order in Europe (Merkel, 2015a) as well as during the press conference with Obama where Merkel (2014b) states how the trans-Atlantic co-operation has shown to be strong and continuously important for Europa and the European security order. All solutions and main tools are connected to formal or informal institutions.

What is apparent when studying the speeches is how the demand for leadership is based both on an EU-level with the EU as its own organisation for example describing the EU as a structure for peace and security similar to the UN (Merkel, 2015b). However, there are also signs of focusing on bilateral and trilateral arrangements and diplomacy when mentioning Franco-German collaborations and her own discussions and relations with Russia (Merkel, 2015a; Merkel, 2014b). The crisis can thus be argued to reveal a lack of successful institutions. This created a situation where the demand for leadership appeared with a focus on institutional

solutions in line with how Merkel (2014a) mentioned the importance of talk, assist and then lastly using sanctions.

5.1.3 Supply
Two types of power resources became apparent when analysing the texts. The first one is material power. This becomes apparent when Merkel (2014a) talks about the large number of bilateral agreements between Germany and Russia but also has its connection to how Russia is choosing a path of isolation, to the Bundestag she says, *"We are all, and indeed to an ever greater degree, interconnected – Russia, too."* (Merkel, 2014a), it shows how countries depend on each other. The consequences however, Merkel meant that Germany and its allies are ready to take on together, something that is clear both during her speech in Munich and after the G-7 summit. However, the material power is solely economic and not militaristic. This is something that reoccurred in all of the texts. In Munich she states that no one is interested in a divided Europe with the risk of escalation which in combination with her speech in the Bundestag "*I say to everyone who is worried and concerned: military action is not an option for us."* (Merkel, 2014a) makes it clear that Germany will not support any military solutions. The second power resource is institutional power. During her press conference with Obama, she talked about the steps taken by the European Union, Germany and the US, which shows how Germany as an actor has a great influence on the strategies to solve the problems. When talking she also mentions how the EU wants specific things showing the influence Germany has over the agenda. In front of the Bundestag Merkel (2014a) also talks about how Germany with its 27 allies has a goal and will discuss and take collective action. Another example of institutional power is the talk regarding the Minsk agreement. Merkel (2015b) mentions how Germany together with France has held successful discussions with Russia and Ukraine resulting in an agreement. This is clearly in order with how Merkel has stressed the strategy of *talk, assistance and sanctions* (Merkel, 2014a), showing how the German agenda has influenced the strategy when approaching the crisis.

The second question regarding supply is the leadership surplus'. As mentioned during contextual factors the German leadership came about as something reluctant. However, there are still parts of the speeches that point to a surplus. The view presented by Germany regarding the instruments of the 21st century and their critical view on militaristic solutions could be argued to result in a surplus' where the cost of not taking the leadership role would result in armed conflict or military solutions. Germany's close contact with Russia and how that could be affected might also to some extent affect the willingness to lead. The leadership surplus' is a bit tricky to find in the texts. However, there are signs of it. So even though the surplus was somewhat harder to pin-point there are clear signs of power resources and therefore existence of supply of leadership.

5.1.4 Leadership style
What is evident when studying the leadership style of Merkel is how the four different styles often can be observed at the same time but when observing the speeches and comparing them the structural and directional leadership styles become apparent. The directional leadership is

exemplified during her speech in the Bundestag when she talks about how Germany's allies will act with Germany *"This is why the Federal Government takes a three-pronged approach – talks, assistance and sanctions – with Germany taking each new step in the current crisis in close coordination with our partners."* (Merkel, 2014a). It becomes clear that Germany calls for action in line with how they act themselves. When looking further at how Germany acts to solve the crisis Merkel presented a three-step strategy of actions for the Bundestag. The focus will be to talk with Putin, assist Ukraine and finally enforce sanctions on Russia. The three steps, talk, assistance and sanctions, are constantly reoccurring when looking into the leadership of Merkel and the actions presented to solve the problem.

The three steps could be argued to represent an entrepreneurial leadership style, however, some aspects point towards a more structural style. The structural style is characterised by a negotiation and the focus on asymmetric relations and how there are consequences of not acting in accordance with what is required. Merkel continuously talks about the instruments of the 21st century. In front of the Bundestag, she presents how it was the lack of communication that resulted in the 20th century's conflicts and its instruments of war that resulted in its huge tragedies. Continuing talking about how the instruments of the 21st century is based on the common international values of human rights, freedom, democracy and rule of law (Merkel, 2014a). This promise could be entrepreneurial as well, but it takes the form of more structural leadership due to the unchangeable attitude Merkel has toward changing the foundations of the thought of the instruments of the 21st century. It is made clear, mainly during Merkel's speech in Munich that it is Russia who has to change, she says *"Whoever wishes to ensure the security, stability and well-being of his people needs to accept the rules of the international community"* (Merkel, 2015a). This means that Russia needs to abide by the rules set by actors in the international community. Similarly, she mentioned during the G-7 summit that Germany and its partners as well as the EU are prepared to keep sanctions on Russia (Merkel, 2015b) and both in the Bundestag and during the press conference with Obama she stated that Germany and the EU are ready to take further steps implementing more sanctions on Russia (Merkel, 2014a; Merkel, 2014b). In front of the Bundestag she said, *"if they choose to follow the international order and choose to communicate the sanctions against them will be relived."* (Merkel, 2014a). This carrot-stick attitude towards Russia is what makes the style more structural, if Russia does not comply with the demands of Germany and its allies, they will face continuous consequences.

5.2 Ursula von der Leyen

5.2.1 Contextual factors

When looking into the contextual factors regarding the Commission as a leader there are mainly two factors prevalent in the literature. The first one is crisis management where Anghel & Jones (2023:768) mentions how the Russia-Ukraine war and its sanctions resulted in a combination of the CFSP with budgetary questions. This combination of policy areas was a result of the crisis and resulted in an opportunity for von der Leyen to take on a leadership role. Baracani

(2023:1452) describes how a crisis opens up for the President of the Commission to demonstrate political leadership and this was the second major crisis that von der Leyen faced. Thus, the crisis opened up for von der Leyen's leadership. It should also be noted that Merkel no longer was Chancellor of Germany and that attempts were made by other member states to demonstrate political leadership. The second factor is von der Leyen's geopolitical Europe. As a president von der Leyen had a goal of strengthening the role of the Commission as a foreign policy actor which therefore increased the effect of von der Leyen as president and her goals (Baracani, 2023:1452).

5.2.2 Demand

During a speech in the European Parliament (EP) von der Leyen states that *"this is our show of force"* (von der Leyen, 2022). This can be interpreted as an argument of how the crisis is testing the institutional strengths of the EU which further becomes clear when she in the same speech states "*This is a clash between the rule of law and the rule of the gun*" (von der Leyen, 2022) which further clarifies the threat that the war of aggression has to the EU. Almost a year later during a statement in Tallinn with the prime minister of Estonia and NATO secretary-general, she stated "*Instead of dividing the European Union, he finds us united and determined to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes. Instead of dominating the global energy market, he has seen his main source of revenue slashed.*" (von der Leyen, 2023c) where it is described, even though talking about Russian failure, that the threat towards Europe was division and submission. The strongest example of portraying the potential cost of not acting towards the crisis is in her speech in the EP where she explains how the Russian war of aggression is a watershed moment for Europe (von der Leyen, 2022). To not act and to not succeed will be a disaster for Europe and the European order.

When looking towards the positive effects of her leadership there are some reoccurring words indicating it. These are unity, solidarity and European principles. This becomes clear when she states that Europe is more united than ever but also that she is proud of their solidarity (von der Leyen, 2022) as an effect of Europe acting together with welcoming refugees as well as quickly acting together implementing sanctions. A year later she states, *"What a difference a year of unity and resolve can make"* (von der Leyen, 2023a) while also mentioning how a whole continent had mobilised further pushing the positive effects of her leadership. Later in her statement in Tallinn she also mentions how Europe is a body of principles and how these principles shape the geography of what Europe is (von der Leyen, 2023c). These three reoccurring words therefore create a picture of the positive effects of working together under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen. What is not evident when studying the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen is the lack of institutions or institutional failure. Of course, the war could be argued as a result of failure of the EU institutions as institutions of peace but there are no clear findings towards it.

5.2.3 Supply

When analysing the material two power resources become apparent for Ursula von der Leyen. Firstly, materialistic power becomes apparent. All texts mention sanctions against Russia but

also military support. Von der Leyen (2022) mentions how they have initiated three steps of economic sanctions to hit Russia with force across multiple sectors a heavy show of force. Then for the EP in 2023 she says, *"Since the war began, the European Union has provided Ukraine with EUR 67 billion in economic, humanitarian and military support:"* (von der Leyen, 2023a) further showing the economic and military support the EU has granted Ukraine and it can be viewed as evidence of materialistic power resources. The second power resource observed is ideational power. During her conversation at the Munich Security Conference, she stated how the Commission had been granted information by US security services already in late 2021 and together with them prepared potential sanctions (von der Leyen, 2023b). This shows how the Commission has some form of expertise working in their favour. Ideational power is also about credibility and legitimacy and during the conversation in Munich it becomes apparent that Ursula possesses legitimacy within the EU when Sanna Marin heavily praises her and her work but also when initiation the conversation mentioning how the Commission dealt with the Covid-19 pandemic giving them credibility to deal with crises (von der Leyen, 2023b).

When further looking into the leader's surplus' drawing from the contextual factor of geopolitical Europe it is clear that there is a willingness to lead from the Commission and von der Leyen. One example in the texts is when she mentions her interactions with Zelenskyy and other stakeholders. As mentioned earlier how she worked together with US intelligence (von der Leyen, 2023b) but also when she mentions her talks about the future of Ukraine with Zelenskyy (von der Leyen, 2023a). In front of the EP in 2022 von der Leyen also said" *We cannot take our security and the protection of people for granted. We have to stand up for it. We have to invest in it. We have to carry our fair share of the responsibility."* (von der Leyen, 2022). This can also be interpreted not only willingness to lead but also the acknowledgment of reasonability for the Commission and her as President of it, to take on a role of leadership.

5.2.4 Leadership style
What is described as a geopolitical Europe becomes clear when studying the leadership style of Ursula von der Leyen. It is also clear that she creates a narrative with a long-time frame connecting the economic sanctions as well as further European integration. Von der Leyen (2022) during her statement to the European parliament says *"This is our show of force"* commenting on Russia's war in Ukraine. The quote sets the tone for the leadership style expressed by von der Leyen during the war. It can be classified as intellectual leadership. The war is portrayed as a war against the European order and the EU's values whereas von der Leyen (2022) describes it as European values being under attack. A year later Ursula von der Leyen (2023a) makes a second speech in the European Parliament and combines the effects of the war and the actions of the EU to the enlargement and inclusion of Ukraine in the union. This provides further observations of how the narrative is framed as a war against Europe where Ukraine is a part of Europe. It becomes obvious when she states that Ukraine is part of Europe with its future in the EU (von der Leyen, 2023c). The longer time frame, a characteristic of intellectual leadership, is clear when the narrative presented by von der Leyen (2022) is further

developed. Von der Leyen (2023a) describes how Ukraine has a dream and how that dream is Europe while further pointing to the consequences for Russia as a result of their actions. At the same time, the war of European values is further developed with talks of sanctions on countries supporting Russia. A view on the conflict that is strongly polarizing can be observed and pushed further during von der Leyen's (2023c) statement during the NATO summit in Tallinn, where she states that there is no room for negotiations as long as the war continues, as long as Russia does not stop.

There are also signs of structural leadership, not as present as intellectual, where there is a clear line regarding the relation between the EU and Russia where the EU has the advantage which is clear when she mentions the three levels of sanctions towards Russia and also mentions how the sacrifice of EU-countries will be noticed as well (von der Leyen, 2022). However, it is added that these consequences should be seen as an investment instead *"This is our principle: Freedom is priceless."* (von der Leyen, 2022) shows again intellectual leadership but in relation to aspects of structural leadership.

6. Conclusions

The findings in the analysis have some aspects that support previous research in the field. When studying Ursula von der Leyen, and the supranational leadership of the Commission this study shows how the leadership of von der Leyen did support the interactionist approach presented by Kassim (2013) where the structural institutional framework of crisis management, but also economic competence can be understood to be transformed into leadership within the CFSP by understanding the environmental factors. The leadership by von der Leyen can therefore be understood to have emerged due to the structural threat Russia's war of aggression had on the European security order and further because the Commission had the power resources to do it as well as the willingness to lead exemplified in von der Leyen's *Geopolitical Europe*. At the same time, it is important to understand how the previous crises helped create a structure in which the Commission could take on the role of leadership. The findings therefore present a stringer supply of leadership and a more unclear demand for it.

The findings when studying Angela Merkel, showed how she demonstrated leadership both within and outside of the EU-framework. There are clear signs of the lack of institutions to deal with the crisis but also strong support for creating new ones for dialogue and in the end, co-operation implied by Merkel's three steps of action but also a description of the reality with Russia as a part of globalised world. Contextual factors such as the strong ties between Germany and Russia regarding trade and other bilateral agreements as well as other contextual factors also help to understand why Germany took on a leadership role. The losses for Germany if the conflict would have escalated, would been big in numbers as well as the unwillingness for military solutions. It is therefore understandable for the active work towards communication and the creation of institutions to support it. The findings therefore presented a stronger demand for leadership in comparison to supply.

This study aimed to answer two research questions. When studying the demonstrated leadership Merkel was found to demonstrate directional and structural leadership and von der Leyen was found to demonstrate mainly intellectual leadership but to some extent structural leadership. The reason for the different styles cannot fully be answered by the findings of the analysis however, there are some aspects that can be taken into account. Firstly, the directional leadership can be argued to be a result of Merkel being a representative of a member state. Thus, she can take action to an extent that von der Leyen cannot be due to being a representative of a different actor opening for explanations regarding institutional limitations. Secondly, the strong intellectual leadership by von der Leyen can also be argued to be a result of the Competence and expectations put on the Commission as a crisis manager but also as a voice for the Union. This was not something that could be expected on the same level by Merkel. Therefore, the collective actor, represented can possibly affect what type of leadership that are demonstrated thus opening up the aspect of institutional expectations. What dictates what styles of leadership that are possible for a leader to demonstrate is a question that further needs to be studied. What can be concluded is that when implementing leadership, not a set type of leadership styles is required supporting previous findings on leadership styles.

The second question was what could explain why a leader takes on the role of leadership in a crisis situation. It was clear that the presence of demand and supply was found when analysing leadership and it can therefore be viewed as necessary for the emergence of leadership. What should be brought up from the findings is how there was a difference regarding how strong the demand and supply could be analysed in the different situations. The crisis of 2014 showed stronger demand while the war of 2022 showed stronger supply. This finding shall not be interpreted as something definite, thus it opens up further potential areas of research. However, it is still relevant to discuss the implications of this finding. This can be used to further discuss the explanations of why the two crises had different actors occur as leaders. The demand for new successful institutions in 2014 can be argued to have resulted in member states looking outside of the EU framework at first to deal with the crises and then looking inwards to create institutions, either formal or informal, to institutionalise the response for future crises. That would explain why von der Leyen with such ease took on the leadership role when implementing sanctions in 2022. At first, there were power resources and a leadership surplus' but as mentioned by Cardwell & Moret (2023:2) the sanctions implemented in 2022 were an add-on to the ones set in place in 2014. There were already institutions regarding implementation and thus the need for Germany to act was not as relevant, resulting in less demand. What could be an explanation of the different actors emerging as leaders could be the existence of institutions or not. When there are no institutions connected to competencies of the Commission they will not occur as a leader and instead a member state, like Germany in 2014 will. This resulted in the creation of institutions in which the Commission could emerge as a leader in 2022. The findings also open up the possibility that the theoretical framework was insufficient and opening up the need for testing other theoretical approaches or designs. To be able to further answer the question this study identifies some aspects that are relevant for future studies. Firstly, by studying the relation between demand a supply further to understand how that relationship is connected to the possibility to take on a leadership role. Secondly, it is of interest to further study how the sanctions implemented in 2014 affected the possibility for von der Leyen to take on leadership. Thirdly it would be relevant to study how contextual factors such as the crises and their effect on who can take on leadership. This is connected to the unwillingness for military means presented by Merkel would affect the willingness to demonstrate leadership in an armed conflict.

The framework was built on how demand for and supply of leadership was required for leadership to emerge. However, the findings of the study showed how the demand and supply were not always strongly present. Thus, revealing a need for further studying leadership comparatively as this study has done. To continue the need for further studies, other relevant aspects could focus on the effect of individual traits such as both Merkel and von der Leyen being women from Germany with the same political affiliation. It could also be of relevance to study potential leadership actors that did not turn out as leaders such as the High Representative or other influential member states like France.

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