Optimal Taxation and Other-Regarding Preferences

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Abstract
The present paper analyzes optimal redistributive income taxation in a Mirrleesian framework extended with other-regarding preferences at the individual level. We start by developing a general model where the other-regarding preference component of the utility functions is formulated to encompass almost any form of preferences for other people’s disposable income, and then continue with four prominent special cases. Two of these reflect self-centered inequality aversion, based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), whereas the other two reflect non-self-centered inequality aversion, where people have preferences for a low Gini coefficient and a high minimum income level in society, respectively. We find that other-regarding preferences may substantially increase the marginal tax rates, including the top rates, and that different types of other-regarding preferences have very different implications for optimal taxation.

JEL: D62, D90, H21, H23.

Keywords: Optimal Taxation, Redistribution, Social Preferences, Inequality Aversion.

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1. Introduction

Growing empirical evidence suggests that people have preferences that go beyond those of the narrowly selfish *Homo Economicus*, i.e., they have other-regarding preferences in addition to preferences for their own economic outcomes. The purpose of the present paper is to integrate such preferences, in general as well as in more specific forms, in the theory of optimal redistributive taxation.

Most models of optimal income taxation imply that the government prefers lower to higher inequality for a given aggregate gross income. One rationale for this is to assume concave utility functions such that low-income individuals have higher marginal utility of income (or consumption) than high-income individuals. Another rationale is to assume a prioritarian social welfare function in the sense that social welfare is concave in individual utilities (e.g., as in Diamond 1998). In fact, most models allow for both of these mechanisms, i.e., both the individual utility functions and the social welfare function are (or can be) concave (e.g., Mirrlees 1971, Saez 2001). Sometimes the social objective function is modeled directly in terms of a concave function of individual income (e.g., Atkinson 1970), and sometimes, as in Saez and Stantcheva (2016), direct social welfare weights are applied, where these weights are inversely related to the disposable income. In each of these cases, we can say that *the government* is inequality averse. At the same time, *individuals* are in these models almost always assumed *not* to care about inequality, or have other-regarding preferences more generally. That is, their utility is typically modelled to depend solely on their own disposable income (or consumption) and labor supply/effort, and not on any measure of other people’s income.

The present paper, in contrast, analyzes the implications of other-regarding preferences for optimal redistributive income taxation. We begin by presenting a general model of optimal income taxation under other-regarding preferences, where the other-regarding preference component of the individual utility functions encompasses almost any form of preferences for other people’s disposable income or consumption. In other words, this model is not restricted to inequality aversion or other types of pro-social preferences. It also encompasses models of social comparisons driven by concerns for social status, and even more generally reflects almost any form of consumption externalities. Despite the generality of the underlying model, the results show that the optimal marginal income tax can be written as a sum of two terms. One is
a modified redistributive component – an analogue to the ABC component described in Diamond’s (1998) and Saez’ (2001) interpretation of the solution to Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal tax problem – where the modification arises because externalities affect the social costs and/or benefits of redistribution. The other is the value of the marginal externality that each individual imposes on other people. Note that the latter is type specific, since the externality that other-regarding preferences give rise to is typically non-atmospheric in the sense that the marginal contribution to this externality differs among individuals. We also show how the corrective and redistributive aspects of tax policy interact in important ways, where redistributive elements directly affect the type-specific value of the marginal externality.

While there are many kinds of other-regarding preferences, there is extensive evidence suggesting that people tend to be inequality averse in the sense of having preferences for a more equal income distribution. We will therefore also analyze four specific models of inequality aversion, which are special cases of our general model. In each such case, the theoretical analysis is combined with numerical simulations allowing us to go beyond the policy rules and quantify the importance of other-regarding preferences for the optimal marginal tax schedule as well as for the overall redistribution policy.

Two of the specific models focus on self-centered inequality aversion, based on the seminal contributions by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), respectively. By self-centered, we mean that individuals care about the relationships between their own and other people’s disposable income, rather than inequality per se. Note that the externalities generated here are typically more complex than those following in related models of social status, where people impose negative consumption externalities on one another (see Section 2). In the models presented below, increased disposable income of a specific individual may lead to either more or less inequality and can thus lead to a negative or positive externality depending on this individual’s position in the income distribution.

In our continuous-type version of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, individuals compare both upward and downward in the income distribution and experience disutility of discrepancies in both dimensions, although possibly to a larger extent in the upward direction (reflecting disadvantageous inequality). By increasing their disposable income through increased labor supply (e.g., by working more or harder), individuals impose positive externalities on people with higher income and negative externalities on people with lower income than themselves.
This means that the corrective marginal tax component – the analogue of the Pigouvian element – is negative for low-income earners and positive for high-income earners. The resulting externality is consequently non-atmospheric. Despite this, we are able to present a closed-form solution for this corrective tax element, showing that it only depends on the ordinal income rank and two parameters reflecting people’s aversion to inequality. Inequality aversion of the Fehr-Schmidt type typically leads to higher marginal income tax rates along the whole income distribution, in the lower part to raise revenue higher up in the distribution and in the higher part primarily to correct for the negative externalities that high-income earners impose on other people. Our numerical simulations, which are based on empirical evidence related to the Fehr-Schmidt model, show that these effects are likely to be substantial, and that inequality aversion motivates a much more equal disposable income distribution than the conventional *Homo Economicus* model of optimal taxation.

In the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model, each individual’s disutility of inequality depends on the discrepancy between the individual’s own disposable income and the average disposable income. This model is in many ways similar to the Fehr-Schmidt model, albeit with the important difference that the externality is *atmospheric* here: the externality works through the mean disposable income, and an additional income unit affects mean income in the same way regardless of the initial income level. Thus, while increased income of an individual A can affect an individual B’s utility positively or negatively, depending on whether B’s income is below or above the mean, the effect is independent of where A is located in the income distribution. This means, in turn, that the corrective tax element is the same for everybody, based on Pigouvian logic.

There are two striking differences in the optimal marginal tax schedule between the Bolton-Ockenfels and Fehr-Schmidt models: the former implies higher marginal tax rates for low-income earners and lower marginal tax rates for high-income earners. The intuition is that the externality component in the marginal tax implemented for high-income earners is smaller in the Bolton-Ockenfels model. Therefore, seemingly similar models of self-centered inequality aversion may have quite different policy implications.

However, instead of directly comparing their own disposable income with that of other people, individuals may prefer a more equal income distribution, *ceteris paribus*. The inequality aversion is then said to be *non-self-centered*. We are taking a broad perspective here, beyond
direct hedonic interpretations, where the preferences for equality can also be interpreted as reduced forms taking instrumental effects of inequality, such as crime and the implications thereof, into account (see the next section).

In one of these models of non-self-centered inequality aversion, people prefer to live in a society with lower inequality measured by the Gini coefficient of disposable income. Since increased income for different individuals affects the Gini coefficient in different ways, the externalities are non-atmospheric and resemble those of the Fehr-Schmidt model. Thus, the corrective marginal tax component (the analogue of the Pigouvian element) will be negative for individuals for whom a small income increase reduces the Gini coefficient. We show that this is the case for a majority of the population, and more precisely for the bottom income share \((1+G)/2\), where \(G\) is the Gini coefficient. Correspondingly, the corrective tax element is positive for the share above this threshold, i.e., for the remaining upper income share \((1−G)/2\).

In the second model of non-self-centered inequality aversion, we consider a case of Rawlsian poverty aversion, where people are concerned with the lowest disposable income in society, inspired by Charness and Rabin (2002). Assuming that the poorest group in society is unemployed (or works very little), this type of other-regarding preference does not give rise to any corrective taxation motive. Yet, it tends, nevertheless, to increase the marginal income tax rates for purely redistributive reasons. The effects on the marginal tax schedule are reminiscent of those associated with self-centered inequality aversion of the Bolton-Ockenfels type. This resemblance accords well with intuition: the externality is atmospheric in the Bolton-Ockenfels model, such that all individuals contribute equally at the margin, while the marginal externality is zero in the Rawlsian framework. Thus, redistributive concerns lead to similar tax policy adjustments in both cases.
Finally, the paper presents top marginal income tax rates of two kinds. First, we follow convention based on an unbounded ability distribution and generalize the top marginal income tax formula of Diamond (1998) to encompass other-regarding preferences. This top marginal income tax rate is shown to depend on the labor supply elasticity and the Pareto parameter (reflecting the thickness of the upper tail of the ability distribution), as in Diamond (1998), and in addition on the social value of the marginal externality caused by top earners. The top marginal tax rate is shown to increase in this externality, which follows intuition. Second, realizing that an unbounded ability distribution is of course impossible in the finite world we live in, we also consider a case with a bounded ability distribution and present the optimal marginal income tax for the individual with the highest income. We show that the zero-on-the-top result by Sadka (1976) does not hold in general in economies with other-regarding preferences (although it does hold for the Rawlsian case), and that the marginal income tax rate implemented for the top-income individual may in fact be substantial.

The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review, followed by the presentation and analysis of the general model of optimal income taxation under other-regarding preferences in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 present the corresponding analyses of the special cases characterized by self-centered and non-self-centered inequality aversion, respectively. Section 6 presents the analysis of top-income marginal tax rates and Section 7 concludes the paper. Proofs and background calculations are presented in the Online Appendix.

2. Literature Review

There is a large experimental and empirical literature on other-regarding preferences in general, and inequality aversion in particular. For experimental work on inequality aversion, see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2003), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fisman et al. (2007), Bellemare et al. (2008), Bruhin et al. (2019), and Almås et al. (2020). The broad message is that people prefer more equal to unequal allocation, *ceteris paribus*, and that they are willing to trade off some of their own income in order to obtain a more equitable allocation. There is also evidence

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1 Part of this literature focuses on the potential context-dependence of preferences for equality, where these preferences largely depend on the perceived fairness, suggesting that some inequalities are perceived as more fair than others (e.g., Cappelen et al. 2013; Almås et al. 2020), and that people’s willingness to forsake their own income is related to others’ previous actions and associated perceived intentions (e.g., Charness and Rabin 2002).
suggesting that many people in particular have preferences for the economic outcome of the worst off; see, e.g., Andreoni and Miller (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Fisman et al. (2007, 2015), and DellaVigna et al. (2012). Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Fehr et al. (2021) provide broad overviews of the literature on preferences for redistribution.

Regarding the potential instrumental effects of inequality, there is substantial cross-country evidence of a robust positive correlation between the incidence of crime and the extent of income inequality (e.g., Fajnzylber et al. 2002). Not surprisingly, however, it is less straightforward to clearly identify causal relationships; see Glaeser et al. (1996) and Kelly (2000). There are also studies on the potential impact of inequality on social capital. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that participation in social activities is lower in more unequal societies, whereas Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that trust is lower in areas with a more uneven distribution of income. Some authors argue that inequality contributes to a society’s degree of polarization, which in turn may lead to social tension in general and in extreme cases to problems such as civil war (Esteban and Ray 1994; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Blattman and Miguel 2010). Lobeck and Støståd (2023) provide extensive evidence suggesting that most people believe that there are negative externalities associated with inequality.

The theoretical policy-oriented research based on models where people have motives other than material self-interest is considerably smaller. Yet, there is by now a sizable literature dealing with optimal taxation and public expenditure in economies where people are motivated by their relative consumption (or relative income). This research typically assumes that people derive utility from their own consumption relative to that of referent others, i.e., individuals prefer to consume more than others and dislike consuming less, implying that people impose negative positional externalities on one another. A natural interpretation is that relative consumption indicates social status, even if other interpretations are possible as well. Several of these studies

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find that positional externalities may motivate much higher marginal tax rates compared with conventional models of optimal taxation.

There is also related work on optimal taxation under externalities related to rent seeking and earnings differences, respectively. Piketty et al. (2014) analyze negative effects of rent seeking among top earners, where such activities induce personal enrichment rather than increase the size of the pie, and show that such behavior can motivate substantially higher top marginal income tax rates; Rothschild and Scheuer (2016) generalize and extend this analysis. Lockwood et al. (2017) analyze implications of varying externalities from different professions, arguing that high-paying professions tend to generate negative and low-paying professions positive externalities. This implies higher marginal taxes on top incomes.

The theoretical policy-oriented literature allowing for *prosocial* preferences, in contrast, is very small. In fact, despite the extensive empirical and experimental evidence referred to above, such preferences are almost absent in the modern theory of optimal redistributive taxation. An exception is the study by Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013) examining the joint implication of relative consumption concerns and altruism for optimal commodity taxation. In their model, the altruism component in people’s preferences means that each individual’s utility depends positively on the average utility level in the economy as a whole.

Nyborg-Støstad and Cowell (2022) is most closely related to the present paper. The analytical part of their study is based on a Mirrleesian model of optimal taxation where agents have quasi-linear utility functions, and where the measure of equality that people care about is given by variants of the absolute Gini coefficient, i.e., the product of the average disposable income and the conventional (relative) Gini coefficient. Their inequality measure is thus importantly different from the conventional Gini coefficient, on which one of the four special cases

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3 Dufwenberg et al. (2011) provide a more general theoretical treatment of other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium.

4 To see this, consider Poorland and Richland. In Poorland, half the population barely survives at 500 USD/year (i.e., slightly more than 1 USD per day) and the remaining half earns 100,000 USD/year. In Richland, half the population earns 100,000 USD/year and the remaining half 200,000 USD/year. Based on almost all practically used inequality measures, including the conventional Gini coefficient, Poorland is much more unequal than Richland. For example, the 20/20 ratio (the income ratio of the 80th and the 20th percentile) is 200 in Poorland and only 2 in Richland. Yet, remarkably, the *absolute* Gini coefficient is larger in Richland.
analyzed in the present paper is based. They show how the resulting inequality externality affects the policy rules for marginal income taxation, and they also discuss implications of externalities induced by preferences for equality more broadly.

Simula and Trannoy (2022) also analyze inequality aversion in the context of optimal taxation, albeit from a perspective different from ours. They consider a rank-dependent social welfare function (rather than a welfarist one), which depends directly on a measure of inequality, accompanied by conventional utility functions at the individual level (meaning that people do not care about inequality). Thus, there are no other-regarding preferences or externalities in their study.5

To our knowledge, our study is novel in the literature on optimal redistributive taxation in several important ways. First, it provides a general model of optimal redistributive taxation under other-regarding preferences, which encompasses virtually all possible versions of inequality aversion as well as other kinds of interdependent preferences. This enables us to derive a policy rule for marginal income taxation, which is applicable to almost any (atmospheric or non-atmospheric) consumption externality that other-regarding preferences may give rise to. Second, we provide qualitative and quantitative results for a broad spectrum of specific models of other-regarding preferences, all of which are special cases of our general model.

3. A General Model of Optimal Income Taxation under Other-Regarding Preferences

Consider an economy with linear production and competitive markets, implying that ability or marginal productivity reflects a fixed before-tax wage rate per unit of labor, w. Let \( f(w) \) denote the continuous density function of the ability distribution. The population is normalized to one for notational convenience such that \( \int_0^\infty f(w)dw = 1 \). We follow convention in assuming that the single-crossing condition holds, implying that higher-ability individuals earn a higher gross income and enjoy more consumption in equilibrium than lower-ability individuals. Therefore, \( F(w) = \int_0^w f(t)dt \) simultaneously reflects the ability distribution function and the ordinal rank

5 See also Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2018) for a comprehensive and insightful treatment of different social objective functions and optimal income taxation.
of ability, gross income, and disposable income, respectively. We will subsequently show that this ordinal rank, which will be referred to as \( F(c_w) \) for an individual with disposable income \( c_w \), and hence ability \( w \), is part of several optimal policy rules.

### 3.1 Preferences and Individual Behavior

Individuals of any ability-type \( w \) derive utility from their own consumption, \( c_w \), and labor supply/effort, \( l_w \), as in conventional models. We also assume that individuals care about a social outcome, a key variable in the present paper, which we often interpret as a measure of inequality, although it can be given other interpretations as well. This measure, denoted \( I_w \), typically varies between individuals and depends on the individual’s own consumption as well as a type-specific and continuous (in \( w \)) measure of other people’s consumption, \( H_w \), such that

\[
I_w = I(c_w, H_w),
\]

where

\[
H_w = \int_0^\infty h_w(c_s) f(s) ds.
\]

Thus, the weights attached to other people’s consumption are type specific and given by the type-specific and continuous function \( h_w(\cdot) \) for an individual of type \( w \). In addition, although individuals are assumed to care about the consumption distribution in the economy as a whole, they do not care enough to voluntarily give money to others, i.e., there is no charitable giving.  

We can then write the utility function as follows:

\[
U_w = v(c_w, l_w, I_w) = v(c_w, l_w, I(c_w, H_w)) = u(c_w, l_w, H_w).
\]

The function \( v(\cdot) \) expresses the preferences in terms of the individual’s own consumption, \( c \), and labor supply/effort, \( l \), respectively, and the measure of inequality (or social outcome more generally), \( I \), described above. This function is increasing in \( c \), decreasing in \( l \), decreasing in \( I \), and strictly quasi-concave. \( u(\cdot) \) is a convenient reduced form to be used in some of the

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6 For recent research on charitable giving in an optimal taxation framework, see Aronsson et al. (2023).

7 We follow convention in the literature on optimal taxation by taking the preferences as given. It is not the aim of the present paper to explain why people tend to have certain kinds of social preferences; see, e.g., Alger and Weibull (2013) for an evolutionary approach to social preferences.
calculations below. Since the externality represented by $H_w$ is typically non-atmospheric, it follows that a consumption change among type $s$ individuals can affect the utility of an individual of type $w$ positively or negatively, depending on whether it leads to increased or decreased inequality, as experienced by individuals of type $w$.

If the preferences are weakly labor separable, a special case often examined in the literature on optimal redistributive taxation, equation (3) can be rewritten as

$$U_w = v(c_w, l_w, I_w) = v(q(c_w, I_w), l_w).$$

(4a)

with utility function (4a), the marginal rate of substitution between $I$ and $c$ does not depend directly on effort, $l$. Another frequent special case is the quasi-linear utility function, in which equation (3) can be written as

$$U_w = v(c_w, l_w, I_w) = V(c_w + g(l_w, I_w)).$$

(4b)

We will return to the special cases of weak labor separability and quasi-linearity below.

For later use, an $s$ individual’s marginal willingness to pay for an individual of type $w$ to decrease their consumption is given by

$$M_{sw} = \frac{H^{(s)}_w}{u^{(s)}_c} h^{(s)}_{c_w} = -MRS^{(s)}_{H,c} h^{(s)}_{c_w},$$

(5)

where a subscript attached to the utility function or the function $h(\cdot)$ denotes partial derivative.

By using $v_c + v_1 l_c = u_c$, $v_1 l_H = u_H$, we can alternatively write equation (5) as

$$M_{sw} = -\frac{v_1^{(s)} l^{(s)}_c h^{(s)}_{c_w}}{v^{(s)}_c + v_1^{(s)} l^{(s)}_c}.$$  

(6)

The aggregate (or mean) marginal willingness to pay among all individuals to avoid the externality generated by an individual of type $w$ then becomes

$$E(M_w) = -\int_0^\infty MRS^{(s)}_{H,c} h^{(s)}_{c_w} ds = -E(MRS_{H,c}) E(h_{c_w}) (1 + \kappa_w),$$  

(7)

where $\kappa_w$ denotes the normalized covariance between the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by type $w$ and the effect of type $w$’s consumption on the measure of inequality, i.e.,

$$\kappa_w = \text{cov}(MRS_{H,c}, h_{c_w}) / E(MRS_{H,c}), h_{c_w} / E(h_{c_w}).$$

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8 This could, of course, have been expressed through the $v$-function instead using $v_c + v_1 l_c = u_c$, $v_1 l_H = u_H$.  


The individual budget constraints imply that private consumption equals gross income minus the income tax: 
\[ y_w - T(y_w) = c_w, \]
where \( T(y_w) \) denotes a general, nonlinear tax function (where the tax payment can be either positive or negative).

Individuals are assumed to be atomistic agents in the sense of treating \( H_w \) as exogenous, which is a conventional assumption in models with externalities. Each individual of any type \( w \) chooses consumption and labor supply subject to the budget constraints implying the following first-order condition:
\[ MRS_{l,c}^{(w)} = \frac{v_{l}^{(w)}}{v_{c}^{(w)} + v_{l}^{(w)}l_{c}^{(w)}} = \frac{u_{l}^{(w)}}{u_{c}^{(w)}} = -w \left( 1 - T_{y}^{(w)} \right), \]
where \( T_{y}^{(w)} \) denotes the marginal income tax rate facing each individual of ability-type \( w \).

### 3.2 Public Decision-Problem and Optimal Taxation

The government maximizes a generalized utilitarian social welfare function, as in, e.g., Mirrlees (1971) and Saez (2001),
\[ W = \int_{0}^{\infty} \psi(U_{w}) f(w) dw, \]
where \( \psi \) is weakly concave. The resource constraint for the economy as a whole implies that aggregate production is equal to aggregate consumption
\[ \int_{0}^{\infty} w l_{w} f(w) dw = \int_{0}^{\infty} c_{w} f(w) dw. \]

The incentive compatibility constraint, preventing each individual from mimicking the adjacent type with lower productivity (by choosing the labor supply in order to reach the same income as this type), can be written as
\[ \frac{dU_{w}}{dw} = -\frac{l_{w} u_{l}^{(w)}}{w}. \]

As this constraint holds for each type, we can use partial integration to derive
\[ \int_{0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{dU_{w}}{dw} + \frac{u_{l}(c_{w}, l_{w}, H_{w})}{w} l_{w} \right) dw = \int_{0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{u_{l}(c_{w}, l_{w}, H_{w})}{w} - \frac{\partial w U_{w}}{\partial w} \right) dw + \frac{\partial w U_{w}}{\partial w} \Big|_{0}^{\infty} = 0. \]
where $\theta_w$ is a differentiable multiplier.

The social decision problem can now be expressed such that utility, $U_w$, is a state variable while $l_w$ and $H_w$ are control variables. Inverting the function $u(\cdot)$ in equation (3) and solving for $c_w$ gives

$$c_w = k(l_w, H_w, U_w).$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

The properties of the function $k(\cdot)$, applicable to all types $w$, can be summarized as follows:

$$k_i = \frac{1}{u_c}; \quad k_j = -\frac{u_i}{u_c}; \quad k_H = -\frac{u_H}{u_c}. \hspace{1cm} (15)$$

By using the function $k(\cdot)$, the Lagrangean of the social decision problem can then be written

$$L = \int_0^\infty \psi(U_w) f(w) dw + \lambda \int_0^\infty (w l_w - k(l_w, H_w, U_w)) f(w) dw$$
$$+ \int_0^\infty \left( \theta_w \left( \frac{u_i (k(l_w, H_w, U_w), l_w, H_w)) l_w}{w} - \hat{\theta}_w U_w \right) dw, \hspace{1cm} (16)$$
$$+ \int_0^\infty \eta_w \left( H_w - \int_0^\infty h_w (k(l_s, H_s, U_s)) f(s) ds \right) f(w) dw$$

where we have suppressed the term $U_w \theta_w - U_0 \theta_0$, which is zero by the transversality conditions.

$\lambda$ is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the resource constraint, $\theta_w$ is the multiplier attached to the incentive compatibility constraint imposed on individuals of type $w$, and $\eta_w$ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the type-specific externality, $H_w$. The social first-order conditions are presented in the Online Appendix.

Now, let

$$\Gamma_w = \frac{1}{\lambda} \int_0^\infty \eta_h(c_w) f(s) ds \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

denote society’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by the consumption of type $w$ individuals. As such, it will appear in the policy rules for marginal income taxation presented below. Let us also introduce the following short notation:

$$R_i = \int_0^\infty \cdots \int_0^\infty M_{r_1} f(r_1) \, dr_1 \cdots M_{r_i} f(r_i) \, dr_i \hspace{1cm} (18a)$$
so \( R_{w}^{s} = 1 \),

\[
R_{w}^{s} = \int_{0}^{\infty} M_{n_{w}} f(r) \, dr = E(M_{w}),
\]

(18b)

\[
R_{w}^{s} = \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} M_{n_{w}} f(r_{2}) \, dr_{2} M_{n_{w}} f(r_{1}) \, dr_{1} = E(E(M)M_{w}),
\]

(18c)

\[
R_{w}^{s} = \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} M_{n_{w}} f(r_{3}) \, dr_{3} M_{n_{w}} f(r_{2}) \, dr_{2} M_{n_{w}} f(r_{1}) \, dr_{1},
\]

\[
= E\left(E\left(E(M)M\right)M_{w}\right)...
\]

(18d)

(18e)

where \( E(M_{w}) \) thus measures the mean (or expected) value of all people’s marginal willingness to pay for an individual of type \( s \) to decrease their consumption. Since the population size is normalized to one, this also means that \( E(M_{w}) \) reflects the sum of all people’s marginal willingness to pay for reduced consumption by an individual of type \( s \). \( E(M) \) correspondingly denotes the mean of these \( E(M_{w}) \) over all types \( s \). Or in probabilistic terms, the expected value of a random individual’s marginal willingness to pay for a decrease in another random individual’s consumption.

If the preferences are weakly labor separable (see equation [4a]), the \( R \) factors in (18) directly affect the policy rules for marginal income taxation by being part of the value of the marginal externality generated by any type \( w \). However, in the general case, where the preferences are not necessarily labor separable, (18) must be modified to capture interaction effects between corrective and redistributive elements in the tax system. To do so, we start by presenting an analogue to the \( ABC \) formulation introduced by Diamond (1998), through which the redistributive aspects of marginal taxation can be expressed in terms of estimable behavioral elasticities and the government’s preferences for redistribution. Let \( \delta_{w} = \psi'(U_{w})u^{(w)}_{c} / \lambda \) denote the welfare weight the government attaches to individuals of type \( w \), and let \( \xi^{u} \) and \( \xi^{c} \) denote the uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticity, respectively, with respect to the marginal wage rate derived under a linearized budget constraint. We can then define (for all \( w \)) the \( A, B, \) and \( C \) factors introduced by Diamond (1998), but here generalized to allow for preferences that are not quasi-linear:

\[
A_{w} = \frac{1 + \xi^{u}w}{\xi^{c}w},
\]

(19a)
\[ B_w = \int_0^\infty (1-\delta_s) \exp \left( -\int_w^s \frac{\partial \text{MRS}_{w}(m)}{\partial c} \, \frac{dy_m}{m} \right) \frac{f(s)}{1-F(w)} \, ds, \] (19b)

\[ C_w = \frac{1}{\sigma_w}, \] (19c)

where

\[ \sigma_w = -\frac{\partial (1-F(w))}{\partial w} \frac{w}{1-F(w)} \]

is the Pareto parameter that determines how fast the upper tail of the ability distribution decreases with the gross wage rate. In the special case where the upper tail of the ability distributed is Paretian, \( \sigma_w \) is constant in this range such that \( \sigma_w = \sigma \), where \( \sigma \) is the Pareto parameter. \( A_w \) is interpretable as an efficiency mechanism based on behavioral labor supply responses, \( B_w \) reflects the desire for redistribution in favor of agents with abilities lower than or equal to \( w \) (which necessitates tax revenue raised from individuals with abilities higher than \( w \)), and \( C_w \) measures the shape of the ability distribution and reflects the thickness of this distribution in the upper tail. In a conventional model without externalities, as in Diamond (1998) or Saez (2001), the optimal marginal income tax rates will simply be given by

\[ T_y^{(w)} / (1-T_y^{(w)}) = A_w B_w C_w, \]

where the intuition is well-known and well-explained elsewhere.

Naturally, this simple rule does not hold in the presence of externalities. Yet, as will be shown, the optimal marginal tax rate can be written as a modified \( ABC \) term plus a corrective term measuring the value of the marginal externality that individuals of type \( w \) impose on other people. The modification of the \( ABC \) term refers to the \( B \) factor, which takes the following form in our model:

\[ \tilde{B_w} = \int_0^\infty (1-(\delta_s - \Gamma_s)) \exp \left( -\int_w^s \frac{\partial \text{MRS}_{w}(m)}{\partial c} \, \frac{dy_m}{m} \right) \frac{f(s)}{1-F(w)} \, ds. \] (20)

Thus, we must deduct the value of the marginal externality, \( \Gamma_s \), from \( \delta_s \) in order to obtain the social marginal cost of decreased disposable income for all individuals affected by the marginal tax increase on type \( w \), i.e., for all \( s > w \). Note that this extra component arises for redistributive reasons; it does not reflect the direct externality correction, which will be explored below.

With these preliminaries at our disposal, we are now in a position to modify the \( R \) factors described above and then present the policy rule for marginal income taxation. Let
\[ \varepsilon_{I(w)}^{H,c} = \frac{\partial \text{MRS}_{H,c}^{(w)}}{\partial l} \frac{I_w}{\text{MRS}_{H,c}^{(w)}} \]

denote the elasticity of \( \text{MRS}_{H,c} \) with respect to the labor supply for an individual of type \( w \).

Under weak labor separability, this elasticity is zero, while it can be either positive or negative in the general case depending on whether effort is complementary with or substitutable for the externality. We can then adjust the marginal willingness to pay measure in (5) as follows:

\[ \tilde{M}_{\gamma_{k,t}^{(w)}} = M_{\gamma_{k,t}^{(w)}} \left( 1 + \tilde{B}_{k} C_{k} \varepsilon_{I(k)}^{H,c} \right). \]  

(21)

Note that equation (21) reflects an interaction effect between the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality and the incentive compatibility constraint, since \( \tilde{B}_{k} \) is directly proportional to the Lagrange multiplier attached to the incentive compatibility constraint for type \( r_k \). The \( R \) factors in (18) can then be adjusted correspondingly:

\[ \tilde{R}_{s}^{i} = \ldots \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} \tilde{M}_{\gamma_{r,t}^{(w)}} f(r_s) \ dr_s \ldots \tilde{M}_{\gamma_{r,t}^{(w)}} f(r_2) \ dr_2 M_{\gamma_{r,t}^{(w)}} f(r_1) \ dr_1 \]  

(22a)

so

\[ \tilde{R}_{s}^{i} = 1 + \tilde{B}_{s} C_{s} \varepsilon_{I(s)}^{H,c}, \]  

(22b)

\[ \tilde{R}_{s}^{i} = \int_{0}^{\infty} \tilde{M}_{\gamma_{s,t}^{(w)}} f(r_s) \ dr_s = E(\tilde{M}_{s}), \]  

(22c)

\[ \tilde{R}_{s}^{i} = \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} \tilde{M}_{\gamma_{r,s,t}^{(w)}} f(r_s) \ dr_s M_{\gamma_{r,s,t}^{(w)}} f(r_1) \ dr_1 = E(\tilde{M}_{s} M_{s}). \]  

(22d)

We are now ready to present our main general results:

**Proposition 1.** (i) The optimal marginal income tax rate satisfies the following policy rule for any type \( w \) supplying labor:

\[ \frac{\bar{T}_{y}^{(w)}}{1-\bar{T}_{y}^{(w)}} = A_{w} \tilde{B}_{w} C_{w} + \Gamma_{w} \]

\[ = A_{w} \tilde{B}_{w} C_{w} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \tilde{R}_{s}^{i} M_{s, w} f(s) \ ds \]  

(23)

(ii) If the preferences are weakly labor separable, equation (23) reduces to read

\[ \frac{\bar{T}_{y}^{(w)}}{1-\bar{T}_{y}^{(w)}} = A_{w} \tilde{B}_{w} C_{w} + \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \tilde{R}_{s}^{i} M_{s, w} f(s) \ ds. \]  

(24)

(iii) If the consumption externality is atmospheric, equation (23) reduces to read
\[ T_y^{(w)} = \frac{A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w}{1 - T_y^{(w)}} + \frac{E(M)}{1 - E(M)} + \int_0^\infty \tilde{B}_w e^{H \epsilon}_w M_{w} f(s) ds \left( 1 - E(M) \right). \]

(iv) If the consumption externality is atmospheric and preferences are weakly labor separable, equation (23) simplifies to

\[ T_y^{(w)} = \frac{A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w}{1 - T_y^{(w)}} + \frac{E(M)}{1 - E(M)}. \]

The first line of equation (23) suggests that we can simply add the value of the marginal externality to the ABC term; let be that the B component is different here than in model economies without externalities. Note also that this “additivity” applies regardless of whether the externality is non-atmospheric or not. However, the second line implies that the interpretation of the externality component is far from straightforward in the general case with non-atmospheric externalities.

If the externality is atmospheric, which means that \( E(M_w) = E(M) \) for all \( w \), we can see from results (iii) and (iv) that more conventional policy rules for marginal taxation under externalities surface, since the corrective component (the final term on the right-hand side) is the same for everybody. In equation (26), which assumes weak labor separability, the value of the marginal externality just reflects the sum of all people’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by an individual of type \( w \).

Equation (25) also shows how the externality interacts with the redistributive tax component in case the preferences are not labor separable. To interpret this interaction effect, suppose that the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality is positive, in which case the interaction effect works to increase (decrease) the marginal income tax if the private marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality tends to increase (decrease) in the labor supply/effort, such that \( e_i^{H \epsilon} > 0 (< 0) \) on average. The intuition is, of course, that this adjustment contributes to relax the incentive compatibility constraints by making mimicking less attractive. The adjustment goes in the opposite direction if \( M < 0 \). Note also that the interaction effect vanishes in the special case of weak labor separability in equation (26), where \( MRS_{H \epsilon} \) is independent of effort (such that \( e_i^{H \epsilon} = 0 \)). Finally, if the resource allocation is first best, which coincides with the special case of our model where \( \theta_w = \tilde{B}_w = 0 \) for all \( w \), equation (25) reduces to read
\[ T^{(w)}_w = E(M_w) = E(M) \] for all \( w \), which is a conventional Pigouvian tax measuring the sum of all people’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality.

Let us now return to the general policy rules in equations (23) and (24), which allow for non-atmospheric externalities, where the value of the marginal externality (the second term on the right-hand side) takes the form of an infinite series. Consider first the somewhat simpler case of weak labor separability in equation (24), where each addend in this infinite series constitutes a weighted sum of people’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by an individual of type \( w \). The first addend, with weight factor \( R^0_w = 1 \), is given by

\[
\int_0^\infty M_{sw} f(s) \, ds = E(M_w),
\]
i.e., the unweighted sum of all individuals’ marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in the disposable income of an individual of type \( w \). The second addend with weight factor \( R^1_w \) becomes

\[
\int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty M_{rs} f(r_1) \, dr_1 M_{sw} f(s) \, ds = \int_0^\infty E(M_s)M_{sw} f(s) \, ds,
\]
where a type \( s \) individual’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by an individual of type \( w \) is weighted by all people’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by a type \( s \) individual. Similarly, the third addend with weight factor \( R^2_w \) can be written as

\[
\int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty M_{rs} f(r_1) \, dr_1 M_{rs} f(r_2) \, dr_2 M_{sw} f(s) \, ds = \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty E(M_s)M_{rs} f(r_1) \, dr_1 M_{sw} f(s) \, ds,
\]
which implies that any type \( r_1 \) individual’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by an individual of type \( s \) is weighted by other people’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality generated by an individual of type \( r_1 \). The fourth addend implies a corresponding extension by weighting the integrand of the third addend, and so on. The intuition is that the marginal externalities interact at the social optimum if the externalities are non-atmospheric. More specifically, since the marginal contribution to the externality differs between individuals, and the second-best optimal resource allocation equalizes the social (not the private) marginal utility of disposable income (or consumption) among individuals, adjusted for incentive compatibility, it follows that the social marginal benefit of correcting the externality generated by any type \( w \) depends on the social marginal benefits of correcting the
externalities generated by all other individuals. Thus, the corrective tax component implemented for any type \( w \) may either exceed or fall short of the sum of other people’s marginal willingness to pay for a type \( w \) individual to decrease their disposable income. This will be described more thoroughly below.

To shed further light on the interpretation of the externality term in equation (24), note that we can rewrite the \( R \) factors above using normalized covariances such that, e.g.,

\[
R^2_s = \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty M_{r_2} f(r_2) \, dr_2 M_{r_1} f(r_1) \, dr_1
= E(M) E(M_s) \left( 1 + \text{cov} \left( \frac{M}{E(M)}, \frac{M_s}{E(M_s)} \right) \right),
\]

(27)

where

\[
\rho_s = \text{cov} \left( \frac{M}{E(M)}, \frac{M_s}{E(M_s)} \right)
\]

(28)
is the normalized covariance between how much all people are willing to pay for a reduction in the disposable income of a certain type and how much people of that type are willing to pay for a reduction of the disposable income of an individual of type \( s \). If individuals are willing to pay more for a reduction in the disposable income among the rich (which makes sense), and richer individuals are willing to pay more for a reduction in the disposable income of type \( s \) individuals (which may be the case, and may seem likely due to an income effect), then there is a positive covariance. In general, these covariances will of course vary between types, but in the benchmark case where they do not vary, we are able to present a much simpler version of equation (24).

**Corollary 1.** If the preferences are weakly labor separable, and if \( \rho_w = \rho \) for all \( w \), then

\[
\frac{T_y^{(w)}}{1-T_y^{(w)}} = A_w \bar{B}_w C_w + \frac{E(M_w)}{1-(1+\rho)E(M)}.
\]

(29)

To interpret Corollary 1, we start by considering a hypothetical first-best resource allocation (which is equivalent to the special case of our model where \( \theta_w = B_w = 0 \) for all \( w \)). By using \( \Omega_w = 1/\left(1 + E(M_w) - (1+\rho)E(M)\right) \), equation (29) then simplifies to read
\[ T_y^{(w)} = \Omega_y E(M_w). \] (30)

In the special case where \( \rho_w = \rho = 0 \), we have \( T_y^{(w)} < E(M_w) \) for \( E(M_w) > E(M) \) and \( T_y^{(w)} > E(M_w) \) for \( E(M_w) < E(M) \). As indicated above, the intuition is based on the fact that the externalities are non-atmospheric. In this case, the first-best efficiency condition does not imply that the private marginal utility of disposable income (adjusted for social welfare weights) should be the same for each individual, as it would with atmospheric externalities. Instead, the social marginal utility of disposable income, i.e., taking the externalities into account, should be the same. This implies, in turn, that the private marginal utility of disposable income for an individual who generates negative externalities (typically high-ability individuals) will at optimum be larger than that of an individual who generates positive externalities (or smaller negative externalities).\(^9\) Thus, if \( E(M_w) > (<) E(M) \), it follows that \( E(M_w) \) overestimates (underestimates) the corrective tax necessary to induce individuals of type \( w \) to make the socially desired choice.

Suppose next that \( \rho_w = \rho > 0 \). This implies that \( T_y^{(w)} < E(M_w) \) for \( E(M_w) > (1 + \rho)E(M) \) and \( T_y^{(w)} > E(M_w) \) for \( E(M_w) < (1 + \rho)E(M) \). While the basic logic is the same as for the case where \( \rho = 0 \), such that the first-best deviation from a conventional Pigouvian tax is due to that the private marginal utility of disposable income (again adjusted for the welfare weights implicit in the function \( \psi \)) differs among individuals at the social optimum, the critical levels for when the optimal marginal tax exceeds, or falls short of, a conventional Pigouvian tax have now changed. The intuition is that a positive covariance implies that those who generate large negative externalities and (as explained above) have a high marginal utility of disposable income are also willing to pay more for avoiding the externalities generated by others, and vice versa. Therefore, the modification due to differences in the marginal utility of disposable income will be smaller here.

The above reasoning also applies to equation (29), which assumes a second-best optimal resource allocation and labor separable preferences. The only modification here is that the social marginal utility of disposable income (which is equalized among individuals at the optimum)

\(^9\) Recall that we are in the first-best here where distributional concerns are taken care of by type-specific lump-sum taxes.
must be adjusted to reflect the incentive compatibility constraints. This illustrates the importance of the interaction between the size of the externality caused by a specific individual and the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externalities generated by other people, and hence the corresponding covariances. The latter insight is, of course, also valid in the case where the covariances are not identical, i.e., underlying equation (24).

Let us now return to the general policy rule given in equation (23). The interpretation of the externality component is similar to that in equation (24), except that externality correction now serves a redistributive purpose as well. Thus, the \( R \) factors in equation (24) are replaced with the \( \hat{R} \) factors, defined in equations (22), which imply an interaction effect between the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality and the incentive compatibility constraints. As we explained above, if the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality tends to increase (decrease) in work effort, this motivates an upward (downward) adjustment of the externality term compared with the simpler model with labor separability, *ceteris paribus*, where the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality does not depend directly on the labor supply.

4. Optimal Income Taxation under Self-Centered Inequality Aversion

In the previous section, we derived a general policy rule for optimal marginal income taxation when the utility of each individual depends on the disposable income of all individuals, which includes any kind of other-regarding preferences. This policy rule was expressed in terms of people’s marginal willingness to pay for other people to reduce their disposable income. In this section, we apply the framework set out above to economies where people are characterized by self-centered inequality aversion, based on the seminal contributions by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).

4.1 Results based on the Fehr and Schmidt model

The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model is typically expressed in terms of either two or \( n \) individuals, but it is straightforward to generalize it to a continuous distribution of individuals. The utility function of an individual of any type \( w \) can then be written as follows:

\[
U_w = u \left( c_w - \beta \int_0^w (c_w - c_s) f(s) ds - \alpha \int_w^\infty (c_s - c_w) f(s) ds, l_w \right),
\]

(31)
where $\alpha$ reflects disadvantageous and $\beta$ advantageous inequality aversion. Thus, a type $w$ individual’s marginal willingness to pay for an individual above type $w$ to reduce their disposable income is given by\(^{10}\)

$$\alpha \over 1 + \alpha - (\alpha + \beta) F(c_w),$$

where $F(c_w)$ is thus the ordinal disposable income rank from zero to one. By analogy, the type $w$ individual’s marginal willingness to pay for an individual below type $w$ to increase their disposable income becomes

$$\beta \over 1 + \alpha - (\alpha + \beta) F(c_w).$$

As is typically assumed, if $\alpha > \beta > 0$, people dislike both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, but they dislike disadvantageous inequality more. Another reasonable property of the Fehr-Schmidt model, which to our knowledge has not been discussed before, is that people are willing to pay more for both a disposable income decrease among those above themselves and a disposable income increase among those below themselves, the higher up in the disposable income distribution they are.

Note also the close link with the literature on relative consumption. If $\beta = -\alpha$, the utility function changes to read $U_w = u(c_w + \alpha(c_w - E(c)), l_w)$, i.e., the frequently used difference-comparison formulation (e.g., Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 2008). In this case, therefore, the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequality aversion reduces to an analytically much simpler form, where the consumption externality is atmospheric.\(^{11}\)

Despite that utility function (31) implies complex non-atmospheric consumption externalities, we can present a straightforward policy rule for marginal income taxation, as described in Proposition 2.

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\(^{10}\) Note that the population is normalized to one here. For population size $n$, this measure generalizes to read

$$\alpha / n \over 1 + \alpha - (\alpha + \beta) F(c_w).$$

\(^{11}\) See also Bellemare et al. (2008) and Bruhin et al. (2019) for generalizations of the Fehr and Schmidt model.
Proposition 2. Under the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality aversion, where the preferences are given by (31), the optimal marginal income tax rate can be written as follows for any type \( w \) supplying labor:

\[
\frac{T_y^{(w)}}{1-T_y^{(w)}} = A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w + \frac{\exp((\alpha + \beta)F(c_w)) - 1}{\alpha + \beta \exp(\alpha + \beta)} \alpha + \frac{\exp((\alpha + \beta)F(c_w)) - \exp(\alpha + \beta)}{\alpha + \beta \exp(\alpha + \beta)} \beta.
\]

(32)

The value of the marginal externality contains two parts, given by the second and third terms of (32). Note that each of these terms depends solely on the (observable) ordinal disposable income rank, \( F(c_w) \), in addition to the inequality aversion parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). Consider first the bottom of the distribution, where \( F(c_w) = 0 \). In this case, and if the lowest type supplies labor, the first externality term vanishes, and (32) simplifies to

\[
\frac{T_y^{(w)}}{1-T_y^{(w)}} = A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w - \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta) - 1}{\alpha + \beta \exp(\alpha + \beta)} \beta < A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w.
\]

(33)

Individuals at the bottom of the income distribution impose a positive externality on other people (by influencing the advantageous inequality experienced by them), which motivates a corrective subsidy, i.e., the marginal tax implied by (33) falls short of the purely redistributive \( ABC \) component. Therefore, in the special case where people only dislike disadvantageous inequality, such that \( \beta = 0 \), the whole externality term vanishes and (33) reduces to

\[
T_y^{(w)} / (1-T_y^{(w)}) = A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w, \text{ since people at the bottom of the income distribution no longer generate externalities.}
\]

Consider next the top of the income distribution, where \( F(c_w) = 1 \). This means that the second externality term of (32) vanishes, and equation (32) changes to read

\[
\frac{T_y^{(w)}}{1-T_y^{(w)}} = A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w + \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta) - 1}{\alpha + \beta \exp(\alpha + \beta)} \alpha > A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w.
\]

(34)

The disadvantageous inequality that the highest earners impose on other people leads to a negative externality that calls for a corrective tax, i.e., the marginal income tax rate exceeds the purely redistributive \( ABC \) component. We can also see that the (somewhat unintuitive) special case where people only care about advantageous inequality, i.e., where \( \alpha = 0 \), implies that the externality term in (34) vanishes. If the inequality aversion is symmetric with \( \beta = \alpha \), (34) reduces to

\[
T_y^{(w)} / (1-T_y^{(w)}) = A_w \tilde{B}_w C_w + (\exp(2\alpha) - 1) / (\exp(2\alpha) + 1). \text{ Thus, the externality term}
\]


at the top increases monotonically in $\alpha$ (and in the equally large $\beta$), starting from zero, and approaches $(\exp(2) - 1)/(1 + \exp(2)) \approx 0.79$ when $\alpha$ approaches 1.

Returning to the general equation (32), we can see that the sum of the externality terms implied by Fehr-Schmidt preferences increases monotonically in the ordinal disposable income rank, $F(c_m)$. This is an intuitive result: the higher an individual’s income, the larger the number of persons with lower incomes suffering from the negative externality that this individual imposes on them, *ceteris paribus*. Therefore, if people are inequality averse according to the Fehr-Schmidt model, externality correction will work in the direction of a more progressive marginal income tax schedule, *ceteris paribus*.

However, it is difficult to assess the quantitative effects of inequality aversion on the marginal tax functions based solely on the policy rule presented in Proposition 2. To examine how inequality affects the marginal tax schedule and the overall redistribution, we also present empirically relevant numerical simulations. There are at least two approaches to model the (unobserved) ability distribution. Saez (2001) and several subsequent studies use the observed income distribution together with the labor supply function of their numerical model, evaluated at the actual tax system, in order to estimate the ability distribution. The estimated ability distribution, which corresponds to the observed income range, can then be combined with an assumed distribution (typically a Pareto distribution) for the upper tail. In principle, this approach allows for a distinction between the observed and the optimal income distribution, which is its main advantage. At the same time, real world tax systems often contain a number of technical complications such as regional variation, vertical tax interaction between regional and central governments, and different aspects of tagging, all of which are likely to affect the resulting productivity distribution but are difficult to fully integrate in the analysis. In turn, this contributes to make replication difficult.

The other approach is to assume a parametric form of the ability distribution (as is done in, e.g., Mankiew et al., 2009, Kanbur and Tuomala, 2013, and Tuomala, 2016). This approach to modelling the productivity distribution is transparent, easy to apply, and straightforward for purposes of replication. Since our purpose is to compare the optimal tax and redistribution policies in economies where people have other-regarding preferences with the optimal tax and
redistribution policies in a standard *Homo Economicus* model, we believe that the advantages of the parametric approach dominate in our case.

We follow the approach by Mankiw et al. (2009) in extending a parametric ability distribution with an “atom” of 5% of the population with a productivity close to zero. Following Kanbur and Tuomala (2013) and Toumala (2016), we assume that ability (measured by the before-tax wage rate per unit of labor) can be characterized by a Champernowne distribution with density function  \( f(w) = \zeta(z^5 w^{\zeta-1}) / (z^5 + w^\zeta)^2 \). This distribution has the appealing property of converging to a Pareto distribution at the upper tail with Pareto parameter \( \zeta \), where we choose \( \zeta = 2.4 \) in line with empirical evidence (e.g., Saez 2001). We also choose \( z = 85,500 \) to roughly capture the mean and median of the income distribution in the U.S. economy in 2022 (these statistics will of course also depend on the other-regarding preference parameters). To further increase the realism of the numerical simulations, we assume a fixed level of public consumption corresponding to roughly 15% of GDP in the baseline described below.

The social welfare function is assumed to be utilitarian, while the utility function takes the following form for any type \( w \):

\[
U_w = \log \left( c_w - \beta \int_0^w (c_w - c_s) f(s) ds - \alpha \int_w^\infty (c_s - c_w) f(s) ds \right) - l_w^4 / 4 \tag{35}
\]

implying a Frisch elasticity of labor supply that is almost constant.\(^{12}\) Figure 1 presents the marginal tax rates and disposable income (also interpretable as private consumption in our model) based on three different parametrizations, including a baseline case without inequality aversion (where \( \alpha = \beta = 0 \)). The remaining two cases are based on a recent and extensive meta-analysis by Nunnari and Pozzi (2022), who estimate the mean values of the \( \alpha \) – and \( \beta \) – parameters based on 42 laboratory studies with a total of 289 parameter estimates, as well as their 95% confidence intervals. Here we will present our simulation results based on the low and high limits of these confidence intervals. At the low limit, \( \alpha = 0.302 \) and \( \beta = 0.266 \), while

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\(^{12}\) The Frisch elasticity equals \( 1/3 \) for \( \alpha = \beta = 0 \), which is in line with empirical evidence (see the overview by Whalen and Reichling, 2017). In all simulations, conducted in Mathematica, the before-tax income increases monotonically in ability, such that the before-tax income is distinguishable among types if they work.
\( \alpha = 0.642 \) and \( \beta = 0.396 \) at the high limit.\(^{13}\) These results will be compared with a baseline, which is the standard model of optimal taxation without any inequality aversion.

**Figure 1.** Marginal income tax rates and disposable income as functions of the before-tax income for different levels of inequality aversion based on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model.

Note: \( T_{y}^{No} \) denotes the marginal income tax corresponding to a baseline case without any inequality aversion (where \( \alpha = \beta = 0 \)), while \( T_{y}^{low} \) and \( T_{y}^{High} \) denote the marginal income taxes corresponding to the lower and higher limits, respectively, for \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). The disposable income schedules are defined analogously.

Starting with the standard model of optimal taxation without any other-regarding preferences, we can see that the marginal tax schedule \( T_{y}^{No} \) takes the same U-shaped form as in much earlier literature on optimal taxation (e.g., Saez, 2001; Mankiew et al., 2009). Furthermore, the marginal tax rates are substantial, as is the overall redistribution from high-income to low-income individuals, which can be seen by the corresponding disposable income graph. For example, the optimal baseline disposable income level of an individual with zero before-tax income is almost 50,000 USD per year, whereas it is about 124,000 for an individual with a before-tax income of 200,000 USD/year.

\(^{13}\) These values can be compared with what Fehr and Schmidt (1999) originally suggested, i.e., \( \alpha = 0.85 \) and \( \beta = 0.315 \).
To analyze the implications of inequality aversion, we compare the marginal tax schedule and disposable income schedule of the baseline with the corresponding schedules for the two regimes with inequality aversion, i.e., the low and high values, respectively, of $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Moreover, inequality aversion will affect not only the marginal tax rates but also the intercept of the tax schedule, and hence the uniform lump-sum transfer. Therefore, we also present the resulting disposable income as a function of gross income, where the disposable income at zero gross income reflects this lump-sum transfer.

Two broad observations are immediately obvious. First, the marginal income tax rates are much higher under inequality aversion than in the baseline. In fact, even if the inequality aversion is modest in the sense that $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are in the lower ranges of empirical estimates (as implied by the low-regime), the effect is considerable. This is both a consequence of externality correction, in particular at relatively high income levels (where individuals impose negative externalities on other persons), and stronger preferences for redistribution. The latter leads to higher marginal taxation at low income levels, despite that low-income earners impose positive externalities on other people in the Fehr-Schmidt model. Second, the disposable income is more equally distributed than in the baseline. The latter accords well with the result that the marginal income tax rates are higher also for low-income earners than in the baseline. Thus, the redistributive motive to raise revenue through high marginal taxation of low-income earners dominates any corrective motive to subsidize their labor supply to internalize externalities.

### 4.2 Results based on the Bolton and Ockenfels model

In the model suggested by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), the utility function is given by

$$U_w = u\left(c_w, l_w, \frac{c_w}{E(c)}\right),$$

where $\frac{\partial u}{\partial (c / E(c))} > 0$ for $c < E(c)$, $\frac{\partial u}{\partial (c / E(c))} = 0$ for $c = E(c)$, and $\frac{\partial u}{\partial (c / E(c))} < 0$ for $c > E(c)$.

Given their own disposable income and labor supply, an individual prefers the average disposable income to be as close as possible to their own disposable income. The perceived
inequality depends on the discrepancy between the individual’s own disposable income and the average disposable income. For Bolton-Ockenfels preferences, therefore, the consumption externality is atmospheric. From the analysis in Section 3, this means that we can write \( E(M_w) = E(M) \), and that the policy rule for marginal income taxation is rather straightforward.

Let \( F(E(c)) \) reflect the ordinal rank of the individual whose disposable income is equal to the mean disposable income, and hence also the share of individuals consuming below the average. Policy rules corresponding to the general utility function (35) as well as for two useful special cases are given in Proposition 3.

**Proposition 3.** The policy rule for marginal income taxation under the Bolton-Ockenfels (2000) inequality aversion, based on utility function (35), is given by equation (25), which reduces to equation (26) if the preferences are labor separable.

Under the utility specification \( U_w = v\left(c_w - \frac{E(c)}{c_w} - 1, l_u\right) \), we obtain

\[
\frac{T^{(u)}_y}{1 - T^{(u)}_y} = A_w B_w C_w + \frac{E(c)E\left(1/c^2\right) - E\left(1/c\right)}{1/2 - \phi\left(E(1/c) - E\left(1/c\right)\right)} \phi, \tag{36a}
\]

while utility specification \( U_w = v\left(c_w - \frac{E(c) - c_w}{l_u} \right) \) gives

\[
\frac{T^{(u)}_y}{1 - T^{(u)}_y} = A_w B_w C_w + \frac{F(E(c)) - 1/2}{1/2 - \phi\left(F(E(c)) - 1/2\right)} \phi, \tag{36b}
\]

where \( \phi > 0 \).

The first part of the proposition, which is applicable to the general utility function (35), follows because the consumption externality is atmospheric. This fact also implies that the second term on the right-hand side of (25), (26), and (36a)–(36b), respectively, is identical for all \( w \). As such, this term is interpretable as a standard Pigouvian element of the marginal income tax.

The utility function underlying special case (36a) is quite similar to the functional form discussed explicitly by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), with one important difference: the ratio is the inverse. Bolton and Ockenfels present the functional form \( c_w - \phi\left(c_w / E(c) - 1\right)^2 \). For our purposes, the problem with their functional form is that it is not monotonic in the individual’s
own disposable income for high disposable income levels. The utility function underlying (36b) is interesting in the sense that its linear structure makes it somewhat reminiscent of the Fehr-Schmidt specification. On the other hand, (36b) has the unrealistic drawback of implying a higher marginal willingness to pay for reduced advantageous than reduced disadvantageous inequality.

For each of these two specifications, we can observe that the numerator of the externality term contains two parts with opposite signs. This is because increased disposable income for any individual, *ceteris paribus*, leads to negative externalities for all individuals with disposable income levels below the average and positive externalities for all individuals with disposable income levels above the average. This suggests that the sum of people’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externality can be relatively small, since positive and negative terms of this sum tend to cancel out (at least in part). To exemplify, consider equation (36b), where the externality term is positive if, and only if, \( F(E(c)) > 1/2 \), which is the case if mean income is larger than median income or, in other words, if the second Pearson measure of skewness is positive.

Therefore, an interesting conclusion is that seemingly similar models of inequality aversion imply very different corrective tax elements. Whereas the non-atmospheric consumption externality implied by Fehr-Schmidt preferences work in the direction of higher marginal income tax rates for high-income earners, Bolton-Ockenfels preferences imply an atmospheric externality where the corrective tax element is the same for everybody.

For the numerical simulations, we follow the same approach and assumption as in the Fehr-Schmidt model. The utility function is based on the one underlying (36a) as follows:

\[
U_w = \log \left( c_w - \phi \left( \frac{E(c)}{c_w} - 1 \right)^2 \right) - l_w^4 / 4 ,
\]

where \( \phi > 0 \) is a parameter. To make the simulations comparable with those corresponding to the Fehr-Schmidt model, we calibrate the Bolton-Ockenfels model such that one simulation corresponds to the low level of inequality aversion and the other to the high level in the Fehr-Schmidt model. This is done by choosing \( \phi \) such that the mean value of (i) the marginal willingness to pay by an individual of the lowest disposable income level (0th percentile) for an individual of the 90th percentile to decrease their disposable income and (ii) the marginal
willingness to pay by an individual of the 90th percentile for an individual of the 0th percentile to increase their disposable income takes the same values as in the Low and High versions, respectively, of the Fehr-Schmidt model.\textsuperscript{14} This procedure implies that $\phi$ equals 38,200 and 74,700 in the scenarios with low and high inequality aversion, respectively.

**Figure 2.** Marginal income tax rates and private disposable income as functions of the before-tax income for different levels of inequality aversion based on the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model.

Note: $T_{y}^{No}$ denotes the marginal income tax corresponding to a baseline case without any inequality aversion (where $\phi = 0$), while $T_{y}^{Low}$ and $T_{y}^{High}$ denote the marginal income taxes corresponding to the lower and higher levels of inequality aversion, as defined in the context of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The disposable income schedules are defined analogously.

\textsuperscript{14} It is easy to show that this mean value equals \[0.5 \alpha + \beta + 0.1 \alpha (\alpha - \beta) \quad (1 + \alpha)(1 + 0.1 \alpha - 0.9 \beta)\] for the Fehr and Schmidt model and \[\phi \left( \frac{E(c)}{c_{0}} - 1 \right) + \phi \left( 1 - \frac{E(c)}{c_{90}} \right)\] for the Bolton and Ockenfels model, which makes it possible to iteratively solve for the value of $\phi$ that corresponds to the values of $\alpha$ and $\beta$. Naturally, there are many alternative calibration methods.
As with the Fehr-Schmidt type of preferences, inequality aversion implies higher marginal income tax rates and a more equal disposable income distribution than the baseline (where the individuals are not inequality averse at all). Yet, there are two striking differences: the marginal tax rates for high-income earners are lower and the marginal tax rates for low-income earners are higher in the Bolton-Ockenfels model than in the Fehr-Schmidt model. The intuition is that the externality is atmospheric, and thus contributes to all people’s marginal tax rates in the same way, in the Bolton-Ockenfels model, whereas it is non-atmospheric such that the negative externality increases in income in the Fehr-Schmidt model. This necessitates higher marginal income tax rates in the lower part of the income distribution for purely redistributive reasons under the Bolton-Ockenfels type of preferences, as it is more costly to increase the marginal tax rates among people with reasonably high incomes compared with the Fehr-Schmidt model (where middle- and high-income earners generate larger negative externalities).

5. Optimal Income Taxation under Non-Self-Centered Inequality Aversion

Although much work on other-regarding preferences in behavioral economics has focused on self-centered inequality aversion, one may question this point of departure when studying inequality at the societal level. Instead, individuals may, for a variety of reasons, prefer a more equal disposable income distribution to a less equal one regardless of the relationship between their own and other people’s disposable income. In this case, the inequality aversion is said to be non-self-centered. We will focus on two variants of non-self-centered inequality aversion, where people (i) prefer a more equal to a less equal distribution in terms of the Gini coefficient, the by far most commonly used inequality measure at the social level, and (ii) would like the lowest disposable income level in society to be as high as possible.

5.1 Preferences with respect to the Gini coefficient

Let us consider the case where people prefer a low Gini coefficient, $G$, such that $I = G$ and $U_w = u(c_w, l_w, G)$. Since the Gini coefficient can be written

\[ G = \frac{\int_0^1 F(x) dx}{\bar{u}} \]

15 The value of the marginal externality, i.e., the second term on the right-hand side of (25), (26), and (36a)--(36b), equals 0.097 in the low-regime and 0.109 in the high-regime. As such, it contributes to the marginal tax rates by roughly 10 percentage points.
\[ G = \frac{1}{E(c)} \int_{0}^{\infty} c_w (2F(w) - 1) f(w) dw, \quad (37) \]

one can show that the marginal willingness to pay by an individual of type \( s \) for a decrease in a type \( w \) individual’s disposable income is given by

\[ M_{sw} = -\frac{\partial G}{\partial c_w} \frac{u_{c(s)}^{(w)}}{u_{c(s)}^{(s)}} = -\frac{2F(c_w) - 1 - G}{E(c)} \frac{MRS_{G,c}^{(s)}}{MRS_{G,c}^{(s)}}, \]

where the first factor reflects how the disposable income increase of a type \( w \) individual affects the Gini coefficient, and the second reflects a type \( s \) individual’s marginal willingness to pay to avoid inequality.\(^{16}\) We are now ready to present both general results with respect to the Gini function.

**Proposition 4.** If people are inequality averse with respect to the Gini coefficient, such that the utility function reads \( U_w = u(c_w, l_w, G) \), the policy rule for marginal income taxation can be written as follows for any type \( w \) supplying labor:

\[ T_{y(w)} = A_w B_w C_w + \frac{2F(c_w) - 1 - G}{E(c)} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} R_i^{(s)} MRS_{G,c}^{(s)} f(s) ds. \quad (38a) \]

Under weak labor separability, equation (38a) simplifies to read

\[ T_{y(w)} = A_w B_w C_w + \frac{2F(c_w) - 1 - G}{E(c)} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} R_i^{(s)} MRS_{G,c}^{(s)} f(s) ds. \quad (38b) \]

Utility specification \( U_w = u(c_w - \mu G, l_w) \) implies

\[ T_{y(w)} = A_w B_w C_w + \frac{2F(c_w) - 1 - G}{E(c) + \mu G} \mu. \quad (38c) \]

Utility specification \( U_w = u(\log c_w - \xi G, l_w) \) implies

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\(^{16}\) From this expression one can easily observe the well-known fact that disposable income changes in the upper tail of the distribution tend to have relatively small effects on the Gini. Consider, for example, the case where Gini is equal to 0.4, and suppose that the 99.99th -percentile disposable income level is 10,000 times the 99th -percentile level (which is roughly consistent with the current disposable income distribution in the U.S.). Then, naturally, an additional dollar to an individual at the 99.99th -percentile will increase the Gini more than an additional dollar to an individual at the 99th -percentile. Yet, the increase is only about 3% larger despite the fact that the income of the former individual is 10,000 times larger.
\[
T_y^{(w)} = A_w \hat{B}_w C_w + \left(2F(c_w) - 1 - G\right) \xi.
\] (38d)

Finally, utility specification \(U_w = u(c_w, G, l_w)\) implies
\[
T_y^{(w)} = A_w \hat{B}_w C_w + \frac{2F(c_w) - 1 - G}{G} \xi.
\] (38e)

In (38a) and (38b), which are based on a general utility function, the externality term is still quite complex, but it is in both cases proportional to the factor \(2F(c_w) - 1 - G\) reflecting how increased disposable income by an individual of type \(w\) affects the Gini coefficient. Each policy rule in the proposition implies that the externality is negative, such that the second term on the right-hand side is positive, if, and only if, \(F(c_w) > (1 + G)/2\). This is because an additional disposable income unit for an individual of type \(w\) causes a negative externality if, and only if, it leads to an increase in the Gini, and vice versa. The externality term thus contributes to the marginal tax schedule in a way similar to the model with Fehr-Schmidt preferences, i.e., individuals in the lower part of the distribution primarily impose positive consumption externalities on other people and vice versa for individuals higher up in the distribution. Thus, non-self-centered inequality aversion may have policy implications very similar to those associated with self-centered inequality aversion.\(^{17}\)

The utility function underlying (38c) is similar to the functional form analyzed by Nyborg-Støstad and Cowell (2023), although that paper uses the absolute Gini coefficient. This form implies that the willingness to pay for a reduction in the Gini coefficient is the same for all individuals. However, assuming that high inequality increases crime rates, this property runs counter to empirical evidence that the willingness to pay to reduce crime increases in income (Cohen et al. 2004, Atkinson et al. 2005). Moreover, rich people naturally tend to spend more on security than poor people. These empirical patterns are instead consistent with the utility functions underlying (38d) and (38e), where the latter form has been used in experimental work by, e.g., Carlsson et al. (2007).

\(^{17}\) This similarity is intuitive in light of earlier research. Schmidt and Wichardt (2019) show that if people are inequality averse according to the Fehr-Schmidt model, and if the preferences are aggregated into a social welfare function, one can express this social welfare function in terms of the average income and the Gini coefficient.
For the numerical simulations, we follow the same underlying assumptions and calibration approach as for the Bolton-Ockenfels model, based on the parameters of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The utility function (which is a special case of the utility function underlying [38d]) is given as follows:

\[
U_w = \log c_w - \xi G - l^4_w / 4,
\]  

(39)

where \( \xi \) reflects the strength of the inequality aversion. An individual’s marginal willingness to pay to reduce the Gini coefficient is then independent of the Gini itself, and proportional to the individual’s own disposable income. The calibration implies that \( \xi \) equals 0.265 in the low-scenario and 0.46 in the high-scenario.

**Figure 3.** Marginal income tax rates and disposable income as functions of the before-tax income for different levels of aversion to inequality based on the Gini coefficient.

Note: \( T_y^{\text{No}} \) denotes the marginal income tax corresponding to a baseline case without any inequality aversion (where \( \xi = 0 \)), while \( T_y^{\text{Low}} \) and \( T_y^{\text{High}} \) denote the marginal income taxes corresponding to the lower and higher levels of inequality aversion, as defined in the context of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The disposable income schedules are defined analogously.
Figure 3 shows that the effects of inequality aversion on the marginal income tax rates are substantial and to some extent reminiscent of those found for the Fehr-Schmidt model of self-centered inequality aversion. One important difference, though, is that the marginal tax rates in the lower part of the income distribution are much less sensitive to inequality aversion than they are in the Fehr-Schmidt model. This means that the redistributive motive to increase the marginal tax rates among low-income earners in response to inequality aversion (and thus raise more revenue higher up in the distribution) is almost fully offset by the corrective motive to subsidize the low-earners’ labor in order to internalize the positive consumption externalities that these earners generate. Therefore, the effects of inequality aversion on the disposable income distribution are much smaller here than in the Fehr-Schmidt model examined above.

The intuition behind these results and, in particular, the discrepancy from the otherwise similar results of the Fehr-Schmidt model, is that the positive marginal externality in the lower end of the distribution is larger when the concerns for inequality are based on the Gini coefficient. In addition, the marginal externality that people generate continues to be positive higher up in the distribution compared with the Fehr-Schmidt model.

5.2 Rawlsian preferences

With Rawlsian preferences, utility can be written

\[ U_w = u(c_w, I_w, c_{\min}) , \]  

where \( c_{\min} \) constitutes the lowest disposable income level in the economy, and \( \partial u / \partial c_{\min} > 0 \). It is convenient to assume that people with abilities below a certain threshold level will not work. The disposable income of all unemployed people is then the same and equal to the uniform lump-sum transfer of the tax system, in this case \( c_{\min} \). This also implies that Rawlsian preferences do not lead to any externalities. The intuition is, of course, that unemployed individuals cannot influence their disposable income space.\(^{18}\) Consider Proposition 5.

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\(^{18}\) If, on the other hand, it would be optimal for society if also the type with the lowest disposable income level works, then, in principle, these individuals would impose positive externalities on all other types through their labor supply behavior. Yet, if the ability distribution started from zero, it would be difficult to model a case where these individuals supply a non-negligible amount of labor.
Proposition 5. The policy rule for marginal income taxation under Rawlsian preferences for any type \( w \) supplying labor can be written as follows:

\[
\frac{\gamma^{(w)}}{1-\gamma^{(w)}} = A_w B_w C_w.
\]

Thus, the policy rule is exactly the same as in economies without any other-regarding preferences.

Although policy rule (41) is identical to the rule without externalities, the levels of marginal taxation (as well as the tax intercept) will of course depend on the strength of the Rawlsian maximin preference.

For the numerical simulations, we use the following utility function:

\[
U_w = \log c_w + \zeta \log c_{\text{min}} - t_w^4 / 4.
\]

To arrive at results comparable to those presented above, we calibrate the model by choosing the parameter \( \zeta \) to roughly correspond to the low and high inequality aversion cases, as defined in the context of the Fehr-Schmidt model. These calibrations are analogous to those used for the Bolton-Ockenfels and Gini models, respectively.\(^{19}\) As before, we assume a parametric ability distribution with an atom of 5% of the population at the bottom, which will here thus correspond to the fraction of people with the lowest disposable income. The results are presented in Figure 4.

\(^{19}\) This implies that \( \zeta \) equals 0.265 under low inequality aversion and 0.467 under high inequality aversion.
Figure 4. Marginal income tax rates and disposable income as functions of the before-tax income for different levels of aversion to inequality based on Rawlsian preferences.

Note: $T_y^{No}$ denotes the marginal income tax corresponding to a baseline case without any inequality aversion (where $\zeta = 0$), while $T_y^{Low}$ and $T_y^{High}$ denote the marginal income taxes corresponding to the lower and higher levels of inequality aversion, as defined in the context of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The disposable income schedules are defined analogously.

Except that the very lowest type may impose externalities on other people, the change in marginal tax structure between the baseline (which is the same as before) and the high and low inequality aversion curves solely reflects a stronger motive for redistribution caused by inequality aversion. Despite this important difference compared with the other models, we can see that inequality aversion still leads to substantial increases in marginal taxation and a more equal disposable income distribution. The marginal tax schedules presented in Figure 4 are reminiscent of those found under self-centered inequality aversion of the Bolton-Ockenfels type. This result is intuitive: in the Bolton-Ockenfels model the externality is atmospheric such that each individual’s marginal contribution is the same, while the value of the marginal externality is zero here (a technical special case of an atmospheric externality). Thus, the resemblance between Figures 2 and 4 is hardly surprising. To increase the disposable income
of the lowest type (and, consequently, the disposable income of low-income earners above this type), we raise additional tax revenue higher up in the distribution through higher marginal taxation in the lower part of the distribution. In addition, we can observe that the minimum disposable income, and hence the lump-sum transfer of the tax system, is larger based on Rawlsian preferences compared with the other kinds of inequality aversion examined above, which follows intuition.

6. Top Marginal Income Tax Rates

This section deals with the marginal tax treatment of top incomes and in particular how this tax treatment is modified by other-regarding preferences. In subsection 6.1, we continue to focus on the case where ability is unlimited, as in many earlier studies of top income taxation. Yet, although this case typically provides good approximations of the marginal tax rates at very high income levels, ability can, strictly speaking, not be infinite in a finite world. Therefore, subsection 6.2 examines the case with a bounded ability distribution and presents the marginal income tax rate for the individual(s) with the highest finite ability and income.

6.1 Top Marginal Income Tax Rates when Ability and Income are Unbounded

Following Diamond (1998), we simplify by assuming quasi-linear utilities here, implying zero income effects such that the compensated and uncompensated labor supply elasticities coincide, i.e., \( \zeta^u_w = \zeta^c_w = \zeta^\infty_w \). (19a) reduces to read \( A_w = 1 + 1/ \zeta^\infty_w \). Similarly, when ability approaches infinity, (20) can be simplified to

\[
\tilde{B}_w = \lim_{w \to \infty} \int (1 - (\delta^u_s - \Gamma^u_s)) \frac{f(s)}{1 - F(w)} ds = 1 + \Gamma^\infty
\]

Provided that the welfare weight, \( \delta^u_w \), realistically, approaches zero at the top. Therefore, we obtain the following simple \( ABC \) expression, adjusted for externalities, when the before-tax income (and ability) approaches infinity:

\[
A_w \tilde{B}_w C_\infty = \frac{1 + \zeta^\infty_w}{\zeta^\infty_w \Gamma^\infty} (1 + \Gamma^\infty),
\]

(41)

where \( \Gamma^\infty \) is interpretable as society’s marginal willingness to avoid the externalities generated by top earners. Thus, the factor \( (1 + \Gamma^\infty) \) constitutes the only modification compared to the
corresponding ABC formula in Diamond (1998). The interpretation is that the distortive part of the top marginal income tax rate is modified by the externality: the right-hand side of (41) is scaled up (due to a lower social cost of redistribution) if the externality is negative and scaled down (due to a higher social cost of redistribution) if the externality is positive. Our result is presented in Proposition 6.

**Proposition 6.** For quasi-linear utility functions, the top marginal income tax rate is given by

\[ T^{(w)} = \frac{(1+1/\xi_w)(1+\Gamma_x)+\sigma_x\Gamma_x}{\sigma_x+(1+1/\xi_w)(1+\Gamma_x)+\sigma_x\Gamma_x}, \]

where under F-S preferences \( U_w = u\left(c_w - \beta \int_0^w (c_w - c_s)f(s)ds - \alpha \int_0^w (c_s - c_w)f(s)ds - g(l_w), l_w \right) \)

\[ \Gamma_x = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta) - 1}{\alpha + \beta \exp(\alpha + \beta)} \alpha, \]

under B-O preferences \( U_w = \nu \left(c_w - \phi \left(\frac{E(c)}{c_w} - 1\right)^2, l_w \right) \)

\[ \Gamma_x = \frac{E(c)\left(1/c^2\right) - E\left(1/c\right)}{1/2 - \phi \left(E(c)\left(1/c^2\right) - E\left(1/c\right)\right)} \phi = \Gamma_w \quad \forall w, \]

under preferences with respect to the Gini \( U_w = u\left(\log c_w - \xi G), l_w \right) \)

\[ \Gamma_x = (1-G)\xi, \]

and under Rawlsian preferences \( U_w = u\left(\log c_w - \xi G), l_w \right) \)

\[ \Gamma_x = 0. \]

To interpret (42), consider first the corresponding equation (15) in Diamond (1998), which with our notations can be written as follows (if the welfare weight is zero at the top):

\[ T^{(w)} = \frac{1+1/\xi_w}{\sigma_x + 1+1/\xi_w}. \]

Comparing this expression with (42) above, we can see that the differences are solely due to the externalities generated by the top earners, i.e., \( \Gamma_x \). Note also that (42) implies

\[ \frac{\partial T^{(w)}}{\partial \Gamma_x} = \frac{(1+1/\xi_w + \sigma_x)\sigma_x}{(\sigma_x + (1+1/\xi_w)(1+\Gamma_x)+\sigma_x\Gamma_x)^2} > 0. \]

Thus, the top marginal income tax rate increases with the magnitude of the negative consumption externality (and vice versa should it be positive), which follows intuition.
Note once again that the externality is atmospheric under Bolton-Ockenfels preferences, and not particularly large at the top, and that high-income individuals do not generate any externalities in the Rawlsian case. Consequently, the policy rule for the top marginal income tax rate is exactly the same as in model economies without other-regarding preferences. Finally, it is straightforward to plug in parameter estimates for the Gini and (in particular) the Fehr and Schmidt cases, together with standard assumptions for the Diamond model, to see that the top marginal income tax rates often increase substantially due to other-regarding preferences.

6.2 The Top Marginal Tax Rate when Ability and Income are Bounded

This case corresponds to the classical analyses by Sadka (1976), who showed that, in conventional models without externalities, the optimal marginal income tax rate for the highest ability type equals zero. There is no need to assume quasi-linearity here, since the ABC component is always equal to zero for the individual(s) with the highest income. Moreover, we are here able to provide closed form solutions for important special cases.

**Proposition 7.** The optimal marginal income tax rate for the individual(s) with the highest income is given by

\[
T^{(\text{Max})}_y = \frac{\Gamma_{\text{Max}}}{1 + \Gamma_{\text{Max}}}. \tag{48}
\]

Under Fehr-Schmidt preferences \( U_w = u\left(c_w - \beta \int_0^\infty (c_w - c_s) f(s) ds - \alpha \int_0^\infty (c_s - c_w) f(s) ds - g(l_w, l_w)\right) \):

\[
T^{(\text{Max})}_y = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta) - 1}{(\alpha + \beta)\exp(\alpha + \beta)} \alpha. \tag{49}
\]

Under preferences with respect to the Gini \( U_w = u\left(\log c_w - \tilde{\xi} G\right), l_w \):

\[
T^{(\text{Max})}_y = \frac{1 - G}{1 + (1 - G) \tilde{\xi}}, \tag{49}
\]

Under Rawlsian preferences \( U_w = u\left(\log c_w - \tilde{\xi} G\right), l_w \):

\[
T^{(\text{Max})}_y = 0. \tag{50}
\]

The marginal income tax rate in Proposition 7 just reflects the social value of the marginal externalities generated by the highest income earner, clearly implying that the zero-at-the-top
result does not hold in general in economies where people have other-regarding preferences; the Rawlsian version constitutes an exception for reasons explained above. Note also that the top marginal income tax rate in (48) coincides with the first-best top marginal income tax rate, i.e., the policy rule that would follow if the government were able to redistribute through type-specific lump-sum taxes.

To see that the top marginal tax rates may not only be positive but also quantitatively substantial, consider the two parameterization used in the numerical Fehr-Schmidt illustrations, where $\alpha = 0.302$ and $\beta = 0.266$ in the low parameter case, and $\alpha = 0.642$ and $\beta = 0.396$ in the high parameter case. Then we obtain top marginal tax rates of about 26% and 46%, respectively, which are indeed substantially larger than zero.\(^{20}\)

For the corresponding Gini case we obtain, as expected (cf., e.g., footnote 16), lower but still substantial top marginal tax rates. Considering the previously used parameter values of $\xi = 0.265$ and $\xi = 0.46$ for the low and high parameter cases, together with a Gini coefficient of 0.4, we obtain top marginal tax rates of about 14% and 22%, respectively.

7. Conclusion

This paper integrates other-regarding preferences in the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation based on an extension of the Mirrleesian (1971) continuous type model. The point of departure is a very general framework, where other-regarding preferences encompass almost any kind of individual preference with regards to other people’s disposable income. An implication is, of course, that our framework also encompasses almost any kind of non-atmospheric consumption externality. Despite the generality of the model, we show that the policy rule for marginal income taxation can be written as the sum of two distinct terms: one is a purely redistributive component, interpretable as a generalization of the $ABC$ rule (where the generalization refers to the redistributive costs and benefits of externality correction), while the other is corrective and reflects the value of the marginal externality that each individual imposes.

\(^{20}\) By calculating the optimal marginal tax rate for several parameter combinations, it is moreover immediately obvious that the top marginal income tax rate under Fehr-Schmidt preferences primarily depends on $\alpha$ and is almost independent of $\beta$. The intuition is, of course, that all people will compare their own disposable income disadvantageously to the disposable income at the top.
on other people. We also show how the redistributive and corrective tax elements interact in the context of marginal taxation, and how (part of) this interaction vanishes if the preferences are labor separable.

Four special cases of the general model are also examined, where the other-regarding preference refers to inequality aversion. More specifically, we consider two models of self-centered inequality aversion based on the seminal contributions of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), respectively, and two models of non-self-centered inequality aversion where the measure of inequality that people care about is given by the disposable income Gini and the disposable income of the poorest group in society, respectively. Whereas all these cases show that inequality aversion motivates much higher marginal income tax rates and a more equal income distribution than model economies where people are not inequality averse, the more specific implications of inequality aversion for tax policy differ considerably across models. For instance, the corrective tax element varies across individuals in the Fehr-Schmidt and Gini models, such that individuals in the lower part of the income distribution primarily impose positive externalities on other people and vice versa for individuals higher up in the income distribution, while the consumption externality is atmospheric in the Bolton-Ockenfels model. Thus, externality correction works more in favor of tax progression in the Fehr-Schmidt and Gini models, which means lower marginal taxes for low-income earners and higher marginal taxes for high-income earners compared with the Bolton-Ockenfels and Rawlsian models. In other words, it is not only important to distinguish between self-centered and non-self-centered inequality aversion; seemingly similar models of self-centered inequality aversion can also have quite different implications.

Future research may take several directions, and we will merely point out two of them. First, the preferences for equality may be stronger in certain domains and weaker in others. If so, this would suggest that income taxation alone may not fully correct for the associated externalities. It would, therefore, be relevant to extend the analysis to a framework where also commodity taxation, wealth taxation, and/or public provision of private goods can be used for purposes of redistribution and correction. Second, and in a similar vein, it would be interesting to extend the general framework of other-regarding preferences to model economies with additional policy instruments (such as other tax instruments and public goods). Each of these extensions is clearly substantial enough to warrant their own papers.
References


