DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DOES FOREIGN AID PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS?

Evidence from a quantitative large-N study of 121 aid-receiving countries, 2003-2021

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Abstract

Human rights are in crisis. Even if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrates 75 years in 2023, the anniversary comes at a time when the world is experiencing human suffering so grave that international human rights organizations are alerting for a global human rights crisis. Parallelly, the international donor community proclaims that foreign aid has an important role in promoting global human rights conditions. Previous research on the subject is rather scarce. Most earlier studies focus on the opposite relationship – the effect of human rights on foreign aid and aid allocation, and results are very mixed. The research on related themes, for example the effect of foreign aid on democracy and governance, shows contradictory results to what we might expect from the relationship between foreign aid and human rights. Hence, there are still many doubts regarding this notion – does foreign aid really succeed in promoting human rights? This thesis addresses the question and the gap in the literature by investigating the total gross disbursements of Official Development Assistance in 121 aid-receiving countries during the time period 2003-2021. Applying a time-series cross-sectional analysis and using a fixed effects model, the results of this thesis indicate a statistically significant, positive effect of foreign aid on human rights.

Key words: human rights, physical integrity rights, civil liberties, foreign aid, Official Development Assistance, bilateral aid, multilateral aid

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1. Introduction

The year 2023 marks the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). As a consequence of the two atrocious World Wars, in 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UDHR. It was the first internationally recognized declaration of its kind, which has come to form the basis of global human rights norms. Sadly, the 75th anniversary follows one of the bloodiest, most disastrous years for human rights in recent history, where the breakdown of international human rights norms seems to have reached new levels. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, unleashing destruction and war on a people living in peace, which has led to human suffering and human rights violations that have been condemned four times by the United Nations General Assembly (Amnesty International, 2023). Throughout 2022, the conflict in Ethiopia and the Tigray region raged on, according to some sources claiming hundreds of thousands of lives (Amnesty International, 2023), making it one of the deadliest conflicts in modern history. The reports from Tigray on human rights violations are extensive, including widespread sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, forced displacements, summary killings and the government denying the population food, medicine and humanitarian aid (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In Colombia, the world's most dangerous country for human rights defenders (Front Line Defenders, 2022), last year was also one of the deadliest in a long time, with reports of as many as over 200 human rights activists being killed (Aljazeera, 2023). In Iran, the end of 2022 finished with waves of mass protest for fundamental rights, and the reports on the government responses alert for grave human rights violations taking place, such as the use of excessive and lethal force, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual violence, sham trials and unlawful imprisonments (Amnesty International, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2023). The list could go on, and unfortunately, these are only a few examples from a vastly discouraging reality where human rights had an especially disastrous year last year.

The adoption of the UDHR in 1948 sparked a new era, where the rights specified in the declaration have come to form the basis for international norms, but also taken a special place as a base for those rights that all of us have the obligation to protect and promote. Hence, with this in mind and adding the magnitude and scale of what organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch call a human rights crisis, these issues are, with reason, of greatest concern to governments. It can be seen not only in the ratification of human rights treaties or the condemnations from the UN General Assembly, but also in the most central place human rights have taken in various spheres such as business, trade, and what will be the topic

for this thesis, foreign aid. Within foreign aid, human rights have for long been of major interest to donors, and seen as a possible mechanism that could help improve respect for human rights globally.

In foreign aid, donors commonly use human rights, both human rights treaty ratification and general human rights performance, as a conditionality for aid granting (Magesan, 2013). Some examples are the U.S. that as early as 1975 passed the Foreign Assistance Act which conditioned U.S. aid on respect for human rights (Knack, 2004), the EU that since the Cold War has been demanding respect for human rights and democracy in return for foreign aid (Carnegie & Marinov, 2017; Dunning, 2004), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) which identifies human rights as "a perspective that should permeate all development cooperation" (Sida, 2006), and even diverse countries such as Japan that in their adoption of the ODA Charter after the Cold War "calls on Japan to contribute to the achievement of mankind's common goals - democracy, *human rights,* peace, and sustained development - via its aid policy" (Furuoka, 2005, 127). This shift in paradigm, especially in the post-Cold War period, is also visible in multilateral institutions' policy agendas; for example in the World Bank proclaiming that "the World Bank believes that creating the conditions for the attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of development. The world now accepts that sustainable development is impossible without human rights" (Gaeta & Vasilara, 1998). As human rights obviously are of great concern to donors and efforts to contribute to the improvement of human rights conditions worldwide are visible in these donor declarations, a doubt that arises is to what extent donors are succeeding in living up to these global commitments – does foreign aid really succeed in improving human rights? Approaching the question, this study takes its starting point in the expectations and hopes for foreign aid as a possible improver of global human rights performance. Building on previous research, which is inconclusive in what possible effects foreign aid has on human rights, the aim of the thesis is to further explore and broaden the understanding of the relationship between the two. I do this by taking on the research question, *what effect does foreign aid have on respect for human rights?*

To answer this, I employ a time-series cross-sectional statistical method, investigating 121 aid-receiving countries during the time period 2003-2021. Specifically, I examine if the aid inflows these countries receive have had an effect on respect for human rights within the countries. As

compared to previous research, which mostly look at the opposite causal relationship and mostly under specific conditions and contexts, this study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to both take on this under-researched causal direction and to apply a more comprehensive approach than previously done in terms of time scope, countries and aid sectors included. It is also one of very few studies that focus specifically on human rights, whereas previous studies mainly focus on foreign aid and its effects on related issues such as democracy and governance (see e.g. Gafuri, 2022; Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013). Hence, this thesis is a much needed contribution to a theoretical actuality that lacks both new and more comprehensive contributions, and a complex empirical reality that needs further clarification. Looking at previous research, it reaches very mixed conclusions. While e.g. national goals and geopolitics have been found to be more important than human rights in foreign aid (Nielsen, 2013), some studies do find that human rights performance is actually being both punished (Dietrich & Murdie, 2017; Lebovic & Voeten, 2009) and rewarded (Schmaljohann, 2013) through aid allocation. Going further, many studies raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of aid (Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013), but others indicate that under certain conditions aid has a positive effect on human rights and related issues (Carnegie & Marinov, 2017; Gafuri, 2022; Kersting & Kilby, 2014; Dijkstra, 2018). In this study however, measuring respect for human rights as both respect for physical integrity and civil liberties, I find a positive effect of foreign aid. Testing two contrasting hypotheses - that f*oreign aid has a* ***positive*** *effect on respect for human rights* and that *foreign aid has a* ***negative*** *effect on respect for human rights* – my results support the first mentioned. I show that foreign aid does have a positive, robust effect on respect for human rights.

1.1. Disposition

The disposition of the thesis is the following: first, in the next chapter I will provide a review of the theoretical framework and display the State of the Art of the previous research on the subject. Second, I present the aim, the research question and two specified hypotheses that aspire to answer the research question. Third, a chapter on methodology and data follows, which includes a discussion of the statistical method, operationalizations of variables, display of global trends and considerations of the advantages and limitations of the study. Fourth, the empirical results of the thesis and robustness checks are presented. In the end, there is a concluding discussion.

2. Theoretical framework and previous research

There is a great deal of perplexity and debate about the relationship between foreign aid and human rights. In the following chapter, I present and reflect upon the relevant literature and give some clarity to the issue. First, I introduce and discuss the theoretical framework and literature on the effects of human rights on foreign aid. Second, I provide an overview of the previous research and empirical evidence about the effects and effectiveness of aid on human rights and related themes such as democracy and governance. Third, a section about the possible causal mechanisms and why we would expect foreign aid to have an effect on human rights follows.

2.1. Theoretical framework

The relationship between foreign aid and human rights has been widely debated, but results are unsatisfying in different aspects. To begin, whereas this study brings attention to the impact of aid on human rights, most earlier studies are almost exclusively concentrated on the opposite causal direction. The perhaps most elaborated branch of research on the issue centers around studies and evidence of to what extent human rights have an impact on foreign aid, in the form of for example aid allocation, aid sanctions and aid rewarding. Looking at aid allocation, strategic considerations guided by concerns of "realpolitik", national goals and power position of donors (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Dietrich & Murdie, 2017; Lebovic & Voeten, 2009; Neumayer, 2003), as well as political alliances (Nielsen, 2013), have been proven more important than human rights considerations. Neumayer (2003) for example cannot find any support for the fact that respect for the very basic human rights, physical integrity rights, would have a positive effect on aid allocation. Rather the opposite has been found to be true, that states that show less respect for human rights receive more aid (Neumayer, 2003; Capellán & Gomez, 2007). Nevertheless, even if there on the one hand exists substantial evidence that there is a lack of will within the international society to punish human rights violations, on the other hand, some studies find that under certain conditions what is referred to as 'aid sanctioning' actually happens. Within multilateral aid for example, subsequent to human rights blaming – when e.g. international human rights organizations have provided sufficient information and public attention to human rights violations – Lebovic and Voeten (2009) found that this leads to multilateral institutions allocating less aid to the responsible government. Also, this form of human rights blaming has been found to have consequences not necessarily on the amount of aid allocated, but on the direction of the funds, resulting in aid being redirected from state

actors to non-state channels such as NGOs (Dietrich & Murdie, 2017). It is also found that when states violate human rights it has negative consequences for especially economic inflows directed towards the government, but not primarily in aid sectors which are important for continued support for fragile populations and human rights (Nielsen, 2013). Looking at the larger picture, there is similarly some evidence that democracy and human rights performance is not only punished when failing to live up to expectations, but also rewarded when being virtuous; democracies and countries that show greater respect for civil and political rights have been found more likely to receive aid (Neumayer, 2003; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Nielsen, 2013), and greater human rights treaty ratification is found to result in higher inflows of foreign aid (Magesan, 2013; Schmaljohann, 2013).

Furthermore, not only does most earlier theory focus on the opposite causal direction, but there is also a lack of a clear, human rights focus with bearing on reality and actual human rights conditions. Looking at the extensive literature on for example human rights treaty ratification and its effect on human rights, as mentioned there are on the one hand proofs that greater ratification leads to higher aid inflows and that enhanced ratification under some conditions leads to improved human rights performance. For example, human rights treaties are found to have an effect on human rights, but typically only in more democratic states (Neumayer, 2005). On the other hand, other scholars express reservations about using human rights treaty ratification as a measurement for respect for human rights (Goodliff & Hawkins, 2006), arguing that ratification can be used as a substitute for actual "good" behavior (Schmaljohann, 2013). Ratification has also been found to even have negative impacts on domestic human rights institutions (Magesan, 2013) and in autocracies to be associated with *more* human rights violations (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007; Neumayer, 2005). This tells us that even if there is some evidence for human rights treaty ratification having positive effects on human rights, while designed to prevent governments from violating human rights, in reality they can have the opposite effect and might not be an effective measurement of respect for human rights.

As displayed, there is a rich branch of research that takes its basis in the effects of human rights on foreign aid, which reaches interesting but inadequate conclusions. Human rights seem to have an effect on aid allocation, with both aid sanctioning and aid rewarding taking place, and both respect for democracy and civil and political rights and human rights treaty ratification have been found to have an impact on foreign aid. These theoretical assumptions confirm the

connectedness between foreign aid and human rights, forming the foundation for the expectations of interest in this study.

2.2. Previous research – effects of foreign aid on human rights and related issues

Going further, even if previous literature have failed to give attention to the causal direction of interest to this study – the effect of foreign aid on human rights – there are some studies that have begun to explore the relationship and the effect of foreign aid on closely related issues, such as democracy and governance. These studies also find mixed empirical results and conflicting theoretical predictions as to whether foreign aid has contributed to the objective of promoting human rights, democracy and development more generally. Whereas some scholars find positive effects of aid on sectors such as democracy and Quality of Governance, others argue that there aren't any significant effects, or even that aid has a negative influence on these political dimensions.

Kersting and Kilby (2014) find a small positive effect of foreign aid on democracy, using Freedom House indicators for measuring democracy. Their findings are robust using cross-sectional data, and persists over time. However, they also find that this is only true for donors from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), who might also be expected to have a more clear focus on democratic values in foreign aid. They also find it to be conditioned on the strategic importance of the recipient country for the donor, where recipients of great strategic value for donors are less likely to democratize (Kersting & Kilby, 2014). A similar, albeit small, positive effect of foreign aid is found by Jones and Tarp (2016), examining the net effect of total aid on political institutions. They find that this effect is driven by more stable, low intensity, inflows of 'governance aid' (ibid.), indicating that the type and thus objectives of aid might be of importance for the aid effectiveness as well. Gafuri's (2022) findings also indicate that the specific aid sector might be important for the aid effectiveness, as she finds a small positive effect of foreign aid on democracy when looking specifically at the EU democracy aid sector. Moreover, it is also argued that the timing is important for the effect of aid. Dijkstra (2018) finds that the effect of foreign aid on democracy and governance was negative or non-existent during the Cold War, but that the effect of aid on democracy after 1990, on average, is positive. However, still with the exception of countries of strategic importance. The same has been found in earlier studies; a small positive effect of foreign aid on democracy, but limited to the post–Cold War period (Dunning, 2004).

Those that argue for the negative effects of foreign aid often argue that the negative effects are generated from the alternative income that foreign aid provides, much like the arguments in the "resource curse" literature about the possible negative effects of being in possession of natural resources. Djankov et al. (2008) even talk about an "aid curse". As argued, aid can weaken accountability of governments towards citizens by providing an alternative income to tax collection, where it impedes governments incentives to collect tax from its citizenry (Kersting & Kilby, 2014) and thus alleviate internal pressure for democratic and institutional reform (Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013). This would in practice mean that aid could function as a mechanism to keep autocratic leaders in power, for example. Furthermore, foreign aid has been argued to function as a rent which encourages competition and rent-seeking behavior among domestic elites in recipient countries, which weakens institutions and results in corruption and foments conflict over the control and internal distribution of aid (Djankov et al., 2008; Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013). Djankov et al. (2008) find that countries that are dependent on foreign aid actually experience the weakening of democratic institutions and governance according to the level of aid they receive. Similar results have been found in later studies, that aid negatively affects both economic and political institutions (Young & Sheehan, 2014).

Other studies find no effect at all of foreign aid on democracy, governance and institutions (Knack, 2004). Askarov and Doucouliagos (2013) present the first meta-analysis of previous research. Including a large number of studies on aid and its aggregate effect on democracy and institutions, on average they find no effect at all of foreign aid either. Looking at disaggregate results however, they find that aid on average has had either no effect or a slightly negative effects on democracy. For governance and QoG, they find that aid had some positive effect during the Cold War, but during the post-Cold War period aid has become ineffective in promoting governance (ibid.). When looking at regional factors, they do find a small positive effect of aid on democracy and institutions in the transitional economies of Europe, whereas the results are modest or insignificant when including both African, MENA and Asian recipients (ibid.).

Turning to the literature that look at the impact of foreign aid on human rights specifically, there are very few studies. To the best of my knowledge, the study by Carnegie and Marinov (2017) that focuses on EU derived aid is the most recent example. They examine if aid improves democracy *and* human rights, in relation to what they call aid-shocks, which refers

to large, sudden increases in aid flows. They find that these actually have an effect on human rights and democracy, where the effect on human rights is rather direct if looking at changes in policy as compared to the effect on democracy which they found has an impact but only after a certain amount of time. However, in their study, even if the effect on human rights seems to be relatively immediate, it is also found rather short-lived and doesn't seem to have an effect over a longer time horizon. Although, the human rights indicators they examine aren't worsened either, but rather unchanged (ibid.). What can be said from this is that, looking at the research on foreign aid and related issues such as democracy, and Carnegie and Marinov's study on foreign aid and human rights, what we know this far is that there are both indications that foreign aid could be expected to have a positive effect on human rights, as well as a negative effect, or no impact at all. Further clarification is needed.

2.3. Why we could expect foreign aid to have an effect on human rights – the mechanisms behind the relationship

Considering mechanisms that might be of greater importance for enhancing respect for human rights, much emphasis in previous research is given to aid conditionalities, referring to when certain levels of respect for human rights and democracy is applied as a *precondition* for aid allocation. Research suggest that the initial level of human rights, civil and political rights and democracy is an important criteria for donors which will increase the likelihood of receiving aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003), since the initial levels of democracy and human rights also can be an important determinant for the effect of the aid. More democracy and greater respect for civil and political rights can be considered favorable for aid effectiveness and further enhancements on respect for human rights, since a greater respect for democratic values lowers risk for aid capturing, but also allows for greater accountability, transparency and control of financing. Likewise, QoG and governance in general are also mentioned in this aspect as favorable conditions for the effectiveness of foreign aid and human rights implementation (Rajan & Subramanian, 2007; Dietrich & Winters, 2021; Cole, 2015). It can determine levels of corruption and aid capturing as well as government and administrative effectiveness, policy implementation, level of rule of law and civil society autonomy. More simply put, good governance is expected to deepen democracy (Cole, 2015), and is thus a common conditionality within the aid community (Dietrich & Winters, 2021). However, QoG as an important mechanism for aid effectiveness has also been questioned at an empirical level,

argued to matter less than previously claimed (ibid.), adding another level of complexity to the debate.

Furthermore, some mechanisms are more oriented towards "post-conditionality", such as requirements on policy and institutional change post allocation (Dunning, 2004; Knack, 2004; Carnegie & Marinov, 2017). Examples of this are requirements of implementation of national human rights institutions, or specific aid projects oriented towards the promotion of human rights. These projects or disbursements, "aid boosts", can provide an increased capacity to incentivize reform change, and have been found to have an impact, however existing studies have found the effects short-lived and often followed by a reversion to prior behaviors from recipient countries ones the "boost" stops (Carnegie & Marinov, 2017). Reasoning about post-conditionality, it is maybe here that we would find the stronger arguments for that foreign aid would have an impact on human rights.

Moreover, in the realm of conditions applied by donors, the research on aid sanctioning and aid rewarding also lead to important expectations on foreign aid and its impact on human rights. As mentioned in previous sections, there is some evidence that governments who violate human rights experience economic sanctions in the form of less aid being allocated or aid being redirected to sectors further away from government control (Lebovic & Voeten, 2009; Dietrich & Murdie, 2017), and that governments that live up to certain desirable circumstances are also rewarding for this with aid (Magesan, 2013; Schmaljohann, 2013). Hence, the expectation from donors seems to be that the aid allocated will have an effect on human rights, and that the redirection, withdrawal or increase can generate changes in human rights performance. This reveals a reality with a possible dynamic relationship between the aid an human rights. Even if the issue of endogeneity is central here, that it could be true that human rights also drive aid, it displays an interesting empirical reality where the understanding of aid as a possible mechanism generates certain donor behaviors which have the potential to further generate changes also in recipient countries behaviors.

Nevertheless, as discussed in previous sections, even if we see aid conditionalities, aid rewarding and aid sanctioning taking place, significant doubts remain about the actual motivations of donors in really applying these conditions. As mentioned, donor's strategic considerations have many times been found more important than prioritizing human rights

policy (Lebovic & Voeten, 2009; Dietrich & Murdie, 2017; Nielsen, 2013; Neumayer, 2003). Also, geopolitical considerations for example were found to be the most important in the early stages of foreign aid policy during the Cold War era, but should be considered in the post-Cold War as well as the purpose of the aid can be an important factor for how well it will "work" (Dijkstra, 2018). Not only purpose, but also specific type of aid is identified as another important mechanism for determining or understanding the effects of foreign aid, which displays both possibilities but also doubts. For example, aid directed towards governance, institutions and democracy assistance specifically have been found to have greater effects on democracy promotion (Jones & Tarp, 2016; Gafuri, 2022). On the other hand though, there are studies finding that for example democracy aid has also been proven rather toothless – it might spur democratic institutional change such as transition from a one-party system to a multi-party system, but this very rarely happens when it threatens the incumbent (most commonly autocratic) regime (Dietrich & Wright, 2014). These implications are also interesting in the light of the "aid curse" claim (Djankov et al., 2008), where it is recognized that aid under certain conditions could actually risk being harmful for development and incentivize corruption and aid capturing (Djankov et al., 2008; Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013). As mentioned, while there are significant indications for the expectations of foreign aid to have an impact on human rights, the tangible perplexity that surrounds the relationship discloses that not all important considerations are easily made. Once again, we need further and more comprehensive studies on the subject.

3. Aim, research question and hypotheses

3.1. Aim

With the preceding review of theory and previous research, it has hopefully become more clear that many doubts remain about the relationship between foreign aid and human rights. This thesis takes its starting point in the expectations on and hopes for foreign aid as an improver of human rights, which are visible in both the mainstreaming of human rights, aid sanctioning and human rights conditionalities applied by donors. Taking the diverse empirical findings and lack of consensus on foreign aid and human rights into consideration, to better understand if expectations are valid and to possibly give some clarity to the empirical anticipations, further research is needed. Thus, the aim and purpose of this study is to build on previous research on

foreign aid and its possible effects on human rights, to enhance knowledge and to give a more comprehensive understanding of the actualities surrounding the relationship between the two.

3.2. Research question

The results in previous research are very mixed, where some studies find a relationship with existing indications of both a positive and negative relationship, while others point to no relationship and highlight either conditional effects, or other considerations as more important for aid allocation than recipients' respect for human rights. Looking at the scarce research on the causal direction investigated in this study, there are also doubts about the actual effects of foreign aid on human rights. Carnegie and Marinov (2017) find a small positive effect under a particular context and particular conditions, but besides from their study this causal direction is very under-researched. As a matter of fact, existing literature presents contradictory results, and we still know very little about what we can expect the relationship to really look like. Once again, more research is needed. Furthermore, few studies look at the overall relationship, considering aid from a bigger perspective. Most studies that exist look at specific contexts, conditional effects or specific conditions, but very few look at the overall, general expectation of the impact of foreign aid on human rights. Taking these facts together, in this thesis I aim to explore the broad relationship between foreign aid and human rights, asking the following question:

What effect does foreign aid have on respect for human rights?

I take on a more comprehensive perspective on international aid flows, both in aspects of time, recipient countries and form of aid. In contrast to previous research, I focus on the most recent time period (2003-2021), include a time span of 19 years, 121 countries and all official bilateral and multilateral ODA flows. Additionally, I measure human rights in two different ways and maintain a clear focus on human rights performance in practice, which adds another dimension to the contribution. To the best of my knowledge, it is the only study of this magnitude and with this ambition. Not only does this study contribute to theory development taking on this very under-researched causal direction, but it also helps give clarity to broader perspectives of foreign aid and human rights, and to what can be expected from this relationship.

3.3. Hypotheses

The previous literature on the effect of foreign aid and the expected outcomes of aid allocation indicates on the one hand that aid can have an enhancing effect on both democracy and human rights. Even if the effect is sometimes found to be small or to some extent conditional on other factors, positive effects of foreign aid on democracy (Kersting & Kilby, 2014; Jones & Tarp, 2016; Dijkstra, 2018; Gafuri, 2022), governance (Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013) and human rights (Carnegie & Marinov, 2017) have been found. Furthermore, the rich literature on human rights affecting aid allocation shows that there is a dynamic relationship between the two. Human rights enjoy a normative position in all international transactions due to their wide acceptance and many times undeniable status, and the commitment to their global compliance is visible through mechanisms such as aid sanctioning, aid rewarding and donor conditionalities (Dietrich & Murdie, 2017; Nielsen, 2013; Lebovic & Voeten, 2009; Magesan, 2013; Schmaljohann, 2013). What is clear is that human rights is a priority for donors. Considering the expectations from previous research and that human rights are a strong concern for donors, it is reasonable to expect that aid should also have this anticipated effect on human rights and that countries with larger aid inflow levels should experience improvements in respect for human rights over time, other aspects held equal. Which leads to the first hypothesis:

*H1: Aid has a **positive** effect on respect for human rights*

On the other hand, there is also evidence pointing to the fact that there are dependencies on the effects of aid, for example previous levels of democracy (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Nielsen, 2013) and QoG (Rajan & Subramanian, 2007; Dietrich & Murdie, 2017). There are also findings that show that high inflows of aid result in corruption and weakened institutions (Djankov et al., 2008) and might have slightly negative effects on democracy and governance (Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013). Looking specifically at foreign aid and human rights, especially in the light of human rights treaty ratification, there is also evidence indicating that there isn't any effect (Magesan, 2013). Also, aid is provided in many different forms and for various different reasons, not only for purposes of enhancing development and human rights. To the extent that strategic, commercial or other reasons motivate donors in their aid allocation, the effects on respect for human rights could be expected to be negative. With the literature being so mixed in its results, it is also reasonable to hypothesize that aid does not promote human rights and rather that countries with larger aid inflow levels might experience negative

effects on respect for human rights over time. Therefore, the second hypothesis that I will test could be called a counter-hypothesis, stating:

*H2: Aid has a **negative** effect on respect for human rights*

However, as many studies on interrelated themes of the effects of foreign aid fail to find a relationship (e.g. Knack, 2004), it is also reasonable to expect that this thesis might reach similar results as well: a lack of evidence that could support the expected relationship.

4. Methodological framework - data and research design

To establish a causal relationship between foreign aid and human rights is not an easy task. There are many factors that could be thought to influence respect for human rights in a country, especially if one attempts to get close to the core of human rights and the existence of "on the ground" human rights violations. Modeling as I do in this study allows to control for various factors that might have a great influence on the dependent variable – respect for human rights – but still, there are always country- and context-specific factors that might influence the relationship and create omitted-variable bias. This is important to keep in mind when interpreting the results.

Since foreign aid cannot be expected to have an immediate impact on human rights, and these processes of change are expected to be long term, I use a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) statistical method to study the impact of foreign aid on human rights. The time period examined is 2003-2021 and the units of analysis are 121 aid-receiving countries[1]. TSCS is a good method in terms of getting closer to making causal inferences about the relationship since it uses data collected for the same units of analysis over a longer time span, making analysis of change over time possible (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, 228-9). For the estimator, I use fixed effects, which is a good approach for the purpose of the study since it takes the heterogeneity of the units of analysis into consideration and allows for control of unobserved explanatory variables and differences within the countries, such as culture and other time-invariant contextual factors (ibid.). The method ensures that the explanatory variables do not pick up spurious trends rather than actual substantive effects of foreign aid on human rights, since it is

[1] A complete list of countries included in the analysis can be found in the Appendix.

based on time variation *within* each cross-sectional unit and as mentioned allows for control of change over time (ibid.). To confirm the use of fixed effects, I performed a Breuch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test to determine if the data could be pooled, which revealed that it could not. Furthermore, I performed a Hausmann test to decide between the best fit of using a fixed effects estimator or a random effects estimator, which confirmed the fit of using fixed effects (see Appendix for both tests). Nevertheless, acknowledging that no empirical strategy is unproblematic or lacks limitations, different estimators have been used to test the robustness of the results. These and other alternative model specifications can be found in the Appendix and are discussed in the section "Robustness checks".

4.1. Operationalizations

The data I use in this study has been collected from three reliable, renowned and widely cited sources: the Quality of Government (QoG) time-series cross-sectional dataset (Teorell et al., 2023), the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) time-series dataset version 12 (Coppedge et al., 2022) and directly from the OECD's Crediting Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activity dataset (OECD, 2023a). The relevant variables from each dataset, which I will further elaborate upon in this section, were merged into one dataset. A complete scheme of more detailed variable statistics, as well as a correlation matrix can be found in the Appendix.

4.1.1. Dependent variable(s) - measuring human rights

To measure human rights is not a straightforward task, but rather one of considerable choices. For this study, I operationalize human rights using two different measurements, which together capture both the core of the UDHR and some more extended dimensions. Hence, in the study I will distinguish between *physical integrity rights* and *civil liberties*. The distinction is also commonly made in the human rights literature.

The first key dependent variable in this study is respect for *physical integrity rights*, which is operationalized by using the physical violence index from the V-Dem time-series dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022). The index measures to what extent physical integrity rights are respected. The index is estimated by averaging two indicators measuring two different aspects

of physical integrity, namely the indicators of *freedom from torture*[2] and *freedom from political killings*[3], which both focus on political terror carried out by the government and actions taken by government agents. The variable ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 displays low respect for physical integrity and 1 represents the highest respect.

Using the physical violence index is favorable since physical integrity rights can be considered the rights closest to the very core of the UDHR, corresponding to Articles 3, 5 and 6 in the UDHR (United Nations, 2023). These rights also enjoy a more undeniable status (Neumayer, 2003), which makes them especially relevant. Other human rights more related to for example political rights could possibly be subject to contextual questioning, but might also be too close to the concept of 'democracy'. Additionally, the V-Dem data focuses on actual practices rather than just legal or constitutional rights, which is advantageous for this study since it gives a better indication of the scope of "on the ground" human rights violations in a country. Another strength of the V-Dem physical violence index is that it is based on expert assessments, rather than self-reported information. This is good for the validity of the results, since it helps avoid systematic measurement errors, for example that countries with a better human rights record provide better access to information and more positive results than countries with a worse record. To have an initial focus on physical integrity rights is also of importance since they lay the foundation for the ability to exercise other human rights. People who don't feel that their physical integrity is protected, who live in fear of e.g. forced disappearances, unlawful imprisonments and as in this study torture and political murder, are severely being deprived of the possibility and freedom to exercise other rights, such as the right to speak, move, demonstrate and organize freely. The index might however be considered limited in reach to some extent, as it only measures levels of torture and political killings and ignores other forms of grave human rights abuses. In reality, governments might engage in various forms of human rights violations or even substitute one form with the other.[4]

[2]"Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (*e.g.*, police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups)" (Coppedge et al, 2022, 176).
[3] "Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups)" (Coppedge et al, 2022, 176.)
[4] An example of this substitution is given by Goodman and Jinks (2003), looking at human rights abuses in Latin America in the 70's and 80's. They found that as the use of torture, political imprisonment and unfair trials decreased by Latin American governments, disappearances became a more used form to get rid of "unwanted" people (ibid.).

While physical integrity rights can be referred to as perhaps the most basic negative rights, which restrain in this case the government and its agents from taking certain actions towards their population, this study also aims to broaden the analysis of human rights to include more extensive dimensions of rights as well. In line with previous research (see e.g. Neumayer, 2005), as a second key dependent variable, I have also used certain aspects of *civil liberties* to capture a more broad measurement of human rights. Again, I used two variables from the V-Dem time-series dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022; Pemstein et al., 2022), the *private civil liberties index*[5] and the *political civil liberties index*[6], which respond to Articles 4, 13, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the UDHR (United Nations, 2023). From these, I created an index by summarizing the two indices and rescaling the new index to range from 0 to 1, where 0 displays low respect for these civil liberties and 1 represents high respect. Just as the first key dependent variable, these variables also focus on practices and are based on indicators that reflect government repression of human rights rather than just constitutional and legal rights. In accordance with for example Neumayer (2005), no political rights variable is added to the civil liberties variable, since these rights can be considered too close to the concept of political democracy, whereas the civil liberties included are more related to the UDHR.

4.1.2. Main independent variable - aid data

To operationalize *foreign aid*, I use gross disbursements of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) from all sectors and all OECD DAC donors and multilateral development institutions in the OECD's CRS Aid Activity dataset (OECD, 2023a). ODA is the main source of financing for development aid, and is defined by the OECD as "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of development countries" (OECD, 2021). ODA includes both grants and soft (concessionary) loans and is disbursed to various different sectors such as health, education, governance and civil society. However, it excludes economic flows such as military aid or loans with primarily commercial objectives. I use disbursements of aid as it is more meaningful for the purpose of the study with the actual expenditures as compared to commitments, given that the interest is what impact aid that is actually disbursed has on human rights.

[5] "Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights" (Coppedge et al., 2022, 297)

[6] "Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression", (Coppedge et al., 2022, 297).

For a more intuitive understanding and comparison of the impact of foreign aid in relation to the receiving country, following previous research on foreign aid I calculate foreign aid as per capita by country (Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013; Gafuri, 2022). I divide the ODA received by each country by the World Development Indicator of population (World Bank, 2022) and divide by a thousand, resulting in a variable showing the value of ODA in thousands of 2020 US dollars per capita. Additionally, in the Appendix I present models with ODA calculated as a fraction of the country-specific real GDP (Djankov et al., 2008; Knack, 2004; Jones & Tarp, 2016), using a variable of the real GDP in 2017 US dollars from The Penn World Table database sourced via the QoG dataset (Feenstra et al., 2015; Teorell et al., 2023).[7]

I do not differentiate between bilateral and multilateral aid in the analysis, since there aren't any strong theoretical differences predicted for the impact of aid from bilateral and multilateral donors on human rights in the aid-receiving states. The decision to include both DAC donors and multilateral development agencies also relates to the ambition of this study to expand beyond ODA solely from the governments constituting the DAC. Additionally, the donors included in the analysis represents the by far largest in terms of economic flows. Multilateral organizations and institutions include for example EU and UN institutions, the agencies included in the World Bank Group, various regional and global development banks such as the African Development Bank and the IMF. The study does not include ODA from private donors, nor non-DAC donors[8].

A question that needs to be asked, relating to the interpretation and validity of the results, is to what extent ODA typically targets activities that are related to human rights, and can be expected to have an impact on the stated relationship. If looking at the figures, in 2021 the total ODA from both DAC and multilateral donors disbursed to what the OECD defines as "developing countries" was 205 561.395 million US dollars, whereas the total ODA for the specific sector "Human Rights" delivered to developing countries was only 1 130.283 million US dollars, a mere 0,55% of total ODA (OECD, 2023a). Reasonably, the small part of the total ODA that the human rights sector represents cannot be expected to carry all of the effect of ODA on human rights. However, as mentioned in the introduction, there are many examples

[7] This is done by first adjusting the 2017 measure of the country real GDP to 2020 constant US dollars using the United States Labor Bureau conversion rates (mid-year values) (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2023). The ODA variable is then divided by the adjusted 2020 real GDP, to get a variable of the proportion that ODA constitutes as compared to GDP.
[8] A complete list of bilateral and multilateral donors can be found in the Appendix.

from reality, to mention some the World Bank, SIDA, the EU and Japan, with donors stating that *all* aid should be permeated by and promote human rights principles. These statements and subsequent actions pave a direction in which aid comes not only with conditionalities, but with great expectations of harmonization and positive effects for total aid on human rights. For this reason, the total of gross disbursement has been included in the analysis, but these facts should be taken into account in the interpretation of the results.

4.1.3. Control variables

Deriving from previous research, I include several control variables that I expect can influence the relationship, either by having an impact on the dependent variable(s) *human rights* directly, or by affecting the independent variable *foreign aid*.

Conflict

I include a control variable measuring the extent of *internal and external armed conflicts* in the analysis. It is a control variable commonly used in the literature (see e.g. Gafuri, 2022), since involvement in conflict can be expected to have a negative impact on respect for human rights and conflict can be associated with more extensive human rights abuses. Also, it can be considered of importance for aid inflows, as the level of need tends to be guiding in aid allocations and a country in conflict would be considered to be in greater need. Together with other factors, the conflict variable helps paint a gathered picture of a state's capacity to manage both aid flows and human rights abuses. I use two variables from the UCDP Dyadic dataset (retrieved from the QoG standard dataset), both the internal and the interstate armed conflict variables (Davies et al., 2022; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson, 2022). I combine the variables to display a more comprehensive picture of conflict. Furthermore, as no conflict was coded as a missing value, besides from combining the variables I also recoded the missing values in the variables to take the value of 0. It is not a perfect measurement, since missing values don't need to imply the absence of conflict and caution in the interpretation of the results should thus be taken.

State capacity - governance effectiveness and state authority over territory

A second aspect important to control for is state capacity (see e.g. Rajan and Subramanian, 2007; Dietrich and Murdie, 2017; Cole, 2015). To be able to account for state capacity in the analysis, two different variables have been included. First, the *government effectiveness* variable from the World Bank's Worldwide Indicators of Governance (Kaufmann et al., 2010),

sourced from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2023). It focuses on the government's ability to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods[9], which is considered to have a positive effect on the ability to improve respect for human rights and manage aid inflows. I rescaled the variable to a 0-1 scale for easier interpretation, with 0 representing the lowest government effectiveness and 1 representing the highest government effectiveness. Due to the variety of options in operationalizing state capacity (Vaccaro, 2020), as a robustness check the variable of *rigorous and impartial public administration* from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022) has been included instead of government effectiveness in an alternative model specification in the Appendix (see Gafuri, 2022 for similar modeling). The variable measures to what extent public officials are rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties.

Second, in the main models I include a variable of *state authority over territory* from the V-Dem time-series dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022) as well, which focuses on the state's territorial reach and authority as an aspect of state capacity. It displays over what percentage of the territory the state has effective control, meaning recognized as the preeminent authority. During situations such as civil wars, internal conflict, state failure and situations of criminal territorial control, respect for human rights can be expected to be negatively affected, as can a state's ability to effectively implement and manage aid inflows to these territories, which makes the variable relevant to include in the analysis.

Democracy

Additionally, the level of democracy can be expected to affect both levels of respect for human rights and aid inflows. Higher levels of democracy correspond with the theory about aid conditionality, where democracy level is sometimes treated as a favorable precondition for aid effectiveness and more democratic countries have been found to receive more aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Nielsen, 2013). This makes it plausible to expect democracy to have a positive effect on both respect for human rights and aid inflows. However, using an index of democracy[10] is problematic since these indices usually include civil liberties and correlate too much with the dependent variables. Hence, for this analysis one of the most important aspects of democracy has been controlled for, namely free and fair elections, using the *clean elections*

[9] Specifically, the variable measures the quality of public service provision, quality of bureaucracy, competence of civil servants, independence of the civil service from political pressures and credibility of the government's commitments to policies (Teorell et al., 2023).

[10] E.g. the Hadenius and Teorell (2005) index of the Freedom House and Imputed Polity variables.

index from the V-Dem time-series dataset (Coppedge et al., 2022; Pemstein et al., 2022). It focuses on to what extent elections are free and fair, meaning free from registration fraud, systemic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying and election violence. It ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates that elections are not free and fair, and 1 indicates that elections are fully free and fair.

Socioeconomic aspects - GDP per capita and GDP growth

GDP per capita is the most commonly used variable in the literature to control for socioeconomic development, since it is highly correlated with other development variables such as life expectancy and literacy (Neumayer, 2003). Low GDP per capita can be expected to have a positive effect on aid allocation, but negative effects on respect for human rights. The variable I use is the GDP per capita variable from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2022), accessed through the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2023). The variable is recalculated from 2015 to 2020 US dollars to correspond with the aid data.[11] A logged version of the variable is used to deal with abnormal distribution of observations. Histograms of the distribution before and after logging it can be found in the Appendix.

To further control for development and socioeconomic factors, I include another economic variable, GDP growth rate, which is expected to have a positive effect on respect for human rights. It is also a World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2022), and is accessed through the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2023). It displays the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices, based on constant local currency.

Background factors - infant mortality and population

I also test the relationship under control for two additional background factors: *infant mortality* and *population size*. Both variables come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2022), accessed through the QoG standard dataset (Teorell et al., 2023). The infant mortality variable displays the probability of dying between birth and age 1 per 1000 live births, and is important to control for since it is a common measurement of development. High levels of infant mortality are expected to have a negative impact on human rights, but a positive effect on aid inflows since it displays a reality where a country is in greater

[11] This is done by using the United States Labor Bureau conversion rates (mid-year values) (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2023).

need of foreign aid. Population size is also a common control variable in the relevant literature, as more populated countries often receive less aid in proportion to GNI, GDP and population size for example. The natural logarithmic version of the population variable was used to deal with abnormal distribution of observations. Histograms of the distribution before and after logging it can be found in the Appendix.

4.2. Descriptive statistics – global trends

4.2.1. Human rights trends in aid-receiving countries

Figure 1. Global trends – physical integrity rights



Figure 2. Global trends - civil liberties



Source: Coppedge et al., 2022

Figures 1 and 2 help illustrate a gathered picture of the most recent trends (2002-2021) in respect for human rights in the aid-receiving countries included in the analysis. Figure 1 illustrates that the use of torture and political killings as a way for governments to abuse rights and strike fear into their populations is a quite common practice. Although, respect for human rights was on a slow but steady positive path. In 2011 however, the slightly negative trend we are currently experiencing took speed – people's right to live free from torture and political killings is not being strengthened but rather challenged. This is especially visible for 2019 and 2020. Figure 2 illustrates the same patterns in respect for civil liberties in aid-receiving countries, although with the negative trend being considerably stronger. What can be concluded from these illustrations is that even if we saw a positive development in respect for human rights up until 2011, it is clear that what we are witnessing now is a downward, negative movement. Turning to reports from international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, their call for acknowledgement of an international human rights crisis doesn't seem so abstract. As global norms of respect for these once

considered undeniable rights appear to be on the breakdown, we can ascertain that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch seem to be right, human rights are in crisis. This can be acknowledged in the light of the simultaneous downward trend in for example democracy, where the world is currently experiencing a democratic backsliding (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2022; Boese et al., 2022).

4.2.2. Foreign aid trends in aid-receiving countries

Figure 3. Components of ODA – bilateral (DAC) and multilateral ODA



Source: OECD, 2023b

Figure 4. Bilateral (DAC) ODA to LDCs



Source: OECD, 2023b

Looking at foreign aid trends, the OECD reports that between 2000 and 2022, DAC countries' bilateral ODA almost tripled in volume and multilateral ODA doubled in the same period, as visible in Figure 3. Hence, we see a historic commitment to global development in the aid figures. However, the drastic increase last year was reportedly driven by in-donor refugee costs, mostly due to the war in Ukraine (OECD, 2023b). Looking at disaggregated data, bilateral ODA towards what

the OECD calls 'least developed countries' declined last year by about 0.7% in real terms (OECD, 2023c). As noticed in Figure 4, levels of bilateral ODA to least developed countries have been at similar levels since 2010.

Putting the human rights and aid data in context, Figures 5 and 6 give an illustration of the focal relationship in the thesis, plotting the period (2002-2021) average of each country's foreign aid per capita against its human rights scores. The fitted lines in Figures 5 and 6 show a positive correlation between a country's foreign aid inflows (per capita) and its human rights scores. This indicates a positive relationship between the two, which will be further elaborated in the chapter on results.

Figure 5. Foreign aid by physical violence score



Figure 6. Foreign aid by civil liberties score



Each country's aid inflow (per capita) and physical violence index score averaged over the period 2002-2021. Based on author's calculations.

4.3. Limitations and endogeneity

As discussed in earlier sections, endogeneity can be a serious issue in this study. While I explore the effect of aid on human rights, it is also possible that human rights drive aid. As mentioned, previous literature shows that both a better record of human rights treaty ratification and respect for human rights seem to have a positive effect on aid allocations and are conditional factors important for donors in their aid allocation criterions. If this is the case, then modeling as I have done will potentially produce biased results. However, it could very well be that there is a dynamic, bidirectional relationship between the two: as well as foreign aid could drive human rights, human rights also drive foreign aid. Looking at the reality, it is much more complex than straightforward causal chains, and as well as there are evidence for foreign

aid influencing human rights with conditionalities and donor incentives, we also see a reality where recipient countries are aware of donor expectations and aid rewarding, which could lead to proactive behaviors in changing human rights performance pre aid allocation. This multifaceted reality of course makes it especially difficult to model, since the existence of a more dynamic, perhaps bidirectional, relationship is not possible to "control" away. Hence, in the Appendix I have included a table displaying the statistical analysis of a reversed relationship – the effect of human rights on foreign aid – which will be discussed in the section "Robustness checks".

Regarding limitations, first, for the specific sample I use in the study a primary consideration is the time period. The availability of data for the main explanatory variable (foreign aid) has been guiding in the selection of the time period, as the more comprehensive reporting of disbursements from the OECD only started in 2002, with data available until 2021. Hence, since I apply a one year time lag in the main models (which is discussed below), the time period of focus for this study is 2003-2021. To focus on this period is favorable for the purpose of the study. Very little previous research has focused on this recent time period, which can give a better picture of current donor behaviors. Furthermore, especially relevant for data from before 1990, it might be subject to influence by the Cold War's geopolitics (Jones & Tarp, 2016) and thus in general a poor guide to the realities of the past two decades.

Second, concerning the sample used in the study, even if there were data for more than 160 countries and regions in the OECD aid data, not all of them were included in the analysis. This has to do with the lack of data availability in the main explanatory variable for all 19 years included in the analysis, since some countries were objects of aid reception in the early 2000s, but then stopped receiving aid since they were then considered developed countries.[12] Also, some countries and all regions were excluded from the analysis due to a lack of data in both the dependent variables and the explanatory variables. This might be a problem if there is a bias in what countries were excluded. The countries excluded in this study are mainly very small island nations, such as Dominica, and some "subnational divisions" such as the British Overseas Territories of Turks and Caicos and Saint Helena for example. This of course is a limitation since these countries are not represented in the data, but the aid flows to these nations

[12] Examples of countries are Slovenia and Slovakia, which received aid in 2002 and 2003, but then stopped receiving aid and became DAC members in 2013.

are also relatively small and are not expected to have a very strong influence on the analysis. In the final sample, 121 aid-receiving countries in total have been included.

Third, a limitation when using time-series data is the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, that the value of the dependent variables influences the subsequent years' value. This means that the model will predict some of the values of the dependent variable better than others (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, 234). As expected, when the model specifications were tested for this with a Woolridge test and a Modified Wald test (see Appendix), it showed signs of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. To deal with these problems, Huber-White robust standard errors, clustered by country, were included in all of the regressions. Additionally, in the main models all of the independent variables are included with a one year lag. This is in accordance with previous literature on foreign aid and human rights, but also since theoretically the explanatory variables are expected to come before the dependent variable in time with a time lag in effect. Additionally, alternative models are presented in the Appendix with two, three and four year lags for all independent variables. A further benefit of including time lags is also that it to some extent deals with problems of autocorrelation (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, 254).

Fourth, an additional potential problem with using time-series data is non-stationarity. Unrelated series of data can have similar time trends, and when regressed together risk producing false significant relationships. This potential spuriousness caused by possible global trends in human rights could then misguide our results (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017, 253). To investigate this, unit root tests were carried out for all time-variant variables, which showed no major problems with unit roots (see tests of main variables in Appendix). However, year-specific dummy variables (time-fixed effects) were included in the main models as well, which allows for control for potential time trends and global changes in human rights that could affect all countries equally. Furthermore, the models were tested for multicollinearity, problems of variables correlating too much (ibid., 146-7), but the test showed no sign of multicollinearity (see Appendix). Lastly, when tested for influential observations, Bangladesh was shown to be a potential influential observation for several years. One could argue that outliers should not be excluded from the sampling since these units of analysis also are a part of the real picture and it would be arbitrary to exclude them, but as a robustness check an alternative model

excluding Bangladesh is presented in the Appendix (see Tables 21 and 22), which showed no major differences from the main models.

5. Results

This chapter presents the results from the statistical analyses for both key dependent variables, as well as robustness checks and alternative model specifications. It is concluded with a summary of the results.

5.1. Regression results – dependent variable: physical integrity rights

In Table 1, the results from the fixed effects regressions with physical integrity rights as dependent variable are presented. From the table, what is clear is that foreign aid disbursed one year earlier is associated with an increase in respect for human rights, measured as respect for physical integrity rights, a relationship that is constant in all five models presented in the table. Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between foreign aid and respect for physical integrity rights. It shows a positive, statistically significant effect ($p<0.001$), and suggests that a 1000 US dollar increase in foreign aid per capita is associated with a 0.174 increase in the scale for respect for physical integrity rights (scale 0-1). However, there are several factors that could be thought to affect the relationship, which is visible in the later models presenting the control variables. In Model 2 the relationship under control for the socioeconomic variables, GDP per capita and GDP growth, and the background factors, infant mortality and population size, is presented, which illustrates a rather unchanged coefficient of 0.178, still statistically significant at a 95% level. When introducing three more control variables in Model 3, the conflict variable and the state capacity variables governance effectiveness and state authority over territory, the main relationship is stronger. In Model 3 we see that a one percent increase in state control over territory is associated with almost a 0.004 increase in respect for human rights. Furthermore, holding the control variables in Model 3 constant, a 1000 US dollar increase in foreign aid per capita is associated with a 0.188 increase in respect for physical integrity rights. Models 4 and 5 display the full model specification with all control variables, introducing democracy (free and fair elections) as a control as well, with the difference between the models that Model 5 also account for time-fixed effects, where I have included time dummies for all the years of analysis to further control for global time trends. Interestingly, when presenting the democracy variable, the main relationship becomes considerably weaker, telling us that the

relationship is to a great extent driven by democracy. In Model 5 we can see that the main relationship is still statistically significant at p<0.05. It shows that when all control variables are held constant, a 1000 US dollar per capita increase in foreign aid is associated with a 0.131 increase on the 0-1 scale of respect for physical integrity rights. Model 5 also shows the association between democracy (free and fair elections) and respect for human rights. A one unit change in the democracy variable is associated with a 0.28 increase on the scale for respect for physical integrity.

Table 1: effect of foreign aid (p. c.) on respect for physical integrity rights

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.174***	0.178**	0.188**	0.121*	0.131*
	(0.0372)	(0.0676)	(0.0657)	(0.0496)	(0.0538)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0328	0.0149	0.00226	0.00218
		(0.0360)	(0.0382)	(0.0323)	(0.0369)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000653	0.000235	0.0000684	-0.0000665
		(0.000593)	(0.000541)	(0.000506)	(0.000571)
L.Infant mortality		-0.00175	-0.00173	-0.00137	-0.00137
		(0.00110)	(0.00106)	(0.000985)	(0.000996)
L.Population (log)		-0.0783	-0.0679	-0.0806	-0.0754
		(0.0866)	(0.0864)	(0.0787)	(0.0938)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00701	-0.00885	-0.00910
			(0.00857)	(0.00748)	(0.00742)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.0173	-0.0441	-0.0431
			(0.129)	(0.110)	(0.111)
L.State authority over territory			0.00378**	0.00304**	0.00305**
			(0.00118)	(0.000953)	(0.000970)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.279***	0.278***
				(0.0510)	(0.0514)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.601***	1.674	1.315	1.567	1.483
	(0.00338)	(1.384)	(1.375)	(1.257)	(1.566)
r2	0.0100	0.0323	0.0650	0.176	0.178
Observations	2273	2236	2232	2232	2232
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

5.2. Regression results - dependent variable: civil liberties

Turning to Table 2, the results from the fixed effects regressions with respect for civil liberties as the dependent variable are presented. What we initially can ascertain is that the results in Table 2 support the results in Table 1 – also here we see that foreign aid disbursed one year earlier is associated with an increase in respect for human rights, only this time measured as respect for civil liberties. This relationship is also in Table 2 constant for all the models presented. Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship, a positive, statistically significant ($p<0.001$) effect of foreign aid on respect for civil liberties, which suggests that a 1000 US dollar per capita increase in foreign aid is associated with a 0.135 increase on the scale (0-1) of respect for civil liberties. When controlling for other factors that could impact the relationship, we see that in both Model 2 which displays the relationship under control for GDP per capita, GDP growth, infant mortality and population, and Model 3 which additionally controls for conflict, government effectiveness and state authority over territory, the relationship is still positive and statistically significant (at $p<0.01$), with the coefficient rather unchanged at 0.144 and 0.143 respectively. In Model 4 however, when additionally introducing democracy (free and fair elections) as a control, we see that even if the coefficient is still positive and statistically significant ($p<0.05$), the effect becomes significantly smaller, showing that a 1000 US dollar per capita increase in foreign aid is associated with a 0.0749 increase in respect for civil liberties on the 0-1 scale. The relationship also holds with control for time trends, introducing time-fixed effects in Model 5, resulting in a coefficient of 0.0729. In Models 4 and 5, we also see that an increase in the scale for democracy (0-1 scale) is associated with a 0.284 increase in respect for civil liberties. The conclusions we can draw from comparing the two tables and different measures of human rights, are that the effect of foreign aid is much stronger on physical integrity rights (Table 1) as compared to civil liberties (Table 2). Also that democracy is strongly and consistently associated with higher levels of human rights, as expected from the literature. But the perhaps most important conclusion from these two tables is that foreign aid is positively and statistically significantly associated with higher levels of human rights.

Table 2: effect of foreign aid (p. c.) on respect for civil liberties

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.135***	0.144**	0.143**	0.0749*	0.0729*
	(0.0274)	(0.0456)	(0.0444)	(0.0290)	(0.0321)
L.GDP per capita (log)		-0.00597	-0.00294	-0.0158	-0.0250
		(0.0348)	(0.0369)	(0.0285)	(0.0362)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000561	0.000307	0.000137	-0.000201
		(0.000381)	(0.000340)	(0.000295)	(0.000314)
L.Infant mortality		-0.000477	-0.000472	-0.000110	0.000166
		(0.000913)	(0.000907)	(0.000775)	(0.000780)
L.Population (log)		-0.0864	-0.0920	-0.105*	-0.0875
		(0.0597)	(0.0587)	(0.0494)	(0.0597)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00647	-0.00834	-0.00941
			(0.00696)	(0.00594)	(0.00596)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.113	-0.140†	-0.116
			(0.113)	(0.0743)	(0.0726)
L.State authority over territory			0.00165	0.000897	0.000798
			(0.00157)	(0.00137)	(0.00133)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.284***	0.284***
				(0.0426)	(0.0426)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.645***	2.104*	2.070*	2.326**	2.092†
	(0.00250)	(0.980)	(0.985)	(0.844)	(1.105)
r2	0.0111	0.0280	0.0439	0.253	0.276
Observations	2273	2236	2232	2232	2232
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

5.3. Robustness checks and alternative model specifications

For robustness checks, to begin I try the relationship using alternative statistical estimators. In the Appendix (Table 3 and 4), I present models with both respect for physical integrity rights and civil liberties as dependent variables but using both a pooled OLS and a random effects estimator. Both these tables display similar results: a positive, statistically significant effect of foreign aid on human rights. The pooled OLS estimator however shows somewhat stronger

results. With all control variables included and time-fixed effects, a 1000 US dollar per capita increase in foreign aid is associated with a 0.295 increase in the scale of the physical integrity rights variable ($p<0.05$) one year later, whereas the strength of the beta coefficient using random effects is very similar to the main model specification in Table 1; a 1000 US dollar increase per capita is associated with a 0.138 increase on the physical integrity rights scale ($p<0.01$) one year later. For civil liberties, just as in the main models the effect reported using pooled OLS and random effects is somewhat more modest: a beta coefficient of 0.174 respectively 0.0793. For civil liberties we see some differences in the significance level, with results with pooled OLS not reaching the acceptable significance level of 95%, whereas the random effects model does so ($p<0.05$). In conclusion however, the direction and strength of the effect are similar for alternative statistical estimators, and the results can be considered robust.

Going further, as an additional robustness check I try models with alternative variables. First, in Table 5 in the Appendix I use an alternative measurement instead of government effectiveness, the *rigorous and impartial public administration* variable. Using this instead, for physical integrity rights the results are robust. With all control variables and time-fixed effects included, the effect of foreign aid is still positive and statistically significant ($p<0.05$), although somewhat weaker than in the main models with a beta coefficient of 0.0856. Also, state authority over territory is no longer statistically significant, but the rigorous and impartial public administration variable is. Looking at the effect on civil liberties (Table 6 in the Appendix), including all control variables and time-fixed effects it shows a positive relationship, however only statistically significant at a 90% level ($p<0.1$). Second, in the Appendix I also introduce an alternative model specification with foreign aid measured as a fraction of GDP (see Table 7 and 8 in the Appendix). When looking at the relationship with respect for physical integrity rights, the effect is also positive and statistically significant at $p<0.001$, with a one unit increase in foreign aid as a fraction of GDP associated with a 0.327 increase in the physical integrity rights scale, which shows that results are robust to different operationalizations of foreign aid. Looking at civil liberties the effect of foreign aid (fraction of GDP) is smaller, which corresponds with the results in the main models presented above. When including all the control variables, foreign aid as a fraction of GDP is only associated with a 0.136 increase in respect for civil liberties, significant at $p<0.05$ (Model 4). However, when introducing time-fixed effects (Table 8 Model 5), the relationship loses statistical

significance. Instead, only democracy and state authority over territory have a statistically significant effect on respect for civil liberties at $p<0.001$. Third, following previous studies (e.g. Carnegie & Marinov, 2017), I include a model specification with the logged version of foreign aid per capita in the Appendix, which showed no major differences in results (Table 9 and 10). In sum, the results on physical integrity rights can be considered slightly more robust to alternative models than the results of the effect of foreign aid on civil liberties.

Additionally, the relationship was also tested for various different time lags. Whereas the main models are presented with a one year time lag, in Table 11-16 in the Appendix, models with time lags ranging from two to four years can be found for both dependent variables. What can be said from these tables is that the effect of foreign aid doesn't seem to be very long-lived, but more immediate. The effect of foreign aid on human rights declines sharply over time, for each year increased in lag. Although, these results have to be taken only as indications, as for the analysis of the effect on the physical integrity rights, for two years lag, results are only statistically significant at a 90% level ($p<0.1$), which is not within the acceptable significance level. For three and four years lag the effect is not statistically significant at all and no effect at all can be confirmed. For civil liberties, in the main models the effect is not statistically significant for any of the different time lags. What can be said from these results is that the effect of foreign aid on human rights cannot be confirmed for aid given more than one year earlier.

Finally, in the Appendix I also include regression models for each region.[13] The relationship between foreign aid per capita and respect for human rights (physical integrity rights) is statistically significant at $p<0.01$ for Latin America and the Caribbean and at $p<0.05$ for the Sub-Saharan Africa region. For Eastern Europe and post-Soviet region and the MENA region however, results are not significantly robust (see Table 17 in the Appendix). Looking at civil liberties (Table 18 in the Appendix), the effect of foreign aid on civil liberties is significantly robust at $p<0.01$ for Latin America. For Eastern Europe and post-Soviet and MENA regions, results are only statistically significant at $p<0.1$, and for Sub-Saharan Africa results are not statistically significant. These results should be taken carefully due to few observations, but they do however indicate that it seems that there are regional differences in the impact of foreign aid, also on human rights.

[13] Except for Asia, due to insufficient observations.

5.3.1. Endogeneity

To address the issue of endogeneity between foreign aid and human rights, I re-ran the main models (Table 1 and 2), but using foreign aid per capita as dependent variable and human rights (both physical integrity rights and civil liberties) as the main independent variable (see Table 19 and 20 in the Appendix). The results show a positive, statistically significant relationship between respect for human rights and foreign aid. This indicates that, as previously mentioned, there is a possibility that human rights also drive foreign aid allocation. This is not a new notion, but rather something that has been established in previous literature (see e.g. Neumayer, 2003; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Nielsen, 2013). However, as before mentioned, what this adds to our knowledge, taking also the results presented in Table 1 and 2 from this study into consideration, is that perhaps the relationship between the two is more dynamic than before shown; human rights have an effect on foreign aid and aid allocation, but as shown in this study, foreign aid also has an effect on human rights.

5.4. Summary of results

The first hypothesis (H1) in this paper stated that foreign aid has a positive effect on respect for human rights. Based on the results presented in Table 1 and 2, H1 can be confirmed, thus rejecting the second hypothesis (H2) which stated that foreign aid has a negative effect on human rights. My findings go in line with the scarce previous research on foreign aid and human rights (Carnegie & Marinov, 2017), in line with expectations derived from research on foreign aid and its effect on related issues (Gafuri, 2022; Kersting & Kilby, 2014; Jones & Tarp, 2016), and additionally in line with donor community discourse (see e.g. Sida, 2006; World Bank, 1998; Furuoka, 2005). My findings are however inconsistent with previous findings of foreign aid having a negative effect on for example democracy (Askarov & Doucouliagos, 2013), and also inconsistent with previous analyses that fail to find any relationship at all (Knack, 2004). Contemplating on the main research question which has been guiding in this thesis, "*what effect does foreign aid have on human rights?"*, the fast and perhaps most important answer is that this study concludes that foreign aid has a positive effect on human rights. The more interesting answer though is that the results also tell of a more nuanced reality.

Starting off with the control variables, state control of territory and democracy both have a statistically significant, positive effect on respect for human rights. Having a more extensive

control over territory has a positive effect on respect for human rights, which is consistent with the theory about higher state capacity having a positive influence on human rights (Cole, 2015). This was also shown in the alternative models that looked specifically at rigorous and impartial public administration. One might reflect on what states might have low control of territory and administration, for example states characterized by conflict. Conflict would affect this control and in the longer perspective also make it harder to maintain higher levels of human rights in such a context. The understanding of the results for this control variable is thus quite intuitive.

As for the democracy variable, what both Table 1, Table 2 and all of the models tell us is that when levels of democracy are higher (elections are free and fair), so is respect for human rights. It is noticeably the strongest, most influential control variable, and a driving factor in the relationship. This is consistent with previous literature, which both has shown that foreign aid has an effect on democracy (Gafuri, 2022; Kersting & Kilby, 2014), that states that have higher democracy levels typically receive more aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000), but also that democracy is a favorable condition for succeeding in improving human rights (Neumayer, 2005). The important role that democracy plays is interesting, but displays a complexity in the light of current global developments. Results in this thesis indicate that there is political will and compliance with global norms, expressed through foreign aid. But we also see before us a reality with a world order shaking in its foundations and which in many ways is questioning a system we have both leaned and counted on. The world is experiencing a third wave of autocratization with more autocracies than democracies globally and a strong upswing of far-right populism. Besides the direct effects we see in human rights violations in contemporary conflicts and from repressive governments, one can only ask what this will do for human rights also in the long run, given the strong connection between democracy and human rights.

Looking further at the results in this study, the results I find, taken together with both previous literature but also with the results in the endogeneity test which show the reversed effect, are interesting. Not only does foreign aid have an effect on human rights, but human rights also have an effect on foreign aid. The results show a nuanced picture, displaying a more dynamic, non-static relationship between foreign aid and human rights than before proven. This is interesting, since it indicates that both incentives and mechanisms are important for the effects of aid. For example, having a better human rights (and democratic) performance might attract higher aid inflows, but, receiving more aid also spurs greater respect for human rights. It gives

hints of a possible bidirectional relationship between the two, of a relationship that goes "back and forth" in a sense, and that is affected by both donor and recipient incentives. This opens up for the possibility to better understand the mechanisms by which this works, and is something to investigate further in future research.

Finally, what is also noticeable comparing Table 1 and Table 2 is that the effect of foreign aid on physical integrity rights, the most basic human rights, is stronger than on civil liberties. One can only reason about why this is so. One explanation could be that foreign aid is also allocated to countries with low respect for civil liberties, autocracies for example, and might thus not have a strong effect on these rights more closely related to the concept of democracy, but still on basic human rights. Reflecting more upon the character of the rights, in a sense respect for civil liberties might be more robust and a consequence of more long-going processes of development and democratic change. Respect for civil liberties seems less volatile and can thus be expected to be less affected by foreign aid. Respect for physical integrity rights on the other hand might be less steady and hence more easily affected by foreign aid. This could also have to do with the fact that physical integrity rights are more closely related to human rights violations that we see in for example conflict, and can then be expected to fluctuate more.

Considering possible limitations with the results, a first reflection is on the robustness. In this thesis, I have put foreign aid and human rights to a very hard test, controlling for numerous factors that could influence a great deal, such as democracy. Still, the statistically significant, positive effect of foreign aid on human rights remains. This is a strong indication of the strength of the results. Important to reflect upon though, is that the main models did show signs of both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, problems that were treated accordingly, but can still have had an influence on the results. Concerning the model specification, I have tested for a linear relationship, which might be somewhat arbitrary. Can the relationship really be expected to be linear? Most probably not, which of course is a consideration for future studies. Also, considering alternative models, results were more robust for physical integrity than for civil liberties. This should also be taken into consideration when observing the results. To conclude, one of the strengths of this study is that it takes on a broad perspective on aid and human rights. Looking at the relationship from a perspective as broad as I have, we see a positive effect of foreign aid. But this is also one of the limitations, since it tells little of the possible mechanisms behind the relationship. It paves the way for future studies that can investigate this further.

6. Concluding discussion

The year 2023 marks the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a declaration which was adopted to defend those rights that all of us have the obligation to protect and promote. But the anniversary coincides with a period in recent history where human suffering is greater than in a long time. Looking at the situation in Ukraine, Tigray, Colombia and Iran, these are only a few examples of a global actuality that has led human rights organizations such as Amnesty International to alert for a global human rights crisis. Parallelly, we see the integration of human rights considerations in various spheres, not the least in foreign aid. Promoting human rights is often identified as not only a common goal for the aid community, but also a perspective that should permeate all aid. Given this, a necessary question to be asked, which has been the focus of this thesis, is if foreign aid really succeeds in this – does foreign aid promote human rights?

Specifically, in this thesis I have tested the effect of foreign aid on respect for human rights, particularly respect for physical integrity rights and civil liberties, in aid-receiving countries. This was done in accordance with the theoretical framework and previous research asserting that there is a strong connection between foreign aid and human rights. Whereas previous studies mostly focus on the impact of human rights on foreign aid, the theoretical approach I employ explores the reverse relationship – how foreign aid affects human rights. This since foreign aid has been proven to have an impact on related themes such as democracy and QoG, and there are strong indications that it could also have an effect on human rights. What this effect might be however, where theory suggests both possible positive and negative impacts of foreign aid, has not been investigated in the same magnitude as in this study before. Hence, in comparison to previous research, I contribute by providing a more comprehensive analysis than previously done, both temporally and by including more countries, as well as a more complete picture of international aid flows.

Using human rights data from the V-Dem dataset and data on gross disbursements of total ODA from the CRS OECD's dataset, my analysis is based on the most recent human rights and aid data, focusing on the period 2003-2021. I find that the total foreign aid inflows to aid-receiving countries are associated with an improvement in respect for human rights. This relationship is especially robust when looking at the most basic human rights, physical integrity rights – the right of every citizen to live a life free from torture and political killings. However,

there are also strong indications that foreign aid also has an effect on respect for more general civil liberties such as freedom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom of association.

The results found in this study show the importance of continued, strong commitment from donors. It shows that donor incentives and actions matter, and that foreign aid could function as a mechanism to improve not only development and democracy, but also human rights in aid-receiving countries. As displayed in the theory section, there are those arguing that aid to repressive and human rights abusing states might do more harm than good. This thesis has proven that this is not the case. Looking at the effect of total aid flows to 121 aid-receiving countries, from all bilateral and multilateral donors, the overall effect of foreign aid is positive. Hence, it shows the importance not only of donor incentives and action for human rights, but also of continued support in the form of foreign aid more generally. Additionally, it is important to remember that aid targets many other spheres as well, such as social, economic, and ecological sectors. This thesis might have a more instrumental focus on aid, examining its effects, but aid also has a strong normative aspect. It is also an act of international solidarity. Keeping this in mind, one should acknowledge that its solidary and global commitment to human development, welfare and wellbeing, reach well beyond the findings of this thesis.

Even if this thesis constitutes an important contribution to the foreign aid-human rights nexus, there are still many remaining questions about the effects of foreign aid, as well as about the potential of foreign aid as an improver of human rights globally. Especially in light of the political discourse and the donor community's motivations to contribute to a world where human rights are more extensively respected. This thesis has provided proof for the positive effects of foreign aid on human rights. Now that we know this, further questions come to light. Future research should seek to identify the mechanism behind the relationship and further explore the effects of commonly used aid practices. For example, does aid sanctioning have an effect on the behavior of human rights abusing states? Is aid rewarding really an effective strategy for incentivizing better human rights performance? Is the application of aid conditionalities motivated in the light of human rights outcomes? Moreover, it is also necessary to further explore under which conditions foreign aid is most effective in promoting human rights. Looking at previous research there are indications that levels of for example democracy, QoG and effective bureaucracy is important for an effective implementation of foreign aid, is this also true for the impact of foreign aid on human rights?

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Appendix

Recipients and donors included in analysis 47
Aid-receiving countries included: 47
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Appendix

Recipients and donors included in analysis

Aid-receiving countries included:			
Afghanistan	Dominican Republic	Lesotho	Senegal
Albania	Ecuador	Liberia	Serbia
Algeria	Egypt	Libya	Seychelles
Angola	El Salvador	Madagascar	Sierra Leone
Argentina	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Solomon Islands
Armenia	Eritrea	Malaysia	Somalia
Azerbaijan	Eswatini	Maldives	South Africa
Bangladesh	Ethiopia	Mali	Sri Lanka
Belarus	Fiji	Mauritania	Sudan
Benin	Gabon	Mauritius	Suriname
Bhutan	Gambia	Mexico	Syrian Arab Republic
Bolivia	Georgia	Moldova	Tajikistan
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ghana	Mongolia	Tanzania
Botswana	Guatemala	Montenegro	Thailand
Brazil	Guinea	Morocco	Timor-Leste
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique	Togo
Burundi	Guyana	Myanmar	Tunisia
Cambodia	Haiti	Namibia	Turkey
Cameroon	Honduras	Nepal	Turkmenistan
Cape Verde	India	Nicaragua	Uganda
Central African Republic	Indonesia	Niger	Ukraine
Chad	Iran	Nigeria	Uruguay
Chile	Iraq	North Macedonia	Uzbekistan
China	Ivory Coast	Pakistan	Vanuatu
Colombia	Jamaica	Panama	Vietnam
Comoros	Jordan	Papua New Guinea	Yemen
Congo	Kazakhstan	Paraguay	Zambia
Costa Rica	Kenya	Peru	Zimbabwe
Cuba	Kyrgyzstan	Philippines	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Rwanda	
Djibouti	Lebanon	Sao Tome and Principe	

Multilateral donors included:

EU Institutions	**World Bank Group, total:**
International Monetary Fund (concessional trust funds)	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
	International Development Association (IDA)
Regional Development Banks, total:	International Finance Corporation (IFC)
African Development Bank (AfDB)	
African Development Fund (AfDF)	**Other Multilaterals, total:**
Asian Development Bank (AsDB)	Adaptation Fund
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)
IDB Invest	Arab Fund (AFESD)
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)	Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB)
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)	Center of Excellence in Finance (CEF)
Caribbean Development Bank (CarDB)	Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)	Climate Investment Funds (CIF)
Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)	Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)
International Investment Bank (IIB)	Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)	Global Fund
New Development Bank (NDB)	Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)
North American Development Bank (NADB)	Green Climate Fund (GCF)
	International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP)
United Nations, total:	Montreal Protocol
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)	Nordic Development Fund (NDF)
IFAD	OPEC Fund for International Development (OPEC Fund)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	OSCE
International Labour Organisation (ILO)	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)	WTO – International Trade Centre (ITC)
UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)	
UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF)	
UNAIDS	
UNDP	
UNECE	
UNEP	
UNFPA	
UNHCR	
UNICEF	
UNRWA	
WFP	
WHO – Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan (SPRP)	
World Health Organisation (WHO)	
World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO)	

Bilateral donors – DAC countries – included:	
Australia	Korea (South)
Austria	Luxembourg
Belgium	Netherlands
Canada	New Zealand
Czech Republic	Norway
Denmark	Poland
Finland	Portugal
France	Slovak Republic
Germany	Slovenia
Greece	Spain
Hungary	Sweden
Iceland	Switzerland
Ireland	United Kingdom
Italy	United States
Japan	

Descriptive statistics

Variable	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Physical violence index	2273	0.6143788	0.2667792	0.017	0.983
Civil liberties	2273	0.655077	0.2404555	0.012	0.965
Foreign aid (per capita), 1000 US dollars	2273	0.0754382	0.0885598	0.0009535	1.008524
Conflict (internal and interstate)	2273	0.2899252	0.8354859	0	8
Governance effectiveness	2269	0.3870396	0.1285832	0.0010701	0.7597021
State authority over territory	2273	89.45918	10.93659	31.111	100
Democracy (free and fair elections)	2273	0.4311311	0.2763386	0	0.972
GDP per capita (log)	2239	7.81345	0.9918868	5.623882	9.779131
GDP growth	2236	4.052309	5.797577	-50.33852	86.82675
Population (log)	2273	16.0995	1.713489	11.32025	21.06763
Infant mortality	2273	37.20803	25.14026	1.95	132.92
Year	2273	2012.026	5.444357	2003	2021

Correlation matrix

	Physical violence index	Civil liberties	Foreign aid (per capita)	Foreign aid (fraction of GDP)	Conflict (internal and interstate)	GDP per capita (log)	GDP growth	Infant mortality	Population (log)	Democracy (free and fair elections)	Government effectiveness	State authority over territory
Physical violence index	1.0000											
Civil liberties	0.7871	1.0000										
Foreign aid (per capita)	0.2480	0.2039	1.0000									
Foreign aid (fraction of GDP)	0.0133	0.0925	0.5622	1.0000								
Conflict (internal and interstate)	-0.2384	-0.1755	-0.1805	-0.0876	1.0000							
GDP per capita (log)	0.3498	0.1636	-0.0476	-0.5248	-0.1296	1.0000						
GDP growth	-0.0191	-0.0631	-0.0056	0.0287	-0.0117	-0.0678	1.0000					
Infant mortality	-0.3264	-0.1432	-0.0345	0.4363	0.1024	-0.7005	0.0877	1.0000				
Population (log)	-0.2898	-0.1863	-0.5086	-0.1715	0.4141	-0.1391	0.0750	0.0418	1.0000			
Democracy (free and fair elections)	0.7406	0.7392	0.1435	-0.0529	-0.0826	0.3949	-0.0532	-0.3658	-0.1337	1.0000		
Government effectiveness	0.4736	0.3458	0.0260	-0.3131	-0.0619	0.6062	0.0264	-0.6056	-0.0480	0.5335	1.0000	
State authority over territory	0.2521	0.1354	0.0662	-0.0888	-0.2410	0.2646	0.1561	-0.3223	-0.1289	0.1978	0.4301	1.0000

Distribution of GDP/capita before and after log transformation

Graph to the left showing the variable before being logged, and graph to the rights showing the variable after being log transformed.





Distribution of population before and after log transformation

Graph to the left showing the variable before being logged, and graph to the rights showing the variable after being log transformed.



Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier tests for random effects

Dependent variable *physical violence index*:

To see if data can be pooled. The test result is significant which means that data cannot be pooled (pooled OLS). Random effects the best way to continue.

Estimated results:	Var	sd = sqrt (Var)
Physical violence index	0.0698786	0.2643457
e	0.0068649	0.0828547
u	0.0210105	0.14495

Test: Var(u) = 0

chibar2(01) = 9667.83

Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000

Dependent variable *civil liberties*:

To see if data can be pooled. The test result is significant which means that data cannot be pooled (pooled OLS). Random effects the best way to continue.

Estimated results:	Var	sd = sqrt (Var)
Civil liberties	0.0570714	0.2388963
e	0.0033642	0.0580015
u	0.0206644	0.1437513

Test: Var(u) = 0

chibar2(01) = 11416.43

Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000

Hausmann tests

Dependent variable *physical violence index*:

Significant test, meaning that the coefficients in the two models are significantly different in the regression, which tells me that fixed effects is preferred over a random effects model.

Test of H0: Difference in coefficient is not systematic

Chi2 (9)	= (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
	= 87.63
Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

Dependent variable *civil liberties*:

Significant test, meaning that the coefficients in the two models are significantly different in the regression, which tells me that fixed effects is preferred over a random effects model.

Test of H0: Difference in coefficient is not systematic

Chi2 (9)	= (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
	= 594.56
Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

Autocorrelation – Woolridge tests

Dependent variable *physical violence index*:

Wooldridge test for AR(1) autocorrelation in panel data. Highly significant, telling us we have autocorrelation.

H0 = no first-order autocorrelation

F(1, 120)	= 332.631
Prop > F	= 0.0000

Dependent variable *civil liberties*:

Wooldridge test for AR(1) autocorrelation in panel data. Highly significant, telling us we have autocorrelation.

H0 = no first-order autocorrelation

F(1, 120)	= 449.833
Prop > F	= 0.0000

Heteroskedasticity – Modified Wald tests

Dependent variable *physical violence index:*

Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model.

H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i

Chi2 (121)	= 11178.48
Prop > chi2	= 0.0000

Dependent variable *civil liberties*:

Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model.

H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i

Chi2 (121)	= 2890.28
Prop > chi2	= 0.0000

Distribution of residuals



Unit root tests

Fisher-type unit root test for key dependent variable *physical violence index:*

The Z-test shows signs of unit roots. However, since the units of analysis in the sample are countries, and not individuals for example, we can think of the N's as "finite", meaning that, countries with random features is not realistically going to be added to the sample like if applying random sampling. Hence, the P-test can be trusted and the analysis proceed. Furthermore, caution in the results of these test should be taken, since fisher unit root test are more appropriate in giving robust results for T>20. In this study, T =19.

Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, with time trends included

		Statistics	P-value
Inverse chi-squared(242)	P	398.0578	0.0000
Inverse normal	Z	-0.9819	0.1631
Inverse logit t(584)	L*	-3.2045	0.0007
Modified inv. Chi-squared	Pm	7.0935	0.0000

Fisher-type unit root test for key dependent variable *civil liberties*:

The Z- and L-test shows signs of unit roots. However, since the units of analysis in the sample are countries, and not individuals for example, we can think of the N's as "finite", meaning that, countries with random features is not realistically going to be added to the sample like if applying random sampling. Hence, the P-test can be trusted and the analysis proceed. Furthermore, caution in the results of these test should be taken, since fisher unit root test are more appropriate in giving robust results for T>20. In this study, T =19.

Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, with time trends included

		Statistics	P-value
Inverse chi-squared(242)	P	285.5198	0.0287
Inverse normal	Z	3.6202	0.9999
Inverse logit t(589)	L*	2.1265	0.9831
Modified inv. Chi-squared	Pm	1.9782	0.0240

Fisher-type unit root test for main independent variable *foreign aid (per capita)*:

All test are significant, no signs of unit roots. We have stationarity.

Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests

		Statistics	P-value
Inverse chi-squared(242)	P	425.3615	0.0000
Inverse normal	Z	-5.0020	0.0000
Inverse logit t(609)	L*	-5.2103	0.0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared	Pm	8.3346	0.0000

VIF test for multicollinearity

Dependent variable *physical violence index*:

No signs of multicollinearity, since no VIF was higher than 5.

Variable	**VIF**	**1/VIF**
GDP per capita (log)	2.44	0.410446
Government effectiveness	2.34	0.427210
Infant mortality	2.32	0.431520
Population (log)	1.76	0.568003
Foreign aid (per capita)	1.55	0.645174
Democracy (free and fair elections)	1.47	0.678885
State authority over territory	1.38	0.726092
Conflict (internal and interstate)	1.25	0.799264
GDP growth (annual %)	1.05	0.954870
Mean VIF	1.73	

Dependent variable *civil liberties*:

No signs of multicollinearity, since no VIF was higher than 5.

Variable	**VIF**	**1/VIF**
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Conflict (internal and interstate)	1.25	0.799264
GDP growth (annual %)	1.05	0.954870
Mean VIF	1.73	

Outliers

By plotting the residuals we can detect if there are any outliers present in the data. However, no such systematic outliers can be identified.



Cook's Distance test for influential observations

Here we can see that Bangladesh stands out as a somewhat influential observations. This should not affect the analysis considerably due to the use of fixed effects, but nevertheless an alternative model without Bangladesh is presented later in the Appendix (Table 21 and 22).



Alternative models and robustness checks:

Table 3: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for physical integrity rights – pooled OLS and random effects

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 6 Pooled OLS	Model 7 Pooled OLS	Model 8 Pooled OLS	Model 9 Random effects	Model 10 Random effects	Model 11 Random effects
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.869***	0.289*	0.295*	0.189***	0.123*	0.138**
	(0.0605)	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.0370)	(0.0486)	(0.0515)
L.GDP per capita (log)		-0.00278	-0.00283		0.00557	0.0107
		(0.0254)	(0.0256)		(0.0247)	(0.0244)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000434	0.000262		0.000130	-0.000106
		(0.000981)	(0.00111)		(0.000472)	(0.000543)
L.Infant mortality		0.0000545	0.0000386		-0.000774	-0.00107
		(0.000750)	(0.000795)		(0.000623)	(0.000712)
L.Population (log)		-0.0187*	-0.0184*		-0.0349***	-0.0315***
		(0.00890)	(0.00907)		(0.00940)	(0.00898)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)		-0.0347**	-0.0349**		-0.0101	-0.0103
		(0.0110)	(0.0110)		(0.00725)	(0.00719)
L.Government effectiveness		0.243†	0.242†		0.0189	0.00910
		(0.141)	(0.144)		(0.104)	(0.105)
L.State authority over territory		0.000524	0.000520		0.00279**	0.00272**
		(0.00135)	(0.00136)		(0.000864)	(0.000870)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)		0.597***	0.597***		0.311***	0.310***
		(0.0518)	(0.0522)		(0.0489)	(0.0493)
Time-fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.549***	0.524†	0.519†	0.602***	0.764**	0.698**
	(0.00704)	(0.278)	(0.279)	(0.0219)	(0.268)	(0.262)
r2	0.0833	0.595	0.595			
Observations	2273	2232	2232	2273	2232	2232
Countries		121	121		121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 4: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for civil liberties – pooled OLS and random effects

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 6 Pooled OLS	Model 7 Pooled OLS	Model 8 Pooled OLS	Model 9 Random effects	Model 10 Random effects	Model 11 Random effects
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.613***	0.169†	0.174†	0.141***	0.0738*	0.0793*
	(0.0555)	(0.0884)	(0.0903)	(0.0273)	(0.0295)	(0.0322)
L.GDP per capita (log)		-0.0244	-0.0252		-0.0122	-0.00718
		(0.0210)	(0.0211)		(0.0241)	(0.0255)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		-0.00110	-0.00185†		0.000227	-0.000292
		(0.000782)	(0.000978)		(0.000268)	(0.000291)
L.Infant mortality		0.00140†	0.00132		0.000806	0.000498
		(0.000785)	(0.000838)		(0.000601)	(0.000640)
L.Population (log)		-0.00516	-0.00449		-0.0280**	-0.0205*
		(0.00813)	(0.00828)		(0.00904)	(0.00927)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)		-0.0305*	-0.0310*		-0.00914	-0.00993†
		(0.0128)	(0.0130)		(0.00578)	(0.00569)
L.Government effectiveness		0.186†	0.183		-0.0844	-0.0779
		(0.111)	(0.113)		(0.0710)	(0.0692)
L.State authority over territory		-0.00120	-0.00125		0.000774	0.000520
		(0.00128)	(0.00129)		(0.00134)	(0.00135)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)		0.640***	0.641***		0.303***	0.305***
		(0.0464)	(0.0464)		(0.0406)	(0.0408)
Time-fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.609***	0.640*	0.637*	0.645***	1.000**	0.870**
	(0.00646)	(0.253)	(0.257)	(0.0206)	(0.311)	(0.330)
r2	0.0510	0.576	0.580			
Observations	2273	2232	2232	2273	2232	2232
Countries		121	121		121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 5: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for physical integrity rights – alternative variable *rigorous and impartial public administration*

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.174***	0.178**	0.113*	0.0851*	0.0856*
	(0.0372)	(0.0676)	(0.0440)	(0.0373)	(0.0402)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0328	0.00478	-0.00289	-0.0209
		(0.0360)	(0.0242)	(0.0238)	(0.0295)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000653	-0.000266	-0.000280	-0.000406
		(0.000593)	(0.000423)	(0.000422)	(0.000472)
L.Infant mortality		-0.00175	-0.00118	-0.00108	-0.000951
		(0.00110)	(0.000862)	(0.000858)	(0.000878)
L.Population (log)		-0.0783	-0.0548	-0.0638	-0.0917
		(0.0866)	(0.0707)	(0.0692)	(0.0791)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00583	-0.00698	-0.00762
			(0.00805)	(0.00738)	(0.00727)
L.Rigorous and impartial public administration			0.111***	0.0936***	0.0950***
			(0.0146)	(0.0134)	(0.0136)
L.State authority over territory			0.00148	0.00139	0.00156
			(0.00115)	(0.00104)	(0.00103)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.160***	0.157***
				(0.0355)	(0.0353)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.601***	1.674	1.384	1.524	2.079
	(0.00338)	(1.384)	(1.134)	(1.114)	(1.326)
r2	0.0100	0.0323	0.271	0.303	0.307
Observations	2273	2236	2236	2236	2236
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 6: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for civil liberties – alternative variable *rigorous and impartial public administration*

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.135***	0.144**	0.0926**	0.0571*	0.0441†
	(0.0274)	(0.0456)	(0.0303)	(0.0226)	(0.0246)
L.GDP per capita (log)		-0.00597	-0.0204	-0.0301	-0.0514†
		(0.0348)	(0.0241)	(0.0217)	(0.0295)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000561	-0.0000161	-0.0000338	-0.000390
		(0.000381)	(0.000267)	(0.000250)	(0.000273)
L.Infant mortality		-0.000477	0.00000113	0.000134	0.000503
		(0.000913)	(0.000728)	(0.000687)	(0.000693)
L.Population (log)		-0.0864	-0.0690	-0.0804†	-0.0925†
		(0.0597)	(0.0502)	(0.0464)	(0.0548)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00516	-0.00662	-0.00807
			(0.00632)	(0.00558)	(0.00553)
L.Rigorous and impartial public administration			0.0844***	0.0629***	0.0652***
			(0.0150)	(0.0117)	(0.0119)
L.State authority over territory			-0.000203	-0.000319	-0.000288
			(0.00155)	(0.00143)	(0.00137)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.203***	0.199***
				(0.0288)	(0.0272)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.645***	2.104*	1.956*	2.133**	2.452*
	(0.00250)	(0.980)	(0.850)	(0.795)	(1.017)
r2	0.0111	0.0280	0.260	0.352	0.383
Observations	2273	2236	2236	2236	2236
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 7: effect of foreign aid (fraction of GDP) on respect for physical integrity rights

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (fraction of GDP)	0.361***	0.480***	0.473***	0.310***	0.327***
	(0.106)	(0.131)	(0.114)	(0.0899)	(0.0966)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0547	0.0377	0.0216	0.0167
		(0.0396)	(0.0402)	(0.0334)	(0.0387)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000730	-0.000181	-0.000340	-0.000298
		(0.000752)	(0.000665)	(0.000638)	(0.000659)
L.Infant mortality		-0.00183	-0.00154	-0.00128	-0.00128
		(0.00115)	(0.00102)	(0.000961)	(0.000975)
L.Population (log)		-0.0902	-0.0708	-0.0919	-0.105
		(0.0938)	(0.0873)	(0.0796)	(0.0925)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00676	-0.00926	-0.00907
			(0.00798)	(0.00667)	(0.00667)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.0548	-0.0849	-0.0852
			(0.134)	(0.111)	(0.113)
L.State authority over territory			0.00557***	0.00455***	0.00462***
			(0.00106)	(0.000862)	(0.000893)
L.Democracy (free and fair elecations)				0.278***	0.278***
				(0.0530)	(0.0530)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.609***	1.705	1.041	1.483	1.720
	(0.00279)	(1.506)	(1.380)	(1.266)	(1.534)
r2	0.00617	0.0421	0.0983	0.211	0.214
Observations	1996	1983	1983	1983	1983
Countries		112	112	112	112

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 8: effect of foreign aid (fraction of GDP) on respect for civil liberties

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (fraction of GDP)	0.327***	0.313**	0.305**	0.136*	0.114
	(0.0777)	(0.0927)	(0.0955)	(0.0681)	(0.0769)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0172	0.0157	-0.000955	-0.00270
		(0.0366)	(0.0390)	(0.0293)	(0.0354)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000640	0.0000191	-0.000145	-0.000254
		(0.000472)	(0.000462)	(0.000408)	(0.000424)
L.Infant mortality		-0.000338	-0.000165	0.000104	0.000356
		(0.000921)	(0.000851)	(0.000737)	(0.000767)
L.Population (log)		-0.0800	-0.0765	-0.0982†	-0.0755
		(0.0657)	(0.0603)	(0.0504)	(0.0537)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00653	-0.00911†	-0.00949†
			(0.00662)	(0.00528)	(0.00537)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.127	-0.158*	-0.140†
			(0.121)	(0.0770)	(0.0762)
L.State authority over territory			0.00356***	0.00252**	0.00234**
			(0.000939)	(0.000790)	(0.000814)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.287***	0.288***
				(0.0445)	(0.0449)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.661***	1.833†	1.516	1.972*	1.607†
	(0.00205)	(1.050)	(0.934)	(0.791)	(0.892)
r2	0.00933	0.0219	0.0692	0.290	0.306
Observations	1996	1983	1983	1983	1983
Countries		112	112	112	112

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 9: effect of foreign aid (log) on respect for physical integrity rights

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita, log)	0.0193***	0.0177	0.0233*	0.0135†	0.0152†
	(0.00402)	(0.0107)	(0.00956)	(0.00766)	(0.00840)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0320	0.0110	0.000334	0.00549
		(0.0359)	(0.0372)	(0.0321)	(0.0364)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000606	0.000151	0.0000143	-0.000170
		(0.000596)	(0.000544)	(0.000511)	(0.000579)
L.Infant mortality		-0.00158	-0.00154	-0.00127	-0.00129
		(0.00114)	(0.00109)	(0.00100)	(0.00101)
L.Population (log)		-0.0719	-0.0602	-0.0763	-0.0599
		(0.0889)	(0.0873)	(0.0797)	(0.0980)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00775	-0.00928	-0.00957
			(0.00834)	(0.00738)	(0.00730)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.0155	-0.0434	-0.0452
			(0.129)	(0.111)	(0.111)
L.State authority over territory			0.00410***	0.00323***	0.00321***
			(0.00113)	(0.000917)	(0.000938)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.277***	0.276***
				(0.0512)	(0.0517)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.676***	1.640	1.274	1.545	1.254
	(0.0129)	(1.413)	(1.389)	(1.269)	(1.626)
r2	0.0106	0.0304	0.0681	0.176	0.178
Observations	2273	2236	2232	2232	2232
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 10: effect of foreign aid (log) on respect for civil liberties

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita, log)	0.0190***	0.0214*	0.0237**	0.0138*	0.0142†
	(0.00296)	(0.00961)	(0.00880)	(0.00666)	(0.00719)
L.GDP per capita (log)		-0.00795	-0.00780	-0.0185	-0.0208
		(0.0335)	(0.0349)	(0.0277)	(0.0357)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000536	0.000246	0.000109	-0.000284
		(0.000362)	(0.000328)	(0.000286)	(0.000314)
L.Infant mortality		-0.000292	-0.000283	-0.00000594	0.000222
		(0.000914)	(0.000896)	(0.000760)	(0.000775)
L.Population (log)		-0.0786	-0.0831	-0.0993*	-0.0685
		(0.0596)	(0.0565)	(0.0481)	(0.0569)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00716	-0.00870	-0.00979†
			(0.00665)	(0.00579)	(0.00577)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.109	-0.137†	-0.117
			(0.110)	(0.0740)	(0.0726)
L.State authority over territory			0.00199	0.00111	0.000962
			(0.00148)	(0.00130)	(0.00129)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.279***	0.279***
				(0.0422)	(0.0424)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.715***	2.066*	2.012*	2.285**	1.797†
	(0.00948)	(0.984)	(0.966)	(0.830)	(1.062)
r2	0.0188	0.0383	0.0591	0.259	0.282
Observations	2273	2236	2232	2232	2232
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 11: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for physical integrity rights, two years lag

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L2.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.122**	0.120*	0.128*	0.0769†	0.0776†
	(0.0385)	(0.0509)	(0.0511)	(0.0420)	(0.0458)
L2.GDP per capita (log)		0.0404	0.0299	0.0198	0.0169
		(0.0371)	(0.0390)	(0.0347)	(0.0404)
L2.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000466	0.000000222	-0.000179	-0.0000943
		(0.000547)	(0.000478)	(0.000470)	(0.000478)
L2.Infant mortality		-0.00123	-0.00122	-0.000966	-0.000921
		(0.000976)	(0.000971)	(0.000918)	(0.000955)
L2.Population (log)		-0.0730	-0.0693	-0.0837	-0.0860
		(0.0887)	(0.0866)	(0.0812)	(0.0953)
L2.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00237	-0.00411	-0.00436
			(0.00634)	(0.00531)	(0.00531)
L2.Government effectiveness			-0.0850	-0.107	-0.105
			(0.129)	(0.115)	(0.115)
L2.State authority over territory			0.00364**	0.00304**	0.00305**
			(0.00117)	(0.00100)	(0.00103)
L2.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.221***	0.220***
				(0.0492)	(0.0496)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.607***	1.516	1.246	1.518	1.575
	(0.00344)	(1.379)	(1.347)	(1.262)	(1.565)
r2	0.00493	0.0210	0.0487	0.117	0.120
Observations	2155	2121	2117	2117	2117
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with two-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 12: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for physical integrity rights, three years lag

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L3.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.0815*	0.0783	0.0831†	0.0514	0.0502
	(0.0390)	(0.0484)	(0.0494)	(0.0442)	(0.0487)
L3.GDP per capita (log)		0.0393	0.0302	0.0236	0.0176
		(0.0401)	(0.0411)	(0.0385)	(0.0455)
L3.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000197	-0.000147	-0.000252	-0.000180
		(0.000449)	(0.000418)	(0.000425)	(0.000427)
L3.Infant mortality		-0.00127	-0.00128	-0.00111	-0.00103
		(0.000959)	(0.000948)	(0.000917)	(0.000969)
L3.Population (log)		-0.0888	-0.0866	-0.0999	-0.105
		(0.0939)	(0.0916)	(0.0888)	(0.101)
L3.Conflict (internal and interstate)			0.00103	0.000101	-0.000198
			(0.00651)	(0.00572)	(0.00576)
L3.Government effectiveness			-0.0751	-0.0926	-0.0892
			(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.123)
L3.State authority over territory			0.00302**	0.00261*	0.00262*
			(0.00115)	(0.00108)	(0.00116)
L3.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.158**	0.159**
				(0.0514)	(0.0518)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.611***	1.786	1.581	1.817	1.934
	(0.00350)	(1.429)	(1.395)	(1.350)	(1.635)
r2	0.00227	0.0157	0.0329	0.0670	0.0708
Observations	2037	2005	2001	2001	2001
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with three-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 13: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for physical integrity rights, four years lag

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L4.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.0576	0.0546	0.0545	0.0365	0.0301
	(0.0398)	(0.0468)	(0.0482)	(0.0448)	(0.0488)
L4.GDP per capita (log)		0.0368	0.0373	0.0330	0.0254
		(0.0422)	(0.0432)	(0.0419)	(0.0503)
L4.GDP growth (annual %)		0.0000437	-0.000291	-0.000352	-0.000310
		(0.000437)	(0.000395)	(0.000399)	(0.000427)
L4.Infant mortality		-0.00122	-0.00120	-0.00110	-0.000998
		(0.00101)	(0.000994)	(0.000979)	(0.00104)
L4.Population (log)		-0.0935	-0.0975	-0.106	-0.112
		(0.100)	(0.0990)	(0.0982)	(0.110)
L4.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00177	-0.00226	-0.00270
			(0.00549)	(0.00500)	(0.00500)
L4.Government effectiveness			-0.138	-0.147	-0.141
			(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.132)
L4.State authority over territory			0.00238†	0.00216†	0.00217
			(0.00122)	(0.00122)	(0.00134)
L4.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.0939†	0.0950†
				(0.0515)	(0.0521)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.614***	1.883	1.784	1.930	2.070
	(0.00359)	(1.517)	(1.498)	(1.488)	(1.765)
r2	0.00116	0.0119	0.0244	0.0362	0.0402
Observations	1919	1888	1884	1884	1884
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with four-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 14: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for civil liberties, two years lag

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L2.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.110***	0.109**	0.107**	0.0561*	0.0428
	(0.0284)	(0.0400)	(0.0388)	(0.0277)	(0.0312)
L2.GDP per capita (log)		0.00196	0.00720	-0.00286	-0.00700
		(0.0346)	(0.0366)	(0.0302)	(0.0368)
L2.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000219	-0.0000841	-0.000263	-0.000261
		(0.000380)	(0.000340)	(0.000321)	(0.000320)
L2.Infant mortality		-0.000157	-0.000169	0.0000885	0.000379
		(0.000831)	(0.000840)	(0.000743)	(0.000772)
L2.Population (log)		-0.0952	-0.104†	-0.119*	-0.0980
		(0.0610)	(0.0598)	(0.0530)	(0.0599)
L2.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00482	-0.00656	-0.00716
			(0.00617)	(0.00515)	(0.00519)
L2.Government effectiveness			-0.145	-0.167*	-0.147†
			(0.104)	(0.0783)	(0.0766)
L2.State authority over territory			0.00181	0.00122	0.00103
			(0.00137)	(0.00121)	(0.00119)
L2.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.220***	0.222***
				(0.0416)	(0.0420)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.648***	2.175*	2.182*	2.454**	2.137*
	(0.00254)	(0.964)	(0.957)	(0.854)	(1.052)
r2	0.00730	0.0281	0.0471	0.172	0.193
Observations	2155	2121	2117	2117	2117
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with two-years lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 15: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for civil liberties, three years lag

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L3.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.0846**	0.0828*	0.0807*	0.0500†	0.0376
	(0.0285)	(0.0340)	(0.0332)	(0.0275)	(0.0314)
L3.GDP per capita (log)		0.00686	0.00966	0.00331	-0.00244
		(0.0359)	(0.0381)	(0.0337)	(0.0400)
L3.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000109	-0.000163	-0.000265	-0.000207
		(0.000339)	(0.000307)	(0.000303)	(0.000303)
L3.Infant mortality		0.0000589	0.0000316	0.000201	0.000476
		(0.000817)	(0.000827)	(0.000771)	(0.000808)
L3.Population (log)		-0.104	-0.113†	-0.125*	-0.107†
		(0.0631)	(0.0623)	(0.0586)	(0.0635)
L3.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00214	-0.00304	-0.00352
			(0.00568)	(0.00505)	(0.00525)
L3.Government effectiveness			-0.130	-0.147†	-0.127
			(0.100)	(0.0870)	(0.0856)
L3.State authority over territory			0.00186	0.00147	0.00127
			(0.00118)	(0.00108)	(0.00112)
L3.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.153***	0.155***
				(0.0426)	(0.0433)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.650***	2.268*	2.275*	2.504**	2.239*
	(0.00256)	(0.982)	(0.973)	(0.918)	(1.067)
r2	0.00458	0.0316	0.0481	0.107	0.129
Observations	2037	2005	2001	2001	2001
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with three-years lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 16: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for civil liberties, four years lag

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L4.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.0691*	0.0695*	0.0656*	0.0489†	0.0357
	(0.0287)	(0.0302)	(0.0300)	(0.0270)	(0.0303)
L4.GDP per capita (log)		0.00852	0.0138	0.00980	0.00536
		(0.0364)	(0.0389)	(0.0365)	(0.0431)
L4.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000102	-0.000151	-0.000209	-0.000235
		(0.000325)	(0.000286)	(0.000290)	(0.000306)
L4.Infant mortality		0.000327	0.000280	0.000372	0.000619
		(0.000819)	(0.000826)	(0.000802)	(0.000843)
L4.Population (log)		-0.103	-0.116†	-0.123†	-0.103
		(0.0653)	(0.0656)	(0.0645)	(0.0681)
L4.Conflict (internal and interstate)			0.0000827	-0.000384	-0.000794
			(0.00572)	(0.00542)	(0.00553)
L4.Government effectiveness			-0.153	-0.161†	-0.142
			(0.0956)	(0.0928)	(0.0916)
L4.State authority over territory			0.00182†	0.00161	0.00139
			(0.00101)	(0.000981)	(0.00107)
L4.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.0879*	0.0908*
				(0.0425)	(0.0433)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.651***	2.235*	2.299*	2.435*	2.136†
	(0.00259)	(1.010)	(1.011)	(0.996)	(1.115)
r2	0.00321	0.0360	0.0525	0.0723	0.0931
Observations	1919	1888	1884	1884	1884
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
All variables except for the dependent were run with three-years lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 17: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for physical integrity rights, regional differences

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1 Eastern Europe and post-Soviet	Model 2 Latin America	Model 3 MENA	Model 4 Sub-Saharan Africa
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.149	0.367**	0.111	0.141*
	(0.150)	(0.121)	(0.0885)	(0.0603)
L.GDP per capita (log)	0.244*	0.196	0.0356	-0.127
	(0.0828)	(0.124)	(0.0939)	(0.0788)
L.GDP growth (annual %)	-0.00309	-0.000191	-0.00115*	0.00182*
	(0.00212)	(0.00211)	(0.000462)	(0.000750)
L.Infant mortality	-0.00940**	-0.000744	-0.00206	0.0000757
	(0.00242)	(0.00154)	(0.00299)	(0.00191)
L.Population (log)	-0.516*	0.503	-0.223	0.141
	(0.227)	(0.310)	(0.133)	(0.163)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)	-0.0201	-0.0139	-0.0161†	-0.0154
	(0.0244)	(0.0243)	(0.00886)	(0.0122)
L.Government effectiveness	0.0374	0.111	-0.202	0.125
	(0.160)	(0.231)	(0.364)	(0.187)
L.State authority over territory	0.00420†	0.00512	0.00229	0.00131
	(0.00233)	(0.00633)	(0.00168)	(0.00122)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)	0.321**	0.343	0.486***	0.226**
	(0.0959)	(0.234)	(0.0816)	(0.0774)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	6.509†	-9.813†	3.772	-1.021
	(3.459)	(5.579)	(2.349)	(2.656)
r2	0.357	0.285	0.555	0.152
Observations	289	355	223	876
Countries	16	19	12	48

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lag. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix. Asia is not represented in the regions due to insufficient observations.

Table 18: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for civil liberties, regional differences

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1 Eastern Europe and post-Soviet	Model 2 Latin America	Model 3 MENA	Model 4 Sub-Saharan Africa
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.239†	0.316**	0.118†	0.0589
	(0.120)	(0.0912)	(0.0641)	(0.0377)
L.GDP per capita (log)	0.0884	0.0533	-0.0965	-0.0520
	(0.0573)	(0.0705)	(0.119)	(0.0579)
L.GDP growth (annual %)	-0.000147	-0.000581	-0.000181	0.000478
	(0.000823)	(0.000994)	(0.000512)	(0.000555)
L.Infant mortality	-0.000677	-0.000175	-0.00106	-0.000368
	(0.00245)	(0.00143)	(0.00524)	(0.00126)
L.Population (log)	-0.0972	-0.0299	-0.307	-0.142
	(0.164)	(0.272)	(0.183)	(0.102)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)	-0.000836	-0.00160	-0.0119	-0.0141†
	(0.00932)	(0.0139)	(0.00780)	(0.00804)
L.Government effectiveness	0.0338	0.0226	0.133	-0.160†
	(0.104)	(0.136)	(0.407)	(0.0821)
L.State authority over territory	0.00147	0.00326	-0.000907	0.000257
	(0.00156)	(0.00284)	(0.00204)	(0.000954)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)	0.258**	0.208	0.528***	0.148*
	(0.0666)	(0.190)	(0.0766)	(0.0593)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.244	0.404	6.359†	3.247†
	(2.422)	(4.600)	(3.300)	(1.646)
r2	0.322	0.296	0.599	0.141
Observations	289	355	223	876
Countries	16	19	12	48

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lag. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix. Asia is not represented in the regions due to insufficient observations.

Table 19: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights) on foreign aid (p.c.), reversed causality model

Dependent variable: foreign aid (per capita)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Physical violence index	0.0836***	0.0832**	0.0859***	0.0782*	0.0736*
	(0.0123)	(0.0254)	(0.0250)	(0.0321)	(0.0321)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0105	0.0167	0.0162	-0.0227
		(0.0138)	(0.0116)	(0.0115)	(0.0161)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.0000425	-0.0000577	-0.0000581	0.000307
		(0.000538)	(0.000565)	(0.000565)	(0.000588)
L.Infant mortality		0.000225	0.0000483	0.0000517	0.000342
		(0.000626)	(0.000670)	(0.000670)	(0.000675)
L.Population (log)		0.00273	-0.0322	-0.0332	-0.109†
		(0.0479)	(0.0523)	(0.0512)	(0.0590)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.000674	-0.000816	-0.0000771
			(0.00140)	(0.00145)	(0.00149)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.0354	-0.0364	-0.00234
			(0.0650)	(0.0632)	(0.0615)
L.State authority over territory			-0.000978†	-0.000977†	-0.000692
			(0.000580)	(0.000577)	(0.000511)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.0133	0.0143
				(0.0229)	(0.0235)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effectes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.0250***	-0.109	0.514	0.531	1.967†
	(0.00757)	(0.824)	(0.903)	(0.884)	(1.033)
r2	0.0201	0.0212	0.0243	0.0249	0.0769
Observations	2391	2347	2232	2232	2232
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 20: respect for human rights (civil liberties) on foreign aid (p.c.), reversed causality model

Dependent variable: foreign aid (per capita)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Civil liberties	0.107***	0.107***	0.0966***	0.0876**	0.0863*
	(0.0162)	(0.0252)	(0.0254)	(0.0321)	(0.0333)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0140	0.0180	0.0176	-0.0209
		(0.0137)	(0.0115)	(0.0114)	(0.0163)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.0000324	-0.0000853	-0.0000812	0.000299
		(0.000529)	(0.000556)	(0.000551)	(0.000575)
L.Infant mortality		0.000142	-0.0000585	-0.0000509	0.000226
		(0.000638)	(0.000690)	(0.000698)	(0.000705)
L.Population (log)		0.00334	-0.0309	-0.0318	-0.109†
		(0.0489)	(0.0541)	(0.0527)	(0.0606)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.000741	-0.000856	-0.0000151
			(0.00144)	(0.00147)	(0.00150)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.0253	-0.0270	0.00532
			(0.0651)	(0.0635)	(0.0612)
L.State authority over territory			-0.000717	-0.000729	-0.000451
			(0.000596)	(0.000586)	(0.000529)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.00944	0.00941
				(0.0222)	(0.0227)
Constant	0.00578	-0.163	0.448	0.469	1.925†
	(0.0106)	(0.844)	(0.939)	(0.908)	(1.061)
r2	0.0191	0.0206	0.0203	0.0205	0.0736
Observations	2391	2347	2232	2232	2232
Countries		121	121	121	121

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 21: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for physical integrity rights – without Bangladesh

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (physical integrity rights)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.174***	0.178**	0.188**	0.120*	0.130*
	(0.0372)	(0.0677)	(0.0658)	(0.0494)	(0.0536)
L.GDP per capita (log)		0.0355	0.0182	0.00359	0.00315
		(0.0360)	(0.0383)	(0.0325)	(0.0372)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000669	0.000250	0.0000738	-0.0000667
		(0.000593)	(0.000540)	(0.000506)	(0.000571)
L.Infant mortality		-0.00188†	-0.00185†	-0.00144	-0.00143
		(0.00110)	(0.00107)	(0.000993)	(0.00101)
L.Population (log)		-0.0858	-0.0755	-0.0849	-0.0796
		(0.0867)	(0.0866)	(0.0790)	(0.0941)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00710	-0.00892	-0.00922
			(0.00867)	(0.00757)	(0.00751)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.0230	-0.0483	-0.0466
			(0.129)	(0.110)	(0.111)
L.State authority over territory			0.00374**	0.00302**	0.00303**
			(0.00118)	(0.000950)	(0.000967)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.281***	0.280***
				(0.0522)	(0.0526)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	0.604***	1.779	1.425	1.632	1.547
	(0.00341)	(1.385)	(1.375)	(1.259)	(1.567)
r2	0.0102	0.0351	0.0673	0.177	0.180
Observations	2254	2217	2213	2213	2213
Countries		120	120	120	120

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.

Table 22: effect of foreign aid (p.c.) on respect for civil liberties – without Bangladesh

Dependent variable: respect for human rights (political and private civil liberties)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
L.Foreign aid (per capita)	0.136***	0.145**	0.144**	0.0749*	0.0729*
	(0.0274)	(0.0456)	(0.0446)	(0.0290)	(0.0321)
L.GDP per capita (log)		-0.00291	0.000892	-0.0139	-0.0233
		(0.0347)	(0.0369)	(0.0285)	(0.0363)
L.GDP growth (annual %)		0.000570	0.000317	0.000138	-0.000200
		(0.000383)	(0.000339)	(0.000295)	(0.000312)
L.Infant mortality		-0.000582	-0.000577	-0.000157	0.000118
		(0.000912)	(0.000907)	(0.000778)	(0.000784)
L.Population (log)		-0.0925	-0.0988†	-0.108*	-0.0907
		(0.0599)	(0.0589)	(0.0496)	(0.0598)
L.Conflict (internal and interstate)			-0.00649	-0.00834	-0.00945
			(0.00706)	(0.00601)	(0.00603)
L.Government effectiveness			-0.119	-0.145†	-0.120
			(0.113)	(0.0741)	(0.0724)
L.State authority over territory			0.00161	0.000878	0.000782
			(0.00157)	(0.00137)	(0.00133)
L.Democracy (free and fair elections)				0.286***	0.286***
				(0.0435)	(0.0435)
Constant	0.645***	2.181*	2.157*	2.368**	2.134†
	(0.00251)	(0.982)	(0.986)	(0.844)	(1.104)
r2	0.0115	0.0280	0.0440	0.252	0.275
Observations	2254	2217	2213	2213	2213
Countries		120	120	120	120

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All variables except for the dependent were run with one-year lags. Histogram showing distribution before and after logged variable for population and GDP/capita presented in Appendix.