




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DEMOCRACY FOR ALL?

A Quantitative Study on How Power-sharing Affects Approval of Non-Democratic Governance in African Post-Conflict Societies

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Abstract

Since the Cold War, intrastate conflicts have become more common, and more conflict settlements call for power-sharing. Despite power-sharing being so common as a means of ending civil conflict, academic research indicates that power-sharing could be harmful to democratization. Previous academic research has focused on the macro perspective of the impacts of power-sharing on post-war democratization while the micro perspective has been overseen by scholars. This thesis addresses this gap by scrutinizing the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance in six African post-conflict societies by conducting a Multiple Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis using Afrobarometer survey data. By using a grievance-based theoretical framework, I hypothesized that: (1) inclusion in power-sharing generates a higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to being excluded from power-sharing; (2) grievances have a moderating effect on the relationship between inclusion in power-sharing and approval of non-democratic governance. The analysis entailed that: (1) individuals who have ethnic linkages to armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements approve of non-democratic governance to a greater extent compared to individuals without such linkages; (2) individuals who are included in power-sharing and not having grievances generate to some extent higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to individuals who are included in power-sharing and having grievances.

Keywords: Intrastate conflict, post-conflict power-sharing, Afrobarometer, non-democratic governance, grievances

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Introduction

Today, intrastate conflict is the most common type of armed conflict (PRIO, 2009), and since the end of the Cold War, more settlements in conflicts are calling for power-sharing. During the 1980s, 46% of the conflict settlements involved power-sharing. During the 1990s, it increased to 74% and between 2000 and 2006, it increased to 79% (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2015, p. 41). However, whether power-sharing improves democracy is sometimes questionable. In such arrangements, most of the top positions are obtained by the groups at the negotiations (mostly the warring parties) (Mehler, 2009, p. 471), which was the case in the Ivory Coast, Chad, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo where civilian political parties have suffered because peace was negotiated with a third-party actor and the peace was negotiated from above (Ibid., p. 472).

Despite that power-sharing has become a popular means of ending civil conflict, academic research provides alarming evidence that power-sharing might be harmful to post-conflict democratization in the long term. Firstly, power-sharing can lower the trust of the public in governmental institutions and jeopardize democratic legitimacy when negotiated by outsiders. Also, power-sharing incentivises violence because the groups obtain power-sharing positions depending on their capacity to use violence (Curtis, 2012, p. 91). Power-sharing marginalises non-dominant groups to create stability and pacify dominant groups (Agarin & McCulloch, 2020, p. 3). Secondly, power-sharing can create rent-seeking behaviour and clientelism which can institutionalize self-enrichment. Political elites often use state income to enrich themselves and finance their networks for political support, which can inhibit post-conflict economic and political development (Haass & Ottmann, 2015, p. 1). Power-sharing incentivises groups to gather support from their constituent groups because of wartime divisions built into post-war political structures. This can lower the confidence of the public in governmental institutions (Jung, 2012, p. 486).

Being left out of the power-sharing arrangements can have negative consequences. Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) argue that ethnonationalist policies induced by the state to discriminate and exclude specific ethnic groups cause grievances within the targeted groups (p. 89). In turn, grievances can cause resentment against the government because “ethnic groups excluded from state power are deprived of political representation and likely to be disadvantaged in access to government services” (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 90). Thus, some ethnic groups might be excluded from the power-sharing arrangements which can cause horizontal inequalities and grievances. Political horizontal inequalities increase the risk of internal conflict (Cederman et al., 2011, p. 488), and a vicious circle is created.

The effects of power-sharing on democracy at the macro level have been studied by political scientists in the field of conflict and peace research, and power-sharing is more or less viewed as a top-down process. There are several studies on the effects of power-sharing on post-conflict democratization on the aggregated level (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Lemarchand, 2007; Mehler, 2009; Agarin & McCulloch, 2020; Bieber, 2013; Graham et al., 2017; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2020; Jung, 2012; Haass & Ottmann, 2017), and the relationship between power-sharing and post-conflict peace (Jarstand & Nilsson, 2008; Mattes & Savun, 2009; Mukherjee, 2006a; Mukherjee, 2006b; Tull & Mehler, 2005; Cammett & Malesky, 2012; Cederman et al., 2015; DeRouen et al., 2009; Gates et al., 2016; Haass & Ottmann, 2015; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Ottmann, 2020; Pospieszna & Schneider, 2013; Spears, 2002; Sriram & Zahar, 2009; LeBas, 2014), and conflict onset and recurrence (Bormann et al., 2019; Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015; Strøm et al., 2015).

However, the number of studies scrutinizing the disaggregated perspective is limited. There are studies scrutinizing the effects of power-sharing on individuals' well-being (Ottmann & Haass, 2017), on the distribution of public goods and ethnic favouritism (Haass & Ottmann, 2021), and on citizens' and women's political engagement (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). There is a vast number of studies covering the effect of power-sharing on post-conflict democracy on the macro level. However, the micro perspective on the effects of power-sharing and democracy has been neglected in previous scientific studies, until now. This study contributes to the scientific literature by: (1) providing a unique insight concerning the effects of power-sharing on post-conflict democracy on the individual level; (2) creating an original dataset with information on power-sharing arrangements between governments and armed groups with ethnic linkages in six African post-conflict societies. This study addresses the gap in the scientific literature with the following question: *how do inclusion and exclusion in power-sharing arrangements affect the approval of non-democratic governance?*

To explain how power-sharing affects the approval of non-democratic governance, I build the theoretical framework around a grievance-based model derived from the *theory of relative deprivation* by Ted Robert Gurr (1971). I hypothesize that: (1) individuals who belong to ethnic groups involved in power-sharing arrangements are more likely to be in favour of non-democratic types of governance compared to individuals who lack involvement in power-sharing arrangements; (2) being included in power-sharing arrangements and not having grievances generates higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to being included in power-sharing arrangements and having grievances.

By linking ethnic groups to armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements, it was possible to conduct an *Ordinary Least Squares* (OLS) regression analysis with Afrobarometer survey data from six African post-conflict countries. I was able to measure the impact of being involved in power-sharing arrangements (explanans) on the approval of non-democratic types of governance (explanandum). The results showed that there is a positive and significant correlation between power-sharing and approval of non-democratic governance which confirms the first hypothesis. This means that individuals who are involved in power-sharing approve of non-democratic governance to a greater extent compared to individuals who are not involved in power-sharing. The hypothesis that individuals included in power-sharing and not having grievances generates a higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to individuals included in power-sharing and having grievances (H2) is only true for the approval of one-party rule. For the approval of military rule and one-man rule, it is the opposite, but the difference between the two groups of individuals is not significant for the approval of one-man rule. Therefore, the second hypothesis is only partly confirmed.

In the first section of this study, the previous research on the effects of power-sharing on post-conflict democracy and peace, conflict recurrence, and different disaggregated perspectives is presented and discussed. The second section presents the theoretical framework and discusses why inclusion in power-sharing is likely to make individuals approve of non-democratic governance. Next, the data, research design, and method are discussed, followed by a presentation of the results, discussion, and conclusions.

1. Concepts

1.1. Power-sharing

According to Strøm et al. (2015) sharing political power has three purposes: “to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the political process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority” (p. 165). Graham et al. (2017), Strøm et al. (2015), and Bormann et al. (2019) dissect the term further and categorize political power-sharing into three different sub-categories, *inclusive*, *dispersive*, and *constraining* power-sharing. *Inclusive* power-sharing is “arrangements that mandate the participation of several parties or groups in particular offices or decision-making processes” (Graham et al., 2017, p. 688). In other words, this kind of arrangement includes large cabinet coalitions that represent significant groups and armed forces, and civil services (Ibid., p. 689). *Dispersive* power-sharing can be “arrangements that divide authority among actors in a well-defined pattern (for example, territorial decentralization)” (Ibid., p. 688). In

other words, this kind of arrangement level the power balance-balance between groups and often include federalism and other measures to increase the influence of subnational governments (Ibid., p. 689). *Constraining* power-sharing can be “arrangements that limit the power of any actor and thus protect ordinary citizens and vulnerable groups against encroachment and abuse” (Ibid.).

The issue areas of power-sharing are described by Hartzell and Hoddie (2015), and they focus on political, economic, territorial, and military power-sharing. *Political power-sharing* “emphasizes proportionality in the distribution of central state authority” (p. 41). This means that representation within governing institutions can be guaranteed based on group affiliation. This can be achieved by proportional representation in the government’s administration and executive branch, and proportional representation in elections (Ibid.). One example of political power-sharing was in Burundi where the two main ethnic groups, the Hutus, and the Tutsis shared power by having two vice presidents. One from each group to assist the president. The arrangement also included the cabinet where 40% were Tutsi, and 60% were Hutu (Ibid.).

Military power-sharing “seeks to distribute authority within the coercive apparatus of the state” (Ibid., p. 42). One way to achieve this type of power-sharing is that the armed forces of the opposing side of the government are integrated into the security apparatus of the state by for example proportions of the relative size of the armed factions. Other ways can be to balance the number of troops or that the armed groups are allowed to still be armed and keep their security forces. Members of less powerful groups can be granted leadership positions in the security forces of the country. In Burundi, the security forces included equal numbers of Tutsis and Hutus (Ibid.).

Territorial power-sharing “seeks to divide political influence among different levels of government by creating forms of decentralized government that are territorially based” (Ibid.). Examples of this are regional autonomy or federalism which helps groups that are regionally fixed to achieve a degree of independence from the central government (Ibid.). One example of territorial power-sharing as a means of terminating a conflict was in the Addis Ababa Accords in 1972. The agreement was that Southern Sudan gained some autonomy from the national government (Ibid.).

Economic power-sharing addresses “the access to and control of economic resources under the purview of the state” (Ibid.). This mechanism is designed to address concerns that when losing elections, minority groups might lose access to state resources ensuring the groups’ survival (Ibid.). In the Lomé Peace Agreement in Sierra Leone in 1999, economic power-

sharing was applied to appoint the rebel leader Foday Sankoh as head of a committee overseeing the diamond and gold resources in the country (Ibid., p. 43).

1.2. Approval of Non-Democratic Governance

According to Keulder and Wise (2005), an individual who is a devoted democrat will reject all kinds of non-democratic governance (p. 4). In this study, the approval of non-democratic governance takes three different shapes. The approval of one-party rule, military rule, and one-man rule. These three types of non-democratic governance have been used in research by Mattes and Bratton (2016) to explore the depth of democratic commitment.

1.3. Ethnicity

The ACD2PR dataset from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR) Family was used in this study. Therefore, the definition of ethnicity used in this study will be the same as used by the founders of the EPR Dataset Family. The authors used Max Weber's definition of ethnicity which is "a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture" (Vogt et al., 2015, p. 3). According to Vogt et al. (2015), there are different indicators to indicate shared culture and ancestry. Such as the same faith and a common language (p. 3). The definition of ethnicity in this study includes ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, and racial groups. However, it does not include "tribes and clans that conceive of ancestry in genealogical terms, nor regions that do not define commonality based on shared ancestry" (Ibid.).

2. Previous Research

The purpose of this section is to highlight how previous research on power-sharing has focused mainly on the macro-perspective where there are numerous studies on the effect of power-sharing on post-conflict democracy, peace, and conflict-recurrence. These studies are often descriptive small-N studies, and the results are often contradictory. Few studies are exploring the effects of power-sharing on the individual level and those studies do not consider support for democracy. I will in this chapter provide a comprehensive overview of the effects of power-sharing on different outcomes. The chapter for previous research is divided into three sub-chapters. The first is a comprehensive picture of how power-sharing affects post-conflict democracy on the macro level. In the second sub-chapter, the relationship between power-sharing and conflict recurrence and onset is discussed. In the third sub-chapter, I will present and discuss the limited research on the effect of power-sharing on outcomes at the individual level, such as well-being and distribution of public goods.

2.1. How Power-sharing Affects Post-Conflict Democracy

There is a lively debate about whether power-sharing increases the chances of democratization after conflict. At the moment there are two “camps” in this field of research. The “pessimists” (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Lemarchand, 2007; Mehler, 2009; Haass & Ottmann, 2017; Agarin & McCulloch; Bieber, 2013; Jung, 2012), and the “optimists” (Graham et al., 2017; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2020).

The “pessimists” suggest that power-sharing, in terms of a long-term basis does not guarantee the basis for democracy (Jung & Shapiro, 1995, p. 301), and that power-sharing is more of a short-term solution (Jung, 2012, p. 486). Scholars like Lemarchand (2007) have reached more pessimistic conclusions and provide evidence that power-sharing failed in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Power-sharing is seen as a short-term solution because the arrangements will create a political climate which is not compatible with a healthy democracy in the long run. Firstly, power-sharing counteracts a vivacious opposition and therefore deprives citizens of the ability to change the government (Jung & Shapiro, 1995, p. 297). Secondly, power-sharing hinders democracy and the inclusion of civil society because power-sharing arrangements often only include the warring parties and the others are left out (Mehler, 2009, p. 472). Also, non-dominant groups are marginalised to pacify dominant groups to stabilize the country (Agarin and McCulloch, 2020, p. 3). Thirdly, power-sharing creates incentives for the former warring parties to gather political support from their constituent groups because of wartime divisions built into post-war political structures (Jung, 2012, p. 486). Fourthly, political power-sharing arrangements create rent-seeking incentives, which means that power-sharing elites are in office for a limited time, and therefore likely to collect as much rent as possible before the end of their term (Haass & Ottmann, 2017, p. 60; Haass & Ottmann, 2015). This results in “power-sharing cabinets substantively increase corruption in post-conflict countries and that his effect is stronger in the presence of natural resource rents” (Ibid.).

In this field of research on how power-sharing affects post-conflict democracy, a vast number of studies are descriptive in character (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Lemarchand, 2007; Mehler, 2009; Agarin & McCulloch, 2020; Bieber, 2013; Jung, 2012), and looking at power-sharing arrangements in one or a handful of countries. Some of the descriptive studies are only looking at Balkan countries (Bieber, 2013; Jung, 2012). Doing in-depth case studies can be helpful to figure out why power-sharing inhibits or promotes post-conflict democracy. However, these kinds of studies might have strong internal validity since they can take regional context into account, whereas large N-studies have a limited ability to do so. Large N-studies have been conducted by Hartzell and Hoddie (2015; 2020) and Graham et al. (2017) by using

binary independent variables and have reached more optimistic conclusions than the descriptive studies. Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) claim that a transition to democracy is possible when agreeing to adopt a variety of power-sharing arrangements (p. 64). This can have an accumulative effect if states implement two or more types of power-sharing (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2020, p. 9). Power-sharing institutions can make leaders and their supporters consider elections by minimizing the sense of insecurity among political actors (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015, p. 38).

Hartzell and Hoddie (2015; 2020) have focused on four types of power-sharing, territorial, economic, military, and political, whereas Graham et al. (2017) focused on constraining, including, and dispersive power-sharing dimensions, and included testing the effects of the different power-sharing dimensions in a post-conflict, and non-conflict political context. According to Graham et al. (2017), democratic survival is depending on the type of power-sharing and the political context. *Inclusive* power-sharing promotes inclusive power-sharing in only post-conflict contexts. *Dispersive* power-sharing destabilizes post-conflict democracy, whereas *constraining* power-sharing increases democratic survival regardless of political context (p. 702). The reason according to Graham et al. (2017), is that “constraints prevent electoral victors from abusing their authority, persuade electoral losers to accept temporary defeat, and encourage third parties to support the democratic order” (p. 702).

2.2. How Power-sharing Affects Post-conflict Peace and Conflict Recurrence

At first glance, this subchapter might seem redundant, but understanding how power-sharing affects post-conflict peace and conflict recurrence is important because it is an earlier stage of democratization. Power-sharing can have unwanted effects on post-conflict peace that can make democratization difficult in the long term. To dissect this field of research, it is easier to divide between two areas. The first one includes the three different types of power-sharing, inclusive, constraining, and dispersive power-sharing. The second area includes the different issue areas in power-sharing such as political, military, economic, and territorial power-sharing. Spears (2002) argues that power-sharing does not resolve conflict, but “instead may only temporarily displace it or disguise disputants’ more malevolent intentions” (p. 123). The reason is that it is complicated for the interlocutors to differentiate authentic peacemakers from warlords who for their benefit will exploit the political settlements (Ibid.). LeBas (2014) has a similar conclusion and argues that power-sharing arrangements can create instability and conflict in the short term (p. 65). Haass & Ottmann (2015) challenges this conclusion and claims that power-sharing is effective in ending violence in the short term. However, power-sharing

can incentivise patronage and corruption because the power-sharing elites are aware that they are in office for a limited period. This threatens long-term peacebuilding (p. 6). On the other hand, having access to state resources can have positive effects. Personalized power-sharing (portfolios for the warring parties) has a pacific effect because it gives power-sharing elites access to state resources that help adopt strategies for counterinsurgency (Ottmann, 2020, p. 1).

When it comes to three different types of power-sharing (inclusive, dispersive, and constraining), inclusive power-sharing is most likely to be adopted in post-conflict settings, whereas the other types of power-sharing (constraining and dispersive) are adopted in a more diverse group of societies without any recent history of conflict (Strøm et al., 2015, p. 180). Apart from the adaptation of the different types of power-sharing, there are different opinions among scholars whether which one or how many of them that has a pacific effect. Gates et al. (2016) argues that only constraining power-sharing has pacific effect (p. 512). Pospieszna and Schneider (2013) on the other hand, mean that power-sharing arrangements such as grand coalitions (inclusive power-sharing) marginally reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, whereas power-sharing institutions such as federalism (dispersive power-sharing) and proportional representation (PR) cannot prevent conflict recurrence (p. 44). The claims regarding federalism by Pospieszna and Schneider (2013) are challenged by Bormann et al. (2019) who claim that there is some evidence that dispersion might decrease the likelihood of territorial and ethnic conflicts (p. 98). Pospieszna and Schneider (2013) are also contradicted by Mukherjee (2006a) who argues that PR elections and parliamentarism prolongs peace in post-conflict settings (p. 405), and by Cammett and Malesky (2012) who conclude that PR with a closed list is also associated with prolonged peace (p. 982). Cederman et al. (2015) concluded that *decentralization* could prevent conflict on the condition that there have not been previous historical conflicts (p. 354).

When looking at the issue areas of power-sharing (military, territorial, economic, and political). There are different opinions among scholars regarding the effect of these types of power-sharing on post-conflict peace and conflict recurrence. Military and territorial power-sharing decrease the risk of a failed peace because these two types of power-sharing prevent conflict recurrence due to costly concessions (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). DeRouen et al. (2009) on the other hand argue that “less costly concessions by government of military integration and autonomy increase the duration of peace agreements” (p. 367). This is because costlier and harder power-sharing provisions to implement decrease the duration of a peace agreement because the government can be motivated to renegotiate the terms and there can be commitment issues. In other words, it is hard for the warring parties to know if the other party is fully

committed to the peace agreement (Ibid.). Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) come to the same conclusion regarding military power-sharing and argue that implementation of this type of power-sharing improves the possibilities of maintaining peace (p. 303). However, Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) put more emphasis on the signal of commitment the implementation of the power-sharing agreement has. The commitment gives the signal that the parties are willing to “endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups” (p. 303). Another commitment issue is that power-sharing arrangements can put groups and individuals who are not committed to governing the country for the benefit of the whole population. This can create less democratic states (Sriram & Zahar, 2009, p. 11). Ottmann and Vüllers (2015) shed light on a different perspective and argue that mere promises of power-sharing might be enough to preserve the peace. When it comes to implementing the promises, economic and political posts make a bigger difference compared to territorial and military concessions (p. 346).

Compared to territorial and military power-sharing, political power-sharing entails low costs and therefore has no effect on post-conflict peace (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008, p. 211). Mattes and Savun (2009) come to a different conclusion and argue that political power-sharing prolongs peace duration (p. 737). This conclusion is challenged by Tull and Mehler (2005) who argue that political power-sharing entails conflict recurrence because it creates incentives for power-hungry groups to use violence (p. 375). Mukherjee (2006b) adds another dimension regarding the relationship between political power-sharing and post-conflict peace. He argues that political power-sharing combined with military victory prolongs post-conflict peace, whereas political power-sharing combined with stalemate instead shortens post-conflict peace (p. 479). Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) has a different approach and points out that power-sharing arrangements in peace agreements have a cumulative effect. In other words, the more dimensions of power-sharing included in the peace agreement, the higher the likelihood of an enduring peace (p. 318).

2.3. The Effects of Power-Sharing at the Disaggregated Level

The effects of power-sharing on the disaggregated level are limited compared to the field of aggregated research on the effects of power-sharing. The research with a focus on the disaggregated perspective scrutinized the effects of power-sharing on the distribution of public goods and ethnic favouritism (Haass & Ottmann, 2021), on individuals’ well-being and sense of being unfairly treated (Ottmann & Haass, 2017), on citizens’ and women’s political

engagement (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). However, these studies do not cover the effects of power-sharing on support for democracy on the individual level.


The sense of “well-being” is higher among individuals belonging to an ethnic group with linkages to an armed group involved in power-sharing arrangements compared to individuals without those linkages (Ottmann & Haass, 2017, p. 21). Perceived living conditions are also higher among individuals with power-sharing linkages, and individuals who are not included in power-sharing arrangements are tending to feel unfairly treated by the government to a larger extent compared to individuals with power-sharing linkages (Ibid.). The causal mechanism is related to ethnic favouritism in post-war settings. “Co-ethnic representation through power-sharing at the elite level increases opportunities for individuals to profit from distributive politics, improves their psychological utility of having co-ethnics in office, and reduces fear of ethnic discrimination” (Ibid., p. 22). Power-sharing elites who have access to state resources and are known to allocate them to their ethnic kin as a reward since regions with ethnic groups involved in power-sharing arrangements have higher night-time lights emissions compared to regions inhabited by groups who are not represented in power-sharing arrangements (Haass & Ottmann, 2021, p. 999).

Apart from Ottmann and Haass (2017) (who used Afrobarometer data), there are relatively few studies that are using survey data to research the effects of power-sharing. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010) conducted a study using survey data from the *World Value Survey* (WVS) measuring the effect of power-sharing on political engagement among respondents. The results showed that only proportionality of electoral rules affect political engagement, whereas federalism and parliamentarism did not have a noticeable effect on citizens’ and women’s political engagement (p. 1000).

3. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I will explain how power-sharing is expected to affect the approval of non-democratic governance, and how grievances can act as a moderator. The theory is based on a few assumptions. The first one is that power-sharing arrangements are a top-down process where the warring parties and the elites are engaged in negotiations. The second assumption is that there are “winners” and “losers” in power-sharing arrangements. The “winners” are the actors at the negotiation table, in other words, the warring parties (the treatment group). The “losers” are the individuals who belong to the ethnic groups that are not involved in the power-sharing arrangements (the control group).

Figure 1. The Expected Correlation Between Power-sharing and the Approval of Non-democratic Governance



Being excluded with or without intentions from power-sharing arrangements can cause, from a stakeholder’s perspective, a chain of unwanted effects (see Figure 1). Much of the theoretical expectations are derived from the *theory of relative deprivation* by Ted Robert Gurr (1971). *Relative deprivation* (RD) is defined as:

“Actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping” (Gurr, 1971, p. 24).

Values are “the desired events, objects, and conditions for which men strive” (Ibid., p. 25). Gurr (1971) categorizes three different values in his study. Welfare values, power values, and interpersonal values (Ibid.). The two values that are the most relevant in this context are welfare and power values. *Welfare values* are contributing to self-realization and well-being and include physical goods, for example, health services, physical comforts, food, and shelter (Ibid.). *Power values* are “those that determine the extent to which men can influence the actions of others and avoid unwanted interference by others in their own actions” (Ibid., p. 26). *Power values* include the desire to “participate in collective decision-making-to vote, to take part in political competition, to become a member of the political elite” (Ibid.). Power can be used as a tool for marginalized groups to remove the sources of discontent by increasing the political and societal value opportunities. This can be increasing the reallocation and output of economic goods (Ibid., p. 143).

Exclusion on the group level from the *values* described by Gurr (1971) can lead to what Stewart (2008) describes as *horizontal inequalities*. Horizontal inequalities are defined as “inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups” (Stewart, 2008, p. 3). The horizontal inequalities can also be categorized into social, economic, cultural, and political dimensions. For example, political horizontal

inequalities mean limited or blocked access to “central decision-making authority within the state”, and the aspect concerns the income distribution between groups (Cederman et al., 2013, p. 32).

Horizontal inequalities can cause grievances when individuals are not among the warring parties and therefore not involved in the power-sharing negotiations, and when the members of an ethnic group can compare their own group’s wealth and status compared to the groups involved in the power-sharing arrangements (Cederman et al., 2013, p. 39). The grievances can also occur after the arrangements where the groups involved in the arrangements exploit their newly obtained power to actively exclude other ethnic groups to state power as a political strategy to increase the political power of the included group (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 85). Ethnic groups represented in post-conflict power-sharing arrangements enjoy more state revenues and resources compared to ethnic groups that are not represented in power-sharing arrangements (Haass and Ottmann, 2021, p. 999). Research also shows that individuals whose ethnic group is included in power-sharing arrangements are more satisfied with their living conditions (Ottmann and Haass, 2017, p. 21). Even if one of the purposes of power-sharing is to address political and economic power imbalances that are one of the root causes of civil war (Bormann et al., 2019, p. 87), such imbalances can paradoxically occur because certain groups were not among the warring parties.


I hypothesize that individuals who have connected to power-sharing arrangements are more likely to approve non-democratic types of governance since these individuals can gain from these arrangements. Civil conflicts can be attractive for rebel leaders because it is an opportunity to seize commodities (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 588). Such rebel leaders might not have the ambition to democratize the country, and instead adopt a rent-seeking behaviour since the elites know their time in office is limited (Haass & Ottmann, 2015, p. 6). Power-sharing can incentivise rebel groups to gather political support from their constituent groups because wartime division can occur in post-war political structures. These cleavages can lower the confidence of the public in governmental institutions (Jung, 2012, p. 486).

Post-conflict power-sharing elites are also known to allocate public goods to their ethnic kin as a reward (Haass & Ottmann, 2021, p. 999). Individuals can also gain from being represented in office. Ottmann & Haass (2017) argues that “co-ethnic representation through power-sharing at the elite level increases opportunities for individuals to profit from distributive politics, improves their psychological utility of having co-ethnics in office, and reduces fear of ethnic discrimination” (p. 22).

Hypothesis 1: *Individuals who belong to ethnic groups involved in power-sharing arrangements are more likely to be in favour of non-democratic types of governance compared to individuals who lack involvement in power-sharing arrangements.*

I also hypothesize that the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance is conditioned by grievances. Given previous research, grievances are likely to work as a moderator¹ that increases or decreases the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance. Individuals without power-sharing linkages perceive their ethnic group to be treated unfairly by the government to a larger extent than individuals with power-sharing linkages (Ottmann & Haass, 2017, p. 16). Being treated unfairly by the government can be perceived grievance of being left out of political participation. Marginalised and oppressed groups can be particularly in favour of democracy because they might think that their interests would be protected in a democracy (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 656).

Figure 2. The Theoretical Model of the Interaction Term



Hypothesis 2: *Being included in power-sharing arrangements and not having grievances generates higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to individuals who are included in power-sharing and who have grievances.*

¹ A *Moderator* is “a characteristic that influences the direction or magnitude of the relationship between an independent and dependent variable. If the relationship between variable x and y varies is different for males and females, sex is a moderator of the relationship” (Kazdin, 2007, p. 3).

4. Research Design

4.1. Data and Material

In this chapter, all the different datasets are presented and discussed for the case selection, and the Afrobarometer from where the study sample is collected.

4.1.1. Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED)

The PSED has previously been used in research on power-sharing (Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015; Haass & Ottmann, 2021; Ottmann, 2020; Ottmann & Haass, 2017). The dataset contains “information on the promises and practices of power-sharing between governments and rebels for a five-year period after the conclusion of the peace agreement²” (Ottmann & Vüllers, 2014, p. 2). The time span of the data is between 1989 and 2006 and includes 41 countries in Europe, Africa, the Americas, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The dataset is helpful because it provides information about when the peace agreement was signed after the armed conflict³ and detailed information about the power-sharing arrangements the peace agreement entailed. For example, what kind of power-sharing arrangements, and the name of the representative that received a cabinet post if there were political power-sharing. Since the PSED is focusing on the dyadic relationship between a government and rebels, this study will focus on intrastate wars. The dataset has some limitations. It does not include data on power-sharing because of situations not captured by the definition of civil conflict⁴ by the UCDP, for example, electoral violence. There is a reason why there is a five-year period from the signing of a peace agreement. “It often takes an extended period of time to implement some of the types of measures opposing sides agree to as part of a settlement” (Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003, p. 310). Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) argue further that “analyzing implementation efforts for a period shorter than five years would involve the risk of missing genuine efforts on the part of former adversaries to follow through on settlement commitments” (Ibid.). Adding cases where the Afrobarometer survey was conducted before the end of the five-year period might hurt the internal validity and external validity since the survey can be conducted before all power-sharing arrangements have been put into practice. Therefore, it can be difficult to capture “true”

² A *peace agreement* is defined as “any agreement that has been signed by the government of a state and one or more rebel group(s) and that settles all or part of the incompatibility underlying the conflict” (Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015, p. 2).

³ The UCDP defines *armed conflict* as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 618).

⁴ A *civil conflict* is defined as an armed conflict that occurs “between the government of a state and internal opposition groups” (Gleditsch et al., 2002, Ibid., p. 619).

opinions from the respondents in the survey regarding their approval of non-democratic governance. This would result in dropping Uganda as a case and losing valuable observations. However, an exception was made for Uganda since the first power-sharing arrangement was put into force in January 2003, which was two years before the Afrobarometer survey was conducted (Ottmann & Vüllers, 2015).

4.1.2. ACD2EPR Dataset

The ACD2EPR Dataset is a part of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset Family. This family of datasets provides information on “ethnic groups’ access to state power, their settlement patterns, links to rebel organizations, transborder ethnic kin relations, and intraethnic cleavages” (ETH Zürich, u.d.). The ACD2EPR links politically relevant ethnic groups with conflicts in the *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset*. The ACD2EPR Dataset provide country-based dyadic data between the government of the specific country and an armed/rebel group. The dataset also provides information about the linkages between the armed groups and different ethnic groups in a specific country. The linkage is based on three different categories “*Claim*”, “*Recruitment*”, and “*Support*”. “*Claim*”⁵ describes “*whether a rebel group has made an exclusive claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic group*”. “*Recruitment*”⁶ describes “*whether a rebel group is recruiting from an ethnic group*”. “*Support*”⁷ describes “*whether a rebel group is supported by at least 50% of the members of an ethnic group*” (Wucherpfennig, et al., 2012). This dataset is useful for the case selection process when combining it with the *Power-Sharing Event Dataset* (PSED) because different ethnic groups can be tied to different power-sharing arrangements depending on the ethnic group’s linkage with an armed/rebel group.

4.1.3. Afrobarometer

The AB is a pan-African, non-partisan research network providing surveys on governance, the economy, society, and democracy based on public attitudes since 1999 in more than 30 countries (Afrobarometer, 2023). The surveys are conducted with face-to-face interviews where the respondents are randomly selected, and the sample is between 1200 to 2400 adult citizens in each country. The AB has previously been used in research concerning support for democracy in Africa (Bratton & Mattes, 2001), political attitudes (Cheeseman, 2015), and democratic awareness (Mattes & Bratton, 2007). The data from this dataset was provided to

⁵ 0 = “No claim”, 1 = “Direct evidence for claim”, 2 = “Indirect evidence, e.g., group name, for claim”.

⁶ 0 = “No recruitment”, 1 = “Recruitment”, 2 = “Ethnic group members are recruited by the rebels and government”.

⁷ 0 = “No or little support”, 1 = “Large support”, 2 = “One ethnic group supports both the rebel group and the government (only in non-ethnic conflicts”.

operationalize the three independent variables, the approval of one-party rule, military rule, and one-man rule (see Chapter 4.4.2.). The data is subjective because it is based on the opinions of single individuals. This is especially the case concerning grievance control (“*treated unfairly*”) which is operationalized on the survey question “*How often, if ever are [members of the respondent’s ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?*”. The question is a perception of reality, and it is subjective whether the respondent’s ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government. It is also not possible to know in what sense the respondent perceives that his/her ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government. Other surveys could have been suitable for the study, for example, the *World Value Survey* (WVS). Using the WVS was ruled out for several reasons. Firstly, there were more countries in the PSED data that fulfilled the participation criteria when using AB data compared to data from the WVS (see Chapter 4.2.). Secondly, the Afrobarometer contains better survey questions that could be operationalized as the dependent variable to capture the approval of non-democratic governance. In the WVS, instead of “one-party rule”, there is an “expert rule” instead. A country having experts ruling it is more uncommon than having a single party ruling it. Therefore, “one-party rule” is a better alternative. To capture the independent variable, the AB is a better alternative than the WVS. There are more alternatives to the survey question about ethnic belongings in AB which made it possible to link the survey data with the ACD2EPR data.

4.1.4. African Cabinet and Political Elite Data Project (ACPED)

If the Afrobarometer survey was conducted after the end of the five-year period, the ACPED dataset was used to complement with information on whether representatives from the armed groups⁸ had cabinet positions or were influential in politics after the five-year period ended in the PSED. The dataset contains detailed information about 5643 cabinet ministers (distinguished by country and month) in 23 African countries between December 1996 and December 2017. The information concerns the cabinet members’ identity, party, home region, and position. This information is monthly based for each year (161 145 Minister-months in total). The dataset limited to political power-sharing since this type of power-sharing it is possible to trace armed groups that after the peace agreement were involved in politics. This could be problematic if a country only experienced military power-sharing (for example, integration of rebel groups into the country’s armed forces) since information about the integrated individuals would not be available in ACPED data.

⁸ Armed groups that were involved in power-sharing arrangements according to the PSED.

4.2. Case Selection

Africa is a great continent to find cases for this study for several reasons. Firstly, because of the great diversity of ethnic groups in Africa. With a great variety of ethnic groups in each country, it is possible to link individuals to ethnic groups and link those ethnic groups with armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements. Secondly, Africa is the region in the World with the highest number of intrastate conflicts. A result of this is a great number of attempts with negotiated settlements (Haas and Ottmann, 2021, p. 982).

The case selection in this study was similar to the case selection Ottmann and Haass (2017) conducted. The criteria for being adopted as a case in this study: (1) the country must be a post-conflict country where the conflict ended with power-sharing arrangements documented in the *Power-sharing Event Dataset* (PSED); (2) the armed group is identified in the PSED and involved in power-sharing arrangements; (3) the power-sharing arrangements took place in a five year period from the signing of a peace agreement, and there was no conflict recurrence; (4) an ethnic group has ties to an armed group in terms of fulfilling two out of three criteria in the ACD2EPR (see definitions in Appendix A); (5) the survey must have been conducted during or at the end of the five-year period; (6) if the fifth criteria could not be fulfilled, politicians from the armed group must be involved in politics and identified in the ACPED; (7) survey questions are available to operationalize the independent and dependent variables in the given country.

The research includes post-conflict countries where the conflict ended in power-sharing arrangements. By combining the PSED, ACD2EPR Dataset, and the Afrobarometer, it was possible to identify and find individuals belonging to ethnic groups tied with armed groups (see criteria for ties below) involved in power-sharing arrangements. By looking at the data from the PSED, it was possible to see detailed information about the power-sharing arrangements between the government and armed groups in a given country within a five-year period from the date the peace agreement was signed. Details of what type of power-sharing (political, territorial, economic, and military) were available. This information made it possible to link armed groups to power-sharing arrangements. Combining this information with the ACD2EPR Dataset, it was possible to establish ethnic-based links between ethnic groups and the armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements. Since the Afrobarometer contains information on the respondents' ethnic belonging, it was possible to link the respondents' opinions on non-democratic governance with the two other datasets.

A problem occurred when determining when an armed group should be considered ethnically based which is vital to the case selection and the internal and external validity of the

study. Because if an ethnic group cannot be linked with an armed group, it is not possible to accurately measure the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance. In the study by Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), the authors used two criteria to link an ethnic group to an armed group or rebel group. The first criterion is the ethnicity of the fighters in the armed group and if the group are recruiting a significant amount of people from an ethnic group. It can also be a coincidence because of local availability and not a thought-through strategy from the group (p. 95). Therefore, the second criterion is necessary because it determines whether the rebel group is publicly announcing that it is fighting on behalf of an ethnic group. Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) coded the armed group as “ethnic” if claim and recruitment occur simultaneously (Ibid.). Using the two criteria by Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) can be problematic because it does not include “support”. An armed group can consist of a vast amount of fighters from an ethnic group, indicating recruitment and the group can claim to be fighting on behalf of an ethnic group. However, the legitimacy of the armed group as “ethnic” would come into question if not a significant share of the ethnic group the armed claim to represent, support the armed group. Despite this, I choose to adopt the same two criteria by Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), but I accepted all cases that fulfilled at least two of three criteria (claim, support, and recruitment) in this study to avoid losing too many cases.

Table 1. Coding of Ties Between Ethnic Groups and Armed Groups

Country	Armed groups	Ethnic Groups	Claim ^a	Recruitment ^a	Support ^a
<i>Burundi</i>	CNDD-FDD	Hutu	1	1	1
<i>Côte D'Ivoire</i>	MPCI	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	1	1	1
	MPIGO	Southern Mande	1	1	0
	FRCI	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	1	1	1
	FRCI	Southern Mande	1	1	1
<i>Liberia</i>	LURD	Krahn (Guere)	0	1	0
	LURD	Mandingo	0	1	0
	MODEL	Krahn (Guere)	0	1	1
<i>Senegal</i>	MFDC	Diola	1	1	0
<i>South Africa</i>	ANC	Asians ^b	1	1	1
		Coloureds	1	1	1
		Blacks	1	1	1
<i>Uganda</i>	UNFRIL	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	1	1	0

Notes:

a = See the definitions for "claim", "recruitment", "support", and the different values in Appendix A.

b = In the Afrobarometer survey conducted in South Africa, some respondents have identified themselves as "Indians". According to the EPR Atlas from GROW^{up} (2023), "Asians" mostly consist of "Indians". Therefore, the respondents in the Afrobarometer in South Africa who identifies themselves as "Indians" are considered affiliated with *African National Congress* (ANC).

Source: ACD2EPR

To capture the effect of power-sharing on the approval of democratic governance, the Afrobarometer surveys for a given country must have been conducted between the signing of a peace agreement and the end of the five-year period (or on the fifth year) in the PSED. If the

survey was conducted many years after the five-year period ended, it would jeopardize the study's internal validity (Niger and Mali were excluded for this reason). If the survey was conducted several years after the end of the five-year period, additional information was used from the *African Cabinet and Political Elite Data Project* (ACPED) and the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP). The information was used to identify members of the cabinet in the given country belonging to the armed groups in the PSED. Also, an important assumption is that the study looked at all types of power-sharing. In other words, if a country and armed groups were registered in PSED data, the arrangements tied to that dyadic relationship between that armed group and the government were valid cases to use.

In the PSED, there was a vast selection of African countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Niger, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Djibouti, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Comoros, and Sudan. Because of the lack of data from the Afrobarometer, Guinea Bissau, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), Rwanda, Somalia, Djibouti, Angola, Comoros was excluded from the study. Sierra Leone and Mozambique were excluded from the study because there were no data on ties between the armed groups and any ethnic groups. Sudan was excluded from the study because the survey conducted in the country lacked the questions that were operationalized as the dependent variable. Left standing were six countries, Burundi, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda. Liberia, Senegal, and Uganda are suitable cases since the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in the same year as the end of the five-year period or during the five-year period. More information about the cases can be found in Appendixes B and C.

4.3. Sample

The sample consists of six African countries, Burundi, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda (see Table 2). In total, there are 9162 observations (respondents) in this study, whereas 3620 respondents are assigned to the treatment group (the respondents who belong to ethnic groups that have ties with armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements). The control group consists of 5542 respondents that belong to the ethnic groups without ties to armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on the Study Sample

Country	Country sample size	Rebel group	Included ethnic groups (treatment group)	Excluded ethnic groups (control group)
<i>Burundi</i>	1081	CNDD-FDD	Hutu (899)	Tutsi (175), Twa (7)
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	1154	FRCI	Mandé du Nord (315), Mandé du Sud (75), Gur (Voltaïque) (81)	Akan (453), Krou (230)
<i>Liberia</i>	1197	MODEL	Krahn (49)	Bassa (151), Belle (7), Gbandi (15), Gio (80), Gola (53), Grebo (143), Kissi (48), Kpelle (286), Kru (70), Lorma (98), Mandingo (29), Mano (106), Mende (9), Vai (42), Sarpo (11)
<i>Senegal</i>	1189	MFDC	Diola (70)	Wolof (551), Pulaar/Toucouleur (296), Serer (158), Mandinka/Bambara (86), Soninke (8), Manjack (7), Bainouk (6), Bassari (1), Maure (6)
<i>South Africa</i>	2200	ANC	Black/African (1560), Coloured (220), Indian (100)	European/White (320)
<i>Uganda</i>	2345	UNRFII	Alur (79), Kakwa (12), Lugbara (119), Madi (47)	Karamojong (1), Ateso (169), Japadhola (45), Jonam (6), Kumam (6), Kuksabin (1), Luo (310), Mugwere (46), Muganda (443), Mugishu (92), Musoga (241), Munyoli (25), Mufumbira (37), Muhoro (11), Mukiga (143), Mukonzo (33), Munyarwanda (21), Munyoro (76), Mutagwenda (9), Mutooro (85), Mwamba (4), Munyankole (275), Samia (9)
Total	9162		3620	5542

Source: Afrobarometer, ACD2EPR

4.4. Variables

The chapter is divided into three sub-chapters. In the first one, the independent variable is presented and discussed, the second sub-chapter is where the dependent variables are presented. The last sub-chapter is where the controls are presented.

4.4.1. Independent Variables

The independent variable, *Power-sharing* is operationalized by the survey question “*What is your tribe? You know your ethnic or cultural group?*” from the Afrobarometer. The same operationalization of power-sharing has been conducted before by Ottmann and Haass (2017). This survey question is suitable to operationalize the independent variable because the data from ACD2EPR data on groups’ affiliation with armed groups are ethnically based. This makes it possible to link respondents in the Afrobarometer to armed groups in the ACD2EPR dataset, and those armed groups’ involvement in power-sharing arrangements. The variable is a binary where the treatment group is coded as 1 and the control group is coded as 0 (see Table 2). The treatment group are all the respondents that belong to an ethnic group tied to armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements. The control group is respondents belonging to an ethnic group with no ties to an armed group involved in power-sharing arrangements. Respondents that answered “*Other*”, “*Refused*”, “*Don’t Know*”, or “*[COUNTRY] only or does not think of self in those terms*” are coded as “*Missing*”. When independent variables are correlated with each other it can be difficult to separate the effect of those different independent variables on the dependent variable. To see how much the independent variables correlate with each other; a multicollinearity test was conducted. The test showed that there is no multicollinearity between the independent variables (see Appendix E).

4.4.2. Dependent Variables

Previous research on democratic attitudes has operationalized a vast variety of survey questions from the Afrobarometer to capture the effect of democratic attitudes. A survey question that has been used frequently in research (Mattes & Bratton, 2016; Lagos, 2001) “*Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?*” where the respondents have been three statements. Statement 1 is “*Democracy is preferable to any kind of government*”. Statement 2 is “*In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable*”. Statement 3 is “*For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have*”. Mattes and Bratton (2007) argue that responses to this kind of question are insufficient because the respondents can have different ideas of what democracy is compared to the interviewer. In this regard, the comparability between the two statements (1 and 2) becomes limited (p. 193). One way to

circumvent this issue is to contrast democracy with other forms of non-democratic alternative regimes that most Africans are familiar with. For example, military government, presidential dictatorship, and one-party rule. A democrat would reject all these forms of authoritarian regimes and prefer democratic rule (p. 194).

To isolate the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance. Three dependent variables were used from the Afrobarometer surveys to conceptualize the approval for non-democratic governance. All three of these variables were selected because these types of governance have been relatively common in Africa in the past and the present. This makes the questions more relatable than asking questions about “democracy” because the interviewer can have a different perception of democracy than the respondent. In the Afrobarometer survey, the interviewer asked the question, “*There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?*”, followed by three statements. These three statements are the dependent variables in this study, and all are five-stage ordinal variables ranging from 0 to 4. 0 is “*Strongly Disapprove*”, 1 is “*Disapprove*”, 2 is “*Neither Approve Nor Disapprove*”, 3 is “*Approve*”, and 4 is “*Strongly Approve*”. From the Afrobarometer 1st round (2000) for South Africa, the question was formulated differently. Instead, it was formulated as: “*Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one South Africa has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections?*” (p. 10).

The first dependent variable, *Approval of one-party rule* is operationalized by the statement “*Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office*”. The second dependent variable, *Approval of military rule* is operationalized by the statement “*The army comes in to govern the country*”. The third dependent variable, *Approval of one-man rule* is operationalized by the statement “*Elections and the National Legislature are abolished so that the president can decide everything*”.

One might suppose the creation of an index of approval of non-democratic governance is suitable since it would simplify the study. Therefore, I conducted a *Cronbach’s alpha test* to measure the internal consistency. In other words, how closely related the variables are as a group (UCLA, 2023). Running the test indicated that the three dependent variables are ill-suited to create an index. The reliability coefficient was 0,568, and a score of 0,70 or higher is considered “acceptable in most social science research institutions” (UCLA, 2023). One option

would have been to remove one of the index variables. However, this would make the reliability coefficient weaker. Therefore, the decision was made to have three dependent variables.

4.4.3. Control Variables

To avoid *Omitted Variable Bias* (OVB), several socioeconomic variables were used during the study such as gender, age, education, and employment (the coding of the variables can be found in Appendix D). *Gender* is a dichotomous variable used from the Afrobarometer data where the value 0 is “*Male*” and 1 is “*Female*”. *Age* is a continuous variable from the Afrobarometer data where the youngest respondent was 18 and the older was 99. Age is expected to have a negative correlation with the approval of non-democratic types of governance since older people have probably experienced different types of governance during their lifetime in unstable countries and know by experience that some types of governance are less favourable than others. There is a positive correlation between *education* and support for democracy (Cheeseman, 2015; Bratton and Mattes, 2001). Therefore, it is expected that education will be negatively correlated with all types of non-democratic governance. The variable is a three-stage ordinal where the value 0 = “*Low*”, 1 = “*Middle*”, and 2 = “*High*” and is operationalized through the survey question “*What is the highest level of education you have completed?*” (Uganda and Liberia)⁹. There is a positive relationship between *employment* and democratic support (Cheeseman, 2015). Therefore, it is expected that employment is negatively correlated with all types of non-democratic governance. Employment is a dichotomous variable where the value 1 is “*Employed*” and 0 is “*Unemployed*”. “*Don’t know*” and “*Refused*” will be coded as “*Missing values*”. The variables were operationalized from the survey question “*Do you have a job that pays a weekly or monthly cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you looking for a cash job (or looking for another one if you are presently working)?*” in the AB. To control for *democracy*, I used the *V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index* in the same year the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in each country.

There is a negative and significant correlation between power-sharing and the *perception of being treated unfairly by the government* (Ottmann and Haass, 2017, p. 16). Meaning that individuals who belong to an ethnic group linked to armed groups in power-sharing arrangements have a lower perception of their ethnic group being unfairly treated by the government compared to individuals without those linkages. Individuals who perceive that

⁹ The question is asked differently in the survey conducted in South Africa in 2000; “*What was the highest grade, standard or form you completed?*”. In Senegal, Burundi, and the Ivory Coast, the question was asked in French, “*Que le plus haut niveau d’éducation que vous avez atteint?*”.

they are treated unfairly by the government might be a part of a politically marginalized group and therefore are less likely to participate in power-sharing arrangements. The fact that the group is marginalized from the beginning can influence the approval of non-democratic governance because marginalized groups are expected to be in favour of democratic governance (Cheeseman, 2015, p. 656). The variable “*perceived as being treated unfairly by the government*” is used as a proxy for grievances to avoid OVB. To operationalize the variable, the survey question “*How often, if ever are [members of the respondent’s ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?*” is used from the Afrobarometer. The variable is a binary variable where value the respondent is given the value 1 if the respondent perceives that his/her ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government (has grievances). Otherwise, the respondent is given the value 0. My theory is that inclusion in power-sharing agreements generates higher approval of non-democratic governance and that grievances can act as a moderator in that relationship. Together with the independent variable, an interaction term is created with the grievance variable (Power-sharing*Treated unfairly) to test if grievances work as a moderator.

5. Method

In this chapter, the method of choice will be presented and discussed, followed by a walk-through of the assumptions of linear regression, and the country-fixed effects.

5.1. Multiple Linear Regression (Ordinary Least Squares)

To isolate the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance and answer the first hypothesis, the following *Ordinary Least Squares* (OLS)¹⁰ model will be applied.

$$Approval_{iec} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Powersharing_e + X_{iec} + \mu_c + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{iec}$$

$Approval_{iec}$ is measure for the approval of non-democratic governance for an Afrobarometer respondent (i), belonging to ethnic group (e), in the country (c). β_0 is the constant, and $\beta_1 Powersharing_e$ is a dichotomous variable measuring whether the respondent’s ethnic group (e) is represented in a power-sharing arrangement. This represents the regression slope representing the change in approval of non-democratic governance depending on the inclusion in power-sharing. X_{iec} represents a vector for respondent covariates (individual level) such as age, gender, education, employment, and treated unfairly. μ_c represents control variables at the

¹⁰ The goal is to find the best-suited regression line (regression coefficient) that minimises the dependent variable's observed and predicted values. This is achievable by minimizing the “the sum of the squared differences between observed and predicted values (i.e. errors)” (Wolf & Best, 105, p. 16)

country level such as the level of democracy in the country in the same year as the survey was conducted. The vector γ_c represents the country-fixed effects to capture unobserved country-level variables. ϵ_{iec} stands for the error term. To test the second hypothesis, the following OLS model will be applied.

$$\begin{aligned} & Approval_{iec} \\ &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Powersharing_e + \beta_2 Treatedunfairly_{ie} + \beta_3 Powersharing_e \\ & * Treatedunfairly_{ie} + X_{iec} + \mu_c + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{iec} \end{aligned}$$

The second hypothesis suggests that the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance is conditioned on grievances. This model is the same as the previous one, but this OLS model includes an interaction term.

Another suitable method would be to use a probit regression model and use a binary outcome variable instead of a five-stage ordinal variable. Using this kind of method is useful because one can avoid violating assumptions of homoscedasticity (Best & Wolf, 2013, p. 7). However, this method has some disadvantages. The direction of the coefficients can be interpreted (negative or positive correlation between the independent and dependent) but interpreting the scale of the coefficients is not possible (Ibid., p. 11). For linear regression, it is possible to interpret the scale of the regression coefficient. The survey questions used for operationalizing the dependent variables in this study are five-stage ordinals and recoding them into a binary variable could affect the validity of the results negatively. A binary variable would be coded as 0 = Does not approve, and 1 = Does approve, and it is not possible to assign the respondents who answered “Neither approve nor disapprove” to value 1 or 0 in the recoded dependent variable.

5.2. Satisfying the Assumptions of Linear Regression

When conducting research using linear regression certain assumptions that must be satisfied to make sure that the results can be estimated accurately. The following assumptions are linearity, homogeneity of variance (homoscedasticity), and independence. There are several more assumptions to be fulfilled for the regression coefficients to be the best-unbiased estimates (Mueleman, 2015, p. 83). However, due to time constraints, I choose to test the assumptions that can have the most negative impact on the results if violated (UCLA, 2023).

5.2.1. Linearity

The assumption of *linearity* is that “the relationships between the predictors and the outcome variable should be linear” (UCLA, 2023). If this assumption is violated, it can seriously

jeopardize the results. However, since the study is conducted using a binary variable as an independent variable, the assumption of linearity is automatically fulfilled because “linearity assumption is always met for each of the indicator functions since a straight line always fits two points directly” (Bookdown.org, 2023).

5.2.2. Homogeneity of Variance (Homoscedasticity)

The assumption of variance (homoscedasticity) is that “the variance of the residuals is homogenous across level of the predicted values” (UCLA, 2023). When this assumption is violated, it is called *heteroscedasticity* which means that the variance among the error terms is not constant. When the value of the independent variable increase, it will increase or decrease the unexplained variation in the dependent variable. As a result, a potential violation is that the standard errors (SE) will look smaller or larger than they should be, which can entail faulty inferences (Meuleman et al., 2015, p. 22). I conducted a *Breusch-Pagan test* to statistically test if there is heteroscedasticity (this test only applies to linear heteroscedasticity). The test confirmed that there is heteroscedasticity between power-sharing and the three dependent variables, and therefore this assumption is violated. One way to counter the issue of heteroscedasticity is to conduct *weighted least squares* (WLS) instead of ordinary least squares. Due to my limited knowledge of SPSS and time constraints, this action was not taken.

5.2.3. Independence of Residuals

This assumption means that the values of the residuals (error terms) should not be correlated. In other words, “the residual value for one observation cannot depend on the residual for other data points” (Meuleman et al., 2013, p. 36). A common violation of this assumption is a clustering of observations which can be a result of the research design. (Ibid., p. 38). The AB sample design is clustered and stratified in different subnational units of government such as region, province, and state, and if the interview was conducted in an urban or rural location (Afrobarometer, 2023). Ethnic groups can in many cases be geographically concentrated (Haass & Ottmann, 2021), which can create a situation where the residuals of the respondents are correlated if the subsamples are gathered in ethnically homogenous areas. A violation of this assumption can “affect statistical inference but does not invalidate regression analysis as a descriptive tool” (Meuleman et al., 2023, p. 38.). A way to counter this issue would have been to implement cluster-robust standard errors in the regression models, but due to time constraints, this action was never taken.

5.3. Country-fixed Effects

By controlling for country-fixed effects, it will capture time-invariant specific features for each country that is not captured by the independent variables. This is done by “allowing the constant to vary independently for each state” (Cederman et al., 2010, p. 111). For example, when using a control like wealth and not controlling for country-fixed effects can bring complications. The reason is this, South Africa is wealthier than the other countries in the sample. There is a risk that South Africans are driving the results if not including the country-fixed effects. Apart from the *World Value Survey* (WVS), the Afrobarometer datasets lack a country code variable. To control for the country-fixed effects, the first stage was to create a “Country” variable for each country (dataset). The Afrobarometer datasets contain a “Respondent number” variable that I recoded into a “Country” variable. For instance, for Burundi, I assigned all the respondents to the value “1”. In the second country, I assigned all the respondents to the value “2”. After I merged all six datasets, I created a dummy variable for each country, except for South Africa which acted as a reference. The regression coefficient for each of these dummy variables is the difference with the reference category, South Africa.

6. Results


The results from the three different OLS-regression tables are presented, one for each of the dependent variables. All models in the regression tables are controlling for country-fixed effects. Each regression table has five models whereas the first three models in each regression table test the first hypothesis. The first model is testing the relationship between power-sharing and the dependent variable without any controls. The second model is testing how grievances are affecting the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable by including the variable “*Treated unfairly*”. The third model is the same as the second one, but this model includes all the different controls. The fourth and fifth models are testing the second hypothesis. The fourth model includes the interaction term (Power-Sharing**Treated unfairly*). The fifth and last model includes the interaction term and all the control variables. The interaction term generates four groups of individuals: (1) individuals who have linkages to an armed group involved in power-sharing and do not have grievances; (2) the same as group one, but these individuals have grievances; (3) individuals who do not have linkages to an armed group involved in power-sharing and does not have grievances; (4) the same as group 3, but these individuals have grievances. However, the focus is on groups one and two, whereas the first group will act as a reference. It is important to note that in the models for testing the second hypothesis, the independent variable (“*Power-sharing*”) is mirrored (included in power-sharing

is coded as 0 instead of 1) to test the second hypothesis. To visualize the relationships between the groups, I will use the *General Linear Function* in SPSS and *Estimated Marginal Means* (EMMEANS)¹¹.

6.1. Statistical Analysis

For descriptive statistics, I ran crosstabs with the independent and dependent variables and created one bar chart for each dependent variable (see Figures 3, 4, and 5 below) The charts show that there is a difference between those respondents in the surveys who are included in power-sharing arrangements and those who are excluded from power-sharing arrangements. For example, the share of individuals who are excluded from power-sharing is more disapproval of the three different types of non-democratic governance compared to individuals who are included in power-sharing. A Chi² test was conducted, and it indicated that there is a positive correlation between power-sharing and the approval of one-party rule, military rule, and one-man rule. These correlations were significant at $p = <0,001$. From a theoretical standpoint, it is interesting to run a multiple regression analysis to test if the significance between power-sharing and the different types of non-democratic governance still holds when implementing different controls.


Figure 3. Power-sharing and the Approval of One-party Rule



N = 8946
 Missing = 454
 Source: Afrobarometer


¹¹ The reason for using EMMEANS, and not the regression coefficients is because SPSS (unlike STATA) does not have the ability to plot *average marginal effects*.

Figure 4. Power-sharing and the Approval of Military Rule



N = 8935
 Missing = 465
 Source: Afrobarometer

Figure 5. Power-sharing and the Approval of One-man Rule



N = 8932
 Missing = 468
 Source: Afrobarometer

6.1.1. Statistical Analysis for the Effect of Power-sharing on the Approval of One-party Rule

Models 1, 2 and 3 are testing the first hypothesis (see Table 3), and there is a positive and significant correlation between power-sharing and approval of one-party rule across all three models. This means that individuals who belong to an ethnic group involved in power-sharing approve of one-party rule to a greater extent compared to individuals without such linkages. This confirms hypothesis 1. When controlling for grievances in model 2, the effect positive effect of power-sharing is slightly weakened, but it is still highly significant. When all the controls are implemented in model 3, the positive effect of power-sharing got weakened and the level of significance dropped ($P \leq 0,05$). The grievance variable ("*Treated unfairly*") has a negative highly significant effect on the approval of a one-party rule across models 2 and 3 which was expected. In other words, individuals who perceive that their ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government are less likely to approve of one-party rule.

Table 3. Effects of Power-sharing on the Approval of One-party Rule

	Model 1 (H1)	Model 2 (H1)	Model 3 (H1)	Model 4 (H2) ^a	Model 5 (H2) ^a
Power-sharing	0,053 (0,039)***	0,048 (0,040)***	0,031 (0,040)*	0,026 (0,054)	0,035 (0,054)+
Respondent controls					
Gender			-0,070 (0,027)***		-0,069 (0,027)***
Age			-0,048 (0,001)***		-0,046 (0,001)***
Education			-0,163 (0,025)***		-0,162 (0,025)***
Employment			0,041 (0,030) ***		0,038 (0,030)***
Contextual controls					
Democracy			-		-
Grievances controls					
Treated unfairly		-0,094 (0,030)***	-0,079 (0,030)***	-0,015 (0,049)	-0,008 (0,049)***
Power-sharing*Treated unfairly				-0,115 (0,061)***	-0,103 (0,060)***
Constant	1,335 (0,043)***	1,571 (0,052)***	2,101 (0,073)***	1,536 (0,049)***	2,035 (0,068)***
N	8946	8590	8520	8590	8520
Country-fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X
Adjusted R ²	0,088	0,094	0,122	0,097	0,124

Notes:

All models control for country-fixed effects where South Africa is the reference country.


a = The independent variable in models 4 and 5 has been mirrored to test the second hypothesis. In this case, individuals who are included in power-sharing arrangements are the reference group (coded as 0).

The variables in the study have different scales, therefore Standardized β is used instead of Unstandardized β .

*** = $\leq 0,1\%$, ** = $\leq 1\%$, * = $\leq 5\%$, + = $\leq 10\%$.

Models 4 and 5 are testing the second hypothesis, and the regression coefficient for the interaction term is negative and highly significant. To understand the regression model for the second hypothesis, I calculated the predicted values for the reference group (included in power-sharing and not having grievances) and the group of respondents who are included in power-sharing and have grievances (see appendix L). Being included in power-sharing and having grievances is given by the grievance coefficient (-0,008). The predicted values show that an individual who is included in power-sharing and has grievances is associated with a lower likelihood of approving one-party rule compared to an individual who is included in power-sharing and has no grievances (reference group). The coefficient for the interaction term is highly significant which indicates that the difference between the two groups is significant. This confirms the second hypothesis. When plotting the results, it can be observed that the EMMEANS (see Figure 6) show that being involved in power-sharing arrangements (green line) and having grievances generates higher approval of a one-party rule (1,378) compared to having no grievances (1,092). This is the opposite of what the predicted values showed, but the EMMEANS are only visualizing the relationships.

Figure 6. Estimated Marginal Means of the Approval of One-party Rule



6.1.2. Statistical Analysis for the Effect of Power-sharing on the Approval of Military Rule

Models 5, 6, and tests the first hypothesis (see Table 4), and there is a positive and significant correlation between power-sharing and the approval of military rule across all three models. This means that individuals included in power-sharing approve of this type of non-democratic governance to a greater extent compared to individuals who are excluded from power-sharing. This confirms the first hypothesis. Power-sharing is significant at $P \leq 0,05$ even when adding all the controls. However, the positive effect of power-sharing increased slightly when adding the controls.

Table 4. Effects of Power-sharing on the Approval of Military Rule

	Model 5 (H1)	Model 6 (H1)	Model 7 (H1)	Model 8 (H2) ^a	Model 9 (H2) ^a
Power-sharing	0,036 (0,035)*	0,037 (0,036)*	0,040 (0,037)*	0,013 (0,050)	0,009 (0,050)
Respondent controls					
Gender			-0,041 (0,025)***		-0,041 (0,025)***
Age			-0,051 (0,001)***		-0,050 (0,001)***
Education			-0,067 (0,023)***		-0,067 (0,023)***
Employment			0,032 (0,028)**		0,030 (0,028)**
Contextual controls					
Democracy			-		-
Grievances controls					
Treated unfairly		0,012 (0,028)	0,020 (0,028)+	0,066 (0,045)***	0,072 (0,045)***
Power-sharing*Treated unfairly				-0,078 (0,055)***	-0,076 (0,055)***
Constant	0,868 (0,039)***	0,840 (0,048)***	1,100 (0,068) ***	0,830 (0,045)***	1,096 (0,063)***
N	8935	8581	8513	8582	8513
Country-fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X
Adjusted R ²	0,006	0,006	0,014	0,007	0,015

Notes:

All models control for country-fixed effects where South Africa is the reference country.


a = The independent variable in models 4 and 5 has been mirrored to test the second hypothesis. In this case, individuals who are included in power-sharing arrangements are the reference group (coded as 0).

The variables in the study have different scales, therefore Standardized β is used instead of Unstandardized β .

*** = $\leq 0,1\%$, ** = $\leq 1\%$, * = $\leq 5\%$, + = $\leq 10\%$.

Models 8 and 9 test the second hypothesis, and the interaction term is negative and highly significant in both models. Being included in power-sharing and having grievances is given by the grievance coefficient (0,072). The predicted values indicate that being included in power-sharing and having grievances is associated with a higher likelihood of approving military rule compared to an individual who is included in power-sharing and not having grievances. The interaction term is highly significant which means that the difference between these two groups of respondents is significant. These results contradict the second hypothesis. In Figure 7, it can be observed that being included in power-sharing (green line) and having grievances generated more approval of a military rule (0,971) compared to not having grievances (0,760).

Figure 7. Estimated Marginal Means of the Approval of Military Rule



6.1.3. Statistical Analysis for the Effect of Power-sharing on the Approval of One-man Rule

Models 9, 10, and 11 are testing the first hypothesis (see Table 5), and there is a positive and highly significant correlation between power-sharing and the approval of one-man rule across all three models. This means that individuals included in power-sharing approve of one-man rule to a greater extent compared to individuals who are excluded from power-sharing. This confirms the first hypothesis.

Table 5. Effects of Power-sharing on the Approval of One-man Rule

	Model 9 (H1)	Model 10 (H1)	Model 11 (H1)	Model 12 (H2) ^a	Model 13 (H2) ^a
Power-sharing	0,083 (0,030)***	0,086 (0,031)***	0,076 (0,031)***	-0,057 (0,042)**	-0,052 (0,042)*
Respondent controls					
Gender			-0,044 (0,021)***		-0,044 (0,021)***
Age			-0,023 (0,001)*		-0,023 (0,001)*
Education			-0,113 (0,019)***		-0,113 (0,019)***
Employment			0,025 (0,023)*		0,024 (0,023)*
Contextual controls					
Democracy			-		-
Grievances controls					
Treated unfairly		-0,004 (0,023)	0,006 (0,023)	0,027 (0,038)	0,031 (0,038)+
Power-sharing*Treated unfairly				-0,045 (0,046)*	-0,036 (0,046)+
Constant	1,030 (0,033)***	1,032 (0,040)***	1,281 (0,056)***	1,158 (0,037)***	1,394 (0,053)***
N	8932	8581	8512	8581	8512
Country-fixed effects	X	X	X	X	X
Adjusted R ²	0,071	0,073	0,086	0,073	0,086

All models control for country-fixed effects where South Africa is the reference country.

a = The independent variable in models 4 and 5 has been mirrored to test the second hypothesis. In this case, individuals who are included in power-sharing arrangements are the reference group (coded as 0).


The variables in the study have different scales, therefore Standardized β is used instead of Unstandardized β .

*** = $\leq 0,1\%$, ** = $\leq 1\%$, * = $\leq 5\%$, + = $\leq 10\%$.

Models 12 and 13 test the second hypothesis. In model 12, the interaction term is significant, but when the controls are implemented in model 13, the interaction term is only significant at

$p \leq 0,10$. Being included in power-sharing and having grievances is given by the regression coefficient (0,031). The predicted values show that being included in power-sharing and having grievances is associated with a higher likelihood of approving one-man rule compared to being included in power-sharing and not having grievances. This contradicts the second hypothesis. However, since the interaction term is only significant at $p \leq 0,10$, the difference between these two groups of respondents is not significant. In Figure 8, it can be observed that being included in power-sharing (green line) and having grievances leads to higher approval of a one-man rule (1,061) which is higher than not having grievances (0,803).

Figure 8. Estimated Marginal Means of the Approval of One-man Rule



7. Discussion of Results

In this section, I will first discuss the results of the study in the light of the previous research, and theoretical expectations. After, I will discuss the limitations of the study, and how it may have affected the validity of the results.

7.1. Does Individuals Involved in Power-sharing Approve of Non-democratic Governance?

In this study, I ask how inclusion and exclusion in power-sharing arrangements affect the approval of non-democratic governance. Based on the previous research and theoretical framework, I hypothesized that: (1) individuals who belong to ethnic groups involved in power-sharing arrangements are more likely to be in favour of non-democratic types of governance compared to individuals who lack involvement in power-sharing arrangements; (2) being included in power-sharing arrangements and not having grievances generates higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to being included in power-sharing and having grievances. The first hypothesis was confirmed. There was a positive and significant correlation between power-sharing and all three types of non-democratic governance. This indicated that individuals who are involved in power-sharing approve of non-democratic governance to a larger extent than individuals who are not involved in power-sharing. This is in line with previous research to some extent. Power-sharing is not likely to promote democracy in the long run (Jung & Shapiro, 1995) and is more of a short-term solution (Jung, 2012), and power-sharing is likely to fail (Lemarchand, 2007).

The results can be explained by how power-sharing can create patronage and clientelism which incentives elites and individuals to profit from postwar distribution politics. Individuals with power-sharing linkages have higher perceived well-being (Ottmann & Haass, 2017, p. 3), and a perception of higher living conditions compared with fellow countrymen (Ibid., p. 16) compared to individuals without power-sharing linkages. Ottmann and Haass (2017) used the same variable that is operationalized as the grievance variable (“*Treated unfairly*”) in this study. In their study, power-sharing harms the perception of one’s ethnic group being treated unfairly. Meaning that individuals with power-sharing linkages have a lower perception of being treated unfairly by the government compared to individuals without power-sharing linkages (Ibid.). These factors can indicate that: (1) inclusion in power-sharing is favourable, and that individuals can gain from being represented in office; (2) power-sharing elites can by allocation of public goods reward their ethnic constituents (Ottmann & Haass, 2021, p. 999), and to increase their chances to stay in power (Haass, 2021, p. 208). The positive correlation between

power-sharing and the approval of non-democratic governance can also be explained by ethnic favouritism and “in-group bias”. As Habyarimana et al. (2009) hypothesized in a study that coethnics care more about the welfare of people from their group than people from other groups based on the observation “that people often give more generously of their time and energy to charities that benefit members of their own religion, ethnic group, or community than to charities that benefit others” (p. 153). However, Habyarimana et al. (2009) did not find any evidence for their hypothesis about the preference mechanism regarding individuals caring more about the welfare of coethnics than non-coethnics (Ibid., p. 155). On the other hand, the generalizability and external validity of the study conducted by Habyarimana et al. (2009) is questionable due to its limited reach. It was conducted in an urban area in Kampala, Uganda. Therefore, one cannot exclude that “in-group bias” and coethnic preferences affected the results of this study.

The second hypothesis is partly confirmed. The results showed that being included in power-sharing and not having grievances generated a higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to being included and having grievances was only true for approval of one-party rule. For the approval of military rule, individuals who are included in power-sharing and having grievances generated a higher approval of military rule compared to those without grievances. Regarding the approval of one-man rule, it was the same results as the approval of military rule, but the difference between the two groups of individuals was not significant.

The finding that individuals who are included in power-sharing and have no grievances generate higher approval of one-party rule compared to individuals who have grievances could be explained by the theoretical framework I stated above for the first hypothesis. However, the finding that grievances work differently for approval of military rule and one-man rule could have an explanation related to the groups’ power status before the peace agreement. On the assumption that the armed group with ethnic linkages wage war against the government because of grievances and that the ethnic group has had a previous history of being excluded from political power. The group forces a negotiated settlement with the government, and the armed group and its ethnic constituents realize the benefits of being in office or having ethnic representation in office. This incentive non-democratic behaviour such as patronage and clientelism, where political elites use state income to finance their networks for political support and to enrich themselves (Hass & Ottmann, 2015, p. 1). This also creates opportunities for individuals who now have ethnic representation in office and can profit from distributive politics (Ottmann & Hass, 2017, p. 22). Individuals with ethnic representation in power-sharing are more satisfied with their living conditions (Ibid., p. 21), and they enjoy more state resources

than individuals without power-sharing representation (Haass & Ottmann, 2021, p. 999). As a result, the group exploit their newly obtained power to increase the political power of the in-group at the expense of other ethnic groups (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012, p. 85).

7.2. Limitations

The grievance variable has limitations because it may not capture all aspects of grievances because of the way the survey question is formulated. The survey question only captures the perception of the respondent's ethnic group is being treated unfairly by the government. However, grievances can have different causes such as political exclusion, and this variable is not giving any indication on what basis the individual's ethnic group might be treated unfairly. For example, economically, politically, and so on. In the AB, there are better-suited survey questions to capture potential economically and politically based grievances among the respondents. Such as, "*Think about the condition of [R's Ethnic Group]. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?*" and "*Think about the condition of [R's Ethnic Group]. Do they have less, the same, or more influence in politics than other groups in this country?*". These survey questions were unfortunately not present across all countries.

There is a risk that the criteria for being included in the study were too relaxed. There were a few instances of whether countries like Burundi, the Ivory Coast, and Uganda are valid cases to use to isolate the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance. The AB survey was conducted in 2012 which was four years after the end of the five-year period of power-sharing arrangements in the PSED. Despite that the armed group CNDD-FDD had representatives having cabinet positions after the end of the five-year period, there is a risk that there are omitted variables affecting the approval of non-democratic governance between the end of the five-year period and the AB survey (see appendix B). In the case of the Ivory Coast, the main armed group of interest (FRCI) was not represented in politics according to the ACPED data. However, the group was together with three other armed groups (the MPCI, the MPIGO, and the MJP) a part of the umbrella organization Forces Nouvelles (FN). Representatives from the FN were involved in politics after the five-year period and all the organizations in FN are linked to the same ethnic groups as the FRCI. Therefore, I accepted the Ivory Coast as a valid case.

Another limitation is that regression models do not include some controls that were left out due to time constraints such as relative military strength, power status before the peace agreement, long-term effects of power-sharing, and previous democratic traditions. The *relative*

military strength of the rebel group compared to the government before the peace agreement. This is an important factor because armed groups obtain power-sharing positions because of their capacity for violence (Curtis, 2012, p. 91). A high capacity for violence would increase the leverage for negotiations for the rebel groups. Rebel groups that are militarily stronger than the government are more likely to force a negotiated settlement (Clayton, 2013, p. 609), and rebel groups in power parity with the government can demand more concessions because of the cost the group can inflict on the government on the battlefield (Hultquist, 2013, p. 623). This could inflict damage on the public's perception of the democratic legitimacy of the power-sharing government. This study is not taking the long-term effects of power-sharing into account since the survey within a five-year period from the signing of the peace agreement is used. There are different opinions among scholars on whether power-sharing has a positive long-term effect on democratization. Some argue that there is no long-term guarantee that power-sharing provides a basis for democracy (Jung & Shapiro, 1995) and that power-sharing is a short-term solution (Jung, 2012). Scholars like Toft (2010) argue that negotiated settlement is the type of civil war termination that generates the lowest average polity scores 20 years after conflict (p. 24).

Conclusion

The most common type of conflict today is intrastate conflict, and a higher share of conflicts is calling for power-sharing. There is therefore an interest to understand the impact of power-sharing on democratization on the individual level. While previous research has focused on the macro perspective of the impacts of power-sharing on post-war democratization, the micro perspective has been overseen by scholars. By linking individuals with ethnic linkages to armed groups involved in power-sharing arrangements, I study the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance in six African post-conflict societies. I answered the following research question: *how do inclusion and exclusion in power-sharing arrangements affect the approval of non-democratic governance?*

I used a grievance-based theoretical framework that suggests that individuals with power-sharing linkages approve of non-democratic governance to a larger extent compared to individuals without such linkages. The reason according to the theoretical framework, is that ethnic representation in government can foster redistributive politics for political support. I also hypothesized that grievances could act as a moderator and that individuals who are included in power-sharing and not having grievances generate a higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to individuals who are included in power-sharing and having grievances.

By using an OLS regression, the study isolated the approval of non-democratic governance by using survey data from the Afrobarometer conducted within a five-year period after a peace agreement was signed (in some instances after the five-year period). An interaction term was created to capture the conditioning effects of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance was also implemented. The results show that power-sharing has a positive and significant impact on all three types of non-democratic governance. This means that individuals with linkages to an armed group involved in power-sharing arrangements approve of non-democratic governance to a greater extent compared to individuals without such linkages. The results also showed that being included in power-sharing and not having grievances generated a higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to being included and having grievances was only true for approval of one-party rule. For the approval of military rule, it was the opposite, and the difference between the groups of individuals was not significant regarding one-man rule. However, the results must be taken *cum grano salis* because the regression models are violating some of the assumptions of linear regression which can affect the significance. There are also limitations of the study such as limitations of the data.

This study has contributed to the scientific literature by: (1) increasing the understanding of the micro-dynamics of the effects of power-sharing on democratization, and how grievances can act as a moderator in that relationship; (2) creating an original dataset with information on power-sharing arrangements between governments and armed groups with ethnic linkages in six African post-conflict societies. Further research must be conducted to increase the understanding of the relationship between power-sharing and the approval of non-democratic governance. Some areas must be explored such as if the effect of power-sharing on the approval of non-democratic governance differs depending on the different types of power-sharing (inclusive, constrained, and dispersive), and the different issue areas of power-sharing (military, political, economic, and territorial). The finding that being included in power-sharing and having grievances in some instances generates higher approval of non-democratic governance compared to those who are included and not having grievances is partly explained by the theoretical framework adopted in this study. I suspect that grievances might have a different effect on the approval of non-democratic governance depending on the causes of grievances. For example, grievances caused by political or economic exclusion might have different impacts on the approval of non-democratic governance. The grievances variable in this study is operationalized by a survey question that does not capture all types of grievances and does not indicate how the grievances are caused. Future research also must further develop the theoretical framework to explain this finding.

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***Appendix A.* Coding of ties between ethnic groups and armed groups**

Claim

“Describes whether a rebel group has made an exclusive claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic group”

0: “No claim”

1: “Direct evidence for claim”

2: “Indirect evidence, e.g., group name, for claim”

Recruitment

“Describes whether a rebel group is recruiting from an ethnic group”

0: “No recruitment”

1: “Recruitment”

2: “Ethnic group members are recruited by the rebels and the government”

Support

“Describes whether a rebel group is supported by at least 50% of the members of an ethnic group”

0: “No or little support”

1: “Large support”

2: “One ethnic group supports both the rebel group and the government (only in non-ethnic conflicts)”

Source: ACD2EPR Dataset Codebook

Appendix B. Case selection

The primary power-sharing arrangements in Uganda were military power-sharing according to the PSED. This can cause complications by using countries with only military power-sharing. The armed group, Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII) was dissolved after the peace agreement was signed in 2002 and one battalion got integrated into the Ugandan army (UCDP, 2023). Since the armed group got dissolved, it was complicated to find information if the Ugandan military was purged of individuals who were integrated into the military according to the power-sharing arrangements. The survey for South Africa was conducted five years after the end of the five-year period, but the country was still a suitable case since the African National Congress (ANC) that was involved in the power-sharing arrangements were still politically influential during the same year as the survey was conducted in 2000. The surveys in Burundi and the Ivory Coast were conducted several years after the end of the post-conflict five-year period. Therefore, several assumptions had to be made to accept them as cases by using data from the ACPED and the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP).

The survey for Burundi was conducted four years after the end of the five-year period. The CNDD-FDD was represented in cabinet by Gabriel Ntisezerana who was second Vice-President from 2008 to 2010 and Come Manirakiza was the minister of Energy and Mines from late 2011 to 2017. Antoinette Batumubwira was the minister for External Relations and cooperation in 2008 and 2009, and Alain Aime Nyamitwe was the minister of Foreign Affairs from 2015 to 2017 (Raleigh & Shephard, 2020). Since representatives from the CNDD-FDD held cabinet positions after the end of the five-year period, Burundi was considered a valid case. The Ivory Coast is more complex, and the country was accepted on several assumptions. The rebel group of interest, the FRCI (Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire) consists of FN (Forces Nouvelles) fighters which is an umbrella organization for three rebel groups, MPIGO, MPCII, and MJP (UCDP, 2023). The FRCI is not represented in the ACPED data, but representatives from FN were the minister of solidarity and war victims (Raleigh & Shephard, 2020). It is far-fetched to claim that a representative from the FN also represents the FRCI, but the Ivory Coast was accepted as a case because FRCI, the MPIGO, the MJP, and MPCII are linked to the same ethnic groups.

Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics on the Cases

Country	Armed groups	Ethnic groups linked to armed groups	PS-arrangements	Start conflict	PA signed	Afrobarometer round (year)
Burundi	CNDD-FDD	Hutu	Political, military, economic		16-11-2003 -> end of period (2008)	5 (2012)
Côte D'Ivoire	MPCI; MPIGO, MJP	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur), Southern Mande	Political	23-01-2003 24-01-2003 07-06-2004	07-03-2003 30-07-2004	5 (2013)
	FRCI	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur), Southern Mande	Political, military	09-11-2004	06-04-2005 -> end of period	
Liberia	MODEL	Krahn (Guere)	Political, economic		18-08-2003 ->end of period	4 (2008)
Senegal	MFDC	Diola			31-12-2003 -> end of period	4 (2008)
South Africa	ANC	Asians, Coloreds, Blacks	Political, military		18-11-1993 -> end of period	1 (2000)
Uganda	UNRFII	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	Military		24-12-2002 -> end of period	3 (2005)

Notes:

a = See the definitions of the different types of power-sharing in Chapter 1.

Sources: Afrobarometer, ACD2EPR, PSED.

Appendix D. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables

	AB Question	Scale	Values	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
DV								
	<i>There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?</i>							
	Approval of a one-party rule^a	Ordinal	0=Strongly Disapprove, 1=Disapprove, 2=Neither Approve Nor Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve	9179	1,15	1,30	0	4
	Approval of a military rule^b	Ordinal	0=Strongly Disapprove, 1=Disapprove, 2=Neither Approve Nor Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve	9167	0,90	1,13	0	4
	Approval of a one-man rule^c	Ordinal	0=Strongly Disapprove, 1=Disapprove, 2=Neither Approve Nor Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve	9163	0,73	0,98	0	4
IV								
	Power-sharing	Binary	0=The ethnic group is not linked to an armed group involved in power-sharing arrangements, 1=The ethnic group is linked to an armed group involved in power-sharing arrangements	9162	0,39	0,48	0	1
Controls								
	Gender	Binary	0=Female, 1=Male	9400	0,49	0,50	0	1
	Age	Continuous		9359	35,88	13,46	18	99
	Education^d	Ordinal	0=Low, 1=Middle, 2=High	9386	0,54	0,60	0	2
	Employment	Binary	0=Unemployed, 1=Employed	9367	0,34	0,47	0	1
	Democracy	Continuous		6	0,40	0,17	0,13	0,63
	Treated unfairly^e	Binary	0=Never 1=Always, Often, Sometimes	8834	0,44	0,49	0	1
	PS*Treated unfairly			9061	0,14	0,34	0	1

Notes:

a = Statement: *“Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office”*

b = Statement: *“The army comes in to govern the country”*

c = Statement: *“Elections and the Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything”*

d = In all countries except for South Africa, In all countries except for South Africa, Low = *“No formal schooling”, “Informal schooling only”, “Some primary schooling”, “Primary school completed”*. Middle = *“Some secondary school/high school”, “Secondary school completed/high school”, “Post-secondary qualifications, not university”*. High = *“Some University”, “University completed”, “Post-graduate”*.

In South Africa, there were different values in each category compared to the other countries. Low = *“No formal schooling”, “Some primary schooling”, “Primary school completed”*. Middle = *“Some high school”, “High school completed”, “Other post-matrix qualifications other than University”*. High = *“Some University, college completed”, “University, college completed”, “Post-graduate”*.

e = For all countries except South Africa, the original variable was a four-stage ordinal, 0 = *“Always”*, 1 = *“Often”*, 2 = *“Sometimes”*, 3 = *“Never”*. The variable was recoded into a binary where the value 0 = *“Perceived as never being perceived by the government”*, and 1 = *“Perceived as being treated unfairly by the government”*. Value 0 consists of the old value *“Never”*. Value 1 contains the old values *“Always”*, *“Often”*, and *“Sometimes”*. The reason for letting *“Never”* stands as its value in the binary variable is because the other values indicate that the respondent has the perception that his/her ethnic group never is treated unfairly by the government to some extent. For example, the difference between *“Sometimes”* and *“Never”* is too great for having in the same category.

For SA, The original variable was a five-stage ordinal, 1 = *“Always”*, 2 = *“To a large extent”*, 3 = *“To some extent”*, 4 = *“Hardly at all”*, and 5 = *“Never”*. For SA to be compatible with the other countries, the variable was recoded into a binary variable where the values 1, 2, 3, and 4 were recoded into 0. The former value 5, was coded as 1.

Sources: Afrobarometer, V-Dem


Appendix E. Multicollinearity Test of All the Variables in the Regression Models

	Approval of a one-party rule		Approval of a military-rule		Approval of a one-man rule	
	<i>Collinearity tolerance</i>	<i>VIF</i>	<i>Collinearity tolerance</i>	<i>VIF</i>	<i>Collinearity tolerance</i>	<i>VIF</i>
Power-sharing	0,526	1,900	0,526	1,900	0,528	1,893
Gender	0,955	1,047	0,956	1,046	0,956	1,046
Age	0,931	1,075	0,932	1,073	0,930	1,075
Education	0,816	1,225	0,818	1,222	0,818	1,222
Employment	0,936	1,068	0,938	1,066	0,938	1,066
Democracy	0,803	1,245	0,802	1,247	0,802	1,246
Treated unfairly	0,586	1,707	0,586	1,707	0,586	1,707
Power-sharing*Treated unfairly	0,401	2,492	0,402	2,485	0,405	2,470


Source: Afrobarometer, V-Dem

The results from the multicollinearity test showed that the *tolerance level* was between 0,401 and 0,953. The closer to 1,0 (max), the better. Variables with a value of 0,1 can be redundant. The *Variance Inflation Factor* (VIF) score was between 1,406 and 2,492. As a rule of thumb, VIF scores over 10 are problematic (UCLA, 2023). However, the variables had a VIF score lower than that. In summary, the independent variables are not over-correlating.


Appendix F. Jitter Plot of Respondents Included in Power-sharing and the Approval of a One-party Rule




Appendix G. Jitter Plot of Respondents Excluded from Power-sharing and the Approval of a One-party Rule




Appendix H. Jitter Plot of Respondents Included in Power-sharing and the Approval of a Military Rule




Appendix I. Jitter Plot of Respondents Excluded from Power-sharing and the Approval of a Military Rule



Appendix J. Jitter Plot of Respondents Included in Power-sharing and the Approval of a One-man Rule



Appendix K. Jitter Plot of Respondents Excluded from Power-sharing and the Approval of a One-man Rule



Appendix L. Calculations of the interaction effects

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Power} - \text{sharing} + \beta_2 \text{Grievances} + \beta_3 \text{Power} - \text{sharing} * \text{Grievances}$$

Approval of one-party rule

$$Y = 2,035 + 0,035 * \text{PS} - 0,008 * \text{Grievances} - 0,103 \text{PS} * \text{Grievances}$$

Included in PS (0) and have no grievances (0) (The baseline model)

$$Y = 2,035 + 0,035 * 0 - 0,008 * 0 - 0,103 * 0$$

$$Y = 2,035$$

Included in PS (0) and have grievances (1)

$$Y = 2,035 + 0,035 * 0 - 0,008 * 1 - 0,103 \text{PS} * 0 * 1$$

$$Y = 2,035 - 0,008$$

An individual who is included in power-sharing and has grievances is associated with a lower likelihood of approving non-democratic governance compared to an individual who is included in power-sharing and has no grievances.

Approval of military rule

$$Y = 1,096 + 0,009 * \text{PS} + 0,072 * \text{Grievances} - 0,076 \text{PS} * \text{Grievances}$$

Included in PS (0) and have no grievances (0) (The baseline model)

$$Y = 1,096 + 0,009 * 0 + 0,072 * 0 - 0,076 * 0$$

$$Y = 1,096$$

Included in PS (0) and have grievances (1)

$$Y = 1,096 + 0,009 * 0 + 0,072 * 1 - 0,076 \text{PS} * 0 * 1$$

$$Y = 1,096 + 0,072$$

An individual who is included in power-sharing and has grievances is associated with a higher likelihood of approving military rule compared to an individual who is included in power-sharing and has no grievances.

Approval of one-man rule

$$Y = 1,394 - 0,052 * \text{PS} + 0,031 * \text{Grievances} - 0,036 \text{PS} * \text{Grievances}$$

Included in PS (0) and have no grievances (0) (The baseline model)

$$Y = 1,394 - 0,052 * 0 + 0,031 * 0 - 0,036 * 0$$

$$Y = 1,394$$

Included in PS (0) and have grievances (1)

$$Y = 1,394 - 0,052 * 0 + 0,031 * 1 - 0,036PS * 0 * 1$$

$$Y = 1,394 + 0,031$$

An individual who is included in power-sharing and has grievances is associated with a higher likelihood of approving non-democratic governance compared to an individual who is included in power-sharing and has no grievances.

Appendix M. Country-fixed Effects

The reason for coding all respondents for each country in numerical order instead of just “1” is to avoid all respondents being assigned to the same value when merging all the countries into one big dataset. This would make the country of origin indistinguishable when making dummy variables for the country-fixed effects.