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STUDIA GRAECA ET LATINA
GOTHOBURGENSIA LXV

KARIN HULT

THEODORE METOCHITES
ON ANCIENT AUTHORS
AND PHILOSOPHY


Semeioseis gnomikai 1–26 & 71

A Critical Edition with Introduction,
Translation, Notes, and Indexes

With a Contribution by Börje Bydén



ACTA UNIVERSITATIS GOTHOBURGENSIS



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Abstract

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The book contains a critical edition of 27 chapters of the *Semeioseis gnomikai*, a collection of 120 essays by the Byzantine statesman and scholar Theodore Metochites (1270–1332). The edition is planned to appear in four volumes altogether.

The book is divided into three parts, (1) an introduction, (2) the edition of the Greek text, with English translation and notes, (3) an essay by Börje Bydén. Also included are a bibliography, an index of passages from ancient authors, and indexes of Greek words and names.

The introduction presents the three manuscripts used for the edition, Par. gr. 2003, Marc. gr. 532 (both of the early fourteenth century), and Scor. gr. 248, a sixteenth-century copy of the latter. This edition is the first critical edition of the text, meant to replace the 1821 edition by C. G. Müller and Th. Kiessling, which was based on an inferior manuscript. In the concluding essay, Börje Bydén examines a number of relevant passages in order to form a clearer picture of how the nature and purpose of the *Semeioseis gnomikai* may have been defined by Metochites and his contemporary audience.

Keywords: rhetoric, literary style, genre, essay, irony, philosophy, classical authors, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Dio, Synesius, Xenophon, Philo, Josephus

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*To the memory of
Ole L. Smith*

Preface

The Metochites Project was begun in 1993 as a cooperative venture between the Department of Greek Studies, Philosophy and History, University of Cyprus, and the Department of Classical Studies, Göteborg University. The aim of the project is to prepare a complete critical edition of Theodore Metochites' *Semeioseis gnomikai* (*Miscellanea philosophica et historica*), with accompanying English translation and notes. In addition, the project includes special studies on the *Semeioseis* (e.g., linguistic, aesthetical, philosophical, historical) and offers the opportunity for the study of other aspects of Metochites' life and work.

The one hundred and twenty essays in the *Semeioseis gnomikai* will be published in four volumes. I am presently preparing volume two, essays 27–60.

The project was initiated by Ole L. Smith, Göteborg, and Panagiotis A. Agapitos, Nicosia. After a brief illness, Ole passed away on February 6, 1995. At that time we were working on a pilot study for the project, which was finished by Panagiotis and me and published in 1996 (*Theodoros Metochites on Philosophical Irony and Greek History*). Ole discovered the important Venice manuscript, and identified the scribal hands in the Paris and Escorial manuscripts. His death was a hard blow for the project, as well as for his graduate students, friends and colleagues, not least myself. He has been sorely missed during the work on this book.

The present volume includes a study by Börje Bydén on the nature and purpose of the *Semeioseis gnomikai*. This chapter was originally written for his dissertation, which is part of the Metochites Project, treating of the philosophical content of Metochites' writings (*Theodore Metochites' Stoicheiosis astronomike and the Study of Natural Philosophy and Mathematics in Early Palaiologan Byzantium*, forthcoming). At the end of the day this chapter was left over; however, I was more than happy to accommodate it in this volume.

Bydén's chapter was added when my own book was already finished. Some adjustments have been made between the two parts of

the book; we have, however, refrained from drastic reworkings of our respective contributions. This has inevitably resulted in some overlappings, especially in the sections that deal with the character of the *Semeioseis* (pp. xv–xvi and 246–47, respectively) and the title of the work (pp. xiv–xv and 251–52, respectively). I apologise for any inconvenience that this may cause the readers. A number of cross-references between the two parts of the book have been added in the notes.

Those essays edited here that deal with philosophers and philosophy are discussed in Bydén's dissertation, which can be used partly as a companion volume to the present one. Unfortunately, I can give only chapter references to this work, as yet unpublished; it will, however, contain a full *index locorum*.

I am grateful to various foundations and institutions that have supported the project with funds for personnel, electronic equipment and microfilms, printing, and travel grants: Adlerbertska forskningsfonden, Anna Ahrenbergs fond, Herbert & Karin Jacobssons Stiftelse, Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Stiftelse, Magn. Bergvalls Stiftelse, the Royal Society of Arts and Sciences in Gothenburg, the Swedish Science Council (previously the Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences), The Arts Faculty of Göteborg University, and the University of Cyprus Research Committee.

The Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana (Venice) and the Bibliothèque nationale (Paris) have supplied microfilms of MSS in their possession; the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes (CNRS, Paris) has provided a microfilm of the Escorial MS, which could not be obtained from the Escorial library.

I wish to express my gratitude to those colleagues and friends who have helped me during my work with this book, particularly Tryggve Göransson, Staffan Wahlgren, and Staffan Fogelmark, who have made valuable comments and criticisms. I have also had valuable help of various kinds from Jan Retsö, Jan Olof Rosenqvist, Pär Sandin, Martin Jacobsson, Jerker Blomqvist, Gunnel Hult, Magnus Wistrand, and the Greek Seminar at Göteborg University.

I am very grateful to Monika Asztalos for her constructive criticism and suggestions for improvements, both in my part of the book and in Bydén's study.

Special thanks to Panagiotis Agapitos, who has been a constant source of information and encouragement, and whose contributions to the pilot study I have used in the present volume; to Kalliope

Pougiourou, who typed the whole text of the Paris manuscript into a computer; and to Jon van Leuven, who corrected my English.

My largest debt of gratitude is to Börje Bydén, with whom I have been able to discuss all aspects of my work, textual criticism, interpretation and commentary. He has suggested numerous improvements, and also been very generous in sharing his expertise on Greek philosophy. Through the resourcefulness, strength, and vigour of his mind, the man has been of the greatest use to me.

Göteborg, November 2002

K. H.

Contents

INTRODUCTION	xiii
1. Theodore Metochites	xiii
2. The <i>Semeioseis gnomikai</i>	xiv
Date	xiv
Title	xiv
Character	xv
3. The manuscripts	xvi
The Paris manuscript (P)	xvii
The Venice manuscript (M)	xx
The Escorial manuscript (E)	xxi
The relation between M and E	xxii
The relation between P and M	xxv
Other manuscripts	xxxii
4. The edition of Müller and Kiessling	xxxiii
5. The present edition	xli
Editorial principles	xli
The translation	xliii
The notes	xliii
TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES	1
THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE <i>SEMEIOSEIS GNOMIKAI</i> :	
THE ANTITHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC	245
(by Börje Bydén)	
The <i>Semeioseis gnomikai</i> : a brief general description	246
Possible models and parallels	248
Beck on the nature of the <i>Semeioseis</i>	250
The preface. (1) The title	251
The preface. (2) The <i>aporia</i>	258

Beck on the purpose of the <i>Semeioseis</i>	261
<i>Poem 12</i>	263
Nikephoros Gregoras, <i>Letter 23</i>	269
Metochites on prose style	273
Metochites' prose style	283
BIBLIOGRAPHY	289
INDEX OF PASSAGES	296
INDEX OF GREEK WORDS	306
INDEX OF GREEK NAMES	357

Introduction¹

1. Theodore Metochites

Theodore Metochites (1270–1332)² is one of the outstanding figures of Byzantine letters and culture.³ A close associate of Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282–1328), he was actively involved in the affairs of the state, rising steadily to the highest offices, until in 1328 both he and Andronikos fell from power. His literary and scholarly output was vast; it falls into the following major categories, represented by a group of deluxe manuscripts, possibly edited by his pupil Nikephoros Gregoras:⁴

Astronomy: Vat. gr. 1365 (three treatises on Ptolemy).

Philosophy: Par. gr. 1866 and Par. gr. 1935 (paraphrases of various Aristotelian treatises)

Poetry: Par. gr. 1776 (twenty poems in dactylic hexameter on various subjects).

Rhetoric: Vindob. phil. gr. 95 (eighteen orations on various subjects).

Essay-writing: Par. gr. 2003 (the *Semeioseis gnomikai*).

Epistolography: The collection of his letters has been lost.⁵

¹ This introduction is a revised and expanded version of that found in Agapitos & al. (1996, 9–25).

² Brief biographical notes in *Tusculum-Lexikon*, 525–528 and *ODB* 2, 1357–1358.

³ Unfortunately, no full treatment of Metochites' life and works exists. In general, see Ševčenko (1962 and 1979). The study by E. de Vries-van der Velden (1987) contains valuable information but is marred by the author's bias against Metochites (see Hunger 1987 and Kianka 1990). The only in-depth study of the *Semeioseis gnomikai* is by H.-G. Beck (1952).

⁴ See the grouping of Metochites' works by Gregoras in a letter of 1328 congratulating Theodore on his birthday (*Ep.* 24a.32–51 Leone [= *Ep.* 14 Guiland]) and the funeral oration on his deceased teacher (*Hist.* 1:474–81).

⁵ It was preserved in the 15th-century MS Scor. B. IV. 24 (Z. IV. 20), ff. 177–263, which was destroyed in the fire at Escorial in 1671; see de Andrés (1968,

2. The *Semeioseis gnomikai*

Date

The *Semeioseis gnomikai* were published sometime between May 1321, the outbreak of the first civil war between Andronikos II and his grandson of the same name, and May 1328, Metochites' fall from power.

The *terminus post quem* is furnished by a letter from Nikephoros Gregoras to Joseph the Philosopher, which contains an enumeration of Metochites' works but does not mention the *Semeioseis* — the most likely explanation being that they had not yet been published. Since the letter talks of the difficult times, it is generally assumed to have been written after May 1321. However, the letter also presupposes that Joseph has left the capital for Thessaloniki, and this allows us to put the *terminus post quem* even later, since S. I. Kourouses has dated Joseph's departure to May 1326.⁶

The *terminus ante quem* is furnished by another letter from Gregoras, to the Grand Logothete himself, congratulating him on the publication of a new book, which is generally agreed to refer to the *Semeioseis gnomikai*. The letter was obviously written before the debacle of May 1328.⁷

Title

There is some uncertainty regarding the original title of the collection. Of the three manuscripts used here, P, M, and E (see below), only E gives a title: Γνωμικαὶ σημειώσεις, 'Sententious Remarks' or 'Didactic Notes'. In both P and M the folia where the title was (probably) written have disappeared.⁸ However, since E is a copy of M it is very likely that the scribe of E has also copied the title from M.

On f. 1v of P is found a note written by Andreas Darmarios: Θεοδώρου μεγάλου λογοθέτου τοῦ Μετοχίτου ὑπομνηματισμοὶ καὶ ση-

58). A selection of 48 letters was preserved in Scor. I. II. 10 (E. II. 10), also destroyed in 1671 (de Andrés, *ibid.*, 210).

⁶ Gregoras, *Ep.* 22 Leone (= *Ep.* 13 Guiland). See Guiland (1927, 53–61); Leone (1982, 2:71–76); Kourouses (1972). See also de Vries-van der Velden (1987, 127–29, nn. 31–32).

⁷ *Ep.* 23 Leone (= *Ep.* 15 Guiland). See Guiland (1927, 7–8); Leone (1982, 2:77–81). Ševčenko believes that the 'new publication' refers to Metochites' *Logos* 10, the so-called 'Ἠθικός' (1962, 36 n. 2). Cf. Bydén (below, pp. 269–73).

⁸ See below, pp. xvii and xx.

μειώσεις γνωμικαὶ διὰ κεφαλαίων ρκ' διηρημένα. As pointed out by Bydén, this may very well reflect a tradition going back to the author.⁹ In his *Poem* 12, Metochites himself refers to the work as Γνωμῶν Σημειώσεις (244 ὁ κάλεσα Γνωμῶν Σημειώσιος).¹⁰

I have decided to use the title Σημειώσεις γνωμικαί, in that order (i.e., I follow Darmarios rather than E), since it seems more practical to have the adjective after the noun.

Character

The *Semeioseis gnomikai* is a collection of 120 essays of varying length. In the collection's prefatory essay (*Sem.* 1: Προοίμιον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι νῦν λέγειν) Metochites declares that in his times the presentation of new thought, religious or secular, is not possible. Yet he has decided to publish (ἐκδοῦναι) his essays and notes on subjects that he happened to contemplate upon during his life, some of these essays being written in immediate response to his personal experiences. Throughout the work, the personal note is striking.

The lengthy *pinax* of the collection discloses a broad variety of subjects. There are essays devoted to Plato and Aristotle (nos. 5, 8, 11–13), essays on mathematics, physics and logic (nos. 7, 14, 23). A substantial number of essays is concerned with various moral questions, such as human character and conduct, the βίος θεωρητικός and its advantages, Christian piety (nos. 4, 30, 35, 46–48). A group of essays includes discussions of ancient authors, such as Josephus, Dio of Prusa, Xenophon, Plutarch and others (nos. 15–20, 71). A further group of essays presents thoughts on politics and political institutions (nos. 96–100), while yet another group is devoted to Roman and Byzantine history, particularly the desolate condition of the empire in Metochites' times (nos. 37–39, 106–109). This last group is connected with a series of essays on Tyche and the unfortunate changes in human life (nos. 27–29, 116); here Metochites draws his conclusions from his own life. Finally, a small group of essays deals with nature and the beauty of creation (nos. 42–45).

⁹ Below, p. 252. In Agapitos & al. (1996, 20–21 and n. 46) it was suggested that Darmarios created the title on the basis of a passage at the end of Metochites' prefatory essay (*Sem.* 1.3.5 ὑπομνηματισμοὺς δὴ τινὰς ἐπιτετημένως ἐκδοῦναι καὶ σημειώσεις κατὰ μέρη). The terms γνωμικός, σημείωσις and ὑπομνηματισμός are discussed by Bydén on pp. 253–56.

¹⁰ Cf. Cunningham & al. (1983); below, p. 264 and n. 61.

Reading through this material, one comes to recognise certain recurrent motifs, such as the idea of living as successors to older and greater cultures, the instability of life, the importance of παιδεία, the importance of the study of history. Most of these ideas can be found in the other works of Metochites as well, most prominently in the orations and the poems.

There are many questions concerning the *Semeioseis gnomikai* as a book. When were the individual essays written, over a longer period of time or mainly in Metochites' later years? Did he intend publication from the start, or were the essays written for his desk-drawer, perhaps as drafts for speeches and orations? Is there, or is there not, a plan behind the composition? How serious is Metochites in the proem, where he complains about the impossibility of 'saying anything', i.e., of presenting new ideas, and then goes on to say something in another 119 chapters?

Other problems that need to be investigated are e.g. the relation between the *Semeioseis gnomikai* and Metochites' other works, his sources, and whether his work had any influence on other authors in 14th-century Byzantium.

It is to be hoped that these questions may be addressed when all of the essays have appeared in this new edition. Although not all of them can be resolved at the present stage, a first attempt is made by Börje Bydén in a discussion on the nature and purpose of the *Semeioseis gnomikai*, included in the present volume (pp. 245–88).

3. The manuscripts

The present edition is based on the two oldest known manuscripts P, *Parisinus graecus* 2003, and M, *Venetus Marcianus graecus* 532 (coll. 887), both of the early 14th century, and on the 16th century manuscript E, *Scorialensis graecus* 248 (Y.I.9), which is a direct apograph of M.

P and M have been collated from microfilms and *in situ*; E has been collated from a microfilm provided by the IRHT, Paris.

More details about P, the various later MSS and references to earlier literature may be found in a study by Melina Arco Magri.¹¹

¹¹ Arco Magri (1982).

The Paris manuscript (P)

P, Par. gr. 2003, is a parchment codex of 278 folia and clearly an *édition de luxe*.¹² It is written in the so-called 'Metochites style'; the scribe who wrote the entire codex has also copied other Metochites MSS.¹³ P may be dated ca. 1328–1334.¹⁴

P has two flyleaves (ff. 1–2), which originally were blank. The text starts on f. 3r with the pinax, without giving any title of the work.¹⁵ However, a leaf appears to have been cut out between ff. 2 and 3; the title was probably written there.¹⁶

On f. 3r, above the pinax, there is an 'authorship' note written by Nikephoros Gregoras: τοῦ σοφωτάτου μεγάλου λογοθέτου θεοδώρου τοῦ μετοχίτου.¹⁷ Similar notes by Gregoras can be found in other Metochites MSS, and have rightly been taken as an indication of his supervision of the edition of Metochites' works.¹⁸

Corrections and marginal notes

The manuscript contains corrections and marginal notes by the main scribe P¹ and by a contemporary hand P². When studying P *in situ*, it is mostly quite easy to distinguish between the two hands. P¹ writes with characteristic neat, rounded letters, a rather large hand; the ink is faded to brown. Red ink has been used for the chapter headings; in

¹² Omont (1888, 177).

¹³ For specimina of P, see Ševčenko (1962, plate VII), and Agapitos & al. (1996, plate II). For the 'Metochites style' cf. Hunger (1961, 101 ff.) and Prato (1991, 140–49). Prato suggested that the Metochites MSS Par. gr. 1776, Par. gr. 1935, Par. gr. 2003, Vind. phil. gr. 95, and Vat. gr. 1365 (all part of the deluxe edition of Metochites' works) were written by the same scribe, belonging to the chancellery of Andronikos II and active ca. 1311/12–1332 (or even after that). E. Lamberz has identified this scribe as Michael Klostomalles (Lamberz 2000, 157–59); cf. *PLP* 11867.

¹⁴ See below, p. xxx.

¹⁵ See above, pp. xiv–xv. As was noted there, the title found on f. 3v was written by Andreas Darmarios. Darmarios has also written out Metochites' monograms on f. 278r at the bottom of the page. For a good specimen of Darmarios' hand see Follieri (1969, 68); see also Kresten (1969).

¹⁶ Other Metochites MSS have titles written in formal majuscule; see e.g. Vat. gr. 1365, f. 1r or Par. gr. 1776, f. 1r.

¹⁷ For a reproduction see Ševčenko (1962, plate VI b).

¹⁸ See Ševčenko (1962, 282 with n. 3). The other manuscripts are Vat. gr. 1365, f. 1r; Vat. gr. 303, ff. 1r and 2v; Par. gr. 1776, f. 1v (for reproductions see Ševčenko, *ibid.*, plates V a–c and VI a).

the pinax, for the numbers and the first letter of each chapter heading, plus the title of the proem; for the *γράφεται* notes on ff. 143v, 255r, 272r and 272v, and for the monograms on the last folio of the MS. The writing of P² is smaller, more careless and cursive; the ink is brownish-black.¹⁹

After P¹ finished his work and corrected a number of mistakes, P² has clearly gone through the whole text very carefully, comparing it with the exemplar.²⁰ He has also changed P¹'s punctuation in many places.

The notes in the margin include (a) corrections in the form of variant readings prefixed by the standard symbol *γρ(άφεται)*, which must be taken to mean that they were found in the exemplar from which P was copied (or in some other manuscript); (b) additions to the text prefixed with *κείμ(εν)ον* or *γρ(άφεται)*; (c) the three 'Metochites' notes (see below).

P¹ has written the notes on ff. 36r–v, 143v, 223r(?), 225v, 272r–v, and the textual supplements not prefixed with *κείμ(εν)ον* on ff. 63r(?), 164v and 213r. P² has added the variant *γρ(άφεται)* note on f. 119r, a number of textual corrections (e.g. ff. 96r, 99r, 194v), and the textual addition on f. 17r prefixed with *κείμ(εν)ον*.

In two places are found variants written above the line (in red ink), in what seems to be a third hand, i.e., neither P¹ nor P²:

- 18.4.2 τὰς λέξεσιν: τῆ λέξει s. l. P (ut vid. tertia manus)
 71.8.8 κατὰ φύσιν P M: τῆ φύσει s. l. P (ut vid. tertia manus), E

I have not found this third hand anywhere else in P.

The 'Metochites' notes

In the margin of P are found three notes that are written in the first person and appear to be comments by Metochites on his own text. On f. 49r he says 'I myself have suffered this, as I foretold'; on f. 52r, 'I, too, suffered this shortly after writing it'; and on ff. 115r–v,

¹⁹ In a few cases it is difficult to determine whether a correction is by P¹ or P²; see below (2.1.6 προσῆ, 4.5.5 τάνθρώπινα, 4.6.2 εἴδη). In 13.4.5 οἴ(τινες) s. l. the ink points to P¹ but the hand seems to be that of P².

²⁰ Some of the corrections of P¹ and P² are probably against the exemplar; see below, pp. xxvii–xxviii.

‘As God is my witness, I, the author, am right in this. For I have lived it.’²¹

Ihor Ševčenko drew the reasonable conclusion that we here have a sample of Metochites’ own handwriting.²² In Agapitos & al. it was instead suggested that although Metochites is indeed the author of the three notes, they were not entered into the margin of P by him but by P². It was further suggested that P² is none other than Nikephoros Gregoras.²³

The question is complicated by the fact that Gregoras has written his notes and comments in two different styles. The corrections and marginal notes, and the three ‘Metochites’ notes, are written in an informal handwriting, whereas the ‘authorship’ note above the pinax is written in a more formal, calligraphic style. Gregoras’ two types of handwriting can however be paralleled from other manuscripts.²⁴

The identification of P² as the scribe of the three ‘Metochites’ notes seems almost certain; compare, for example, P² on f. 119r and the note on f. 52r. It seems unlikely that P² is Metochites himself; it would be very strange if he wrote γράφεται notes on his own text, regarding his own second thoughts as variant readings. On the other hand, the content of the three ‘Metochites’ notes excludes the possibility that the author is Gregoras.

After P¹ had copied the text, and also corrected some of his mistakes, Nikephoros Gregoras (P²) thus went through the text and checked it against the exemplar, correcting some mistakes overlooked by P¹, and changing the punctuation in many places. He also wrote some corrections and notes in the margin, and copied Metochites’

²¹ 49r (commenting on *Sem.* 27, 178 MK): ὡς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγ’ ὧν προύλεγον οὕτω, πεπεύραμαι, 52r (commenting on *Sem.* 28, 187 MK): πεπεύραμαι καὶ ἐγὼ τούτου μετὰ βραχὺ τοῦ ταῦτα γράψαι, and 115r–v (commenting on *Sem.* 62, 382–83 MK): ἀληθεύω θεοῦ ἐφορῶντος ἔγωγ’ ὁ συγγράφων· οὕτω δὲ βεβίωκα.

²² See Ševčenko (1962, 58–59, n. 5; 282, n. 3; 1979, 49, n. 220). For reproductions of the three notes see Ševčenko (1962, plates II and VII).

²³ See Agapitos & al. (1996, 18–20). The identification of P² as the scribe of the three ‘Metochites’ notes, and with Gregoras, was first made by Ole Smith when examining the Paris manuscript *in situ*.

²⁴ Apart from his ‘authorship’ notes in P and other Metochites MSS (above, p. xvii) Gregoras’ formal handwriting is also found in a letter of his (*Ep.* 120, Leone 2:312–14), Vat. gr. 116, ff. 230v–231r, identified and reconstructed by Ševčenko ([1964] 1981b). Gregoras’ informal hand has been identified in Vat. gr. 2660, written partly by Gregoras around 1336 (see Lilla 1991).

three personal remarks from the exemplar (or some other manuscript). Above the pinax he wrote the 'authorship' note.

On this interpretation thus (a) P was in some way 'edited' by Gregoras sometime between 1328 and shortly after Metochites' death, and (b) the author's hand is not to be found in the manuscript.

Apart from the notes by P¹ and P², and the 'Metochites' notes, there are numerous notes in Greek and Latin by a 16th-century hand. These later notes may be disregarded since they give nothing to the text and only testify to the energetic study of the *Semeioseis gnomikai* by a much later scholar.²⁵

The Venice manuscript (M)

M, Marc. gr. 532 (coll. 887), is a paper MS of 396 pages measuring 230 x 150 mm.; it consists of 1 binion and 50 quaternions.²⁶ The paper is of very poor quality, and there seem to be no watermarks. The state of the codex today is very bad, since it has been damaged by moisture to such a degree that for long passages the text can only be read with great difficulty or not at all. The first two folia of the MS, which preserved the beginning of the pinax up to *Sem.* 35, have been lost, and therefore no title of the work survives in M.

Unfortunately, the codex can only be dated from palaeographical evidence; Mioni's judgement 'saec. XIV' cannot be doubted, although greater precision would be welcome. The script by itself does not give any further clues; the whole book has been written by one scribe throughout, in a somewhat nondescript hand of the earlier half of the 14th century. It shows no influence from the 'Metochites style'.²⁷

M contains corrections by the original scribe. In a number of places where the writing has become blurred by moisture one or more letters have later been touched up by another hand with a different-coloured ink.

It is remarkable that the codex has been catalogued and known to exist at least since 1740,²⁸ and yet has been left to lie unexplored in

²⁵ Cf. Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2).

²⁶ Mioni (1985, 421). For a specimen of M, see Agapitos & al. (1996, plates III–IV).

²⁷ Cf. above, p. xvii.

²⁸ Zanetti (1740, 287).

the Biblioteca Marciana.²⁹ The reason may be its poor physical state. For the essays edited here, the distribution of the legible parts is as follows:

ff. 1r–4v	pinax (part)	about 75% legible
5r–8v	<i>Sem.</i> 1–2	about 40% legible
9r–13r	<i>Sem.</i> 3	about 85% legible
13v–32f	<i>Sem.</i> 4–10.3.2	all legible
32v–70v	<i>Sem.</i> 10.3.2– <i>Sem.</i> 26	mostly illegible (0–20% legible)
201r–210r	<i>Sem.</i> 71	about 80% legible

In the 1468 inventory of Bessarion's library, volume no. 309 is described as *item logothetae Metochitae diversa opera, in papyro*.³⁰ This probably refers to M, in which case Bessarion's mark of ownership was perhaps found on the now lost first page of the manuscript.³¹ There seems to be nothing in Bessarion's hand in the MS.

The Escorial manuscript (E)

E, Scor. gr. 248 (Y.I.9), is a paper manuscript with 424 folia, measuring 344 x 252 mm.³² Among other texts it contains the *Semeioseis gnomikai* on ff. 201–424.³³ On f. 201r, at the beginning of the pinax, the work's title has been preserved (τοῦ μεγάλου λογοθέτου θεοδώρου τοῦ μετοχίτου, γνωμικαὶ σημειώσεις). E was written by three scribes of whom the first wrote ff. 1–76 and 201–424, the second ff. 80–129v and 185–197v; finally, Petros Karnabakas wrote ff. 134–

²⁹ Arco Magri does not discuss M, although the MS was briefly mentioned by Bloch [below, p. xxxiii] (1790, 36), and also by Sathas in his catalogue of Metochites' works (Sathas 1872 [1972], ρκκ'). The only reader appearing on the sheet recording users of the MS up to 1993 is S. Peppink, who as far as we know never mentioned the MS in any of his publications. Nor does Mioni give any other reference than Zanetti's catalogue.

³⁰ See Labowsky (1979, 169).

³¹ Of course 'diversa opera' may also refer to Metochites' orations. There is however no evidence of a Venice manuscript containing the orations. The hypothesis that vol. 309 in the inventory is in fact M, and that M was thus owned by Bessarion, is supported by the fact that E has been copied from M (see below, p. xxii).

³² de Andrés (1965, 89–92).

³³ For a specimen of E, see Agapitos & al. (1996, plate V).

182. The MS can be dated to 1539–1542.³⁴ Attention was drawn to this MS by Arco Magri, who regards it as an independent witness to the text.³⁵

However, the MS is not an independent witness but a copy of M.³⁶ E was written in Venice for Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza by scribes known to have worked for him on other MSS,³⁷ and we know that MSS written for Mendoza in Venice were often copied from MSS in the Bessarion collection.³⁸ Moreover, it seems from the Bessarion catalogues that there was only one MS in this collection containing the *Semeioseis gnomikai*.³⁹

The relation between M and E

That E is not a descendant of P but may be a descendant of M is clearly demonstrated by the errors shared by ME against P:⁴⁰

Errors in ME

- | | |
|--------|----------------------------------|
| 3.2.5 | om. οὐκ (οὐκ ἀσείστως P) |
| 3.5.8 | ἀναλυτικῶς (ἀναλυτικοῖς P) |
| 5.1.1 | ἀκριβέστατον (ἀκριβέστερον P) |
| 6.1.4 | ὑπερφωνοῦντες (ὑπερφρονοῦντες P) |
| 6.4.3 | τὸ (τῶ P) |
| 9.2.1 | ἔχειν (ἔχοι P) |
| 9.3.2 | ἱκανὸς (ἱκανῶς P) |
| 71.3.3 | ἀνίκανος (ἀνικάνως P) |

³⁴ This date is based on Mark L. Sosower's report (letter of 13 June 1994) on the watermarks. de Andrés says 'saec. XVI med.' (1965, 89).

³⁵ Arco Magri (1982, 56); see also Arco Magri (1989–1990, 398, n. 10). Arco Magri thought that the part of the MS containing the *Semeioseis* was considerably older (end of 14th–beginning of 15th century) and by a different hand than the one that wrote ff. 1–76. However, the watermarks reported in de Andrés' catalogue speak against this dating.

³⁶ See further below. — It should be remembered that M was not known to Arco Magri.

³⁷ For the Escorial MSS see Graux (1880).

³⁸ Graux (1880, 184). The first part of our Scor. Y.1.9 is a case in point: the text of Symeon Seth's Σύνοψις was copied from Marc. gr. 257 (Delatte 1939, 3–4).

³⁹ Cf. above, p. xxi.

⁴⁰ 23.1.2 (ὀρωμεν PE, ὀρῶ μὲν M) does not prove that E is dependent on P.

- 71.3.5 πᾶν M et ut vid. E (πῶ P)
 71.8.8 ἀνύτοι (ἀνύτει P)

In the following cases there is a slight uncertainty concerning the reading in M:

- 23.3.4 πάντων M (it seems to be filled in with different ink), E
 (πάντως P)
 25.1.7 ἐκείνον E et ut vid. M (ἐκείνος P)
 71.9.6 ἔχοι E et ut vid. M (ἔχη P)

Furthermore, E is probably a direct copy of M (see above, p. xxii).

Lacunae in E

There are a number of places where the scribe of E was obviously unable to read M. Sometimes such cases are marked with a blank space in the manuscript, sometimes a word or a number of letters are simply left out. These lacunae are found in passages which are completely destroyed in M today; however, one can estimate their position on the folia of M, and it appears that they tend to cluster near the top or bottom of the pages. Thus it seems probable that although most of M could still be read around 1540, the manuscript was already damaged by humidity at the edges. These lacunae are not mentioned in the critical apparatus in the present edition.

- 17.2.5 συνυφαίνει P: [] φαίνει E
 17.4.2 μετρίων P: μετοι— E
 18.2.6 ἢ τε πρόθεσις P: ἢ [] πρόθεσις E
 18.2.9 παρήκον P: πα[] κὸν E
 18.3.6 δριμύς ἐστι P: δριμύς [] E
 18.3.7 καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' P: [] οὐκ οἶδ' E
 18.5.3 ἀντίθετα P: ἀντί[] E
 18.5.3 οὐ νέμει P: οὐ [] μει E
 18.5.3 καὶ τοῦτο καὶ P: καὶ το[] καὶ E
 18.5.3 οἷς λέγει P: οἷς [] E
 19.2.4 ὅλως P: om. E
 19.3.3 εἰ μὴ νεμεσήσαι P: εἰ [] νεμεσήσαι E
 19.3.4 καὶ μὴν οὐ κατ' ἦθος P: καὶ [] οὐ κατ' ἦθος E
 19.4.6 ἐπηλυγάζεται P: ἐπηλυ[] E

- 19.4.6 μὴ προσποιούμενος P: μὴ []ποιούμενος E
 19.5.4 ἄνδρας καὶ οἷς P: ἄνδρας []οἷς E
 20.1.5 ὡς ἄρ' οὐδὲ P: [] ἄρ' οὐδὲ E
 20.1.5 πάντα λέγων P: λέγων πανυ[] E⁴¹
 20.2.2 οὐ τὴν P: [] τὴν E
 23.1.1 οὐκ ἀκαίρως P: []κ ἀκαίρως E
 24.1.5 ἐστίν P: []τιν' E
 24.2.1 ὅτι γὰρ οὗτος P: [] τὶ E
 26.1.2 καὶ καρπὸς P: [] καρπὸς E

The same explanation may be proposed for a number of completely erroneous readings of E (e.g. 16.3.2 πρόοιμος, 18.3.6 ἀπείθειν ἄξιος, 19.5.5 ἀπαντῶν ὄν, 20.1.4 καλῶς, 22.2.6 οἷονται (?) and ἦ, 26.1.3 καὶ, 26.1.4 πάροδοι); they are mostly found in passages corresponding to now illegible passages near the top or the bottom of pages in M. Here the scribe of E has obviously tried to guess what was in M; it seems that his knowledge of Greek was inadequate.⁴²

Since E is almost certainly a copy of M, it can be used for those parts of the text where M is illegible. To determine the reliability of E as a witness to M, let us examine those sections of the text where M can be read.

Errors in E

- 2.3.8 αὐτῶν P, ut vid. M: αὐτῆς E
 3.6.5 τὸ P, ut vid. M: τὸν E
 3.7.8 ἄλλου PM: ἄλλον E
 5.1.5 γινόμενον PM: γενόμενος E
 5.4.5 μηδὲ PM: μὴ E
 6.2.7 δὴ PM: om. E
 6.4.6 κοινωνίαις PM: κοινωνίας E
 7.2.5 οἷ' PM: οἷ E
 7.3.3 ὄλωσ PM: ὄλος ut vid. E

⁴¹ Here it seems that M had a different word order from P.

⁴² Before γινόμενος in 71.12.9, Arco Magri (1991, 465) reads οὐ in E (f. 324v). However, what she reads as οὐ is in fact a decorative curl, which the scribe of E sometimes writes on one or both sides of the centred last word(s) of an essay (e.g. ff. 213r, 216v, 219r, 225r, 227r, 217v), the last word of the essay's title (e.g. f. 217r), or even the last word of a page (f. 226r).

- 9.1.1 βούλονται PM : βούλεται E
 9.1.2 ξυνορῶεν PM : ξυνορῶμεν E
 9.1.2 βούλοιτ' P, p. c. M (add. v s. 1.): βούλοιτ' E
 10.1.1 ὅσοι PM : ὅτι E
 10.1.5 οὐ PM : om. E
 10.3.6 σωφρονοῖμεν PM : σωφρονεῖμεν E
 12 title ἔτι PM : ὅτι E
 18.2.2 εὐκολία PM : εὐκολίαν E
 25.2.2 κινήσαν PM : κοινήσαν ut vid. E
 71.7.1 ἐπιβολαῖς PM : -βουλ- E
 71.8.6 αἰροῖτο PM : αἰρεῖτο E
 71.9.1 πρέπον τε καὶ PM : πρέπονται E
 71.9.2 ἔξω PM : ἔξωθεν E
 71.11.2 τονοῖ PM : τονεῖ E?
 71.12.6 διαιρεῖ τε PM : διαιρεῖται E

That there are copying errors in E is not surprising. The list above is, however, not a disconcertingly long one, and although E should certainly be used with some caution, it appears to be quite a good witness to M. In some places where P is wrong and M is illegible, E preserves the correct reading from M (see below, *Errors in P*).

The relation between P and M

A number of errors in P against M (and/or E) demonstrate the latter's independence of the former.

Errors in P

- 4.3.2 om. μὴ προση- (ME)
 8.2.1 om. μὴν (ME)
 13.2.2 ἐπιμελὲς (ἐμμελὲς E, non leg. M)
 17.3.4 ἐξενεγκότε (ἐξενεγκόντε M, ἐξενέγκοντε E)
 19.2.7 ὑπόθεσι (ὑποθέσεσι E, non leg. M)
 21.1.7 om. καὶ ὑποσχέσεων
 71.2.3 λόγων (λόγῳ E, non leg. M)
 71.5.4 ἀχρηστίας καὶ ἀδικίαν (εὐχρηστίας ἀδικίαν ME)
 71.11.4 προσέχειν (προσέχει ME)

Especially 4.3.2 and 71.5.4, but also 13.2.2 and 21.1.7, show very clearly that M cannot be a copy of P. This is supported by the four

corrections made by P¹ against the archetype (9.3.1, 10.4.6, 12.3.5, and 71.8.4, quoted below, p. xxvii), which are not found in M.

In the 1996 pilot study it was suggested that both M and P are independent.⁴³ However, the hypothesis that P might be a copy of M has now gained some support from the recent findings concerning the MSS of Metochites' *Stoicheiosis astronomike*. According to Bydén (forthcoming) the MS C (Vat. gr. 1365) of that work is most probably a copy of V (Vat. gr. 182). C is part of the deluxe edition of Metochites' work, and thus a sister manuscript of our P; they were both written by the 'Metochites scribe' Michael Klostomalles. V is a parallel to our M, probably written by the same scribe.

Of course, the manuscripts of one work need not stand in the same relation to each other as those of another work. But it is interesting that we are probably dealing with the same duo of scribes. If Bydén is right in his interpretation of the relation between V and C,⁴⁴ and if the two *Semeioseis* MSS were produced in exactly the same way as the two *Stoicheiosis* ones, P should thus be a copy of M. In that case M should not contain any separative errors as against P.

I believe that the list of errors in M (above, pp. xxii–xxiii), although perhaps not as impressive as the list of errors in P (p. xxv), speaks against the dependence of P on M. I find it difficult to explain away all these cases as intelligent guesses on the part of the scribe of P. Also, it should be remembered that M is illegible for large parts of the text. There are a number of cases where P is right and E is wrong (e.g. pinax 12 ἔτι P, ὄτι E; pinax 28 τῶν P, τὸν E; 10.3.6 που P, ποι E; 10.5.7 αὐτοῦ P, αὐτῶ E; 22.2.6 τρόπον P, τρόπων E); at least some of these incorrect readings of E may very well come from M.

Further, the marginal notes by P² in P, which were copied from another manuscript than M (above, pp. xviii–xix), also speak against the dependence of P on the latter. If such a manuscript existed, why would the scribe of P have used M as his exemplar?

Thus the two 14th-century MSS appear to be independent. On the other hand their text is so similar that it is natural to infer that they were copied from the same exemplar, which would thus be the arche-

⁴³ Agapitos & al. (1996, 22).

⁴⁴ It should be noted that Bydén is not certain; he allows for the possibility that V and C are both copies of the same exemplar.

type. More importantly, P and (M)E also share a number of errors, which were probably found in the archetype:

- 12.4.5 κατεπανιστάμεναι (P and E; M is illegible): I suggest that this is a mistake for κατεξανιστάμεναι. The latter word is found in *Sem.* 7.1.5, 10.4.3; 55, 316; 57, 339; 96, 614; 97, 621 MK, whereas κατεπ- does not occur (it is not found in LSJ; there are 14 occurrences in TLG).
- 12.7.4 καταληπτὴν (P and E; M is illegible) is probably a mistake for καταληπτικὴν, which makes better sense; cf. also 13.2.7 καταληπτικῆς ἕξεως and 23.1.3 τὴν καταληπτικὴν σοφίαν (καταληπτός is not found elsewhere in *Sem.*).
- 19.3.7 τοῖς ῥήμασι (τοῖς om. PE; M is illegible). Τοῖς was probably missing in the archetype.

In the following cases I suggest that the situation in PME reflects an error in the archetype; these errors were first copied by P¹ but subsequently corrected, either by P¹ himself or by P²:

Errors in the archetype corrected by P¹

- 9.3.1 τρανότερος p. c. P¹: τρανώτερος ME. The archetype probably had τρανώτερος; perhaps Metochites spelled the word that way. It does not occur again in the *Semeioseis* (τρανώς occurs 11 times).
- 10.4.6 ὀνόσεται p. c. P¹: ὀνήσεται a. c. ut vid. P, ut vid. E, non legitur M. It seems that the archetype had ὀνήσεται. (*Il.* 9.55 has ὀνόσεται.)
- 12.3.5 προσσχόντες p. c. P¹: προσχόντες ME. The archetype probably had προσχόντες.
- 71.8.4 τῶν ἄλλων p. c. P¹: τῶν ἄλλων ἢ περὶ ἄλλων a. c. P¹, ME. A mistake in the archetype.

In 16.3.2 (αὐτῇ ex αὐτῆς ut vid. corr. P¹: αὐτοῖς E, non leg. M) it is difficult to say what was in the archetype. Perhaps this passage was already damaged in M when E was copied from it.

Errors in the archetype corrected by P²

- 4.4.4 οὐκ add. P²: om. P¹ME. οὐκ was obviously missing in the archetype.
- 5.3.1 ὦν s. l. P²: ὄν P¹ME. The archetype must have had ὄν.
- 10.1.3 βέλτιστοι τινες ex βέλτιστοι, τίνες corr. P²: βέλτιστοι, τίνες P¹ME
- 12.5.6 καὶ add. s. l. P²: om. E, non leg. M. I suppose that καὶ was missing in the archetype.
- 19.4.5 τι add. s. l. P²: om. E, non leg. M; τι was probably missing in the archetype.
- 22.2.2 ἑτεροιούμενοι P²: ἑτεροιούμενα P¹E, non leg. M
- 25.1.2 πάντως ex πάντας vel πάντες corr. P², πάντες E, non leg. M
- 71.12.2 ὑποβάλλων p. c. P² (ων s. l.), E: ὑποβάλλον a. c. P, M

In the following cases I have not accepted P²'s corrections of the archetype:

- 1.2.5 παμπλήρει (P¹ME) in παμπλήρη corr. P². The archetype must have had παμπλήρει. Both are possible.
- 8.2.3 post αὐτὸς add. μὴ s. l. P². The addition of μὴ is psychologically understandable, but grammatically unnecessary.
- 9.3.1 ἐστὶν λέγειν ἀληθές ex ἐστὶν ἀληθές corr. P²: ἐστὶν ἀληθές P¹ME. See the note ad loc.
- 19.2.7 γενικῶς in γεννικῶς corr. P². See the note ad loc.
- 71.9.6 ἀτημελήτως in ἀπη- ut vid. corr. P² (ME have ἀτη-). It is uncertain whether P² has changed ἀπη- to ἀτη-, or vice versa. Those who copied P obviously thought the latter, since all its descendants have ἀπη-.

- 71.11.7 μωκήσαιτο P¹ME: μωμ- s. l. P². Neither μωκάομαι nor μωμάομαι occurs elsewhere in *Sem.*, but καταμωκάομαι occurs several times.⁴⁵

To these should be added the problematic

- 2.1.6 προσείη ME, προσῆ p. c. P². The archetype probably had προσείη; either P¹ or P² changed it to προσῆ. This is a “correct” change, but in Metochites the optative is more frequent than the subjunctive after ἦν. With some hesitation I have kept προσείη.

Of course, if one believes that P² is Metochites himself, one should adopt all his corrections into the text.

Apart from the four cases mentioned above, all corrections entered by P¹ agree with the readings of (M)E and are thus — on the interpretation offered here — in accordance with the archetype. P¹ obviously overlooked some mistakes, which P² later corrected. It seems however that P² did not always check P¹ against the exemplar; at least that must be our conclusion if we believe that those readings of (M)E that are obviously superior to those of P, e.g. 17.3.4 ἐξενεγκόντε and 71.5.4 εὐχρηστίας ἀδικίαν, were found in the archetype.

In some cases P¹ has corrected the word order by writing α and β (or α, β, and γ) above the line (e.g. 10.4.5 καὶ λέγειν ἔχειν (aut λέγειν καὶ ἔχειν) ex ἔχειν καὶ λέγειν corr. P¹, non leg. M; 71.1.1 ἀμέλει μετρίων ex μετρίων ἀμέλει corr. P¹). These corrections are always in accordance with what is found in (M)E. Then there are a number of passages where P has a different word order from (M)E, without corrections. This must mean, either that P has not been checked against the exemplar in these cases, or that the scribe of P has copied the exemplar correctly, the scribe of M incorrectly.

The marginal notes written by P¹ are paralleled in (M)E: f. 36r (18.2.5; found in E, M is illegible), 143v (71.2.2; found s. l. M and p. c. E). The γράφεται written by P¹ on f. 36v (18.3.6) has no counterpart in E (M is illegible). This does not, however, exclude the possibility that it was once found in M, too. This part of M seems to


⁴⁵ Καταμωκάομαι also occurs in Metochites, *Stoicheiosis astronomike* 1.1.25 and 1.1.27.

have been rather badly damaged before E was copied from it, and the *γράφεται* note may have been illegible.⁴⁶

The notes written by P²—the addition on f. 17r (9.3.3) prefixed by *κείμ(εν)ον* and the three ‘Metochites’ notes—have no counterparts in ME. They probably represent additions made to the archetype after M had been copied from it.

The archetype, ω , was probably a copy of Metochites’ original, α ;⁴⁷ there is nothing to suggest that we are more than one stage removed from the manuscript of the author. The lack of any marginalia in M similar to those written in P by Gregoras suggests that M was probably copied from ω before Metochites entered there his corrections and personal remarks (θ), something which makes a date of M before 1328 very likely.

If the ‘Metochites’ notes were entered into the margin of P by Metochites himself, the MS must of course be dated prior to 1332. If they were written by Gregoras, as suggested here, P may have been written after Metochites’ death, but probably not much later.



⁴⁶ See above, pp. xxiii–xxiv. The lacunae in E are mostly found in *Sem.* 17–19.

⁴⁷ α was most likely finished between the spring of 1326 and May 1328 (above, p. xiv).

The diagram above gives a schematic view of the textual history of the *Semeioseis* based on our present knowledge. An edition must be based on both P and M, and on E for those portions of the text where M is illegible.

P and M both are very good manuscripts indeed. The differences between them are on the whole few, and mostly insignificant. M seems to contain (or have contained) fewer errors than the first version of P, and is thus to that extent the best manuscript. I am not so sure, however, that M is a better manuscript than P *with its corrections*. Since P has been carefully corrected by both P¹ and P² (although it must be admitted that there are a few errors that were overlooked by both of them), since it is part of the 'official' edition authorised by Nikephoros Gregoras (P²), and since M is illegible for large parts of the text, I have decided to follow P in those cases where it is difficult to decide which is right (most of them being variations in word order), and where the consequences of a wrong choice are not very serious.

E, too, is in general quite reliable. The errors that do occur in this manuscript are often blatant, and represent instances where the scribe was unable to read his exemplar. The parts of M that were legible ca. 1540 (i.e., most of it) are on the whole faithfully represented in E. In some cases E undoubtedly preserves the correct reading from the now illegible M (see above, p. xxv, *Errors in P*).

Finally I would like to comment on a few errors and variant readings.

- 1.3.5 ξυνηννόηκα ut vid. E, ξυνενηννόηκα P, non leg. M. Ξυνηνοέω occurs in other places; ξυνηννοέω does not.
- 6.2.5 χρόνων ME, χρόνον P. Ὑπὸ χρόνον is a common expression, whereas ὑπὸ χρόνων is very rare (four occurrences altogether in TLG), which may explain P.
- 12.1.1 ἐκλόγιμοι PE, non leg. M. The word, which is not found in LSJ or TLG, occurs six times altogether in *Sem.* (here and 78, 519; 96, 605; 96, 609; 101, 668; 103, 679 MK). Ἐλλόγιμος occurs 12 times.
- 13.1.3 γεωμετρίαν E, τὴν γεωμετρίαν P, non leg. M. When preceded by a preposition the word is mostly written without the article in Metochites, which is why I follow E here.

- 17.1.3 καὶ, sed εἰ in marg. add. P¹ (καὶν E, non leg. M). Here the archetype probably had καὶν, which is found in E (M is illegible). I suggest that P¹ by mistake wrote καὶ, then discovered his mistake and added εἰ in the margin next to καὶ (f. 34r); this addition was filled in by P².

Other manuscripts

A number of secondary, mostly 16th-century, manuscripts of the *Semeioseis gnomikai* are described by M. Arco Magri (1982); see also eadem (1989–1990). Further manuscripts are listed in Sinkewicz & Hayes (1989).

- Athens, Metochion Panagiou Taphou 628 (*olim* 1167).
 Madrid, Matritensis 4771 (Arch. Hist. 164,10)
 Modena, Mutinensis α.J.6.28 (*olim* III-F-17), ff. 134–164
 Modena, Mutinensis α.O.4.17 (*olim* II-H-13)
 Modena, Mutinensis α.T.8.9 (*olim* II-E-14), ff. 2–5v, 8r–10v
 Modena, Mutinensis Arch. II,12 (fragments)
 Munich, Monacensis (*olim* Augustanus) gr. 402
 Munich, Monacensis gr. 197
 Naples, Neapolitanus III-E-14, ff. 1–333v
 Oxford, Bodleianus Can. gr. 98
 Paris, Coislinianus gr. 165 (*olim* Germanensis)
 Salamanca, Salmanticensis gr. 2185 (Palacio 22)
 Vatican, Barberinianus gr. 54 and 55
 Vatican, Vaticanus gr. 302
 Vienna, Vindobonensis phil. gr. 8
 Zaragoza, la Seo, ms. gr. 29–16 (el Pilar 3249)⁴⁸
 Zeitz, Cizensis 64

All these manuscripts are descended from P.⁴⁹ Although several of them were written in Venice in the mid-16th century, only some

⁴⁸ I am very grateful to Vicente Ramón, Zaragoza, who helped me obtain a copy of this manuscript.

⁴⁹ Those that I have been able to check all have the lacuna in 4.3.2 and the error in 71.5.4 (see above, p. xxv). I have not been able to obtain microfilms of Metoch. Panag. Taphou 628, or the Mutinenses α.J.6.28, α.T.8.9, or Arch. II,12. According to Ševčenko (1979, 49 n. 220) and Arco Magri (1982, 53–54) these, too, are descendants of P.

twenty years after E was copied there from M,⁵⁰ unfortunately none of them is based on M (perhaps because the latter was already in a fairly poor state).⁵¹

So far none of these manuscripts has been found to contain anything of value. They are not used for the present edition.

4. The edition of Müller and Kiessling

A small volume with samples of the *Semeioseis gnomikai* was published in 1790 by the Danish bishop Jens Bloch.⁵² The only complete edition of the collection is the one published in 1821 by C. G. Müller and Th. Kiessling (henceforth MK). It was based on a 16th-century MS and unsystematic collations of three other late apographs.⁵³

Apart from the unsatisfactory manuscript basis, the edition of MK suffers from a number of weaknesses. The editors made an attempt to correct obvious errors in the MSS that were used and to punctuate the text. However, their work cannot be called successful, and they seem to have given up understanding the text in many places.

The pages of MK are given in the margin of the present edition.

⁵⁰ Neap. III-E-14, Matr. 4771, Mon. gr. 197, and Vat. gr. 302 were written by Andreas Darmarios June 1560–October 1561, Barb. gr. 54–55 in 1584, Mut. α.O.4.17 in June 1560 by a countryman of Darmarios, Michael Maleas Epidauriotes, and Mut. α.T.8.9 and α.J.6.28 (probably) by Darmarios' collaborator Nikolaos Choniates, all in Venice (Arco Magri, op. cit.). Salmanticensis 2185 was written by Darmarios in Trento, April 1563. It seems that all MSS executed by Andreas Darmarios are descendants of P.

⁵¹ Thus the hope expressed in Agapitos & al. (1996, 24, n. 51), that at least Vindob. phil. gr. 8 might be a copy of M, has proved unfounded.

⁵² Bloch usually gives only the title of each essay, followed by a brief summary of the content; sometimes he quotes short passages *verbatim*. Essays 17, 18, and 20 are reproduced in their entirety. Bloch uses the Coislirianus (which he calls 'Germ.' [ibid., 37]), supplemented by P ('Cod. Reg.').

⁵³ The main source for Müller & Kiessling was the Cizensis 64 (from the middle of the 16th century) in the Episcopal Library at Naumburg-Zeitz. On this MS and the other *apographa* see Arco Magri (1982). Besides the Cizensis, Müller & Kiessling quoted readings from Coisl. 165, Mon. gr. 197 and Aug. 402. They also quote readings from P, either found in Bloch or reported to them by Boissonade (MK, xii). – The numeration of Essays 1 through 19 of the pinax in MK is wrong by one less, since they have not included the first essay in their numbering. The numbers are, however, correct from Essay 21 onwards, since the editors omitted number 20 from the list.

The readings of MK, i.e. in general those of Cod. Ciz. 64, are not mentioned in the apparatus of the present edition.

The following list comprises instances where the text in the present edition differs from that found in MK. For the sake of completeness it includes practically all deviations, also readings in MK which are obviously typos, e.g. MK 20.2 (2.1.9) τῆ instead of μῆ; 78.19 (10.4.6) σφέρειν instead of φέρειν; 99.10 (13.2.7) ἄλλου instead of ἄλλον; 470.11 (71.6.6) σοπυδάζοι instead of σπουδάζοι. I have only omitted a few variants in elision that do not affect the sense. An asterisk denotes that the reading of the present edition is found in a note in MK, either as a suggestion by MK themselves, or reported from the the Monacenses, or, occasionally, from P.

Apart from the variants enumerated in the list below, there are also considerable differences in punctuation between the present edition and that of Müller & Kiessling.

<i>The present edition</i>		<i>Müller & Kiessling</i>
	Τοῦ μεγάλου λογοθέτου Θεοδώρου τοῦ Μετο- χίτου γνομικαὶ σημειώσεις	1.1–3 τοῦ σοφωτάτου μεγά- λου λογοθέτου θεο- δώρου τοῦ μετοχίτου [πίναξ τῆς παρουσίας βίβλου]
pinax ι´	ἐξαρχῆς	2.16 ἐξ ἀρχῆς
pinax ιδ´	πάντων τῶν	3.16* πάντων
pinax λδ´	οὐδέν	4.3 οὐδεὶ
pinax λε´	μικροῖς	4.6 μικροῦς
pinax μ´	τῶν μοναχῶν	4.16 om. τῶν
pinax νγ´	ἔστιν	5.20 ἔστιν
pinax νγ´	ἐξαρχῆς	5.21 ἐξ ἀρχῆς
pinax ξβ´	διὰ	6.21 δι´
pinax ξγ´	βιωφελέστατον	7.1–2 βιωφιλέστατον
pinax ξε´	δίκη σφετέρᾳ	7.7* δίκης σφέτερα
pinax ξζ´	ἀκολουθεῖν	7.13 ἀπολουθεῖν
pinax ο´	τά τε ἄλλα	7.19 om. τε
pinax οε´	τῆς θεοσεβείας	8.2 om. τῆς
pinax πδ´	περιουσίας	8.20* περὶ οὐσίας
pinax ρβ´	τοεξαρχῆς	10.1 τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
pinax ργ´	τοεξαρχῆς	10.3 τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
pinax ριγ´	τοεξαρχῆς	11.4 τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
pinax ριε´	τὰ κατὰ	11.11 om. τὰ
pinax ριθ´	ἐξαρχῆς	11.20 ἐξ ἀρχῆς
pinax ρκ´	τῆς τοῦ βίου	12.2 τῆς τῶν τοῦ βίου
1.1.3	τῆς	13.17 τοῖς
1.2.3	ταῦτά τε	15.5* ταῦτα τὰ τε

The present edition

1.2.4	περὶ
1.2.5	παμπλήρει
1.2.6	ἀνεμέσητον
1.2.6	ἦ
1.2.6	ἄπραξία
1.2.7	κινήσαι
1.2.7	ταῦτά
1.2.7	ὡς γε
1.2.9	τοῦτ' ἀμέλει
1.3.2	ὅμως
1.3.2	κινήσειε
2.1.2	ἦ μνήμη
2.1.3	τοσοῦτω
2.1.6	ἦν μὴ
2.1.6	προσεῖη
2.1.9	μὴ
2.1.9	ἐπιδόσεις
2.2.4	εὐεπιχείρητα
2.2.4	λύηται
2.3.3	ὡς γε
2.3.3	ἐνίοτε
2.3.4	νόμους
2.3.7	ἦνυσμένοις
3.1.3	ἐκδέδοται
3.1.5	ἐλλογίμοις
3.1.7	προτεθέντος
3.1.7	παρ' ἅ
3.1.8	περιγίνεσθαι
3.2.1	πάντα
3.2.2	τῶν δ' οὐ· οὐδ' ἔστι
3.2.4	ἄαπτος
3.3.1	τούτων
3.3.3	τοῦ ἀνδρὸς
3.4.1	πραγματεία τῶν καθόλου
3.4.2	τεύξεσθαι
3.5.1	ἔνεκα
3.5.1	τοσαῦται
3.5.3	προσδιορισμῶν
3.5.8	δυσσοδεύτω
3.5.9	μετεώρους
3.6.2	δίκαι'
3.6.7	τοῦτο
3.7.4	βασίλει'
3.7.6	ἐν ἑαυτοῦ
3.7.7	ταῦτά
3.7.7	κινεῖσθαι

Müller & Kiessling

15.10–11*	περὶ τὴν
15.14	παμπλήρη
16.3	ἀναμέσητον
16.4	ἦ
16.5*	εὐπραξία
16.6	νικήσαι
16.9	ταῦτα
16.10	ὡστε
16.15*	τ' ἀμέλει
17.6	om.
17.8	νικήσειε
18.20	ἦ μνήμη
18.26	τοσοῦτο
19.15*	ἦν μὴ
19.15	προσεῖη
20.2	τὴ
20.3	ἐκδόσεις
21.3	εὐεπιχείρηται
21.4*	λύκται
22.4	ὡστε
22.4	ἐνί τε
22.6	νόμον
22.25	ἦνυσμένοις
23.21	ἐκδίδοται
24.11*	ἐλλογίμοις
24.22	προστεθέντος
24.23	παρὰ
25.1	περιγινέσθαι
25.14	πάντας
25.18*	τῶν δ' οὐδ' ἔστι
26.12	ὁ ἄαπτος
26.25	τούτων
27.15*	ἀνδρὸς
28.15	πραγματείαν καθόλου
28.20	τεύξασθαι
29.19*	ἔνεκεν
29.11	τοσαῦτα
29.19	προδιορισμῶν
31.5*	δισσοδεύτω
31.11	μετεώροις
32.4*	δίκαι
32.21	τοῦ
33.16	βασιλείαν
34.1	ἑαυτοῦ
34.4	ταῦτα
34.8	καὶ κινεῖσθαι

The present edition

3.7.8	αὐτὸ κινοῡν
3.7.8	παύσαιτο
3.7.8	οὐδὲ λείποι
3.7.9	ταῦτά
4.1.3	ἦττηται
4.1.4	ἄτεκτος
4.1.5	ἔφετον
4.2.1	εἰ κἂν
4.3.1	δοκοῖεν
4.3.2	τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων
4.4.4	ὄντ'
4.5.1	ἐποπτεύοντες
4.5.4	αὐτὸν
4.6.3	πρότερον αὐτοῦ
4.6.5	λόγω
5 title	τῶν μαθηματικῶν
5.1.2	μελαγχολᾶ
5.1.3	ἀνενοήτων
5.1.6	ἄπ'
5.2.5	ἑαυτοὺς
5.2.5	ἐπαῖοι
5.3.2	ἐν Ἑλλησιν
5.3.7	καὶ συχνὰ
6.1.1	τοσοῦτο
6.1.1	φλαύροις
6.1.2	βίστον
6.1.7	καὶ προσέτι
6.1.8	ἐπὶ καταδίκη
6.1.9	ἱστορία
6.2.2	τοῦ ὄντος
6.2.4	ταῖς συνήθεσιν
6.2.5	ῥύμη
6.2.7	ταυτότης
6.2.8	καὶ καθ' ἦν
6.3.1	ἀλόγου
6.4.2	συνέσται
7.1.1	τὸν σοφὸν Πυθαγόραν
7.1.5	ᾧ τα
7.2.2	ἐκείνων τῶν
7.2.5	οἷ'
7.3.1	τὸ μαθηματικόν
7.3.3	ὄλος
7.3.6	μάλιστ' ἐσπούδακε
7.3.6	καὶ ἄρισθ'
7.3.6	τὸ
7.4.3	ἔχει
7.4.5	κατωρθωκότ'

Müller & Kiessling

34.12–13	αὐτὸ τὸ κινοῡν
34.13	παύσαι τὸ
34.13–14	οὐδ' ἐλλείποι
34.22	ταῦτα
35.16	ἦττηνται
35.22	ἄτεκτος
36.3	ἔφετον
36.8*	εἰ κανὸν
37.16	δοκεῖεν
37.20	τῶν [lacuna] κόντων
39.14	ὄντες
39.22*	ἐπτόντες
40.10	αὐτῶν
41.8	om. αὐτοῦ
41.20	λόγων
42.2	om. τῶν
42.18	μελαγχολοῖ
43.1*	ἀνενοήτων
43.20	ἐπ'
45.9*	αὐτοὺς
45.10	παῖοι
46.4	om. ἐν
46.27	τὰ συχνὰ
49.3	τοσοῦτω
49.7–8*	φαύροις
49.14	βιστόν
50.10	πρὸς ἔτι
50.19*	ἐπικαταδίκη
51.2	ἱστορίας
51.20	ὄντως
52.8–9	τῆς συνήθεσιν
52.10	ῥύμη
53.2	ταυτότῆς
53.7	ἢ καθ' ἦν
53.17	λόγου
55.3	συνέσθαι
56.16	om. σοφόν
57.15	ᾧτα
58.21	om. τῶν
59.13	οἷ
59.26	om. τὸ
60.15	ὄλος
61.10	om. μάλιστ'
61.11	om. καὶ
61.12	τὸν
62.4	ἔχει
62.12	κατωρθωκότα

<i>The present edition</i>		<i>Müller & Kiessling</i>	
7.4.8	ἔμοιγε δοκῶ	63.2–3	ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ
8.1.1	πολλῇ τῇ	63.15	om. τῇ
8.1.3	εὐθέως	64.3	εὐθέως
8.2.1	γε μὴν	64.12	om. μὴν
8.2.2	φαίην	64.15*	φαίη
8.2.6	τοσαύτης	65.14	ταύτης
8.2.7	λογισμῶν	65.18*	λόγισ
8.3.4	τῆς πόλεως	66.18	πόλεως
8.3.6	ἀποιήτως	67.1*	ἀποζητήτως
9.1.2	δέος	67.19	δέ σοι
9.1.2	προφέρειν	67.21	προσφέρειν
9.1.2	οἱ βούλουιτ'	67.23	ὁ βούλουιτ'
9.1.3	ταῦτ' ἀφρονεῖν	68.3–4	ταῦτ' ἀφρονεῖν
9.1.4	δυσωπουμένους	68.11	δυσωπουμένους
9.1.4	παραφθέγγξαιτ'	68.12	παραφθέγγξαι τ'
9.1.5	τῷ μὴ τυγχάνειν	68.17	τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν
9.2.2	ἔσω	70.5	ἔστω
9.2.2	τὸ	70.7	τὸν
9.3.3	δῆ	71.16	δῆ μάλισθ' ὡς τὰ πολλὰ
10.1.4	ἦ καὶ	74.1	ἦ
10.2.1	Χρῦσιππος τε καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ καὶ	74.17	Χρῦσιππος τε καὶ
10.3.6	τὰ ἐκείνων	76.23	τάκεινων
10.3.6	που	76.25	ποι
10.4.2	τὰ κατ' αὐτούς	77.16	om. τὰ
10.4.2	ὀλίθους	77.18–19*	ὀλίθους
10.4.5	καὶ λέγειν ἔχειν	78.10	λέγειν καὶ ἔχειν
10.4.5	δ'	78.12	θ'
10.4.6	φέρειν	78.19	σφέρειν
10.4.9	νῦν γε εἶναι	79.9	νῦν εἶναι
11.1.1	τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους	81.9	Ἀριστοτέλους
11.1.2	δέ γε	81.17*	δόγε
11.1.7	τότ'	83.2	τότ'
11.2.1	πάνυ, τῶν	83.12	πάνυ τοι
11.2.5	οὔκουν γε	84.20	οὔκουν
11.2.7	συνεισηνεγκεῖν	85.9*	ζυνεισηνεγκεῖν
12 title	ἔτι περὶ	85.13*	om. ἔτι
12 title	καὶ τοῦ	85.13*	καὶ περὶ τοῦ
12.1.2	ἦ	86.1	ἦ καὶ ²
12.1.5	παρώφθησαν	86.16*	παρώφθησαν
12.2.2	ἀπέστησαν	87.6	ἀνέστησαν
12.2.6	ὅσοι	88.9*	ὅσοι καὶ
12.3.1	κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν	88.10*	καταφιλοσοφίαν
12.3.2	τὸ πρᾶγμα	88.18	πρᾶγμα
12.3.5	προσσχόντες	89.12	προσέχοντες
12.4.5	καίτοι γε	90.17*	καίτοι

*The present edition**Müller & Kiessling*

12.4.5	κατεξανιστάμεναι	90.20	κατεπανιστάμεναι
12.5.5	ἔρριπται	92.3*	ἔριπται
12.5.5	ὀλίγοι	92.3	ὀλίγη
12.6.1	ἦρξαντο	93.2	ἦρξατο
12.6.5	τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης εὐετη- ρίας καὶ εὐπραγίας καὶ συμμαχίαν	94.1*	τῆς συμμαχίαν
12.6.9	ἀνῦσαι	95.7*	ἀνύσαι
12.7.1	τῆς διαδοχῆς	95.17–18	διαδοχῆς
12.7.4	καταληπτικὴν	96.6	καταληπτὴν
13.1.3	γεωμετρίαν	97.21	τὴν γεωμετρίαν
13.2.2	ἔμμελές	98.3	ἐπιμελές
13.2.7	ἄϊλον	99.10	ἄϊλου
13.2.9	ὡς ἀληθῶς	99.16	ἀληθῶς
13.2.11	συνδιάθεσιν	100.8	διάθεσιν
13.3.1	ἐνενόησε	100.9	ἐνόησε
13.4.1	τὸ κοινόν	101.20*	τόκονον
13.4.1	ἐξεγένεθ'	101.22	ἐξεγένεσθ'
13.4.3	πονεῖν ἐπήει	102.7	om. ἐπήει
13.4.5	οἵτινες	102.22	εἵτινες
13.4.7	δ' ὅμως	103.6	ὅμως
14.2.1	ἄλλοις γε	104.24	ἄλλοις
14.3.2	του τῶν	107.16	τούτων
14.4.5	ἐποπτεύει	110.4	ἐποπτεύοι
14.4.5	κρίνει	110.6	κρίνοι
14.5.3	προέχειν	111.4	προσέχειν
14.5.5	ἑαυτῷ	111.11	αὐτῷ
15.2.1	οὐδεμίᾱ	113.15	οὐδεμίᾳ
15.2.1	ἔοικε	113.18*	ἔοι
16.1.2	τοῦ ἀνδρὸς	117.4–5	τάνδρὸς
16.1.2	προνεχθὲν	117.5*	προσνεχθὲν
16.1.4	κατὰ τᾶλλ'	117.21	κατ' ἄλλ'
16.4.6	τῆς δὲ λέξεως	123.7*	τῆς λέξεως
17.1.3	κἂν	124.17	εἰ καὶ
17.1.4	κεχρωσμένους	125.4*	κεχρωμένους
17.2.1	λείως	125.13*	λείως
17.2.3	Αἴγυπτου	126.1*	Αἴγυπτον
17.2.5	τὴν τε θεῖαν	126.8	om. τε
17.2.5	παμπλείστων τε καὶ	126.10	om. τε
17.2.7	τῶν	126.19*	τὸν
17.3.4	ἐξενεγκόντε	129.2	ἐξενεγκότε
18.2.4	πάσης	132.18	πάσης τῆς
18.2.4	κατὰ	133.4	καὶ κατὰ
18.3.1	συνασκήσει	135.8	σὺν ἀσκήσει
18.3.3	ἀήθης	135.19*	ἀήθεις
18.3.4	τὴν σπουδαζομένην	136.7	σπουδαζομένην
18.3.7	ἐπιτρέπον	137.8	ἐπιτρέπον

*The present edition**Müller & Kiessling*

18.4.2	τούφανές	138.6–7*	τούφανές
18.5.7	συλλογιζομένω	141.6	ξυλλογιζομένω
18.5.7	ἴσως	141.8	καὶ ἴσως
18.5.8	καίτοι γε	141.13	καίτοι
18.5.8	άνύσας	141.15*	άνύσσης
19.1.3	ἅμα τε	142.8	ἅμα
19.1.3	καὶ μηδέν	142.11	μηδέν
19.1.3–4	ἄμφω καιροῦ τυγχάνουσαν καὶ μὴν ἔτι κἂν εἰ μετ' ἐνστάσεων	142.13*	ἄμφω
19.2.5	ἐπίτηδες τε	143.19	om. τε
19.4.6	εἰς ἃ βούλεται	147.21–22	om. εἰς
19.5.1	προσέχειν	148.2*	προσέχει
19.5.4	αὐτοῖς	149.4	αὐτῶν
19.5.5	ἢ	149.8	ἢ καὶ
20.2.1	παραβάλλεσθαι	151.21	παραβαλέσθαι
20.3.1	δημογορικαῖς	153.6*	δημογορικαῖς
20.3.3	τὸ πειστικόν	153.17	om. τὸ
21.1.1	Ἄριστοτέλους	155.15*	Ἄριστοτελικῶν
21.1.4	τῶν ἐπισκέψεων	156.20	ἐπισκέψεων
21.1.6	ἢ κατὰ	157.9	καὶ κατὰ
21.1.6	ὑποτυποῖ	157.10*	ἀποτυποῖ
21.1.7	τόσων δὴ καὶ τόσων καὶ ὑποσχέσεων	157.11	om. καὶ ὑποσχέσεων
21.1.7	ἐπιλησομένους	157.12	ἐπιμελησομένους
21.2.1	μὲν	157.14	μὴν
21.2.1	γεννικῶν	157.18	γενικῶν
21.2.3	Ἑρμογένους τοῦδε τοῦ συντάγματος ἔνεκα καὶ εἴθε γε μὴν ἄγονος τοῦδε	157.25–158.1*	Ἑρμογένους τοῦδε
22.1.1	ταῖς τε ἱστορικαῖς	159.16	om. τε
22.2.3	καὶ τὰς περὶ	160.22	om. τὰς
22.2.5	ἄλλως	161.11	ἄλλος
22.3.4	ταμείους τῆς φαντασίας	162.15*	ταμείους τοῖς φαντασίας
23.1.2	ἀγενῶς	163.9*	ἀγενῶς
23.1.4	ψήφους	163.21	ψήφοις
23.1.4	τάδε	163.23	τάδε, τάδε
23.2.2	ὀρίσασθαι	164.23*	ὀρίσθαι
23.2.5	πράττεσθαι	165.11–12	πεπλάττεσθαι
23.2.5	προαγομένων	165.14	προγόνων
24.1.5	μᾶλλον δ'	168.2	μᾶλλον
24.2.1	καινίζει	168.8	καινίζειν
24.3.2	πεῖθοιτο νοῦν	169.13–14	πεῖθοι τὸν νοῦν
25.1.6	δὴ	171.9	μὴ
25.1.7	ἐπίτηδες	171.16	ἐπίτηδι'
25.1.8	ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνὴρ ... ἐν οἷς	171.21	repeated in MK

*The present edition**Müller & Kiessling*

25.2.2	κινήσαν	172.13	νικήσαν
25.2.5	τάναντί'	173.5–6	τάναντία
26.1.3	παραλαμβάνουσι	174.1	προσλαμβάνουσι
26.1.5	ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ... σώματος	174.8	repeated in MK
26.1.6	πορεία	174.17	πονηρεία
26.2.1	καὶ κατασκόπησιν	175.8	om. καὶ
26.2.4	φιλοσόφοις	175.20	φίλοις
26.2.4–5	χρήσις ἐπιτρέπει καὶ τὰ παρὰ φιλοσόφου ἕξεως	175.24*	χρήσις
26.2.5	ἐπιπλεῖστον	176.2*	ἐπὶ πλεῖστον
26.2.7	σχοινία	176.13	σχοίνια
26.2.8	λεκτική	176.16	λεκτῆ
71.2.1	κατασυλλογίζεσθαι	463.22–23	μετασυλλογίζεσθαι
71.2.2	δυσζύμβλητοι	464.4*	δυσζύβλητοι
71.2.3	λόγω	464.10	λόγων
71.2.4	πάντων	464.19*	πάντων, πάντων
71.3.5	λέσχην	466.5*	λέγχην
71.3.5	πολὺν	466.6*	μολὺν
71.3.7	ικανὸς	466.12	ικανός, καὶ
71.3.7	γάρ δὴ	466.17*	om. δὴ
71.3.9	εἴτ'	466.23	ἢ τ'
71.5.1	ἀπεναντίας	468.11	ἀπεναντίας
71.5.1	τοῦ ἀνδρὸς	468.15	om. τοῦ
71.5.4	ἐυχρηστίας	469.5	ἀχρηστίας
71.5.4	ἀδικίαν	469.6	καὶ ἀδικίαν
71.5.5	ἅ πασι	469.7	ἅπανσι
71.6.2	ἀπαξιοῖ	469.22	ἀξιοῖ
71.6.5	βδελυρᾶς	470.4*	βδελυρᾶς
71.6.6	σοπυδάζοι	470.11	σοπυδάζοι
71.6.8	χρήσει	470.20*	χρήσει μὴ
71.7.3	ἢ	471.17	ἢ
71.8.8	κατὰ φύσιν	474.19*	κατὰ τῆ φύσει
71.9.5	πνεῖν	475.23	πλεῖν
71.9.6	ἀτημελήτως	476.1	ἀπημελήτως
71.9.9	ἠλλοτριῶται	476.18	ἄλλοτριῶται
71.10.1	κατασκοπὸν	476.23	κατάσκοπον
71.10.4	ἐπαινετῶν τὴν γλῶτταν καὶ πάνυ τοι ταχύς τυγχάνει τῶν	477.19*	ἐπαινετῶν
71.10.5	ἐστίν. οὐκ ἀτημελήτως δ' ὅμως χρῆσθαι, δηλὸς ἐστίν	477.20*	ἐστίν
71.11.2	εὐτέλεια	478.7	εὐτέλεια
71.11.4	οἶ'	478.25	οἶα
71.11.7	μωκήσαιτο	479.13	μωμήσαιτο
71.12.1	ἀποδεικνύον	479.18	ἀποδεικνύον

The Paris manuscripts in MK

The information given in the notes in MK on the two Paris manuscripts, ‘Cod. Reg.’ (P) and ‘Cod. Germ.’ (Coisl. gr. 165) is not always reliable. It should be remembered that Müller and Kiessling never saw these manuscripts themselves but only knew them by report from Bloch or Boissonade. Sometimes the reading given for ‘Cod. Par. Reg.’ is wrong, whether quoted from Boissonade or Bloch.⁵⁴ The designation ‘Cod. Par.’, which usually refers to P, is occasionally used for the Coislinianus instead, something which the reader can only discover by checking either the two manuscripts, or Bloch.⁵⁵

5. The present edition

The present edition comprises essays nos. 1–26 and 71. The title alludes to the fact that many of these essays treat of ancient authors including philosophers, or subjects related to philosophy. Essay no. 71 ‘On Plutarch’ is included since despite its position much later in the collection, it belongs thematically with the group 15–20 (on Josephus, Philo, authors educated in Egypt, Synesius, Dio, and Xenophon).

Editorial principles

The critical apparatus is rather detailed. Since P, M, and E are presented here for the first time, and since the apparatus is on the whole not very bulky, I have included some deviations in accents and breathings.

Since P *with its corrections* seems to be a somewhat better manuscript than M—and certainly better than E—,⁵⁶ I follow P against M/E in those cases where both offer good readings, and where it is difficult to choose; e.g. (in many cases) where they differ in word or-

⁵⁴ E.g. 14.4.2: MK 109, n. 25 πόθου (P has πόθον); 18.2.6: MK 134, n. 26 αὐτοῦ (P has αὐτὸν); 18.4.2: MK 138, n. 56 τοῦφανές (P has τοῦμφανές). At 18.2.5 MK (133, n. 20) seem unaware that the γράφεται note is found also in P, which is admittedly difficult to elicit from Bloch.

⁵⁵ E.g. 5.4.1: MK 47, n. 27 ‘Paris. Cod. νομοθετήσαι’ (P has νομοθετεῖν); 14.4.2: MK 109, n. 23 ‘Paris. ἦττων ap. Bloch.’ (P has ἦττον); 16.3.4: MK 122, n. 34 ‘Cod. Paris. φύεται’ (P has ἐφίεται).

⁵⁶ See above, p. xxxi.

der. Moreover, since M is illegible for large portions of the text, the choice is often not between P and M but between P and E.

In the apparatus I have indicated the legibility or otherwise of M only where E differs from P. I.e., 6.2.5 ‘χρόνων: χρόνον P’ means that M agrees with E in having χρόνων; 5.1.5 ‘γενόμενον: γενόμενος E’ that M agrees with P in having γενόμενον; and 13.2.2 ‘ἐμμελές: ἐπιμελές P, non leg. M’ means what it appears to mean. Thus the reader is not told, for the rest of the text, whether M is legible.⁵⁷ On the other hand, if E agrees with P it seems a safe conclusion that the same is, or was, true of M, too.

Accents have been normalised in accordance with conventional practice. It has been argued by some scholars that the accentuation of the manuscripts should be reproduced, particularly in a case like this, where the manuscripts in question are contemporary with the author.⁵⁸ I have however decided against this, on the grounds that (1) the manuscripts do not always agree, (2) they are not consistent, and (3) I do not believe that we are entitled to assume that the punctuation found in the manuscripts was less meaningful or important to the Byzantines than the accents. Thus, if we decide to keep the contemporary accentuation, we should, in the name of consistency, also keep the punctuation. This, however, I have decided against, since it would add considerably to the difficulty of understanding the text.

Thus the punctuation, too, has been normalised. I have only removed, not added; i.e., in all the places where punctuation marks are found in the present edition, there are also punctuation marks (although not always of the same type) in the manuscripts.

I have normalised ἀνήρ into ἀνήρ when it means ‘the man’ (the oblique cases always have the definite article).

For a number of adverbs I have kept the spelling of the MSS: διατοῦτο, ἐξανάγκης, ἐξαρχῆς, ἐξεπιπολῆς, ἐξορθοῦ, ἐπιπλείστον, κατακαιρόν, οὐχάπαξ, οὐχῆκιστα, ταπολλά, τίποτε, τοεξαρχῆς. All of them except διατοῦτο, ἐξεπιπολῆς, ἐξορθοῦ, and οὐχάπαξ are also found written separately as two (or three) words. I have also kept the spelling ἀμηγέπη.

⁵⁷ Some indication is given above, p. xxi.

⁵⁸ Cf. the discussion in Rosenqvist (1996, 107) with references.

The text has been divided into sections and paragraphs. For practical reasons this reference system is used in the notes to the translation and in the word indexes.

The translation⁵⁹

Like most translators, I have tried to find a balance between faithfulness to the original and legibility. If the former dominates somewhat over the latter, this is due to honesty. There are a number of places where I feel uncertain about the meaning of the Greek; by reproducing them in the translation I give the reader a chance of discovering them and making a different interpretation. However, I have refrained from dotting the text with question-marks, which would be unaesthetic and irritating. The more serious problems of interpretation are signalled and discussed in the notes.

Another circumstance that speaks for a faithful rendering of Metochites' language is the preliminary character of the present edition. It is only the first of a series; there are still 93 essays of the *Semeioseis gnomikai* to be edited, and Metochites' language remains to be systematically investigated.⁶⁰ Thus it is still too early to make a paraphrase of the text, which is what a smooth translation would amount to. At this stage of the work on Metochites, it is more important to pinpoint his idioms than to gloss over the difficulties of his style.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Metochites was notorious for his style; not even the admiring Nikephoros Gregoras could suppress his criticism.⁶¹

The notes

The notes deal mostly with questions of language and translation, but they also contain some information on the historical and literary background, Metochites' sources etc.

References to the essays edited here are in the form (*Sem.*) 5.2.3, i.e. essay, section and paragraph number. Pages in Müller & Kiessling are not given, since they are found in the margin of the edition.

⁵⁹ A Norwegian translation of *Sem.* 8 by Tomas Hägg is found in Wyller (1993, 367–71). A Latin translation of *Sem.* 17 is found in *PG* 144:947–54.

⁶⁰ E.g. his use of the optative.

⁶¹ Gregoras, *Hist.* 1:272.

Other essays are quoted from Par. gr. 2003; references are given in the form (*Sem.*) 57, 334 (MK), i.e., essay number followed by page in Müller & Kiessling's edition.

TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES

Sigla

P	Parisinus graecus 2003, ca. 1328–34
P ¹	prima manus
P ²	manus Nicephori Gregorae (?)
P [?]	incertum utrum P ¹ an P ²
M	Marcianus graecus 532 (coll. 887), ca. 1326–28
E	Scorialensis graecus 248 (<i>olim</i> Y.I.9), ca. 1539–42
a. c.	ante correctionem
add.	addidit
cf.	confer
coni.	coniecit
corr.	correxerit
fort.	fortasse
leg.	legitur, leguntur
marg.	in margine
om.	omittit, omittunt
p. c.	post correctionem
s. l.	supra lineam
vid.	videtur

Τοῦ μεγάλου λογοθέτου Θεοδώρου τοῦ Μετοχίτου
1
γνωμικαὶ σημειώσεις

- A. Προοίμιον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι νῦν λέγειν.
 B. Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον.
 5 Γ. Περὶ τῆς ἀσαφείας τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους συνταγμάτων.
 Δ. Ὅτι πάντες ἤττηνται δοξοσοφίας.
 E. Περὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους δοξοσοφίας καὶ περὶ τῶν μαθημα-
 τικῶν.
 Ιζ. Ὅτι πολὺ πάντες ἡδονταὶ οἷς ἂν συνεθισθῶσιν. 2
 10 Ζ. Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν Πυθαγόραν πάντων τῶν σοφῶν εὐλαβεί-
 ας καὶ περὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ.
 Η. Ὅτι πᾶσι σύνηθες τοῖς σοφοῖς εἰρωνεία καὶ τὸ χαριεντί-
 ζεσθαι, καὶ Πλάτωνι μάλιστα καὶ Σωκράτει.
 Θ. Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς νοεῖ τις λέγειν.
 15 Ι. Ὅτι ἀνευλαβῶς ἅπαντες οἱ σοφοὶ πρὸς τοὺς πρὸ αὐτῶν
 ἐχρήσαντο, ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους.
 ΙΑ. Περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ λογικὸν
 εὐδοκμήσεως τοῦ ἀνδρός.
 ΙΒ. Ἔτι περὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ κατ'
 20 αὐτὸν καὶ λογικοῦ.
 ΙΓ. Περὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ τῆς σοφίας καὶ μάλ-
 ιστα περὶ τοῦ ἁρμονικοῦ.
 ΙΔ. Ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαρχῆς τέλειον κατέστη τὸ τῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπι-
 στήμης.
 25 ΙΕ. Περὶ Ἰωσήπου.
 Ιζ. Περὶ Φίλωνος.

1-2 τοῦ μεγάλου λογοθέτου Θεοδώρου τοῦ μετοχίτου γνωμικαὶ σημειώσεις:
 titulum om. P¹, non leg. M, τοῦ σοφωτάτου μεγάλου λογοθέτου Θεοδώρου τοῦ
 μετοχίτου P² 19 ἔτι: ὅτι E, non leg. M τοῦ om. E, non leg. M

The Grand Logothete Theodore Metochites' Sententious Notes

1. Proem, where it is also pointed out that it is no longer possible to say anything	21
2. On memory, and that it is necessary	27
3. On the obscurity of the writings of Aristotle	33
4. That everybody suffers from intellectual vanity	49
5. On Aristotle's intellectual vanity also regarding mathematics	57
6. That all men like what they are accustomed to	65
7. On the respect of all wise men towards Pythagoras, and on mathematics	75
8. That usually all wise men are ironic and witty, especially Plato and Socrates	83
9. That it is impossible to express one's thoughts	89
10. That all wise men were disrespectful towards their predecessors, and on Plato and Aristotle	97
11. On Aristotle and his fame in natural science and logic	107
12. Further on Aristotle and his natural science and logic	113
13. On Plato and the mathematical part of wisdom, and especially on harmonics	127
14. That the science of mathematics was not fully developed from the beginning	135
15. On Josephus	145
16. On Philo	151

- ΙΖ. Ὅτι πάντες ὅσοι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἐπαιδεύθησαν τραχύτερον τῷ λέγειν χρῶνται.
- ΙΗ. Περὶ Συνεσίου.
- ΙΘ. Περὶ Δίωνος.
- 5 ΙΖ. Ὅτι πάντες ὅσοι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἐπαιδεύθησαν τραχύτερον τῷ λέγειν χρῶνται.
- ΙΗ. Περὶ Συνεσίου.
- ΙΘ. Περὶ Δίωνος.
- Κ. Περὶ Ξενοφώντος. |
- 10 ΚΑ. Περὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν βιβλίων τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, 3 καὶ περὶ τοῦ βιβλίου Ἑρμογένους τοῦ περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος.
- ΚΒ. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ μαθηματικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀστασιάστου.
- ΚΓ. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ θεωρίᾳ ἀβεβαίου.
- 15 ΚΔ. Ὅτι διὰ τὸν πρὸς ῥητορικὴν πόλεμον ἀεὶ διαλόγοις ὁ Πλάτων χρῆται.
- ΚΕ. Ὅτι διὰ τὴν πρὸς Πλάτωνα μάχην σπουδάζειν ἠξίωσεν Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν.
- ΚΖ. Ὅτι τῷ ἀπλῶ καὶ ἀτημελήτῳ τῆς φωνῆς φιλοσοφία οἰκείως ἔχει.
- 20 ΚΖ. Θρηνοὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.
- ΚΗ. Περὶ τοῦ ῥητοῦ τοῦ λέγοντος οὐκ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν βίον ἄλλου ἐν οὐδενί, καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον μεταβολῶν, καὶ περὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν συγγράφοντα.
- 25 ΚΘ. Περὶ τοῦ εὐμεταβλήτου πάντων τῶν κατ' ἀνθρώπου.
- Λ. Περὶ τῆς κατ' ἀνθρώπου ἀμαθίας τῶν βελτίστων.
- ΛΑ. Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι τελεία κατάληψις περὶ τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ὑπόδειγμα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν τῇ μέθῃ μὴ τελείως καταβαπτισθέντων.
- 30 ΛΒ. Ὅτι ἡδὺ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ᾧ τις ἂν χρόνιος συνεθισθείη.
- ΛΓ. Ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀηδῶς σύνεισι τῷ κατ' ἔθος 4 μακρὸν ὄψωδον βίῳ.

17. That all who were educated in Egypt write in a rather harsh style 159
18. On Synesius 165
19. On Dio 175
20. On Xenophon 185
21. On Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Hermogenes' book
On the Method of Force 191
22. On the lack of dissension in the science of mathematics . . . 195
23. On the uncertainty in natural science 201
24. That Plato always uses the dialogue form because of his war against rhetoric 205
25. That Aristotle decided to study rhetoric because of his opposition to Plato 209
26. That a simple and unadorned language is typical of philosophy 213
- [71. On Plutarch 219]
27. Lament on human life
28. On the dictum which says that it is impossible to find anyone leading a life free from sorrows, and on the reversals of life, including those which have befallen the author
29. On how easily everything in human life is reversed
30. On human beings' ignorance of what is best
31. That those who are in the body do not have a perfect apprehension of reality, and an example of this taken from those who are inebriated but not completely drunk
32. That people like those things which they have become accustomed to for a long time
33. That many people are dissatisfied with a life, whatever it may be, that is always the same

- ΛΔ. Ὅτι τινὲς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀνοήτων οὐδὲν ἤττον ἢ κατὰ τοὺς πεπαιδευμένους ἤδιστα βιοῦσι μεγάλα περὶ ἑαυτῶν οἰόμενοι.
- ΛΕ. Ὅτι πολλοὶ διὰ φιλαυτίαν ἐπὶ μικροῖς, οἷς ἔχουσιν, ἀπειροκάλως ἐπιδείκνυνται.
- 5 ΛΖ. Ὅτι καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τινες ἀγαθοῖς εὐγνώμονές εἰσι καὶ περὶ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐνταῦθα.
- ΛΖ. Θρηῆνοι ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν πραγμάτων ἐλαττώσει καὶ μεταβολῇ τῆς μεγάλης ἐκείνης εὐδαιμονίας.
- 10 ΛΗ. Θρηῆνοι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἕω τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῆς κακῶς πραξάντων.
- ΛΘ. Θρηῆνοι ἔτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔνι παραβάλλειν τὰ ἐκεῖ πάντα τοῖς ἀλλαχοῦ Ῥωμαϊκοῖς.
- Μ. Θρηῆνοι ἔτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τὰ τῶν μοναχῶν ἐκεῖσε βέλτιον εἶχεν, ἢ ἄλλοθί πη.
- 15 ΜΑ. Ὅτι ἔθος ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρελθόντα τοῦ βίου ποθεῖν, κακείνων ἤδιστα μεμνήσθαι.
- ΜΒ. Ὅτι σφόδρα ἠδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ ἐποπτεία τῆς κτίσεως.
- ΜΓ. Ὅτι ἤδιστον ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν ἐποπτεία. |
- 20 ΜΔ. Ὅτι ἤδιστον θέαμα ἡ θάλαττα. 5
- ΜΕ. Ὅτι εἰκάζειν ἂν εἶη τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἰλαρῷ συνόντας σεμνότητι τῷ τῆς θαλάττης ἐν γαλήνῃ θεάματι.
- ΜΖ. Ὅτι πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ποθεινὸν τὸ ἄπραγμον τοῦ βίου.
- 25 ΜΖ. Ὅτι τοῖς πλείοσι περισπούδαστον ἡ περὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀσχολία.
- ΜΗ. Ὅτι πλεῖστα δυσχερῆ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ πολλὰ πράττειν βιοῦσι κἂν εἰ δοκῶσιν εὖ πράττειν.
- 30 ΜΘ. Ὅτι ἔνιοι διὰ μικρογνωμοσύνην τινὰ καὶ οὐ λογισμῶν κρίσιν ἀποτρέπονται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τοῦτο πάντως οὐδ' ἐπαίνου τινὸς ἄξιον.
- Ν. Ὅτι ἔστιν ὁμοίως ἠδεσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν εὐπραγεῖν καὶ ἐν μεγίσταις ὑποθέσεσι καὶ ἐν ἤττοσι καὶ διαφόροις πολιτευμασιν εὖ πράττοντας.
- 35

34. That some ignorant and stupid people, no less than those who are educated, lead very pleasant lives and think highly of themselves
35. That many people because of self-love vulgarly brag about what little they have
36. That some people are grateful even for small advantages, and on the Emperor
37. Lament on the decline of Rome and the reversal of its great prosperity
38. Lament on the misfortunes of the inhabitants of the eastern part of the Roman Empire
39. Further lament on the same subject, and that it is impossible to compare the whole situation there to that in the other parts of the Roman Empire
40. Further lament on the same subject, and that the monasteries there were better than anywhere else
41. That human beings usually long for the past, and remember it fondly
42. That human beings find it extremely pleasant to behold Creation
43. That it is very pleasant to behold heaven and the heavenly bodies
44. That the sea is a very pleasant sight
45. That one could compare those partaking of joyful solemnity with the sight of the sea when calm
46. That a life of inaction is attractive to many people
47. That most people strive to engage in activities
48. That many things are difficult and painful for those who lead busy lives, even if they seem prosperous
49. That some people reject an active life because of narrow-mindedness, not because of a rational decision, and that this is certainly not commendable
50. That it is equally possible to be content and appear prosperous for those who are doing well in the highest stations in life and those [who are doing well] in various more humble pursuits

- ΝΑ. "Οτι μέγας ἐπιτειχισμὸς τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν νοερὰν ἐνέργειαν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ.
- ΝΒ. Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι φιλαυτίας, καὶ ὅπως ἐπείγονται πάντες ὥστε πλέον δοκεῖν ἢ εἶσιν.
- 5 ΝΓ. "Οτι ἀπορεῖν ἔστιν ὅπως οἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ξυνέλαχον ἐξαρχῆς τῷ βίῳ εἰς τέλος, οἱ δὲ τούναντίον. |
- ΝΔ. "Οτι πολὺ τὸ ἐναντιολογεῖν ἀνθρώποις οὐ μόνον πρὸς ἀλ- 6 λήλους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς.
- ΝΕ. "Οτι οὐκ ἔστι παρ' ἀνθρώποις ἀπλανῆς σχεδὸν κρίσις οὐδ' ἀπαθής.
- 10 ΝΖ. "Οτι ἔστιν ἀεὶ ὅπως ποτέ τις πράττει παρασκευῇ γνώμης εὐλόγως ἀντανισοῦν ἑαυτὸν ταῖς μεγάλαις εὐπραγίαις.
- ΝΖ. "Οτι ἔνιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλάττονται φιλόσοφον πρόσχημα καὶ περιφρόνησιν τῶν τυχηρῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον 15 εὐπραγούντων, ἀτευκτοῦντες αὐτοῖ τινος εὐετηρίας καὶ βασκαίνοντες.
- ΝΗ. Πότερον ἄμεινον ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ ὅτι ἄμεινον τὸ γενέσθαι.
- ΝΘ. "Οτι πολὺ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τὸ περιαιτολογεῖν.
- 20 Ξ. "Οτι ἄπορον εἰ ἔστι τις ἀνθρώποις καθάπαξ γαλήνη κατὰ τοὺς λογισμούς.
- ΞΑ. "Οτι οὐκ ἔξω λόγου παντάπασι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὰ τῶν Ἐφεκτικῶν ἐναντιουμένων πρὸς πᾶσαν κατάληψιν, καὶ ὅτι καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Σωκράτης ἀρχὰς εἰς τοῦτ' ἔδωκαν.
- 25 ΞΒ. Περὶ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων πράγμασι, τῶν μὲν διὰ φιλόπραγμα ἦθος φαῦλον, τῶν δὲ διὰ ἀμαθίαν καὶ ἀπρονόητον τὴν τύχην. |
- ΞΓ. Περὶ τῶν ἐλπίδων, καὶ ὅτι τρόπον μὲν τινα βιωφελέστα- 7 τον ἀνθρώποις τὸ κατ' αὐτὰς χρῆμα, τρόπον δέ τιν' αὐθις καθάπαξ νεμεσητὸν καὶ κατεγνωσμένον.
- 30 ΞΔ. "Οτι ἡδιστον ἀνθρώποις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ συνήθει διατριβῇ ὁτιοῦν πράττειν εὖ καὶ τιμᾶσθαι.

51. That the body and that which belongs to it are a great hindrance for the soul in its proper intellectual activity
52. On the self-love present in all men, and that they strive to seem to be more than they are
53. That it is difficult to explain why some people are prosperous in life from beginning to end, whereas some [fare] in the opposite way
54. That people often contradict not only each other but also themselves
55. That it is almost impossible for human beings to form a correct or impartial judgement
56. That one can always, by mental adjustment, make oneself able to compare oneself reasonably with [those of] great prosperity
57. That some people feign a philosophical attitude and disdain towards those who are fortunate and prosperous in life, because they themselves have failed to obtain some benefit and are envious
58. Whether it is better for man to be born or not to be born, and that it is better to be born
59. That people often talk about themselves
60. That it is uncertain whether there is any calm for people in their reflections
61. That the [doctrines] of the Sceptics, who were in opposition to all certain knowledge, do not appear to be completely unreasonable, and that Plato and Socrates laid down the principles for this
62. On those who throw themselves into activities, some because of a meddlesome and base character, some owing to ignorance and unforeseen chance
63. On expectations, and that in some way they are an extremely useful thing for people, but in another way completely harmful and detrimental
64. That it is very pleasant for human beings to be successful and admired at home, in their usual activity

- ΕΞ. "Ότι πολλάκις ἔνιοι συμπίπτουσι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν δόγμασι καὶ κρίσεσι, καὶ ὄλλυνται δίκη σφετέρᾳ.
- ΕΞ. "Ότι τινές εἰσι ταχεῖς πιστεύειν τῇ προνοίᾳ διὰ τὰ φαινόμενα κατὰ λόγον ἀπαντᾶν τοῖς χρηστοῖς τε καὶ πονηροῖς
5 ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου, καὶ αὐθις ἀπιστεῖν τῇ προνοίᾳ διὰ τὰναντία τούτοις.
- ΕΖ. "Ότι θαυμασίως πολλάκις εἴωθε ταῖς μεγίσταις πράξεσι καὶ εὐτυχίαις τάχιστ' ἀκολουθεῖν δυσπραγήματα χαλεπὰ καὶ μηδὲν ἦττον ἀνυπονόητα.
- 10 ΕΗ. "Ότι οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὁμοφροσύνη.
- ΕΘ. "Ότι πολὺ νοσοῦσι ταῖς προσπαθείαις ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὀρθῶσιν.
- Ο. "Ότι χρήσιμα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ καὶ γεωμετρικοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἶδους διὰ τὰ τε ἄλλα πλεῖστα τῷ βίῳ καὶ
15 διὰ τὰ τῶν μηχανικῶν ἔργα.
- ΟΑ. Περὶ Πλουτάρχου.
- ΟΒ. Θεωρία εἰς τὸ ἔπος τὸ λάθε βιώσας.
- ΟΓ. Εἰ προσίσταται τῷ Χριστιανικῶς ζῆν τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν ζῆν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς πράγμασι ζῆν.
- 20 ΟΔ. "Ότι τὸ μὴ μετὰ πολλῶν βιοῦν πραγμάτων εὐκολίαν φέρει εἰς τὴν τήρησιν τῶν τῆς Χριστιανικῆς εὐσεβείας νομίμων.
- ΙΟΕ. "Ότι καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ πολιτευομένοις ἔξεστι καλῶς βι- 8 οῦν τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τοῖς τῆς θεοσεβείας νομίμοις.
- ΟΖ. Εἰ γαμητέον ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ τοῖς ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχουσι καὶ φροντίδα τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ζωῆς.
- 25 ΟΖ. "Ότι παντὶ τρόπῳ τῷ πολιτικῷ ἀντιποιητέον εἰρήνης.
- ΟΗ. "Ότι καὶ πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν παρασκευαστέον τῷ πολιτικῷ.
- ΟΘ. "Ότι μὴ διὰ τὰς ἀτυχίας καὶ τὸ κακῶς πολλάκις πράττειν
30 ἀποτρεπτέον τοῦ πράττειν.
- Π. "Ότι τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες σχεδὸν περὶ τὸ λέγειν διέτριψαν μόνον, μὴ χρήσιμοι γενόμενοι ταῖς περὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν θεωρίαις.

65. That it often happens that people are negatively affected by their own views and judgements, and are destroyed through their own fault
66. That some people are prone to believe immediately in Providence because of that which seems reasonably to befall good and bad, and then again, not believe in Providence because of the opposite event
67. That the greatest achievements or successes are surprisingly often immediately followed by severe as well as unexpected misfortunes
68. That there is on the whole no unanimity among men
69. That people are very much influenced by emotional attachments and do not see clearly
70. That the branches of philosophy dealing with mathematics and geometry are useful in life for many reasons and particularly on account of the works of engineers
71. On Plutarch
72. Reflection on the expression *Live hidden*
73. Whether it goes against a Christian life to lead an active life among many people
74. That it is easier to keep the commandments of the Christian faith if one does not lead an active life
75. That it is possible also for those who lead a public life to live nobly in accordance with virtue and the principles of Faith
76. Whether those who care for and concern themselves with a life of virtue should marry or not
77. That a politician should strive for peace by every means
78. That a politician must also prepare for war
79. That one must not desist from action because of set-backs and frequent failures
80. That most or nearly all philosophers only devoted themselves to talking, and were not useful for political theory

- ΠΑ. Ὅτι πάντες σχεδὸν τῶν ἐν Ἑλλησι φιλοσοφησάντων τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν ἀπέστησαν.
- ΠΒ. Ὅτι ἐπιμελητέον βασιλεῖ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ πορίζεσθαι χρηματισμοὺς τῇ ἀρχῇ.
- 5 ΠΓ. Ὅτι μὴ καθάπαξ ἑαυτὸν δοτέον τῇ περὶ τὸ χρηματίζεσθαι ἐπιμελεία τὸν βασιλέα καὶ πάντα τρόπον σπουδαστέον εἰς τοῦτο.
- ΠΔ. Ὅτι ἐπιμελητέον ἀνεμεσήτως περιουσίας καὶ πλούτου τῷ πολιτικῷ.
- 10 ΠΕ. Ὅτι οὐ καθάπαξ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχειν ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν τῷ πλουτεῖν.
- ΠΖ. Ὅτι πάντες ἄνθρωποι σχεδὸν φιλοπλουτίας ἤττηνται. |
- ΠΖ. Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδείγματος περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα 9 ἀστασίας.
- 15 ΠΗ. Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδείγματος περὶ τῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ χρήσεως.
- ΠΘ. Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδείγματος περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς κυριότητος τοῦ νοός.
- ϑ. Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδειγμάτων περὶ τῆς κατὰ νοῦν ζωῆς.
- ϑΑ. Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδείγματος περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην τῇ γενητῇ φύσει ἐναντιοπραγίας.
- 20 ϑΒ. Ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἀπρόσκοπον τῆς Χριστοῦ πίστεως, ἔοικεν, ὠκονομήθη τὸ τῆς μοναρχίας κράτος Αὐγούστῳ τε τῷ Καίσαρι καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ Κωνσταντίνῳ.
- ϑΓ. Ἐπισημασία ὅπως ἡμῖν ἐν μνήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ τὰ περὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πάντα, καὶ μέγιστα καὶ ὅσα βραχείως ἄξια λόγου.
- 25 ϑΔ. Ὅτι χρήσιμον τοῖς παιδευομένοις ἡ ἀποχώρησις καὶ ἀποστροφή τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὑποδείγματος.
- ϑΕ. Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδειγμάτων περὶ τοῦ νοός καὶ τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων χρήσεως.
- 30 ϑΖ. Περὶ δημοκρατίας.
- ϑΖ. Περὶ ἀριστοκρατίας.

81. That nearly all Greek philosophers desisted from taking part in politics and public affairs
82. That a king must devote himself mainly to obtaining funds for his administration
83. That a king must not devote himself entirely to making money and spend all his efforts on this
84. That a politician must devote himself blamelessly to affluence and wealth
85. That it is not proper to devote oneself entirely to getting rich
86. That nearly all men are conquered by love of wealth
87. Reflection on the instability of human affairs, with examples
88. Reflection on the use of the rational faculty, with examples
89. Reflection on perception and the supremacy of the mind, with examples
90. Reflection on an intellectual life, with examples
91. Reflection on how created nature suffers reversal in the material world, with examples
92. That, as it seems, the monarchical rule of the Emperor Augustus and the great Constantine came into being for the unhindered [expansion] of the Christian faith
93. Brief note that everything concerning the Greeks has been preserved for us in memory and writing, both the greatest things and those worthy of a passing mention
94. That it is useful for those who are being educated to retire and desist from action, with examples
95. Reflection on the mind and the use of the senses, with examples
96. On democracy
97. On aristocracy

- 9Η. Περὶ βασιλείας.
 9Θ. Περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας.
 Ρ. Περὶ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.
 ΡΑ. Ὅπως οὐ μόνον Ἕλληνες ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων
 5 ἔθνῶν κοινοπολιτείας ἐχρήσαντο. |
 ΡΒ. Ὅτι τοεξαρχῆς ἅπαντα σχεδὸν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν ἔθνη, 10
 οὐ κοινοπολιτείας, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ δεσποτῶν ἦγοντο.
 ΡΓ. Ὅτι τοεξαρχῆς ἡ πόλις Κυρήνη Ἑλληνίς ἐν Λιβύῃ.
 ΡΔ. Περὶ Καρχηδόνας καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν πολιτείας.
 10 ΡΕ. Περὶ Καρχηδόνας ἔτι καὶ ὅπως διὰ τὸ μέγιστα εὐπραγῆσαι
 καθάπαξ ἐντεύθεν ἡ πόλις αὕτη ὤλετο.
 ΡΖ. Περὶ τῆς Ῥώμης καὶ ὅπως ἐκ μικρῶν ἀρχῶν τοσοῦτο κρά-
 τος καὶ μέγεθος ἀρχῆς κατ' αὐτὴν συνέστη.
 ΡΖ. Περὶ Νουμᾶ Πομπηλίου δευτέρου βασιλέως τῆς Ῥώμης,
 15 καὶ ὅπως τηνικαῦτα κατὰ καιρὸν βασιλεύειν ἤρεθη.
 ΡΗ. Ὅπως Ῥωμαῖοι ἐκ μικρῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν πραγμάτων μετὰ τὰ
 πρὸς Πύρρον καὶ Καρχηδονίους ἐξῆς πολέμια εἰς μέγα
 προῆλθον ἀρχῆς κράτος καὶ φρόνημα σχεδὸν παγκόσμιον.
 ΡΘ. Ὅτι ἡ Ῥωμαϊκὴ μεγίστη μοναρχία ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἔοι-
 20 κεν ὑπὸ τῆς θείας προνοίας γενέσθαι εἰς εὐδρομίαν τοῦ
 σωτηριώδους Χριστιανικοῦ δόγματος.
 ΡΙ. Περὶ Σκυθῶν.
 ΡΙΑ. Ὅτι χρήσιμον τοῖς περὶ λόγους σπουδάζουσιν ἡ περὶ τὸ
 ἱστορικὸν ἐπιμέλεια. |
 25 ΡΙΒ. Περὶ τοῦ ἀνιδρύτου καὶ μὴ διαρκοῦς εἰς τέλος τῶν ἀνθρω- 11
 πίνων πραγμάτων ἐξ ὑποδειγμάτων.
 ΡΙΓ. Περὶ Ἑλλήνων, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ὄγκῳ πράξεων ἢ τύχης περι-
 φανεῖς ἦσαν τοεξαρχῆς, ἀλλ' ἀστειότητι φύσεως καὶ ἥ-
 θους καὶ γνώμης εὐγενεία.

2 τῆς in marg. add. E 6 τοεξαρχῆς: τὸ ἐξαρχῆς E 8 τοεξαρχῆς: τὸ ἐξαρχῆς E
 21 χριστιανικοῦ: χριστιανοῦ a. c. E 28 τοεξαρχῆς: τὸ ἐξαρχῆς E

98. On monarchy
99. On the constitution of Athens
100. On the constitution of Sparta
101. That not only the Greeks but also many other peoples practised democracy
102. That virtually all peoples in Asia did not practise democracy from the beginning, but were governed by despots
103. That Cyrene in Libya was a Greek city from the beginning
104. On Carthage and its constitution
105. More on Carthage and how the city perished precisely because of its great achievements
106. On Rome, and how from small beginnings it became such a strong and great power
107. On Numa Pompilius, the second king of Rome, and how he was chosen king opportunely at that time
108. How Rome, from a humble beginning, after the wars with Pyrrhus and Carthage became a great power, with ambitions nearly of world domination
109. That it seems that Rome became the greatest Empire in the world with the help of Divine Providence, in order to aid the spread of the redeeming Christian faith
110. On the Scythians
111. That it is useful for intellectuals to study history
112. On the instability of human affairs and lack of continuity till the end, with examples
113. On the Greeks, and that in the beginning they were famous not because of the magnitude of their deeds or fortune, but because of the refinement of their nature and character, and the nobility of their thought

- PIΔ. Ὅπως κατὰ καιρὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας ἀρίστω ἄνδρε καὶ στρατηγῶ κατὰ ταυτὸν γεγόνατον τῇ πατρίδι.
- PIE. Ἐλεγχος εἰς τὸ ἀνίδρυτον καὶ εὐμετάβλητον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὅτι εἰ δὴ τι ἄλλο καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου βίον τοῦτο παρίστησιν, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν Πολιόρκητὴν ἐπικληθέντα Δημήτριον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸν Εὐμενῆ.
- PIZ. Εἰς τὸ ἄστατον τῆς τύχης ἐξ ὑποδείγματος.
- PIZ. Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδειγμάτων, ὅπως τινὲς ἀπὸ μεγάλων πράξεων καὶ μεγάλης τύχης ἀλλάττουσιν εἰς ἀπραξίαν ἢ τὸ πρᾶττειν ταπεινῶς.
- PIH. Ὅτι τῶν ἐπιμελῶς κτηθέντων ἡ ἀποβολὴ οὐκ ἀταλαίπωρος οὐδ' ἐρραστωνευμένη.
- PIΘ. Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐξαρχῆς εἰς τέλος τοῦ βίου ἄκρατος ἀνιανοῦ τινος εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς τῶν μεγάλων εὐτυχιῶν ὑποβλέπεσθαι μεταβολάς. |
- PK. Ὅπως πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνεπιστήμονες εἰσιν ὡς 12 ἀληθῶς τῆς τοῦ βίου χρήσεως ἐξ ὑποδειγμάτων.

14 ἐξαρχῆς: ἐξ ἀρχῆς E

114. How opportunely Epaminondas and Pelopidas, two brave men and excellent military commanders, arose in their paternal city at the same time
115. Investigation into the instability and changeability of human affairs, and that especially the life of Alcibiades is an illustration of this, and similarly that of Demetrius called Poliorcetes, and further Eumenes
116. On the instability of luck, with examples
117. Reflection, with examples, on how some people change from great deeds and great fortune to inactivity or doing humbly
118. That the loss of what has been carefully acquired is not un-painful or easy
119. That there does not exist among human beings any happiness in life that is from beginning to end unmixed with pain, and that one must face reversals of great fortune
120. That many people are truly ignorant of how to handle [that which befalls them in] life, with examples

1 Ἄλλ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τοῖς ὀψὲ τῶν χρόνων νῦν εἶναι πειρωμένοις
 τοῦ βίου, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀπηοῦν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι, εἴ τις ἀμέλει καὶ
 ὀτιοῦν χρῆσθαι δύναται. 2 Καὶ τὸν μὲν Ῥωμαῖον Κάτωνα, καὶ
 5 λόγῳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου αἰρέσει δόκιμον ἄνδρα, χρόνοις ὀψὲ τῶν
 Ῥωμαϊκῶν πραγμάτων τῇ ζωῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ξυντετυχηκότα
 καὶ χρώμενον εἰς τὸ ἀκριβέστερον καὶ ὅπως ἐδόκει καθάπαξ
 εἶναι οἱ βέλτιστον ἐννοσοῦσιν ἤδη τοῖς πράγμασιν, 3 ἔφησέ τις,
 οὐκ ἀκαίριως ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος Νόμοις καὶ
 10 τῇ Πολιτείᾳ βιοῦντα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῇ τῶν Ῥωμύλου καὶ τῆς
 Ῥώμης πολιτευμάτων ὑποστάθμη πολιτευόμενον, ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς
 ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις νομίμου πρώτης ἡγεμονίας τῆς ὑπατι-
 κῆς, μάλιστ' ἄξιον ὄντα τυχεῖν, εἰ δὴ τις ἰ καὶ ἄλλος τῶν τηνικ- 14
 αὐτ' ὄντων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν. 4 Ἡμεῖς δὲ οἵ γε νῦν τῷ βίῳ καὶ
 15 τῇ ζωῇ χρώμεθα ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν ὑποστάθμη τοῦ παντὸς βίου καὶ
 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, πῶς ἂν ἔχοιμεν βιο-
 τεύειν, ἐξετάζειν ἄλλοις παρήμι, καὶ ἔμοιγ' ἐνταῦθα νῦν ἀθεώ-
 ρητα ἔστω, 5 πλὴν γε ὅτι ἀρετῆς ἀδυναμίαν καὶ ἀχρηστίαν οὐκ
 ἔστιν, οὐδὲ νῦν ἀμέλει, οὐδὲ καθάπαξ, οὐδ' ἐν πᾶσι καιροῖς καὶ
 20 πᾶσι πράγμασι καταψηφίσασθαι, οὐδ' ἐξοριστέον ὅλως ὅτε
 ταύτην τοῦ βίου δι' ἀκαιρίαν, ἀλλ' ἄσυλον διὰ πάντων καιρῶν
 καὶ πραγμάτων τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀπρόσκοπον χρῆσθαι δέ-
 δωκεν ἡ φύσις ἀνθρώποις. 6 Ὁ δέ γε νῦν ἦν τῷ λόγῳ σκοπός,

9-13 τοῖς Πλάτωνος — ὑπατικῆς: cf. Plut., *Phoc.* 3.2

4 καὶ² om. E, non leg. M 6 ξυντετυχηκότα ex -χηκα- corr. P¹

¹ Λέγειν and λόγῳ χρῆσθαι in this essay have a pregnant sense, 'say something', i.e., 'say something interesting'. What is more, Metochites' chief concern is the difficulty of saying something interesting *in writing*. The same complaint, or rather the complaint that this view is so prevalent in Metochites' time, is found in *Sem.* 9.1.5. For a discussion of the proem see Bydén (below, pp. 251-60).

1. Proem, where it is also pointed out that it is
no longer possible to say anything

1 For us who are experiencing life now, late in history, it is not possible to use speech¹ in any way whatsoever, even if someone should indeed have the ability of using it. 2 The Roman Cato was an honourable man both intellectually and in his conduct, a man who, having entered life and politics towards the end of the Roman Republic,² handled an already unsound political situation most skilfully and in the way that seemed to him best. 3 Somebody³ said about this Cato, quite aptly in my opinion, that it was because he acted as if he lived under Plato's *Laws* and *Constitution*, instead of taking part in politics among the dregs of Romulus and the Roman institutions, that he failed to obtain the highest lawful office of that time, the consulship,⁴ although he truly deserved to achieve it more than anyone else of the politicians of that time. 4 But we who nowadays are truly living in the dregs of all time and of human history—as for the rest, how we should conduct our lives I leave for others to examine, and shall not investigate it here (5 except [to say] that it is not possible to condemn virtue to powerlessness and uselessness, now, at all, on any occasion or in any situation, nor should virtue at all be dismissed from our lives now and then as being inopportune, but nature has given men the ability of using it harmlessly at all times and in all situations), 6 but the theme of this proem is the fact that for those nowa-

² χρόνοις ὀψὲ τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν πραγμάτων here cannot mean 'late in Roman history', so πράγματα is interpreted as *res publica*, i.e., the Republic as opposed to the Empire, with an adjective like δημόσιος left out (LSJ s.v. πρᾶγμα III.2). In the two instances below, πράγματα probably has the more general sense of 'politics'.

³ Τίς: i.e., Plutarch or Cicero (cf. the following note).

⁴ Cato stood for the consulship in 51 BC, but was defeated. Metochites is quoting Plutarch, who is quoting Cicero: Plut., *Phoc.* 3.2 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Κικέρων φησὶν αὐτὸν ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ Πλάτωνος πολιτείᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ Ῥωμύλου πολιτευόμενον ὑποστάθμη τῆς ὑπατείας ἐκπεσεῖν. Cic., *Att.* 2.1.8 *dicit enim tamquam in Platonis πολιτείᾳ, non tamquam in Romuli faeae sententiam* 'he speaks in the Senate as though he were living in Plato's Republic instead of Romulus' cesspool' (trans. Shackleton Bailey).

ὅτι τοῖς ὀτιοῦν λέγειν νῦν δυναμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι τῷ λέγειν σχεδὸν νῦν χρῆσθαι.

- 2 Ἡ περὶ τίνος ἂν καὶ χρήσαιντο; Πάντα γὰρ ὡς εἶπεῖν φθάσαντ' ἄλλοις εἴληπται, καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι λείπεται μεθῦστερον
- 5 νῦν ἡμῖν μοιρίδιον εἰς χρῆσιν τῇ φωνῇ, οὐθ' ὅσα γε περὶ τῶν θείων καὶ οἷς μάλιστα κατ' ὀφειλὴν ἀξιώσει τις ἂν προσέχειν, οὐθ' ὅσα γε τῆς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔξωθεν σοφίας. 2 Καὶ ἱερὰ γὰρ ἅπαντα γράμματα, καὶ ὅσα νενομισμένα θεσπέσια δέδοται παλαιά τε καὶ νέα, πλείστοι δὴ καὶ ἰθαυμαστοὶ πάνυ τοι καὶ βίον 15
- 10 καὶ λόγον ἄνδρες ἐκείνοι, καὶ διὰ πλείστων πόνων, ἐν λόγοις ἠρευνήσαντο· 3 καὶ τῇ παρασκευῇ τῆς σοφίας εἰς μεγίστην ὄνησιν ἀνθρώποις εὖ μάλα ἔχρησαντο, πρὸς ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν κατὰ μέρος θεωρίας καὶ ἀφηγήσεις, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλας πάσας τῶν τοῦ καλοῦ νόμων καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς εὐρέσεις τε καὶ ὑποτυπώσεις· 4
- 15 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων θεωρίαν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κατανεύονται σοφία, πλείστα δὴ καὶ διάφορα περὶ διαφόρων τῶν ὑποκειμένων εἰς σκέψιν, καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὴν τῆς φωνῆς ἄσκησιν, ἅπαντα φθάσαντα τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν εἴργασται. 5 Καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν ἐράνου συντελεία παμπλήρει παρ' ἄλλων ἄλλα, πάντα δ' οὖν
- 20 παρ' ἐκάστων, εἰς τὸν βίον ἐνεσκεύασται καὶ συντέακται, περὶ τε τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἐκείνων ἀρχηγῶν ἐκδόσεις φιλοπονώτερον ἀφηγουμένων καὶ φιλανθρώπως τοῖς μετ' αὐτούς, καὶ οἴκοθεν ἄττα δὴ συνεισφερόντων ἐπὶ τοῖς πάλαι. 6 Καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι σχεδὸν λείλειπται γε ἡμῖν, οὐδὲ χάρα τις ὅλως εἰς κοινωφελῆ τινα 16
- 25 φορὰν ἴσως ὅστις ἂν οἴός τ' εἶη, οὔτε καιρὸς εἰς ἀνεμέσητον ὅμως ἐπίδειξιν τινα καὶ προκοπῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἀμιλλαν, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, γλώττης ἀπραξία καὶ κάθειρξις διὰ πάντων. 7 Ὅπου γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ κινήσαι τὸν νοῦν, νέον οὐκ ἂν ἐρεῖν ἔχοι, ἀλλ' ὃ πρότερον ἤδη φθάσαν ἦνυσταί τι, καὶ τοῖς
- 30 ἀκρωμένοις προεἴληπται· καὶ λοιπὸν ἀηδία ταῦτά φέρειν, ἢ

19 παμπλήρει in παμπλήρη corr. P (ut vid. P²)

days who are able to speak in any way it is not possible nowadays to use this ability.

2 For what is there to use it on?⁵ Practically everything has been anticipated by others, and there is not a scrap left to us now on which to use our voice, neither that which pertains to religion, which one should consider one's chief duty to study, nor that which pertains to secular wisdom in other fields. 2 All sacred writings, all the divine laws which have been given, old and new,⁶ have been analysed in writing with much exertion by a great number of men, intellectually and morally admirable; 3 they have used the preparation of [secular] wisdom in an excellent manner and for the greatest advantage of mankind, both regarding these writings and the detailed investigations and accounts of them, and regarding all other discoveries and commentaries on the laws of goodness and virtue. 4 But also that which has been discovered by human wisdom concerning the investigation of reality, manifold and varied, about the many different things which are subject to examination,⁷ and that which pertains to training the voice—everything has been treated beforehand by our predecessors. 5 And as at a bountiful feast with contributions from all the guests, everything has been prepared and organised for human life, different things by different people, everything by all of them together, painstakingly and for the benefit of posterity commenting on the writings of those early pioneers, and also contributing something of their own after those wise men of old. 6 There is hardly anything⁸ left for us, no room at all for any contribution of general usefulness for that person [among us] who is perchance able [to make such a contribution], and no opportunity for an at least legitimate display [of wisdom] and accompanying striving for improvement. There is only the enforced inactivity and confinement of the tongue at all times. 7 For wherever someone might move his mind he cannot say anything new, but only

⁵ *For what is there to use it on?* or: 'nor is there any subject on which to use it'. But Metochites often uses ἤ to introduce a direct question (e.g. in 1.3.3 and *Sem.* 2.1.7 below).

⁶ Perhaps referring to the Old and New Testaments.

⁷ διαφόρων τῶν ὑποκειμένων: for this construction, where an indefinite adjective is followed by a definite noun, see Wifstrand (1937, 9).

⁸ σχεδόν appears to be in the wrong place, but probably it is the *combination* οὐδὲν ὅτι which means 'nothing'.

πρὸς φιλοτιμίαν ἴσως, ἢ πρὸς γέ τι χρήσιμον, ὡς γε δόξειεν ἄν,
 8 καὶ περὶ ὧν ἄλλοι πρότερον ἤδη καὶ ἴσως γε καὶ κοιμίδῃ βέλ-
 τιον, σπουδάζειν αὐτόν τινα νῦν γε εἶναι καὶ κατεπιέγεσθαι,
 οἷς οὐ καθάπαξ ἄρα μὴ δεῖ γέλωτ' ὄφλοντα, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἠτισοῦν
 5 χρεῖα. 9 Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμέλει περὶ τε τῶν θειοτέρων μάλιστ' αὐτῶν
 ἦ προεῖρηται, καὶ ὅσα γε κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης σο-
 φίας ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ὡς ἄρα τις ἂν οἶός τ' εἴη τὰ οἴκοι
 κατ' αὐτόν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπιδείκνυσθαι.

3 Οὕτω δυστυχοῦμεν οἱ περὶ λόγους νῦν πόρρω πάνυ τοι
 10 τοῦ καιροῦ τὰ τῆς ἀφωνίας, ὥστ' ἀνάγκην ταύτην ἔχομεν, οὐ
 Σπάρταν ἢ κοσμεῖν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἂν ἐλάχομεν, ἀλλὰ τύ- 17
 χην μάλιστα φέρειν, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἡμεῖς γε νῦν ἦ
 ξυνελάχομεν, ἀνιαρῶς μὲν ἴσως κοιμίδῃ, φέρειν δ' οὐδ' ὅμως. 2
 Ἔγωγέ τοι μάλιστα περὶ τούτων συνεχῶς ξυννοούμενος, ἀχθό-
 15 μενος μὲν ὅμως (ἦ πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔμελλον;), πάντων δ' ἀποτρέπο-
 μαι σὺν ἀνίᾳ, καὶ ταχὺς αὐτίκα, πρὸς ἅ τις ἂν με κινήσειε λο-
 γισμὸς κατ' ἔφρσιν ἦντινα δῆ, καὶ ἴσως οὐκ εὐπεριφρόνητον,
 οὐδ' ἔξω παντάπασι λόγου. 3 Ἦ τί γὰρ ἂν δρώην; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
 20 ὅστις δαιτὸς δεύεται πολλῶν ἐόντων καὶ παντοίων καὶ μάλιστ'
 ἐσκευασμένων πάντων εἰς ἐτοίμην χρῆσιν. 4 Καὶ ἴσως ἂν εἴη τὸ
 καθ' ἡμᾶς ὅ τι ποτ' ἄρα πρὸς πλῆθουςαν τράπεζαν πάσης εὐγε-
 νείας καὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τρυφᾶν, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν αὐθις
 Ἀβυδηνὸν ἐπιφόρημα, καὶ ναυτιᾶν ἀφορμή. 5 Ἀτὰρ νῦν γε λο-

11 Σπάρταν κοσμεῖν — ἂν ἐλάχομεν: Diog., VIII 16 in *CPG* I 307.3; Diog., VIII 46 in *CPG* I 314.7 11–12 τύχην — φέρειν: cf. Men., *Mon.* 1.740; *Dys.* 276 19 δαιτὸς δεύεται: *Il.* 1.468; 24.69 23 Ἀβυδηνὸν ἐπιφόρημα: Zenob., I 1 in *CPG* I 1.1–9; *Suda* A 100

19–20 μάλιστ' ἐσκευασμένων πάντων: μάλιστα πάντων ἐσκευασμένων E, non leg. M

⁹ A tentative translation of ὡς ἄρα τις, assuming that ὡς is somehow comparative (i.e., approximately similar to ὅσῳ), 'insofar as, to the extent that there is someone ...'.

¹⁰ The expression denotes that one has no choice. Frequently quoted; cf. Stephanus' *Thesaurus*, s.v. Σπάρτη χ.

something which has already been achieved by someone else, and already received by the listeners. The only thing left to do is to reluctantly present the same results, either, perhaps, to gain glory, or for some supposedly useful purpose, 8 and now oneself study things that others have studied before, and perhaps much better, and incur ridicule by exerting oneself on subjects where absolutely no exertion is required, or of any use whatsoever. 9 This [is true] both, and particularly, of religion, in the way I mentioned above, and also of other study and investigation of human wisdom, if there should be⁹ anyone who is capable of displaying his talent and resources.

3 So unfortunate are we intellectuals nowadays, living late in time with regard to the impossibility of speech, that we are forced by necessity, not, as the saying goes, to *rule Sparta which has fallen to our lot*,¹⁰ but rather—this, too, according to the dictum—to *bear the destiny* which has fallen to our lot,¹¹ perhaps altogether wretchedly, but bear it nonetheless. 2 I for my part, being constantly aware of these things, sadly (for how could I not be sad?) I still immediately turn away in distress from everything towards which some cogitation might impel me according to a desire that is perhaps not despicable, nor completely unreasonable. 3 For what can I do? There is no one who *needs* [another] *meal* when there are already so many different courses and everything is prepared for ready use. 4 Perhaps our predicament is, as it were, to live softly at a table laden with every noble thing and all that is excellent, which would be, to quote another proverb, *a dessert of Abydos*¹² and a cause for nausea. 5 But now I

¹¹ Men., *Sent. Mon.* 1.740 (= *Sententiae e codicibus Byzantinae*, 813) φέρειν ἀνάγκη θνητὸν ὄντα τὴν τύχην.

¹² Ἀβυδηνὸν ἐπιφόρημα ‘a dessert of Abydos’, i.e., something unpleasant. After entertaining guests at dinner, the inhabitants of Abydos were said to have their children brought in by their nurses; the guests were much inconvenienced by the noisy nurses and the howling children (*CPG* I 1 [Zenob. I 1]; cf. *Suda* A 100).

It seems however that Metochites is rather using the expression in the same sense as μὴ εἰκῆ τὸν Ἄβυδον sc. πατεῖν (Paus. Attic., Fr. 2, 152.5–6), viz. for something useless and worthless, or Ἄβυδοκόμης (used of worthless persons); cf. Eustathios, *Ad Il.* 1:559.29–560.2 Ἰστέον δὲ καί, ὅτι τὸ Ἄβυδος ὕστερον ἐπὶ συκοφάντου ἐτέθη παροιμιακῶς διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν συκοφάντας εἶναι τοὺς Ἄβυδηνούς· ὅθεν καὶ Ἄβυδοκόμῃ οἱ ἐπὶ συκοφαντίᾳ κομῶντες, τίθεται δέ, φασίν, ἢ λέξις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰκαίου καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου. κωμφοδοῦνται δέ, φασί, καὶ εἰς μαλακίαν οἱ τῆς Ἄβύδου. Πausανίας δὲ καὶ παροιμίαν εἶναι λέγει “μὴ εἰκῆ τὸν Ἄβυδον”, ἢ ἐχρῶντο, φησίν, ἐπὶ τῶν εἰκαίων καὶ οὐδαμινῶν.

γισμὸς οὗτος ἐπῆλθεν ἐμοὶ καὶ τάχα μὲν ἔξω παντὸς λόγου, τάχα δ' οὐ, ὑπομηματισμοὺς δὴ τινὰς ἐπιτετημένως ἐκδοῦναι, καὶ σημειώσεις κατὰ μέρη ὅπως ἂν ἐπίη περὶ ὧν ἰένιote βιοτεῦ- 18
ων τὰ παρόντα, ξυννενόηκά τιναν καὶ ξυνελογισάμην ἐπ' ἐμαυ-
5 τοῦ, 6 καὶ ὧν ἴσως ἂν οὐκ ὀλίγοι δοκῶ μαρτύραιντό μοι, συμφωνοῦντες αὐτίκ' ἀκούοντες καὶ συντιθέμενοι τοῖς γνωμα-
τεύμασιν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταῦθ' οἱ λογισμοὶ στρέ-
φοντες ἐθησαύριζον οἴκοι. 7 Καὶ ἴσως γε καὶ ὁ νῦν εἴρηται περὶ
τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀφανίας ἡμῖν τοῖς γε νῦν βιοῦσι, καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ
10 λέγειν ὅ τι ποτ' ἄρα ἀπραξίας καὶ δυσχερείας ἢ δυστυχίας, ἐν ἔσται κατὰ τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ ἅμα μὲν πρῶτον, ἅμα δὲ καὶ προ-
οίμιον τῶν ἐξῆς.

Περὶ μνήμης, καὶ ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον: Β'

1 Κράτιστον ὡς ἀληθῶς διὰ πάντων πραγμάτων ὅσα τις ἂν
15 κατίδοι καὶ λογίσαιτο, μνήμονα μάλιστ' εἶναι ὧν ξυνεάρακέ
τις, καὶ οἷς ἐκάστοτ' ἐν λόγοις, ἢ πᾶσι πράγμασι, ξυνέλαχε, 2
καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις ἄλλως εἴποι τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων. Σοφίας τε γὰρ
πάσης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οὐ φύσις μᾶλλον πρὸς εὔρεσιν ἐτοί-
μη ἢ μνήμη τὴν εὔρεσιν ἐδράζουσα καὶ ἰστώσα καὶ συγκατα-
20 σκευάζουσα. 3 Τέχνης γὰρ πάσης καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ
καὶ σοφίας αὐτῆς μάλιστα χρήσις οὐκ ἂν ὅλως εἴη μνήμης
ἄνευ, καὶ τὸ μνήμονα εἶναι βέλτιστον ἐν πᾶσιν, οἷς ἂν τις
ἐγχειροίη καὶ οἷς ἂν ὅλως συνείη, καὶ ὅσῳ γε πλεῖον ἂν εἴη
τοιοῦτον εἶναι, τοσοῦτῳ βέλτιον ἔτι καὶ πάνυ τοι βέλτιστον. 4
25 Οὐκ οὖν γε ἔστι ἡ παιδείας ἀπάσης καὶ σοφίας κτῆσιν ὄτρωον 19
ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ τῶν κομιδῆ τὴν φύσιν εὐγενῶν καὶ ἀστείων, εἰ
μὴ ἄρα οἱ τὰ τῆς μνήμης ἔρρωται, ἢ θησαυρίζεται καὶ μένει
καθάπαξ ἄσυλα πρὸς χρήσιν, ὅσα λαβῶν τις ἢ εὐρῶν φθάσας
ἀνύσαι· 5 εἰ δὲ μή, παραρρηθήσεται τοῖς ἐπαγομένοις, ὡσπερ

4 ξυννενόηκα ut vid. E, ξυνενενόηκα P, non leg. M

have conceived this idea, which may or may not be wholly unreasonable, to publish some brief¹³ memoranda and disconnected notes, jotted down now and then, about a few things that, living in the present time, I have now and then thought out and concluded by myself,¹⁴ 6 and to which I think quite a few people would testify, agreeing when they hear them and confirming these ideas, since for them, too, their revolving cogitations have stored up these things in their minds. 7 And perhaps what has just been said about the silence enforced on us who are living now, and about our inactivity and awkwardness or misfortune as it were in regard to the possibility of speech, can be considered one theme, and both the first chapter and, at the same time, the proem of what is to follow.

2. On memory, and that it is necessary

1 Most important when dealing with everything that one can observe and think is truly to be able to remember well what one has understood and experienced on any given occasion, in any word or action. 2 No one in his right mind is likely to deny this, for the beginning of all wisdom and knowledge is not so much a nature ready for discovery as a memory which confirms, establishes and prepares the discoveries. 3 For without memory there would be no employment of any art or pursuit in life and particularly not of wisdom itself; to possess a good memory is most advantageous in everything one undertakes or experiences in general, and the more capacious one's memory is, the better—indeed best of all. 4 There can occur no acquisition of education in general or wisdom by anyone, even among those whose characters are wholly noble and accomplished, if he is not well endowed with memory, where that which he has previously achieved, having received it [from others] or discovered it himself, is stored up and remains once and for all, intact for use. 5 Otherwise it

¹³ Literally, 'publish in abridged form'.

¹⁴ Metochites is anxious to stress the humbleness of his 'brief notes': ἐπιτετμημένως, κατὰ μέρη, ὅπως ἂν ἐπίη, ἐνίοτε, τινῶν. Τινῶν probably goes with περί (i.e., περί τινῶν, ἃ ... ζυνενοήκα). In 1.2.8 above is another case of a (repeated) τις appearing late in the sentence.

ἔχονθ' ὀρώμεν ἀμέλει τῶν ποταμῶν τὰ ρεύματα, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι
 ποτὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λαβέσθαι, διὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνίδρυτον. 6
 Ὀνησιμώτατον οὖν ὄντως, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνυσιμώτατον καὶ ἀναγ-
 καιότατον, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, πρὸς κατόρθωσιν παντὸς σπουδάσ-
 5 ματος καὶ πάσης προκοπῆς, τὸ πρὸς μνήμην εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ
 διαρκῶς πάνυ τοι· καὶ ἀδύνατον ὅτουοῦν τυχεῖν, ἢ μὴ τοῦτο
 προσεῖη· 7 ἢ πῶς γὰρ οἶόν τ' ἂν εἴη ἐν τῇ τῆς παιδείας ἕξει
 κάλλιστ' ἔχειν, ὅτε μὴ συνέχεται μνήμη τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τυπού-
 μενα δι' εὐρέσεως καὶ περινοίας οἴκοθεν, ἢ διδασκαλικῆς ἀμέ-
 10 λει μεταδόσεως καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἐγχαραττόμενα καὶ τὸν νοῦν τεχ-
 νιτεύοντα καὶ πλάττοντα, 8 ἢ κατὰ φιλόσοφον διάθεσιν, ἢ κατ'
 ἄσκησιν τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τῆς γλώττης ἐπιμέλειαν, ἢ κατὰ τὴν τῆς
 ἐρμηνείας γραμματικὴν νομοθεσίαν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν· 9 ἢ πῶς
 ἔστιν ἐντεῦθεν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, μελετᾶν ὀρηοῦν· ἢ πῶς
 15 ἔστιν ἢ εὐτοκεῖν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἐπὶ τὸ γόνιμον κινεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ τὰ 20
 τῆς μνήμης εὖ μάλ' ἐπαρκεῖ καὶ πηγάζει τὰς ἐπιδόσεις;

2 Ἀλλὰ μὴν αἱ περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἱστορίαι κομιδῆ πολυ-
 ωφελέστατόν τι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι χρῆμα τοῖς εὖ πεπειραμένοις
 καὶ ξυνορώσιν, ἐπὶ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν πρακτέων αὐτῶν, ἕξ
 20 ὑποδειγμάτων χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐμπίπτουσι, καὶ οἷς ἂν τις ξυλλάχοι
 βιοτεύων. 2 Πῶς δ' ἂν τις ἔχοι κατὰ καιρὸν ἐντεῦθεν ἀνύτειν, ἃ
 μὴ πρότερον τεθησαύρισται τοῖς τοῦ νοῦ ταμείοις, καὶ ῥᾶον
 ἕξεστι λοιπὸν ἐκεῖθεν εὐπορεῖν προχειριζομένῳ διὰ τῆς μνήμης
 κατὰ χρεῖαν ἐκάστοτε πάντως ἐν λόγοις τε καὶ πράγμασι; 3 καὶ
 25 ὁ μὲν μῦθός φησι τὰ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ Δαιδάλου δημιουργή-
 ματα, βελτίῳ τοῖς ὠνούμενοις εἶναι τὰ δεδεμένα τῶν μὴ δεδεμέ-
 νων· ἃ γὰρ ἂν τις ἄδετα πρίαίτο, οἴχεσθαι φεύγοντ' αὐτόθεν
 αὐτίκα, καὶ μάτην ἦν ὁ πόνος καὶ τὸ τίμημα καταβαλλόμενον,
 μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ζημιοῦσθαι περιῆν τῷ πριαμένῳ. 4 Ἀλλ' ἡμῖν

1-2 τῶν ποταμῶν — λαβέσθαι: cf. Heraclit., fr. 91; Arist., *Metaph.* 1010a; Plut., *De E apud Delphos* 392b 25-28 τὰ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ Δαιδάλου — αὐτίκα: cf. Pl., *Men.* 97e-98a, *Euthphr.* 11c; Hesych. Δ 48

7 προσεῖη: προσῆ p. c. P²

will slip away when he adds new knowledge, as we can observe to be the case with the streams of rivers, where we can never grasp the same [water twice] because of its unstable nature. 6 This ability if any is thus very useful indeed, or rather most effective¹ and necessary in order to succeed in any venture or progress, namely to be well and sufficiently endowed with regard to memory, and it is impossible to achieve anything whatsoever if memory is not there. 7 For how would it be possible to be well educated if memory does not hold together that which has been stamped on the soul through discovery and congenital perspicacity, or that which is engraved by means of the imparting and guidance of instruction, building and forming the mind, 8 either in accordance with a philosophical inclination, or by practice in speaking and care for the language, or by grammatical rules and correctness of linguistic usage? 9 How would it be possible, starting from these things, or rather on these conditions, to practise anything in any way, or how would it be possible to be productive, or use one's knowledge in a fruitful way, if memory is not sufficient and brings forth its contributions?

2 But the stories of people of old seem to be an extremely useful thing in many ways for those who are experienced and able,² in intellectual and even in practical matters, to use examples to tackle the chance occurrences and that which befalls them in life. 2 But how could anyone appropriately achieve anything with something which has not earlier been stored up in the treasure-houses of the mind³ and which is therefore easily accessible every time one is providing oneself by means of one's memory for current needs, intellectual or practical? 3 The myth tells us that of the inventions by the engineer Daedalus, those that were tied down were better for the buyers than those untied, for those that they bought untied immediately escaped from there, and the labour and the price paid were both in vain, or, rather, the outcome for the buyer was to suffer economic damage. 4 But for us who occupy ourselves with words and are created by

¹ A word-play: ὀνησιμώτατον ... μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνυσιμώτατον.

² συνοράω c. inf. equivalent to οἶδα c. inf., 'know how to ...'.

³ τεθησαύρισται τοῖς τοῦ νοῦ ταμείοις: The concept of the 'treasure-houses of the mind/memory/imagination' recurs several times: *Sem.* 22.3.4, 71.8.2, and especially in *Sem.* 111: 736, 738, 741, and 748 MK.

ἄρα τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἔχουσι καὶ δημιουργουμένοις ὑπὸ σοφίας οὐδὲν πλέον ἔσται, οὐδ' ἠτισοῦν ὄνησις εἰς τὴν πρόθεσιν, ἣν μὴ συνεχόιντο | δεσμῶ μνήμης αἱ τῶν λογισμῶν τυπώσεις καὶ τὰ 21
 χαραττόμενα ταῖς ψυχαῖς διάφορα τῆς σοφίας κόμματα, ἀλλ'
 5 αὐτίκα ῥᾶστ' εὐεπιχείρητα καὶ ἀνίδρυτ' ἔχη, καὶ λύηται καὶ ὑποχωρῆ παντὶ τῷ προσπίπτοντι. 5 "Ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μέγιστον ἐκ θεοῦ δῶρον ὄντως ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μνήμης μάλιστ' εὖ ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν δὴ συνεχέιν, οὐκ εὐρίπιστα καὶ διάλυτα, ῥᾶστα τὰ κτώμενα· καὶ πολλοῦ γ' οἶμαι, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ παντός, ἀξιώσειεν ἂν καὶ
 10 πολλοῦ πρίαιτ' ἂν τις, εἴπερ οἶόν τ' ἦν, πεφυκέναι πρὸς μνήμην εὐγενῶς· καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔστιν ἢ οὕτω σοφίας ὅλως τυχεῖν.

3 Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὕτω. Τί δ' ἄλλο γε ἀνδρὶ βασιλεῖ, ἢ ὅλως πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν ἀρχαῖς αἰτίσιν ἄρα καὶ ἡγεμονίαις, μάλιστ' ἐπίχρειον καὶ βιωφελέστατον, ὡς μνήμη καὶ τὸ
 15 παντελείως ἐνταῦθα πεφυκέναι, 2 οὐ μόνον περὶ ἃ τῶν πρότερον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὡς οἶόν τε πόρρω τῶν ἄνω χρόνων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ πραγμάτων ἀκούειν ἔχει τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ πάνθ' ἃ νῦν ἐκάστοτέ οἱ ξυμπίπτοι, καὶ ὧν ἀκούειν ἔχει, καὶ ἃ καθορᾶν, καὶ ἃ ξυλλογίζεσθαι νῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πρότερον, καὶ ἴσως μὲν
 20 ἐγγύς, ἴσως δὲ πόρρω, 3 ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὰ βέλτιστα δρᾶν, μηδ' ἀπατάσθαι, μηδ' ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι ῥᾶστα, μηδ' ἀτευκτεῖν τῶν χρησίμων τε καὶ καιρίων, ἀλλ' | ὥστε τῶν μὲν εὖ μάλ' ἄπτεσθαι, 22
 τὰ δὲ φεύγειν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχειν εἰς προὔπτον, τὰ δὲ διοικεῖν ξὺν λόγῳ πάντως ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ καὶ ἀπραξίᾳ ὡς γε δόξειεν ἂν
 25 ἐνίστε, καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τοῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς πράγμασι.
 4 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ Πλάτων ἐκεῖνος, καὶ νόμους εἰς ἡρμοσμένον βίον ἀνθρώποις καὶ πολιτείας ξυγγράφων καὶ προνοῶν φύσει τε πανσόφῳ καὶ μνήμη παλαιῶν καὶ ὧν ξυνέλαχε πείρα τὰ βέλτιστα, πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ μνημονικὸν εὖ μάλ' ὡς οἶόν τε
 30 τὸν βασιλέα βούλεται καὶ τὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ πόλεως ἄριστον ἡγεμόνα· 5 ὡς εἰ μὴ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρα προσεῖη γε αὐτῷ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἃ νομίζει περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷς τὰς ἡγεμονικὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας

wisdom there will be no advantage or any profit whatsoever with regard to our object, if the imprints of our cogitations and the different stamps of wisdom engraved on the soul are not held together by the bands of memory, but will immediately be vulnerable to attacks and unstable, and are easily dissolved and recede before anything that hits them. **5** Therefore the greatest gift from God in this life is truly to have a really good memory, so that it can retain the acquired material with the greatest ease, without it being unstable or dissolvable, and I think one would value very highly, or rather highest of all, and, if it were possible, pay a great deal to be born with a good memory, and on the whole it is not possible to achieve wisdom in any other way than this.

3 And this is true of intellectual work. But what other thing could be so necessary and exceedingly useful in life also for a king, or in general for anybody who holds an office or a position of power, as memory, and to be perfectly endowed in this respect, **2** not only in regard to that which one can hear of the past, as far back as possible in history, of both men and events, but also in regard to anything that a man meets at any time in the present, and that which he can hear and understand⁴ and conclude, both now and earlier, perhaps recently, perhaps further back, **3** with the help of which he is always able to do what is best, without being deceived or easily despised, or fail to achieve what is useful and appropriate, but so that he can successfully undertake some things and avoid others, openly refute some but handle others rationally in quiet and what may sometimes appear to be inactivity, and on the whole always for the good of the affairs of state? **4** Therefore also Plato, writing both *Laws*, for an adjusted life for men, and *Constitutions* [i.e., the *Republic*], and providing what is best both by means of his all-wise nature and his memory of ancient history and events he had experienced himself, in addition to the other things also wants his king, the most excellent leader of his state, to have as good a memory as possible, **5** thinking that if this is not found in him besides the other things which he (Plato) prescribes for him and for those to whom he⁵ entrusts the highest offices,⁶

⁴ καθορᾶν is often used like συνορᾶν, i.e., 'see' = 'understand'.

⁵ The subject of ψηφίζεσθαι is either Plato or (less probably) the king.

⁶ ἀρχαιρεσία, 'elections of magistrates', here used in the sense of ἀρχή.

ψηφίζεται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη φαύλως αὐτῷ καὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ τὰ πράγματα ἐσόμενα. 6 Οὐκ οὐκ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τούτου μήτ' αὐτὸν τυγχάνειν οὐδ' προτίθεται καὶ σκοπός ἐστι καθόλου τῇ ἀρχῇ, μήτε τοὺς ἀρχομένους ὧν ἄρα δεῖ καὶ ὡς ἂν σφίσι εἴη βέλτιστα. 7
 5 Οὕτω δὴ πάντων μάλιστα χρεωδέστατον κομιδῇ μεμνήσθαι ὧν τε φθᾶσας πεπείραται πρὸς τὰς ἐξῆς ἐν παραπλησίοις χρήσεις, ὧν τε φθᾶσας ἤκουσεν, ὧν τ' εἶδεν, οἷς τε ξυνέλαχε καθάπαξ λόγους περὶ παλαιῶν ἱστορίας, πᾶσιν οἶμαι πράγμασιν, εὖ τε ἡνυσμένοις καὶ μὴ· 8 καὶ διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν μνήμης, ἐν πάσῃ βασι-
 10 λικῇ καὶ ἀρχικῇ διοικήσει, κατὰ τε μάχας καὶ εἰρηνικὰ συνθήματα, πρὸς τε τοὺς ἐκτὸς καὶ τὸ ἰὺπὸ χεῖρα μάλιστα, πράττειν 23
 εὖ καὶ κατορθοῦν, καὶ μὴ πλάνη φέρεσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν ἐν πλείστοις ὑπ' ἀμαθίας εἴτουν ἀμνηστίας ὧν ἐχρῆν.

Περὶ τῆς ἀσαφείας τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους
 συνταγμάτων: Γ'

15

1 Λογισμὸς οὗτος ἔπεισί μοι καὶ πείθω γ' ἐμαυτὸν εὖ μάλα, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν ἄλλοις ὅμως ξυνδοκῇ, ἴσως μὲν ἄμεινον ἂν ξυν-
 ορωῶσιν ἢ ἐγώ, ἴσως δ' οὐ, πείθω δ' οὖν οὕτως ἐμαυτόν, ὡς ἄρα
 τὸ τῆς ἀσαφείας Ἀριστοτέλει δι' ἐπιμελείας περὶ τὰς οἰκείας
 20 συντάξεις ἐπίτηδές ἐστι, 2 καὶ ὡς ἂν μὲν σεμνύνοιτο τῷ μὴ ῥα-
 δίῳ τῆς καταλήψεως τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ περὶ πλείονος εἴη, καὶ μὴ
 πᾶσιν ἐκκέοιτο τὰ πολλοῦ τιμώμενα, ἢ μάλισθ' ἂ πολλοῦ
 τιμᾶσθαι σπουδάζει καὶ πολλῶν πόνων ἀνὴρ ἀξιοὶ κτήσασθαι.
 3 Καὶ προσίεμαι δὴ, καὶ οὐδ' ἔγωγ' ἀπωθοῦμαι τὸ περιφερό-
 25 μενον εἰς πολλοὺς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπιστόλιον περὶ τούτου πρὸς
 Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν βασιλέα ἐπιτετιμηκότα περὶ τούτων αὐτῷ, ὡς
 ἄρα τὰ σπουδαῖα οἱ δέδοται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκδέδοται· καὶ συχ-
 νοὶ γὰρ περὶ τούτου μνήμην πεποιήνται, καὶ μάλισθ' ὁ πολυμα-

27 δέδοται μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκδέδοται: cf. Arist., *Ep.* 6; Plut., *Alex.* 7.8

9 αὐτῶν ut vid. M, αὐτῆς E 21 περὶ πλείονος: περιπλείονος P

things will necessarily turn out badly for him and his administration.⁷ 6 Without a good memory it is thus impossible both for him to achieve himself what he has set his mind on and the goal of his office in general, and for the subjects [to achieve] what is necessary and best for them. 7 Thus the most useful thing of all for future needs in similar situations is to remember that which one has experienced earlier, what one has heard and seen, and the accounts of ancient history that one has ever come across—I mean everything, well done or not— 8 and through the memory of this, in every royal or official dispensation, in wars and treaties of peace, both towards foreigners and especially in internal affairs, to be prosperous and successful, and not be carried away in confusion and commit blunders in most cases because of ignorance, namely because one has forgotten that which is necessary.

3. On the obscurity of the writings of Aristotle¹

1 The following thought occurs to me, and I am fully convinced—and if there are others who do not agree with me perhaps they understand better than I, perhaps not—but² I am convinced that the obscurity of Aristotle is deliberate, caused by his concern for his own writings, 2 with the aim that what he says be elevated through the difficulty of reading it and [thus] become more valuable, and that that which is highly valued, or rather, what Aristotle strives to make highly valued and thinks should be acquired [only] at the cost of great exertion, should not be easily accessible to everybody. 3 And I accept and do not reject as spurious that widely circulated letter by Aristotle on this subject to king Alexander when the latter had reproached him about this, where he says that he has ‘offered but not published’ the things that are of concern to him. Many writers men-

⁷ Relevant passages in the *Republic* are e.g. 413d, 486d, 487a, and 535a–c (a philosopher must have a good memory); 473c–d and 543a (kings must be philosophers).

¹ This essay is discussed in Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2).

² I suppose that ὅμως belongs with πείθω δ’ οὖν οὕτως ἐμαυτόν, despite its juxtaposition with ξυνδοκῆ. Another possibility is to read ὁμῶς (with ξυνδοκῆ). Ὅμως occurs once in the *Sem.* (98, 628 MK). Other problematic cases of ὅμως are found in *Sem.* 4.5.6, 14.3.4, and 17.1.4; see the notes ad locc.

θέστατος Πλούταρχος. 4 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε μάλιστα δοκεῖ σκοπὸν ἔτ' ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἀσαφείας εἶναι τῷ ἀνδρί, κομιδῇ πῶς | ἂν εἴποιμι ξὺν δόλῳ καὶ μηχανῇ κλέπτειν καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τέ 24 ἐστι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ μὴ δῆλον εὖ μάλα
 5 ποιεῖσθαι περὶ οὗ πρόκειται οἱ ἐκάστοτε, τί ποτ' ἄρα φρονεῖ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἀποφαίνεται ἀληθές περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὃ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀξιοῖ πείθειν. 5 Καὶ δῆλόν γε ὅτι τοῦτό οἱ μάλιστα σπουδάζεται περὶ τὰ τῶν προβλημάτων ἀξιολογώτερα, καὶ ὧν πολλή τις ἔφεσις καὶ πολλή τις ἀνάγκη τυχεῖν καὶ ξυνιδεῖν, ὅπως ποτ' ἄρ' 10 ἔχοι, καὶ ὧν πολλή τις ἐξέτασις τοῖς ἐλλογίμοις, καὶ ἄλλως ἄλλοι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τάναντί' ἔδοξαν· 6 ὥστε καὶ δόξειεν ἂν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις αὐτοῦ συντάγμασιν ἐπαμφοτερίζειν ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ διπλᾶ σχεδὸν κρούειν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, καὶ μὴ δῆλος εἶναι πάνυ τοι, μεθ' ὧν ἐστι καὶ ὁμοφρονεῖ τῶν πλείστα καὶ τάναντία λεγόντων ἀλλήλοις, 7 ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἀκολουθῶν τοῖς λεγομένοις τοῖσδε δόξαις ἂν αὐτὸν συμφωνεῖν, νῦν δὲ τοῖσδε τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ἴσως γε τάναντιώτατα, νῦν δ' ἄλλο τι καινότερον αὐτὸν ἐκτίθεσθαι φρόνημα περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος εἰς θεωρίαν, μηδὲν ἄλλο λέγοντα παρ' ἃ πρότερον εἴρηται τοῖς 20 περὶ αὐτοῦ ζητοῦσι καὶ μαχομένοις, 8 ὡς ἂν δοκοῖη καὶ ἀμφοτέρων | πλεόν εἶναι τι καὶ περιγίνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις 25 αὐτίς χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀφορμὰς διδόναι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἔλκειν αὐτὸν καὶ συνηγορεῖν εὖ μάλ' ἠδέως αὐτῷ, ἢ καὶ προήγορον μᾶλλον ἔχειν τῆς αὐτῶν αἰρέσεως, καὶ φεύγειν ἄρα τὰς ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων εὐθύνας, 9 δι' ἔρωτα δοξοσοφίας, καὶ ἴσως ἀλλότριον ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ οὐκ ἀνεμέσητον· ἄλλα γὰρ σοφισταῖς δοτέ-

13 διπλᾶ — κρούειν: Aristid., *Πρὸς Λεπτίνην ὑπὲρ ἀτελείας* 162.8 Jebb; *Κατὰ τῶν ἐξορχουμένων* 402.8 Jebb

³ Plut., *Alex.* 7.8: ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν αὐτοῦ παραμυθούμενος Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπολογεῖται περὶ τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων, ὡς καὶ ἐκδεδομένων καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένων 'both published and not published'. Note that Metochites instead uses two different verbs. *Many writers*: e.g. Elias [?David], *In Cat.* 125.11; Simplicius, *In Phys.* 8.28; Photius, *Amphil.* 142, *PG* 101:800A–B.

⁴ πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι: cf. below, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

tion this, especially the learned Plutarch.³ 4 But I for my part think that Aristotle's object in writing obscurely lies also, and particularly, in this: simply to—how shall I put it⁴—deceive his readers as much as he can with duplicity and artifices, and not make entirely clear, concerning the problem under discussion at a given point, what his views are, what he discloses to be the truth about it, and what he wants others to believe. 5 And it is obvious that he strives to do this particularly with the most important problems, concerning which there is much endeavour and great necessity to grasp and understand the truth of the matter, which scholars have examined a great deal, and where different people have reached different and even contradictory conclusions. 6 Thus Aristotle would appear to be ambiguous in his writings of this type, and *strike doubly*, as the saying goes,⁵ and not reveal at all clearly on whose side he is and with whom he agrees of those who maintain so many different and contradictory views, 7 but as one follows what he writes, one receives the impression that he sometimes agrees with one side, sometimes with the other, which asserts something different and even the opposite, and sometimes that he is proposing some new idea about the subject under discussion, [although] he is not saying anything except what has been said before by those who have investigated and debated these problems, 8 in order to appear to outdo and surpass both sides, and at the same time [appear to] concede something to both and give them a pretext to regard him as being on their side and gladly agree with him, or rather regard him as an advocate of their own views; in this way he avoids⁶ censure from both sides. 9 This is due to his desire to appear wise,⁷ a desire which is to my mind illiberal and reprehensible. For surely some subjects should be given to sophists to treat, and others to those who have resolved to study Being and Truth.⁸

³ διπλᾶ κρούειν. Metochites has probably picked up the expression from Aelius Aristides, who employs it twice (I have not found any other instances in TLG). Its meaning in Aristides seems to be 'speak with forked tongue' (cf. *Πρὸς Λεπτίην ὑπὲρ ἀτελείας* 162.8 Jebb δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομοθέτην καὶ ξύμβουλον καὶ πάντα τοιοῦτον καθαρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ διπλᾶ κρούειν, ὡς λόγος and *Κατὰ τῶν ἐξοργουμένων* 402.8 Jebb), and that sense fits the context here in Metochites, too.

⁶ This sentence is not quite grammatical, but perfectly comprehensible. Φεύγειν should have been in the optative, continuing the final clause.

⁷ For δοξοσοφία, cf. below, p. 48 n. 1.

⁸ Here, suddenly, Metochites seems to criticise Aristotle, not for deliberately writing *obscurely*, but for writing about the wrong kind of *subjects*.

ον σπουδάζειν, καὶ ἄλλα πάντως τοῖς περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ ἀληθὲς σπουδάζειν προτιθεμένοις.

- 2 Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ πάντας αἰτιᾶσθαι τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο σφόδρ' ἐπείγεται, καὶ δεικνύειν πειρᾶται
- 5 περὶ πάντα σχεδὸν ἀτευκτοῦντας τῆς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείας· 2 καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀφειδῶς αὐτῷ περὶ πάντας, καὶ οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ λόγος οὐδεὶς, οὐδὲ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον ἄπτεται καὶ κατατρέχει, τῶν δ' οὐ, οὐδ' ἔστι τις αἰδῶς αὐτῶν τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας ὁ αὐτὸς ἔστιν ἐπείγόμενος ὁμοίως, καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰδῶς τις
- 10 ὠφείλετό οἱ, δίκαια ποιεῖν αἰρουμένῳ· 3 οἷον δὴ τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα σαφῶς οὕτω λέγω, τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῆς σοφίας αὐτῷ καὶ παρ' οὗ πλεισθ' ὅσα περὶ ὧν δογματίζει φθάσας ἔχει λαμβάν, 26 καὶ ταῦτ' αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ λέγει, καὶ εἰ λανθάνειν πειρᾶται δι' ἔρμηνείας ἄλλης καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ἔστιν ἐπικρυπτόμενος· καὶ τοῦτο
- 15 ξύνοιδεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, καὶ εἰ πάντας οἶεται, πάντως οὐχ ἑαυτὸν κλέπτειν οἷός τε ἔστι καὶ διαδιδράσκειν. 4 Καὶ τοίνυν ὡς εἰκὸς εἶδ' ἡ λογιζόμενος καὶ φρονῶν καὶ συννοούμενος, ἅμα μὲν ὡς ἴσως δὴ καὶ παρ' ἄλλων αὐτὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἔρανον ἀντιλήφεται, τῶν ἐξῆς μεθύτερον αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀπαντήσεται οἱ ταῦτ' αὐτὰ δίχα
- 20 τινὸς αἰδοῦς, παραπλησίως ὡς αὐτὸς ἐχρήσατο, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄρα τις θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς ἄαπτος ἔσται καὶ πᾶσιν ἀπρόσιτος καὶ ἄσυλος καὶ ἀζήμιος, 5 ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ὡς οὐ ληπτῶν παντάπασιν οὐκ ἀσειστος συλλογιζόμενος, καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτων καθάπαξ ἀποφαίνεσθαι δεδοικώς, 6 ἐπαμφοτερίζειν ὡς οἷόν τε πειρᾶται καὶ καλύπτειν ἃ δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀξι-
- 25 οῖ, καὶ προτιθέμενος ἀμέλει λέγειν καὶ δοκῶν ὅτι οὖν λέγειν, οὐ παντάπασιν ἔστιν ἀλώσιμος, οὐδὲ δῆλος ὅ τι καὶ λέγει, φεύγων

21 θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς: cf. *Suda* A 3438; Θ 181

8 οὐδ': ἄλλ' ME 23 οὐκ om. ME

⁹ οὐδὲ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον ἄπτεται καὶ κατατρέχει, τῶν δ' οὐ, οὐδ' (ἀλλ' ME) ἔστι τις αἰδῶς αὐτῶν τῷ ἀνδρὶ: the reading of ME, which would mean 'nor does he attack and inveigh against some but not others, towards whom he has some deference, but he is the same ...' (i.e., ἀλλ' ἔστι τις αἰδῶς is a continua-

2 For the man wants to censure all his predecessors and strives eagerly after this, trying to show that they have failed to find the truth about reality in practically all matters; 2 he is merciless towards all and takes account of no one, nor does he attack and inveigh against some but not others; he has no deference for [any of] them, but is the same, i.e. equally aggressive, towards everybody, also towards those whom he would owe some respect if he had chosen to behave justly.⁹ 3 An obvious example that I may mention is Plato, his guide to wisdom, from whom he has previously taken a very large part of his doctrines, saying the same things as Plato does even though he tries not to show it, hiding it as much as possible by couching [his borrowings] in a different language. And this he knows in his heart of hearts, and even if he believes that he can deceive everybody else, he surely cannot deceive or elude himself. 4 Inferring, thinking and reaching the reasonable conclusion that he will probably be paid back in his own coin by others, namely those who will come after him, and that the same disrespectful treatment that he has given others will be meted out to him, and that he will not be like some *god from the machine*,¹⁰ untouchable, inaccessible to everybody, inviolate and unpunishable, 5 and at the same time not being quite confident in his conclusions on the subject-matter itself, since it is not entirely easy to grasp, and fearing to disclose his views about it categorically, 6 he tries to be as ambiguous as possible, and chooses to conceal what he thinks about these things. When he has decided to speak and gives the impression of saying something, whatever it is, he is not at all

tion and explanation of τῶν δ' οὐ [ἄπτεται καὶ κατατρέχει]), is nearly as good as that of P.

¹⁰ ὡς ἄρα τις θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς. It is perfectly natural to say of someone that he is 'like a *god*, untouchable, inviolate' etc., but not that he is like a *deus ex machina*, untouchable etc. The point of the 'god from the machine' is that he appears suddenly and unexpectedly and puts a hopelessly tangled or desperate situation to right. See LSJ s.v. μηχανή I.3; *Suda* A 3438 and Θ 181 and cf. e.g. Eun., *Hist.* 1:220.5–10 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δράμασιν, ὅταν ἐξ ἄπορον καὶ δύσλυτον αἰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔργων πλοκαὶ τελευτήσωσιν, ὁ καλούμενος ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεὸς ἐπεσόδιος ἐς μέσον ἔλκεται, πάντα συμπεραίνων καὶ καταστρέφων ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον καὶ εὐκρίτον. I have not found any parallel to Metochites' use of the expression; it does not occur again in the *Semeioseis*. Nikephoros Gregoras uses it in the established sense, *Hist.* 3:72.20.

Possibly Metochites is somehow combining the idea of divine immunity with the idea of an arbitrary (and definitive) solution to a seemingly insoluble problem, which is what he suggests Aristotle wanted to achieve in many cases.

εὖ μάλα διὰ τῆς ἀσαφείας τῶν λεγομένων τὸν ἔλεγχον οὐκ ἀνύποπτον ὄντα.

3 Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον, ὅτι μὴ περὶ πάνθ' ἃ προτίθεται ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν καὶ περὶ τουτωνὶ ὦντινων ἄρα σαφῆς
 5 ἐστιν 1 ὃ βούλεται καὶ πᾶσιν ἐκκείμενος, ὥστε ξυνορᾶν καὶ 27
 χρῆσθαι, 2 νῦν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶνδέ τινων ἄλλων, καὶ ὦν οὐκ εὐ-
 ληπτος μάλισθ' ἢ θεωρία, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν τούτοις ἢ σκέψις ἢ
 πλείστη τῆ φιλοσοφία, καὶ ὁ πάντων πόθος πλανᾶται κατὰ ζή-
 τησιν αὐτῶν, εὖ μάλα τὰσφαλῆς ἰχνηλατῶν, τὴν ἀσάφειαν ἐφ'
 10 οἷς τηνικαῦτα λέγει περιαμπίσχει τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἂν λαθῶν
 ἀμέλει παρέλθοι τοὺς ἐποπτεύοντας. 3 Ἐν οἷς δ' ἀσφαλέστατα
 θαρρεῖν ἔοικεν ἑαυτῷ, φιλόανθρωπός ἐστιν εὖ μάλα τοῖς ἀκρω-
 μένοις, καὶ παντέλει' ἔχουσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τρανώς ἃ δοκεῖ, καὶ
 ἀδικοῖεν ἂν αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ἢ γέλωτ' ἀμαθίας λαμπρᾶς ἂν ὀφλι-
 15 σκάνοιεν, εἰ μὴ ἔποινό γε καὶ θαυμάζοιεν τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἠκρι-
 βωμένον τε καὶ ἐπιτυχές· 4 οἷα τὰ περὶ ζῳῶν αὐτῷ πάντα συν-
 τάγμαθ' ὄρᾶν ἔστι, καὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικά, καὶ τιν' ἄλλα ὅστις
 ἄρα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν οἷός τε ἐστι· πολὺ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς
 τὸ σαφές καὶ πολὺ τὸ πιστόν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ δίκαιός
 20 ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις θαρρεῖν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρρησίᾳ χρῆσθαι. 5 Οὕτω
 δὴ παντάπασιν ἰκανώτατός ἐστιν ἐπ' αὐτῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς
 ἀληθείας κατ' αὐτὰ γνώμων ὀρθότατος, ἀγχινοῖα τε θαυμάζειν 28
 πάντων εὖ μάλ' ἄξιος, ὅσοι τε δῆτα πρότερον καὶ μεθύστερον
 αὐτοῦ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐσπούδασαν. 6 Ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθόλου περὶ
 25 φύσεως, οἷος ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δευτέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς
 εἴτουν περὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς παραδόσεως καὶ τεχνολογίας, ἐν
 δὲ τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, 7 πολλὴ
 πάντως ἢ δυσχερεῖ' ἐνταῦθα λαβέσθαι τρανώς τε καὶ ἀκριβέσ-
 30 ἐρμηνείας ἐπηλυγάζεται, μηχανώμενος ἀπόρρητα πάνυ τοι κει-
 μῆλια συνέχειν ἐντός.

easy to understand, nor is he clear as to what he is saying, escaping through the obscurity of his words the criticism which he suspects will be levelled against him.

3 And so much is clear: he is not the same in all matters proposed for discussion, but sometimes and concerning some things, whatever they may be, he is transparent as to what he means and open for everybody to understand and use,¹¹ 2 whereas on other occasions and concerning other things that are not very easy to investigate (and most of the investigations in philosophy are done on such questions; the desire of mankind is roaming in quest of them, carefully tracking down what is certain)—when he says something in such cases he envelops his doctrines with obscurity, in order to secretly evade those who are examining him. 3 But where he seems to trust himself most firmly he is very benevolent towards his listeners, and they grasp perfectly and clearly what his views are. And surely it is rather they who do wrong, or incur derision because of their blatant ignorance, if they do not follow and admire the man's accuracy and his attainments, 4 such as one can see in all his writings on zoology and meteorology, and some other works, if one has the power of observation. For in these books there is much that is clear and much that is convincing, and here the man is truly justified to trust himself and speak with confidence. 5 Thus he is highly competent in these subjects, and completely knowledgeable in all the truth concerning them, and worthy of admiration for his acumen more than all others who have devoted themselves to these studies, both before him and afterwards. 6 But as to his doctrine,¹² in the *Physics*, the *Posterior Analytics* (i.e., his teaching and instruction concerning demonstration), the *Metaphysics*, and the *On the soul* 7 it is extremely difficult to grasp clearly and accurately what he means and what his views are, and he conceals himself in great obscurity of language, pretending¹³ to guard within him treasures which may not be divulged.

¹¹ ἐκκείμενος ὥστε ξυνορᾶν καὶ χρῆσθαι: i.e., like an open book.

¹² A slight anacoluthon. οἷος ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ is probably an indirect question ('what his *logos* is like') governed by πολλή δυσχέρεια ... λαβέσθαι.

¹³ μηχανώμενος. It is not so much that he uses artifices to hide his knowledge; he is pretending to hide knowledge which actually is not there. Similarly σοφίζόμενος below, 3.5.8.

4 Περὶ γὰρ δὴ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας, καὶ οἷος αὐτῆ σκο-
 πὸς τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν καὶ πραγματεία τῶν καθόλου, καὶ ὡς
 περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ περαίνει σεμνῆ σεμνῶς, φθάνει πολλάκις ἐν
 τοῖς περὶ φύσεως αὐτοῦ συντάγμασι τὸν ἀκροατὴν μετέωρον
 5 καταστησάμενος, 2 ὥστε καὶ προσδοκᾶν ἀρρήτων τινῶν καὶ με-
 γίστων καὶ πανσόφων καὶ σχεδὸν ὑπερφυῶν τεύξεσθαι, καὶ
 πολλὴν ἐμποιήσας αὐτῷ λιχνεΐαν τῆς ἐνταῦθα σπουδῆς. 3
 Ἄτὰρ δὴ σπουδάζων περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσι-
 κά, φεύγει διὰ τῆς ἀσαφείας καὶ μηχανᾶται μὴ καθάπαξ ἀλώ-
 10 σιμος εἶναι, ὡς ἂν δὴ μὴ δῆλος γίνοιτο | πολλῷ τῶν ὑποσχέσε- 29
 ων ἐλάττων ἀπαντῶν καὶ ὧν ἐλπίδων ἐπράττετο τοὺς ἀκούον-
 τας, 4 ἀλλ' ἄρ' ἑαυτοὺς μὴ λαμβάνοντας αὐτοὶ γ' αἰτιῶντο,
 μηδ' ἐπομένους, ὡς ἄρ' αὐτοῦ γε τὰ πάντων θαυμασιώτατα καὶ
 μεγάλης διανοίας ἀξιούμενα καὶ ὑπερηρμένα τῆς ἐπιπολαίου
 15 ξυντυχίας σπουδάζοντος.

5 Καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς εἶναι τῆς λογικῆς ἅπας
 αὐτῷ περὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ εἶναι δὲ τοῦδέ γ' ἔνεκα, διὰ τὴν
 ἀναγκαστὴν τῆ φιλοσοφία χρῆσιν ἐπὶ τῆ ζητήσει τῆς ἀληθείας
 τῶν ὄντων, αἱ τοσαῦται πολύστροφοι πραγματεΐαι τῶν περὶ τὸν
 20 συλλογισμὸν μεθόδων καὶ παραδόσεων. 2 καὶ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν
 περὶ τὴν εὔρεσιν ἀπλῶς τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ κατ' εἶδη διαί-
 ρεσιν εἰς τὰ τρία κληθέντα σχήματα, καὶ ὅσα ἐξῆς τούτοις ὕλης
 αὐτοῦ καὶ εὐπορίας ἔνεκα εἰς τὰ προτεινόμενα, καὶ ὅλως ὅση
 τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ θεωρία, 3 καὶ ἔτι γε μὴν ὅσοι τρόποι καθ'
 25 ἕκαστον τῶν σχημάτων αὐτῶν, ἄφυκτοι, συλλογιστικοὶ καὶ
 παντάπασιν ἄτρεπτοι, καὶ μὴ καθ' ὅτιοῦν τὸ ἐπαμφοτερίζον ἔ-
 χοντες ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς τῶν προσδιορισμῶν, ὅσοι τε
 καθόλου καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς μερικὴν ἐρμηνείαν ἀποφαίνονται, 4 καὶ
 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἅπαντα τὰνταῦθά πως ἀλλήλων ἐχόμενα καὶ ὡς
 30 ἐκ διαδοχῆς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀναφαινόμενα πρὸς θεωρίαν | πᾶσα 30
 ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀπαραίτητα προσάγειν καὶ τεχνολογεῖν, ἅπαντ'
 ἄριστα καὶ τελεώτατ' ἀνήρ φέρων εἰς μέσους ἐκτίθεται καὶ νο-

16 post εἶναι verbum dokei expectes 27 προσδιορισμῶν ex προδιορισμῶν
 corr. P¹, vix legitur M

4 For regarding the First Philosophy,¹⁴ and that its object is things which are above nature and its business [is] with the most general things, and that it concerns such things and, being exalted, achieves them in an exalted manner—in the *Physics* he often makes his readers expectant in advance [to hear] about this, 2 so that they expect to be told things inexpressible, magnificent, all-wise and almost supernatural, and he inculcates in them a great appetite for this kind of study. 3 But when he deals with precisely these things in his *Metaphysics*, he eludes his hearers by means of obscurity and contrives to be completely incomprehensible, presumably in order that they shall not realise that he is far from living up to his promises and the expectations which he has created in his hearers, 4 but blame themselves for not understanding or being able to follow, since (as they think) he is dealing with that which is most admirable of all, worthy of a great mind, and raised above a superficial reading.

5 And in the same way his whole aim in logic is¹⁵ concerning demonstration,¹⁶ and this is also (because of the necessary needs of philosophy in the search for the truth of Being) the aim of his manifold treatises on the methods and presentation of the syllogism.¹⁷ 2 That which concerns simply the discovery of the syllogism and its division according to kind into the three so-called 'figures', and that which follows, the aim of which is its material and a good supply regarding the premises, i.e., the whole exploration of its genesis; 3 further, all the moods of each of the figures, inescapable, syllogistic and altogether immutable, with no ambiguity whatsoever in any of the combinations of further specifications,¹⁸ both those universally and those specifically expressed: 4 virtually all these things, which must needs be put forward and are necessary to describe as connected to each other and in such a way that they are suggested to reflection by one another successively—all this he expounds and establishes in a

¹⁴ I.e., metaphysics (Arist., *Metaph.* 1026a24).

¹⁵ I cannot explain the use here of εἶναι instead of ἐστίν. Perhaps δοκεῖ or some similar verb has disappeared in the transmission (but why has P², Gregoras, not reacted?). It seems unlikely that we have here a case of εἶναι = ἐστίν, intruding from the spoken language.

¹⁶ *demonstration*: or 'scientific proof'.

¹⁷ 1–4: a synopsis of *Analytica priora* I.

¹⁸ προσδιορισμῶν: 'quantifiers and qualifiers' (Bydén [forthcoming, chap. 2]).

μοθετεῖ, μηδὲν ὀτιοῦν παριείς, μηδ' ὑπεύθυνον καὶ ὀρηοῦν τοῖς μετ' αὐτόν, ὁποῖοί ποτ' ἂν εἶεν, παραδιδούς. 5 Ἄλλ' ὅστις ἂν ὡς ἀληθῶς μὴ θαυμάζοι τὴν ἐν τούτοις τάνδρὸς περίνοιαν εἰς τε πᾶσαν τῶν εἰκότων ἐνταῦθ' εὔρεσιν αὐτοῦ πρώτου (οὐδὲ γὰρ 5 ἔχομεν ἄλλου του τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ περὶ τούτων νομοθεσίας τινὰς καὶ παραδόσεις), 6 καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὰκριβέστατον καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τ' ἦν καὶ τελειότατον, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι λοιπὸν εὔρεῖν διάθεσιν καὶ κατάστασιν, μάταιος ἂν εἴη τις καὶ δυστυχῆς καὶ ἀμαθέστατος πάντων ἀνθρώπος, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ἦτινι βασκανία 10 συνών. 7 Καὶ μὴν αὐτὰ δὴ ταῦτα τὰ περὶ τούτων Ἀριστοτέλει συνταττόμενα μάλισθ' ἀπάντων τῶν τῆς λογικῆς αὐτῷ καὶ σαφέστατα, καὶ θαρρεῖν ἔοικεν ἐν τούτοις ἑαυτῷ σφόδρα τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιτυγχάνοντι καὶ ἀξίως τῶν ὑποσχέσεων καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὄλως εἴη βέλτιον, καὶ τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν θησαυροὺς δὴ τούτους 15 τῆς σοφίας οἴος τέ ἐστι παρρησίᾳ προδεικνύειν, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἀξίως αὐτὸς ἐπιδείκνυσθαι. 8 Ἐν δ' ἄρα τοῖς δευτέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς ὡς εἴρηται καὶ τῇ περὶ τὸ ἀποδεικνύειν ἐξετάσει 31 καὶ θεωρίᾳ δῆλός ἐστιν εἰς τὸ σύνηθες τῆς ἀσαφείας σκότος εἰσδύομενος, καὶ κρύπτειν σοφιζόμενος ἀπόρητα καὶ θαυμά- 20 σια οἶα τῶν πολλῶν ὑπέρτερα, καὶ τῷ δυσσοδεύτῳ τῆς ἐρμηνείας φεύγων ἡμᾶς, 9 ὡς ἂν εἴη τε καὶ δοκοίη παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἀσθένειαν τὸ ἄληπτον τῶν αὐτῷ σπουδαζομένων, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐν προσδοκίᾳ μεγίστων ἀτυχεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς δῆλος γίνοιτο μὴ ταῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν ἀξίως ἀπαντῶν αἷς φθάσας πολλάκις μετεώ- 25 ρους πεποίηκε, καὶ προσέχειν εὖ μάλ' ἀξιούοντας αὐτῷ.

6 Καὶ μὴν παραπλησίως ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίοις, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο προείρηται, μάλα γεννικῶς ἄπτεται τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ προβλήματος καὶ τῆς θεωρίας, καὶ πολὺς ἐστὶν αὐτίκα ἐν προοιμίοις τοὺς ἄλλους τὰ εἰκότ' ἐλέγχων κατ' ἔθος αὐτῷ, 2 καὶ προ- 30 βάλλων ἔπειθ' ἐξῆς τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀξιοζήτητα, καταδιαιρούμενος εὖ μάλ' ἕκαστα καὶ καταριθμῶν τὰ περὶ τούτου δίκαια προβλήματα, πάντων μάλιστ' ἄριστα καὶ τελεώτατα τῶν πρὸ

3 θαυμάζοι: θαυμάζει P 17 ἀναλυτικοῖς: ἀναλυτικῶς ME 32 τελεώτατα: τελει- E

perfect manner, neglecting nothing, nor leaving anything to be criticised in any way by his successors, whoever they may be. 5 If there is anyone who does not truly admire Aristotle's perspicacity¹⁹ in these things, regarding his whole discovery of what is probable, which he was the first to make in this field (for we do not possess any expositions or treatments of these things from any of his predecessors), 6 and also regarding the way he has organised and established [his results], with the highest accuracy and perfection, in a way that one does not find nowadays—such a person must be worthless, awkward, the most ignorant man alive, and a prey to the most indescribable malice. 7 And precisely those things written by Aristotle on these subjects are the clearest of all his logical writings. Here he seems to trust himself as being successful in everything in a manner which is worthy of his promises and could not be bettered, and he is able to disclose with confidence his treasures of wisdom, or rather, show himself in a manner worthy of Reality. 8 But, as I said, in his *Posterior Analytics*, i.e., in his investigation and speculation on demonstration, one can clearly see that he envelops himself in his customary darkness of obscurity, and affects²⁰ to hide things which are secret and wonderful, as if above the understanding of people in general, and through the difficulty of his language he is trying to dodge us, 9 in order that the incomprehensibility of his investigations and the fact that we fail to understand the great things which we hope for should be imputed to ourselves and our inadequacy, while he himself should not be shown up as not having fairly fulfilled the promises by which he has often made us excited in advance, and made us decide to listen carefully to him.

6 And in the same way, in his books *On the Soul*, as was also mentioned earlier, to begin with he deals most admirably with the problem and the investigation, and right from the start, in the introductory sections, he is volubly refuting the others about what is probable, in his customary manner, 2 and then he goes on to propose what is worth investigating concerning the soul, carefully dissecting everything and enumerating the legitimate problems concerning this topic, better and more perfectly than anyone before him, 3 including

¹⁹ περίνοια: here perhaps with some emphasis on περί, 'his comprehensive, all-encompassing ingenuity'.

²⁰ Cf. above, p. 39 n. 13 on μηχανώμενος in 3.3.7.

- αὐτοῦ, 3 καὶ ἅττα δὴ μηδ' εἰς νοῦν ἦκεν ἴλλως ἐκείνοις ἐπιζητη- 32
σαι, κατὰ μέρη πάντα προτιθέμενος εἰς τὴν θεωρίαν θαυμασιώ-
ταθ' ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ ὅσα τῆς λογικῆς αὐτῆ φύσεως καὶ ὅσα τῆς
ἀλόγου δίκαι' ἐτάζειν καὶ τεχνολογεῖν τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν αἰτίας. 4
- 5 'Ἄλλ' ἐξῆς ἔπειτ' αὐθις τὰ μὲν ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ σώ-
ματος τῆ ψυχῆ καὶ ἅττα οὐσίωται τῆ ἀλογία, βέλτιστα πάνυ τοι
σπουδάζεται οἱ, καὶ πολὺ τὰκριβές καὶ καίριον καὶ πιστὸν ἔχει.
Κάνταῦθά γε ἂν ἴδοις, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ὄντως ἐστὶν αὐτὸς
ὁμοιος ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τεχνίτης παντέλειος, καὶ γνώμων τῆς φύσεως.
- 10 5 Περὶ δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἀψάμενος θεωρῆσαι καὶ διαλα-
βεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὸ νοερὸν αὐτῆς, συνήθως ἔτ' αὐθις κάνταῦθα τὸ
σκότος τῆς ἀσαφείας ἐπαμφιέννυσι τοῖς λεγομένοις, 6 καὶ φοι-
βασμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ πυθόχρηστα δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀφηγούμενοι καὶ
δηλοποιοῦντες τὰ αὐτοῦ στοχαστικῶς κατασκέπτεσθαι, καὶ ἄλ-
15 λως ἄλλη φέρει καὶ συνέλκει κατὰ βούλησιν οἰκείαν τὰ προ-
κειμένα, 7 οἷ γε μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο καθόλου γ' ἐρεῖν τὸ πάντων
ἀναγκαιότατον συλλογίσασθαι καὶ πεισθῆναι βέβαιον ἔχουσιν
ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων, ὅ τι ποτ' ἀνὴρ φρονεῖ τῷ ὄντι περὶ ψυχῆς, εἴτ'
ἀθάνατός ἐστιν, εἴτε μή.
- 20 7 'Ἄλλ' ἄρα τοῖς μὲν δοκεῖ μάλιστα μὴ διδόναι χάραν βιώ-
σεως καὶ οὐσίας ἄλλην ἢ τὴν μετὰ σώματος αὐτῆ· καὶ τοῦτ'
αὐτόθεν ἔχουσι πείθειν τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἐν οἷς ὀρίζεται ταύτην 33
καὶ οὐσιοῖ μόνον ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι, 2 βουλόμενος καὶ νομίζων
ἀνέδην αὐτὴν καὶ παραδιδούς ἐντελέχειαν μόνον σώματος ὀρ-
25 γανικοῦ, φύσει ζῶν ἔχοντος, καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι δὴ καὶ τέμνων αὐ-
τῆς ἰδιοσύστατον, καὶ φέρον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὥστ' ἐξ-
ανάγκης καὶ θνητὴν σὺν αὐτῷ λύεσθαι λυομένῳ, καὶ μηδὲν
ἔχειν πλέον. 3 Τοῖς δὲ καὶ τούναντίον ἅπαν ἔστιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ
συνορᾶν καὶ πείθειν ἑαυτοὺς ὡς οὕτω φρονοῦντος τοῦ ἀνδρὸς
30 καὶ ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν μάλισθ' ὀριζομένου, καὶ βίσιον καὶ
οὐσίαν αὐτῆ διδόντος ἰδίαν ἢ κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τὴν μετὰ τοῦ
σώματος, 4 ἐν οἷς περὶ τοῦ νοῦς ὡς ἂν μόνου θεωρῆ καὶ ἰδιο-
πραγούντος καὶ βασιλεῖ' ἔχοντος καὶ δεσποτεῖαν ἄμικτον καὶ

such things as they did not even think of searching for, truly admirably laying out everything, one thing after the other, for investigation, both that of the rational part of the soul and that of the irrational part which it is proper to investigate, and to analyse the reasons concerning this. 4 Immediately after that he deals very competently with those things that for the soul are inseparable from matter and the body, and such things that have their essence in the irrational part, and he offers much that is accurate, appropriate and convincing. And here you can see that Aristotle is truly himself: a consummate craftsman and an expert on nature. 5 However, when he goes on to speculate on the rational soul and analyse its intellectual properties, here once again, in his usual manner, he envelops his words with the darkness of obscurity, 6 and those who try to give an account of and disclose his views seem to proceed by guesswork and reconnoitre prophecies and oracles of the Pythian god, and he drifts now in this direction, now in another, carrying the propositions with him as he pleases. 7 His readers are not even able, from his books, to state with certainty that which is the most necessary of all things to ascertain and be convinced of, namely, what the man really thinks about the soul, whether it is immortal or not.

7 To some he seems clearly to accede to it no possibility of life and being apart from that with the body; they are able to persuade people in general of this from those passages where he defines the soul and grants it existence only with the body as a prerequisite, 2 proposing, decreeing and frankly stating it to be only the actuality of an organic body which has life by nature,²¹ and he does not distinguish any part of the soul which is of a peculiar constitution and moves in another direction than the body; this implies that when the body is dissolved, the soul, being mortal, is necessarily dissolved with it, and has nothing left. 3 But others are able to gather exactly the opposite view from him and persuade themselves that he thinks in this way and does indeed define the soul as immortal, granting it a life and being of its own, other than its attachment to the body, 4 in those passages where he theorises about the mind as acting independently, being ruler, absolutely supreme, and with an actuality which

²¹ μόνον is Metochites' addition, not found in Aristotle; cf. *De anima* 412a27 ff. ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια ἢ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὄργανικόν.

ἀπροσδεῆ τοῦ σώματος ἐνέργειαν· 5 καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα
 τῆς νηὸς καὶ τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἅμα καὶ πλωτῆρος εἰκονίζει τὸν ἐν
 σώματι νοῦν, ἐν αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς βιβλίοις, καὶ μά-
 λιστ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις κατὰ τὸ ἦτα καὶ θῆτα τῆς
 5 φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως, 6 τοῦτο μὲν αὐτὸν φέροντα τὸ σῶμα δεικ-
 νύων ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῦτο δὲ συμφερόμενον, χωριστὸν δ' ἴ- 34
 ὅμως οὐσιωμένον ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν συνεζευγμένον λείποντ' ἄδε-
 τον, μὴ λείποντα δ' ἑαυτόν· 7 οἷς ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς κατὰ Πλάτωνα
 εἰ καὶ μηχανᾶται λανθάνειν ταῦτὰ λέγων, ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα
 10 τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῦ αὐτοκινήτου τὸ μὲν κινεῖσθαι δεικνύει καὶ
 μόνον κινεῖσθαι, μὴ κινεῖν δέ, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν μόνον, οὐ κινεῖσθαι
 δὲ καθ' αὐτό, κινεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἢ συγκινεῖσθαι
 τῷ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κινουμένῳ, 8 ὡς ἐντεῦθεν ἐξανάγκης ἂν ἔπεσθαι,
 ὅτι τὸ μὲν κινούμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου καὶ παύσαιτ' ἂν ὑπ' ἄλλου κι-
 15 νούμενον, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ κινουὶν οὐκ ἂν ἄρα παύσαιτο κινουὶν, οὐδὲ
 λείποι ἂν ἑαυτό, ὅτι δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ οὐσία αὐτῷ· μὴ λείπον
 δ' ὅλως ἑαυτό, εὖ γε δῆλον πάντως, οὐσίωται τῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ καὶ
 μὴ τελευτᾶν τῆς κινήσεως, εἴτουν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ καὶ ζωῆς. 9
 Οὕτω δὴ τοῖς τάναντία βουλομένοις περὶ ψυχῆς ἀφορμαί τοῦ
 20 Ἀριστοτέλους δίδονται κατὰ σκοπὸν σφίσις ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ
 τοὺς ἄλλους ἀξιοῦν πείθειν, μετὰ τοσούτου συμμαχου δυσαντι-
 βλέπτου ταῦτὰ καὶ φρονοῦντος καὶ πείθοντος.

14–18 τὸ μὲν κινούμενον — καὶ ζωῆς: cf. Pl., *Phdr.* 245c

2 ἐν: ἐν τῷ a. c. ut vid. P¹ 14 ἄλλου: ἄλλον E 15 αὐτὸ scripsi, αὐτὸ
 PME 15–16 οὐδὲ λείποι: οὐδ' ἑλλείποι P

does not need the body. 5 And he compares the mind in the body to the example of the ship and the pilot and sailor,²² both in these same books on the Soul and above all in his treatises on movement in the seventh and eighth books of his treatise on Physics, 6 showing that the mind on the one hand carries the body like a master, on the other hand is carried along by it, but, nevertheless, has a separate being in itself;²³ it leaves unattached that to which it is yoked, but does not leave itself. 7 Saying the same things as them (following Plato,²⁴ even if he contrives not to show it) particularly in these books, he demonstrates that the 'self-moved' is partly being moved, and only being moved, never moving [something else], partly only moving, never being moved according to its own principle, but moved accidentally, or moved together with that which it moves, 8 so that it would follow by necessity that what is moved by something else may also cease to be moved by something else, but that which is the mover will not stop moving nor abandon itself, since it is precisely this thing which constitutes its essence. But since it never abandons itself, it is entirely clear that its essence is defined by eternal existence and by never ceasing from its movement, i.e., its essence and life. 9 In this way pretexts are offered in Aristotle to those who hold opposite views on the soul to argue for their own purposes and presume to convince the others with such an awesome ally thinking and asserting the same things [as they].

²² Or 'pilot-cum-sailor'. Arist., *De anima* 406a 5–6 καθ' ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν ὅσα κινεῖται τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον πλωτῆρες· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως κινοῦνται τῷ πλοίῳ κτλ., 413a 8–9 ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἢ ψυχῆ (ἦ) ὡς περ πλωτῆρ πλοίου, 416b 26 ὡς περ καὶ ᾧ κυβερνᾷ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ τὸ πηδάλιον. Is Metochites alluding to the fact that πλωτῆρ occurs in *De anima*, whereas κυβερνήτης is found in the *Physics*? Cf. also Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2).

²³ οὐσιωμένον ἐν ἑαυτοῦ: the phrase ἐν ἑαυτοῦ (ἑαυτῶν, ἑμαυτοῦ, ἐκάστων), i.e., ἐν + genitive, occurs several times in the *Semeioseis* with μένειν or related verbs: 5.2.2 (φέρειν); 6.2.7 (μονή τίς ἐστίν); *Sem.* 32, 211; 38, 239 (MK omits ἐν); 39, 245 (εἰμί); 42, 262 (ἐπιδημεῖν); 57, 334 (μένειν); 67, 420 (μένειν); 74, 496 (μένειν). Cf. LSJ s.v. ἐν A.I.2.b.

²⁴ following Plato: the *Phaedrus*.

I "Οτι πάντες ἤττηνται δοξοσοφίας: Δ'

35

1 Πολὺ μάλιστ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὁ τῆς δόξης ἔρωσ κρατεῖ, καὶ οὐ
 τοῖς μὲν ἴσως, τοῖς δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὅτῳ μῆ, κἂν εἰ
 πάντα τις δῆθεν προσποιοῖτο πράγματα μὴ φροντίζειν ταύτης,
 5 ἀλλ' ὑπερημέμενος τις εἶναι, καὶ παντάπασιν ἀνάλωτος, τοὺς
 πολλοὺς πείθειν ἀξιώων καὶ ἀποσεμνυνόμενος κομιδῇ πρὸς αὐ-
 τήν, 2 καὶ τινα τρόπον ἐντεῦθεν δόξαν ἄλλην καινότεραν αὐθις
 ἐαυτῷ πραττόμενος τῶν αὐτῷ προσεχόντων, ἐκ τοῦ περιφρονεῖν
 δόξης, ὡς ἄρ' αὐτὸς μεγαλόφρων τις ἢ κατ' ἄλλους ἅπαντας,
 10 καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὑπεραναβάς. 3 Καὶ ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὡς κατ' ἄλλος
 ἄλλο τι προκοπῆς καὶ βελτιώσεως εἶδος τῆς δόξης ἤττηται, κἂν
 εἰ μὴ τις ἀνελευθέρως πρὸς ταύτην ἐπείγεται καὶ πράττη πρὸς
 τοῦτο, χαίρει δ' οὖν ὅμως εὖ μάλα πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις ἐπαίνων
 τυγχάνων, καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κλειζόμενος, ἐφ' οἷς ἠνυκέναι τι
 15 δοκεῖ ἄμεινον ἢ κατὰ πολλοὺς, 4 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄθικτός τις καὶ
 ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄτεγκτος εἰς γλυκυθυμίαν καὶ ἰλαρότητας | καὶ ἠδονῆς 36
 διάθεσιν ἐν ψυχῇ ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἔξωθεν κρινόντων εὐφημίας καὶ
 τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ κρότων· 5 καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείστοις ἐφετὸν πάνυ
 τοι καὶ περισπούδαστον παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, εἰ οἶόν τ' ἦν
 20 καλῶς ἀκούειν καθ' ὅτιοῦν ἢ φύσεως ἢ ἀσκήσεως ἢ τύχης ὑπερ-
 φέρον τῶν ἄλλων πλεονέκτημα.

2 Καίτοι τί λέγω; πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν, εἰ κἂν ἐν τρισὶν ἀνθρώ-
 ποις δύναιτο, καὶ τούτοις ὡς τὰ πολλὰ φαύλοις καὶ μηδὲν
 ἴσως ἐπαίουσι περὶ ὧν κρίνουσιν, εὐδοκιμεῖν πολλοῦ πρίαιντ'

¹ To suffer from δοξοσοφία, pretensions to wisdom, is to [want to] *seem to be wise*, whether one is wise or not. I translate it with 'intellectual vanity' everywhere except in 3.1.9, where ἔρωτα δοξοσοφίας is rendered 'his desire to appear wise'.

² κατ' ἄλλος ἄλλό τι: cf. *Sem.* 10.1.1 with note.

³ πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις: to say 'how shall I put it?' seems uncalled for with χαίρει ἐπαίνων τυγχάνων, which is in no way daring, surprising, or strongly put.

The phrase (with the variant πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι) occurs several times in the *Se-meioseis*: 3.1.4, 4.1.3, 4.6.3, 5.4.2, 6.1.7, 7.1.5, 8.1.3, 10.5.4, 12.3.3, 18.2.7, 18.5.2, 25.2.3; also 27, 181; 28, 188; 30, 206; 35, 226, and 93, 593 MK. In

4. That everybody suffers from intellectual vanity¹

1 The desire for fame is extremely common among human beings. It is not the case that it may be present in some and not in others, but there is no one who is free from it, not even if someone should go to any length to appear not to care for it, but to be above that sort of thing and completely incorruptible, presuming to make people in general believe this and displaying a very supercilious attitude towards reputation, 2 thereby, by despising fame, again somehow creating for himself another, new kind of fame among those who take an interest in his doings, as if he were more noble-minded than everybody else, rising above human nature. 3 And in fact we can see that people are overcome by [the lust for] fame, each with regard to his particular talent or advantage,² even if someone does not vulgarly strive for glory and acts with this in mind but still enjoys hugely³ receiving praise and being commended by people because of things he is considered to have done better than others, 4 and is not untouchable or, so to speak, impossible to soften into sweetness of mind and a disposition towards cheerfulness and pleasure in his soul by acclamation from those who judge him from the outside, or by being applauded all around. 5 It is desirable for most people, and eagerly striven for by all, to have, if possible, a good reputation for no matter what advantage they enjoy over others in respect of natural endowment, education or fortune.

2 But what need is there for me to point this out? Many men would pay a great deal to be able to enjoy a good reputation, even if it were only among three people, and these (as is usually the case)

some of these cases a translation like 'how shall I/one put it' is appropriate (e.g. in 3.1.4, 4.6.3, 5.4.2, 7.1.5, 18.5.2), whereas in others it seems less so (see further the translation and notes ad locc.). Sometimes πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις is combined with χαίρει and related words: besides this passage also 6.1.7 ἀσμενέστατα and 8.1.3 χαίροντες. In these cases I have tentatively interpreted the phrase as 'more than words can tell', 'inexpressibly'; similarly with καλλύνεται. Cf. also *Sem.* 30, 206 MK χαίρομεν and 93, 593 MK πολλάκις ζυνορῶν ἡδομαι πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις καὶ θαυμάζω; the latter I would now rather translate 'I am extremely delighted' (cf. Agapitos et al. 1996, 37).

No matter how idiosyncratic Metochites' use of 'how shall I put it', there is no doubt that the expression belongs under the Hermogenic Form of ἀλήθεια (Sincerity); cf. Bydén on Metochites' style (below, pp. 258 and 283–84).

ἄν. 2 Οἱ βελτίους δ' ἐνταῦθα καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ μεγαλόφρονες
 καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν κρίσεως ἑαυτοὺς ἐλευθεροῦντες, τάληθές
 καλὸν δι' αὐτὸ νομίζοντες καλὸν καὶ ποθοῦντες, καὶ κατολιγω-
 ροῦντες τῆς τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς ἀξιούσιν, ἐποπτείας καὶ ψήφου, 3
 5 καὶ ζῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μόνοις καὶ τῷ καλῷ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' οἵτινες ἂν
 εἶεν οὗτοι, καὶ ὅσοι παντέλειοι τὴν γνώμην, ἐρασταὶ τάγαθοῦ,
 βούλονται ἂν ὅμως καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς δέξαιντο, εἰ ἄρα προσεῖη,
 καὶ ἴσως μηδὲν ἐπιτηδες ἐπιμεληθέντων αὐτῶν, | καὶ τινων ἐφ- 37
 ορώντων ἐπιγνωμοσύνη τῆς κατὰ σφᾶς ἀστειότητος ἡστιν οσ-
 οῦν, καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ συναίσθησις· 4 εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτό γε μάλισθ'
 10 ὅμως σφόδρ' ἂν ἄχθοιντο καὶ ἀνιῶντο φλαῦρα καὶ τάναντί'
 ἀκούοντες ὧν ἔχουσιν ἡνυκότες ὡς βέλτιστα τῶν ὑπ' ἀμαθίας,
 ἢ οὐκ οἶδ' ἡστινος βασκανίας, οὐ συνιέντων ἐν οἷς εἰδ' πράτ-
 τουσι· 5 καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καθόλου περὶ πάσης εὐδοξίας καὶ ὀρᾶν
 15 ἔστι καὶ λέγειν, καὶ ῥάδιον περὶ τούτου πλεῖστα λέγειν καὶ αἰεὶ
 πλείω ἔθ' ἐξῆς ὅστις βούλεται.

3 Ἀτὰρ δὴ περὶ δοξοσοφίας μάλιστ' ἰδίᾳ, τί τις ἐρεῖ ὅσον
 δὴ σχεδὸν πάντες ἐνταῦθα κεχήνασι καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψή-
 φου καὶ δόξης ἑαυτοὺς ἡρτήσαντο καὶ τρίβουσιν, εἰ μάλᾳ πο-
 20 νοῦντες οἱ περὶ λόγους, ὡς ἂν δὴ δοκοῖεν ἕκαστος πάνυ τοι
 πλεῖστον ἀνύσαντες, 2 καὶ πλεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἢ καὶ ἡνυκότες
 εἰσί, καταμευδόμενοι πολλάκις ἑαυτῶν καὶ συκοφαντοῦντες
 παντὶ τρόπῳ τάληθές, τῶν προσόντων σφίσι καὶ τῶν μὴ προσ-
 ηκόντων ἀντιποιοῦμενοι, καὶ κακουργοῦντες οὕτω καὶ ἀδικοῦν- 38
 25 τες τοὺς ξυντυγχάνοντας ἀπατηλαῖς ἐπιτηδεύσεσι καὶ προσχή-
 μασι. 3 Καὶ τούτων οὐχ οἱ μὲν, οἱ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅστις οὐ,
 ἀλλὰ πάντες, καὶ οἱ πᾶσαν ὡς ἀληθῶς παιδεῖαν ἄκροι, σοφισ-
 τεύουσι τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, καὶ βούλονται ἂν οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ
 ὄντα δοκεῖν καὶ τὴν οἴκοι πλείστην ἴσως οὐσίαν μακαρίζεσθαι,

5 οἵτινες: εἴ τινες P 15 καὶ² + lacuna P 18 σχεδὸν πάντες: πάντες σχεδὸν
 ME 23-24 μὴ προση- spatio relicto om. P

4 ζῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μόνοις καὶ τῷ καλῷ. Cf. the note on this dative below, *Sem.*
 6.1.4.

were ignorant and incapable of understanding anything of that which they were supposed to judge. **2** But those who are better and wiser in this respect, noble-minded and freeing themselves from the judgement of common people; who because of this regard as good and desire what is good in truth, disregarding, as they claim, the examination and opinion of other people; **3** who live only in dependence on themselves and the Good⁴ (I do not know what people these are); all those with perfectly accomplished minds, lovers of the Good, still want [recognition], and do not take exception (even if they themselves perhaps have not intentionally pursued this) if some of their audience should also recognise⁵ their accomplishment, whatever it might be, and share their perception of the Good. **4** And if [there are perchance some cases where] this does not hold true, then at least [this much can be said, that] they are very angry and upset when they are disparaged and misrepresented, the opposite to what they have achieved [being praised as] excellent by people who because of ignorance or I do not know what kind of ill will are incapable of understanding the subjects where they are successful. **5** This can be seen and said on [desire for] fame in general; it is easy to say many things about this, and always more after that, if one wants to.

3 But concerning intellectual vanity especially, how can I describe how avid almost all men⁶ are [for glory], making themselves dependent on the opinion and view of people in general, exerting themselves, the intellectuals [especially] working hard to seem, each one of them, to have achieved great things, **2** in truth more than they *have* achieved, frequently lying about themselves and distorting the truth by any means, claiming for themselves both what they have and what does not belong to them, thus abusing and fooling their readers with deceitful practices and pretences? **3** Nor is it true that some of these people do this and some don't: I do not know of anybody who does not; everybody, also those most highly educated, act dishonestly on this point and would dearly love not only to appear to be blessed with that which they really have and their own perhaps very great abilities, but also to seem to possess more than they actually

⁵ ἐπιγνωμοσύνη: the word also occurs in *Sem.* 98, 628 MK ἐξέτασις ἀπλανῆς καὶ ἐπιγνωμοσύνη.

⁶ *all men ... , the intellectuals [especially]:* or πάντες ... οἱ περὶ λόγους, 'all intellectuals'.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι πλεῖν δοκεῖν ἢ ἐκτῆσαντο· 4 κἂν εἴ τί που καὶ λέ-
 λειπται σφίσι τῶν τοσοῦτων τῆς σοφίας εἰδῶν καὶ τμημάτων,
 καὶ τοῦτ' εὖ μάλ' ὑποκρίνονται καὶ πράττουσι δοκεῖν παρὰ τοῖς
 πολλοῖς, καὶ τούτου γ' ἐπιτυχεῖς εἶναι, καὶ παντέλειοι, καὶ ὡς
 5 ἂν οἰοί τ' εἶεν, ἐπείγονται πάνυ τοι λαθεῖν τοὺς μετὰ τιμῆς εἰς
 αὐτοὺς ὀρῶντας.

4 Περὶ μὲν γε τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικαῖς σπουδαζόντων
 λόγοις καὶ καλλυνομένων ῥητορικαῖς ἀβρότησι καὶ κοπτόντων
 τοῦτο μὲν τὰ βουλευτήρια, τοῦτο δὲ τὰ θέατρα, καὶ οἷς ὅλως
 10 ἔργον ἢ τῶν ἀκροαμένων ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου δουλαγωγία καὶ
 ὀλκή, τί τις ἂν λέγοι; ἢ ὡς αὐτόθεν γε δῆλον τοῦθ' οἱ ἄνδρες
 κατεπείγονται ὡς βέλτιστοί γε εἶναι δοκεῖν, ἢ καὶ ὡς βέλτιστα 39
 λέγειν· 2 κἂν εἰ μάλιστ' ἐνταῦθα δύναιτο καὶ τὰ τῆς γλώττης
 εὐγενῶς σφίσιν ἤσκηται, πολλῶ γ' ἔτι κρεῖττον δύνασθαι βού-
 15 λοντ' ἂν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις δοκεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ ὡς ἐνὶ μάλισ-
 τα παρεσκευάσθαι κάλλιστα τὴν φωνήν, καὶ γεννικῶς ὀπλί-
 σθαι καὶ ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἄμεινον. 3 Καὶ
 μὴν ἔτι φιλαυτοῦντες ὡς ἅπαντες σχεδὸν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ῥᾶσθ'
 ἂ βούλονται καὶ οἴονται περὶ αὐτῶν· καὶ φιλοδοξοῦντες, ἐν
 20 σφίσιν αὐτοῖς πρώτοις κριταῖς εὖ μάλα τυγχάνουσιν ὧν ἐρῶσιν
 αὐτοὶ γ' ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν, καὶ τὰς ψήφους καθ' ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἀμέλει
 βούλονται, φέρονται· 4 καὶ κόλακες ἑαυτῶν εἰσι πρώτοι, τὰ μὴ
 ὄντ' ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ θαυμάζοντες περὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ χαριζόμενοι
 καὶ οὐκ ἀδεκάστως κρίνοντες.

25 5 Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι γε φιλοσοφίας ἀντιποιοῦνται καὶ
 κατὰ ζήτησιν τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν ὄντων σεμνοὶ σεμνῶς πονοῦσι,
 τάχα μὲν οὖν οὐδ' αὐτοὶ τῆς περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀληθείας ἀκριβεῖς
 εἰσι καὶ ἀδέκαστοι γνώμονες καὶ κριταί, ἀλλὰ νοσοῦσιν ὑπὸ
 φιλαυτίας καὶ αὐτοὶ περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖ' ἐποπτεύοντες, 2 ἂν δ' ἄρα
 30 καὶ ἄμεινον ἐνταῦθα τῶν πολλῶν δύναιτο συνορᾶν καὶ λογί-
 ζεσθαι μὴ τάλλοτριώτατα τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας περὶ
 ἑαυτῶν, ὃ πάντων μάλισθ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐργωδέστατον. 3 Ἄλλ' 40
 οἷ γε δῆθ' ὅμως περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔξωθεν οἰκονομοῦσιν ὡς ἂν

do. 4 Even if they are lacking in any of the many branches and sections of wisdom, they dishonestly lay claim also to this, and contrive to appear to people in general to have achieved this, too, and to be perfectly accomplished; they try their hardest to dupe those who regard them with admiration.

4 As to those who practise epideictic oratory, taking pride in rhetorical refinement, wearying both the courthouses and the auditoriums, and whose only aim is to enslave and captivate the audience by every means—what should one say,⁷ except that it is obvious from this that these men strive to appear to be as excellent, and to speak as excellently, as possible? 2 And even if they are extremely able in this respect and highly trained in the art of rhetoric, they would like to seem, every one of them, much *more* accomplished in the eyes of all men, to have trained their voice as perfectly as possible, and to have armed themselves well, yes, better than anyone has ever done in the whole of history. 3 Moreover, since they suffer from self-love (as does almost everybody), they also with the greatest ease believe what they like about themselves; since they are eager for fame, when they are first judged, namely by themselves, they fully receive from themselves what they desire, and the vote on their ability falls out exactly as they like; 4 they are their own principal flatterers, praising and admiring in themselves qualities which they do not have, judging favourably and without impartiality.

5 But, indeed, also those who lay claim to philosophy and, solemn men, labour solemnly in the search for the truth of Reality—perhaps not even they are accurate and incorruptible experts and judges concerning the truth about themselves, but they too suffer from self-love when it comes to judging their own work, 2 even if they are admittedly capable of a better understanding than ordinary people in this field, and of drawing conclusions about themselves that are not entirely alien to reality and the truth, which is really the most arduous achievement of all. 3 It is nevertheless true that they make arrangements from their side for others to be able to have a higher

⁷ Here τί τις ἄν λέγοι probably means ‘what need is there to mention *them*?’, implying that it is only to be expected that such people are *doxosophoi*.

- δύναιτο καὶ πλείον τι περὶ αὐτῶν φρονεῖν, ἢ τὰ κατ' αὐτοὺς
ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἔχει, καὶ ὅσοι γ' αὐτοὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν
κατὰ τὴν τῆς βιοτῆς αἴρεσιν ὑπερεφρόνησαν, ὡς γε τέως ἔδο-
ξαν, καὶ παρρησίᾳ πρὸς πολλοὺς οὐκ ᾤκησαν μεγαληγορήσαι
5 καὶ ὡσπερὶ πρόγραμμα τῆς αὐτῶν ἐκθέσθαι τοῦτο ζωῆς· 4 οἶον
τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην λέγω καὶ ὅστις ὅμοιος, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ὅσοι
μετ' αὐτὸν ἔπειθ' ὕστερον ἐλευθερίαν πάντων ἀήττητον καὶ
παρρησίαν ἀκμαστικὴν πάνυ τοι κατὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀν-
θρωπίνης ζωῆς εἴλοντο, 5 οἶοι δὴ τινες ᾤφθησαν ἀριστεῖς κατὰ
10 τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν τοῦ βίου νοσημάτων καὶ τῆς πλάνης, οἱ περὶ
Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην καὶ Κράτητα, οἱ πάντα δὴ τάνθρώ-
πινα σπουδάσματα παραδραμόντες κομιδῇ γεννικῶς καὶ θαυ-
μάζειν ὄντως ἀξίως, 6 πρὸς δοξοσοφίαν ἄρα καθάπαξ οὐκ
ἀήττητοι καὶ ἄνοσοι περιεγέγοντο, ἀλλὰ πολλῇ τοῖς ἀνδράσι
15 σπουδῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας καὶ ἄρχοντας καὶ ἰδιώτας, καὶ
ξὺν νῶ κατασκευτομένους καὶ μὴ, πρὸς πάντας δ' ὅμως ἀνθρώ-
πους, 7 σφίσι προσέχειν εὖ μάλα τὸν νοῦν ἀξιούν, ὡς μόνοις
τὴν ἀληθινὴν σοφίαν εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἐρρωμένως καὶ παντά-
πασιν ἐπιτυχῶς τε καὶ ἀνόσως, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον.
- 20 **6** Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀνε- 41
μέσητα παντάπασιν, οὐδ' εὖστομα μὴ κείσθω τάνθάδε πράγμα-
τα, εἰ καὶ μάλιστ' αἰδοῦς ἀνὴρ ἄξιος· 2 πολὺς μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀλη-
θῶς πᾶσαν σοφίαν καὶ μεγαλοφυῆς καὶ γενναῖος, πάντων ἐπι-
τυχῆς ὅσα παιδείας εἶδη καὶ κόμματα, εἰ καὶ βελτίων ἴσως αὐ-
25 τὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τοῖσδέ τιςιν ἢ ἐν τοῖσδέ τιςιν ἄλλοις. 3 Πᾶσι δ'
ἄρα τοῖς πρότερον αὐτοῦ πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι μετρίως ἀδεῶς ἐπι-
τιμῶν, καὶ μάλ' ἐπανιστάμενος καὶ κατελέγχων, καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι
μὴ παριεῖς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ σκωμμάτων ἀνεύθυνον ἐν δόγμασί τε
κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ῥητορικαῖς χρήσεσι, 4 δηλὸς ἐστὶν εὖ
30 μάλα τοῖς προσέχουσιν ἐκάστοθ' οἷς ἐσπούδακε τὸν νοῦν, πᾶ-
σαν ἑαυτῷ προσποιούμενος δόξαν πάντων ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πά-

3 κατὰ τὴν ex verbo quod non leg. corr. P¹ 5 τοῦτο P, a. c. ut vid. M, τούτων
E et p. c. M 7 αὐτὸν: αὐτῶν P 11-12 τάνθρώπινα ex τάνθρώπια corr. P¹
24 εἶδη ex ἤδη ut vid. corr. P¹

opinion of them than what is actually warranted by their abilities, even those among them who themselves in their chosen walk of life despised the opinion of common people—at least that is the impression they have hitherto made⁸—and did not hesitate to boast self-confidently before the multitude and set up this attitude as a sort of programme for their lives. 4 I am thinking for instance of Socrates and those like him, but also his later followers who adopted a totally uninhibited freedom and extreme outspokenness as regards human nature and life, 5 all those who were seen to be noble in their lives and in the afflictions and aberrations of existence, like Diogenes, Antisthenes and Crates, who, although they altogether nobly and truly admirably kept aloof from human affairs, 6 did not escape unconquered or untouched by intellectual vanity, but really strove hard to make their audience, both men in authority and private citizens, both people of sound judgement and unsound, in short everybody,⁹ 7 think it worthwhile to pay attention to them, in the belief that they alone were in happy possession of true wisdom—strongly, completely accurately, impeccably and in a way that could not be bettered.

6 Even the admirable Plato himself is not entirely blameless on this point, a fact which should not be passed by in silence even if the man is highly deserving of respect. 2 For he is truly expert in the whole of wisdom, talented, noble, successful in all kinds and branches of education, even if he is more accomplished in some fields than in others. 3 But by, how shall I put it, fairly fearlessly criticising¹⁰ all his predecessors, objecting and refuting, leaving none of their blunders in philosophical doctrines and rhetorical usages uncensured, 4 he, as is perfectly clear each time one observes his works, lays claim to the whole-hearted admiration of all men, [a reputation] sacred and

⁸ ὡς γε τέως ἔδοξαν, translation uncertain.

⁹ πρὸς πάντας δ' ὅμως ἀνθρώπους, ὅμως not translated. I suppose that it is explained by τοὺς μὴ [ξὺν νῶ κατασκεπτομένους], i.e., even if someone showed unsound judgement, they still wanted him to admire them. Or ὅμως may be a repetition of the ὅμως in 4.5.3, and refer to the whole passage: even if these philosophers succeeded in keeping aloof from human affairs, they were still anxious to be admired etc. Another possibility is to emend to ὁμοίως, 'all men alike'. However, ὁμοίως is very rare in *Sem.* (it only occurs twice, never preceded by δέ), whereas ὅμως is rather frequent (65 instances, of which 23 δὲ [or δ'] ὅμως).

¹⁰ or: 'how shall I put it to avoid exaggeration?' (πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι μετρίως). But this expression otherwise never has a complement. Cf. above, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

σης σοφίας ἱεράν τινα καὶ ἄσυλον, καὶ ἥς οὐδὲν ὅ τι ποτ' ἄρα νοσοῦν καὶ ὀπηοῦν ἦν μὴ τις νοσῶν ἴσως αὐτὸς ἄλλως δόξαι, κατολιγωρῶν ὑπ' ἀμαθίας ἢ βασκανίας τῶν θαυμάζειν ἀξίων· 5 καὶ ταῦτα οὐ λόγῳ νῦν ἄλλως ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολλαχῆ τις ταῦτα συλλογίσαιτο, καὶ σχεδὸν αὐταῖς οὕτω δὴ λέξεσιν αἷς νῦν εἶναι χρώμεθα, εὐροί τις ἂν εἰρημένα.

Ἰ Περιὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους δοξοσοφίας καὶ περιὶ 42
τῶν μαθηματικῶν: Ε΄

1 Ἀριστοτέλην ὅστις ἂν μὴ θαυμάσαι πάνυ τοι καθ' ὅσον οἶός 10
τέ ἐστίν ὡς ἄκρον φιλοσοφίαν ἄπασαν καὶ μάλιστά γε τὴν
λογικὴν αὐτὴν ἐταστὴν ἐντελέστατον καὶ τεχνίτην, καὶ τὴν γε
φυσικὴν ἔτ' ἀκριβέστερον γνώμονα καὶ συνήγορον ὑπὲρ τῆς
φύσεως καὶ τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἔργων, ἀπορήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε, 2 καὶ
θαυμάσαιμ' ὄντως, τίς οὕτω φρενῶν ἕξω καὶ πάσης ὑπεύθυνος
15 ἀβελτηρίας καὶ πηρώσεως εἰς τὰ παντάπασιν οὕτω δῆλα (οὐ
γὰρ ἂν φαίην βασκανίας, εἰς ἅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὄλως ἔγγιστα φρο-
νεῖν καὶ ὀπηοῦν παραβάλλεσθαι, καὶ λοιπὸν ἐντεῦθεν ἴσως καὶ
βασκαίνειν χώραν εἶναι), ὅστις μὴ μελαγχολᾷ, καὶ λαμπρῶς ἂν
καὶ περιφανῶς μαίνοιτο. 3 Τίς γὰρ ὄλως ἐγγύς, ἢ τίς οὕτω καθ-
20 ἀπαξ ἀσύνητος τῆς τοσαύτης ἐκείνου περινοίας καὶ μεγαλονοί-
ας καὶ ἀκριβείας καὶ ποριμότητος καὶ εὐκαιρίας ἐν πᾶσιν, οἷς
ἂν ἐκάστοτε σπουδάζοι, καὶ ἐπιτυχίας δραστηκώτατα, καὶ ἐρ-
γασίας ἀφύκτου καὶ πολυμαθίας | καὶ τῶν ἀλογίστων τέως καὶ 43
ἀνεννοήτων σχεδὸν αὐτῶν, 4 καὶ γνώμης ἐπιμελοῦς σὺν ἀκμῇ
25 διαρκεστάτη καὶ πάσης ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν λογισμῶν καὶ διανοίας

7 περιὶ fortasse add. P² 12 ἀκριβέστερον: ἀκριβέστατον ME

¹¹ Cf. Plato, *Crito* 46d ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο 'that we were talking merely for the sake of argument'.

¹² many passages in *Plato's own writings* etc.: Obscure. The theme of the essay as a whole is probably inspired by a passage in Diotima's speech in the *Symposium* (208c–d); cf. also *Laws* 4, 721b. If 'this' and 'it' in paragraph 5

inviolable regarding the whole of wisdom, one in which there is nothing in any way reprehensible, unless someone who is mad himself may have another view, through ignorance or envy despising those who deserve admiration. 5 And this is not something I have made up for the sake of argument,¹¹ but one can infer it from many passages in Plato's own writings, expressed with almost exactly the same words that we are using now.¹²

5. On Aristotle's intellectual vanity also regarding mathematics¹

1 If there is anybody who does not admire Aristotle as much as he can as a supreme investigator and expert in the whole of philosophy and particularly in that part which deals with logic, and with an even more detailed knowledge of natural science, and as a defender of the physical world and its works, I for my part would be bewildered, 2 and I would be quite surprised if anybody is to that degree out of his mind and completely stupid and mentally deficient concerning things that are entirely obvious (for I would not use the term 'envy' when we are dealing with things where it is not possible to approach Aristotle in thought or in any way compare with him, so that perhaps there would be room for envy)—unless that person suffers from melancholic derangement and is clearly and manifestly mad. 3 For speaking generally, who is able to approach his level, or [on the other hand] who is so completely incapable of understanding his great perspicacity, elevation of thought, accuracy, inventiveness and success in everything he studies on any given occasion, in a manner highly productive of success;² his unerring³ work and his wide learning, even in things which up to that time had not been the subject of intellectual study; 4 his mind which is active with the most

refer to Plato's own *doxosophia*, I do not know what passages in Plato Metochites is thinking of (especially since he says that they are 'expressed with almost exactly the same words that we are using now').

¹ This essay is discussed in Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2). For δοξοσοφία cf. above, p. 48 n. 1.

² The καί before ἐπιτυχίας δραστηκώτατα is ignored in the translation.

³ ἐργασίας ἀφύκτου, perhaps 'his work that he never abandoned' (less probably 'inescapable': his work that no one can overlook).

εὐδοκιμήσεως, οὐ πλέον μόνον ἢ κατὰ πάντας ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλέον ὄντως ἢ τις ἂν ὄλως ἐννοήσαι πρὶν ἂν ἐντύχοι τοῖς αὐτοῦ; 5 Καὶ ἔγωγε σαφῶς οὕτωςί πως ἀξιῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλου του τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἀνθρώπων 5 φορὰν εἰς τὸν βίον οὕτω λυσιτελεστάτην εἶναι ὅσα γε εἰς σοφίαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀνθρώποις πράγματα καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ βελτίωσιν, ὡς τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ἐν βίῳ γενόμενον καὶ τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἐν λόγοις καὶ σοφίᾳ συντέλειαν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀνθρώποις· 6 καὶ μεγίστην ἂν εἶναι ζημίαν ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν λογικὴν 10 εὐζωΐαν, ἣν ἄρα τις ἐξέλοιτο τὰ κατ' αὐτὸν τῆς κοινῆς τῶν ὄλων συντάξεως καὶ τῶν ἐράνων τῆς σοφίας, ἐν νῶ θέμενος ὡς ἂν μὴ γεγονότα τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ φορὰν ἐκ μέσου τῷ λογισμῷ ποιησάμενος. 7 Οὕτως ἐμοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ φρονεῖν 44 καὶ λέγειν ἔπεισι, καὶ οἶμαί γε καὶ λίαν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἀληθῶς, κὰν εἴ τις ἄλλος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ προσέχων εὖ μάλα τὸν νοῦν 15 ἐποπτεύοι καὶ σκέπτοιο, συνθεῖτ' ἂν ἐπιεικῶς ἔμοιγε, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχοι λέγειν, ὀρθῶς γε πάντως φρονῶν.

2 Ἀτὰρ ὅπερ εἶχον ἐν νῶ, τοιοῦτός γε ὢν ἀνὴρ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ οὕτω πλεονεκτήσας τοὺς ἄλλους μεγαλοφυΐα καὶ σπουδῇ, 20 ἀνθ' ὅμως ἔτι προσπεριβάλλεται πράγματα καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῦ ποιεῖται καὶ ἂ μὴ πρόσσεστιν, ὑπὸ φιλαυτίας ὡς οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μάλιστα' αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλούς. 2 Καὶ οἴός τέ ἐστιν ἀνθρωπος ὑπ' ἄκρας δοξοσοφίας καὶ πλειόνων ἢ κατὰ τὰ οἴκοι ταμεία θησαυρὸν ἐαυτὸν πλήρη πάσαις μηχαναῖς ὑπεμφαίνειν τοῖς 25 πολλοῖς, καὶ μὴ κατολιγωρεῖν εἴ πη παρείκοι καὶ δίδωσιν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ πλείω τῶν ὄντων φαντάζειν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῦ φέρειν καὶ παρακατέχειν, μὴ προδεικνύειν μηδ' ἐκτιθέναί πασιν ἀξιῶν, 3 καὶ ὢν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀκριβῆς ἐν παρόδῳ λόγων ἄλλων σοφίζεσθαι τὴν μετουσίαν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὡς εὖ ἡνυκῶς 30 κἀνταῦθα καὶ μάλιστα' ἔχων ἀμέλει χρῆσθαι, μὴ κατοκνῶν ἐν

7 γενόμενον: γενόμενος E 9 εἶναι + τὴν ME 20 αὐτοῦ scripsi: αὐτοῦ PME

⁴ εὐδοκιμήσις: cf. e.g. below, *Sem.* 10.3.5. This sense not mentioned in LSJ, Lampe or Stephanus' *Thesaurus* (the word is not found in *LBG*). Cf.

enduring energy, and the absolute, so to speak, excellence⁴ of his arguments and capacity for reasoning, [qualities which he possesses] not only in a higher degree than everybody else, but also truly more than one would be able even to imagine before one came across his writings? 5 With some confidence I assert and submit⁵ that no other achievement, by any man who has ever lived, has been so useful to human life as regards wisdom and the intellectual concerns of men and the improvement of the mind, as [has] this man [by] living among us, and his contribution in intellectual matters and wisdom to the common [knowledge] of mankind. 6 And [I suggest] that it would very seriously injure our well-being as rational creatures if anyone should remove Aristotle's writings from the common fund of knowledge and from the banquet of wisdom, imagining to myself what it would be like if the man had never existed, and in my mind eliminating his contribution. 7 In this way it occurs to me to think and speak about him, with great certainty and truth, as I believe, and if anybody else were to judge and examine this attentively, he would, I think, with good reason agree with me and not be able to dissent, if he is in his right senses.

2 But what I had in mind now was that although he is a man so great in wisdom and surpassing other people in talent and achievement, he still tries to lay hands on everything and appropriate also those things that do not belong to him. This he does from self-love like most people, and more than most people. 2 Owing to his excessive intellectual vanity the man is capable of making himself appear to people in general, by every means at his disposal, as a treasure-house full of more things than he really has in his store-rooms, and does not hesitate, whenever there is a possibility and an opportunity, to appear to his readers as carrying within him⁶ more than he really possesses, but holding it back because he chooses not to show and present it to everybody; 3 he is capable of suggesting cursorily, when dealing with other questions, that he also has knowl-

however Nik. Greg., *Hist.* 2:589.3–4 τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐδοκίμησιν, καὶ αὐτὴν τῶν ἐναντίας ἔχόντων κακίαν.

⁵ Καὶ ἔγωγε σαφῶς οὕτωςί πως ἀξιῶ καὶ τίθεμαι. Cf. *Sem.* 3.1.3 Καὶ προσίεμαι δὴ, καὶ οὐδ' ἔγωγ' ἀπωθοῦμαι with note. Here the same 'chiastic' interpretation is possible, i.e., that οὕτωςί πως ἀξιῶ refers to the preceding passage (in which case one should put a comma after ἀξιῶ).

⁶ ἐν with the genitive: cf. above, p. 47 n. 23.

μέρει πως ἐπίτηδες μεμνήσθαι, ὡς ἂν τοῖς γε μετ' ἐκείνων τοῖς
 χρόνοις ἐξῆς ἡμῖν δοκοῖη καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυχῆς, ἀφειδῆς ὧν
 ὄλως ἰ πρὸς δόξαν, 4 καὶ ὧν ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔχοι παρακερδαί- 45
 νειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐν φαντασίᾳ τινί, κἂν εἰ μὴ μετ' ἀληθείας,
 5 ἥκιστα ἀποτρεπόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐντὸς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συναισθήσεως
 δικαστηρίων τε καὶ ἐλέγχων· 5 ὡς ἄρα τινὲς ἴσως ἄλλοι τῶν
 ἀστέιων καὶ οὐδὲν ἐλευθερίας ἐπίπροσθεν ποιουμένων καὶ ἀλη-
 θείας, καὶ οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς
 πολιτευομένων, αὐτοὶ γ' ἑαυτούς, κἂν εἰ μὴ τις ἐξωθεν ἐπαίῳ,
 10 πείθουσι τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων σφίσιν ἀπέχεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἀλ-
 λολοτρίων, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, τοῖς ἄλλοις οἷς αὐτῶν μέτεστιν ἐξίστα-
 σθαι, 6 καὶ μὴ κατειρωνεύεσθαι τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν
 εὐηθείας κατεπεμβαίνειν, πλείω τῶν ἐνότων ἀπατηλῶς ἐπι-
 δεικνύμενοι, καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστ' ἐνὸν ἀφθόνως ταῖς οἴκοι μα-
 15 κραῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ἀνεμεσήτως καθάπαξ χρῆσθαι, καὶ θαυμά-
 ζειν ὄντως ἀξίως.

3 Οἶον δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους νῦν εἶναι δοξοσοφίας
 εἶχεν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἂ μὴ πῶς ἐστὶν αὐτῷ δίκαια τῆς τῶν πολλῶν
 ἀμαθίας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας κλεπτύσης, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπὶ πολλοῖς τοῖς
 20 κατ' αὐτὸν θησαυροῖς καὶ μεγάλη κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ,
 καὶ ὧν πᾶς τις νοῦν ἔχων ἀγάσασαίτ' ἂν εἶ μάλα. 2 Οἶον ὡς ἂν
 δι' ἐνὸς ὑποδείγματος ἐν βραχεῖ τινι τὸ πιστὸν τῷ λόγῳ δοίη-
 μεν, τὸ μὲν μαθηματικὸν ἰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καθόλου, καὶ μάλιστ' 46
 αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ σφαιρικὸν τε καὶ ἀστρολογικόν, ὅπῃ τῶν χρόνων
 25 μετὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἔρευναν καὶ θεω-
 ρίαν ἐν Ἑλλησιν ἦκεν ἅπ' Αἰγυπτίων τε καὶ Χαλδαίων, 3 καὶ
 τριβὴν τιν' εἶχε καὶ χρῆσιν τοῖς περὶ Πυθαγόραν μάλιστα καὶ
 ὅσοι μετ' ἐκείνον ἐξῆς διεδέξαντο τὰ τῆς τοιαύτης σπουδῆς, καὶ
 τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν Ἰταλία· 4 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ ἐν Ἑλλησιν

21 ὧν s. l. P², ὄν P¹ME

⁷ 'By contrast': a free translation, for the sake of clarity, of ὡς (which refers to the immediately preceding idea, 'to be warded off by the law-courts and cross-examinations of one's own conscience').

edge of things concerning which he is perhaps [really] no expert, as if he had worked successfully also with them and were competent to discuss them, not neglecting to mention them deliberately through scattered hints, in order to appear to later generations successful also in these things, being, as he is, completely unscrupulous in his craving for glory. 4 And things in which he might unjustly gain something and be superior among his fellow-men, in fantasy if not reality—from such things he is by no means warded off by the law-courts and cross-examinations of his own conscience. 5 By contrast⁷ some other people, I think, who are men of culture, people who do not value anything more than freedom and truth and who conduct their lives not only in dependence on others but also on themselves,⁸ [such people] persuade themselves, even if nobody else is listening, to abstain from things that do not belong to them, and to leave, by necessity, matters which are not their concern to those people whose concern they are, 6 and not treat the general public with raillery and take advantage of their simplicity by deceitfully displaying more than is actually there; this the more so when one is in a position to use one's great inborn resources freely, harmlessly, and in a manner truly admirable.

3 But⁹ now we were talking about Aristotle's intellectual vanity and the things which are not his by right, but which the ignorance and carelessness of people in general wrongfully attribute to him in addition to his many treasures and great and genuine reputation, things that everybody in his right mind must admire very much. 2 So for instance—to take one example and show in a few words the truth of what I have just said—the whole mathematical part of philosophy, and in particular the branch that studies [celestial] spheres and astronomy, came from Egypt and Babylonia late in time, after the Greeks had already begun to study, explore, and theorise about natural philosophy, 3 and it was first adopted and used especially by Pythagoras and those who succeeded him in this study, mostly in Italy. 4 But nevertheless the Greeks, too, had studied this subject,

⁸ ἐαυτῷ ζῆν, to live 'by virtue of' oneself, is the βίος θεωρητικός, the Christian ideal (also practised by Socrates and Plato, see below, *Sem.* 6.1.4).

⁹ Οἷον is difficult. It cannot mean 'for instance' here, since the preceding passage discusses people who are *not* δοξόσοφοι. Perhaps it means 'as', i.e., what οἱ ἀστέιοι do *not* do.

ἐπιμελὲς ἦν περὶ τούτων, καὶ πρὸ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους χρόνων
 καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλην, οὕτω δ' ἐξείργαστο παντελείως
 περὶ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἑλλησιν, οὐδὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον πᾶν ἀνυσίμως
 εἶχε τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, οὐδ' ὡς ὕστερον ἐπέδωκε μετ' Ἀριστοτέλην
 5 πόλλ' ἔτη τοῖς τῶν Καισάρων χρόνοις, ἐνακμάσαν πάνυ τοι ὡς
 εἴ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας. 5 Αὐτός γε μὴν Ἀριστοτέ-
 λης ὀρηοῦν ἀψάμενος τῆς σπουδῆς ταύτης, οὐ μάλα τοι φαίνε-
 ται περὶ ταύτην σχολάσας, οὐθ' ὡς ἄρ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς φι-
 λοσοφίας εὖ μάλ' ἠνυκῶς δεικνυται, καὶ συντετυχηκῶς σχεδὸν
 10 ἅπασι, κάλλιστ' ἀπαλλάξας, 6 ἀλλὰ δηλὸς ἐστὶ τοῖς ἐπισκεπ-
 τομένοις ζῆν νῶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ μέρος ἦττον ἔχων ἢ ἄλλοι τῶν κατ'
 αὐτὸν τῆνικαῦτα, καὶ οὐδ' ὅσον ὁ κατ' ἐκείνον τότε χρόνος ἐδί-
 δου πᾶν ἄρα σπουδάσας καὶ συλλεξάμενος ἀμείωτον. 7 Ἄλλ'
 ἐπιδείκνυται κἂν τούτοις ὅμως καὶ συχνὰ τὰ ἐκ γεωμετρίας
 15 αὐτῷ περὶ πάντα οἱ τὰ συντάγματα φυσικά τε καὶ λογικά καὶ 47
 τῶν μαθηματικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγη τῷ ἀνδρὶ χρήσις καὶ μνήμη, καὶ
 οἷός τέ ἐστιν, ἦν ἄρα δύναίτο, τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας πείθειν καὶ
 μηχανῇ παρέλκειν, ὡς τ' ἀμέλει λογίζεσθαι καθάπαξ αὐτὸν εὖ
 πράττειν κἂνταῦθα, 8 καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἴσως ἢ κατὰ τᾶλλα περὶ
 20 ἃ σπουδάζειν αἰρεῖται, τῷ ὄντι προελόμενος κατὰ καιρὸν, ὡς
 ἂν αὐτὸς ἀμεινον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τάληθές κἂνταῦθα τῶν ὄντων
 καὶ τῆς φύσεως εὐρηκῶς τε καὶ κατανοήσας καὶ φιλανθρώπως
 ὑποδεικνύς, εἰς βελτίωσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις· 9 περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν μα-
 θηματικῶν οὐδ' εἶναί οἱ χρεῖαν, ἃ μονοειδῆ τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπλᾶ
 25 καὶ ἀναμφήριστα κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτὰ ἅπαξ
 τοῖς φθάσασιν ἠκρίβωται πάντως καὶ δέδοται τοῖς σπουδαίοις,
 ὥστε καὶ ἱκανῶς εἰδέναι καὶ χρῆσθαι κατ' αὐτά.

4 Οὕτω περὶ πάντ' ἄλλα τῆς παιδείας καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἀνήρ
 δοξοσοφῶν οὐκ ἄδηλός ἐστι· καὶ πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔμελλεν; ὅς γε
 30 οὐδὲ ῥητορικὰς τέχνας ἀπώκησε νομοθετεῖν καὶ συντάττειν,
 πρὸς ὃ μηδεμίαν χρῆσιν ἦν αὐτῷ πάντως, ἄλλα δῆτ' ἐπιδηλότατα
 προελομένῳ καὶ τὴν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀίρεσιν

3-4 ἀνυσίμως εἶχε: εἶχεν ἀνυσίμως ME

both before Aristotle and up to his time, although it was not yet perfectly elaborated by them (nor had philosophy yet fully reached its due potential¹⁰), nor had advanced in the way it did many years after Aristotle, when in the time of the Roman Emperors it flourished as much as any division of philosophy. 5 But obviously Aristotle himself, although he dabbled in this field to some extent, had not studied it professionally, nor can he be shown to have made any significant contribution [in this field], as he did in the other branches of philosophy, where, confronting practically every challenge, he acquitted himself with honour; 6 on the contrary, to those who examine the matter judiciously it is apparent that he mastered this topic to a lesser degree than others who were his contemporaries, and that he did not even study or make a complete collection of what had been produced by his own time. 7 This notwithstanding, there are frequent allusions to geometry in all his writings on natural sciences and logic, and the man cites and mentions mathematicians to no small degree, nor does he shrink, whenever there is a chance, from trying to persuade his readers and by contrivance seduce them into believing that he has been completely successful also in this field, 8 perhaps no less than in the other fields that he chooses to investigate (and that he really, and rightly, prefers), as if he himself, more successfully than his predecessors, also in this case had found and understood the truth about this world and nature, and benevolently disclosed it for the improvement of others. 9 For his business is not with mathematics,¹¹ which, being by nature uniform, simple, and indisputable, has been elaborated once and for all with identical results by all those who came before him, and has been left to those who are interested so that they know enough about it and are able to make use of it.

4 Thus it is quite obvious that he is a man who wants to appear wise in all fields of education, including this one. And what else could one expect, considering that he did not even shrink from prescribing about and compiling a book on rhetoric, something of which he him-

¹⁰ τὸ γιγνόμενον: see LSJ s.v. γίγνομαι I.2.b 'fall due', τὸ γιγνόμενον μέρος Xen., *Hell.* 7.4.33 'the amount which fell to their share'; cf. the expression πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀποδιδόναι in *Sem.* 28, 192 and 47, 279 MK. Probably the same meaning below, *Sem.* 10.1.3.

¹¹ *his business is not with mathematics*: or 'he has no need of mathematics'. Περὶ γὰρ τοῖ ... χρείαν: acc. c. inf. without a governing verb.

προθεμένῳ τοῦ βίου. | 2 Ἄλλ' ὑπ' ἄκρας ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξοσο- 48
φίας καὶ τοῦ πάντ' ἔχειν αὐτὸς μόνος παντέλειος δοκεῖν λογίζε-
σθαι καὶ τοῦ πάντ' εἰδέναι, πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι, τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ'
ἐσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα, καὶ ταῦτα σπουδάξει· 3 καὶ θαρρεῖν
5 οἶεται δεῖν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ θαρρεῖν τῇ τῶν πολλῶν προλήψει περὶ
αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεγαλοφυΐας, ὡς ἐπιτυχεστάτης πάντως
καὶ διαρκοῦς εἰς πᾶν γνωστικὸν εὖρημα, καὶ οὐδένας γε ἐπιτι-
μήσοντας ὄλως αὐτῷ περὶ ὄτουοῦν. 4 Καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις μὲν
ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἐν πᾶσι ξυνορᾶν πολὺν τε καὶ ποριμώτατον, καὶ ἂ
10 μὴ καθάπαξ ἐσπούδακε, μῆδ' ἔσχε τούτων ἀρχάς, ὧν πάντως
ἀπαραιτήτως δεῖ, καὶ ἂ μὴ πέφυκεν ὡς εἶπεῖν· 5 ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐχ
ὁ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐστὶν ἐν πᾶσι τῆς τελειότητος καὶ πάσης
ἀκριβείας τῶν προκειμένων εἰς θεωρίαν ἀριστεύς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
μὲν τοιοῦτος ὥστε μῆδὲ θαυμάζειν ἀξίως ἀτεχνῶς ἐξεῖναι, τοῖς
15 δὲ ὅμως ἀνόμιος ἑαυτῷ. 6 Εἰρήσθω γὰρ οὕτω τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αἰδοῖ
καὶ ὄντως δικαίως, πλὴν γε ὅτι οὐκ ἄδηλός ἐστιν, εἴ τις ἐποπ-
τεύοι σὺν νῶ, τὰ μὴ ὄντα προσποιούμενος.

Ἰ' Ὅτι πολὺ πάντες ἡδονται οἷς ἂν συνεθισθῶσιν: ζ' 49

1 Οὐκ ἄρα τοσοῦτο καθορᾶν ἔστι καὶ ἴσως θαυμάζειν ἄξιον
20 Ὀδυσσέα τὸν τῆς Ἰθάκης καὶ τῶν Κεφαλλήνων ἡγεμόνα τοὺς
τῆς πατρίδος ποθοῦντα καπνοὺς καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπεύδοντα,
καὶ πολλῷ πρόσθεν ἄγοντα τὰς ἐν φλαύροις νησιδίοις καὶ
αὐχμηροῖς συνήθεις διατριβὰς καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἰσχνότητα καὶ

3-4 τά τ' — ἔόντα: *Il.* 1.70 20-21 Ὀδυσσέα — ποθοῦντα καπνοὺς: cf. *Od.*
1.58 f.; *Dio* 13.4.5; *Luc., Patr. enc.* 11.5; *Greg. Nyss., Eun.* 1.1.79.

14 μῆδὲ: μὴ E

¹² I.e., τοῦ πάντ' <αὐτὸς μόνος παντέλειος δοκεῖν> εἰδέναι.

¹³ Here, before a quotation from Homer, πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι is perhaps not unmo-
tivated; cf. *Sem.* 28, 188 MK πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις ἔρμαιον τάκ τῆς τύχης. See above,
pp. 48-49 n. 3.

self made absolutely no use, clearly preferring other things and making the study of philosophy the aim of his life? 2 But because of his truly enormous intellectual vanity, and because he thinks that he is the only person who is able to calculate everything, and who knows everything,¹²—how shall I put it: *what is and what will be and what has been*¹³—he devotes himself also to this,¹⁴ 3 and believes that he should have confidence in himself and in the preconceived ideas that people in general have formed about him and his talent as being completely successful and sufficient for every discovery in knowledge, and [be confident] that nobody at all will reproach him about anything. 4 And it is indeed possible to understand him to be vigorous and highly resourceful in all fields, both in subjects that he has not studied at all and whose first principles, which are absolutely indispensable, he does not know, and in subjects for which he has, so to speak, no natural ability.¹⁵ 5 Nevertheless Aristotle is not the same ‘prince of perfection’¹⁶ and accuracy in all the things that are proposed for investigation. Sometimes he is so supreme that it is simply impossible to admire him as he deserves, but sometimes, on the other hand, he is not up to his usual standard. 6 Let this be enough said out of respect for the man and in truth justly—except that one cannot help noticing, when assessing him judiciously, that he tries to lay claim to what does not belong to him.

6. That all men like what they are accustomed to

1 It is not so easy to understand¹ and it is, I think, surprising that Odysseus, the king of Ithaca and Cephallenia, longed for the [hearth-]smokes of his homeland² and hastened to return to them, much preferring his accustomed life in those insignificant and parched little is-

¹⁴ *devotes himself also to this*: i.e., mathematics.

¹⁵ *subjects that he has not studied*: mathematics; *subjects for which he has no natural ability*: rhetoric.

¹⁶ A play on Aristotle's name: 'Αριστοτέλης ... τελειότητος ... ἀριστεύς. Cf. below, p. 165 n. 1.

¹ καθορᾶν = συννορᾶν; cf. above, *Sem.* 2.3.2 (p. 31 and n. 4).

² Cf. *Od.* 1.58 f. ἴεμενος καὶ καπνὸν ἀποθρώσκοντα νοῆσαι ἦς γαίης. Often alluded to in Byzantine literature (Mullett 1981, 75).

στένωσιν τῆς ζωῆς, 2 ἢ τὰς ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ ἀήθεσιν αὐτῶ
 χώροις καὶ ἀποδημίαις καὶ πλάναις τῶν οἴκοι μετὰ λαμπρότη-
 τος ἡδονὰς πάνυ τοι πλείστας καὶ ῥαστώνην ζωῆς οἶαν ἐπιπό-
 θητον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ὑγρὸν βίον καὶ λυτὸν, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς εὐ-
 5 μάρειαν βιώσεως θέλγητρα· 3 οὐ τοσοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ κατ' ἐκεῖ-
 νον καθορᾶν ἔστιν, ὡς εἴρηται, ὅσον δὴ Σωκράτην αὐτὸν καὶ
 Πλάτωνα τοὺς ὑπερναβάντας τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα ποθεῖν ἂν
 κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὡς γ' ἐδόκουν, οἷς ἐβίου, οἷς ἔλεγον, 4 ὑπερ-
 φρονούντες ὡς ἀληθῶς τοὺς τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ σώματος δεσμούς,
 10 καὶ μηδὲν ἀξιοῦντες τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῆν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ
 τῇ κρίσει τοῦ βελτίστου καὶ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ, 5 καὶ μετὰ τούτων
 ὅμως τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν λογισμῶν, τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀτρέπτως
 ἐχομένους ἰ διατριβῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐν Λυκείῳ καὶ Ἀκαδημία περι- 50
 πάτους τὸν ἅπαντα τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον, οὐκ ὀλίγον γενόμενον
 15 ἀμφοτέροις, 6 καὶ τὰς ἐκεῖσε μετὰ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 σπουδαστῶν ὁμιλίας φιλοῦντας καὶ στέργοντας ἐπιεικῶς ὡς
 ἥδιστα, καὶ κομιδῇ φιλοχωροῦντας καὶ προστιθεμένους ὀλκῇ
 καρδίας λιπαρεῖ, καὶ προσπάσχοντας ὡς ἀμέλει πάντες ἀνθρω-
 ποι οἷς ξυνέλαχον. 7 Σωκράτης μὲν γε λέγεται δις που ἢ καὶ
 20 προσέτι βραχὺ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀποδημήσας ἐν στρατείαις καὶ
 τοῦθ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης νόμου, καὶ μὴν ἔτι πλέον χρόνου τινὸς ὀλί-
 γου πάνυ τοι γενόμενος ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις ἀσμε-
 νέστατα ταχὺς ἔπειτ' ἐπανήκων οἴκοι ποθεινότατ' ἀπαντᾶν εἰς
 τὰς φιλάτας ὁμιλίας τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις ἐν Λυκείῳ, 8 καὶ κατα-
 25 γηρᾶν Ἀθήνησιν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὡς ἥδιστα, μέχρις ἂν ὑπὸ
 τῶν φίλων πολιτῶν καὶ τῆς ἐρωμένης πατρίδος ἐπὶ καταδίκη
 θανάτου, ὡς ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχθιστος ὦν σφίσι καὶ τὰ μέγιστ' ἀδικῶν
 καὶ λυμαινόμενος, τὸ κώνειον πίοι. 9 Πλάτων δ' ἰ αὐτὸς εἰς Αἴ- 51
 γυπτον ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἀποδημήσας ἔρωτι καὶ ἱστορίᾳ τῆς ἐκεῖσε χώ-
 30 ρας τε καὶ σοφίας, καὶ τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τυράννοις
 ὑπὲρ φιλοσοφίας καὶ φίλων συμμίξας, τάχισθ' ὅμως καὶ οὗτος
 τῆς συνήθους γίγνεται βιώσεως, πόλλ' ἔξανύτων ἔτη εἰς αὐτὸ

8-9 ὑπερφρονούντες: ὑπερφρονούντες ME 24 φιλάτας ex φιλάτ corr. P²
 27 σφίσι ex σφᾶς ut vid. corr. P¹

lands, and the meagreness and hardship of existence there, 2 to an abundance of sumptuous pleasures in foreign places unfamiliar to him, exiled and straying far away from home; a comfortable existence such as men long for, a soft and relaxed life, and all the charms that contribute to well-being. 3 That Odysseus made this choice is, as I just said, less understandable than the fact that Socrates and Plato, who rose above all those things that seem desirable to men, as they appeared to do by their conduct and utterances, 4 truly despising the bonds of matter and the body, choosing not to live in dependence on³ other things but only on themselves,⁴ on reason, and on the examination of what is best and truly good, 5–6 still, even with these arguments and considerations, kept unswervingly to life in Athens,⁵ reasonably loving and cherishing, for the whole duration of both their long lives, the philosophical discussions in the Lyceum and Academy,⁶ and their association with the young people and other students there; that they were partial to the place and, yielding to a strong inclination of the heart, felt affection, as in fact everybody does, for that which has fallen to their lot. 7 It is said that Socrates, who left Attica not much more than twice,⁷ briefly taking part in a military campaign, and this because he was obliged by the law, and, further, stayed in Macedonia for a very short time, quickly returning home with the greatest joy,⁸ eagerly rejoined his friends in their customary discussions in the Lyceum, 8 and enjoyed growing old in Athens amid these pursuits, until his own compatriots and his beloved city by a sentence of death, as if he were their worst enemy and guilty of the blackest of crimes, forced him to drink the hemlock. 9 As for Plato, he made a brief journey to Egypt because he desired to learn about the country and its wisdom; he also had some dealings with Sicily and the tyrants there on behalf of philosophy and his friends. Still he, too, could not return too soon to his accustomed life, which he con-

³ The dative denotes condition, 'by virtue of', 'on the strength of'; cf. below, 6.2.5 οἷς εἰσὶν and 6.3.1 ᾧ δὴ καὶ αὐτῷ ... οὐσιώμεθα καὶ ζῶμεν καὶ ἐσμέν.

⁴ Cf. above, 5.2.5 (p. 61 and n. 8).

⁵ We are never told what they could have been expected to prefer instead. A life of retirement, like monks, or of exile, like Xenophon?

⁶ Socrates used to visit the Lyceum (Pl., *Lys.* 203a).

⁷ Cf. Pl., *Crito* 52b5 and *Symp.* 219e ff.; Diog. Laer. 2.23.

⁸ πῶς ἂν εἶποι τις ἀσμενέστατα, translation uncertain. See the note on this expression in 4.1.3 above (pp. 48–49 n. 3).

τῆς ζωῆς τοῦσχατον, 10 καὶ αὐτὸς μὴ παντάπασιν εὐτυχῶς ἀπ-
αλλάξας οἴκοι τοῦ βίου, ἀλλ' ἀγνωμόνων πειραθεῖς τῶν φι-
τάτων τέως καὶ κατολιγορηθεῖς ἐν τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς ζωῆς
ὕφ' ὧν οὐκ ἐχρῆν, οὐδ' ἂν ποτ' ᾤθη.

- 5 2 Καὶ ἄλλοι γε μὴν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος εὐδοκίμων
ἀνδρῶν καὶ ξυνεωρακότων εὖ μάλα τάνθρώπινα πράγματα, καὶ
ὅσοι ἐν Ἑλλησι καὶ ὅσοι γενῶν ἄλλων εὐγενῶν τε καὶ μῆ, 2
καὶ ὅσοι θεοσεβείας ἀληθοῦς ἐπέτυχον πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ
συνεβίωσαν τῇ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀνόςφ καὶ ἀνευθύμφ ἐπιγνώ-
10 σει καὶ λειτουργίᾳ καὶ ὅσοι μῆ, ἀλλ' ἐξετράπησαν τῶν καλλίσ-
των καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ἀληθείας, ἢ γνώμαις οἰκείαις πιστεύοντες
ἢ προλαβούσαις ἀγωγαῖς καὶ πατρίοις ἐκ πολλοῦ κακοὶ κακῶς
τε καὶ ἀμαθῶς ἐπόμεινοι, 3 καὶ ὅλως ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοι
τῶν πολλῶν τι πλεον ἔσχον ἢ ἔχουσι καὶ ὅσοι μηδὲν περὶ τῶν | 52
15 ὄντων ἐπαίουσιν ἀκριβές, ἀλλὰ τὸν βίον ἔλκουσιν ἄλλως τὸν
ἀσυλλόγιστον καθάπαξ τρόπον, 4 οἱ μὲν ἦττον, οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον,
σφόδρα δὴ προσανέχουσι καὶ ὄλοι πρόσκεινται στέργοντες ὡς
ἠδιστα καὶ ἀνεπιστρόφως, πάση διαθέσει ψυχῆς, οἷς ἂν ξυλλά-
χωσιν ἐξαρχῆς τόποις καὶ πατρίσιν, ἢ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν αἰστίσιν
20 ἄρα βίου καθ' αἶρεσιν ἢ τύχην, ἢ ὅλως γ' ἐρεῖν ταῖς συνήθεσιν
αὐταῖς τοῦ ζῆν ἀγωγαῖς· 5 καὶ οὐκ ἂν ῥᾶστ' ἀποτρέποιντο, χαί-
ροντες ὅλη ρύμη τῷ παθητικῷ τῆς φύσεως οἷς εἰσίν, οἷς ὑπὸ
χρόνων ἕκαστοι ᾤκείωνται, καὶ πάντας ὡς βέλτιστα πράττουσι
σφίσι προσέχειν ἀξιοῦντες καὶ συμπεῖθοντες, ὡς ἂν οἰοί τ' εἶεν,
25 καὶ μάλ' ἀχθόμενοι ἦν ἄρα τις ὀλιγοροῖη τῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς ὡς
οὐδένων, ἢ κατατιφῶτο παραβαλλόμενος ὡς ἄρα φαύλως ἐχόν-
των· 6 καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς οὐ βούλεται καὶ οἶεται τὰ σφέτερα
αὐτοῦ κάλλιστ' ἔχειν καὶ κάλλιστ' ἔχειν δοκεῖν, καὶ οὐδεὶς ὃς
οὐχ ἠδεται καὶ κατέχεται σφόδρα οἷς καθάπαξ εἶθιστα. 7 Τὸ

11 ὄντος ex ὄντως corr. M 20 ταῖς ex τοῖς corr. P² 23 χρόνων: χρόνον P
28 αὐτοῦ: αὐτ + lacuna P

⁹ I.e., Aristotle. For his ingratitude and lack of respect towards Plato, cf. *Sem.* 3.2, 7.1.5; 10.3–4; 25.

tinued for many years until the very end of his days. 10 He, too, died in his own city not altogether happily, having experienced the unkindness of those who until then had been his closest friends,⁹ neglected towards the end of his life by those who ought not to have done so, and from whom he had never expected such treatment.

2 And through history also other illustrious¹⁰ men with deep insight in human affairs, both among the Greeks and among other peoples, noble or not; 2 both those who have attained the true faith, in former times and the present, and lived in the unblemished and impeccable recognition and service of divine nature, and those who did not, but turned away from the highest Good and the truth of Reality, either trusting in their own beliefs or, base themselves, basely and ignorantly following earlier teachings and ancestral beliefs, handed down for a long time; 3 that is, all men, both those who had or have acquired something more than common people and those who have no accurate insight into reality, but drag out their lives planlessly and unreasonably (in a way that does not follow from the premises):¹¹ 4 [all men,] some less, some more, are devoted to and cherish wholeheartedly, enthusiastically and unhesitatingly, with the entire inclination of their souls, the place and homeland that has once fallen to their lot, or their walk of life whatever it may be, [chosen] on purpose or accidentally—in general, their accustomed way of life. 5 They do not lightly leave this, since with the emotional part of their nature they delight wholeheartedly in the things by virtue of which¹² they exist and with which each one has become familiar in the course of time; they think it right that everybody should regard them as being highly successful and try their best to convince them of this, taking exception if anybody should disparage what they have as worthless, or by way of comparison denounce it as inferior. 6 There is no one who does not want and believe his own [belongings and customs] to be, and appear to others to be, the best, and no one who does not thoroughly enjoy and depend on the things he has once become used to. 7 For to lose, through the agency of some intruding

¹⁰ *illustrious*: or 'accomplished'. For εὐδοκίμησις cf. above, pp. 58–59 n. 4.

¹¹ A wittily formulated reproach: τρόπος of course alludes to the moods of the syllogism; ἀσυλλόγηστος: the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Cf. Arist., *APo* 91b23.

¹² Cf. above, p. 67 n. 3.

γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τίνος παρεμπιπτούσης τύχης ἀφίστασθαι τῆς εἰθισ-
 μένης κοινωνίας καὶ ἕξεως ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστιν, ὅτι καὶ ἀφίστα-
 σθαι πῶς ἐστὶν ἑαυτοῦ· ἢ γὰρ ἰ ἔθιμος ἀγωγή μονή τις ἐστὶν ἐν 53
 ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταυτότης ζωῆς, 8 καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν λοιπὸν ὀπη-
 5 οῦν ἄλλως ἢ κατ' ἔθος, μεταβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι,
 καὶ πῶς ἐξίστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ καὶ θνήσκειν τὸ μέρος οὕτω δὴ·
 φθορὰ γάρ ἐστὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὄντότητος τῷ ζῳῳ, καὶ καθ'
 ἦν πάντως μετέβαλε διάθεσιν, ταύτη τέθηκε· 9 καὶ ἦδεται
 κατὰ φύσιν εἰ μάλα δῆλον τῇ ἀμεταβλησίᾳ καὶ διατριβῇ τοῦ
 10 ζῆν καὶ ἀγωγῇ ἐν ταυτότητι, καὶ τὸναντίον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πά-
 σχει τῷ ἐναντίῳ· ἄχθεται τῇ λύσει καὶ τομῇ τῆς κατ' ἔθος ἕξεως
 καὶ ζωῆς.

3 Ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μὴ πόρρω λόγου τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰρῆσθαι, καί-
 τοι γε δοκοῦν ἐπιπολαιότερον εἰρῆσθαι, τὸ φύσιν εἶναι πῶς τὸ
 15 ἔθος. Μονή γάρ ἐστὶν ἥπερ εἴρηται ζωώσεως καὶ ὀλκῆ βίου τὸ
 ἀμετάβλητον· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ παθητικοῦ
 καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐστὶν ἕξις καὶ ἐνέργεια, ᾧ δὴ καὶ αὐτῷ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη
 οὐσιούμεθα καὶ ζῶμεν καὶ ἐσμέν· 2 καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ μέρει τῆς
 ψυχῆς κοινὰ πρὸς τᾶλλα τῶν ζῳῳ τῶν ἀλόγων ἔχοντες, καὶ
 20 παραπλήσια ζῶμεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνδιατιθέμεθα πρὸς ἡδονὴν 54
 καὶ ἀνίαν τῷ ἀλόγῳ κοινῇ τῆς ψυχῆς· 3 ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ ὡσερ
 ἐκεῖνα κατ' ἔθος πράττοντα χαίρει, καὶ οἷς ἂν ξυλλάχοι χώροις
 ἢ νομαῖς ἢ κοινωνίαις ἢ αἰστίσιν ἄρα βιώσεσιν ἦδεται καὶ
 προσπάσχει, 4 παραπλησίως καὶ ἄνθρωποι χαίρουσιν οἷς ἂν
 25 ξυλλάχωσι καὶ κατ' ἔθος οἰκειωθῶσι, καὶ πρόσκεινται σφόδρα
 τῷ κοινῷ πάντες μέρει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῆς ζωῆς τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς
 παθητικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ, ἧς ἄρα ζωῆς καὶ τὸ ἦδεσθαι τε καὶ τὸν-
 ἀντίον ἐστὶ κοινὸν τοῖς τε ἄλλοις τῶν ζῳῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 ποις συμπεφυκός. 5 Ὅ καὶ τέμνειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη βιώσεως καὶ

14-15 φύσιν εἶναι πῶς τὸ ἔθος: cf. Arist., *Mem.* 452a28; *Rh.* 1.11, 1370a; cf. *Trag. adesp.*, fr. 516

1 δὴ om. E 2 ἀνιαρότατόν ex ἀνιαρώτατόν corr. P¹ et P² 11 τομῇ ex τῇ
 τομῇ corr. M 14 εἰρῆσθαι p. c. M 18 οὐσιούμεθα scripsi, οὐσιώμεθα PME

Fate, one's customary society and behaviour is extremely disagreeable, since it is to somehow renounce oneself. To lead one's accustomed life is remaining-in-oneself¹³ and identity of life, 8 and, consequently, to change,¹⁴ in any other way or in one's habits, is to change one's life and existence, and somehow depart from one's own nature, and in this way partly die. For in this way it is a destruction of reality for the living being, and surely, in so far as¹⁵ it has changed its disposition, to that extent it has died. 9 And it is entirely clear that [everybody] by nature prefers the unchangeability and [unvarying] passing of life, i.e. to live in the same way all the time, and necessarily views the opposite with opposite feelings,¹⁶ and hates the dissolution and separation from his accustomed conduct and life.

3 Therefore it is said¹⁷ with some reason by common people, although it sounds rather superficial, that in a way *habit is nature*.¹⁸ For as was said above, lack of change is a continuance of living and a carrying-on of life. It is the disposition and activity of the irrational and emotional part of the soul in us, which in turn is, with necessity, a part of our essence and life and being. 2 And having, through this element in our soul, something in common with the other, non-logical living creatures, we live in like manner to them and are, in common with them, inclined towards pleasure and sorrow by means of the irrational part of our soul. 3 And because of this, as they enjoy behaving according to habit and enjoy and feel affection for their allotted places or pastures or companions or way of life, whatever it may be, 4 similarly human beings enjoy what they have been allotted and become familiar with by habit, and are all strongly partial to it because of the common element of existence and life, the emotional and irrational part of their soul — [this] life in which joy and its opposite are common to other living beings and a natural part of man. 5 This

¹³ μονή τις ἐστὶν ἐν ἑαυτοῦ: cf. above, p. 47 n. 23.

¹⁴ μεταβάλλειν first intransitive, then transitive.

¹⁵ καθ' ἣν sc. διάθεσιν.

¹⁶ I.e., they view changes with distrust.

¹⁷ ὅθεν ... εἰρήσθαι: probably consecutive, which explains the infinitive. The same construction in 6.4.1 δοκεῖν.

¹⁸ Arist., *De mem.* 452a28 ὡςπερ γὰρ φύσις ἦδη τὸ ἔθος; it should be kept in mind that Metochites had written a commentary on this treatise. Cf. also Arist., *Rh.* 1.11 (1370a) καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὡςπερ πεφυκὸς ἦδη γίνεταί.

ουσίας ἡμῖν ἀπαραίτητον μέρος, διοικεῖν δὲ ἴσως ἂν ἐξείη πρὸς τᾶμεινον ὅσοις τοι ζυμβέβηκεν, ἢ θείῳ τινὶ δώρῳ καὶ τύχῃ ἢ κράτει γνώμης, ἢ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα μάλιστα, πάσχειν εἰθίσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι τὰ βέλτιστα.

- 5 4 Καὶ τοίνυν κάλλιστά μοι δοκεῖν εἰρησθαι καὶ κομιδῇ γ' ἐπαινεῖν ἔγωγ' ἀξιώ, πολλακίς ἐν μνήμῃ λαμβάνων τὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἐκεῖνο, βίον ἐλοῦ τὸν ἄριστον· τὸν δὲ ἡδὺν ἢ συνήθεια ποιήσει. Τὸ γὰρ εἰθισμένον, ὅπως ποτ' ἄρ' ἔχον, σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἐπαγωγὸν εἰς ἡδονήν, 2 καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ὡς ἀσκη-
- 10 τέον κατ' ἴθος τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον ἀπαραίτητον, πάντως ὃν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἄτμητον, περὶ τὰς ἀμείνους τῷ λόγῳ χρήσεις, καὶ αὐτίκα συνέσται πάντως τῷ ἔθει τὸ ἡδεσθαι συμπεφυκὸς ἀτρεπτον αὐτῷ κατ' ἀνάγκην καθάπαξ ἄφυκτον· 3 καὶ μὴν αὐθις διὰ τὸ ἡδεσθαι βεβαιοῦται καὶ ἀκίνητα μένει τὰ βέλτιστά γε τῶν
- 15 ἔθων, καὶ ἀλλήλων γ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀληθῶς αἴτια· τῷ τε γὰρ ἔθει τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς αὐτόθεν οὐσιοῦται, καὶ τῷ ἡδεσθαι λοιπὸν ἔπειτα μάλ' αὐθις βεβαιοῦται καὶ πῆγνυται, κατ' οὐδὲν ἄρρηκτα, τὰ τοῦ ἔθους. 4 Καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κάλλιστ' εἴρηται Πλάτωνι καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὡς εἴ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν αὐτοῦ, τὸ περόνην εἶναι τινα
- 20 τὴν ἡδονὴν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐφ' ἐκάστου πράγματος οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν· 5 καὶ ἅμα τέ τις ἡδοῖτ' ἂν ἐφ' ὅτῳ δῆ, καὶ ἅμα περόνην τινὶ δῆτ' ἐντεῦθεν πρὸς αὐτὸ συνδεῖται μάλ' ἄρρηκτα· καὶ ὅς ἄρα κατ' ἔθος ὅτιοῦν, ἢ εὖ τ' ἔχον καὶ μῆ, σύνεστιν ὀτφοῦν πράγματι καὶ
- 25 ἡδεται πάντως ὅτι τοῦτο πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἔθει, σφόδρ' ἔτι περο- νᾶται τῷ ἔθει διὰ τὴν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδονὴν καὶ οὐ ῥᾶστα τέμνεται, δι' ἣν ἄρα τὴν αἰτίαν ὀρωμεν, 6 καὶ ὃ προῦκειτο

7-8 βίον — ποιήσει: Plut., *De tuenda sanit. praec.* 123c; *De exilio* 602b-c; Stob. 3:14.1-2; Galen 5:33.5-6; *Rhet. Her.* 4.24. Cf. *Gnom. Byz.* 126, 186-87; *Gnom. Vat.* 461, 171-72. 19-20 περόνην — τῇ ψυχῇ: cf. Syn., *Dio* 2:249.19-20; Pl., *Phd.* 83d

16 τῷ: τὸ ME

¹⁹ Cf. *Sem.* 6.4.2 below, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον ἀπαραίτητον, πάντως ὃν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἄτμητον.

inevitable part of our life and being may not be possible to eliminate,¹⁹ but perhaps [some people] may be able to handle it better, [namely] those for whom it has happened, through either a divine gift and Fortune, or strength of mind, or indeed both, that they have become used to meeting both suffering and happiness as nobly as possible.

4 There is a saying of the Pythagoreans that seems to me²⁰ excellently put; I find it altogether praiseworthy and often call it to mind: *Choose the best life; habit will make it agreeable.*²¹ For that to which one is accustomed, whatever it is like, is highly conducive to pleasure. 2 The purport of this saying is that one must exercise by habit the soul's inescapable irrational component, which is also by nature surely unseverable, in the higher usages of the *rational* component, and [then], through habit, pleasure, which is congenital and impossible to eliminate [from habit], will with inescapable necessity immediately be added to this exercise.²² 3 Conversely, through pleasure the best of our habits are confirmed and remain stable. The two truly cause each other: that which belongs to pleasure has its essential being²³ in habit, and then, through pleasure, habit is again confirmed and solidified, not to be broken by anything. 4 And it is very well said by Plato (I am not sure that it is not the best thing that he ever said) that pleasure is a 'dress-pin' for the soul in [relation to] every thing where it occurs.²⁴ 5 At the same time that someone takes pleasure in something, whatever it may be, he is also thereby very firmly attached to that thing with a kind of pin. And he who according to some habit, whatever it may be, good or bad, devotes himself to something, whatever it may be, and takes whole-hearted pleasure in this habit (surely this must be so), is still more pierced by the habit because of the pleasure induced when practising it, and is not easily separated [from it], for the reason which we have already seen. 6 That was the point

²⁰ For δοκεῖν cf. above, 6.3.1 εἰρήσθαι.

²¹ A saying attributed to the Pythagoreans by Plutarch (*De sanit. praec.* 123c; *De exil.* 602b–c) and Stobaeus 3:14.1–2.

²² αὐτῷ (governed by συνέσται) probably = αὐταῖς, i.e., ταῖς χρήσεσι τῷ λόγῳ.

²³ *has its essential being*: οὐσιούται (αὐτόθεν not translated).

²⁴ Cf. Synesius, *Dio* 2:249.19–20 ὁ γὰρ θεὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν περόνην ἐποίησε τῇ ψυχῇ, alluding to Plato, *Phaedo* 83d (where the word used is ἦλος, not περόνη); see de Vries-van der Velden (1987, 137 n. 42 [1]).

νῦν λέγειν, ὅτι δὴ πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ αὐτοὶ γε οἱ τῶν πολλῶν
 βελτίους δεινῶς πρόσκεινται καὶ ὡς ἥδιστα προσπάσχουσιν,
 οἷς ἂν ξυλλάχασι καὶ κατ' ἔθος ὀτιοῦν οἰκιωθῶσιν, ἢ τόποις,
 ἢ πατρίσιν, ἢ οἰκίσεσιν, ἢ βίου τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς χρήσει καὶ τύχη, ἢ
 5 κοινωνίαις ἀνθρώπων ἢ πράξεων.

Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν Πυθαγόραν πάντων τῶν σοφῶν
 εὐλαβείας καὶ περὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ: Ζ'

1 Τὴν εἰς τὸν σοφὸν Πυθαγόραν εὐλάβειαν οὐ Πλάτωνος
 μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αὐτοῦ, θαυμάζειν ἔπεισέ μοι
 10 κομιδῇ κατὰ νοῦν λαμβάνοντι τὸ πρὸς πάντας ἀφειδῆς καὶ ἀμ-
 φοτέρων, ὅσοι πρὸ αὐτῶν περὶ σοφίαν ἐπόνησαν καὶ γνώμας
 τινὰς καὶ δόγματα τοῖς μετ' αὐτοὺς ἐξῆς, ὡσπερ τινὰς ἐράνους,
 εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ συντελέσαντες ὥφθησαν. 2 Πλά-
 των μὲν γὰρ οὐθ' ὄλως αὐτοῦ μνησθῆναι μοι δοκεῖ διὰ πάντων
 15 αὐτοῦ συνταγμάτων, ὥστε καὶ ὀτιοῦν | ἐπιπληξάει οἱ καὶ κατε- 57
 λέγξαι τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀποτυγχάνοντα,
 ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ πολλακίς ὀράται
 τοῦτο ποιῶν. 3 Πόθεν; ὅς γε καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν αὐτοῦ περὶ
 φύσεως διὰ Τιμαίου πρὸς ἡμᾶς φθέγγεται, ὃς εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος
 20 τῶν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ Σικελίᾳ, ἢ μᾶλλον ἐρεῖν καὶ ὠντινωοῦν
 ἀπανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς Πυθαγορείων, ἐν πρώτοις μάλιστ' ἐστίν. 4
 Ἀλλὰ καὶ συχνὰ συνέπραξε καὶ εἰς κοινὸν ἦκε Πλάτων τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ὀνομαστοῖς τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ, καὶ συχνὰ
 πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν ἐπιστολαῖς γράμματα. 5 Ἀριστοτέ-
 25 λης δ' αὐτὸς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπάντων μεγαλωνύμων τε καὶ τῆς
 φιλοσοφίας ἐκλόγων προστατῶν καὶ αὐτοῦ γε μὴν Πλάτωνος, ᾧ
 τὰ μέγιστ' ὀφείλειν δίκαιος ἦν, λαμπρῶς κατεξανέστη, καὶ θρι-
 αμβεύει τὰ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ, πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις,
 ἀνέδην ἐμποπεύων, 6 ὡς ἄρ' αὐτὸς κομιδῇ περιγινόμενος τὴν

I wanted to make here, namely, that all men, also those superior to the common people, are fiercely devoted to, and enjoy with the greatest pleasure, those things that they have been allotted and have become familiar with through any kind of habit, be it place, homeland, dwelling, original walk of life and fortune, their circle of companions, or deeds.²⁵

7. On the respect of all wise men towards Pythagoras, and on mathematics

1 I am amazed by the respect shown the wise Pythagoras not only by Plato, but also by Aristotle himself, when I call to mind both philosophers' disrespect for all those who had devoted themselves to wisdom before them, and who were known to have contributed some thoughts and beliefs, for the benefit of their followers, to the common treasure of philosophy. 2 For Plato, I think, does not mention him at all in any of his writings, not even to rebuke or refute him as having misunderstood truth and reality, in the way that he is often seen to do with his other predecessors. 3 And this is hardly surprising, seeing that he utters his most beautiful thoughts on nature through the mouth of Timaeus, who was indeed one of the most distinguished Pythagoreans in Italy and Sicily, or rather anywhere in the whole world. 4 But Plato also often met and co-operated with the other famous Pythagoreans in Italy, and he often wrote letters to them. 5 But Aristotle openly rose up against all the other celebrated and illustrious leaders of philosophy and indeed against Plato himself, whom he justly owed a lot,¹ and he triumphs [against them]—how shall I say—brazenly parading² their views in all his works 6 as if he him-

²⁵ The topic of this essay is discussed also in *Sem.* 32, 'That people like those things which they have become accustomed to for a long time', whereas the opposite is pointed out in *Sem.* 33, 'That many people are dissatisfied with a life, whatever it may be, that is always the same'.

¹ ὀφείλειν δίκαιος ἦν: a mild conflation of two related thoughts: it was *right* that Aristotle should be grateful to Plato, since he *owed* him a lot. For references cf. above, p. 68 n. 9.

² The views of Aristotle's predecessors are forced to walk like captives in his triumphal procession. LSJ only give an intransitive meaning, 'walk in procession', of ἐμπομπεύω. Here however it is more probably transitive, with τὰ κατ' αὐτούς as

ἐπίγνωσιν πᾶσαν τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν ὄντων, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῆς φύσεως εὖ μάλ' ἐπιτυγχάνων, αὐτοὺς δὲ πολὺ τῶν εἰκότων ἕξω φέροντας καὶ πάσης ἐπιτιμήσεως καὶ εὐθύνης ἀξίως. 7 Πρὸς δὲ δὴ Πυθαγόραν οὕτως ἀμέλει φεῖδεται καὶ ἰ σφόδρ' ἄνθρωπος 58
 5 αἰδήμων ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τοῦνομά γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν εὐλαβῶς ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κληθέντων, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἐν πλείστοις τῶν αὐτοῦ, 8 μεμνημένος δ' οὖν τῶν αἵρεσιωτῶν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὐ πάνυ τοι κατατρέχων ὁράται οὐδὲ πικρῶς ἀπτόμενος, ὥσπερ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις συνεχῶς δριμύς ἐπανίσταται καὶ παντὶ 10
 τρόπῳ κατεπιχειρεῖ πλέον αὐτὸς ἔχειν ἐν πᾶσιν, οἷς ἂν σὺν αὐτοῖς κοινῶς προὔθετο.

2 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ μακαρίζω τῆς τύχης ἔγωγε Πυθαγόραν, ἥ συνέλαχεν ἐξαρχῆς εἰς τέλος ἐν Ἑλλησι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν οὐκ ὀλίγοις οὐδὲ φαύλοις γενῶν. Αὐτὸς τε γὰρ ἐν 15
 αἰδοῖ πάση καὶ δόξῃ μεγίστη πόλλ' ἔτη βιώσας, εὖ μάλ' ἀνύσας διαγέγονε, καὶ μέγιστον αὐτοῦ κλέος ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ χρόνοις καὶ τῇ ζῳῇ· 2 καὶ πολλοὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ τοῦ βίου ζηλωταί, καὶ πλείστον ἐσπούδασαν περὶ αὐτόν, ὅσοις ἂν ξυλλάχοι καὶ ὅσοι φοιτήσαιεν ἂν ὅλως ἐς αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἄρα περὶ ἕνα 20
 τιν' ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν πάνυ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν ἐκείνων τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ περιφανῶν καὶ μεγίστης τυχόντων δόξης. 3 Καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτα, πολλοὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐνόμισαν καὶ διεδέξαντο καὶ προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα γεννικῶς, οὐκ ἐν Ἑλλησι μόνον, οὐδ' ἰ ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ τε καὶ Σικελίᾳ, ἥ δὴ μάλιστα πολὺς ὁ 59
 25 Πυθαγόρας ἤκουσεν ἐπὶ πλείστον τῶν χρόνων ἀκμαστικῶς πάνυ τοι, 4 ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ κοιμητῆ πόρρω βαρβάρους καὶ τοῦ κοινῶ γένους αὐτῷ καθάπαξ ἄλλοτριῶις ἀνδράσιν, Αἰγυπτίοις τε καὶ Χαλδαίοις καὶ μὴν ἔτ' ἐκ τούτων Ἀσσυρίοις τε καὶ Πέρσαις, οἷς ἄρα δὴ πολλὰ κοινὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῆς αἵρέσεως τῆς σοφίας, 30
 καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκέιθεν ἀμέλει τῶν αὐτοῦ χρόνων ἄχρι καὶ δεῦρο, καὶ οἷς μὴδ' ἴσως τοῦνομα τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔγνωσται, τὰ ἐκείνου δ' ὅμας σπουδάζεται δόγματα. 5 Καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν τῆς φιλοσο-

15 μάλ': μᾶλλ' E et ut vid. M

self, being superior to them in the full understanding of the truth of reality, had discovered the laws of Nature, whereas they had let themselves be carried far away from what is reasonable, in a way deserving of every reproach and correction. 7 But towards Pythagoras he is so diffident and respectful that he seems to be cautious even regarding the very name also of those named after him, and in most of his writings it is not [mentioned], 8 but when he does mention the man's followers, it can be seen that he does not attack or oppose them sharply, as he is always aggressively opposing the others, and attempting by every possible means to come out on top in every subject that he proposes for treatment in common with them.

2 Therefore I deem Pythagoras happy for his fortune, which he enjoyed from the beginning till the end among the Hellenes, and also among other nations, not few or insignificant. For he himself lived for many years respected by all and with the greatest reputation, working successfully, and his fame was exceedingly great in his own time and during his life. 2 And while he lived he had many adherents of his wisdom and way of life and ardent admirers, both those who were continuously near him and those who studied with him in general, to a degree like no other single man among those famous and illustrious and with the most glorious reputation in philosophy. 3 And when his life came to an end, there were many who adopted and continued and devoted themselves keenly to his philosophical system, not only among the Hellenes or in Italy and Sicily, where Pythagoras most of the time enjoyed a particularly great reputation, 4 but now much further away, among barbarians and men who were totally alien to his common race, Egyptians and Babylonians, and after them Assyrians and Persians, who have much in common with him in their philosophical aims, from his time and up till the present. And there are adherents of the man's doctrines among people who do not even know his name. 5 And that part of philosophy that deals with mathematics

object. I am not sure that it is necessary to change it to ἐκπομπεύων. For πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις see above, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

φίας μοῖρα κατ' ἐκείνον, καὶ οἱ' ἐξ ἐκείνου τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν ἐξε-
 δέχθη καὶ νενόμισται, καὶ τοῖς νῦν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἔθνεσι
 σοφοῖς ἀνδράσι κρατεῖ μάλισθ' ὡς οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ που καὶ ἀλλα-
 χοῦ τῆς γῆς. 6 Καὶ μὴν τοῦτ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸ τῆς μαθηματικῆς
 5 ἐπιστήμης, ἧς τὰ πρῶθ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνὴρ ἐκείνος
 φέρεται, καὶ τῆς εὐδαίμονος καὶ περιφήμου καὶ τιμίας αὐτῷ
 τύχης αἴτιον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι τὴν ζωὴν, καὶ τῆς
 παρὰ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἰδοῦς, τῶν ἄκρων τὴν σο-
 φίαν καὶ πάντας ὑπερφρονησάντων καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους
 10 ἐπιτιμᾶν ἀξιούντων ὡς ὑπευθύνους.

3 Πλάτων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς περὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν τῆς φιλοσο-
 φίας δηλὸς ἐστὶν ὀλικῶς προσέχων καὶ προσκείμενος, καὶ τοσ- 60
 οὔτω γε μάλιστα, ὥστε καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ
 γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἀρχὰς αἰτιᾶσθαι, καὶ πως
 15 ἐντεῦθεν ἀφορμὰς Ἀριστοτέλει δοῦναι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὸ φυσικὸν
 σπουδᾶσασιν αὐτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι, ὡς μὴ κατὰ καιρὸν ἐνταῦθα
 χρώμενον. 2 Καὶ πλείστα Πυθαγόρα κοινὰ καὶ Πλάτωνι, ὅστις
 ἂν νοῦν ἔχων ἐπισκοποῖη, καὶ δόγματα ὁμόλογα, οἷον δὴ τὸ περὶ
 τῆς ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μεταβατικὸν αὐτῆς ἀπὸ σωμα-
 20 τῶν εἰς σώματα, καὶ τὸ προενεῖναι τὰ εἶδη τῶν ὄντων αὐτῇ,
 κἀντεῦθεν τὰς μαθήσεις οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμνήσεις εἶναι, καὶ
 ἄλλ' οὐκ ὀλίγα περὶ τε τοῦ θείου καὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν κρίσεων. 3
 Καὶ ὅλως Πυθαγόρειος Πλάτων εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ μέρος, καὶ πλεί-
 στον μὲν δὴ τὸ πιστὸν τῷ νῦν τούτῳ λόγῳ διὰ τῶν ἐκδεξαμένων
 25 τὰς ἀγράφους αὐτοῦ παραδόσεις, ὡς ἱστορεῖν ἔστι, καὶ τῶν
 αὐτοῦ διαδόχων ἐξῆς· 4 ὑπεμφαίνει δ' οὖν ὅμως καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς
 συντάγμασιν αὐτοῦ, πλείστας ἄρα καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ μαθηματι-
 κοῦ χρήσεις φέροντα καὶ ἐν πλείστοις, καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν
 τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς κράσεις καὶ οἱ τῶν ἀριθμῶν λόγοι πρὸς
 30 τὸ μουσικὸν σύμφωνοι, εἰ δὴ τις ἀμέλει τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν
 ἐτελείσθη, καὶ δύναιτ' ἂν ἐπαίειν καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐπεσθαι. 61
 5 Καὶ πολλῇ καὶ πολλαχοῦ Πλάτωνι κατὰ Πυθαγόραν ἢ περὶ

1 οἱ' scripsi, οἱ' PM, οἱ E 2 τοῖς s. l. add. M 21 ἄλλ': ἄλλο P 23 ὅλως:
 ὅλος ut vid. E πλάτων εἶναι: εἶναι πλάτων ME

and originates in him, and those of his tenets that were taken over and adopted by his followers, are more valued among the present-day wise men of the peoples mentioned than in any other part of the world that I know of.³ 6 And I think that this, the knowledge of mathematics, in which this man wins the first prize among men, is the cause of the happiness, fame and honour that fell to his lot, both while he lived and after his death, and of the respect shown to him by Plato and Aristotle, these two pinnacles of wisdom, who despised and found themselves justified to reproach everybody else as being culpable.

3 It is evident that in general Plato devoted himself to and studied the mathematical part of philosophy, even to the extent that he alleged mathematical principles as causes in nature and those things that are subject to birth and change,⁴ thereby giving Aristotle and those who studied natural science reason to blame him as being mistaken in his views on this point. 2 And whoever examines the question judiciously can observe that Plato has many things in common with Pythagoras, and similar beliefs, for instance on the immortality of the soul, and its ability to move from one body to another, and that the Forms are laid down in it beforehand, and that, therefore, the process of acquiring knowledge is nothing but recollection, and also not a few things concerning the Divine and ethical judgements. 3 In general, Plato is partly Pythagorean; the strongest proof of this claim is provided by those who received his unwritten doctrines and his later followers. 4 It is however also shown by the content of his own writings, adducing many examples from mathematics in many places, and by the blending in the creation of the World Soul, and by the ratios of the numbers corresponding to musical intervals,⁵ if one is initiated in and capable of understanding music, and of following what he says. 5 Plato often follows Pythagoras in his investigation, or

³ Metochites is referring to contemporary Oriental mathematics and astronomy, which were to some extent known in Constantinople. See Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 4, section "The Persian connection") and Tihon (1981).

⁴ Cf. *Sem.* 13.3.2 (131 and n. 9).

⁵ The examples are taken from the *Timaeus*.

τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ θεωρία, μᾶλλον δὲ σεμνηγορία, καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν κρεῖττονος οὐσίας καὶ ἀρχηγόνου πάντων οὐσιώσεως· καὶ πό-
 νος οὐκ ὀλίγος, τὰ πάντα νῦν εἶναι περὶ τούτων τοῦ Πλάτωνος
 ἐνταῦθα φέρειν. 6 Καὶ τοίνυν ὁ σκοπὸς ἦν νῦν, πῶς ἄρ' ἦν αὐ-
 5 τὸν ἑαυτῷ Πλάτωνα μάχεσθαι καὶ κατελέγειν ἃ τιμᾶ, καὶ περὶ
 ἃ μάλιστ' ἐσπούδακε, καὶ τὸν τούτων ἐξαιρετον ἡγεμόνα καὶ
 ἄρισθ' ὡς οἶόν τ' ἦν ἠνυκότα περὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 παντὸς αἰῶνος ἀνθρώπων, ἴσα τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐθύνην τε καὶ
 καταμωκᾶσθαι ὧν ὀλιγῶρος ἔχει καὶ οὐκ αὐτοῖ γέ εἰσι τάνδρι
 10 τὰ φίλτατα;

4 Ἀριστοτέλης δ' αὖθις, περὶ τὸ φυσικὸν μάλιστα σπουδά-
 σας καὶ πάντων ἐνταῦθα τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ πλέον φέρεσθαι πειρώ-
 μενος, κατατρέχειν αὐτῶν χώραν ἔχει, δριμύς ἀνθρωπος ἐπιθέ-
 σθαι καὶ συνιδεῖν ἀνδρῶν ἐν οἷς σπουδάζουσιν ἀμαρτήματα. 2
 15 Καὶ σπουδάζουσι γε μάλιστα περὶ τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἀόριστον καὶ
 οὐχ ἀπλοῖκόν οὐδ' ἄτρεπτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεφυκὸς ἐπαμφοτερίζειν
 καὶ λαβὰς ἐμπαρέχειν τοῖς τάναντία φρονεῖν αἰρουμένοις καὶ
 λέγειν, ὁποῖόν ἐστιν ἀμέλει τὸ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν θεωρητικόν, καὶ
 ὅσα ῥοῆ καὶ κινήσει καὶ τροπῇ μυρία συμπέφυκε. 3 Τῆς δὲ κατὰ 62
 20 τὸ μαθηματικὸν ἀπλότητος καὶ ἀμεταβλησίας καὶ βεβαιότητος
 εἶ μάλ' ἐπαίω, ἔοικε πᾶσα ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ξυνορᾶν, ὡς
 ἄρα εἴ τις ἂν ἐνταῦθα περάνας ἐντελέστατ' ἔχοι, 4 καὶ τοῦ ὄν-
 τος ἐπιτυχῶς ἐνοειδοῦς τε ὄντος ὡς εἴρηται καὶ ἀσειστῶς ἐστῶ-
 25 σθαι, οἷος ἐνταῦθα τεχνίτης πάσης τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ γνῶμων
 ἀκριβέστατα Πυθαγόρας γέγονε, 5 τί τις ἂν χρῆσαιτό γε λοιπόν;
 καὶ εἰ βούλοιο μάλα φιλονεικεῖν ὑπὸ φιλαυτίας καὶ μάχεσθαι
 πρὸς τὸν εὐτυχῆσαντα καὶ κατωρθωκότ' εἶ μάλα σπουδῆν οὐκ
 εὔτροπον, οὐδὲ τόπον ὅλως ἐμπαρέχουσαν κακουργεῖν, 6 πλην

16 οὐχ ἀπλοῖκόν ex χάπλοικόν corr. E 22 ἔχοι: ἔχει P 28 κατωρθωκότ' ex
 κατορ- corr. M

⁶ Σεμνηγορία perhaps implies a mild criticism, cf. μὴ κατὰ καιρὸν in 7.3.1
 above: Plato is going too far when he supposes that mathematics played a role

rather solemn declarations,⁶ on numbers and on the higher reality, as he deems, and the substantification which is the origin of everything—it would demand great effort to enumerate here and now everything that Plato has to say about these things. 6 And my point is: how could it be possible for Plato⁷ to fight against himself, and refute what he admires and has studied above all, and to censure and mock this exceptional guide, who had accomplished the best possible results in mathematics of all men from time immemorial, in the way that he does all the others whom he despises and who are not exactly his favourites?

4 Aristotle, on the other hand, especially when he studies natural science and tries to surpass all his predecessors in this field, finds opportunities to inveigh against them, a man sharp in attacking and finding faults with others in their work. 2 And they⁸ mostly devote themselves to the indeterminate essence of matter, which is not simple or unchangeable, but rather by nature ambiguous and offering opportunities to people who choose to think and say the most opposite things. Of this description is that faculty of ours which speculates on creation and those innumerable things that are subject to ceaseless flow and motion and change. 3 But Aristotle, realising the simplicity and unchangeability and stability of mathematics, naturally also understood that if someone has accomplished perfect results in this field 4 in a manner hitting upon Reality, this being of a single nature, as was said above, firmly established and impossible to divide into contradictions and opposites, in the way that Pythagoras was an expert with accurate knowledge in the whole of truth, 5 why should anyone [bother to] work in this field in the future? — even if someone through self-love should wish to argue and polemicise against someone else who has achieved and accomplished excellent results in a subject which is not easy to upset⁹ and does not offer any opportunity whatsoever for mischief, 6 unless one longs to appear deranged

also in the creation of the world. As a Christian Metochites is bound to distance himself from such a view.

⁷ Since according to Metochites other philosophers often contradict themselves (cf. *Sem.* 23 and 61), perhaps one should emphasise 'how could it be possible for Plato to fight against himself?'.
⁸ I.e., Aristotle's predecessors.

⁹ I suggest that οὐκ εὐτροπον means 'not easily refuted'. Cf. ἀτρεπτον in 7.4.2 above, περιτρέπειν in 12.4.2 and ἀτρέπτως in 12.5.3 (with note).

εἰ μή τις ἐρᾷ δοκεῖν μελαγχολᾶν καὶ περιφανῶς μαίνεσθαι
κατὰ τῶν σεμνοτάτων καὶ τιμίων κακὸς κακῶς παραβαλλόμε-
νος, αὐτῆς δὴ λέγω τῆς μαθηματικῆς ἕξεως, εἰς ὃ πολλοῦ γε δεῖ,
μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ παντός, τῷ πάντα θαυμαστῷ συνορᾶν Ἄριστο-
5 τέλει. 7 Πόθεν; ὅς γε καὶ εἰσποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν πάντα τρόπον τῇ μα-
θηματικῇ σοφίᾳ πειρᾶται, καὶ οἷός τέ ἐστι κακὸς τούτου γεννικῶς
ἐπιδείκνυσθαι καὶ τῶν πολλῶν πράττεσθαι καὶ οἰκονομεῖν δό-
10 λξαν περὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς ἄρα καὶ περὶ ταύτην ἄριστα καὶ παντελεῖ- 63
ως ἔχοντος. 8 Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἔμοιγε δοκῶ καὶ καθάπαξ ἀπετράπετο
10 τῆς πρὸς τὸν Πυθαγόραν ὀλιγωρίας καὶ βλασφημίας κοινῇ μετὰ
Πλάτωνος, ὡς ἄρα περὶ τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ ἀναμφήριστα τῶν
ὄντων τε καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐσπουδακότα, καὶ μάλ' ἐπιτυχῶς
τῆς αὐτῶν ἀπλότητος καὶ παντάπασιν ἀνεμεσήτως ἀνύσαντα,
καὶ θαυμάζειν μᾶλλον ἀξίως.

15 Ὅτι πᾶσι σύνηθες τοῖς σοφοῖς εἰρωνεῖα καὶ τὸ
χαριεντίζεσθαι, καὶ Πλάτωνι μάλιστα καὶ
Σωκράτει: Η'

1 Χαρίεντές γέ εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ πλείστοι πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν
πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας καὶ πολλῇ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰρωνεῖα
20 χρώμενοι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅστις οὐ, 2 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν καὶ μεθ' ὅτι
πλείστης κακοηθείας τε καὶ δυσνοίας ἐπιφερόμενοι καὶ τῆς ἐν
βάθει πικρίας ἰῶ κεχρωσμένα τῇ γλώττῃ πέμποντες ἔσωθεν βέ-
λη, καὶ τὸ βάσκανον σφᾶς ὀπλίζει, κἂν εἰ ἔστιν ὅτε τὴν ἐλευθε-
ρίαν πλάττωνται, 3 οἱ δ' ἐξεπιπολῆς, πῶς ἂν εἴποι | τις, εὐκολία 64
25 καὶ ἤθους καὶ γλώττης χαίροντες καὶ οὐ παντάπασιν ἀηδῶς οὐ-
δὲ φορτικῶς ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος χρώμενοι, πάσης σκηνης κακούργου
ἀλλότριου καὶ δράματος · 4 καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ δηγματῶδες
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐ καθάπαξ ἀφιλόνητον, οὐδ' εὖ μάλ' ἐπιτι-

22-23 ἰῶ — βέλη: cf. Pi., O. 2.83 ff.

2 κακὸς in rasura scriptum P 18 -λειστ- in rasura scriptum P 22 κεχρωσ-
μένα ex κεχρωσμένοι corr. P²

and clearly mad, wantonly opposing oneself against the most exalted and venerable men (I mean in mathematical knowledge), something which Aristotle with his admirable understanding of all things is far, indeed as far as possible, from doing. 7 And this is hardly surprising, seeing that he is trying by every means to have himself adopted by the mathematical science, and is capable of showing off on this account and of securing and winning¹⁰ fame for himself from people in general, as if he were a great and perfect expert also in this field. 8 Therefore, I think, he once and for all, in common with Plato, abstained from disparaging and blaspheming against Pythagoras, since the latter had devoted himself to the most important and incontestable elements of reality and knowledge, achieving results which hit upon the simplicity of these things and were completely blameless and worthy of admiration.

8. That usually all wise men are ironic and witty, especially Plato and Socrates

1 Most wise men in ancient times and nowadays are witty and frequently use irony towards those with whom they converse, and I do not know of anyone who does not; 2 but some of them also attack with the greatest possible malevolence and ill-will and send with their tongue arrows from within dipped in the poison of their deep-seated bitterness;¹ they are armed by spite, even though they sometimes feign a liberal attitude. 3 But others like to light-heartedly display—how shall I put it²—good temper of both character and speech, and to use irony straightforwardly without the least unpleasantness or vulgarity because they are alien to any kind of evil-minded staging and intrigue. 4 Even the biting quality in their words is not, in fact, totally inhuman or, in consequence, extremely aggressive towards

¹⁰ Here οἰκονομεῖν is obviously a near-synonym of πράττεσθαι.

¹ 'arrows from within': perhaps an allusion to Pindar, *O.* 2.83 ff., where βέλη is used metaphorically (of poetry): πολλά μοι ὑπ' ἀγκώνος ὠκέα βέλη ἔνδον ἐντὶ φαρέτρας φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν | ... | τίνα βάλλομεν ἐκ μαλθακῶς αὐτε φρενὸς εὐκλέας οἰστοὺς ἰέντες;

² πῶς ἂν εἶποι τις: cf. above, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

θέμενον ἔπειθ' ἐξῆς οἷς προσπαίζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἴσως μὲν ἀνύτον εἰς ὄνησίν τινα, ἴσως δ' ἄλλως οὕτωςί πως φέρον, μηδὲ προσποιούμενον σκοποῦ τινος πέρας, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον, ὡς ἐρεῖν, τοῦ κόρδακος ἔνεκεν.

- 5 2 Ἐπαντά γε μὴν καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐνορᾶν ἢ τῷ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Σωκράτει, εἰ δὲ βούλει μάλιστ' ἀμφοῖν, ᾧ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγὼ τίθεμαι. 2 Οὕτε γὰρ τοσαῦτα φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε καταψεύδεσθαι Σωκράτους Πλάτωνα καὶ τάλλοτριώτατα τοῦ ἦθους τε καὶ τοῦ βίου ἀνδρὶ φιλάτῳ συκοφαντοῦντα φέρειν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν εἰδόσι τοῖς πλείοσιν ἐκείνον ἐκείνῳ τοῖς λόγοις χρώμενον, 3 οὕτ' αὖθις, εἰ μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔχαιρε καὶ αὐτὸς Πλάτων καὶ χαίρων εἶθιστο χρῆσθαι παραπλησίως καί, εἰ ταῦτ' ὄντως ἐκείνου, τοῖς ἐκείνου καὶ αὐτὸς προσέκειτο στέργων ἐπιεικῶς ὅλη ψυχῆς αἰρέσει, 4 πολὺς ἂν ἦν
- 15 | ὁ Σωκράτης διὰ πάντων αὐτῶ τῶν λόγων οὕτω χρώμενος, οὓς 65 εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀνθρώποις ἅπασιν ἐξῆς συνετάττετο κομιδῇ σπουδάζων προγράμματά τινα καὶ στήλας καὶ κηρύγματα τοῦ βίου τε καὶ τῆς σοφίας ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ φίλου Σωκράτους. 5 Καὶ ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ἀκούειν ἔχομεν τῶν ἱστορούντων περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὡς ἄρα τοιούτῳ χρωμένων ἦθει καὶ τοιούτοις ἀμέλει τοῖς λόγοις ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, 6 ὥστε καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ φασιν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος καὶ ἡ τοῦ βίου χρῆσις Πλάτωνι μὲν αἴτιον γέγονε τοῦ καθάπαξ ἐκφυγεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πατρίδος πράττειν μετὰ σοφίας τοσαύτης,
- 25 καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος Ἀθήνησι βιώσαντι· 7 Σωκράτει δ' ἔπραξεν ἐνταῦθα πολιτευομένῳ σωφρόνας τε καὶ δικαίως καὶ μετ' ὀρθῶν, ὡς εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος, τῶν λογισμῶν κακῶς ἀπαλλάξαι, καὶ ὅλως τὸ κώνειον τοῦ θανάτου συνεκέρασαν ἢ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων αὐτῷ, φῆμ' ἔγωγε, πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀηδία,

3-4 τοῦ κόρδακος ἔνεκεν: Ar., Nu. 555; cf. Aristid., *Katà τῶν ἐξορχουμένων* 412.18 Jebb

5 μὴν om. P 7 τίθεμαι ex τίθειαι corr. P¹ 13 αὐτὸς + μὴ s. I. P²

those whom they mock; but perhaps it achieves something useful or again, perhaps, it evolves planlessly without claiming to accomplish a specific goal, but only, so to speak, for the sake of jesting.³

2 In fact all this can be seen in Plato, or in the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, or, if you prefer it, indeed in both, a view to which I would rather subscribe. 2 For I do not think that Plato would falsely attribute to Socrates all these things and slanderously bring forward traits totally alien to the character and life of a person most dear to him, and especially since he used the man in his writings among people who for the most part knew him, 3 nor again, unless Plato himself also had delighted in irony and therefore was accustomed to use it in a similar manner and had, as one might imagine, whole-heartedly adopted⁴ Socrates' attitudes (if they were really his), 4 would Socrates have behaved in this manner throughout Plato's dialogues, which he composed for the common good of all future generations, when with great seriousness he wrote a kind of proclamations, monuments and declarations on life and wisdom on behalf of himself and his friend Socrates. 5 And at the same time, moreover, we can hear about both of them from those who have written about them that their attitude and words towards those with whom they conversed were always coloured by irony.⁵ 6 Therefore some people say that this attitude and way of life was the reason why Plato altogether kept away from politics and involving himself with all his wisdom in the common affairs of the state, even though he lived in Greece and, of all Greek cities, in Athens. 7 But in the case of Socrates, who lived there so modestly, justly and with such fair judgement as no one else, I would say that the dislike of him on the part of those who conversed with him brought about that he died in a bad manner and actually prepared the deadly hemlock, 8 since these people jointly and

³ The *kordax* was an undignified dance characteristic of comedy; cf. Dover's commentary to *Clouds*, v. 540, and s.v. *κόρδαξ* in *RE*. The expression *τοῦ κόρδακος οὔνεχ'* is also quoted by Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 34 (*κατὰ τῶν ἐξορχουμένων*), 47 Keil (= p. 412 Jebb).

⁴ It is interesting to note that P² (i.e., Nikephoros Gregoras [?]) has lost the thread in this huge sentence and added a superfluous *μή* above *αὐτὸς προσέκειτο* (8.2.3) in P.

⁵ I do not know which writers Metochites is referring to here.

8 κοινή τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὕβριν δοκούντων καὶ ὑπερηφανίαν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μετ' εἰρωνείας ἐλέγχους ἐκάστοτε ἐκάστους κακοήθειάν τε καὶ δύσνοιαν ἄκρατόν τε καὶ ἀπολίτευτον.

- 5 3 Καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι μὲν καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ἡμῖν· ἀλλὰ καὶ 66
Ξενοφῶντες ἐν ὑπομνήμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Αἰσχίνοι διαλεγόμενοι, πολλὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ὑπεμφαίνουσι τῷ Σωκράτει τὴν εἰρωνείαν καὶ τὴν ἀηδίαν ἐντεῦθεν, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, τῶν ἀκουόντων. 2 Καὶ δῆλόν γε τοίνυν κακὰ τούτων, ὡς οὐ πάνθ' 10 ἡμῖν οἴκοθεν ὁ Πλάτων φθέγγεται ἢ παρὰ Σωκράτους φθέγγεται, ἀλλ' εἰσὶ γε μάλισθ' οἱ λόγοι τῷ ἀνδρὶ γνήσιοι καὶ σφόδρ' ἐπαληθεύοντες αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ Σωκράτους βίῳ καὶ τρόπῳ. 3 Πολὺς δ' ὅμως ὁ ἐν Πλάτωνι Σωκράτης ἢ ὁ ἐν Σωκράτει Πλάτων, εἰ δ' οὖν, ὡς ἔφη, ἔστω γε κοινὸς ἀμφοῖν ὁ ἐρμῆς κατὰ τὴν παρ- 15 ομιάν· 4 πολὺς δ' οὖν τὴν εἰρωνείαν παντὶ γε πρὸς ὃν οἱ λόγοι, εἴτε σκυτεὺς τίς ἐστὶν εἴτ' οἰκοδόμος εἴτε ναυπηγὸς εἴτε κεραμεὺς εἴθ' ὅστις τέχνης ἡστινοσοῦν ἐπιμελητῆς, καὶ αὐθις εἴτε βουλευτῆς καὶ προστάτης τῆς πόλεως καὶ ὅλως τὰ κοινὰ πράττων εἴτ' ἰδιώτης, καὶ γ' ἔτι εἴτε πρεσβύτης εἴτε νέος εἴθ' ἡστινος 20 ἡλικίας ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ, 5 καὶ μὴν ἔτ' αὐθις εἴτε ῥητορείας καὶ τοῦ λέγειν τεχνίτης εἴτε σοφιστείας εἴτ' ἀληθοῦς φιλοσοφίας ἐστὶν ἐραστής εἴτ' ἐποποιὸς αὐτὸς εἴτ' ἄλλοτριῶν πόνων ὑποκριτής τε καὶ ῥαψωδός. 6 Ἄπασι γὰρ εὖ μάλ' ἀνήρ, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραπλησίως πᾶσι, μὴδ' ἐκ περινοίας μὴδὲ δυσνοίας, ἢ ἀλλ' ἔσ- 67

14 κοινὸς — ἐρμῆς: Arist., *Rh.* 1401a 22; Diog. V 38 in *CPG* I 259.1–2; Plut., *Maxime cum princ. philos. esse diss.* 777d; Luc., *Navig.* 12.

6 αἰσχίνοι: αἰσχίνοι ME 18 τῆς om. P

⁶ The Greek title of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* is usually given as ἀπομνημονεύματα, sometimes with an added explanatory Σωκράτους (Schmid & Stählin, 225 n. 5). Ὑπομνημονεύματα is found in Eustathios, *Ad Il.* 3:449.11–12 Ξενοφῶν ἐν τοῖς κατ' αὐτὸν Ὑπομνημονεύμασι (*RE* s.v. Xenophon, vol. IX A 2, coll. 1776 f.). 'Aeschines' refers to Aeschines from Sphettus, the pupil of Socrates, whose famous Socratic dialogues have been preserved in fragments. The juxtaposition of Socrates, irony, Xenophon, and Aeschines is strongly re-

individually deemed his conduct to be insulting and arrogant, and thought the ironic questions that he always used in his discussions to be malevolence and ill-will, both unbridled and unsociable.

3 And this we know from history. But also people like Xenophon in his 'Memoirs', also people like Aeschines in his dialogues,⁶ indicate Socrates' frequent use of irony in his discussions and conversations, and the dislike that this necessarily created in his listeners. 2 Thus it appears clearly also from these sources that Plato does not himself invent everything that Socrates says, but that his utterances are in fact genuine to the real person, and have the ring of truth as far as the actual life and character of Socrates is concerned. 3 There is, however, much of Socrates in Plato or of Plato in Socrates, or, to put it differently,⁷ let both, as I just said, have a *common Hermes*, according to the proverb.⁸ 4 Thus Socrates always uses irony towards every person with whom he talks: shoemakers, builders, shipwrights, potters, or any other craftsmen; or, again, members of the Council (protectors of the city, wholly engaged in politics), private citizens, old men, young men, or those of any age in between; 5 and again, experts in rhetoric and the art of speaking, lovers of sophistry or of true philosophy, epic poets or declaimers and rhapsodes of the works of others. 6 He really fastens himself on everybody,⁹ albeit not in the same degree, nor out of cunning or ill-will

miniscent of Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 18.5 'What did Socrates mean by these clever remarks, allegorical or ironic as they may be? Let us hear an answer on his behalf from Plato or Xenophon or Aeschines or another of his intimates.' (trans. Trapp 1997b, 163); it is not unlikely that Metochites had that passage in mind here. *Sem.* 17.3.3 confirms that Metochites was familiar with Maximus (as was Nikephoros Gregoras; see Trapp *ibid.*, lxi–lxv). Cf. Bydén (below, p. 249; also *idem*, forthcoming, chap. 5).

⁷ The idiomatic expression εἰ δ' οὖν, which means something like 'or if not', 'let me phrase it differently', occurs several times in the *Semeioseis*, e.g. in 10.1.4: τάχ' ἂν εἶεν αὐτοὶ δὶς γε τοσοῦτων ἄξιοι, εἰ δ' οὖν, ἔστω τετράκις ἢ δεκάκις 'they may be worth twice as much as such people—or [if you are not satisfied with that] let us say four or ten times as much'; 16.3.4 ἢ πάσα, εἰ δ' οὖν ἢ πλείων, πρόθεσις. Cf. Karlsson (1962, 144–45).

⁸ κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς: a proverbial saying, meaning 'luck is common' and applied to things or people sharing or dividing a find. The expression occurs first in Aristotle.

⁹ Probably a reference to Plato's *Apology* 30e–31a, where Socrates likens himself to a gadfly (μύωψ) tormenting (πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων) a large and noble but

τιν οὐ καὶ ῥῶον καὶ ἀποιήτως βάθους τινὸς καὶ δεινότητος, ἅπασι δ' οὖν ἐπιφύεται. 7 Καὶ εἰ δὴ τις ἄλλος ὡς ἀληθῶς τῶν σοφῶν, Πλάτων μάλιστ' εἰρωνεῖα χαίρει πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας πάσης εὐλαβείας ἔξω καὶ παντὸς ὄκνου· πάνυ τοι θαρ-
 5 ρῶν ἔοικεν ἐαυτῷ, καὶ οὐχ ἥττόν γε τῆ πρὸς ὃ βούλοιτ' ἂν εὐστομίᾳ ἢ τῷ τῆς σοφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἥθους παντελεῖω τε καὶ ὀρθῷ, ἄκρος ἀνὴρ κατ' ἀμώτερα.

“Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς νοεῖ τις λέγειν: Θ’

1 Κοινὸν ἄρα τοῦτο πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τοῖς τε ἀμαθεστέροις καὶ
 10 τοῖς ἐν τῷ λέγειν τὰ μέγιστα δυναμένοις, τὸ μὴ ῥᾶστ' ἐξεῖναι μηδ' ἔχειν λέγειν, ἅττ' ἂν νοῶσιν ὡς ἄρα νοοῦσι καὶ λέγειν βούλονται. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τί τις ἂν ἔχοι λέγειν, ὅπως' ἐξωθεν ἐπέχει τὴν τῶν λόγων φορᾶν; 2 Ἡ δέος ἴσως ὑποπτευόμενον, ὡς μὴ μάλα τοι συνοῖσον τοῖς ἐροῦσιν οἶμαι, ἦν ἀμέλει
 15 λέγοιεν ὅ τι ἂν ξυνορῶεν καὶ προφέρειν δοκιμάζοιεν ἐκάστοτε δι' ἀγροικίαν φαύλων δεσποτῶν ἢ αὐθάδειαν καὶ ὕβριν, οἷ βούλοιντ' ἂν | ἅπαντας συνανοηταίνειν σφίσιν ἢ συνακολασ- 68
 ταίνειν ἐν οἷς ἂν κρίνωσι καὶ νοῶσι καὶ λέγωσι, 3 καὶ τὰς αὐτάς ψήφους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἀφρονεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι τῶν ὄντων ἔκ-
 20 τροπα· εἰ δὲ μή, κλάοιεν ἂν ὅσοι τοι δόξαιεν ἂν ἐπαίειν βέλτιον, καὶ μὴ παντάπασιν ἀσυνέτως καὶ ἀτρέπτως καὶ ἀνεπιστρόφως πάντων πραγμάτων, καὶ ἀρρεπῶς ὀρητοῦν ὡς περ αἰσκιαὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐποιντ' ἂν. 4 Ἡ καὶ δυσωπία τις ἐνίοτε, οἷα δὴ ξυμβαίνει πολλάκις ἀποτρέπεσθαι καὶ πραγμάτων καὶ
 25 λόγων δυσωπουμένους, ὡς ἂν μή πού τι παραφθέγγαιντ' ἀηδὲς ἢ ὀρητοῦν φέρον ἀνίαν, οἷς οὐ βούλονται· ἢ προσπάθει' αὐτίς νικῶσα τὴν κρίσιν τῶν λόγων καὶ τὰς ἀμείνους ψήφους διὰ φίλ-

10 τὰ μέγιστα: τὰμέγιστα P 12 βούλονται: βούλεται ut vid. E 14 τοῖς ἐροῦσιν οἶμαι: οἶμαι τοῖς ἐροῦσιν ME 15 ξυνορῶεν: ξυνορῶμεν E 17 βούλοιντ': βούλοιτ' E et a. c. M 20 τοι: τι ME

(although at times rather thoughtlessly and without the refinement of some inner depth and talent),¹⁰ but still he enmeshes everybody. 7 Of all wise men Plato is the one who most delights in irony towards the people he meets, beyond all respect and hesitation. He certainly seems to have confidence in himself, and no less in the eloquence directed towards his aims, than in his perfection and uprightness of wisdom and character—an exceptional man in both respects.

9. That it is impossible to express one's thoughts

1 All men have this in common, both the most uneducated and those most accomplished in the art of rhetoric, that they cannot¹ easily express what they think in the way they think and wish to express it. And to begin with all the other, external things that hinder the [free] flow of speech, what can one say? 2 There may be fear and suspicion on the part of those who wish to speak that it will not be to their advantage if they actually utter their thoughts and choose to express them on a given occasion, because of the brutality, wilfulness and cruelty of depraved rulers, who would like everybody to join them in depravity or licentiousness² in their judgements, thoughts and speech, 3 and hold the same opinions as *they* do, and think and want the same perverse things. If not, those will come to grief who seem to understand better and do not follow them quite imprudently or unhesitatingly or heedlessly of all things and unwaveringly, in the way that shadows [follow] bodies. 4 Sometimes the reason may be consideration, as for instance it often happens that people desist from both actions and speech because they are considerate and wish to avoid uttering anything that is unpleasant or in any way hurtful to people they do not want to hurt, or, again, there may be some par-

somewhat sluggish horse, the Athenian people. The verb used here, ἐπιφύεται, is rather strong, meaning 'grow upon' or 'attach oneself'; Metochites may be inspired by its use in Plutarch, e.g. in *Alex.* 55.2; *Dem.* 14.4 ('persist'); *Per.* 33.8 ('harass'); *Pomp.* 51.6; *Quaest. conv.* 694e and 712d ('attack').

¹⁰ ἀποιήτως: 'in a way unaffected by', c. gen. Cf. *Sem.* 25.1.9 ἀπλάστω πάσης κατ' αὐτὸν ἀστειότητος 'unformed by any elegance like [Plato's]'.
¹ Impersonal ἐξείναι (sc. αὐτοῖς) co-ordinated with personal ἔχειν.

² Συνανοηταίνω: LSJ give one instance of this word (Sch. E. *Ph.* 394); I have found nothing in TLG. The simple ἀνοηταίνω occurs in Plato and in later writers.

τατα ἢ τινας ἐπιτηδείους ἢ ὅλως οἷς αὐτοὶ προσκείμεθα. 5 Καὶ
 δηλοῖ γ' ἐσμέν, ἦν τις ἐπαίη, ἢ τῷ μὴ τυγχάνειν εὐγνωμόνων
 ἀκροατῶν, καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα³ ἡμῖν νῦν γε εἶναι τοῖς λόγους
 ἔχουσιν ὄψε τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης βιοτῆς· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 5 ἔστι ξυλλαχεῖν σχεδὸν οὐδέσιν, οἱ τὸν νοῦν προσέξουσι τοῖς
 λεγομένοις ἦν ὅτιοῦν τις δύναιτο λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκτρέπονται πάν-
 τες ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ φεύγουσιν ὡς παραληροῦντα, 6 οἱ μὲν δι'
 ἀβελτηρίαν παντάπασι καὶ ἀμαθίαν, καὶ τὸ φαύλως πράττειν
 καὶ ἰ ἀναισθητῶς τὸν βοσκηματώδη τρόπον, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ 69
 10 πᾶν τὸ παρὸν καὶ φαινόμενον ἐν χερσὶν εὐπεριφρόνητον ἄγειν
 καὶ μόνοις προσανέχειν ἀξιοῦν καθάπαξ τοῖς ἄνω καὶ πόρρω
 μάλιστα τῶν χρόνων, 7 ὡς ἐκείνους ἀμέλει τυχόντας τῆς φύ-
 σεως ἀκμαζούσης καὶ φύσεως ὄντας εὐγενῆ φοράν καὶ τῆς τύ-
 χης τῶν βελτίστων καιρῶν, ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς νῦν ἥδη νοσοῦση καὶ
 15 φθινοῦση ξυλλαχόντας τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν
 ὅτιοῦν ἀνύτειν ἀστεῖον ἔχοντας. 8 Οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ βασκανίαν
 οὐδὲ προσορᾶν ὅλως οἰοῖ τ' εἰσίν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ οὐδὲν βούλον-
 ται τοῖς ὁμοτέχνους ἢ ἀντιτέχνους ἐρεῖν ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ συγχο-
 ροῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμέλει λογιζέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀηδέστατα
 20 πάνθ' ὀρώσι καὶ λεγόμενα παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ πραττόμενα, μᾶλλον
 δὲ οὐδ' ὀρᾶν βούλονται, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς μόνοις ἀβλεπεῖν, καὶ
 μηδ' ὅτιοῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι μηδὲ ζῆν ὅλως.

2 Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν, ἢ καὶ ἴσως ἄλλ' ἔτι πλείω· καὶ οὐ ῥάδιον
 ἀριθμεῖν ἅπανθ' ἐξῆς, ὁπόσ' ἔξωθεν ὡς ἔφην ἐπέχει καὶ προσ-
 25 ἵσταται, περὶ ὧν ἂν τις ἐννοήσειεν, οὐκ ἔξω πάνυ τοι τοῦ και-
 ροῦ, καὶ λέγειν ἔχοι. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅπερ μάλιστα⁴ εἶχον ἐν νῷ καὶ
 κοινὸν ἅπασιν ἐπιθέμην ἀνθρώποις, 2 ὅτι μὴ πέφυκε, μῆδ' ὅστις
 εὐγενῆς πάνυ τοι ἢ τὴν γλῶτταν μῆδ' ὅστις ἦττον ἔχει, καὶ πολ- 70
 λῷ γ' οὗτος μᾶλλον, εἰ γε πάντως τοῦτο δηλόν, ἰκανώσασθαι

26 ἔχοι: ἔχειν ME

³ *people*: or 'things', neuter.

⁴ For this complaint, and the expression 'say something' = 'say something important, interesting', cf. *Sem.* 1.

tiality that defeats the judgement of arguments and the better opinion because of [our affection for] our nearest and dearest, our companions, or people³ we ourselves like in general. **5** And it is clear to those with insight that we also [desist from speaking] because we cannot obtain benevolent listeners. This is the situation particularly for us who devote ourselves to scholarly pursuits nowadays, late in time and human history. For it is almost impossible to find anyone who is willing to take account of what is said, if someone should be able to say something,⁴ but everybody is put to flight as it were, and avoids such a person as if he were talking nonsense, **6** some owing to complete stupidity and ignorance, because they are inept and unperceptive like brutes, others also because they hold in contempt everything that is contemporary and at hand, and only deign to take notice of people who lived far back in history, **7** as if those men partook of human nature at its culmination, and were a superior harvest of nature and of fortune at the most excellent period of time, whereas we who live now partake of a nature that is already ailing and deteriorating and [live in such] a period, and are incapable of achieving anything valuable whatsoever. **8** Others again are so envious that they cannot bear even the sight [of other people's excellence]. Not only do they not want to speak well of their colleagues or rivals, but they do not even allow themselves to take notice of them. They see everything said or done by them with the utmost revulsion, or rather, they do not want to see them at all, but, only regarding these people, to be blind, and not even have sense-perception, yes, not even be alive at all.⁵

2 These things, and perhaps more—it is not easy to enumerate everything that externally, as I said, holds [one] back and stands in the way regarding anything that one might not entirely inappropriately think and have to say. But what I particularly had in mind, and propose that all men have in common, is this: **2** It is not given by nature either to the accomplished speaker or to one less accomplished (and obviously this is true especially concerning the latter) to possess a tongue that is a match for his mind, and be sufficiently en-

⁵ It seems rather strange to say that they would rather be dead than take notice of their rivals, but of course *αὐτοῖς μόνοις* makes all the difference. We would use the reverse perspective: 'to me they do not exist'; 'to cut someone dead'.

τὴν γλῶτταν τῷ νῶ, καὶ τὴν τῆς ἐρμηνείας αὐτῷ φωνὴν καὶ τὸν ἀγγέλλοντα λόγον, περὶ ὧν ξυνορᾷ τις ἔσω καὶ λογισμοῖς ἄπτεται, διαρκῶς ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν καὶ παρρησίᾳ καὶ τρανώς εὖ μάλα δῆλον τὸ νοούμενον θέσθαι. 3 Ἄλλὰ πάσης εὐστομίας ἄμεινον
 5 ὁ νοῦς ἔνδον ἀνύτει καὶ πάντ' ἐλάττω τῆς γνώμης ἔξω τῇ γλώττη πρόεισιν, ὅσα πρόεισι καὶ καθιστορεῖ τὴν τῶν λογισμῶν ἔσω διοίκησιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν. 4 Καὶ ἴσως τοῖς μὲν τοῦτο μᾶλλον, τοῖς δ' ἦττον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀληθές καὶ αὐτὸς τίθεμαι, τὴν τοῦ λέγειν δύναμιν τισι βέλτιον ἢ τισιν ἄλλοις ἡσκήσθαι, καὶ παρὰ
 10 τὴν φύσιν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, πρὸς τὸ καθυπουργεῖν τῇ νοήσει καὶ τῇ βουλήσει, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλου προφέρειν καὶ ἦττον ἔχειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ ἴσως τὸν μὲν ἐπιτυχέστατα καὶ παντελείως ἐνίστε περὶ ὧν προτίθεται λέγειν, τὸν δὲ μή. 5 Ἄλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ πάντων ἅμα πραγμάτων ὧν ἂν ξυνορᾷ τις, οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως
 15 ἔχει λέγειν, οὐδ' ὡς ἂν ἰκανῶς τε καὶ ἰσομετρήτως τῇ χρεΐᾳ, οὐδ' ὅστις αὐτὸς ὡς βέλτιστα λέγειν ἤπερ ἔφην ἡσκηται.

3 Πλατωνικὸς μὲν οὖν λόγος οὗτος εἰ δὴ τις καὶ ἄλλος εὖ εἰρημένος, ὅτι θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπόν, φράσαι δὲ καὶ διερμηνεῦσαι ἀδύνατον· καὶ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀληθές, οὕτω παντὸς μᾶλλον
 20 ἐστὶν ἀληθές· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ θεοῦ οὔτε νοήσαντα οὔτ' εἰπόντα πᾶν ὅτιοῦν, ἔπειτ' εὖ ἀνύσαι, οὐδ' ἂν ὅστις μάλιστα⁶ ἀκριβέστερος ἢ τρανότερος ἐρεῖν. 2 Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ πάντα σχεδόν, ὅσα ἀξιολογώτερα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ὧν ἐργώδης ἐστὶν ἢ κατάληψις, ὡσάυτως κατιδεῖν ἔστιν, ὅστις ἐπαίει τε καὶ ἀληθεύειν βούλεται, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰκανῶς τῷ νῶ καὶ τοῖς ἔνδον
 25 λογισμοῖς λέγοντα καὶ διαγγέλλοντ' ἀπαντᾶν. 3 Ἄλλὰ νοούμεν ἐνίστε καὶ περὶ ἐνίων, εἰ καὶ μὴ καθάπαξ τῶν εἰκότων ἐπι-

18-19 θεὸν — ἀδύνατον: cf. Greg. Naz., *Or.* 28.4; Pl., *Tim.* 28c

2 ἔσω: ἔστω ut vid. P 20 ἐστὶν + λέγειν P² 22 τρανότερος p. c. P¹, τρανώτερος ME 23 ὅσα: ὅσ' ME 25 ἰκανῶς: ἰκανὸς ME

⁶ Plato, *Timaeus* 28c τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν, referred to e.g. by

dowed with a voice that expresses it, or speech that discloses the things that he understands and reflects upon in his mind, so that he is able to freely and clearly reveal—this is obvious—what he has thought. **3** But the achievements of the mind within are always superior to even the greatest eloquence; that which comes out by means of the tongue, and attempts to report the organisation and activity of the cogitations within, is always less than the thought. **4** This may affect some more than others; it is true, and I admit it: the ability to speak is more trained in some than in others, owing both to nature and to practice, relative to serving the thought and the intention; one person may be superior or inferior to another in this respect; it may occur now and then that someone is completely successful in that which he has proposed to speak about, whereas someone else is not. **5** But the truth is that all the things, taken together, that someone understands, he cannot explain equally well, not so as to [express them] sufficiently or in a way that meets his needs, not even if, as I said before, he has trained himself as well as possible in the art of rhetoric.

3 This, if anything, is well put by Plato: that it is difficult enough to conceive of God, but to describe and explain him is impossible.⁶ And since this [sc. one's conception of God] is true, it is consequently particularly [impossible to describe and explain a thing that is] true.⁷ For whatever one thinks or says about God, one cannot be successful, not even if one is capable of speaking extremely accurately and clearly. **2** But also regarding practically all things that are highly important and require a great effort to grasp one can observe the same thing (if one understands and wishes to be truthful), [namely] that it is impossible by means of speech and declarations to adequately match the mind and the cogitations within. **3** Sometimes when we ponder upon some things, even if we are by no means perfectly successful in our conclusions, we do not fail completely to hit

Gregory of Nazianzus (*Or.* 28.4), who, like Metochites, writes *νοῆσαι* instead of *εὔρεῖν*. The expression may have occurred in the *florilegia* (cf. de Vries-van der Velden 1987, 137 f., n. 42 [2]).

⁷ I.e., Plato's words may equally well be applied to the truth as to God (since God *is* truth). A tentative translation of an extremely elliptical and obscure sentence. P² added *λέγειν* before the second *ἀληθές*, but this is hardly helpful (unless he interpreted the passage to mean 'as this is true, it is particularly difficult to say [anything that is] true,' which sounds like nonsense).

τυχεῖς καὶ παντέλειοι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόρρω παντάπασι τῶν δικαίων
 τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἄλλος ἴσως ἄλλου βέλτιόν τε καὶ χειρόν·
 ἀτὰρ δὴ κατὰ τὸ τῶν ναρκώντων πάθος ἢ τὰ καθ' ὑπνοὺς φαν-
 τάσματα, ἀκίνητοῦμεν εἰς τὸ λέγειν περὶ ὧν νοοῦμεν, καὶ
 5 σφόδρ' ἐρῶντες καὶ ὀρμώμενοι. 4 Καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιβάλλοντες
 λέγειν, οὐκ ἔχομεν ὅ τι χρώμεθ' ἄν, περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα, οὐδ'
 ὅπως ἂν περιγενοίμεθα τὰς τῆς διανοίας ἐργασίας καὶ περατώ- 72
 σεις ἕξω προφέρειν ἄλλοις καὶ λόγοις ἀναζωγραφεῖν εἰς προῦ-
 πτον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἀναμάττεσθαι τᾶνδον τυπώματα καὶ δι' ἔρμη-
 10 νευτικῆς καὶ λογικῆς καθιστορήσεως εὖ μάλ' ὑποδεικνύειν, 5
 ἀλλ' ἀποροῦμεν περὶ ὧν ξυνορῶμεν λέγειν διαρκῶς, καὶ οἷς
 προσπάσχομεν καὶ συνδιατιθέμεθα νοεραῖς ἐπαφαῖς, οὐκ ἔχο-
 μεν ἱκανῶς ἀγγέλλοντα λόγον, οὐδ' ἐκφαίνοντα τοὺς ἔνδον
 καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἴσως θησαυροὺς οὐστυνας ἄρα τῆς καταλή-
 15 ψεως· καὶ δυστυχοῦμεν τὸ ἀνεπίδεικτον τῶν τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς
 γνώμης πλούτων δι' ἀτονίαν χρήσεως περὶ τὸ λέγειν. 6 Αἰ αἰ
 ποσάκις ἔγωγ' αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑμαυτοῦ πεπείραμαι μάλισθ' οὕτω καὶ
 ξυνήκα πεπονθῶς, καὶ ἀχθόμενος μὲν πάνυ τοι, μὴ ἔχων δ' ὅ τι
 δρῶν ἂν λέγειν ὠρμημένος, μηδ' ὅπως ἑμαυτῷ χρώμην ἂν κατὰ
 20 βούλησιν, αὐτόθεν ὅμως καταπαύω καὶ ἀποτρέπομαι. 7 Καὶ
 πολλοὺς ἂν μοι δοκῶ σωφρονοῦντας καὶ βουλομένους ἀληθεύ-
 ειν ἔχειν μάρτυρας ἀοράτου τοῦδε πάθους καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆσδε
 τῆς τύχης καὶ τοῦ μὴ διαρκοῦς τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἀσυνδυάστου
 25 κατ' ἄμφω, νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον ὑπέρητην καὶ διερμηνέα δεσποτι-
 κοῖς συνθήμασιν.

3 δὴ: κείμ(εν)ον μάλισθ' ὡς τὰ πολλὰ in marg. P²

upon the truth of the matter; some may be more successful, some less. But like people who are drugged, or when we see visions in our sleep, we are paralysed and unable to utter our thoughts, no matter how much we wish and strive to do so. 4 And often when we attempt to speak, we do not know how to set about achieving our aim, nor how to succeed in communicating⁸ to others the results and conclusions of our thoughts, to delineate them in words for the world to see, or rather reproduce the internal imprints and present them adequately by means of an interpretative and verbal report. 5 We are at a loss how to explain satisfactorily what we have understood, and regarding the things with which we like to deal by means of intellectual perceptions we lack a voice that is able to adequately proclaim and disclose the potential treasures of understanding within ourselves; we are unfortunate in that we cannot divulge our wealth of mind and thought because of a lack of vigour in our ability to speak. 6 Alas, how often have I experienced this in my own case, and realised that I was affected [by this misfortune]. Although [I do it] with great regret, still, when I do not know what to do when I attempt to speak, or how to behave [to achieve] what I want, I immediately fall silent and refrain from speaking. 7 And I believe that I could produce many discerning and truthful persons to testify to this invisible affliction, people who share in this misfortune, namely, the insufficiency of [human] nature and its inability to join the two, mind with assisting and interpreting speech, by means of authoritative connections.⁹

⁸ It looks as if the construction is περιγίγνομαι c. inf.

⁹ Or: 'authoritative conventions'; cf. Pl., *Cra.* 433e συνθήματα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα.

1'Οτι άνευλαβῶς ἅπαντες οἱ σοφοὶ πρὸς τοὺς 73
 πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐχρήσαντο· ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ
 Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους: Γ'

1 Οὐκ άνεμέσητον ἄρα τῷ θαυμαστῷ Πλάτωνι μηδὲν ἦτον ἢ
 5 καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει, τὸ πρὸς πάντας σχεδὸν άνευλαβῆς καὶ ὀλίγω-
 ρον, ὅσοι πρὸ αὐτοῦ γεγονάσιν ἐρασταὶ σοφίας καὶ κατ' ἄλλο
 ἄλλο τι τῆς παιδείας ἐτυπώθη νόμισμα καὶ κατεκόσμησεν ἑαυ-
 τόν, 2 καὶ συντέλειάν τιν' ἕκαστος τοῖς λόγοις ὅμως χάριτος
 ἀξίαν καὶ μνήμης εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀνθρώποις συνεισήνεγκαν, καὶ
 10 τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως εἰπεῖν κοινῇ πάντες ἐβελτί-
 ωσαν, καὶ τελειοποιὸν αὐτῷ δύναμιν τὸ μέρος ἕκαστος ἐσπού-
 δασαν, καὶ καθάπλισαν εὖ καὶ κατεσκευάσαντο. 3 Εἰ μὴ γὰρ
 οὐτοὶ βέλτιστοὶ τινες ἂν εἶεν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἕκαστος καὶ εὐφη-
 μίας καὶ θαυμάζειν ἄξιοι, τίνων ἂν εἶεν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ
 15 Πλάτων βελτίους, τίνων ἂν εἶεν αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον θαυμάζειν ἄξι-
 οἱ; 4 Εἰ γὰρ δὴ φαύλων τινῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυστυχῶν, καὶ οὐς
 πρίατ' ἂν τις δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν ἴσως ὀβολῶν, ἀμείνους εἰσίν, εὖ γε
 τῆς τύχης, εὖ γε τῆς προκοπῆς τῶν οὐδένων· τάχ' ἂν εἶεν αὐτοὶ
 δίς γε τοσοῦτων ἄξιοι, εἰ δ' οὖν, ἔστω τετρακίς ἢ καὶ δεκάκις, 74
 20 καὶ τοῦτό γε χαριστέον σφίσι· 5 πάντως δ' ἂν εἶεν οὐ πολλοῦ
 τινος τῶν ὀβολῶν ἀριθμοῦ παραβαλλόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ γε ἄξιοι,
 τοῦ παντὸς ἀξιούντες ἑαυτοῦς, καὶ δικαίως ἀμέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν
 ἀξιούμενοι. 6 Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἀληθείας ἐρεῖν ἐκείνους ἀδικήσαντες
 ἑαυτοῦς ἠδίκησαν, καὶ καταδραμόντες εὖ μάλα καὶ σφόδρα γε

17 δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν — ὀβολῶν: cf. Dem. 18.28; Suda T 997

6 ὅσοι: ὅτι E 13 βέλτιστοὶ τινες P², βέλτιστοι, τίνες P¹ME 17 δυοῖν:
 δυεῖν ME 19 καὶ om. P 20 οὐ om. E 24 ἑαυτοῦς: -ὄς ut vid. s. l. M

¹ κατ' ἄλλος ἄλλο = ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλο. For this word order, cf. Aelius Aristides, *Πρὸς Λεπτίνην ὑπὲρ ἀτελείας* 164.6 Jebb κατ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ κινεῖ τὸν ἀν-
 ἄγυρον. It is interesting to note that this passage also contains a reference to the
 proverbial *anagyros*, which Metochites mentions below, 10.1.6. Perhaps he has
 picked up this syntagm (κατά followed by a nominative) from this passage in
 Aristides; cf. below, p. 217 n. 5. It is not found elsewhere in the *Semeioseis*.
 (cont. on p. 97)

10. That all wise men were disrespectful towards their predecessors, and on Plato and Aristotle

1 The admirable Plato deserves no less censure than Aristotle for his disrespect and disdain towards practically all lovers of wisdom who lived before him and who turned themselves into so many coins of teaching, each with a different stamp.¹ 2 After all,² every one of them made some intellectual contribution to the common good of mankind that is worthy of gratitude and remembrance, and the rational [part] of human nature was improved by, so to speak, all of them together, each one in his turn developing some of its powers of accomplishment, and they armed and prepared it well. 3 For if every one of them were not the most excellent in philosophy, each in his own special field,³ and worthy of praise and admiration, than whom would Aristotle and Plato be better? Than whom would they be more admirable? 4 If they are better than good-for-nothing, unsuccessful people, whom one could perhaps buy for two or three obols,⁴ how lucky for them, how splendid to be better than nobodies! They may be worth twice as much as such people, or why not make it⁵ four or ten times as much; let us grant them even this. 5 But assuredly they would still, by comparison, not be worth a very large sum of obols, although they consider themselves worth everything—with justice, and are so considered by us, too. 6 No, to speak the truth, when they wronged those men, they wronged themselves, and when they denounced them so vehemently and completely ruthlessly, they created

Other occurrences in Aristides are *ibid.* 146.1–2 Jebb and *Πρὸς Δημοσθένη περὶ ἀτελείας* 2.14–15 Jebb (in both cases *κατ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ φέρει τὴν ψήφον*); and, in the latter speech, 26.11–12 Jebb *πονηρευόμενος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸς σταντοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν*. I have not found any other occurrences in TLG of *κατ' ἄλλος*, nor of *κατ' αὐτός*, nor of *αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ* preceded by a preposition (except Aristides, *Πρὸς Δημοσθένη κτλ.* 5.10 Jebb *παρ' αὐτὸς σταντοῦ*).

² ὅμως, i.e., in spite of the lack of respect displayed by Plato and Aristotle.

³ *each in his own special field*: a tentative translation of τὸ γινόμενον 'what is due'; cf. above, p. 63 n. 10.

⁴ 'Worth two or three obols' seems to be a set expression for 'cheap', cf. e.g. Dem., *De corona* 28 ἐν τοῖν δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ἐθεώρουν ἄν 'they could have sat in the cheap seats'; Philippides (Com.) fr. 9 δυοῖν ὀβολῶν ἔσθοντας ἢ τριωβόλου; Lib., *Progymn.* 11.18.1; *Suda* T 997 (τριωβολιμαῖος). The expression also occurs elsewhere in the *Semeioseis*.

⁵ For εἰ δ' οὖν see above, p. 87 n. 7.

ἀφειδῶς τῶν ἀνδρῶν χάραν τινὰ καθ' ἑαυτῶν παρέσχοντο βλασφημεῖσθαι· καὶ οὐ καλῶς οὐδ' αὐτοὶ γ' ἐξῆς τῶν ἐκδεξαμένων ἀπήλλαξαν, ἀλλ' ἐκίνησαν ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀνάγυρον τῆς παροιμίας.

- 5 2 Καὶ δηλόν γε οὐ πόρρω οὐδὲ μήποτε ξὺν χρόνῳ ἢ καμάτῳ μακρῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν αὐτίκα τὸ πιστὸν οἷς λέγομεν δίδωσιν Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὸς ἐπανιστάμενος Πλάτωνι, παρ' οὗ τὰς πηγὰς ἀπάσας ἔχει τῆς σοφίας, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει μεθύστερον Χρῦσιππός τε καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοί, καὶ Γαληνὸς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. 2 Ἀλλ' ἀδικώτατα φήσεί τις ἂν ἴσως, καὶ μάλα δικάϊως τοῦτο, καὶ αὐτὸς φημ' ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀφειδὲς αὐτῶν εἰς οὓς οὐκ ἐχρῆν, καὶ χάρις μάλισθ' ὡς ἐν βελτίστοις φθάσαντας ὠφείλετο καὶ μνήμη μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ ἀστειότητος, 3 τὸ ἀφειδὲς ἐξῆς ἀκόλουθον ἀμφοῖν μετ' εὐλόγου τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν γνώμης καὶ κρίσεως συνεσκεύασε· καὶ προιδέσθαι γε πάντως ἐχρῆν τὸ ὅποια ἂν εἴπησθα, τοῖα καὶ ἀκούσαις, σωφρονικὸν ἐκ | ποιητικῆς καὶ μάλα καίριον. 4 75 Οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς ἀφυεῖς γε πάντως ἔμελλον καὶ ἀνίκανοί τινες ὀφθῆναι καὶ ἀμελεῖς αὐτῶν ἡγεμόνων ἀκόλουθοι, καὶ ἔδειξαν εὖ μάλα μιμησάμενοι, καὶ οὐκ ἀπέσχοντο καθάπερ ἀφ' 20 ἱερῶν τιῶν καὶ ἀσύλων. 5 Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἄνδρῳ τῷδε πάντ' ἀρίστω τὴν σοφίαν καὶ θαυμάζειν πάντων μᾶλλον ἀξίω τῶν προτέρων καὶ φθασάντων ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν καὶ ὅσοι μετ' αὐτοὺς, τίς οὕτω πάσης σοφίας ἀλλότριος καὶ ἀμαθέστατος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παντάπασιν οὕτω δηλα μὴ βλέπων, ἢ μὴ βλέπων ὀρθῶς, 25 ὃς οὐκ ἂν συνθεῖτο παρρησίᾳ, καὶ φρονεῖν οὕτω δὴ καὶ λέγειν οὐκ ἂν ἀξιώσσει; 6 Καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη γε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείθεν πόρρω τῶν χρόνων εἰς ἡμᾶς νῦν ἄτρεπτος δόξα, πάσας αὐτοῖς ψήφους τῶν πρωτείων τε καὶ τροπαίων τῆς μεγάλης σοφίας κατὰ πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων εὖ μάλα πείθουσα, κρατεῖ πάνυ τοι καὶ 30 κρατήσῃ γ' οἶμαι τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον ἴσως ἐξῆς μεθ' ἡμᾶς.

3 ἐκίνησαν — ἀνάγυρον: cf. Aristid., *Πρὸς Λεπτινὴν ὑπὲρ ἀτελείας* 164.6 Jebb; Lib., *Ep.* 78; *Decl.* 26; Hesych. A 4249; *Suda* A 1843; K 1638 15–16 ὅποια — ἀκούσαις: cf. *Il.* 20.250

some grounds for slander against themselves. Nor did they escape unharmed from their own successors, but *stirred up* the proverbial *stinking trefoil* against themselves.⁶

2 We clearly do not have to look very far, nor indeed spend a lot of time or effort [to prove our point], but what we have said is confirmed immediately by Aristotle himself, who revolted against Plato, from whom he has received all the sources of his wisdom, and, in a later period, Chrysippus and the Stoics against Aristotle, and Galen against them. 2 One might perhaps with the greatest justice say [that they did this] most unjustly,⁷ and I myself agree. But their lack of respect towards those whom they ought not to have treated disrespectfully (on the contrary they deserved gratitude, and to be mentioned with deference and politeness, for having gone before with excellence⁸) 3 immediately created disrespect for both of them in turn, adulterating⁹ the reasonable attitude and judgement that originated with them. They should have foreseen that *as you speak, thus are you answered*, a wise and very apt poetic saying.¹⁰ 4 For their successors would prove not to be completely untalented or incompetent or negligent followers of their teachers, and it turned out that they actually did the very same thing that *they* had done and did not refrain from [attacking them] as [one does in the case of] those who are sacred and inviolate. 5 But that Plato and Aristotle were highly accomplished in wisdom and more worthy of admiration than all their predecessors, those famous men who came before them, and also more than those who came after them—who is such a complete stranger to all wisdom, so ignorant and unable to see (or not seeing rightly) what is so absolutely clear, that he does not freely admit this and think it right to harbour such a view and pronounce it? 6 The great reputation of these two, continuing unshaken from those early times up to the present, easily winning for them a unanimous vote for the first prize and a trophy for their great wisdom¹¹ against all

⁶ Ἀνάγυρος, *Anagyris foetida*, stinking bean-trefoil; Lib., *Ep.* 78 μὴ κινεῖν τὸν ἄ. 'let sleeping dogs lie' (LSJ s.v.). Metochites may have seen the expression in Aristides; cf. above, pp. 96–97 n. 1, and below, p. 217 n. 5.

⁷ ἴσως perhaps because of the apparent oxymoron ἀδικώτατα ... μάλα δικαίως.

⁸ with excellence: ἐν βελτίστοις, literally 'among the best'.

⁹ adulterating: lit. 'together with'.

¹⁰ *Il.* 20.250 ὀπποῖόν κ' εἴρησθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσαις.

3 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτοῖς τὰ πάντ' ἄνοσα καὶ ἀνεύθυνα
καθάπαξ, καὶ τὸ μὴ τυχεῖν τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ἀληθείας ἐντελέστατα
μετὰ σώματος ἔτ' ὄντας Πλάτωνός ἐστι τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ λόγος
καὶ εἰ δὴ τις ἄλλος πολὺ κατὰ καιρὸν εἰρημένος. 2 Καὶ ἰ τοίνυν 76
15 καὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰκότ' ἂν ἔποιτο τῇ φύσει καὶ οὐκ ἀνύποπτά γε
τάκ ταύτης ὀλισθηρὰ καὶ δυστυχήμαθ' ὀπηροῦν τῆς περὶ πάντων
καταλήψεως. 3 Καὶ τοῦτό γε προῖδέσθαι πάντως καὶ σφᾶς αὐ-
τοὺς ἐχρῆν, καὶ Ἀδράστειαν ὡς εἶπειν τιμᾶν εὐλαβεῖσθαι τε
πρὸς τοὺς ἐξῆς μετ' αὐτούς, καὶ προπαρασκευάζειν, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς
10 τοὺς φθάσαντας οἰκείας αὐτῶν εὐγενείας καὶ εὐγνωμοσύνης
καὶ ἐτοιμότητος εἰς συγγνώμην, 4 καὶ αὐτοὺς παρορᾶν ἐτοιμό-
τατα καὶ συγγνωμονέστατα καὶ αἰδεσιμώτατα, εἴ τί που καὶ
σφίσιν ἐν οἷς ἐσπούδασαν ἀμάρτημα συμβαίη, τῆς φύσεως τῆς
κοινῆς ἀναγκαῖον μοιρίδιον ὡς εἶπειν διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντα περὶ
15 πάντων ἰκανώτατα καὶ ἐντελέστατα πεφυκέναι καὶ πάντων ἐπι-
τυχέστατα, 5 χάριν σὺν θαύματι μάλιστα καὶ δικαίως σφόδρ'
ἔχοντας τῆς τοσαύτης εὐδοκιμήσεως τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ πλεονεξί-
ας καὶ ἀκρότητος ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς τῆς σοφίας πράγ-
μασι. 6 Καὶ τοίνυν τὴν μὲν εἰς αὐτοὺς αἰδῶ καὶ τὸ θαῦμα περὶ
20 τῆς σοφίας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἰ μὴ μαίνοιτό τις, πάντων μᾶλλον
ἀξιοῦν ἔστιν ἡμῖν, ξυμμετρούμενοις ὅποια τὰ ἐκείνων πρὸς ὁ-
ποῖα τὰ ἡμῶν ἐκάστων, καὶ μηδὲ προσορῶσιν ὅλως, εἴπερ σω-
φρονοῖμεν, ἦν ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμάρτηταί που, διὰ ἰ τὴν περὶ τῶν 77
πλείστων χάριν. 7 Τὸ δ' εἰς τοὺς προλαβόντας ἐκείνους, τὰ τῆς
25 σοφίας εὐγενῆ θρέμματα καὶ προγόνους τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς καὶ
τὴν ὁδὸν αὐτοῖς ὑπανοίξαντας, καὶ ὧν τοῖς ἴχνεσιν ἠκολούθη-
σαν, εἰ καὶ βέλτιον ἢ κατ' ἐκείνους τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τοῦ τέλους
ἔτυχον, ἠκολούθησαν δ' οὖν, ἀδίκους αὐτοὺς χρήσασθαι γλώτ-

2-3 τὸ μὴ τυχεῖν — ὄντας: cf. *Pl.*, *Phd.* 66b 8 Ἀδράστειαν — τιμᾶν: cf. *A.*, *Pr.* 936; *Pl.*, *R.* 451a

1 πάντ': πάντα P 21 τὰ ἐκείνων ut vid. M: τὰ κείνων P 22-23 σωφρονοῖ-
μεν: σωφρονεῖμεν E 23 που: ποι E, non leg. M 25 αὐτῆς ex αὐτοῖς corr.
P¹ 28 αὐτοὺς: αὐτοῦ ut vid. E, non leg. M

their competitors put together, is very much alive, and will, I think, probably live on forever after us.

3 But nevertheless, not even their work is completely faultless and irreproachable; that we cannot completely grasp the truth of reality while we are still in the body is said by the admirable Plato, and this is very well put. 2 Even they were probably subject to that which is to be expected in human nature, nor was it impossible to foresee the slips and mistakes of various kinds occasioned by it¹² in understanding reality. 3 This they themselves should indeed have anticipated, and, so to speak, *paid homage to Adrasteia*,¹³ and been cautious with respect to their successors, and prepared beforehand, by themselves showing a noble mind, benevolence and readiness to forgive, 4 that their successors, too, readily, charitably and respectfully would overlook it if some fault should occur in their work (a necessary component, so to speak, in our common nature, due to the fact that we cannot be in all respects completely sufficient, perfect and successful in everything), 5 most of all, and justly, feeling gratitude joined with wonder at the distinction¹⁴ of these two men, their excellence and superiority to all others in matters of wisdom. 6 And the respect in which they are held and the admiration of their wisdom we must (if we are not insane) approve more than anything, measuring whatever of theirs against anything whatsoever of each one of us, and, if we are wise, not even noticing, because of our gratitude for most of their achievements, if they should have made some mistake. 7 But their attitude towards their predecessors, those noble nurslings of wisdom, their forbears in [the study of] Nature itself,¹⁵ who opened the way for them and in whose footsteps they followed

¹¹ The expression ἡ μεγάλη σοφία is a bit strange. Perhaps it is due to the athletic metaphor: they won the competition in 'greatest wisdom'. It does not appear to be an established technical term.

¹² I.e., by human nature.

¹³ I.e., Nemesis, retribution. A. Pr. 936 οἱ προσκυνῶντες τὴν Ἀδράστειαν σοφοί; Pl. Rep. 451a5 προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν (quoted by e.g. Dem. In Aristog. 4; Lib. Ep. 283.2.7, Or. 1.158.7 and Decl. 15.(1.)15.6). Cf. Stoich. 1.1.24, where Metochites is describing his successful career: ἐρρέτω δὲ Ἀδράστεια, καὶ λεγόντων ἄλλοι, καὶ πρὸς αἰὲν βασκανίαν ἔφεδρον εὐλαβητέον ἡμῖν ἴσως ἀξιώσειέ τις ἄν, Poem 12, 253 (below, p. 264 and n. 62), and Nik. Greg., Hist. 3:206.12–13. For Metochites and Adrasteia, see now Hinterberger (2001, 294–302).

¹⁴ εὐδοκίμησις; cf. above, pp. 58–59 n. 4.

¹⁵ προγόνους τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς, translation uncertain.

ταις καὶ στόμα κατ' αὐτῶν ἀνοίξαι πλατύ, τοῦτό γε δὴ λοιπὸν ἔπειτ' ἐπαινεῖν οὐκ ἔχομεν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

4 Ὅποτε γὰρ καὶ πλέον ἢ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἔσχον αὐτοὶ οἷς ἐπόνησαν, ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ πολὺ προέσχον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως τις φήσκειν, οὐκουν γε σωφρονῶν, ὅποτε καὶ φιλτέραν ἢ αὐτοὺς ἔσχον τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν, 2 ἔχρην γε ὅμως καὶ αὐτῶν ὅτιοῦν μέλειν αὐτοῖς καὶ τι παρέχειν σεμνότητος καὶ τιμῆς, καὶ τὰ κατ' αὐτοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν ὄντων ἀμαρτήματα καθάπερ δὴ πατέρων ἐπικαλύπτειν δυστυχήματα καὶ ὀλίσθους, 3 ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτω φίλαυτοὶ γ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλαλήθεις καὶ φιλόνοικοι κατ' αὐτῶν ἀνέδην, ὥστε καὶ μάλ' ἀνευλαβῶς ἐπ' αὐτοὺς θριαμβεύειν καὶ παρρησίᾳ κατεξανίστασθαι μηδεμιᾶ σὺν φειδοῖ καὶ κόσμῳ τῶν ἐποπτευόντων, καὶ ὡσπερ τὸν Ὀμήρου Θερσίτην ἀκριτοεπὴ καὶ λῆρον ἀηδίας πάσης καὶ ἀλαζόνα τῶν μὴ προσ- 78
15 ἠκόντων ὑποκριτὴν, ἢ τι φαῦλον ἄλλ' ἐπίτριπτον ὄνειδος, 4 καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν καθάπερ ἀμέλει φύσεώς τιν' ἀμβλώματα ἅμα μὲν κατακωμῳδεῖν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ παίειν αἴσχιστα κατὰ μέσην ἀγορὰν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὅποσοις τὰ οἰκεῖα σπουδάσματα προὔφερων, εὖ γε εἰδότες, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἔδειξεν, ἀξιολογώτατα καὶ 20 πολυπόθητα ἐσόμενα. 5 Κἂν εἰ ταῦτά γε τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν αὐτοῖς προσήκειν καὶ λέγειν ἔχειν ᾧοντο, ἡμεῖς μέγα τοι πατέρων εὐχόμεθ' ἀμείνονες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δ' αἰθίς κατὰ καιρὸν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπῶν ἐπαινεῖν ἔδει, εὖ εἰρημένον ἀνθρώποις σωφρο-

5-6 φιλτέραν — ἀλήθειαν: cf. Arist., *EN* A 6, 1096a12-17 13-14 Θερσίτην ἀκριτοεπὴ: cf. *Il.* 2.246 21-22 ἡμεῖς — εἶναι: *Il.* 4.405

21 καὶ λέγειν ἔχειν (aut λέγειν καὶ ἔχειν) ex ἔχειν καὶ λέγειν corr. P¹, non leg. M

¹⁶ ὅποτε has an almost concessive force here (followed by ὅμως in 10.4.2).

¹⁷ In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as he is about to criticise Plato's theory of Forms, Aristotle says (A 6, 1096a12-17) 'Perhaps we had better examine the universal, and consider critically what is meant by it; although such a course is awkward, because the Forms were introduced by friends of ours. Yet surely it would be thought better, or rather necessary (above all for philosophers) to refute, in defence of the truth, even views to which one is attached; since although both are dear, it is right to give preference to the truth' (ἀμφοῖν γὰρ

(even if they were more successful than those men in attaining their object and end, they still followed them)—that they spoke unjustly and ranted against them, this trait in Plato and Aristotle we cannot go on to applaud.

4 For when¹⁶ Plato and Aristotle got the better of their predecessors in the questions they discussed—and no one can deny that they did, at least no one in his right mind—, and when they, as they themselves claim, held Truth dearer than their predecessors,¹⁷ 2 they still ought to have shown some consideration for them, too, ought to have given them some deference and respect, and the mistakes that those men committed with regard to the truth of Reality they ought to have tried to conceal in the way that [sons conceal] their fathers' mistakes and slips,¹⁸ 3 and not been so self-loving, rather than truth-loving, and ruthlessly competitive against their predecessors as to triumph over them completely disrespectfully and openly revolt without the least consideration or the decent behaviour that befits a judge, like Homer's Thersites, a babbler and abominable humbug, a boastful pretender to things he had no share in, or like some other vile accursed pest,¹⁹ 4 and, so to speak, both make fun of them and whip them disgracefully²⁰ like some abortions of nature, in full sight of the Hellenes to whom they presented their own work, knowing well—and the event proved them right—that it would be extremely valuable and much sought after. 5 And if they thought that it was appropriate and allowed for them²¹ to quote these words from epic, *we declare ourselves to be better men by far than our fathers*, at least it would have been proper for them to acknowledge the following passage from the

ὄντοι φίλοι ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν) (trans. Thomson). Referred to e.g. by Synesius, *Ep.* 154, 276.6–7; Elias [?David], *In Cat.* 122.4–5; John Philoponus, *De aetern. mundi* 6.8, 144.20. Cf. Düring (1957, 132) and Searby (1998, 130 [8]).

¹⁸ As Metochites himself was forced to hide *his* father's 'mistakes and slips'. For George Metochites, see Ševčenko (1975, 25–26) and de Vries-van der Velden (1987, 31–51) with references.

¹⁹ For Thersites, cf. *Il.* 2.212 ff. 'Ἀκριτοεπής not in LSJ; cf. however ἀκριτό-μυθος 'babbling confusedly' *Il.* 2.246.

²⁰ Κατακωμωδεῖν and παίειν continue the construction of ἐχρῆν (4.2) ... μή (4.3), i.e., the things that Plato and Aristotle ought not to have done, but did.

²¹ A zeugma with ᾤοντο: They thought that these words suited them (ταῦτα αὐτοῖς προσήκειν), and that they could quote them (ἔχειν λέγειν) or, if προσήκειν is impersonal, that it was suitable for them to, and that they could, quote these words.

- κοῖς, 6 τέττα· ἢ μάλ' ἀληθῶς τε καὶ ἀτρεκέως ἔειπας· οὐ τίς τοι τὸν μῦθον ὀνόσεται. ἀτὰρ δὴ καὶ τόνδ' ἐμεῦ μῦθον ἄκουσον ὄν μοι θεὸς ὤπασε, καὶ περισφύζοντας ἐκείνοις τὸ σεμνόν τε καὶ κόσμιον, τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν ἔπειθ' ἐξῆς φέρειν πολλῶ βέλτιστα.
- 5 7 Ἐπεὶ καὶ βουλομένοις γε προσορᾶν εὐγνώμωνως καὶ πλείστ' ἐξῆν θαυμάζειν ἐκείνων σὺν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ δι' εὐφήμου καὶ τιμίας ἄγειν τῆς μνήμης, καὶ ἰχρήσθαι φιλανθρώπως. 8 Τὸ δὲ τὰ μὲν 79 παρορᾶν τε καὶ παρατρέχειν ἄριστ' ἔχοντα καὶ σιγῆς σκότῳ καλύπτειν, τὰς δ' ἀτυχίας αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσ' ἐνόησαν ἐν τῇ σπουδῇ
- 10 καὶ τῷ βίῳ παρὰ τὸ μὴ διαρκῆς καθάπαξ τῆς φύσεως ἐν πᾶσιν ἀκροαταῖς τε καὶ κριταῖς κατελέγγειν ἀνευθριάστως καὶ μὴ περιστέλλειν ὀπηοῦν, 9 πῶς ἂν τις δίκαιον θεῖτο ἢ πῶς ἂν λυσιτελεῖν, καὶ οὐ λέγω νῦν γε εἶναι τοῖς φθάσασι καὶ παρελθοῦσιν ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς γε μάλιστα τοῖς λέγουσι;
- 15 5 Καὶ εἴρηται γε πρὸ βραχέος ὡς ἄρα πολλοὺς ἐξῆς παραπλήσι' ἐδίδαξαν ἐφ' ἑαυτούς, λαβὰς καὶ αὐτοὶ δόντες τοῖς βλασφημεῖν βουλομένοις καὶ σὺν λόγῳ τινὶ πάντως μετὰ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν νόμων καὶ κρίσεων, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραπλησίως καὶ τοσαύτας, 2 δόντες δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτοὶ λαβὰς ἄστινας δὴ τοῖς προθε-
- 20 μένοις ἐπηρεάζειν τῷ μὴ παντάπασι καὶ διὰ πάντων ἀλωβήτῳ τῆς φύσεως· καὶ δείκνυσιν Ἀριστοτέλης τόδε ταχὺς ἐπὶ Πλάτωνα, καὶ ἐπ' Ἀριστοτέλην ἕτεροι, καὶ προεἰρηται γέ ἡμῖν. 3 Καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά τις ἀμφοῖν αἰτιάσαιτο μᾶλλον, Πλάτωνα τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν ἐνταῦθα δόντα καὶ τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ὑπόδειγμα
- 25 κακὸν θέμενον, κἂν εἰ μὴ σὺν τέχνῃ πλείστη καὶ βάθει πικρίας, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐκολώτερον ἀνὴρ ἐχρήσατο, 4 ἢ τὸν δεύτερον αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπελθόντα, καὶ μάλα τοι καθαπτόμενον

1-3 τέττα: *Il.* 4.412; ἔειπας: *Il.* 24.379 (v.1.); οὐ τίς — ὀνόσεται: *Il.* 9.55; θεὸς ὤπασε: *Od.* 8.498

2 ὀνόσεται ut vid. E, ex ὀνήσεται ut vid. corr. P¹, non leg. M

²² For this mixed Homeric quotation cf. the *apparatus fontium*. 'Ατρεκέως occurs several times in the phrases ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον or ἀτρεκέως ἀγορεύσω. Ἐμεῦ μῦθον is not found in Homer.

same epic, suitable to be quoted by modest persons, 6 *you have spoken most truly and accurately. No one will blame you for your word. But now listen to this word which a god sent to me,*²² and, preserving respect and politeness for them, thereafter present their own views in the best possible manner. 7 For if someone were willing to regard [those earlier philosophers] benevolently, there was much of their work that he could justly admire, and preserve in memory with reverence and esteem, and treat charitably. 8 But to disregard and pass over the best part of those men's work, and obscure it in the darkness of silence, while at the same time right in front of the listeners and judges unblushingly refuting and in no way trying to cover their mistakes and the instances where they erred in their work and their lives because of the insufficiency of human nature— 9 how could this be regarded as just or profitable, and I do not mean profitable for those early, long dead philosophers, but indeed for their detractors themselves?

5 As I said a moment ago, Plato and Aristotle taught many others [to behave] in the same way towards them; they, too, gave those who wished to slander them opportunities to do so (on the whole with some reason), [these opportunities being found] among the rules and decisions they left, although not to the same degree, and not on so many occasions;²³ 2 still, with that component in their nature which was not completely nor always unblemished, they themselves offered pretexts of one kind or another for those who set out to insult them. Aristotle promptly shows this against Plato, and others against Aristotle, as I said before. 3 I do not know which of the two one should blame the most: Plato, who started this practice and presented a bad example to his successor, even if he did not do so very elaborately or with deep bitterness, but in a quite light-hearted manner,²⁴ 4 or the one who was active in the same field after him, and who attacked and maltreated, how should I say, drastically or with care,²⁵

²³ Plato and Aristotle left to posterity (1) [valuable] 'rules and decisions', (2) opportunities to criticise them; however, the first category is more numerous than the second. For the notion, and the phrasing (μετὰ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν νόμων καὶ κρίσεων), cf. above, 10.2.3 μετ' εὐλόγου τῆς ἐξ αὐτῶν γνώμης καὶ κρίσεως.

²⁴ Cf. the discussion in *Sem.* 8.

²⁵ For πῶς ἄν εἴποιμι cf. above, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

καὶ κακουργοῦντα πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι γεννικῶς ἢ ἐπιμελῶς τῶν τε 80
 ἄλλων, καὶ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα Πλάτωνος. 5 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἄρα δεῖ
 φιλοχωρεῖν ἔτι καὶ κρίνειν, Πλάτων μὲν αὐτὸς πρὸς οὐδένα
 τῶν πρότερον τοιοῦτον ἀγνωμονεῖ τε καὶ ἐπιτίθεται, ὡς ἄρ' ἀ-
 5 μέλει πρὸς οἶον Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα, οὐδ' οὕτω θαυ-
 μάζειν ἄξιον αὐτῷ καὶ κομιδῇ προσέχειν αἰδημόνως, ὡς Ἀρι-
 στοτέλει Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸ ἐν λόγοις αὐτοῦ κράτος, οὗ τὸ κλέος
 Ἑλλάς τε πᾶσα καὶ βάρβαρος σεμνύνειν ἡξίου. 6 Καὶ μὴν ἔτι
 τὸ μὲν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀγνωμον εἰς τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀφειδές
 10 καὶ ἀχάριστον, καίπερ ὄν μετ' ἀληθείας ἐρεῖν νεμεσητὸν καὶ -
 αὐτό, οὐ τοσοῦτον ὅμως ἐστὶν ὅποσον Ἀριστοτέλει τὸ πρὸς
 Πλάτωνα, τὸν αὐτῷ πάσης σοφίας ἡγεμόνα καὶ τοσαύτης μεγα-
 λοδωρεᾶς χορηγόν. 7 Καὶ Πλάτων μὲν οἶον ἑαυτὸν παρέσχε
 Σωκράτει τῷ καθηγητῇ, καὶ οὐ μὴ τοσαυτ' ὄνατο τῆς σοφίας
 15 καὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅπως Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτοῦ, δῆλόν γε παντί, καὶ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκείνου κομιδῇ θαυμάζειν ἄξιον, εἰ δὴ καὶ
 ἀξίως ἐπαινεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστι καὶ θαυμάζειν, ᾧ γε δὴ καὶ πάντα τὰ
 αὐτοῦ φέρων εἰ μάλ' ἀποδίδωσί τε καὶ ἀνατίθησι καὶ οὐχ ἑαυ-
 τοῦ ποιεῖται. 8 Ἀριστοτέλης δ' οἶος ἀπήντησε καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τε-
 20 λευτήσαντι τὸν βίον Πλάτωνι, οὗ πολλῷ πλείω ἢ Σωκράτους
 Πλάτων καὶ πάνυ τοι πλείστ' ὄνατο, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὡς εἴ τις ἄλ- 81
 λος ἄλλου του τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος, τί τις ἂν ἔχοι
 λέγειν; 9 Καὶ σιωπᾶν ἴσως ἀρμόδιον φειδοῖ καὶ ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ
 μὲν ἀτυχήσαντος ὧν ἐχρῆν, τοῦ δ' ἀντιδόντος ἀδικάταθ', ἃ μὴ
 25 ἐχρῆν.

Περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους, καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ
 λογικὸν εὐδοκιμήσεως τοῦ ἀνδρός: ΙΑ'

1 Καὶ τᾶλλα μὲν τῆς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους σοφίας ὅστις μὴ θαυ-
 μάζοι καθ' ὅσον οἶός τέ ἐστιν, ἀποροίην ἂν ἔγωγε καὶ θαυμά-
 30 σαιμι τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὅστις ἂν εἴη, περιφανεστάτην οὕτω καὶ τος-

11 ἀριστοτέλει: ἀριστοτέλης ut vid. E, non leg. M 15 αὐτοῦ: αὐτῷ E, non leg. M 23 ἴσως ἀρμόδιον: ἀρμόδιον ἴσως ME

everybody, not least Plato himself. 5 Indeed, if one must take sides and judge, Plato is not unfair and violent towards any of his predecessors in the way that Aristotle is towards him;²⁶ nor is he as obliged to honour [his predecessors] and treat them respectfully as Aristotle is to respect him and his intellectual power, whose fame the whole of Hellas and the barbarians deemed worthy of veneration. 6 Furthermore, Plato's unkindness, disrespect and ingratitude towards his predecessors, although admittedly blameworthy, is still not as blameworthy as Aristotle's similar behaviour towards Plato, his teacher in the whole of wisdom and donor of this splendid gift. 7 And that Plato dedicated himself to his teacher Socrates, from whom he did not gain as much wisdom and virtue as did Aristotle from *him*, is obvious to everyone (this trait of his is worthy of admiration, if indeed it is within our capacity in a worthy manner to praise and to admire it)—Socrates, to whom he nobly offers and ascribes all his thoughts instead of presenting them as his own. 8 But the way Aristotle treated Plato both living and dead, from whom he gained much more than *he* did from Socrates, indeed most of all (more, I think, than anyone has ever gained from anyone else from time immemorial)—what can one say? 9 Perhaps it is best to be silent out of consideration for both—the one for failing to get his dues, the other for paying back with injustice, which he ought not to have done.

11. On Aristotle and his fame in natural science and logic¹

1 As for the other aspects of Aristotle's wisdom, if there is anyone who does not admire him as much as possible, whoever that person might be, I would be bewildered and surprised at his stupidity, so blatant and so great, a stupidity which I would not call envy, or,

²⁶ Literally, 'Plato for his part is unfair and violent towards no such person (πρὸς οὐδένα τοιοῦτον) among his predecessors as that person towards whom (ὡς πρὸς οἶον) Aristotle [is unfair and violent], viz. Plato himself,' i.e., nobody among Plato's victims is comparable to Aristotle's victim, Plato.

¹ This essay is discussed in Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2).

αύτην ἡλιθιότητα, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν φαίην βασκανίαν, ἢ
 καὶ αὐθις μᾶλλον ἐρεῖν ἡλιθιότητα εἴ τις βασκαίνων ὀράται,
 περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄλως ἐννοεῖν οὕτω συμμετρούμενον, ὡς ἀν-
 εφίκτων, καὶ παραβάλλεσθαι. 2 Τὸ δέ γε τῆς φυσικῆς τε καὶ
 5 λογικῆς θεωρίας ἄκρον καὶ τὴν περίνοιαν ἐν τούτοις τοῦ ἀν-
 δρὸς καὶ ἀκρίβειαν, οὐκ ἔχω τίς ἂν γενοίμην εἰς νοῦν λαμβά-
 νων ἐκάστοτε, κατασκεπτόμενός τε ἐπ' ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸς ἄλ-
 λους περὶ τούτων λέγειν καὶ διεξιέναι πειρώμενος. 3 Πολὺν γὰρ
 ἐν τούτοις ἀπάντων τῶν ἄλλων προέχει ἢ κατὰ τ' ἄλλ' ἅπαντα,
 10 καταδιαιρούμενος ἅπανθ' ἕκαστα καὶ διοικῶν θεσμοῖς | τισιν 82
 εὐτάκτοις καὶ λόγοις καὶ χώραν οἰκείαν εἰς θεωρίαν ἐκάστου
 διδούς καὶ πάντα νομίμως εἰς τὴν ἐξέτασιν προτιθέμενος καὶ
 οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ παριεῖς καὶ πάντα περαίνων καὶ κατασυλλογιζό-
 μενος καὶ ἀνευρίσκων ἄφυκτα, 4 οὕτως ἐπιτυχῶς τε καὶ καιριώ-
 15 τατα καὶ διὰ πάσης ἀκριβείας τῶν δικαίων ἐκάστου, ὡς μηδενὶ
 τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ζυγῶρεῖν ἔτ' ἀμφιγνοεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, εἰ
 δήπου καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδέχεται περὶ αὐτοῦ ἢ κατ' ἄλλου γνώμην
 ἔχει καὶ κρίσιν, ἢ εἰ δὴ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ τινος ἐκάστου τῶν προτι-
 θεμένων καὶ λέλειπται τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ καταλήψεως ἔξω. 5
 20 Καὶ σφόδρα γε ἀνὴρ εὐμηχάνως ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθα κατὰ καιρὸν
 πρὸς ἐτοίμην πίστιν τῶν ἀκουόντων χρῆσασθαι, καὶ πράττειν ὅ-
 πως ἂν εὖ μάλα οἱ ἔποιντο τοῖς φαινομένοις θαρροῦντες, τὰ τῆς
 ὕλης αἰεὶ δοκιμάζων μετ' αἰσθήσεως αὐτόθεν χειραγωγούσης,
 καὶ οἷς ὁ μετὰ σώματος ἔτι νοῦς οὐκ ὀκνεῖ προσβαίνειν καὶ
 25 συντίθεσθαι ῥᾶστ' εὐπειθῆς διὰ τὰς μετὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὁμολο-
 γίας. 6 Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καθάπερ τις βουλευτῆς τῆς φύσεως καὶ
 πάρεδρος ὁ θαυμαστός Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ταῖς αὐτῆς φιλοτεχνή-
 σεσι καὶ ἐργασίαις καὶ ἅπαντ' ἐντελέστατα εἰδῶς τε καὶ λέγειν

6 οὐκ ἔχω τίς ἂν γενοίμην: A., Pr. 905

2 ἐρεῖν: δεῖν ut vid. E, non leg. M 9 προέχει: προέχειν E, non leg. M
 10 ἕκαστα: ἐκάστου E, non leg. M 11 εὐτάκτοις non leg. M, -κτοι- non leg.
 P 23 δοκιμάζων: δοκιμάζειν E, non leg. M

rather, if someone is seen to be envious, this would be more appropriately termed stupidity, seeing that in these things, being unattainable, it is completely impossible to think like and compare with him. **2** But as to Aristotle's excellent investigations of natural science and logic, and his perspicacity and acumen in these fields, *I know not what will become of me*² every time I recall these things to my mind, reviewing them to myself and trying to talk about and describe them to others. **3** For in these subjects he is much more superior to everybody else than in all other fields, dividing all things individually and organising them with well-ordered precepts and arguments, giving to every [question] its proper space for investigation, in a lawful manner laying everything out to be scrutinised, leaving nothing aside, accomplishing, deducing and discovering everything with inescapable results, **4** in a manner so successful, appropriate and with [such] complete acumen in what is due to every problem, as not to allow any of his readers to continue in doubt, concerning any individual question, whether it allows also another view, whether he has an opinion and judgement on something else, or whether there is anything concerning each separate question under discussion which has been left out of the investigation and explanation. **5** And it seems that the man's treatment of these questions is extremely ingenious, well-judged, and of a kind to be readily accepted by his listeners; he ensures that they agree with him freely and have confidence in appearances, since he is constantly examining the things of Matter with sense-perception as a readily available guiding principle, [things] the intellect-still-in-the-body does not hesitate to approach and agree with, being easily persuaded because of its agreement with sense-perception. **6** And the admirable Aristotle, like some councillor and lieutenant of Nature in its contrivances and works, knowing and able to state everything perfectly, or like one of its servants been sent down

² I.e., 'I am at a loss to express my admiration'.

ἔχων, ἢ κατάπεμπτός τις ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτῆς διάκονος, ἐπιτυ-
 χέστατα καὶ κατὰ ἰπᾶσαν ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ ἀκρίβειαν περὶ τῶν 83
 αὐτῆς ἐκάστων ἀγγέλλειν, 7 ὅπως ποτ' ἔχει, καὶ μεθ' οἶων τῶν
 ὑποκειμένων ἐσκεύασται καὶ πρὸς ὃ βέλτιστον τῷ τεχνίτη καὶ
 5 χρήσιμον αὐτῷ γέ τι ἐκάστω καὶ τῷ παντί. Οὕτω δὴ πάντα
 καθόλου τε καὶ κατὰ μέρη τὰ τῆς φύσεως προτίθεται καὶ τελεσ-
 φόρος ἐστὶ γνώμων καὶ νομίζει πάντ' ἀνευδεῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι
 οὐ.

2 Περὶ δὲ τῆς λογικῆς αὐτῆς, τί τις ἂν ἄξιον εἴποι τοῦδε
 10 τάνδρος, οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρώτου τὰς περὶ τούτων ὀργανώσεις ἔχο-
 μεν; Οὐκ οὐκ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐδενὸς ἄλλου τῶν πάντων, τῶν πρώτων ἐκεί-
 νων ὀνομαστικῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας ἐξαιρέτων, οὐδὲν
 ὀτιοῦν ἐνταῦθα σπούδασμα καὶ σύνταγμα ἡμῖν εἰς διδασκαλί-
 αν περὶ τούτων καὶ χρήσιν, καὶ μόνου γὰρ δῆτ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τῶν
 15 τῆς λογικῆς ἔχομεν ἐντελέστατα καὶ ἠκριβωμένως, ὡς μηδὲν
 ὀτιοῦν λείπεσθαι, 2 ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς ἐξῆς μετ' ἐκείνων τοῦτο δὴ μό-
 νον λείπεσθαι, τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐκείνου πονεῖν καὶ τρίβειν ἐν τοῖς αὐ-
 τοῦ, μεγίστην τοῦτ' αὐτὸ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ἀφορμὴν ἐπιδείξεως
 ἔχοντας, ἦν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνώμονες φαίνονται εὖ μάλ' ἐπόμενοι καὶ
 20 τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀφηγηταὶ κατὰ καιρὸν, καὶ ἰμὴ πόρρω φέροντες. 3 84
 Καὶ τοίνυν τὸν πρῶτον αὐτὸν σπουδάσαντα περὶ ταῦτα τῆς
 σοφίας καὶ παρὰ μηδενὸς ἐκδεξάμενον, οὐκ οὐκ γὰρ ὅ τι καὶ λό-
 γου τινὸς ἄξιον, καὶ τὰς ἐνταῦθα πάσας ποικιλίας καὶ στροφὰς
 ἰχνηλατήσαντα καὶ ἀνευρόντα, καὶ πάνθ' ἕκαστα διελόμενον
 25 τακτοῖς ὄροις ἢ προσῆκε καὶ κατατεχνιτεύσαντα παντελείως,
 καὶ νόμους ἀσαλεύτους περὶ αὐτῶν συνταξάμενον καὶ ὧν οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἔξω χρώμενον εὖ πράττειν καὶ χρῆσθαι, 4 τίνος ἂν πρῶ-
 τον θαυμάσαι τις ἀξίως καὶ τίνων ἐξῆς; ἢ μᾶλλον ἐρεῖν, τίνος
 ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄλλων τῆς περὶ τούτων ζητήσεως καὶ
 30 ἐπιμελείας καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης, πρὸς ἦν οὐδὲν ἦν ἡγεμονικὸν
 αὐτῷ, 5 οὐκ οὐκ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοσοῦτον, ὥστε εἰδέναι τὴν εἰς τὰ τρία
 σχήματα καὶ εἶδη τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ διαίρεσιν τῆς εὐρέσεως ὡς

9 εἴποι ex εἴπποι ut vid. corr. P¹ 18 τοῦτ': τοὺς E, non leg. M

down to us for this purpose, seems to me to report most successfully and with complete truth and accuracy on its every aspect, 7 what it is like, with what material and for what purpose it has been constructed by the Craftsman in the best manner and usefully for every part and for the whole. Thus he presents all of Nature both generally and particularly, and he is an expert who has treated this exhaustively, organising everything impeccably, neglecting nothing.

2 As for the study of logic itself, how could one speak of the man in a way he deserves, he who is the first from whom we have the systematic treatment of this subject? There is nothing from any one of those great men, those earlier famous men who lived before him, exceptional in wisdom, not one treatise or book for our education and use in this subject, but from him alone we have everything that pertains to logic, perfectly elaborated, 2 so there is nothing left except this one thing that is left for his followers, to study his writings and spend their time on his work, having their greatest ambition and pretext for display in showing themselves to be acquainted with his writings, understanding them well and summarising them for other people in a suitable manner, although they do not carry his results further. 3 This man, thus, the first to study this branch of wisdom, who did not take it over from anybody else—nothing worth mentioning, anyway—and who tracked down and discovered all the intricacies and tangles of this subject, and dissected everything in the proper manner by means of fixed definitions, and exhaustively dealt with it technically, and drew up incontestable rules about it, rules without which it is impossible to be successful and accomplish anything, 4 what should one justly admire him for first and what secondly or, rather, what part more than the others in his investigation of these things, his concern and his treatment of this, towards which there was nothing that was guiding him, 5 at least not to the extent of providing him with the knowledge of how to divide his findings into the three figures and the moods of the syllogism, in a manner ex-

σφόδρα ἐπιτυχέστατα τῆς ἀκριβείας ἀπάντων, ὡς ἄρα ἐντε-
 λέστατα, ὡς μηδένας ἔχειν ἔθ' ἐξῆς ὅτιοῦν προσθεῖναι, οὐκουν
 γε μὴ γέλωτα ὄφλοντας, μηδ' ἐπιτιμᾶν καθ' ὅτιοῦν, εἰ μὴ μαί-
 νοιτό τις, ὡς ἄλλως ἐχρῆν ἢ ὡς νενόμισται; 6 Καὶ μὴν ἅπαντες
 5 ὅσοι καὶ ἠρξάντο τινος εὐρέσεως ἢ τέχνης ἢ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ
 ἔσχον ἀμέλει καὶ εἰς τέλος ἱκανώσασθαι, ὅτι μηδὲ πέφυκε τοῦτ'
 ἐξεῖναι, σχεδὸν ὡς ἐπὶ πάντων ἔστι | πραγμάτων ὄρων τῶν ἀπὸ 85
 τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος εἰς νῦν εὐρημένων εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀνθρώποις.
 7 Καὶ ἀρχὴ φησιν ἡ παροιμία παντὸς ἡμισυ· τὸ δὲ καὶ πρῶτον
 10 αὐτὸν ἄρξασθαι περὶ ταῦτα τῆς σοφίας σπουδάσαι καὶ διὰ
 πάντων εἰς ὅσον ἐξῆν καὶ τάξεως καὶ τελειότητος καὶ ἀκριβεί-
 ας τυχεῖν καὶ ἱκανώσασθαι καθάπαξ ἀνευθύνως, καὶ ὡς οὐκέθ'
 ὅτιοῦν λιπεῖν ἄλλω σωφρονοῦντι προσεπιθεῖναι καὶ συνεισεν-
 εγκεῖν, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πάντων μᾶλλον ὡς ἀληθῶς θαυμάζειν
 15 ἄξιον;

Ἔτι περὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ
 κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ λογικοῦ: IB'

1 Μέγιστον δὴθ' ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦτο δεῖγμα τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους
 περὶ τὸ φυσικὸν τε καὶ λογικὸν εὐδοκιμήσεως καὶ νίκης κατὰ
 20 πάντων, ὅσοι τε πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσοι μετ' αὐτὸν γεγόνασι φιλο-
 σοφίας ἄνδρες ἐκλόγιμοι, τὸ μηδὲν νυνὶ παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τινος
 περὶ τούτων σύνταγμα, οὐκουν γε ὥστε καὶ λόγου τινὸς ἄξιον
 εἶναι δοκεῖν, οὐ τῶν πάλαι πρῶτων, οὐ τῶν ἔγγιστα. 2 Καὶ τοί-
 νυν περὶ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ γε Ἀριστοτέλους, εἰ μὲν οὐθ' ὅλως ἐνε-
 25 νόησάν τι περὶ τούτων, ἢ | καὶ ἀμφοῖν, ἢ θατέρου γε, ἢ καὶ εἰς 86

9 ἀρχή — ἡμισυ: Pl., *Lg.* 753e6; *Diog.* I 83 in *CPG* II 13.9; *Suda* A 4097; cf. *Arist.*, *SE* 34, 183b17–23

1 ἐπιτυχέστατα: ἐπὶ τὰ ὕστατα ut vid. E, non leg. M 4 καί: οὐ E, non leg. M 6 ἱκανώσασθαι: ἱκανῶ in ima pagina E, non leg. M 14 μᾶλλον ὡς ἀληθῶς: ὡς ἀληθῶς μᾶλλον E, non leg. M 16 ἔτι: ὅτι E τοῦ: om. E, non leg. M καὶ + περὶ E, non leg. M 25 ἦ² + καὶ P, non leg. M

ceedingly successful in hitting upon the exact truth of everything, completely perfect, with the result that nobody after him is able to add anything whatsoever (unless they want to incur ridicule), or criticise him in any way (unless they are mad), [saying that] something ought to be different than what he has defined. 6 All those who have started any examination or craft or branch of knowledge have been unable to complete it to the intended goal, since this is by nature impossible, something which one can see with all things that have been invented from the beginning of time and up to the present for the common [good] of mankind. 7 But *the beginning is half of the whole*, says the proverb.³ The fact that Aristotle was the first to begin studying this part of wisdom and everywhere achieved order, perfection and accuracy as far as was possible, and completed it absolutely impeccably and in such a way as to leave nothing whatsoever to any other wise man to add and contribute—is not this truly more admirable than anything?

12. Further on Aristotle and his natural science and logic¹

1 This is truly the greatest proof of Aristotle's expertise in natural science and logic, and his superiority to all the élite of philosophy who came before and after him, that we now do not possess any work written by anyone of them on these subjects, at least nothing that seems worth consideration, by either the ancient or the more recent writers. 2 And, to begin with those who came before Aristotle, if they did not even conceive any ideas about either or both of these subjects, or, if they did have some idea about them, supposed that

³ For this passage, cf. Arist., *SE* 34, 183b17–23 'For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced bit by bit by those who have taken them on, whereas the original discoveries generally make advance that is small at first though much more useful than the development which later springs out of them. For it may be that in everything, as the saying is: "the first start is the main part" (μέγιστον γὰρ ἕως ἀρχῆ παντός): and for this reason it is the most difficult ...' (trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes 1984).

¹ This essay is discussed in Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2).

νοὺν ὅτιποτοῦν λαβόντες οὐκ ᾤθησαν ἐξεῖναι σφίσιν οὐδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σπουδάσαι, καὶ διατοῦτ' ἄρ' ἀπέσχοντο, 3 τί ποτε χρῆ δοκεῖν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους, καὶ ποιόντινα συνορᾶν αὐτὸν τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἰς τὰ
 5 βέλτιστα, ὅστις ἀμέλει καὶ συνείδε περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἅττα ἔστι νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν, καὶ συνενόησεν ἅμα ἱκανῶς ἔχων εἰς τὰῦτα καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν νόνον ἑαυτὸν καθεῖναι, καὶ ἅμα ἀψάμενος καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνήσας ἐντελέστατα καὶ ἄριστα διεγένετο. 4 Εἰ δὲ κάκεινοι πρότερον ἐπεβάλλοντό τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τινα συνε-
 10 τάξαντο περὶ τούτων, τοῖς δ' Ἀριστοτέλους δευτέρου γ' ἔλθόντος αὐτοῦ καὶ πάνυ τοι περιγενομένου πλείστον ἐπεκαλύφθησαν, 5 καὶ παρῶθησαν τὰ ἐκείνων ὡς οὐδὲν μήποτ' ἀνύσιμον ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν μήθ' ὅλως παραβάλλειν πρὸς τὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἄξια, τί ποτ' αὐθις χρῆ λογίζεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ τε
 15 καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ πόσον τὸ ἐν τούτοις κράτος τάνδρῃ δείκνυται;

2 Καὶ μὴν ἔτι περὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν ὡσαύτως, εἰ μὲν ὅλως οὐκ ἠξίωσαν ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους προσθεῖναι, ἅτε μὴ ἐξὸν ὅτι-
 οῦν, εὖ γε δῆλον πάντως, ἢ ἀντιβλέψαι καὶ ἀντιθεῖναι πρὸς τὰ
 20 αὐτοῦ ὡς ἄρα βέλτιον ξυννενοηκότες | αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου 87
 δεῦτεροι γενόμενοι μάλιστα, καὶ οὐ τις ἂν ὄναιτο πλεῖν ἢ ἐκείνου τε καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου, 2 καὶ διατοῦτ' ἄρα, σφόδρ' εὐλαβηθέντες καὶ ἀποδειλιάσαντες πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σοφίαν καὶ τὸ ἄκρον ἐν οἷς ἐσπούδασεν, ἀπέστησαν τοῦ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ
 25 αὐτοὶ συντάττειν, ἔξεστι λοιπὸν αὐθις καθορᾶν τε καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, τίς ἐκεῖνος ἀνὴρ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου δυσαντίβλεπτα καὶ διὰ πάντων ἀνυσιμώτατα συντάγματα καὶ πάσης αἰδοῦς τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν ἀξιούμενα. 3 Εἰ δέ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ χρόνοις ὕστερον περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπεβάλλοντο καὶ ἀπετόλμησαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνου,
 30 πλέον τι καὶ ἄμεινον ἴσως ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ὕστεροί γ' ἐπιόντες εὐρεῖν τε καὶ ἀντρεῖν οἰηθέντες, λόγου δέ τινας τὰ κατ' αὐτοὺς

18 προσθεῖναι: προθεῖναι E, non leg. M
 20 ἄρα + τι E, non leg. M
 22 τῶν: τῷ E, non leg. M
 29 τὰ ἐκείνου: τάκεινου E, non leg. M

ξυν-
 νενοηκότες: νενοηκότες E, non leg. M
 29 τὰ

this was impossible for them, and that they were incapable of studying such matters, and for that reason refrained from doing so, 3 how should we regard Aristotle, and how are we to understand his nature and his work which had such excellent results? For he understood what is possible to think and say about such things, and he also realised that he was capable of tackling and working on them, and as soon as he had confidently started on them he continued [to work] with the best and most perfect results. 4 But if his predecessors did treat these things before him, and composed some writings about them, but were obscured by Aristotle who came after them and surpassed them completely, 5 and their treatises were disregarded as no longer offering anything useful for the purpose, and completely unworthy of being compared to those written by him—once again, what are we to think about him and his writings, and how great is his power shown to be in these?

2 And the same can indeed be said about his followers: if they did not find it worthwhile to add anything to the results of Aristotle because it is impossible to do so (which is obviously the case), or oppose him and propose anything in contradiction to him in the belief that they understood better because they had come after his lifetime, something which would be more useful than Aristotle and his writings, 2 and therefore, being extremely cautious and hesitant when faced with the man's wisdom and excellence in those things he had studied, refrained from writing themselves about the same things, one may, once again, understand and conclude what sort of man he is, and the quality of his writings, difficult to oppose and always exhaustive, [writings] that merit all respect on the part of his followers. 3 But if they themselves at a later time entered upon the same subjects and dared challenge his results, perhaps thinking that since they approached these things after his time, they could discover and say

τοῖς μετ' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἠξιώται, ἀλλὰ πάσαις ψήφοις ἀποδοδοκί-
 μασται καὶ ἀπέρριπται καθάπερ Ἀθήνησιν οἱ νόθοι πάλαι ἐς τὸ
 Κυνόσαργες, 4 καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχομεν οὔτ' ἀξιοῦμεν ὅλως αὐτοῖς
 χρῆσασθαι, οὔτ' ὄνασθαί τι τῆς αὐτῶν σπουδῆς πρὸς τὰ τοῦ ἀν-
 5 δρὸς ἐκείνου παραβαλλόμενοι, καὶ παντάπασι τὰ αὐτῶν ὠντιν-
 ὦν ἄρα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν σπουδάσματα κατέσβεσται καὶ κατήρ-
 γηται ὅσα καὶ μὴ γεγονότα τοῖς νῦν ἡμῖν ὄπῃ τῶν χρόνων μετ'
 αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ μετ' αὐτούς, 5 πόσῃ ἄρα διη κατανοεῖν
 τε καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι δεῖ τὴν κατ' ἐκείνων νίκην καὶ | πλεον- 88
 10 εξίαν Ἀριστοτέλους, καὶ πόσον ἀμέλει πείθειν ἐντεῦθεν ἔχομεν
 ἑαυτοὺς οἱ νῦν ἡμεῖς εὖ μάλα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τοῖς τοῦ ἀν-
 δρὸς περὶ τε τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν λογικῶν συντάγμασιν, 6 ὡς
 ἂν ἄριστ' ἔχουσι καὶ τελεώτατα καὶ ἐπιτυχέστατα διὰ πάντων,
 καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως βέλτιον, πάντοθεν ἐξετάζοντες οὕτω
 15 πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ πάντας φιλοκρινούντες ὅσοι πρότερον καὶ ὅσοι
 μετ' ἐκείνον ἐξῆς;

3 Τῷ ὄντι γὰρ ὅσοι πρὸ ἐκείνου κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπρώτευ-
 σαν, περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν πάνυ τοι διέτριψαν καὶ τὸ πλεῖ-
 στον αὐτοῖς τῆς σπουδῆς ἐν τούτοις ἦν, καὶ οὐ καθάπαξ ἀκαί-
 20 ρως, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἂ καὶ ἴσως τὰ πλείω τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐνταῦθα
 προσείσθαι τε καὶ τιμᾶν ἔχομεν. 2 Καθόλου δέ γε πρὸς τὰ τοῦδε
 τοῦ ἀνδρὸς παραβάλλειν, τίς οὕτω περιφανῶς μαίνεται, ὅστις
 καὶ ὅλως τοῦτ' ἐρεῖν ἀξιώσειε; Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα δῆλον αὐτίκα,
 καὶ οὐκ ἀμφιγνοεῖν ἔστι περὶ τούτου. 3 Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνων ἄ-
 25 παντα παρεώραται καὶ κατωλιγώρηται, καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι νῦν γε εἶ-
 ναι παρ' ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων λείπεται. Τὰ δέ γε τοῦ ἀν-
 δρὸς τούτου, τοῦ παντὸς ἀξιοῦμεν εἰδέναι, καὶ κομιδῇ πῶς ἂν
 εἴποι τις ὡς οἶόν τε σπουδάζομεν· 4 καὶ ὅς ἂν μάλιστα κατανε-
 νοηκῶς ἔχοι ταῦτα καὶ | διὰ μνήμης ἔχοι, κάλλισθ' οὐτός καὶ ὡς 89
 30 ἔνι μάλιστα περὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἔργων
 κατάληψιν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ πλείονος ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ καὶ τοῖς νῦν
 ἀνθρώποις ἐστίν, ὅς ἂν ἐντελῶς τὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῆς

4 αὐτῶν: αὐτῶ E, non leg. M 22 οὔτω: οὔτως ME

something more and better in addition to them, and [if] their writings have not been judged worthy of any attention by their followers, but by common consent have been repudiated and rejected, as in Athens in the old days those of impure birth were banished to Cynosarges,² 4 and we neither can nor wish to use them in any way, nor gain anything from studying them when we compare them to the writings of Aristotle, and on the whole their efforts on the same subjects [as dealt with by A.], no matter who these persons were, have been completely extinguished and invalidated as if they never existed by us of a later time, who are living after both Aristotle and his successors — 5 we must understand and conclude Aristotle's victory and superiority over them to be very great, and we who are living now must strongly persuade ourselves to pay attention to his writings on natural science and logic, 6 seeing that they are excellent, absolutely perfect and always successful, so that there is nothing better when we examine [this] from every angle, classifying everyone and comparing both his predecessors and his followers with this.³

3 As a matter of fact, the leading philosophers before him spent most of their time investigating the natural world, and the greater part of their study was about this and was not all futile, but some and perhaps most of their results in this field we can accept and esteem. 2 But to compare them in general with Aristotle's contribution—who would be so openly mad as to presume to suggest this? The situation is immediately clear; there are no two views concerning it. 3 For all of their writings are overlooked and disregarded, and there is nothing of theirs which remains in our days. But *his* writings we consider it worth everything to know, and we study them simply, how should one put it,⁴ as much as possible. 4 And the person who is most familiar with them and has memorised them, this person has the most complete understanding possible of nature and its works, and the person who is perfectly well-versed in the writings of Aristotle and his great wisdom concerning nature and constantly remembers and

² LSJ, s.v. Κυνόσαργες: 'a gymnasium outside the city of Athens, sacred to Heracles, for the use of those who were not of pure Athenian blood.'

³ paragraphs 5–6: literally, 'how great must we ... and how strongly must we ...?'

⁴ πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις: cf. above, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

- αὐτοῦ μεγάλης περὶ τὴν φύσιν σοφίας ἤσκηται καὶ διὰ μνήμης αἰεὶ καὶ διὰ γλώττης ἔχει. 5 Περί δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ἐκείνοι πρότερον ἄνδρες ἅπαντες φιλοσοφίας σπουδασταὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι καὶ βραχύτατον ὅλως ἐπόνησαν, ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοῦθ' ἱκανῶς ἔχειν νομίσαντες
- 5 ὅπως οὖν, ἢ μὴδ' εἰς νοῦν τοῦτο βαλλόμενοι καὶ προσσχόντες ὅτιοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοήσαντες καθάπαξ πρᾶγμα τοσοῦτον καὶ πολλοῦ πόνου καὶ σπουδῆς ἄξιον, ὥστε καὶ ἀξίως τυχεῖν. 6 Καὶ ἔοικεν ὡς ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἐκάστοτ' ἐν οἷς ἐσπούδαζον λογικαῖς εἴτουν συλλογιστικαῖς πίστεσι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἐνήν πάντως
- 10 περαίνειν καὶ ἀνύτειν εἰς τὰ προκείμενα, ἢ πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐκ εἶχον δὲ κατανοεῖν οὐδὲ λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν οἷς ἐχρῶντο, τίνα ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς ἄρ' ἔχει καὶ πῶς ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ὅλως χρῆσθαι καὶ πῶς μάλιστα βέλτιστα ἔστι χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν.
- 15 4 Καὶ οἱ μὲν γε οὕτω πρότερον ἐκείνοι. Ὅσοι δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλην μάλιστα περὶ ἄμφω γ' ἐσπούδασαν, καὶ τὸ τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ τὸ τῆς λογικῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου τάνδρὸς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ἀρχῶν τε καὶ ὑποδειγμάτων, καὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου 90 μάλιστ' ἴχνεσιν ἐπόμενοι (ἢ πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἐξῆν;) 2 καὶ
- 20 πρὸς πλεῖστα τῶν αὐτοῦ φιλονείκως τινὲς ἔσχον ἐπεξιόντες καὶ μὴ φειδόμενοι κατατρέχειν ἀντανιστάμενοι καὶ περιτρέπειν ἀξιοῦντες, καὶ σφίσι προσέχειν ὡς βέλτιον ἢ κατ' ἐκείνον ἠνυκόσι, βραχὺ δὴ μάλιστ' ἢ κατ' οὐδὲν ὄναντο τῆς φιλοτιμίας ταύτης, ἢ ἀκαιρίας. 3 Ποῦ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνων πάντα τόσα καὶ τόσα
- 25 συντάγματα παρ' Ἑλλησιν ἢ βαρβάροις; καὶ ἡ μεγίστη σπουδὴ τῶν διαδεξαμένων ἀνδρῶν ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μὴ γέγονεν ὅλως τοῖς νῦν ἀνθρώποις ἔχει. 4 Καὶ μόνος ἄλλιος ἐν οὐρανοῖς φησι Σιμωνίδης· καὶ μόνος Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου συντάγματα
- 30 φυσικῶν καὶ λογικῶν κατάληψιν σπουδάζειν αἰρουμένοις. 5

27 μόνος ἄλλιος ἐν οὐρανοῖς; Sim. fr. 100 Page

4-5 ἔχειν νομίσαντες ὅπως οὖν: ὅπως οὖν ἔχειν νομίσαντες E, non leg. M 5 προσσχόντες p. c. P¹, προσχόντες ME

speaks about these things, this man is greatly respected in our present society and among the present generation.⁵ **5** But concerning logic all those earlier students of philosophy did not compose anything, however slight, either because they judged themselves not capable of this, or because the thought did not even occur to them and they were simply ignorant in a subject which demands such great effort and study in order to be fully grasped. **6** It is reasonable to assume that in their studies they always used logical, i.e. syllogistic arguments, since it was not possible to achieve anything or accomplish the proposed goal in any other way—how could it? But they were not capable of fully understanding and formulating that which they were using, what these things are and how they work, and how it is possible to use them in general, and especially how it is possible to use them best, most safely and most appositely.

4 And so much for Aristotle's predecessors. But all those who after Aristotle have mostly studied both subjects, both the physical and the logical philosophy, [starting,] as I believe, from his principles and proofs, and following mostly in his footsteps (for what else could they do?), **2** and being, some of them, competitive in regard to most of his results, attacking and not hesitating to inveigh against him and presuming to refute him and devote themselves to themselves, as if their achievements were greater than his, these people have profited only slightly or not at all from this ambition, or lack of judgment. **3** For where are all of their writings, so numerous, among Hellenes or barbarians? Among people living now it is as if the great efforts of Aristotle's successors had never existed at all. **4** *The sun is alone in the heavens*, says Simonides.⁶ And Aristotle and his writings alone constitute the whole curriculum for those who choose to study philosophy, and particularly the understanding of physics and logic.

⁵ Note the chiasmic arrangement (which does not appear in the translation): ὅς ἄν ... οὗτος ... κατάληψιν ἔχει | περὶ πλείονος ... ἐστι, ὅς ἄν ...

⁶ Metochites appears to be the only source for this quotation (see Page 1962, 307).

Καίτοι γε οὐκ ὀλίγα μὲν ἐκδόσεις εἰσὶ Θεοφράστου, οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ Χρυσίππου καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς διαδόχων, κατεξανιστάμεναί γε αὐταὶ δριμύτερα μάλιστα τῶν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐκείνου, οὐκ ὀλίγα δὲ καὶ χρόνοις ὕστερον ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτοῦ Γαληνοῦ, 5 φιλονείκως καὶ αὐταὶ καὶ διαφόρως πάνυ τοι κατ' Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο μὲν περὶ ἰ τῶν φυσικῶν, τοῦτο δὲ 91 περὶ τῶν λογικῶν.

5 Καὶ λαμπροί γε καὶ αὐτοὶ πάντες ἄνδρες περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Ἀριστοτέλει πάντων μάλιστα σπουδάζοντες καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι, καὶ τὸ δὴ χάριεν, μετὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκάστοτε προτεθειμένοι 10 σκοπῶν καὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς τῶν συγγραμμάτων χρώμενοι, 2 περὶ ζῴων τάδε ἢ τάδε κατ' ἐκείνον ἐν προοιμίαις καὶ ὑποσχέσεσι, καὶ περὶ κατηγοριῶν καὶ σχημάτων, καὶ ἀναλυτικῶν πρώτων τε καὶ δευτέρων, καὶ περὶ πάντων καθόλου 15 παραπλησίως, σεμνοὶ σεμνῶς ἡμῖν ἐπαγγέλλονται καὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται κατ' ἐκείνον οὕτω χρώμενοι, οὐκοῦν ἄχρι τούτου. 3 Τὰ δ' ἐξῆς ὁ Διὸς ὄντως Κόρινθος ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ πολλὴ ἀηδία, ἢ τοῖς ἐκείνου γε χρωμένων ἀτρέπτως, ἅτε μὴ ἐξὸν ἄλλως ὀπηοῦν χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἐν ἐκείνοις ἄριστα πάντων 20 καθόλου καὶ ἐντελέστατα καὶ ἀκριβέστατα σπουδάσαντα, 4 ἢ εἴ τι καὶ πλέον ἐπιφέρειεν τοῖς ἐκείνου, δευτεροὶ γε ἴσως ἐπιόντες αὐτοί, μάτην πονούντων καὶ εἰς οὐδὲν δέον, οὐδ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος, ἢ καὶ πῦρ χερσὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν σκαλλόντων, ἦν ἄρα τι καὶ ἀντιλέγειν οὐκ ὀκνῶσι τάνδρῃ, καὶ αὖτις οὕτω μάτην 25 πονούντων. 5 Καὶ ἰ σαφῆς πάλιν ἢ αὐτὴ πίστις τῶν νῦν λόγων, 92 ὡς ἄρ' ἐκεῖνα τῶν ἀνδρῶν τόσα καὶ τόσα σπουδάσματα καὶ πάνυ τοι πλεῖστα, πάντ' ἔρριπται καὶ ὀλίγοι κομιδῇ καὶ ἴσασιν, εἰ ὅλως γέγονε· 6 μόνον δὲ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐκείνου κρατεῖ καὶ τι-

17 ὁ Διὸς — Κόρινθος: Pi., N. 7.105; cf. Ar., Ra. 439, Ec. 828; Pl., Euthd. 292e 23 πῦρ χερσὶ — σκαλλόντων: proverbium ignotum

2-3 κατεξανιστάμεναί scripsi: κατεπανιστάμεναί PE, non leg. M 27 ἔρριπται: ἔριπται P, non leg. M

5 And yet the publications of Theophrastus [were] not few, nor those of Chrysippus and the later Stoics, being in the sharpest opposition to those of Aristotle. And in the later period, after these philosophers, there are numerous books of Galen, these too being written in rivalry and opposition to Aristotle and his work. And this applies to both physics and logic.

5 And all those men, illustrious themselves, who have studied above all the same things that Aristotle studied and emulated him, and, an amusing fact, each time formulated the same goals and used the same titles for their writings as he does, writing this or that in their introductions or declarations, 2 On animals, On categories and figures, Prior and Posterior Analytics, and similarly about everything, solemnly declare to us their aims and are not ashamed of emulating him in this way, at least concerning these things.⁷ 3 But from then on [there is] really *Corinth, the city of Zeus*⁸ in their compositions, and much tedium, since⁹ either they are using his results unchanged,¹⁰ because it is not possible to use them in any other way whatsoever and because in these [subjects] the man worked best, most perfectly and accurately of all,¹¹ 4 or, if they have contributed something in addition to his work, perhaps [attempting to do this] because they came later, they are exerting themselves in vain and for no need or profit, or else they are *stirring up fire with their hands*, as the proverb says,¹² if they do not hesitate to oppose the man, in that case, too, labouring in vain. 5 And, once again, a clear confirmation of what I am saying here is the fact that all these numerous studies by these men are all vanished, and only a few persons are even aware of them ever having ex-

⁷ The only occurrence of the phrase οὐκοῦν ἄχρι τούτου in TLG is Aelius Aristides, *Πρεσβευτικὸς πρὸς Ἀχιλλεῖα* 425.2 Jebb; cf. below, 217 n. 5.

⁸ The expression Διὸς Κόρινθος is used of persons who are always repeating the same old story: 'when the Megarians revolted from Corinth, the Corinthians sent envoys to Megara protesting that "Corinth, the city of Zeus" (ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος) would not tolerate this presumption (and probably harped upon this phrase). In a subsequent engagement the Megarians made a battle-cry of not sparing "Corinth, the city of Zeus" ' (Sandys 1946, 391, quoting a scholion on Pindar, *N.* 7.105).

⁹ Taking *χρωμένων, πονούντων, σκαλλόντων* and *πονούντων* as absolute genitives (they could also be governed by ἀηδία or τοῖς λόγοις).

¹⁰ ἀτρέπτως: cf. περιτρέπειν in 5.4.2.

¹¹ τὸν ἄνδρα ... σπουδάσαντα, absolute accusative, co-ordinated with ἐξόν.

¹² πῦρ χερσὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν σκαλλόντων: I have not found the source, or any other occurrence, of this proverb.

μᾶται καὶ σπουδάζεται τὸν ἅπαντ' ἐξ ἐκείνου γ' αἰῶνα καὶ
 παρὰ πᾶσι, καὶ οὐχ Ἑλλησί γε μόνοις ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀλλ' εἴτινες
 καὶ γλώττης καὶ λέξεως ἄλλης ἢ Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέ-
 λους ἐκδόσεως ἀλλότριον, ἐρασταὶ δ' ὅμως σοφίας εὖ μάλα πο-
 5 νοῦσιν Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σπουδάζουσι συντάγ-
 ματα, 7 καὶ βιάζονται καθ' ὅσον οἰοί τ' εἰσὶ μεταφέρειν ταῦτα
 τοῖς οἰκείοις ἤθεσι τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τῆς γλώττης, καὶ μεταφέρειν
 ὄντως τῷ κατ' αὐτοὺς βίῳ καὶ τῇ ζωῇ ἀληθινῆς ἀφορμῆν εὐδαι-
 μονίας, καὶ θησαυροὺς σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων ἀποδή-
 10 μους τῶν οἴκοι καὶ ἐθίμων ταμείων ἀποσυλῶντες παρρησίᾳ καὶ
 ἀποτεμμαχίζοντες.

6 Καίτοι γε μάλιστ' ἴσχυσαν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἐπὶ τε τῶν
 Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ χρόνοις ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς καὶ ταῖς
 τῶν Καισάρων αὐτοκρατορίαις, ἠνίκα δὴ καὶ ἰ τὰ τῆς Χριστια- 93
 15 νικῆς θεοσεβείας ἀναλάμπειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κατὰ πάσης ἤδη τῆς
 οἰκουμένης ἤρξαντο. 2 Οἷ γε δὴ μάλισθ' οὗτοι καὶ κατ' Ἀριστο-
 τέλους ἀντετάξαντο καὶ τῶν αἵρεσιωτῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ διαδόχων,
 τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου, καὶ πολὺ κράτος ἔσχον ἐκεῖνοι πλεῖν ἢ
 κατὰ πάντας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαφοραῖς στασιώτας
 20 ἄλλους, καὶ πλεῖστον ὅσον ἤκμασαν καὶ γεννικῶς ὠπλίσαντο,
 καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἤξίωσαν αὐτοὶ πλήθει τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ συνταγ-
 μάτων πλήθει, 3 ἃ δὴ πάντ' οἴχεται καὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους καθ-
 ἀπαξ ἤττηται σοφίας, καὶ οὐκέτι καὶ νῦν ἀντέχει, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν
 αὐτῶν λείπεται, ὡς ἂν εἰ καὶ μὴ γέγονεν ὅλως ἥπερ εἴρηται·
 25 μόνον δὲ τὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἄσυλα τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου μένει
 καὶ ἀζήμια διὰ πάντων ἀκμάζει καὶ σπουδάζεται πάνυ τοι
 πλεῖστον, ὅσοις τοι φιλοσοφίας ἔρωσ πολλοὺ τιμᾶται. 4 Καὶ
 τᾶλλα μὲν τοῦ σοφοῦ Γαληνοῦ περὶ τῆς φιλανθρώπου κατ' αὐ-
 τὸν τέχνης εὖ μάλα κρατεῖ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, βιωφε-
 30 λέστατ' ὄντως καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις Ἑλλησί τε καὶ πᾶσιν
 ἄλλοις, εἴπερ καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ μάλιστ' ἐπίχρεια, 5 καὶ συντηροῦ-

1 γ': γε E, non leg. M 3 καὶ² add. s. l. P², om. E, non leg. M 3-4 ἀρισ-
 τοτέλους: ἀριστοτελικῆς E, non leg. M 8 καὶ om. E, non leg. M 16 ἤρ-
 ξαντο: ἤρξατο E, non leg. M

isted. 6 Only *his* writings have been authoritative and honoured and studied ever since his lifetime, and among all peoples, and indeed not only among the Hellenes, but some peoples who use another language than Greek and are foreign to the work of Aristotle, but are nevertheless lovers of wisdom, work hard on Aristotle, and study his writings, 7 and strive as much as possible to translate them to their own customary language and tongue, and literally translate to their own life a cause for true happiness, gladly plundering and cutting off pieces from treasures of wisdom and the knowledge of Truth [located] far away from their usual stores at home.

6 And yet the Stoics were most influential in the Hellenistic period and later in Roman times, under the Emperors, when the Christian faith first began to illuminate human life in the whole of the civilised world. 2 The Stoics were in opposition both to Aristotle and to his disciples and followers, the Peripatetics, and they were extremely influential, more so than all the other adherents of the different schools of philosophy. They flourished greatly and were well armed,¹³ and they thought very highly of themselves because of the multitude of their adherents and their writings. 3 But this is all gone, completely vanquished by the wisdom of Aristotle; nothing remains, nothing whatsoever is left of their writings; it is as if they had never existed, as I said above. Only the works of Aristotle remain intact for the whole of this time, flourish undamaged everywhere and are studied intensely by those who honour the passion for philosophy. 4 The other writings of the wise Galen, on that art of his which serves mankind, have a strong position among men,¹⁴ truly being of the greatest use to everybody, both Hellenes and all others, in their lives, no less valuable than any other helpful [things]. 5 And they are

¹³ γεννικῶς ὀπλίσαντο, cf. 4.4.2 γεννικῶς ὀπλίσθαι.

¹⁴ Literally, 'in life and among men'.

σιν αὐτὰ παῖδες ἰατρῶν κειμήλια τῷ ὄντι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης εὐ- 94
 ετηρίας καὶ εὐπραγίας καὶ συμμαχίαν κρατίστην ὑπὲρ τῆς φύσε-
 ως ἐν ταῖς ἐπιπιτούσαις ἐκάστοτε τοῦ σώματος συμφοραῖς. 6
 Τὰ δὲ γ' ἐπ' Ἀριστοτέλην αὐτοῦ Γαληνοῦ παρηρησία μάχιμα
 5 πλεῖσθ' ὅσα πονηθέντα καὶ ἴδιαι συντάξεις ἀντιπολιτευόμεναι
 καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τι καὶ συνεισφέρειν δόξασαι ἢ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 αἰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐκδόσεις, ποῦ νῦν εἰσίν, ἢ τίσι σπουδά-
 ζονται, 7 ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα τῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὥσπερ Ἀριστοτέ-
 λους τὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελέστατα πολὺ προέχειν δοκοῦντα
 10 πάντως, ὡς εὖ γε δῆλόν ἐστι παντὶ τάληθές πρὸ παντὸς τιθεμέ-
 νω καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντι ξυνορᾶν; 8 Καίτοι τί λέγω; Πολλοῖς μὲν
 οὖν τῶν προσανεχόντων ἰατρικῇ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῖς γε πλείοσι
 τῶν τὰ ἐκείνου τιμώντων καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς πᾶσι τρόποις ἐξαί-
 ρειν καὶ θαυμάζειν ἀξιούντων σοφίαν, καὶ ἠγγόηταί γε τοῦθ', 95
 15 ὡς ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος βιβλία πάνυ τοι πλεῖστα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 Ἀριστοτέλει συνέταξε καὶ κατὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ, σπουδῇ πάση καὶ
 συντόνοις ἐπιμελείαις ὥστε καὶ περιγενέσθαι χρυσάμενος. 9
 Ἄλλ' ἅπαντ' ἐκεῖνος κατὰ τῶν ὁμοτέχνων εὐδοκιμήσας, ἐν
 τούτοις καὶ ὀτιοῦν κατὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀνῦσαι καὶ πλέον τι σχεῖν
 20 οὐκ ἴσχυσεν, ἀλλὰ μάτην πονήσας ἐλέγχεται τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ εἰς
 οὐδὲν χρήσιμον οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ οὔτε τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ, φιλο-
 νεικίας καὶ φιλαυτίας μόνον ἤττων γενόμενος.

7 Καὶ μὴν ἔτι καὶ θαυμάζειν μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἄξιον, ὅτι
 δὴ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ διαφό-
 25 ρων καὶ διαφόρους ἐκδεξαμένων αἱρέσεις, ὡς αὐτὸς ἀμέλει
 Πορφύριός τε καὶ Πρόκλος καὶ τινες ἄλλοι μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης
 τε καὶ γνώμης τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ καταλόγου καὶ τῆς δια-
 δοχῆς, 2 καὶ πολλοὶ γε μὴν ἔτι πάνυ τοι πλεῖστον ἐν σοφίᾳ περὶ
 αὐτῶν λογίζεσθαι καὶ φρονεῖν ἀξιούντες, καὶ πείθοντες ἑαυ-
 30 τοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμπεῖθειν αἰρούμενοι, καὶ καθάπαξ ἀν-
 αινόμενοι καὶ ἀπαξιοῦντες ὄντινωνοῦν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων αὐ-
 τῶν δοκεῖν τε καὶ ἀκούειν ἀκόλουθοι καὶ σπουδασταὶ τῶν κατ'

7 αἰ p. c. P¹ 14 ἠγγόηταί ex -τέ corr. P¹ 18 εὐδοκιμήσας: -μάσας E, non leg. M

guarded by the physicians as genuine treasures for human well-being and prosperity, and as the most powerful ally on behalf of nature in the afflictions which are constantly befalling the body. 6 But the many books which this same Galen wrote in open opposition to Aristotle, and his specific compositions with the opposite views, which pretend to contain and contribute something more than the publications of Aristotle on the same subjects—where are they now, and by whom are they studied 7 in the same way as his other works and as Aristotle's very careful [investigations] that seem to be vastly superior,¹⁵ as is quite clear to everyone who values the truth more than anything else, and is capable of good understanding? 8 But what need is there to go on? Many of those who devote themselves to medicine and truly honour most of Galen's writings and think that one should by every means exalt and admire the man's wisdom are not even aware that he composed a great number of books on the same subjects as Aristotle, and in opposition to his works, working with whole-hearted zeal and intense effort to surpass him. 9 But although he was successful in all his work aimed against his fellow physicians, in these [anti-Aristotelian] writings he could not accomplish anything whatsoever or prevail against him, but time proves him to have laboured in vain and to no use either for himself or for humanity, but only to have yielded to contentiousness and self-love.

7 And this too is indeed a cause for wonder, that many of those different people who polemicised against Aristotle, and were the leaders of different schools of philosophy, as for instance Porphyry himself and Proclus, and a few others, not of the same views and beliefs,¹⁶ of those of the Platonic party and succession, 2 and also many others [who] presumed to think highly of themselves because of their wisdom, persuading themselves about this and wishing to persuade others, too, and who declined and refused to appear and be called followers of anyone, even of the greatest, and adherents of

¹⁵ There is a slight contradiction between 'seem' and the following 'as is quite clear to everyone'. This difficulty may be removed by taking παντί with δοκούντα instead of with δηλον, in which case ὡς εἶ γε δηλόν ἐστι becomes a separate unit. However, the word order seems to speak against this interpretation. Anyway, Metochites surely means 'the writings of Aristotle are superior' (as he says in many other passages), although he says that they 'seem to be' so.

¹⁶ *not of the same views and beliefs*: sc. as Porphyry and Proclus.

ἐκείνους | αἰρέσεων, 3 ὡς οἱ περὶ Σιμπλίκιον καὶ Θεμίστιον καὶ 96
 Ἄμμωνίω γε ἀμφοτέρω καὶ Συριανὸν καὶ Ἑρμείαν καὶ Πλουτ-
 άρχω γε ἀμφοτέρω καὶ Δαμάσκιον, 4 τοσοῦτον ἐθαύμασαν τὴν
 ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς καὶ λογικοῖς περὶνοιαν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ κα-
 5 ταληπτικὴν ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τελειότητα, ὥστε καὶ
 πρόθυμοι γ' εὖ μάλα τῶν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς συνταγ-
 μάτων ἐξηγηταὶ γενέσθαι, καὶ φιλόανθρωποι καὶ διερμηνεῖς ἀν-
 θρώποις ταπεινὰ πράττουσι καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν ἰκα-
 νῶς τε καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔχουσι, 5 καὶ χρήσιμοι γε ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰς
 10 τὸν βίον καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς λογικῆς ἀνθρώπων φύσεως χειραγω-
 γοὶ τῆς τῶν βελτίστων συνέσεως, μηκέτ' ἀπαξιοῦντες τὸ μέρος
 τοῦτο καθυπουργεῖν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ καταγγέλλειν τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ,
 ὡς ἄρα τι μέγα περὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ φρονοῦντες κατ' ἔθος ἀν-
 θρώπινον.

15 | Περὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ τῆς σοφίας 97
 καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ ἀρμονικοῦ: ΠΓ'

1 Πλάτωνα δὲ τὸν θαυμάσιον ἴσμεν πάνυ τοι τοῖς μετὰ Πυθα-
 γόραν διαδόχοις ἐκείνου συμμίζαντα κατὰ τὸν βίον καὶ συν-
 εσχολακότα τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν ὄντων, ἐν Ἑλλάδι τε καὶ κατὰ τὴν
 20 Ἰταλίαν, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀπόδημον γενόμενον ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου χρόνον
 οὐ βραχύν τινα, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσμεν ἄλλων τε μαθόντες καὶ αὐτοῦ
 γε μάλισθ' ἱστοροῦντος, καὶ τοῖς ἐκεῖσε συγγερόμενον ἱερο-
 γραμματεῦσιν ἐπιμελῶς, 2 Ἐδόκουν δ' οὐτοὶ γε κομιδῇ πλεῖν ἢ
 κατὰ πάντας ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐν ἐκείνοις ἄρα τοῖς χρόνοις,

4-5 καταληπτικὴν scripsi: καταληπτήν PE, non leg. M 21 τοῦτ': τοῦτο P,
 non leg. M

¹⁷ For a discussion of this list see Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2).

¹⁸ For a similar play on Aristotle's name cf. *Sem.* 5.4.5.

¹⁹ Literally, 'look at him successfully' (ἀνυσίμως, perhaps 'straight', 'directly'). Metochites is probably referring to the simile of the sun in the heavens, *Sem.* 12.4.4 above. Those 'less well endowed' are not able to look at Aristotle without being blinded by his light.

their doctrines, 3 such as Simplicius, Themistius, the two Ammonii, Syrian, Hermias, the two Plutarchs, and Damascius¹⁷ 4 —[all these men] were so impressed by Aristotle's perspicacity in his writings on physics and logic, and his perceptive acumen—his perfection, so to speak¹⁸ —that they became enthusiastic guides to his writings on such subjects, and benevolent interpreters for men who are less well endowed and are unable to look at him,¹⁹ 5 and truly usefully guiding them in the understanding of the things most valuable²⁰ to the life and community of human beings' rational nature, no longer refusing, because of their high opinion of themselves as is common among men, to serve the man (at least in this respect) and promote his doctrines.²¹

13. On Plato¹ and the mathematical part of wisdom,² and especially on harmonics

1 We know that during his life the admirable Plato associated very much with the followers of Pythagoras, and engaged together with them in Greece and Italy in the examination of reality, and spent a considerable period of time away from home, in Egypt (and this we learn both from others and especially from what he himself tells us), and also assiduously associated with the priestly scribes there.³ 2 And they were reputed to spend their time, more than all other men in that day but also in earlier ages further back in history, investigat-

²⁰ Or: the understanding of the best people, i.e., the philosophers.

²¹ μηκέτι because of ἀπαξιοῦντες in 12.7.2: they refused to follow any other philosopher, but with Aristotle they no longer refuse. For τὸ μέρος τοῦτο cf. above, 12.5.2 οὐκοῦν ἄχρι τούτου.

¹ The title is somewhat misleading, since this essay mostly discusses Pythagoras; similarly the essay on Philo is as much about Josephus. (This is an indication that the titles originate with Metochites himself.)

² τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ τῆς σοφίας: cf. e.g. 14.1.3 τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας. Metochites seems to use σοφία sometimes like our 'wisdom', sometimes in the specialised sense φιλοσοφία. I translate consistently: σοφία 'wisdom', φιλοσοφία 'philosophy'.

³ What Plato himself tells us in *Ep.* 7 is that at the age of forty he went to Italy and Sicily (324a6, 326b5), and that previously he had made the acquaintance of the Pythagorean philosopher Archytas (338c6 ff.). The claim that Plato went to Egypt is found e.g. in Diogenes Laertius 3.6.

μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πορρωτάτω πάλαι τῶν χρόνων, περὶ τὴν τῶν
 θείων σπουδάζειν ἱστορίαν καὶ τὴν τῆς μαθηματικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπι-
 στήμης ὑπὲρ τὴν ὕλην ἀναχώρησιν. 3 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ πάνυ τοι
 τῆς κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν φιλοσοφίας Πλάτων εὖ ἔσχε, καὶ ἄ-
 5 μεινον πολλῶ δὴ ἢ κατ' Ἀριστοτέλην, καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ περὶ γεω-
 μετρίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν θεωρίαν.

2 Μουσικῶν γὰρ λόγων ἤρξατο μὲν Πυθαγόρας καὶ θαυμά-
 σιος ἐν τούτοις ἡγεμὼν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν αὐτὸς γέγονε, πρῶτος φι-
 λοκρινήσας ὑπ' ἄκρας ἀγχινοίας καὶ περινοίας καὶ γνωστικῆς
 10 ἐπιμελείας 2 τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀκουστικῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ κρίσεως καὶ 98
 χειραγωγίας εἰς νοῦν διαιρέσεις τῶν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς λόγων καὶ τὸ
 σύμφυτον τοῖς οὖσιν ἐμμελὲς καὶ ἡρμοσμένον ὄροις τακτοῖς
 καθάπαξ τὸ ἀσάλευτον ἔχουσι καὶ μεγάλης ἐπιστήμης εὕρεσιν
 χορηγοῦσι, 3 πρῶγμα θαυμασιώτατον ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἴ τις ἄπτοιτο
 15 ξὺν νῶ καὶ κατανοεῖν ἔχει καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι ὡς, ἐπειδὴ χρει-
 ᾶν ἔχομεν τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἀφορμῆς κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν ἐν-
 αγούσης εἰς τὴν νοερὰν ἐργασίαν καὶ τὰ τῆς διανοίας συμ-
 περάσματα, 4 καὶ δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 χρησθαι, καὶ τὴν ἄλογον καὶ πείραν καὶ κρίσιν καὶ τὸ φαινό-
 20 μενον προλαμβάνειν, εἰ καὶ νοσερῶς ἔχει καὶ ἀμαρτητικῶς τοῦ
 τελείου καὶ ἀτρέπτου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς, προλαμβάνειν δ' ὅμως εἰς
 τοὺς ἀσειστους ἔξω τῆς ὕλης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐπιλογισμοὺς καὶ
 παντάπασιν ἀλωβήτους καὶ ἀνευθύνους τε καὶ ἀνόσους, 5 πολ-
 25 λῶ λοιπὸν ῥῶδόν ἐστι τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὄρασιν αἰσθητικῇ χειραγω-
 γία, ἧς ἐστὶν ἔκγονα γεωμετρία καὶ σφαιρικὴ εἵτουν ἀστρονο-
 μικὴ καὶ ἀριθμῶν ὀρισμοὶ καὶ καταλήψεις τὸ μέρος, ἢ τῇ κατὰ
 τὴν ἀκουστικὴν αἰσθήσει χρησθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐντεῦθεν τῶν ἀρμο-
 νικῶν, καὶ συμφώνων καὶ μή, λόγων ἀποπεράτωςιν συλλογισ-
 30 τικὴν. 6 Ὁράσεως μὲν γὰρ ἔχομεν εὖ μάλ' ἀπονώτερον μέτρα 99
 τινὰ καὶ διαιρέσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν λαμβάνειν, διὰ τὸ τῆς αἰ-
 σθήσεως ἀνθρώποις ταύτης τελειότερον ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀκριβέσ-
 τερον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν χρῆσιν. 7 Ἀκοῆς δ' οὐ τοσοῦτον, οὐδ' οὐ-

5 περὶ + τὴν P, non leg. M 12 ἐμμελὲς: ἐπιμελὲς P, non leg. M 20 ἔχει: ἔχοι
 P, non leg. M

ing the divine things and elevating the mathematical science itself above matter. ³ Therefore Plato became well-versed in the mathematical part of philosophy, much more so than Aristotle, and particularly in geometry and the science of numbers.

² For the scientific study of music was begun by Pythagoras, who also himself became an excellent guide in this subject for the Hellenes, being, through his supreme acumen, perspicacity, and expert thoroughness, the first to distinguish, ² by means of acoustic perception and judgement and guidance to the mind, the divisions of the ratios of numbers, and the harmony inherent in reality and structured by fixed definitions that are absolutely unassailable and assist in the discovery of certain knowledge. ³ This is truly most wondrous for anyone who regards it judiciously and is capable of understanding and concluding that,⁴ since in mathematics we need the perceptual impetus that leads to the work of the mind and the conclusions of thought, ⁴ and [given that] to begin with we must by necessity stick to sense-perception and take as a preliminary our irrational experience, judgement, and phenomena (even if these things are feeble and fail to achieve what is perfect, incontrovertible and accurate, still take them as preliminaries) for the irrefutable conclusions of knowledge that are independent of matter, completely inviolate, irreproachable and sound— ⁵ under these conditions it is much easier to use the guidance provided by the sense of sight, the offspring of which are geometry and spherics, i.e., astronomy, and also to some extent the definitions and concepts of numbers, than to use the sense of hearing to [attain] the syllogistic apprehension of the harmonious or non-harmonious ratios. ⁶ For in the case of sight we are able to discern quite effortlessly some measures and divisions of the perceptible things through the perfection, so to say, and accuracy of this sense in human beings for their own use. ⁷ But in the case of hearing we can-

⁴ The object clause governed by *ὅς* comes in 13.2.5.

τως ἔτοιμόν τε καὶ ἄπονον ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλικῆς ἐντεύξεως βοήθειαν
 εἰς τοὺς ἐπιλογισμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἀπαθείς χρόνοις ὕστερον ἀπο-
 φάνσεις τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ὡσπερ εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ
 5 ἄυλον ἀύλου θεωρίας καὶ καταληπτικῆς ἕξεως καὶ τελευτῆς
 15 ὑπόδειγμα τὴν ἀρχήν· 8 οὐ γὰρ δὴ παραπλησίως ἔχομεν, ὡς ἂν
 δῆτ' ἐπὶ τῆς ὀράσεως αὐτῆς, σταθμούς τινας καὶ πῆχεις ἀκοῆς
 καὶ φωνῆς εὐορίστους συνιδεῖν, καὶ διαιρέσεις καὶ μέτρα ῥᾶστ'
 ἄπονα χρῆσθαι. 9 Ἄλλὰ πολὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος ὁ Πυ-
 10 θαγόρας καὶ θαυμάζειν μάλιστ' εἰ δὴ τις ἄξιος, ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκουσ-
 10 τικῆς ταύτης ἐντεύξεως καὶ πείρας καὶ χρήσεως, ὑπ' ἄκρας εὐ-
 κολίας καὶ ἐτοιμότητος καὶ εὐφυΐας καὶ εὐστροφίας τοῦ νοῦ, 10
 καὶ μέχρι τῶν λεπτοτάτων καὶ ἀκαριαίων αὐτῶν καταδιελόμε-
 νος καὶ καταριθμήσας καὶ ὀρισάμενος πῆχεσι καὶ θριγγοῖς ἀσα-
 λεύτοις τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τοῖς ἤχοις μήκη, ὅποσαοὺν ἕκαστα,
 15 καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφώνους τε καὶ ἰμή, 100
 καὶ ἀρμονίας ἔχοντας εὐ καὶ μή, καὶ ἀνθ' ἕκαστα ταῦτα μετ'
 ἀκλονήτου τῆς πίστεως, 11 καὶ μὴν ἔτι τὸν σύνδεσμον ἀπάντων
 ἐνταῦθα τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὴν ἀλληλουχίαν, ὥστε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡρ-
 μόσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα καλῶς ἐστάναι, καὶ τὴν ἐντεῦθεν τῆς ψυ-
 20 χῆς προσπάθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀκουστικὰς ἀρμονίας διαφόρους
 καὶ διάφορον συνδιάθεσιν.

3 Πυθαγόρας τοίνυν οὕτω πολὺς ὡς ἄρα θαυμασιώτατ' ἐνε-
 νόησε, καὶ κανόσιν οἴσισιν ἄρα καὶ κατατομαῖς κατεστήσατο
 τὴν ἀρμονικὴν ἐπιστήμην πρῶτος Ἑλλήνων, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς εἰ-
 25 πεῖν πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐν
 παντὶ πράγματι σύμφυτον δύναμιν. 2 Ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ὁ πάνσοφος
 Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἦττον Πυθαγόρας φησὶν ἀρχέ-
 γονον φύσιν, οὐ μόνον τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων οὐσιώσεως, ἀλ-
 λά καὶ αὐτῆς οὐχῆκιστα πάσης τῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ

4 ἀύλου om. E, non leg. M 22 πολὺς ex πολὺς ὑς corr. P¹

⁵ καταληπτικὴ ἕξις καὶ τελευτή: a knowledge and consummation character-
 ised by, belonging to, apprehension. Perhaps the whole phrase means no more
 than 'perfect knowledge'.

not, from the encounter with matter, get that much or that ready and easy help for cogitation, or later for the irrefutable statements of knowledge, but the sense of hearing seems somehow to be already from the beginning an immaterial indication of an immaterial investigation and knowledge.⁵ 8 For we are not able, as in the case of sight, to 'see' well-defined weights and lengths of hearing and sound, or divisions and measurements easy to use without effort. 9 But Pythagoras was truly a great man, worthy indeed of admiration, who from this acoustic encounter, experience, and use, through the utter effortlessness, readiness, talent and versatility of his mind, 10 dissected and counted and defined with certain lengths and boundaries, down to the finest and most minute quantities of the voice and sounds, the size of each and what relations they have to each other, whether they are concordant with each other or not, and harmonising well or otherwise, and all of these things with unshaken assurance, 11 and further the cohesion and interdependence of all things in this world with the effect that through their fitting together they are firmly established; and the resulting affection of the soul, and its varying sympathy towards the various acoustic harmonies.⁶

3 This the industrious Pythagoras thought out most admirably,⁷ and he was the first of the Hellenes, or rather, so to speak, the first of all men to establish the science of harmony with laws and divisions in accordance with the congenital power of numbers in all things. 2 For the all-wise Plato, but also no less Pythagoras himself, says that Number is the nature that is the original cause not only of the reality of all things,⁸ but also especially of the whole of the mathematical science and knowledge itself.⁹ 3 And it is possible to understand and

⁶ I.e. the musical scales. καὶ διάφορον: καὶ because of the preceding διαφόρου. As the 'acoustic harmonies' vary, so does the soul's sympathy vary.

⁷ Πυθαγόρας τοίνυν οὕτω πολὺς ὡς ἄρα θαυμασιώτατ' ἐνενόησε: translation uncertain (taking οὕτω with ἐνενόησε and ὡς with θαυμασιώτατ'). The Greek could also mean, literally, 'Pythagoras (thus), so πολὺς that [it was] extremely admirable, thought out ...', but in that case ἐνενόησε would lack a complement. The content of paragraph 13.2.11 would in fact fit excellently as the object of ἐνενόησε, but the position of τοίνυν, which is normally placed at the beginning of the sentence, seems to prevent this.

⁸ Literally, 'of the substantification (οὐσιώσεως) of reality in general'.

⁹ Number the origin of mathematics (cf. *Sem.* 7.3.1): [Pl.], *Epin.* 977a–b and 978b–979a; cf. Metochites, *Stoicheiosis astronomike* 1.5.5–6. Plato nowhere says

- ἔξεως. 3 Καὶ δὴτ' ἔξεστι συνορῶν τε καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, ὅτι καθάπερ Χαλδαίοις πρώτοις τε καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀστρονομίαν, καὶ τοῖς Αἴγυπτον οἰκήσασι πρότερον ἀρχαιοτάτοις ἀνθρώπων, ὡς λόγος, τὰ κατὰ γεωμετρίαν πρώτοις ὡσαύτως καὶ
- 15 μάλιστ' ἤσκηται, ἀρκείθεν ἀρξάμενα μεθύτερον πεφοίτηκεν εἰς Ἑλληνας, 4 οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἔοικεν ἐσπουδάσθη τὰ ἰκατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν θεωρίαν, ἣ τε ἀπλῶς ἔχει, καὶ ἣ πρὸς 101 ἀλλήλους ἐν σχέσει ἔν τε μουσικοῖς λόγοις καὶ οἴστισιν ἄρ' ἄλλοις. 5 Ἄλλ' ὅπερ τῷ λόγῳ νῦν σκοπὸς ἦν, Πυθαγόρα μὲν
- 10 οὕτω δὴ μάλιστ' ἐπονήθη τὴν ἀρχὴν τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ ἀρμονικὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι πω καὶ παντελείως τηρικαὺτ' ἐκείνῳ, καθάπερ ἀπὶ πάσης ἄλλης ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς ταπολλὰ διανοητικῆς ἔξεως καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τεχνικῆς ἐργασίας, 6 μὴ τοῖς εὐρεταῖς ἐκάστων τὴν ἀρχὴν, κἂν εἰ θαυμάζειν ἀξίως εἶ
- 15 μάλ' ἔχοιεν, ὡς ἄρα τῷ ὄντι καὶ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός, μήποτ' ἐξεῖναί γε ὅμως καὶ πρὸς πέρας ἰκνεῖσθαι τῆς σπουδῆς μηδ' ὄντινων ἂν ἄρξαιντο παντελείως, ἀλλὰ λείπεσθαι τι καὶ τοῖς ἐκδεξαμένοις προσάγειν τελειοποιὸν ἴσως ἐξῆς, καὶ περαίνειν τὴν κατὰστασιν ὁτουοῦν ἣ κάλλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι.
- 20 4 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ τοῖς διαδεξαμένοις τὸν θαυμαστὸν Πυθαγόραν ἐν τῇ περὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρμονικῆς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀνθρώποις βιωφελεστάτῃ τοῖς ἐλλογίμοις φορᾷ καὶ συντελείᾳ, ἐξεγένεθ' ὅμως καὶ ὅτιοῦν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ φέρειν αὐθις ἐπὶ τοῖς φθάσασι τῷ ἀνδρὶ. 2 Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀντετάξαντό τινες πρὸς αὐ-
- 25 τὸν ἀγνωμονήσαντες τὴν μεγίστην δωρεὰν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἰ πρώτην 102 καὶ καλλίστην ἀρχὴν, ὡς ἄρ' ὤφθησαν Ἀριστοξένειοι μεθύτερον ἀντιπολιτευόμενοι Πυθαγορείοις τοῖς γνησίοις τάνδρὸς ἰδίᾳ τινὲς τῆς ἀρμονικῆς ἐπιστήμης αἰρεσιῶται, 3 νῦν γε εἶναι παρήμι, πλήν γε ὅτι τοῦθ' ὅμως νῦν φημι, ὅτι μέχρι πολλοῦ με-
- 30 τὰ Πυθαγόραν περὶ τὴν ἀρμονικὴν θεωρίαν πονεῖν ἐπῆει καὶ φέρειν τι πλέον, μέχρι καὶ εἰς αὐτόν γε Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Κλαύδιον. 4 Αὐτὸς γὰρ δὴ κάλλιστ' ἀνὴρ Πτολεμαῖος, ὡσπερ δὴ τελευταί-

conclude that in the same way that astronomy was practised first and foremost by the Babylonians, and similarly geometry first by the former inhabitants of Egypt, who are said to be the oldest people in the world, and was later imported from there to Greece, 4 so, it seems, the Hellenes studied the investigation of numbers, both their nature in themselves and how they are related to one another both in musical theory and in some other disciplines. 5 But this is the point of my essay: Pythagoras was the first who seriously studied the science of music and harmony, but his results were not yet at that time exhaustive, as one can usually see in the case of every other theoretical science and practical skill, 6 namely that in the beginning the inventors of each science, even if they are worthy of admiration and are doing extremely well, as was certainly the case with Pythagoras, are still not yet able to reach the frontiers of their science or whatever they have started, but there is something left for their successors to add, perhaps something that in its turn completes [the system], and to establish whatever it may be in its optimal form.

4 Therefore it was still possible also for those who succeeded the admirable Pythagoras in the contribution and accomplishment of arithmetic and harmonics, which are highly useful for distinguished persons,¹⁰ to add some thoughts of their own and contribute to his earlier results. 2 And whether there were some who opposed him, ungrateful for his great gift and the splendid beginnings which he created, as people like the followers of Aristoxenus were later seen to be at variance with Pythagoras' true followers, having their own view of the science of harmonics, 3 I pass this by for the moment except to say this, that for many years after Pythagoras there were people who got it into their heads to work with the investigation of harmonics and contribute something in addition, and this continued to the time of Claudius Ptolemy. 4 But Ptolemy himself¹¹ came after all others,

that number is the origin of all existing things, whereas this view is attributed to the Pythagoreans (and Speusippus) by Aristotle, *Met.* 13; cf. Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 5). The reverse order would have been more logical: number is the original cause not only of mathematics, but also of the whole of reality.

¹⁰ Or: scientists?

¹¹ I am not sure what to make of *κάλλιστ' ἀνὴρ*. Probably *κάλλιστα* goes with the whole sentence, referring to Ptolemy's general excellence, and *ἀνὴρ* is redundant. One gets the impression that when he wrote *κάλλιστ' ἀνὴρ* Metochites had not yet decided how the sentence would evolve.

ος καὶ τελεώτατος ἐπὶ πᾶσι γνώμων πάσης τῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐπιγεγνόμενος, χώραν ἐξῆς οὐ παρήκεν οὐδενὶ τῶν ἀπάντων φέρειν καὶ ὅτιοῦν ἔτι μετ' αὐτὸν πλέον, περὶ τᾶλλα τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ μουσικὴν, οὐκ οὐκ γὰρ ὅστις μὴ μαίνεται· 5
 5 ἄλλ' ἔχομεν ἐκεῖθεν τῶν αὐτοῦ συνταγμάτων ἐκπεπονημένα τῷ ἀνδρὶ παντελείως, ὡσπερ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀστρονομίαν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρμονικῆς ἐπιστήμης. Ἀμείνους μὲντ' ἂν εἶμεν λοιπὸν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν καὶ ὡς οἶόν τε χρώμενοι, ἢ καὶ προσέτι πλέον ὀρώντες ὅτιοῦν καὶ συνεισφέρειν οὐκ οἶδ' οἵτινες ἂν οὐδ' ὅπως πειρώμενοι· 6 τέως μὲν γὰρ ἦπερ εἴρηται οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ Πτολεμαίου καὶ οἱ μάλιστα περὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ κατέτειναν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ταύτη γὰρ πάνυ τοι πλεῖστον ἐπόνησαν, ἔτ' εἶχον ἀμέλει χρῆσθαι καὶ οὐ παντάπασιν ἀνευδῶς ἐπέβαινον. | 7 Ὡς ἄρα καὶ Πλάτων αὐτὸς ὁ πάντ' ἄριστος 103
 15 φίλα μὲν εὖ μάλ', ὡς οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος πλέον, ἔχει περὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, καὶ περὶ τὰ τέτταρα κληθέντα μαθήματα κομιδῇ σπουδάζει καὶ δύναται περὶ ταῦτα κράτιστα, μετὰ τοῦ καιροῦ δ' ὅμως καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τ' ἦν χρῆσθαι· 8 καὶ πολὺς ὢν ἐν ἅπασιν, ἥττων ἐστὶν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὴν ἀρμονικὴν
 20 ἔξιν, καὶ μὴν ἔτι γὰρ μᾶλλον περὶ τὴν ἀστρονομικὴν αὐτήν, καὶ βραχὺ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιδείκνυται καὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ κατὰ τᾶλλα, καίτοι γὰρ δηλὸς ὢν ἐρῶν σφόδρα καὶ προσποιούμενος, καὶ οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ περὶ ταῦτα χοροῦ τιθεὶς ἑαυτόν.

25 Ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τέλειον κατέστη τὸ τῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης: ΙΔ'

1 Ὡσπερ δὴ κἀν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, ὅσα τε κατὰ φύσιν αἰετὶ γίνεται καὶ ὅσα διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως ἢ τεχνικῆς σοφίσεως εἰς τὸν βίον | προήχθη καὶ πολιτεύεται καὶ κρατεῖ κατὰ τι πάντως 104
 τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης εὐζωΐας χρήσιμον, τοῦθ' ὄραν ἔστιν 2 ὅτι μὴ

9 προσέτι scripsi: πρὸς ἔτι PE, non leg. M 10 οἵτινες ex εἴ τινες corr. P (fortasse P²), non leg. M 13 χρῆσθαι: χρῆ E, non leg. M 17 ταῦτα: τὰ E, non leg. M 18 τ' om. ut vid. E, non leg. M

last and with the most perfect knowledge of the science of mathematics as a whole, and did not thereafter leave any opportunity for anyone to contribute anything whatsoever after him, either in other fields or in astronomy and music, at least not for any sane person. **5** But from that time we have, among his writings, those on harmonics no less perfectly elaborated by him than those on astronomy. And in the future we would do better to devote ourselves to studying them as thoroughly as we can and use them as much as possible, rather than look further and try to add anything (if there is anybody who does that).¹² **6** For until then, as we said earlier, the predecessors of Ptolemy and those who exerted themselves and toiled with mathematics were still able to do something and developed [the subject], not entirely without defects. **7** And Plato himself, excellent in all respects, delights more than anyone I know of in the mathematical part of philosophy and studies eagerly the so-called four disciplines, and is extremely competent in them—as competent as was possible considering the time in which he lived. **8** And although he is a great man in everything, he is still inferior to himself in the science of harmony and even more in astronomy, and has but small results to show us in these subjects, unlike the other fields in which he worked. And yet he is obviously very attracted by and ambitious concerning these subjects and does not forgo to join in this dance.

14. That the science of mathematics was not fully developed in the beginning

1 In the same way that in all other things—both those that are constantly occurring by nature and those that have been brought into men's lives by some practice or technical invention and are applied and recognised as valid in connection with anything whatsoever that is useful for the good of mankind—one can see **2** that they¹ do not

¹² It seems that Metochites is objecting to something which, as he suddenly realises, actually does not occur. He modestly desists from mentioning here his own commentary on Ptolemy, the *Stoicheiosis astronomike*.

¹ ἕκαστα is coreferential with τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄπασιν in 14.1.1.

τέλει' εὐθύς ἐκ προοιμίων ἕκαστα πρόεισι τῆς αὐτῶν ἕξεως, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὀλίγου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκάστοτε προχωροῦντα, τελευτῶντά γε ὅμως κάλλισθ' ὡς οἶόν τε καὶ παντέλεια τῆς οἰκείας οὐσιώσεως περαίνει καὶ ζὺν χρόνῳ καθίσταται, 3 ὡσαύτως γε δῆτα
 5 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης αὐτῆς καθόλου γε τῆς σοφίας, νῦν δέ γε ὅμως εἰρήσθω περὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ διελομένοις ἰδίᾳ, ὡσαύτως γε δῆτα καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ ξυμβεβηκὸς ἕξεστιν ὄραν, 4 μὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθύς ἀνθρώποις, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλησι, παντέλειον
 10 ἑαυτοῦ φανῆναι καὶ ἀνυσιμῶτατ' ἔχειν, ὡσπερ ἄρα χρόνοις ἕσπερον ἐπονήθη καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ διαρκέστατ' εἰς πέρας ἵκετο τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸ σπουδάσασιν. 5 Ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ πάσης ἐπιμέλεια σοφίας ὀψιαίτερον τῶν ἐκ μακροῦ χρόνων εἰς Ἑλληνας ἔλθειν ἢ καὶ εἰς ἄλλους οὐστινασοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τοῦθ' ὅστις
 15 ἂν καλῶς ἐπιστήσειε τοῖς παλαιοῖς τὸν νοῦν, κατιῶν διὰ τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἄνωθεν, ὅψεται μάλισθ' οὕτως ἔχον.

2 Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε ἡμῖν ἴσως περὶ τούτων εἰρήσεται, ἀτὰρ δὴ περὶ τῶν τετιτῶν κληθέντων μαθημάτων οὕτως κατανοεῖν 105 ἔχομεν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, ὡς πάλαι πρότερον Χαλδαίοις τε
 20 καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις ἐσπουδάσθη ταῦτα, ὅψε δ' εἰς Ἑλληνας ἦκε κατ' ἐκδοχὴν τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀρχῶν· 2 καὶ Θάλητά φασι καὶ Πυθαγόραν πάνυ τοι πλεῖστον ἢ πάντες Ἑλληνες καὶ Πλάτωνα μάλ' ἀδύθις ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου περὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν γενομένους αὐτοὺς κομιδῇ πονῆσαι, καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον αὐτὸν ὡς εἴρηται
 25 Πυθαγόραν, καὶ οὐχάπαξ ἐκεῖσε γενόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεῖν ἔτι. 3 Εἰσὶ δ' οἱ φασι καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τὰ ἐκείνου ξυγγεγραφῶς Ἰάμβλιχος, τῶν αἰρεσιωτῶν ἐκείνου καὶ σπουδαστῆς ὃν οὐκ οἶδ' ὡς εἴ τις ἄλλος πλεόν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν φιλοσοφίας, ὡς ἄρα μὴ μόνον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀπεδήμησε καὶ διέτριψε Πυθαγόρας
 30 πλεῖστον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς Χαλδαίους, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦς ἔτ' ἔρωτι σοφίας ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ἀφίκετο. 4 Καὶ φαίνονται γε μάλιστ' ἐξαρχῆς

3 -σθ add. P² 4 γε om. E, non leg. M 6 δέ om. E, non leg. M 29 διέτριψε: δι' οὐ ut vid. E, non leg. M

emerge in a perfect state² at the start, but in each case develop initially from some slight beginning and yet are finally, with time, completed and established in the best way possible and in fulfilment of their own nature,³ 3 so for the mathematical part of philosophy (or rather for the whole of wisdom, but for now, let us make this observation concerning mathematics, treating the subject separately)—so it is possible to see that the same has happened with mathematics, 4 namely that it did not appear at once to men, or rather to the Hellenes, in its complete form, fully developed, as it was later elaborated and reached its final form most excellently and sufficiently among those who studied it. 5 For it seems that the study of the whole of wisdom came later in history to the Hellenes than to some other peoples, and whoever fixes his attention well on the ancient writers,⁴ going through history from the beginning, will see that this is very true indeed.

2 And perhaps we shall discuss this in some other place. But concerning the so-called four disciplines, we can understand and conclude that they were studied much earlier by Chaldaeans and Egyptians, and came late to the Hellenes, who took over the beginnings from these peoples. 2 And it is said of Thales and, more than all other Hellenes, Pythagoras, and later of Plato, that they personally went to Egypt and worked with mathematics—Pythagoras for the longest time, as I just said, and not only once, but several times. 3 But there are some, and among them Pythagoras' chronicler Iamblichus, who was one of his adherents and more zealous than anyone I know for the man himself and his philosophy, who say that Pythagoras not only travelled to Egypt and lived there for a long time, but also [went] to the Chaldaeans, and, due to his longing for wisdom, even further away, to India.⁵ 4 And it is in fact clear that especially the

² 'in a perfect state': τέλεια τῆς αὐτῶν ἕξεως. The construction of τέλειος c. gen. is not mentioned in LSJ.

³ παντέλειος c. gen. (also § 4 παντέλειον ἑαυτοῦ); not in LSJ. Cf. above, τέλειος c. gen. If οὐσίωσις, as is probable, here means no more than οὐσία or φύσις, the whole expression παντέλεια τῆς οἰκείας οὐσιώσεως means something like 'self-fulfilment'.

⁴ Or, less probably, 'the past' (τοῖς παλαιοῖς neuter).

⁵ The statement that Pythagoras visited India is not found in Iamblichus. Cf. however Clem. Alex., *Strom.* 1.15.70.1–2 (quoting Alexander Polyhistor): 'Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων Ζαράτῳ τῷ Ἀσσυρίῳ μαθητεῦσαι

καὶ πρῶτοί γε ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὴν ἀστρονομίαν Χαλδαῖοι σπου-
 δάσαντες· ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ Ἀβραάμ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας
 ἡμῖν πρόγονον, καὶ Χαλδαῖος γὰρ οὗτος τὸ γένος, καὶ τὸν ἐξ αὐ-
 τοῦ χρόνοις ὕστερον Μωϋσῆν τὸν νομοθέτην πρῶτον ἐν γράμμα-
 5 σι περὶ τῆς εἰς θεὸν εὐσεβείας, ἀστρονομικῆς εὖ μάλα σοφίας
 ἐπιστήμονας ἄκρους γενέσθαι. 5 Πάντων δὲ ὅσοι καὶ γεγόνασιν 106
 ἐν μνήμῃ τινὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον Ἑλληνας τῷδε τῷ ἄνδρῃ καὶ ἀμφω-
 τέρω γε πολὺ προτέρω ἐγενέσθην, καὶ ῥῆστ' ἔξεστιν ἐπιλογίζε-
 σθαι τὰ τῶν χρόνων. 6 Καὶ Χαλδαῖοι μὲν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν εὖ
 10 μάλ' ἔσχον, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ περὶ γεωμετρίαν· καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ φασιν,
 εἰ μὴ μυθῶδες καὶ παρορᾶσθαι δίκαιον, διὰ τὰς κατατομὰς τῆς
 γεηπονίας, εἰς ἣν ἐξανάγκης αἰ τοῦ Νείλου ἀρδεῖται καὶ ἐπικλύ-
 σεις χρήσιμοι, εἰς τὰς γεωμετρικὰς θεωρίας αὐτοὺς κεκινήσθαι.
 7 Τῷ ὄντι δὲ καὶ πάντων μάλιστ' ἀληθέστατον τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα
 15 σοφοὶ τινες ἐδόκουν τοεξαρχῆς Αἰγύπτιοι, κἀντεῦθεν μεγίστου
 κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνόματος καὶ περὶ γεωμετρίαν σφόδρ' ἐπαίον-
 τες. 8 Ταῦτα δὲ δῆτ' ἄμφω τὰ μαθήματα δηλόν γε ὡς ἐκείθεν εἰς
 Ἑλληνας ἦκε καὶ τῶν ἐξαρχῆς χρόνων μάλιστ' ὄψέ, καὶ ἄλλως
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἐρεῖν, εἰ μὴ τις ἀγνοεῖ γε τὰ πάντη δηλὰ ἢ περιφανῶς
 20 ψεύδεσθαι βούλεται. 9 Ἡ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς τε καὶ τοὺς
 τῶν ἀριθμῶν μουσικούς λόγους θεωρία σύμφυτος μὲν ἐστὶν ὡς
 ἀληθῶς, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως τις ἐρεῖ, οὐκουν γε ὅστις περὶ τῶν
 μαθημάτων ὄλως ἐπαίειν οἷός τε ἐστὶ, τῇ τῆς ἀστρονομίας καὶ
 γεωμετρίας ἐπιστήμῃ, καὶ τὸν περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντα μὴ καὶ
 25 περὶ ἀριθμούς ἔχειν ὀρηοῦν χρῆσθαι, τῶν ἀδυνάτων παντάπα- 107
 σι, καὶ δηλόν γε ὅστις ἂν ἄπτοιτο καὶ ἀξιοίη χρῆσθαι γεωμε-
 τρία τε καὶ ἀστρονομία. 10 Οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐπ' ἀληθείας ἐρεῖν δο-
 κοῦσί γ' Ἑλληνας μάλιστ' ἐνταῦθα τῆς μαθηματικῆς, Πυθαγό-

4 χρόνοις: χρόνοι E, non leg. M 12 νείλου ex λείλου corr. E, non leg. M

ἵστορεῖ τὸν Πυθαγόραν ..., ἀκηκοέναι τε πρὸς τούτοις Γαλατῶν καὶ Βραχμά-
 νων τὸν Πυθαγόραν βούλεται, and Eus., *Praep. ev.* 10.4.15.

⁶ γενέσθαι: infinitive probably due to the preceding φασί, and despite the in-
 tervening φαίνονται, which seems to represent Metochites' own addition to the

Chaldaeans studied astronomy from the beginning, i.e. first of all peoples. And therefore also Abraham himself, the origin of our faith, who was of Chaldaean descent, and Moses, his descendant at a later time, the first lawgiver who wrote down the laws concerning the faith in God, were⁶ highly accomplished in the science of astronomy.⁷ 5 But these two men lived much earlier than all the Hellenes of antiquity who have been recorded by memory; it is very easy to compute the chronology.⁸ 6 Thus the Chaldaeans were experts in astronomy. But the Egyptians were experts in geometry. And some people say—if it is not a fairy tale which should justly be disregarded—that the Egyptians had been spurred to the science of geometry through the division [of land] demanded by agriculture, for which the inundations and floods of the Nile are necessarily useful.⁹ 7 But in fact it is more true than anything that the Egyptians were reputed to be wise from the beginning, and therefore enjoyed a great reputation among men, and to have a great knowledge in geometry. 8 Thus it is clear that both these sciences [i.e. astronomy and geometry] came to Greece from those peoples, and at a very late point in time compared to the whole of human history, and it is not possible to claim anything else unless one is ignorant of that which is completely obvious, or wishes to utter blatant lies. 9 But it is true (and no one will deny this, at least no one who is at all capable of understanding mathematics) that the theory of numbers and their musical ratios is interrelated with the science of astronomy and geometry; and that a person who studies those sciences should be in any way unable also to use numbers is completely impossible, as is clear [to] anyone who undertakes and practises geometry and astronomy. 10 However, to speak the truth, especially the Hellenes with Pythagoras as their guide seem to have achieved great, indeed perfect results in this field of mathemat-

tradition he is mentioning. φασι may refer to e.g. Clem. Alex., who mentions both traditions (Pythagoras going to India and Abraham being an astronomer), although admittedly very far apart in the *Stromateis* (in book 1 and 6, respectively; cf. the preceding and the following note).

⁷ Abraham as astronomer: cf. Artapanus (2nd cent. BC) *ap. Eus. Praep. ev.* 9.18; Philo, *De Abr.* 77; Josephus, *Ant.* 1.168; Clem. Alex., *Strom.* 6.11.84.1–2. Moses as inspiration for Hipparchus and Ptolemy: cf. John Philoponus, *De opificio mundi* I 7 (pp. 15 f. Reichardt). See also Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 5).

⁸ The Byzantines ‘knew’ when Abraham was born; dates were supplied by the chronicles. Cf. Grumel (1958, 222).

⁹ Cf. Hdt. 2.109.

ραν ἀρχηγὸν ἔχοντες, μέγιστα καὶ τελεώτατ' ἀνύσαντες ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπιστήμην πολὺ πάντων ἔθνων προενεγκεῖν.

3 Ὁ δ' οὖν ἐβουλόμην καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ, ὅτι δὴ
 5 τῶν χρόνων ὄψῃ ἢ κατ' ἄλλους οὐστινασοῦν Ἑλληνας τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἤψαντο. 2 Ὡς δ' ἄρα καὶ ἤψαντο, οὐκ εὐθύς ἐξαρχῆς εἰς πέρατα τῆς ἐν τούτοις ἐπιστήμης διεγέγοντο, οὐθ' οἱ πρῶτοί γε αὐτοὶ ἀψάμενοι οὐθ' οὔτινες ἐξῆς ἔγγιστ' ἔπειτα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλου του τῶν ἀπάντων ἐπιτηδεύματος μαθηματικοῦ ἢ τινος ὅλως γνωστικοῦ πεφύκασιν ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ πόλλ' ἐφεξῆς ἔτη ἔτι πῶ ἐνδεῶς εἶχον καὶ διέτριψαν, ἢ ὥστε παντάπασιν ἐνταῦθα τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτυχεῖς γενέσθαι. 3 Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' ἐῷ νῦν γε εἶναι, ἀστρονομίας δὲ πέρι πλείστος μὲν ἦν ἐκείνοις ἰόνος, καὶ ἤνυτον ὅτιποτοῦν, καὶ πρό
 108 γε τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος αὐτοῦ καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν εἰς πολλοστὸν ἔτος· 4 πᾶσαν δὲ τὴν κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ εἶχον Ἑλληνας εἰς τέλος κομιδῆ, σπουδάζοντες καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλου πλέον ἀνευρίσκοντες ὅμως καὶ ἀεὶ πλείον μετὰ τῶν χρόνων οἱ δευτέροι τῶν προτέρων, οὐκ εἶχον δ' οὐπω καθάπαξ ἀνυσιμώτατα ταύτη πῶς μέχρι καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν Καισάρων μοναρχίας.

4 Εὐκλείδης μέντοι ὁ ἐκ Μεγάρων Σωκρατικός, ἡλικιώτης ὢν Πλάτωνος, ἄριστος τὰ ἐς γεωμετρίαν ἀνὴρ καὶ πλείστ' ἐνταῦθα συνταξάμενος, ὡς ὁρᾶν ἔστι κατὰ τὴν ἐν ἐπιπέδοις θεωρίαν καὶ στερεοῖς καὶ τὴν τῶν Ὀπτικῶν τε καὶ Δεδομένων καὶ Κατοπτρικῶν, καὶ ἄλλων ὄντινωνοῦν ἐνταῦθα, καὶ μουσικῶν μὲν ἄπτεται καὶ ἀστρονομικῶν ἐπισκέψεων. 2 Ἄλλ' ἐν ἰτούτοις
 109 ἦττον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πολὺ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνύτων ὁρᾶται, καὶ τὰ

1 ἔχοντες: ἄρχοντες E, non leg. M 24 συνταξάμενος: συνταξάμενοι E, non leg. M

¹⁰ I take σπουδάζοντες and ἀνευρίσκοντες to be concessive; ὅμως, despite its position in the consecutive construction, really belongs with ἀκρίβειαν οὐκ εἶχον (or the following οὐκ εἶχον ἀνυσιμώτατα). εἰς τέλος κομιδῆ is difficult to

ics, and to be far superior to all other peoples in the science of arithmetic.

3 But what I wanted to say, and the point of this essay, is that [the] Hellenes undertook the study of the mathematical part of philosophy later than some other peoples. 2 And once they started, they did not at once achieve perfection in this science, neither those who first began its study, nor their immediate successors, in the same way that men are by nature unable to do so with any other pursuit, mathematical or on the whole intellectual, but for many years to come they were still doing inadequately, so that they did not at all succeed in attaining the proper results. 3 And the other things I will leave aside for the present, but with astronomy the Hellenes exerted themselves greatly, and they did actually achieve some results both before the admirable Plato himself, and after him for many years. 4 But they lacked the exact knowledge of this science to complete perfection despite their studies and despite the fact that the one discovered more than the other and, as time went by, the successors always [discovered] more than their precursors.¹⁰ And their knowledge continued in this imperfect state even up to the time of the Roman Emperors.

4 But Euclid, the Socratic of Megara,¹¹ a contemporary of Plato, an expert in geometry who also wrote copiously in this field, as one can see by his investigation of planes and solid bodies and by his investigations of *Optics* and the *Data* and *Mirrors*, and all other related subjects, also touches upon investigations of music and astronomy.¹² 2 But it is plain to see that in these subjects his achievements are truly far below his usual level, and his writings on the *Phaenomena* seem to hover as if in some preludes or forecourts outside the mys-

reconcile with a concessive sense of σπουδάζοντες; therefore I take it as an elaboration of ἀκρίβειαν.

¹¹ The mathematician Euclid, whose place of birth is unknown but who worked in Alexandria (fl. ca. 300), is confused with Eucleides of Megara, the disciple of Socrates and founder of the Megaran school. This identification, found already in Valerius Maximus (1st cent. AD), was not refuted until 1572 by the translator F. Commandino (Schreiber 1987, 26).

¹² Geometry, planes and solid bodies: the *Elements* (Στοιχεῖα). The *Optica* is the earliest surviving Greek treatise on perspective. The *Data* is closely related to the first four books of the *Elements*. *Mirrors*: the *Catoptrica* (spurious). Music: the *Sectio canonis* and the *Introductio harmonica* (the latter nowadays regarded as spurious). Astronomy: the *Phaenomena*. Cf. Metochites, *Stoich.* 1.1.32.

περὶ τῶν Φαινομένων αὐτοῦ συντάγματα δοκεῖ πως ὡσπερ ἐν
 προοιμίῳ τισὶν ἢ προαυλίῳ τῶν ἀστρονομικῶν μυστηρίων
 ἔξω τρίβειν, καὶ πόθον αὐτοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων ἐπιστήμην
 μόνον καὶ φαινομένην περὶ ταῦτα κατάληψιν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ βά-
 5 θος ἄλλ' ἐξεπιπολῆς ἀπτομένην ἐνδείκνυσθαι. 3 Καὶ τις ἂν
 ἴσως ἐφορώμενος πρὸς τὴν χρόνους ἔπειθ' ὕστερον ἀναλάμψα-
 σαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ταύτης ἥπερ εἴρηται τελειότητα καὶ ἀκρί-
 βειαν καὶ τὰς Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Κλαυδίου συντάξεις καὶ τῶν
 πρὸ αὐτοῦ μικρόν, 4 αἰσχύνουτ' ἂν ὡς εἶπεν ὑπὲρ Εὐκλείδου
 10 τοιαῦτα περὶ τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν καταλείψαντος συντάγματα,
 καὶ ὡσπερ παιδίων ἐπιδείξεις τινὰς ταῦτα δὴ πρὸς ἰ τὰ ἐκείνων 110
 ἀκμάζοντα καὶ πρεσβυτικὰ λογίσαιτ' ἂν παραβάλλον, 5 εἰ μὴ
 τις φιλανθρώπως τοὺς κατ' Εὐκλείδην χρόνους καὶ τοὺς μεθύσ-
 τερον ἐποπτεύει καλῶς, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἐν ταῖς πάντων πραγ-
 15 μάτων ἀρχαῖς συγγνώμης ἀξιούμενον κρίνει, καὶ ἅμα τἄλλα
 τῆς περὶ γεωμετρίαν σπουδῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς θαυμάσια συντάγματα
 τόσα καὶ τόσα, 6 καὶ πάντ' ἄριστα μάλιστ' ὀρθῶς ἐπιλογιζό-
 μενος εὐλαβῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἄνδρα τοσοῦτον δεῖν ἠγεῖται, καὶ
 τῶν αὐτοῦ πάντων καὶ τῶν ἐν δευτέρῳ τῆς χρείας μὴ κατολιγω-
 20 ρεῖν ἑαυτὸν πείθει δικαίως, ἀντὶ τῆς ὀφειλομένης τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕνεκα τοσοῦτων τε καὶ τοιούτων χάριτος.

5 Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ ἐκ Πέργης λέγειν
 ἔχομεν, ἀνδρὸς ὅσα γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τελειοτάτου καὶ πρώτου τῶν
 περὶ γεωμετρικὰ σπουδασάντων, οὗ καὶ Πτολεμαῖος κατὰ και-
 25 ρὸν ἐν ἀξιολόγοις χρήσεσι μέμνηται· καὶ τιμῶντ' γε μάλα καὶ
 θαυμάζοντι τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν ἔξιν τὸν ἄνδρα ἐκείνον εὐοικῶς
 ἐστίν. 2 Ἄλλ' ὅμως καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ ἐς ἀστρονομίαν
 παῖς ἂν εἴη ὥστε καὶ παραβάλλειν ἀνδρὶ, ἣν ἄρα Πτολεμαῖϝ
 παραμετροῖτο καὶ παραβάλλοιτο. 3 Πτολεμαῖός γε μὴν αὐτὸς ὁ
 30 θαυμάσιος, οὐκ ὀλίγων ἐν τῇ μαθηματικῇ συντάξει μεμνημένος,
 ὅσοι περὶ τὰ ἀστρονομικὰ σφόδρ' ἐπόνησαν καὶ ἰ πεποίηνταί τι 111
 νας ἐκδόσεις, Ἀττικοί τε καὶ ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες καὶ Ῥόδιοι καὶ

teries of astronomy, and to show that he only longs for knowledge of the celestial bodies and that his apprehension of these things is illusory¹³ and treats of them not in depth but superficially. 3 And if one considers the perfection and accuracy which, as I said, later shone forth in this science, and the writings of Claudius Ptolemy and his immediate predecessors, 4 one is almost, so to speak, embarrassed on Euclid's behalf for having left behind him such writings on the celestial phenomena, and one is tempted to regard them as efforts by children showing off when one compares them to *their* consummate and adult works, 5 unless one generously takes into careful consideration the time of Euclid as compared to the later period, and judges that the natural [weaknesses] in the first attempts of any endeavour deserve to be pardoned, and at the same time remembers Euclid's many other excellent writings on the study of geometry, which are all of the highest quality, 6 and rightly thinks that one should regard with respect a man of such calibre, and justly persuades oneself not to despise the whole of Euclid's works together with those of secondary value instead of [giving] the appreciation which is due to him because of his many other excellent writings.

5 And the same can be said about Alexander of Perge,¹⁴ a most distinguished man in my opinion and the greatest of the geometers, whom also Ptolemy aptly mentions in substantial quotations;¹⁵ he seems to hold the man in high esteem and to admire his scientific knowledge. 2 But nevertheless in the field of astronomy even Alexander himself would seem like a child compared to a man if he should be measured against and compared with Ptolemy. 3 But the admirable Ptolemy himself, who in his *Syntaxis mathematica*¹⁶ mentions not a few who had worked industriously with astronomy and published works [in this field], men from Attica and other Hellenes, and also

¹³ His apprehension is (only) φαῖνομένη, a pun on the book's title (and subject), τὰ φαινόμενα. Cf. below, p. 165 n. 1.

¹⁴ Metochites means *Apollonius* of Perge, *fl.* ca. 200.

¹⁵ Ptolemy, *Syntaxis* 12.1 (2:450.10 and 2:456.9–10).

¹⁶ Later also known as the *Almagest*.

Φοίνικες καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον Αἰγύπτιοι, πάντων ἄρα τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ, πολλῶ τινι προέχειν Ἴππαρχον τίθεται, 4 καὶ πλεῖστά γε τῶν αὐτοῦ προσίεται ὡς ἐπιμελέστατα καὶ ἀληθείας ἐπιτυχέστατα καὶ πάσης ἀκριβείας καὶ τελείας ἕξωσ περι τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων
 5 ἐπιστήμην, καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πολὺς ἐστί προσέχων μετ' αἰδοῦς ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὑπεξάιρον κομιδῇ, ἢ κατ' ἄλλους ἅπαντας, ὅσοι πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἔγγιστά τε καὶ πόρρω. 5 Ἔοικε δ' ἐαντῷ πλέον ὅμως θαρρῶν ὡς παντελείως ἐπὶ τῆς ἀστρονομικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἠνυκῶτι καὶ διφκηκῶτι πάνθ' ἕκαστα κατὰ καιρὸν ὅσα κατ' αὐτήν, καὶ οὐ-
 10 δὲν ὅ τι μὴ λειλοπότι τῶν ἀξίων λόγου καὶ θεωρίας, ὥστε μὴ καὶ συνιδεῖν καθάπαξ καὶ μετ' ἀκριβείας ἀσείστου τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν ἐκδοῦναι. 6 Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ὑπὲρ ἅπαντας τὴν σοφίαν ταύτην θαυμάζεσθαι, τοὺς τε πρὸ αὐτοῦ πλεῖστον ὑπερβαλόμενος καὶ | τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ὅ τι καὶ προσθεῖναι 112
 15 τῇ τῶν οὐρανίων ἐπιστήμῃ χῶραν δοῦς καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ γε μὴν προσθεῖναι πόνοις, 7 ὅ τι μὴ μόνον περὶ αὐτὰ διατρίβειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ πονεῖν οὐδὲν νέον εἰσφέροντας ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ αὐθις ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ καθόλου γ' ἐρεῖν εἰς πέρας αὐτὸς ἐπιτυχέστατον τῆς ἐπιστήμης ταύτης γενόμενος.

20

Περὶ Ἰωσήπου: ΙΕ'

1 Ἰώσηπον δὲ τὸν Ἑβραῖον ἀξιῶν τις ἐπαινεῖν κατ' ἄμφω, τὴν τε τοῦ νοῦς καὶ τὴν τῆς γλώττης εὐκολίαν, δικαίως ἂν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ἀξιοίη. 2 Καὶ ἔοικε γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνὴρ ἀμφοτέρω τῶ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος κηρῶ τῶ μὴ σκληρῶ τε καὶ ἀνυχηρῶ

23-24 τῶ — Πλάτωνος κηρῶ: cf. Pl., *Tht.* 191c

5 ἐστί: ἐπι ut vid. E, non leg. M 10 θεωρίας: θεωρία E, non leg. M 14 ὑπερβαλόμενος p. c. ut vid. P¹, in -βαλλ- corr. E

¹⁷ Astronomers mentioned in the *Syntaxis* include Athenians (Meton, Euctemon, Callippus), 'other Hellenes' (e.g. Aristarchus of Samos) and, of course,

Rhodians, Phoenicians and especially Egyptians¹⁷—far above all these men who were his predecessors he ranks Hipparchus,¹⁸ 4 and he accepts many of his results as being extremely careful and achieving truth and complete accuracy and perfect knowledge in the science of the celestial bodies. He often pays respectful attention to him, so to speak, and holds him in much higher esteem than all his other predecessors, both recent and earlier. 5 Nevertheless he seems to place even greater confidence in himself as having achieved perfect results in the science of astronomy, having appropriately settled each separate problem presented by the subject, and of the things that merit reasoning and investigation there is nothing that he has left aside, so that he has not understood and handed it down with unexceptionable accuracy to later generations. 6 In truth he is a man who deserves to be admired above all others for this wisdom, seeing that he has widely surpassed his predecessors, and has left his successors no opportunity to add anything to the science of astronomy, or indeed to add anything to his work, 7 but only to spend their time going over the same ground, and labour with his results without contributing anything new unless, again, it comes from his works. In short, Ptolemy has reached, in the most fortunate manner possible, the frontiers of this science.

15. On Josephus

1 He who deems that the Jew Josephus should be praised on both counts, for his facility of both mind and language, judges to my mind correctly. 2 In both respects the man truly resembles the admirable Plato's wax, which is not hard and dry and tainted with some base

'especially Egyptians', i.e., Alexandrians (e.g. Eratosthenes, Hipparchus, Dionysius, Theon). The problem is Rhodes and Phoenicia: although there did exist astronomers from these places (Rhodes: Posidonius of Apamea, called ὁ Πόδιος, Geminus—the latter is also said to come from Tyrus—and some others, anonymous; Phoenicia: Theodosius of Tripolis and Geminus of [Rhodes or] Tyrus), they are not mentioned in the *Syntaxis*.

It so happens that the geographical names Egypt, Phoenicia, and Rhodes occur in close proximity to one another in *Syntaxis* 2.6.9–11 (1:108–9). Could it be that Metochites has that passage in mind here? In any case it is fairly certain that he relates Ptolemy's text from memory.

¹⁸ Hipparchus of Nicaea, middle 2nd century BC.

καὶ ξυμμίκτω φαύλης τινὸς καὶ κοπρώδους ὕλης καὶ φύσεως, κάντεῦθεν ἀνωμάλῳ πρὸς πᾶσαν χρῆσιν καὶ διάπλασιν, ἀλλὰ μαλθακῶ καὶ διύγρῳ καὶ ῥῶστ' ἔχοντι καὶ ἰπεφυκῶτι τυποῦσθαι 113 πρὸς πάνθ' οἷς ἂν ἐκάστοτε ξυλλάχοι. 3 Ὑγρὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀυχμῶδης, καὶ αὐτοφυῶς καὶ πόνων δίχα πολλῶν καὶ ἀρόσεων γόνιμος, ὑγρὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα πρὸς πάντ' ἐρραστωνευμένως φέρεσθαι. 4 Καὶ ῥεῖ γε ὁ νοῦς αὐτῷ, ῥεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα μάλ' ἀπροσκόπτως, κατὰ τοὺς ἐν πεδίοις ἰόντας ποταμοὺς ἀλύφῳ καὶ ὀμαλῷ ρεύματι, καὶ μὴ διὰ πετρῶν τινων καὶ 10 ῥηγμάτων ὀχληρῶς ἐπιτρέχοντας, καὶ τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν τῶν ἔγγιστ' αὐτοῖς προσέχειν ἀναγκάζοντας αἰεὶ· καὶ ῥεῖ γε μὴν ἔτι ποτίμου τινὸς καὶ διειδοῦς τοῦ ὕδατος.

2 Καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ καθαρὸς μὲν, ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ ἰλαρὸς χρῆσασθαι· ὁ δὲ καὶ πέφυκεν οὕτω δὴ ξὺν οὐδεμιᾷ φιλεργῷ διοικήσει καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἀλλ' ἀποιήτος ἔχων ἐν ῥαστώνῃ, καὶ κατὰ 15 φύσιν αὐτῷ τὰ τῆς εὐστομίας, καὶ οὐκ ἔοικε τρίβειν ἀνὴρ κομιδῆ περὶ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν, οὐδ' ἐπικοσμεῖν τὸν νοῦν περιέργοις τισὶ περιβλήμασι. 2 Τοιγαροῦν ἰ καὶ ἀφελῆς μὲν ἐστί κατὰ φύσιν, 114 οὐκ εὐτελής δέ, οὐδὲ μετ' ἐπιτηδεύσεώς τινος τὴν ἀφέλειαν οὐκ ἀμπεχόμενος, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ δεινότητι χρώμενος εὖ μάλ' ἀδήλω καὶ δόλῳ κακουργῶν εἴσω καὶ κλέπτων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀπλαστίᾳ, 3 ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὀρᾶν ἔστιν, ἂν εἴ τις ξυνορᾶν δύναιτο καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὐκ ἔξω μένει καὶ πλανᾶται περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον μόνον, μὴ χωρῶν ὅτιοῦν εἴσω· τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις, 25 ὡς ἄρα καθάπαξ ἀναξίοις ἐπαίειν ἐν οἷς εἰσι καὶ βεβήλοις περὶ τῶν τῆς γλῶττης ὀργίων, θύρας ἐπιτιθέμεθα τῆς παροιμίας. 4 Ἰωσήφῳ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀφέλεια, καὶ οὐκ εὐτελής γε δι' ἀτονίαν αὐθις οὐδ' εὐπεριφρόνητος, ἀλλ' ἐπανθεῖ γε τῷ ἀποιήτῳ τῆς ἐρμηνείας καὶ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι εὐγενῆς ὅμως χροῖα, καὶ κα-

24–26 τοῖς γὰρ — βεβήλοις — θύρας ἐπιτιθέμεθα: cf. Orph., Fr. 245,1 Kern; Suda B 218

7 ῥεῖ δέ: ἡδὲ E, non leg. M 27 εὐτελής: εὐτελεια ut vid. E, non leg. M

and impure matter and nature, and therefore by its unevenness unsuitable for any use and shaping, but soft and moist, with a natural ability and propensity to receive easily the stamp of all the different things which it meets on different occasions. ³ For Josephus' mind is soft, not hard and dry; its fertility is spontaneous, not achieved by means of great effort and toil; and his tongue, too, is soft and pliant, able to move easily to every subject. ⁴ His thought as well as his tongue flow completely unhindered, like rivers whose course runs over level ground, effortlessly and with an even flow, not laboriously through rocks and rifts, forcing the minds and ears of those nearby to pay very close attention to them. And it flows with a drinkable and clear water.

² Josephus' discourse is pure, but still sweet and delightful to read. He is like this by nature, without any officious arrangement or care, but with an uncontrived, easy and natural eloquence; it seems that he does not spend the least effort on his language, or try to embellish his thoughts with any superfluous adornments. ² Thus his style is naturally simple but not base, nor does he deliberately embrace Simplicity while actually, in secret, using Force,¹ acting with inner dishonesty and deceit, creating a false appearance of artlessness, ³ as one can see in the case of some authors, [at least] if one is capable of understanding and observation and does not remain on the outside, roaming on the surface without going inside at all. For to such people, *who are* completely unworthy of understanding the things they are dealing with and *uninitiated* in the mysteries of the tongue, *we close the door*, as the proverb says.² ⁴ But Josephus' Simplicity is congenital, and furthermore it is not base or contemptible owing to lack of vigour, but the artlessness and frankness of his style has a bloom of nobility; and this noble bloom, too, is his

¹ The names of the Hermogenic forms are written with capital letters (cf. Wooten 1987). For various suggested translations of these terms see Lindberg (1977). For Metochites' judgements on style in *Sem.* 15–20 and 71, see Bydén (below, pp. 273–83) and Hult (forthcoming). For Byzantine rhetoric, see Kustas (1973).

² An Orphic saying: φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστί, θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βέβηλοι (fr. 245.1 Kern; Eus., *PE* 13.12.5), frequently quoted.

τὰ φύσιν γε καὶ τὸ τῆς εὐχροίας αὐτῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιπονείται κομ-
 ματικῶς. 5 Ταῦτ' ἄρα κάλλους τε ἴσον ἀπέχει, διὰ τὸ κατὰ φύ-
 σιν εὐδρομα χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἀξιώματος. Ὅς γε δὴ καὶ σεμνὸς μὲν
 ἐστὶν ἔστιν οὐ ταῖς ἐπινοίαις καὶ ταῖς ὑποθέσεσιν ἐξανάγκης,
 5 περὶ τῶν θείων ἅττα δὴ διεξιῶν καὶ μεμνημένος κατὰ καιρὸν τῇ
 προθέσει τῶν λόγων· 6 ἀλλὰ κἀνταῦθ' ὅμως ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τῇ
 γλώττῃ, καὶ ἰ μὴ συνεξαίρεσθαί πως φροντίδα τινὰ καὶ ἐπιμέ- 115
 λειαν ποιεῖται, τῇ φύσει δ' ἀπλῶς χρώμενος· καὶ δὴ λοιπὸν ἐκ
 τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας οὐδ' ἀκμαστικός ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ τραχὺς ἢ σφοδρὸς
 10 οὔτε νοῦν οὔθ' ἔρμηνείαν.

3 Καὶ ἡ λέξις αὐτῶ πολλὴν ἔχει τὴν γαλήνην· οὔτε γὰρ
 βροντῶδες ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ὀτιοῦν καὶ σφόδρ' ἐπιβρέμον καὶ κατα-
 κτυποῦν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ὡς ἂν ἔξω τῆς συνήθους καὶ ἀπλοϊκῆς
 τοῦ λέγειν ἀγωγῆς, ἀλλ' οὐδ' Ἀττικῆς ἀστειότητος καὶ καλλι-
 15 επείας ξένης λόγος ὅλως αὐτῶ, 2 ἀλλὰ καθάπαξ ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦς,
 εὐγενῆς φύσει καὶ ἀποίητος, καὶ πάσης ὑποκρίσεως ἀφροντισ-
 τῶν, μόνῳ τῶ κατὰ φύσιν ἀπλάστῳ δρόμῳ χρώμενος· κἀν εἰ δῆ-
 που τι καὶ προσποιοῖτο τῶν τῆς φωνῆς χρωμάτων, καὶ τοῦτ' οὐ
 πόρρω φέρον, ἀλλ' οἰκεῖον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως. 3 Εὐκρινῆς γὰρ
 20 ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶ φύσει λείῳ, καὶ τούτου δῆτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιμελής· καὶ
 ἥθους αὐτῶ μέτεστιν ἐκ τῆς τέχνης ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ γλυκύτητος,
 καὶ παθητικὸς οἴκοθεν τε καὶ κατ' ἄσκησιν.

4 Καὶ ταῦτα πάνθ' ὡς ἔστι ξυνορᾶν ξυγγενῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν
 ἔξει τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὅς γε καὶ πιθανὸς ὢν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ χρῆσιν δημ-
 25 ηγορίαις καὶ στοχαστικός εὖ μάλα καὶ ἀγχίνους ἰ καὶ ἐπιτυχῆς 116
 τῶν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ καιριῶν, οὐδ' ἐπιμελής ἐστὶ τῇ τέχνῃ, οὐδὲ
 κατὰ τοὺς αὐτῆς νόμους χρῆται, διοικούμενος ἐν δεινότητι, 2
 ἀλλὰ πλείστῳ χρῆται κἀνταῦθα τῶ ἦθει καὶ τῶ παθητικῶ, καὶ
 οὐ κύκλω περίεσιν οὐδὲ συστρέφεται· καὶ ὅλως κατὰ φύσιν
 30 κἀν τούτοις φέρεται, καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν ἐπαληθεύει τῶν λόγων σὺν
 ὅτι πλείστη κἀνταῦθα τῇ λειότητι βαδίζων ἀνεπιτήδευτος. 3
 Τοιγαροῦν καὶ οἱ ῥυθμοὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἡ συνθήκη πᾶσα συγγε-

by nature, and not elaborated as an embellishment. **5** By means of his natural ease of expression he therefore achieves a balance between Beauty and Dignity; for sometimes he is also by necessity exalted in his ideas and subjects, writing about or mentioning divine topics when it is relevant to the purpose of his work. **6** But still, even on such occasions he is the same as regards his language; he does not spend any thought or care on elevating his style, but simply writes in accordance with his nature. And therefore for the same reason he is neither florescent nor harsh or vehement in his thought or language.

3 His diction has much serenity. There is nothing loud in it whatsoever, nothing that thunders and roars against the listeners by deviating from the customary, simple course of language; nor is his style at all characterised by Attic elegance or beautiful, unusual phrases. **2** It is completely simple, naturally noble and uncontrived, avoiding every dissimulation, proceeding only with a natural artlessness. And even when he adds some ornament of language, it is not exaggerated but in accordance with his nature. **3** For in addition to his natural smoothness he remains clear, taking pains to attain this, and beyond his native ability he uses technique to achieve Character and Sweetness. He is also emotional, both naturally and through practice.

4 All this, as one can understand, is in accordance with the man's innate character, since, although he is convincing in the example speeches, sagacious and shrewd and capable of hitting upon what is forceful and appropriate, he does not take pains with technique or write according to the rules of rhetoric, composing [his writing] with Force, **2** but here, too,³ he uses a great deal of Character and Emotion. He does not write in rounded periods or compressed sentences, but also here the course of his language is completely natural. He makes the speeches sound genuine, writing artlessly and with the greatest possible smoothness. **3** Therefore also the rhythm of his language,

³ κἀνταῦθα occurs twice in 15.4.2; I suppose it refers to ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις.

νῆς αὐτῷ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀπλότητι, καὶ αἱ βάσεις οἰκείως σχε-
δὸν διὰ πάντων τῶν αὐτοῦ δακτυλικάι τε καὶ ἰαμβικάι καὶ τρο-
χάζουσαι· καὶ σχολῇ τις ἂν εὐροι τι τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῦ πυρρι-
χίζον καὶ καταβαρυνόμενον ἐν σπονδαίαις λήξεισι, καὶ ὄλως
5 ναστῶδες καὶ συμπεπιλημένον τοῖς ῥήμασιν.

Περὶ Φίλωνος: ΙΣ'

1 Φίλωνος δ' αὐθις τοῦ Ἑβραίου πέρι τοῦτο νῦν λέγειν ἔχομεν
εὐθύς, ὡς ἄρα μέγα μαρτύριον τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας τὸ παρὰ πᾶσι
τοῦτο σχεδὸν περιχόμενον πάλαι πρότερον, ὑπ' ἐνίων εἰρημέ-
10 νον παραβαλλόντων αὐτὸν Πλάτωνι, ὅτι | δὴ Φίλων πλατωνί- 117
ζει ἢ Πλάτων φιλωνίζει. 2 Καίτοι γε κομψότερον μὲν τοῦτ' εἴ-
ρηται, κομπῶδες δ' ἐστὶ καὶ θρασὺ καὶ παρακεκινδυνευμένον
εἴρηται ὑπὸ τινος ἴσως ἔραστοῦ τοῦ ἀνδρός, προενεχθὲν ἀπρο-
όπτως καὶ προνοίας ἔξω τοῦ προσήκοντος· εἰ γὰρ καὶ φίλος
15 ἀνὴρ καὶ θαυμάζειν ἄξιος Φίλων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄξιος Πλάτωνι πα-
ραβάλλειν καὶ συμμετρεῖσθαι γε παρὰ τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἴσων τυγχάνειν. 3 Ἄλλ' ἔοικέ γε ὅμως περιττός
εἶναί τις τὴν σοφίαν ἀνὴρ, καὶ τούτου γε μαρτύριον ἦπερ ἔφην
ὀπηοῦν εἶναι τὸ εἰρημένον. Τῷ ὄντι γὰρ καὶ τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος
20 φιλοσοφίας αἵρεσιώτης ἐστὶν ὁ Φίλων· δογματικὸς γὰρ ἐστὶ,
καὶ ὑψηλῶν ὁ νοῦς ἐφίεται τῷ ἀνδρί· καὶ ἠθικός ἐστὶ· καὶ τῇ
περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά σπουδῇ πάνυ τοι προσέθετο. 4 Καὶ τοῦ φυ-
σικοῦ μὲν οὐ καθάπαξ ὀλιγώρηκεν, ἀλλὰ δηλὸς ἐστὶ κἀνταυθὰ
γε τῆς φιλοσοφίας νέμων ὅ τι ποτ' ἄρα τῆς σπουδῆς· οὐ μὴν
25 τοσοῦτό γε αὐτῷ τοῦδε μέλει ὥσπερ γε καὶ κατὰ τᾶλλ' ἄπερ εἴ-
ρηται, καὶ | τοῦτό γε κατὰ ζῆλον ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦ Πλάτωνος. 5 118

10-11 Φίλων — φιλωνίζει: Phot., *Bibl. cod.* 105, 86b26; *Suda* A 69 et Φ 448

3-4 πυρριχίζον: πυρρίζον E, non leg. M 10-11 πλατωνίζει: πλατωνίζειν E,
non leg. M 13 τοῦ om. P, non leg. M 22 μαθηματικά: μαθητικά P, non
leg. M

and the whole composition, correspond to his natural simplicity, and accordingly the clausulae throughout practically the whole of his work are dactylic, iambic and trochaic; it would be difficult to find in his works any pyrrhics, anything heavy in spondaic clausulae, or on the whole anything dense and compressed in his words.

16. On Philo

1 Again, concerning the Jew Philo we can at once say this, that a great testimony to his wisdom is that saying which practically everybody repeats about him, formulated in earlier times by some people who were comparing him to Plato, namely that *Philo writes like Plato, or Plato like Philo*. 2 However, although this is elegantly put, it is boastful and impudent, perhaps spoken in boldness by some admirer of the man, uttered thoughtlessly and without suitable circumspection. For even if Philo is a dear¹ and admirable man, he does not deserve to be mentioned alongside Plato and be compared with him to the extent that he receives the same and equal [praise]. 3 Still, it seems that the man is of surpassing wisdom, and that, as I said, the adage is in a way a testimony of this. And in fact Philo is an adherent of Plato's philosophy. For he is interested in metaphysics,² and his mind strives after higher things; he is also interested in ethics and much devoted to the study of mathematics; 4 he did not at all despise natural science, but clearly also spent at least some part of his studies on this branch of philosophy. But he is less interested in this field than in the others which I mentioned—also here truly emulating Plato. 5 In addition to this, he also takes care with language to the ex-

¹ A pun: φίλος Φίλων. Cf. below, p. 165 n. 1.

² *interested in metaphysics*: here as well as in *Sem.* 18.5.5 δογματικός seems to refer particularly to metaphysics. In 71.3.3 and 5 it probably has the wider meaning 'theoretical' (cf. Lampe s.v. 2).

Καὶ τῆς γλώττης ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπιμελεῖται, ὅσον κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν καὶ προσήκει γε ἤπερ σπουδάζει σοφίᾳ καὶ πρόσκειται· 6 οὐ γὰρ δογματικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἠθικοῖς ἀξιοῖ φιλοσοφία κομμωτικῶς ἐσκευάσθαι, καὶ δρόμους τρέχειν ἀγγελίας δικαστηρίοις
 5 καὶ ἀγωγῇ πολιτικῇ προσήκοντας, καὶ κατατεχνιτεύειν τὴν ἐρμηνείαν τῶν λεγομένων πολὺν πόνον ἐνταῦθα νέμοντας, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄρα παρήκοι μετ' ἀξιώματός τινος ἀπλούστερον ταύτη γε χρῆσθαι. 7 Καὶ τοίνυν καὶ Φίλων αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀτημελήτως οὐδ' ἀνασκήτως καθάπαξ ἔχων κἀνταῦθα, δηλὸς ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀποτυγ-
 10 χάνων τῶν τῆς φωνῆς ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλ' εὐφυῶς καὶ ταύτη γε πειρώμενος καὶ ὡς ἂν εὐ μάλλ' ἐπαινείσθαι δίκαιος εἶναι. 8 Μάλιστα δ' εὐκίως ἐστὶ περὶ νοῦν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν σχολάζοντι, καὶ πλείστα γε πεπόνηκεν ὡς συνορᾶν ἐστὶ καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τῇ σοφίᾳ, καὶ βίος | ἐστὶν αὐτῷ καὶ καθόλου τῆς ζωῆς πρόθεσις ἢ 119
 15 παιδεία, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ' αὐτὸν Ἰώσηπον. 9 Ἀμφοτέρω μὲν γε τῷδε τῷ ἄνδρῳ πλείστον ἀμέλει τῶν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντων ἔθνους Ἑβραίων τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐνδόξω ἐγενέσθην ἐπὶ τῇ κτήσει τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σοφίας πρὸς τῇ πατρίῳ, καὶ πλεί-
 20 νειαν.

2 Ἐοικέ γε μὴν ὁ Ἰώσηπος, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν συνεγράψατο δῆλον τοῦτ' ἔστι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ βίου αἰρέσεως, ἦττον προσταλαιπω-
 ρῆσαι τοῖς λόγοις ἢ κατὰ τὸν Φίλωνα, καὶ μὴ παραπλησίως ἐ-
 25 ἀυτὸν ἐκδοῦναι τοῖς ἐνταῦθα πόνοις, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει μᾶλλον ἐνευδοκιμεῖν ἢ τῇ περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα σχολῇ, καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρος μὲν εἶναι πάσης παιδείας κατὰ τε φιλοσοφίαν πᾶσαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἄσκησιν, 2 οὐ τοσοῦτον δ' ἐνιδρώσας τῇ περὶ τούτων σπουδῇ, διὰ φύσεως ὅμως ἀστειότητα καὶ τάχος καὶ μνήμην κάλλιστ' ἀνύσας τυχεῖν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῆς σοφίας θησαυρῶν
 30 καὶ κτήσεων, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν γλώτταν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς σχεῖν. 3 Ἦν ἄρα δι' εὐκολίαν ὡς εἴρηται φύσεως εὐθηκτον ἔχων, ὀλίγων ἐδεήθη | τῶν πόνων ὥστε παρ' Ἑλλησιν ἀ- 120

tent that is needed and appropriate and fitting for the [branch of] philosophy that he is studying. 6 For in metaphysical and ethical treatises philosophy does not deign to rig herself out with adornments and use the kind of language which belongs in the field of courthouses and political discourse, where one spends great effort on the presentation of the subject-matter, but rather extemporises, using a language that is on the whole simple but to some extent also Dignified. 7 And Philo himself, who is not completely negligent or unpractised on this point either, clearly does not fail to achieve a good language, but with great talent attempts also this [viz. to write well], and with admirable results. 8 But it seems that his main interest is the philosophical content and, as one can see and infer, he toiled hard at³ wisdom.⁴ Intellectual work is his life and his whole aim of existence—much more so than for Josephus. 9 These two men became more famous than any other Jews from time immemorial for having acquired Greek wisdom in addition to their own ancestral beliefs, and both wrote copiously in noble Greek.⁵

2 But Josephus, it seems (this appears both from his works and from his career), did not work so hard with his texts as Philo, or devote himself to such labours to the same extent, but won fame through his natural talent rather than through application to the subject. He was familiar with all kinds of studies, with the whole of philosophy and rhetoric. 2 But although he did not toil so much with these kinds of studies, he still, through his natural elegance, speed and memory, achieved brilliant results and attained also the other treasures and possessions of wisdom, but rose above the multitude particularly in his language. 3 Since, then, as I said, his language was well-sharpened due to natural facility, it did not take much effort for

³ *toiled hard at* or perhaps 'made a great contribution to'.

⁴ φιλοσοφία and σοφία appear to be synonymous. Cf. above, p. 127 n. 2.

⁵ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν τῆς γλώττης εὐγένειαν, literally: 'according to the Greek nobility of language'. For the phrase cf. Const. Porph. *De legationibus* 221.25 Κομεντίολος μεγαλοφρόνως τὴν τῆς γλώττης εὐγένειαν ἐπεδείκνυτο.

ριστεύσαι κομιδῇ μετ' ὀλίγων ἐναρίθμιος, καὶ ἀπὸ ξένης ἤκων
 τοῖς γησιόις ἐμπολιτεύσασθαι καὶ συντάξασθαι. 4 Καὶ δηλόν
 γε τοῦτο μάλιστα τῷ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς βίῳ, ὅς γε Ἱεροσολυμίτης ὢν
 καὶ ἱερατικῆς ὡς αὐτός φησι φυλῆς τε καὶ λειτουργίας, καὶ τῇ
 5 κακῇ τῆς πατρίδος τύχῃ καὶ τοῖς χαλεπωτάτοις συναντήσας καὶ
 συζήσας καιροῖς μεγίστοις καὶ ἐργώδεσιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη
 συνηνέχθη πράγμασιν, ὥστε καὶ στρατιωτικῶν καὶ μαχίμων
 ἐπὶ πλείστον ἔργων ἄψασθαι, 5 τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν πατρίων καὶ
 τῆς πατρίδος παραβαλλόμενος ἐπιμελέστατα, τοῦτο δὲ συνὼν
 10 ὕστερον τοῖς κατ' αὐτῆς ὀπλισμένοις αὐτοκράτορσι Ῥωμαίων
 Οὐέσπασιανῶ τε καὶ Τίτῳ, 6 καὶ τελευτῶν τὰ Ῥωμαίων πολι-
 τευσάμενος ἀντὶ τῶν πατρίων, ἐπὶ δόξῃ διὰ φύσεως καὶ ἤθους
 καὶ γνώμης εὐγένειαν, καὶ βασιλέων τρίψας ἀυλαῖς ἐν σπουδῇ
 πραγμάτων, Τίτου καὶ Δομετιανοῦ, ὥστε μὴ καθάπαξ ἀπρόσ-
 15 κοπος τὰ περὶ λόγους ἀμέλει γενέσθαι.

3 Φίλων δὲ καθόλου συνεβίωσεν ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου τῇ σχολῇ
 καὶ ἰ τῷ τῶν λόγων ἔρωτι καὶ πολιτικῶν δὴ τινων ἔργων οὐδὲ 121
 τοῦ καιροῦ μάλιστα διδόντος βραχὺ καὶ ἤψατο. Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ
 πλείσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ μάλιστα συνετάξατο, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν Ἰώ-
 20 σηπον λέγω νῦν γε, ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τις καὶ ἄλλος τῶν ἐλλογίμων καὶ
 διὰ μνήμης ἐν Ἑλλάσσι. 2 Καὶ μάλιστα μὲν τὰ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν
 προὔθετο· καὶ τῶν πατρίων ὑπερβαλλόντως ὢν σπουδαστής,
 ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς κατὰ Μωσέα πάλαι γράμμασι πᾶσαν τὴν αὐτοῦ
 σοφίαν φιλοπονεῖ, καὶ πάντ' αὐτῇ φέρων κάλλιστ' ἀνατίθησιν
 25 εὖ μάλα πρόθυμος καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, 3 ὅσα καὶ ἀπλῶς οὐ-
 τω δὴ καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐπαινεῖν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα δι' ὑπονοιῶν
 καὶ ἀλληγοριῶν, τῆς προδήλου καὶ καθ' ἱστορίαν ἐντεύξεως
 βαθυτέρα· καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐνταῦθα δὴ πάσης φιλοσοφίας
 ἀφορμὴν συνεισάγειν ὡς οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ πάσαις μηχαναῖς ἐπ-
 30 εἴγεται καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἐπιδείκνυσι σοφίας. 4 Καὶ πολὺς μὲν
 ἐστὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ ὑψηλῶν ὡς ἔφην ἰ ἐφίεται, καὶ τυγχάνει γε 122

4 φησι: φησὶν E, non leg. M 24 αὐτῇ ex αὐτῆς ut vid. corr. P¹, αὐτοῖς E,
 non leg. M 25 πρόθυμος: πρόοιμος E, non leg. M 31 ἐφίεται: φίεται E,
 non leg. M

him to achieve a prominent position among the Hellenes, becoming one of a select few, and although he was a foreigner, he won citizenship and was counted among the true-born. **4** This emerges most clearly from his life. He was born in Jerusalem and, as he himself tells us, was a member of the priestly tribe and rank.⁶ Having encountered and lived through his country's misfortune and the terrible times, momentous and distressing, he was swept away helplessly by the tide of events, so that for a long while he even had to lay his hand to the works of war. **5** First he dutifully risked his life on behalf of his ancestral culture and his country; later he entered the service of the Roman emperors who had led the campaign against it, Vespasian and Titus, **6** and finally he became a Roman citizen instead of one of Judaea, passing his days in glory by reason of his nobility of nature, character and mind, engaged in the affairs of state in the halls of the emperors Titus and Domitian, so that he was not exactly unhampered for literary activity.⁷

3 But Philo lived in Egypt entirely dedicated to studies and his love of letters and did not take the least part in politics, even though the time [in which he lived] gave ample opportunity to do so. Therefore he wrote copiously, and I do not mean only in comparison with Josephus, but also with the most famous and celebrated among the Greeks. **2** His main interest was philosophy. Having thoroughly studied the traditional beliefs of his people, on the foundation of the Old Testament of Moses he elaborates his [i.e., Moses'] entire wisdom, and referring all things to it he attributes everything [to Moses] beautifully, enthusiastically and in every possible way, **3** both those things⁸ that it is possible to praise straightforwardly, as they appear on the surface, and those [that must be explained] by means of covert significance and allegory, since they are too deep for an obvious and historical reading. One might say that here he tries, as much as he can and with every means at his disposal, to create an occasion for [digressing on] the whole of philosophy, and displays his own wisdom.⁹ **4** He has a powerful mind and, as I said, strives after higher

⁶ Josephus, *BJ*, introduction and 3.352; *Ap.* 1.54; *Vit.* 2 and 198.

⁷ No doubt Josephus reminds Metochites of himself: he, too, was thwarted in his literary activities by affairs of the state (cf. Nik. Greg., *Hist.* 1:272–73, according to whom Metochites was a statesman by day and wrote by night).

⁸ I.e., passages in, or works by, classical authors.

⁹ *his own wisdom*: or (less probably) 'the wisdom of his people'.

θαυμαστῶς ὅπως ἄρα τούτου μᾶλλον οὐ καὶ ἡ πᾶσα, εἰ δ' οὖν ἡ πλείων, πρόθεσις.

- 4 Μέλει δέ πως αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴρηται γε, κὰν τούτοις τῆς γλώττης· καὶ ἔστι μὲν αὐτῷ, τῇ προθέσει πάντως οἰκείως, ἀξιώματος
 5 καὶ σεμνότητος ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ φροντὶς τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον τῆς ἑρμηνείας χρωμάτων, καὶ οὐ ταῖς ἐννοίαις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασι καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐπαίρεται. 2 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριτος οὐ καθάπαξ ὀλιγωρεῖ οὐδ' ἀποτυγχάνει, καὶ ἔστι μᾶλλον αὐτῷ ἢ κατὰ τὸν Ἰώσηπον τὰ τῆς
 10 χάριτος καὶ τοῦ ἠθους κατ' ἐπιτήδευσιν πλέον ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς κατ' ἔθος φύσεως ὡς ἐκεῖνος χρῆται, ἀλλ' ἐπιμελεῖται μᾶλλον ἢ ἀναδίδωσιν ἀποιήτως. 3 Καὶ οὐ ρεῖ γε οὕτως ἐπιὸν ἀπόνως ἀμέλει, ἀλλὰ ξὺν ἐργασίᾳ καὶ διοικήσει τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν γε συνήθους πλέον ἀξιοῖ φέρειν, οὐ διὰ πάντων, οὐδ'
 15 ἔργον τοῦτο πρῶτον αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐ χαριέστερος τῆς προθέσεως γινόμενος, ὥστε καὶ τιν' ὥραν ἐπιδείκνυσθαι. 4 Καὶ οὐκ ἐν σχήμασιν οὐδ' ἐν ἐπιπλοκαῖς καὶ ἑτερότησι τοῦ δρόμου τῶν λόγων ὁ καλλωπισμὸς | τάνδρι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τῶν ῥημάτων εὐσή- 123
 μῳ καὶ ταῖς καινότησιν, ἐν οἷς καὶ γοργός ἐστιν εἰ δὴ τις καὶ
 20 ἄλλος, καὶ πολὺν νοῦν ἐν ὀλίγοις στενούμενος ὀνόμασι. 5 Τὸ πλείστον δ' ἀπλῶς τε καὶ φιλοσόφως κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν τῷ λέγειν χρῆται καὶ οὐ περιεργάζεται χωρῶν ἀφροντίστως οὕτωςί. 6 Τῆς δὲ λέξεως αὐτῷ τὸ ἔκτροπον καὶ ἄηθες πολλακίς καὶ ἀπολίτευτον, ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἑρεῖν τινα κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τραχυτέραν
 25 αὐτῷ καὶ ἴσως οὐ καθάπαξ νεμεσητῶς, ἔστι δ' ὥστε καὶ προσήκειν φάναι τῷ παντὶ σκοπῷ καὶ τῇ προθέσει τῶν λεγομένων· οὐ γὰρ παντάπασιν ἔξω οὐδ' ἀνοίκειον τοῦ σεμνοῦ τε καὶ ἀξιωματοῦ τὸ τραχὺ τῆς φωνῆς, ὡς ἡ τέχνη βούλεται καὶ νομίζει.

18 τάνδρι: τοῦδε E, non leg. M

things, and in some amazing manner he achieves even more than that which is his whole, or at least his chief, aim.¹⁰

4 But as I said, also in these writings he cares about language to some extent. And in complete agreement with his [philosophical] aim, he is more anxious and concerned to achieve Dignity and Solemnity in his language than the other colours of expression; he is exalted not only in his thoughts, but also in his vocabulary, rhythm, and composition. 2 But neither does he altogether disregard, or fail to achieve, Grace. In him more than in Josephus, Grace and Character are achieved deliberately rather than appearing naturally, and he does not write simply from natural habit, as does Josephus, but composes with care rather than write in an uncontrived style. 3 And [his writing] does not flow forth as it chances and without effort, but he has the ambition to bring forth, by means of work and arrangement, more than what is customary by nature. He does not do this everywhere, nor is it his primary concern, but sometimes he becomes more pleasing than [warranted by] his subject, so that he even exhibits some charm. 4 The beauty of his language is not found in figures, or in the sequence of words being convoluted or unusual, but in the clarity of his words, and his new coinages. In this respect he is as Rapid as anyone, cramming an abundance of meaning into a few words. 5 But mostly he writes simply and in a philosophical style suited to his subject, and does not overelaborate, proceeding without much care for style.¹¹ 6 But the strangeness and the often unusual and idiosyncratic [quality] in his diction is such that one can say, on the one hand that it is in accordance with his somewhat harsh nature and perhaps not altogether blameworthy, on the other that it suits his whole theme and the object of his writing. For his harsh diction is not entirely irrelevant or foreign to Solemnity and Dignity, [and this is] as the art [of rhetoric] deems and prescribes.

¹⁰ τυγχάνει ... πρόθεσις, translation uncertain. For εἰ δ' οὖν, see above, p. 87 n. 7.

¹¹ Literally, 'proceeding ἀφροντίστως in this manner'. This carelessness is proper for a philosopher; cf. 18.2.4–5 on the style of Synesius; 71.9 (on Plutarch), and *Sem.* 26.

Ἰὸτι πάντες ὅσοι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἐπαιδεύθησαν
τραχύτερον τῷ λέγειν χρῶνται: ΙΖ'

124

1 Ἐννοιά μοί τις αὕτη πολλάκις καὶ λογισμὸς ἔπεισιν, ἴσως
μὲν τάληθοῦς τυγχάνων, ἴσως δὲ μή, λογίζομαι δ' οὖν ὅτι δὴ
5 πάντες, ὅσοι κατ' Αἴγυπτον ἐπαιδεύθησαν παλαιοί τε πρότερον
καὶ νεώτεροι καὶ συνεγράψαντο ἅττα δὴ, παραπλήσιοί πως τὴν
φωνήν εἰσι τραχύτερον τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι μάλιστα
χρῶμενοι· 2 καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι πάντως κατ' ἔθος ἔοικε κρατήσαν
ἐκεῖσε, τῶν ἐκδεξαμένων ἄλλων ἐπ' ἄλλοις τῶν αὐτῶν ἐχομέ-
10 νων δρόμων τῆς γλώττης. 3 Καὶ πάντας γὰρ ἐπισκοπούμενος
ἔγωγε ὅσοι τὸν τοιοῦτον χαρακτήρα καὶ τύπον τῆς ἐρμηνείας
ἐνόμισαν καὶ καθιστόρησαν οὕτω δὴ καὶ διέθεντο τὰ σφέτερα
αὐτῶν συντάγματα, κἂν ἄλλος ἄλλου βέλτιον καὶ τούναντίον
ἐχρήσατο, καὶ ὅσοι τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς θεοσεβείας καὶ πίστεως καὶ
15 ὅσοι μή, 4 πάντας δ' ὁμως τοὺς γε τοιούτους ἐν τῷ λέγειν κατ' 125
Αἴγυπτον μόνον τῇ παιδείᾳ συσχολάσαντας ξυνορῶ καὶ συν-
εθισθέντας καὶ δευσοποιὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τῆς φωνῆς βαφήν τε καὶ
ἄσκησιν ἐκεῖσε δὴ κεχρωσμένους, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι πω καὶ ἄλλη πο-
λιτευσάμενους τὰ τῆς σοφίας καὶ κοινωνήσαντας ἄλλων δὴ τι-
20 νων νομίμων καὶ ἔθῶν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ χρήσεων.

2 Οἶον δὴ Φίλων ὁ Ἑβραῖος ἐκεῖνος Αἴγυπτον μόνον οἶδε
καὶ ταύτη γε τὸν ἅπαντα τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον τροφῷ τῆς παιδείας ἐ-
χρήσατο, πολὺς τὴν σοφίαν ἀνήρ· καὶ τῆς γλώττης πρόνοιαν
ἐπιμελῶς ποιούμενος, οὐχ ἰλαρὸς καθάπαξ ἐμπίπτει τοῖς ὡσίν,
25 οὐδὲ λείως τοῖς ῥήμασιν οἷς ἐρμηνεύων ἐκάστοτ' ἐκφέρει τὸν
νοῦν καὶ διαπλάττει καὶ προδείκνυσι. 2 Καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ
Κλαύδιος μεθύστερον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον συντάττει τὰ κάλλιστα
καὶ θαυμασιώτατα σπουδάσματα, καὶ Θεῶν μετ' αὐτόν, 3 καὶ
τῶν τῆς ἡμετέρας Χριστιανικῆς ἀγλῆς, Ὠριγένους τε καὶ Παναί-
30 τιος καὶ Κλήμης ὁ τοὺς Στρωματεῖς συνθέμενος καὶ ὁ θαυμασ-

13 κἂν: καί, sed ei in marg. add. P¹, non leg. M 29 χριστιανικῆς ex
χριστιανῆς corr. E

17. That all who were educated in Egypt
write in a rather harsh style

1 The following thought and reflection often occurs to me; perhaps it hits upon the truth, perhaps not, but to my mind all those who were educated in Egypt,¹ both in earlier times and more recently, and who composed something in writing, resemble each other in their language: they write on the whole somewhat harshly, and particularly in their vocabulary. 2 It seems that this is in complete accordance with a habit that obtained there; one generation took over from the preceding one, [all] keeping to the same tenor of language. 3 For when I examine all those who practised this style of writing, and who composed their books in this manner, even though some of them wrote better or worse than the others, both those who belonged to our faith and the others, 4 I find that² all who write in this manner studied and acquired their education only in Egypt and, so to speak, dyed themselves with a deep dye and practice of language there. They did not conduct their philosophical studies elsewhere, or partake of any other educational usages, practices, or customs.

2 For instance, Philo the Jew knows only Egypt, and he used her as his nurse in culture during his whole life, a man outstanding in wisdom. And although he bestows great care on his language, he does not strike the listeners' ears at all pleasantly or smoothly as regards the phrases he uses to disclose, shape and convey his thoughts.³ 2 Later Claudius Ptolemy writes the most excellent and admirable treatises in the same manner, and after him Theon,⁴ 3 and, from our Christian fold, Origen, Panaetius, Clement who wrote the *Stromateis*, and the truly admirable Gregory, teeming with miracles (for even

¹ 'Egypt' here stands for Alexandria (see below, 17.3.1).

² ὅμως not translated ('although some were good writers, some were not, and some were Christians, some pagans, *still*, they were all educated in Egypt ...'). Cf. above, p. 33 n. 2.

³ Cf. the description of Philo's language in *Sem.* 16, particularly 16.4.

⁴ Claudius Ptolemy, the astronomer, mathematician, geographer, etc., lived probably in Alexandria in the 2nd century AD. Theon of Alexandria, 4th century AD, the Neoplatonic philosopher and father of Hypatia, wrote a commentary on Ptolemy's works.

τὸς ὄντως καὶ θαυματοβρότης Γρηγόριος (εἰ καὶ Ποντικὸς γὰρ οὐίτος, ἀλλ' ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου τὸ πλεῖστον ἐπαιδεύθη, παρ' Ὠριγέ- 126
 νει, καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς φησι περὶ αὐτοῦ), 4 καὶ ὁ τοῦ Παμφίλου
 Εὐσέβιος, ἐκ Παλαιστίνης μὲν τὸ γένος, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς φησι
 5 τοῖς ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου πάνυ τοι χρονίως συνεφοίτησε, πολυμαθῆς
 ἀνὴρ καὶ δῆλός γε πολλάς ἐκδόσεις προενεγκὼν καὶ χρώμενος
 οὕτω τῇ γλώττῃ· 5 καὶ ὁ πολὺς τὴν τε θεϊὰν κατὰ Χριστὸν σο-
 φίαν καὶ τὴν θύραθεν ὁ ἱερὸς Κύριλλος διὰ πάντων τῶν αὐτοῦ
 παμπλείστων τε καὶ πολυτιμῆτων τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ Χριστοῦ καὶ αὐ-
 10 τὸς γε μὴν οὕτω χρῆται καὶ συνυφαίνει τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ χρώ-
 ματι φωνῆς φεύγοντι τὸ λειὸν ἐπίτηδες καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἔθιμον· 6
 Συνέσιός τε αὐτὸς πολὺ θαυμάσιος ἀνὴρ πᾶσαν σοφίαν δι' εὐ-
 κολίαν καὶ πρὸς πάντα χωροῦσαν ἐτοιμότητα φύσεως, καὶ νοῦν
 τε καὶ γλῶτταν εὐστροφος καὶ ταχὺς εἰ δὴ τις καὶ ἄλλος, καὶ
 15 ῥέων ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἀμογητί, 7 καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σοφίαν αὐτῷ τῶν
 κατ' Αἴγυπτον ἢ τῆς παιδείας ἐργαστηρίων ἀπολαβὼν καὶ πριά- 127
 μενος καὶ βραχὺ τι κομιδῇ, καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς φησιν, Ἑλλησιν ἐκ
 Λιβύης καὶ πέραν κατ' Εὐρώπην γενόμενος, παρατραχύνεται
 τὴν ἐρμηνεϊὰν ἐν οἷς ἐκάστοτε σπουδάζει, καὶ δυσδιόδευτα
 20 πλεῖστα καὶ δυσέντευκτα τῷ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἔθιμῳ φθέγγεται· 8 καὶ
 τοῦτ' ἔστι μὲν ἔστιν οὗ τῷ ὄντι τῷ καλῶς κρίνοντι προσίεσθαι
 καὶ ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ μὴ ψοφοδεῶς ἔχειν κατακτυπούμενον ἀσυνή-
 θως ὡς τὰ παιδάρια· ἔστι δ' οὗ καὶ νεμεσήσαι τις ἂν δικαίως τὸ
 τῆς γλώττης παράτροπον.

3 αὐτοῦ: ἑαυτοῦ E, non leg. M 13 καὶ¹ om. E, non leg. M 23 καὶ p. c.
 E, non leg. M

⁵ Origen, ca. 185–254, was born and educated in Alexandria. In 230 he was exiled and founded a school in Caesarea in Palestine. Panaetius: Metochites is probably thinking of Clement's teacher at Alexandria, *Pantaenus*. Although he was the first Head of the school of Alexandria, he was not educated there. His writings are lost, but perhaps still existed—or were believed to exist—in the 14th century (see Quasten 1963–66, 2:4–5; contrast, however, Wilson 1983, 262–63). Gregory the 'Wonder-worker' studied for five years with Origen in Caesarea (Crouzel 1969, 20). As appears from the next paragraph, Metochites

though he came from Pontus, he received most of his education in Egypt, at the school of Origen, as he says himself),⁵ 4 and Eusebius the son of Pamphilus, who descended from Palestine, but, as he himself tells us, studied for a long time with those in Egypt,⁶ a highly learned man who, as is well known, produced a vast literary output, and who wrote in this manner. 5 Also the sainted Cyril,⁷ distinguished both in pagan and in the divine Christian wisdom—in all of his numerous writings, much valued by the church of Christ, he, too, writes in this manner and weaves together his orations with a colour of language which deliberately avoids that which is smooth and customary for the ears.⁸ 6 And Synesius, most admirable in all branches of wisdom because of his facility and his natural readiness to deal with every subject, a man who, if anyone, is versatile and quick in both mind and tongue, and writes fluently without effort, 7 who purchased all his wisdom from the Egyptian workshops of culture, and only very little—and this is what he himself says—from the Greeks when he had come from Libya and over to Europe,⁹ expresses himself in a harsh style in all his works, and writes many [things] that are difficult to penetrate and read compared to what one is accustomed to hear. 8 And in truth, sometimes this can be accepted and admired by anyone who has sound judgement, and does not take fright like a child at every noise when exposed to something unfamiliar. But sometimes one is justified in censuring the strangeness of Synesius' style.

does not regard Palestine as a part of Egypt. However, Origen's school in Caesarea may be seen as part of the Alexandrian educational tradition. Gregory's epithet is usually given as *θαυματουργός*.

⁶ Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea, which is also his probable birthplace, ca. 263–399. He referred to himself as the 'son' of his teacher Pamphilus. During the persecution of Diocletian he fled into the Egyptian desert of the Thebais (Quasten 1963–66, 3:310).

⁷ St. Cyril, patriarch of Alexandria, which was also his birthplace, d. 444.

⁸ Cf. τὸ ἔθιμον τῆς ἀκοῆς in 17.2.7 below.

⁹ Probably referring to Synesius' *Ep.* 136, written after his visit to Athens on the way to Constantinople, where he says *νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνοις Αἴγυπτος τρέφει τὰς Ὑπατίας δεξαμένη γονάς, αἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίαι, πάλαι μὲν ἦν ἡ πόλις ἐστία σοφῶν, τὸ δὲ νῦν ἔχον σεμνύνουσιν αὐτὰς οἱ μελιττουργοί* (236.12–237.2). Cf. also *Ep.* 56 (54).

- 3 Ἄλλα περὶ τούτου νῦν γε ἡμῖν εὐφημα κείσθω· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢ πρόθεσις τοῦτ' ἦν ἐξετάζειν περὶ τούτων καὶ κρίνειν. Ὁ δ' οὖν ἐβουλόμην, ἐπιστωσάμην διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνδρῶν, οἳ πάντες ἐπ' Ἀλεξανδρείας κατ' Αἴγυπτον τὰ τῆς σοφίας ἐσπούδασαν, 128
- 5 ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ προουθέμην, ὅτι δὴ παραπλησίως πάντες ἐνταῦθα τὴν φωνὴν ἤσκησαν, ἀθηθέστερον ἐκτραχυνόμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. 2 Ὡν δὴ τούναντίον ἅπαν συνορᾶν ἔστι καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν Συρίᾳ τε καὶ Φοινίκη παιδευθέντων, λειότατα κομιδῇ χρωμένων τῷ λέγειν καὶ οὐδ' ὀρηοῦν ἀνόδευτα καὶ τοῖς 10 πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῖς, καὶ πᾶσα ῥαστώνη πᾶσιν ὡσὶν ἐντεῦθεν, καὶ οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν ἀφιλόανθρωπον ἐμπίπτει πλήττον τραχύτητι. 3 Καὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦδε πλείστους ἂν ἔχοιμεν μάρτυρας, ὅστις ἂν προσέχειν βούλοιο, τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ φιλοσόφων, οἳ δόγματά τινα καὶ συντάξεις ἐπόνησαν διαφόρους, ὡς οἱ περὶ Πορ- 15 φύριον καὶ Μάξιμον, Φοινίκες δὲ οὗτοι καὶ Τύριοι, καὶ πλείστοί γ' ἐκείθεν ἄλλοι οὕτω τῇ γλώττῃ χρησάμενοι, τοῦτο δ' ἐκ ῥητόρων μάλισθ', οὓς καὶ δικαιοτέρον τις ἐν τοῖς τοῦ λέγειν δρόμοις μαρτύρῃται ἂν. 4 Καὶ παρὲς τοὺς ἄλλους πλείστους ἔχων ἐρεῖν, Λουκιανόν τε καὶ Λιβάνιον ἐν μνήμῃ ποιοῦμαι νῦν, 20 ἀμφοτέρω Σύρω ἄνδρε καὶ ὀνομαστώ γ' ἐν ῥητορείᾳ καὶ γλώττης ἀσκήσει, καὶ πόλλ' ἐξενεγκόντε βιβλία μετ' εὐστομίας θαυμάσια, 5 οἳ καίτοι γε τὸ Ἀττικίζειν ὑπερβαλλόντως σπουδάζοντες, οὕτω δὴ μάλιστα τὸ τῆς γλώττης ἰλαρὸν ἠσπᾶσαντο καὶ προεῖλοντο καὶ οὐκ ἄτριπτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ Ἀττικίζειν φέ- 25 ρει πρὸς τιν' ἐκτροπὴν τοῦ ἐθίμου καὶ σκληρύνεται τοῖς ὡσί, παρορῶσι τοῦτο καὶ οὐχ αἰροῦνται, οὐδὲ χαίρουσιν ὅτιοῦν οὕτω χρῆσθαι, πάντα τρόπον τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἐρραστανευμένον προκρίνοντες.

- 4 Παραπλησίως δὲ τῇ ἐρμηνείᾳ χρῶνται καὶ πάντες Ἀσιανοὶ καὶ μάλιστ' Ἰωνες, καὶ πολὺς ἐντεῦθεν ἀριθμὸς φιλοσόφων τε καὶ ῥητόρων πιστοῦται τὸν λόγον, ὅστις καταλογίζεσθαι βούλοιοιτ' ἂν. 2 Καὶ πολλὴ γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν συντέλει' ἀνδρῶν

21 ἐξενεγκόντε: ἐξενεγκότε P, ἐξενέγκοντε E

3 But let us speak no more of this. For it was not my intention to investigate and judge these matters. My point, which I have illustrated with the persons mentioned above, who all studied wisdom in Alexandria in Egypt, was, as I said in the beginning, that everybody there wrote in a similar style, exhibiting an unusual Asperity in their vocabulary. 2 One can observe and conclude the exact opposite concerning those educated in Syria and Phoenicia, who write with the utmost smoothness, not the least difficult to get through even for common people, and from this comes complete easiness for every ear, and nothing in the least unpleasant falls against them (the ears), striking with Asperity. 3 And to this assertion I could name any number of witnesses if someone would be willing to listen, some of them from the ranks of philosophers, who elaborated doctrines and various treatises, as for instance people like Porphyry and Maximus¹⁰—they were Phoenicians from Tyre—and many others from there who wrote in this manner, and in particular some orators, whom one would be especially justified in mentioning when discussing the field of rhetoric. 4 Leaving aside many that I could mention, for the present I call to mind Lucian and Libanius. Both came from Syria, were famous for their rhetoric and linguistic schooling, and published a large number of books, admirably eloquent. 5 Although they were both ardent Atticists, they nevertheless appreciated and preferred a pleasant and unconstrained language, so that in those cases where Atticising leads to a departure from normal usage and becomes unpleasant to the ear, they disregard it and prefer not to apply it. They do not like at all to write in that manner, since they always prefer an easy language.

4 Also all the Asians write in roughly the same manner, particularly the Ionians; a large number of philosophers and orators from that area confirm my claim, if anyone would wish to enumerate them. 2 For in truth Ionia has contributed many excellent men to the chorus of wisdom; I am thinking of all branches of education, philosophical

¹⁰ For Metochites's familiarity with Maximus of Tyre, cf. *Sem.* 8.3.1 (86–87 n. 6).

σπουδαίων τῷ χορῷ τῆς σοφίας ὡς ἀληθῶς γέγονε, πᾶσαν παι-
 δείαν, καὶ φιλοσόφους αἰρέσεις καὶ ῥητορικὰς ἐπιδείξεις φημί,
 καὶ πολὺς πόνος καὶ ἴσως οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ πάντας ἀπαριθμεῖσθαι,
 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ μετρίων μνησθῆναι δόξειεν ἂν ὡς τοὺς ἄλλους
 5 περιφρονοῦντος εἶναι. 3 Καὶ δὴ καθόλου ἰ γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἀπάν- 130
 των εἰπών, ὡς οὕτω δὴ χαίρουσι τῇ γλώττῃ χρώμενοι, καὶ παρα-
 πέμπων τὸν βουλόμενον ἐπισκέπτεσθαι πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν παν-
 τοῖα βιβλία καὶ πλείστα, τοσοῦτο νῦν προστίθιμι μόνον, 4 ὡς
 ἄρα τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης καὶ χάριτος τραχύτερον μὲν Αἰγύπ-
 10 τιοὶ καὶ ἀγροικότερον ἐχρήσαντο τὰ ἐς ἐρμηνείαν, Φοίνικες δὲ
 καὶ Σῦροι καὶ ἔτι Ἀσιανοὶ τε καὶ Ἴωνες ἰλαρότερον, καὶ πάν-
 τα τρόπον τὴν ὁμαλὴν καὶ ὀδεύσιμον καὶ ἄπονον καθάπαξ καὶ
 ἀπρόσκοπον τοῖς ὡσὶν εἴλοντο.

Περὶ Συνεσίου: ΙΗ΄

15 1 Συνέσιος δ' ὁ Κυρηναῖός ἐστι μὲν παντὸς ἐραστῆς εἵδους σο-
 φίας, ἔστι δὲ καὶ παντὸς πολὺ μάλιστ' ἐπιτυχῆς τῷ τε πολυαρκεί
 πάντως τῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς πάντ' εὐκινήτῳ τε καὶ οἰκείῳ
 καὶ πεφυκότι καὶ μνήμῃ καὶ τάχει καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἀκαμάτῳ καθ-
 ἀπαξ καὶ ζέοντι δραστικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ μικρολόγως οὐδ' ἀπειρο-
 20 κάλως ἰ μὲν οὖν ἔρωτι· 2 ἂ πάντα καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ ἀνθ' ὁμοῦ 131
 πολὺ κράτος πιστοῦται φύσεως τῷ ἀνδρὶ. Καὶ δηλὸς γε ὡς οὐ
 λίχνος ἐστὶν ἀκαίρως πρὸς ἃ μὴ ἐχρῆν ἀπαντ' ἀναιδῶς πράγ-
 ματα καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶόν τέ ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ. 3 Καὶ τοίνυν ἄκρος μὲν οὐκ
 ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἅπαντα, οὐ πολλῶν γε μὴν αὐτὸς δευτέρα φέ-
 25 ρεται, καὶ κομιδῇ σὺν ὀλίγοις ἐστὶν ἐναριθμῖος· καὶ ὧν ἄρα
 καθ' ὅτιοῦν λείπεται, τῷ περὶ τᾶλλα ἀνθ' ὁμοῦ κάλλιστ' ἔχειν
 καὶ πλεῖν ἢ ὡς ἂν κατὰ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων τε καὶ δοκι-
 μων, πολὺ μάλιστ' ἀνὴρ θαυμάζειν ἐστὶν ἄξιος.

2 Φιλοσοφία μὲν γὰρ πρόθεσις αὐτῷ πάνυ τοι πρὸ τῶν ἄλ-
 30 λων ἀπάντων, μέλει δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῆς γλώττης καὶ τῶν ἐντεῦθεν

schools as well as rhetorical displays—it would take great effort to enumerate them all, and perhaps this is not the right occasion to do so. Indeed, even to mention a few of them might seem to imply disdain of the others. **3** Having made the general statement about all of them that they like to write in this manner, and, if anyone wants to verify this, referring him to their numerous books of every different kind, I only want to add this, **4** that in comparison with the Attic style and grace, the Egyptians wrote in a somewhat harsh and crude style, whereas the Phoenicians and Syrians, and further the Asians and Ionians, wrote more pleasingly and on the whole preferred a style which is even, smooth, easy to get through, totally undemanding and untiring for the ear.

18. On Synesius

1 Synesius of Cyrene is a lover of every branch of wisdom, and highly successful in each one of them through his natural resourcefulness, flexibility, and inborn familiarity¹ with everything, his memory, his [mental] agility, and his absolutely untiring and burning—powerfully, but neither pettily nor without refinement—love of the Beautiful.² **2** All these things, taken separately and together, confirm that the man has a most powerful nature. It is also clear that he is not impertinently and shamelessly curious about everything, [even] things that one should not [be curious about], and which at the same time are impossible [to investigate]. **3** Indeed, although not foremost in everything, he is not surpassed by many, but belongs in a very select group. And even in those cases where he falls short in some respect, the man is worthy of the greatest admiration for being an expert in so many other areas at once, more so than many illustrious philosophers.

2 Philosophy is his aim above all others, but because of his fertile mind he also cares about language and the ornaments deriving from it.

¹ *inborn familiarity*: καὶ οἰκείῳ καὶ πεφυκότι. Perhaps φύσεως ... πεφυκότι is intended as a pun. For other puns, cf. 65 n. 16; 143 n. 13; 151 n. 1; 169 n. 9; 229 n. 22.

² Hardly a normal position of μὲν οὖν.

κόσμων τῷ τῆς διανοίας γονίμῳ. Καὶ νοῦς μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ διὰ 132
 πάντων ὧν λέγει φιλοσοφία προσήκων καὶ γνήσιος καὶ κατ'
 αὐτὴν βέλτιστ' ἐνεργής, 2 ἐπικαλλύνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῇ κατὰ
 τὴν φωνὴν χάριτι, καὶ πρόρρισι ἀμέλει τοῖς ἔξω καὶ διαδεικνυ-
 5 ται περικοσμούμενος εὐαγγέλω τῇ χρήσει· καὶ πολὺ τὸ ἀστεῖον
 καὶ τέρπον ἐντεῦθεν ἔχει εὐκολία κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ ἀνδρός, 3
 πρᾶγμα πάντων ἐργωδέστατον καὶ σπάνιον συντυχεῖν, καὶ οὐ
 μὴ πολλὰ μῆδ' ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἀνθρώ-
 πων ὑποδείγματα, ὥστ' εἰς ἓν ἦκειν δηλαδὴ ταῦτα, νοῦν ἀξίω-
 10 ματικὸν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ ἀπέριττον ὡς τὰ πολλὰ
 κατὰ φύσιν εὐστομία προϊόντα καὶ συνυφαινόμενον. 4 Οὐ γὰρ
 φιλεῖ νοῦς φιλόσοφος ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν ὥρας,
 οὐδὲ πέφυκεν ὡς ἀληθῶς οὕτω, ἀλλ' ἀποποίητός ἐστι πάσης κατὰ
 τὴν γλῶτταν χάριτος, 1 καὶ ἀπλῶς οὕτως ῥεῖ καὶ διατίθεται 133
 15 καθάπαξ ἀκαλλώπιστος ἔξω συντυχεῖν, καὶ οὐ νέμει τι φροντί-
 δος ἐνταῦθα οὐδ' ἴσως ῥᾶστ' ἔχει χρῆσθαι κατὰ φύσεώς τινα
 ιδιότητα καὶ σύμφυτον ἀπλαστίαν κάλλους. 5 Καὶ ὁρῶμέν γε
 πλὴν ὀλίγων τοὺς ἐξαρχῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πάντας πρωτεύσαντας
 οὕτω χρησαμένους τῷ λέγειν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἀνεπιτήδευτ'
 20 αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀνάσκητα, καὶ μὴν ἔτ' αὐθις ἰδίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τὸ λέγειν
 ἐπιμελεῖς, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ δὴ καὶ μόνον ἔξω τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὀρ-
 γίων ἐπειγομένους καὶ τεχνιτεύοντας. 6 Συνεσίφω δὲ κομιδῇ σὺν
 ὀλίγοις, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅσοις ἄρα δὴ τισιν, ἢ τε πρόθεσις ἤπερ εἴ-
 25 ἔχειν τὸν νοῦν ἀξιοῖ καὶ ᾧ μὴ, καὶ ῥαστωνεύεσθαι 1 δόξαι τις 134
 ἂν ἴσως αὐτὸν τῆνικαῦτα καὶ προσπαίξιν, φιλοσόφου σπουδῆς
 ἐστὶν εὖ μάλα, 7 καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἐρμηνεία

6 εὐκολία: εὐκολίαν E τοῦ ἀνδρός: τάνδρος E, non leg. M 13 πάσης +
 τῆς P, non leg. M 19 τῶ: δὲ ut vid. E, non leg. M ἀνεπιτήδευτ': γρ.
 ἀγοήτευτ' in marg. add. P¹E, non leg. M 26 αὐτὸν: αὐτὴν E, non leg. M

³ ὅμως: Metochites often emphasises the contrast between concentrating on
 the form and concentrating on the content; see e.g. *Sem.* 26.

In all his writings the content is worthy of philosophy, noble, and working admirably in accordance with it [i.e., philosophy], 2 but³ it is also adorned with a graceful language; it comes forth with the help of external [means]⁴ and is presented in a polished and accessible style,⁵ and his natural facility derives much elegance and charm from this. 3 This is something that is very difficult indeed [to achieve], and very rarely met with; there are not many examples of it, nor [has it been found] in many people through the whole of history, namely, that these two things are combined: a content that is Dignified on account of philosophy, Solemn, and mostly naturally free from overelaboration, presented and couched in an elegant language. 4 For a philosophical content does not usually care about charm of language, nor indeed is it by nature thus inclined, but unconcerned about every grace of expression,⁶ flowing forth simply, arranged completely without adornments when viewed superficially. It does not spare any thought for such things, and it tends not to be very easy owing to a certain natural idiosyncrasy and inherent disregard for Beauty. 5 We can see that, with a few exceptions, from the beginning all leading philosophers have written in that way—i.e., they have not cared about or taken pains with their language— and, further, in exceptional cases, that those who *have* taken such pains have only endeavoured and contrived to achieve this outside the sacred rites of philosophy. 6 But for Synesius (and very few others, I do not know how many), his subject in every discussion, as I said, both those which he seems to take seriously and thinks it right to apply himself to wholeheartedly, and those where he does not—and in those works he might even seem to be frivolous and joking⁷—is definitely suitable for philosophical study, 7 and his exposition of what he has to say is couched

⁴ τοῖς ἔξω: external to thought, mind, concept etc.; cf. *Sem.* 26.1.1 κόσμοις ἔξω-θεν. Or perhaps τοῖς ἔξω here refers to the people ‘outside’ Synesius, i.e. his listeners/readers.

⁵ εὐάγγελος here must mean something like ‘conveying its message well, efficiently’.

⁶ ἀποίητος (c. gen.) active; less probably passive, ‘unaffected by’; cf. ἀπλαστίαν κάλλους below. The construction of ἀποίητος with the genitive is not found in LSJ; cf. however Smyth § 1428. For the whole of this passage, cf. *Sem.* 26, ‘That philosophy feels comfortable with a simple and unadorned language’.

⁷ *frivolous and joking*: Metochites is probably thinking of Synesius’ oration *On Baldness*.

καλλύνεται πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις ταῖς τοῦ λέγειν χάρισιν, ὥστε καὶ δόξειέ τις ἂν ἴσως μᾶλλον ἐπιπολῆς ὄρων καὶ χρώμενος, ὡς ἄρα τούτου μόνον ἀμέλει τῷ ἀνδρὶ μέλει, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐν-
 ταῦθα περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον. 8 Καὶ τὸ δὴ μάλιστ' ἔτι θαυμάζειν
 5 ἄξιον, ὅτι καὶ οὐ ζὺν πολλῶ τῷ καμάτῳ δῆλός ἐστιν, εἴ τις ἐπ-
 αῖειν οἴος τέ ἐστι, διοικῶν τὴν φωνὴν καὶ πομπευτικῶς τὸν νοῦν
 ἐπιδεικνύμενος καὶ θεατρικῶς, ἀλλ' ὅ γε δῆτ' ἄρα μετὰ ῥαστώ-
 νης εὖ μάλα χωρεῖ, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ὡς εἶπειν ἔχει τὴν ἐμφαινο-
 μένην ὥραν. 9 Καὶ πόνων οὐ δεῖται πολλῶν οὐδ' ἐπιμελείας
 10 οὐδ' ἐπιτηδεύσεως, εὐκολία φύσεως καὶ ἐτοιμότητι πρὸς τὸ πᾶν 135
 ὅτιοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥσπερ αἱ κατὰ γῆς ῥῆστα χωροῦσαι καὶ ἀνα-
 χεόμεναι πηγαὶ κατὰ τὸ παρήκον ἀκάματοι καὶ μάλα ποτίμου
 κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἡδίστου νάουσαι τοῦ ὕδατος.

3 Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως ἔχει. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνεργὸς
 15 τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ τοι κατὰ φιλοσόφους καὶ πόριμος καὶ ταχὺς οἴ-
 κοθὲν τε κάκ πείρας καὶ συνασκήσει τῶν βελτίστων καὶ πρώ-
 των νομίμων καὶ δογμάτων φιλοσοφίας. 2 Ἡ γλῶττα δὲ καὶ αὐ-
 τὴ παραπλησίως ἐνεργὸς καὶ φιλοτίμως ἀνύτει καὶ κατατείνει
 δρόμον ἀπρόσκοπον. Εὖ δὲ πεφυκυῖα καὶ τάχιστα καὶ ἀπόνως
 20 ὡς ἔφην φέρεσθαι καὶ οὐ ζὺν βία καὶ φροντίδι πλειίστη, γαλη-
 νῶς ὅμως μετ' ἀληθείας ἐρεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ λείως εἴτουν πολι-
 τικῶς καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀρχαῖον ἐκείνον τύπον· 3 ἀλλ' ἐπαινετὸν
 μὲν καὶ θαυμάσιον οἶον τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἐρραστωνευμένον τῷ ἀν-
 δρὶ καὶ ἔτοιμον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀήθης ἐστὶ ἰ τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς πά- 136
 25 λαι νομίμοις ἐκείνοις τοῦ λέγειν καὶ νεωτέρας τινὸς ἕξεως, κἂν
 εἰ σὺν ἀστειότητι μάλ' αὐθις, νεωτέρας δ' ὅμως ἐστί· 4 καὶ τῆς
 προτέρας εὐγενείας ἐκείνης ἔκτοπα φέρει καὶ κομψεύεται καινῇ
 διαθέσει, μήτε κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἀπλότητα καὶ πολιτικὴν τέχ-
 νην τοῦ λέγειν, μήτε κατὰ τὴν σπουδαζομένην τηνικαῦτ' ἐκεί-
 30 νην δεινότητα καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ τοὺς ἀκούοντας κλέπτουσαν. 5
 Ἐπαληθεύων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις διὰ τὴν φιλόσοφον πρόθεσιν καὶ
 ἀπλαστία μετ' εὐστομίας χρώμενος, τὴν εὐστομίαν ἕξω ῥητορι-

16 συνασκήσει: σὺν ἀσκήσεως E, non leg. M

in a language so graceful and ornate⁸ that anyone who observes and reads it more superficially might draw the conclusion that this is the only thing the man cares about,⁹ and that he is wholly occupied with appearance. 8 Further, what is most admirable of all is that he clearly (at least to anyone who is capable of understanding) controls his language without any particular effort, conveying his message in a style which is both elevated and dramatic,¹⁰ but proceeds in a relaxed manner and displays so to speak a natural charm. 9 He does not need much exertion or care or endeavour, being possessed of a natural facility and readiness to deal with anything whatsoever, like those subterranean streams that flow for long distances easily and untiring, running with a naturally drinkable and sweet water.¹¹

3 And so much for that. But the man's mind is active exactly in the manner of philosophers, inventive, and quick both in itself and from experience, by studying the finest and foremost laws and doctrines of philosophy. 2 And also his language is active in a similar way, is successful in a way that emulates [the success of his mind], and keeps up an untiring flow. However, although it has, as I said, a natural ability to proceed quickly and effortlessly, without demanding much exertion or care, to speak truthfully, it is not calm, nor is it smooth or ordinary and like the style used in the old days, 3 but although his language is admirable and wonderfully relaxed and versatile, nevertheless it is a stranger to those ancient Hellenic rules of writing and adopts a more modern style (even if it is very elegant, it still *is* modern). 4 He exhibits traits that are alien to the earlier nobility and flaunts a new mode of composition, adhering neither to the ancient simple and everyday way of speaking, nor to the Forceful style that was cultivated in those days, that used every means to beguile the listeners. 5 Because of his philosophical aim he is genuine¹²

⁸ Literally, 'an extremely (πῶς ἄν εἴποι τις) graceful language, so much so that ...'. Here I have tentatively translated πῶς ἄν εἴποι τις in the same way as with χαίρω (cf. the translation and notes to 4.1.3 and 6.1.7), since ταῖς τοῦ λέγειν χάρισιν does not seem strong enough to motivate a deprecatory 'how shall I put it' (unless the reason is that Metochites here uses χάρις in a general sense, not the Hermogenic, technical sense that could be expected in the context).

⁹ Perhaps ἀμέλει ... μέλει is intended as a pun. Cf. above, p. 165 n. 1.

¹⁰ πομπευτικῶς: cf. 20.3.2; θεατρικῶς: cf. 19.5.3 and 20.3.3.

¹¹ The same simile is used of Josephus' style in 15.1.4.

¹² ἐπαληθεύων: cf. 15.4.2.

κῶν παρασκευῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνισμάτων ἔχει, καὶ λογοειδὲς εὖ
 μάλα οἱ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιμελές, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ῥήτορας· 6 πόθεν;
 ὅς γε καὶ ἂ πείθειν ἀξιοῖ καὶ πειρᾶται | οὐ πιθανῶς ἀγωνίζεται, 137
 ἀλλ' ἀποιήτως καὶ μετὰ σεμνότητος καὶ ἀξιώματος καὶ τῶν φι-
 5 λοσοφία δικαίων προφέρει, οὐκουν γέ ἐστιν ἔντεχνον οὐδὲν
 ὀτιοῦν αὐτῷ πιθανὸν οὐδὲ κακούργως ἀρπάζον, οὐδὲ νικᾶν
 πάντα τρόπον σπουδάζει καὶ δριμύς ἐστι κατὰ τῶν ἀκουόντων,
 7 ἀλλ' ἐπανθοῦν ἔχει μετὰ ῥαστώνης τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὸ ἦθος
 ἐπιτρέπον εὖ μάλα, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὡς εἴ τῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ πλεόν, καὶ
 10 τό γε μὴν πάντως μὴ σπανίζον, ἀλλ' ὡς ὀρᾶται κατ' αὐτὸν ἐν
 πολλῇ τῇ χρήσει, εἴ τις ὀρθῶς κρίνει, τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ἀρρητό-
 ρευτόν ἐστι καὶ λογοειδές.

4 Ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀττικῆς δὴ τινος καλλιπεπείας καὶ καινότητος
 βραχὺ τῷ ἀνδρὶ μέλει, καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄρα οἱ κατ' ἐκείνους Ἑλ-
 15 ληνας τῷ λέγειν εὖ πάλαι χρωμένους, ἀλλὰ τῷ κοινῷ χαίρει
 καὶ σφόδρ' ἐθίμῳ καὶ ἀπλῶς οὕτωςι κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀτέχνως ὡς
 εἰπεῖν τὸν λόγον διατίθεται, 2 καίτοι γε μὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώ-
 μενος ὅμως οὕτω, | ἀλλ' ἐξῶν ἐστιν ὅτε, καὶ πλειστάκις ἀμέλει 138
 τοῦτο, τῆς κοινῆς αὐτῆς ἕξεως καὶ γνωρίμου καὶ εἰς ἀνόδευτ'
 20 ἀδεῶς ἄγων καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν λεγόντων εὐλαβῶς ἔχουσιν
 αὐτὸς ἀπτόμενος, καὶ ἴσως μὲν οὐκ ἀκαίρως, ἀφροντιστῶν δ' ὁ-
 μως τῶν ἀκουόντων, καὶ ταῖς λέξεσιν εἰς τοῦμφανὲς τραχυνό-
 μενος. 3 Οὕτω θαρρεῖν ἔοικεν εὖ μάλα ἑαυτῷ, καὶ χαίρει καθ'
 αἴρεσιν ἑαυτῷ χρώμενος ὡς ἄρα τις αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ τῆς ἐρμη-
 25 νείας ἀνεύθυνος καὶ μὴ τῶν νομίμων τε καὶ ἐθίμων τῇ τέχνῃ τοῦ
 λέγειν ἐν λόγῳ πλείστῳ γινόμενος, τῷ τε παντὶ δρόμῳ τοῦ λό-
 γου καὶ τῷ ἦθει καὶ τῇ διαθέσει καὶ πρὸς γ' ἔτι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν
 ὡς ἔφην αὐτοῖς. 4 Καὶ δείκνυσιν ἔτ' αὐθις καὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς
 γραμματικῆς τοῦτ' ἀκρίβειαν καὶ ὅσον ἑαυτῷ θαρρεῖ, καινίζων
 30 τῇ χρήσει κἀναντῦθα πλεῖν ἢ κατ' ἕθος τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ μὴ τῶν

3 ἂ πείθειν ἀξιοῖ: ἀπείθειν ἀξιος E, non leg. M πιθανῶς: γρ. πειστικῶς in
 marg. add. P¹ 5 ἔντεχνον: ἐν τέλει E, non leg. M 10 πάντως: πάντων E,
 non leg. M 22 ταῖς λέξεσιν: τῇ λέξει s. l. P (ut vid. tertia manus) 27 τῷ
 om. E, non leg. M πρὸς γ' ἔτι ex πρὸς γε corr. P

in his orations; his language is unaffected and at the same time eloquent, with an eloquence that has nothing to do with rhetorical exercises and declamations. He takes care to write in prose style, but not like the orators. 6 Indeed, why should he? — a man who does not contend in a specious manner even those things that he wishes and tries to establish, but proposes his thoughts artlessly, with Solemnity and Dignity, and with all the [procedures] due to philosophy. Nor are there any artificial arguments in his writings, nothing that captivates the reader by deceit. He is not trying to win through by every means, using Subtlety towards his listeners, 7 but beside his effortlessness there is on his orations a bloom of a liberal ethos, more so than for anyone else I know. And it does not occur at all rarely, but is often used by him, as anyone who judges soundly can see. In my view it is unrhetoical and belongs to prose style.

4 But he also cares little for Attic beauty and innovation of language; in this respect, too, he differs from those ancient Greeks who practised eloquence. He delights in that which is common and highly familiar, and he arranges his discourse in a naturally simple or, so to speak, non-technical manner. 2 And yet he does not use an everyday vocabulary, but sometimes—in fact, very often—he takes leave of common and well-known usage and plunges fearlessly into unknown territory; he attempts things that most writers fight shy of (perhaps not inappropriately, yet without regard for his readers), and makes his diction openly Harsh.¹³ 3 Thus he appears to have great confidence in himself, and enjoys writing as he pleases, like an autocrat; he is wilful when putting [his message] into words and does not pay much attention to¹⁴ the rules and customs of rhetoric in the general run of his discourse, in its character, arrangement, and, on top of this, as I said, in the very words themselves. 4 He shows this again, and a similar self-confidence, in his attitude towards grammatical accuracy,¹⁵ being more innovative than most people also on this point, even though, because of his consummate skill also in this area, he never

¹³ This aspect of Synesius' language has already been discussed in *Sem.* 17.2.6–8.

¹⁴ The expression ἐν λόγῳ γίνεσθαι τινος is not mentioned in LSJ, but I suppose it belongs under section I.4, s.v. λόγος.

¹⁵ I.e., he is careless regarding grammatical accuracy.

εϊκότων ἐκπίπτων διὰ τὸ καὶ περὶ ταύτην ἄκρον τὴν τέχνην. 5
 Ἐπεὶ ἢ μηδὲ συγγνωστὸν πάντως τὸ ξενίζον ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄηθες, 139
 ἦν μὴ μετ' ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῶν τῆς τέχνης νομίμων ὀρθῶ· ἦν δ'
 ἄρ' οὕτως εὐθαρσῆς τις εἶη καὶ χρώμενος ἔξω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν
 5 ἀγωγῆς ἀκλόνητος, ἴσως καὶ θαυμάζειν μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἄξιος, ὡς
 ἄρα καὶ Συνέσιος ὄντως αὐτός, ἦν τις ἐπαίειν οἴός τ' εἶη.

5 Καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν γλῶτταν οὕτως ἄρ', εἰ καὶ μὴ καθ-
 ἀπαξ ἄκρως, βέλτιστα δ' ὅμως ἔχει τάνδρι. Φιλοσοφίαν δ' ὡς
 εἴρηται προτίθεται τοῦ βίου παντός, καὶ διηρημένης εἰς πλείστα
 10 πάντων εὖ ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τῶν μὲν αὐτῷ μέτεστι, τῶν δ' οὐ καθ-
 ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ ἥττον μέτεστιν ἢ κατὰ τᾶλλα. 2 Οὐδ' ἔχει τις ἐρεῖν
 περὶ αὐτοῦ, πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις ἀπολαβόμενος καὶ ὀρίσας, ὡς ἄρα
 τοῦδέ τινος ὁ ἀνὴρ σπουδαστής ἐστιν ἢ τοῦδέ τινος αἰρεσιώτης
 ἐστὶ τοῦ συντάγματος, εἰς ἃ δὴ πλείστα κατατέμνεται τὰ φιλο-
 15 σόφων πράγματα, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν κοινὸς θιασώ-
 της καὶ συντελής, καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τῶν βελτίστων, ἢ τῶν ἀπ' 140
 Ἄριστοτέλους καὶ Πλάτωνος, 3 καὶ σύνδεσμός τις ἀμφοῖν κοι-
 νωνίας καὶ διαλλακτικῆς εἰς τὰ νομιζόμενα καὶ δοκοῦντα φιλο-
 νείκως ἀντίθετα, καὶ ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων τὰ βελτίω πορίζεται, καὶ
 20 οὐ νέμει πλεῖν ἢ λυσιτελεῖ θατέρῳ τούτων ἑαυτόν· καὶ τοῦτο
 καὶ αὐτός φησι περὶ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οἷς φρονεῖ καὶ οἷς λέγει πισ-
 τοῦται μάλιστα. 4 Καὶ τοίνυν τῆς φυσικῆς τε θεωρίας τὸ μέρος
 τῆ φιλοσοφία κάλλιστ' ἐν μετουσίᾳ δείκνυται, καὶ οἷός τέ ἐσ-
 τιν ἐνταῦθα τρίβειν οὐκ ἔξω καιροῦ, τῆς τε τῶν προτέρων μᾶ-
 25 λιστ' ἀπολαύσας παρασκευῆς καὶ γόνιμος περὶ ταῦτ' οἴκοθεν
 οὐ πολλῶν δεύτερος. 5 Καὶ ἠθικός ἐστὶ καὶ δογματικός εἰ δὴ τις
 καὶ ἄλλος τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος, καὶ νομίζει μὲν ἐνταῦθ' ὡς ἄ-

3 μετ': κατ' E, non leg. M 6 αὐτός: αὐτὰς E, non leg. M 11 τᾶλλα
 scripsi, τ' ἄλλα PE, non leg. M 15 ἀλλὰ πάντων: ἄλλ' ἀπάντων E, non
 leg. M 25 γόνιμος: φρόνιμος E, non leg. M 27 ἀπὸ om. E, non leg. M

¹⁶ *the art*, sc. of grammar.

¹⁷ Photius gives a short characterisation of Synesius' style in *Bibl.*, cod. 26, 5b28–34: Ἀνεγνώσθη ἐπισκόπου Κυρήνης, Συνέσιος αὐτῷ ὄνομα, περὶ προ-

goes beyond what is reasonable. 5 For one cannot unreservedly condone innovation and unusual features in this respect unless it can be seen to be done correctly and according to the rules of the art.¹⁶ But if someone is so bold as to write without hesitation in a way that is outside what most people have been taught, perhaps he is the more worthy of admiration. Which is certainly true of Synesius, if one is capable of understanding.¹⁷

5 Thus his language, even if it is not absolutely perfect, is on a very high level. But as I said, philosophy is the aim of his whole life, and although it is divided into very many branches, he masters them all: he is not familiar with some while being completely ignorant of others, nor is he less knowledgeable in some than in others. 2 No one can say of him—how shall I put it:¹⁸ categorising and defining—that the man is an adherent of this or that, or a disciple of such and such a body of doctrine, of all the many into which the ‘business’ of philosophers is divided; he is, so to speak, a common worshipper and adherent of them all, particularly the highest, those stemming from Aristotle and Plato. 3 He is a link joining the two philosophers together, a mediator in regard to those doctrines that are usually considered and seem to be opposed to each other in rivalry; he selects the best from both, and does not dedicate himself to either one of them more than is advantageous. This he himself says about himself,¹⁹ and confirms it with his thoughts and writings. 4 He shows that the discipline of natural science is an integral part of philosophy, and he is able to practise it not without success; he takes the greatest advantage of the results produced by his predecessors, being at the same time himself a contributor second to only a few. 5 He is as devoted to ethics and metaphysics as any other Platonist.²⁰ His prac-

νοίας, περὶ βασιλείας καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν· τὴν δὲ φράσιν ὑψηλὸς καὶ ὄγκον ἔχων, ἀποκλίνων δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιητικώτερον. Ἀνεγνώσθη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιστολαὶ διάφοροι, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀποστάζουσαι μετὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν ἰσχύος καὶ πυκνότητος. It seems that Metochites is not directly inspired by Photius.

¹⁶ πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις: cf. the discussion on this expression above, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

¹⁹ Cf. Synesius, *On Kingship* 8 (2:17.8–9) Πλάτωνι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει, τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἡγεμόσι.

²⁰ In 16.1.3 the same characterisation is made of Philo. For δογματικός see the note ad loc.

ριστά τε καὶ κριτικώτατα, βακχεύει δ' ἐν τούτοις ταῖς τῶν κρειττόνων καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν ἐποπτεῖαις καὶ τελεταῖς, καὶ συνοργιάζει τῇ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀπλότητι καὶ τῇ δεσποτείᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἡγεμονικοῖς τοῦ νοῦ μυστηρίοις. 6 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔτι καὶ μαθηματικῶν εὐρέσεων ἐπιστημονικῶς εὖ μάλ' ἔχει· καὶ πάντ' ἔστι |
 5 ταῦτα ἐξ ὧν καταλέλοιπε βιβλίων ἀσφαλῶς συλλογίζεσθαι. 141
 Καὶ πολυειδῆς ὧν οὕτω τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσιν ἀρκεῖ τῇ τῆς φύσεως εὐγενείᾳ μάλιστα καὶ τῷ κράτει ἢ τῷ συνεχεῖ τῆς μελέτης καὶ μονίμῳ τε καὶ φιλοπόνῳ τῆς ἀσκήσεως. 7 Καὶ γάρ μοι καὶ συλλογιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ σφόδρ' ἐπισκοπουμένῳ τὰ κατ' αὐτὸν πράγματα δοκεῖ, καὶ ἴσως μὲν ζῆν λόγῳ, ἴσως δὲ μή, δοκεῖ δ' ὅμως ἀνὴρ μὴ πολυμαθῆς εἶναί τις τὰ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ, μηδ' ἐνσχολάσαι πάνυ τοι τοῖς ἐκείνων, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς οἶμαι τῶν εὐδοκιοῦντων τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν, 8
 15 καίτοι γε σχολῆς ἀπολαύσας ἐν βίῳ μάλιστ' εἰ δὴ τις καὶ ἄλλος καὶ πραγμάτων ἔξω ζωὴν ἀνύσας φιλοσόφῳ πρέπουσαν. Ἀλλὰ ταχύς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀγχίνους, ἀλλ' εὐφυῆς ἅπαντα τῆς σοφίας κάλλιστα καὶ παντοῖ' εἶδη, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ὀλίγης κτήσεως καὶ πόνων καὶ ἀσκήσεως, κατὰ φύσιν ἀνυσιμώτατος.

20

Περὶ Δίωνος: ΙΘ'

1 Περὶ Δίωνος, ᾧ Προῦσα πατρὶς, πλείστ' εἴρηται Συνεσίῳ, καὶ ἴσασιν ὅσοις τὰ ἐκείνου πάντως σπουδάζεται τῆς τε σοφίας αὐτοῦ πέρι | καὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου αἰρέσεως πρώτης τε καὶ δευτέρας, 142
 καὶ ὅ τι δῆποτε τῆς τοῦ βίου μεταθέσεως αἴτιον τῷ ἀνδρὶ. 2
 25 Μᾶλλον δὲ μετ' ἀληθείας ἐρεῖν ἴσασι περὶ τούτων ὅσοις τὰ Δίωνος ἐπιμελὲς ἐστίν εἰδέναι βιβλία, πλείστα τε καὶ διαφόρου κατὰ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν ἔξεως, ἐξ ὧν τὴν τε κατὰ τὸν βίον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἱστορίαν ἔχομεν συλλογίζεσθαι, 3 καὶ ἅμα τε τὴν διάθεσιν τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ, νῦν μὲν ῥητορικῶς ἐπιχειροῦσαν, νῦν

9-10 συλλογιζομένῳ: ξυλλογιζομένῳ ME 15 ἐν om. E, non leg. M 28 τε om. P, non leg. M

tice in this field²¹ is excellent and highly discerning; here he celebrates the mysteries of the highest things, raised above nature. And he celebrates together with the mind's simplicity and mastery concerning Reality, and its mysteries of leadership. 6 But he is also a great expert in mathematical discoveries; all this can be safely inferred from the books he left behind. And having so many talents regarding wisdom, he is competent in all branches more by reason of his noble and forceful nature than by continuous practice and persevering and industrious work. 7 When I try to form an opinion about Synesius, taking the facts concerning him into consideration, it seems to me—perhaps justly, perhaps not—that the man is not as well-versed in the works of his predecessors, or that he studied them so much, as some other men who are famous for their learning, 8 and this despite the fact that he certainly enjoyed as much leisure as anyone and lived a life of detachment from worldly affairs, fitting for a philosopher. But he is quick-witted, sharp-witted, talented in all the noble and diverse branches of wisdom, and since he is naturally prolific, he needs [but] little acquisition, toil and practice.

19. On Dio

1 Concerning Dio of Prusa much information is given by Synesius, and those who have studied his writings at all know about Dio's wisdom, and his first and second careers, and the reason for the change in his life.¹ 2 Or rather, to speak the truth, those people know about it who make it their business to read *Dio's* books, which are of great number and in different styles. From these we are able to infer the man's personal history, 3 and both his intellectual disposition—at one time it argued in a rhetorical fashion, at another it was befitting

²¹ *in this field*: i.e., metaphysics.

¹ According to Synesius Dio converted from rhetoric to philosophy (*On Dio*, *passim*).

δὲ φιλοσόφῳ πρέπουσαν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐργασίαν τῆς γλώττης, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα προσήκουσαν καὶ μηδὲν ἦττον ἐπαινείσθαι κατ' ἀμφοτέρα δικαίαν ὡς κατ' ἄμφω καιροῦ τυγχάνουσιν, 4 καὶ μὴν ἔτι, κἂν εἰ μετ' ἐνστάσεων καὶ σκοπῶν οὐχ ὁμοίων, ἀλλ' 5 ἀκολούθῳ πρὸς τοῦ βίου τὴν ἐφ' ἐκάτερα πρόθεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅμως αὐθις ἐμφορὲς ἔχουσιν τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιφαινομένους τοῦ λέγειν τύπους καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ διοίκησιν.

2 Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε τοῦτο νῦν ἔπεισι σημειοῦσθαι, καὶ πολλάκις γὰρ ἐπεσκεψάμην καὶ τὸν βουλόμενον προσέχειν ἀξιώ τὸν νοῦν 10 καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, ὅτι δὴ τῷ ἄνδρῳ τῷδε, Δίῳ τε καὶ Συνέσιος, περὶ τὴν φωνὴν κατ' οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν εὐοικότε πλεῖσθ' ὅμως ἔχεται κοινά. 2 Καὶ χαίρει μᾶλλον Συνέσιος Δίῳ διευτεροῦ ἐπιὼν αὐτὸς καὶ οἷς Δίῳ | λέγει, καὶ δηλὸς ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς 143 περὶ αὐτοῦ Δίῳνος μέμνηται, καὶ μέμνηταί γε οὐχάπαξ, οὐδ' ἐν 15 παρόδῳ λόγων οὐδ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἐπελθόν, ἀλλ' ὅ γε δὴ μάλιστα τέρεται μεμνημένος. 3 Καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς γλώττης δηλὸς ἐστὶν εἰ μάλ' ἀλώσιμος ὢν, καίτοι γε χρώμενος αὐτὸς ἄλλως ἢ κατ' ἐκείνον, καὶ μήθ' ὄλως ῥητορικῶς σπουδάζων καὶ τεχνιτεύων ὅτι ποτ' οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ὡς ἄρα Δίῳ αὐτὸς μάλιστα τῇ 20 τέχνῃ σπουδάζει (καὶ σφόδρ' ἐστὶ τὸ δραστήριον αὐτῷ κατὰ ῥήτορας ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν αὐτοῦ συνταγμάτων, μήπω δὲ τότε τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσενέσαντι καὶ προσθεμένῳ), 4 μήτε μὴν ὄλως, κατὰ τὸ λογοειδὲς ᾧ καθάπαξ χρῆται καὶ καταγγέλλει τὰ βέλτιστα τοῦ νοῦ καὶ ὅσα κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐστὶ γόνιμος, ὑποχαλῶν ὄλως εἰς τὸ ὑπτίον καὶ λιτότητι ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ἀκοαῖς 25 οἰκειούμενον, 5 ὡσπερ ἄρα καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως Δίῳ καὶ φεύγει τὸ διηρμένον καὶ μεστὸν ἐπίτηδές τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν οἷς κατ' αὐτὸν ἀμέλει Συνέσιον μετὰ φιλοσόφου προθέσεως φθέγγεται, ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις δηλονότι τοῦ βίου. 6 Συνεσίῳ γὰρ 30 τοῦναντίον ἢ φωνῇ καθάπαξ τετόνωται, καὶ φεύγει μᾶλλον ἀπάσῃ σπουδῇ καὶ πᾶσι τρόποις τὸ ἔθιμον, κἂν ταῖς εὐτελεστάταις ἔστιν ὅτε συμβαῖνον ἐννοίαις ὀγκοῦσθαι χαίρει, | καὶ δι- 144

9 ἀξιώ τὸν νοῦν: τὸν νοῦν ἀξιώ E, non leg. M 10-11 συνέσιος ex -σίως corr. P² 12 ὄμως: ὅσα E, non leg. M 25 ὄλως om E, non leg. M

of a philosopher—and the working of his language, which was equally suitable in either field and no less praiseworthy in one than the other, achieving appropriate results in both, 4 and further, indeed, even if the lifestyles and ambitions [which it accompanied] were not identical but adapted to his two aims in life, still having [in both cases] a similar colour, as regards both the outer form and the organisation of his language.

2 But now it occurs to me to note down² the following (for I have often observed it, and I ask whoever so wishes to pay attention to this and draw the [same] conclusion), that these two men, Dio and Synesius, although they are, so to speak, utterly dissimilar with regard to their language, still have very much in common. 2 Synesius rather takes pleasure in himself coming second after Dio and his writings, as appears from those passages where he mentions Dio, and he mentions him more than once, and not only in passing or by chance, but he loves to mention him. 3 It is obvious that he is captivated by Dio's language, even if he himself writes in a different manner from him, neither trying to write in a style altogether rhetorical and adapted to his listeners, in the way that Dio pays very much attention to rhetoric (in his early works, before he had decided to devote himself mainly to philosophy, he wrote in a highly rhetorical style), 4 nor on the other hand, because of the prose style which he employs to disclose the fruits of his thoughts and his results in philosophy,³ altogether relaxing into a style which is ordinary and accommodated by plainness to the ears of common people, 5 in the way that Dio both deliberately and by natural inclination avoids an exalted style and Fullness of expression, particularly in those writings that according to Synesius have a philosophical aim, i.e., those from the second period of his life. 6 Synesius, by contrast, writes in an altogether intense style and on purpose and with every means rather avoids the customary; he likes to 'swell out' in his ideas even if it sometimes happens that they are extremely trivial; he tries

² σημειῶσθαι: cf. the (probable) title of the work, σημειώσεις γνωμικαί. This is the only occurrence of the verb in the whole collection, as σημειώσεις in 1.3.5 is the only occurrence of the noun.

³ Λογοειδές appears to be a kind of 'middle' style used by Synesius (cf. 18.3.5–7: dignified in content, outwardly simple and unadorned). Synesius writes like neither Dio the Orator nor Dio the Philosopher. Cf. Bydén (below, pp. 279–80 n. 121).

αίρειν ἑαυτὸν ἀμηγέπη πειράται μὴ πράττειν ταπεινὰ παντά-
 πασι, μήδ' εὐπεριφρόνητα τῇ διαθέσει τῆς ἐρμηνείας σπουδά-
 ζων. 7 Καὶ τοίνυν οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν ἀφελείας αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, ὅ τι
 μὴ ταῖς ὑποθέσεσι μόνον ἔστιν οὐ διατίθησιν ἡδέως, καὶ διὰ
 5 γλυκύτητος εἰς τὴν ἀφελείαν γενικῶς ἂν φέρειν ὀρητοῦν δόξαι,
 καὶ τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἴσως ἄρα βραχὺ καὶ σπανίως, συνθήκη δὲ
 καθ' ὅτι οὖν οὐ. 8 Καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις ἂν καὶ ἄλλος κατὰ Συνέ-
 σιον καὶ τὰ χαμερπῆ καὶ γλυκάζοντα συνέχειν τε καὶ σεμνύ-
 νειν, ἀναφέρων τῷ δρόμῳ τε καὶ τῇ συνθήκῃ, αἰροῖτό τε καὶ
 10 δύναιτο. Δίων δὲ πᾶν τὸναντίον ὁρᾶται, ὅς γε καὶ τὰς ἀξιωμα-
 τικὰς αὐτὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀκόμψως καὶ ἀφελῶς προφέρειν εἴωθεν.

3 Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμως, ὑπεναντίως οὕτως ὅσον γ' εἰς τὸ φαινό-
 μενον τῆς ἀγγελίας τῷ λέγειν χρώμενοι, οὐκ ὀλίγα τοῖς καλῶς
 ξυνορῶσιν ἔχουσι κοινά, καὶ καθὼς ἔφην ὁ δεῦτερος ἦκων Συν-
 15 ἔσιος αὐτὸς ἐπικεικῶς χαίρει τῷ Δίῳ. 2 Καὶ οὐ λέγω νῦν κατὰ
 τὴν φιλόσοφον ἀμέλει πρόθεσιν, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν γάρ, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 καὶ τὸ γόνιμον ἄρ' ἐκάτερος ταῖς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέσεσιν ἐμπε-
 ρὲς ἔχουσι, καὶ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῆς γνώμης εἰς τὰ ἰ παραπλήσια 145
 φέρονται· καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν ἦθει κομιδῇ
 20 ξυγγενεῖ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν παθητικούς ποιοῦσι καὶ γοητεύειν
 εὖ μάλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀκροώμενον οἶω τ' ἔστιν ἄμφω. 3 Τό γε
 δὴ καὶ ἴσμεν ἅπαντες ὅσοι τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν πεπειράμεθα, καὶ
 εἰ μὴ νεμεσήσαι τις ἴσως ὡς ἐρῶ, πολλάκις δὴ καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὁ
 δεῦτερος οἷς φθάσας ὁ Δίων ὁρᾶται χρώμενος, καὶ οὐ φεῖδεται
 25 οὐδ' αἰδεῖται τοὺς ἐποπεύοντας. 4 Καὶ μὴν οὐ κατ' ἦθος ἄρα
 μόνον οὕτως ὁρᾶται χρώμενος, ὃ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἠβούλετο, ἀλλ'
 ἔτι πῶ καὶ θαυμάζω μάλιστ' ἔγωγε ξυνορῶν, ὅτι καὶ νοήμαθ'
 ὅλα τῶν Δίωνος ἀφαιρεῖται Συνέσιος εἰς κατασκευὴν ὧν ἐκάσ-
 τοθ' αἰρεῖται καὶ σπουδάζει, 5 μάλιστα δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 30 σπουδάζων καὶ τὴν ἔνστασιν ἔχων ὧν καὶ Δίων αὐτός, καὶ κρα-

1 ταπεινὰ: τὰ δεινὰ E, non leg. M 4 ὑποθέσεσι: ὑπόθεσι P, non leg. M
 5 γενικῶς in γεννικῶς corr. P² 14 ξυνορῶσιν ἔχουσι κοινά ex ξυνορῶσιν κοι-
 νά corr. P¹ 18 ἐπιβολαῖς: ἐπιβουλαῖς E, non leg. M 22 ἅπαντες: πάντες
 E, non leg. M

somehow to exalt himself and strives not to appear the least humble or insignificant in the arrangement of his discourse. 7 He certainly does not partake of Simplicity, except only in his subject-matter, which he sometimes arranges in a pleasing manner and may seem, through Sweetness, to be generally⁴ inclining towards Simplicity, and also perhaps, briefly and rarely, in his vocabulary, but never in his composition. 8 And I do not know if there is anybody else who, like Synesius, would choose and be able to hold together and exalt [even] that which is humble⁵ and sweet by raising it with his language and composition. But Dio appears to be the total opposite: he usually presents also dignified subjects in an unadorned and Simple style.

3 And yet, although there are superficial contrasts in the language they use in their writings, to a discerning judge they nevertheless have not a few things in common, and as I said above, Synesius, the successor, is duly appreciative of Dio. 2 And I certainly do not mean [only] in their philosophical aims—for in this respect they are alike—but also that both of them are equally prolific, each in his subject, and that they are brought to similar results by their intellectual approach. And especially with the Character of their language, in which they are very similar, they make their orations emotional, and both of them are truly capable of enchanting the audience. 3 This is well known to us who are familiar with their writings, and I hope that I do not give offence when I say that he who comes second often uses what Dio has already used before him, without inhibitions and without being ashamed to be seen to do so. 4 Indeed, it is not only in the Character [of his language] that he is seen to do this, as I just said, but I am also amazed to find that Synesius takes over whole arguments from Dio in order to establish whatever thesis he is arguing at the time;⁶ 5 and he studies and takes as his starting-point the same

⁴ 'In general' (γενικῶς) is more appropriate here than 'nobly' (γεννικῶς); in most other cases the latter meaning is more suitable. The spelling of the MSS is no guide when deciding which of the two is meant.

⁵ χαμερπή, literally, 'crawling on the ground'.

⁶ Metochites' observations on Synesius' dependence on Dio are examined and corroborated by Asmus (1900), who also, unlike Metochites, gives numerous examples.

τύνει τὸ προκειμένον, ταυτό γε ὄν ὃ καὶ Δίῳ, διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
 ἐννοημάτων καὶ ἐπιχειρήσεων ὧν φθάσας ἐκείνος ἀνύτει προ-
 ενεγκῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς βέλτιστα πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν. 6 Καὶ οὐ ποιεῖ-
 ται μόνον τὸν νοῦν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κοινόν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ τὰ ρή-
 5 ματ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἔπειτ' ἰαὐτὴν τοῦ λόγου, μὴ συγκα- 146
 λύπτων ὀπηοῦν ὡς ἄρα ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμενος· καὶ ὄραν ἔστιν
 οὐτωσὶ πλείστα μάλιστα καὶ κατ' ἄλλα τῶν βιβλίων ἀμφοῖν, 7
 ὃ δ' οὖν βασιλικὸς Συνεσίῳ οἶμαι, καὶ ῥᾶστ' ἔξεστιν ὄραν,
 οὐκ ὀλίγα τῶν Δίῳ βασιλικῶν ἀποφέρεται, κατασκευάζων
 10 τὴν πρόθεσιν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ῥήμασι, καὶ τίθησιν ὡς οἰκεῖ' αὐτοῦ
 Συνεσίῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν ὡς ἄλλου κατὰ χρεῖαν δὴ τινα πρὸς πίσ-
 τωσιν τῶν σπουδαζομένων, ὡς καὶ τοῦτ' εἰώθασιν ἐνίοθ' οἱ λέ-
 γοντες. 8 Ἄλλ' ὅ γε δὴ Συνέσιος ἦπερ εἴρηται μηδὲν εὐλαβού-
 μενος εἴ τις ἂν ξυνορήῃ, συνυφαίνων τὸν λόγον ὡς οἴκοθεν,
 15 τρέχων ἅμα πρόσω φασὶ καὶ ὀπίσω, καὶ συνεχῆ μετὰ τῶν αὐτὸς
 αὐτοῦ καὶ γνησίῳ τῆς φορᾶς ποιούμενος.

4 Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὕτω, καὶ κοινὰ γε ἀμφοῖν τῆς φωνῆς οὐκ
 ὀλίγα. Τὸ δέ γε πλείστον μάλιστα καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις δῆλον ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἐναντίων ἰδεῶν καὶ διαθέσεων τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν χρωμα-
 20 τίζουσι. 2 Καὶ Συνεσίῳ μὲν εἴρηται περὶ, μέτρια μὲν, ἀλλ'
 ἴσως γε τὴν εὐτονίαν ἀποχρώντως παριστῶντα τῆς ἐρμηνείας
 τῶν λόγων, καὶ ὅτι εἰ δὴ τις καὶ ἄλλος φεύγει τὸ ἀφελές, εἰ καὶ
 μὴ δεινός ἐστι μήτε κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε κατ' ἐπιτήδευσιν, 3 φεύγει
 δ' οὖν ὡς ἔφην παντὶ τρόπῳ τὸ ἀφελές, καὶ ἰ δύναται καὶ αἰρεῖ- 147
 25 ται κατ' ἔθος ἐπιτήδες καὶ τὰ καθάπαξ εὐτελέστερα τῶν πραγ-
 μάτων τε καὶ ἐννοημάτων ἐπιμελεῖα τινὶ τῆς γλώττης ἐξαιρεῖν
 ὀπηοῦν καὶ λογοειδῶς ἀπαγγέλλειν. 4 Δίῳ δὲ πλείστη πάνυ
 τοι τῆς ἀφελείας ἐπιμέλεια τῷ λέγειν· καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν οὕτω

15 τρέχων ἅμα πρόσω — καὶ ὀπίσω: *Il.* 1.343; *Od.* 24.452

8 συνεσίῳ οἶμαι: οἶμαι συνεσίῳ E, non leg. M 10 τοῖς scripsi: om. PE, non leg. M 13 μηδὲν: οὐδὲν E, non leg. M 14 τὸν: καὶ E, non leg. M 17 γε non leg. EM 19 ἰδεῶν: αὐτῶν E, non leg. M

things as Dio; he argues for the proposed theme, which is the same as Dio's, by means of the same concepts and arguments that *he* used before him, producing truly useful results. 6 And it is not only Dio's subject-matter that he makes his own, but sometimes he uses the very same words and the same composition of his discourse, in no way trying to conceal the fact that he is using another man's words. This can be seen in very many cases also in other books of the two men, 7 but [particularly] in the case of Synesius' *On Kingship* I think it is very easy to see that it has borrowed a great deal from the imperial orations of Dio. It establishes the thesis with the same words, presenting it as Synesius' own and not as an example taken from somebody else in order to strengthen the author's case, as orators are sometimes wont to do.⁷ 8 But Synesius, as I said, is not the least afraid that someone will realise [his borrowing], but composes the oration as if on his own, running *back and forth*, as they say,⁸ making it [sc. his *logos*] continuous with his own genuine contributions.⁹

4 Thus it is the case that the two have not a few things in common in their language. But for the most part, as is clear to most people, they colour their orations with opposing types [of style] and arrangement. 2 And we have already discussed Synesius; perhaps, although we have not said very much, we have sufficiently indicated the vigour of the language of his speeches, and that he, if anyone, avoids Simplicity, even though he is not Forceful, either naturally or by design; 3 but, as I said, he avoids Simplicity with every means at his disposal. He is able, and usually deliberately chooses, by taking pains with his language, somehow to exalt and present even completely trivial things and ideas in a style suitable for speeches.¹⁰ 4

⁷ Metochites means that orators sometimes quote other writers by name in order to strengthen their own arguments, but Synesius instead uses material from Dio without acknowledging his debt.

⁸ ἄμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω: a Homeric phrase (*Il.* 1.343, *Od.* 24.452), perhaps taken from Plutarch (*Aetia Rom. et Gr.* 279c "ἄμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω" καθ' Ὀμηρον; also *An seni resp. ger. sit* 788e; *De Stoic. repugn.* 1035d; *Sulla* 29.2). I suppose that the expression here is meant to convey that Synesius is running back and forth between Dio and himself (so to speak) when collecting his arguments.

⁹ συνυφαίνων τὸν λόγον κτλ.: translation uncertain. Συνεχῆ probably implies that there are no visible boundaries between Synesius' borrowings from Dio and his own contributions. This sentence is incomplete, lacking a finite verb.

¹⁰ λογοειδῶς must refer to something more exalted than 'prose style' here; cf. above, p. 177 n. 3.

ταῖς ἀληθείαις χαίρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τοῦτ' ἔργον αὐτῷ καὶ σπουδῆς πάσης ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀξιούμενον ἐπίτηδες πλάττεσθαι τὸ ἀφελές τε καὶ ὑπτιον καὶ ἀποίητον. 5 Καὶ ὡσπερ δέ τι ἄλλο ἄλλω τῷ, καὶ αὐτῷ πρόθεσίς ἐστι τὸ ἄκομψον, καὶ τὸ θαυμάσιον 5 δεινότης ἐστὶν αὐτῷ κατὰ μέθοδον ἢ ἀφέλεια, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ὑποκρίσεως ἔργον, καὶ τὸ πειστικὸν αὐτὸ μᾶλλον πράττει τῇ δοκούσῃ γε ἀπλαστίᾳ καὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ῥαδίῳ τε καὶ ἀτημελήτῳ. 6 Καὶ τὰς ἐννοήσεις ἀπλᾶς ὡς εἰπεῖν προφέρων καὶ ἀκόμψως χρώμενος, ὡς ἄρα μηδὲν ἐν 10 φροντίδι τινὶ μεθόδου τινὸς καὶ διοικήσεως, εὐ μάλ' ἐπηλυγάζεται καὶ λανθάνειν πειρᾶται συνέλκων ἀσειστος τε καὶ ἀνυπόπτως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς ἃ βούλεται, μὴ προσποιούμενος ἀγωνίζεσθαι.

5 Καὶ ἰ δῆλός ἐστι μὲν οὕτως ἄρ' ἔχων, εἴ τις οὐχ ἀπλοϊκῶς 148
 15 ἐμπίπτων εὐ μάλ' ἀξιοῖ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν οἷς λέγει, δῆλος δὲ καὶ ὅτι, δεῆσαν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄσκησιν τοῦ λέγειν ἐκκαλέσασθαι τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ παραδοῦναι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πάλαι πρότερον δοκίμων, καὶ τῶν ἔγγιστ' αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ πόρρω τῶν χρόνων, λυσιτελήσοντας εἰς ὃ προτρέπεται τὴν εὐφώνιαν αὐτὴν δηλαδὴ 20 καὶ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ὡς βέλτιστα μελέτην, 2 παρατίθεται μὲν αὐτῷ φίλους ἄνδρας οἷς δέοι ἂν ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις συγγίνεσθαι καὶ γυμνάζειν τὴν φωνὴν κατ' ἐκείνους τυπούμενον, μάλιστα δ' ἐπαινεῖ καὶ συνίστησιν εἰς τοῦργον καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην Ξενοφῶντα τὸν Γρύλλου, 3 τὸν Ἀττικὸν μὲν εἰ δὴ τις καὶ ἄλλος 25 καὶ γένος καὶ γλώτταν, τῇ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς ιδέα χρησάμενον μετὰ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν σκηνῇ καὶ δράματι ταύτης ἀφελείας πάντων μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων παλαιῶν τε καὶ νέων, καὶ ὅσοι κατ' αὐτὸν Σωκρατικοὶ καὶ μετὰ φιλοσόφου προθέσεως ἐβίωσαν, καὶ ὅσοι κατ' αὐτὸν πάλιν ῥητορικῶς. 4 Οὕτω δὴ 30 κἀντεῦθεν προδείκνυσι καὶ ἰ πιστοῦνται τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ νῦν ἡμῖν 149 λεγόμενα· οἷς γὰρ χαίρει καὶ οἷς ἤδεται ξυνών, καὶ φίλους ἄνδρας καὶ οἷς τὰ βέλτιστα βούλεται προτρέπεται γὰρ τοῖς αὐτοῖς

3 τι s. l. add. P², om. E, non leg. M
 32 αὐτοῖς: αὐτῶν P, non leg. M

14 ἄρ' ἔχων: δ' οὖν E, non leg. M

Dio, on the other hand, is very careful to achieve Simplicity in his writing (in truth it is his nature to enjoy doing this), but he also takes great pains with it and considers it worth much exertion to form his style deliberately to be Simple, unadorned and artless. 5 And as other people have other aims, his is lack of adornment, and—an admirable thing—his Force lies in his studied Simplicity; although this simplicity seems to be natural, it is much more a result of dissimulation, and its persuasiveness is rather effected by its apparent artlessness and its seeming ease and spontaneity. 6 Setting forth his thoughts pure and simple, so to speak, and writing in an unadorned style, as if caring nothing about method and arrangement, he conceals himself well and strives to hide the fact that without upsetting his readers or arousing their suspicions, he entices them to follow him where he pleases, while pretending to have no such aim.

5 That he has this strategy is clear to anyone who does not study his works superficially but decides to observe them carefully. It is also obvious¹¹ that when need arises, for the purposes of his writing, for him to call forth some useful person and quote some people, both among those who were famous in antiquity and those closer to himself in time, who are likely to be useful [to him] for the aim towards which he turns his eloquence and his care to write as well as possible 2 —although he also mentions other writers he likes, whose works should be studied and on whose language one may model one's own, he particularly praises and recommends for this kind of work and practice Xenophon the son of Gryllus,¹² 3 who was, if anyone, Attic in both descent and language, but who also wrote the kind of language characterised by this natural, but also theatrical and dramatic,¹³ Simplicity—more so than all other Hellenes, both ancient and modern, both those who, like Dio, were Socratics and lived their lives with a philosophical aim, and those who, [again] like Dio, devoted themselves to rhetoric. 4 In this way Dio shows and confirms what we now say about him also by this,¹⁴ for he urges his friends and those he wishes well to use those writers he himself likes and enjoys

¹¹ δῆλος δὲ καὶ ὅτι ... παρατίθεται αὐτῷ: a slight anacoluthon.

¹² Dio 18.14–19 (2:254–56).

¹³ ἐν σκηνῇ καὶ δράματι: cf. *Sem.* 20.3.3.

¹⁴ *by this*: viz., his practice of quoting useful examples, particularly from Xenophon.

χρησθαι. 5 Τοιοῦτος αὐτός ἐστι πάντως, ταῦτ' ἐπαινῶν οἷς χρη-
 ται, καὶ χρώμενος αὐτὸς τέως οἷς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδεῖους προσ-
 ἔχειν βούλεται. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις βελτίοσιν ἢ αὐτὸς ἐχρήσατο
 προσέχειν ἠξίωσεν ἄν, οὐδὲ φίλους ἔκρινεν ἄν ὥστε καὶ τῶν
 5 καλλίστων δι' ἑαυτοῦ τυχεῖν πλεῖν ἢ ἑαυτόν, 6 οὐδὲ μὴν αὐθις
 ὦν ἑαυτῷ βελτίστων φήθη τάναντία παρετίθετο φίλοις καὶ μά-
 λιστ' ἀδικεῖν ἄνδρας ἐπιτηδεῖους ἐπειράτο σφόδρα τιμῶντας
 αὐτόν καὶ πειθομένους ἀνυπόπτως, ὁ μὴδ' ἐχθροὺς ἀδικεῖν τῷ
 βίῳ προθέμενος καὶ πάντας εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν αἴρεσιν, φίλους τε
 10 καὶ μὴ, συμπεῖθων.

Περὶ Ξενοφῶντος: Κ'

1 Ξενοφῶντα δ' ἐκείνον ἐκάλουν μὲν Ἀττικὴν μέλιτταν, οὕτω
 δὴ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἐκείνου γλῶτταν καὶ τὴν κατ'
 αὐτὴν ἀνθηφορίαν ἐπόθησαν. Ἐπισημειοῦνται δέ τινες τῶν 150
 15 παλαιῶν ὡς ἄρα τοσοῦτο περὶ ἑαυτοῦ φρονεῖν ἐπὶ αὐτῷ, ὥστε
 καὶ παραβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὸν θαυμαστόν οὐκ ἀπάκνει Πλάτω-
 να· 2 καὶ δεῖγμα ποιοῦνται ὅτι δὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπίτηδες ἐνε-
 χεῖρησε τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσασθαι προθέσεων ἐπὶ τῷ Σωκράτει, καὶ
 πολλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου καὶ δι' ἐκείνου φθέγγεται τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ
 20 ἀντισυμποσιάζει Πλάτωνι, τὸν Σωκράτην σκοπὸν ἔχων. 3 Καὶ
 πολὺς ἐστὶν ὁ Σωκράτης διὰ πάντων αὐτῷ τῶν λόγων καὶ μὴν
 ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων βιβλίοις, ἃ δὴ πάντων τῶν Ξε-
 νοφωντείων ἔγωγε συνταγμάτων βελτίω καὶ πολὺ τῶν κατ' αὐ-
 τὸν ἄλλων προέχειν τίθεμαι. 4 Ἐν τούτοις δ' οὖν τοῖς ἀπομνη-
 25 μονεύμασιν ὡς ἀπὸ Σωκράτους πλεῖστα διαλεγόμενος, ἐν πολ-
 λοῖς ταῦτὰ Πλάτωνι φθεγγόμενος καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὡσαύτως
 κατ' ἐκείνον, ἔοικε ἢ πιστὸν ἐμποιεῖν τινα τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις, 5 151

12 Ἀττικὴν μέλιτταν: *Suda* Ξ 47

1 ἐπαινῶν: ἀπαντῶν ὦν E, non leg. M 6 βελτίστων: κρατίστων E, non leg.
 M 23 καὶ: κα' α ut vid. E, non leg. M 26 πλάτωνι: πλάτων E, non leg.
 M 27 κατ' ἐκείνον: καλῶς E, non leg. M

enjoys reading. 5 He is constantly like that, praising that which he uses, and in the meantime himself using those writers whom he wants his friends to observe. For he would not have deemed it right [for them] to adhere to other and better [models] than he himself used; he would not have made a judgement that resulted in his friends obtaining through him better models than *he* did;¹⁵ 6 nor, on the other hand, would he have recommended to his friends the opposite of what he thought best for himself, and tried to harm his companions, who were great admirers of his and followed his lead unsuspectingly—he who made it his goal in life not to harm even his enemies, trying to persuade everybody, friendly to him or otherwise, to choose the same path.

20. On Xenophon

1 People used to call the above-mentioned Xenophon “the Attic bee”;¹ so greatly did they appreciate his language and were attracted by its bounty. But some of the ancients record that he also thought so highly of himself that he did not even hesitate to compare himself to the great Plato. 2 As proof of this they cite the fact that he deliberately set himself to writing about the same subjects concerning Socrates.² He says many things about him and through him on other occasions, and he also writes his own *Symposium*, with Socrates as the main figure, in opposition to that of Plato. 3 Socrates figures frequently in all his writings and especially in the *Memorabilia*, which I for my part consider to be the best of all of Xenophon’s books, widely surpassing the others. 4 In these *Memorabilia*, where he mostly writes as though he were recording Socrates’ own words, and in many cases [writes] the same things and also on the same subjects as Plato, he seems to offer some kind of confirmation to his readers 5

¹⁵ A very strange idea of Metochites. Why would Dio conceive of—or be suspected by us of conceiving—the idea of recommending to his friends better models than he used himself? (Perhaps Metochites is just trying to convey that Dio was so determined to use only the best examples himself that he could not think of recommending anything else to his friends. The first part of 19.5.5, and 19.5.6, make sense; the confusion is caused by the second half of 19.5.5).

¹ *Suda* Ξ 47: Ἀττικὴ μέλιττα ἐπωνομάζετο. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2.57 ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ καὶ Ἀττικὴ Μοῦσα γλυκύτητι τῆς ἐρμηνείας. – Ξενοφῶντα ἐκείνων: referring back to 19.5.2–3.

² Cf. Diog. Laert. 3.34.

- ὡς ἄρ' οὐδὲ Πλάτων πολλὰ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων Σωκράτους καταψεύδεται, παρ' αὐτοῦ πάντα λέγων ὡς εἶωθε τιμῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐκείνου γ' ἔνια καὶ οὐ συκοφαντεῖται καθάπαξ παρ' αὐτῷ Σωκράτης, βέλτιστα λέγων
- 5 ἀνθρώποις τοῖς κατ' αὐτὸν τηνικαῦτ' ἐκείνοις, καὶ μὴν τοῖς ἔτ' ἐξ ἐκείνου μέχρι δεῦρο νῦν εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἐξῆς ἅπασι. 6 Καὶ τό γε ὅλον ἐστὶ δρᾶμα τὸ κατὰ Σωκράτην Πλάτωνι· Πλάτων δὲ ἡμῖν τὰ δοκοῦντα παρ' αὐτοῦ φθέγγεται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἂ παρ' ἐκείνου κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐκδεξάμενος ἀξιοῖ μνήμης τε καὶ
- 10 συγγραφῆς, καὶ παιδεύειν δι' αὐτῶν πειρᾶται τοὺς ζυντυγχάνοντας. 7 "Ὅτι δῆτ' ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς ὑποθέσεσι καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἡμῖν διὰ Σωκράτους ταῦτα φθέγγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔξω λόγου δόξαι τις ἂν οἶμαι πάντως, καὶ πολλὴν ὄντως τῆς σοφίας τε καὶ καλοκαγαθίας Σωκράτει πίστιν ἡμῖν παρέχεται.
- 15 2 Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε παραβάλλεσθαι μὲν Πλάτωνι Ξενοφῶντα | καθάπαξ οὐκ ἀνεμέσητον κρίνω, καὶ πολλὴν εὐήθειαν ἢ καὶ μα- 152 νίαν ἄντικρυς παρρησίᾳ καταψηφίζομαι, εἴ τις ἄλλως ἐρεῖ. 2 Καὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν παραπλήσιον ἢ ὀπηροῦν ἔγγιστα, πᾶσαν λέγω σοφίαν, οὐ τὴν περὶ τῶν ὄντων θεωρίαν καὶ ταύτης καθ' ὅ
- 20 τι ἂν εἴποι τις εἶδος, οὐ τὴν περὶ τὸ λέγειν ἄσκησιν· πολὺ γὰρ ἀνὴρ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος πάντα λείπεται. 3 "Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν Ξενοφῶντα λόγου πλείστου δὴ τινος ἄξιον Ἑλλησι δοκεῖ, θαυμάσαιμ' ἂν ὅστις οὐκ οἶδε καὶ πείθεται γ' εὖ μάλα, τοῦτο μὲν ταῖς ἱστορίαις καὶ κρίσεσι καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτοῦ δό-
- 25 ξη καὶ φήμῃ τῶν παλαιῶν, 4 τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πειρώμενος αὐτὸς καὶ συγγινόμενος τάνδρῃ διὰ τῶν βιβλίων ὧν συντάξεν, ἂ καὶ φιλοσοφία προσεσηκῶτα κάλλιστα τὸν ἄνδρα δείκνυσι, καὶ μά- λιστα τὸν Σωκρατικὸν τρόπον ἐν ταῖς ἠθικαῖς καὶ πρακτικαῖς κρίσεσι, 5 καὶ τὴν γνώμην ἔτοιμον, κἂν εἰ μὴ βρῶντα δαψιλῶς
- 30 καὶ βαθὺν καὶ περινοίας δεικνύμενον εἰς τὰ μὴ πολλοῖς πρόχειρα συνορᾶν τε καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, | ἀστεῖον δ' ὅμως καὶ τοῦ 153

3 ἀληθῶς: αὐτὸς E, non leg. M 11-12 ξενοφῶν ἡμῖν διὰ σωκράτους: ξενοφῶν διὰ σωκράτους ἡμῖν ME (ἡμῖν non leg. M) 15 παραβάλλεσθαι: παραβάλλεσθαι P, non leg. M

that Plato, too, does not distort much of what Socrates himself uttered when he says everything through him,³ as he usually did out of veneration for the man, but that, on the contrary, some of it are genuine quotations from Socrates, and he is certainly not misrepresented when Plato makes him utter the most beautiful things to the people who lived at that time, his own contemporaries, and also to those who came afterwards, up to our own time, and all future generations. 6 The whole thing is ‘a drama about Socrates, by Plato’; Plato presents his views through Socrates, but still, some of it he has actually learned from Socrates, deems it worthy of record and writing, and uses it to try to instruct the readers. 7 And Xenophon, too, says the same things on the same subjects through Socrates [as does Plato].⁴ But this too, I think, one should not consider wholly unreasonable, and it truly provides us with great confirmation of the wisdom and moral rectitude of Socrates.

2 But simply to put Xenophon on the same level as Plato I consider reprehensible, and if anyone asserts something else, I would frankly and to his face condemn him for gross stupidity, or even madness. 2 For there is no similarity whatsoever between the two, no proximity at all, I mean as regards the whole of wisdom: not regarding the investigation of Reality, or any subdivision of it that may be mentioned, and not regarding literary skill, where the man is in every respect far inferior to the great Plato. 3 But that also Xenophon is regarded by the Hellenes as highly remarkable in his own right—I would be surprised if there is anyone who does not know this, being convinced on the one hand by the accounts and judgements about him and his fame and reputation among the ancients, 4 on the other by personal experience of the man by reading his books, which reveal that he has made a thorough study of philosophy, and especially the Socratic manner of his ethical and practical judgements; 5 that he has a versatile mind and, even though he is not abundantly teeming or deep or a man who by means of perspicacity arrives at those things that not many people can easily understand and realise, he is still clever and capable of easily attaining pertinent results; and further

³ παρ’ αὐτοῦ πάντα λέγων, translation uncertain.

⁴ ὅτι left untranslated.

καιρίου τυγχάνοντα ῥαδίως, ἔτι γε μὴν τὴν φωνὴν ἡσκημένον κατὰ φύσιν εὖ καὶ ῥητορικῶν οὐκ ἔξω καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιτεχνήσεων.

3 Καὶ περὶ τὸ δικαστικὸν γὰρ εὐθηκτος, καὶ δείκνυσι κατὰ
 5 τὰς ἱστορικὰς συγγραφὰς ἐν ταῖς δημηγορικαῖς καὶ ἀντιθετι-
 καῖς χρήσεσι, καὶ περὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐπιτυχῆς καὶ πειστικὸς
 καὶ τὸ γόνιμον ἔχων οὐκ εὐπεριφρόνητον, 2 καὶ περὶ τὸ πανηγυ-
 ρικὸν ἐπαφρόδιτος, κἂν εἰ μὴ λογοειδῆς ἀμέλει, πλείστον ὅμως
 ὥρας μετέχων καὶ ἦθους, καὶ ζῆν τῷ γαληνῷ καὶ ὑπίῳ πομπεύ-
 10 ει διαιρόμενος ἀμηγέπη καὶ πυκνούμενος τοῖς ἐνοήμασι, 3 καί-
 τοι γε σφόδρ' ὡς οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος ἀφελεία χαίρων φύ-
 σει τε καὶ κατὰ κρίσιν ἐπίτηδες, ὡς ἂν δὴ καὶ μετὰ σκηνῆς τινος
 ἐντεῦθεν καὶ δράματος τὸ πειστικὸν μάλιστα διοικούμενος, καὶ
 δεινότητι χρώμενος ἐν ἀπλάστῳ τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ἀπραγμα-
 15 τεύτῳ τῇ χρήσει. Ἀξιώματος δὲ καὶ ἀκμῆς οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν αὐτῷ
 μέλει. 4 Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ μάλιστα μὲν ὡς ἔφην αὐτῷ κατὰ φύσιν,
 ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τό γε πλείστον ἴσως οὐκ ἀρρητόρευτον οὐδ' ἄνευ
 ἐστὶν ὑποκρίσεως καὶ μεθόδου κατὰ σκοπὸν ἀνυσίμως ἔχοντα. 154
 Καὶ ἰσχνὸς δὲ ὢν μάλιστα γοργότητος, πάνυ τοι καὶ ἐντρεχειᾶς
 20 ἀλλοτριῶς ἐστὶ· 5 καὶ ἥκιστα τις ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ τόσοις καὶ τό-
 σοις ὀτιοῦν περιβεβλημένον ὄψεται, οὐδ' ἐκ περιοδικῆς συ-
 στροφῆς στρογγύλεσθαί πως ἰκνούμενον, ἀλλὰ καθόλου διὰ
 πάντων αὐτῷ τὸ ὑπτίον εὐθυφορούμενον ἰλαρῶς ὀρᾶται.

4 Καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος αὐτῷ τοιοῦτος. Οὐκ ἀνίκανος δὲ ὢν ἐν
 25 πράγμασιν, οὐδὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν τηνικαῦτα φιλοσο-
 φούντων ἐν λόγοις ἐπιδεικνυμένων τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν. Πό-
 θεν; ὅς γε καὶ στρατηγικώτατος αὐτοχειροτόνητος δεῖσαν εὖ
 μάλα καὶ καρτερὸς τῶν μυρίων ἡγεῖται, καὶ διασφύζει τῇ Ἑλλά-
 δι τοὺς ἄνδρας. 2 Φεύγων ὅμως διεγένετο τὸ πλείστον τοῦ βίου
 30 τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἀπολίτευτος μάλιστα τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τύχην, ἦ,
 μὴ καλῶς χρησάμενος Ἀθήνησιν, οὐκ ἦν ἡδὺς ὀρᾶσθαι, οὐδ' εἰ-

7 ἔχων p. c. P² 11 γε om. E, non leg. M 12 ὡς ἂν: ὡσαύτως E, non leg. M 13 τὸ: τούτου E, non leg. M

that he is naturally accomplished⁵ in language and not without technical knowledge of rhetoric and politics.

3 He is also skilled in the judicial genre, which he shows in his historical writings in the public speeches and discussions;⁶ in the deliberative genre he is felicitous, persuasive, and productive in a way not to be despised; 2 in panegyrics he is graceful, and although he by no means writes like a speech-writer,⁷ he still has a great deal of Charm and Character. Together with his quiet and unassuming style he is slow and dignified, being in a certain sense exalted and crowded with thoughts; 3 however, still he [also] delights in Simplicity more than anyone I know, both by natural inclination and by a conscious choice; it is as if he achieves his persuasiveness with the help of staginess and drama,⁸ in reality employing Force although on the surface his style appears to be artless and unstudied. He is completely uninterested in Dignity and Florescence. 4 This, as I said, is above all due to his natural inclination. But most of his writing is, I think, not unrhetoical, and it is not without dissimulation and method that he achieves his purpose. And being very sparing in Rapidity he is also a stranger to Swiftness.⁹ 5 In his numerous writings it is impossible to find any wordiness, or anything which through periodic concentration somehow arrives at being rounded,¹⁰ but on the whole in all his writings one discerns a cheerful and straightforward plainness.

4 Xenophon's literary work is as I have described. But he was not without ability in practical matters, nor like the others who devoted themselves to philosophy at that time, who [only] displayed their political virtue in words. On the contrary: when necessity arose he elected himself commander and led the ten thousand well and forcefully and saved these men for Hellas. 2 And yet for the greater part of his life he lived without taking part in politics, being deprived

⁵ ἡσκημένον κατὰ φύσιν εὖ sounds slightly contradictory. Perhaps it means 'he has trained his natural talent'.

⁶ i.e., speeches and discussions that he inserts in his historical writings as examples or illustrations. Cf. 15.4.1 ἐν ταῖς κατὰ χρῆσιν δημηγορίαις.

⁷ λογοειδής: cf. λογοειδῶς in 19.4.3.

⁸ Cf. 18.2.8, 19.5.3.

⁹ γοργότητος ... καὶ ἐντρεχείας: as appears from the context the two terms must be near-synonyms. Cf. also Hesych. E 3397 ἐντρεχέστερον· γοργότερον.

¹⁰ στρογγύλεσθαι ἰκνούμενον: obscure, but at least the former must be governed by the latter.

χεν οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἠδέως ὄρᾶν τὴν πατρίδα. 3 Τοιγαροῦν καὶ ἀπό-
 δημος διεβίω τὸ πλεῖον καὶ οὐ πολλὰ τοῖς οἴκοι δῆλός ἐστιν εὖ-
 νους ὢν, Φιλολάκων δὲ καὶ Φιλαγησίλαος ἰ μάλιστα, καὶ πο- 155
 λὺς ἐραστής ἐκείνου, ᾧ καὶ συνεβίωσε πόλλ' ἔτη συνὼν ἤδισ-
 5 τα, χρήσιμος ὢν τάνδρι, 4 καὶ μηδὲν ἤττον ὡς αὐτὸς φησι χρή-
 σιμον αὐτὸν ἔχων εἰς παντοίαν ἀρετὴν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ
 τῆς σωματικῆς χρεῖας ἀφρόντιστον ὄνατο δι' ἀγροῦ δωρεᾶς, οὐ
 πολυτάλαντον ὅμως φορὰν ἐκεῖθεν, ἀλλ' ἀρκοῦσαν ἀμέλει τῷ
 ἤθει τε καὶ τῷ βίῳ καρπούμενος.

10 Περὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν βιβλίων τῶν μετὰ τὰ
 φυσικά, καὶ περὶ τοῦ βιβλίου Ἑρμογένους τοῦ
 περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος: ΚΑ'

1 Πολλάκις ἔχω ξυνεωρακῶς ἔγωγε περὶ τῶν βιβλίων Ἀριστο-
 τέλους, ὧν πολὺς ὁ λόγος, ὧν ἐπιγράφεται μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, καὶ
 15 πρὸς τούτῳ γε περὶ τοῦ βιβλίου τοῦ διδασκάλου τῆς ῥητορικῆς 156
 τέχνης Ἑρμογένους, ὃ περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος ὀνομάζει, ὡς ἄ-
 μεινον ἂν ἦν τοῖς ξυγγραφασμένοις, ἦν μὴ ξυνετάττοντο σφίσι
 ταῦτα, 2 ἢ τό γε δεύτερον εἰ μὴ συνετήρουν τῷ χρόνῳ ταῦθ'
 Ἑλληνες καὶ παρέπεμπον τοῖς ἐξῆς αἰεὶ τῶν σπουδαζόντων ἐν
 20 λόγοις καὶ μετ' ἐπισκέψεως μάλιστα ξυγγινομένοις καὶ σφόδρα
 τὸν νοῦν προσέχουσι ταῖς παλαιαῖς ἐκδόσεσι καὶ παρασκευαῖς
 εἰς δὴ τινα σοφίαν. Φθάνουσι γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες πλεῖστα δὴ τοῖς
 ἠγησασμένοις αὐτῶν βιβλίοις περὶ τῶνδε τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπ-
 αγγελιάμενοι. 3 Καὶ πολὺς ἐστὶν ὁ θαυμάσιος Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν
 25 τοῖς βιβλίοις οἷς περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρεῖ τοῖς πλείστοις περὶ
 τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐξαίρων καὶ ποιούμενος

3 φιλολάκων: φιλοκάκων E, non leg. M

¹¹ ἦ [sc. Τύχη] οὐκ ἦν ἠδὺς ὀρᾶσθαι: i.e., Tyche did not want to help him. Xenophon sided with Agesilaus and the Spartans against the Athenians in the battle of Coroneia in 394, which caused his banishment from Athens.

of his citizenship through Fate, for whom he was not a sweet sight when he was in trouble in Athens, and he himself was also barred from the sweet sight of his country.¹¹ 3 Therefore he lived mostly away from Athens, and is clearly often not very well disposed towards his compatriots. But he was a great friend of Sparta and Agesilaus, indeed a warm admirer of the latter, in whose proximity he lived happily for many years, being useful to the man, 4 but, as he himself says,¹² Agesilaus was also useful to *him* regarding all kinds of virtue, and from him he benefited, in addition to that which was unconcerned with the body's needs, through the gift of a country estate¹³ from which he gained an income, not large but sufficient for a man of his character and lifestyle.

21. On Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Hermogenes' book *On the Method of Force*

1 I have often made the observation concerning the celebrated books of Aristotle entitled *Metaphysics*, and also on the book by the teacher of rhetoric, Hermogenes, called *On the Method of Force*,¹ that it would have been better for their writers if these books had not been written by them, 2 or, second best, if the Hellenes had not preserved them through the ages and continued to transmit them to the successive generations of scholars, who are always carefully inquiring into and keenly studying the old writings and treatises concerning any branch of wisdom. For through their earlier writings both authors make great promises in advance concerning these works. 3 In most of those books where he investigates natural science, the admirable Aristotle often makes the reader expectant concerning the First Philosophy and keenly hopeful that at this stage of his study he will be suc-

¹² The king's virtues are enumerated in *Agesilaus* 3–11, but in this work Xenophon never mentions himself or his friendship with Agesilaus; nor is it mentioned in Plutarch's *Agesilaus*.

¹³ At Scillus, south of Olympia. The information that Xenophon was given the estate by the Spartans originates with the orator Dinarchus (*ap. Diog. Laert.* 2.52; cf. also Paus. 6.5.6).

¹ Hermogenes of Tarsus (ca. 160–ca. 225 AD). The *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος*, 'On how to achieve a forceful (vigorous) style', is spurious (cf. below, p. 193 n. 3).

ἐν ἐλπίσι μεγίσταις, ὡς ἐνταῦθά γε τῆς αὐτοῦ σπουδῆς μεγάλοις
 δὴ τισι καὶ ἱεροῖς καὶ ἀπορρήτοις ὡς εἶπειν ἐπιτυχῆς συνέσται.
 4 Καὶ ταῖς ἀξιολογωτάταις ἐκάστοτε καὶ παρ' ἐκάστοις τῶν φυ-
 σικῶν αὐτοῦ συνταγμάτων τῶν ἐπισκέψεων συμπίπτων καὶ
 5 ὑπερβαινούσαις τὰν μέρει καὶ ὑπερφρονούσαις τὴν ὕλην, 5
 ὑπερτίθεται τὴν θεωρίαν καὶ τοῦ πρώτου φιλοσόφου καὶ τῆς
 πρώτης φιλοσοφίας, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ φυσικὰ εἴτουν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ,
 ταῦτό γὰρ αἰ κλήσεις αὐταὶ διάφοροι σκοποῦσιν ἐν καὶ βού-
 λονται, τὴν περὶ τούτων ἐξέτασιν καὶ διδασκαλίαν ποιεῖται,
 10 καὶ ἰ καθυπισχνεῖται τὰ περὶ τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις βελτίοσι πάν- 157
 τως ἢ κατὰ τὰ παρόνθ' ἐκαστα. 6 Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ Ἑρμογένης
 περὶ τῶν μεθόδων τῆς δεινότητος μεμνημένος ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
 τῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδασκαλικῶν πόνων, τὴν μάθησιν ταύτην
 καὶ μελέτην πάντων ὑπερτίθησι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνικῶν τοῦ
 15 λέγειν ἐντολῶν καὶ παραδόσεων ἀξιολογωτάτην προεπαγγέλ-
 λεται ταύτην οὐκ ὀλίγῳ τινὶ ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας, ἃς ὑποτυποῖ καὶ
 διατάττεται. 7 Εἶθ' ὡσπερ ἐπιλαθόμενοι τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν τόσων
 δὴ καὶ τόσων καὶ ὑποσχέσεων, ἢ πάντως ἡμᾶς γ' ἐπιλησομένους
 οἰηθέντες, ὧν ἐν ἐλπίσι παρ' αὐτῶν φθάσαντες γεγόναμεν,
 20 2 ὁ μὲν ἐξῆς ἔπειτα τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῷ ῥητορικοῖς πόνοις καὶ
 συντάγμασιν Ἑρμογένης συνεχῆς ἐκτίθεται τὸ περὶ μεθόδου δει-
 νότητος παντάπασι ἀπρονοήτως, πολὺ τῶν ὑποσχέσεων λειπό-
 μενον καὶ κομιδῇ γ' ἐμφανῶς τῶν γεννικῶν ἐκείνων ἐλπίδων
 ἀνάξιον, 2 καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς βέλτιον ἂν ἦν τάνδρῳ μὴ τοῖς Ἑλλη-
 25 σιν ἐκδεδομένον, ἀλλὰ μένον ἐν ἐλπίσι μόνον, ἢ πολλῶ γ' οὕτω
 τῶν ὑποσχέσεων ἔλαττον ἐκδεδομένον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ
 τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν τοςαύτην προεπαγγελίαν ἀξίως
 ἀπήντηκε. 3 Καὶ ἴσως δ' ἂν καὶ αἰσχύνοιτό τις ὑπὲρ Ἑρμογέ-
 νους τοῦδε τοῦ συντάγματος ἔνεκα, καὶ εἴθε γε μὴν ἄγνος τοῦ- 158
 30 δε φθάσας ἀπώλετο καὶ προὔτεθνήκει αὐταῖς ἐπαγγελίαις μὀ-

2 ἱεροῖς: ἱερεῖς E, non leg. M ἐπιτυχῆς in ἐπιτυχῶς corr. E, non leg. M
 8 ταῦτο: ταῦτα E, non leg. M 16 ἦ: ἡ E, non leg. M 18 καὶ ὑποσχέσεων
 om. P, non leg. M 23 ἐκείνων ἐλπίδων: ἐπίδων ἐκείνων E, non leg. M

cessful and encounter things great, sacred and, so to speak, esoteric. 4 And every time in every one of his writings on physics when Aristotle hits upon those questions that are the most important ones, raised above the particular and looking beyond matter, 5 he postpones² the First Philosopher's investigation of the First Philosophy, and allocates his investigation and instruction on these questions 'above physics', or 'after physics'—for these two different designations mean one and the same thing—and promises [to deal with] them in another, much better work than the one at hand. 6 In the same way Hermogenes, who mentions the methods of Force in his other textbooks on rhetoric, places this knowledge and practice above everything else³ and announces beforehand that it is more valuable than all his other technical instructions and precepts on how to speak, and the most important by far compared to the other things on which he lays down rules and instructions.⁴ 7 But then one gets the impression that both authors forget their many undertakings and promises, or suppose that we will forget that which we are already expecting from them.

2 Immediately after his other rhetorical efforts and writings the one, Hermogenes, in a completely unthinking manner publishes his book *On the Method of Force*, a work that falls very much short of the promises, and is clearly altogether unworthy of those noble hopes; 2 it would truly have been better if this book had not been published among the Hellenes, but remained a promise, than to be published as it is now, being so inferior to what was promised. For the reader finds nothing in it that lives up to the promises or the anticipatory assurances. 3 And one might even feel ashamed on behalf of Hermogenes because of this book, and wish that he had perished

² Metochites seems to be playing with the two meanings of *ὑπερτίθημι*, 'place, allocate above [something else]' and 'defer, postpone'.

³ Cf. n. 2 on *ὑπερτίθησι*. In his most famous work, *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* ('On Types of Style'), Hermogenes values *δεινότης* above all else, while at the same time postponing a full treatment of it: *Id.* 378.18–19 *τοῦτο δὲ ἰδίας ἐστὶ πραγματείας ἐπομένης μὲν τῷ Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγῳ*, and 380.1–3 ... *διαλήψεσθαι γε περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἐν τῷ Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος ἰκανῶς εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα*. If Hermogenes ever wrote such a treatise it has not come down to us; the one preserved under his name, and discussed by Metochites in this essay, is spurious (Hagedorn 1964, 84–85).

⁴ Slightly tautological, since *τῶν ἄλλων ... παραδόσεων* must be coreferential with *τὰς ἄλλας ἅς ... διατάττεται*.

- ναις, αὐταῖς μόναις ἐλπίσιν, αἷς αὐτός τε εἶχεν ἴσως ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 περὶ τούτου καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔχειν ἔπειθεν οἷς παρεδίδου τὰς
 ῥητορικὰς ἐπιτεχνήσεις τοῦ λέγειν. 4 Ἀριστοτέλης δ' αὐτὸς
 ἰδίᾳ μὲν χρόνοις ἔοικεν ὕστερον καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος τὰς ἐκδόσεις
 5 τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ ποιεῖται, καὶ πορρωτέρω γ' ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν
 μεγάλων ἐπαγγελμάτων καὶ ὑποσχέσεων, καὶ τοῦτό γ' αὐτίκα
 τεχνικῶς ἐκεῖνος ἀποβουκολήσας τῶν γεννικῶν ἐλπίδων ὡς
 οἷόν τ' ἦν τοὺς ἐντυχεῖν μέλλοντας, 5 ἔπειτα κατ' ἔθος πολλῶ
 σκότῳ τῆς λεκτικῆς χρήσεως συγκαλύπτει τὸ σύγγραμμα, βου-
 10 λόμενος φεύγειν τὸν τῶν ὑποσχέσεων ἔλεγχον καὶ τὸ καταφα-
 νῆς γίνεσθαι μὴ τῶν ἐλπίδων ἄξι' ἀποδιδούς, ἀλλὰ γε δὴ συγ-
 κρύπτειν δοκεῖν ἀπόρητὰ τινὰ ἔργα καὶ κειμήλια δογμάτων
 καὶ θησαυροὺς σοφίας, οὐ τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐχερεῖς κτήσασθαι. 6
 Οἷος ἐκεῖνος ἐν πολλοῖς τοιοῦτος ἄλλοις οἰκονομῶν τὸ μὴ ῥά-
 15 διον εἰς σύνεσιν καὶ ἀνύσιμον, ἐν οἷς βούλεται πλέον τι τῶν
 ἄλλων αὐτὸς ξυνορᾶν δοκεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ μὴ καθάπαξ ἐν
 τοῖς ὑψηλοτέροις τῶν ἰσπουδασμάτων καὶ τῶν προθέσεων 159
 ἀλώσιμος εἶναι, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγῶνες καὶ παλαίσματα πλείστα,
 καὶ οὐκ ἀνεύθυνον οὐδ' ἀναμφήριστον τὸ νικᾶν. 7 Καὶ τοῦτο
 20 μὲν οὕτω· δῆλος δ' ὅμως κἂν τούτοις Ἀριστοτέλης βέλτιον ἢ
 κατὰ τὸν Ἑρμογένην ταῖς ἐπαγγελίαις ἀπαντήσας, καὶ κάλλισ-
 τα καὶ θαυμάζειν ἄξι' ἀποδοὺς κἂνταῦθα, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὰς
 ὑποσχέσεις τῶς καὶ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἐλπίδας ἱκανῶς ἔχοντα.

Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ μαθηματικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ

25

ἀστασιάστου: KB'

- 1 Πολύ τις ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων οἶμαι τὸ
 ἀστασιάστον ὄψεται· καὶ ἄλλον μὲν ἄλλου βέλτιόν τε καὶ μὴ
 περὶ τὴν ἕξιν ταύτην γενόμενον ξυνορᾶν ἔστι καὶ συλλογίζε-
 σθαι ταῖς τε ἱστορικαῖς παραδόσεσι, καὶ ὧν καταλελοίπασι βι-
 30 βλίων καὶ συνταγμάτων ἐποπτεῖα καὶ πείρα, 2 ἄλλον δ' ἄλλῳ
 μαχόμενόν τε καὶ τάναντία λέγοντα καὶ φρονούντα τῶν ἀπό

before giving birth to it, and died beforehand with only the promises and expectations which he himself probably had concerning it and persuaded others to have, those to whom he handed down the rhetorical techniques. 4 Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to publish his *Metaphysics* at a later point in time, privately and in instalments, and, so to speak, further away from his great declarations and promises, and as soon as he has cleverly diverted⁵ his readers as much as possible from their noble hopes, 5 thereafter, as is his habit, he conceals his book in great obscurity of linguistic expression, wishing to escape the test of his promises, and [escape] being exposed as not having delivered findings worthy of the readers' expectations but [wanting] to seem to hide the most arcane things, heirlooms of dogma and treasures of wisdom, not easy for ordinary people to acquire.⁶ 6 He behaves in the same way in many other places when treating of things not easy to understand fully, where he wants to appear to the general public as having a deeper understanding than others, and not be at all comprehensible in the higher questions and subjects concerning which there is much competition and wrestling, and where victory is neither free from censure nor indisputable. 7 And let this be enough said. But, this censure notwithstanding, it is clear that Aristotle also here lived up to his promises much better than Hermogenes, and that he produced very beautiful and admirable things also in this part of philosophy, even if they did not to a sufficient degree meet the expectations of the general public.

22. On the lack of dissension in the science of mathematics

1 It can be observed, I believe, that there is a striking lack of dissension among those philosophers who are mathematicians. To be sure, one may understand and conclude, both from the transmitted historical narratives and through perusal and experience of the books and writings they themselves have left behind, that some of them were more or less expert in this discipline than others. 2 But among

⁵ ἀποβουκολήσας: leading astray, like cattle.

⁶ The same accusation, expressed at greater length, forms the subject of *Sem.* 3, 'On the obscurity of the writings of Aristotle'.

τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος οὐδένας, οὐθ' Ἑλληνας πρὸς Ἑλληνας, οὔ-
 τε βαρβάρους μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν, τὴν δὲ μαθηματικὴν ἐπιστήμην
 τε καὶ ἔξιν εὖ ἠνυκότας, ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἔστιν ὀρᾶν πάλαι τε
 καὶ νῦν ἔτι μῆδὲν ἦττον, πρὸς βαρβάρους ὡσαύτως, ἀλλὰ μὴν
 5 οὐδὲ βαρβάρους ἄρα πρὸς Ἑλληνας. 3 | Καὶ ὅλως οὐδὲν πρὸς 160
 τοὺς ἐξ ἄλλων γενῶν τοῖς ἐξ ἄλλων γενῶν, ἧ δὴ καὶ πεφυκὸς ἂν
 ἦν μάλιστα, περὶ τῆς αὐτῆς σπουδῆς τῆς μαθηματικῆς δηλαδή,
 ὅτιποτοῦν μάχιμόν ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ταυτό γε σκῆμμα καὶ ὑποκείμε-
 νον τῇ θεωρίᾳ κατὰ τὴν μαθηματικὴν πᾶσαν ἔξιν ἐναντιολογία
 10 τις καὶ ἀσύμβατον νόημα, οὐ μᾶλλον γε ἢ αὐτῷ τινι πρὸς ἑαυ-
 τόν.

2 Ἄλλ' ἂ τοῖσδέ τισι περὶ ὄντινων ἄρα τῆς μαθηματικῆς
 ἐπιστήμης δοκεῖ, κοινῇ πᾶσι καὶ ὁμοφρόνως ξυνδοκεῖ, καὶ νέοις
 καὶ παλαιοῖς, καὶ Ἑλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσοις τοι
 15 ξυντετύχηκεν εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· καὶ πάντες ὡς πρὸς ἓνα
 σκοπὸν ὀρῶντες ἄλλοθεν ἄλλοι τῶν τόπων εἴτουν τῶν διαλέκ-
 των βάλλοντες ξυμπίπτουσι, καὶ κατευστοχοῦσιν οἱ τυγχάνον-
 τες. 2 Καὶ ὡσπερ πάντ' ἀριθμὸν ὡσαύτως ἅπαντες ξυνορῶσι τῷ
 νῷ, ταῖς λέξεσι διαφόροις χρώμενοι, ἦτοι τὰ δύο, δύο πάντες,
 20 καὶ δέκα τὰ δέκα, καὶ ἄττα δὴ πάντα τοσαῦτα, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν
 ἑτεροιοῦμενοι, 3 παραπλησίως δὴ καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 μαθηματικὰς διπλᾶς θεωρίας καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν ὡσαύ-
 τως διπλᾶς ἐν ἀσυνέτοις πάντως ἀλλήλων τοῖς ῥήμασιν, ἅπαν-
 25 τες καθάπαξ βέλτισθ' ὁμόφρονές εἰσι, καὶ κοινοπολιτείαν ἅ-
 παντες ἐν τούτοις ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποι, καὶ πόρρω καὶ σύνεγγυς
 ὄντες, καὶ στασιαστικῶς τᾶλλα καὶ μαχίμως τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ 161
 μή. 4 Καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ μέρος ἅπαντες ἔζων ἄνθρωποι,
 οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἀνθρώποις ἄλλ' ἢ εἰρήνην βαθεῖα καὶ ἀστασίαστος
 βίωτος καὶ κοινὰ καθόλου πράγματα, κἂν ἄλλος ἄλλου γε προ-
 30 ἔχων ὀρᾶται, ἢ διὰ φύσεώς τινος πλεονεξίαν, ἢ δι' ἀσκήσεως

6 τοῖς: τοὺς E, non leg. M 20 ἄττα scripsi: ἄττα PE, non leg. M 21
 ἑτεροιοῦμενοι P², ἑτεροιοῦμενα P¹E, non leg. M

all these people and during the whole of history, one does not see anyone opposing and contradicting and thinking differently from anyone else, neither Hellenes opposed to Hellenes, nor those who are barbarians in respect of their language, but nevertheless successful in the mathematical science (as one can see to be true of many, not only in antiquity but also very often nowadays) in opposition to other barbarians, and not even barbarians in opposition to Hellenes. **3** And between people of different races, where conflict would be highly natural, there is clearly no conflict whatsoever at this particular point, I mean in the science of mathematics, and on a given problem or subject of investigation there are no contradictions or irreconcilable ideas at all in mathematics, any more than a man is in opposition to himself.

2 On the contrary: those views that are held by some people on something in mathematics are shared by everybody in unanimity, both in our time and in antiquity, both Hellenes and barbarians, in short, everybody who happens to know anything about this subject.¹ And all people, shooting from different places or different languages, since they are looking at the same goal all of them hit the same spot and are successful, no matter who they are.² **2** And as all men, using different languages, have the same mental concept of numbers so that everybody agrees on 'two' or 'ten' and so on with all the others, although their names vary, **3** so everybody without exception, [even] among people who are completely unable to understand each other's speech, is in agreement regarding the two arithmetical disciplines and the two that treat of bodies,³ and all men share a common citizenship in these things, no matter whether they live far or near, or whether or not they are in conflict with each other on other, e.g. political, issues. **4** And if men, so to say, chose to follow this party,⁴ they would experience nothing but perfect peace and a life without faction, and everybody's interests would coincide, even if one individual might be superior to someone else either through some natural advantage or

¹ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν: lit., 'the same subject' (as the others).

² Mathematical activity being likened to shooting at a target is rather strange, but the point of the simile is obviously that you can shoot at the same target from different positions.

³ *the two arithmetical disciplines*: arithmetic and harmonics; *the two that treat of bodies*: geometry and astronomy.

⁴ I.e., 'the Mathematical Party'.

ἴσως, ἢ καὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα. 5 Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέριστον καὶ ἀστασί-
 αστον ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁμόλογον, εὖ μάλα δῆλον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
 ἄλλως τις εἴποι προσέχων τὸν νοῦν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας βιοῦν
 αἰρούμενος. 6 Ὅτι δ' οἱ μὲν πλέον ἠνυκότες ὀρῶνται περὶ τήνδε
 5 τῆς σοφίας τὴν ἕξιν, οἱ δ' ἔλαττον, πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ παρ'
 Ἑλλησιν ἀμέλει καὶ βαρβάροις, καὶ τοῦτό γε δῆλον ὡσαύτως,
 καὶ πολὺ τὸ εὐλόγον ἔχει, δι' ἕτερόν γε τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπον ἢ
 καὶ δι' ἀμφοτέρα.

3 Τοῦ γε μὴν συμφώνου τοσοῦτου καὶ εἰρηναίου τοῖς μαθη-
 10 ματικοῖς τῶν φιλοσόφων, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' αἴτιον ὅ τι μὴ τὸ βεβηκὸς
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων τῇ θεωρίᾳ ταύτῃ πραγμάτων καὶ ἀπλοϊκόν. 2
 Περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος ἀεὶ, καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλ-
 λοντος ὀρηοῦν κατ' ἰοῦδένα λόγον κατ' οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα καὶ σύμ- 162
 βαμα, καὶ ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτυχῆς κατάληψις ἢ αὐτὴ πάντως καὶ
 15 οὐκ ἐπαμφοτερίζειν ὅλως πέφυκε, 3 καθὼς ἄρ' ἔχει περὶ τῶν ἐν
 φύσει καὶ ὑπὸ γένεσιν, ἃ καὶ ῥέει διόλου καὶ μεταβάλλει πρὸς
 τάναντία καὶ συµμεταβάλλειν ἀναγκάζει τοὺς περὶ αὐτῶν λό-
 γους, καὶ χώραν ἐναντιολογίας περὶ αὐτῶν δίδωσιν. 4 Ἄλλ'
 οὐχ οὕτω τὰ κατὰ τὴν μαθηματικὴν ἐπιστήμην θεωρητά, ἃ, κἂν
 20 εἰ προσχρηταί πως τῇ ὕλῃ πρὸς χειραγωγίαν ἀμηγέπη τοῖς μετ'
 αἰσθήσεως ζῶσιν ἔτι πῶ τὸν παρόντα βίον εἰς τὰς κατὰ διά-
 νοιαν ἀποπερατώσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅμως ἀφαιρεῖται τελευτῶντα
 τῆς ὕλης τῷ νῷ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ θησαυρίζεται τοῖς ταμείοις τῆς φαντα-
 σίας, καὶ μένει γε παντάπασιν ἀζήμια καὶ ἄσυλα φθορᾶς ἀπά-
 25 σης καὶ τροπῆς. 5 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ ἀίδια τοῖς ἔξω καλεῖται τὰ
 μαθηματικὰ καὶ μόνιμα τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτῶν λόγους
 ἀτρέπτους ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν καὶ καθάπαξ τὸ στάσι-
 μον ἔχοντας, καὶ οὐδεμία λοιπὸν στασιώδης ἐτερότης τῇ περὶ
 αὐτῶν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ μάχιμος θεωρία τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζου-
 30 σιν.

3 ἄλλως: ἄλλος P, non leg. M 4 ὀρῶνται: οἶονται E, non leg. M 7 ἔχει: ἢ
 E, non leg. M 29 αὐτῶν p. c. P²

perhaps through training, or both. **5** For among the mathematicians there clearly prevail agreement, unanimity and concord; no one who considers the matter and chooses to live in truth would deny this. **6** But that some can be observed to have achieved more in this branch of philosophy and some less, both in the old days and now, among Hellenes and barbarians, in either one or the other or both of the ways mentioned above,⁵ this is also true and very reasonable.

3 But the reason for this concord and peace among the mathematical philosophers is none other than the stability and simplicity of the things that form the subject-matter of this enquiry. **2** For concerning that which is One and always the same and never changes in any way whatsoever, in accordance with any argument, thing or accident, also the correct apprehension is altogether identical and not by its nature at all ambiguous, **3** as is the case with the things of nature, which are subject to creation and, since they constantly flow and change into their opposites, force the descriptions of them to change with them and enables the existence of opposite views. **4** But this is not the case with the subject-matter of the science of mathematics, for even if it uses matter as a kind of additional help in order somehow to guide those who are still living their lives in dependence on sense-perception to the conclusions of reason, nevertheless in the end it is liberated from matter by the intellect and is stored up in the treasure-houses of imagination where it remains completely safe from harm, not subject to any destruction or change. **5** And therefore the mathematical objects were called eternal and essentially permanent by the pagans. And the descriptions of mathematics are, in accordance with its nature, incontestable and established once and for all, and consequently there is no seditious difference in the truth about it and no conflicting enquiry among those who study this subject.

⁵ *the ways mentioned above: 22.2.4, natural advantage and/or training.*

I Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ θεωρίᾳ ἀβεβαίου: ΚΓ'

163

1 Ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ φυσικὸν θεωρία μάλιστ' ἐπαμφοτερίζειν οὐκ ἀ-
καίρως ἔχει, καὶ τοῖς τάναντία περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγουσι χάραν
τινὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶ πως λέγειν δίδωσι. 2 Καὶ ὀρώμεν γὰρ ὡς οὐ-
5 τω γε πολλοὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας δοκίμων ἐχρή-
σαντο, καὶ κατασκευάζουσιν οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὰ δόξαντα, καὶ
πολλοὺς ἔχουσι τοὺς εἶ μάλα δὴ πειθομένους ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων
λογισμῶν κινούμενοι, 3 καὶ πολλὰὶ στάσεις ἐνταῦθα καὶ μερισ-
μοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχόμενοι, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς αἰρέ-
10 σεων μεγαλώνουσι πολλοὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον προστάται καὶ ἡγεμόνες
ἀλλήλοις ἀντιπράττοντες παρρησίᾳ καὶ μηδενὶ ξὺν κόσμῳ, καὶ
πολλὰ πλήθη καὶ συντάγματα τῶν σπουδαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἀντιπο-
λιτευομένων τὴν καταληπτικὴν σοφίαν καὶ χρῆσιν. 4 Καὶ ἴσως
οἱ μὲν ἄμεινον ἔχουσι ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς
15 ἔρρωνται καὶ νίκης ἀποφέρεσθαι ψήφους δίκαιοι, οἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ
οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ νικῶσι καὶ ἡττηνται, καὶ οἱ
μὲν τάδε, οἱ δὲ τάδε βέλτιον ξυννεοήκασιν, οὐκ ἀπίθανοι δ'
ὅμως ἅπαντες, οὐθ' ὥστε καὶ μὴ τυγχάνειν καθάπαξ ἀκροωμέ-
νων | καὶ συντιθεμένων τοῖς δόγμασιν. 5 Ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν νυκτο- 164
20 μαχίᾳ καὶ ἀδήλω καὶ δυστεκμάρτῳ πάντοθεν τῷ σκοπῷ βάλλου-
σι καὶ μάλισθ' ὑπ' ἀλλήλων βάλλονται καὶ κατευστοχοῦ-
σιν ἔστιν οὗ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνουσιν ἄλλοτε καὶ νεμεσητὰ πράτ-
τουσι (καὶ εἰ μὴ θαυμάζειν ἐν τισιν ἄξια, συγγνώμης γε μὴν οὐ
πόρρω, τὰ δὲ καὶ πάνυ τοι θαυμάζειν ἄξια), 6 οἱ αὐτοὶ τάναν-
25 τία καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, νῦν μὲν σύμφωνα ἄλλοις ἄλλοι, νῦν δὲ
μαχόμενα, καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πολλὴ προδήλως περὶ τῆς φυσικῆς
θεωρίας τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡ μάχη, καὶ διάφοροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους
αἱ δόξαι μετ' ἐναντίων ἐνστάσεων.

2 Τὸ δ' αἴτιον, εἶ γε δῆλον αὐτόθεν, εἴ τις καλῶς συλλογί-
30 ζοιτο, τοῦναντίον τοῦ κατὰ τοὺς μαθηματικούς αἰτίου τῆς ὁμο-

4 ὀρώμεν γὰρ: ὀρῶ μὲν γὰρ M 6 ἀγεννῶς: ἀγενῶς ME

23. On the uncertainty in natural science

1 Natural science, on the other hand,¹ is quite appropriately capable of being ambiguous, and it enables those who make opposite statements on a given subject to appear to be right to some extent. 2 For we see that many famous philosophers have done this² concerning the same questions and argue not inadequately in favour of their views and, spurred by opposite notions, firmly convince many others, 3 and because of this there have been³ many factions and parties hostile to one another, and in the past there were many celebrated leaders of the schools of natural science fighting each other openly and without the least civility, and there were many scores of, and writings by, their adherents, with conflicting views on scientific theory and practice. 4 And perhaps some are more successful than the others, sound in their tenets and entitled to be voted victors, whereas others are not; some succeed and some are defeated, by a greater or smaller margin; some have superior ideas on one question, others on another, but none of them are unconvincing to the extent that they do not find any listeners at all, or such as agree with their views. 5 But as in a battle fought by night they shoot from all directions at a target that is obscure and difficult to discern and mostly hit one another; they sometimes hit the mark, while sometimes they miss it and perform badly ([however], even though what they do is not admirable in some respects, it still deserves to be excused, and some of it is admirable indeed); 6 the same people make contradictory statements even concerning the same questions, now agreeing with and now contradicting each other; in short, it is obvious that there is a great battle among the philosophers on natural science, and different opinions with opposite origins.

¹ *on the other hand* (δέ): this essay is closely linked to the preceding one. Despite the translations 'mathematical science' (*Sem.* 22) and 'natural science' (here) it should be pointed out that Metochites does not regard these two disciplines as being on the same level, something which emerges both from the contents of these essays and from his terminology, mathematics being called ἐπιστήμη, natural science θεωρία.

² I.e., made opposite statements.

³ Despite the present forms κατασκευάζουσιν and ἔχουσι in the preceding paragraph, Metochites is clearly describing the situation in the past (τὸ ἀρχαίον).

νοίας καὶ τῆς ἀστασιάστου πίστεως, ὅτι τὸ τῆς σπουδῆς ὑποκείμενον σφίσιν ἀβέβαιον τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ῥεῖ μεταβάλλον ἀεὶ καὶ μυριάσι τροπαῖς ὑπεύθυνόν ἐστι καὶ οὐ συνέχεται καθάπαξ ἀσειστοῖς αἰτιολογίαις. 2 Καὶ τοίνυν ὡς περὶ ἀστάτου καὶ ἀνιδρύτου γε τῶν λόγων ὄντων καὶ οὐδὲν μήποτ' ἔχοντος ἀσφαλῆς καὶ ἀσάλευτον ὀρίσασθαι, οἷα δὴ τὰ ὑπὸ γένεσιν πάντως πάντα καὶ φύσιν καὶ κίνησιν, 3 καὶ ἰοὶ περὶ αὐτῶν λόγοι διαμαρτάνουσιν ἔστιν οὐ καὶ ὅτε καὶ τυγχάνουσι, καὶ μὴν ἔτι καὶ ἀσυμφώνως ἔχουσι καὶ πολλὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν ἐναντιολογιῶν 15 ἀφορμὰς διὰ τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῶν εἰς τάναντία περιχώρησιν. 4 Τὸ γὰρ μὴ μένον ἐν ταυτότητι, πῶς ἂν τις λόγοις ὡς ἐνοειδῆς ὀρίσαιτο; Καὶ τὸ μυρίαν ὑφιστάμενον τὴν μεταβολὴν, πῶς ἔστιν ἀπλότητι συσχεῖν καταλήψεως; Καὶ τὸ πάσαις τροπαῖς ἀλλάττον ὑποκείμενον, 5 πῶς οὐκ αἴτιον αὐτὸ πλείστας τε καὶ 15 διαφόρους καὶ τὰς ἐναντίας περὶ αὐτοῦ πράττεσθαι δόξας τῶν ἐποπτευόντων, καὶ λόγους τῶν μὲν τά, τῶν δὲ τὰ λογίζεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη προαγομένων καὶ πείθειν ἀξιούντων τοὺς ἐπιμελῆς ποιουμένους τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν;

3 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ Παρμενίδαι καὶ Ζήνωνες καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέες τε καὶ Δημόκριτοι καὶ Ἀναξαγόραι καὶ Ἀναξιμένεις καὶ 20 Ἀναξίμανδροι καὶ Λεύκιπποι καὶ Ἡράκλειτοι καὶ Χρῦσιπποι καὶ Θεόφραστοι καὶ οἱ κορυφαῖοι τὴν σοφίαν ἅπασαν Ἀριστοτέλεις καὶ Πλάτωνες, εἰς πολλὰς τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν κατατεμόντες αἰρέσεις καὶ διάφορα δόγματα, 2 πάντες μὲν ἔχουσιν οὐκ ἀκαίρως ὡς ἔφην λέγειν καὶ διατρίβειν ἐνταῦθα, πάντες δὲ καὶ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐλέγχονται τε καὶ περιτρέπονται, καὶ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀκαίρως, ἀλλ' ὡς εὐλόγους ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀντιθέσεων ἀφορμὰς ἀλλήλοις παρεχόμενοι, 3 εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄλλων ἄλλοι τῶν εἰκότων τυγχάνουσι καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲ παντάπασιν ἔξω 30 τάλθηθῶς. Τὸ γὰρ δὴ μὴ τῶν βελτιόνων καὶ ἀκριβέστερον τῆ σπουδῆ ταύτῃ χρῆσαμένων ἐπαίειν, καὶ τῆς νίκης αὐτοῖς τὰς ψήφους ἀποδιδόναι, μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶη, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' εἶτ' ἄγνω-

15 πράττεσθαι ex πλάττεσθαι corr. P² 16 τὰ λογίζεσθαι ex ταλο- corr. E

2 But as is immediately clear to someone who considers it well, the reason [for this variety of opinions in natural science], in contrast to the reason for the concord among mathematicians and their dissonance-free assurance, is that the subject-matter of the natural scientists' study is essentially unstable, flowing, constantly changing, and subject to innumerable modifications; it is in no way contained by unchanging causal explanations. 2 Since the descriptions concern that which is infirm and unstable, having nothing certain and solid to define, as for instance everything that is subject to creation and nature and movement, 3 these descriptions also sometimes miss and sometimes hit the mark; they are further non-concordant discordant, and from their subject-matter⁴ they contain many grounds for contradictions, through the oscillation from one extreme to the other characteristic of these objects. 4 For how could something that does not remain identical be delimited with definitions as if it were uniform? And how could that which is subject to endless change possibly be grasped by apprehension pure and simple? And an object which is changing with all kinds of modifications, 5 how could it not itself cause many different and even contradictory opinions to be formed by the beholders, and by necessity [elicit many different] accounts by people who are by necessity spurred to thought, different people in different ways, and undertake to persuade those who care about the truth concerning these things?

3 Therefore people like Parmenides and Zeno, Empedocles and Democritus, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes and Anaximander, Leucippus, Heraclitus, Chrysippus, Theophrastus, and the two pinnacles of all wisdom, Aristotle and Plato, breaking up natural science into many different sects and dogmas, 2 all of them, as I said, are able to make statements and work not inappropriately in this field, but all of them are also refuted and disproved by one another, this, too, not inappropriately, but as if offering one another reasonable objections and grounds for opposite views, 3 even if some of them are more successful than others in hitting upon what is reasonable and perhaps not entirely outside the truth. For not to listen to those who are superior and have worked more accurately in this science, and vote for them as victors, would certainly not be right but befitting people who are ei-

⁴ ἐξ αὐτῶν, probably referring to τὰ ὑπὸ γένεσιν καὶ φύσιν καὶ κίνησιν.

μόνων ἢ ἀσυνέτων ἀνδρῶν. 4 Καὶ ἴσως δικαίως ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν ἀξιοίη πάντας σὺν λόγῳ πάντως τῆς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἕκαστον φορᾶς οὐ παντάπασιν ἀγεννοῦς, ἢ πάντων ἂν κατελέγχοι τὰ τυχήματα καὶ τὰς ἀμαρτίας συνεξολισθαινόντων ἐν πολλοῖς
 5 τῇ φύσει τῶν ὑποκειμένων εἰς σκέψιν. 5 Πάντας δ' οὐ δικαίως ἂν ἐν ἴσῳ τιθεῖ μη διαστέλλων ὀπησοῦν τοὺς ἄμεινον εἰς τὴν πρόθεσιν ἠνυκότας καὶ κάλλισθ' ὡς οἶόν τ' ἦν μάλιστ' ἀπαλλάξαντας.

10 Ἰ' Ὅτι διὰ τὸν πρὸς ῥητορικὴν πόλεμον ἀεὶ
 167 διαλόγοις ὁ Πλάτων χρῆται: ΚΔ'

1 Θαυμάσαι τις ἂν ἴσως εὖ μάλα ξυννοούμενος τὸν εἰς τοσοῦτον τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος πρὸς ῥητορικὴν πόλεμον, καὶ τὴν ἀκήρυκτον ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ καθάπαξ ἄσπονδον μάχην, 2 ὅτι καίτοι ῥητορικὸς ὢν ὁ ἀνὴρ ὡς οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος πλέον τῶν
 15 ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος μέχρι καὶ δεῦρο, καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν εἰς ἄκρον πεπαιδευμένος, διὰ τὴν κατὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐκτόπως ἐπ' αὐτοῦ πρόθεσιν κρατοῦσαν παντάπασιν ἀπέστη τοῦ καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἐξορθοῦ συγγράφασθαι, κατὰ τὸ τῶν ῥητόρων ἔθος, ἀποτάδην οἴκοθεν συνεχῆ καὶ ἀδιάκοπον τὸν δρόμον ποιούμενος, 3 ἀλλὰ
 20 πάντ' ἐν διαλόγοις τὰ θαυμάσι' ὄντως ἐκεῖνα καὶ κατατετημημένως ἐν πεύσεσι καὶ ἀπαντήσεσι, καὶ ταύταις ἐπίτηδες ὡς οἶόν τ' ἂν εἶη συντόμοις καὶ συχναῖς, φθέγγεται, καίτοι γε πλεῖστα βιβλία συνταξάμενος καὶ καταλελοιπῶς ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλον τρόπον οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ. 4 Καὶ οὐ μόνον οὕτω διόλου χρῆται, ἀλλὰ
 25 καὶ πείθειν ἀξιοῖ πάντας, ὡς ἄρ' οὕτω δητ' ἐστὶ τῷ παντὶ βέλτιον χρῆσθαι, καὶ φεύγειν τὰ ῥητορικὰ μήκη καὶ τοὺς διαύλους τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν λόγων, | 5 ἐξ ὧν ἦν ἐν τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις τε 168 καὶ δικαστηρίοις εὐδοκμεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ὡς αὐτὸς

2 πάντως: πάντων ME 3 ἀγεννοῦς: ἀγεν + lacuna M, ἀγέννητον E κατελέγχοι: -ελέγchon E, non leg. M 9 ῥητορικὴν πόλεμον fortasse a P² scriptum 13 ἄσπονδον: ἄσποδον E, non leg. M

ther unfair or stupid. 4 And perhaps one should justly choose to praise everybody who has made some sensible contribution to each common good, rather than censure for their faults and mistakes all those who often are brought down because of the nature of the objects of their study. 5 But it would not be fair to regard everyone as equal, without somehow setting apart those who have been more successful in regard to the proposed goal, and performed their task as well as was possible.

24. That Plato always uses the dialogue form because of his war against rhetoric

1 It is an amazing thing, when one calls to mind the admirable Plato's implacable war and, so to speak, heraldless and completely truceless battle against rhetoric, 2 that although the man has a rhetorical ability greater than anyone I know of in the whole of history until the present, and a highly trained tongue, because of the animosity against rhetoric strangely dominating in him he totally refrained from writing even the slightest thing straightforwardly,¹ according to rhetorical practice, and making the exposition in sequence, continuous and uninterrupted, 3 but although he wrote and left to us a great number of books he utters all of his truly admirable views in dialogues and in a cut-up manner by means of questions and answers, deliberately made as short and frequent as possible; there is nothing written in any other form, 4 and not only does he always write in this manner himself, but he also wants to persuade everybody else that it is better in every way to write in this manner and avoid the length prescribed by rhetoric and the double course² of contentious speeches, 5 through which it was possible to win glory in the council-houses and courts,

¹ ἐξορθοῦ is obviously the opposite of writing in dialogue form, i.e., 'in his own name', that he himself 'stands for' what he writes.

² The δίαυλος was a double race e.g. in Olympia, from the start, round a turning-post, and back again. Gregoras uses the word in the letter to Metochites where he praises the latter's 'new book', the *Semeioseis*: *Ep.* 23, 101–2 ὅσοι τὰς ἀρχαιολογίας δίαυλον τῆς σφῶν αὐτῶν πεποιήκεσαν γλώττης 'all those who have made Classical Scholarship a course of their own tongue' (trans. Bydén, below, p. 271). Cf. also *Sem.* 17.3.3 ἐν τοῖς τοῦ λέγειν δρόμοις.

βούλεται συστρέφειν τοὺς ἀκροαμένους καὶ συγχεῖν καὶ κλέπτειν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλήθειαν.

2 "Ὅτι γὰρ οὗτος δητ' ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν θαυμαστῶν ἐκείνου καὶ τοσοῦτων διαλόγων σκοπός, καὶ πάντ' ἐπὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν καὶ
5 τοὺς ῥήτορας ἀνήρ' ἐπιμελῶς καινίζει καὶ τεχνάζεται, καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς οὕτω χρῆται χαίρων οὕτως ἤθους ιδιότητί τινι, δηλὸς ἐστὶν ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ ὅστις προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ἐπιμελέστερον ἐγκύπτει τοῖς αὐτοῦ λόγοις, συλλογίσαιτ' ἄν. 2 Ἄλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδεῶς πολλαχοῦ τῶν λόγων ἀνακηρύττει τοῦτο καὶ προ-
10 δείκνυσιν, ὡς κατὰ σκοπὸν οὕτω πειρᾶται, καὶ πειρᾶται γε συνέλκειν εἰς τοῦθ' ἅπαντας. 3 Οὕτω γε κομιδῇ κατὰ ῥητορικῆς παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ τῶν τότε μετὰ ταύτης κοπτόντων τὰ δικαστήρια σπουδάζει, μάλιστα τῶν ἐκείνου χρόνων ἀκμαζούσης αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν αὐτῇ χρωμένων ἐν Ἑλλησι, καὶ μάλιστ' Ἀθη-
15 νησι, 4 καὶ οὐδενὸς φείδεται πράγματος ἢ λόγου ἢ πάσης ἐπιμελείας, ῥητῆς τε καὶ μή, καὶ δικαίας καὶ μή, μετ' ἀληθείας ἐρεῖν, ὡς περ οἱ σφόδρ' ἐχθραίνοντες καθ' ὅτουοῦν, ὥστε καθελεῖν καὶ φλαῦρον ἀποδείξαι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορι- 169 κὴν πρᾶγμα, καὶ πάντα κάλλιστον καὶ κρατοῦν ἐν παντὶ καὶ βιωφελέστατον ἀνθρώποις φιλοσοφίαν.

3 Καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι μὲν τάνδρῳ συγγνωστόν, διὰ προσπάθειαν καὶ φιλαυτίαν τὰ οἰκεία καὶ περὶ ἃ σπουδάζειν εἴλετο πάσαις μηχαναῖς ἐξαίροντι, ὡς ἅπαντες ἄρ' εἰώθασιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅσοι κατὰ τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ὅσοι πολλῶ βέλτιον ἢ κατὰ τοὺς
25 πολλοὺς κρίνουσι καὶ συνορῶσι τάληθῆ καὶ δίκαι' ἐκάστοις. 2 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ φιλονεικότερον ὅμως πλεῖν ἢ ἔδει χρωμένου, καὶ νεμεσήσαι τις ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἔξω λόγου, εἰ δὲ μή, ῥαδίως οὐκ ἂν πείθοιτο νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τῆς ἀκαίρου σπουδῆς ταύτης μὴ καθάπαξ ὅσα καὶ ἀνδράποδον ἀλώσιμος ἀγόμενος. 3 Χρῆ γὰρ δι

26 φιλονεικότερον ex -ώτ- corr. P²

³ ἢν εὐδοκιμεῖν (1.6) ... ἔστιν συστρέφειν (1.7). Perhaps the change of tense is meant to stress the different roles played by rhetoric then (Athens in the 5th–4th century BC) and now (Metochites' own time).

or, rather, through which it is³ possible to sway the listeners according to one's wishes and confuse and obscure the truth of the matter.

2 That this is the aim of Plato's many admirable dialogues, that all his inventions and new practices are directed deliberately against rhetoric and the orators, and that he does not do this thoughtlessly, because he likes it this way owing to some specific trait in his character, is clear indeed, and everyone who looks into his works attentively and carefully is likely to draw this conclusion. 2 But he himself also openly declares this many times in his works,⁴ and he shows that he attempts this on purpose, and tries to persuade everybody else to do the same; 3 to that extent does he exert himself with all the means at his disposal against rhetoric and those who at that time were wearying the courthouses with it, for in his time rhetoric and those who used it flourished greatly among the Hellenes, and particularly at Athens; 4 he spares no action or word, or any measure, in words or otherwise, just or, to speak candidly, unjust, in the typical manner of those who are bitterly opposed to something, to condemn everything that has to do with rhetoric and expose it as inferior and worthless, and show that philosophy is absolutely the best [thing], valid on all occasions and most useful for human life.

3 And this may be forgiven the man, that he, because of his passionate attachment [to philosophy] and his self-love,⁵ uses every means to promote his own interest and that which he has chosen to study, as is the custom of all men, both those who judge like common people and those whose judgement and understanding of truth and what is right for everybody is much better than that of common people. 2 But [his conduct] is also that of a man who acts more contentiously than is proper, and it would not be unreasonable to censure this or at least not be easily persuaded, if one is discerning and does not submit to being led like a captive, overpowered by this ill-judged zeal. 3 For it is necessary both to respect and venerate the

⁴ Plato discusses rhetoric particularly in two dialogues, the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus* (cf. Kennedy 1980, 41–60). Especially in the *Gorgias* he is very critical of it; see e.g. the discussion between Socrates and Polos, 462b–466a, and the summary in 480a–481b.

⁵ Obviously Metochites thinks that self-love is allowed to a certain extent. Cf. 24.3.3 below, ἦν τις ἔξω τοῦ καιροῦ φιλαυτῆ, implying that it is also possible to love oneself καιρίως, and 25.2.2 φιλαυτία ... οὐκ ἀσύγγνωστον πρᾶγμα καθ' ἅπαξ.

καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον αἰδεῖσθαι τε καὶ τιμᾶν καὶ τοῖς γε δευτέροις ἀμηγέπη χώραν διδόναι καὶ μὴ παντάπασιν ἀσυνέτως ἔχειν, ἦν ἄρα τις ἔξω τοῦ καιροῦ φιλαυτῆ καὶ κατεπαίρηται τῶν δικαίων, ἐαυτῷ μάλιστα θαρρῶν ὡς οὐδενὸς ἀντιβλέποντος. 4 Ὡς ἄρα
 5 καὶ Πλάτων αὐτὸς τᾶλλα πάνυ τοι θαυμάζειν ἄξιος, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἀγωνίσμασιν ἐκφέρεται τοῦ μέτρου, κατατρέχων ἴσως ἄδικα καὶ συγγνώμης ἔξω τοῖς προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν.

10 | Ὅτι διὰ τὴν πρὸς Πλάτωνα μάχην σπουδάζειν ἠξίωσεν Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν: ΚΕ' 170

1 | Ὅπερ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀκαίρου διαμάχης καὶ φιλονεικίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν καὶ τοὺς τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐπιμελητὰς ἐπεσημηνάμεθα καὶ θαυμάζειν ἔχομεν, οὐκ ἀξιούντες ἀνεμεσήτως προσέχειν αὐτῷ, 2 τοῦθ' ὡσαύτως, ἢ μάλισθ' ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ πολλῷ γε πλεόν, θαυμάζειν ἔχομεν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὴν ἀμετρίαν αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ Πλάτωνος, τοῦ πάσης τῆς σοφίας ἡγεμόνος αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἀντιπολιτεῖαν πρὸς αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ ἀντίπραξις ξυνορᾶν βουλόμεθα πάντως, καὶ γνώμης οὐ χρηστῆς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου τιθέμεθα. 3 Πολὺ γὰρ
 20 τὸ φιλόνηκόν τε καὶ μάχιμον Πλάτωνι, καὶ ταῦτα ῥητορικῶ γε ὄντι, καὶ μετ' εὐγενοῦς ἀμέλει τῆς γλώττης κατὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πάντα τρόπον αἰρουμένῳ καὶ πράττοντι πρὸς αὐτὴν τάναντιώτατα καθὼς εἴρηται, καὶ οἱ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διάλογοι πιστοῦνται. 4 Καὶ πολὺ γε μηδὲν ἦττον ὅ τι μὴ καὶ μᾶλλον
 25 ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ κατὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι καὶ τρόποις πᾶσι καὶ χρήσει πολέμιον Ἀριστοτέλους, ὅς γε καὶ μὴ πεφυκῶς περὶ τὴν γλῶτταν εὔ, μῆδ' ὡς ἔοικεν ἀσκήσας εὐστομίας | ἐν- 171
 ἐργειαν, ῥητορικὸς τις εἶναι βούλεται, 5 καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς εὔ

6 τῆς om. E, non leg. M 13 ἔχομεν: εἶχομεν E, non leg. M 18 πάντως ex πάντας vel πάντες corr. P², πάντες E, non leg. M 19 ἀφιλοσόφου: fort. τοῦ φιλοσόφου E, non leg. M

best thing and to some extent allow what is second best, and not pretend to look the other way if someone loves himself beyond the appropriate measure and is arrogant towards what is right, having the greatest confidence in himself in the belief that no one will oppose him. ⁴ Thus also Plato himself, although he is indeed worthy of admiration in other respects, in his attacks on rhetoric is carried away beyond reason, trampling it I think unjustly and in a way that cannot be condoned by those who observe it.

25. That Aristotle decided to study rhetoric because of his opposition to Plato

1 As we have observed and have reason to wonder concerning Plato's inappropriate struggle and rivalry against rhetoric and its practitioners, since we do not think it right to agree with him uncritically,¹ **2** in the same way, or indeed much more, we have reason to wonder at a similar trait in Aristotle, and we certainly have no wish to play down² his lack of moderation towards the admirable Plato, his guide to the whole of wisdom, and his constant disagreement with and opposition against him, which we ascribe to a reprehensible and unphilosophical attitude. **3** For Plato is very competitive and aggressive against rhetoric, and this although he is himself rhetorical; he speaks with his noble tongue against rhetoric and takes sides against it and acts in opposition to it with every means, as was said earlier;³ the man's dialogues confirm this. **4** But Aristotle is no less, if not even more, hostile⁴ towards Plato in every word, every way and every action, since even though he has no natural ability for speech, nor as it seems any practice in the art of eloquence, he wants to be counted as an orator, **5** and without further ado claims to be a teacher of rhetoric

¹ Or: 'since we do not think that we can agree with him with impunity'. But it seems better to take ἀνεμεισήτως in an active sense.

² ξυνορῶν βουλόμεθα: literally, 'we want to see' or 'realise'. Cf. 24.3.3 ἀσυνέτως ἔχειν = 'pretend not to notice', 'look the other way'.

³ In *Sem.* 24.

⁴ *no less ... hostile*: compared with Plato's animosity towards rhetoric.

μάλ' ὡς βελτίστου κατὰ τὸν βίον χρήματος αὐτόθεν ἀξιοῖ δι-
 δάσκαλος εἶναι, καὶ βιβλία τῆ τῶν λόγων τέχνη συντάττει, καὶ
 ὅπως ἔστιν αὐτῆ χρηθῆσθαι νομοθετεῖ, μηδὲν δέον, μήδ' ἐξὸν ἴσως
 αὐτῷ κάλλιστ' ἐνταῦθα σπουδάζειν καὶ δεικνυσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ μό-
 5 νον δι' ἐναντιότητα καὶ πόλεμον πρὸς Πλάτωνα. 6 Καὶ τὸ δὴ
 χάριεν, ἐκεῖνος μὲν κατὰ ῥητορικῆς εὐγενῶς τῆ φωνῆ χρώμενος
 καὶ συγγράφων, οὗτος δ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διὰ πάντων ἀρρη-
 τόρευτος τὴν γλῶτταν καὶ τοῦ λέγειν ἀνάσκητος, 7 καὶ ἴσως μὲν
 ἐκὼν γε εἶναι χρώμενος οὕτως ἀποιήτως τε καὶ ἀκόσμως, καὶ
 10 τοῦτο διὰ τὸν πρὸς Πλάτωνα πόλεμον καὶ τὴν μάχην, τάναντία
 κἀνταῦθα πράττων ἐπίτηδες, ἴσως δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ἄκων γε ὄντως
 τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος ἄλλως ὀπηοῦν χρηθῆσθαι. 8 Φι-
 λονεικῶν δ' ὅμως καὶ ἅπαντ' ἀντιπράττων Πλάτωνι δηλὸς ἐσ-
 τιν ὁ ἀνὴρ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἢ πρόθεσις αὐτῷ ἐν οἷς περὶ ῥητορι-
 15 κῆς βιβλία συντάττει, καὶ τεχνιτεύει τὰ κατ' αὐτὴν ὡς ἂν κἀν-
 ταῦθα τάναντία πράττων ὀφῶτο, τὶ μὲν ἔξω τοῦ καιροῦ, τὶ δ' οὐ
 παντάπασι, αὐτῷ Πλάτωνι, 9 καὶ ἰ μάλιστ' ἐναντίως ἔτι κἀν- 172
 ταῦθα χρώμενος ἢ κατ' ἐκεῖνον ἀλλοτριωτάτῃ πάσης ἐπιμελεί-
 ας τῆ φωνῆ καὶ ἀπλάστῳ πάσης κατ' αὐτὸν ἀστειότητος, τὰ μὲν
 20 ὡς ἔοικε φύσει, τὰ δ' ἐπίτηδες, ὡς εἴρηται.

2 Οὕτω πολὺ φιλονεικῶς ἐχρήσαντ' ἀμφοτέροι καὶ τοῦ δι-
 καίου καὶ προσήκοντος ἀλογίστως, ὁ μὲν κατὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς
 καὶ τοῦ λογοειδοῦς, μηδὲν φειδόμενος τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τῆ διόλου
 τῶν διαλόγων χρήσει, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ κατὰ Πλάτωνος μὲν,
 25 ἀλλ' ὅμως ὑπὲρ ῥητορικῆς, καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐν διαλόγοις
 φθεγξάμενος, καὶ ταῦτα πλεῖσθ' ὅσα συγγεγραφῶς. 2 Καὶ φι-
 λουτία μὲν ἄμφω τῷ ἄνδρῳ τὸ κινήσαν εἰς ταῦτ' ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀσύγ-
 γνωστον πρᾶγμα καθάπαξ· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀσύγνωστον αὐθις, ἀλλ'
 Ἀριστοτέλει πλεόν ἢ Πλάτωνι. 3 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν μὲν ἴσως,
 30 προσποιεῖται δ' ὅμως κατολιγωρεῖν περὶ ἃ μάλιστ' ἐσπούδα-
 κεν· ὁ δὲ μηδὲν ἦττον ἀδικῶν τάληθές ἐαυτοῦ ποιεῖται καὶ σο-
 φίζεται (πῶς ἂν ἐπιεικῶς εἴποιμι;) ὧν αὐτῷ μὴ μέτεστι. 4 Καὶ ὁ

12 ἐκεῖνος; ἐκεῖνον E et ut vid. M 27 κινήσαν; κοινήσαν ut vid. E

as being the best thing in life; he writes books on the art of words, and lays down rules on how one can use it, and this although there is no need for him to do so (nor does he seem to be able to achieve or offer anything valuable in this field), but only because of his opposition and struggle against Plato. 6 And the amusing thing is that Plato writes against rhetoric in well-formulated language, whereas Aristotle everywhere writes on its behalf in an unrhetorical language, untrained in the art of speaking. 7 And perhaps he writes in this unstudied and uncouth manner voluntarily because of his fight and struggle against Plato, deliberately doing the opposite to him also here; or perhaps not, but actually involuntarily, and because he is incapable of writing in any other way. 8 But the man is openly aggressive and polemical against Plato in everything, and this is his object in his books on rhetoric; he writes technical instructions on rhetoric in order to be seen to do the absolute opposite to Plato also here—partly inappropriately, partly not— 9 and he writes in a completely contrary manner also here,⁵ with a language totally alien to every careful elaboration and without the elegance of Plato's style, partly as it seems by nature, partly, as I said, on purpose.

2 Thus the conduct of both was motivated by strong contentiousness, without regard for what is right and proper, one of them [acting] ruthlessly against rhetoric and speech-style, both in other ways and through his constant use of dialogues, Aristotle against Plato but at the same time on behalf of rhetoric, and uttering nothing whatsoever in dialogues, even though his writings are very numerous.⁶ 2 And it was self-love that moved both of them to this, a thing not completely inexcusable, but on the other hand if it is inexcusable, it is more so for Aristotle than for Plato. 3 For Plato, perhaps unjustly, nevertheless pretends to neglect that which he has studied very much. But Aristotle, acting in truth no less unjustly, tries with clever stratagems to appropriate—how shall I express it suitably?⁷—that in which he has no part. 4 Plato clearly disregards that which he

⁵ *κἀνταῦθα* occurs three times in seven lines, all with the meaning 'also here', viz. in the field of rhetoric.

⁶ Aristotle actually did write dialogues, a fact which must have been known to Metochites; cf. Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 2).

⁷ For *πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι* cf. above, pp. 48–49 n. 3.

μὲν ἠλόγηκεν ἂν κέκτηται προδήλως καὶ ὧν μὴ πολλοῦ τινος ἀξίαν τὴν ζημίαν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἦγηται, ὃ δ' ἀντιποιεῖται τῶν αὐτῶ μὴ προσηκόντων καὶ ἀξιοὶ θαυμάζειν ἂν ξύνοιδεν ἑαυτῶ μὴ περὶ πλείονος ἄγοντι. 5 Καὶ ὁ μὲν οἷς οὐδέν τι κοινὸν ἔχειν νομίζει τάναντί' αἰρεῖται, ἄδικα μὲν | ἀλλ' οὐ καθάπαξ συγ- 173 γνώμης ἔξω, ὁ δὲ τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἐκ τῶν δικαίων καὶ οἷς πλειστά οἱ κοινὰ καὶ βίου καὶ σοφίας μετ' ἀληθείας κοινὴ πρόθεσις, καὶ οἷς ἀναγκαῖα τιμῆς πάσης ὀφλήματ' ἔχει, πᾶσι τρόποις ἐπανίσταται καὶ τάναντί' ἐπείγεται πολιτεύεσθαι διὰ πάντων πραγ- 10 μάτων.

‘Ὅτι τῶ ἀπλῶ καὶ ἀτημελήτῳ τῆς φωνῆς
φιλοσοφία οἰκείως ἔχει: ΚΣ’

1 Τό γέ τοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν οἰκείον ἐν τῶ λέγειν ἀπλοϊκόν τέ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄκομψον, καὶ οὐδὲν μήποτ' ἐπιμελὲς ἦθῶν 15 τε καὶ σχημάτων καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ ῥήματα συνθέσεως ὅλως, κἀνταῦθα δὴ πρῶτον τὸ γενναῖον αὐτίκα φιλοσοφίας ὄραται καὶ ἐλευθέριον, καὶ μὴ τισιν ἐπίτηδες κόσμοις ἔξωθεν καλλυνόμενον. 2 Οὐ γὰρ μέλει τῆς γλώττης τῶ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ὀρηοῦν ἄλλως ἢ ὥστε καὶ φέρειν ἔξω μόνον τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰς τοῦ λο- 20 γικοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐνεργείας καὶ διαγγέλλειν νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, τοῦτο μὲν προβλήματα θεωρίας, τοῦτο δὲ συμπεράσματα καὶ καρπούς. 3 Ἡ δὲ περὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἐπιμέλεια περιέργον εἶναι φιλοσόφοις μάλιστα δοκεῖ, καὶ πᾶν ὃ μήποτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐν δευτέρῳ τίθενται, καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ μόνου τ' εἰσὶ καὶ τοῦ πό- 25 θου περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων θεωρίαν καὶ ἐπίσκεψιν, καὶ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀνεπίδεικτον χρῆσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης παραλαμβάνουσι διακο- 174 νικῶς κατὰ χρεῖαν ἀπαραίτητον. 4 Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἀγγέλ-

1 ὧν: τὴν E, non leg. M 19 ἄλλως: ἄλλων E, non leg. M 22 περιέργον: πάρεργον E, non leg. M 24 τ': γ' E, non leg. M 26 ἀνεπίδεικτον ex ἀνεπέδεικτον ut vid. corr. E χρῆσιν: καὶ E, non leg. M παραλαμβάνουσι E et ex προσ- corr. P¹, non leg. M

has acquired, the loss of which he actually does not regard as very serious. But Aristotle tries to acquire what does not belong to him and decides to pretend to admire something that he is conscious of really not appreciating. ⁵ Plato chooses the opposite to those people with whom he considers himself to have nothing in common, unjustly, it is true, but not completely inexcusably. But Aristotle revolts with all means against those who ought justly to be dearest to him, with whom he has most in common and, to speak the truth, shares the same goal in both life and philosophy and to whom he owes inescapable debts of honour, and strives to do the opposite to them on all occasions.

26. That a simple and unadorned language is typical of philosophy

¹ The language typical of philosophy is naturally simple and unadorned, in no way aiming at characterisation or rhetorical figures or [conscious] composition of words in general (and here one immediately sees the nobility and liberality of philosophy), and not deliberately embellished with external ornaments.¹ ² For the philosopher is not the least interested in language in any way except to bring out to the general public the logical activities natural to man and set out the problems of investigation, as well as the conclusions and results of his mind and thought. ³ But to philosophers concern for the language seems superfluous, and everything that is not necessary they regard as being of secondary importance; they are only interested in their goal and their endeavour concerning the investigation and exploration of reality, and they adopt an unadorned use of language as an additional help because it cannot be avoided. ⁴ For it is not possible to

¹ A well-established idea; cf. Tartaglia 1987, 358 (quotations from Synesius' *Dio* and Joseph the Philosopher). For a discussion of the present essay, other passages in Metochites' work relating to the theme, and Metochites' own language, see Bydén (below, pp. 273–87).

λειν τᾶνδον, οὐδὲ ψυχαῖς μόναις καὶ διανοίαις συνεῖναι καὶ
 κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, ὡς ἄρ' ἴσως τὰ θεϊότερα κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ
 ὅλως ἐλεύθερα τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῖς ἔξω σοφοῖς
 δοκεῖ, 5 ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη μέχρις ἂν καὶ ζῶμεν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος
 15 καὶ ἀλλήλοις συζῆν καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ συνεῖναί γε σωματικῶς.
 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ χρηστέον γέ ἐστιν ὅτι δὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τοῖς κατὰ
 τὸ σῶμα, ἄλλοις τέ φημι πᾶσι πράγμασι καὶ μηδὲν ἦττον αὐτῇ
 τῇ φωνῇ, μηδὲν ἐπιποιοῦντας μηδὲ πράγματ' ἔχοντας ἐν οἷς μὴ
 δεῖ. 6 Ἄλλ' ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τόπον κινήσει καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην
 10 ἐκάστοτε χρειὰ προσχρώμεθα τῇ πορείᾳ καὶ τοῖς ποσὶν ἀπλῶς
 οὕτωςί πως καὶ οὐδὲν προσπεριεργαζόμεθα τῇ ἀπαραιτήτῳ χρή-
 σει σχήματά τινα καὶ ὑποκρίσεις, 7 ὡσαύτως δὴτ' ἀμέλει καὶ
 περὶ τὸ λέγειν ἀξιόφι φιλοσοφία κινεῖσθαι, ἀπλοϊκῶς οὕτωςί
 καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, 1 μηδὲν ἔπειτα περινοοῦντας ἐπὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ 175
 15 πόνον τινὰ καὶ φροντίδα τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν χρήσει προστι-
 θέντας.

2 Καὶ ὀρώμεν γὰρ οὕτω πάντας πλὴν ὀλίγων πάνυ τοι τῶν
 τῇ φιλοσόφῳ προθέσει καθάπαξ ἑαυτοὺς δεδωκότων οὕτω χρω-
 μένους τῷ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ὅλως ὄντας, καὶ τὴν τῶν
 20 ὄντων πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ κατασκόπησιν καὶ κατάληψιν μό-
 νον ἔργον ἔχοντας, 2 καὶ μηδὲν ἐπιστρεφομένους τῆς κατὰ τὴν
 γλῶτταν χάριτος καὶ τοῦ κατακοσμεῖν κἀντεῦθεν τοῖς ἔξωθεν
 τῶν νοημάτων περιβλήμασιν αὐτὰ τὰ νοήματα, καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν
 οὕτωςί πως ἀπλοϊκῶς ἐκφέροντας ῥήμασιν οἷστισι δὴ τὰ ἐκ φι-
 25 λοσοφίας καὶ ἀποιήτως κάλλους καὶ χρώματος παντός. 3 Ἐπεὶ
 καὶ ἴσως ἐργῶδες ἂν εἴη κατ' ἄμφω μερίζεσθαι καὶ ἐπιμελῶς
 ἔχειν, καὶ κατ' ἄμφω γὰρ ἂν εἴη μὴ παντὸς τοῦ προσήκοντος
 τυγχάνειν μῆδ' ἀνυσίμως χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥστε καὶ ἐκατέρου διὰ
 θάτερον ἀπολείπεσθαι. 4 Καὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις γὰρ δόγμασιν
 30 οὐκ εὐφυῶς ἔχει προσαρμόζειν διάθεσις εὐστομίας ὑπερηρμένη
 καὶ κρατυνομένη δι' ἐπιμελείας καὶ κομμωτικῆς κομψείας, ἀλλ'

1 τᾶνδον: πάροδον E, non leg. M 25 κάλλους καὶ χρώματος παντός: παν-
 τὸς κάλλους καὶ χρώματος E et p. c. M

proclaim one's inner thoughts in any other way; nor is it possible to communicate with each other by means of our souls and thoughts alone, in the way that perhaps those beings do that are essentially more divine and completely liberated from bodily matter, as we and the pagan wise men believe. 5 But as long as we live together with the body we must live together with and deal with each other, and do so with the help of our bodies. Therefore we must by necessity use what belongs to the body, I mean both all the other parts and not least the voice itself, without adding anything or troubling ourselves with that which is not necessary. 6 But as in the case of motion in space and any other necessary need we proceed simply with the help of our feet, not trying to elaborate their inevitable use with gestures and histrionics, 7 in exactly the same way does philosophy deem that one should move in the case of language, in a simple and natural way, not trying to elaborate the [plain] voice or add any effort or care to the interpretative use of language.

2 And we can see that once men have given themselves to the pursuit of philosophy, all but very few write² in this manner. They are completely dedicated to the mind, and their whole activity is in dealing with, investigating and understanding reality. 2 They do not care the least for elegance of expression or, in consequence, for embellishing their thoughts with ornaments external to those thoughts; we see that they communicate their philosophical tenets in a simple manner, all anyhow using those words that come to mind, in a way unaffected by any [striving for] Beauty or adornment. 3 For it would probably be [too] arduous to divide one's attention and dedicate oneself to both aspects,³ and the result would be a failure to achieve all that which is expected and to be successful in one's work, so that one would miss both objects, each because of the other. 4 And a disposition towards rhetoric, intensified and strengthened by care and embellishing refinement, does not fit in a natural manner with the philo-

² *all ... write*: literally, 'speak': cf. φωνή above, 26.1.7, and *Sem.* 2.

³ *both aspects*: i.e., form and content.

ἀπλαστία καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεπιτήδευτος χρῆσις ἐπιπρέπει. 5
 Καὶ τὰ παρὰ φιλοσόφου ἕξεως ἐνεργήματα προϊόντα καὶ πηγάζοντα οὐκ ἔχει πως οἰκείως πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ λείγειν ἀβρότητα, 176
 ἀλλ' ἀσυνδύαστα καὶ ἀσύνδετα ταῦθ' ὡς ἐπιπλείστον. 6 Τὸ
 5 μὲν γὰρ αὐτοφυές, τὸ δ' ἐπιποίητον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐνούσιόν τι χρῆμα, τὸ δὲ δόξης τε καὶ φαντάσματος ἥρτηται καὶ ὅλως ἐπιπλόλαιον χρωματίζεται, καὶ τὸ συνάπτειν τὰλλοτριώτατα παντάπασιν οὕτω πειρᾶσθαι οὔτ' ἐρραστωνευμένον, 7 καὶ φθείρειν ἔστιν ἀμφοτέρα καὶ ἀναξίως καὶ ἀνικάνως ἀποδιδόναι τῆς
 10 προσηκούσης ἀρετῆς ἑκατέρῳ. Καὶ ἴσως μὲν ἂν εἴη τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν τὰ ἀσύγκλωστα συνδεῖν, οὐ μὴν φαίη τις ἂν αὐθις, ἐξ ἄμμων πλέκειν, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν λόγον, σχοινία. 8 Οὐ γὰρ εἰκάσει τις τῇ ἀτοπία τῆς παροιμίας ταύτης κατὰ καιρόν, εἴ τις πειρῶτο συνάπτειν τὰ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κραταιὰ καὶ σεμνὰ
 15 λεκτικῇ δῆθεν συντονία τε καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὴν τοῦ χρυσοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εὐγένειαν ἐπικοσμεῖν ἀξιοίη γραφικῶς τισιν ἐκ βαφῶν ἐπανθίσμασιν.

11 τὰ ἀσύγκλωστα συνδεῖν: cf. Syn., *Ep.* 57 (41), 65.6–7; *Suda* Π 1917 12
 ἐξ ἄμμων πλέκειν — σχοινία: Aesop., *Prov.* 10 in *CPG* II 229.3; Greg. Cyr. III 46 in *CPG* II 114.3; *Suda* E 1536; cf. Aristid., *Πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ τῶν τετάρων* 309.29 Jebb

1 ἐπιπρέπει: ἐπιτρέπει E, non leg. M 8 πειρᾶσθαι + καὶ E, non leg. M 10
 εἴη add. P¹ 11 συνδεῖν: συνδεῖναι E, non leg. M

sophical tenets, but sincerity and a natural artlessness are appropriate. 5 The results that emerge and flow forth from the occupation with philosophy somehow do not go well with an ornate language, but the two are mostly incompatible and cannot be combined. 6 For the one is spontaneous, the other created; the one, something inherent, the other dependent on appearance and phenomena, and coloured altogether superficially. And to try to join in this manner things completely different is not easy; 7 one runs the risk of destroying both, and rendering both in a way unworthy and falling short of the virtue proper to each. And perhaps to do this would be, as the saying goes, to *join what cannot be combined*.⁴ For one would not, again, referring to another dictum, say that it is to *twine ropes out of sand*.⁵ 8 It would not be appropriate to refer to this bizarre dictum if someone should attempt to join the powerful and exalted dogmas of philosophy with exertion and care for the language, but it would rather be as if they presumed to embellish the natural purity of gold by painting it with colours.

⁴ Cf. Synesius, *Ep.* 57 (41), 65.6–7 πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἱερωσύνη συνάπτειν συγκλώθειν ἐστὶ τὰ ἀσύγκλωστα, quoted in *Suda* Π 1917. The phrase τὰ ἀσύγκλωστα συγκλώθειν also occurs in some philosophical writers: Proclus, *In Rep.* 1.63; John Philoponus, *In Phys.*, *CAG* 16: 34, 320, 475, 478 (cf. also *De aet. mundi* 461.20); Simplicius, *In Epict.* 19.35. Metochites weakens the effect of the proverb by writing συνδεῖν instead of συγκλώθειν (or perhaps he considered such a variation to be elegant).

⁵ *Suda* E 1536 ἐξ ἄμμου σχοινίον πλέκεις· ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων. Most occurrences of this dictum in TLG have ἐξ ἄμμου; Metochites' variant, ἐξ ἄμμων, is not found. Aelius Aristides (*Πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων* 309.29 Jebb) has ἐκ τῆς ψάμμου (v.l. ἐκ τῆς ἄμμου; see the edition of Lenz & Behr, p. 515). Nevertheless it cannot be excluded that Metochites (who is probably quoting from memory) has been inspired by Aristides. For other echoes of Aristides in the *Semeioseis*, cf. above, notes on *Sem.* 3.1.6 (p. 35 n. 5), 8.1.4 (p. 85 n. 3), 10.1.1 (pp. 96–97 n. 1), 10.1.6 (p. 99 n. 6), and 12.5.2 (p. 121 n. 7). One of Metochites' *Logoi* treats of Demosthenes and Aristides (ed. Gigante 1965).

I Περὶ Πλουτάρχου: ΟΑ'

1 Περὶ δὲ Πλουτάρχου καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν περιουσίας
 τάνδρὸς μεμνημένον νῦν ῥάδιον μὲν ἴσως ἐρεῖν ἅττα δὴ καὶ ὡσ-
 περ ἐκ πολλῶν παρόντων μετ' ἀδείας ἀπάσης ἔχοντα λαβέσθαι
 5 τινῶν ἀμέλει μετρίων. 2 Ἴσως δ' οὐ πάνυ τοι ῥάδιον οὐδὲ παντὶ
 χρήσασθαι καὶ πολλῶν παρόντων ἀπολεξάμενον ἅττα δὴ προ-
 λαβεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοῦ ποιήσασθαι· ῥητέον δ' ὅπως ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ
 λόγῳ μνησθέντι νῦν εἶναι τυχὸν οὕτω δὴ μνησθῆναι, 3 πάντως
 δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἅττ' ἂν βουλοίμεθα καὶ οἷοί τ' εἶημεν ἐρεῖν,
 10 καὶ πρὸς οὐδεμίαν ἀνάγκην παραβαλλόμεθα, οὐδ' ἔχοι τις
 ἡμῶν ὀφειλόμενον πράττεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς γ' ἔτι καὶ εὐθύ-
 νειν ὅμως, ἢν μὴ τὸ εἰκὸς ἐξεῖη γε νῦν ἡμῖν ἀποδιδόναι.

2 Πλουτάρχῳ τοίνυν φύσις τε ἔοικε πρὸς πᾶσαν σοφίαν εὐ-
 θηκτος εἶναι, καὶ ῥᾶστ' ἔχει χρῆσθαι περὶ πάντα καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν
 15 τῶν κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν εἰδῶν τε καὶ μερῶν ἀποπέφυκεν ἀνὴρ,
 ὅστις εὖ μάλα πειρώμενος ξυνορᾶν ἔχοι καὶ κατασυλλογίζε-
 σθαι, 2 ὡσπερ ἄρα πολλοὶ τινες τῶν εὐγυνῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ 464
 ἀστείων πάλαι τε καὶ ἴσως νῦν πρὸς τάδε μὲν ἔχουσι τῶν τῆς
 σοφίας κατὰ φύσιν εὖ ἀνύτειν καὶ χρῆσθαι, πρὸς τάδε δ' οὐ,
 20 ἀλλ' ἔχουσι δυσαγῶγος καὶ δυσξύμβλητοὶ πῶς εἰσιν, ὥστε καὶ
 ῥᾶστα συνεῖναι ὡσπερ καὶ οἰσισινοῦν ἄλλοις τῶν τῆς σοφίας
 κομμάτων καὶ τυποῦσθαι. 3 Καὶ τινες μὲν ἄλλων ἄλλοι παρὰ
 τὰ πλείω πεφύκασιν καὶ τὰ πλείονος ἴσως ἄξια λόγου, τινὲς δ'
 οὐ, πρὸς ἐλάττω δὲ ἅττα δὴ καὶ τῶν ἐν πλείονι λόγῳ καὶ τῶν ἐν
 25 δευτέρῳ τοῖς ἐρασταῖς τῶν καλῶν καὶ φιλολόγοις. 4 Πλούταρχος
 δ' ἦπερ ἔφην οἰκείως τε ἔχει τῇ φύσει πρὸς πάντα καὶ ἂ βού-

5 ἀμέλει μετρίων ex μετρίων ἀμέλει corr. P¹ 16-17 κατασυλλογίζεσθαι: κατα
 vix leg. P 20 δυσαγῶγος: γρ. ἀνα in marg. add. P¹, ἀνα s. l. M, p. c. E
 24 λόγῳ: λόγῳ P, non leg. M

¹ μεμνημένον νῦν: in *Sem.* 70, 460-62 MK. A detailed analysis of the present
 essay, with a brief account of Plutarch's *Nachleben* in late antiquity and Byzant-
 tium, is found in Tartaglia (1987); see also Arco Magri (1991). For the reader's

71. On Plutarch

1 As to Plutarch, whom I mentioned a moment ago,¹ and his abundance of wisdom, it is perhaps easy to say some things, and as from a great store safely² pick a number of items. **2** On the other hand, perhaps it is no easy task not to use everything, but to pick out, select and adopt only some of those many things. But it must be said that, as it occurred to me to mention Plutarch in my text just now, this happened by chance.³ **3** It is entirely up to me what I may wish and be able to say; my venture is not dictated by necessity, and no one will be able to exact any outstanding debt or censure me, if I should prove incapable of producing what is due.⁴

2 Plutarch seems to have a natural talent for the whole of wisdom; he is able to write with the greatest ease about everything and is not by nature unsuited for any kind or branch of education (as anyone who studies him carefully can understand and conclude), **2** in the way that many noble and cultured men in the past, and perhaps also nowadays, have a natural talent for achieving good results in some branches of wisdom but not in others, where they are poorly guided⁵ and unintelligent, so that they would have a better understanding and stamp of, as it were, any other section of wisdom [than these]. **3** Some people are naturally suited for great subjects,⁶ such as are perhaps of higher importance, whereas others are not, but instead [are fit to treat of] things more lowly than those of the highest or second highest worth to scholars and lovers of Beauty. **4** But Plutarch, as I

convenience I reproduce a number of Tartaglia's references to Plutarch in the following notes.

² μετ' ἀδείας: Tartaglia (1987, 346) sees here a possible allusion to Maximos Planoudes' recent (i.e., recent to someone writing ca. 1320) editorial work on Plutarch. Arco Magri rather thinks that we have here an instance of an idea recurring now and then in Metochites, that of the library where one can 'easily' find what one needs (1991, 471, referring to Gigante 1982, 366); cf. also below, 71.7.8 (p. 231 and n. 25).

³ ὅπως ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ μνησθέντι νῦν εἶναι τυχὸν οὕτω δὴ μνησθῆναι, translation uncertain.

⁴ Tartaglia (1987, 346) takes—wrongly, I think—ἡμῖν as indirect object of ἀποδιδόναι rather than with ἐξεῖη.

⁵ δυσαγώγως and P's *graphetai* variant ἀναγώγως obviously mean the same thing.

⁶ *great subjects*: τὰ πλείω.

λοιτ' ἂν τῶν τῆς παιδείας μείζω τε καὶ ἤττω, καὶ οὐδὲν μάλλον
οὐδ' ἤττον τῆδε ἢ τῆδε, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐραστής ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν
ἔστιν οὐ μὴ καὶ ἄπτεσθαι δεῖν ἠγεῖται τῆ περι πάντ' ἀπληστίᾳ
καὶ λιχνείᾳ πάσης πολυμαθίας καὶ φιλοπλουτίας πάντων δὴ
5 τῶν βελτίστων, 5 ἂ κατὰ μέρη τινὲς ἀποτεμνόμενοι, καὶ ὡς ἂν
ἀμέλει δύναιντό τε καὶ αἰροῖντο, περὶ ταῦθ' ὅλως τὸν ἅπαντα
βίον τρίβουσι καὶ ἀποχρώντως ἔχειν καὶ ἱκανῶς οἴονται, καὶ
ἀξιοῦσι τιμᾶσθαι καὶ προσέχειν σφίσιν ἅπαντας, 6 ἢ φύσεως
ὀλιγότητι ἢ τοῦ περὶ τὰ κάλλιστ' ἔρωτος, ὀλιγαρκείς τινες | καὶ 465
10 οὐκ ἀηδῶς ὀλίγοις οἴσισιν ἄρα χρώμενοι. 7 Πλουτάρχῳ δὲ
πρὸς πάνθ' ἡ φύσις ὡς ἔφην οἰκείως ἔχει καὶ πάντων ἐμέλησεν
αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀποτυγχάνει γε σπουδάσας, εἰ καὶ μάλλον ἐπὶ τι-
νων ἀνύσας ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἄλλα δὴ, περὶ ἂ μὴ πλείστον τῆς σχο-
λῆς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ἠξίωσε νεῖμαι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγορήσας ἀμωσγέπως τὰ
15 δεύτερα περὶ ταῦτα φέρεται.

3 Φιλοσοφίαν μὲν γὰρ προΐσταται τοῦ βίου, καὶ ταύτη γε
μάλιστα δῆλός ἐστι χρώμενος καὶ λέγων καὶ βιοτεύων, καὶ
ταύτης γέ τοι μάλιστα τῷ γνωστικῷ τε καὶ κριτικῷ περὶ τὴν τοῦ
βίου χρῆσιν. 2 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ τὰ πλείω τῶν αὐτῷ ξυγγεγραμ-
20 μένων εἰς ἥθους νομοθεσίαν φέρει καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπικρίσεις καὶ
πρακτέων ἐπιμέλειαν, καὶ βασανίζει τὰ γεγονότα τοῖς πρὸ αὐ-
τοῦ καὶ οἷς χρῆ βιοῦν. 3 Δογματικῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν φύσιν ἤττον
αὐτῷ μέλει, ἢ ὧν εἴρηται, ἔτι δ' ἀμφοῖν ἤττον, καὶ πολλῷ γε μὴν
τοῦτο δῆλον, τῶν μαθηματικῶν αὐτῷ μέλει· δῆλος δ' ὅμως καὶ
25 οὕτως ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνικάνως ἔχων πρὸς ταῦτα, οὐδὲ καθάπαξ
ἀποποιούμενος. 4 Πόθεν; ὅς γε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Σταϊκοὺς ἀπομά-
χεται καὶ περὶ τε φυσικὰ δόγματα καὶ περὶ πάντ' ἄλλα κατελέγ-
χει, καὶ κατελέγχει γε τάναντιώτατα μὴ μόνον τοῖς οὔσιν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἑαυτοῖς λέγοντας. 5 Καὶ ὅλως πολὺς ἐστι κατ' αὐτῶν, οἷ

18 τοι: τι E, non leg. M 25 ἀνικάνως: ἀνίκανος ME

⁷ Tartaglia (1987, 347–48) suggests that this may be a sneer at Metochites' antagonist Nikephoros Choumnos.

said, is naturally at home with everything and anything he likes of the important or less important parts of education, and there is nothing [of which his command is] in any way greater or smaller. He is a lover of all things at once, and to him there is nothing not worth trying, since he is insatiable in everything, greedy to acquire every kind of learning, and desirous of becoming rich in all the highest things. 5 These highest things others cut up in different parts, and, each according to his ability and preference, spend their whole lives engaged in these parts, thinking that their work is admirable and sufficient, demanding that everybody should honour and take notice of them.⁷ 6 This they do because of the feebleness of either their nature or their love of the highest things, being men who are contented with little and perform not badly in a few areas, whatever they may be. 7 But Plutarch, as I have already said, has an innate aptitude for everything. All subjects are of interest to him, and he never fails in his efforts, even though he achieves more in some fields than in others on which, it seems to me, he decided not to spend most of his study, but since (in a manner of speaking) he neglected them, his performance was [only] second-best.

3 For he considers philosophy to be the most important thing in life, and clearly puts it to good use both in his writings and in his own life, especially the part concerned with finding out and deciding how we should lead our lives. 2 Therefore most of his writings pertain to ethical precepts, political judgements, and considerations regarding rightful conduct, and he judges actions and events by comparing them with historical events and with ethical rules.⁸ 3 Natural science interests him less than the things I mentioned,⁹ and mathematics even less—in fact, clearly much less—than these two. Even so, he shows that he does not lack knowledge in these subjects, or reject them altogether. 4 How could he—seeing that he polemicises against the Stoics and refutes them both regarding their beliefs on nature and in all other matters, too? And he proves that not only is their doctrine in the sharpest contradiction to Reality, but they even contradict themselves.¹⁰ 5 On the whole he is a fierce critic of the Stoics, the

⁸ *historical events* (τοις πρὸ αὐτοῦ): less probably masc., ‘[the actions of] those who lived before him’.

⁹ *Natural science*: δογματικῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν φύσιν, ‘theoretical [philosophy] concerning nature’.

466
 μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων αἰρέσεων ἤκμασαν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ
 χρόνων καὶ μικρὸν ἔτι πρὸ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ μετ' αὐτόν, καὶ
 μάλιστα φιλοσόφων περὶ τὸ δογματικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν ἐσπούδα-
 σαν, καὶ τεχνολογίαν τινὰ δι' ἀσκήσεως πάσης τὴν περὶ ταῦτα
 5 λέσχην καὶ τὸν πολὺν πόνον ἐπεδείξαντο. 6 Ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ οὐκ
 ὀλίγας ἐκδόσεις περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αὐτὸς προβλημάτων φιλοπο-
 νεῖ καὶ μάλ' ἐπιμελῶς ἐπεξεργάζεται, καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν μαθη-
 ματικὴν ἕξιν ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν αὐτοῦ μέμνηται μετ' ἐπικρίσεων,
 ὡς ἀμέλει σχολάσας μάλιστ' ἐν τούτοις. 7 Καὶ λέγειν ἱκανὸς
 10 κομιδῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχηγέτας καὶ τοὺς ἐξαίρετους αὐτῶν πρὸ αὐ-
 τοῦ, Πυθαγόραν καὶ τοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ Εὐκλείδην καὶ Πλάτω-
 να καὶ Ἰπάρχους, καὶ Ἀρχιμήδην καὶ ὅσοι τοῦ κατ' αὐτοῦ
 χοροῦ καὶ συντάγματος ἀναφέρων· οὐπω γὰρ δὴ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν
 ἔτι τότε Πτολεμαῖοι καὶ Θέωνες. 8 Καὶ ὅλως περὶ πάντα τῆς φι-
 15 λσοφίας εἶδη τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν φιλομαθὲς καὶ πολυαρκές, καὶ τὰς
 μακρὰς οὐσίας καὶ τοὺς ἐνόντας θησαυροὺς τῆς σοφίας ἐπιδείκ-
 νυται. 9 Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα ἂν ἀλγήσαι καὶ ὀργῇ χρῆσα-
 σθαι, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἐξωθεῖ τῶν γε τοιούτων ὅπως ἄρα εἴτ' ἄκοντά
 γε ἦ καὶ ἴσως ἐκόντα, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν δεινῷ θέσθαι ὡς μέγιστα
 20 τῆς αὐτοῦ πολυμαθίας ἀφαιρούμενος.

467
 14 Φιλοτιμώτατος γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα γενέσθαι δοκεῖ μοι περὶ
 πᾶσαν εἶδησιν καὶ πολυμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην ὁ ἀνὴρ, οὐκ οἶδ' ὡς
 εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος σοφῶν, 2 καὶ πάντ'
 ἐκμαθεῖν ἐπιδείκνυται τὰ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῶν ὀπηοῦν πονησάν-
 25 των αὐτῇ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἰδέαν καὶ πάνθ' ὡς ἀληθῶς πράγματα
 πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐδὲν εὐπερι-
 φρόνητον ἔοικε νομίζειν πρὸς ἀπλῆν μάθησιν καὶ πείραν τῶν τε
 ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ θείων. 3 Καὶ πᾶσι κοινός ἐστιν ἐπόπτης, ὅς γε
 καὶ οὐδεμιᾶ δὴ τινι τῶν κατὰ φιλοσόφους αἰρέσεων πρόσκει-

2 πῶ: πᾶν M et ut vid. E 6 τῶν: om. E, non leg. M 8 μέμνηται: αι non leg. P 9 ἱκανὸς ex ἱκανῶς corr. P² 21 δὴ μάλιστα: μάλιστα δὴ ME

¹⁰ Plut., *De Stoic. repugn.* 41–44, 1052f–1055c (see Tartaglia 1987, 348 n. 33).

¹¹ Tartaglia (1987, 349 n. 34) gives the following references to Plutarch: *De primo frigido*, *Quaestiones physicae*, and various passages in the *Moralia*

most flourishing philosophical school in his day, and also for some time before and after him. Of all philosophers they were the most concerned with the study of natural science, and they took great pains to turn their discussions and hard toil in this field into a systematic discipline. 6 Furthermore Plutarch himself wrote several carefully elaborated books on physical problems, and in many places in his works he mentions and gives his opinion on mathematical problems, an indication that he has studied them a great deal.¹¹ 7 He is qualified to enter into discussion with the leading and most illustrious mathematicians among his predecessors, making references to Pythagoras and his followers, Euclid, Plato, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and all those who belong to their entourage and following. For men like Ptolemy and Theon had not yet appeared in his time. 8 In general, concerning every branch of philosophy, he is eager for knowledge and highly talented, showing himself to be in possession of vast resources and inner treasures of wisdom. 9 And I believe that he would have been greatly distressed and angry if someone had dispossessed him of these things, against his will or otherwise,¹² and he would have been most offended and considered that they had deprived him of the greatest part of his wide-ranging learning.

4 For it seems to me that he was extremely ambitious concerning every kind of knowledge, wide-ranging learning and memory, more so, I think, than any other wise man from time immemorial, 2 and he shows that he has memorised everything that has ever been written by anybody within the field of wisdom before his time, in every subject—in truth, everything done by practically everybody. It seems that he did not despise anything [conducive] to unqualified knowledge and experience of things human and divine. 3 He is an impartial judge of everything; he does not belong to any particular philosophi-

where arithmetical, geometrical, and astronomical problems are discussed, e.g. *De Iside et Osiride* 367e–368e and 373a–374b; *De E apud Delphos* 387d–391e; *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 1047c–e.

¹² It seems that Metochites unthinkingly uses the common pair ἄκοντα–ἐκόντα, although only the first term fits the context (it is nonsense to say that Plutarch would be distressed if someone tried to deprive him of something *with his consent*). Or perhaps the expression should be taken not with αὐτὸν, i.e., Plutarch, but with τις, the person who would deprive him of his rights, but I doubt whether Metochites could commit such a gross syntactical error.

ται, οὐδ' ἀπ' αὐτῆς εἶναι βούλεται καὶ καλεῖσθαι ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ ἄλλοι πάντες σχεδὸν τῶν φιλοσοφίας τροφίμων (καὶ μάλιστα ἦν τοῦτό γ' ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ χρόνων καὶ μικρὸν πρὸς ἔτι καὶ μετ' αὐτόν), 4 οὐδὲ Πλατωνικός τις οὐδ' Ἀριστοτελικὸς εἴτουν ἐκ
 5 τοῦ περιπάτου ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισιν μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττόν γε μὴν ἠξίωσε βιώσαι τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ ἰδί' ἀποτεμόμενος ἑαυτὸν νεῖμαί τινι τούτων χρήσει καὶ κλήσει, 5 ἀλλὰ πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι πρὸς αὐτοῦ ποιεῖται καὶ οὐδὲν μήποτ' ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ κοινὸν ἰ φίλον ἑαυ- 468 τὸν τάττει τοῖς ἐξαιρέτοις τῆς πάσης φιλοσοφίας καὶ καθηγεμό-
 10 σι πᾶσι. 6 Καὶ ὡσπερ Ἑλλανοδίκης τις καὶ κριτῆς ἐπόπτης ἄνωθεν ἦκων τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀγόνων καὶ ἀθλητῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστῶν, οὐδενὶ προῖκα ἀξιοῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ προσίεται μὲν τὰ ἐκάστων καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐξ ἀπάντων συντέλειαν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῷ βίῳ, πάντων δ' ἀποφέρεται καὶ κερδαίνειν
 15 ἀξιοῖ τὸ χρήσιμον τῷ γ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ βίῳ καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ.

5 Καὶ τὰ πάντων ἐπικρίνων μάλιστα ἠγδῶς ἔχει καὶ ἀπεναντίας φέρεται τοῖς ἐξ Ἐπικούρου, καὶ πάντ' ἀντιπράττει καὶ κατεπίγεται τοῦδε τοῦ συστήματος ὅλη ρύμη γνώμης· καὶ γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα εἰκέναι μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς προθέσει τοῦ
 20 βίου τε καὶ τῶν λόγων. 2 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ καὶ κοσμιότητος πάσης περὶ τὸν βίον διδάσκαλος καὶ πάσης περὶ τὸ θεῖον εὐλαβείας, οὐδὲν ἀπαξιῶν οὐδ' ἀπαθούμενος καὶ ἀτιμάζων τῶν ἄλλων παρ' ἄλλοις νομίμων τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀγιστείας. 3 Ἐπίκουρος δὲ πᾶν τὸνναντίον φιλονεικεῖ καὶ κατελέγειν πει-
 25 ρᾶται καὶ περιτρέπειν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐποπτείαν καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ πάντ' ἀνθρώπων περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμιμα, καὶ διδάσκαλος ὑβρεῶς ἐστὶ πάσης καὶ ἀκοσμίας περὶ τε τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἰ ἐπιμέλειαν, 4 ὡς οὐδὲν ἐντεύθεν ὄνή- 469

7-8 αὐτοῦ scripsi: αὐτοῦ PME

¹³ I take ὡσπερ δὴ καὶ ἄλλοι πάντες σχεδὸν τῶν φιλοσοφίας τροφίμων to refer to those philosophers who, unlike Plutarch, *are* adherents of a particular philosophical school, and καὶ μάλιστα ἦν τοῦτο γ' ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ χρόνων καὶ μικρὸν πρὸς ἔτι καὶ μετ' αὐτόν to refer to the same practice. Tartaglia (1987,

cal school with which he wants to be identified, as is the case with nearly all other nurslings of philosophy (and this tendency was particularly prevalent in his day and for a brief period after his time).¹³ 4 He decided to live more or less in accordance with philosophy not as a Platonist or an Aristotelian, i.e. Peripatetic, or any other kind of philosopher, dedicating himself exclusively to any particular philosophical practice and designation. 5 Instead he makes it his business to know everything and be ignorant of nothing, and he declares himself a friend to the distinguished men of the whole of philosophy and all leaders. 6 Coming from above like an Olympic judge or critical viewer of the philosophical games, athletes and competitors, he prefers not to grant favours to anyone, but accepts everybody's achievements and their common contribution to philosophy and life, taking over and resolving to gather from everybody that which is useful for his own life and wisdom.

5 When judging everybody's contribution Plutarch is very critical indeed and disagrees entirely with the followers of Epicurus. In every way he opposes and attacks this philosophical school with the whole force of his mind,¹⁴ and this, I think, is in complete agreement with the man's aim in his life and letters. 2 For he teaches every kind of virtue and propriety in life, and absolute reverence towards the Divine; there is nothing that he renounces or rejects and treats disrespectfully of different peoples' different ways of venerating their gods. 3 Epicurus, by contrast, is contentious and tries to refute and deny the divine care and providence concerning men, as well as all human practices relating to God. He teaches every kind of arrogance and impropriety¹⁵ regarding both religion and the concern for virtue, 4

350) takes both expressions as referring to eclecticism. But why would Metochites praise Plutarch for behaving like most other philosophers? And as to the eclecticism, it is true that it was prevalent in practice; however, most philosophers did not regard themselves as, or profess to be, eclectic, and most were officially adherents of one or the other philosophical school.

¹⁴ *he opposes and attacks this philosophical school*: Tartaglia (1987, 351 n. 39) gives the following references to Plutarch: *Adversus Colotem* (if it was available to Metochites; see idem 1987, 345–46 and 348, n. 33); *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*; *De latenter vivendo*; *De defectu oraculorum*; *De sera numinis vindicta*, and also some of the *Lives*, e.g. *Brutus*, *Lucullus*, and *Pyrrhus*.

¹⁵ Cf. Plut., *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 1086d–87a and *De sera numinis vindicta* 548b–c (Tartaglia 1987, 352 n. 41).

- σιμον ὄν, ἀλλὰ μάταια διανοίας ἀναπλάσματα καὶ κενὴν μακαρίαν κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ μακρὸν λήρον κατὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων καὶ μηδὲν χρησίμων, καὶ κατὰ τῆς σωματικῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ εὐχρηστίας ἀδικίαν καὶ δυναστείαν ἐπαχθεστάτην, 5 καὶ ἄλλ' οἶμαι δὴ παραπλήσια καὶ ἅ πᾶσι σωφρονικοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ γενναίοις ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ προστάταις καὶ τῷ σοφῷ Πλούτάρχῳ πάνυ τοι διαβέβληται, καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἀλλότρια καθάπαξ κρίνεται καὶ Σαρδαναπάλῳ καὶ τοῖς κατ' αὐτὸν παραπέμπεται.
- 10 **6** Ἄλλ' ὅπερ ἔλεγον, Πλούταρχος δὴ πάντα μὲν τὰ παρὰ πάντων προσίεται ὀπηοῦν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας πρόσχημ' ἔχοντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄκαρπον αὐτῷ, οὐδ' ἐπιτιμητικός ἐστιν εὖ μάλα ῥᾶστα, καὶ εἴ τις μὴ πάντα διὰ πάντων καλὸς καὶ καίριος χρήσθαι. 2 Ἄλλ' ἔχει μὲν τῶν κρειττόνων καὶ πλουτούντων ἐν καλοῖς τὰ
- 15 κρείττω καὶ πλείστα, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀπηοῦν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συντελούντων τῇ παρασκευῇ τῆς εὐγενοῦς ὅτιοῦν ἕξω ἄττα δὴ, καὶ οὐκ ἀπαξιοῖ καὶ ἀπωθεῖται καθάπαξ τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν. 3 Καὶ πᾶσιν εἰδέναι χάριν ἔτοιμός ἐστιν ὑπὸ μετριότητος καὶ ἀβαροῦς ἡθους καὶ φιλανθρώπου καὶ εὐγνωμονικοῦ δὴ τινος, καὶ ἅμα
- 20 μὲν ἀλαζονείας, ἅμα δε βασκανίας ἕξω κατὰ τὸ συνοῖσον ὀπηοῦν ἄρα χρῆται, 4 πλὴν δ' ὅμως Ἐπικούρου τε καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, πρὸς οὓς καὶ ἰᾶσπονδον καὶ ἀκήρυκτον διὰ πάσης τῆς αὐ- 470 τοῦ ζωῆς εἴλετο πόλεμον. 5 Καίτοι γε καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν τὴν μὲν γνῶμην καὶ τὰ δόγματα τῆς ἐπικήρου καὶ βδελλυρᾶς σοφίας καὶ
- 25 τὰς τῶν κρίσεων ἀσελγείας καὶ τὸν φορτικὸν σαρκασμὸν ὅλη ῥοπή τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκτρέπεται, καὶ δῆλός ἐστι πάσαις ἐπιχειρήσεσι

1-2 κενὴν μακαρίαν: Luc., *Herm.* 71; *Nav.* 12

4 εὐχρηστίας: ἀχρηστίας καὶ P 11 φιλοσοφίας: -ας non leg. E 12 ἐστιν εὖ μάλα ῥᾶστα: ἐστὶ ῥᾶστ' εὖ μάλα ME 24 βδελλυρᾶς: βδελυρᾶς ME

¹⁶ κενὴν μακαρίαν: I have only found the expression in Lucian.

¹⁷ παραπέμπεται, perhaps (less probably) 'transmitted by' Sardanapalus etc.

[saying] that such concepts are useless, futile figments of the mind, *empty happiness* as the saying goes,¹⁶ long-winded nonsense concerning things that are non-existent and totally meaningless, injustice and an abominable oppression of the freedom and well-being of the body, 5 and other similar views, I think, that are rejected by all sensible men and noble champions of truth and right, including the wise Plutarch; they are judged to be completely alien to philosophy, and are left to¹⁷ Sardanapalus and the likes of him.¹⁸

6 But, as I said, Plutarch accepts everything offered by everybody, provided that it somehow has the appearance of belonging to philosophy. There is nothing that is not culled by him, nor is he prone to criticise even if someone should prove not to be entirely blameless and suitable to use. 2 But he has taken most, and the most important, [of his views] from those who are superior and rich in excellence, but also some from those who are good [only] to some extent, [but] who have made some contribution to the preparation of the noble knowledge,¹⁹ and he does not altogether decline and reject what they have to offer. 3 Since he is modest and has a tolerant, friendly and generous disposition he is willing to acknowledge gratitude towards everybody, and he exhibits neither arrogance nor envy concerning anything that is likely to be of use somehow; 4 the exceptions are Epicurus and his followers, against whom Plutarch waged a relentless and truceless war during his whole life. 5 And yet, although with regard to this school he rejects with all his soul their views and the tenets of their dangerous and villainous [so-called] wisdom, their base judgements and vulgar sarcasm, and can be seen to oppose them

¹⁸ Plutarch is the most voluminous pagan critic of Epicurus (Long 1974, 236). 'Sardanapalus', an amalgamation of several Assyrian kings, is a byword for depravity (cf. e.g. Plut., *De Alex. M. fort. aut virt.* 336c–d; Hesych. Σ 200 πάντες σχεδόν ἀπάσης ἀκολασίας καὶ τρυφῆς δοῦλον τοῦτον ἀναγράφουσι γεγονέναι). Epicurus is coupled with Sardanapalus by Plutarch in *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*, 1095d; Posidonius (fr. 190a, 216 Theiler) joins Epicurus with Sardanapalus and the Sybarite Mindyrides against Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Socrates (the latter representing the Stoics according to Theiler, comm. ad loc., 2:170); cf. Justin Martyr, *Apologia secunda* 7.3 τοὺς σπουδαίους, οἷον Σωκράτην καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, διώκεσθαι καὶ ἐν δεσμοῖς εἶναι, Σαρδανάπαλον δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ δοκεῖν εὐδαιμονεῖν and Eustathius, *Ad Od.* 1:294.11–12 ἄπερ ἂν εἴποι Σαρδανάπαλος ὁ Νίνου ... ἢ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐταίρος Ἐπίκουρος.

¹⁹ τῆς εὐγενοῦς ἕξεως, i.e., philosophy.

κατ' αὐτῶν ἀπομαχόμενος καὶ τάναντιώτατα νομίζων, 6 εἰ δέ τί
 που καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν ὀπηοῦν ἀπαντᾷ μνήμης ἄξιον καὶ χρήσεως
 κατὰ καιρὸν ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐκάστοτε σπουδάζοι, πρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ
 τοῦτο ποιεῖται καὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνεται φέρειν εἰς μέσον, διὰ τὸ καθ-
 5 ὄλου πρὸς ἐκείνους μάχιμον, ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστι φέρειν ἐκεῖθεν χρή-
 σιμον, 7 ἠγούμενος οἶμαι μὴ φίλους μῆδ' ἐχθροὺς ὄραν, ἐν οἷς
 ὄνησίς τις ἔστιν ἢ τοῦναντίον, καὶ προσπαθείαις ἐχόμενον κρί-
 νειν, ἀλλὰ δοκιμάζειν ἐν πᾶσιν εἴ τί ποτ' ἔστι παραπλησίως
 βέλτιστον, 8 καὶ παρορᾶν πᾶν ἀνόνητον, κἂν ἄρα σπουδαίων
 10 ἀνδρῶν ἢ καὶ φίλων ἀμάρτημα, καὶ τῇ χρήσει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ
 τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ πᾶν νέμειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φίλοις ἀνδράσι καὶ ὧν εὐ-
 γενής ἢ πλείων τῷ βίῳ φορά. 9 Τοιγαροῦν καὶ πρὸς Ἐπικούρου
 οὕτω χρῆται, καὶ εἰ μὴ φίλα Πλουτάρχῳ πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρ' ἔστί,
 καὶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἰ τῶν ἐξ Ἐπικούρου κατὰ και- 471
 15 ρὸν μέμνηται πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν ἀνύτων ἀμέλει.

7 Καὶ πλουτῶν γὰρ ὁράται καθόλου ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ἐν οἷς
 ἐκάστοτε προτίθεται, καὶ πολύχους ὧν ταῖς οἴκοθεν ἐργασίαις,
 καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ποριμώτατος εἴ τις ἄρα καὶ ἄλλος ἐννοῆσαι καὶ
 μετ' εὐκολίας ἐρεῖν εἰς ἃ δοκιμάζει καὶ ὧν ἐκάστοτε διδάσκα-
 20 λός ἐστι, 2 τῷ παραδειγματικῷ πλείστον τρόπῳ χρῆται κάλ-
 λιστ' εὐφῶς καὶ οἰκείως θαυμαστῶς ὅπως, καὶ τῇ συνεχείᾳ
 τῶν γε τοιούτων ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ μεμέστωται καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἱστορίας
 καὶ χειρῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ γνῶμῶν ἀστείων εἰς τὰ προκείμενα, 3
 καὶ οὐκ ἀρχαίων μόνον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ σεμνὸν ἐχόντων καὶ
 25 τίμιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἔγγιστ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νέων ἐκλέγων, βασκα-
 νίας ἀπάσης δίχα καὶ περιφρονήσεως, τὰ χρήσιμα κατὰ σκο-
 πόν, κἂν ἐκ μεγάλων ἀνδρῶν καὶ περιφανῶν ἢ βίου ἢ παιδείας
 δόξῃ, κἂν ἐξ ἀφανῶν τε καὶ πολλοῖς ἀγνοουμένων καὶ ὧν ὀλί-
 30 ὄγκος μέγας καὶ τύχη πλείστον ἀκμάσασα, καὶ μὴ τοιούτων, ἀλ-
 λά μῆδὲ τοῖς ἐκ γειτόνων συναίσθησίν τινα δόντων· καὶ ὅλας
 πᾶνυ τοι περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει Πλούταρχος, καὶ ταῖς πραγματεῖωδε-

3 αὐτοῦ scripsi: αὐτοῦ PE, non leg. M 16 ἐπιβολαῖς: ἐπιβουλαῖς E 27 ἦ!
 ἦ P, non leg. M 32 ταῖς: σταῖς ut vid. E

with every means at his disposal, and himself harbours views that are diametrically opposed to theirs— 6 yet, if by any chance he encounters among their views something worthy of being noted and used to advantage in the studies with which he happens to be engaged at the time, he adopts this, too,²⁰ and is not ashamed, because of his general hostility to the Epicureans, to bring out whatever useful thing one might find there. 7 This is, I think, because he prefers not to view people as friends or enemies depending on whether they bring advantage or disadvantage, and form judgements under the influence of attachments, but rather decide in the same way in each case whether there is some truth in it;²¹ 8 to disregard everything that is useless, even if the person who commits the mistake should be a noble man or his friend, and allow everything to be governed by the practice of truth and beauty, rather than by those men he admires and whose contribution in life is mostly noble. 9 Therefore he acts in this way also towards Epicurus, even though he is not kindly disposed to the man, and in his writings often appositely mentions the Epicureans whenever it achieves something for his purpose.

7 On the whole one can see that he is productive²² in his application to whatever he sets his mind on and prolific in his own works; he is as resourceful as anyone in conceiving and easily formulating ideas concerning whatever subject he is dealing with and teaching about. 2 In particular, his method is to use examples, which he does in a wonderfully talented and natural way, and his writings are full of a succession of examples from history, ancient anecdotes and maxims most apposite for his subject, 3 not only from antiquity, exalted and venerable through the passage of time, but he also chooses, without any envy or snobbery whatsoever, from recent ones, close to his own time, such as are useful for his purpose, no matter whether they concern great men, famous for their life or education, or humble persons, unknown to most people and little talked about, 4 and similarly from all kinds of events, both those of great weight and flourishing fortune, and those that are not [of that dignity] but are unknown even to

²⁰ Tartaglia mentions *De capienda ex inimicis utilitate* 91a–b (1987, 352 n. 42).

²¹ βέλτιστον (sc. εἶναι) with ἡγούμενος (although they are admittedly extremely far apart); παραπλησίως with ἐν πάσιν.

²² A run: πλουτῶν Πλούταρχος. Cf. above, p. 165 n. 1.

σιν ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ χρήσεσι πιστοῦται καὶ περαίνει τὰ σπουδα-
ζόμενα. 5 Καὶ πυκνὸς οὐ ἰ μόνον ἐστὶν ἓν γε τοιούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ 472
ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος τις ἐπινοήσειεν αὐτὸς ἱκανὸς ἐστὶ, περιουσία
καὶ κράτει καὶ γνώμης εὐεξία, καὶ ἀφ' ὧντινωνοῦν φέρεσθαι τι
5 καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μεταποιεῖν πορισμοὺς αὐτῷ καὶ κατασκευὰς εἰς
τοὺς λόγους ἐκάστους καὶ τὰ νῦν ἐκάστοτε προβλήματα καὶ τὴν
αὐτοῦ σπουδὴν, 6 καὶ μὴ φειδόμενος οὔτ' εὐτελῶν τῶν λόγων
ᾧ ἢ μνήμη, μήτ' εὐτελῶν καὶ πολλοῖς εὐπεριφρονήτων τῶν ἔρ-
γων, οἷς χρῆται πρὸς συμμαχίαν τῆς προθέσεως ἐκάστης, 7 ἐμοὶ
10 δοκεῖν ἅμα μὲν εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ γενναίου μάλιστα τοῦ ἦθους
κάκ πάντων ἀνύπτοντος καὶ οἷς μὴ τις ἄλλος ἐννοεῖ χρῆσθαι
μηδ' ἀξιοῖ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ πολυμαθίας ἐπίδειξιν, μέχρι
καὶ τῶν ὀλίγου λόγου καὶ ἀφανεστάτων ἰκνουμένην, 8 καθὼς
τοῖς ἐν μεγάλας οὐσίαις καὶ βαθεῖ βιοῦσι πλούτῳ, πάσης εἰσὶ
15 χρείας παρασκευαί, καὶ ταμιεύονται ῥᾶστ' ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου
λαβεῖν πάντα, καὶ τὰ τῆς εὐτελεστάτης ἀποσκευῆς ἐπίχρεια.

8 Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδενὶ γε τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος σο-
φῶν ἐμέλησεν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ὡς αὐτῷ Πλουτάρχῳ πάντα πρὸ αὐ-
τοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν Ἑλλησὶ τε καὶ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ πᾶσιν ἀν-
20 θρώποις πράγματ' εἰδέναι, καὶ συναγαγεῖν ὁμοῦ τοῖς τῆς μνήμης
ταμείοις καὶ ἀναζωγραφεῖσαι ῥᾶστα δὴ καθορᾶν τοῖς τῆς φαν- 473
τασίας πίναξι, 2 καὶ προχειρίζεσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ
τοῦ βίου παντὸς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀγωγὴν, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἄλλας μετ' ἄλλας
καὶ ἥττονας καὶ μείζονας, καὶ κοινοπολιτείας ἄλλας παρ' ἄλ-
25 λους, καὶ νόμιμα παντοῖα καὶ χρήσιν βίου, καὶ τεχνῶν εὐρέσεις
καὶ τεχνῶν ἀσκήσεις, καὶ μετοικίας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀποικίας
ἀρχηγετῶν, καὶ πολέμους ἔθνων καὶ μάχιμ' ἔργα, 3 καὶ παντοί-
ας σοφίας ἀρχάς, καὶ ὅσοι τῶν τῆς παιδείας ἀπάντων εἰδῶν καὶ

2 πυκνὸς οὐ μόνον P et a. c. M, οὐ μόνον πυκνὸς E et p. c. M 5 αὐτῷ
scripsi: αὐτῷ PME

²³ I.e., he is able to create and transform (ποιεῖν καὶ μεταποιεῖν) means of
constructing different kinds of arguments. Πορισμούς may be an allusion to πο-
ρίσματα, corollaries, i.e. 'deductions from previous demonstrations' (LSJ s.v.).

people nearby. On the whole Plutarch frequently uses such things, and relies on real-life approaches and examples when conducting his studies. 5 And not only does he frequently use examples, but he himself is also able, more than anybody else might think, through the resourcefulness, strength, and vigour of his mind, to profit in some way from everything, no matter what, and create and transform for himself means and constructive reasonings for every argument, problem, and subject with which he happens to be engaged.²³ 6 He does not fight shy of insignificant utterances, which are quoted, or insignificant and to many people contemptible deeds, which he uses as an aid to achieve his purpose. 7 This, I think, shows that his character is highly noble and able to profit from everything whatsoever, even things that nobody else would think of using or deign to use, and it also shows his wide learning, which embraces even unimportant and unremarkable things. 8 He might be compared to people who are extremely wealthy and enjoy vast riches,²⁴ who have at their disposal ways of meeting every need, and stores from which they can easily take anything, even the most trivial necessities.²⁵

8 In truth, I think that no other wise man through the whole of history has taken such a great interest as did Plutarch in learning about everything that had happened before his time among all peoples, Hellenes, Romans and all others, to gather it together in the treasure-houses of memory, depict it on the tablet of imagination so that it can easily be seen, 2 and present the progress of the whole of human affairs from the beginning, the successive powers great and small, different constitutions²⁶ among different peoples, various customs, modes of life, inventions of arts, practices of arts, migrations of people, colonisations undertaken by leaders, wars between nations, military deeds, 3 the beginnings of every kind of wisdom, the found-

²⁴ Cf. *Sem.* 27, 178 MK τίς τῷ βαθεῖ πλούτῳ καὶ ταῖς μακραῖς οὐσίαις.

²⁵ As was pointed out by Tartaglia (1987, 354 n. 48), the same metaphor of a well-stocked house where all things, both great and small, can readily be found when needed, reappears in *Sem.* 111, 741–42 MK (there, too, used of Plutarch).

²⁶ Here κοινοπολιτεία seems to mean no more than the simple πολιτεία. In 22.2.3 it seems to mean 'shared, common citizenship'. LSJ have only one example of the word, in a 2d century BC inscription from Delphi, with the meaning 'citizenship of a *koinon* or league.' Stephanus' *Thesaurus* and LBG refer only to Metochites; the word is not found in TLG.

- μερῶν ἀρχηγοί, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐπίλεκτοι προστάται καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας αἵρεσιῶται διάφοροι, καὶ περὶ ἃ διηνέχθησαν, ἢ τῶν θείων, ἢ τῶν φυσικῶν, ἢ τῶν περὶ τὰ πρακτέα δογμάτων καὶ τοῦ πολιτικῶ καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ κοινῇ βελτίστου. 4
- 5 Καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα (τί γὰρ δεῖ πλέον ἔτ' ἐπεξιόντα τρίβειν;) ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Πλουτάρχου συντάξεων μάλισθ' ἡμῖν, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοῦ σχεδὸν πασῶν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ πάνυ τοι πλείστων, ἃς ὁ χρόνος θησαυρίζει τοῖς ὁπὲ τῶν χρόνων ἡμῖν ἤκουσι καὶ ξυλλαχοῦσι τῷ βίῳ, ὅσοις τοι φιλοπονεῖν ἐν τούτοις ἔρωσ ἐστὶ. 5
- 10 Καὶ ὅστις βούλεται τὰ πάντα σχεδὸν εἰδέναι ὅσα δῆτα πρὸ τῆς Πλουτάρχου κατὰ τὸν βίον παρόδου καὶ φιλοπονίας καὶ σπουδῆς, ἢ πάντα ζητεῖν ἢ ἀνάγκην ἔχει τὰ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ' 474 αὐτὸν συντάγματα καὶ πλείστα δὴ πονεῖν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἢ μόνα τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε ζητεῖν κἀντεῦθεν περὶ πάντων χρῆσθαι. 6
- 15 Καὶ μάταιος ἂν ἴσως εἴη πόνος, εἰ ἄρα τις τούτου γ' εἵνεκα περὶ πλείστ' ἔχειν αἰροῖτο καὶ πράγματα μάλιστ' ἔχειν, ἐνὸν ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου ῥᾶον οὕτω δὴ πάνυ τοι τῷ ἀνδρὶ χρῆσθαι καὶ τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἔχειν αὐτοῦ μόνου περὶ πάντων, καὶ ὧν ἐπέιγει τις χρῆσις καὶ ὧν μὴ. 7 Καὶ παγκόσμιόν ἐστι πάσης ἱστορίας καὶ
- 20 μαθήσεως ἀνήρ ταμεῖον καὶ ὡσπερ ἀγορά τις τῆς σοφίας, καθ' αἵρεσιν ὁτφοῦν καὶ κατὰ χρεῖαν ἀμέλει πᾶσαν ἀπραγμόνως πορίζεσθαι· καὶ τί δεῖ πόρρωθεν ἄρα καὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλη πως ἐμπορεύεσθαι; 8 Καὶ ἡ μὲν οὐσία τῆς σοφίας τάνδρι τοσαύτη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πάνυ τοι φιλότιμός ἐστι περὶ τὸν τῆς δια-
- 25 νοίας πλοῦτον καὶ γεννικῶς ἔχων καὶ μάλ' ἰσχύων κατὰ φύσιν, πλείστον ἔκ τε παρασκευῆς πάσης δύναται χρῆσθαι καθ' ὅ τι ἂν αἰροῖτο, καὶ προθέμενος ἀνύτει.

19-20 παγκόσμιόν — σοφίας: cf. Eun., *VS* 456, IV.1.3

7 τῶν ἄλλων + ἢ περὶ ἄλλων ME et a. c. P¹ 16 αἰροῖτο: αἰρεῖτο E 25
κατὰ φύσιν: τῆ φύσει E et s. l. P (ut vid. tertia manus) 26 ἐκ τε: ἔτ' ἐκ E,
non leg. M 27 ἀνύτει: ἀνύτοι ME

ers of all the different kinds and branches of education and particularly their most excellent champions, the different adherents of philosophy and on what points they differed, whether theology, natural science, or concerning rules of practical conduct, i.e., politics and what is best in the life of men, privately and publicly. 4 And all this—for what need is there for me to continue this enumeration?—we can learn, either from the writings of Plutarch, or from practically all other writings put together, those many writings that are stored up by Time for us who arrive to take part in life late in history, and who are attracted by this kind of study. 5 If someone wants to know anything that happened before Plutarch's entry into life, his work and studies, that person must either try to get hold of all the books written before Plutarch or in his time, and spend a vast amount of work, or he can content himself with acquiring *his* books, there to find all the material for every need. 6 And to my mind it would be a waste of labour if someone, in order to achieve this, were to choose to submit to a great deal of exertion and a lot of trouble when it is possible to use Plutarch, easily and without more ado, and find in him alone all the contributions made by everybody else, both things for which there is a special need, and those for which there is not. 7 The man is a complete treasure-house of the whole of history and knowledge, a market-place of wisdom that caters²⁷ without difficulty for anybody whomsoever, according to the taste and wants of each.²⁸ So what need is there to purchase one's goods in any other manner, from far away and from many other peoples? 8 Thus the man's wealth of wisdom is of this magnitude, and he is most generous with the riches of his thought. Being by nature highly productive and competent, through every kind of preparation he is able to write abundantly on whatever subject he chooses, and achieves what he sets out to do.

²⁷ The construction of *πορίζεσθαι* is not entirely clear. Interestingly, Nikephoros Gregoras, who quotes this passage in his letter to Metochites congratulating him on the publication of the *Semeioseis*, has *πορίζουσα* (*Ep.* 23.85, below, p. 271, n. 88 l. 4). For the connections between *Sem.* 71 and Gregoras' *Letter* 23 see Bydén (below, pp. 270–71).

²⁸ Probably inspired by Eunapius' famous characterisation of Longinus, 'a living library and a walking museum', *VS* 456, IV.1.3 *Λογγίνος δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον βιβλιοθήκη τις ἦν ἔμψυχος καὶ περιπατοῦν μουσεῖον.*

9 Τοῦ μέντοι λεκτικοῦ καὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἀνεπιμέλητός ἐστι, καὶ πάσης μάλισθ' ὥρας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀκμῆς, περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον τῆς λέξεως ὀλιγωρεῖ. Καὶ ῥέει κατὰ φύσιν ἄπλαστος οὕτως καὶ ἀποίητος τῶν ἔξωθεν κόσμων καὶ περιβλημάτων τῆς | διανοίας, 475
 5 κατὰ τὸ τῆ φιλοσόφῳ προθέσει πρέπον τε καὶ οἰκεῖον ἔθος τε καὶ ἦθος χρώμενος, 2 καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔξω πάσης περιεργίας ἢ κατὰ χάριν ἢ κατὰ δεινῶσιν, οὐκ ἀνίκανος ὢν, εἴ τις ὀρώφῃ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ δηλὸς ὢν εἰ μάλᾳ μὴ μέλον αὐτῷ τῶν γε τοιούτων καταγλωττισμάτων, ἀλλὰ βλέπων εἰς ἄλλα,
 10 καὶ ταῦτ' ἀποποιούμενος καὶ ἀπαξιῶν, 3 καὶ μέχρι τοσοῦτου τὴν γλῶτταν ἐνεργὸς ὢν, ὅσον ἀμέλει πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πρὸς δήλωσιν καὶ παραπομπὴν καὶ ἀγγελίαν τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ὡς ἄρα μὴ ἔξον τὰν βᾶθει προφέρειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐρμηνεῖα προδεικνύειν ἀνθρώποις ἢ ὀχήματι τῆ φωνῆ χρώμενον. 4 Τοι-
 15 γαροῦν πάσης ὡς ἔφην ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ ὥρας ἀλλότριος ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμῆς κατὰ τὸ λεκτικὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ μέλει καὶ ἀξιώματος ὡσαύτως, ὅ τι μὴ καθ' ὅσον εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν τείνει· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀξιώματος καὶ τοῦ σεμνοῦ πλήρης ἐστί. 5 Καὶ πᾶς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁ σκο-
 20 πὸς ὄντως καὶ ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ λέγειν, καὶ ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ζῆν ὅλως χωρὶς ἔστι τοῦ πνεῖν, οὐδὲ τούτων ἄνευ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας καὶ μετὰ φιλοσόφου προθέσεως ὀρηοῦν φθέγγεσθαι. 6 Ἄλλ' ἄρα δὴ τῷ σεμνῷ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀξιοματικῷ κατὰ νοῦν τὰ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας οὐσίωται | σπουδάσματα, κἂν ἔξωθεν ἀτημελήτως ἔχη, καὶ 476
 25 τοῦτο δι' ὄγκον οἶμαι καὶ φρόνημα μεγάλοις πρέπον, 7 καὶ πάσης εὐτραπείας καὶ κομμωτικῆς χρήσεως καὶ στιλπνότητος ἢ καὶ ὀπλισμῶν καὶ φραγμάτων ἔξωθεν ἀλλοτριῶν καὶ ἐπιποιήτων ἀλλότριον, καὶ οἷς ὅλως οἱ κρατοῦντες παντὶ τρόπῳ, καὶ ἀπάταις γε μὴν ἔστιν οὐδ', κατὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδίκως ἀξιοῦσι

9 καταγλωττισμάτων: *Ar., Nu.* 51; *Syn., Dio* 2:263.17; *Suda* K 504

5 προθέσει: προθεσις ut vid. E πρέπον τε καὶ: πρέπονται E 6 ἔξω ut vid. M, ἔξωθεν E 20-21 ὅλως χωρὶς ἔστι: ἐστὶ ὅλως χωρὶς ME 24 ἀτημελήτως in ἀπη- ut vid. corr. P² 24 ἔχη: ἔχοι E et ut vid. M

9 But he spends no care on style and language, and completely neglects every Grace and also Florescence on the surface of his diction. His writing runs casually, with a natural artlessness, and he does not try to create external ornaments and amplifications of the content, writing as he does with the custom and character suitable for and belonging to a philosophical aim. 2 And although he is a stranger to every rhetorical overelaboration towards either grace or exaggeration,²⁹ he is not incompetent, as one can see if one pays attention. It is, however, obvious that he is not interested in such elegant prattle,³⁰ but looks to other things while renouncing and rejecting these. 3 He takes trouble with his language [only] insofar as it is necessary in order to transmit and express his thoughts, since it is impossible to convey and bring out what is in one's mind and communicate one's beliefs to other people in any other way than by using the vehicle of language. 4 Thus his writing, as I said, is alien to every Carefully Wrought Style and Grace, but he is also little interested in stylistic Florescence and Dignity, except insofar as it relates to the content. For here he is full of a natural Dignity and Solemnity. 5 And indeed the whole aim and objective of oratory lie in these things, and as it is impossible to live without breathing, so it is impossible to make any statement whatsoever concerning philosophy or with a philosophical aim without these qualities. 6 Philosophical studies are essentially characterised by natural Solemnity and intellectual Dignity, even if they are outwardly unpolished, and this, I think, because of their majesty and pride, suitable for great subjects, 7 and strange to every pleasantry, ornate and glittering style, or external weapons and armour, alien and artificial—things which those [orators] who try to prevail by any means, sometimes even deceit, see fit to use against

²⁹ Cf. ἀύξεισις καὶ δεινῶσις (Dion. Hal., *Vett. Cens.* 2.5).

³⁰ καταγλωτισμάτων: According to Thomas Magister (p. 196 Ritschl) the word in Aristophanes, *Clouds* 51 means 'excessive and indecent kisses' (ἐπὶ τῶν περιέργων καὶ ἀσέμνων φιλημάτων), and in Synesius (*Dio* 2:263.17), κομψοὶ λόγοι. Cf. also *Suda* K 504.

χρησθαι. 8 Ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ τῷ τοῦ Πλουτάρχου λόγῳ σχημάτων ἐναλλαγῆς καὶ διοικήσεως περὶ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἐρμηνείας οὐδ' ὄλως μέτεστιν, οὐδὲ γοργότητος, οὐδ' ἐπιδρομῆς, οὐδ' ἦθους ὀπηοῦν κλέπτοντος, 9 εἰ καὶ μὴ παντάπασι ἐπ' ἀλη-
 5 θείας ἐρεῖν ἦθους παθητικοῦ καὶ διάθεσιν ἠντιναοῦν ἐμποιοῦν-
 τος τῇ ἀκροάσει καὶ κίνησιν κράσεως, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ μετ' ἀπλαστίας ὡς οἶόν τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἠλλοτριώ-
 ται.

10 10 Ἔστι γὰρ οὗ τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων Πλουτάρχος οὐκ ἀνέορ-
 τος τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδ' ἐρημίᾳ καθάπαξ ἐμψύχου φάναι συνου-
 σίας καὶ πάσης κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ποιότητος ἕξω σύνοικος, οὐδ'
 ἄλλως οὕτω φέρεται τὴν ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν ἡμῖν, εἰ καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ-
 το κατὰ σκοπὸν ἔχει, τὸ τῆς γλώττης ἀνεπιμέλητον καὶ σχῆμα
 καὶ λέξιν καὶ μεθόδων πασῶν τρόπους, 1 καὶ μόνου τοῦ κατὰ 477
 15 νοῦν ἀνύτειν ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς ἐπέλθοι φορεῖται. 2 Ὡσπερ γε μὴν
 ἦθους ἐνίστ' ἔφημεν ἀποιήτως αὐτῷ μέτεστιν ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοῦ-
 το μόνον αὐτῷ τῶν περὶ τὴν φωνὴν χρωμάτων ἐπανθεῖ, ξυμβὰν
 οὕτω δὴ. 3 Ἀτὰρ δὴ πολλάκις καὶ τῷ τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐσήμῳ
 χρησθαι, καὶ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀρυτόμενος καὶ
 20 οἰοεὶ βάπτων ἐκεῖθεν τὸν κάλαμον, εὖ μάλ' ἐμφαντικῶς κατα-
 γράφει τὰ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων ὀνόματα, δρι-
 μύταθ' ἀπτόμενος καὶ καθιστορῶν ἃ βούλεται καὶ καιρίως μά-
 λιστ' ἐν τούτοις ἐνεργῶν κατ' εὐχρηστίαν πᾶσαν. 4 Καὶ βραχὺ
 ῥημάτιον πολλάκις αὐτῷ καιρίως τυγχάνει τοῦ σκοποῦ, καὶ τοῖς
 25 ἐπόπταις καὶ ἀκροαταῖς τρανῶς προδεικνύει νοῦν κάλλιστον,
 καὶ οὐδ' ἀμελῶς ἐν τούτοις ἔχων οὐδ' ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀνὴρ τρέχων
 ὀρᾶται, ἀλλὰ ῥᾶστα μὲν τῷ ὄντι πλεῖν ἢ κατ' ἄλλους τῶν ἐπαι-
 νετῶν τὴν γλώτταν, καὶ πάνυ τοι ταχὺς τυγχάνει τῶν χρησίμων
 αὐτοῦ τῷ νῷ, καὶ ἄπρονος ὡς ξυνορᾶν ἔστιν. 5 Οὐκ ἀτημελήτως
 30 δ' ὅμως χρησθαι δηλὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ φιλοτίμως μὲν ὀπηοῦν,
 κατὰ καιρὸν δ' αὖθις, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἀμέλει ταύτης ἀν-
 δρὶ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ τὴν γλώτταν, καὶ πάσης ἀνωτέρῳ

20 ἐμφαντικῶς ex ἐμφατικῶς corr. P²

common people. 8 Therefore Plutarch's language is completely free from variation and arrangement of figures concerning diction and phraseology; [it is free from] Rapidity and attack and any deceitful Character, 9 although to tell the truth it is not completely strange to an emotional Character which creates a certain disposition in his readers and moves their temperament, and this with the greatest artlessness and naturalness.

10 For sometimes in his writings Plutarch indulges in such things. He does not exist completely without living company, so to speak, and outside every quality of language, nor does he come drifting haphazardly to us from Scythia,³¹ even though his first goal is an uncontrived language regarding both scheme and diction and the figures of every [rhetorical] method, and he is only concerned to achieve [the communication of] his message, and his writing is carried along as it chances. 2 But as I said, sometimes he partakes of Character without so to speak contriving to do so, and this is the one ornament of style that blooms on his writing, almost accidentally as it were. 3 But he often also uses the clarity of the words, and drawing on the very nature of the things,³² and as it were dipping his pen therein, he vividly sets down in writing the words [to describe] the situations and events, Subtly grasping and describing what he chooses, and writing most successfully in these passages in the most efficient manner. 4 With a small word he often successfully hits the mark, and conveys clearly to his viewers and listeners an admirable thought. In these cases it can be seen that he is not negligent or wandering about haphazardly, but with the greatest ease—more so than other writers, praised for their language—he hits upon what is useful for his purpose very quickly, and, as one can see, without effort. 5 But it is also clear that he does not write carelessly, but to some extent ambitiously (suitably, however), and this care befits a man who is a

³¹ *nor ... from Scythia*: i.e., he is not a barbarian. Perhaps Metochites is thinking of the common expression *Σκυθῶν ἐρημία* (*Ar., Ach.* 704; cf. *CPG* II 208 [Macarius VII 66] ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρήμων καὶ ἐξηγησιωμένων τόπων).

³² τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων: i.e., his subject-matter?

κολακείας ἢ ἀπάτης ἢ λεκτικῆς ὄλως κομψότητος, ἐπιπρέπει· ἢ
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὕτω δῆ.

478

11 Ὡς δ' ἄρα τῆς τοῦ λέγειν τέχνης, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὴν
χρῆται, μέτεστι τῷ ἀνδρί, καὶ ῥητορικῆς εὐ μάλ' ἕξεώς ἐστιν ἐν
5 πείρᾳ, καὶ τῆς ἐπαινετῆς εὐστομίας οἷός τέ ἐστι τυγχάνειν, 2
δείκνυσι μὲν ἀμηγέπη καὶ οἷς αὐτὸς ἐνίοτε λέγει καὶ χρῆται· οὐ
γὰρ πάντα διὰ πάντων εὐτελείᾳ σύνεστι καὶ τῆς γλώττης καθ-
ἀπαξ ὠλιγόρηκεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐ διαίρεται καὶ τῆ ἐρμηνείᾳ καὶ
καλλιπερίᾳ τοιοῦ καὶ κοσμεῖ τὰ λεγόμενα, 3 ἢ τυχὸν οὕτω ξυμ-
10 βαῖνον καὶ ὁσάκις ἂν ἐπίοι ξυγχαρῶν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῆ δυνάμει τῆς
ἕξεως, ἢ καὶ ἴσως κατὰ σκοπὸν, ὡς ἂν ἀπόδειξις ἐντεῦθεν εἴη,
ὅτι μὴ διὰ τὸ ἀνικάνως καὶ ἀφυῶς ἔχειν πρὸς εὐφωνίαν χρῆται
τῷ λέγειν, ὡς ἄρα δὴ χρῆται, ἀλλ' ἐκὼν γε εἶναι τῷ κατὰ φιλο-
σοφίαν ἤθει προσανέχει, παρ' αὐτῷ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ βού-
15 λοιτ' ἂν, χρῆσθαι ῥᾶστα καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς ἕξεωθεν κάλλεσι τὰ
σεμνὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας σπουδάσματα. 4 Μάλιστα δ'
ἂν εἴη τοῦ νῦν γε τούτου λόγου πίστις καὶ τεκμήριον εὐ μάλ' ἐν-
αργέστατον, εἴ τις ξυνίησι καὶ προσέχει τὸν νοῦν οἷς πολλαχοῦ
περὶ ῥητόρων ἀνδρῶν κρίνει καὶ τῆς τοῦ λέγειν αὐτῶν ἐκάστων
20 ιδέας, καὶ ὡς ἄρα πεφύκασι πρὸς τὴν τέχνην, καὶ οἷα διαφέρου-
σι καὶ ἄλλος ἢ ἄλλου βελτίων καὶ ἥττων ἐστί. 5 Διαριεῖται γὰρ
ἐν τούτοις καὶ κατατεχνιτεύει τοὺς κρινομένους λόγους ἐπιει-
κῶς ἄριστα καὶ καθάπαξ ὡς αὐτὸς μάλιστ' ἐπίβολος καὶ ἰκα-
νῶς ἔχων τῶν τῆς τέχνης νομίμων. 6 Καὶ ᾧ κρίνειν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ
25 χρῆσθαι πάντως ἕξεστιν, εἰ αἰροῖτ' ἂν, καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ἀποτυγ-
χάνει, ἀλλ' ἐκὼν γε εἶναι κατ' ἄλλον τῷ ὄντι σκοπὸν ἀνύτων
ὡς ἀμέλει βούλεται. 7 Καὶ πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἔστιν ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ
τὰ κατὰ ῥητορικὴν καὶ ῥήτορας ἀνδρας ἐπισκεπτομένῳ καὶ τε-
λεώτατα διαιρουμένῳ τε καὶ φιλοκρινοῦντι τὰς αὐτῶν περὶ τὸ
30 λέγειν δυνάμεις καὶ χρήσεις· καὶ οὐκ ἂν μακῆσαιτό τις ἂ κἀν-
ταῦθα φθέγγεται, ἀλλ' οὐχῆκιστα κἀν τούτοις ὄψεται τὴν τοῦ
Πλουτάρχου περινοίαν καὶ τὸ καίριον τῆς κρίσεως.

8 καὶ¹ om. ME 9 τοιοῦ: τοιοῦ ut vid. E 18 προσέχει: προσέχειν P 20
οἷα scripsi: οἷ' PME 24 ᾧ: ᾧν P 30 μακῆσαιτό: μωμ- s. l. P²

philosopher, free-born in his speech, and raised above every flattery, deceit, and in general any ornate language. And so much for this.

11 But even if Plutarch does not write according to the rules of oratory, he still partakes of them; he is considerably experienced in rhetoric, and capable of attaining a laudable eloquence. 2 This is sometimes shown also in his own writings, for not everything he writes is characterised by austerity, nor did he completely neglect his language, but sometimes he writes in a more exalted style and strengthens and embellishes his subject with an ornate language. 3 This occurs either by chance, every time he happens to³³ indulge himself and his rhetorical ability, or sometimes on purpose, in order to demonstrate that he does not write the way he does because he lacks ability and natural talent for eloquence, but voluntarily observes the ethos of philosophy, and that he can also easily write in another manner and adorn his naturally solemn philosophical studies with external ornaments. 4 But the clearest confirmation and proof of what I have said³⁴ [can be found] if someone understands and observes his frequent judgements on orators and their individual style and natural talent, and where they differ, and how one is more or less capable than the other.³⁵ 5 For in these works he distinguishes and discusses the works he is judging with technical skill and as one who is himself an expert, completely familiar with the rules of rhetoric. 6 That which people are capable of judging, they are also capable of practising if they choose, and Plutarch's lack [of eloquence] is not due to lack of ability, but he deliberately writes as he pleases in accordance with another aim.³⁶ 7 And one can often find him discussing rhetoric and orators, making excellent analyses and classifications of their rhetorical ability and usage. And no one is likely to criticise what he says there, but in those passages, too, Plutarch's perspicacity and good judgement are not least discernible.

³³ ἐπίοι c. part., not in LSJ.

³⁴ *what I have said*: i.e., that Plutarch is in fact an able rhetorician.

³⁵ Tartaglia (1987, 359 n. 66) suggests that Metochites may be thinking of the *Decem oratorae vitae*; *De audiendo* 42d; *De gloria Atheniensium* 350b–51b.

³⁶ As appears from the translation, the words καὶ ὧν κρίνειν ... εἰ ἀποῖτ' ἄν are taken as a parenthesis, stating a general truth; the following καὶ οὐκ ἄγνοῶν are interpreted as referring to Plutarch himself. But the change of subject is harsh.

12 Ὁ δὲ δὴ πεποίηταί οἱ σύνταγμα περὶ Ὀμήρου θαυμάσιον, πάσης ἡγεμόνα σχεδὸν αὐτὸν σοφίας ἀποδεικνύον καὶ τοῦτο δὴ πιστὸν ποιούμενον ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου κατὰ μέρος ἐπῶν, ἀπόδειξιν μὲν ἄρα βελτίστην ἔχει πόσον ἐστὶ πάση σοφίᾳ τὸ χρήσιμον
 5 ἐκ τῆς Ὀμήρου φύσεως καὶ ὧν διέξειςιν, 2 ὑποβάλλων σπέρματα καὶ ἀρχικὰς ὑποθέσεις τῆς περὶ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς παιδείας μεθύτερον εὐφορίας καὶ ἀκμῆς τῶν γεννικῶν | ἐκείνων 480
 καὶ λογάδων ἀνδρῶν, ἄλλων περὶ ἄλλα δοκίμων, 3 καὶ μάλα δὴ κράτιστα φιλοπονησάντων εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν
 10 ἀνθρώποις καὶ κατὰ μέρη θαυμάζειν ἀξίων, καὶ ἀξίων ἀπολαμβάνειν χάριτας ὑπὲρ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστον συντελείας. 4 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μηδὲν ἦττον ὅτι μὴ καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς τοῦ Πλουτάρχου σπεριουσίας κατὰ τὴν τῆς σοφίας ἕξιν καὶ κτήσιν, καὶ τῆς περὶ πάντα πολυμαθίας καὶ περινοίας
 15 καὶ τῶν τῆς διανοίας αὐτοῦ θησαυρῶν καὶ ὧν ἐναπέθετο παντοίων κόσμων καὶ κειμηλίων, καὶ ὡς κατ' οὐδὲν ἀνήρ ἐνδεής, οὐδὲ τίποτ' ἔστι κατὰ τὴν παιδείαν κόμμα, πρὸς ὃ μὴ πέφυκε μηδὲ κεχάρακται. 5 Καὶ κάλλισθ' ἡ διάνοιά οἱ σφραγίδα καὶ διαθεσιν ἔχει τὰ τε ἄλλα δηλαδή, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς τέχνης
 20 κρατήσαντα νόμιμα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐγγυμασθεῖσαν τῷ βίῳ σύνταξιν καὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς γραμματικῆς κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν βᾶσανον. 6 Ἐν οἷς γὰρ τὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ τούτων καιριώτατα διαιρεῖ τε καὶ καθιστορεῖ πάντα, καὶ πάντων αὐτὸν Ὀμηρον ἡγεμόνα καὶ χορηγὸν εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἰ μάλ' ἐπαρκοῦντα, 7 δηλὸς ἐστὶν αὐτόθεν πολυμαθέστατος περὶ πάντων ὁ Πλούταρχος, ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς καὶ διεξιὼν καὶ | οὐκ ἀποτυγχάνων τῶν δικαίων ἐκάστου, 481
 25 μηδὲ τῶν ἐφ' ἐκάστου δικαίων ἂν ἐπαίων αὐτός. 8 Οὕτω δὴ περὶ πάντα βέλτιστ' ἀνὴρ κατατεχνιτεύει καὶ διέξεισι, πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον καθ' ἕκαστ' ἀποδιδούς, καὶ Ὀμήρω τὴν ἀρχηγετικὴν

5 ὑποβάλλων P²E, ὑποβάλλον P¹M 18 σφραγίδα ex σφραγίδα corr. P² 22
 διαιρεῖ τε: διαιρεῖται E 28 πάντα + τὰ E, non leg. M

12 But his admirable treatise on Homer,³⁷ which shows the poet as a guide to practically every kind of wisdom, and proves this by referring to the individual verses, demonstrates excellently how much usefulness for every kind of wisdom there is in Homer's nature and in his narrative, 2 he who sowed the seeds and laid the foundations of the later harvest of all branches of education,³⁸ and of the culmination consisting in those noble and chosen men, each with a different claim to fame, 3 who laboured hard for the common good of mankind regarding wisdom, who, each in his way, deserve our admiration and are worthy of receiving our gratitude for their individual contributions. 4 But it also demonstrates, no less and perhaps even more [than for Homer], *Plutarch's* abundance of wisdom,³⁹ his wide learning concerning all things, his perspicacity and the richness of his mind, all the many beautiful treasures that he stored up, showing that the man lacked for nothing. There is no section of education for which he is not naturally talented and engraved. 5 His mind holds [this] stamp and disposition in the most admirable manner, both in regard to other things and concerning the prevalent rules of rhetoric and the whole of that curriculum which is followed in life, and also concerning the grammatical precepts of language. 6 For as he pertinently analyses this and that concerning these things and narrates everything, and [presents] Homer as a pioneer in all things and an excellent guide for humanity, 7 thereby Plutarch reveals himself as extremely learned in all things, exhibiting a detailed knowledge and analysis, and not failing to give everybody his due, or himself give the praise that each man may deserve. 8 Thus he composes his works and deals excellently with every subject, in each case granting everything that is due, and [granting] to Homer the founder's privilege and precedence in all

³⁷ Nowadays regarded as spurious; see Kindstrand (1990, V–VII). References in Tartaglia (1987, 360 nn. 68–69).

³⁸ Cf. [Plut.], *De Hom.* 2.6.3 οἶονεὶ σπέρματα καὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων παντοδαπῶν τοῖς μεθ' αὐτὸν παρεσχημένος, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ποιηταῖς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πεζῶν λόγων συνθέταις ἱστορικῶν τε καὶ θεωρηματικῶν.

³⁹ ἔξις and κτῆσις appear to be synonymous here.

προνομίαν καὶ προεδρίαν περὶ πάντων, καὶ ἑαυτῷ πάρεργον ὁδοῦ φασὶ τὴν περὶ πάντα μάθησιν καὶ ἀκρίβειαν καὶ τὸν τῆς σοφίας ἀπάσης πλοῦτον. 9 Καὶ ὄναιτό γε τῆς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν εὐποιίας ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἑαυτῷ χρήσιμος γιγνόμενος.

1-2 πάρεργον ὁδοῦ : E., *El.* 509

things, and to himself,⁴⁰ *as a secondary effect*,⁴¹ as they say, knowledge and accuracy in everything, and the wealth of the whole of wisdom. 9 Bless the man for his benevolent contribution to the common weal, while at the same time he was useful to himself!

⁴⁰ 'Granting to himself', i.e., revealing himself to be in possession of.

⁴¹ *πάρεργον ὄδοῦ*: frequently quoted (71 instances in TLG).

Börje Bydén

The Nature and Purpose
of the *Semeioseis gnomikai*:
The Antithesis of Philosophy and Rhetoric*

Any attempt at a historical understanding of the thoughts expressed in a literary work must start from assumptions about what communicative function the work was intended to have within the cultural context in which it was produced. Statements and arguments will be interpreted differently, according as we find them in an epic poem, a pragmatic treatise, or a school commentary, because we know that different forms or genres are chosen for different purposes, and we have a more or less clear idea of what form this or that author will have considered to be best suited for what purpose.

The understanding of Theodore Metochites' *Semeioseis gnomikai* is hampered by the fact that its communicative function is not immediately clear. The work does not fit easily into any pre-existing ancient or mediaeval literary genre, philosophical or otherwise. My aim in this study is to shed some light on how the author and his contemporary audience may have defined its nature and purpose.

In two preliminary sections I shall give a brief general description of the work and try to determine roughly its position vis-à-vis the earlier and contemporary Greek literary tradition. In the study proper, I shall employ a twofold method. Firstly, I shall discuss all the direct evidence that is relevant to my aim. This consists of a small number of passages from (a) the preface to the *Semeioseis* itself, (b) Metochites' *Poem* 12, and (c) Nikephoros Gregoras' *Letter* 23, which is addressed to Metochites. Secondly, I shall use the more indirect approach of comparing Metochites' reflections in the

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Semeioseis on the style and content of other literary works with his own literary performance. I shall give special attention to the anti-thesis between philosophy and rhetoric, which is central in the *Semeioseis* not only as a theme but also as a literary problem.

The Semeioseis gnomikai:
a brief general description

The *Semeioseis gnomikai* consists of 120 prose chapters, each with a length of between 3 and 28 printed pages in the old edition by Müller and Kiessling (Leipzig, 1821). These chapters treat of many and diverse subjects. A score of them discuss classical authors, notably Plato and Aristotle; a score of them deal with problems relating to the conditions of human knowledge; a score of them treat of different aspects of Greek and Roman history. The remaining half of the *Semeioseis* is devoted to moral questions in the widest possible sense, spanning from meditations on the transience of human life to discussions of the pros and cons of different political constitutions, and not infrequently bearing on the vicissitudes of Metrochites' own life and career.

Each chapter develops some view on a mostly fairly well-defined theme, which is briefly stated in a chapter heading. The heading may have the form of a 'specification' (the preposition περί followed by one or more nouns in the genitive case); a 'proposition' (a statement preceded by an introductory ὅτι or ὅπως); or, in a few cases, a 'problem' (a question introduced by εἰ or πότερον).¹ Most examples of 'propositions' in the headings of the *Semeioseis* are general statements on moral issues, which may in many cases be classified as 'rhetorical sentences' or 'maxims' (γνώμῃ). I shall presently come back to these.

In some cases the theme of a chapter has no obvious connection with those of the preceding and following chapters. This is, however, rare. Looking at the Table of Contents on pp. 4–18 of this volume, one may easily discern quite a few groups of thematically more or

¹ It may also be a combination of these types: preposition + noun + conjunction + indicative clause. A few chapters are, in addition, designated as 'Contemplations on the basis of examples' (Θεωρία ἐξ ὑποδειγμάτων); there is also a series of four 'Laments' (Θρήνοι) (37–40). Occasionally, other variants occur, e.g. chap. 93, which is called a 'Remark' (Ἐπισημασία).

less closely related chapters. Thus, for example, chaps. 24–26 treat of the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric; chaps. 37–40 are ‘laments’ on the fate of the Byzantine empire in Metochites’ days; chaps. 42–45 dwell on the pleasure of beholding different parts of Creation; chaps. 46–49 weigh the pros and cons of an active and a contemplative life; chaps. 72–76 query whether it is possible to combine a life in Christ with a life in the world; chaps. 77–78 comment on the politician’s duty ‘to strive for peace, prepare for war’; chaps. 80–81 point up the impracticability of the political theories of ancient philosophers; chaps. 82–86 treat of national and private wealth; chaps. 87–91 enquire into the conditions of human knowledge; chaps. 96–98 deal with different political constitutions; and chaps. 99–110 discuss various cities and nations in ancient history.

It is important to note that some of these groups in turn form second-order groups. Thus, for example, the ethical and political themes discussed in chaps. 72–86 lead naturally into one another. The nostalgic ‘laments’ in chaps. 37–40 are linked with chaps. 42–45 praising the pleasures of contemplation through chap. 41, in which it is pointed out that reminiscing about the past is pleasurable. Conversely, nearly all the chapters on classical authors belong with the first 26 of the work (all included in the present edition), whereas ancient historiography looms especially large in the last 28 chapters.

The relations between the parts of these first- and second-order groups are of different types. In some cases, we have to do with a dyadic relation in which the chapters are antithetically opposed (e.g. chaps. 22–23), or even a triadic, with the third chapter added as a synthetic conclusion (e.g. chaps. 96–98); in many other cases, a series of chapters are concatenated in such a way that each new chapter presents a digression on some point brought up in the preceding one, but there is little or no essential unity between all the chapters in the series (e.g. chaps. 15–20).

From this description we may conclude, with Beck, that the *Semeioseis* as a whole was not composed in accordance with any systematic principles.² The author seems to have focused his attention on the individual chapters. The impression that he has been concerned with thematic unity on this level is borne out by the references in several chapters to ‘the present theme.’³ Similarly, at *Semeiosis*

² Beck (1952, 24). ³ ὁ νῦν σκοπός; e.g. *Sem.* 1.1.6; 5.2.1; 14.3.1.

1.3.7, he expresses the wish that his readers will regard the preface of the collection as 'one as to its theme': in this way, he says, it will be able to fulfil a double function, at the same time being included among the chapters of the *Semeioseis* and preceding the remaining chapters by way of introduction. Thematic unity thus seems to be a requirement for being included as a chapter.

At the same time, however, it deserves to be emphasized that the chapters are almost invariably parts of thematic first- and second-order groups. The result is that, notwithstanding the absence of a systematic plan, the *Semeioseis* as a whole clearly exhibits a loose, 'organic,' kind of structure, based, as it seems, rather on Metochites' own free associations than on the inherent logic of the subjects discussed in his work. This is an aspect of the *Semeioseis* that Beck tended to overlook, and I shall return below to some of its implications.⁴

Possible models and parallels

The specific literary form of the *Semeioseis* is probably unique in earlier and contemporary Greek literature. Any attempts to single out a closest parallel fail to convince.⁵ This is not to deny that there are many works which are similar in certain respects and from which Metochites may have drawn his inspiration. Plutarch's *Moralia* is perhaps the most obvious example. Metochites' admiration for Plutarch is well attested (see especially *Sem.* 71, included in this volume). In contrast to earlier Byzantine writers, he may well have had access not only to a limited selection of the essays of the *Moralia*, but to a

⁴ Pp. 261–63.

⁵ Bloch (1790, 171–72) compared the *Semeioseis* to Photius' *Bibliotheca* and, in particular, to the *Ἰοβία* or *Violarium* ('quod similis fere est argumenti'), then commonly believed to be an original work of the Empress Eudokia Makrembolitissa, but later shown to be a forgery by the 16th-century scribe Constantine Palaiokappa, reproducing material from various lexica and scholia. Krumbacher (1897, 551) regarded it as a prose counterpart of John Tzetzes' *Chiliads*, 'gewissermassen,' only not quite clear in what respect. Beck (1952, 25) compared it with Photius' *Bibliotheca*, which he found much more restricted in respect of the scope of its subject-matter; with Michael Psellos' *De omnifaria doctrina*, which he found more superficial; and with the *Dogmatic Panoply* of Euthymios Zigabenos, which he found less independent. Hunger (1952, 9) interpreted the linking of Metochites' name with Plutarch's in a letter from Nikephoros Gregoras to the former as an allusion to the *Miscellanea*, 'die ein Pendant zu den plutarchischen *Moralia* darstellen' (cf. below, 265–68; 281–82; 286–87).

nearly complete edition, namely the one prepared by Maximos Planoudes, probably at the monastery of Chora, in the last decade of the thirteenth century.⁶ Other ancient miscellanists with whom Metochites appears to have been familiar include Aelian⁷ and Clement of Alexandria.⁸ He also drew on Maximus of Tyre for *Semeioseis* 88 and 90,⁹ and he was a keen admirer of Synesius (*Sem.* 18) and Dio Chrysostom (*Sem.* 19). Maximus I mention because Metochitean *Semeioseis* have much in common with Maximian *Dialexeis* in format and structure, even if not in the particulars of style.¹⁰ As for Synesius and Dio, on the other hand, there are also stylistic similarities which may be of significance. I shall return to these below, in the sections on Metochites' stylistics and style.

The loose and 'organic' structure of the *Semeioseis* is perhaps most reminiscent of such collections of answers to classroom questions as are represented in Byzantium by a few specimens from the late eleventh century, e.g. John Italos' *Quaestiones quodlibetales*.¹¹ Another similarly free-structured kind of work are the letter collections that were so popular with Late Byzantine authors. But apart from the fact that the *Quaestiones quodlibetales* and related collections deal primarily with philosophical questions on a rather technical level, they share with the letter collections a general characteristic which the *Semeioseis* lacks. The individual pieces that these types of collection contain were each originally produced in answer to some

⁶ Represented by codex Par. gr. 1671, dated 11 July 1296 and containing 69 essays including the *Lives* of Galba and Otho. On this edition and the later full edition based upon it, see Irigoien (1987, cclxxi–cclxxxiv). On Metochites, Planoudes and Plutarch, see Tartaglia (1987, 345–46) and Ševčenko (1975, 41–42 and nn. 170–77). On Planoudes and the Chora monastery see Wendel (1940, 406–10), but note also the divergent view of Constantinides (1982, 68–70). To the indications of Metochites' use of Planoudes' edition adduced by Tartaglia (1987, 345–46) could be added his praise of the spurious *De Homero*, which is found in no other Plutarch MSS of an early enough date than the Planoudean (Kindstrand 1990, v).

⁷ *Sem.* 110, 734 MK. ⁸ *Sem.* 17.2.3. ⁹ See Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 5).

¹⁰ There is a careful discussion of the literary form of the *Dialexeis* in Trapp (1997b, 1950–75); see also Trapp (1997a, xxxii–xlvi). According to Metochites, Phoenicians, even philosophers like Porphyry and Maximus, use a language which is smooth, not harsh (*Sem.* 17.3.2–3). As will be seen below (pp. 277–82), this is in Metochites' view exceptional for philosophers.

¹¹ Thus Beck (1937) deals with the *Semeioseis* under the heading 'Frag-Antwort-literatur,' on account of its heterogeneity, although he admits that it does not strictly belong there (*ibid.*, 127 n. 40).

particular need of the moment, and only subsequently brought together for publication. In the case of the *Semeioseis*, it is generally very hard to divine any more immediate purpose behind the composition of a particular essay than, at most (see below, 261–63), that it should eventually form part of a collection of essays on miscellaneous topics. One may even go so far as to argue that the absence of an original context like that of a correspondence or a classroom discussion is part of the reason why the *Semeioseis* do give the appearance of being more than accidentally connected with each other, that is, of constituting a literary whole despite their lack of an overall plan.

Beck on the nature of the Semeioseis

I shall now proceed to discuss the evidence as to how the *Semeioseis* as a literary work was regarded by the author and his contemporary audience. One important source for Metochites' own idea of the character and purpose of his work is the preface. It was taken into consideration in the only profound discussion of the issue to have appeared so far, in the seminal study by Beck (1952).

The main concern of Beck was to establish the value of the *Semeioseis* as a source text for what he called 'die Krise des byzantinischen Weltbildes im 14. Jahrhundert.' In order to do this, he had to dispose of the argument that the work was largely made up of conventional rhetorical exercises, and on that account of restricted value for the history of thought. He admitted that a number of the essays deal with themes and use techniques familiar from rhetorical exercise texts, so-called *progymnasmata*, but contended that in contrast to the ordinary progymnasmatis, Metochites avails himself of these techniques for the purpose of expressing his personal 'Empfindungen, Eindrücken, Überlegungen, Ängsten und Zweifeln,' as well as for that of discussing 'die mit den Problemen seiner Zeit engstens verbundenen Anliegen und Nöte.'¹² 'Die Frage ist allein die,' Beck argued,

ob die Form der Techne um ihrer selbst willen gepflegt wird, oder ob sie nur Umkleidung eines für sich bestehenden und auch ohne diese Form denkbaren Inhalts ist (1952, 22).

¹² Beck (1952, 21).

In order to decide this question, Beck considered four principal arguments. (1) The *Semeioseis* includes a number of essays which stand as far apart from rhetoric as was possible in Byzantium; (2) it deals constantly with current problems of Byzantine life; (3) the rhetorical techniques are employed in a highly idiosyncratic manner; and (4) an 'echte, persönliche Ton,' or even 'existenzielle Note,' is conveyed throughout the work. He came to the conclusion that the *Semeioseis* should be regarded as a 'zwar auf weite Strecken formal rhetorisches, inhaltlich aber stark philosophisches, literarkritisches, geschichtspolitisches, ja bekennerisches Werk,' which indeed deserves to be taken into serious consideration in an account of the Byzantine world-view.¹³

There can be little doubt that Beck was right about the influence of school rhetoric on the *Semeioseis*. I also agree with him that the important question is rather to what extent the rhetorical elements of the work have been a primary concern of the author, although I do feel sceptical about the possibility of separating the content of the work from these elements. Whether Metochites' primary concern was with the message or the mode of presentation, the precepts of rhetoric were obviously second nature with him, part and parcel of the way in which he thought and communicated. One of the reasons for devoting the following sections of this chapter to the evidence of contemporary views of the *Semeioseis* is that it may help us assess the significance of these rhetorical elements. One such piece of evidence that was overlooked by Beck is a few lines in Metochites' *Poem* 12, where he himself speaks of the *Semeioseis*. This text will be discussed after the preface, to which I shall now turn my attention.

The preface. (1) The title

In the preface to the *Semeioseis* (*Sem.* 1), Metochites puts forward that neither in the field of theology, nor that of philosophy, nor that of rhetoric, are there any questions left that have not been exhaustively treated by previous generations of writers. All the sacred texts and all the secular classics have been commented on and, in some cases, supplemented. The awareness of this state of affairs, he ex-

¹³ Beck (1952, 22–23).

plains, has always prevailed upon him to refrain from giving vent to his thoughts on diverse subjects, with much ensuing agony. This time, however, he continues, he has, after some hesitation, decided to ‘publish some brief memoranda and notes in no special order, concerning a few things that I myself have reflected on at different occasions in my life.’¹⁴ He does this, he says, in the hope that people who themselves have entertained similar thoughts without daring to express them publicly will receive his ‘notes’ favourably. In the last few lines he proposes that the preface itself should be regarded as the first example of the kind of writing he has in mind.

According to Metochites, then, publishing the *Semeioseis* is the only alternative he has found to keeping an agonizing silence in the overwhelming presence of the Greek secular and sacred traditions. In what way can it be such an alternative? In order to sort this out, it would be useful, to begin with, to have an exact grasp of the meaning of the words used by Metochites to describe the *Semeioseis* in the preface, namely ὑπομνηματισμοὶ καὶ σημειώσεις, which I have here translated as ‘memoranda and notes.’

These words are probably more significant to the present enquiry than is immediately apparent from the passage quoted above. On f. 1^v of Par. gr. 2003, one of the principal MSS of the *Semeioseis*,¹⁵ the contents of the volume are described as Θεοδώρου μεγάλου λογοθέτου τοῦ Μετοχίτου ὑπομνηματισμοὶ καὶ σημειώσεις γνωμικαὶ διὰ κεφαλαίων ρκ’ διηρημένοι. The hand has been identified as that of the industrious sixteenth-century scribe and forger Andreas Darmarios.¹⁶ It is unlikely, however, that Darmarios himself invented the title on the basis of the passage in the preface, in view of the fact that Metochites, in the only other passage of his œuvre in which the *Semeioseis* is mentioned calls it, in ‘epic’ form, Γνωμῶν Σημειώσις.¹⁷ The most reasonable hypothesis will be that Darmarios’ title reflects a tradition going back to the author himself. This hypothesis receives strong support from the fact that another important witness to the text, Scor. gr. 248, which is independent of the Paris MS,¹⁸ introduces the work as τοῦ μεγάλου λογοθέτου Θεοδώρου τοῦ Μετοχίτου γνωμικαὶ σημειώσεις.¹⁹ But regardless of the truth of the hypo-

¹⁴ *Sem.* 1.3.5. ¹⁵ See pp. xvii–xx. ¹⁶ Agapitos & al. (1996, 18).

¹⁷ *Poem* 12, 244. Note that the word μνήματα occurs in line 243.

¹⁸ See pp. xxi–xxvi.

thesis, ὑπομνηματισμοὶ καὶ σημειώσεις are the words used by the author himself in his preface to describe the work, and hence some semantic information on them may be useful.

As for the first of them, ὑπομνηματισμός in later Greek (it first occurs in Polybius) takes on most of the technical significations of the classical equivalent ὑπόμνημα. The basic notion is that of a written reminder. A non-literary style is often connoted. In the Neoplatonic classifications of Aristotle's writings, 'hypomnematic' works are the philosopher's private notebooks:

"Hypomnematic" are those works which the Philosopher composed for his own recollection and for further testing. Some of them are uniform, being reminders concerning some single subject, others are miscellaneous and deal with several subjects. However, the hypomnematic works seem not to be fully worthy of serious attention. On this account, nor can the Philosopher's views be ascertained from them (Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.14–18).²⁰

Thus, ὑπομνηματισμοί is found in the sense of (1) private notes or memoranda;²¹ (2) published memoirs;²² (3) diplomatic reports;²³ (4) public records;²⁴ (5) annals or chronicles.²⁵ It may also denote (6) essays of a more polished kind. Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to his own essays on various rhetorical subjects as ὑπομνηματισμοί,²⁶ and Plutarch speaks of ὑπομνηματισμοί on fearlessness and courage, self-control and magnanimity.²⁷

Finally, it may denote (7) scholia and commentaries on philosophical and other authors,²⁸ and even compendia of such authors.²⁹

¹⁹ Agapitos & al. (1996, 20–21 and n. 46). Additional support is found in a passage paying compliments to Metochites in Nikephoros Gregoras, *Letter* 24a, 15–17, written probably shortly after the publication of the *Semeioseis*: 'We would indeed be speaking quite truthfully if we were to call you a rhetorical, a poetical, an astronomical man, and in addition a political, a practical, and a sentence-giving one (γνωμοδότην).'

²⁰ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.28–4.8; Olympiodorus, *Prolog.* 6.24–30; Elias [?David], *In Cat.* 114.1–14. See also Hadot (1990, 70–71).

²¹ Iamblichus, *VP* 23.104.10; Plutarch, *Ant.* 15.5.

²² Polybius 2.40.4; cf. Plutarch, *Ar.* 3.3. ²³ Polybius 25.4.5.

²⁴ Plutarch, *De fort. Rom.* 326a8. ²⁵ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *AR* 1.7.2.

²⁶ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Dem.* 49, 236.11; *Thuc.* 1, 325.3–4; *Thuc. id.* 1, 421.11. On the familiarity with the *De Thucydide* in Metochites' close environment, see Ševčenko (1962, 61–66).

²⁷ Plutarch, *De Alex. magni fort. aut virt.* 328a4.

²⁸ Simplicius, *In Phys.* 430.3; 601.12; Eustathios, *In Il.* 2:697.19 4:227.5; *In Od.* 1:131.24; George Tornikes, *Or.* 283.4.

In fact Metochites himself designates his *Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy* as ὑπομνηματισμοί in the preface to that work (lines 11–12). There are also other parallels in the descriptions of the two Metochitean works in their respective prefaces (see below). The *Paraphrases* are, however, a very different kind of work from the *Semeioseis*, and it seems necessary to conclude that Metochites uses the word ὑπομνηματισμοί in two different acceptations in the two prefaces.

The second word, σημειώσεις, may refer to any kind of sign, natural or conventional. 'Sign, indication' is the sense in which it is used, in the singular, by numerous theological and ecclesiastical writers: there is a precedent in the Septuagint (Psalms 59:6). It is applied to diverse types of writing: signatures;³⁰ colophons;³¹ Hebrew script.³² The graphic representation itself seems to be what is primarily intended in these examples. But the word is also used of the content represented. Origen speaks of his εἰς τὴν Ἔξοδον σημειώσεις,³³ meaning, presumably, commentaries or scholia. This seems to be the sense also in Eustathios, *In Il.* 1:292.7; 3:833.9.³⁴

Both the sense of 'note, comment' and that of 'note, memorandum' are, however, more commonly expressed by some of the compounds of the word formed with prepositional prefixes. To name but one instructive example, in Iamblichus, *Vita Pythagorica* 23.104, ὑπομνηματισμοί and ὑποσημειώσεις are synonymous doublets meaning 'notes of conversations,' in contradistinction to published works.³⁵ In all probability, ὑπομνηματισμοί and σημειώσεις in Metochites, *Semeiosis* 1.3.5 are also intended as synonymous doublets (a common stylistic feature in Metochites). Consequently, each of the words can in this passage only have a meaning that it shares with the

²⁹ ?Arius Didymus, 2.7.5 = Stobaeus, 2:57.15–16; idem, 2.7.12 = Stobaeus, 2:116.18; Nikephoros Blemmydes, *EL* 688C–689A.

³⁰ Eusebius, *HE* 5.19.4.3. ³¹ Eusebius, *HE* 5.20.2.3.

³² Eusebius, *HE* 6.16.4.3. ³³ *Philocalia* 27.10n.2.

³⁴ Σημειώσεις also occurs in superscriptions of ecclesiastical documents, meaning 'report of the proceedings,' while ὑπομνήματα (not ὑπομνηματισμοί) in the same context is used of the official proceedings of the Church Councils, and later, of the Patriarch's personal notes (Darrouzès 1970, 482–508; 399–426).

³⁵ This is the sense of ὑποσημειώσεις also in Diogenes Laertius, 2.122 (Sino is said to have made notes of Socrates' conversations). It may be noted in this connection that the ἀπομνημονεύματα of Xenophon are called by Metochites ὑπομνήματα (*Sem.* 8.3.1).

other. That is, they must mean either ‘notes, comments’ or ‘notes, memoranda.’ The former alternative does not match the actual content of the *Semeioseis* very well. Probably, then, the two words should be understood in the sense of ‘notes, memoranda’ with the connotation ‘not intended for publication,’ much as ὑπομνηματισμοί and ὑποσημειώσεις in Iamblichus.³⁶

Indeed, Metochites’ statement that he took the decision to publish these notes and memoranda in defiance of the monumental weight of the tradition would make best sense on the assumption that they were not originally intended for publication. This, then, seems to be what the author implies. Whether it was actually the case is another question, to which I shall return in the next section.

The adjective γνώμικός, which occurs in the titles of Par. gr. 2003 and Scor. gr. 248, though not in the actual text of the *Semeioseis*, is derived from γνώμη in the sense of rhetorical ‘sentence’ or ‘maxim.’ As we have seen, Metochites himself refers to the *Semeioseis* as Γνωμῶν Σημειώσις in *Poem* 12, 244. In Hermogenes’ definition, the γνώμη is a ‘summary general statement advising against something or recommending something or making clear how each thing is.’³⁷ One of the progymnastic school exercises was consecrated to it. The γνώμη in question could be a familiar quotation from a poet or an orator, on which the student was required to enlarge in accordance with a certain procedure. Whether directly or not, Hermogenes’ definition is probably indebted to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 2.21, according to which γνώμαι are general statements which involve a moral judgement.³⁸ The notion that a moral judgement is involved is clearly present also in the first known occurrences of the derivative adjective. In

³⁶ The *Vita Pythagorica* was a very rare work in the early fourteenth century, but it was very probably read by Metochites: see Bydén (forthcoming, chap. 5).

³⁷ Hermogenes, *Prog.* 4, 8.16. In Aphthonius, whose *Progymnasmata* would normally be on the syllabus instead of Hermogenes’, the definition is cut down to ‘a summary statement advising against or recommending something’ (25.8–9 S).

³⁸ ‘[A maxim] is a statement; not about a particular fact, such as the character of Iphicrates, but of a general kind; nor is it about any and every subject — e.g. “straight is the contrary of curved” is not a maxim — but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided’ (1394a19–26, trans. Rhys Roberts, in Barnes 1984). Cf. *SE* 17, 176b18–20: ‘true opinions and general assertions’ are both called γνώμαι. In [Aristotle], *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, 1430a40, on the other hand, a γνώμη is defined as ‘the expression of an individual opinion on general matters’ (trans. Forster, in Barnes 1984).

Dio Chrysostom as well as in Sextus Empiricus it appears in tandem with words meaning 'exhortatory,' denoting the element of usefulness in poetry as opposed to that of pleasure.³⁹ The meaning of the adjective in ?Hermogenes, *Heur.* 4.3 (177.3), seems again to be dependent on Aristotle's discussion in the *Rhetoric*.⁴⁰

The significance of the homonymous progymnastic exercise for Metochites' 'gnomic notes' (assuming that Σημειώσεις Γνωμικαί is indeed the title he chose for them) is not easy to determine. It is true that some of the obligatory points of the school γνώμη (or the χρεία, which follows the same procedure) appear in many places in the *Semeioseis*; but far from all the essays centre on a statement that answers to the definition of γνώμη, and I think none adhere strictly to the exercise pattern.⁴¹ Indeed, many of them discuss theses that would rather fall under other headings in the progymnastic programme. It seems safest to assume that Metochites found it convenient to qualify his notes as 'gnomic' because they are largely 'moral' or 'exhortatory,' i.e. they often argue for or against a particular course of conduct, although, admittedly, not even this is an adequate description of all the individual essays of the *Semeioseis*.

Finally, there are two more expressions in the passage cited that deserve some attention. Metochites tells us that he has decided to publish his notes 'in abridged form' (ἐπιτετμημένως ἐκδοῦναι); they will be arranged, he says, 'in no special order' (lit. 'piecemeal as they will occur': κατὰ μέρη ὅπως ἂν ἐπίη).⁴² Again, he uses similar expressions in the preface to the *Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural*

³⁹ Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 52.17 (2:109.15–17); Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 1.278 (3:70.16–19).

⁴⁰ *Rhet.* 1394a26–1395a2; cf. [Aristotle], *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1430b1–5. What Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* 2.21 about the advantage of using γνώμαι may be compared with the hope, expressed by Metochites in the preface (*Sem.* 1.3.5–6), that his audience will receive his 'memoranda and notes' favourably because they reflect their own opinions: 'One great advantage of maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about particular cases' (1395b1–3, trans. Rhys Roberts in Barnes 1984). Metochites may have read this and taken it to heart.

⁴¹ A γνώμη was developed through eight points: encomiastic, paraphrastic, causal, from the opposite, by comparison, example, testimony of the ancients, brief epilogue (Aphthonius, *Prog.* 25.29–26.2).

⁴² *Sem.* 1.3.5.

Philosophy. There he says that he has ‘considerably abbreviated’ (ἐπιτέμνων) the Aristotelian text ‘in definitional form’ (ὀριστικῶς). This possibly refers to the frequent insertions in the *Paraphrases* of ‘subheadings’ stating the proposition argued in the subsequent paragraph. Abbreviating Metochites’ own notes and memoranda can, on the other hand, only mean condensing and/or selecting from a more extensive body of material.

The phrase ‘as they will occur’ (ὅπως ἂν ἐπίη) in the preface has parallels throughout the entire work. A good example is *Semeiosis* 19.2.1, where the theme of the chapter is presented with the words ‘it occurs to me now to make a note of this’ (ἐμοίγε τοῦτο νῦν ἔπεισι σημειοῦσθαι). Similar phrases are not infrequent in Plutarch, where they contribute to a feeling of spontaneity to which Metochites was, apparently, not insensitive. In *Semeiosis* 71.10.1, he speaks with approval of Plutarch’s habit of expressing his thoughts in the first words that occur to him (ὡς ἐπέλθοι φορεῖται). Such ‘spontaneity’ may be thought to be the hallmark of an essayistic style, as opposed to systematic exposition. But this need not have been the opposition that Metochites primarily had in mind. The cited phrases are, of course, also reminiscent of Socrates’ promise in Plato’s *Apology* not to deliver ‘elaborate speeches’ but to speak ‘off the cuff in the first words that occur.’⁴³ My suggestion is that Metochites may have thought of the arrangement of his notes as characteristic of a philosophical style as opposed to a rhetorical one. He treats of the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric especially in *Semeiosis* 26, where he argues that the use of refined language is foreign to the spirit of philosophy. In the two concluding sections, I shall attempt briefly to evaluate Metochites’ own stylistic performance in the light of his discussion of this relationship.⁴⁴ If, then, he chose to follow

⁴³ Plato, *Ap.* 17b8–c2. There are a couple of interesting parallels between the preface to the *Semeioseis* and the ones to Photius’ *Bibliotheca* and *Ad Amphiloichium quaestiones*. In the preface to the *Bibliotheca*, Photius explains that he has not arranged the chapters (i.e. the ‘codices’) in systematic order, but ‘as memory put each one of them forward’ (1.16–17); should there prove to be omissions or inexactitudes, he goes on, this is not surprising, since he has worked from memory. Likewise, in the preface to the *Ad Amphiloichium quaestiones*, he declares, like Socrates, that his answers will not ‘be adorned with an elaborate diction, but [use] the first words that occur’ (lines 21–22). On Metochites and Photius, see Ševčenko (1962, 172 n. 2).

⁴⁴ Pp. 273–88.

Socrates' lead and desist from 'elaborate speeches,' this may have been because he wished to be true to the spirit of philosophy.

Naturally, it may also have been because he wished to *seem* to be true to this spirit. I will even go so far as to suggest that it may have been because he wished to seem to *seem* to be. At any rate, it should be noted that in the stylistic theory of Hermogenes, who was the undisputed authority in this field throughout the Byzantine era, the insertion of a phrase to the effect that 'the thought just entered my mind' or the like is regarded as characteristic of the 'form' of Sincerity or Truthful Speech.⁴⁵ I shall come back to the relevance of Hermogenes' stylistic theory for the analysis of the *Semeioseis* below. In the present context, I only wish to draw attention to the possibility that the promise to speak 'as it occurs' may signal to the educated reader the author's choice of a particular Hermogenic 'form' called Truthful Speech. As I shall later argue, Metochites may have considered this 'form' suitable for someone speaking 'on philosophical topics and with a philosophical purpose,' as he phrased it.⁴⁶

To sum up this section, the semantic information marshalled in it suggests that Metochites in his preface wished to represent the *Semeioseis*, correctly or not, as an 'abridged edition' of his own private notes or memoranda, which he had had no intention to publish at the time that he wrote them. This suggestion is confirmed by other evidence, which will be reviewed in the following sections.

The preface. (2) The aporia

As we saw above, Metochites, in his preface, sets out and amplifies the following *aporia*: 'So much has been said already. What then gives me the right to speak?' This *aporia* can be traced back at least to the Athenian funeral oration and its contemporary offshoots. In those speeches, however, it is always brought up only to be resolved immediately. Once Isocrates, in his *Panegyric*, has acknowledged the fact that many 'self-styled wise men' have already delivered speeches on the subject that he has proposed for himself, he goes immediately on to specify in what respects he thinks his treatment will be superior to theirs, and does not even have to spell out the question as to what gives him the right to speak (*Pan.* 3–4). Metochites' older

⁴⁵ Hermogenes, *Id.* 359.6–14. ⁴⁶ *Sem.* 71.9.5.

contemporary and literary opponent, Nikephoros Choumnos, places himself squarely within this tradition by suggesting, in the opening lines of his *On the Nature of the World*, that even if the sheer number of different views on natural philosophy may seem intimidating, the very fact that they differ proves that there is still more to be said.⁴⁷

Metochites, in contrast, insists that '[we late-comers to literature] are by necessity forced to...bear the fate...we have been allotted, reluctantly perhaps, but bear it nonetheless.'⁴⁸ Whatever one might say, it has been said before; the late-comer's lot is to tax the reading public's patience by repeating all over what has already been better expressed by others.⁴⁹ By omitting to state a reason for his adding to the transmitted body of learning, Metochites removes the element of self-assertion traditionally connected with the *aporia*. He only tells us that in spite of everything he has decided to publish his notes and memoranda. But why? Beck proposed that in this way Metochites wanted to prove that not everything had already been said after all.⁵⁰ But then why doesn't Metochites say so? On the contrary, the only hope he ever expresses for his notes is that they will appeal to people who themselves have entertained similar thoughts (although, admittedly, he does not mention whether he has ever seen these thoughts expressed in writing).

It is easy to see why Beck's proposal might be tempting. If the *Semeioseis* does not add anything to what the classics have already said, then, by Metochites' own argument, it lacks a *raison d'être*. All Metochites will have achieved by his *aporia* is to remind his readers that this is the case and to make clear that he himself is aware of it. This is not a gesture of modesty; it is an act of self-destruction. Yet if the *aporia* should be taken as a serious expression of the 'insight into the disadvantages of a culture burdened with too brilliant a tradition,'⁵¹ I can come to no other conclusion than that 'self-destruction' is indeed the rhetorical strategy adopted by Metochites.

The only way of saving Beck's proposal is to avoid taking the *aporia* seriously. It could be argued that it is not necessary to assume that Metochites was in fact so very pessimistic about the creative possibilities of Byzantine literature. In spite of his dramatic manner of expression, the points he wished to make might have been rather

⁴⁷ Text in Sakkellion (1890, 75). ⁴⁸ *Sem.* 1.3.1.

⁴⁹ *Sem.* 1.2.7-8. ⁵⁰ Beck (1952, 24; 59). ⁵¹ Ševčenko (1961, 175).

banal: he shared with his readers a high appreciation of the Greek classics, and he recognized that he himself could never really emulate the latter. Confronted with a vehemently traditionalist audience like the Late Byzantine he might have felt that a *captatio benevolentiae* like this was indispensable in order to take the edge off expected criticism.

There are at least two problems with this interpretation. One is that it presupposes that the audience could be expected to disregard completely the literal meaning of Metochites' expressions of creative despair (in spite of the fact that they seem to be a rather unconventional development of a well-known literary convention). The other problem is that it will plunge us headlong into a mode of interpretation of the *Semeioseis* where arguments are taken not at face value but as literary conventions only. This was exactly the mode of interpretation that Beck himself sought to evade.

I think there may be another way out of the impasse. This is to interpret Metochites' decision as what we may call a formal solution to a material problem. Even if everything has been said before, there is nothing to prevent it from being expressed in novel ways, recast in a personal mould, indeed, arranged according to the whim of the author rather than to any systematic principle. The peculiar style and the literary form would then be what gives the *Semeioseis* its *raison d'être*. To be sure, this is not a real solution, since a new style or literary form is an irrelevant response to a need for new ideas, which is what Metochites says impedes his writing. But Metochites also makes it clear that this need is created by the demands of his audience.⁵² The fact that he is really more concerned about public attitudes towards contemporary authors than about his own lack of creativity is even more clearly brought out in *Semeiosis* 9.1.5–8 (this volume, p. 90). In sum, if the audience feels that a new style or literary form can compensate for the lack of new ideas, the solution will work anyway. On this interpretation, then, Metochites relies on the stylistic and literary features of the *Semeioseis* to see him through the ordeal of public criticism.

⁵² *Sem.* 1.2.7–8.

Beck on the purpose of the Semeioseis

Beck further argued that there was no purpose connected with the composition of the individual chapters of the work. These are, he said,

nichts anderes als der Niederschlag der Erfahrungen, Eindrücke und Ideen eines reiches Lebens. Es sind flüchtige Aufzeichnungen über ethische Probleme, Tagebuchnotizen über die immer wieder aufstoßenden ewigen Rätsel des Lebens, kleine Aufsätze nach der Lektüre einzelner Klassiker, Randnotizen allgemeiner Art über Eindrücke und Ergebnisse seiner wissenschaftlichen Kommentare und Abhandlungen (1952, 24).

That is to say, Beck accepted without further ado that the chapters were, as Metochites says, originally ‘notes and memoranda.’ The decision to publish them, on the other hand, Beck considered to have been motivated by the author’s ambition.⁵³

It is doubtful that Beck’s opinion of the composition of the chapters can be correct. For several reasons, I find it hard to believe that it should have been guided by no definite plans whatsoever, or indeed that the publication of the chapters should have been quite as unpremeditated as Metochites suggests in his preface. If the chapters were not intended for publication, why were they written and saved in the first place? It is true that some of them have themes in common with some of Metochites’ speeches and poems.⁵⁴ It may be tempting to surmise that they are early drafts. But the thematic unity which characterizes the individual chapters of the *Semeioseis* is not what one expects from diary entries and commonplace-book notes. Moreover, there are numerous discussions in the *Semeioseis* which have no parallels in Metochites’ other extant works.⁵⁵

The most important objection to Beck’s view is, however, posed by the degree of structure presented by the *Semeioseis* as a whole.⁵⁶

⁵³ Beck (1952, 24).

⁵⁴ For comparisons of the *Sem.* with *Poems* 14–20, see Gigante ([1967] 1981). On the relationship between the *Sem.* and *Logos* 10, see Polemis (1995, 44–49). See also Hinterberger (2001) on the relationship between *Sem.* 28 and *Poem* 1.

⁵⁵ I cannot follow Ševčenko’s (1962, 136; 1975, 25) suggestion that *Poem* 1, 400–10 mentions historical essays composed in Metochites’ youth (which Ševčenko thought might be identical to the ones in the *Semeioseis*). To my mind, this passage, like the corresponding passage in the preface to the *Stoicheiosis astronomike* (1:1, 165–69), refers solely to hagiographical orations, in all probability the second, third, and fourth speeches of Vindob. gr. 95.

The number and size of the primary and secondary groups of chapters, as well as the different types of relationship between the chapters in these groups, show conclusively, I think, that the *Semeioseis* is not a spur-of-the-moment assemblage of diverse pre-existing material. The chapters in these groups must have been originally composed in much the same form and sequence that they still have in the work. It is a natural inference that they were in fact composed especially for the work. If that is so, the literary form of the *Semeioseis* is not accidental, but purposely created, perhaps, as the ‘formal-solution’ hypothesis suggests, in compensation for the absence of an original philosophical content. These considerations seem to prompt a shift away from the interpretative perspective of Beck, to a mode of interpretation which focuses less on the ‘confessional’ aspect of the *Semeioseis* and more on Metochites’ rhetorical and literary strategies. They do not necessarily imply that the *Semeioseis* is of no value as a testimony to the early Palaiologan *Zeitgeist*, but they suggest that we may reasonably expect to find Metochites’ most important accomplishments not on the level of the thoughts and sentiments expressed in it but on the level of the literary form.

Granted, then, that the individual chapters were composed for publication, the question of the purpose of composing them will lead directly to the question of the purpose of publishing them. Metochites and his contemporaries distinguished between two possible motives behind the publication of a literary work. As Nikephoros Choumnos explained, it could be published either ‘so as to be useful’ (κατὰ χρῆσιν) or ‘for the sake of ambition’ (φιλοτιμίας ἕνεκεν).⁵⁷ Metochites himself developed this dichotomy in *Semeiosis* 1.2.7–9. It goes without saying that the dichotomy is false. No doubt there were works in the fourteenth century, as today, which did more for the needs of the readers than they did for the reputation of the author — and vice versa. But then as now, authors were fully capable of

⁵⁶ Beck seems to have been aware of this, to judge from his attempt to downplay the degree of structure in the work: ‘Zwar werden gewisse inhaltlich zusammengehörige Kapitelgruppen gebildet, aber dazwischen stehen immer wieder Abschnitte, die nicht das geringste mit der Gruppe zu tun haben, und andere zum Thema gehörige Kapitel tauchen erst viel später auf’ (1952, 24).

⁵⁷ Choumnos, *Letter 72*, AN 85.10–11. Cf. idem, *Letter 3*, AN 4.10; *Letter 4*, AN 5.9–10; *Letter 35*, AN 42.22; *Letter 78*, AN 94.18. Boissonade (AN 5, n. 3) compares Synesius, *Ep.* 23, 41.7–8.

simultaneously being helpful to others and pursuing their personal interests, without becoming schizophrenic. Metochites knew this, and he congratulated Plutarch on having succeeded in both respects.⁵⁸

The important thing is that the notion of usefulness seems to be a *sine qua non* in early Palaiologan apologies and eulogies of a certain type of literary works, namely philosophical ones. Metochites himself emphasizes the utility of his works in the prefaces to the *Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy* (*passim*) and the *Stoicheiosis astronomike* (1:1.34–40). So does Nikephoros Gregoras, in his description of the *Semeioseis* in *Letter 23*. I shall postpone the question as to what kind of services the *Semeioseis* may have been considered to offer its readers until the section dealing with Gregoras' description. A subtle illustration of the way in which the dichotomy of philosophy and rhetoric was correlated with that of usefulness and ambition is found in Metochites' review of his own literary works in *Poem 12*, where he achieves the transition from his speeches and poems to his philosophical works with the words 'the three other books that I have composed will bring some advantage to generations after us' (235–36). This passage will be discussed in the next section.

Poem 12

As is stated in the heading, Metochites' twelfth poem deals, among other things, with the author's own writings. It is addressed to the church historian Nikephoros Kallistos Xanthopoulos, who was an old friend of the author's. Metochites accuses Nikephoros and his brother, Theodore, of having turned their back on him in a dire situation, in his private life as well as in the empire (lines 15–20). He reminds Nikephoros of all the praise he has bestowed on Metochites' literary works, and he modestly hints that some of his compliments may not have been altogether warranted by the facts (24–77). However, he goes on, Nikephoros was absolutely right about one thing: Metochites has always set wisdom above everything else in this life (78–108).

At line 169 Metochites begins a review of his own literary output, which he divides into oratory (199–224), poetry (225–34), and

⁵⁸ *Sem.* 71.12.9.

philosophy (235–326). The section on the philosophical works begins with a passage on the *Semeioseis*, and continues with passages on the *Stoicheiosis astronomike* and the *Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy*. The following is my own translation of the former passage. I will not deny the existence of a few uncertainties. The text established by Cunningham & al. (1983) is supplied in footnotes. I have changed the punctuation in a couple of places.

But the three other books that I have composed will eventually bring some advantage to later generations after us, and, perhaps, everlasting glory to me; there will be examples of the philosophical knowledge that I indeed possess, throughout all the manifold subdivisions of this [knowledge] (235–39).⁵⁹

Philosophy is concerned with the things connected with nature, and with what is called mathematics, and, in addition, with logic and, again, ethics: that is considered to be all (240–42).⁶⁰

Of all of these together there are records within this book, which I called Notes of Gnostic Sentences: anyone who makes a careful examination of it will see what I mean. With eloquence have been brought together, one by one, some clear examples, new and old, of all the things a host of which I have just enumerated (?), flowing from my mind, as if from some capacious treasury, from all sides in various directions, impressed, likewise, with the stamps of multifarious wisdom (243–51).⁶¹

This book is, perhaps, a witness to the strength of my intelligence and of my vast erudition — may *Adrasteia* keep away (\approx touch wood)! — you should know that you yourself used to say this to me, and one would not expect you ever to mislead me with false statements, for this does not behove your character. Indeed, there are in addition many who agree with your judgement, and who bear witness with you, affirming these things (252–58).⁶²

⁵⁹ Ἀτὰρ ἂν τριφάσι' εἴτερα τεύχεα σύνταγμαί δὴ ὀνηγόνοισι μεθ' ἡμέας οἴσει τί ποτ' ὄνειρα, ἢ δέ τ' ἐμοὶ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἴσως, δείγματά τ' ἔσται ἢ φιλοσόφου παρεούσης εὖ μάλ' ἔμοιγ' ἔξιος ἢ εἶδα διὰ πάντα πολυμερέα τῆσδ' ἅμα.

⁶⁰ τὰ μετὰ φύσιος ἔργα μέλει φιλοσοφίῃ, ἢ τὰ τε μαθηματικά καλέονται, σὺν δὲ λογικὰ, ἢ σὺν δ' αὖ ἠθικά· τὰ κρινέουσί τ' ἐόνθ' ἅπαντα,

⁶¹ τῶν κεν ἕσσ' ἅμαδις μνήματ' ἐνὶ τεύχει πάντων ἢ τῶδ', ὃ κάλεσα Γνωμῶν Σημειώσις, ἔνδον· ἢ τοῦ κεν ἐπίσκοπος ὅστις ἐπιμελέως γένοιτ' ἄν, ἢ ὕψεθ' ὃ φημι· σὺν ἄρ' εὐφωνί' ἀολλέα πάντων ἢ δείγματα σαφέα τῶν καταλουγισάμην νῦν ἕμαδον, ἢ ἦτ' ἄπ' ἄρα ταμείου του πολυχανδέος ἴσως, ἢ νοὺς ἐμοῖο ῥέοντα πάντοθεν ἄλλυδις ἄλλα, ἢ κόμμασι δὴ τυπούμεν' ὁμοῦ σοφίης παντοίης, ἢ ἄττα [scr:psi: ἄττα] διακριδὸν ἀγερθεν παλαιὰ νέα τε.

⁶² καὶ τόδ' ἐμοὶ νοὺς ἢ δὲ πολυμαθίης τε τεῦχος ἢ μαρτύρετ' ἴσως κράτος — ἀδράστεια δ' ἀπέστω — ἢ καὶ τὸς ἐμοὶ σύ γε πολλάκις ἴσθ' [scr:psi: ἦσθ'] ὡς κεν τόδ' ἔειπας, ἢ οὐδέ σε παραπάφειν οἴσαιτ' ἄν τις ἐμὲ λούγοις ἢ ψεύδεσιν, οὔποτε·

However, I have left this book in the world as a picture of my mind, or perhaps a statue. And just as some have thought fit to bequeath journals to history, so it will hereafter be journals of my thoughts, of the things I have contemplated in my mind on each occasion (259–63).⁶³

It may well be that lines 256–58 ('Indeed...things') allude to Nikephoros Gregoras' *Letter 23*, in which he showered praise on Metochites' work.⁶⁴ If so, 'these things' in line 258 probably refers back to lines 246–51 ('For with eloquence...wisdom'), which correspond rather well with the compliments paid by Gregoras.⁶⁵ Especially, the encyclopaedic scope of the *Semeioseis* is stressed by Gregoras. As we shall see below, these descriptions may be profitably compared with *Semeiosis 71*, where Metochites expresses his deep admiration of Plutarch's all-encompassing curiosity and versatility. In the present context I only wish to point to the possibility that Metochites' description of his own work may be influenced by that afforded by his flattering friend and disciple; it may naturally also depart, to a greater or lesser extent, from his own original conception of it.

Assuming, however, that the description of the *Semeioseis* in *Poem 12* does reflect Metochites' original conception of the work, what does it tell us? The most significant additions to the information that we have extracted from the preface to the *Semeioseis* come in lines 243–51. There Metochites says that the *Semeioseis* is an eloquent collection of (old and new) contributions to all the subdivisions of philosophy.⁶⁶ In lines 259–63, moreover, he compares the work to a picture or a map (πίναξ) of his own mind — or perhaps a statue, he adds, revealing that he hopes it will be seen as worthy of imitation.⁶⁷ And just as there are journals of external events, the *Semeioseis* is the journals of Metochites' mind, recording his thoughts on different occasions. The last remarks tie in with the statements in the preface to the *Semeioseis*, and may help us determine more accu-

οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τόδ' ἦθεσι σοῖσιν. ἢ μὲν ἔτι σῆ κρίσιί πάρ γ' ἔασι σύμφωνοι ἢ
 ποῦλλοὶ σὺν τ' ἄρα σοι μάρτυροι ταῦτα φάντες.

⁶³ ἀτὰρ ἐγὼ τόδε τεῦχος ἐμείο ἅτε πίνακα νοῦος ἢ ἐ τ' ἴσως ἀνδριάντα λιπόμην
 ἐνὶ βίῳ· ἅτε δ' ἐφημερίδας τινὲς ἐντίθεσθαι μνήμα ἢ νούμισαν, ἀμετέρων ἄρ'
 ἐφημερίδες λουγισμῶν, ἢ ὧν περ ἐκάστοτ' ἀνά νόον ἔμβαλον, ἔσσοντ' ἔνθεν.

⁶⁴ See below, pp. 269–73.

⁶⁵ Gregoras, *Letter 23*, 79–102.

⁶⁶ Although he conspicuously fails to mention theology or metaphysics.

⁶⁷ Agapitos & Smith (1992, 43); cf. Hunger (1978, 1:157–65).

rately the significance of these. I shall come back to these elements of the description in *Poem* 12 shortly.

In lines 259–63 as well as 248–51 Metochites hints, as he also did in the preface to the *Semeioseis*, that his contributions were written straight out of his head. The question is how to square this suggestion with the new claim in line 246 that they were brought together ‘with eloquence’ (σὺν εὐφωνίᾳ). Does Metochites mean that what ‘flowed from his mind’ were rough drafts which later underwent stylistic revision, perhaps in the process in which the condensation and/or selection referred to in the preface took place? Εὐφωνία is a word used by Metochites earlier in the poem (179), and elsewhere, to describe the workings of the art of rhetoric. I have already touched briefly on the significance of the traditional (Platonic) opposition between philosophy and rhetoric for Beck’s interpretation of the *Semeioseis*.⁶⁸ Metochites himself strongly affirms this opposition, especially in *Semeiosis* 26, where philosophical views are said not to be in harmony with a rhetorical attitude (διάθεσις εὐστομίας) enhanced by practice.⁶⁹ At the same time, of course, not even the most fervently anti-rhetorical Platonist would maintain that all philosophical works are necessarily marked by stylistic neglect. Plato himself, as Metochites recognizes (*Sem.* 24.1), has always been hailed as a paragon of Greek composition. Similarly, in *Sem.* 18.3.5, Metochites characterizes the works of Synesius as being philosophical ‘with eloquence’ (εὐστομία). It is part of Metochites’ argument in that passage that Synesius’ stylistic ability is natural, rather than consciously developed with the help of rhetorical techniques. Likewise, in *Sem.* 71.11.1, Metochites claims that Plutarch, even though he does not write according to the rules of rhetoric, is well acquainted with them, and is ‘capable of hitting upon the commendable eloquence’ (εὐστομία, this time qualified as ἐπιαινετή). This proves, according to Metochites, that Plutarch did not write the way he did because he lacked a natural talent for eloquence (εὐφωνία).⁷⁰ On the other hand, εὐφωνία is also used at *Sem.* 19.5.1 with reference to Dio of Prusa. The context there leaves no doubt that what is meant is indeed the practice of the art of rhetoric and not some innate capacity.⁷¹

⁶⁸ See above, pp. 250–51. ⁶⁹ *Sem.* 26.2.4; see further below, 277–83.

⁷⁰ *Sem.* 71.11.3.

⁷¹ Cf. *Sem.* 111 (743 MK): The Greeks so admired Dio for his eloquence (εὐφωνία) that they nicknamed him Chrysostom (‘Gold-Mouth’).

The above examples raise the question whether there is a difference of meaning between εὐστομία and εὐφωνία, the former being perhaps a term of wider application and predominantly one of approval, while the latter is mostly used of eloquence attained through the methodical use of rhetorical techniques, suggesting disapproval. This may be the case in a work by which Metochites is clearly influenced in the *Semeioseis*, namely Synesius' essay on Dio of Prusa.⁷² In the opening lines of the *Dio*, Synesius reports Philostratus' distinction between two kinds of sophists: sophists proper and those philosophers who have gained a reputation as sophists on account of their eloquence (εὐστομία).⁷³ Dio belongs in the second group. Clearly, then, Philostratus did not oppose εὐστομία to philosophy. In contrast, a few pages down, Synesius himself differentiates between two phases in Dio's literary production: in the sophistical orations, he says, Dio shows off the splendour of his speech, for there he aims only at eloquence (εὐφωνία). When Dio eventually became a philosopher, Synesius continues, he left all this behind, for philosophy admits only of the kind of beauty that belongs naturally to its subject-matter.⁷⁴

Any such semantic distinction between the two words, however, is only partly upheld by Metochites in the *Semeioseis*, where both of them are used both in a purely good sense and in a more indeterminate sense.⁷⁵ The choice of εὐφωνία in *Poem* 12, 246 may thus be determined simply by the exigencies of metre.

The bottom line is that there is probably no need to assume that Metochites is distinguishing between an unrhetorical and a rhetorical phase in the genesis of the *Semeioseis*: the kind of eloquence meant in *Poem* 12, 246 may well be the kind of 'natural eloquence' that Metochites attributed to philosophical writers like Synesius and Plutarch. I shall deal more fully with the relationship between the theory and practice of stylistics in the *Semeioseis* in the two concluding sections.

The metaphors used in lines 259–63 to describe the *Semeioseis* seem to corroborate the interpretation offered in the preceding sec-

⁷² *Sem.* 19 is expressly dependent on the *Dio* (19.1.1). Tartaglia (1987, 347 n. 30) pointed to parallels also between *Sem.* 71 and the *Dio*.

⁷³ Synesius, *Dio* 2:233.6–8.

⁷⁴ Synesius, *Dio* 2:240.18–241.11.

⁷⁵ For εὐστομία in the sense ascribed above to εὐφωνία, cf. *Sem.* 25.1.5.

tions of the statements in Metochites' preface on the nature of his work. They also enable us, however, to pursue further the question of the purpose of the work. First, the metaphor of intellectual 'journals' or 'diaries' (ἐφημερίδες)⁷⁶ is probably intended to suggest that the *Semeioseis* is a collection of private notes not originally intended for publication. It is also probably a hint that these notes can and should be used to form a picture of the man who wrote them, much as notes and memoranda are used as material for historical accounts. Indeed, the two other metaphors, that of a picture/map and that of a statue, suggest the same thing with less ambiguity. The purpose of publishing the *Semeioseis*, then, according to *Poem* 12, was to leave an intellectual self-portrait to posterity. Granted that the individual chapters of the work were written with a view to publication, as was argued in the preceding section, they too are thus primarily intended to be self-representational. Metochites hopes, he says, that the *Semeioseis* and his other philosophical works will bring him everlasting glory. It is true that he also mentions that they will bring advantage to future generations; but again, this amounts to little more than a genre specification, since 'usefulness' was considered by Metochites and his contemporaries as a hallmark of philosophical writings as opposed to (epideictic) oratory.

There are a few other poems by Metochites in which he speaks of his own works; the preface to his *Stoicheiosis astronomike* also contains a somewhat rambling *curriculum vitae*. Nevertheless, apart from *Poem* 12, there appears to be no other mention of the *Semeioseis* throughout the whole literary output of the Grand Logothete. An important part of the explanation for this is, obviously, that the *Semeioseis* was published late in Metochites' career.⁷⁷

One passage which may be worth comparing with the passage of *Poem* 12 discussed above is *Poem* 4, 247–49. The poem is addressed to Nikephoros Gregoras. The context of the passage is that Metochites charges Gregoras with the custody of his literary remains, which he goes on to describe in outline. He first relates how he 'toiled

⁷⁶ ἐφημερίς is also the normal Greek word for 'almanac', i.e. 'tabulations of the true positions [sc. of the Sun, Moon and planets] themselves,' as opposed to tables of mean longitudes and equations, making computations of the planetary positions possible (Mercier 1994, 13; 23 n. 1). Metochites was surely familiar also with this meaning of the word.

⁷⁷ See p. xiv.

at showpieces of euphonious eloquence (ρήτρας τ' εὐφωνίης τε | δείγματα), taking thought only for graceful practice in speech...' (lines 244–46). Then he calls attention to his

choice pieces of Philosophy, which were simple and unpretentious and without any beautiful and charming style which blossoms, as it were, with the Spring of Oratory.⁷⁸

These lines reaffirm the conventional dichotomy between Metochites' stylistically polished speeches and his unembellished philosophical works. The latter are subsequently specified (lines 250–82) as the *Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy* and the *Stoicheiosis astronomike*. No reference is made to the *Semeioseis*. It is a natural inference that it had not as yet been published. It may be noted, however, that even if it had been published it would have been difficult to fit into the context here, inasmuch as Metochites apparently conceived of it as bridging the dichotomy, by combining philosophy with eloquence, in the manner of Plutarch and Synesius.⁷⁹

Nikephoros Gregoras, Letter 23

Letter 23 (Leone) is one of six letters from Gregoras to Metochites. It was tentatively dated by Leone between May 1326 and May 1328.⁸⁰ At line 79, Gregoras, having paid his old master a few compliments on his earlier achievements in astronomy and natural philosophy, embarks on a eulogy of a 'new book' by Metochites. Guiland considered that the publication referred to had to be the *Semeioseis*.⁸¹ Ševčenko, in contrast, believed that certain key-words in Gregoras' letter probably alluded to *Logos 10* (the *Ethikos*).⁸² As Leone showed, Ševčenko's hypothesis involves great chronological difficulties.⁸³ Moreover, as de Vries-van der Velden has pointed out, there is no reason why the alleged 'ethical' key-words could not equally well

⁷⁸ τὰ δ' ἀπ' ἄρ' ἐκλόγιμα φιλοσοφίας, ἀπλοϊκά τε | δίχα τε πάσης λέξιος ὄραν ἐχούσης τερπνὴν, | εἴαρί κεν φωνῆς θαλέθουσαν ἀτὰρ ἄκομψα (vv. 247–49). Translations are by Ševčenko & Featherstone (1981, 39).

⁷⁹ This circumstance may lessen the significance of the absence of the *Semeioseis* from *Poem 4* for the relative dating of these works (on the date of *Poem 4*, see Ševčenko & Featherstone 1981, 12–13).

⁸⁰ Leone (1982, 77).

⁸¹ Guiland (1927, 7 n. 4).

⁸² Ševčenko (1962, 36 n. 2).

⁸³ Leone (1980, 198–99).

allude to the *Semeioseis*.⁸⁴ The fact is that the letter contains several other passages which make excellent sense if we understand them as allusions to the *Semeioseis*, but could hardly refer to *Logos* 10. This holds true especially of lines 82–85, where Gregoras describes the new book as a ‘complete treasury of every kind of enquiry and learning and like some market-place of wisdom easily satisfying anybody’s choice and every possible need.’⁸⁵ This is, as Tartaglia observed, a quotation from *Semeiosis* 71.8.7, where the same words express admiration for the encyclopaedic scope of Plutarch’s production.⁸⁶ In fact, Gregoras’ praise on the whole corresponds fairly closely to Metochites’ praise of Plutarch in *Semeiosis* 71. This circumstance also corroborates Guillard’s and Hunger’s view that the complimentary description of Metochites as the incarnation in a single body of Homer, Plato, Ptolemy, and Plutarch, in Gregoras’ *Letter* 24a, 41, should be understood as alluding partly to the *Semeioseis*.⁸⁷

Apparently, then, Gregoras compared the *Semeioseis* to Plutarch’s *Moralia*, and he did so in letters addressed to the author himself. He would certainly not have done this unless he expected the addressee to be flattered by the comparison. It seems quite likely, therefore, that imitation or emulation of Plutarch had been in Metochites’ mind. The passage of Gregoras’ *Letter* 23 that deals with the *Semeioseis* runs as follows:

I leave the rest aside; but this astonishing new book, what can one say, what account can one give? What words could one use to describe it, what number and kind of them? By God, let me borrow some of your eloquence for a moment, in order that I may review what is yours with the help of what is yours. For it is ‘a complete treasury of every kind of enquiry and learning and like some market-place of wisdom easily satisfying anybody’s choice and every possible need.’ This book provides as many services as there are clauses written in it to all those who pursue all the various branches of knowledge and to all rulers and all their subjects; and, in addition, to Navy men and Generals and Captains and Sergeants, and to slaves and masters, to those who are in distress and lament the pranks of life and at the same time to those who laugh and jest about the serious pursuits of life; it is simply a storehouse containing all sorts of treasures, a pharmacy offering cures of every kind; it is as it were a universal library and a living teacher, providing the whole of education and teaching the whole of

⁸⁴ de Vries-van der Velden (1987, 128–29 n. 32); cf. *Poem* 12, 242–47.

⁸⁵ For the Greek text, see n. 90. ⁸⁶ Tartaglia (1987, 340 and n. 5).

⁸⁷ Guillard (1927, 64 n. 2); Hunger (1952, 8–9).

morals. It is a soil which shows forth all kinds of roads leading to all good things, one which brings forth everything wholesome to all souls; it is a sea carrying to all the various ports and harbours and headlands and isles and straits and displaying all kinds of exceedingly lucrative commerce, giving instruction on 'the mind and the towns of many people' [cf. *Od.* 1.3]. In one word, it is all what anyone would consider a sample of Beauty, so that it is the same thing to go through this book and to know all that has been said by all of the wise men and authors of old, and all those who have made Classical Scholarship their own literary pursuit (lines 79–102).⁸⁸

As is seen, the most heavily emphasized features of Metochites' work in this description are its encyclopaedic scope (the passage translated above contains 23 instances of forms, derivations, and compounds of the word *πάς*) and its usefulness. The allusions to Homer reflect the fact that Metochites devotes the last section of *Semeiosis* 71 to a discussion of the Pseudo-Plutarchean *De Homero*, a work in which Homer is praised not least for his encyclopaedic scope and his usefulness.

Gregoras' emphasis on usefulness was noted by Guiland, who saw in the *Semeioseis* an example of the kind of work that he considered most typical of the scholars of the Palaiologan age: '...de véritables encyclopédies, destinées à faciliter l'examen des problèmes qui passionnaient alors les esprits.'⁸⁹ To this Beck replied that 'abgese-

⁸⁸ 'Ἄλλ' ἔω τάλλα· τῆς δὲ νέας ταυτησὶ βιβλίου τὸ θαῦμα τί τις ἂν λέγοι καὶ τί τις ἂν ἀφηγοῖτο καὶ τίσι χρῆτο ῥήμασι πρὸς ἔνδειξιν καὶ ὀπόσοις καὶ ὀποδοποιῶ; σύ μοι, πρὸς θεοῦ, πρὸς βραχὺ τῆς σῆς εὐγλωττίας μετάδος, ἵνα τὰ σὰ ἐκ τῶν σῶν ἐξαγγείλω. «παγκόσμιον» γάρ ἐστι «πάσης ἱστορίας καὶ μαθήσεως αὐτῆ ταμείον καὶ ὡσπερ ἀγορὰ τις τῆς σοφίας καθ' αἴρεσιν ὀφουδὸν καὶ κατὰ χρεῖαν ἀμέλει πᾶσαν ἀπραγμόνως πορίζουσα»· ὅσα γὰρ κῶλα καὶ κόμματα ταύτῃ ἐγγέγραπται λόγων, τοσαύτας ἄρα καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας παρέχεται πᾶσι τοῖς τε τὰ παντοῖα τῆς σοφίας ἀσκοῦσι παιδεύματα καὶ πᾶσιν ἄρχουσι καὶ πᾶσιν ἀρχομένοις, ἔτι μὴν καὶ ναυτικοῖς καὶ στρατηγοῖς καὶ λοχαγοῖς καὶ οὐραγοῖς καὶ δούλοις καὶ δεσπότης, λυπουμένοις θ' ἅμα καὶ θρηνοῦσι τὰ τοῦ βίου παίγνια καὶ αὐ γελῶσί τε καὶ παίζουσι τοῦ βίου τὰ σπουδάσματα καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν θησαυρὸς μὲν ἐστὶ παντοδαπὰ συνέχων κειμήλια, ἱατρειὸν δὲ παντοῖα προτεῖνον φάρμακα· βιβλιοθήκη τίς ἐστὶ παντοδαπὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἔμπυχος, πᾶσαν χορηγοῦσα παιδεύειν καὶ πᾶν ἦθος ῥυθμίζουσα· γῆ ἐστὶ παντοῖας ὁδοῦς ὑποφαίνουσα πρὸς πᾶν ἀγούσας ἀγαθὸν καὶ καρποφοροῦσα πάσαις ψυχαῖς ἅπαν τὸ χρῆσιμον· θάλασσά ἐστι πρὸς παντοῖους λιμένας καὶ ἐπίνεια καὶ ἀκτὰς καὶ νήσους καὶ πορθμοὺς περιάγουσα καὶ κέρδους παντὸς ἐμπορίαν πᾶσαν προφαίνουσα, «πολλῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων ἄστυα καὶ νόον» ἐκδιδάσκουσα· ἐνὶ λόγῳ, πᾶν ἐστὶν ὃ πᾶς τις ἂν ἐνθυμηθεῖ δεῖγμα καλοῦ, ὡς εἶναι ταῦτόν ταύτην τε διελθεῖν καὶ ἅμα πάντ' εἰδέναι τὰ πᾶσιν εἰρημένα τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν τε καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ ὅσοι τὰς ἀρχαιολογίας διαυλον τῆς σφῶν αὐτῶν πεποιήκεσαν γλώττης.

⁸⁹ Guiland (1926a, 77).

hen von allem anderen...eine Reihe der in den *Miscellanea* behandelten Probleme durchaus nicht die gelehrte Welt von damals beschäftigte.⁹⁰ As I mentioned above, Beck held that the publication of the *Semeioseis* was motivated by ambition.⁹¹ He never addressed the question why Gregoras (and Metochites himself) would stress the usefulness of the work if in fact it had no such purpose. Part of the answer is, no doubt, as we have seen, that the value of a philosophical work was conventionally connected with its usefulness. In order to assess Gregoras' and Metochites' claim, we must first ask what kind of services the *Semeioseis* may have offered to its readers. Gigante held that it was designed to fulfil political and educational purposes. It was, he maintained,

non semplicemente un sacrario dell'antica sapienza, ma uno strumento moderno di filosofia pratica, un manuale di etica aristocratica, che consentisse all'*élite* un comportamento adeguato al ruolo di classe dirigente, distinto da quello del volgo, ignorante e disordinato. I *Miscellanea* ci appaiono ora non un mero (e complicato) trattenimento letterario, una mera giostra di pensieri e riflessioni, ma un'opera concepita come *vademecum* enciclopedico, come una guida *utile*...a cui l'uomo prudente e riflessivo, l'intellettuale sollecito a risolvere un problema di valutazione, può ricorrere con sicurezza di rinvenirvi una soluzione adeguata.⁹²

I shall not attempt to disprove Gigante's thesis. It may be noted, however, that while he emphasized the potential of the *Semeioseis* as an instrument of class rule, Gregoras in the passage quoted earlier seems to have considered it to have a more democratic appeal. It is 'a market-place...satisfying anybody's choice,' he says, and it provides services to masters and slaves alike. Let us take these metaphors seriously. What kind of services is Gregoras talking about? Perhaps the other metaphors with which he describes the usefulness of the *Se-*

⁹⁰ Beck (1952, 23). ⁹¹ See p. 260.

⁹² Gigante ([1967] 1981, 219–20). A related view of the purpose of Metochites' whole philosophical output was taken by Tartaglia, who thought it was to 'contribuire concretamente al progresso dell'umana famiglia per mezzo di un'attività letteraria che, in virtù di intrinseche doti d'utilità, si ponesse come un indispensabile punto di riferimento per le giovani generazioni e per le future, agevolandone il cammino sulla strada del sapere e della scienza' (1987, 340). The intentions that Arco Magri perceived behind the *Semeioseis* were, in contrast, reactionary rather than progressive: according to her, its purpose was 'precipuamente quello di riesumare i classici...per rivalutarli, magnificarli e riproporli, quasi una sorta di reazione alla situazione storica del momento che vedeva, invece, contrapposte alle greche le nuove ideologie teologiche imposte da Roma' (1991, 462–63).

meioseis could give us a clue. 'A storehouse containing all sorts of treasures... a universal library,' he calls it, asserting that '...it is the same thing to go through this book and to know all that has been said by all of the wise men and authors of old.'

Should we infer that Gregoras thinks that the *Semeioseis* will be properly employed as a gnomology, well worth reading and reflecting on for anybody, but especially well suited for other writers in quest of the apt historical illustration, paroemiac or literary quotation, etc.? Arguably, yes. The allusions to Plutarch are there for a reason. From Menander Rhetor onward, the usefulness of Plutarch had been widely agreed to consist in the wealth of historical examples, apophthegms, proverbs, and anecdotes that could be collected from his works, for all purposes, and not least for that of composing new works.⁹³ Metochites' own view was clearly along these lines.⁹⁴ Indeed, Ps.-Plutarch thought similarly of Homer's usefulness.⁹⁵ This kind of usefulness, then, may have been what Gregoras and Metochites claimed for the *Semeioseis*. As we saw above, however, it was probably not the primary goal of the work.

Gregoras ends *Letter 23* by praising the enchanting beauty of the language of the Grand Logothete's new book.⁹⁶ This, too, astounding as it will seem to the ordinary reader, agrees with Metochites' claim in *Poem 12* to have combined in the *Semeioseis* a philosophical content with an eloquent form, even if, as we shall see in the following section, he was not, strictly speaking, aspiring for beauty.

Metochites on prose style

The Grand Logothete did have a well-developed sense of the importance of different literary styles being used on different occasions and for different subject-matters. So would anybody who had gone through Byzantine secondary education with its heavy emphasis on classical rhetoric. Consequently, the kind of language used for a Byzantine literary work will often reveal something about the nature and the purpose of the work. It is, for instance, probably no accident

⁹³ See Tartaglia (1987, 341–45).

⁹⁴ *Sem.* 71.8; cf. Tartaglia (1987, 355 n. 52).

⁹⁵ [Plutarch], *De Homero* 2.6.3; cf. Tartaglia (1987, 360 and n. 68).

⁹⁶ Gregoras, *Letter 23*, lines 105–10.

that Metochites' *Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy* are written in a relatively simple language, conforming in general to standard philosophical usage and favouring short and uncomplicated sentences, while in his speeches the Grand Logothete makes a point of using a convoluted and 'grand' style. Much has been said about how awkward Metochites' style can be; not so much about the fact that it varies with the circumstances.⁹⁷

The conceptual apparatus on which Metochites' views on style depend is taken over mainly from the rhetorical textbook corpus consisting of the works of Aphthonius and Hermogenes, and from the commentaries on these that accumulated throughout the Byzantine era.⁹⁸ As Ševčenko demonstrated, Metochites knew his Hermogenes well.⁹⁹ A good deal of information concerning the Grand Logothete's views on rhetorical matters is provided by a series of chapters in the *Semeioseis* (15–20) on stylistic similarities and differences between a number of authors. *Semeiosis* 71 contains a discussion of Plutarch's style. *Semeioseis* 24–26 are concerned with the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric. All these chapters are edited by Hult in the present volume.

Besides Hermogenes' theory of style, expounded in the treatise *On Forms* (henceforth *Id.*), there now and then appears in Byzantine rhetorical handbooks a doctrine of three proper ways of co-ordinating different levels of content and style, or 'characters' (χαρακτῆρες), perhaps ultimately deriving from Peripatetic rhetoricians.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ See, however, Ševčenko (1981, 297; 310 n. 71a).

⁹⁸ On the study of rhetoric in Byzantium generally, see Hunger (1978, 1:65–196); also Kennedy (1983, 265–325); Kustas (1970); Ševčenko (1962, 53–61). My English translation of Hermogenic terms will in the main conform to that of Wooten (1987). I will also adopt Wooten's convention of writing the names of the specific 'forms' with a capital first letter. For convenience, however, I retain the more common rendering 'form' (in inverted commas) instead of Wooten's 'type of style' for Hermogenes' ἰδέα.

⁹⁹ Ševčenko (1962, 52–58).

¹⁰⁰ It is affiliated with the theory of *genera dicendi* or *elocutionis* predominant in Latin stylistic theory ever since the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *Orator*. This theory may have developed from Aristotle's and Theophrastus' doctrine of virtues of speech. In turn, the theory of 'forms' emerged as a more refined version of the doctrine of characters: historical kinship, however, does not exclude synchronic opposition. On the character doctrine in some Byzantine handbooks, see Conley (1994, 223–24). A historical survey of ancient stylistics will be found in Martin (1974, 329–45). On the question of 'Levels of Style in Byzantine Literature' in general, see Ševčenko (1981).

In the early fourteenth century, the influence of the character doctrine can be clearly perceived in the *Encyclopaedia* of Joseph Rhakendytes, although the term ‘character’ itself is not used in this work. Joseph was a close friend of Metochites’: the latter’s *Logos* 16 is in effect a funeral oration on him.¹⁰¹ The character doctrine is in evidence, for instance, in chap. 5 of Joseph’s *Synopsis artis rhetoricae* (*Syn.* 530–34), which is devoted to rhetorical *decorum*, defined as ‘expression well-suited for the subject-matter.’¹⁰² In this chapter, the terms ‘expression’ (φράσις) and ‘subject-matter’ (ὑποκείμενον πρᾶγμα) are used interchangeably with the Hermogenic terms ‘diction’ (λέξις) and ‘thought’ (έννοια). This seems to indicate a departure from Hermogenes’ theory of ‘forms’, on two important points: (1) ‘Subject-matter’ is apparently not an element of speech, which is what ‘thought’ is in Hermogenes;¹⁰³ (2) All other elements of speech are apparently subsumed under that of ‘expression’, whereas in Hermogenes there are six other elements of speech besides ‘thought’ and ‘diction’ (approach, figures of speech, clauses, word order, cadences, and rhythm). I shall presently come back to the difficulties involved in what I think is a conflation, on Joseph’s (or his source’s) part, of the character doctrine and the Hermogenic system.

The basic tenets of the character doctrine are as follows. There are three characters: grand, simple, middle. The grand character combines a humble subject-matter or humble thoughts (Joseph, as we have seen, identifies ὑποκείμενον πρᾶγμα and έννοια) with a lofty manner of expression, or diction. The simple character combines lofty thoughts with a humble diction. Joseph specifies that where the thoughts are lofty, the diction should be pure and clear, and gives an example from the description of God in Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or.* 38.¹⁰⁴ The middle character is one in which both thought and diction

¹⁰¹ *Logos* 16 was edited by Treu (1899).

¹⁰² *Syn.* 530.9–10. Chapter 5 of Joseph’s *Synopsis* is closely related to a couple of passages in a short treatise, *περὶ τῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν τοῦ τελείου λόγου*, preserved in Cod. Par. gr. 2918 (ed. *RG* 3:570–87 W; for *Syn.* 530.9–531.14, cf. 579.1–580.24; *Syn.* 531.14–30 ≈ 582.19–583.6; cf. Terzaghi 1902, 124–25). Other chapters of the *Synopsis* are related to some passages in another treatise in the same MS, *περὶ τῶν ὀκτῶ μερῶν τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου* (ed. *RG* 3:588–609 W). De Falco (1931, 634) suggested that the *Synopsis* reproduces a manual compiled from three sources, two of which drew on lost works which were also the direct or indirect sources of the two treatises of Par. gr. 2918.

¹⁰³ Hermogenes, *Id.* 218.13–224.2.

¹⁰⁴ Joseph, *Syn.* 531.14–21.

tend towards the average. Joseph adds that if lofty thoughts are expressed in a lofty way, they will be too difficult to understand; humble thoughts expressed in a humble way, on the other hand, will be trivial.¹⁰⁵

The different values that thought and diction can assume are enumerated in the preceding chapters of Joseph's work. In chap. 2 (*Syn.* 516–21), Joseph explains that there are two kinds of thought: rhetorical thoughts, which are clear and common, and philosophical ones, which are solemn and elevated. The latter are concerned with theology, natural philosophy, and so forth. The writer should aim at a proper blend of thoughts; models in this respect are Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Michael Psellos' speeches and letters, Synesius, Themistius, Plutarch, and 'those among more recent writers whom you see follow these authors.'¹⁰⁶

In chap. 4 (*Syn.* 525–30), Joseph classifies diction on the basis of two dichotomies: humble and grand, and natural (*φυσική*) and refined (*κομψή*) diction respectively. As older models of the grand style he adduces Philo, Synesius, Thucydides, and 'maybe Philostratus too.' Contemporary examples, he claims, are as numerous as the leaves and flowers of spring. Here, as in the case of thought, Joseph's advice is to steer a middle course, modelling oneself on Themistius, Plutarch, Gregory of Nyssa, Josephus, Lucian, Heliodorus' *Chariaclea*, Procopius of Caesarea, and Michael Psellos. It is difficult to say in what way the second dichotomy, that between natural (also literal, *κυρία*) and refined (also tropical, *τροπική*) diction, is thought by Joseph to differ from the first one. In any case, rhetoric is said to tend towards refinement, philosophy towards naturalness.¹⁰⁷

It may be inferred from his way of introducing it that Joseph regarded the dichotomy of humble and grand diction as an extended scale along which the Hermogenic forms are distributed:

¹⁰⁵ Joseph, *Syn.* 531.26–30. Cf. Synesius, *Dio* 2:241.6–9. The chiasmic correlations of the Byzantine authors stand in contrast to the parallel ones of Cicero: 'is est enim eloquens qui et humilia subtiliter et alta graviter et mediocria temperate potest dicere' (*Orator* 100). One Byzantine author who repudiated the chiasmic correlations was Michael Psellos, *MB* 5:148–49.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph, *Syn.* 516.14–521.13.

¹⁰⁷ Joseph, *Syn.* 526.28–528.3.

Diction is a multifarious thing, as you have learned in the *On Forms*. A Clear diction is different from a Solemn and Elevated, and a Beautiful diction is another one and a Rapid one another still. Nevertheless, we have divided it into two, into the humbler and the more high-flown: for that which is midway between them will become clear from the comparison of these. Thus the Pure and Clear seems humbler... (*Syn.* 525.11–21).

If this inference is true, what we witness in Joseph may be adequately described as a conflation of two principles of stylistic difference, one basically ‘vertical’, or, better, quantitative, the other basically ‘horizontal’, or, better, qualitative.¹⁰⁸ The quantitative principle is operative in the character doctrine, where each author is situated on one of three different levels of style ranging from the most natural to the most artificial, and one of three different levels of content ranging from the most humble (or ‘simplest’) to the most elevated (or ‘deepest’). On each of these scales, an author can only be situated on one level at a time. The qualitative principle is employed in the Hermogenic system, where an author’s style is analysed in terms of its prevalent ‘forms’ in each of the eight elements of speech. There is nothing to prevent a style from having several ‘forms’ in each element of speech. On this principle, a Clear diction is not closer to a rhetorical degree zero than a Solemn one, only different. The quantitative principle presupposes a hard and fast distinction between style and content, whereas the qualitative principle actually requires the inclusion of thought as one among the elements of speech. I mentioned above that Joseph’s equation of Hermogenic ‘thought’ and ‘diction’ with extralinguistic ‘subject-matter’ and omnilinguistic ‘expression’ is liable to upset the Hermogenic system. I suspect that a similar conflation of principles may also be the cause of some inconsistencies in Metochites’ views on the relation between language and thought.

Metochites, too, espoused a theory of rhetorical *decorum* involving levels or degrees of style. In *Semeiosis* 26, he opposes philosoph-

¹⁰⁸ For a similar conflation in Michael Psellos, see Ševčenko (1981, 290–91). The designation ‘quantitative principle,’ for the principle which structures what Ševčenko calls ‘“vertical” levels of style,’ seems in fact to have ancient authority. Fortunatian, *Ars rhet.* 3.9, mentions three kinds of *characteres elocutionis*: ποσότης, ποιότης and πηλικότης; the first of these kinds, ‘quantity,’ is what rhetoricians usually have in mind when they speak about characters. Cf. ?Syrianus, *Praef.* 98.20–99.4; see also Montefusco (1979, 446–54).

ical subjects generally to a language enhanced by rhetorical techniques. The operations of philosophical knowledge, he says, are natural and have substance, while an elaborate language depends on appearance. To combine philosophy and rhetoric would be, if not impossible, in most cases detrimental to both purposes: it would be like decorating gold with painted ornaments.¹⁰⁹ Language is vital to thought in the same way as body in general to soul in general, but in philosophy a minimum of care about the mode of expression will suffice.¹¹⁰ And very few philosophers, Metochites asserts, have taken an interest in other aspects of their own writings than the content.¹¹¹ Metochites is here in his most Platonic mood. Philosophy, he thinks, is concerned with truth, and rhetoric is essentially compromising or even misrepresenting the truth.¹¹² Ideally, philosophy would be at a rhetorical degree zero, which would be reached, presumably, when the philosopher no longer aims at influencing the reader in any other way than to make him understand the philosophical message.¹¹³

The opposition of philosophical subjects and rhetorical language is only brought to a thematic level in *Semeiosis* 26. It underlies many arguments throughout chaps. 15–25, whether the theme is why Plato wrote dialogues (the reason is that he refused the alternative, to write speeches) or why Aristotle wrote the *Rhetoric* (there is no acceptable reason, since the Stagirite was a philosopher). It seems to be wholly in keeping with a quantitative conception of stylistic difference, and to that extent it also agrees with the character doctrine. Metochites often opposes a natural to a refined manner of expression in much the same way that Joseph does in the *Synopsis of Rhetoric*. As we saw in the section on *Poem* 12, however, another and less polarized account of the relation between philosophy and rhetoric is also found in these chapters of the *Semeioseis*. A moderate, natural, eloquence is sometimes said to be reconcilable with philosophy.¹¹⁴ ‘Natural eloquence’ seems roughly to signify a manner of writing which conforms to rhetorical rules without the author’s having to exert himself.¹¹⁵ At the same time, however, Metochites seems to think that adequate knowledge of these rules can help.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁹ *Sem.* 26.2.5–8. ¹¹⁰ *Sem.* 26.1.4–7; cf. 71.9.1–3. ¹¹¹ *Sem.* 26.2.1–2.

¹¹² Cf. *Sem.* 9.2.2–3.7; 18.2.3–7; 54, 308–9 MK; 71.10.5.

¹¹³ Cf. *Sem.* 18.3.5–7; 71.9.3. ¹¹⁴ *Sem.* 18.2.1–3; 71.10.1–11.3.

¹¹⁵ *Sem.* 18.2.8–9. ¹¹⁶ *Sem.* 18.4.1–5; 71.11.1–7.

In these cases, Metochites tends to state the rhetorical *decorum* of philosophical works in Hermogenic terms. That is, instead of describing philosophy as ideally characterized by the absence of style, he co-ordinates philosophical thoughts, apparently conceived of as an element of speech, with the presence of certain 'forms' or types of style, which are, presumably, then, 'low-level' styles. This quantification of Hermogenic 'forms' we have already witnessed in Joseph Rhakendytes. But Joseph and Metochites differ over the relative values or degrees of the particular 'forms'. In Joseph's exposition, a humble or natural style coincides with Hermogenic 'forms' such as Clarity and Simplicity, obviously on the assumption that a simple and clear way of expressing one's thoughts is closest to a rhetorical degree zero. Metochites seems not to share this assumption. He seems to be prepared in some of these chapters to associate a 'low-level style' with rhetorical (and even grammatical) carelessness.¹¹⁷ This is not unreasonable, since, as Metochites knew perfectly well, Simplicity may be every bit as carefully devised as other 'forms'.¹¹⁸ The consequence is that for Metochites the rhetorical *decorum* will be satisfied by a combination of philosophical thoughts and a language which is anything but clear and simple. In fact, it turns out that many of the 'forms' which Metochites thinks are suitable for philosophy are in Hermogenes' system subtypes of the 'form' of Grandeur.

It is, then, in Metochites' view to some extent possible to couch a philosophical message in an eloquent language. 'The admirable Plato' himself is adduced as an example of such a combination.¹¹⁹ More important for our purposes here, so are Synesius, Philo, and Plutarch.

According to Metochites, Synesius is one of the very few authors who have succeeded in wedding philosophical thoughts to an eloquent language (εὐστομία). This he appears to have accomplished effortlessly.¹²⁰ His philosophical intentions prevented him from making use of rhetorical techniques (and thereby distorting the truth), but not from expressing himself in a naturally well-shaped style, qualified as λογοειδής.¹²¹ Some characteristics of this style are given. It is

¹¹⁷ *Sem.* 16.4.5; 18.2.4–5.

¹¹⁸ *Sem.* 19.4.4–6; 20.3.3.

¹¹⁹ *Sem.* 24.1.1–5.

¹²⁰ *Sem.* 18.2.3–9.

¹²¹ *Sem.* 18.3.5–7. The word usually means, simply, 'prose-like.' This is the sense in Hermogenes, *Id.* 232.11–12, where it is used of iambic and trochaic

charming, elegant and pleasurable.¹²² However, diction is harsh or rough.¹²³ This refers partly to the sound of the words, but especially to the use of metaphor.¹²⁴ Thus, it is not a calm or smooth style. It is not Atticist, it is more modern, but elegant all the same.¹²⁵ It is energetic, and it avoids the commonplace. It has no part in Simplicity.¹²⁶ This in combination with its roughness is what lends Synesius' language its Dignity. Synesius is also capable of elevating or inflating even very trivial thoughts¹²⁷ — this is no criticism but an acknowledgement of his stylistic Force (δεινότης).¹²⁸

Δεινότης, in Hermogenes, is the complete mastery of all 'forms' and the ability to use them on the proper occasion.¹²⁹ This is a sense of the word that does not originate with Hermogenes (it was probably current at least as early as Dionysius of Halicarnassus),¹³⁰ but one which he seems to have defended against other contemporary or earlier rhetoricians, for whom δεινότης signified primarily a uniformly grand style.¹³¹ This, Hermogenes contends, is instead 'apparently but not really δεινός';¹³² it is characteristic of sophists, a term which Hermogenes does not use in a good sense.¹³³

It is clear that Metochites too conceives of Force along the lines laid down by Hermogenes.¹³⁴ Yet the Grand Logothete was certainly no exception to the general stylistic trend in Byzantine times, which

rhythms, characteristic of a Pure style. In Byzantine writers it is sometimes found in the sense of 'speech-like, oratorical.' Joseph Rhakendytes's *Synopsis of Rhetoric* includes a few lines about epistolography, in which Joseph warns against too formal a style in letters: one should aim for a matter-of-fact manner of expression, for a letter is a message from a friend to another, 'but people nowadays have no scruples about writing whole letters that look like speeches' (λογοειδέις) (*Syn.* 559.3–7). This seems to be the meaning also in Metochites, *Sem.* 20.3.2: Xenophon's style in panegyrics is said to be 'charming and partaking of Grace and Character,' although by no means λογοειδής. Cf. *Sem.* 19.4.3. But in *Sem.* 18.3.5–7 it is contrasted precisely to a rhetorical prose style; it does not, however, exclude 'eloquence' (εὐστομία). In *Sem.* 19.2.4 it seems to denote some kind of middle style.

¹²² *Sem.* 18.2.2. ¹²³ *Sem.* 18.4.2. ¹²⁴ Cf. Hermogenes, *Id.* 258.7–18.

¹²⁵ *Sem.* 18.3.2–4. ¹²⁶ *Sem.* 19.2.6–7. ¹²⁷ *Sem.* 19.2.6.

¹²⁸ Cf. Hermogenes, *Id.* 221.11–23. ¹²⁹ Hermogenes, *Id.* 368.22–369.24.

¹³⁰ Cf. *Dem.* 8, 143.11–144.10 with *Amm.* 3, esp. 259.24 and *Thuc.* 23, 360.9–12.

¹³¹ Hermogenes, *Id.* 369.24–372.19. ¹³² Hermogenes, *Id.* 372.20–373.7.

¹³³ Hermogenes, *Id.* 377.10–378.20. No doubt the later history of the concept is influenced by the treatment of it as morally neutral in Aristotle, *EN* 6.12, 1144a23–28.

¹³⁴ *Logos* 13.15–17.

was, obviously, to rank the difficult or even obscure above the virtues of 'forms' such as Clarity and Simplicity. Even when authors professed their belief in the classical ideals, their rhetorical practice spoke another language.¹³⁵ Occasionally, as in the preface to his *Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy*, Metochites does imply that Clarity is a virtue; more often, though, he will be found defending features associated with a grand or dignified style, as, notoriously, in his polemic with Nikephoros Choumnos.¹³⁶

As I said, Metochites, in contrast to Joseph Rhakendytes and his source, seems to consider a grand style perfectly suitable also for philosophy. Synesius, for instance, is anything rather than a representative of Simplicity. This does not mean that his style is inappropriate, for, as Metochites explains, it is distinguished by its disregard for the rules of rhetoric and grammar.¹³⁷ It is a 'non-style,' and thus by definition suitable for philosophy. Apart from the chapter on Synesius, similar developments can be found in Metochites' analyses of Philo (*Sem.* 16) and Plutarch (*Sem.* 71). Philo's language is said to be characterized in all its parts by Dignity and Solemnity, and this is 'wholly appropriate to his [philosophical] aim.'¹³⁸ Nor does it lack Charm or Character. Sometimes Philo even raises his eloquence to such a degree as to make it border on the Graceful or Rapid, which is not consistent with his aim. But mostly he writes in an adequate and simple philosophical style. His diction is often rather harsh, and this, Metochites says, is not inappropriate to the Solemn and Dignified, as the art of rhetoric lays it down.¹³⁹

Plutarch, on the other hand, does not, according to Metochites, care at all about language except insofar as it is necessary for the clarification and communication of his thought.¹⁴⁰ 'Therefore,' Metochites goes on,

as I said, his writings are alien to all Carefully Wrought Style and Grace, but he also takes little interest in Florescence and Dignity, except as far as content is concerned: in this respect his writings are full of natural Dignity and Solemn-

¹³⁵ Cf. Ševčenko (1981, 298–304); Kustas (1970, 70–72; 1973, 63–100).

¹³⁶ For the polemic in general and the stylistic issues in particular, see Ševčenko (1962, 21–67).

¹³⁷ *Sem.* 18.4.3–5.

¹³⁸ *Sem.* 16.4.1.

¹³⁹ *Sem.* 16.4.2–6.

¹⁴⁰ *Sem.* 71.9.1–3.

nity. For these qualities are really the whole objective of speaking, and just as it is impossible to live at all without breathing, so it is impossible to make a single statement on a philosophical issue and with a philosophical aim without these. Philosophical studies are in fact characterized by natural Solemnity and intellectual Dignity, even if they are outwardly careless (*Sem.* 71.9.4–6).

Notwithstanding this, Metochites admits that even Plutarch occasionally indulges in the ‘form’ of Emotional Character.¹⁴¹ Indeed, in those cases in which Plutarch applies his admirable vividness of expression,

he is clearly not careless, but ambitious, to some extent and in a suitable manner. This kind of care befits a philosophical man, who speaks freely, and who stands above all flattery or deceit, or on the whole, stylistic refinement (*Sem.* 71.10.5).

One can scarcely help getting the impression, when reading these passages as well as the rest of the chapter on Plutarch, that Metochites is not only delivering some of his most benevolent criticism here, but also formulating some of his own literary ideals. In his study of the polemic between Metochites and Choumnos, Ševčenko regarded Metochites’ praise of δεινότης in *Logos* 13 as ‘une apologie, assez adroite, *pro domo sua*.’ He also thought that in defending, in *Semeioseis* 16 and 18, Philo’s harsh style and Synesius’ use of rare words and neologisms, Metochites was pleading his own case.¹⁴² I think this is very probably true. Perhaps we can even push this line of thought a little further. It seems a reasonable hypothesis that Metochites’ espousal in the *Semeioseis* of the idea that rhetorical concern is alien to the nature of philosophy has something to do with the facts that he himself appears here not as an orator but as a writer of philosophical prose, and that his own style in these chapters not only exhibits the typically Metochitean tortuousness familiar from his speeches, but actually breaks down in ungrammatical disconnection from time to time. The assumption that the Grand Logothete was guided by the same principles in his own writing as in his reading of other authors requires no special warrant. Hermogenes’ system was intended both as an instrument for the literary critic and as an aid to the author, and Metochites was well aware of this.¹⁴³ To form

¹⁴¹ *Sem.* 71.9.9–10.2. ¹⁴² Ševčenko (1962, 55 and n. 10).

¹⁴³ Hermogenes, *Id.* 213.4–14; cf. *Sem.* 71.11.6.

a notion of how Metochites would analyse his own style, it may be useful to proceed now to compare his comments on the language of other authors with the actual character of his own, as described in accordance with the system of Hermogenes.

Metochites' prose style

In this section I shall give a very rough and impressionistic overview in Hermogenic terms of the most conspicuous features of Metochites' style. The elements of speech will be discussed in the order in which they are generally treated in Hermogenes.

Thoughts in the *Semeioseis* should be classified under the various subtypes of Grandeur or Dignity (Solemnity, Abundance, Asperity, Brilliance, Florescence, Vehemence).¹⁴⁴ Indeed, according to Hermogenes, a philosophical subject-matter automatically produces Solemnity.¹⁴⁵ So do all general statements, but when specific examples are added the result will rather be Abundance.¹⁴⁶ Abundance is also produced whenever anything extraneous or circumstantial is added to the simple narration or argument.¹⁴⁷ Attacks on people in a superior or inferior position generate Asperity and Vehemence respectively.¹⁴⁸ These are all common features of Metochites' style in the *Semeioseis*, and in Hermogenes' stylistics they all combine to create Grandeur.

The most usual *approaches* in the *Semeioseis* are probably those characteristic of Abundance, e.g. when the order of an argument is inverted so as first to state the reasons or proofs and then the main proposition;¹⁴⁹ or a single thought is lingered on and rephrased in different ways, e.g. by the use of synonymous doublets.¹⁵⁰ It is equally important, however, to note that the approaches characteristic of Sincerity are also frequently employed. Sincerity is produced, for instance, by the many sudden expressions of amazement,¹⁵¹ by the many parenthetical expressions of doubt or hesitation — such as

¹⁴⁴ Hermogenes, *Id.* 242.3–7.

¹⁴⁶ Hermogenes, *Id.* 245.15–246.1.

¹⁴⁸ Hermogenes, *Id.* 260.17–262.2.

¹⁵⁰ Hermogenes, *Id.* 284.22–286.23.

¹⁴⁵ Hermogenes, *Id.* 242.22–245.15.

¹⁴⁷ Hermogenes, *Id.* 278.13–282.14.

¹⁴⁹ Hermogenes, *Id.* 282.15–284.21.

¹⁵¹ Hermogenes, *Id.* 355.2–356.3.

Metochites' pet phrase, 'how should one put it' (πῶς ἂν εἴποι τις) —,¹⁵² and by the passages where Metochites claims that 'this thought just occurred to me.'¹⁵³

Diction in the *Semeioseis* is largely Grand or Florescent: metaphors and new coinage, notoriously common in Metochites,¹⁵⁴ produce Asperity or Vehemence,¹⁵⁵ while a high rate of nominal phrases is typical of Solemnity and Brilliance.¹⁵⁶ I have not examined the phonetic qualities of Metochites' prose: it could be expected to favour broad and harsh sounds (i.e. principally, in the first case, long *a*'s and *o*'s, and, in the second case, consonant clusters such as *pt* and *ps*), which are characteristic of Solemnity and Asperity.¹⁵⁷

The *figures of speech* of the *Semeioseis* belong, on the whole, to an Abundant style. Abundant figures are primarily all those which 'drag along second or even third thoughts.'¹⁵⁸ Not infrequently puns occur, which are principally associated with a Simple or a Sweet style.¹⁵⁹ But then again, Hermogenes explicitly says that Asperity admits of nearly all figures.¹⁶⁰

The *clauses* of the *Semeioseis* are of varying length and structure. This is typical of Abundance.¹⁶¹ A slight predominance of longer clauses may be suggestive of Solemnity, Brilliance, or Florescence.¹⁶²

Concerning *word order*, *cadences* and *rhythm*, finally, these are the words of Hermogenes:

The cadences used in Asperity, like the arrangement of the words, should be formed from inconsistent metrical patterns, with the clauses ending sometimes in one kind of foot and sometimes in another. Thus the rhythm that is appropriate to Asperity is cacophonous, as though there were no rhythm at all (*Id.* 260.4–9; trans. Wooten 1987, 30).

No doubt this description fits the *Semeioseis* well. The results of an examination of the cadences in Metochites' prose (a sample from the *Semeioseis* and *Logos* 16) were reported by Hunger. In the *Semeio-*

¹⁵² Hermogenes, *Id.* 361.4–11.

¹⁵³ Hermogenes, *Id.* 359.6–15.

¹⁵⁴ See the Index of Greek Words for thesaurista in *Sem.* 1–26, 71. Cf. also Ševčenko (1962, 37–39).

¹⁵⁵ Hermogenes, *Id.* 258.7–18; 262.9–14.

¹⁵⁶ Hermogenes, *Id.* 249.12–250.5; 267.7.

¹⁵⁷ Hermogenes, *Id.* 247.12–248.9; 258.14–15.

¹⁵⁸ Hermogenes, *Id.* 286.24–295.12. ¹⁵⁹ Hermogenes, *Id.* 339.23–344.12.

¹⁶⁰ Hermogenes, *Id.* 259.9–10. ¹⁶¹ Hermogenes, *Id.* 295.13–17.

¹⁶² Hermogenes, *Id.* 251.18–20; 268.21–23; 272.11–12.

seis, 25.4 per cent of the cadences failed to satisfy Meyer's Law. Hunger concluded that 'Theodoros gehört also...zu den byzantinischen Autoren, die die rhythmische Klausel nicht beobachten.'¹⁶³

All in all, the *Semeioseis* mainly exhibits features of a Grand or Dignified style, combined with ones of Sincerity. Broadly speaking, this answers to Hermogenes' description of δεινότης.¹⁶⁴ It should be especially noted that there is very little in the *Semeioseis* that answers to Hermogenes' descriptions of a Carefully Wrought Style (ἐπιμέλεια) and Beauty (κάλλος). These two 'forms' are opposed by Hermogenes in a general way to 'a style that is carelessly constructed and unrhythmical and pays no attention to the order of words...'. The latter kind of style, Hermogenes goes on, 'may be useful, for example in the creation of Asperity and Vehemence....'¹⁶⁵ Indeed, Asperity together with Abundance seem to be the most prominent subtypes of 'forms' in the *Semeioseis*.

There are, indeed, features of the *Semeioseis* which are not so easily classified even under those Hermogenic 'forms' supposed to make for artlessness. The frequency of downright anacolutha, and the misattributions and even misnomers with which the work is replete, might seem to suggest authentic carelessness rather than the attempt to realize rhetorical 'forms' associated with a 'natural' and philosophical style.¹⁶⁶ Still, there need be no contradiction involved in admitting both. It is quite possible to relax one's attention to one's language on purpose, and one of the most efficient ways of seeming careless is no doubt actually to be so. Given that a 'low-level' style is characterized by neglect rather than simplicity, then, a rhetorically conscious author who considers a low-level style to be suitable for his purposes can reproduce the features of this style by purposely neglecting his language. In this way, he may be able to convince his audience either that he does not care about his language or, more realistically, that he is a rhetorically conscious author who manages to satisfy the *decorum*. What is that if not stylistic refinement?

¹⁶³ Hunger (1952, 18 n. 6).

¹⁶⁴ Hermogenes, *Id.* 373.24–376.4; cf. Ševčenko (1962, 55–58).

¹⁶⁵ Hermogenes, *Id.* 296.5–14; trans. Wooten 1987, 54.

¹⁶⁶ Misattributions are rife: for a few Platonic quotations see de Vries-van der Velden (1987, 137 n. 42). It may be added that the collections of fragments of Simonides and Pindar include items that are known from no other source than the *Sem.* Misnomers: Apollonius of Perge is referred to as Alexander, *Sem.* 14.5.1; Panaetius of Alexandria is referred to as Panaetius, *Sem.* 17.2.3.

The outline of the style of the *Semeioseis* that I have given above corresponds on many points with the ones that Metochites himself gives of the philosophical prose of Philo, Synesius, and Plutarch. As we saw in the preceding section, Metochites thinks that these writers differ to the extent that Philo does show some concern about his language, and occasionally even lapses into the Sweet and Beautiful 'forms', whereas Plutarch is consciously and all but consistently un-rhetorical, except when he wants to give proof of his rhetorical ability;¹⁶⁷ Synesius, again, does not bother to be eloquent but cannot help being so, recherché and elegant. The common factors are, first, moderation, greater or lesser, in the use of rhetorical techniques, in spite of an excellent knowledge of them; and second, the predominance of low-level features in the sense accepted by Metochites, ones associated with the 'form' of Grandeur (or Dignity) as well as ones associated with Simplicity and Clarity. Furthermore, all three authors are said to apply their rhetorical knowledge primarily to the choice of words. While Plutarch is praised for his vividness of expression, Philo and Synesius are both held to favour a harsh diction.

Therefore, when Metochites says about Plutarch that the theoretical knowledge he shows in his criticism is evidence that his own plain and casual style was not due to ignorance of 'the rules of the art,'¹⁶⁸ it seems not too far-fetched to understand this as a subtle hint that Metochites, too, wrote the way he did not out of ignorance but out of a deep awareness of the rule that a philosophical subject-matter requires a 'low-level' style. According to the traditional interpretation of the character doctrine, this would mean that a simple and clear language is best suited for philosophy; but the rule could also be so interpreted as to allow all those traits which may be considered indications of stylistic indifference as typically philosophical, even those associated with 'forms' that would traditionally be qualified as 'high-level.' This is, I submit, how Metochites actually interpreted it.

To sum up, it seems reasonable to assume that Metochites conceived of his 'notes and memoranda' as essays much in the same genre as Plutarch's *Moralia*. The description of Plutarch's works in *Semeioseis* 71 emphasizes many features that are present, or at least probably intended to be present, in the *Semeioseis* too. This is true

¹⁶⁷ *Sem.* 71.11.2–3. ¹⁶⁸ *Sem.* 71.11.

of Plutarch's versatility and eclecticism,¹⁶⁹ and also of his preference for ethics to natural philosophy and mathematics.¹⁷⁰ The impressiveness as well as the practical usefulness of his historical (and contemporary) illustrations, anecdotes and sentences (γνώμῃσι) have clearly also been an inspiration for the Grand Logothete.¹⁷¹

But Plutarch is not Metochites' only model. The latter's admiration for the Chaeroneian's versatility and eclecticism is paralleled by that for Synesius'.¹⁷² Metochites must certainly have recognized the differences between Plutarch's fairly easy-going literary style and his own. In his *Byzantine History*, Nikephoros Gregoras blamed Metochites for not having modelled his style on some ancient author, with the consequence that it grated on the readers' ears, 'as the thorn stings the hand of those who pick roses.'¹⁷³ As Ševčenko observed, Gregoras re-utilized here a passage which he had originally used for describing Synesius' style, in the preface to his commentary on the *On Dreams* (526B).¹⁷⁴ It is probably true that by Byzantine standards Metochites took exceptional pride in cultivating a personal style (in *Logos* 13.20, he pokes fun at contemporary writers' fear of 'making a modest departure and writing, to any degree, in a manner of their own'). It is also true, however, that in contrast to the analysis of Plutarch's style, the analysis of Synesius' style sanctions many of Metochites' own idiosyncracies (not least the harsh diction). It seems likely that the Grand Logothete whole-heartedly embraced the final statement of the *Dio*:

Though the characters of style are of many kinds and differ widely, it is necessary that in every one of my imitations that which is peculiar to me resounds as well, just as the highest string, itself abiding the rhythm, reverberates with the melody that is set in motion (2:278.17–20).

* * *

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Tartaglia (1987, 346–48; 350–51).

¹⁷⁰ *Sem.* 71.3.1–3.

¹⁷¹ *Sem.* 71.7.1–4; 71.7.7–8; 71.8.4–7.

¹⁷² *Sem.* 18.5.1–6. Tartaglia (1987, 347 n. 30) rightly brought Metochites' encyclopaedism into connection with Synesius' characterization of the philosopher in *Dio* 2:246.12–15.

¹⁷³ Gregoras, *Hist.* 1:272.6–14.

¹⁷⁴ Ševčenko (1962, 35 n. 3). It was then held that the *On Dreams* had been dedicated to Metochites, but Ševčenko later refuted this view (1964, 438–39).

The *Semeioseis* cannot be reduced to models, sources, and influences. As I said at the outset, its literary form is probably unique in earlier and contemporary Greek literature. As far as I can tell, its purpose is correspondingly original. In it, Metochites repeatedly forms notions of the characters of authors on the basis of the character of their writings. This is how he expected his own readers to behave. The *Semeioseis* is an intellectual self-portrait. To be sure, it is a carefully idealized one: it does not offer any unsparing self-analyses or uncensored diaries. In fact it scarcely contains anything like diaries at all, even though the author would probably like us to believe so. The whole work was, or so I have argued, conceived and composed as a self-portrait. There is no denying that the *Semeioseis* may hold a lot of interest as a 'philosophisches, literarkritisches, geschichtspolitisches, ja bekennerisches Werk.'¹⁷⁵ But in my view it is even more impressive as a literary project, as a brief reconnaissance of the literary field that was explored in full more than two centuries later by Montaigne.

¹⁷⁵ Beck (1952, 23).

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Abbreviations

- ANRW* *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*. Berlin.
BZ *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*. Munich.
CPG *Corpus paroemiographorum graecorum*. Ed. E. L. von Leutsch & F. G. Schneidewin. 2 vols. Göttingen, 1839–51.
DOP *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*. Washington, D.C.
JÖB *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*. Vienna.
LBG *Lexikon zur byzantinischen Gräzität, besonders des 9.-12. Jahrhunderts*. Ed. E. Trapp. Vienna, 1994–.
LSJ LIDDELL, H. G. & SCOTT, R. 1940. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th ed. Revised and augmented by H. S. Jones. Oxford.
MB *Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη (Bibliotheca graeca Medii aevi)*. Ed. C. N. Sathas. 7 vols. Venice, Athens, and Paris, 1872–94. Reprint Hildesheim & New York, 1972.
MK *Theodori Metochitae Miscellanea philosophica et historica*. Ed. C. G. Müller & T. Kiessling. Leipzig, 1821. Reprint Amsterdam, 1966.
PG *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca*. Ed. J.-P. Migne. 161 vols. Paris, 1857–66.
PLP *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit*. Ed. E. Trapp. Vienna, 1976–96.
RE *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Ed. G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, K. Mittelhaus, K. Ziegler. Stuttgart, 1894–1978.
TLG *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. CD Rom # E. University of California, Irvine, 2000.

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Index of passages

- Aeschylus
Prometheus
905 ... 108
936 ... 100, 101n.13
- Aesopus
Proverbia
10 in *CPG* II 229 ... 216
- Aphthonius
Progymnasmata
25.8–9 ... 255n.37
25.29–26.2 ... 256n.41
- Aristides, Aelius
Κατὰ τῶν ἐξορχουμένων
402.8 Jebb ... 34, 35n.5
412.18 Jebb (= 34.47 Keil)
... 84, 85n.3
Πρεσβευτικὸς πρὸς Ἀχιλλεῖα
425.2 Jebb ... 121n.7
Πρὸς Δημοσθένη περὶ ἀτελείας
2.14–15 Jebb ... 97n.1
26.11–12 Jebb ... 97n.1
Πρὸς Λεπτίνην ὑπὲρ ἀτελείας
146.1–2 Jebb ... 97n.1
162.8 Jebb ... 34, 35n.5
164.6 Jebb ... 96n.1, 98
Πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων
309.29 Jebb ... 216, 217n.5
- Aristophanes
Acharnenses
704 ... 237n.31
Ecclesiazousae
828 ... 120
Nubes
51 ... 234, 235n.30
555 ... 84, 85n.3
Ranae
439 ... 120
- Aristotle
Analytica priora
I ... 41n.17
Analytica posteriora
91b23 ... 69n.11
- (Aristotle)
De anima
406a 5–6 ... 47n.22
412a 27 ff. ... 45n.21
413a 8–9 ... 47n.22
416b ... 47n.22
De memoria
452a28 ... 70, 71n.18
Epistulae
6 ... 32
Ethica Nicomachea
A 6, 1096a12–17 ... 102 + n. 17
6.12, 1144a23–28 ... 280n.133
Metaphysica
1010a ... 28
1026a24 ... 41n.14
Rhetorica
1.11, 1370a ... 70, 71n.18
2.21, 1394a19–26 ... 255n.38
1394a26–1395a2 ... 256n.40
1395b1–3 ... 256n.40
1401a 22 ... 86
Sophistici elenchi
17, 176b18–20 ... 255n.38
34, 183b17–23 ... 112, 113n.3
- [Aristotle]
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum
1430a40 ... 255n.38
1430b1–5 ... 256n.40
- ?Arius Didymus
2.7.5 = Stobaeus, 2:57.15–16 ...
254n.29
2.7.12 = Stobaeus, 2:116.18 ...
254n.29
- Artapanus
apud Eusebium, *Praep. ev.*
9.18 ... 139n.7
- Blemmydes, Nikephoros
Epitome logica
688C–689A ... 254n.29
- Choumnos, Nikephoros
Epistulae
3, *AN* 4.10 ... 262n.57

- (Choumnos, Nikephoros
Epistulae)
 4, AN 5.9–10 ... 262n.57
 35, AN 42.22 ... 262n.57
 72, AN 85.10–11 ... 262n.57
 78, AN 94.18 ... 262n.57
On the Nature of the World ... 259
- Cicero
Epistulae ad Atticum
 2.1.8 ... 21n.4
Orator
 100 ... 276n.105
- Clement of Alexandria
Stromateis
 1.15.70.1–2 ... 137n.5
 6.11.84.1–2 ... 139n.7
- Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus
De legationibus
 221.25 ... 153n.5
- Corpus paroemiographorum
 graecorum*
 I 1.1–9 (Zenob. I 1) ... 24, 25n.12
 I 259.1–2 (Diog. V 38) ... 86
 I 307.3 (Diog. VIII 16) ... 24
 I 314.7 (Diog. VIII 46) ... 24
 II 13.9 (Diog. I 83) ... 112
 II 208 (Mac. VII 66) ... 237n.31
 II 114.3 (Greg. Cypr. III 46) ...
 216
 II 229.3 (Aesop. 10) ... 216
- Demosthenes
De corona
 28 ... 96, 97n.4
In Aristogitonem
 37.4 ... 101n.13
- Dio Chrysostom
Orationes
 13.4.5 (1:180.10) ... 64
 18.14–19 (2:254–56) ... 183n.12
 52.17 (2:109.15–17) ... 256n.39
- Diogenes Laertius
 2.23 ... 67n.7
 2.52 ... 191n.13
 2.57 ... 185n.1
 2.122 ... 254n.35
 3.6 ... 127n.3
 3.34 ... 185n.2
- Diogenianus
 I 83 in *CPG* II 13.9 ... 112
 V 38 in *CPG* I 259.1–2 ... 86
 VIII 16 in *CPG* I 307.3 ... 24
 VIII 46 in *CPG* I 314.7 ... 24
- Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Ad Ammaeum
 3, 259.24 ... 280n.130
Antiquitates Romanae
 1.7.2 ... 253n.25
De Demosthene
 8, 143.11–144.10 ... 280n.130
 49, 236.11 ... 253n.26
De Thucydide
 1, 325.3–4... 253n.26
 23, 360.9–12 ... 280n.130
*De Thucydidis idiomatibus (epistula
 ad Ammaeum)*
 1, 421.11... 253n.26
De veterum censura
 2.5 ... 235n.29
- Elias [?David]
In Aristotelis Categorias
 114.1–14 ... 253n.20
 122.4–5 ... 103n.17
 125.11 ... 34n.3
- Eunapius
Fragmenta historica
 1:220.5–10 ... 37n.10
Vitae sophistarum
 456, IV.1.3 ... 232, 233n.28
- Euripides
Electra
 509 ... 242
- Eusebius
Historia ecclesiastica
 5.19.4.3 ... 254n.30
 5.20.2.3 ... 254n.31
 6.16.4.3 ... 254n.32
Praeparatio evangelica
 9.18 ... 139n.7
 10.4.15 ... 138n.5
 13.12.5 ... 147n.2
- Eustathios
Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem
 1:292.7 ... 254
 1:559.29–560.2 ... 25n.12

- (Eustathios
Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem)
 2:697.19 ... 253n.28
 3:449.11–12 ... 86n.6
 3:833.9 ... 254
 4:227.5 ... 253n.28
Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam
 1:131.24 ... 253n.28
 1:294.11–12 ... 227n.18
- Fortunatian
Ars rhetorica
 3.9 ... 277n.108
- Galen
 5:33, 5–6 Kühn ... 72
- Gnomologium Byzantinum*
 126, 186–87 ... 72
- Gnomologium Vaticanum*
 461, 171–72 ... 72
- Gregoras, Nikephoros
Epistulae
 22 ... xivn.6
 23 ... xivn.7, 245, 263, 265
 23, 79–102 ... 265n.65, 271
 23, 82–85 ... 270
 23, 85 ... 233n.27
 23, 101–2 ... 205n.2
 23, 105–10 ... 273n.96
 24a, 15–17 ... 253n.19
 24a, 32–51 ... xiiin.4
 24a, 41 ... 270
 120 ... xixn.24
Historia Romana
 1:272 ... xliiin.61
 1:272.6–14 ... 287n.173
 1:272–73 ... 155n.7
 1:474–81 ... xiiin.4
 2:589.3–4 ... 59n.4
 3:72.20 ... 37n.10
 3:206.12–13 ... 101n.13
On Synesius, On Dreams
 526B ... 287
- Gregory of Cyprus
 III 46 in *CPG* II 114.3 ... 216
- Gregory of Nazianzus
Orationes
 28.4 ... 92
 38 ... 275
- Gregory of Nyssa
Contra Eunomium
 1.1.79 ... 64
- Heraclitus
 Fr. 91 ... 28
- Hermogenes
Peri ideon
 213.4–14 ... 282n.143
 218.13–224.2 ... 275n.103
 221.11–23 ... 280n.128
 232.11–12 ... 279n.121
 242.3–7 ... 283n.144
 242.22–245.15 ... 283n.145
 245.15–246.1 ... 283n.146
 247.12–248.9 ... 284n.157
 249.12–250.5 ... 284n.156
 251.18–20 ... 284n.162
 258.7–18 ... 280n.124, 284n.155
 258.14–15 ... 284n.157
 259.9–10 ... 284n.160
 260.4–9 ... 284
 260.17–262.2 ... 283n.148
 262.9–14 ... 284n.155
 267.7 ... 284n.156
 268.21–23 ... 284n.162
 272.11–12 ... 284n.162
 278.13–282.14 ... 283n.147
 282.15–284.21 ... 283n.149
 284.22–286.23 ... 283n.150
 286.24–295.12 ... 284n.158
 295.13–17 ... 284n.161
 296.5–14 ... 285n.165
 339.23–344.12 ... 284n.159
 355.2–356.3 ... 283n.151
 359.6–14 ... 258n.45
 359.6–15 ... 284n.153
 361.4–11 ... 284n.152
 368.22–369.24 ... 280n.129
 369.24–372.19 ... 280n.131
 372.20–373.7 ... 280n.132
 373.24–376.4 ... 285n.164
 377.10–378.20 ... 280n.133
 378.18–19 ... 193n.3
 380.1–3 ... 193n.3
- Progymnasmata*
 4, 8.16 ... 255n.37

- ?Hermogenes
Peri heurseos
 4.3, 177.3 ... 256
- Herodotus
 2.109 ... 139n.9
- Hesychius
 A 4249 ... 98
 Δ 48 ... 28
 E 3397 ... 189n.9
 Σ 200 ... 227n.18
- Homer
Iliad
 1.70 ... 64
 1.343 ... 180, 181n.8
 1.468 ... 24
 2.212 ff. ... 103n.19
 2.246 ... 102, 103n.19
 4.405 ... 102
 4.412 ... 104
 9.55 ... 104
 20.250 ... 98, 99n.10
 24.69 ... 24
 24.379 ... 104
Odyssey
 1.58 f. ... 64, 65n.2
 8.498 ... 104
 24.452 ... 180, 181n.8
- Iamblichus
Vita Pythagorica
 23.104 ... 254
 23.104.10 ... 253n.21
- Isocrates
Panegyricus
 3-4 ... 258
- John Italos
Quaestiones quodlibetales ... 249
- John Philoponus
De aeternitate mundi
 461.20 Rabe ... 217n.4
 144.20 ... 103n.17
De opificio mundi
 1 7, 15 f. Reichardt ... 139n.7
In Aristotelis Categorias
 3.28-4.8 ... 253n.20
In Aristotelis Physica
 CAG 16:34, 320, 475, 478 ...
 217n.4
- Joseph Rhakendytes
Encyclopaedia ... 275
Synopsis artis rhetoricae
 516.14-521.13 ... 276n.106
 516-21 ... 276
 525.11-21 ... 277
 525-30 ... 276
 526.28-528.3 ... 276n.107
 530.9-10 ... 275n.102
 530.9-531.14 ... 275n.102
 530-34 ... 275
 531.14-21 ... 275n.104
 531.14-30 ... 275n.102
 531.26-30 ... 276n.105
 559.3-7 ... 280n.121
 579.1-580.24 ... 275n.102
 582.19-583.6 ... 275n.102
- Josephus
Antiquitates Judaicae
 1.168 ... 139n.7
Bellum Judaicum
 introduction ... 155n.6
 3.352 ... 155n.6
Contra Apionem
 1.54 ... 155n.6
Vita
 2 and 198 ... 155n.6
- Justin Martyr
Apologia secunda
 7.3 ... 227n.18
- Libanius
Declamationes
 15.(1.)15.6 ... 101n.13
 26 ... 98
Epistulae
 78 ... 98, 99n.6
 283.2.7 ... 101n.13
Orationes
 1.158.7 ... 101n.13
Progymnasmata
 11.18.1 ... 97n.4
- Lucian
Hermotimus
 71 ... 226
Navigium
 12 ... 86, 226
Patriae encomium
 11.5 ... 64

- Macarius
VII 66 in *CPG* II 208 ... 237n.31
- Maximus of Tyre
Orationes ... 249
18.5 ... 87n.6
- Menander
Dyscolus
276 ... 24
Monostichoi
1.740 (= *Sententiae e codicibus Byzantinae* 813) ... 24, 25n.11
- Metochites, Theodore
Logoi
10 ... 261, 269–70
13 ... 282
13.15–17 ... 280n.134
13.20 ... 287
16 ... 275
Paraphrases of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy ... 264, 269
preface ... 257, 263, 281
preface, 11–12 ... 254
Poems
1 ... 261
1, 400–10 ... 261n.55
4, 244–46 ... 269
4, 247–49 ... 268
4, 250–82 ... 269
12 ... 245, 263
12 ... 273, 278
12, 15–20 ... 263
12, 24–77 ... 263
12, 78–108 ... 263
12, 179 ... 266
12, 199–224 ... 263
12, 225–34 ... 263
12, 235–326 ... 264
12, 235–36 ... 263
12, 235–39 ... 264
12, 240–42 ... 264
12, 242–47 ... 270n.84
12, 243–51 ... 264, 265
12, 244 ... xv, 252n.17, 255
12, 246 ... 266, 267
12, 246–51 ... 265
12, 248–51 ... 266
12, 252–58 ... 101n.13, 264
12, 256–58 ... 265
- (Metochites, Theodore
Poems)
12, 259–63 ... 265–67
14–20 ... 261
Semeioseis gnomikai
1 ... 251
1.1.6 ... 247n.3
1.2.5 ... xxviii
1.2.7–8 ... 259n.49, 260n.52
1.2.7–9 ... 262
1.2.8 ... 27n.14
1.3.1 ... 259n.48
1.3.3 ... 23n.5
1.3.5 ... xv, xxxi, 177n.2,
252n.14, 254
1.3.5–6 ... 256n.40
1.3.7 ... 248, 256n.42
2.1.6 ... xxix
2.1.7 ... 23n.5
3.1.3 ... 59n.5
3.1.4 ... 48–49n.3
3.1.6 ... 217n.5
3.1.9 ... 48n.1
3.2 ... 68n.9
3.3.7 ... 43n.20
3.5.8 ... 39n.13
4.1.3 ... 67n.8, 169n.8
4.4.2 ... 123n.13
4.4.4 ... xxviii
4.5.6 ... 33n.2
4.6.3 ... 48–49n.3
5.2.1 ... 247n.2
5.2.2 ... 47n.23
5.2.5 ... 67n.4
5.3.1 ... xxviii
5.4.2 ... 48–49n.3, 121n.10
5.4.5 ... 126n.18
6.1.4 ... 50n.4, 61n.8
6.1.7 ... 48–49n.3, 169n.8
6.2.5 ... xxxi, 67n.3
6.2.7 ... 47n.23
6.3.1 ... 67n.3, 73n.20
6.4.1 ... 71n.17
6.4.2 ... 72n.19
7.1.5 ... 48–49n.3, 68n.9
7.3.1 ... 80n.6, 131n.9
7.4.2 ... 81n.9
8.1.3 ... 48–49n.3

- (Metochites, Theodore
Semeiosis gnomikai)
- 8.1.4 ... 217n.5
 8.2.3 ... xxviii
 8.3.1 ... 163n.10, 254n.35
 9.1.5 ... 20n.1
 9.1.5–8 ... 260
 9.2.2–3.7 ... 278n.112
 9.3.1 ... xxvii, xxviii
 10.1.1 ... 48n.2, 217n.5
 10.1.3 ... xxviii, 63n.10
 10.1.4 ... 87n.7
 10.1.6 ... 97n.1, 217n.5
 10.2.3 ... 105n.23
 10.3.5 ... 58n.4
 10.3–4 ... 68n.9
 10.4.6 ... xxvii
 10.5.4 ... 48n.3
 12.1.1 ... xxxi
 12.3.3 ... 48n.3
 12.3.5 ... xxvii
 12.4.2 ... 81n.9
 12.4.4 ... 126n.19
 12.4.5 ... xxvii
 12.5.2 ... 127n.21, 217n.5
 12.5.3 ... 81n.9
 12.5.6 ... xxviii
 12.7.4 ... xxvii
 13.1.3 ... xxxi
 13.3.2 ... 79n.4
 14.1.3 ... 127n.2
 14.3.1 ... 247n.3
 14.3.4 ... 33n.2
 14.5.1 ... 285n.166
 15.1.4 ... 169n.11
 15.4.1 ... 189n.6
 15.4.2 ... 169n.12
 15–20 ... 247, 274
 15–25 ... 278
 16 ... 281, 282
 16.1.3 ... 173n.20
 16.3.2 ... xxvii
 16.3.4 ... 87n.7
 16.4 ... 159n.3
 16.4.1 ... 281n.138
 16.4.2–6 ... 281n.139
 16.4.5 ... 279n.117
 17.1.3 ... xxxii
 17.1.4 ... 33n.2
 17.2.3 ... 249n.8, 285n.166
 17.2.6–8 ... 171n.13
 17.2.7 ... 161n.8
 17.3.1 ... 159n.1
 17.3.2–3 ... 249n.10
 17.3.3 ... 87n.6, 205n.2
 18 ... 249, 282
 18.2.1–3 ... 278n.114
 18.2.2 ... 280n.122
 18.2.3–7 ... 278n.112
 18.2.3–9 ... 279n.120
 18.2.4–5 ... 157n.11, 279n.117
 18.2.7 ... 48n.3
 18.2.8 ... 189n.8
 18.2.8–9 ... 278n.115
 18.3.2–4 ... 280n.125
 18.3.5 ... 266
 18.3.5–7 ... 177n.3, 278n.113,
 18.4.1–5 ... 278n.116
 18.4.2 ... 280n.123
 18.4.3–5 ... 281n.137
 18.5.1–6 ... 287n.172
 18.5.2 ... 48–49n.3
 18.5.5 ... 151n.2
 19 ... 249
 19.1.1 ... 267n.72
 19.2.1 ... 257
 19.2.4 ... 280n.121
 19.2.6 ... 280n.127
 19.2.6–7 ... 280n.126
 19.2.7 ... xxviii
 19.3.7 ... xxvii
 19.4.3 ... 189n.7, 280n.121
 19.4.4–6 ... 279n.118
 19.4.5 ... xxviii
 19.5.1 ... 266
 19.5.2–3 ... 185n.1
 19.5.3 ... 169n.10, 189n.8,
 279n.121, 280n.121
 20.3.2 ... 169n.10, 280n.121
 20.3.3 ... 169n.10, 183n.13,
 279n.118
 22.2.2 ... xxviii
 22.2.3 ... 231n.26
 22.2.4 ... 199n.5
 22.3.4 ... 29n.3
 22–23 ... 247

- (Metochites, Theodore
Semeioseis gnomikai)
- 23 ... 81n.7
 24.1 ... 266
 24.1.1–5 ... 279n.119
 24.3.3 ... 207n.5, 209n.2
 24–26 ... 247, 274
 25 ... 68n.9
 25.1.2 ... xxviii
 25.1.5 ... 267n.75
 25.1.9 ... 89n.10
 25.2.2 ... 207n.5
 25.2.3 ... 48n.3
 26 ... 257, 277, 278
 26.1.1 ... 167n.4
 26.1.4–7 ... 278n.110
 26.1.7 ... 215n.2
 26.2.1–2 ... 278n.111
 26.2.4 ... 266n.69
 26.2.5–8 ... 278n.109
 27, 178 ... xixn.21, 231n.24
 27, 181 ... 48n.3
 28 ... 261
 28, 187 ... xixn.21
 28, 188 ... 48n.3, 64n.13
 28, 192 ... 63n.10
 30, 206 ... 48–49n.3
 32 ... 75n.25
 32, 211 ... 47n.23
 33 ... 75n.25
 35, 226 ... 48n.3
 37–40 ... 246n.1, 247
 38, 239 ... 47n.23
 39, 245 ... 47n.23
 41 ... 247
 42, 262 ... 47n.23
 42–45 ... 247
 46–49 ... 247
 47, 279 ... 63n.10
 54, 308–9 ... 278n.112
 57, 334 ... 47n.23
 61 ... 81n.7
 62, 382–83 ... xixn.21
 67, 420 ... 47n.23
 70, 460–62 ... 218
 71 ... 248, 265, 267, 270–71,
 274, 281, 286
 71.3.1–3 ... 287n.170
 71.3.3 ... 151n.2
 71.3.5 ... 151n.2
 71.7.1–4 ... 287n.171
 71.7.7–8 ... 287n.171
 71.7.8 ... 219n.2
 71.8 ... 273n.94
 71.8.2 ... 29n.3
 71.8.4 ... xxvii
 71.8.4–7 ... 287n.171
 71.8.7 ... 270
 71.9.1–3 ... 278n.110, 281n.140
 71.9.3 ... 278n.113
 71.9.4–6 ... 282
 71.9.5 ... 258n.46
 71.9.6 ... xxviii
 71.9.9–10.2 ... 282n.141
 71.10.1 ... 257
 71.10.1–11.3 ... 278n.114
 71.10.5 ... 278n.112, 282
 71.11 ... 286n.168
 71.11.1 ... 266
 71.11.1–7 ... 278n.116
 71.11.2–3 ... 286n.167
 71.11.3 ... 266n.70
 71.11.6 ... 282n.143
 71.11.7 ... xxix
 71.12.2 ... xxviii
 71.12.9 ... xxivn.42, 263n.58
 72–76 ... 247
 72–86 ... 247
 74, 496 ... 47n.23
 77–78 ... 247
 80–81 ... 247
 82–86 ... 247
 87–91 ... 247
 88 ... 249
 90 ... 249
 93 ... 246n.1
 93, 593 ... 49–49n.3
 96–98 ... 247
 98, 628 ... 33n.2, 51n.5
 99–110 ... 247
 110, 734 ... 249n.7
 111, 736 ... 29n.3
 111, 738 ... 29n.3
 111, 741 ... 29n.3
 111, 741–42 ... 231n.25
 111, 743 ... 266n.71

- (Metochites, Theodore
Semeioseis gnomikai
 111, 748 ... 29n.3
Stoicheiosis astronomike
 ... 264, 269
 1:1, 165–69 ... 261n.55
 1.1.24 ... 101n.13
 1.1.25 ... xxixn.45
 1.1.27 ... xxixn.45
 1.1.32 ... 141n.12
 1:1.34–40 ... 263
 1.5.5–6 ... 131n.9
- Old Testament
Psalms
 59:6 ... 254
- Olympiodorus
Prolegomena
 6.24–30 ... 253n.20
- Origen
Philocalia
 27.10n.2 ... 254n.33
- Orpheus
 Fr. 245.1 Kern ... 146, 147n.2
- Pausanias
 6.5.6 ... 191n.13
- Pausanias Atticista
 Fr. 2, 152.5–6 Erbse ... 25n.12
- Philippides (Com.)
 Fr. 9 ... 97n.4
- Philo
De Abrahamo
 77 ... 139n.7
- Photius
Ad Amphiloichium quaestiones
 preface 21–22 ... 257n.43
 142, *PG* 101:800A–B ... 34n.3
Bibliotheca
 preface, 1.16–17 ... 257n.43
 cod. 26, 5b28–34 ... 172n.17
 cod. 105, 86b26 ... 150
- Pindar
Nemea
 7.105 ... 120, 121n.8
Olympia
 2.83 ff. ... 82, 83n.1
- Plato
Apologia
 17b8–c2 ... 257n.43
 30e–31a ... 87n.9
Cratylus
 433e ... 95n.9
Crito
 46d ... 56n.11
 52b5 ... 67n.7
Epinomis
 977a–b ... 131n.9
 978b–979a ... 131n.9
Epistulae
 7 324a6 ... 127n.3
 7 326b5 ... 127n.3
 7 338c6 ff. ... 127n.3
Euthydemus
 292e ... 120
Euthyphron
 11c ... 28
Gorgias
 462b–466a ... 207n.4
 480a–481b ... 207n.4
Leges
 721b ... 56n.12
 753e6 ... 112
Lysis
 203a ... 67n.6
Meno
 97e–98a ... 28
Phaedo
 66b ... 100
 83d ... 72, 73n.24
Phaedrus
 245c5–7 ... 46
Respublica
 413c–d ... 33n.7
 451a5 ... 100, 101n.13
 473c–d ... 30
 486c–487a ... 33n.7
 535a–c ... 33n.7
Symposium
 208c–d ... 56n.12
 219e ff. ... 67n.7
Theaetetus
 191c ... 144
Timaeus
 28c ... 92 + n.6

Plutarch

- Alexander*
7.8 ... 32, 34n.3
55.2 ... 89n.9
- Antonius*
15.5 ... 253n.21
- Aratus*
3.3 ... 253n.22
- Demosthenes*
14.4 ... 89n.9
- Pericles*
33.8 ... 89n.9
- Phocion*
3.2 ... 20, 21n.4
- Pompeius*
51.6 ... 89n.9
- Sulla*
29.2 ... 181n.8
- Moralia* ... 270
- Aetia Romana et Graeca*
279c ... 181n.8
- An seni respublica gerenda sit*
788e ... 181n.8
- De Alexandri magni fortuna
aut virtute*
328a4 ... 253n.27
336c-d ... 227n.18
- De audiendo*
42d ... 239n.35
- De capienda ex inimicis utilitate*
91a-b ... 229n.20
- De E apud Delphos*
387d-391e ... 223n.11
392b ... 28
- De exilio*
602b-c ... 72, 73n.21
- De fortuna Romanorum*
326a8 ... 253n.24
- De gloria Atheniensium*
350b-51b ... 239n.35
- De Iside et Osiride*
367e-368e ... 223n.11
373a-374b ... 223n.11
- De sera numinis vindicta*
548b-c ... 225n.15

(Plutarch)

- De Stoicorum repugnantiis*
1035d ... 181n.8
1047c-e ... 223n.11
1052f-1055c ... 221n.10
- De tuenda sanitate praecepta*
123c ... 72, 73n.21
- Maxime cum principibus philo-
sopho esse disserendum*
777d ... 86
- Non posse suaviter vivi secundum
Epicurum*
1086d-87a ... 225n.15
1095d ... 227n.18
- Quaestiones convivales*
694e ... 89n.9
712d ... 89n.9
- [Plutarch]
- De Homero* ... 249, 271
2.6.3 ... 241n.38, 273n.95
- Polybius
2.40.4 ... 253n.22
25.4.5 ... 253n.23
- Posidonius
Fr. 190a, 216 Theiler ... 227n.18
- Proclus
In Platonis Rempublicam
1.63 ... 217n.4
- Psellos, Michael
Encomium in Joannem Mauropoda
MB 5:148-49 ... 276n.105
- Ptolemy
Syntaxis mathematica
12.1, 2:450.10 ... 143n.15
12.1, 2:456.9-10 ... 143n.15
2.6.9-11, 1:108-9 ... 145n.17
- Rhetorica ad Herennium*
4.24 ... 72
- Scholias in Euripidem*
Ph. 394 ... 89n.2
- Sextus Empiricus
Adversus mathematicos
1.278, 3:70.16-19 ... 256n.39
- Simonides
Fr. 100 Page ... 118

Simplicius

In Aristotelis Categoriae

4.14–18 ... 253

In Aristotelis Physica

8.28 ... 34n.3

430.3 ... 253n.28

601.12 ... 253n.28

In Epictetum

19.35 ... 217n.4

Stobaeus, John

2:57.15–16 ... 254n.29

2:116.18 ... 254n.29

3:14.1–2 ... 72, 73n.21

Suda

A 69 ... 150

A 100 ... 24, 25n.12

A 1843 ... 98

A 3438 ... 36, 37n.10

A 4097 ... 112

B 218 ... 146

E 1536 ... 216, 217n.5

Θ 181 ... 36, 37n.10

K 504 ... 234, 234n.30

K 1638 ... 98

Ξ 47 ... 184, 185n.1

Π 1917 ... 216, 217n.4

Τ 997 ... 96, 97n.4

Φ 448 ... 150

Synesius

Calvitii encomium ... 167n.7*De regno*

2:17.8–9 ... 173n.19

(Synesius)

Dion

2:233.6–8 ... 267n.73

2:240.18–241.11 ... 267n.74

2:241.6–9 ... 276n.105

2:246.12–15 ... 287n.172

2:249.19–20 ... 72, 73n.24

2:263.17 ... 234, 235n.30

2:278.17–20 ... 287

Epistulae

23, 41.7–8 ... 262n.57

56 (54) ... 161n.9

57 (41), 65.6–7 ... 216, 217n.4

136, 236.12–237.2 ... 161n.9

154, 276.6–7 ... 103n.17

?Syrianus

Praefatio in Hermogenis Peri ideon

98.20–99.4 ... 277n.108

Thomas Magister

Ecloga vocum Atticarum

195–96 Ritschl ... 235n.30

Tornikes, George

Orationes

283.4 ... 253n.28

Tragica adespota

Fr. 516 ... 70

Xenophon

Agesilaus

3–11 ... 191n.12

Hellenica

7.4.33 ... 63n.10

Zenobius

I 1 in *CPG* I 1–9 ... 24, 25n.12

Index of Greek words

“23” refers to the Pinax, “23 title” refers to the chapter headings in the text, “23.3.1” refers to chapter, section, and paragraph in the text.

For words occurring more than fifty times individual occurrences are not listed; the number of occurrences is given within parentheses.

* before a word denotes that it is not found in the dictionaries of Liddell-Scott-Jones or Lampe (the orthographic variants διατοῦτο, ἐξανάγκης, ἐξαρχῆς, ἐξεπιπολῆς, ἐξορθοῦ, ἐπιπλεῖστον, οὐχάπαξ, οὐχῆκιστα, ταπολλά, τίποτε, and τοεξαρχῆς are not marked); (*) denotes that this sense of the word is not found in LSI or Lampe.

codd., *v.l.*, *γρ.* and *scripsi* refer to the critical apparatus.

- ἄαπτος untouchable 3.2.4
ἀβαρής tolerant 71.6.3
ἀβέβαιος unstable 23, 23 title, 23.2.1
ἀβελτηρία stupidity 5.1.2, 9.1.6
ἀβλεπτέω to be blind 9.1.8
ἀβρότης refinement, ornament 4.4.1, 26.2.5
ἀγαθός good 36, 1.3.4, 4.2.3, 6.1.4, 9.1.8, 16.1.7, 71.6.2
ἄγαμαι to admire 5.3.1
ἀγγελία expression 16.1.6, 19.3.1, 71.9.3
ἀγγέλλω to disclose, proclaim, report 9.2.2, 9.3.5, 11.1.6, 26.1.4
ἀγεν(ν)ής unproductive, ignoble, inadequate 23.1.2, 23.3.4
ἀγιστεία reverence 71.5.2
ἀγνοέω to be ignorant 12.3.5, 12.6.8, 14.2.8, 71.4.5, 71.7.3, 71.11.6
ἀγνωμονέω to be unfair, ungrateful 10.5.5, 13.4.2
ἀγνώμων unfair, unfeeling 6.1.10, 10.5.6, 23.3.3
ἀγοήτευτος uncouth 18.2.5 γρ.
ἄγονος without giving birth to 21.2.3
ἀγορά marketplace 10.4.4, 71.8.7
ἄγραφος unwritten 7.3.3
ἀγροικία brutality 9.1.2
ἀγροικος crude 17.4.4
ἀγρός country estate 20.4.4
ἀγχίνουα acumen 3.3.5, 13.2.1
ἀγχίνοος shrewd, sharp-witted 15.4.1, 18.5.8
ἄγω to lead, rule, hold, regard 102, 6.1.1, 9.1.6, 10.4.7, 18.4.2, 24.3.2, 25.2.4
ἀγωγή conduct, guidance, teaching 6.2.2, 6.2.4, 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 15.3.1, 16.1.6, 18.4.5, 71.8.2
ἀγών game, debate 21.2.6, 71.4.6
ἀγωνίζομαι to contend 18.3.6, 19.4.6
ἀγώνισμα declamation; attack 18.3.5, 24.3.4
ἀγωνιστής competitor 71.4.6
ἀγωνιστικός contentious 24.1.4
ἄδεια safety 71.1.1
ἀδέκαστος impartial, incorruptible 4.4.4, 4.5.1
ἄδετος untied, unattached 2.2.3, 3.7.6
ἀδεῶς openly, fearlessly 4.6.3, 18.4.2, 24.2.2
ἄδηλος unclear 5.4.1, 5.4.6, 15.2.2, 23.1.5
ἀδιάκοπος uninterrupted 24.1.2
ἀδικέω to do wrong 3.3.3, 4.3.2, 6.1.8, 10.1.6, 10.1.6, 19.5.6, 19.5.6, 25.2.3, 25.2.3
ἀδικία injustice 71.5.4
ἄδικος unjust 10.2.2, 10.3.7, 10.5.9, 24.3.4, 25.2.5, 71.9.7
ἀδυναμία powerlessness 1.1.5

- ἀδύνατος impossible 2.1.6, 9.3.1, 14.2.9
 ἀεὶ always 24, 56, 2.3.3, 2.3.3, 3.7.8, 4.2.5, 5.3.9, 8.2.5, 10.2.6, 11.1.5, 12.3.4, 14.1.1, 14.3.4, 15.1.4, 21.1.2, 22.3.2, 23.2.1, 24 title
 ἀζήμιος unpunishable; undamaged, safe from harm 3.2.4, 12.6.3, 22.3.4
 ἀηδής unpleasant 33, 4.2.3, 8.1.3, 9.1.4, 9.1.8, 71.2.6, 71.5.1
 ἀηδία revulsion, reluctance, tedium; abomination 1.2.7, 8.2.7, 8.3.1, 10.4.3, 12.5.3
 ἀήθης unfamiliar, unusual 6.1.2, 16.4.6, 17.3.1, 18.3.3, 18.4.5
 ἀήττητος unconquered 4.5.4, 4.5.6
 ἀθανασία immortality 7.3.2
 ἀθάνατος immortal 3.6.7, 3.7.3
 ἀθεώρητος uninvestigated 1.1.4
 ἄθικτος untouchable 4.1.4
 ἀθλητής athlete 71.4.6
 αἰδέομαι to respect; be ashamed 19.3.3, 24.3.3
 αἰδέσιμος respectful 10.3.4
 αἰδήμων respectful 7.1.7, 10.5.5
 αἰδῖος eternal 22.3.5
 αἰδώς respect, deference 3.2.2, 3.2.2, 3.2.4, 4.6.1, 5.4.6, 7.2.1, 7.2.6, 10.2.2, 10.3.6, 12.2.2, 14.5.4
 αἰρέομαι to choose, decide, take sides 107, 3.2.2, 4.5.4, 5.3.8, 6.4.1, 7.4.2, 12.4.4, 12.7.2, 17.3.5, 17.4.4, 19.2.8, 19.3.4, 19.4.3, 22.2.5, 24.3.1, 25.1.3, 25.2.5, 71.2.5, 71.6.4, 71.8.6, 71.8.8, 71.11.6
 αἵρεσις choice, purpose, conduct, philosophical system, school 1.1.2, 3.1.8, 4.5.3, 5.4.1, 6.2.4, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 8.2.3, 12.7.1, 12.7.2, 16.2.1, 17.4.2, 18.4.3, 19.1.1, 19.5.6, 23.1.3, 23.3.1, 71.3.5, 71.4.3, 71.8.7
 αἰρεσιώτης follower, adherent, disciple 7.1.8, 12.6.2, 13.4.2, 14.2.3, 16.1.3, 18.5.2, 71.8.3
 αἰσθάνομαι to have sense-perception 9.1.8
 αἴσθησις sense-perception 89, 95, 11.1.5, 11.1.5, 13.2.2, 13.2.4, 13.2.5, 13.2.6, 22.3.4
 αἰσθητικός perceptual 13.2.3, 13.2.5
 αἰσθητός perceptible 13.2.6
 αἴσχιστα disgracefully 10.4.4
 αἰσχύνομαι to be ashamed 12.5.2, 14.4.4, 21.2.3, 71.6.6
 αἰτία reason 3.6.3, 6.4.5, 15.2.6
 αἰτιάομαι to censure, blame, allege as the cause 3.2.1, 3.4.4, 7.3.1, 7.3.1, 10.5.3
 αἰτιολογία causal explanation 23.2.1
 αἴτιος causing, being the reason 6.4.3, 7.2.6, 8.2.6, 19.1.1, 22.3.1, 23.2.1, 23.2.1, 23.2.5
 αἰών time, period of time 4.4.2, 5.1.5, 6.2.1, 7.3.6, 10.5.8, 11.2.6, 12.5.6, 16.1.9, 18.2.3, 22.1.2, 24.1.2, 71.4.1, 71.8.1
 ἀκαιρία unfitness, unseasonableness; lack of judgement 1.1.5, 12.4.2
 ἄκαιρος ill-judged, inappropriate, futile 1.1.3, 12.3.1, 18.1.2, 18.4.2, 23.1.1, 23.3.2, 23.3.2, 24.3.2, 25.1.1
 ἀκαλλώπιστος unadorned 18.2.4
 ἀκάματος untiring 18.1.1, 18.2.9
 ἀκαριαῖος minute, tiny 13.2.10
 ἄκαρπος uncultured, unpicked 71.6.1
 ἀκήρυκτος heraldless, truceless 24.1.1, 71.6.4
 ἀκίνητέομαι to be paralysed 9.3.3
 ἀκίνητος stable 6.4.3
 ἀκλόνητος unshaken, without hesitation 13.2.10, 18.4.5
 ἀκμάζω to culminate, flourish 9.1.7, 12.6.2, 12.6.3, 14.4.4, 24.2.3, 71.3.5, 71.7.4
 ἀκμαστικός extreme; florescent (of style) 4.5.4, 7.2.3, 15.2.6
 ἀκμή energy; Florescence, culmination (of style) 5.1.4, 20.3.3, 71.9.1, 71.9.4, 71.12.2
 ἀκοή hearing; ear 13.2.7, 13.2.8, 15.1.4, 17.2.5, 17.2.7, 19.2.4
 ἀκολουθεῖν to follow 67, 10.3.7, 10.3.7

- ἀκόλουθος following 3.1.7, 10.2.3,
 10.2.4, 12.7.2, 19.1.4
 ἄκομπος unadorned 19.2.8, 19.4.5,
 19.4.6, 26.1.1
 ἀκοσμία impropriety 71.5.3
 ἀκόσμως in an uncouth manner
 25.1.7
 ἀκουστικός that has to do with hear-
 ing 13.2.2, 13.2.5, 13.2.9, 13.2.11
 ἀκούω to hear 1.3.6, 2.3.2, 2.3.2,
 2.3.7, 3.4.3, 4.1.5, 4.2.4, 7.2.3,
 8.2.5, 8.3.1, 10.2.3, 10.4.6, 11.1.5,
 12.7.2, 15.3.1, 18.3.4, 18.3.6,
 18.4.2, 19.2.3
 ἄκρατος unmixed; unbridled 119,
 8.2.8
 ἀκρίβεια accuracy, acumen, exact
 truth, knowledge 5.1.3, 5.4.5,
 11.1.2, 11.1.4, 11.1.6, 11.2.5,
 11.2.7, 12.7.4, 14.3.4, 14.4.3,
 14.5.4, 14.5.5, 18.4.4, 71.12.8
 ἀκριβής detailed, accurate; skilful,
 expert 1.1.2, 3.3.7, 3.5.6, 3.6.4,
 4.5.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.3, 6.2.3, 7.4.4,
 9.3.1, 12.5.3, 13.2.4, 13.2.6, 23.3.3,
 71.12.7
 ἀκριβῶ to make accurate, elaborate
 3.3.3, 5.3.9, 11.2.1
 *ἀκριτοεπής babbler 10.4.3
 ἀκρόασις lecture, the act of reading
 (listening) 71.9.9; ἡ Φυσικὴ
 ἀκρόασις: *see Index of Greek
 names*
 ἀκροατής listener, reader 3.4.1,
 9.1.5, 10.4.8, 19.4.6, 21.1.3,
 71.10.4
 ἄκρος highest, consummate 4.3.3,
 5.1.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.2, 7.2.6, 8.3.7,
 11.1.2, 12.2.2, 13.2.1, 13.2.9,
 14.2.4, 18.1.3, 18.4.4, 18.5.1,
 24.1.2
 ἀκρότης superiority 10.3.5
 ἀκρόωμενος listener, reader 1.2.7,
 3.3.3, 4.4.1, 19.3.2, 20.1.4, 23.1.4,
 24.1.5
 ἄκων involuntary 25.1.7, 71.3.9
 ἀλαζονεία arrogance 71.6.3
 ἀλαζών boastful 10.4.3
 ἀλγέω to be distressed 71.3.9
 ἀλήθεια truth 3.2.1, 3.3.5, 3.5.1,
 4.5.1, 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 5.2.4,
 5.2.5, 5.4.4, 6.2.2, 7.1.2, 7.1.6,
 7.4.4, 10.1.6, 10.3.1, 10.4.1, 10.4.2,
 10.4.7, 10.5.6, 11.1.6, 14.2.10,
 14.5.4, 15.2.2, 18.3.2, 19.1.2,
 19.4.4, 20.1.6, 22.2.5, 22.3.5,
 23.2.5, 24.1.5, 24.2.4, 25.2.5,
 71.5.5, 71.6.8, 71.9.9
 ἀληθεύω to be truthful 9.3.2, 9.3.7
 ἀληθής (62) true, truthful
 ἀληθινός true 4.5.7, 12.5.7
 ἄληπτος incomprehensible 3.5.9
 ἄλιος sun 12.4.4
 ἀλλάττω to change 117, 23.2.4
 ἀλλαχού elsewhere 39, 7.2.5
 ἄλλη in another direction, elsewhere,
 in another manner 3.6.6, 17.1.4,
 71.8.7
 ἀλληγορία allegory 16.3.3
 ἀλληλουχία interdependence 13.2.11
 ἀλλήλων one another 54, 3.1.6,
 3.5.4, 3.5.4, 6.4.3, 13.2.10, 13.2.11,
 13.3.4, 22.2.3, 23.1.3, 23.1.3,
 23.1.5, 23.1.6, 23.3.2, 23.3.2,
 26.1.4, 26.1.5
 ἄλλοθεν from another direction
 22.2.1
 ἄλλοθι elsewhere 40
 ἄλλος (199) other
 ἄλλοτε at another time 23.1.5
 ἀλλότριος of, belonging to another,
 strange, alien 3.1.9, 4.5.2, 5.2.5,
 6.1.2, 7.2.4, 8.1.3, 8.2.2, 8.3.5,
 10.2.5, 12.5.6, 19.3.6, 20.3.4,
 25.1.9, 26.2.6, 71.5.5, 71.9.4,
 71.9.7, 71.9.7
 ἀλλοτριῶ *pass.* to be alienated, un-
 natural 71.9.9
 ἄλλως otherwise, differently, in vain,
 planlessly, haphazardly 2.1.2,
 2.2.5, 3.1.5, 3.1.7, 3.6.6, 3.7.2,
 4.6.4, 4.6.5, 5.1.7, 6.2.3, 6.2.8,
 8.1.4, 10.4.1, 11.1.4, 11.2.5, 12.3.6,
 12.4.1, 12.5.3, 14.2.8, 14.2.9,
 19.2.3, 20.2.1, 22.2.5, 25.1.7,
 26.1.2, 26.1.4, 71.10.1, 71.11.3

- ἀλογέω to disregard 25.2.4
 ἀλογία irrationality 3.6.4
 ἀλόγιστος not studied, disregarding
 5.1.3, 25.2.1
 ἄλογος irrational 3.6.3, 6.3.1, 6.3.2,
 6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.4.2, 13.2.4
 ἄλυπος free from sorrow, effortless
 28, 15.1.4
 ἀλώβητος unblemished, inviolate
 10.5.2, 13.2.4
 ἀλώσιμος comprehensible, captive
 3.2.6, 3.4.3, 19.2.3, 21.2.6, 24.3.2
 ἅμα at the same time, together 1.3.7,
 1.3.7, 3.1.8, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.5.6,
 3.7.5, 6.4.5, 6.4.5, 8.2.5, 9.2.5,
 10.4.4, 10.4.4, 12.1.3, 12.1.3,
 14.4.5, 19.1.3, 19.1.3, 19.3.8,
 71.2.4, 71.6.3, 71.6.3, 71.7.7,
 71.7.7, 71.9.1, 71.12.9
 ἀμαθής ignorant, uneducated 3.5.6,
 6.2.2, 9.1.1, 10.2.5
 ἀμαθία ignorance 30, 62, 2.3.8,
 3.3.3, 4.2.4, 4.6.4, 5.3.1, 9.1.6
 ἀμαρτάνω to make a mistake 10.3.6
 ἀμάρτημα fault, mistake 7.4.1,
 10.3.4, 10.4.2, 71.6.8
 ἀμαρτητικῶς in a manner that fails to
 achieve 13.2.4
 ἀμαρτία mistake 23.3.4
 ἄμβλωμα abortion 10.4.4
 ἀμείνων better, superior 58, 58,
 3.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.4.2, 4.5.2, 4.5.7,
 5.3.8, 6.3.5, 6.4.2, 9.1.4, 9.2.3,
 10.1.4, 10.4.5, 12.2.3, 13.1.3,
 13.4.5, 21.1.1, 23.1.4, 23.3.5
 ἀμείωτος complete 5.3.6
 ἀμέλει (particle) 1.1.1, 1.1.5, 1.2.9,
 2.1.5, 2.1.7, 3.2.6, 3.3.2, 4.4.3,
 5.2.3, 5.3.7, 6.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.2.4,
 7.3.4, 7.4.2, 8.2.5, 9.1.2, 9.1.7,
 9.1.8, 10.1.5, 10.4.4, 10.5.5, 11.2.6,
 12.1.3, 12.2.5, 12.7.1, 13.4.6,
 16.1.9, 16.2.6, 16.4.3, 18.2.2,
 18.2.7, 18.4.2, 19.2.5, 19.3.2,
 20.3.2, 20.4.4, 22.2.6, 25.1.3,
 26.1.7, 71.1.1, 71.2.5, 71.3.6,
 71.6.9, 71.8.7, 71.9.3, 71.10.5,
 71.11.6
 ἀμελής negligent 10.2.4, 71.10.4
 ἀμέριστος undivided, non-disagree-
 ing 22.2.5
 ἀμεταβλησία unchangeability 6.2.9,
 7.4.3
 ἀμετάβλητος unchanged 6.3.1
 ἀμετρία lack of moderation 25.1.2
 ἀμηγέπη in a certain sense, somehow
 19.2.6, 20.3.2, 22.3.4, 24.3.3,
 71.11.2
 ἄμικτος unrestricted, absolute 3.7.4
 ἄμιλλα striving 1.2.6
 ἄμμος sand 26.2.7
 ἀμνηστία forgetfulness 2.3.8
 ἀμογητί without effort 17.2.6
 ἀμπέχω to embrace 15.2.2
 ἀμφιγνοέω to be in doubt 11.1.4,
 12.3.2
 ἀμφοτέρος either, both 3.1.8, 3.1.8,
 3.1.8, 6.1.5, 6.3.5, 7.1.1, 8.3.7,
 10.5.9, 12.7.3, 12.7.3, 14.2.5,
 15.1.2, 16.1.9, 17.3.4, 18.5.3,
 19.1.3, 19.1.3, 22.2.4, 22.2.6,
 25.2.1, 26.2.7
 ἄμφω both 8.2.1, 8.2.5, 8.2.5, 8.3.3,
 8.3.4, 9.3.7, 10.2.3, 10.5.3, 12.1.2,
 12.4.1, 14.2.8, 15.1.1, 18.5.3,
 19.1.3, 19.3.2, 19.3.6, 19.4.1,
 20.2.2, 25.2.2, 26.2.3, 26.2.3,
 71.3.3
 ἀμωσγέπως in a manner of speaking
 71.2.7
 ἄν (242) (particle)
 ἀνά along, at 21.2.4
 ἀναγκάζω to force 15.1.4, 22.3.3
 ἀναγκαῖος necessary 2, 1.3.7, 2 title,
 2.1.6, 3.6.7, 10.3.4, 25.2.5, 26.1.3
 ἀναγκαστός necessary 3.5.1
 ἀνάγκη necessity 1.2.6, 1.3.1, 2.3.5,
 3.1.5, 3.5.4, 5.2.5, 6.1.7, 6.2.9,
 6.3.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.5, 7.4.3, 8.3.1,
 13.2.4, 16.2.4, 23.2.5, 26.1.3,
 26.1.5, 26.1.5, 26.1.6, 71.1.3,
 71.8.5, 71.8.5, 71.9.3; *see also*
 ἐξανάγκης
 ἀνάγυρος stinking bean-trefoil
 10.1.6

- ἀναγώγως in an unlearned or ill-bred manner 71.2.2 γρ.
 ἀναδίδωμι to write 16.4.2
 ἀναζωγραφέω to delineate, depict 9.3.4, 71.8.1
 ἀναιδῶς shamelessly 18.1.2
 ἀναίνομαι to decline 12.7.2
 ἀναισθήτως unperceptively 9.1.6
 ἀνακηρύττω to declare 24.2.2
 ἀναλάμπω to illuminate, shine forth 12.6.1, 14.4.3
 ἀναλυτικός analytic: *see below, Index of Greek names*
 ἀνάλωτος incorruptible 4.1.1
 ἀναμάττω to reproduce 9.3.4
 ἀνάμνησις recollection 7.3.2
 ἀναμφήριστος indisputable, incontestable 5.3.9, 7.4.8, 21.2.6
 ἀνάξιος unworthy 15.2.3, 21.2.1, 26.2.7
 ἀνάπλασμα figment 71.5.4
 ἀνάσκητος unpractised, untrained, not taking pains with 16.1.7, 18.2.5, 25.1.6
 ἀνατίθημι to ascribe, refer 10.5.7, 16.3.2
 ἀναφαίνω to reveal 3.5.4
 ἀναφέρω to raise, elevate, refer 19.2.8, 71.3.7
 ἀναχέω to run, flow 18.2.9
 ἀναχώρησις withdrawal, location apart 13.1.2
 ἀνδράποδον captive 24.3.2
 ἀνέδην frankly, openly, brazenly 3.7.2, 7.1.5, 10.4.3
 ἀνελευθέρως vulgarly 4.1.3
 ἀνεμέσητος blameless 84, 1.2.6, 3.1.9, 4.6.1, 5.2.6, 7.4.8, 10.1.1, 20.2.1, 25.1.1
 ἀνενδεῶς impeccably 11.1.7, 13.4.6
 ἀνεννόητος not thought about 5.1.3
 ἀνεορτος not partaking of 71.10.1
 ἀνεπίδεικτος unable to express, unadorned 9.3.5, 26.1.3
 ἀνεπιμέλητος not caring, uncontrived 71.9.1, 71.10.1
 ἀνεπιστήμων ignorant 120
 ἀνεπιστρόφως unhesitatingly, heedlessly 6.2.4, 9.1.3
 ἀνεπιτήδευτος artless, natural, not caring about 15.4.2, 18.2.5, 26.2.4
 ἀνερυθριάστως unblushingly 10.4.8
 ἄνευ without 2.1.3, 2.3.6, 20.3.4, 71.9.5
 ἀνεύθυνος uncensured, impeccable, irreproachable, wilful, irresponsible 4.6.3, 6.2.2, 10.3.1, 11.2.7, 13.2.4, 18.4.3, 21.2.6
 ἀνευλαβής disrespectful 10, 10 title, 10.1.1, 10.4.3
 ἀνευρίσκω to discover 11.1.3, 11.2.3, 14.3.4
 ἀνέφικτος unattainable 11.1.1
 ἀνὴρ (168) man, the man
 ἀνθηφορία bounty 20.1.1
 ἀνθρώπινος human 87, 112, 115, 1.1.4, 1.2.4, 1.2.9, 4.5.4, 9.1.5, 10.1.2, 12.6.5, 12.7.5, 14.1.1, 71.4.2, 71.5.3, 71.8.2
 ἄνθρωπος (94) man, human being
 ἀνία disgust, sorrow, distress 1.3.2, 6.3.2, 9.1.4
 ἀνιαρός sorrowful, disagreeable 48, 119, 1.3.1, 6.2.7
 ἀνιάω to be upset 4.2.4
 ἀνίδρυστος unstable 112, 115, 2.1.5, 2.2.4, 23.2.2
 ἀνίκανος incompetent 10.2.4, 20.4.1, 26.2.7, 71.3.3, 71.9.2, 71.11.3
 ἀνόδευτος difficult to get through, unknown 17.3.2, 18.4.2
 ἀνόητος ignorant, stupid 34
 ἀνοίγνυμι to open 10.3.7
 ἀνοίκειος foreign 16.4.6
 ἀνόμοιος unlike 5.4.5
 ἀνόνητος useless 71.6.8
 ἄνοσος untouched, impeccable, unblemished, faultless, sound 4.5.6, 4.5.7, 6.2.2, 10.3.1, 13.2.4
 ἀντανισώω to make equal, compare 56
 ἀντανίστημι to attack 12.4.2
 ἀντερῶ to say instead 12.2.3
 ἀντέχω to remain 12.6.3

- ἀντί instead of 14.4.6, 16.2.6
 ἀντιβλέπω to oppose 12.2.1, 24.3.3
 ἀντιδίδωμι to pay back 10.5.9
 ἀντίθεσις opposite view 23.3.2
 ἀντίθετος opposed 18.5.3
 ἀντιθετικός argumentative 20.3.1
 ἀντικρυς face to face 20.2.1
 ἀντιλαμβάνω to receive in return 3.2.4
 ἀντιλέγω to oppose 12.5.4
 ἀντίληψις objection 23.3.2
 ἀντιποιέομαι to lay claim to 4.3.2, 4.5.1, 25.2.4
 ἀντιποιητέον one must strive for 77
 ἀντιπολιτεία disagreement 25.1.2
 ἀντιπολιτεύομαι to present opposite views, polemicise 12.6.6, 12.7.1, 13.4.2, 23.1.3
 ἀντίπραξις opposition 25.1.2
 ἀντιπράττω to fight, oppose 23.1.3, 25.1.8, 71.5.1
 ἀντισυμποσιάζω to write a 'Symposium' in rivalry of Plato 20.1.2
 ἀντιτάττω to oppose 12.6.2, 13.4.2
 ἀντίτεχνος rival 9.1.8
 ἀντιτίθημι to propose in contradiction 12.2.1
 ἀντίφασις contradiction 7.4.4
 ἀνυπόνοητος unsuspected 67
 ἀνύποπτος unsuspected 3.2.6, 10.3.2, 19.4.6, 19.5.6
 ἀνύσιμος sufficient, exhaustive, efficient, prolific 2.1.6, 5.3.4, 12.1.5, 12.2.2, 12.7.4, 14.1.4, 14.3.4, 18.5.8, 20.3.4, 21.2.6, 26.2.3
 ἀνύτω to achieve 1.2.7, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.7, 4.1.3, 4.2.4, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.5, 7.2.1, 7.3.6, 7.4.8, 8.1.4, 9.1.7, 9.2.3, 9.3.1, 12.3.6, 12.4.2, 12.6.9, 14.2.10, 14.3.3, 14.4.2, 14.5.5, 16.2.2, 18.3.2, 18.5.8, 19.3.5, 22.1.2, 22.2.6, 23.3.5, 71.2.2, 71.2.7, 71.6.9, 71.7.7, 71.8.8, 71.10.1, 71.11.6
 ἄνω in the past 2.3.2, 9.1.6
 ἄνωθεν from the beginning, from above 14.1.5, 71.4.6
 ἀνώμαλος uneven 15.1.2
 ἀνώτερος above 71.10.5
 ἀξιωζήτητος worth investigating 3.6.2
 ἀξιόλογος important, valuable 3.1.5, 9.3.2, 10.4.4, 14.5.1, 21.1.4, 21.1.6
 ἄξιος (55) worth, worthy of, proper
 ἀξιώω (64) to deem worthy; think fit, presume
 ἀξίωμα Dignity (of style) 15.2.5, 16.1.6, 16.4.1, 18.3.6, 20.3.3, 71.9.4, 71.9.4
 ἀξιοματικός dignified 16.4.6, 18.2.3, 19.2.8, 71.9.6
 ἀόρατος invisible 9.3.7
 ἀόριστος indeterminate 7.4.2
 ἀπαγγέλλω to present 19.4.3
 ἀπαθής irrefutable 55, 13.2.7
 ἀπαλλάττω to leave, acquit oneself, die 5.3.5, 6.1.10, 8.2.7, 10.1.6, 23.3.5
 ἀπανταχοῦ anywhere 7.1.3
 ἀπαντάω to meet, live up to, treat 3.2.4, 3.4.3, 3.5.9, 6.1.7, 9.3.2, 10.5.8, 21.2.2, 21.2.7, 71.6.6
 ἀπάντησις answer 24.1.3
 ἄπαξ once 5.3.9; *see also* οὐχάπαξ
 ἀπαξιόω to reject 12.7.2, 12.7.5, 71.5.2, 71.6.2, 71.9.2
 ἀπαραίτητος inevitable, indispensable 3.5.4, 5.4.4, 6.3.5, 6.4.2, 26.1.3, 26.1.6
 ἀπαριθμέω to enumerate 17.4.2
 ἄπας (74) all, every, whole
 ἀπατάω to deceive 2.3.3
 ἀπάτη deceit 71.9.7, 71.10.5
 ἀπατηλός deceitful 4.3.2, 5.2.6
 ἀπειροκάλως without refinement, vulgarly 35, 18.1.1
 ἄπειρος unfamiliar 16.2.1
 ἀπεναντία opposition 71.5.1
 ἀπέρυτος free from overlaboration 18.2.3
 ἀπέχω to abstain, be distant 5.2.5, 10.2.4, 12.1.2, 15.2.5
 ἀπίθανος unconvincing 23.1.4
 ἀπιστέω to disbelieve 66
 ἀπλανής not erring, correct 55

- ἀπλαστία* artlessness, disregard for *c. gen.* 15.2.2, 18.2.4, 18.3.5, 19.4.5, 26.2.4, 71.9.9
ἄπλαστος artless, disregarding, *c. gen.* 15.3.2, 20.3.3, 25.1.9, 71.9.1
ἀπληστία insatiate desire 71.2.4
ἀπλοϊκός simple 7.4.2, 15.3.1, 19.5.1, 22.3.1, 26.1.1, 26.1.7, 26.2.2
ἀπλότης simplicity 7.4.3, 7.4.8, 15.4.3, 18.3.4, 18.5.5, 23.2.4
ἀπλοῦς simple 26, 5.3.9, 15.3.2, 16.1.6, 19.4.6, 26 title, 71.4.2
ἀπλῶς simply, thoughtlessly 3.5.2, 13.3.4, 15.2.6, 16.3.3, 16.4.2, 16.4.5, 18.2.4, 18.4.1, 24.2.1, 26.1.6
ἀπό from 31, 117, 3.1.8, 3.2.4, 5.1.5, 5.1.6, 5.3.2, 6.2.1, 7.1.7, 7.3.2, 7.3.4, 7.3.6, 10.2.4, 10.5.8, 11.2.6, 12.4.5, 12.6.1, 13.2.7, 13.2.9, 16.1.9, 16.2.1, 16.2.1, 16.2.3, 18.2.3, 18.5.2, 18.5.3, 18.5.5, 18.5.8, 19.4.1, 20.1.4, 22.1.2, 24.1.2, 71.4.1, 71.4.3, 71.7.5, 71.8.1, 71.10.1
ἀποβολή loss 118
ἀποβουκολέω to lead astray 21.2.4
ἀποδεικνύω to show, demonstrate 3.5.8, 24.2.4, 71.12.1
ἀποδεικτικός having to do with demonstration 3.3.6
ἀποδειλιάω to be cautious 12.2.2
ἀπόδειξις demonstration 3.5.1, 71.11.3, 71.12.1, 71.12.4
ἀποδημέω to leave one's country 6.1.7, 6.1.9, 14.2.3
ἀποδημία being abroad 6.1.2
ἀπόδημος away from, abroad 12.5.7, 13.1.1, 20.4.3
ἀποδίδωμι to give 10.5.7, 21.2.5, 21.2.7, 23.3.3, 26.2.7, 71.1.3, 71.12.8
ἀποδοκιμάζω to repudiate 12.2.3
ἀποθνήσκω to die 6.2.8
ἀποίητος unstudied, uncontrived, artless, unconcerned about, *c. gen.* 8.3.6, 15.2.1, 15.2.4, 15.3.2, 16.4.2, 18.2.4, 18.3.6, 19.4.4, 25.1.7, 26.2.2, 71.9.1, 71.10.2
ἀποικία colonisation 71.8.2
ἀποκνέω to shrink from 5.4.1, 12.1.3, 20.1.1
ἀπολαμβάνω to take, receive, categorise 17.2.7, 18.5.2, 71.12.3
ἀπολαύω to take advantage of, enjoy 18.5.4, 18.5.8
ἀπολέγω to pick out 71.1.2
ἀπολείπω to miss, lose 26.2.3
ἀπολίτετος unsociable, not taking part in politics, unusual 8.2.8, 16.4.6, 20.4.2
ἀπόλλυμι to perish 21.2.3
ἀπομάχομαι to polemise 71.3.4, 71.6.5
ἀπομνημονεύματα memoirs 20.1.3, 20.1.4
ἄπρονος easy, effortless 13.2.6, 13.2.7, 13.2.8, 16.4.3, 17.4.4, 18.3.2, 71.10.4
ἀπεπεράτως apprehension 13.2.5, 22.3.4
ἀποποιέω to reject, renounce 71.3.3, 71.9.2
ἀπορέω to be bewildered, at a loss, unable to explain 53, 5.1.1, 9.3.5, 11.1.1
ἄπορος hard to discover, uncertain 60
ἀπόρρητος that may not be divulged, secret, esoteric, arcane 3.3.7, 3.5.8, 21.1.3, 21.2.5
ἀπορρίπτω to reject 12.2.3
ἀποσεμνύνω to be supercilious 4.1.1
ἀποσκευή household stuff 71.7.8
ἀποστροφή turning away from 94
ἀποσυλλάω to plunder 12.5.7
ἀποτάδην in sequence 24.1.2
ἀποτεμαχίζω to cut off pieces 12.5.7
ἀποτέμνω to cut up, separate, isolate 71.2.5, 71.4.4
ἀποτολμάω to daringly oppose 12.2.3

- ἀποτρέπομαι to turn away, refrain
 from 49, 1.3.2, 5.2.4, 6.2.5, 7.4.8,
 9.1.4, 9.3.6
 ἀποτρεπτεόν one must refrain from
 79
 ἀποτυγχάνω to misunderstand, fail to
 achieve, miss 7.1.2, 16.1.7, 16.4.2,
 23.1.5, 71.2.7, 71.11.6, 71.12.7
 ἀποφαινώ to disclose, express 3.1.4,
 3.2.5, 3.5.3
 ἀπόφανσις statement 13.2.7
 ἀποφέρω to take over, achieve
 19.3.7, 23.1.4, 71.4.6
 (*) ἀποφύω to be untalented, un-
 suited 71.2.1
 ἀποχράντως sufficiently 19.4.2,
 71.2.5
 ἀποχώρησις retreat, retirement 94
 ἀπραγμάτευτος unstudied 20.3.3
 ἀπράγμων inactive; without difficulty
 46, 71.8.7
 ἀπραξία inactivity 117, 1.2.6, 1.3.7,
 2.3.3
 ἀπρονόητος unforeseen; heedless 62,
 21.2.1
 ἀπροόπτως thoughtlessly 16.1.2
 ἀπροσδεής not needing 3.7.4
 ἀπρόσιτος inaccessible 3.2.4
 ἀπρόσκοπος harmless, untiring, un-
 hindered 92, 1.1.5, 16.2.6, 17.4.4,
 18.3.2
 ἀπροσκόπτως in an unhindered man-
 ner 15.1.4
 ἄπτω to touch, take on, attack 2.3.3,
 3.2.2, 3.6.1, 3.6.5, 5.3.5, 7.1.8,
 9.2.2, 12.1.3, 13.2.3, 14.2.9, 14.3.1,
 14.3.2, 14.3.2, 14.4.1, 14.4.2,
 16.2.4, 16.3.1, 18.4.2, 71.2.4,
 71.10.3
 ἀπωθέω to reject 3.1.3, 71.5.2,
 71.6.2
 ἄρα (149) (inferential particle)
 ἀρδεΐα inundation 14.2.6
 ἀρετή virtue 75, 76, 1.1.5, 1.2.3,
 10.5.7, 20.4.1, 20.4.4, 26.2.7,
 71.5.2, 71.5.3
 ἀριθμέω to enumerate 9.2.1
 ἀριθμός number 7.3.4, 7.3.5, 10.1.5,
 13.1.3, 13.2.2, 13.2.5, 13.3.1,
 13.3.2, 13.3.4, 13.4.1, 14.2.9,
 14.2.9, 14.2.9, 14.2.10, 17.4.1,
 22.2.2, 22.2.3
 ἀριστεύς noble, prince 4.5.5, 5.4.5
 ἀριστεύω to be prominent 16.2.3
 ἀριστοκρατία aristocracy 97
 ἄριστος best 114, 2.3.4, 3.5.4, 3.6.2,
 6.4.1, 7.3.6, 7.4.7, 10.2.5, 10.4.8,
 12.1.3, 12.2.6, 12.5.3, 13.4.7,
 14.4.1, 14.4.6, 18.5.5, 71.11.5
 ἀρκέω to be sufficient, competent
 18.5.6, 20.4.4
 ἄρμόδιος suitable 10.5.9
 ἀρμόζω to adjust, fit, structure
 2.3.4, 13.2.2, 13.2.11
 ἄρμονία harmony 13.2.10, 13.2.11
 ἄρμονικός harmonic, harmonious
 13, 13 title, 13.2.5, 13.3.1, 13.3.5,
 13.4.1, 13.4.2, 13.4.3, 13.4.5,
 13.4.8
 ἄροσις toil 15.1.3
 ἄρπάζω to captivate 18.3.6
 ἀρρεπῶς unwaveringly 9.1.3
 ἄρρηκτος unbreakable 6.4.3, 6.4.5
 ἀρρητόρευτος unrhretorical 18.3.7,
 20.3.4, 25.1.6
 ἄρρητος inexpressible 3.4.2
 ἀρτῶω to hang upon, make dependent
 upon 4.3.1, 26.2.6
 ἀρύτω to draw on 71.10.3
 ἀρχαίος old, ancient 13.3.3, 14.2.5,
 18.3.2, 23.1.3, 71.7.2, 71.7.3
 (*) ἀρχαιρεσία office 2.3.5
 ἀρχέγονος being the origin 7.3.5,
 13.3.2
 ἀρχή beginning, office, power, state
 14, 38, 61, 82, 106, 106, 108, 108,
 2.1.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.3, 2.3.5, 2.3.6,
 3.6.1, 5.4.4, 6.4.6, 7.3.1, 10.5.3,
 11.2.7, 12.4.1, 13.2.4, 13.2.7,
 13.3.5, 13.3.6, 13.4.2, 14.1.4, 14 ti-
 tle, 14.1.2, 14.2.1, 14.4.5, 17.3.1,
 71.8.2, 71.8.2, 71.8.3; *see also*
 ἐξαρχῆς *and* τοῦ ἐξαρχῆς
 ἀρχηγέτης leader 71.3.7, 71.8.2

- ἀρχηγτικός belonging to the founder 71.12.8
 ἀρχηγός pioneer, guide, founder 1.2.5, 14.2.10, 71.8.3
 ἀρχικός official, fundamental 2.3.8, 71.12.2
 ἄρχω to rule, begin 2.3.6, 11.2.6, 11.2.7, 12.6.1, 13.2.1, 13.3.3, 13.3.6
 ἄρχων holder of an office 4.5.6
 ἀσάλευτος certain, incontestable 11.2.3, 13.2.2, 13.2.10, 23.2.2
 ἀσάφεια obscurity 3, 3 title, 3.1.1, 3.1.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.8, 3.6.5
 ἄσειστος firm, irrefutable 3.2.5, 7.4.4, 13.2.4, 14.5.5, 19.4.6, 23.2.1
 ἀσέλγεια baseness 71.6.5
 ἀσθένεια inadequacy 3.5.9
 ἀσκέω to practise 4.4.2, 9.2.4, 9.2.5, 12.3.4, 13.3.3, 17.3.1, 20.2.5, 25.1.4
 ἀσκήσις training, practice, schooling 1.2.4, 2.1.8, 4.1.5, 14.1.1, 15.3.3, 16.2.1, 17.1.4, 17.3.4, 18.5.6, 18.5.8, 19.5.1, 20.2.2, 22.2.4, 71.3.5, 71.8.2
 ἀσκητέον one must exercise 6.4.2
 ἀσμενέστατα gladly 6.1.7
 ἀσπάζομαι to appreciate 17.3.5
 ἄσπονδος without truce 24.1.1, 71.6.4
 ἀστασία instability 87
 ἀστασίαστος without faction or dissension 22, 22 title, 22.1.1, 22.2.4, 22.2.5, 23.2.1
 ἄστατος infirm, unstable 116, 23.2.2
 ἀστεῖος elegant, cultured, accomplished 2.1.4, 5.2.5, 9.1.7, 18.2.2, 20.2.5, 71.2.2, 71.7.2
 ἀστειώτης politeness, elegance, refinement, accomplishment 113, 4.2.3, 10.2.2, 15.3.1, 16.2.2, 18.3.3, 25.1.9
 ἀστρολογικός astronomical 5.3.2
 ἀστρονομία astronomy 13.3.3, 13.4.4, 13.4.5, 14.2.4, 14.2.6, 14.2.9, 14.2.9, 14.3.3, 14.5.2
 ἀστρονομικός astronomical 13.2.5, 13.4.8, 14.2.4, 14.4.1, 14.4.2, 14.5.3, 14.5.5
 ἀσύγγνωστος inexcusable 25.2.2, 25.2.2
 ἀσύγκλωστος that cannot be combined 26.2.7
 ἀσυλλόγιστος unsyllogistic 6.2.3
 ἄσυλος harmless, intact, inviolate 1.1.5, 2.1.4, 3.2.4, 4.6.4, 10.2.4, 12.6.3, 22.3.4
 ἀσύμβατος irreconcilable 22.1.3
 ἀσύμφωνος non-concordant 23.2.3
 ἀσύνδετος that cannot be combined 26.2.5
 ἀσυνδύαστος unable to join, incompatible 9.3.7, 26.2.5
 ἀσύνετος imprudent, incapable of understanding, stupid 5.1.3, 9.1.3, 22.2.3, 23.3.3, 24.3.3
 ἀσυνήθης unfamiliar 17.2.8
 ἀσφάλεια correctness 2.1.8, 18.4.5, 5.1.7, 12.3.6, 18.5.6, 23.2.2
 ἀσχαλία occupation, business 47
 ἀταλαίπωρος painless 118
 ἀτάρ but 1.3.5, 3.4.3, 4.3.1, 5.2.1, 9.3.3, 10.4.6, 14.2.1, 71.10.3
 ἄτε because 12.2.1, 12.5.3
 ἄτεγκτος impossible to soften 4.1.4
 ἀτευκτέω to fail to achieve 57, 2.3.3, 3.2.1
 ἀτεχνῶς simply, in a non-technical manner 5.4.5, 18.4.1
 ἀτημέλητος negligent, spontaneous, unadorned 26, 16.1.7, 19.4.5, 26 title, 71.9.6, 71.10.5
 ἀτιμάζω to disrespect 71.5.2
 ἄτημος unseverable 6.4.2
 ἀτονία lack of vigour 9.3.5, 15.2.4
 ἀτοπία strangeness 26.2.8
 ἀτρεκέως accurately 10.4.6
 ἄτρεπτος unchanging, immutable, inalienable 3.5.3, 6.1.5, 6.4.2, 7.4.2, 9.1.3, 10.2.6, 12.5.3, 13.2.4, 22.3.5
 ἄτριπτος strange, constrained 17.3.5

- ἄττα 1.2.5, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 9.1.1, 12.1.3,
15.2.5, 17.1.1, 22.2.2, 71.1.1,
71.1.2, 71.1.3, 71.2.3, 71.6.2
- ἄττικίζω to write in atticising lan-
guage 17.3.5, 17.3.5
- ἀτυχέω to fail to understand or obtain
3.5.9, 10.5.9
- ατύχημα fault, mistake 23.3.4
- ἀτυχία set-back, error 79, 10.4.8
- αὐθάδεια wilfulness 9.1.2
- αὐθις again 63, 66, 1.3.4, 3.1.8,
3.6.4, 3.6.5, 4.1.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.3,
7.4.1, 8.2.3, 8.3.4, 8.3.5, 9.1.4,
10.4.5, 11.1.1, 12.1.5, 12.2.2,
12.5.4, 13.4.1, 14.2.2, 14.5.7,
15.2.4, 16.1.1, 18.2.5, 18.3.3,
18.4.4, 19.1.4, 19.5.6, 25.2.2,
26.2.7, 71.10.5
- αὐλή hall, fold 16.2.6, 17.2.3
- ἄυλος immaterial 13.2.7 *bis*
- αὐτίκα immediately 1.3.2, 1.3.6,
2.2.3, 2.2.4, 3.6.1, 6.4.2, 10.2.1,
12.3.2, 21.2.4, 26.1.1
- αὐτόθεν from there, immediately
2.2.3, 3.7.1, 4.4.1, 6.4.3, 9.3.6,
10.2.1, 11.1.5, 23.2.1, 25.1.5,
71.12.7
- αὐτοκίνητος self-moved 3.7.7
- αὐτοκρατορία empire 12.6.1
- αὐτοκράτωρ emperor, autocrat
16.2.5, 18.4.3
- αὐτός (720) he, she, it; self; same
- αὐτοφυής spontaneous 15.1.3,
26.2.6
- αὐτοχειροτόνητος self-elected 20.4.1
- αὐχμηρός dry 6.1.1, 15.1.2
- αὐχμώδης hard, dry 15.1.3
- ἀφαιρέω to take from, take away
19.3.4, 22.3.4, 71.3.9
- ἀφανής humble, unremarkable
71.7.3, 71.7.7
- ἀφειδής disrespectful, merciless
3.2.2, 5.2.3, 7.1.1, 10.1.6, 10.2.2,
10.2.3, 10.5.6
- ἀφέλεια Simplicity (of style) 15.2.2,
15.2.4, 19.2.7, 19.2.7, 19.4.4,
19.4.5, 19.5.3, 20.3.3
- ἀφελής simple 15.2.2, 19.2.8,
19.4.2, 19.4.3, 19.4.4
- ἀφηγέομαι to give an account of
1.2.5, 3.6.6
- ἀφήγησις account 1.2.3
- ἀφηγητής one who reports, sum-
marises 11.2.2
- ἀφθόνως freely, generously 5.2.6
- ἀφικνέομαι to arrive 14.2.3
- ἀφιλόσοφος inhuman, unpleasant
8.1.4, 17.3.2
- ἀφιλόσοφος unphilosophical 25.1.2
- ἀφίσταμαι to refrain from, lose 81,
6.2.7, 6.2.7, 12.2.2, 24.1.2
- ἀφορμή cause, ground, pretext 1.3.4,
3.1.8, 3.7.9, 7.3.1, 11.2.2, 12.5.7,
13.2.3, 16.3.3, 23.2.3, 23.3.2
- ἀφρόντιστος careless; not caring
about, *c. gen.* 15.3.2, 16.4.5,
18.4.2, 20.4.4
- ἀφυής untalented 10.2.4, 71.11.3
- ἄφυκτος inescapable, unerring 3.5.3,
5.1.3, 6.4.2, 11.1.3
- ἄφωνία silence, impossibility of
speech 1.3.1, 1.3.7
- ἀχάριστος ungrateful 10.5.6
- ἄχθομαι to be annoyed, grieved, dis-
gusted 1.3.2, 4.2.4, 6.2.5, 6.2.9,
9.3.6
- ἄχρηστία uselessness 1.1.5
- ἄχρι until 7.2.4, 12.5.2
- ἄχώριστος inseparable 3.6.4
- βαδίζω to proceed 15.4.2
- βάθος depth 8.1.2, 8.3.6, 10.5.3,
14.4.2, 71.9.3
- βαθύς deep 16.3.3, 20.2.5, 22.2.4,
71.7.8
- βακχεύω to celebrate 18.5.5
- βάλλω to throw, shoot 12.3.5,
22.2.1, 23.1.5, 23.1.5
- βάπτω to dip 71.10.3
- βάρβαρος barbarian 7.2.4, 10.5.5,
12.4.3, 22.1.2, 22.1.2, 22.1.2,
22.2.1, 22.2.6
- βασανίζω to judge 71.3.2
- βάσανος precept 71.12.5

- βασιλεία domination, monarchy 98, 3.7.4
 βασιλεύς king 36, 82, 83, 107, 2.3.1, 2.3.4, 3.1.3, 16.2.6
 βασιλεύω to rule 107
 βασιλικός royal, imperial 2.3.8; ὁ Βασιλικός (sc. λόγος): *see Index of Greek names*
 βάσις clausula 15.4.3
 βασκαίνω to be envious 57, 5.1.2, 11.1.1
 βασκανία envy, malice 3.5.6, 4.2.4, 4.6.4, 5.1.2, 9.1.8, 11.1.1, 71.6.3, 71.7.3
 βάσκανος malicious 8.1.2
 βαφή dye, colour 17.1.4, 26.2.8
 βδελυρός villainous 71.6.5
 βέβαιος certain 3.6.7
 βεβαίωτης stability 7.4.3
 βεβαίωω to confirm 6.4.3, 6.4.3
 βεβηκώς stable 22.3.1
 βέβηλος uninitiated 15.2.3
 βέλος arrow 8.1.2
 βελτιώω to improve 10.1.2
 βέλτιστος best 30, 1.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.3, 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.6, 3.6.4, 4.2.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.1, 6.1.4, 6.2.5, 6.3.5, 6.4.3, 9.1.7, 9.2.5, 10.1.3, 10.2.2, 10.4.6, 11.1.7, 12.1.3, 12.3.6, 12.7.5, 18.2.1, 18.3.1, 18.5.1, 18.5.2, 19.2.4, 19.3.5, 19.5.1, 19.5.4, 19.5.6, 20.1.5, 22.2.3, 25.1.5, 71.2.4, 71.6.7, 71.8.3, 71.12.1, 71.12.8
 βελτίων better 40, 1.2.8, 2.1.3, 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 3.5.7, 4.2.2, 4.6.2, 6.4.6, 9.1.3, 9.2.4, 9.3.3, 10.1.3, 10.3.7, 12.2.1, 12.2.6, 12.4.2, 17.1.3, 18.5.3, 19.5.5, 20.1.3, 21.1.5, 21.2.2, 21.2.7, 22.1.1, 23.1.4, 23.3.3, 24.1.4, 24.3.1, 71.11.4
 βελτίωσις advantage, improvement 4.1.3, 5.1.5, 5.3.8
 βία exertion 18.3.2
 βιάζω to strive 12.5.7
 βιβλίον book 21, 21, 3.6.1, 3.6.7, 3.7.5, 3.7.7, 12.6.8, 17.3.4, 17.4.3, 18.5.6, 19.1.2, 19.3.6, 19.5.2, 20.1.3, 20.2.4, 21 title, 21 title, 21.1.1, 21.1.1, 21.1.2, 21.1.3, 22.1.1, 24.1.3, 25.1.5, 25.1.8
 βίος (75) life
 βιοτεύω to live 1.1.4, 1.3.5, 2.2.1, 71.3.1
 βιοτή life 4.5.3, 9.1.5
 βίωτος life 115, 2.3.4, 3.7.3, 6.1.2, 22.2.4, 22.3.4
 βιώω to live 34, 48, 72, 74, 75, 1.1.3, 1.3.7, 6.1.3, 7.2.1, 8.2.6, 19.5.3, 22.2.5, 71.3.2, 71.4.4, 71.7.8
 βίωσις life, existence, way of life 3.7.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.9, 6.3.3, 6.3.5
 βιωφέστατος useful in life 63, 2.3.1, 12.6.4, 13.4.1, 24.2.4
 βλασφημέω to slander 10.1.6, 10.5.1
 βλασφημία blasphemy 7.4.8
 βλέπω to look, *see* 10.2.5, 10.2.5, 12.7.4, 71.9.2
 βοήθεια help 13.2.7
 βοσκηματώδης like a beast 9.1.6
 βουλευτήριον courthouse 4.4.1, 24.1.5
 βουλευτής councillor, judge 8.3.4, 11.1.6
 βουλευτικός advisory, deliberative 20.3.1
 βούλησις will, intention 3.6.6, 9.2.4, 9.3.6
 βούλομαι (52) to wish
 βραχύς short, brief 93, 5.3.2, 6.1.7, 10.5.1, 12.3.5, 12.4.2, 13.1.1, 13.4.8, 16.3.1, 17.2.7, 18.4.1, 19.2.7, 71.10.4
 βροντώδης thundering 15.3.1
 βρῶω to teem, abound 20.2.5
 γαλήνη calm, serenity 45, 60, 15.3.1
 γαληνός calm 18.3.2, 20.3.2
 γαμητέον one must marry 76
 γεηπονία agriculture 14.2.6
 γείτων neighbour 71.7.4
 γέλως ridicule 1.2.8, 3.3.3, 11.2.5
 γένεσις birth, creation, genesis 3.5.2, 7.3.1, 7.3.4, 7.4.2, 22.3.3, 23.2.2
 γεν(ν)ητός begotten, created 91

- γενναῖος noble 4.6.2, 26.1.1, 71.5.5, 71.7.7
- γεννικός noble, admirable 21.2.1, 21.2.4, 71.12.2
- γεννικῶς nobly, admirably, vigorously, drastically 3.6.1, 4.4.2, 4.5.5, 7.2.3, 7.4.7, 10.5.4, 12.6.2, 71.8.8
- γεν(ν)ικῶς generally 19.2.7
- γένος race, descent, nation 6.2.1, 7.2.1, 7.2.4, 14.2.4, 17.2.4, 19.5.3, 22.1.3, 22.1.3
- γεωμετρία geometry 5.3.7, 13.1.3, 13.2.5, 13.3.3, 14.2.6, 14.2.7, 14.2.9, 14.2.9, 14.4.1, 14.4.5
- γεωμετρικός geometrical 70, 14.2.6, 14.5.1
- γῆ earth 7.1.3, 7.2.5, 18.2.9
- γί(γ)νομαι (51) to become
- γιγνώσκω to know 7.2.4
- γλυκάζω to be sweet 19.2.8
- γλυκυθυμία sweetness of mind 4.1.4
- γλυκύτης Sweetness (of style) 15.3.3, 19.2.7
- γλῶττα (52) tongue, language
- γνήσιος genuine, true-born, noble 8.3.2, 13.4.2, 16.2.3, 18.2.1, 19.3.8
- γνώματευμα idea 1.3.6
- γνώμη mind, thought, belief, maxim 56, 113, 4.2.3, 5.1.4, 6.2.2, 6.3.5, 7.1.1, 9.2.3, 9.3.5, 10.2.3, 11.1.4, 12.7.1, 16.2.6, 19.3.2, 20.2.5, 25.1.2, 71.5.1, 71.6.5, 71.7.2, 71.7.5
- γνώμων knowledgeable, expert 3.3.5, 3.6.4, 4.5.1, 5.1.1, 7.4.4, 11.1.7, 13.4.4
- γνώριμος well-known 18.4.2
- γνώσις knowledge 12.5.7
- γνωστικός having to do with knowledge, expert 5.4.3, 13.2.1, 14.3.2, 71.3.1
- γοητεύω to enchant 19.3.2
- γόνιμος fruitful, productive 2.1.9, 15.1.3, 18.2.1, 18.5.4, 19.2.4, 19.3.2, 20.3.1
- γοργός rapid (of style) 16.4.4
- γοργότης Rapidity (of style) 20.3.4, 71.9.8
- γράμμα (*pl.*) writing 1.2.2, 7.1.4, 14.2.4, 16.3.2
- γραμματικός grammatical 2.1.8, 18.4.4, 71.12.5
- γραφικός painted 26.2.8
- γυμνάζω to model 19.5.2
- δαίς meal (Hom.) 1.3.3
- δακτυλικός dactylic 15.4.3
- δαψιλής abundant 20.2.5
- δέδοικα to fear 3.2.5
- δείγμα proof 12.1.1, 20.1.2
- δείκνυμι, δεικνύω to show 3.2.1, 3.7.6, 3.7.7, 5.3.5, 10.2.4, 10.4.4, 10.5.2, 12.1.5, 18.4.4, 18.5.4, 20.2.4, 20.3.1, 25.1.5, 71.11.2
- δεινός fierce, forceful, bad 6.4.6, 19.4.2, 71.3.9
- δεινότης Force, a forceful style 8.3.6, 15.2.2, 15.4.1, 18.3.4, 19.4.5, 20.3.3, 21.1.6; *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος*; see *Index of Greek names*
- δείνωσις exaggeration 71.9.2
- δέκα ten 22.2.2, 22.2.2
- δεκάκις ten times 10.1.4
- δέος fear 9.1.2
- δεσμός bond 2.2.4, 6.1.4
- δεσποτεία power, mastery 3.7.4, 18.5.5
- δεσπότης ruler, despot 102, 9.1.2
- δεσποτικός authoritative 9.3.7
- δεῦρο until now, hitherto 7.2.4, 20.1.5, 24.1.2
- δευσοποιός deeply dyed 17.1.4
- δεύτερος second 107, 3.3.6, 3.5.8, 10.5.4, 12.1.4, 12.2.1, 12.5.2, 12.5.4, 14.3.4, 14.4.6, 18.1.3, 18.5.4, 19.1.1, 19.2.2, 19.2.5, 19.3.1, 19.3.3, 21.1.2, 24.3.3, 26.1.3, 71.2.3, 71.2.7
- δέω to need 1.3.3
- δέχομαι to receive 4.2.3
- δέω to tie 2.2.3, 2.2.3
- δέω to need, (impers.) it is necessary 119, 1.2.8, 2.3.6, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 7.4.6, 10.4.5, 10.5.5, 12.2.5, 12.5.4,

- 13.2.4, 14.4.6, 16.2.3, 18.2.9,
19.5.1, 19.5.2, 20.4.1, 24.3.2,
25.1.5, 26.1.5, 71.2.4, 71.8.4,
71.8.7
- δή (192) (emphatic particle)
- δηγματώδης biting 8.1.4
- δῆθεν really 4.1.1, 26.2.8
- δηλαδή clearly, namely 18.2.3,
19.5.1, 22.1.3, 71.12.5
- δηλονότι which is to say 19.2.5
- δηλοποιέω to disclose 3.6.6
- δῆλος (55) clear, obvious
- δήλωσις disclosure 71.9.3
- δημηγορία speech 15.4.1
- δημηγορικός that has to do with public speaking 20.3.1
- δημιουργέω to invent 2.2.4
- δημιούργημα invention 2.2.3
- δημοκρατία democracy 96
- δήποτε (particle) 19.1.1
- δήπου (particle) 11.1.4, 15.3.2
- δῆτα certainly 3.3.5, 4.5.3, 5.4.1,
6.4.5, 11.2.1, 12.1.1, 13.2.8, 13.3.3,
14.1.3, 14.1.3, 14.2.8, 15.3.3,
18.2.8, 20.1.7, 24.1.4, 24.2.1,
26.1.7, 71.8.5
- διά (112) through
- διαβάλλω to repudiate 71.5.5
- διαβιώω to live through 20.4.3
- διαγγέλλω to declare, reveal 9.3.2,
26.1.2
- διαγίγνομαι to continue 7.2.1,
12.1.3, 14.3.2, 20.4.2
- διαδείκνυμι to show, present 18.2.2
- διαδέχομαι to take up, succeed
5.3.3, 7.2.3, 12.4.3, 13.4.1
- διαδιδράσκω to elude 3.2.3
- διαδοχή succession 3.5.4, 12.7.1
- διάδοχος successor, follower 7.3.3,
12.4.5, 12.6.2, 13.1.1
- διάθεσις disposition 2.1.8, 3.5.6,
4.1.4, 6.2.4, 6.2.8, 13.2.10, 18.3.4,
18.4.3, 19.1.3, 19.2.6, 19.4.1,
26.2.4, 71.9.9, 71.12.5
- διαίρεσις division 3.5.2, 11.2.5,
13.2.2, 13.2.6, 13.2.8
- διαίρω to dissect, treat separately,
divide, distinguish, analyse 11.2.3,
14.1.3, 18.5.1, 71.11.5, 71.11.7,
71.12.6
- διαίρω to exalt 19.2.5, 19.2.6,
20.3.2, 71.11.2
- διακονικῶς as a help 26.1.3
- διάκονος servant 11.1.6
- διαλαμβάνω to analyse 3.6.5
- διαλέγομαι to write a dialogue 8.3.1,
20.1.4
- διάλεκτος language 22.2.1
- διαλλακτής mediator 18.5.3
- διάλογος dialogue 24, 24 title,
24.1.3, 24.2.1, 25.1.3, 25.2.1,
25.2.1
- διάλυτος dissolvable 2.2.5
- διαμαρτάνω to miss the mark
23.2.3
- διαμάχη struggle 25.1.1
- διανοητικός theoretical 13.3.5
- διάνοια thought, idea, mind, cogitation,
reason, content 3.4.4, 5.1.4,
9.3.4, 13.2.3, 18.2.1, 22.3.4, 26.1.2,
26.1.4, 71.5.4, 71.8.8, 71.9.1,
71.9.3, 71.9.4, 71.12.4, 71.12.5
- διάπλασις shag 15.1.2
- διαπλάττω to shape 17.2.1
- διαρκής sufficient, satisfactory, enduring
112, 2.1.6, 5.1.4, 5.4.3,
9.2.2, 9.3.5, 9.3.7, 10.4.8, 14.1.4
- διαστέλλω to set apart 23.3.5
- διασώζω to save 20.4.1
- διατάττω to instruct 21.1.6
- διατίθημι to write, compose, arrange
17.1.3, 18.2.4, 18.4.1, 19.2.7
- διατοῦτο for that reason 12.1.2,
12.2.2
- διατριβή passing of life 64, 6.1.1,
6.1.5, 6.2.9
- διατρίβω to spend one's time; continue
80, 12.3.1, 14.2.3, 14.3.2,
14.5.7, 23.3.2
- δίαιλος double race 24.1.4
- διαφέρω to differ 71.8.3, 71.11.4
- διαφορά *pl.* species; different schools
12.6.2
- διάφορος different, various 50, 1.2.4,
1.2.4, 2.2.4, 12.4.5, 12.7.1, 12.7.1,
13.2.11, 13.2.11, 17.3.3, 19.1.2,

- 21.1.5, 22.2.2, 23.1.6, 23.2.5,
23.3.1, 71.8.3
- διδασκαλία teaching, instruction
11.2.1, 21.1.5
- διδασκαλικός having to do with
teaching 2.1.7, 21.1.6
- διδάσκαλος teacher 21.1.1, 25.1.5,
71.5.2, 71.5.3, 71.7.1
- διδάσκω to teach 10.5.1
- δίδωμι to give 61, 1.1.5, 1.2.2, 3.1.3,
3.1.8, 3.7.1, 3.7.3, 3.7.9, 5.2.2,
5.3.2, 5.3.6, 5.3.9, 7.3.1, 10.2.1,
10.5.1, 10.5.2, 10.5.3, 11.1.3,
14.5.6, 16.3.1, 22.3.3, 23.1.1,
24.3.3, 26.2.1, 71.7.4; Δεδομένα:
see Index of Greek names
- διειδήs clear 15.1.4
- διέξιμι to describe, write about
11.1.2, 15.2.5, 71.12.1, 71.12.7,
71.12.8
- διερμηνεύς interpreter 9.3.7, 12.7.4
- διερμηνεύω to explain 9.3.1
- δικνέομαι to arrive 20.2.5
- δίκαια, τά laws 7.1.6, 9.3.3
- δίκαιος appropriate, just, justified
3.2.2, 3.3.4, 3.6.2, 3.6.3, 5.3.1,
5.4.6, 7.1.5, 7.1.6, 8.2.7, 9.3.3,
10.1.5, 10.2.2, 10.3.5, 10.4.9,
11.1.4, 14.2.6, 14.4.6, 14.5.6,
15.1.1, 16.1.7, 17.2.8, 17.3.3,
18.3.6, 19.1.3, 23.1.4, 23.3.4,
23.3.5, 24.2.4, 24.3.1, 24.3.3,
25.2.1, 25.2.5, 71.12.7, 71.12.7
- δικαστήριον law-court 5.2.4, 16.1.6,
24.1.5, 24.2.3
- δικαστικός judicial (genre) 20.3.1
- δίκη duly, rightly 65
- διοικέω to handle, organise 2.3.3,
6.3.5, 11.1.3, 15.4.1, 18.2.8, 20.3.3
- διοικήσιs organisation, arrangement
2.3.8, 9.2.3, 15.2.1, 16.4.3, 19.1.4,
19.4.6, 71.9.8
- δίόλου always 22.3.3, 24.1.4, 25.2.1
- διπλός twofold, double 3.1.6,
22.2.3, 22.2.3
- δίδς twice 6.1.7, 10.1.4
- δίυγρος moist 15.1.2
- δίχα without 3.2.4, 15.1.3, 71.7.3
- διώκω to pursue 14.5.5
- δόγμα belief, faith, doctrine 65, 109,
4.6.3, 7.1.1, 7.2.4, 7.3.2, 17.3.3,
18.3.1, 21.2.5, 23.1.4, 23.3.1,
26.2.4, 71.3.4, 71.6.5, 71.8.3
- δογματίζω to formulate doctrines
3.2.3
- δογματικός having to do with meta-
physics, theoretical 16.1.3, 16.1.6,
18.5.5, 71.3.3, 71.3.5
- δοκέω (87) to think, suppose; seem
- δοκιμάζω to approve, harbour a view;
think fit; test 3.3.7, 9.1.2, 11.1.5,
71.6.7, 71.7.1
- δόκιμος honourable; famous 1.1.2,
18.1.3, 19.5.1, 23.1.2, 71.12.2
- δόλος deceit 3.1.4, 15.2.2
- δόξα opinion; fame, glory; appear-
ance 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.2, 4.1.3,
4.3.1, 4.5.3, 4.6.4, 5.2.3, 5.3.1,
7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.4.7, 10.2.6, 12.7.1,
16.2.6, 20.2.3, 23.1.6, 23.2.5,
26.2.6, 71.7.3
- δοξοσοφέω to pretend to wisdom
5.4.1
- δοξοσοφία appearance of wisdom,
intellectual vanity 4, 5, 3.1.9, 4
title, 4.3.1, 4.5.6, 5 title, 5.2.2, 5.3.1,
5.4.2
- δοτέον one must give 83, 3.1.9
- δουλαγωγία enslavement 4.4.1
- δράμα drama 8.1.3, 19.5.3, 20.1.6,
20.3.3
- δραστήριος active 19.2.3
- δραστικός productive 5.1.3, 18.1.1
- δράω to do 1.3.3, 2.3.3, 9.3.6
- δρμύς sharp, bitter; subtle 7.1.8,
7.4.1, 12.4.5, 18.3.6, 71.10.3
- δρόμος course, flow; career, field
15.3.2, 16.1.6, 16.4.4, 17.1.2,
17.3.3, 18.3.2, 18.4.3, 19.2.8,
24.1.2
- δύναμαι to be able to 1.1.1, 1.1.6,
4.2.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.2, 4.5.2, 4.5.3,
5.3.7, 7.3.4, 9.1.1, 9.1.5, 13.4.7,
15.2.3, 19.2.8, 19.4.3, 25.1.7,
71.2.5, 71.8.8

- δύναμις power, ability 9.2.4, 10.1.2,
 13.3.1, 71.11.3, 71.11.7
 δυναστεία domination, oppression
 71.5.4
 δυνατός possible 1.1.5
 δύο two 10.1.4, 22.2.2, 22.2.2
 (*) δυσαγωγός in a manner poorly
 guided (= ἀναγωγός) 71.2.2
 δυσαντίβλεπτος awesome; difficult
 to oppose 3.7.9, 12.2.2
 δυσδιόδευτος difficult to penetrate
 17.2.7
 δυσέντευκτος difficult to read 17.2.7
 δύσνοια ill-will 8.1.2, 8.2.8, 8.3.6
 δυσξύμβλητος unintelligent 71.2.2
 δυσόδευτος difficult 3.5.8
 δυσπράγημα misfortune 67
 δυστέκμαρτος difficult to discern
 23.1.5
 δυστυχέω to be unfortunate 1.3.1,
 9.3.5
 δυστύχημα mistake 10.3.2, 10.4.2
 δυστυχής awkward, unsuccessful
 3.5.6, 10.1.4
 δυστυχία misfortune 1.3.7
 δυσχέρεια awkwardness, difficulty
 1.3.7, 3.3.7
 δυσχερής difficult 48
 δυσωπέω to be considerate 9.1.4
 δυσωπία consideration 9.1.4
 δωρεά gift 13.4.2, 20.4.4
 δῶρον gift 2.2.5, 6.3.5

 ἑαυτοῦ (95) of himself, herself, itself
 ἑάω to leave aside 14.3.3
 ἐγγίγνομαι to occur 2.1.4
 ἐγγυμνάζω to apply, follow 71.12.5
 ἐγγύς near, recent 2.3.2, 5.1.2, 5.1.3,
 12.1.1, 14.3.2, 14.5.4, 15.1.4,
 19.5.1, 20.2.2, 71.7.3
 ἐγκύπτω to look into 24.2.1
 ἐγκαράττω to engrave 2.1.7
 ἐγχειρέω to undertake 2.1.3, 20.1.2
 ἐγώ I 1.1.3, 1.3.2, 1.3.5, 1.3.6, 3.1.1,
 3.1.1, 5.1.7, 6.4.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.2,
 7.1.7, 8.2.1, 9.3.7, 10.4.6, 10.4.6,
 11.1.6, 12.4.1, 14.5.1, 15.1.1,
 17.1.1, 18.3.7, 18.5.7, 71.2.7,
 71.3.9, 71.4.1, 71.5.1, 71.7.7,
 71.8.1
 ἔγωγε I for my part 1.1.4, 1.3.2,
 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 5.1.1, 5.1.5, 5.1.7,
 5.1.7, 6.4.1, 7.2.1, 7.2.6, 7.4.8,
 8.2.2, 8.2.7, 9.3.6, 10.2.2, 11.1.1,
 17.1.3, 19.2.1, 19.3.4, 20.1.3,
 20.2.1, 21.1.1
 ἐδράζω to confirm 2.1.2
 ἐθίζομαι to be or become accustomed
 to 6.2.6, 6.2.7, 6.3.5, 6.4.1, 8.2.3
 ἔθιμος accustomed, usual 6.2.7,
 12.5.7, 17.2.5, 17.2.7, 17.3.5,
 18.4.1, 18.4.3, 19.2.6
 ἔθνος people, nation 101, 102, 7.2.5,
 14.2.10, 16.1.9, 71.8.2
 ἔθος custom, habit 33, 41, 3.6.1,
 6.2.8, 6.2.9, 6.3.1, 6.3.3, 6.3.4,
 6.4.2, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.3, 6.4.3,
 6.4.5, 6.4.5, 6.4.5, 6.4.6, 12.7.5,
 16.4.2, 17.1.2, 17.1.4, 18.4.4,
 19.4.3, 21.2.5, 24.1.2, 71.9.1
 ἔθω to be accustomed 67, 19.2.8,
 19.3.7, 20.1.5, 24.3.1
 εἰ (141) if
 εἰδησις knowledge 71.4.1
 εἶδον to see 2.3.7, 3.6.4
 εἶδος kind, sort 70, 3.5.2, 4.1.3,
 4.3.4, 4.6.2, 7.3.2, 11.2.5, 18.1.1,
 18.5.8, 20.2.2, 71.2.1, 71.3.8,
 71.8.3
 εἶθε (particle of wishing) 21.2.3
 εικάζω to liken to, refer to 45,
 26.2.8
 εικονίζω to compare 3.7.5
 εἰκός likely, reasonable 3.2.4
 εἰκός, εἰκότα what is probable, rea-
 sonable 3.5.5, 3.6.1, 7.1.6, 9.3.3,
 10.3.2, 18.4.4, 23.3.3, 71.1.3
 εἶμι to go 15.1.4
 εἰμί (471) to be
 εἶπερ if indeed 2.1.6, 2.2.5, 10.3.6,
 12.6.4
 εἶπον (51) to speak, say
 εἰρηναῖος peaceful 22.3.1
 εἰρήνη peace 77, 22.2.4
 εἰρηνικός having to do with peace
 2.3.8

- ἐλευθερία freedom; liberality 4.5.4, 5.2.5, 8.1.2, 71.5.4
 ἐλευθέριος acting like a free-born man, liberal 26.1.1, 71.10.5
 ἐλευθεριότης liberality, frankness 3.1.9, 15.2.4
 ἐλεύθερος free, liberated 26.1.4
 ἐλευθερώ to free 4.2.2
 ἔλκω to draw, drag 3.1.8, 6.2.3
 Ἑλληνοδίκης judge at the Olympic games 71.4.6
 ἐλλόγιμος illustrious; scholar, intellectual 3.1.5, 10.2.5, 13.4.1, 16.3.1, 18.1.3
 ἐλπίς hope 63, 3.4.3, 21.1.3, 21.1.7, 21.2.1, 21.2.2, 21.2.3, 21.2.4, 21.2.5, 21.2.7
 ἐμαυτοῦ (of) myself 1.3.5, 3.1.1, 3.1.1, 9.3.6, 9.3.6, 11.1.2
 ἁρμονική harmonious 13.2.2
 ἐμπαρέχω to offer 7.4.2, 7.4.5
 ἐπίπτω to fall upon, meet, throw oneself into 62, 2.2.1, 12.6.5, 17.2.1, 17.3.2, 19.5.1
 ἐπιποιέω to create in 3.4.2, 20.1.4, 71.9.9
 ἐπολιτεύω to be a citizen 16.2.3
 ἐπομπεύω to make someone walk in procession 7.1.5
 ἐμπορεύομαι to import 71.8.7
 ἐμφαίνω to display 18.2.8
 ἐμφανής clear, visible 18.4.2, 21.2.1
 ἐμφαντικῶς clearly 71.10.3
 ἐμφορής similar 19.1.4, 19.3.2
 ἔμψυχος living 71.10.1
 ἐν (309) in
 ἐνάγω to lead to 13.2.3
 ἐνακμάζω to flourish 5.3.4
 ἐναλλαγή variation 71.9.8
 ἐναντιολογέω to contradict 54
 ἐναντιολογία contradiction 22.1.3, 22.3.3, 23.2.3
 *ἐναντιοπραγία reversal of fortune 91
 ἐναντίος opposite, opposing 53, 66, 3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.1.7, 3.7.3, 3.7.9, 4.2.4, 6.2.9, 6.2.9, 6.3.4, 7.4.2, 7.4.4, 17.1.3, 17.3.2, 19.2.6, 19.2.8, 19.4.1, 19.5.6, 22.1.2, 22.3.3, 23.1.1, 23.1.2, 23.1.6, 23.1.6, 23.2.1, 23.2.3, 23.2.5, 25.1.3, 25.1.7, 25.1.8, 25.1.9, 25.2.5, 25.2.5, 71.3.4, 71.5.3, 71.6.5, 71.6.7
 ἐναντιότης opposition 25.1.5
 ἐναντιῶ to be in opposition 61
 ἐναποτίθεμαι to store up 71.12.4
 ἐναργής clear 71.11.4
 ἐναριθμῖος counted among 16.2.3, 18.1.3
 ἐνδεής deficient, inadequate 14.3.2, 71.12.4
 ἐνδείκνυμι to show 14.4.2
 ἐνδέχομαι to admit 11.1.4
 ἔνδον within 9.2.3, 9.3.2, 9.3.4, 9.3.5, 26.1.4
 ἔνδοξος famous 16.1.9
 ἔνειμι to be present in 5.2.6, 71.3.8
 ἔνεστι, ἐνι it is possible 39, 4.4.2, 5.2.6, 12.3.4, 12.3.6, 13.4.5, 71.8.6
 ἔνεκα (ἔνεκεν, εἵνεκα) on account of, regarding 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 8.1.4, 14.4.6, 21.2.3, 71.8.6
 ἐνέργεια activity, actuality 51, 3.7.4, 6.3.1, 9.2.3, 25.1.4, 26.1.2
 ἐνεργέω to deal with 18.2.9
 ἐνέργημα result of activity 26.2.5
 ἐνεργής active, working 18.2.1
 ἐνεργός active, working 18.3.1, 18.3.2, 71.9.3, 71.10.3
 ἐνευδοκίμῶ to be famous 16.2.1
 ἐνθάδε here 4.6.1
 ἐνιδρώ to labour hard in 16.2.2
 ἔνιοι some 49, 57, 65, 9.3.3, 15.2.3, 16.1.1, 20.1.5
 ἐνίστε sometimes 1.3.5, 2.3.3, 9.1.4, 9.2.4, 9.3.3, 19.3.6, 19.3.7, 71.10.2, 71.11.2
 ἐννοέω to consider, think, reflect 5.1.4, 9.2.1, 11.1.1, 12.1.2, 13.3.1, 71.7.1, 71.7.7
 ἐννόημα thought, concept, notion 19.3.5, 19.4.3, 20.3.2
 ἐννόησις thought, consideration 19.4.6

- ἔννοια thought, cogitation 16.4.1,
 17.1.1, 19.2.6
 *ἔννοσέω to fall ill 1.1.2
 ἐνοειδής single, uniform 7.4.4,
 23.2.4
 ἐνοράω to see in 8.2.1
 ἐνούσιος inherent 26.2.6
 ἐνσκευάζω to prepare 1.2.5
 ἔνστασις origin, institution; lifestyle
 19.1.4, 19.3.5, 23.1.6,
 ἐνσχολλάω to study 18.5.7
 ἐνταῦθα (60) here
 ἐντελέχεια actuality 3.7.2
 ἐντελής perfect 5.1.1, 7.4.3, 10.3.1,
 10.3.4, 11.1.6, 11.2.1, 11.2.5,
 12.1.3, 12.3.4, 12.5.3
 ἐντεῦθεν from there, thence, therefore
 105, 1.2.6, 2.1.9, 2.2.2, 3.7.8, 4.1.2,
 5.1.2, 6.4.5, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 8.3.1,
 12.2.5, 13.2.5, 13.2.11, 13.4.8,
 14.2.7, 15.1.2, 17.3.2, 17.4.1,
 17.4.2, 18.2.1, 18.2.2, 19.5.4,
 20.3.3, 26.2.2, 71.5.4, 71.8.5,
 71.11.3
 ἐντευξίς meeting, encounter 13.2.7,
 13.2.9, 16.3.3
 ἔντεχνος artificial 18.3.6
 ἐντολή instruction 21.1.6
 ἐντός within, inside 3.3.7, 5.2.4
 ἐντρέχεια swiftness 20.3.4
 ἐντυγχάνω to meet with, read 3.1.4,
 4.5.6, 5.1.4, 5.2.2, 5.3.7, 8.1.1,
 8.2.5, 8.2.7, 8.3.7, 11.1.4, 21.2.4,
 71.11.7
 ἐξάριετος remarkable, distinguished
 7.3.6, 11.2.1, 71.3.7, 71.4.5
 ἐξαιρέω to remove 5.1.6
 ἐξαιρώ to exalt, make expectant
 12.6.8, 19.4.3, 21.1.3, 24.3.1
 ἐξανάγκης by necessity 3.7.2, 3.7.8,
 14.2.6, 15.2.5
 ἐξανύτω to continue, finish 6.1.9
 ἐξαρχῆς from the beginning 14, 53,
 119, 6.2.4, 7.2.1, 14.2.4, 14.2.8,
 14.3.2, 18.2.5
 ἔξιμι (ιέναι) to quit, leave 18.4.2
 ἐξεπιπολῆς on the surface, superficial
 8.1.3, 14.4.2
 ἐξεργάζομαι to work out 5.3.4
 ἔξεστι(ν) it is allowed, possible 75,
 2.2.2, 5.4.5, 6.3.5, 9.1.1, 10.4.7,
 11.2.6, 11.2.7, 12.1.2, 12.2.1,
 12.2.2, 12.4.1, 12.5.3, 13.3.3,
 13.3.6, 14.1.3, 14.2.5, 19.3.7,
 25.1.5, 71.1.3, 71.9.3, 71.11.6
 ἐξετάζω to examine 1.1.4, 12.2.6,
 17.3.1
 ἐξέτασις examination, investigation
 3.1.5, 3.5.8, 11.1.3, 21.1.5
 ἐξηγητής interpreter, guide 12.7.4
 ἐξῆς in order, following 108, 1.3.7,
 2.3.7, 3.2.4, 3.5.2, 3.6.2, 3.6.4,
 4.2.5, 5.2.3, 5.3.3, 7.1.1, 7.3.3,
 8.1.4, 8.2.4, 9.2.1, 10.1.6, 10.2.3,
 10.2.6, 10.3.3, 10.4.6, 10.5.1,
 11.2.2, 11.2.4, 11.2.5, 12.2.6,
 12.5.3, 13.3.6, 13.4.4, 14.3.2,
 20.1.5, 21.1.2, 21.2.1
 ἔξις possession; conduct; state; skill,
 knowledge 2.1.7, 2.1.9, 6.2.7,
 6.2.9, 6.3.1, 7.4.6, 13.2.7, 13.3.2,
 13.3.5, 13.4.8, 14.1.2, 14.5.1,
 14.5.4, 15.4.1, 18.3.3, 18.4.2,
 19.1.2, 22.1.1, 22.1.2, 22.1.3,
 22.2.6, 26.2.5, 71.11.1, 71.11.3,
 71.3.6, 71.6.2, 71.12.4
 ἐξίσταμαι to stand aside from 5.2.5,
 6.2.8
 ἐξορθοῦ straightforwardly 24.1.2
 ἐξοριστέον one must dismiss 1.1.5
 ἔξω outside 61, 1.3.2, 1.3.5, 5.1.2,
 7.1.6, 8.3.7, 9.2.1, 9.2.3, 9.3.4,
 11.1.4, 11.2.3, 13.2.4, 13.4.8,
 14.4.2, 15.2.3, 15.3.1, 16.1.2,
 16.4.6, 18.2.2, 18.2.4, 18.2.5,
 18.3.5, 18.4.5, 18.5.4, 18.5.8,
 20.1.7, 20.2.5, 22.3.5, 23.3.3,
 24.3.2, 24.3.3, 24.3.4, 25.1.8,
 25.2.5, 26.1.2, 26.1.4, 71.6.3,
 71.9.2, 71.10.1
 ἔξωθεν from outside, external, secular
 1.2.1, 4.1.4, 4.5.3, 5.2.5, 9.1.1,
 9.2.1, 26.1.1, 26.2.2, 71.9.1, 71.9.6,
 71.9.7, 71.11.3
 ἐξωθέω to force out 71.3.9

- ἔοικα to be like; to seem 92, 109,
 3.3.3, 3.5.7, 7.1.7, 7.4.3, 8.3.7,
 11.1.5, 12.3.6, 13.2.7, 13.3.4,
 14.1.5, 14.5.1, 14.5.5, 15.1.2,
 15.2.1, 16.1.3, 16.1.8, 16.2.1,
 17.1.2, 18.4.3, 19.2.1, 20.1.4,
 21.2.4, 25.1.4, 25.1.9, 71.2.1,
 71.4.2, 71.5.1
 ἐπαγγελία promise, undertaking
 21.1.7, 21.2.3, 21.2.7
 ἐπαγγέλλω to proclaim, promise
 12.5.2, 21.1.2
 ἐπάγγελμα promise 21.2.4
 ἐπάγω to add 2.1.5
 ἐπαγωγός conducive 6.4.1
 ἐπαινετός laudable; admired 18.3.3,
 71.10.4, 71.11.1
 ἐπαινέω to praise 4.4.4, 6.4.1,
 10.3.7, 10.4.5, 10.5.7, 15.1.1,
 16.1.7, 16.3.3, 17.2.8, 19.1.3,
 19.5.2, 19.5.5, 23.3.4
 ἔπαινος praise 49, 4.1.3, 71.12.7
 ἐπαίρω to exalt 16.4.1
 ἐπαίω to hear, understand 4.2.1,
 5.2.5, 6.2.3, 7.3.4, 7.4.3, 9.1.3,
 9.1.5, 9.3.2, 14.2.7, 14.2.9, 15.2.3,
 18.2.8, 18.4.5, 23.3.3
 ἐπαληθεύω to be genuine 8.3.2,
 15.4.2, 18.3.5
 ἐπαμφιέννυμι to envelop 3.6.5
 ἐπαμφοτερίζω to be ambiguous
 3.1.6, 3.2.6, 3.5.3, 7.4.2, 22.3.2,
 23.1.1
 ἐπανήκω to return 6.1.7
 ἐπανθέω to form a bloom on the sur-
 face 15.2.4, 18.3.7, 71.10.2
 ἐπάνθησμα decoration, ornament
 26.2.8
 ἐπανίσταμαι to object to, oppose
 4.6.3, 7.1.8, 10.2.1, 25.2.5
 ἐπαρκέω to be sufficient 2.1.9,
 71.12.6
 ἐπαφή perception 9.3.5
 ἐπαφρόδιτος graceful 20.3.2
 ἐπαχθής abominable 71.5.4
 ἐπεὶ for 10.4.7, 18.4.5, 26.2.3
 ἐπείγω to press; *med.* strive, be ag-
 gressive 52, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 4.1.3,
 4.3.4, 16.3.3, 18.2.5, 25.2.5, 71.8.6
 ἐπειδὴ when, since 7.2.3, 13.2.3
 ἔπειμι (ἰέναι) to come upon, ap-
 proach, occur to; come after 1.3.5,
 3.1.1, 5.1.7, 7.1.1, 12.2.3, 12.5.4,
 13.4.3, 16.4.3, 17.1.1, 19.2.1,
 19.2.2, 20.1.1 (?), 71.1.2, 71.11.3
 ἔπειμι (εἶναι) to belong in addition
 20.1.1
 ἔπειτα then, thereafter 3.6.2, 3.6.4,
 4.5.4, 6.1.7, 6.4.3, 8.1.4, 9.3.1,
 10.3.7, 10.4.6, 14.3.2, 14.4.3,
 19.3.6, 21.2.1, 21.2.5, 26.1.7
 ἐπέξειμι to attack; go through
 12.4.2, 71.8.4
 ἐπεξεργάζομαι to work out, elaborate
 71.3.6
 ἐπέχω to hinder, hold back 9.1.1,
 9.2.1
 ἐπῆλθον to occur; come later, follow
 1.3.5, 10.5.4, 19.2.2, 71.10.1
 ἐπηλυγάζω to cover, conceal 3.3.7,
 19.4.6
 ἐπηρεάζω to insult 10.5.2
 ἐπί (77) to, on
 ἐπιβάλλω to attempt, put one's hand
 to 9.3.4, 12.1.4, 12.2.3
 ἐπιβολή attempt, application, attitude
 19.3.2, 71.7.1, 71.7.4
 ἐπίβολος skilled, expert 71.11.5
 ἐπιβρέμω to thunder 15.3.1
 ἐπιγί(γ)νομαι to come after 13.4.4
 ἐπιγνωμοσύνη recognition 4.2.3
 ἐπιγνώμων acquainted with 11.2.2
 ἐπίγνωσις recognition, understanding
 6.2.2, 7.1.6
 ἐπιγραφή title 12.5.1
 ἐπιγράφω to entitle 21.1.1
 ἐπιδείκνυμι to show, display 35,
 1.2.9, 3.5.7, 5.2.6, 5.3.7, 7.4.7,
 13.4.8, 16.3.3, 16.4.3, 18.2.8,
 20.4.1, 71.3.5, 71.3.8, 71.4.2
 ἐπίδεικτικός for display, epideictic
 4.4.1
 ἐπίδειξις display 1.2.6, 11.2.2,
 14.4.4, 17.4.2, 71.7.7, 71.7.7

- ἐπίδηλος clear, manifest 5.4.1
 ἐπιδίδωμι to advance, improve 5.3.4
 ἐπίδοσις contribution 2.1.9
 ἐπιδρομή attack 71.9.8
 ἐπικειῶς reasonably 5.1.7, 6.1.6,
 8.2.3, 19.3.1, 25.2.3, 71.11.5
 ἐπιζητέω to search for 3.6.3
 ἐπικαλέω to call by surname or nick-
 name 115
 ἐπικαλλύνω to adorn 18.2.2
 ἐπικαλύπτω to conceal; overshadow
 10.4.2, 12.1.4
 ἐπικηρος dangerous 71.6.5
 ἐπικλυσίς flood 14.2.6
 ἐπικοσμέω to embellish further
 15.2.1, 26.2.8
 ἐπικρίνω to judge 71.5.1
 ἐπικρίσις judgement 71.3.2, 71.3.6
 ἐπικρύπτω to hide 3.2.3
 ἐπιλανθάνομαι to forget 21.1.7,
 21.1.7
 ἐπίλεκτος chosen, excellent 71.8.3
 ἐπιλογίζομαι to conclude, think out
 13.4.1, 14.2.5, 14.4.6
 ἐπιλογισμός conclusion, cogitation
 13.2.4, 13.2.7
 ἐπιμέλεια care, consideration, study,
 practice; Carefully Wrought Style
 76, 83, 111, 1.2.9, 2.1.8, 3.1.1, 5.4.1,
 9.2.4, 11.2.4, 12.1.3, 12.6.8, 13.2.1,
 14.1.5, 15.2.1, 15.2.6, 16.4.1,
 18.2.9, 19.4.3, 19.4.4, 19.5.2,
 24.2.4, 25.1.9, 26.1.3, 26.2.4,
 26.2.8, 71.3.2, 71.5.3, 71.9.4,
 71.10.5
 ἐπιμελέομαι to take care of, pursue
 4.2.3, 16.1.5, 16.4.2
 ἐπιμελής careful, painstaking, assidu-
 ous 118, 5.1.4, 5.3.4, 10.5.4,
 12.6.7, 13.1.1, 14.5.4, 15.3.3,
 15.4.1, 16.2.5, 17.2.1, 18.2.5,
 18.3.5, 19.1.2, 23.2.5, 24.2.1,
 24.2.1, 26.1.1, 26.2.3, 71.3.6
 ἐπιμελητέον one must devote oneself
 to 82, 84
 ἐπιμελητής craftsman, practitioner
 8.3.4, 25.1.1
 ἐπινοέω to think of 71.7.5
 ἐπίνοια thought, idea 15.2.5
 ἐπίπεδος plane 14.4.1
 ἐπιπλείστον mostly 26.2.5
 ἐπιπλήττω to rebuke 7.1.2
 ἐπιπλοκή complexity 16.4.4
 ἐπιπόθητος desired 6.1.2
 ἐπιποιέω to add 26.1.5
 ἐπιποίητος created, artificial 26.2.6,
 71.9.7
 ἐπιπόλαιος superficial 3.4.4, 6.3.1,
 26.2.6
 ἐπιπολῆς superficially 18.2.7; *see*
also ἐξεπιπολῆς
 ἐπιπονέω to elaborate 15.2.4
 ἐπιπρέπω to be appropriate, befit
 26.2.4, 71.10.5
 ἐπίπροσθεν before 5.2.5
 ἐπισημασία brief note 93
 ἐπισημεύομαι to observe, record
 20.1.1, 25.1.1
 ἐπισκέπτομαι to examine, observe
 5.3.6, 17.4.3, 19.2.1, 71.11.7
 ἐπίσκεψις investigation, inquiry
 14.4.1, 21.1.2, 21.1.4, 26.1.3
 ἐπισκοπέω to examine 7.3.2, 17.1.3,
 18.5.7
 ἐπιστήμη knowledge, science 14, 22,
 2.1.2, 7.2.6, 7.4.8, 11.2.6, 13.1.2,
 13.2.2, 13.2.4, 13.2.7, 13.3.1,
 13.3.2, 13.3.5, 13.4.2, 13.4.4,
 13.4.5, 14 title, 14.2.9, 14.2.10,
 14.3.2, 14.3.4, 14.4.2, 14.4.3,
 14.5.4, 14.5.5, 14.5.6, 14.5.7, 22 ti-
 tle, 22.1.2, 22.2.1, 22.3.4
 ἐπιστημονικός scientific 14.5.1,
 18.5.6
 ἐπιστήμων versed in 14.2.4
 ἐπιστολή letter 7.1.4
 ἐπιστόλιον letter 3.1.3
 ἐπιστρέφομαι to pay attention to,
 care about 18.2.4, 26.2.2
 ἐπιτειχισμός hindrance 51
 ἐπιτετημένως in an abridged manner
 1.3.5
 ἐπιτέχνησις technique, technical
 knowledge 20.2.5, 21.2.3
 ἐπιτήδειος useful, friendly, friend
 6.1.7, 9.1.4, 19.5.1, 19.5.5, 19.5.6

- ἐπίτηδες deliberately 3.1.1, 4.2.3,
 5.2.3, 17.2.5, 19.2.5, 19.4.3, 19.4.4,
 20.1.2, 20.3.3, 24.1.3, 25.1.7,
 25.1.9, 26.1.1
 ἐπιτήδευμα pursuit 14.3.2
 ἐπιτήδευσις pursuit, endeavour
 2.1.3, 4.3.2, 6.2.4, 15.2.2, 16.4.2,
 18.2.9, 19.4.2
 ἐπιτίθεμαι to attack; close 7.4.1,
 8.1.4, 10.5.5, 15.2.3
 ἐπιτιμάω to rebuke, censure 3.1.3,
 4.6.3, 5.4.3, 7.2.6, 11.2.5
 ἐπιτίμησις reproach 7.1.6
 ἐπιτιμητικός prone to criticise 71.6.1
 ἐπιτρέπω to be liberal (?) 18.3.7
 ἐπιτρέχω to run over 15.1.4
 ἐπίτριπτος accursed 10.4.3
 ἐπιτυγχανώ to attain to, discover, be
 successful 3.5.7, 6.2.2, 7.1.6
 ἐπιτυχής hitting the mark, successful
 3.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.5.7, 4.6.2, 5.2.3,
 5.4.3, 7.4.4, 7.4.8, 9.2.4, 9.3.3,
 10.3.4, 11.1.4, 11.1.6, 11.2.5,
 12.2.6, 14.3.2, 14.5.4, 14.5.7,
 15.4.1, 18.1.1, 20.3.1, 21.1.3,
 22.3.2
 ἐπιτυχία success 5.1.3
 ἐπιφαίνομαι to appear on the surface
 19.1.4
 ἐπιφέρω to add, contribute; *pass.* at-
 tack 8.1.2, 12.5.4
 ἐπιφόρημα dessert 1.3.4
 ἐπιφύομαι to fasten oneself upon, at-
 tack 8.3.6
 ἐπιχειρέω to argue 3.7.9, 19.1.3
 ἐπιχειρήσις attempt, reasoning
 19.3.5, 71.6.5
 ἐπίχρειον what is necessary 2.3.1,
 12.6.4, 71.7.8
 ἔπομαι to follow 3.3.3, 3.4.4, 3.7.8,
 6.2.2, 7.3.4, 9.1.3, 10.3.2, 11.1.5,
 11.2.2, 12.4.1
 ἐποποιός epic poet 8.3.5
 ἐποπτεία initiation, watching, study,
 judgement 42, 43, 4.2.2, 18.5.5,
 22.1.1, 71.5.3
 ἐποπτεύω to watch, examine, judge
 3.3.2, 4.5.1, 5.1.7, 5.4.6, 10.4.3,
 14.4.5, 19.3.3, 23.2.5
 ἐπόπτης viewer, judge 71.4.3, 71.4.6,
 71.10.4
 ἔπος word, expression, verse, line
 72, 3.5.4, 5.1.4, 10.4.4, 10.4.5,
 10.4.5, 12.7.4, 14.5.4, 16.3.3,
 23.1.6, 71.12.1
 ἔρανος meal to which each guest con-
 tributes his share 1.2.5, 3.2.4,
 5.1.6, 7.1.1
 ἐραστής lover, admirer 4.2.3, 8.3.5,
 10.1.1, 12.5.6, 16.1.2, 18.1.1,
 20.4.3, 71.2.3, 71.2.4
 ἐράω to desire 4.4.3, 6.1.8, 7.4.6,
 9.3.3, 13.4.8
 ἐργάζω to write about, treat of 1.2.4
 ἐργασία work, activity 5.1.3, 9.3.4,
 11.1.6, 13.2.3, 13.3.5, 16.4.3,
 19.1.3, 71.7.1
 ἐργαστήριο workshop 17.2.7
 ἔργον work 70, 4.4.1, 5.1.1, 12.3.4,
 16.2.4, 16.3.1, 16.4.3, 19.4.4,
 19.4.5, 19.5.2, 21.2.5, 26.2.1,
 71.7.6, 71.8.2, 71.10.3
 ἐργώδης difficult, arduous 4.5.2,
 9.3.2, 16.2.4, 18.2.3, 26.2.3
 ἔρευνα search, exploration 5.3.2
 ἐρευνάω to analyse 1.2.2
 ἐρημία absence 71.10.1
 ἐρμηνεία interpretation, expression,
 language 2.1.8, 3.2.3, 3.3.7, 3.5.3,
 3.5.8, 9.2.2, 15.2.1, 15.2.4, 15.2.6,
 16.1.6, 16.4.1, 17.1.3, 17.2.7,
 17.4.1, 17.4.4, 18.2.7, 18.4.3,
 19.1.2, 19.2.6, 19.3.2, 19.4.2,
 26.1.7, 71.9.3, 71.9.8, 71.11.2
 ἐρμηνευτικός interpretative 9.3.4
 ἐρμηνεύω to interpret 17.2.1
 ἐρραστωνευμένος easy, relaxed 118,
 15.1.3, 17.3.5, 18.3.3, 26.2.6
 ἔρχομαι: *see* ἦλθον
 ἐρῶ, εἰρήσεται, εἰρήται (70) to say
 ἔρωσ love, desire 3.1.9, 4.1.1, 6.1.9,
 12.6.3, 14.2.3, 16.3.1, 18.1.1,
 71.2.6, 71.8.4
 ἔσχατος last 6.1.9

- ἔσω in one's mind 9.2.2, 9.2.3
 ἔσωθεν from within 8.1.2
 ἐτάζω to investigate 3.6.3
 ἐταστής investigator 5.1.1
 ἕτεροῖά to differentiate 22.2.2
 ἕτερος other, either 10.5.2, 22.2.6
 ἕτερότης otherness, strangeness
 16.4.4, 22.3.5
 ἔτι (64) still, besides
 ἔτοιμος ready, willing; versatile
 1.3.3, 2.1.2, 10.3.4, 11.1.5, 13.2.7,
 18.3.3, 20.2.5, 71.6.3
 ἐτοιμότης readiness 10.3.3, 13.2.9,
 17.2.6, 18.2.9
 ἔτος year 5.3.4, 6.1.9, 7.2.1, 14.3.2,
 14.3.3, 20.4.3
 εὔ (113) well
 (*) εὐάγγελος conveying [a message]
 well, efficiently 18.2.2
 εὐγένεια nobility, purity 113, 1.3.4,
 10.3.3, 16.1.9, 16.2.6, 18.3.4,
 18.5.6, 26.2.8
 εὐγενής noble, *adv.* nobly, well
 2.1.4, 2.2.5, 4.4.2, 6.2.1, 9.1.7,
 9.2.2, 10.3.7, 15.2.4, 15.3.2, 25.1.3,
 25.1.6, 71.2.2, 71.6.2, 71.6.8
 *εὐγνωμονικός generous 71.6.3
 εὐγνωμοσύνη benevolence 10.3.3
 ἐυνώμων benevolent, grateful 36,
 9.1.5, 10.4.7
 εὐδαιμονέω to be happy 4.5.7
 εὐδαιμονία happiness, prosperity 37,
 119, 12.5.7
 εὐδαίμων happy 7.2.6
 εὐδοκίμew to have a good reputation
 4.2.1, 12.6.9, 18.5.7, 24.1.5
 εὐδοκίμησις good reputation; excel-
 lence 11, 5.1.4, 10.3.5, 11 title,
 12.1.1
 εὐδόκιμος famous 6.2.1
 εὐδοξία fame 4.2.5
 εὐδρομία swiftness, propagation 109
 εὐδρομος easily expressed 15.2.5
 εὐεξία vigour 71.7.5
 εὐεπιχείρητος vulnerable to attack
 2.2.4
 εὐετηρία well-being, advantage 57,
 12.6.5
 εὐζωία well-being 5.1.6, 14.1.1
 εὐήθεια simplicity, stupidity 5.2.6,
 20.2.1
 εὐθαρσής bold 18.4.5
 εὐθηκτος well-sharpened, skilful
 16.2.3, 20.3.1, 71.2.1
 εὐθυνα censure, correction 3.1.8,
 7.1.6
 εὐθύνω to censure 7.3.6, 71.1.3
 εὐθύς straight, straightforward, *adv.*
 at once 8.1.3, 14.1.2, 14.1.4,
 14.3.2, 16.1.1
 εὐθυφορέομαι to move in a straight
 line, be straightforward 20.3.5
 εὐκαιρία prosperity 5.1.3
 εὐκίνητος flexible 18.1.1
 εὐκολία lightness, ease, facility 74,
 8.1.3, 13.2.9, 15.1.1, 16.2.3, 17.2.6,
 18.2.2, 18.2.9, 71.7.1
 εὐκόλος lighthearted 10.5.3
 εὐκρινής distinct, clear 15.3.3
 εὐλάβεια respect, reverence 7, 7 title,
 7.1.1, 8.3.7, 71.5.2
 εὐλαβέομαι to be cautious, afraid
 10.3.3, 12.2.2, 19.3.8
 εὐλαβής cautious, respectful 7.1.7,
 14.4.6, 18.4.2
 εὐληπτος easily grasped 3.3.2
 εὐλογος reasonable 56, 10.2.3,
 22.2.6, 23.3.2
 εὐμάρεια well-being 6.1.2
 εὐμετάβλητος easily changed 29, 115
 εὐμήχανος ingenious 11.1.5
 εὐνους well-disposed 20.4.3
 εὐόριστος well-defined 13.2.8
 εὐπειθής easily persuaded 11.1.5
 εὐπεριφρόνητος contemptible 1.3.2,
 9.1.6, 15.2.4, 19.2.6, 20.3.1, 71.4.2,
 71.7.6
 εὐποιία contribution 71.12.9
 εὐπορέω to find available 2.2.2
 εὐπορία good supply 3.5.2
 εὐπραγέω to be prosperous, success-
 ful 50, 57, 105
 εὐπραγία prosperity 56, 12.6.5
 εὐρεσις discovery, invention 1.2.3,
 2.1.2, 2.1.2, 2.1.7, 3.5.2, 3.5.5,

- 11.2.5, 11.2.6, 13.2.2, 18.5.6,
71.8.2
εὐρετής inventor 13.3.6
εὕρημα discovery 5.4.3
εὐρίπιστος unstable 2.2.5
εὐρίσκω to find, discover, invent 28,
2.1.4, 3.5.6, 4.6.5, 5.3.8, 11.2.6,
12.2.3, 15.4.3
εὐσέβεια faith 74, 14.2.4, 14.2.4
εὐσημος clear, lucid 16.4.4, 71.10.3
εὐστομία eloquence 8.3.7, 9.2.3,
15.2.1, 17.3.4, 18.2.3, 18.3.5,
18.3.5, 25.1.4, 26.2.4, 71.11.1
εὔστομος kept silent, unspoken
4.6.1
εὐστροφία versatility 13.2.9
εὐστροφος versatile 17.2.6
εὐτακτος well-ordered 11.1.3
εὐτέλεια neglect 71.11.2
εὐτελής base, trivial 15.2.2, 15.2.4,
19.2.6, 19.4.3, 71.7.6, 71.7.6,
71.7.8
εὐτοκέω to be productive 2.1.9
εὐτονία vigour 19.4.2
εὐτραπελία pleasantry 71.9.7
(* εὐτροπος easily upset 7.4.5
εὐτυχέω to achieve good results
7.4.5
εὐτυχής happy, fortunate 6.1.10
εὐτυχία success, fortune 67, 119
εὐφημία praise, acclamation 4.1.4,
10.1.3
εὐφημος religiously silent; reverent
10.4.7, 17.3.1
εὐφορία good harvest 71.12.2
εὐφούς naturally suited, talented
16.1.7, 18.5.8, 26.2.4, 71.7.2
εὐφύια talent 13.2.9
εὐφωρία eloquence 19.5.1, 71.11.3
εὐχερής easy 21.2.5
εὔχομαι to pray (Hom.) 10.4.5
(* εὐχρηστία well-being; efficiency
71.5.4, 71.10.3
εὐχροια noble bloom 15.2.4
ἐφεκτικός practising suspense of
judgement, Sceptic 61
ἐφεξῆς thereafter 14.3.2
ἐφεις desire, endeavour 1.3.2, 3.1.5
ἐφετός desirable 4.1.5
ἐφίεμαι to aim at, strive after 16.1.3,
16.3.4
ἐφίστημι to place, fix 14.1.5
ἐφοράω to observe, look upon 4.2.3,
14.4.3
ἐχθραίνω to be bitterly opposed to
24.2.4
ἐχθρός enemy, hostile 6.1.8, 19.5.6,
71.6.7
ἔχω (233) to have, hold; be
ἔως dawn, east 38
ζέω to be burning hot 18.1.1
ζῆλος emulation 16.1.4
ζηλωτής adherent 7.2.2
ζημία loss, damage 5.1.6, 25.2.4
ζημιόω to fine 2.2.3
ζητέω to investigate; acquire 3.1.7,
71.8.5, 71.8.5
ζήτησις investigation, exploration,
search 3.3.2, 3.5.1, 4.5.1, 11.1.4,
11.2.4
ζῶ to live 73, 73, 73, 4.2.3, 6.1.4,
6.2.4, 6.2.8, 6.2.9, 6.3.1, 6.3.2,
7.2.6, 9.1.8, 10.5.8, 22.2.4, 22.3.4,
26.1.5, 71.9.5
ζωή life, way of life 76, 90, 1.1.2,
1.1.4, 3.7.2, 3.7.8, 4.5.3, 4.5.4,
6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.5, 6.1.9, 6.1.10,
6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.3.4, 6.3.4, 7.2.1,
7.2.6, 12.5.7, 16.1.8, 17.2.1, 18.5.8,
71.6.4
ζῶον living being, animal 6.2.8,
6.3.2, 6.3.4, 12.5.2; Περὶ ζῴων: *see*
Index of Greek names
(* ζῶωσις life, living 6.3.1
ἡγεμονία office; instruction 1.1.3,
2.1.7, 2.3.1
ἡγεμονικός leading, belonging to a
leader or guide 2.3.5, 3.7.6, 11.2.4,
18.5.5
ἡγεμών leader, teacher, guide 2.3.4,
3.2.3, 6.1.1, 7.3.6, 10.2.4, 10.5.6,
13.2.1, 23.1.3, 25.1.2, 71.12.1,
71.12.6

- ἡγέομαι to lead, come before; consider 14.4.6, 20.4.1, 21.1.2, 25.2.4, 71.2.4, 71.6.7
- ἦδη already 1.1.2, 1.2.7, 1.2.8, 7.2.4, 9.1.7, 12.6.1
- ἡδομαι to delight in, enjoy 6, 50, 6 title, 6.2.6, 6.2.9, 6.3.3, 6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.3, 6.4.5, 6.4.5, 19.5.4
- ἡδονή pleasure 4.1.4, 6.1.2, 6.3.2, 6.4.1, 6.4.3, 6.4.4, 6.4.5
- ἡδύς sweet, pleasant, agreeable 32, 34, 41, 42, 43, 44, 64, 3.1.8, 6.1.6, 6.1.8, 6.2.4, 6.4.1, 6.4.6, 15.2.1, 18.2.9, 19.2.7, 20.4.2, 20.4.2, 20.4.3
- ἠθικός ethical, expressing moral character 7.3.2, 16.1.3, 16.1.6, 18.5.5, 20.2.4
- ἦθος custom, usage; character, ethos 62, 113, 8.1.3, 8.2.2, 8.2.5, 8.3.7, 12.5.7, 15.3.3, 15.4.2, 16.2.6, 16.4.2, 18.3.7, 18.4.3, 19.3.2, 19.3.4, 20.3.2, 20.4.4, 24.2.1, 26.1.1, 71.3.2, 71.6.3, 71.7.7, 71.9.1, 71.9.8, 71.9.9, 71.10.2, 71.11.3
- ἦκιστα not at all 5.2.4, 20.3.5; *see also οὐχῆκιστα*
- ἦκω to come 3.6.3, 5.3.2, 7.1.4, 14.2.1, 14.2.8, 16.2.3, 18.2.3, 19.3.1, 71.4.6, 71.8.4
- ἦλθον to come 12.1.4, 14.1.5
- ἡλιθιότης stupidity 11.1.1, 11.1.1
- ἡλικία age 8.3.4
- ἡλικιώτης contemporary 14.4.1
- ἡμεῖς (58) we
- ἡμέτερος our 17.2.3
- ἡμισυς half 11.2.7
- ἡνίκα when 12.6.1
- ἡρεμία quiet 2.3.3
- ἦτα (the letter) eta, (book) seven 3.7.5
- ἦτοι or 22.2.2
- ἡττάομαι to be overcome by, fall victim to, suffer from 4, 86, 4 title, 4.1.3, 12.6.3, 23.1.4
- ἡττων inferior, less 34, 50, 67, 5.3.6, 5.3.8, 6.2.4, 8.3.7, 9.2.2, 9.2.4, 9.2.4, 10.1.1, 12.6.9, 13.3.2, 13.4.8, 14.4.2, 16.2.1, 18.5.1, 19.1.3, 20.4.4, 22.1.2, 25.1.4, 25.2.3, 26.1.5, 71.2.4, 71.2.4, 71.3.3, 71.3.3, 71.4.4, 71.8.2, 71.11.4, 71.12.4
- ἦχώ sound 13.2.10
- θάλαττα the sea 44, 45
- θάνατος death 6.1.8, 8.2.7
- θαρρέω to have confidence in, trust 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.5.7, 5.4.3, 5.4.3, 8.3.7, 11.1.5, 14.5.5, 18.4.3, 18.4.4, 24.3.3
- θάτερος other, either 12.1.2, 18.5.3, 26.2.3
- θαῦμα wonder, admiration 10.3.5, 10.3.6
- θαυμάζω to wonder at, admire 3.3.3, 3.3.5, 3.5.5, 4.4.4, 4.5.5, 4.6.4, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.6, 5.4.5, 6.1.1, 7.1.1, 7.4.8, 10.1.3, 10.1.3, 10.2.5, 10.4.7, 10.5.5, 10.5.7, 10.5.7, 11.1.1, 11.1.1, 11.2.4, 11.2.7, 12.6.8, 12.7.1, 12.7.4, 13.2.9, 13.3.6, 14.5.1, 14.5.6, 16.1.2, 18.1.3, 18.2.8, 18.4.5, 19.3.4, 20.2.3, 21.2.7, 23.1.5, 23.1.5, 24.1.1, 24.3.4, 25.1.1, 25.1.2, 25.2.4, 71.12.3
- θαυμάσιος wonderful, admirable 67, 3.4.4, 3.5.8, 3.6.3, 13.1.1, 13.2.1, 13.2.3, 13.3.1, 14.4.5, 14.5.3, 17.2.2, 17.2.6, 17.3.4, 18.3.3, 19.4.5, 21.1.3, 24.1.3, 71.12.1
- θαυμαστός admirable, great 1.2.2, 4.6.1, 7.4.6, 10.1.1, 10.3.1, 11.1.6, 13.4.1, 14.3.3, 15.1.2, 16.3.4, 17.2.3, 20.1.1, 20.2.2, 24.1.1, 24.2.1, 25.1.2, 71.7.2
- θαματοβρύτης teeming with miracles 17.2.3
- θέαμα 44, 45
- θεατρικῶς in a theatrical manner 18.2.8
- θέατρον auditorium 4.4.1
- θεῖος divine; *neut. pl.* (Christian) religion 109, 1.2.1, 1.2.9, 6.2.2, 6.3.5, 7.3.2, 13.1.2, 15.2.5, 17.2.5, 26.1.4,

- 71.4.2, 71.5.2, 71.5.2, 71.5.3, 71.5.3,
71.8.3
- θέλημα charm, spell 6.1.2
- θεμιτός allowed, right 23.3.3
- θεός god, God 2.2.5, 3.2.4, 9.3.1,
9.3.1, 10.4.6, 14.2.4, 71.5.3
- θεοσέβεια faith 75, 6.2.2, 12.6.1,
17.1.3
- θεσμός precept 11.1.3
- θεσπέσιος divinely uttered 1.2.2
- θεωρέω to speculate, theorise 3.6.5,
3.7.4, 21.1.3
- θεωρητικός contemplative, specula-
tive 7.4.2
- θεωρητός subject to speculation
22.3.4
- θεωρία theory, speculation, investiga-
tion, science, discipline 23, 72, 80,
87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 117, 1.2.3,
1.2.4, 1.2.9, 3.1.7, 3.3.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.4,
3.5.8, 3.6.1, 3.6.3, 5.3.2, 5.4.5, 7.3.5,
11.1.2, 11.1.3, 12.3.1, 13.1.1, 13.1.3,
13.2.7, 13.3.4, 13.3.5, 13.4.3, 14.2.6,
14.2.9, 14.4.1, 14.5.5, 18.5.4, 20.2.2,
21.1.5, 22.1.3, 22.2.3, 22.3.1, 22.3.5,
23 title, 23.1.1, 23.1.6, 23.3.1, 26.1.2,
26.1.3
- θησαυρίζω to store up 1.3.6, 2.1.4,
2.2.2, 22.3.4, 71.8.4
- θησαυρός treasure, treasure-house
3.5.7, 5.2.2, 5.3.1, 9.3.5, 12.5.7,
16.2.2, 21.2.5, 71.3.8, 71.12.4
- θῆτα (the letter) theta, (book) eight
3.7.5
- θιασώτης worshipper 18.5.2
- θνήσκω to die 6.2.8
- θνητός mortal 3.7.2
- θρασύς impudent 16.1.2
- θρέμμα nursling 10.3.7
- θρήνος lament 27, 37, 38, 39, 40
- θριαμβεύω to triumph; lead in tri-
umph 7.1.5, 10.4.3
- θριγγός wall, fence 13.2.10
- θύρα door 15.2.3
- θύραθεν pagan 17.2.5
- ιαμβικός iambic 15.4.3
- ιατρικός of, belonging to medicine
12.6.8
- ιατρός physician 12.6.5
- ιδέα class, kind; type of style 19.4.1,
19.5.3, 71.4.2, 71.11.4
- ιδιοπραγέω to act independently
3.7.4
- ἴδιος own, private, separate 3.7.3,
4.3.1, 8.2.8, 12.6.6, 13.4.2, 14.1.3,
18.2.5, 21.2.4, 22.3.4, 71.4.4, 71.8.3
- ιδιουσάτατος of a peculiar constitu-
tion 3.7.2
- ιδιότης specific character 18.2.4,
24.2.1
- ιδιώτης private citizen 4.5.6, 8.3.4
- ἱερατικός priestly 16.2.4
- *ἱερογραμματεὺς priestly scribe
13.1.1
- ἱερός holy, sacred 1.2.2, 4.6.4, 10.2.4,
16.3.2, 17.2.5, 21.1.3
- ἱκανός sufficient, adequate, compe-
tent, capable 3.3.5, 5.3.9, 9.2.5,
9.3.2, 9.3.5, 10.3.4, 12.1.2, 12.1.3,
12.3.5, 12.7.4, 21.2.7, 71.2.5, 71.3.7,
71.7.5, 71.11.5
- ἱκανώω to make sufficient, complete
9.2.2, 11.2.6, 11.2.7
- ἰκνέομαι to come 13.3.6, 14.1.4,
20.3.5, 71.7.7
- ἱλαρός cheerful, delightful, pleasant
45, 15.2.1, 17.2.1, 17.3.5, 17.4.4,
20.3.5
- ἱλαρότης cheerfulness 4.1.4
- ἰός poison 8.1.2
- ἰσομέτρητος measuring up to 9.2.5
- ἴσος equal, like 7.3.6, 15.2.5, 16.1.2,
23.3.5
- ἴστημι to establish 2.1.2, 7.4.4,
13.2.11
- ἱστορέω to inquire, observe, record
7.3.3, 8.2.5, 13.1.1
- ἱστορία inquiry, record, story, his-
tory 2.2.1, 2.3.7, 6.1.9, 8.3.1, 13.1.2,
14.1.5, 16.3.3, 19.1.2, 20.2.3, 71.7.2,
71.8.7
- ἱστορικός historical 111, 20.3.1,
22.1.1
- ἰσχνός spare 20.3.4

- ἰσχνότης slenderness, plainness 6.1.1
 ἰσχυρός forceful 15.4.1
 ἰσχύω to be powerful, be able 12.6.1,
 12.6.9, 71.8.8
 ἴσως (85) probably, perhaps
 ἰχνηλατέω to track down 3.3.2,
 11.2.3
 ἴχνος track, footstep 10.3.7, 12.4.1

 καθαίρω to condemn 24.2.4
 καθάπαξ (70) once and for all, at
 all, completely
 καθάπερ just as 10.2.4, 10.4.2, 10.4.4,
 11.1.6, 12.2.3, 13.3.3, 13.3.5
 καθάπτομαι to attack 10.5.4
 καθαρός pure 15.2.1
 κάθειρξις confinement 1.2.6
 καθηγεμών leader 71.4.5
 καθηγητής teacher 10.5.7
 καθίημι to set in motion 12.1.3
 καθίστημι to establish, render 14,
 3.4.1, 13.3.1, 14 title, 14.1.2
 καθιστορέω to report, narrate 9.2.3,
 17.1.3, 71.10.3, 71.12.6
 *καθιστόρησις report 9.3.4
 καθόλου on the whole, in general
 2.3.6, 3.3.6, 3.4.1, 3.5.3, 3.6.7, 4.2.5,
 5.3.2, 11.1.7, 12.3.2, 12.5.2, 12.5.3,
 14.1.3, 14.5.7, 16.1.8, 16.3.1, 17.4.3,
 20.3.5, 22.2.4, 71.6.6, 71.7.1
 καθοπλίζω to arm 10.1.2
 (*) καθοράω to see, understand
 2.3.2, 6.1.1, 6.1.3, 12.2.2, 71.8.1
 καθυπισχνέομαι to promise 21.1.5
 καθυπουργέω to serve 9.2.4, 12.7.5
 καθώς as, like 19.3.1, 22.3.3, 25.1.3,
 71.7.8
 καινίζω to be innovative 18.4.4,
 24.2.1
 καινός new 3.1.7, 4.1.2, 18.3.4
 καινότης new coinage, innovation
 16.4.4, 18.4.1
 καίπερ although 10.5.6
 καίριος appropriate, vital 2.3.3, 3.6.4,
 7.4.8, 10.2.3, 11.1.4, 15.4.1, 20.2.5,
 71.6.1, 71.10.3, 71.10.4, 71.11.7,
 71.12.6
 καιρός time, occasion; right time,
 opportunity 107, 114, 1.1.5, 1.1.5,
 1.2.6, 1.3.1, 2.2.2, 5.2.2, 5.3.8, 7.3.1,
 9.1.5, 9.1.7, 9.1.7, 9.2.1, 10.3.1,
 10.4.5, 11.1.5, 11.2.2, 12.3.6, 13.4.7,
 14.5.1, 14.5.5, 15.2.5, 16.2.4, 16.3.1,
 17.4.2, 18.5.4, 19.1.3, 24.3.3, 25.1.8,
 26.2.8, 71.6.6, 71.6.9, 71.10.5
 καίτοι and yet, but, although 4.2.1,
 6.3.1, 12.4.5, 12.6.1, 12.6.8, 13.4.8,
 16.1.2, 17.3.5, 18.4.2, 18.5.8, 19.2.3,
 20.3.3, 24.1.2, 24.1.3, 71.6.5
 κακότης malevolence 8.1.2, 8.2.8
 κακός bad, base 38, 79, 6.2.2, 6.2.2,
 7.4.6, 7.4.6, 8.2.7, 10.5.3, 16.2.4
 κακουργέω to abuse, maltreat, do
 mischief 4.3.2, 7.4.5, 10.5.4, 15.2.2
 κακούργος evil-minded 8.1.3, 18.3.6
 κάλαμος pen 71.10.3
 καλέω to call, name 3.5.2, 7.1.7,
 13.4.7, 14.2.1, 20.1.1, 22.3.5, 71.4.3
 καλλιέπεια beautiful language
 15.3.1, 18.4.1, 71.11.2
 κάλλος Beauty (of style) 15.2.5,
 18.2.4, 26.2.2, 71.11.3
 καλλύνω to beautify, embellish
 4.4.1, 18.2.7, 26.1.1
 καλωπισμός beauty (of language)
 16.4.4
 καλοκάγαθία moral rectitude 20.1.7
 καλός (53) beautiful, good, noble
 καλύπτω to conceal 3.2.6, 10.4.8
 κάματος toil, effort 10.2.1, 18.2.8
 κᾶν 48, 3.1.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.2.1, 4.3.4,
 4.4.2, 5.1.7, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, 5.3.7, 8.1.2,
 10.4.5, 10.5.3, 13.3.6, 14.1.1, 15.3.2,
 15.4.2, 16.4.1, 17.1.3, 18.3.3, 19.1.4,
 19.2.6, 20.2.5, 20.3.2, 21.2.7, 21.2.7,
 22.2.4, 22.3.4, 71.6.8, 71.7.3, 71.7.3,
 71.9.6, 71.11.7
 κανών rule 13.3.1
 καπνός smoke 6.1.1
 καρδία heart 6.1.6
 καρπώω to gain 20.4.4
 καρπός fruit, result 26.1.2
 καρτερός forceful 20.4.1
 κατά (429) for, during, concerning,
 according to

- καταβάλλω to pay 2.2.3
 καταβαπίζομαι to be drunk 31
 καταβαρύνω to make heavy 15.4.3
 καταγγέλλω to proclaim, promote
 12.7.5, 19.2.4
 καταγηράω to grow old 6.1.8
 καταγιγνώσκω to condemn 63
 καταγλωττίσματα refined words
 71.9.2
 καταγράφω to write down 71.10.3
 καταδιαιρέω to divide, dissect 3.6.2,
 11.1.3, 13.2.10
 καταδίκη sentence 6.1.8
 καταιτιάομαι to accuse 6.2.5
 κατακοσμέω to arrange, equip, adorn
 10.1.1, 26.2.2
 κατακτυπόω to roar against 15.3.1,
 17.2.8
 κατακωμωδέω to make fun of 10.4.4
 καταλείπω to leave behind 14.4.4,
 18.5.6, 22.1.1, 24.1.3
 καταληπτικός that has to do with ap-
 prehension, scientific 12.7.4
 (*scripsi*), 13.2.7, 23.1.3
 καταληπτός capable of being appre-
 hended 12.7.4 *codd.*
 κατάληψις apprehension, perception,
 understanding 31, 61, 3.1.2, 9.3.2,
 9.3.5, 10.3.2, 11.1.4, 12.3.4, 12.4.4,
 13.2.5, 14.4.2, 22.3.2, 23.2.4, 26.2.1
 καταλογίζομαι to enumerate 17.4.1
 κατάλογος list of members, adherents
 12.7.1
 καταμωκάομαι to mock at 7.3.6
 κατανοέω to understand, perceive,
 discover 1.2.4, 5.3.8, 12.2.5, 12.3.4,
 12.3.6, 13.2.3, 14.2.1
 καταπαύω to leave off, cease 9.3.6
 κατάπεμπος sent down 11.1.6
 καταργέω to abolish, invalidate
 12.2.4
 καταριθέω to enumerate, count 3.6.2,
 13.2.10
 κατασβέννυμι to extinguish 12.2.4
 κατασκέπτομαι to reconnoitre, re-
 view 3.6.6, 4.5.6, 11.1.3
 κατασκευάζω to prepare, present
 10.1.2, 19.3.7, 23.1.2
 κατασκευή constructive reasoning
 19.3.4, 71.7.5
 κατασκόπησις investigation 26.2.1
 κατάστασις establishment 3.5.6,
 13.3.6
 κατασυλλογίζομαι to deduce, con-
 clude 11.1.3, 71.2.1
 κατατείνω to stretch out, strain, exert
 13.4.6, 18.3.2
 κατατέμνω to cut up, divide 18.5.2,
 23.3.1, 24.1.3
 *κατατεχνιτεύω to deal with techni-
 cally, 11.2.3, 16.1.6, 71.11.5, 71.12.8
 (*) κατατομή division 13.3.1, 14.2.6
 κατατρέχω to run down, inveigh
 against 3.2.2, 7.1.8, 7.4.1, 10.1.6,
 12.4.2, 24.3.4
 καταφανής clearly seen, exposed
 21.2.5
 καταψεύδομαι to lie about 4.3.2,
 8.2.2, 20.1.5
 καταψηφίζομαι to condemn 1.1.5,
 20.2.1
 κατείδον to observe 2.1.1, 9.3.2
 κάτεμι to go down 14.1.5
 κατειρωνεύομαι to banter, make fun
 of 5.2.6
 κατελέγχω to refute, censure 4.6.3,
 7.1.2, 7.3.6, 10.4.8, 23.3.4, 71.3.4,
 71.3.4, 71.5.3
 κατεξανίσταμαι to rise up against,
 be in opposition to 7.1.5, 10.4.3,
 12.4.5 *scripsi*
 κατεπαίρομαι to be arrogant towards
 24.3.3
 κατεπανίσταμαι to rise up against,
 be in opposition to 12.4.5 *codd.*
 κατεπίγγομαι to strive, exert oneself
 1.2.8, 4.4.1, 18.2.6, 71.5.1
 κατεπμβάινω to step on, take advan-
 tage of 5.2.6
 κατεπιχειρέω to attempt 7.1.8
 κατευστοχέω to hit the mark, be suc-
 cessful 22.2.1, 23.1.5
 κατέχω to hold, dominate 6.2.6
 κατηγορία category 12.5.2
 κατοκνέω to hesitate 5.2.3

- κατολιγωρέω to disregard, despise, neglect 4.2.2, 4.6.4, 5.2.2, 6.1.10, 12.3.3, 14.4.6, 25.2.3
- κατοπτρικός having to do with mirrors 14.4.1
- κατορθώω to be successful 2.3.8, 7.4.5
- κατόρθωσις success 2.1.6
- κείμαι to lie 4.6.1, 17.3.1
- κειμήλιον treasure, heirloom 3.3.7, 12.6.5, 21.2.5, 71.12.4
- κείνος he 10.3.6
- κενός empty 71.5.4
- κεραμεύς potter 8.3.4
- κερδαίνω to gain, gather 71.4.6
- κηρός wax 15.1.2
- κήρυγμα declaration 8.2.4
- κινέω to move 1.2.7, 1.3.2, 2.1.9, 3.7.7 (7), 3.7.8 (4), 10.1.6, 14.2.6, 23.1.2, 25.2.2, 26.1.7, 71.9.3
- κίνησις motion 3.7.5, 3.7.8, 7.3.1, 7.4.2, 23.2.2, 26.1.6, 71.9.9
- κλάω to lament, come to grief 9.1.3
- κλείζω to praise 4.1.3
- κλέος fame 7.2.1, 10.5.5
- κλέπτω to deceive, obscure 3.1.4, 3.2.3, 5.3.1, 15.2.2, 18.3.4, 24.1.5, 71.9.8
- κλήσις name, designation 21.1.5, 71.4.4
- κοινῇ in common, together with 6.3.2, 7.4.8, 8.2.8, 10.1.2, 22.2.1, 71.8.3
- (*) κοινοπολιτεία common citizenship; constitution, democracy 101, 102, 22.2.3, 71.8.2
- κοινός common 75, 81, 5.1.5, 5.1.6, 6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.3.4, 7.1.1, 7.1.4, 7.1.8, 7.2.4, 7.2.4, 7.3.2, 8.2.4, 8.2.6, 8.3.3, 8.3.4, 9.1.1, 9.2.1, 10.1.2, 10.3.4, 11.2.6, 12.7.5, 13.4.1, 18.4.1, 18.4.2, 18.5.2, 19.2.1, 19.3.1, 19.3.6, 19.4.1, 22.2.4, 23.3.4, 25.2.5 (3), 71.4.3, 71.4.5, 71.4.6, 71.12.3, 71.12.9
- κοινωνέω to take part in, communicate 17.1.4, 26.1.4
- κοινωνία society, association 6.2.7, 6.3.3, 6.4.6, 18.5.3
- κοινωνός partner 9.3.7
- κοινοφελής commonly useful 1.2.6
- κολακεία flattery 71.10.5
- κόλαξ flatterer 4.4.4
- κομιδῆ altogether, quite 1.2.8, 1.3.1, 2.1.4, 2.2.1, 2.3.7, 3.1.4, 4.1.1, 4.5.5, 6.1.6, 6.4.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.6, 7.2.4, 8.2.4, 10.5.5, 10.5.7, 12.3.3, 12.5.5, 13.1.2, 13.4.7, 14.2.2, 14.3.4, 14.5.4, 15.2.1, 16.2.3, 17.2.7, 17.3.2, 18.1.3, 18.2.6, 19.3.2, 21.2.1, 24.2.3, 71.3.7
- κόμμα stamp; section 2.2.4, 4.6.2, 71.2.2, 71.12.4
- κομμωτικός having to do with embellishment 15.2.4, 16.1.6, 26.2.4, 71.9.7
- κομπώδης boastful 16.1.2
- κομψεία refinement 26.2.4
- κομψεύομαι to be smart, flaunt 18.3.4
- κομψός elegant 16.1.2
- κομψότης elegance 71.10.5
- κοπρώδης impure 15.1.2
- κόπτω to strike, weary 4.4.1, 24.2.3
- κόρδαξ cordax (a dance of the Old Comedy) 8.1.4
- κορυφαίος highest leader 23.3.1
- κοσμέω to order, rule; adorn 1.3.1, 71.11.2, 71.11.3
- κόσμιος well-behaved, polite 10.4.6
- κοσμιότης propriety 71.5.2
- κόσμος propriety, good behaviour; ornament 10.4.3, 18.2.1, 23.1.3, 26.1.1, 71.9.1, 71.12.4
- κράσις blending, temperament 7.3.4, 71.9.9
- κραταιός powerful 26.2.8
- κρατέω to be valid, prevail, become current 4.1.1, 7.2.5, 10.2.6, 10.2.6, 12.5.6, 12.6.4, 14.1.1, 17.1.2, 24.1.2, 24.2.4, 71.9.7, 71.12.5
- κράτιστος strongest, most important 2.1.1, 12.6.5, 13.4.7, 71.12.3
- κράτος power, rule 92, 106, 108, 6.3.5, 10.5.5, 12.1.5, 12.6.2, 18.1.2, 18.5.6, 71.7.5
- κρατώνω to strengthen; argue for 19.3.5, 26.2.4

- κρείττων stronger, better 4.4.2, 7.3.5, 18.5.5, 24.3.3, 71.6.2, 71.6.2
 κρίνω to judge, deem 4.1.4, 4.2.1, 4.4.4, 9.1.2, 10.5.5, 14.4.5, 17.2.8, 17.3.1, 18.3.7, 19.5.5, 20.2.1, 24.3.1, 71.5.5, 71.6.7, 71.11.4, 71.11.5, 71.11.6
 κρίσις judgement, decision 49, 55, 65, 4.2.2, 6.1.4, 7.3.2, 9.1.4, 10.2.3, 10.5.1, 11.1.4, 13.2.2, 13.2.4, 20.2.3, 20.2.4, 20.3.3, 71.6.5, 71.11.7
 κριτής judge 4.4.3, 4.5.1, 10.4.8, 71.4.6
 κριτικός discerning, deciding 18.5.5, 71.3.1
 κρότος applause 4.1.4
 κρούω to strike 3.1.6
 κρύπτω to hide 3.5.8
 κτάομαι to acquire 118, 2.2.5, 3.1.2, 4.3.3, 21.2.5, 25.2.4
 κτήσις acquisition, possession 2.1.4, 16.1.9, 16.2.2, 18.5.8, 71.12.4
 κτίσις creation 42
 κυβερνήτης pilot 3.7.5
 κύκλος circle 15.4.2
 κυριότης supremacy 89
 κώνειον hemlock 6.1.8, 8.2.7

 λαβή opportunity, pretext 7.4.2, 10.5.1, 10.5.2
 λαγχάνω to obtain by lot 1.3.1
 λαμβάνω to take 1.2.1, 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 3.2.3, 3.3.7, 3.4.4, 6.4.1, 7.1.1, 11.1.2, 12.1.2, 13.2.6, 71.1.1, 71.7.8
 λαμπρός illustrious; clear, obvious, manifest 3.3.3, 5.1.2, 7.1.5, 12.5.1
 λαμπρότης splendour, sumptuousness 6.1.2
 λανθάνω to escape notice 72, 3.2.3, 3.3.2, 3.7.7, 4.3.4, 19.4.6
 λέγω (137) to say, speak
 λείος smooth 15.3.3, 17.2.1, 17.2.5, 17.3.2, 18.3.2
 λειότης smoothness 15.4.2
 λείπω to leave 1.2.1, 1.2.6, 3.7.6, 3.7.6, 3.7.8, 3.7.8, 4.3.4, 11.1.4, 11.2.1, 11.2.2, 11.2.7, 12.3.3, 12.6.3, 13.3.6, 14.5.5, 18.1.3, 20.2.2, 21.2.1
 λειτουργία service 6.2.2, 16.2.4
 λεκτικός stylistic, linguistic 21.2.5, 26.2.8, 71.9.1, 71.9.4, 71.10.5
 λέξις language, diction, word 4.6.5, 12.5.6, 15.3.1, 16.4.6, 18.4.2, 22.2.2, 71.9.1, 71.9.8, 71.10.1
 λεπτός fine, thin 13.2.10
 λέσχη discussion 71.3.5
 λήξις clausula 15.4.3
 ληπτός to be grasped 3.2.5
 λῆρος trash, nonsense; humbug 10.4.3, 71.5.4
 λίαν very, exceedingly 5.1.7
 λιπαρής persistent, earnest 6.1.6
 λιτότης plainness 19.2.4
 λιχνεία appetite, greed 3.4.2, 71.2.4
 λίχνος curious 18.1.2
 λογάς chosen 71.12.2
 λογίζομαι to think, conclude, consider 2.1.1, 3.2.4, 4.5.2, 5.3.7, 5.4.2, 9.1.8, 12.1.5, 12.7.2, 14.4.4, 17.1.1, 23.2.5
 λογικός rational, logical; verbal 11, 12, 88, 3.5.1, 3.5.7, 3.6.3, 3.6.5, 5.1.1, 5.1.6, 5.3.7, 9.3.4, 10.1.2, 11 title, 11.1.2, 11.2.1, 11.2.1, 12 title, 12.1.1, 12.2.5, 12.3.5, 12.3.6, 12.4.1, 12.4.4, 12.4.5, 12.7.4, 12.7.5, 26.1.2
 λογισμός cogitation, thought, idea 49, 60, 1.3.2, 1.3.5, 1.3.6, 2.2.4, 3.1.1, 5.1.4, 5.1.6, 6.1.5, 8.2.7, 9.2.2, 9.2.3, 9.3.2, 17.1.1, 23.1.2, 23.1.4
 λογοειδής in prose-style; in a style suited for speeches 18.3.5, 18.3.7, 19.2.4, 19.4.3, 20.3.2, 25.2.1
 λόγος (145) word, speech, argument, reason
 λοιπός remaining; *adv.* in the future, then, consequently 1.2.7, 2.2.2, 3.5.6, 5.1.2, 6.2.8, 6.4.3, 7.4.5, 10.3.7, 11.2.4, 12.2.2, 13.2.5, 13.4.5, 15.2.6, 22.3.5
 λυμαίνομαι to maltreat, outrage 6.1.8
 λύσις dissolution 6.2.9
 λυσυτελέω to profit, be useful 10.4.9, 18.5.3, 19.5.1
 λυσιτελής profitable, useful 5.1.5

- λυτός relaxed 6.1.2
 λύω to dissolve 2.2.4, 3.7.2, 3.7.2
- μάθημα knowledge, science, discipline 13.4.7, 14.2.1, 14.2.8, 14.2.9
 μαθηματικός (52) scientific, mathematical; Σύνταξις μαθηματική: *see Index of Greek names*
 μάθησις knowledge, learning 7.3.2, 21.1.6, 71.4.2, 71.8.7, 71.12.8
 μαίνομαι to be mad 5.1.2, 7.4.6, 10.3.6, 11.2.5, 12.3.2, 13.4.4
 μακαρία happiness 71.5.4
 μακαρίζω to bless, deem happy 4.3.3, 7.2.1
 μακρός long, long-winded, great 33, 5.2.6, 10.2.1, 14.1.5, 71.3.8, 71.5.4
 μάλα (98) very
 μαλθακός soft 15.1.2
 μάλιστα (157) most of all, certainly
 μάλλον (59) more, rather
 μανία madness 20.2.1
 μανθάνω to learn 13.1.1
 μαρτύριον testimony, proof 16.1.1, 16.1.3
 μαρτύρομαι to testify, act as witness 1.3.6, 17.3.3
 μάρτυς witness 9.3.7, 17.3.3
 μάταιος futile, worthless 3.5.6, 71.5.4, 71.8.6
 μάτην in vain 2.2.3, 12.5.4, 12.5.4, 12.6.9
 μάχη battle, struggle 25, 2.3.8, 23.1.6, 24.1.1, 25 title, 25.1.7
 μάχιμος warlike, aggressive, opposing 12.6.6, 16.2.4, 22.1.3, 22.2.3, 22.3.5, 25.1.3, 71.6.6, 71.8.2
 μάχομαι to fight, debate, polemicise 3.1.7, 7.3.6, 7.4.5, 22.1.2, 23.1.3, 23.1.6
 μεγαληγορέω to boast 4.5.3
 μεγαλοδωρεά a splendid gift 10.5.6
 μεγαλόνοια elevation of thought 5.1.3
 μεγαλόφρων noble-minded 4.1.2, 4.2.2
 μεγαλοφυής talented 4.6.2
 μεγαλοφυΐα talent 5.2.1, 5.4.3
- μεγαλώνυμος celebrated 7.1.5, 23.1.3
 μέγας big, great 34, 37, 50, 51, 56, 67, 92, 93, 105, 108, 109, 117, 117, 119, 1.2.3, 2.2.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.4, 3.5.9, 5.1.6, 5.3.1, 6.1.8, 7.1.5, 7.2.1, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 9.1.1, 10.2.6, 10.4.5, 11.2.2, 12.1.1, 12.3.4, 12.4.3, 12.6.2, 12.7.2, 12.7.5, 13.2.2, 13.4.2, 14.2.7, 14.2.10, 16.1.1, 16.2.4, 21.1.3, 21.1.3, 21.2.4, 71.2.4, 71.3.9, 71.7.3, 71.7.4, 71.7.8, 71.8.2, 71.9.6
 μέγεθος magnitude, body 106, 22.2.3
 μέθη drunkenness 31
 μέθοδος method, pursuit 3.5.1, 19.4.5, 19.4.6, 20.3.4, 21.1.6, 71.10.1; *Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος: see Index of Greek names*
 μεθύτερον afterwards, later 1.2.1, 3.2.4, 3.3.5, 10.2.1, 13.3.3, 13.4.2, 14.4.5, 17.2.2, 71.12.2
 μελαγχολάω to be melancholy, deranged 5.1.2, 7.4.6
 μελετάω to practise 2.1.9
 μελέτη care, practice 18.5.6, 19.5.1, 21.1.6
 μέλιττα bee 20.1.1
 μέλλω to be likely to, to be about to 1.3.2, 5.4.1, 10.2.4, 21.2.4
 μέλω to be an object of care, interest, or consideration 10.4.2, 16.1.4, 16.4.1, 18.2.1, 18.2.7, 18.4.1, 20.3.3, 26.1.2, 71.2.7, 71.3.3, 71.3.3, 71.8.1, 71.9.2, 71.9.4
 μέντοι but, nevertheless 13.4.5, 14.4.1, 71.9.1
 μένω to remain 2.1.4, 6.4.3, 12.6.3, 15.2.3, 21.2.2, 22.3.4, 23.2.4
 μερίζομαι to divide 7.4.4, 26.2.3
 μερικός specific 3.5.3
 μερισμός partition, party 23.1.3
 μέρος part, turn 1.2.3, 1.3.5, 3.6.3, 4.3.3, 5.2.3, 5.3.6, 6.2.8, 6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.3.5, 7.3.3, 10.1.2, 11.1.7, 12.7.5, 13.2.5, 18.5.4, 21.1.4, 21.2.4, 22.2.4, 71.2.1, 71.2.5, 71.8.3, 71.12.1, 71.12.2, 71.12.3
 μέσος middle 3.5.4, 5.1.6, 8.3.4, 10.4.4, 71.6.6

- μεστός full 19.2.5
 μεστόω to fill 71.7.2
 μετά (107) with, after
 μεταβάλλω to change 6.2.8, 6.2.8,
 6.2.8, 22.3.2, 22.3.3, 23.2.1
 μεταβατικός able to move from one
 place to another 7.3.2
 μεταβολή change, reversal 28, 37,
 119, 23.2.4
 μετάδοσις imparting 2.1.7
 μετάθεσις change 19.1.1
 μεταποιέω to remodel, reuse 71.7.5
 μεταφέρω to translate 12.5.7, 12.5.7
 μέτεστί μοί τινος to have a share in,
 be concerned about 5.2.5, 15.3.3,
 18.5.1, 18.5.1, 19.2.7, 25.2.3, 71.9.8,
 71.10.2, 71.11.1
 μετέχω to partake of 20.3.2
 μετεωρολογικός treating of meteorol-
 ogy: *see Index of Greek names*
 μετέωρος in suspense, expectant
 3.4.1, 3.5.9
 μετοικία migration 71.8.2
 μετουσία participation in, knowledge
 of 5.2.3, 18.5.4
 μέτριος moderate; *pl.* of reasonable
 number, few 4.6.3, 17.4.2, 19.4.2,
 71.1.1
 μετριότης modesty 71.6.3
 μέτρον measure, due measure 13.2.6,
 13.2.8, 24.3.4
 μέχρι(ς) as far as, until, as long as
 6.1.8, 13.2.10, 13.4.3, 13.4.3, 14.3.4,
 20.1.5, 24.1.2, 26.1.5, 71.7.7, 71.9.3
 μηδέ and not, not even 2.3.3, 2.3.3,
 2.3.3, 3.4.4, 3.5.4, 3.6.3, 3.6.7, 5.2.2,
 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 7.2.4, 8.1.4, 8.3.6, 8.3.6,
 9.1.1, 9.1.8, 9.1.8, 9.2.2, 9.2.2, 9.3.6,
 10.3.6, 11.2.5, 11.2.6, 12.3.5, 13.3.6,
 18.2.3, 18.4.5, 18.5.7, 19.2.6, 19.5.6,
 25.1.4, 25.1.5, 26.1.5, 26.2.3, 71.6.7,
 71.7.4, 71.7.7, 71.12.4, 71.12.7
 μηδείς nobody, nothing 67, 3.1.7,
 3.5.4, 3.7.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.3, 5.1.5, 5.4.1,
 6.1.4, 6.2.3, 10.1.1, 10.4.3, 11.1.4,
 11.2.1, 11.2.3, 11.2.5, 12.1.1, 19.1.3,
 19.3.8, 19.4.6, 20.4.4, 22.1.2, 23.1.3,
 25.1.4, 25.1.5, 25.2.1, 25.2.3, 26.1.5,
 26.1.5, 26.1.7, 26.2.2, 71.5.4, 71.12.4
 μηκέτι no longer 12.7.5
 μήκος length, quantity 13.2.10,
 24.1.4
 μὴν (65) (affirmative particle)
 μήποτε indeed not 10.2.1, 12.1.5,
 13.3.6, 23.2.2, 26.1.1, 26.1.3, 71.4.5
 μήπω not yet 19.2.3
 μήτε and not, neither, nor 2.3.6, 2.3.6,
 12.1.5, 18.3.4, 18.3.4, 19.2.3, 19.2.4,
 19.4.2, 19.4.2, 71.7.6
 μηχανάομαι to contrive, pretend
 3.3.7, 3.4.3, 3.7.7
 μηχανή artifice, means; theatrical ma-
 chine 3.1.4, 3.2.4, 5.2.2, 5.3.7, 16.3.3,
 24.3.1
 μηχανικός that has to do with me-
 chanics 70
 μηχανοποιός engineer 2.2.3
 μικρογνωμοσύνη narrow-mindedness
 49
 μικρολόγος petty 18.1.1
 μικρός small, little 35, 36, 106, 108,
 14.4.3, 71.3.5, 71.4.3
 μιμέομαι to imitate 10.2.4
 μιμνήσκομαι to remember, mention
 41, 2.3.7, 5.2.3, 7.1.2, 7.1.8, 14.5.1,
 14.5.3, 15.2.5, 17.4.2, 19.2.2, 19.2.2,
 19.2.2, 21.1.6, 71.1.1, 71.1.2, 71.1.2,
 71.3.6, 71.6.9
 μνήμη memory 2, 93, 2 title, 2.1.2,
 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.1.6, 2.1.7, 2.1.9, 2.2.2,
 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.5, 2.3.1, 2.3.4, 2.3.8,
 3.1.3, 5.3.7, 6.4.1, 10.1.2, 10.2.2,
 10.4.7, 12.3.4, 12.3.4, 14.2.5, 16.2.2,
 16.3.1, 17.3.4, 18.1.1, 20.1.6, 71.4.1,
 71.6.6, 71.7.6, 71.8.1
 μνημονικός having a good memory
 2.3.4
 μνήμων able to remember, having a
 good memory 2.1.1, 2.1.3
 μοῖρα part, portion 7.2.5
 (*) μοιρίδιον small piece, part 1.2.1,
 10.3.4
 μοναρχία government by a single
 ruler 92, 109, 14.3.4
 μοναχός monk 40

- μονή remaining, continuance 6.2.7, 6.3.1
- μόνιμος permanent, persevering 18.5.6, 22.3.5
- μονοειδής simple, uniform 5.3.9
- μόνος (60) alone, only
- μουσική music 7.3.4, 13.3.5, 13.4.4
- μουσικός musical 7.3.4, 13.2.1, 13.3.4, 14.2.9, 14.4.1
- μῦθος word, myth 2.2.3, 10.4.6, 10.4.6
- μυθώδης legendary 14.2.6
- μύριοι ten thousand 20.4.1
- μυρίος innumerable, ceaseless 7.4.2, 23.2.1, 23.2.4
- μυστήριον mystery 14.4.2, 18.5.5
- μωκάομαι to ridicule, criticise 71.11.7
- μωμάομαι to criticise 71.11.7 (*v.l.*)
- νάω to flow, run 18.2.9
- ναρκάω to be numb, drugged 9.3.3
- *ναστώδης dense 15.4.3
- ναυπηγός shipwright 8.3.4
- ναῦς ship 3.7.5
- ναυτιάω to suffer from nausea 1.3.4
- νεμσάω to feel offended, criticise 17.2.8, 19.3.3, 24.3.2
- νεμσητός deserving blame, harmful 63, 10.5.6, 16.4.6, 23.1.5
- νέμω to give, spend 16.1.4, 16.1.6, 18.2.4, 18.5.3, 71.2.7, 71.4.4, 71.6.8
- νέος young, new, strange 1.2.2, 1.2.7, 6.1.6, 8.3.4, 14.5.7, 17.1.1, 18.3.3, 18.3.3, 19.5.3, 22.2.1, 71.7.3
- νησίδιον islet 6.1.1
- νικάω to conquer, prevail 9.1.4, 18.3.6, 21.2.6, 23.1.4
- νίκη victory, superiority 12.1.1, 12.2.5, 23.1.4, 23.3.3
- νοερός intellectual 51, 3.6.5, 9.3.5, 13.2.3
- νοέω to perceive by the mind, think, consider 9, 9 title, 9.1.1, 9.1.1, 9.1.2, 9.2.2, 9.3.1, 9.3.1, 9.3.3, 9.3.3, 12.1.3
- νόημα thought, idea, argument 19.3.4, 22.1.3, 26.2.2, 26.2.2
- νόησις thought 9.2.4
- νόθος illegitimate 12.2.3
- νομή pasture 6.3.3
- νομίζω to adopt as custom or law, enact; think, consider 1.2.2, 2.3.5, 3.7.2, 4.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.5, 11.1.7, 11.2.5, 12.3.5, 16.4.6, 17.1.3, 18.5.3, 18.5.5, 25.2.5, 71.4.2, 71.6.5
- νόμιμος customary, lawful, prescribed 74, 75, 1.1.3, 11.1.3, 17.1.4, 18.3.1, 18.3.3, 18.4.3, 18.4.5, 71.5.2, 71.5.3, 71.8.2, 71.11.5, 71.12.5
- νόμισμα coin 10.1.1
- νομοθεσία formulation of principles or rules 2.1.8, 3.5.5, 71.3.2
- νομοθετέω to formulate rules 3.5.4, 5.4.1, 25.1.5
- νομοθέτης lawgiver 14.2.4
- νόμος rule, law 1.2.3, 2.3.4, 6.1.7, 10.5.1, 11.2.3, 15.4.1; Νόμοι: *see Index of Greek names*
- νοσερός unhealthy, feeble 13.2.4
- νοσέω to be sick, suffer 69, 4.5.1, 4.6.4, 4.6.4, 9.1.7, 10.4.8
- νόσημα affliction 4.5.5
- νοῦς (83) mind, reason, intellect, thought, meaning
- νυκτομαχία night-battle 23.1.5
- νῦν (75) now
- νυνί now 12.1.1
- ξενίζω to be strange, unusual 18.4.5
- ξένος strange, foreign 15.3.1, 16.2.3
- ξυγ-, ξυλ-, ξυμ-, ξυν-: *see* συγ-, συλ-, συμ-, συν-
- ὀβολός obol 10.1.4, 10.1.5
- ὀγκόομαι to be swollen 19.2.6
- ὄγκος weight, loftiness, majesty 113, 71.7.4, 71.9.6
- ὄδε this 3.1.7, 3.1.7, 3.3.2, 3.5.1, 4.6.2, 4.6.2, 6.1.1, 9.3.7, 9.3.7, 10.2.5, 10.3.7, 10.4.6, 10.5.2, 11.2.1, 12.1.5, 12.3.2, 12.5.2, 12.5.2, 14.2.5, 16.1.4, 16.1.9, 17.3.3, 17.4.4, 18.5.2, 18.5.2, 19.2.1, 21.1.2, 21.2.3, 21.2.3, 22.2.1, 22.2.6, 23.1.4, 23.1.4, 71.2.2, 71.2.2, 71.2.4, 71.2.4, 71.5.1, 71.8.5, 71.12.8
- ὅθεν whence, wherefore 2.2.5, 6.3.1

- οἶδα to know 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.3.3, 5.3.9, 5.4.2, 6.4.4, 7.2.5, 8.1.1, 8.2.2, 10.4.4, 10.5.3, 10.5.8, 11.1.1, 11.1.6, 11.2.5, 12.3.3, 12.5.5, 13.1.1, 13.1.1, 13.4.5, 13.4.7, 14.2.3, 17.2.1, 18.2.6, 18.3.7, 19.1.1, 19.1.2, 19.1.2, 19.2.8, 19.3.3, 20.2.3, 20.3.3, 22.2.1, 23.3.3, 24.1.2, 71.4.1, 71.4.5, 71.6.3, 71.8.1, 71.8.5, 71.12.7
- οἰκέιος one's own, familiar, proper, fitting 26, 51, 64, 3.1.1, 3.6.6, 4.5.1, 6.2.2, 10.3.3, 10.4.4, 11.1.3, 12.5.7, 13.2.6, 14.1.2, 15.3.2, 15.4.3, 16.3.3, 16.4.1, 18.1.1, 19.3.7, 24.3.1, 26 title, 26.1.1, 26.2.5, 71.2.4, 71.2.7, 71.7.2, 71.9.1
- οἰκειόω to make familiar with 6.2.5, 6.3.4, 6.4.6, 19.2.4
- οἰκέω to inhabit 13.3.3
- οἴκησις dwelling 6.4.6
- οἰκοδόμος builder 8.3.4
- οἴκοθεν from one's own resources 1.2.5, 2.1.7, 8.3.2, 15.3.3, 18.3.1, 18.5.4, 19.3.8, 24.1.2, 71.7.1
- οἴκοι at home, to one's home; inside oneself, inborn 1.2.9, 1.3.6, 4.3.3, 5.2.2, 5.2.6, 6.1.2, 6.1.7, 6.1.10, 12.5.7, 20.4.3
- οἰκονομέω to organise, effect 92, 4.5.3, 7.4.7, 21.2.6
- οἰκουμένη the (civilised) world 109, 12.6.1
- οἶμαι, οἴμαι to think, believe 34, 2.2.5, 2.3.7, 3.2.3, 4.4.3, 5.1.7, 5.4.3, 6.1.10, 6.2.6, 9.1.2, 10.2.6, 10.4.5, 12.1.2, 12.2.3, 18.5.7, 19.3.7, 19.5.6, 20.1.7, 21.1.7, 22.1.1, 71.2.5, 71.5.5, 71.6.7, 71.9.6
- οἶονεῖ as if 71.10.3
- οἶος (63) such as, possible, capable
- οἴχομαι to have departed 2.2.3, 12.6.3
- ὀκνέω to hesitate 4.5.3, 11.1.5, 12.5.4
- ὄκνος hesitation 8.3.7
- ὀλιγαρκής contented with little 71.2.6
- ὀλίγος little, small, few 1.3.6, 5.3.7, 6.1.5, 6.1.7, 6.1.9, 7.2.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.5, 12.4.5, 12.4.5, 12.4.5, 12.5.5, 14.1.2, 14.5.3, 16.2.3, 16.2.3, 16.4.4, 18.1.3, 18.2.5, 18.2.6, 18.5.8, 19.3.1, 19.3.7, 19.4.1, 21.1.6, 26.2.1, 71.2.6, 71.3.6, 71.7.3, 71.7.7, 71.9.4
- ὀλιγότης smallness, feebleness 71.2.6
- ὀλιγορέω to disregard, neglect, despise 2.3.3, 6.2.5, 16.1.4, 16.4.2, 71.2.7, 71.9.1, 71.11.2
- ὀλιγορία contempt, carelessness 5.3.1, 7.4.8
- ὀλιγώρος contemptuous 7.3.6, 10.1.1
- ὀλικῶς in general 7.3.1
- ὀλισθηρός liable to slip 10.3.2
- ὄλισθος slip 10.4.2
- ὀλκή attraction, inclination; continuance 4.4.1, 6.1.6, 6.3.1
- ὄλλυμι to destroy 65, 105
- ὄλος whole 5.1.6, 6.2.4, 6.2.5, 8.2.3, 19.3.4, 20.1.6, 71.5.1, 71.6.5
- ὄλωσ (65) on the whole, generally, in short
- ὀμαλός even 15.1.4, 17.4.4
- ὀμιλία company, conversation 6.1.6, 6.1.7, 8.3.1
- ὀμοιος like, the same 50, 3.2.2, 3.6.4, 4.5.4, 9.2.5, 19.1.4
- ὀμολογία agreement 11.1.5
- ὀμόλογος similar, agreeing 7.3.2, 22.2.5
- ὀμόνοια concord 23.2.1
- ὀμότεχνος colleague 9.1.8, 12.6.9
- ὀμοῦ at the same place, together, at once 10.2.6, 18.1.2, 18.1.2, 18.1.3, 71.8.1, 71.8.4
- ὀμοφρονέω to agree 3.1.6
- ὀμοφροσύνη unanimity 68
- ὀμόφρων unanimous, agreeing 22.2.1, 22.2.3
- ὄμως (65) all the same, nevertheless
- ὄνειδος matter of disgrace, disgraceful person 10.4.3
- ὄνησιμος useful 2.1.6, 71.5.4
- ὄνησις advantage, profit, use 1.2.3, 2.2.4, 8.1.4, 71.6.7
- ὀνίναμαι to have profit, gain 10.5.7, 10.5.8, 12.2.1, 12.2.4, 12.4.2, 20.4.4, 71.12.9

- ὄνομα name, reputation, word 7.1.7,
7.2.4, 14.2.7, 16.4.4, 17.1.1, 17.3.1,
18.4.2, 18.4.3, 22.2.2, 71.10.3,
71.10.3
- ὀνομάζω to call 21.1.1
- ὀνομαί to blame (Hom.) 10.4.6
- ὀνομαστός famous 7.1.4, 7.2.2,
11.2.1, 17.3.4
- ὀντότης reality 6.2.8
- ὄντως really, truly, indeed 2.1.6,
2.2.5, 3.6.4, 4.5.5, 5.1.2, 5.1.4, 5.2.6,
5.4.6, 6.1.4, 8.2.3, 12.5.3, 12.5.7,
12.6.4, 17.2.3, 18.4.5, 20.1.7, 24.1.3,
25.1.7, 71.9.5
- ὀπάζω to send (Hom.) 10.4.6
- ὀπρῶν in any way whatsoever,
somehow, as it were 1.1.1, 2.1.9,
3.5.4, 4.6.4, 5.1.2, 5.3.5, 6.2.8, 9.1.3,
9.1.4, 10.3.2, 10.4.8, 12.5.3, 14.2.9,
16.1.3, 17.3.2, 19.2.7, 19.3.6, 19.4.3,
20.2.2, 22.3.2, 23.3.5, 25.1.7, 26.1.2,
71.4.2, 71.6.1, 71.6.2, 71.6.3, 71.6.6,
71.9.5, 71.9.8, 71.10.5
- ὀπίσω backwards (Hom.) 19.3.8
- ὀπλίζω to arm 4.4.2, 8.1.2, 12.6.2,
16.2.5
- ὀπλισμός armour, weapons 71.9.7
- ὀποῖος of what sort 3.5.4, 7.4.2,
10.2.3, 10.3.6, 10.3.6
- ὀπόσος of what quantity, how much
9.1.1, 9.2.1, 10.4.4, 10.5.6, 10.5.7
- ὀποσοῦν of what quantity 13.2.10
- ὀπότε when 10.4.1, 10.4.1
- ὅπου where, wherever 1.2.7
- ὀπτικός that has to do with optics
14.4.1
- ὅπως how, in what manner, in the
way that 52, 53, 56, 93, 101, 105,
106, 107, 108, 114, 117, 120, 1.1.2,
1.3.5, 3.1.5, 6.4.1, 9.3.4, 9.3.6, 11.1.1,
11.1.5, 11.1.7, 13.4.5, 16.3.4, 19.2.2,
25.1.5, 71.1.2, 71.3.9, 71.7.2
- ὀπωσοῦν in any way whatsoever
12.3.5, 19.2.7, 20.3.3
- ὄρασις sight 13.2.5, 13.2.6, 13.2.8
- ὄράω (*see also* εἶδον) (52) to see,
observe, understand
- ὄργανικός organic 3.7.2
- ὄργάνωσις systematic treatment
11.2.1
- ὄργή anger 71.3.9
- ὄργια sacred rites, mysteries 15.2.3,
18.2.5
- ὀρθός upright, correct, genuine 69,
3.3.5, 5.1.7, 8.2.7, 8.3.7, 10.2.5,
14.4.6, 18.3.7; *see also* ἐξορθοῦ
- ὀρίζω to define, delimit 3.7.1, 3.7.3,
13.2.10, 18.5.2, 23.2.2, 23.2.4
- ὀρισμός definition 13.2.5
- ὀρμάομαι to strive, attempt 9.3.3,
9.3.6
- ὄρος definition 11.2.3, 13.2.2
- ὄς, ἥ, ὅν (314) who, which
- ὀσάκις every time 71.11.3
- ὄσος (101) as much as, as great as
- ὄσπερ who, which 5.1.2, 5.2.1, 6.3.1,
9.2.1, 9.2.5, 12.6.3, 13.3.5, 13.4.6,
14.4.3, 16.1.3, 16.1.4, 16.1.5, 17.3.1,
18.2.6, 19.3.8, 25.1.1, 71.2.4, 71.6.1
- ὅστις (53) whoever, whichever
- ὅστισοῦν (98) whoever, whichever
- ὅστισοτοῦν whoever, whichever
12.1.2, 14.3.3, 22.1.3
- ὅτέ now and then 1.1.5
- ὅτε when 2.1.7, 8.1.2, 18.4.2, 19.2.6,
23.2.3
- ὅτι (158) that
- οὐδέ (123) and not, but not, not
even
- οὐδεῖς (77) not one, nobody
- οὐκέτι no more, no longer 9.2.5,
11.2.7, 12.6.3
- οὐκέτι πῶ not yet 13.3.5
- οὐκουν certainly not, at least not
2.1.4, 2.3.6, 10.4.1, 11.2.1, 11.2.3,
11.2.5, 11.2.5, 12.1.1, 13.4.4, 14.2.9,
18.3.6
- οὐκοῦν (affirmative particle) 12.5.2
- οὐπῶ not yet 5.3.4, 14.3.4, 71.3.7
- οὐράνιος heavenly 14.4.2, 14.5.4,
14.5.6
- οὐρανός heaven 43, 43, 12.4.4, 14.4.4
- οὖς ear 17.2.1, 17.3.2, 17.3.5, 17.4.4
- οὐσία being, essence, reality; prop-
erty, resources 1.2.9, 3.7.1, 3.7.3,
3.7.8, 3.7.8, 4.3.3, 5.2.6, 6.3.5, 7.3.5,

- 22.3.5, 23.2.1, 23.2.3, 26.1.4, 71.3.8,
71.7.8, 71.8.8
- οὐσιώ to grant existence; *pass.* to
have one's being or essence 3.6.4,
3.7.1, 3.7.6, 3.7.8, 6.3.1, 6.4.3, 71.9.6
- οὐσίωσις substantification, being
7.3.5, 13.3.2, 14.1.2
- οὔτε and not, neither, nor 1.2.1, 1.2.1,
1.2.6, 5.3.5, 7.1.2, 8.2.2, 8.2.3, 9.3.1,
9.3.1, 12.1.2, 12.2.4, 12.2.4, 12.6.9,
12.6.9, 14.3.2, 14.3.2, 15.2.6, 15.2.6,
15.3.1, 22.1.2, 22.1.2, 23.1.4, 26.2.6,
71.7.6
- οὗτος (355) this, this man
- οὗτοςί this 3.3.1
- οὕτω(ς) (97) in this way, so
- οὕτωςί in this way, so 5.1.5, 8.1.4,
16.4.5, 18.2.4, 18.4.1, 19.2.5, 19.3.6,
26.1.6, 26.1.7, 26.2.2, 71.9.1
- οὐχάπαξ not only once 14.2.2, 19.2.2
- οὐχῆκιστα not least, especially
13.3.2, 71.11.7
- ὀφειλή duty 1.2.1
- ὀφείλω to owe 3.2.2, 7.1.5, 10.2.2,
14.4.6, 71.1.3
- ὄφελος profit 12.5.4
- ὄφλημα debt 25.2.5
- ὀφλισκάνω, ὄφλω to incur, draw
upon oneself 1.2.8, 3.3.3, 11.2.5
- ὄχημα vehicle 71.9.3
- ὄχληρός laborious 15.1.4
- ὄψέ late 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 5.3.2, 9.1.5,
12.2.4, 14.2.1, 14.2.8, 14.3.1, 71.8.4
- ὄψιμαίτερον later 14.1.5
- παγκόσμιος of the whole world 108,
71.8.7
- παθητικός emotional 6.2.5, 6.3.1,
6.3.4, 15.3.3, 15.4.2, 19.3.2, 71.9.9
- πάθος experience, affliction 9.3.3,
9.3.7
- παιδάριον small child 17.2.8
- παιδεία teaching, education, culture
2.1.4, 2.1.7, 4.3.3, 4.6.2, 5.4.1, 10.1.1,
16.1.8, 16.2.1, 17.1.4, 17.1.4, 17.2.1,
17.2.7, 17.4.2, 18.5.7, 71.2.1, 71.2.4,
71.7.3, 71.8.3, 71.12.2, 71.12.4
- παιδεύω to educate, instruct 17, 34,
94, 17 title, 17.1.1, 17.2.3, 17.3.2,
20.1.6, 24.1.2
- παδίον child 14.4.4
- παῖς child, son 12.6.5, 14.5.2
- παίω to strike, whip 10.4.4
- πάλαι long ago, in antiquity 1.2.5,
6.2.2, 8.1.1, 12.1.1, 12.2.3, 13.1.2,
14.2.1, 16.1.1, 16.3.2, 18.3.3, 18.4.1,
19.5.1, 22.1.2, 22.2.6, 71.2.2
- παλαιός of old date, ancient 1.2.2,
1.2.5, 2.2.1, 2.3.4, 2.3.7, 14.1.5,
17.1.1, 18.3.4, 19.5.3, 20.1.1, 20.2.3,
21.1.2, 22.2.1
- πάλαισμα wrestling 21.2.6
- πάλιν once again 12.5.5, 19.5.3
- πάμπλειστος very numerous 17.2.5
- παμπλήρης very full, bountiful 1.2.5
- πανηγυρικός laudatory, panegyric
20.3.2
- πάνσοφος all-wise 2.3.4, 3.4.2, 13.3.2
- παντάπασι(ν) completely, entirely
61, 1.3.2, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.3.5, 3.5.3,
4.1.1, 4.5.7, 4.6.1, 5.1.2, 6.1.10, 7.4.8,
8.1.3, 9.1.3, 9.1.6, 9.3.3, 10.2.5,
10.5.2, 12.2.4, 13.2.4, 13.4.6, 14.2.9,
14.3.2, 16.4.6, 19.2.6, 21.2.1, 22.3.4,
23.3.3, 23.3.4, 24.1.2, 24.3.3, 25.1.8,
26.2.6, 71.9.9
- παντέλειος perfect, consummate, ex-
haustive 2.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.6.4, 4.2.3,
4.3.4, 5.3.4, 5.4.2, 7.4.7, 8.3.7, 9.2.4,
9.3.3, 11.2.3, 13.3.5, 13.3.6, 13.4.5,
14.1.2, 14.1.4, 14.5.5
- πάντοθεν from all directions 12.2.6,
23.1.5
- παντοῖος of all kinds, diverse 1.3.3,
17.4.3, 18.5.8, 20.4.4, 71.8.2, 71.8.3,
71.12.4
- πάντως 49, in every way, assuredly,
certainly 2.2.2, 2.3.3, 3.1.9, 3.2.3,
3.3.7, 3.7.8, 5.1.7, 5.3.9, 5.4.1, 5.4.3,
5.4.4, 6.2.8, 6.4.2, 6.4.2, 6.4.5, 9.2.2,
10.1.5, 10.2.3, 10.2.4, 10.3.3, 10.5.1,
12.2.1, 12.3.6, 12.6.7, 14.1.1, 16.4.1,
17.1.2, 18.1.1, 18.3.7, 18.4.5, 19.1.1,
19.5.5, 20.1.7, 21.1.5, 21.1.7, 22.2.3,

- 22.3.2, 23.2.2, 23.3.4, 25.1.2, 71.1.3, 71.11.6
- πάνυ (53) altogether, very, quite; famous, great
- παρά (50) from the side of, by the side of, beside, because of
- παραβάλλω to compare, set against, *med.* risk one's life 39, 5.1.2, 6.2.5, 7.4.6, 10.1.5, 11.1.1, 12.1.5, 12.2.4, 12.3.2, 12.5.1, 14.4.4, 14.5.2, 14.5.2, 16.1.1, 16.1.2, 16.2.5, 20.1.1, 20.2.1, 71.1.3
- παράδειγμα example 3.7.5
- παραδειγματικός using examples 71.7.2
- παραδίδωμι to leave, transmit, submit 3.5.4, 3.7.2, 19.5.1, 21.2.3
- παράδοσις handing down, treatment, doctrine 3.3.6, 3.5.1, 3.5.5, 7.3.3, 21.1.6, 22.1.1
- παρακατέχω to keep back 5.2.2
- παρακερδαίνω to gain unjustly 5.2.4
- παρακινδυνεύω to venture, act boldly 16.1.2
- παραλαμβάνω to admit, adopt 26.1.3 *v.l.*
- παραληρέω to talk nonsense 9.1.5
- παραμετρέω to compare 14.5.2
- παραπέμπω to send on, transmit 17.4.3, 21.1.2, 71.5.5
- παραπλήσιος about equal, similar, same 2.3.7, 3.2.4, 3.6.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.4, 8.2.3, 8.3.6, 10.5.1, 10.5.1, 12.5.2, 13.2.8, 16.2.1, 17.1.1, 17.3.1, 17.4.1, 18.3.2, 19.3.2, 20.2.2, 22.2.3, 71.5.5, 71.6.7, 71.7.4
- παραπομπή bringing out 71.9.3
- παραρρέω to flow past, slip away 2.1.5
- παρασκευάζω to prepare, train 4.4.2
- παρασκευαστέον one must prepare 78
- παρασκευή preparation, treatise, exercise 56, 1.2.3, 18.3.5, 18.5.4, 21.1.2, 71.6.2, 71.7.8, 71.8.8
- παρατίθεμαι to cite, mention 19.5.2, 19.5.6
- πατρατραχύνω to make harsh 17.2.7
- παρατρέχω to pass over, omit 4.5.5, 10.4.8
- παράτροπος strange 17.2.8
- παραφθέγγομαι to utter, let drop 9.1.4
- πάρεδρος aide, assistant 11.1.6
- παρείκω to permit, allow 5.2.2
- πάρειμι to be present, at hand 1.3.5, 9.1.6, 21.1.5, 22.3.4, 71.1.1, 71.1.2
- παρέλκω to draw, seduce 5.3.7
- παρεμπίπτω to intrude 6.2.7
- πέρεργον secondary business 71.12.8
- (παρέρχομαι,) παρήλθον to pass away; pass unnoticed, evade 41, 3.3.2, 10.4.9
- παρέχω to give, offer, supply 10.1.6, 10.4.2, 10.5.7, 20.1.7, 23.3.2
- παρήκω to stretch along; to come, arise 16.1.6, 18.2.9
- παρήμι to leave (aside) 1.1.4, 3.5.4, 4.6.3, 11.1.3, 13.4.3, 13.4.4, 17.3.4
- παρίστημι, παριστάω to show, indicate 115, 19.4.2
- πάροδος entrance; passage, passing by 5.2.3, 19.2.2, 71.8.5
- παροιμία proverb, saying 1.3.1, 1.3.4, 3.1.6, 8.3.3, 10.1.6, 11.2.7, 12.5.4, 15.2.3, 26.2.7, 26.2.8
- παροράω to overlook, disregard 10.3.4, 10.4.8, 12.1.5, 12.3.3, 14.2.6, 17.3.5, 71.6.8
- παρησία confidence, freedom, outspokenness 3.3.4, 3.5.7, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 9.2.2, 10.2.5, 10.4.3, 12.5.7, 12.6.6, 20.2.1, 23.1.3
- πᾶς (449) all, every, whole
- πάσχω to feel, suffer 6.2.9, 6.3.5, 9.3.6
- πατήρ father 10.4.2, 10.4.5
- πάτριος ancestral, traditional, belonging to fathers 6.2.2, 16.1.9, 16.2.5, 16.2.6, 16.3.2
- πατρίς homeland, native city 114, 6.1.1, 6.1.8, 6.2.4, 6.4.6, 8.2.6, 16.2.4, 16.2.5, 19.1.1, 20.4.2, 20.4.2
- παύομαι to cease 3.7.8, 3.7.8
- πεδίων level ground 15.1.4

- πείθω to persuade, convince 3.1.1,
 3.1.1, 3.1.4, 3.6.7, 3.7.1, 3.7.3, 3.7.9,
 3.7.9, 4.1.1, 5.2.5, 5.3.7, 10.2.6,
 12.2.5, 12.7.2, 14.4.6, 18.3.6, 19.5.6,
 20.2.3, 21.2.3, 23.1.2, 23.2.5, 24.1.4,
 24.3.2
 πείρα experience 2.3.4, 13.2.4, 13.2.9,
 18.3.1, 22.1.1, 71.4.2, 71.11.1
 πειράομαι to try, attempt, experience
 1.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.3.7, 3.2.1, 3.2.3, 3.2.6,
 6.1.10, 7.4.1, 7.4.7, 9.3.6, 11.1.2,
 13.4.5, 16.1.7, 18.3.6, 19.2.6, 19.3.3,
 19.4.6, 19.5.6, 20.1.6, 20.2.4, 24.2.2,
 24.2.2, 26.2.6, 26.2.8, 71.2.1, 71.5.3
 πειστικός persuasive 18.3.6 (γρ.),
 19.4.5, 20.3.1, 20.3.3
 πέμπω to send 8.1.2
 περαίνω to accomplish, establish,
 develop 3.4.1, 7.4.3, 11.1.3, 12.3.6,
 13.3.6, 13.4.6, 14.1.2, 71.7.4
 πέραν on the other side, over 17.2.7
 πέρας limit, perfection, accomplish-
 ment 8.1.4, 13.3.6, 14.1.4, 14.3.2,
 14.5.7
 περάτωσις conclusion 9.3.4
 περί (456) around, about
 περιάδω *pass.* to be repeated 16.1.1
 περιαμπίσχω to cover, envelop 3.3.2
 περιαντολογία to speak about oneself
 59
 περιβάλλω to amplify, expand 20.3.5
 περίβλημα clothing, adornment
 15.2.1, 26.2.2, 71.9.1
 περιγίνομαι to surpass, be successful;
 survive, escape 3.1.8, 4.5.6, 7.1.6,
 9.3.4, 12.1.4, 12.6.8
 περίεμι to go around 15.4.2
 περίεμι to remain 2.2.3
 περιεργάζομαι to over-elaborate
 16.4.5
 περιεργία over-elaboration 71.9.2
 περίεργος elaborate, superfluous
 15.2.1, 26.1.3
 περικοσμέω to adorn all around
 18.2.2
 περινοέω to elaborate cunningly
 26.1.7
 περίνοια perspicacity, cunning 2.1.7,
 3.5.5, 5.1.3, 8.3.6, 11.1.2, 12.7.4,
 13.2.1, 20.2.5, 71.11.7, 71.12.4
 περιοδικός periodical, recurrent
 20.3.5
 περιουσία abundance, affluence 84,
 71.1.1, 71.7.5, 71.12.4
 περισπούδατος eagerly striven for
 47, 4.1.5
 περιστέλλω to cover 10.4.8
 περισφύζω to preserve 10.4.6
 περιτρέπω to refute, disprove 12.4.2,
 23.3.2, 71.5.3
 περιττός extraordinary, surpassing
 16.1.3
 περιφανής illustrious, conspicuous
 113, 5.1.2, 7.2.2, 7.4.6, 11.1.1, 12.3.2,
 14.2.8, 71.7.3
 περιφέρω to carry round, make
 known 3.1.3
 περίφημος famous 7.2.6
 περιφρονέω to despise 4.1.2, 17.4.2
 περιφρόνησις disdain, snobbery 57,
 71.7.3
 περιχώρησις rotation, oscillation
 23.2.3
 περονάω to pierce 6.4.5
 περόνη pin 6.4.4, 6.4.5
 πέτρα rock 15.1.4
 πεῦσις question 24.1.3
 πη somehow, somewhere 40, 5.2.2
 πηγάζω to flow forth, bring forth
 2.1.9, 26.2.5
 πηγὴ stream, source 10.2.1, 18.2.9
 πήγνυμι to make solid 6.4.3
 πήρωσις mutilation, disability 5.1.2
 πῆχυς length, measure 13.2.8, 13.2.10
 πιθανός convincing, specious 15.4.1,
 18.3.6, 18.3.6
 πικρία bitterness 8.1.2, 10.5.3
 πικρός sharp, vindictive 7.1.8
 πῖναξ drawing-tablet 71.8.1
 πίνω to drink 6.1.8
 πιστεύω to trust, believe in 66, 6.2.2
 πίστις belief, confirmation 92, 11.1.5,
 12.3.6, 12.5.5, 13.2.10, 17.1.3, 20.1.4,
 20.1.7, 23.2.1, 71.11.4

- πιστός trustworthy, convincing 3.3.4, 3.6.4, 5.3.2, 7.3.3, 10.2.1, 71.12.1
- πιστόω *med.* to confirm, prove 17.3.1, 17.4.1, 18.1.2, 18.5.3, 19.5.4, 25.1.3, 71.7.4
- πίστωσις proof, confirmation 19.3.7
- πλανάομαι to wander about, roam, to be in doubt 3.3.2, 15.2.3
- πλάνη going astray, confusion, aberration 2.3.8, 4.5.5, 6.1.2
- πλάττω to form, feign 57, 2.1.7, 8.1.2, 19.4.4
- πλατύς wide 10.3.7
- πλατωνίζω to write like Plato 16.1.1
- πλειστάκις very often 18.4.2
- πλείστος (90) most, greatest, largest
- πλείων (71) more, greater, larger
- πλέκω to plait, twine 26.2.7
- πλεονεκτέω to surpass, be superior 5.2.1, 5.2.4
- πλεονέκτημα advantage 4.1.5
- πλεονεξία excellence, advantage, superiority 10.3.5, 12.2.5, 22.2.4
- πλήθος multitude 12.6.2, 12.6.2, 23.1.3
- πλήθω to be full 1.3.4
- πλήν except 1.1.5, 5.4.6, 7.4.6, 13.4.3, 18.2.5, 26.2.1, 71.6.4
- πλήρης full 5.2.2, 71.9.4
- πλήττω to strike 17.3.2
- πλουτέω to be rich, productive 85, 71.6.2, 71.7.1
- πλούτος richness, wealth 84, 9.3.5, 71.7.8, 71.8.8, 71.12.8
- πλωτήρ sailor 3.7.5
- πνέω to breathe 71.9.5
- ποθινός full of longing, desirable 46, 6.1.3, 6.1.7
- πόθεν whence?, how? 7.1.3, 7.4.7, 18.3.6, 20.4.1, 71.3.4
- ποθέω to desire, long for 41, 4.2.2, 6.1.1, 20.1.1
- πόθος longing, endeavour 3.3.2, 14.4.2, 26.1.3
- ποιέω to do, make 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.2.2, 3.5.9, 5.1.6, 5.2.1, 5.2.5, 6.4.1, 7.1.2, 10.5.7, 14.5.3, 15.2.6, 17.2.1, 17.3.4, 19.3.2, 19.3.6, 19.3.8, 20.1.1, 20.1.2, 21.1.3, 21.1.5, 21.2.4, 23.2.5, 24.1.2, 25.2.3, 71.1.2, 71.4.5, 71.6.6, 71.7.5, 71.12.1, 71.12.1
- ποιητικός poetic 10.2.3
- ποικιλία intricacy 11.2.3
- ποιός of what kind? 12.1.3
- ποιότης quality 71.10.1
- πολεμέω to make war 78
- πόλεμος hostile 108, 25.1.4
- πόλεμος war, struggle, opposition 24, 24 title, 24.1.1, 25.1.5, 25.1.7, 71.6.4, 71.8.2
- πόλις city, state 103, 105, 2.3.4, 8.3.4
- πολιτεία constitution, politics 99, 100, 104, 1.1.2, 2.3.4, 8.2.6; Πολιτεία: *see Index of Greek names*
- πολίτευμα pursuit; institution 50, 1.1.3
- πολιτεύω *med.* to be a citizen, take part in politics, live, behave; *pass.* to be applied 75, 81, 1.1.3, 5.2.5, 8.2.7, 14.1.1, 16.2.6, 17.1.4, 25.2.5
- πολιτικός political; ordinary, everyday 77, 78, 80, 84, 16.1.6, 16.3.1, 18.3.2, 18.3.4, 20.2.5, 20.4.1, 71.3.2, 71.8.3
- πολίτης fellow-citizen 6.1.8
- πολλάκις often 65, 67, 79, 3.4.1, 3.5.9, 4.3.2, 6.4.1, 7.1.2, 9.1.4, 9.3.4, 16.4.6, 17.1.1, 19.2.1, 19.3.3, 21.1.1, 71.6.9, 71.10.3, 71.10.4
- πολλαχῆ in many places 4.6.5
- πολλαχοῦ in many places, often 7.3.5, 24.2.2, 71.11.4, 71.11.7
- πολλοστός many 14.3.3
- πολυαρκής resourceful 18.1.1, 71.3.8
- πολυειδής diverse, versatile 18.5.6
- πολυμαθής learned, well versed 3.1.3, 17.2.4, 18.5.7, 71.12.7
- πολυμαθία wide learning 5.1.3, 71.2.4, 71.3.9, 71.4.1, 71.7.7, 71.12.4
- πολυπόθητος much longed-for 10.4.4
- πολυπραγμοσύνη study, dealing with 5.3.2, 11.2.4, 26.2.1
- πολύς (197) much, many
- πολύστροφος intricate 3.5.1
- πολυτάλαντος worth many talents 20.4.4

- πολυτίμητος much valued 17.2.5
 πολύχους prolific 71.7.1
 πολυωφελής very useful 2.2.1
 πομπευτικός solemn, elevated 18.2.8
 πομπεύω to be solemn 20.3.2
 πονέω to labour, exert oneself, study, write 4.3.1, 4.5.1, 7.1.1, 10.4.1, 11.2.2, 12.3.5, 12.5.4, 12.5.4, 12.5.6, 12.6.6, 12.6.9, 13.3.5, 13.4.3, 13.4.6, 14.1.4, 14.2.2, 14.5.3, 14.5.7, 16.1.8, 17.3.3, 71.4.2, 71.8.5
 πονηρός bad 66
 πόνος work, toil, exertion 1.2.2, 2.2.3, 3.1.2, 8.3.5, 7.3.5, 12.1.3, 12.3.5, 14.3.3, 14.5.6, 15.1.3, 16.1.6, 16.2.1, 16.2.3, 17.4.2, 18.2.9, 18.5.8, 21.1.6, 21.2.1, 26.1.7, 71.3.5, 71.8.6
 πορεία mode of walking, gait 26.1.6
 πορίζομαι to obtain, find 82, 18.5.3, 71.8.7
 πόρμιος resourceful, inventive 5.4.4, 18.3.1, 71.7.1
 ποριμότης inventiveness 5.1.3
 πορισμός means 71.7.5
 πόρρω far away, far from 1.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.2, 6.3.1, 7.2.4, 9.1.6, 9.3.3, 10.2.1, 10.2.6, 11.2.2, 13.1.2, 14.5.4, 15.3.2, 19.5.1, 21.2.4, 22.2.3, 23.1.5
 πόρρωθεν from afar 71.8.7
 ποσάκις how often 9.3.6
 πόσος how great, how much 12.1.5, 12.2.5, 12.2.5, 71.12.1
 ποταμός river 2.1.5, 15.1.4
 ποτε once, at some time, ever 56, 1.3.4, 1.3.7, 2.1.5, 3.1.4, 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.5.4, 3.6.7, 4.6.4, 6.1.10, 6.4.1, 11.1.7, 12.1.3, 12.1.5, 12.3.6, 16.1.4, 19.2.3, 25.2.1, 71.6.6, 71.6.7; *see also* τίποτε
 πότερον whether 58
 πότιμος drinkable 15.1.4, 18.2.9
 ποῦ where? 12.4.3, 12.6.6
 που somewhere, perhaps 4.3.4, 6.1.7, 7.2.5, 9.1.4, 10.3.4, 10.3.6, 71.6.6
 πούς foot 26.1.6
 πράγμα (71) thing, matter, *pl.* state, republic
 πραγματεία business, treatment 3.4.1, 3.5.1
 πραγματειώδης based on reality 71.7.4
 πρακτέος to be done, practical 2.2.1, 71.3.2, 71.8.3
 πρακτικός practical 20.2.4
 πράξις deed 67, 113, 117, 6.4.6
 πράττω to fare, do, create, effect 38, 47, 48, 48, 50, 56, 64, 79, 79, 81, 117, 2.3.8, 3.4.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.2.4, 4.3.4, 5.3.7, 6.2.5, 6.3.3, 7.4.7, 8.2.6, 8.2.7, 8.3.4, 9.1.6, 9.1.8, 11.1.5, 11.2.3, 12.7.4, 19.2.6, 19.4.5, 23.1.5, 23.2.5, 25.1.3, 25.1.7, 25.1.8, 71.1.3
 πρέπω to be suitable 18.5.8, 19.1.3, 71.9.1, 71.9.6
 πρεσβύτης old man 8.3.4
 πρεσβυτικός adult, mature 14.4.4
 πρίαμαι to buy 2.2.3, 2.2.3, 2.2.5, 4.2.1, 10.1.4, 17.2.7
 πρίν before 5.1.4
 πρό before 10, 1.2.4, 3.2.1, 3.5.5, 3.6.2, 4.6.3, 5.3.4, 5.3.8, 5.4.2, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.4.1, 10 title, 10.1.1, 10.5.1, 10.5.6, 11.2.1, 12.1.1, 12.1.2, 12.3.1, 12.6.7, 13.4.6, 14.3.3, 14.4.3, 14.5.3, 14.5.4, 14.5.6, 18.2.1, 18.5.7, 71.3.2, 71.3.5, 71.3.7, 71.4.2, 71.8.1, 71.8.5, 71.8.5
 προαγορεύω to tell beforehand 1.2.9, 3.6.1, 10.5.2
 προάγω to bring forward, induce 14.1.1, 23.2.5
 προαιρέομαι to prefer 5.3.8, 5.4.1, 17.3.5
 προαποθνήσκω to die before 21.2.3
 προαύλιον forecourt 14.4.2
 προβάλλω to propose 3.6.2
 πρόβλημα problem 3.1.5, 3.6.1, 3.6.2, 26.1.2, 71.3.6, 71.7.5
 πρόγονος forebear, origin 10.3.7, 14.2.4
 πρόγραμμα proclamation, programme 4.5.3, 8.2.4
 προδείκνυμι, -ύω to show, disclose, convey 3.5.7, 5.2.2, 17.2.1, 19.5.4, 24.2.2, 71.9.3, 71.10.4

- πρόδηλος clear, obvious 16.3.3,
 23.1.6, 25.2.4
 προδιορισμός previous definition
 3.5.3 *v.l.*
 προεδρία precedence 71.12.8
 προείδον to foresee 10.2.3, 10.3.3
 πρόειμι to emerge, come forth 9.2.3,
 9.2.3, 14.1.2, 18.2.2, 18.2.3, 26.2.5
 πρόνειμι to be in before 7.3.2
 *προεπαγγελία assurance beforehand
 21.2.2
 προεπαγγέλλομαι to announce be-
 forehand 21.1.6
 προέρχομαι: *see* προήλθον
 προέχω to be superior, have the ad-
 vantage of 10.4.1, 11.1.3, 12.6.7,
 14.5.3, 20.1.3, 22.2.4
 προήγορος defender, advocate 3.1.8
 προήλθον to advance 10.8
 πρόθεσις object, aim, curriculum,
 subject 2.2.4, 12.4.4, 15.2.5, 16.1.8,
 16.3.4, 16.4.1, 16.4.3, 16.4.5, 16.4.6,
 17.3.1, 18.2.1, 18.2.6, 18.3.5, 19.1.4,
 19.2.5, 19.3.2, 19.3.7, 19.4.5, 19.5.3,
 20.1.2, 21.2.6, 23.3.5, 24.1.2, 25.1.8,
 25.2.5, 26.2.1, 71.5.1, 71.7.6, 71.9.1,
 71.9.5, 71.9.5
 πρόθυμος enthusiastic 12.7.4, 16.3.2
 προίκα freely, unbribed 71.4.6
 προίσταμαι to put in front 71.3.1
 πρόκειμαι to be proposed for discus-
 sion 3.1.4, 3.6.6, 5.4.5, 6.4.6, 12.3.6,
 19.3.5, 71.7.2
 προκοπή progress, improvement
 1.2.6, 2.1.6, 4.1.3, 10.1.4
 προκρίνω to prefer 17.3.5
 προλαμβάνω to take beforehand, an-
 ticipate, precede 1.2.7, 6.2.2, 10.3.7,
 13.2.4, 13.2.4, 71.1.2
 πρόληψις preconception 5.4.3
 προνοέω to provide 2.3.4
 πρόνοια providence, care, circum-
 spection 66, 66, 109, 16.1.2, 17.2.1,
 71.5.3
 προνομία privilege 71.12.8
 προοίμιον introduction, proem 1, 1
 title, 1.3.7, 3.6.1, 12.5.2, 14.1.2,
 14.4.2
 προπαρασκευάζω to prepare in ad-
 vance 10.3.3
 πρόσ (169) from the side of; near, at;
 to
 προσάγω to add, bring to 3.5.4,
 13.3.6
 προσανέχω to devote oneself to, at-
 tend to 6.2.4, 9.1.6, 12.6.8, 71.11.3
 προσαρμόζω to fit, agree with 26.2.4
 προσβαίνω to approach 11.1.5
 προσδιορισμός further definition,
 specification 3.5.3 (*v.l.* προ-)
 προσδοκάω to expect 3.4.2
 προσδοκία expectation 3.5.9
 πρόσσειμι to be added, to belong to,
 to be present (as well) 2.1.6, 2.3.5,
 4.2.3, 4.3.2, 5.2.1
 προσπιτίθην to add 11.2.7
 προσέτι above, besides 6.1.7, 13.4.5
 προσέχω to pay attention to, study
 85, 1.2.1, 3.3.4, 3.5.9, 4.1.2, 4.5.7,
 4.6.4, 5.1.7, 6.2.5, 7.2.3, 7.3.1, 9.1.5,
 10.5.5, 12.2.5, 12.3.5, 12.4.2, 13.4.5,
 14.5.4, 15.1.4, 15.2.3, 17.3.3, 18.2.6,
 19.2.1, 19.5.1, 19.5.5, 19.5.5, 20.2.4,
 21.1.2, 22.2.5, 24.2.1, 24.3.4, 25.1.1,
 71.2.5, 71.9.2, 71.11.4
 προσήκω to belong to, be appropriate
 4.3.2, 5.2.5, 10.4.3, 10.4.5, 11.2.3,
 14.3.2, 16.1.2, 16.1.5, 16.1.6, 16.4.6,
 18.2.1, 19.1.3, 25.2.1, 25.2.4, 26.2.3,
 26.2.7
 πρόσθεν before 6.1.1
 προσίεμαι to admit, accept 3.1.3,
 12.3.1, 14.5.4, 17.2.8, 71.4.6, 71.6.1
 προσίσταμαι to be against, oppose
 73, 9.2.1
 πρόσκειμαι to be partial, be devoted
 to, belong to 6.2.4, 6.3.4, 6.4.6,
 7.3.1, 8.2.3, 9.1.4, 16.1.5, 71.4.3
 προσκόπτω to offend, commit a
 blunder 2.3.8
 προσλαμβάνω to adopt 26.1.3 (*v.l.*
 παρα-)
 προσνεύω to be inclined towards
 19.2.3
 προσοράω to look at 9.1.8, 10.3.6,
 10.4.7

- προσπάθεια partiality, affection 69,
9.1.4, 13.2.11, 24.3.1, 71.6.7
- προσπαίζω to mock 8.1.4, 18.2.6
- προσπάσχω to feel affection for
6.1.6, 6.3.3, 6.4.6, 9.3.5
- προσπεριβάλλομαι to surround one-
self with, lay one's hands on 5.2.1
- προσπεριεργάζομαι to elaborate fur-
ther 26.1.6
- προσπίπτω to hit, befall 2.2.4
- προσποιέομαι to add, procure for
oneself, lay claim to, pretend 4.1.1,
4.6.4, 5.4.6, 8.1.4, 13.4.8, 15.3.2,
19.4.6, 25.2.3
- προσταλαιπωρέω to persevere in,
work hard with 16.2.1
- προστάτης leader, protector, cham-
pion 7.1.5, 8.3.4, 23.1.3, 71.5.5,
71.8.3
- προστίθημι to add, *med.* side with,
yield to, devote oneself to 6.1.6,
11.2.5, 12.2.1, 14.5.6, 14.5.6, 16.1.3,
17.4.3, 19.2.3, 26.1.7
- πρόσχημα pretence, appearance 57,
4.3.2, 71.6.1
- προσχράομαι to use 22.3.4, 26.1.6
- πρόσω forward, forth 19.3.8
- προτείνω to propose, stipulate 3.5.2
- πρότερον before, earlier 1.2.7, 1.2.8,
2.2.2, 2.3.2, 2.3.2, 3.1.7, 3.3.5, 4.6.3,
10.5.5, 12.1.4, 12.2.6, 12.3.5, 12.4.1,
13.3.3, 14.2.1, 16.1.1, 17.1.1, 19.5.1
- πρότερος earlier, predecessor 10.2.5,
14.2.5, 14.3.4, 18.3.4, 18.5.4
- προτίθημι to set up, propose, *med.* to
propose to oneself, resolve 2.3.6,
3.1.7, 3.1.9, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.6.3, 5.4.1,
7.1.8, 9.2.4, 10.5.2, 11.1.3, 11.1.4,
11.1.7, 12.5.1, 16.3.2, 17.3.1, 18.5.1,
19.5.6, 71.7.1, 71.8.8
- προτρέπομαι to urge forward, turn
toward 19.5.1, 19.5.4
- προὔπτος manifest 2.3.3, 9.3.4
- προφέρω to present, express; to sur-
pass 9.1.2, 9.2.4, 9.3.4, 10.4.4,
14.2.10, 16.1.2, 17.2.4, 18.3.6, 19.2.8,
19.3.5, 19.4.6, 71.9.3
- προχειρίζομαι to arrange, present,
provide for oneself 2.2.2, 71.8.2
- πρόχειρος ready, accessible 66,
20.2.5, 71.7.8, 71.8.6
- προχωρέω to advance, develop 14.1.2
- πρώην earlier 11.2.1
- πρωτεία first prize 10.2.6
- πρωτεύω to be first, leading 12.3.1,
18.2.5
- πρώτος first 1.1.3, 1.3.7, 3.4.1, 3.5.5,
4.4.3, 4.4.4, 7.1.3, 7.2.6, 11.2.1,
11.2.3, 11.2.4, 11.2.7, 12.1.1, 12.5.2,
13.2.1, 13.3.1, 13.3.1, 13.3.3, 13.3.3,
13.4.2, 14.2.4, 14.2.4, 14.3.2, 14.5.1,
16.4.3, 18.3.1, 19.1.1, 19.2.3, 21.1.3,
21.1.5, 21.1.5, 26.1.1
- Πυθόχρηστος delivered by the
Pythian god 3.6.6
- πυκνός frequent 71.7.5
- πυκνώω to make crowded 20.3.2
- πῦρ fire 12.5.4
- (*) πυρρηγίζω to be written in
pyrrhics 15.4.3
- πω yet 13.3.5, 14.3.2, 17.1.4, 19.3.4,
22.3.4, 71.3.5
- πῶς how? 1.1.4, 1.3.2, 2.1.7, 2.1.9,
2.1.9, 2.2.2, 3.1.4, 3.5.4, 4.1.3, 4.6.3,
5.4.1, 5.4.2, 6.1.7, 7.1.5, 7.3.6, 8.1.3,
10.4.9, 10.4.9, 10.5.4, 11.2.7, 12.3.3,
12.3.6, 12.3.6, 12.3.6, 12.3.6, 12.4.1,
18.2.7, 18.5.2, 23.2.4, 23.2.4, 23.2.5,
25.2.3
- πως in any way, somehow 5.1.5,
5.2.3, 5.3.1, 6.2.7, 6.2.8, 6.3.1, 7.3.1,
8.1.4, 14.3.4, 14.4.2, 15.2.6, 16.4.1,
17.1.1, 20.3.5, 22.3.4, 23.1.1, 26.1.6,
26.2.2, 26.2.5, 71.2.2, 71.8.7
- ῥάδιος easy 2.2.2, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.3.3,
3.1.2, 4.2.5, 4.4.3, 6.2.5, 6.4.5, 8.3.6,
9.1.1, 9.2.1, 11.1.5, 13.2.5, 13.2.8,
14.2.5, 15.1.2, 18.2.4, 18.2.9, 19.3.7,
19.4.5, 20.2.5, 21.2.6, 24.3.2, 71.1.1,
71.1.2, 71.2.1, 71.2.2, 71.6.1, 71.7.8,
71.8.1, 71.8.6, 71.10.4, 71.11.3
- ῥαστώνεομαι to be frivolous 18.2.6

- ῥασιώνη easiness, ease, relaxed attitude 6.1.2, 15.2.1, 17.3.2, 18.2.8, 18.3.7
 ῥαψωδός rhapsode 8.3.5
 ῥεῦμα stream, flow 2.1.5, 15.1.4
 ῥέω to flow 15.1.4, 15.1.4, 15.1.4, 16.4.3, 17.2.6, 18.2.4, 22.3.3, 23.2.1, 71.9.1
 ῥήγμα rift, cleft 15.1.4
 ῥῆμα word, phrase 15.4.3, 16.4.1, 16.4.4, 17.2.1, 19.2.7, 19.3.6, 19.3.7, 22.2.3, 26.1.1, 26.2.2
 ῥήματιον small word 71.10.4
 ῥητέον it must be said 71.1.2
 ῥητορεία rhetoric 8.3.5, 17.3.4
 ῥητορική rhetoric 24, 25, 21.1.6, 24 title, 24.1.1, 24.1.2, 24.2.1, 24.2.3, 24.2.4, 24.3.4, 25 title, 25.1.1, 25.1.1, 25.1.3, 25.1.5, 25.1.6, 25.1.6, 25.1.8, 25.2.1, 25.2.1, 71.11.7
 ῥητορικός rhetorical, orator 24, 25, 4.4.1, 4.6.3, 5.4.1, 17.4.2, 18.3.5, 19.1.3, 19.2.3, 19.5.3, 20.2.5, 21.1.1, 21.2.1, 21.2.3, 24 title, 24.1.2, 24.1.4, 25 title, 25.1.3, 25.1.4, 71.9.2, 71.11.1, 71.12.5
 ῥητός that may be spoken, dictum 28, 24.2.4
 ῥήτωρ public speaker, orator 17.3.3, 17.4.1, 18.3.5, 19.2.3, 24.1.2, 24.2.1, 71.11.4, 71.11.7
 ῥίπτω *perf. pass.* to be gone, vanished 12.5.5
 ῥοή flow 7.4.2
 ῥοπή turn of the scale, inclination 71.6.5
 ῥυθμός rhythm 15.4.3, 16.4.1
 ῥύμη force, vehemence 6.2.5, 71.5.1
 ῥώννυμι *perf. pass.* to be sound, strong, well endowed 2.1.4, 4.5.7, 23.1.4

 σαρκασμός mockery, sarcasm 71.6.5
 σαφής clear, obvious, transparent 3.2.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.4, 3.5.7, 5.1.5, 12.5.5
 σεμνηγορία solemn declaration 7.3.5
 σεμνός solemn, exalted 3.4.1, 3.4.1, 4.5.1, 4.5.1, 7.4.6, 10.4.6, 12.5.2, 12.5.2, 15.2.5, 16.4.6, 18.2.3, 26.2.8, 71.7.3, 71.9.4, 71.9.6, 71.11.3
 σεμνότης respect, Solemnity (of style) 45, 10.4.2, 16.4.1, 18.3.6
 σεμνώνω to exalt, venerate 3.1.2, 10.5.5, 19.2.8
 σημειόομαι to note down 19.2.1
 σημείωσις note 1.3.5
 σιγή silence 10.4.8
 σιωπάω to be silent 10.5.9
 σκάλλω to stir up 12.5.4
 σκέμμα problem 22.1.3
 σκέπτομαι to examine 5.1.7
 σκευάζω to prepare, construct 1.3.3, 11.1.7, 16.1.6
 σκέψις examination 1.2.4, 3.3.2, 23.3.4
 σκηνή stage, staginess 8.1.3, 19.5.3, 20.3.3
 σκιά shadow 9.1.3
 σκληρύνω to make hard, unpleasant 17.3.5
 σκληρός hard 15.1.2
 (*) σκοπέω to refer to 21.1.5
 σκοπός goal, aim, object, theme 1.1.6, 1.3.7, 2.3.6, 3.1.4, 3.4.1, 3.5.1, 3.7.9, 7.3.6, 8.1.4, 10.3.7, 12.1.5, 12.5.1, 13.3.5, 14.3.1, 16.4.6, 19.1.4, 20.1.2, 20.3.4, 22.2.1, 23.1.5, 24.2.1, 24.2.2, 26.1.3, 71.7.3, 71.9.5, 71.10.1, 71.10.4, 71.11.3, 71.11.6
 σκότος darkness, obscurity 3.3.7, 3.5.8, 3.6.5, 10.4.8, 21.2.5
 σκυτεύς shoemaker 8.3.4
 σκῶμμα *pl.* follies, blunders 4.6.3
 σοφία (102) wisdom, theory
 σοφίζομαι to contrive, suggest, affect 3.5.8, 5.2.3, 25.2.3
 *σόφισις invention 14.1.1
 σοφιστεία sophistry 8.3.5
 σοφιστεύω to act like a sophist, act dishonestly 4.3.3
 σοφιστής sophist 3.1.9
 σοφός wise 7, 8, 10, 4.2.2, 7 title, 7.1.1, 7.2.5, 8 title, 8.1.1, 8.3.7, 10 title, 12.6.4, 14.2.7, 26.1.4, 71.4.1, 71.5.5, 71.8.1
 σπανίζω to be rare 18.3.7

- σπάνιος rare 18.2.3, 19.2.7
 σπέρμα seed 71.12.2
 σπεύδω to hasten 6.1.1
 σπονδαῖος spondaic 15.4.3
 σπουδάζω (77) to strive, be eager, to study
 σπουδαῖος good, serious, interested; of interest, worth serious attention 3.1.3, 5.3.9, 17.4.2, 18.5.7, 71.6.8
 σπούδασμα pursuit, venture, work, treatise 2.1.6, 4.5.5, 10.4.4, 11.2.1, 12.2.4, 12.5.5, 17.2.2, 21.2.6, 71.9.6, 71.11.3
 σπουδαστέον one must strive 83
 σπουδαστής adherent, student 6.1.6, 12.3.5, 12.7.2, 14.2.3, 16.3.2, 18.5.2, 23.1.3
 σπουδή striving, zeal, study 3.4.2, 4.5.6, 5.2.1, 5.3.3, 5.3.5, 7.4.5, 10.4.8, 12.2.4, 12.3.1, 12.3.5, 12.4.3, 12.6.8, 13.3.6, 14.4.5, 16.1.3, 16.1.4, 16.2.2, 16.2.6, 18.2.6, 19.2.6, 19.4.4, 21.1.3, 22.1.3, 23.2.1, 23.3.3, 24.3.2, 71.7.5, 71.8.5
 σταθμός weight 13.2.8
 στασιαστικός seditious, in conflict 22.2.3
 στάσιμος stable, established 22.3.5
 στάσις faction 23.1.3
 στασιώδης seditious 22.3.5
 στασιώτης partisan, adherent 12.6.2
 στενώω to confine, cram 16.4.4
 στένωσις hardship 6.1.1
 στέργω to love, cherish 6.1.6, 6.2.4, 8.2.3
 στερεός solid 14.4.1
 στήλη monument 8.2.4
 στιλπνότης brightness 71.9.7
 στόμα mouth 10.3.7
 στοχαστικός able to hit; proceeding by guesswork 3.6.6, 15.4.1
 στρατεία military expedition 6.1.7
 στρατηγικός like a general 20.4.1
 στρατηγός military commander 114
 στρατιωτικός of a soldier, military 16.2.4
 στρέφω to twist, turn 1.3.6
 τρογγύλω to make round 20.3.5
 στροφή twist, tangle 11.2.3
 στρωματεῖς: *see Index of Greek names*
 συγγενής, ξυγ- related, of the same kind, corresponding 15.4.1, 15.4.3, 19.3.2
 συγγίνομαι, ξυγ- to associate with, consult, study 13.1.1, 19.5.2, 20.2.4, 21.1.2
 συγγνώμη pardon, forgiveness 10.3.3, 14.4.5, 23.1.5, 24.3.4, 25.2.5
 συγγνώμων forgiving, charitable 10.3.4
 συγγνωστός pardonable 18.4.5, 24.3.1
 σύγγραμμα writing, book 12.5.1, 21.1.2, 21.2.5
 συγγραφή writing 20.1.6, 20.3.1
 συγγράφω, ξυγ- to write down, compose 28, 2.3.4, 14.2.3, 16.2.1, 17.1.1, 21.1.1, 24.1.2, 25.1.6, 25.2.1, 71.3.2
 συγκαλύπτω to conceal 19.3.6, 21.2.5
 συγκατασκευάζω to prepare 2.1.2
 συγκεράννυμι to mix, prepare 8.2.7
 συγκινέω to move together with 3.7.7
 συγκρύπτω to hide 21.2.5
 συγχέω to confound, confuse 24.1.5
 συγχωρέω, ξυγ- to allow, concede 9.1.8, 11.1.4, 71.11.3
 συζεύγνυμι to yoke together 3.7.6
 συζῶ to live together with, live through 16.2.4, 26.1.5
 συκοφαντέω to distort, slander, misrepresent 4.3.2, 8.2.2, 20.1.5
 συλλαγχάνω, ξυλ- to receive by lot, experience by chance 53, 1.3.1, 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.3.4, 2.3.7, 6.1.6, 6.2.4, 6.3.3, 6.3.4, 6.4.6, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 9.1.5, 9.1.7, 15.1.2, 71.8.4
 συλλέγω to collect 5.3.6
 συλλογίζομαι, ξυλ- to infer, conclude 1.3.5, 2.3.2, 3.2.5, 3.6.7, 4.6.5, 12.2.2, 12.2.5, 13.2.3, 13.3.3, 14.2.1, 16.1.8, 17.3.2, 18.5.6, 18.5.7, 19.1.2, 19.2.1, 20.2.5, 22.1.1, 23.2.1, 24.2.1
 συλλογισμός syllogism 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 11.2.5
 συλλογιστικός syllogistic 3.5.3, 12.3.6, 13.2.5

- συμβαίνω, ξυμ- to occur, happen,
 turn out 3.7.7, 6.3.5, 9.1.4, 10.3.4,
 14.1.3, 19.2.6, 71.10.2, 71.11.3
 σύμβαμα accident 22.3.2
 συμβιώω to live together with, dedi-
 cate oneself to 6.2.2, 16.3.1, 20.4.3
 συμμαχία alliance, aid 12.6.5, 71.7.6
 σύμμαχος ally 3.7.9
 συμμ(ε)ίγνυμι to associate with 6.1.9,
 13.1.1
 συμεταβάλλω to change together
 with 22.3.3
 συμετρέω, ξυμ- to measure by com-
 parison 10.3.6, 11.1.1, 16.1.2
 (σύμ-,) ξύμμικτος mixed with 15.1.2
 συμπείθω to persuade, convince also
 6.2.5, 12.7.2, 19.5.6
 συμπεράσμα conclusion 13.2.3,
 26.1.2
 συμπιλέω to compress 15.4.3
 συμπίπτω, ξυμ- to happen, fall upon,
 hit the same spot 65, 2.3.2, 21.1.4,
 22.2.1
 συμπλοκή combination, attachment
 3.5.3, 3.7.3
 (συν-,) ξυνδοκέω to seem good to
 one as to another 3.1.1, 22.2.1
 συμπράττω to cooperate with 7.1.4
 συμφέρω to carry together with; to be
 of use 3.7.6, 9.1.2, 16.2.4, 71.6.3
 συμφοιτάω to go to school together
 17.2.4
 συμφορά misfortune, affliction
 12.6.5
 σύμφυτος inherent, congenital, inter-
 related 13.2.2, 13.3.1, 14.2.9, 18.2.4
 συμφύω to be inherent, congenital
 6.3.4, 6.4.2, 7.4.2
 συμφωνέω to agree in saying 1.3.6,
 3.1.7
 σύμφωνος harmonious, concordant,
 corresponding 7.3.4, 13.2.5, 13.2.10,
 22.3.1, 23.1.6
 σύν, ξύν with 1.3.2, 2.3.3, 3.1.4,
 3.7.2, 4.5.6, 5.1.4, 5.3.6, 5.4.6, 7.1.8,
 10.2.1, 10.3.5, 10.4.3, 10.4.7, 10.5.1,
 10.5.3, 13.2.3, 14.1.2, 15.2.1, 15.4.2,
 16.4.3, 18.1.3, 18.2.6, 18.2.8, 18.3.2,
 18.3.3, 18.5.7, 20.3.2, 23.1.3, 23.3.4
 συνάγω to gather together 71.8.1
 συναίσθησις shared perception; con-
 science 4.2.3, 5.2.4, 71.7.4
 συνακολασταίνω to join in licen-
 tious behaviour 9.1.2
 συνανοηταίνω to join in foolish be-
 haviour 9.1.2
 συναντάω to encounter 16.2.4
 συνάπτω to join together 26.2.6,
 26.2.8
 συνάσκησις training, study 18.3.1
 σύνδεσμος link, cohesion 13.2.11,
 18.5.3
 συνδέω to join together, attach 6.4.5,
 26.2.7
 συνδιάθεσις sympathy 13.2.11
 συνδιατίθεμαι to be sympathetically
 affected together with 6.3.2, 9.3.5
 σύνεγγυς near 22.2.3
 συνεθίζομαι to become used to 6,
 32, 6 title, 17.1.4
 σύνειμι, ξύν- to be together with,
 devote oneself to, experience 33,
 45, 2.1.3, 3.5.6, 6.4.2, 6.4.5, 16.2.5,
 19.5.4, 20.4.3, 21.1.3, 26.1.4, 26.1.5,
 26.1.5, 71.2.2, 71.11.2
 συνεισάγω to introduce, create
 16.3.3
 συνεισφέρω to contribute 1.2.5,
 10.1.2, 11.2.7, 12.6.6, 13.4.5
 συνέλκω to pull along with, entice,
 persuade 3.6.6, 19.4.6, 24.2.2
 συνεξαιρώ to elevate 15.2.6
 συνεξολισθαίνω to slip together
 with 23.3.4
 σύνεσις understanding 12.7.5, 21.2.6
 συνέχεια sequence, succession
 71.7.2
 συνεχής continuous 1.3.2, 7.1.8,
 18.5.6, 19.3.8, 21.2.1, 24.1.2
 συνέχω to hold together, secure
 2.1.7, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 3.3.7, 19.2.8,
 23.2.1, 23.2.4
 συνηγορέω to plead for, agree with
 3.1.8
 συνήγορος advocate, defender 5.1.1

- συνήθεια habit, custom 6.4.1
 συνήθης habitual, customary, usual
 8, 64, 3.5.8, 3.6.5, 6.1.1, 6.1.9, 6.2.4, 8
 title, 15.3.1, 16.4.3
 σύνθεσις composition 19.3.6, 26.1.1
 συνθήκη compounding, composition
 15.4.3, 16.4.1, 19.2.7, 19.2.8
 σύνθημα something agreed upon,
 treaty, convention 2.3.8, 9.3.7
 συνήμι, ξυν- to understand 4.2.4,
 9.3.6, 71.11.4
 συνίστημι to recommend, *pass.* to
 come together, be gathered 106,
 19.5.2
 συννοέω, ξυν- to reflect upon, be
 conscious of, understand, realise
 1.3.2, 1.3.5, 3.2.4, 12.1.3, 12.2.1,
 23.1.4, 24.1.1
 (σύν-,) ξύνοιδα to know, share
 knowledge with 3.2.3, 25.2.4
 σύνοικος dwelling, living 71.10.1
 συνοράω, ξυν- to see, understand
 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 3.1.1, 3.1.5, 3.3.1, 3.7.3,
 4.5.2, 5.4.4, 6.2.1, 7.4.1, 7.4.3, 7.4.6,
 9.1.2, 9.2.2, 9.2.5, 9.3.5, 12.1.3,
 12.1.3, 12.6.7, 13.2.8, 13.3.3, 14.5.5,
 15.2.3, 15.4.1, 16.1.8, 17.1.4, 17.3.2,
 19.3.1, 19.3.4, 19.3.8, 20.2.5, 21.1.1,
 21.2.6, 22.1.1, 22.2.2, 24.3.1, 25.1.2,
 71.2.1, 71.10.4
 συνοργιάζω to celebrate mysteries
 together with 18.5.5
 συνουσία company 71.10.1
 σύνταγμα composition, writing 3, 3
 title, 3.1.6, 3.3.4, 3.4.1, 5.3.7, 7.1.2,
 7.3.4, 11.2.1, 12.1.1, 12.2.2, 12.2.5,
 12.4.3, 12.4.4, 12.5.6, 12.6.2, 12.7.4,
 13.4.5, 14.4.2, 14.4.4, 14.4.5, 17.1.3,
 18.5.2, 19.2.3, 20.1.3, 21.1.4, 21.2.1,
 21.2.3, 22.1.1, 23.1.3, 71.3.7, 71.8.5,
 71.12.1
 σύνταξις composition, writing, sys-
 tem, curriculum 3.1.1, 5.1.6, 12.6.6,
 14.4.3, 17.3.3, 71.8.4, 71.12.5;
 Σύνταξις μαθηματική: *see Index of
 Greek names*
 συντάπτω, ξυν- to count among; or-
 ganise, compose, write 1.2.5, 3.5.7,
 5.4.1, 8.2.4, 11.2.3, 12.1.4, 12.2.2,
 12.6.8, 14.4.1, 16.1.9, 16.2.3, 16.3.1,
 17.2.2, 20.2.4, 21.1.1, 24.1.3, 25.1.5,
 25.1.8
 συντέλεια contribution 1.2.5, 5.1.5,
 10.1.2, 13.4.1, 17.4.2, 71.4.6, 71.12.3
 συντελέω to contribute 7.1.1, 71.6.2
 συντελής member, adherent 18.5.2
 συντηρέω to preserve, guard 12.6.5,
 21.1.2
 συντίθεμαι to agree on, support
 1.3.6, 5.1.7, 10.2.5, 11.1.5, 17.2.3,
 23.1.4
 σύντομος cut short 24.1.3
 συντονία exertion 26.2.8
 σύντονος intense 12.6.8
 συντυγχάνω, ξυν- to meet with, con-
 front, happen to; read 1.1.2, 4.3.2,
 5.3.5, 18.2.3, 18.2.4, 20.1.6, 22.2.1
 (συν-,) ξυντυχία meeting with, read-
 ing 3.4.4
 συνυφαίνω to weave together, com-
 pose, express 17.2.5, 18.2.3, 19.3.8
 συσκευάζω to prepare, create 10.2.3
 σύστημα philosophical school, sys-
 tem 71.5.1
 συστρέφω to gather together, sway;
 condense, compress 15.4.2, 24.1.5
 συστροφή concentration 20.3.5
 συσχολάζω to study together with
 13.1.1, 17.1.4
 συχνός frequent, many 3.1.3, 5.3.7,
 7.1.4, 7.1.4, 24.1.3
 σφαιρικός concerning celestial
 spheres 5.3.2, 13.2.5
 σφας, σφίσι(v) them 1.3.6, 2.3.6,
 3.7.9, 4.2.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.2, 4.4.3,
 4.5.7, 5.2.5, 6.1.8, 6.2.5, 8.1.2, 9.1.2,
 10.1.4, 10.3.3, 10.3.4, 12.1.2, 12.4.2,
 21.1.1, 23.2.1, 71.2.5
 σφέτερος their 65, 6.2.6, 10.4.6,
 17.1.3
 σφόδρα very much 42, 3.2.1, 3.5.7,
 4.2.4, 6.2.4, 6.2.6, 6.3.4, 6.4.1, 6.4.5,
 7.1.7, 8.3.2, 9.3.3, 10.1.6, 10.3.5,
 11.1.5, 11.2.5, 12.2.2, 13.4.8, 14.2.7,
 14.5.3, 15.3.1, 18.2.6, 18.4.1, 18.5.7,

- 19.2.3, 19.5.6, 20.3.3, 21.1.2, 24.2.4, 71.3.9
- σφοδρός vehement 15.2.6
- σφραγίς impression, stamp 71.12.5
- σχεδόν almost 55, 80, 81, 86, 102, 108, 1.1.6, 1.2.6, 3.1.6, 3.2.1, 3.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.4.3, 4.6.5, 5.1.3, 5.3.5, 9.1.5, 9.3.2, 10.1.1, 11.2.6, 15.4.3, 16.1.1, 71.4.3, 71.8.4, 71.8.5, 71.12.1
- σχέσις state, condition 13.3.4
- σχῆμα form, figure, gesture 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 11.2.5, 12.5.2, 16.4.4, 26.1.1, 26.1.6, 71.9.8
- σχοινίον rope 26.2.7
- σχολάζω to study 5.3.5, 16.1.8, 71.3.6
- σχολή leisure, study 16.2.1, 16.3.1, 18.5.8, 71.2.7
- σχολῆ with difficulty 15.4.3
- σῶμα body 31, 51, 3.6.4, 3.7.1, 3.7.1, 3.7.2, 3.7.2, 3.7.3, 3.7.4, 3.7.5, 3.7.6, 6.1.4, 7.3.2, 7.3.2, 9.1.3, 10.3.1, 11.1.5, 12.6.5, 26.1.5, 26.1.5
- σωματικός of the body 20.4.4, 26.1.5, 71.5.4
- σωματοειδής bodily 26.1.4
- σωτηριώδης saving, redeeming 109
- σωφρονέω to be of sound mind, to be wise, discerning 9.3.7, 10.3.6, 10.4.1, 11.2.7
- σωφρονικός modest, sensible 10.2.3, 10.4.5, 71.5.5
- σώφρων modest 8.2.7
- τακτός prescribed, fixed 11.2.3, 13.2.2
- ταμείον treasury, treasure-house 2.2.2, 5.2.2, 12.5.7, 22.3.4, 71.8.1, 71.8.7
- ταμιεύω to deal out, dispense 71.7.8
- τάξις order 11.2.7
- ταπεινός humble, weak 117, 12.7.4, 19.2.6
- ταπολλά usually 13.3.5
- τάττω to appoint, declare 71.4.5
- ταυτότης identity 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 23.2.4
- τάχα perhaps 1.3.5, 1.3.5, 4.5.1, 10.1.4
- τάχος speed, agility 16.2.2, 18.1.1
- ταχύς quick, quick-witted, prompt 66, 67, 1.3.2, 6.1.7, 6.1.9, 10.5.2, 17.2.6, 18.3.1, 18.3.2, 18.5.8, 71.10.4
- τείνω to tend, refer to 71.9.4
- τεκμήριον proof 71.11.4
- τελειοποιός making perfect, able to accomplish 10.1.2, 13.3.6
- τέλειος, *sup.* τελειότατος and τελεώτατος perfect, fully developed 14, 31, 31, 3.5.4, 3.5.6, 3.6.2, 12.2.6, 13.2.4, 13.2.6, 13.4.4, 14 title, 14.1.2, 14.2.10, 14.5.1, 14.5.4, 71.11.7
- τελειότης perfection 5.4.5, 11.2.7, 12.7.4, 14.4.3
- τελεσφόρος bringing to perfection, treating exhaustively 11.1.7
- τελετή initiation, mystery 18.5.5
- τελευταίος last, final 6.1.10, 13.4.4
- τελευτάω to cease, end 3.7.8, 7.2.3, 7.2.6, 10.5.8, 14.1.2, 16.2.6, 22.3.4
- τελευτή end, consummation 13.2.7
- τελέω to initiate 7.3.4
- τέλος end, goal, consummation 53, 112, 119, 7.2.1, 10.3.7, 11.2.6, 14.3.4
- τέμνω to cut, sever 3.7.2, 6.3.5, 6.4.5
- τέρπω to charm, delight; *med.* to enjoy, love to 18.2.2, 19.2.2
- τετράκις four times 10.1.4
- τέττα (denoting friendly or respectful address, Hom.) 10.4.6
- τέτταρα four 13.4.7, 14.2.1
- τεχνάζω to contrive, invent 24.2.1
- τέχνη art, craft, technique 2.1.3, 5.4.1, 8.3.4, 10.5.3, 11.2.6, 12.6.4, 15.3.3, 15.4.1, 16.4.6, 18.3.4, 18.4.3, 18.4.4, 18.4.5, 19.2.3, 21.1.1, 25.1.5, 71.8.2, 71.8.2, 71.11.1, 71.11.4, 71.11.5, 71.12.5
- τεχνικός technical, practical 13.3.5, 14.1.1, 21.1.6, 21.2.4
- τεχνιτεύω to build, shape, contrive 2.1.7, 18.2.5, 19.2.3, 25.1.8
- τεχνίτης craftsman, expert 3.6.4, 5.1.1, 7.4.4, 8.3.5, 11.1.7
- τεχνολογέω to treat technically, analyse 3.5.4, 3.6.3

- τεχνολογία instruction, systematic treatment 3.3.6, 71.3.5
 τέως in the meantime, until then 4.5.3, 5.1.3, 6.1.10, 13.4.6, 19.5.5, 21.2.7
 τήνικαῦτα at that time, then 107, 1.1.3, 3.3.2, 5.3.6, 13.3.5, 18.2.6, 18.3.4, 20.1.5, 20.4.1
 τήρησις keeping, observing 74
 τίθημι to put, *med.* submit, admit, consider 5.1.5, 5.1.6, 8.2.1, 9.2.1, 9.2.2, 9.2.4, 10.4.9, 10.5.3, 12.6.7, 13.4.8, 14.5.3, 19.3.7, 20.1.3, 23.3.5, 25.1.2, 26.1.3, 71.3.9
 τιμάω to value, honour, admire 64, 3.1.2, 3.1.2, 7.3.6, 10.3.3, 12.3.1, 12.5.6, 12.6.3, 12.6.8, 14.5.1, 19.5.6, 24.3.3, 71.2.5
 τιμή admiration, respect 4.3.4, 10.4.2, 20.1.5, 25.2.5
 τίμημα payment, price 2.2.3
 τίμιος held in honour, venerable 7.2.6, 7.4.6, 10.4.7, 71.7.3
 τίποτε what 71.12.4
 τις (348) any one, some one
 τίς, τί who?, what? 1.2.1, 1.3.3, 2.3.1, 3.1.4, 3.1.4, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.3, 7.4.5, 9.1.1, 10.1.3, 10.1.3, 10.2.5, 10.5.8, 11.1.2, 11.2.1, 11.2.4, 11.2.4, 11.2.4, 12.1.3, 12.1.5, 12.2.2, 12.3.2, 12.3.6, 12.6.6, 12.6.8, 71.8.4, 71.8.7
 τμήμα section 4.3.4
 τοεξαρχῆς from the beginning 102, 103, 113, 14.2.7
 τοι (66) (enclitic particle)
 τοιγαροῦν therefore, thus 15.2.2, 15.4.3, 20.4.3, 71.6.9, 71.9.4
 τοίνυν (inferential particle) 3.2.4, 3.5.2, 6.1.3, 6.4.1, 7.3.6, 8.3.2, 10.3.2, 10.3.6, 11.2.3, 12.1.2, 13.3.1, 16.1.7, 18.1.3, 18.5.4, 19.2.7, 23.2.2, 71.2.1
 τοῖος such (Hom.) 10.2.3
 τοιοῦτος such 2.1.3, 3.1.6, 5.2.1, 5.3.3, 5.4.5, 6.1.8, 8.2.5, 8.2.5, 10.2.6, 10.5.5, 12.1.2, 12.1.3, 12.7.4, 14.4.4, 14.4.6, 15.2.3, 17.1.3, 17.1.4, 19.5.5, 20.4.1, 21.2.6, 71.3.9, 71.7.2, 71.7.4, 71.7.5, 71.9.2, 71.10.1
 τομή separation 6.2.9
 τονώω to make strong, intense 19.2.6, 71.11.2
 τόπος place, space, opportunity 6.2.4, 6.4.6, 7.4.5, 22.2.1, 26.1.6
 τόσος so great, *pl.* so many 12.4.3, 12.4.3, 12.5.5, 12.5.5, 14.4.5, 14.4.5, 21.1.7, 21.1.7, 20.3.5, 20.3.5
 τοσοῦτος so great, so large 106, 2.1.3, 3.5.1, 3.7.9, 4.3.4, 5.1.3, 6.1.1, 6.1.3, 7.3.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.6, 10.1.4, 10.3.5, 10.5.1, 10.5.6, 10.5.6, 10.5.7, 11.1.1, 11.2.5, 12.3.5, 12.7.4, 13.2.7, 14.4.6, 14.4.6, 16.1.2, 16.1.4, 16.2.2, 17.4.3, 20.1.1, 21.2.2, 22.2.2, 22.3.1, 24.1.1, 24.2.1, 71.8.8, 71.9.3
 τότε then 5.3.6, 19.2.3, 24.2.3, 71.3.7
 τρανής clear 3.3.3, 3.3.7, 9.2.2, 9.3.1, 71.10.4
 τράπεζα table 1.3.4
 τραχύνω to make rough, harsh 18.4.2
 τραχύς rough, harsh 17, 15.2.6, 16.4.6, 16.4.6, 17 title, 17.1.1, 17.4.4
 τραχύτης harshness, asperity 17.3.2
 τρεῖς three 3.5.2, 4.2.1, 10.1.4, 11.2.5
 τρέχω to run 16.1.6, 19.3.8, 71.10.4
 τριβή practice, use 5.3.3
 τρίβω to spend time; to spend effort, exert oneself 4.3.1, 11.2.2, 14.4.2, 15.2.1, 16.2.6, 18.5.4, 71.2.5, 71.8.4
 τρόπαιον trophy 10.2.6
 τροπή change 7.4.2, 22.3.4, 23.2.1, 23.2.4
 τρόπος way, manner, means, character, mode 63, 63, 66, 77, 83, 85, 3.5.3, 4.1.2, 4.3.2, 4.4.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.8, 7.1.8, 7.4.7, 8.2.6, 8.3.2, 9.1.6, 12.6.8, 13.2.7, 16.3.2, 17.2.2, 17.3.5, 17.4.4, 18.3.4, 18.3.6, 19.2.6, 19.4.3, 20.2.4, 22.2.6, 24.1.3, 24.2.3, 25.1.3, 25.1.4, 25.2.5, 71.7.2, 71.9.7, 71.9.8, 71.10.1
 τρόφιμος nursling, foster-child 71.4.3
 τροφός nurse 17.2.1

- (*) τροχάζω to be written in trochaics 15.4.3
- τρυφάω to live softly 1.3.4
- τυγχάνω to achieve, obtain, hit upon 1.1.3, 2.1.6, 2.2.5, 2.3.6, 3.1.5, 3.4.2, 4.1.3, 4.4.3, 7.2.2, 9.1.5, 9.1.7, 10.3.1, 10.3.7, 11.2.7, 12.3.5, 16.1.2, 16.2.2, 16.3.4, 17.1.1, 19.1.3, 19.2.2, 19.5.5, 20.2.5, 22.2.1, 23.1.4, 23.2.3, 23.3.3, 26.2.2, 26.2.3, 71.1.2, 71.10.4, 71.10.4, 71.10.4, 71.11.1, 71.11.3
- τύπος form, model, style 17.1.3, 18.3.2, 19.1.4
- τυπώω to stamp, form 2.1.7, 10.1.1, 15.1.2, 19.5.2, 71.2.2
- τύπωμα imprint 9.3.4
- τύπωσις imprint 2.2.4
- τύραννος tyrant 6.1.9
- τύχη fate, fortune, misfortune 62, 113, 116, 117, 1.3.1, 4.1.5, 6.2.4, 6.2.7, 6.3.5, 6.4.6, 7.2.1, 7.2.6, 9.1.7, 9.3.7, 10.1.4, 16.2.4, 20.4.2, 71.7.4
- τυχηρός fortunate 57
- ὔβρις insult, arrogance, cruelty 8.2.8, 9.1.2, 71.5.3
- ὑγρός moist, soft 6.1.2, 15.1.3, 15.1.3
- ὔδωρ water 15.1.4, 18.2.9
- ὔλη matter 91, 3.5.2, 3.6.4, 6.1.4, 7.4.2, 11.1.5, 13.1.2, 13.2.4, 15.1.2, 21.1.4, 22.3.4, 22.3.4
- ὑλικός of, belonging to matter 13.2.7
- ὑπανοίγνυμι to open 10.3.7
- ὑπατικός of a consul 1.1.3
- ὑπεμφαίνω to indicate, show, make appear 5.2.2, 7.3.4, 8.3.1
- ὑπεναντίος contrary 19.3.1
- ὑπεξαιρώ to elevate, hold in high esteem 14.5.4
- ὑπέρ over, on behalf of 3.4.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.1, 6.1.9, 8.2.4, 12.6.5, 13.1.2, 14.2.3, 14.4.4, 14.5.6, 16.2.5, 18.5.5, 21.1.5, 21.2.3, 25.1.6, 25.2.1, 71.12.3
- ὑπεραίρω to raise, intensify 3.4.4, 4.1.1, 26.2.4
- ὑπεραναβαίνω to rise above 4.1.2, 6.1.3, 21.1.4
- ὑπερβαλλόντως exceedingly, thoroughly 16.3.2, 17.3.5
- ὑπερβάλλω to surpass 14.5.6
- ὑπερηφανία arrogance 8.2.8
- ὑπέρτερος above 3.5.8
- ὑπερτίθημι to place above, postpone 21.1.5, 21.1.6
- ὑπερφέρω to surpass 4.1.5
- ὑπερφρονέω to despise; to look beyond 4.5.3, 6.1.4, 7.2.6, 21.1.4
- ὑπερφυσής supernatural 3.4.2
- ὑπεύθυνος deserving criticism, culpable, subject to 3.5.4, 5.1.2, 7.2.6, 23.2.1
- ὑπηρέτης assistant 9.3.7
- ὑπνός sleep 9.3.3
- ὑπό under 102, 109, 2.2.4, 2.3.8, 2.3.8, 3.5.4, 3.7.7, 3.7.8, 3.7.8, 4.1.4, 4.2.4, 4.4.3, 4.5.1, 4.6.4, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.4, 5.4.2, 6.1.7, 6.1.8, 6.1.10, 6.2.5, 6.4.5, 7.3.1, 7.4.5, 13.2.1, 13.2.9, 16.1.1, 16.1.2, 22.3.3, 23.1.5, 23.2.2, 23.3.2, 71.6.3
- ὑποβάλλω to throw under, sow 71.12.2
- ὑποβλέπω to face 119
- ὑπόδειγμα example, indication 31, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 112, 116, 117, 120, 2.2.1, 5.3.2, 10.5.3, 12.4.1, 13.2.7, 18.2.3
- ὑποδείκνυμι, -νώ to disclose, present 5.3.8, 9.3.4
- ὑπόθεσις foundation; subject; station in life 50, 15.2.5, 19.2.7, 19.2.8, 19.3.2, 20.1.7, 71.12.2
- ὑπόκειμαι to underlie, be the material, be subject to 1.2.4, 11.1.7, 22.1.3, 22.3.1, 23.2.1, 23.2.4, 23.3.4
- ὑποκρίνομαι to pretend, act dishonestly 4.3.4
- ὑπόκρισις histrionics, dissimulation 15.3.2, 19.4.5, 20.3.4, 26.1.6
- ὑποκριτής declaimer, pretender 8.3.5, 10.4.3
- ὑπόμνημα journal, memoir: *see Index of Greek names*
- ὑπομνηματισμός memorandum 1.3.5
- ὑπόνοια covert meaning 16.3.3

- ὑποπεύω to suspect 9.1.2
 ὑποστάθμη sediment, dregs 1.1.3,
 1.1.4
 ὑπόσχεσις promise, declaration
 3.4.3, 3.5.7, 3.5.9, 12.5.2, 21.1.7,
 21.2.1, 21.2.2, 21.2.2, 21.2.4, 21.2.5,
 21.2.7
 ὑποτυπώω to prescribe 21.1.6
 ὑποτύπωσις sketch 1.2.3
 ὑποχαλάω to relax 19.2.4
 ὑποχωρέω to recede 2.2.4
 ὑπτιος ordinary, plain, unadorned
 19.2.4, 19.4.4, 20.3.2, 20.3.5
 ὕστερος later 4.5.4, 5.3.4, 12.2.3,
 12.2.3, 12.4.5, 12.6.1, 13.2.7, 14.1.4,
 14.2.4, 14.4.3, 16.2.5, 21.2.4
 ὑφίσταμαι to submit to, be subject
 to 23.2.4
 ὑψηλός high 16.1.3, 16.3.4, 21.2.6

 φαίνομαι to appear, seem 66, 5.3.5,
 6.1.3, 9.1.6, 11.1.5, 11.2.2, 13.2.4,
 14.1.4, 14.2.4, 14.4.2, 14.4.2, 15.2.2,
 15.2.3, 16.3.3, 18.2.7, 19.3.1, 19.4.5,
 20.3.3, 71.9.1
 φαντάζω to appear 5.2.2
 φαντασία imagination, fantasy
 5.2.4, 22.3.4, 71.8.1
 φάντασμα vision, *pl.* phenomena
 9.3.3, 26.2.6
 φαῦλος bad, inferior, insignificant,
 ignorant 34, 62, 2.3.5, 4.2.1, 6.2.5,
 7.2.1, 9.1.2, 9.1.6, 10.1.4, 10.4.3,
 15.1.2
 φείδομαι to be diffident, hesitate, to
 spare 7.1.7, 12.4.2, 19.3.3, 24.2.4,
 25.2.1, 71.7.6
 φειδώ consideration 10.4.3, 10.5.9
 φέρω to carry, bring, endure, lead 74,
 1.2.7, 1.3.1, 1.3.1, 2.3.8, 3.5.4, 3.6.6,
 3.7.2, 3.7.6, 4.4.3, 5.2.2, 7.1.6, 7.2.6,
 7.3.4, 7.3.5, 7.4.1, 8.1.4, 8.2.2, 9.1.4,
 10.4.6, 10.5.7, 11.2.2, 13.4.1, 13.4.3,
 13.4.4, 15.1.3, 15.3.2, 15.4.2, 16.3.2,
 16.4.3, 17.3.5, 18.1.3, 18.3.2, 18.3.4,
 19.2.7, 19.3.2, 26.1.2, 71.2.7, 71.3.2,
 71.5.1, 71.6.6, 71.6.6, 71.7.5, 71.10.1

 φεύγω to escape, avoid, to be in exile
 2.2.3, 2.3.3, 3.1.8, 3.2.6, 3.4.3, 3.5.8,
 9.1.5, 17.2.5, 19.2.5, 19.2.6, 19.4.2,
 19.4.3, 20.4.2, 21.2.5, 24.1.4
 φήμη reputation 20.2.3
 φημί to say, assert 1.1.3, 2.2.3, 5.1.2,
 8.2.2, 8.2.6, 8.2.7, 8.3.3, 9.2.1, 9.2.5,
 10.2.2, 10.2.2, 10.4.1, 10.4.1, 11.1.1,
 11.2.7, 12.4.4, 13.3.2, 13.4.3, 14.2.2,
 14.2.3, 14.2.6, 16.1.3, 16.2.4, 16.3.4,
 16.4.6, 17.2.3, 17.2.4, 17.2.7, 17.4.2,
 18.3.2, 18.4.3, 18.5.3, 19.3.1, 19.3.8,
 19.4.3, 20.3.4, 20.4.4, 23.3.2, 26.1.5,
 26.2.7, 71.2.4, 71.2.7, 71.9.4, 71.10.1,
 71.10.2, 71.12.8
 φθάνω to come first, be done earlier
 1.2.1, 1.2.4, 1.2.7, 2.1.4, 2.3.7, 2.3.7,
 3.2.3, 3.4.1, 3.5.9, 5.3.9, 10.2.2,
 10.2.5, 10.3.3, 10.4.9, 13.4.1, 19.3.3,
 19.3.5, 21.1.2, 21.1.7, 21.2.3
 φθέγγομαι to utter, say 7.1.3, 8.3.2,
 8.3.2, 17.2.7, 19.2.5, 20.1.2, 20.1.4,
 20.1.6, 20.1.7, 24.1.3, 25.2.1, 71.9.5,
 71.11.7
 φθείρω to destroy 26.2.7
 φθίνω to deteriorate 9.1.7
 φθορά destruction 6.2.8, 22.3.4
 *φιλαγησίλαος friend of Agesilaus
 20.4.3
 φιλαλήθης lover of truth 10.4.3
 φιλόανθρωπος benevolent, generous
 1.2.5, 3.3.3, 5.3.8, 10.4.7, 12.6.4,
 12.7.4, 14.4.5, 71.6.3
 φιλαντέω to love oneself 4.4.3,
 24.3.3
 φιλαντία self-love 35, 52, 4.5.1, 5.2.1,
 7.4.5, 12.6.9, 24.3.1, 25.2.2
 φίλαντος self-loving 10.4.3
 φιλεργός industrious, officious
 15.2.1
 φιλέω to love, be used to 6.1.6,
 18.2.4
 φιλοδοξέω to be eager for fame 4.4.3
 φιλοκρινέω to distinguish, classify
 12.2.6, 13.2.1, 71.11.7
 φιλολάκων friend of Sparta 20.4.3
 φιλόλογος scholar, intellectual 71.2.3

- φιλομαθής eager for knowledge
71.3.8
- φιλονεικέω to be contentious 7.4.5,
71.5.3
- φιλονεικία contentiousness, rivalry
12.6.9, 25.1.1
- φιλόνεκος contentious, competitive,
zealous 10.4.3, 12.4.2, 12.4.5, 18.5.3,
24.3.2, 25.1.3, 25.1.8, 25.2.1
- φιλοπλουτία love of riches 86, 71.2.4
- φιλοπονέω to be industrious, to elab-
orate 16.3.2, 18.5.6, 71.3.6, 71.8.4,
71.12.3
- φιλοπονία industry, work 71.8.5
- φιλόπονος painstaking 1.2.5
- φιλοπράγμων meddlesome 62
- φίλος friend, friendly 6.1.7, 6.1.8,
6.1.9, 6.1.10, 7.3.6, 8.2.2, 8.2.4, 9.1.4,
10.4.1, 13.4.7, 16.1.2, 19.5.2, 19.5.4,
19.5.5, 19.5.6, 19.5.6, 25.2.5, 71.4.5,
71.6.7, 71.6.8, 71.6.8, 71.6.9
- φιλοσοφέω to devote oneself to phi-
losophy 81, 20.4.1
- φιλοσοφία (75) philosophy
- φιλόσοφος philosopher 57, 80, 2.1.8,
16.4.5, 17.3.3, 17.4.1, 17.4.2, 18.2.4,
18.2.6, 18.3.1, 18.3.5, 18.5.2, 18.5.8,
19.1.3, 19.2.5, 19.3.2, 19.5.3, 21.1.5,
22.1.1, 22.3.1, 23.1.6, 26.1.2, 26.1.3,
26.2.1, 26.2.4, 26.2.5, 71.3.5, 71.3.5,
71.4.3, 71.9.1, 71.9.5, 71.10.5
- (*) φιλοτέχνησις contrivance 11.1.6
- φιλοτιμία love of honour, ambition
1.2.7, 11.2.2, 12.4.2
- φιλότιμος ambitious, emulous
18.3.2, 71.4.1, 71.8.8, 71.10.5
- φιλοχωρέω to be partial (to a place)
6.1.6, 10.5.5
- φιλονίζω to write like Philo 16.1.1
- φλαῦρος petty, insignificant; dis-
paraging 4.2.4, 6.1.1, 24.2.4
- *φοιβάσμος prophecy 3.6.6
- φοιτάω to go to school, study; to be
imported 7.2.2, 13.3.3
- φορά flow, contribution, achievement
1.2.6, 5.1.5, 5.1.6, 9.1.1, 9.1.7, 13.4.1,
19.3.8, 20.4.4, 23.3.4, 71.6.8
- φορέω to carry 71.10.1
- φορτικός vulgar 8.1.3, 71.6.5
- φράγμα protection, armour 71.9.7
- φράζω to describe 9.3.1
- φρήν mind 5.1.2
- φρονέω to think, mean 3.1.4, 3.2.4,
3.6.7, 3.7.3, 3.7.9, 4.5.3, 5.1.2, 5.1.7,
5.1.7, 7.4.2, 9.1.3, 10.2.5, 12.6.2,
12.7.2, 12.7.5, 18.5.3, 20.1.1, 22.1.2
- φρόνημα thought, pride, ambition
108, 3.1.7, 71.9.6
- φροντίζω to care about 4.1.1
- φροντίς thought, concern 76, 15.2.6,
16.4.1, 18.2.4, 18.3.2, 19.4.6, 26.1.7
- φυλή tribe 16.2.4
- φυσικός physical, belonging to natu-
ral science 11, 12, 23, 3.7.5, 5.1.1,
5.3.7, 7.3.1, 7.4.1, 11 title, 11.1.2, 12
title, 12.1.1, 12.2.5, 12.3.1, 12.4.1,
12.4.4, 12.4.5, 12.7.4, 16.1.4, 18.5.4,
21.1.3, 21.1.4, 21.1.5, 21.1.5, 23 title,
23.1.1, 23.1.3, 23.1.6, 71.3.4, 71.3.5,
71.3.6, 71.8.3; Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά:
see Index of Greek names
- φύσις (121) nature
- φύω *perf.* to be by nature, to be natu-
rally endowed 2.1.6, 2.2.5, 2.3.1,
5.4.4, 7.4.2, 9.2.2, 10.3.4, 11.2.6,
14.3.2, 14.4.5, 15.1.2, 15.2.1, 18.1.1,
18.2.4, 18.3.2, 22.1.3, 22.3.2, 25.1.4,
71.2.3, 71.11.4, 71.12.4
- φωνή sound, voice, language 26,
1.2.1, 1.2.4, 4.4.2, 9.2.2, 12.5.7,
13.2.8, 13.2.10, 15.3.2, 16.1.7, 16.4.6,
17.1.1, 17.1.4, 17.2.5, 17.3.1, 17.3.5,
18.2.2, 18.2.5, 18.2.8, 18.3.3, 18.3.5,
19.1.4, 19.2.1, 19.2.6, 19.4.1, 19.5.2,
19.5.3, 20.2.5, 25.1.6, 25.1.9, 26 title,
26.1.3, 26.1.5, 26.1.7, 71.9.1, 71.9.3,
71.10.1, 71.10.2, 71.12.5
- χαίρω to be glad, to like, enjoy
4.1.3, 6.2.5, 6.3.3, 6.3.4, 8.1.3, 8.2.3,
8.2.3, 8.3.7, 17.3.5, 17.4.3, 18.4.1,
18.4.3, 19.2.2, 19.2.6, 19.3.1, 19.4.4,
19.5.4, 20.3.3, 24.2.1
- χαλεπός difficult 67, 9.3.1, 16.2.4
- χαμερπής crawling on the ground,
lowly 19.2.8

- χαρακτήρ style 17.1.3
 χαράττω to engrave 2.2.4, 71.12.4
 χαρίεις pleasing, amusing, witty
 8.1.1, 12.5.1, 16.4.3, 25.1.6
 χαριεντίζομαι to be witty 8, 8 title
 χαρίζομαι to grant a favour, make a
 concession 3.1.8, 4.4.4, 71.4.6
 χάρις grace, gratitude, regard 10.1.2,
 10.2.2, 10.3.5, 10.3.6, 14.4.6, 16.4.2,
 16.4.2, 17.4.4, 18.2.2, 18.2.4, 18.2.7,
 26.2.2, 71.6.3, 71.9.2, 71.12.3
 χαριστέον one must grant 10.1.4
 χάσκω to gape, be avid 4.3.1
 χείρ hand 2.3.8, 9.1.6, 12.5.4
 χειραγωγέω to guide, lead 11.1.5
 χειραγωγία guidance 13.2.2, 13.2.5,
 22.3.4
 χειραγωγός guiding 12.7.5
 χείρων inferior 9.3.3
 χορηγέω to furnish, provide 13.2.2
 χορηγός donor 10.5.6, 71.12.6
 χορός dance, chorus, entourage
 13.4.8, 17.4.2, 71.3.7
 χράομαι (143) to use, treat, write,
 act
 χρεία need, use 1.2.8, 2.2.2, 5.3.9,
 9.2.5, 13.2.3, 14.4.6, 16.1.5, 19.3.5,
 19.3.7, 20.4.4, 26.1.3, 26.1.6, 71.7.2,
 71.7.8, 71.8.7
 χρεώδης needful, useful 2.3.7
 χρή, ἔχρην one must, it is necessary
 2.3.8, 6.1.10, 10.2.2, 10.2.3, 10.3.3,
 10.4.2, 10.5.9, 10.5.9, 11.2.5, 12.1.3,
 12.1.5, 18.1.2, 24.3.3, 71.3.2
 χρῆμα thing 63, 2.2.1, 25.1.5, 26.2.6
 χρηματίζομαι to make money 83
 χρηματισμός money-making 82
 χρήσιμος useful 70, 80, 94, 111, 1.2.7,
 2.3.3, 11.1.7, 12.6.9, 12.7.5, 14.1.1,
 14.2.6, 20.4.3, 20.4.4, 71.4.6, 71.5.4,
 71.6.6, 71.7.3, 71.10.4, 71.12.1,
 71.12.9
 χρήσις use, usage 88, 95, 120, 1.2.1,
 1.3.3, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.3.7, 3.5.1, 4.6.3,
 5.3.3, 5.3.7, 5.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.6, 7.3.4,
 8.2.6, 9.3.5, 11.2.1, 13.2.6, 13.2.9,
 14.5.1, 15.1.2, 15.4.1, 15.4.2, 17.1.4,
 18.2.2, 18.3.7, 18.4.4, 20.3.1, 20.3.3,
 21.2.5, 23.1.3, 25.1.4, 25.2.1, 26.1.3,
 26.1.6, 26.1.7, 26.2.4, 71.3.1, 71.4.4,
 71.6.6, 71.6.8, 71.6.9, 71.7.4, 71.8.2,
 71.8.6, 71.9.7, 71.11.7
 χρηστέον one must use 26.1.5
 χρηστός good, worthy 66, 25.1.2
 χρώα superficial appearance, colour,
 bloom 15.2.4
 χρόνιος long-continued 32, 17.2.4
 χρόνος time 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 2.3.2,
 5.2.3, 5.3.2, 5.3.4, 5.3.4, 5.3.6, 6.1.5,
 6.1.7, 6.2.5, 7.2.1, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 9.1.6,
 10.2.1, 10.2.6, 10.2.6, 12.2.3, 12.2.4,
 12.4.5, 12.6.1, 12.6.3, 12.6.9, 13.1.1,
 13.1.2, 13.1.2, 13.2.7, 14.1.2, 14.1.4,
 14.1.5, 14.2.2, 14.2.4, 14.2.5, 14.2.8,
 14.3.1, 14.3.4, 14.4.3, 14.4.5, 17.2.1,
 19.5.1, 21.1.2, 21.2.4, 24.2.3, 71.3.5,
 71.4.3, 71.7.3, 71.8.4, 71.8.4
 χρυσός gold 26.2.8
 χρώμα colour, style, ornament
 15.3.2, 16.4.1, 17.2.5, 19.1.4, 26.2.2,
 71.10.2
 χρωματίζω to colour 19.4.1, 26.2.6
 χρώζω to dye, stain 8.1.2, 17.1.4
 χώρα space, land, country 1.2.6,
 3.7.1, 5.1.2, 6.1.9, 7.4.1, 10.1.6,
 11.1.3, 13.4.4, 14.5.6, 15.2.3, 16.4.5,
 22.3.3, 23.1.1, 24.3.3
 χωρέω to go, proceed, flow 17.2.6,
 18.2.8, 18.2.9
 χωρίς without 71.9.5
 χωριστός existing separately 3.7.6
 χώρος place 6.1.2, 6.3.3
 ψεύδομαι to lie 14.2.8
 ψηφίζω to decide by vote 2.3.5
 ψηφος vote, opinion 4.2.2, 4.3.1,
 4.4.3, 9.1.3, 9.1.4, 10.2.6, 12.2.3,
 23.1.4, 23.3.3
 ψοφοδεής frightened at every noise
 17.2.8
 ψυχή soul 51, 2.1.7, 2.2.4, 3.6.2, 3.6.4,
 3.6.5, 3.6.7, 3.7.3, 3.7.9, 4.1.4, 6.2.4,
 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.2, 6.3.4, 6.4.2, 6.4.4,
 7.3.2, 7.3.4, 8.2.3, 13.2.11, 26.1.4,
 71.6.5; Περί ψυχῆς: *see Index of
 Greek names*

- ὠνέομαι to buy 2.2.3
 ὦρα charm, beauty 16.4.3, 18.2.4,
 18.2.8, 20.3.2, 71.9.1, 71.9.4
 ὡς (336) as
 ὡσαύτως similarly 115, 3.5.1, 9.3.2,
 12.2.1, 13.3.3, 14.1.3, 14.1.3, 20.1.4,
 22.1.2, 22.2.2, 22.2.3, 22.2.6, 22.3.2,
 25.1.2, 26.1.7, 71.9.4
 ὥσπερ as 1.1.3, 1.2.5, 2.1.5, 6.3.3, 7.1.1,
 7.1.2, 7.1.8, 9.1.3, 9.1.8, 10.4.1, 10.4.3,
 12.4.3, 12.6.7, 12.6.7, 13.2.7, 13.4.4,
 13.4.5, 13.4.8, 14.1.1, 14.1.4, 14.3.2,
 14.4.2, 14.4.4, 15.2.3, 16.1.4, 18.2.9,
 18.5.7, 19.2.5, 19.4.5, 21.1.7,
 22.2.2, 23.1.5, 24.2.4, 26.1.6, 26.2.8,
 71.1.1, 71.2.2, 71.2.2, 71.4.3, 71.4.6,
 71.8.7, 71.9.5, 71.10.2
 ὥσπερ as if, as 4.5.3
 ὥστε so that 52, 1.3.1, 2.3.3, 3.1.6,
 3.3.1, 3.4.2, 3.7.2, 5.3.9, 5.4.5, 7.1.2,
 7.1.7, 7.3.1, 8.2.6, 10.4.3, 11.2.5,
 12.1.1, 12.3.5, 12.6.8, 12.7.4,
 13.2.11, 14.3.2, 14.5.2, 14.5.5,
 16.1.2, 16.2.3, 16.2.4, 16.2.6, 16.4.3,
 16.4.6, 17.3.5, 18.2.3, 18.2.7, 19.5.5,
 20.1.1, 23.1.4, 24.2.4, 26.1.2, 26.2.3,
 71.2.2

Index of Greek names

This index also includes adjectives formed from names and titles of works by ancient authors.

- Ἄβραάμ 14.2.4
 Ἄβυδηνός 1.3.4
 Ἄδράστεια 10.3.3
 Ἀθηναῖος 99
 Ἀθήνησι(ν) 6.1.5, 6.1.8, 8.2.6, 12.2.3,
 20.4.2, 24.2.3
 Αἰγύπτιος 5.3.2, 7.2.4, 14.2.1, 14.2.6,
 14.2.7, 14.5.3, 17.4.4
 Αἴγυπτος 17, 6.1.9, 13.1.1, 13.3.3,
 14.2.2, 14.2.3, 16.3.1, 17 title, 17.1.1,
 17.1.4, 17.2.1, 17.2.3, 17.2.4, 17.2.7,
 17.3.1
 Αἰσχίνης 8.3.1
 Ἀκαδημία 6.1.5
 Ἀλεξάνδρεια 17.3.1
 Ἀλέξανδρος 3.1.3, 14.5.1, 14.5.2
 Ἀλκιβιάδης 115
 Ἀμμώνιος 12.7.3
 Ἀναλυτικά, τὰ δεύτερα work by Aris-
 totle 3.3.6, 3.5.8, 12.5.2
 Ἀναλυτικά, τὰ πρώτα work by Aris-
 totle 12.5.2
 Ἀναξαγόρας 23.3.1
 Ἀναξίμανδρος 23.3.1
 Ἀναξιμένης 23.3.1
 Ἀντισθένης 4.5.5
 Ἀριστοξένιος 13.4.2
 Ἀριστοτέλης 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 25, 3 title,
 3.1.1, 3.5.7, 3.6.4, 3.7.9, 5 title, 5.1.1,
 5.3.1, 5.3.4, 5.3.4, 5.3.4, 5.3.5, 5.4.5,
 7.1.1, 7.1.5, 7.2.6, 7.3.1, 7.4.1, 7.4.6, 10
 title, 10.1.1, 10.1.3, 10.2.1, 10.2.1,
 10.5.2, 10.5.2, 10.5.5, 10.5.5, 10.5.6,
 10.5.7, 10.5.8, 11 title, 11.1.1, 11.1.6,
 12 title, 12.1.1, 12.1.2, 12.1.3, 12.1.4,
 12.2.1, 12.2.4, 12.2.5, 12.3.4, 12.4.1,
 12.4.4, 12.4.5, 12.5.1, 12.5.6, 12.5.6,
 12.6.2, 12.6.3, 12.6.3, 12.6.6, 12.6.6,
 12.6.7, 12.6.8, 12.7.1, 12.7.4, 13.1.3,
 18.5.2, 21.1.1, 21.1.3, 21.2.4, 21.2.7,
 23.3.1, 25 title, 25.1.2, 25.1.4, 25.2.1,
 25.2.2
 Ἀριστοτελικός 21, 21 title, 71.4.4
 Ἀρχιμήδης 71.3.7
 Ἀσία 102
 Ἀσιανός 17.4.1, 17.4.4
 Ἀσσύριος 7.2.4
 Ἀττικός 6.1.7, 14.5.3, 15.3.1, 17.4.4,
 18.4.1, 19.5.3, 20.1.1
 Αὔγουστος 92

- Βασιλικός (sc. λόγος), ὁ work by Synesius 19.3.7, 19.3.7
- Γαληνός 10.2.1, 12.4.5, 12.6.4, 12.6.6
Γρηγόριος 17.2.3
Γρύλλος 19.5.2
- Δαίδαλος 2.2.3
Δαμάσκιος 12.7.3
Δεδομένα, τὰ work by Euclid 14.4.1
Δημήτριος Πολιορκητής 115
Δημόκριτος 23.3.1
Διογένης 4.5.5
Δίων 19, 19 title, 19.1.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.1, 19.2.2, 19.2.2, 19.2.2, 19.2.3, 19.2.5, 19.2.8, 19.3.1, 19.3.3, 19.3.4, 19.3.5, 19.3.5, 19.3.7, 19.4.4
Δομετιανός 16.2.6
- Ἐβραῖος 15.1.1, 16.1.1, 16.1.9, 17.2.1
Ἑλλάς 8.2.6, 8.2.6, 10.5.5, 12.5.6, 13.1.1, 20.4.1
Ἑλλην 81, 93, 101, 113, 5.3.2, 5.3.4, 5.3.4, 6.2.1, 7.2.1, 7.2.3, 10.4.4, 12.4.3, 12.5.6, 12.6.4, 13.2.1, 13.3.1, 13.3.3, 13.3.4, 14.1.4, 14.1.5, 14.2.1, 14.2.2, 14.2.5, 14.2.8, 14.2.10, 14.3.1, 14.3.4, 14.5.3, 16.2.3, 16.3.1, 17.2.7, 18.4.1, 19.5.3, 20.2.3, 21.1.2, 21.2.2, 22.1.2, 22.1.2, 22.1.2, 22.2.1, 22.2.6, 24.2.3, 71.8.1
Ἑλληνικός 12.6.1, 16.1.9, 16.1.9, 18.3.3
Ἑλληνίς 103
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς 23.3.1
Ἐπαμεινώνδας 114
Ἐπίκουρος 71.5.1, 71.5.3, 71.6.4, 71.6.9, 71.6.9
Ἑρμείας 12.7.3
Ἑρμῆς 8.3.3
Ἑρμογένης 21, 21 title, 21.1.1, 21.1.6, 21.2.1, 21.2.3, 21.2.7
Εὐκλείδης 14.4.1, 14.4.4, 14.4.5, 71.3.7
Εὐμένης 115
Εὐρώπη 17.2.7
Εὐσέβιος 17.2.4
- Ζεύς 12.5.3
Ζήνων 23.3.1
- Ἡράκλειτος 23.3.1
- Θάλης 14.2.2
Θεμιστίος 12.7.3
Θεόφραστος 12.4.5, 23.3.1
Θερσίτης 10.4.3
Θέων 17.2.2, 71.3.7
- Ἰάμβλιχος 14.2.3
Ἱεροσολυμίτης 16.2.4
Ἰθάκη 6.1.1
Ἰνδός 14.2.3
Ἰππαρχος 14.5.3, 71.3.7
Ἰταλία 5.3.3, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.2.3, 13.1.1
Ἰων 17.4.1, 17.4.4
Ἰώσηπος 15, 15 title, 15.1.1, 15.2.4, 16.1.8, 16.3.1, 16.2.1, 16.4.2
- Καῖσαρ 92, 5.3.4, 12.6.1, 14.3.4
Καρχηδόνιος 108
Καρχηδών 104, 105
Κατοπτρικά, τὰ work by Euclid 14.4.1
Κάτων 1.1.2
Κεφαλληνες 6.1.1
Κλαῦδιος 13.4.3, 14.4.3, 17.2.2
Κλήμης 17.2.3
Κόρινθος 12.5.3
Κράτης 4.5.5
Κυνόσαργες 12.2.3
Κυρηναῖος 18.1.1
Κυρήνη 103
Κύριλλος 17.2.5
Κω(ν)σταντίνος 92
- Λακεδαιμόνιος 100
Λεύκιππος 23.3.1
Λιβάνιος 17.3.4
Λιβύη 103, 17.2.7
Λουκιανός 17.3.4
Λυκεῖον 6.1.5, 6.1.7
- Μακεδονία 6.1.7
Μάξιμος 17.3.3
Μέγαρα 14.4.1
Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, τὰ work by Aristotle 21, 3.3.6, 3.4.3, 21 title, 21.1.1, 21.2.4

- Μετεωρολογικά, τὰ work by Aristotle 25.1.2, 25.1.2, 25.1.3, 25.1.4, 25.1.5, 3.3.4 25.1.7, 25.1.8, 25.1.8, 25.2.1, 25.2.2, 71.3.7
- Μω(υ)σῆς 14.2.4, 16.3.2
- Νεῖλος 14.2.6
- Νόμοι work by Plato 1.1.3
- Νουμᾶ Πομπηλίου 107
- Ξενοφῶν 20, 8.3.1, 19.5.2, 20 title, 20.1.3, 20.1.1, 20.1.7, 20.2.1, 20.2.3
- Ὅμηρος 10.4.3, 71.12.1, 71.12.1, 71.12.6, 71.12.8
- Ὀπτικά, τὰ work by Euclid 14.4.1
- Ὀυεσπασιανός 16.2.5
- Παλαιστίνη 17.2.4
- Πάμφιλος 17.2.4
- Παναίτιος (wrongly for Πάνταινος) 17.2.3
- Παρμενίδης 23.3.1
- Πελοπίδας 114
- Πέργη 14.5.1
- Περὶ ζῶων work by Aristotle 3.3.4
- Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος work by [Hermogenes] 21, 21 title, 21.1.1, 21.2.1
- Περὶ Ὁμήρου work by [Plutarch] 71.12.1
- Περὶ ψυχῆς work by Aristotle 3.3.6, 3.6.1, 3.7.5
- Περίπατος 6.1.5, 12.6.2, 71.4.4
- Πέρσης 7.2.4
- Πλάτων 8, 10, 13, 24, 25, 61, 1.1.3, 2.3.4, 3.2.3, 3.7.7, 4.6.1, 6.1.3, 6.1.9, 6.4.4, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.4, 7.1.5, 7.2.6, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3, 7.3.5, 7.3.5, 7.3.6, 7.4.8, 8 title, 8.2.1, 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3, 8.2.6, 8.3.2, 8.3.3, 8.3.3, 8.3.7, 10 title, 10.1.1, 10.1.3, 10.2.1, 10.3.1, 10.5.2, 10.5.3, 10.5.4, 10.5.5, 10.5.5, 10.5.5, 10.5.6, 10.5.6, 10.5.7, 10.5.8, 10.5.8, 13 title, 13.1.1, 13.1.3, 13.3.2, 13.4.7, 14.2.2, 14.3.3, 14.4.1, 15.1.2, 16.1.1, 16.1.1, 16.1.2, 16.1.3, 16.1.4, 18.5.2, 18.5.5, 20.1.1, 20.1.2, 20.1.4, 20.1.5, 20.1.6, 20.1.6, 20.2.1, 20.2.2, 23.3.1, 24 title, 24.1.1, 24.3.4, 25 title, 25.1.1,
- Πλατωνικός 9.3.1, 12.7.1, 71.4.4
- Πλούταρχος 71, 3.1.3, 12.7.3, 71 title, 71.1.1, 71.10.1, 71.11.7, 71.12.4, 71.12.7, 71.2.1, 71.2.4, 71.2.7, 71.5.5, 71.6.1, 71.6.9, 71.7.4, 71.8.1, 71.8.4, 71.8.5, 71.9.8
- Πολιτεία work by Plato 1.1.3
- Ποντικός 17.2.3
- Πορφύριος 12.7.1, 17.3.3
- Πρόκλος 12.7.1
- Προῦσα 19.1.1
- Πτολεμαῖος 13.4.3, 13.4.4, 13.4.6, 14.4.3, 14.5.1, 14.5.2, 14.5.3, 17.2.2, 71.3.7
- Πυθαγόρας 7, 5.3.3, 7 title, 7.1.1, 7.1.7, 7.2.1, 7.2.3, 7.3.2, 7.3.5, 7.4.4, 7.4.8, 13.1.1, 13.2.1, 13.2.9, 13.3.1, 13.3.2, 13.3.5, 13.3.6, 13.4.1, 13.4.3, 14.2.2, 14.2.2, 14.2.3, 14.2.10, 71.3.7
- Πυθαγόρειος 6.4.1, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.3.3, 13.4.2
- Πύρρος 108
- Ῥόδιος Rhodian 14.5.3
- Ῥωμαϊκός 37, 39, 109, 1.1.2, 12.6.1
- Ῥωμαῖος 38, 108, 1.1.2, 16.2.5, 16.2.6, 71.8.1
- Ῥώμη 106, 107, 1.1.3
- Ῥωμύλος 1.1.3
- Σαρδανάπαλος 71.5.5
- Σικελία 6.1.9, 7.1.3, 7.2.3
- Σιμπλίκιος 12.7.3
- Σιμωνίδης 12.4.4
- Σκύθης 110, 71.10.1
- Σπάρτα 1.3.1
- Στοά 12.4.5, 12.6.1
- Στοιχεῖα, τὰ work by Euclid (14.4.1)
- Στρωματεῖς work by Clement 17.2.3
- Στωϊκός 10.2.1, 71.3.4
- Συμπόσιον works by Plato and Xenophon (20.1.2)
- Συνέσιος 18, 17.2.6, 18 title, 18.1.1, 18.2.6, 18.4.5, 19.1.1, 19.2.1, 19.2.2,

- 19.2.5, 19.2.6, 19.2.8, 19.3.1, 19.3.4,
19.3.7, 19.3.7, 19.3.8, 19.4.2
- Σύνταξις μαθηματική work by
Ptolemy 14.5.3
- Συρία 17.3.2
- Συριανός 12.7.3
- Σῦρος 17.3.4, 17.4.4
- Σωκράτης 8, 61, 4.5.4, 6.1.3, 6.1.7, 8 ti-
tle, 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.4, 8.2.4, 8.2.7,
8.3.1, 8.3.2, 8.3.2, 8.3.3, 8.3.3, 10.5.7,
10.5.8, 20.1.2, 20.1.2, 20.1.3, 20.1.4,
20.1.5, 20.1.5, 20.1.6, 20.1.7, 20.1.7
- Σωκρατικός 14.4.1, 19.5.3, 20.2.4
- Τίμαιος work by Plato 7.1.3
- Τίτος 16.2.5, 16.2.6
- Τόριος 17.3.3
- Ἵπομνήματα work by Xenophon
8.3.1
- Φαινόμενα, τὰ work by Euclid 14.4.2
- Φίλων 16, 16 title, 16.1.1, 16.1.1, 16.1.2,
16.1.3, 16.1.7, 16.2.1, 16.3.1, 17.2.1
- Φοῖνιξ 14.5.3, 17.3.3, 17.4.4
- Φοινίκη 17.3.2
- Φυσική ἀκρόασις, ἡ work by Aristotle
3.4.1 (Περὶ φύσεως), 3.7.5
- Χαλδαῖος 5.3.2, 7.2.4, 13.3.3, 14.2.1,
14.2.3, 14.2.4, 14.2.4, 14.2.6
- Χριστιανικός 73, 74, 109, 12.6.1,
17.2.3
- Χριστός 92, 17.2.5, 17.2.5
- Χρῦσιππος 10.2.1, 12.4.5, 23.3.1
- Ὠριγένης 17.2.3, 17.2.3

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