



FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

CAMBODIAN-THAI BORDER CONFLICT

A critical case study and grassroots stakeholders' perspectives
on the 2008 Preah Vihear Temple (PVT)

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ABSTRACT

The revival of the Preah Vihear conflict resumed again in 2008 not focusing on the architectural structure of the temple but over the unclearly claimed the temple's vicinity of 4.6km² after the UNESCO registered the temple as the World Heritage. To dampen this flame of the conflict, bilateral talks ranging from frontline to high-profile stakeholders as well as both governments of Cambodia and Thailand were administered but failed to prevent of the military confrontations and skirmishes at the border till the intervention of the ICJ in 2011. Thus, this study aims to explore the perceptions of the civil society actors through semi-structured interviews to promote peace from the bottom in this conflict. Key findings show that grassroots level has limited role in de-escalating the conflict but will be significant in precipitating positive change for the future conflict through their everyday peace activities. Because politics of nationalism is the underlying causes of the conflict, political interests outweighs the locals, who are victimized by the emergence of skirmishes at the border.

Keywords: Preah Vihear temple, Cambodia, Thailand, conflict, grassroots stakeholders, peace, bottom-up peacebuilding

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ABBREVIATIONS

- ASEAN : Association of South-East Asian Nations
- CSO : Civil Society Organization
- EU : European Union
- ICJ : International Court of Justice
- NGO : Non-Government Organization
- PAD : People's Alliance for Democracy
- PVT : Preah Vihear Temple
- UN : United Nation
- UNESCO: United Nation Education, Science and Culture Organization
- UNSC : United Nations Security Council
- WGP : Working Group for Peace

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	2
ABBREVIATIONS	3
1. INTRODUCTION	6
1.1 Introduction to Research Problem.....	6
1.2 Aim and Research Questions	8
1.3 Disposition	8
2. BACKGROUND	9
2.1 The Preah Vihear Conflict	9
2.2 Delimitations	10
2.3 Relevance to Global Studies.....	11
3. PREVIOUS STUDIES	12
3.1 Overview of Peacebuilding Processes.....	12
3.2 Influences of Bottom-up Peacebuilding.....	13
3.3 Hindrances of the Bottom-up Peacebuilding.....	14
3.4 Contribution of this Study.....	16
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	17
5. METHODOLOGY	21
5.1 Research Design	21
5.2 Sampling Technique	21
5.3 Methods of Data Collection	22
5.4 Data Analysis Technique	22
5.5 Ethical Considerations.....	23
6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS	24
6.1 Conflict Tensions and Issues	24
6.1.1 Causes of Conflict and Conflict Issues.....	24
6.1.2 Key actors and Their Roles	24
6.1.3 More Important Actors for De-escalation	25
6.2 Influences on Conflict Dynamics	26
6.2.1 Local Level	26
6.2.2 Civil Society Level	27
6.2.3 National Level	28

6.3 More Actions/ Measures for Conflict De-escalation.....	29
6.3.1 Local Level	29
6.3.2 Civil Society Actors	30
6.3.3 National Level	31
6.3.4 Regional/International Level.....	33
7. DISCUSSION	34
7.1 Politics of Nationalism	34
7.2 Influences on Conflict Dynamics	35
7.2.1 Local Level	35
7.2.2 Civil Society Level	37
7.2.3 Regional Level: ASEAN	39
7.2.4 International Level: the ICJ	40
7.3 How Conflict would be De-escalated.....	40
7.3.1 Grassroots Level.....	40
7.3.2 Civil Society Level	42
7.2.3 National Level	43
8. CONCLUSION	45
8.1 Recommendation for Further Research	46
REFERENCES.....	47
Appendix 1: Lederach’s pyramid	54
Appendix 2: Annex I map	55
Appendix 3: Empirical material.....	56
Interviews:	56
Interview guide for semi-structured interviews	57

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to Research Problem

In the case of the latest border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, the Preah Vihear temple's surrounding area of 4.6 km² constituted the subject matter of 2008 confrontations with the emergence of skirmishes at the border. This dispute lasted for three years with the implementation of peace talks between both sides ranging from frontline military leaders to high-profile officers. In contrast, conflict dynamics became escalating along the border, leading to civilians' displacement, injuries, deaths, and the destruction of civilians' property as well as some damages of the 11th century Preah Vihear Temple (PVT). With such dreadful consequences, this border dispute has impressed both regional and international communities, worldwide researchers and scholars on the grounds of figuring out the root causes of the problems and how to combat the tension. Therefore, this research is of its particular significance wherein it is driven to explore the perspectives of grassroots stakeholders to the PVT in promoting peace. It also tends to unveil how the conflict dynamics is influenced and how it would be de-escalated. The findings of this study will optimistically shed more lights on the existing literature discourses of how peace is built, specifically peace from below, within the framework of conflict resolution.

To mitigate the conflict, a bottom-up peace building approach draws the researchers' attention to and becomes a radical appealing tool in the conflict resolution. Also viewed as "indigenous empowerment", the central concept of this approach is to stimulate local populations from below and mid-levels of society to leverage the existing resources for the implementation of a peace process, which could be further developed onto elite levels (Aliyev 2010, p. 323). In other word, civil society engagements yield fundamental contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding by providing supportive backbones for peace and advancing dialogues and reconciliation between concerned parties or insurgents (DAC 1997, p. 37; Lederach 1997; Rupesinghe, 1995; 1998). Presently, the increasing numbers of non-state actors mark the attentiveness and importance of civil society involvement on the area of peace building in ways of informing the leaders' ambitions and public opinion, and communicating such opinion to the leaders (Orjuela 2003, p. 197). This can inferred that the disconnection between the local and political leadership can be conceptualized as the hindrance of peacebuilding process, so such engagement provides the basis of participatory governance and underlies the key in rendering the join decision making between the government and civil society (Baú 2016, pp. 348-9). So far, there have been empirical cases and studies with reference to this approach in a way that local participations play significant roles in peace making processes.

In Indonesia, local community participations in peace building in post-ethnic violence conflict are viewed as significant and powerful within socio-cultural domain of ethnic tolerance (ET) and religious tolerance (RT) (Hartoyo, et al., 2020). This means the local expressions through various means of thoughts, feelings and behaviors at the local community along with the participation of various stakeholders help consolidate the social cohesion and social capital. He

emphasized the socio-cultural approach centered on local wisdom constitutes the prominent strategy in building peace in post-ethnic and religious conflict in society of diversified cultures.

From another case study of Julius Cesar (2020) in the Philippines, the bottom-up peacebuilding process advances between the people of Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines and the government in the protracted conflict. This conflict hopefully comes the end due to the Mindanao peace process of effective mass-based participations. This positive outcome spells the distinguished contributions of grassroots organizations and community-based peace advocates in settling local conflicts by eradicating violent extremism, promoting peacebuilding by local women's organizations, resolving local clan wars, and observing ceasefire and ensuring civilians' security.

In Kosovo, Spruyt (2005) and Zupančič (2018) pinpointed the local strengths in peacebuilding process of intra-ethnic conflict in the post-conflict society of the north of Kosovo under the auspices of EU officials. In this context, they demonstrated that EU's efforts in peace building is constrained within a particular sphere, so the local (Serbs) underlie the potential actors, despite encountering the risk of being verbally or physically intimidated, can exercise their power in promoting peace. In a similar vein, Orjuela (2003) and Thanirimudalige (2005) emphasized the involvement of civil society actors in the process of bottom-up peacebuilding in the context of Sri Lanka. From them, civil society actors play a potential role in maintaining peace process by reconciling the ethnic divides and influencing the public opinion with peace education programs. Some other means of advocacy work and informal diplomacy are discerned as normative practices and implementations of the civil society in building peace from the bottom. For all political patronage, civil society involvement in the local community in Sri Lanka lays the basis in conceiving of peace from necessary measures of understanding, taking on, and evaluating its central role in peacebuilding.

Brett (2017) also underlined the important role of civil society within the framework of bottom peacebuilding process for post-conflict Guatemala. Such engagement helps assure its secure, stable and sustainable peace politics in formal peace making processes, specifically peace talks and post-conflict peacebuilding. The inclusion of non-state actors in such processes enables them to address structural causes of the conflict and appropriate the measures to deal with those inherent problems. As a consequence, armed conflict has not befallen Guatemala in the aftermath of the peace negotiations, facilitated by civil society.

Aliyev (2010) manifested that peace building from the bottom generates potential outcomes in a case study of conflict in the North Caucasus in past and in the present. In light of little success from the top-down process in the current conflict, he underlined the promising lights shed on the bottom-up peacebuilding approach through NGO engagement in local empowerment and peace activities in the past. From this, civil society at wider masses of participation is discerned the most effective in ensuring peace from the bottom in any form as in the NGO's programs, whose aim is conflict prevention and de-escalation through reconciliation and rehabilitation in conflict-torn societies. Such programs promote inter-ethnic reconciliation and peacebuilding in the border regions of Chechnya and Dagestan by reducing tensions between the Dagestani and

Chechen villagers in the border regions after over-time undesirable encounters with each other. By doing so, inter-ethnic communication and various peace activities were implemented within peace-building program such as peace trainings, especially for children and youth, and other sorts of social and cultural practices.

1.2 Aim and Research Questions

The research aim is to explore the perceptions of the grassroots stakeholders in promoting peace in relation to the Preah Vihear conflict from 2008 to 2011 between Cambodia and Thailand. The study seeks to further investigate what they think regarding the causes of the issues of the conflict and the potential impacts on the conflict dynamics. This thesis also explores the ways which the conflict would be further de-escalated within the conceptual domain of peace from the bottom. The following is an umbrella research question alongside with sub-questions:

- What are the perspectives of the grassroots stakeholders to the Preah Vihear conflict in relation to peace from bottom?
 - What are the causes of the issues of the conflict?
 - How is the conflict dynamics influenced?
 - How would the conflict be de-escalated?

1.3 Disposition

The thesis is categorized into eight parts with the beginning of the introduction. In the introduction section, the topic of this study is discussed, followed by a background of a chosen topic. The background section will also present research objective and questions, delimitation of the study and the relevance of the subject to the academic field (Global Studies). The third part will provide an overview of the previous studies on the chosen topic with the debates on peace from below (grassroots), plus the significance of the study. The following section will deal with methodology, explaining the choices of the research approach and ethical considerations. Then the empirical findings of the study will be discussed, and the discussion and analysis will ensue. Finally, the last section will conclude the thesis and answer the research questions with the theoretical implications and suggestions on future research.

2. BACKGROUND

In this chapter, a background of the Preah Vihear conflict (PVT) will be introduced, followed by the aim and research questions of this study. This chapter will also cover the delimitation and the study's relevance to the academic field of Global Studies.

2.1 The Preah Vihear Conflict

The Preah Vihear Temple (PVT), located in the northern party of Cambodia and bordering eastern Thailand, has become the disputing structural object more than a century. The disagreements of the sovereignty over this ancient temple these respective countries are originated from Franco-Siamese Treaty in 1904 and 1908. Since then, the final map, officially rendered by French officers, proved that the PVT is in Cambodia's territory (International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1962; Strate, 2013; Lilja and Baaz 2016, p. 5). This officially recognized map cannot end the ownership disagreement over the temple as Cambodia sought to enlist the temple a 'World Heritage' site at the UNESCO. Thus, tensions between Cambodia and Thailand flared again in 2008 along with armed violence, thereby leading to temporal destructions, injuries and deaths, till the ceasefire agreement was reached under the ICJ's measure of a "provisional demilitarized zone" from both countries to withdraw their troops from the disputed area straddling their borders in July 2011. Below is the timeline of tension since 2008 according to Cambodian Information Center (2021):

- July 8, 2008: The 11th-century Preah Vihear temple was listed as the World Heritage site by UNESCO, provoking the sense of extreme nationalism in Thailand over the ownership of the temple and its vicinity.
- July 15, 2008: The cross-border tension flared after three Thai activists were detained by Cambodian authorities for their attempt to enter the disputed area and plant the Thai flag near the temple. One Thai soldier lost his leg after stepping on a Cambodian landmine
- August 3, 2008: Cambodian and Thai soldiers exchanged fire for about ten minutes, leaving one Cambodian injured.
- August 16, 2008: Cambodia and Thailand cut down the number of soldiers to 40 from each side at the border.
- October 3, 2008: Cambodian and Thai soldiers exchanged gunfire again at the border.
- October 6, 2008: Two Thai soldiers were injured by landmines in the border area, prompting Thailand to blame Cambodia for its purposive deed.
- October 15-16, 2008: Both sides agreed to introduce joint patrols in the disputing zone, following the gunfire exchange with three Cambodians and one Thai soldier dead.
- October 24, 2008: Cambodian and Thai prime ministers met in Beijing and agreed to prevent the conflict from escalating.
- September 29, 2009: Thai prime minister insisted that Thailand attempted to reach a peaceful agreement on a Joint Border Commission implemented by both sides.

- January 24, 2010: Cambodian and Thai troops resumed fighting 15 kilometers southeast of the temple during a speech there by Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, appreciating the soldiers' sacrifices for their national territory.
- February 9, 2010: Google promised Cambodia to review a map of the temple, which displayed nearly half of the architectural structure was in Thailand's territory.
- August 8, 2010: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen made a complaint to the UN about Thailand violating UN rules by threatening to use armed force against Cambodia, but Thailand denied the accusation a day after.
- August 14, 2010: Cambodia's Foreign Minister Hor Namhong turned to the ASEAN of ten members for assistance in settling the conflict so as to avoid its escalation.
- January 31, 2011: Thailand asked Cambodia to remove its flag from the Buddhist temple (Sikha Kiri Svava Pagoda), located in the disputed area, but Cambodia refused.
- February 1, 2011: A Cambodian court sentenced two Thais, one of whom is a high-profile nationalist activist for spying and trespassing in Cambodia.
- February 4-7, 2011: Fighting resumed for four consecutive days, leaving six deaths. In the same month, both sides agreed on a team of Indonesian observers to take action in the disputed border by up to 40 military and civilian observers.
- April 28, 2011: Both sides reached a ceasefire after a periodic eruption of fighting, but it was violated a day after.
- May 7, 2011: Thailand and Cambodia agreed to have the disputed border monitored by Indonesian observers.

From the chronological order of events, this three-year dispute from 2008 to 2011 caused the tragedy for bilateral soldiers and civilians at the border despite the recurrent peace talks between both Cambodia and Thailand. As such peace talks were implemented from a wide range of borderline military officials to the top officials of both sides, positive consequences could be yielded in a way to prevent the existence of skirmishes. Therefore, this study tends to give a voice to the grassroots stakeholder on the tension between both sides within the domain of peace from below. The diverse concepts of peace as well as the expectations of peacebuilding measures of the relevant stakeholders will be the focal point of this study.

2.2 Delimitations

This study centres on the perceptions of grassroots stakeholders, civil society actors who closely observed the PVT conflict and actively engaged with peacebuilding process from below. Within the conceptual framework of bottom-up peacebuilding, it is to figure out how conflict dynamics is influenced and how it would be de-escalated from the perspectives of relevant civil society actors. Due to time constraint and limited accessibility, the number of the participants and how to collect the data are critically considered. A small proportion of Cambodian and Thai civil society actors was selected for the study, so the opinion expressed by them are not representative of the whole population' one. In contrast, they have overwhelming merits to inform and provide indications on how conflict is conceptualized. Furthermore, there might be some problems with translations from Khmer to English from the interviews with Cambodian respondents although I am bilingual in both languages. To

ascertain the correctness and accuracy of translation. To ascertain the correctness and accuracy of my translation, I have tried my best by employing both printed and online tools for the original meanings from the respondents.

Given the method of this study, semi-structured interviews were employed as the sole means to collect the data, so the findings may be influenced from the respondents' willingness in providing the complete answers (Bryman 2012, p. 479). Such willingness was associated with the quality of data due to the informants' internal and external factors such as nervousness, fear, nationalism, bias and feeling of unsafety, especially within the context of Covid-19 pandemic. In the face of this outbreak, online interviews were adopted to practice social safety measures, so such performance may affect the quality of the data to some level.

2.3 Relevance to Global Studies

Globalization is conceived of being an across-the-globe process with the increasing and multidirectional movement of people, objects, places and information as well as the social structures, from which to engender problems in and expedite the existing movements (Ritzer & Dean 2015, p. 02). Under its influence, Kolossov (2005) asserts that functions of boundaries come to a new radical evolution with the demand of robust economies, "the development of technologies and communications, the advancing well-being and the realizations of transboundary and global environmental drawbacks within the framework of international cooperation. From this perspective, ones are not physically confined in one place but widely travel throughout the global, but problems or disputes also exist along the way due to the conflict of interest as Ramsbotham, et al. (2016) pinpoint that conflict is a natural feature of human beings (p. 9).

One typical habit in conflict is that one prioritizes their own interests rather than surrenders within a broader time frame and a wider class of struggle than armed conflict (*ibid*, pp. 9, 17). This perception is reflected in the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute over the 11th-century Preah Vihear temple, along with the existence of the tragedies to the local as well as the temple's architectural structure until international intervention came into action to recover peace for both countries as well as the region. As conflict is dynamics, informed by the interplay of disputing parties over the incompatible goals, the bottom-up peacebuilding process of the aforementioned dispute underlies a remarkable focus for this study. As conflict resolution is commonly discussed within the field of Global Studies, the findings of this study will shed more lights into the conceptual discourses of the literature.

3. PREVIOUS STUDIES

This chapter will discuss the previous studies on the peacebuilding and the significance of bottom-up peacebuilding processes along with its hindrances of such processes. It will also be divided into three sections: Overview of peacebuilding processes, influences of bottom-up peacebuilding processes, and hindrances of the bottom-up peacebuilding processes.

3.1 Overview of Peacebuilding Processes

According to Ramsbotham, et al. (2016), peacebuilding is intricately associated with the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by understanding structural issues and focusing on the long-term relationship between conflicting parties (p. 35). For *peacemaking*, absence of armed conflict considerably matters in a way that agreement of ceasefires is attained, whereas peacekeeping concerns the intervention of international armed forces in settling the militarily violence between disputants. Desirable consequences are constituted by peacebuilding operations, even limited-operated ones, normally aiming to end the violence (*negative peace*) and address the root causes of violence and yield the conducive atmosphere for positive peace. Galtung (1964) highlighted this kind peace with the focus on “the integration of human society”, within the domain of democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized markets, and neo-liberal development.

Peacebuilding processes oftentimes includes civil tasks by monitoring and promoting humanitarian works with the inclusive acts of civil society as Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said to the High-level Forum on the Culture of Peace, chaired by the General Assembly:

“We know that peace cannot be decreed solely through treaties – it must be nurtured through the dignity, rights and capacities of every man and woman.... It is a way of being, of interacting with others, of living on this planet.”²

From this quote, civil society engagements are critically taken into accounts in peacebuilding processes, not only based on top-down approach but also from national audiences of multi-social dimensions with mixed social, economic, political, religious, gender, and ethnic backgrounds play significant roles in the societal process and movement (Billig 1995, p. 71; Billig 2009, p. 347; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Skey 2009, pp. 336-7). In such processes, the previous studies categorize three groups of key actors: peacebuilders, who advocate stability and liberalization; the political entities of the concerning countries, who tend to retain their power; and the secondary elites, who possess the legitimate power of veto in confronting any negative turning points, affecting their economic and political privileges (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009).

In my research on the perceptions of the grassroots stakeholders, I will take the categories of key actors by referring to the civil society actors as the non-local peacebuilders who actively observed the PVT conflict and closely worked with the locals at the Cambodian-Thai border. Their points of view over the bottom-up peacebuilding processes will be reflected and underlie my contribution on how the conflict is de-escalated from the grassroots level through their understandings and practical experiences.

3.2 Influences of Bottom-up Peacebuilding

Numerous perspectives over the significance of bottom-up peacebuilding come to be stimulating and effective within the domain of conflict resolution (Aliyev, 2010; Baù, 2016; Brett, 2017; Hartoyo, et al., 2020; Julius Cesar, 2020; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Orjuela, 2003; Spruyt, 2005; Thantirimudalige, 2005; and Zupančič, 2018). According to Hartoyo, et al. (2020), his mixed-method study of quantitative and qualitative in the rural area of Indonesia emphasized the potential impact of local community participations in strengthening and promoting peace in in post-ethnic and religious conflict in multi-cultural societies. This empirical study highlighted a specific factor of the socio-cultural approach as the main strategy for peacebuilding rather than socio-demographic characteristics (gender, educational level, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status), whereby violent conflict is not influenced, but ethnic tolerance (ET) and religious tolerance (RT). In other words, local expressions of thoughts, feelings and behaviors at the local community create the social cohesion and capital and lay the firm basis of peacebuilding. This study also concludes that local wisdom underlies the socio-cultural approach in addition with contributions of concerning stakeholders within the domain of peacebuilding.

In alignment with the local community participations, a similar case study of Julius Cesar (2020) in the Philippines found that the protracted conflict between the people of Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines and the government shed brighter lights in peacebuilding processes. This study pinpoints that the Mindanao peace process should not solely rely on Track 1 (primary parties: government and rebel movement) but Track 2 (civil society actors, local government leaders, informal influencers, think tanks, the private sector, and researchers), and Track 3 (grassroots-driven peace work done by local communities, community-based people's organizations, and individuals within the broader population). With the support and complement of Track 2 and 3 actors, the conflict is hopefully settled in light of effective mass-based participations from civil society actors and grassroots organization taking a range of roles in supporting socio-economic development, advising public policy, executing community-based programs and also consolidating peace endeavors. As a result, the Mindanao peace process can be ensured by means of eradicating violent extremism, promoting peacebuilding by local women's organizations, resolving local clan wars, and observing ceasefire and ensuring civilians' security.

Spruyt (2005) and Zupančič (2018) concur with the concepts in relation to the local strengths in peacebuilding. They studied on the case of Kosovo about the ethnic conflict in the post-conflict society. For Spruyt (2005), the locals are the key stakeholders in promoting peace by allowing the people of Kosovo to enhance inter-ethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians, as means to improve lasting stability under the auspices of World Vision, an international NGO. This Christian humanitarian organization that the author worked for have implemented various programs to raise local awareness of peace by enabling them to address the customary negative attitudes, stereotypes and opinions, leading to conflict. This marks their active participations to generate peace-friendly zone and invest in relationships. Zupančič (2018) agreed on this

perspectives in his case study of Kosovo. In peacebuilding process of intra-ethnic conflict, his study contended that the locals (Serbs) are characterized as central peacebuilders in developing their own way of ‘everyday peace’ to dampen the intense situation in the context of constrained space of EU officials. With risks of being verbally or physically threatened, they can exercise their power by implementing innovative ways so as to promote peace under the support of EU officials to a certain extent.

Orjuela (2003) and Thantirimudalige (2005) also support the notion and argued that the engagement of civil society actors marks the noteworthy significance in the process of bottom-up peacebuilding. In the ethnically polarized violent conflict in Sri Lanka, Orjuela (2003) mentioned the importance of civil society engagement in elevating peace by creating friendly atmospheres for dialogues and reconciliation between conflicting parties. From this, three forms of contributions can be notified as (1) addressing “*ethnic divides and public opinion*” by means of education and awareness-promoting programs including inter-ethnic dialogue, (2) addressing “*politics with popular mobilization, advocacy work, and informal diplomacy*”, and (3) addressing “*economic issues*” through reconstruction and development programs. Despite some emerging obstacles in executing some work, the role of civil society actors have lit some candles as guide for future positive outcomes of peace by starting to understand, taking on, and evaluating its central role in peacebuilding. This kind of engagement also corresponds with what Thantirimudalige (2005) stressed out regarding the protracted conflict between the Sri Lankan government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Under the auspices of Area Development Program (ADP), implemented by Word Vision, “trust relationships”, a value which was seriously weakened in the protracted war in Sri Lanka, evolve over time among people of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. Thus, the local communities underlie the prominent agents in consolidate their society by building harmony and trust for the sake of peace.

The other case study of Brett (2017) in post-conflict Guatemala is also in line with the important role of civil society in the bottom-up peacebuilding process. Secure, stable and sustainable peace politics are constituted by the civil society endeavors in formal making processes, mainly peace talks. Those non-state actors help address the structural causes of the conflict and propose the pragmatic measures for the emerging problems. The absence of armed conflict in Guatemala is discerned as the desirable result after the peace negotiations, facilitated by civil society. In parallel, Aliyev (2010) found that bottom-up peacebuilding approach in the North Caucasus outweighed the top-down one in the current conflict. The former yields appreciable consequences in a way to bring in peace along with engagement of NGOs, implementing peace activities and empowering the locals. From this, masses of local participations in such activities were claimed as potential in preventing the conflict through reconciliation and rehabilitation in war-torn societies between Chechen and Dagestani villagers over the border regions of Chechnya and Dagestan.

3.3 Hindrances of the Bottom-up Peacebuilding

A number of studies manifest the limited scope of effectiveness as the obstacles in building peace from the bottom (Aliyev, 2010; Baú, 2016; Chambers & Kopstein, 2001; Orjuela, 2003;

Pawakapan, 2013; and Spruyt, 2005). Despite numerous claims over the significance of the bottom-up peacebuilding, the emerging hindrances are remarkably discerned in making peace process go smoothly and assuring a stable peace. As conflict underlies the pursuit of contrasting goals among the disputants (primary actors), the complex interplay of their attitudes and behavior determines the conflict dynamics, starting to grow and intensify at any time (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, p. 11). In this sense, the primary actors are the key players in informing the conflict formations; if their goals are met or fruitfully negotiated, the conflict dynamics de-escalates accordingly (Baú, 2016; Chambers & Kopstein, 2001; Orjuela, 2003; Pawakapan, 2013; *ibid*, p. 212). Therefore, the bottom-up peacebuilding processes undergo some limitations and constraints.

Spruyt (2005) points out that conflict formation and the matter of time are so challenging in building peace from below. As a case in Kosovo's situation, the locals' general mood changes abruptly from calmness with the flame of anger, leading to the emergence of violence as seen in March 2004 throughout Kosovo between Albanians and Serbians. Emotional sensitivity (suspicion and hatred) bred from the prolonged war needs adequate time to fade along with some peace-related activities. From this, bottom-up peacebuilding requires viable and flexible measures to generate space and relationships within a complex set of dynamics and time frames.

Likewise, Aliyev (2010) agrees on this concept in a way that the desirable outcomes of the bottom-up approach may not be attained if a number of necessary criteria for success of peace efforts are not critically clear. In the case of the North Caucasus, two considerable issues need to be taken into account. First, activities for only rural and IDP communities (Internally Displaced Person) are not sufficient to surely include important conflict participants in a peace process. Second, peacebuilding should be heterogeneous. That means a wide range of stakeholders from multi-dimensional social settings critically matters in the process. Without those criteria, peacebuilding process is very likely to face hindrances along the way.

Orjuela (2003) also highlights "political patronage and the protracted war" as the central challenges of the bottom-up peacebuilding process in Sri Lanka. From its historical narrative of war, Sri Lankan society is ethnically divided, nationalist and violent without the sense of pro-peace along with the continued practice of authoritarian structures and democratic deficits. Numerous NGO activities are rigorously scrutinized and implemented in a top-down or project-oriented manner without the masses of local participations. From this, civil society activities cannot truly promote democratic and peaceful values by bridging ethnic cleavages and consolidate the locals' bonds for the sake of a jointly defined peace.

In a similar vein regarding the polity, Baú (2016) displays a concern in the bottom-up peacebuilding process in the aftermath of civil conflict when there is disconnection between the locals and political leadership. Lack of communication and limited access to information are very likely to engender fragile environment in progressing a stable peace. Such environment is constituted by the low-level trust of the locals towards their state although it also needs to gain legitimacy through close cooperation with its citizens. In contrast, forms of cooperation between the state and the locals underlies a complex challenge (World Bank, 2011). Security

is one of the key factors which consolidates trust and underlies a way that the state can build up its legitimacy from the locals.

3.4 Contribution of this Study

This chapter has reviewed the previous studies with reference to the bottom-up peacebuilding starting from the overall concepts of how peacebuilding is executed. The significance of the bottom-up approach will follow along with the emerging hindrances of implementing it and how it can be facilitated in a way to ensure peace. The previous studies manifest that the current literature with respect to how the Preah Vihear conflict is de-escalated from the bottom have hitherto been limited and efforts to do so remains scant. Therefore, this study seeks to respond to this gap by including the voices of civil society actors by highlighting three main contributions to the field of Global Studies. First, the causes the issues of the conflict are not exclusive from those of other conflicts but create another form of conflict structure, which requires particular peace strategies. Second, limited bottom-up peacebuilding was showcased for the current conflict, but this approach will be critically considered in the future peace strategies. Lastly, Peace strategies of more borderline economic collaboration, more participations from masses for peace in various means become remarkably appreciated for future work in the PVT conflict as well as others. Throughout the thesis, discussed various theories will be tested and examined under the auspices of insights and concepts of the empirical sources.

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In peacebuilding process, various actors are critically considered and underlie the cooperative components to alleviate “truth, love, harmony and happiness and cooperation among humans across the ethnic, racial, religious and national borders.” (Showkat Dar, 2017). Within the framework of a bottom-up peacebuilding approach, a central idea is to empower the local population at the bottom and mid-level of communities in availing of their existing resources to ensure the continued peace process. Subsequently, their endeavors and formulated influences will be alleviated to elite levels (Aliyev, 2010).

According to Lederach’s pyramid (1997, see Appendix 1) and his peacebuilding approach, he categorizes peacebuilding actors into three levels, theoretically significant for my research:

1. Top Leadership: refers to the military, political, religious leaders with high public profile in any conflict. In light of the key political military leaders in the conflict, people in this level, the primary actors with more power and influence than the others in the conflict, can argue, generate and will resolve the conflict.
2. Middle-Range Leadership: deals with middle-range leadership, comprising leaders or representatives of NGOs, ethnic/religious leaders, intellectuals, educators or businessmen, who outnumber those on the top. The individuals from this level function in leadership positions are prominently featured in the conflict owing to their highly respected social status, primary and broader-range networks, and “identity groups” socially recognized of their prestige by the locals and non-locals.
3. Grassroots Leadership: mainly refers to those who closely engage in the local communities, including local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs and other representatives of the local population. These people directly understand the fear and suffering and can witness firsthand the deep-rooted hatred and animosity in the local everyday life.

From the pyramid, Lederach places NGOs and other civil society groups at the middle level as a connecting entity between the level of people/grassroots and elite/state. He also emphasizes that the bottom-up peacebuilding efforts are more efficient than the top level because the top leaders are generally attached with their current incumbents with high public profile. Their positions are also associated with the perspectives and issues in conflict (*ibid*, p. 40). People at this level do not usually have close connections with the governing process but have an influence on the elites as well as the top leaders to some extent. On account of their roles as connectors between the states and population, they should be neutral without any political or military affiliations (Aliyev, 2010). Regarding approaches to peacebuilding, “middle-out” is conceptualized from this level with their development of actions, characterized as problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and the development of peace commissions” (Lederach 1997, p. 46). From this, the proposed approaches of middle-range actors provides the framework to understand the case of the Cambodian-Thai border conflict over the Preah

Vihear temple from the perspectives of civil society actors on how to de-escalate the tensions, engendered by the interplay between the primary actors, two states.

Lederach's pyramid over the three categories of actors in the conflict will give theoretical lens to how the Preah Vihear conflict is conceptualized from the middle-range leadership. The perspectives from this level, civil society actors (NGOs) is my focus in this thesis over the how peace is promoted from the bottom by enabling them to address the causes of the issues of the conflict, show the relevant actors and their roles in the conflict and their suggestions for further peace actions. In the middle-range level, there are a set of leaders with "a determinant *location* in the conflict, if integrated properly, might provide the key to creating an *infrastructure* for achieving and sustaining peace" (Lederach 1997, p. 46). Thus, their social knowledge and experiences, social networks and insightful standpoints in the field are critically taken into account and underlie resourceful information for this study.

According to Galtung (1969, 1996), the triangle model of conflict, violence and peace including both symmetric and asymmetric is characterized as contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behavior (B). The contradiction is about the underlying conflict situation in relation to the actual "incompatible goals" between disputing parties, called by Christ Michell in Ramsbotham, et al. (2016) as a "mis-match between social values and social structure" (p. 12). In a symmetric conflict, the interests and conflict of interests are conceptualized by the conflicting parties, whereas the relationship and the conflict of interests imbedded in the relationship are formulated by the parties in asymmetric conflict (*ibid*). In the triangle model, attitudes refers to the disputants' perceptions and misperceptions of the other and among themselves, often informed by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Behavior refers the tendency of cooperation or coercion, gestures in the form of conciliation or hostility. In violence conflict, it is determined by threats, coercion and destructive acts of the parties.

As all three components are mutually influenced in a full conflict, a change in any component will escalate conflict dynamics like the case of the Cambodian-Thai border dispute over the PVT's vicinity (4.6 km²). The incompatible goals of Cambodia and Thailand determine the structure of the conflict, intensifying the situation with the occurrence of violence through the parties' attitudes and behavior towards the PVT. While the temple is declared to be in Cambodia's territory, its surrounding area is still ambiguous and required future bilateral negotiations. Without hope in Thailand's action amid the already heightened domestic interest in the issues of the temple, Cambodia submitted the form to inscribe the temple as the World Heritage (Pawakapan, 2013, p. 49). This provokes the sense of nationalism as the protest in Thailand against Cambodia's attempt, in the form of increased possibility of hostile response to international events and with the greater concern about the embarrassment of Thai national dignity (Cottam & Cottam, 2001; Renshon, 2017)

From the previous studies, the bottom-up peacebuilding becomes so important and draws the extensive attentions of the scholars and researchers in ensuring social security and everyday comforts of the locals (Billig 1995, p. 71; Billig 2009, p. 347; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Ramsbotham, et al. 2016, p. 213; and Skey 2009, pp. 336-7). In a case of the PVT conflict,

conflict analysis tool matters to understand various aspects and dimensions of the conflict and how peacebuilding is made. By doing so, conflict analysis would generate more comprehensive set of lenses for characterizing how conflict happens, evolves within, and precipitates changes in “the personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions”, and for developing viable responses that foster peaceful change within those dimensions through nonviolent mechanisms (Lederach 1997, p. 83).

To explain and understand the potential or ongoing violent conflict and insecurities through the assessment of *structures*, *actors*, and *conflict dynamics*, I am also inspired by Ramsbotham’s and Sida’s conflict analysis models to look at the PVT conflict in this study from the perspectives of Cambodian and Thai civil society actors (Ramsbotham, et al. 2016; Sida, 2006). That means conflict analysis tools help see how Cambodian and Thai civil society actors think about the conflict. To do so, causes of tension/ conflicts, conflict actors, and conflict structure will be critically conceptualized and addressed in a way to assess the likelihood of future scenarios in the conflict dynamics. Then appropriate measures should be considered to prevent any emergence of violence under any circumstances. As conflict develops due to a complex interplay of disputants’ attitudes and behaviors, it is very likely to involve the third-party (Ramsbotham, et al. 2016, p. 9). Although hard to predict the conflict dynamics, this analysis, at least provides some guidelines to plan for *various contingencies* and create a more *flexible approach* or suggested measures (Sida, 2006). From such analysis, approaches to peace, profit and dignity through education, research and practice are sought as a way to prevent, transform, manage and resolve conflicts among citizens and states from the comprehensive understanding of the conflict-sensitive aspect of policies and programs aiming for the promotion of peace and security (*ibid*; Showkat Dar, 2017).

Along with this, to discover such phenomena, this research employed the epistemology of constructivism (constructionism) under the auspices of the phenomenological approach. According to constructivism, individuals seek understanding of the world by making sense of its meaning through their social interaction and a constant state of revision (Bryman 2012, pp. 30, 34). Within the framework of epistemology, social reality has a meaning for human beings, who develop their actions to be meaningful by acting on the basis of the meaning that “they attribute to their acts and to the acts of others” (*ibid*). Myers (2008) asserts that researchers presume that this social reality is only constructed through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments. Further, it is grounded on the subjective experiences of individuals within a particular context, so researchers tends to exclude pre-existing knowledge of a phenomena so as to avoid the prejudice of researchers, to ensure the accurate data, and to ascertain that a new meaning from the data may emerge (Gray, 2004). Gray also emphasized “current understandings” from the best of individuals’ ability “to allow phenomena to speak for themselves”, without the influence of external preconceptions (2004, p. 21).

In this case of study, perspectives from the respondents (civil society actors) underlie the critical input of the analysis to build up the extensive understanding of the phenomena (2008 PVT conflict). Creswell (2014) stated that studies centered on constructivist perspectives tend

to be derived from the participants' views of the phenomena, perceived to be associated with social and historical dimensions. He also emphasized the importance of the "views, values, beliefs, feelings, assumptions, and ideologies of individuals of the participants" through their experiences in a phenomenon or process rather than in gathering facts and describing acts (2015, p. 402). Thus, rigorous attention is critically taken in account to understand how Cambodian and Thai civil society actors give meanings from their experiences and knowledge in relation to the Preah Vihear conflict. Within a constructivist model, subjective interpretations does not bear a source of bias but underlie as the benchmark to perceive how people experience social reality (Garfinkel, 1967).

Within the domain of the bottom-up peacebuilding, middle-range actors (civil society actors) are the focus for this study will be provided enough room to raise their voices, to interpret and reflect the perspectives from their experiences and knowledge in relation to the Preah Vihear conflict. Their subjective interpretations will be later analyzed to understand the fact of the studied phenomena, guided by research question based on theoretical framework of Lederach's pyramid, along with Sida's and Ramsbotham's conflict analysis model.

5. METHODOLOGY

This chapter deals with the methodology employed in this study. It has four sections starting with research design, followed by sampling technique. Methods of data collection will be the third section, and the data analysis technique will be addressed in the final one.

5.1 Research Design

To conduct this qualitative research and answer the outlined research questions, an inductive approach whereby the theoretical ideas and concepts are derived from the data and materials is applied (Bryman 2012, p. 35-37, 408). As this research specifically operationalized in a form of a single-case study, a holistic and in-depth exploration matters in order to conceptualize the nature and meaning of a social phenomenon (*ibid*, p. 40; Hammarberg et al., 2016). From this, qualitative method is the most viable approach of carrying out this research in a way the reality in a particular societal context is empirically constructed and revealed. Presenting the objective in priori, this study will seek to understand the behavioral and social phenomena of the Preah Vihear conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in 2008 from the conceptual injection of civil society actors who actively engaged into and closely observed the situation.

Qualitative research becomes one of the common methods for researcher within the constructivist paradigm (Lincoln, et al., cited in Mertens, 2015, p. 237). This method is employed to answer the questions about experience, meaning and perspective in-depth from people of a particular case and context, as a case study to be specific. Cohen, et al. (2011) emphasized that a case study formulates a unique example of real people in real contexts, allowing readers to conceptualize ideas better than simply showing them in an abstract manner (p. 289). In light of its powerful determinant to identify both causes and effects of practical realities, case study will serve as the most acceptable way of collecting the data in this study.

5.2 Sampling Technique

As this research will conceptualize and manifest the experiences of the respondents from the shared-feature groups, purposive sampling techniques will be applied. As a “non-probability form of sampling”, this technique aims to sample cases or participants with their relevance to the outlined research questions (Bryman 2012, p. 418). For Collins (2010), researchers who are within the constructivist domain employ this technique with the focus on an identification of group settings and individuals where (and for whom) the processes being traced mostly happen.

Qualitative research is a research strategy that generally deals with words rather than quantification in gathering and analyzing the data, so the researchers mainly base their studies on the interviews (Bryman 2012, p. 380). This strategy does not always employ random samples, for the researchers typically ascertain access to as wide a range of relevant stakeholders to the outlined research questions as possible (*ibid*, p. 469).

Researchers of the constructivist paradigm generally determine the sample size with the main focus on the information-rich and in-depth scope within the limited timeframe. Not comprehensively representing the generalization from a sample to the population, the selected sample size and sampling strategies are ensured for their logics and acceptance from the readers. According to Teddlie and Yu (2007), purposive sampling is applied in various research

on the grounds of the attempt to reach the representativeness, to make comparisons, to heed certain, unique issues or cases, and to formulate a theory through progressive collection of data from various sources. As a consequence, this technique underlies the most viable way in the case study about the Preah Vihear conflict in 2008. With this technique, eleven civil society actors from both Cambodia and Thailand, who actively engaged and closely observed the situation of the conflict, will be purposively chosen to participate in this study. Five of them are Thai, and the rest are Cambodian. Eight of the participants are the members of the management team that organized local activities to raise social awareness of and promote peace at the border amid the emergence of the conflict. The other three used to be the participants and is also the local, who took part in the organized activities at the border in 2011.

Bryman (2012) highlighted one of the problems for the qualitative research, which is quantify the exact numbers of people to be interviewed if theoretical considerations guide selection (p. 425). It is hard to initially determine how many people should be interviewed, but this may not be a critical concern. What considerably matters is the sampling method to be employed: why is it utilized and why is the quantified sample size suitable for the significance of the study? (*ibid*). Nevertheless, Crouch and McKenzie (2006) argued that sample sizes of fewer than twenty enable the qualitative researchers to increase the chances to get closer to their participants in interview-based studies and cultivate fine-grained data or features, which are significant for their studies. Thus, the sample size determined in this study is subjectively appropriate due to a short time frame and the researcher's attempt to conduct in-depth study of a phenomena. From this, it will be too ambitious to proceed more than this number of participants involved, and this study does not aim to generalize its findings.

5.3 Methods of Data Collection

The study employs semi-structured interviewing to elicit detailed and in-depth information from the participants in a setting where I will be able to observe their emotional responses to the interview and decrease any distress or other negative feeling. This kind of style is chosen so as to create wide room of expression with the endeavor to minimizing the formality during the interview so that the participants feel comfortable in providing their answers to the questions. With a list of open-ended questions used as an interviewing guide, I can ensure the interviews will stay on the right track.

Questions are formulated and developed as a guide from the themes of the research questions and previous studies within the existing conceptual domain of how conflict arises and peace is built from below. By doing so amid the pandemics of Covid 19, all selected participants have been interviewed online approximately 50 minutes each with the use of the audio recording (only when the contents are granted) to capture the proper meanings of conceptual exchanges during the interviews. The interviews were be done in English (six participants) and Khmer (5 participants), and have been translated into English and subsequently transcribed for coding.

5.4 Data Analysis Technique

Data analysis in this research will apply in correspondence with the technique of thematic analysis, whereby overarching themes with reference to the research focus has been identified from the responses in the interviews. According to Bryman (2012), a theme allows the

researcher to theoretically conceptualize his or her data from the basis that can theoretically contribute to the literature discourses with regard to the research focus (p. 580). It also builds on codes identified in transcribed interviews. As a consequence, thematic analysis process in this study will go through the means of coding.

As one of the most important processes in grounded theory, the coding technique employed in this research mainly stems from Charmaz's coding techniques whose two main forms will ensue. Initial coding tends to review the transcripts and/ or field notes, conceptualize, give labels (names) to component segments of the data, and do coding on the ground of central theoretical significance (Bryman 2012, p. 569; Charmaz 2006, p. 57-8). Second, selective or focused coding inherently applies to the stages of the initial coding in a way that the codes are mostly frequent and seen as the most revealing about the data. Some of the initial codes will be removed by making the most analytic sense to group the data incisively and completely. In this phase, new codes may stem from combining and synthesizing initial codes. Thereafter, in-depth analysis will be made to account for the data from focused coding to emphasize the main conceptualized themes for the research focus, which theoretical contribute to the existing literature discourses in association with the Preah Vihear conflict.

With the eleven interviews transcribed from audio into text, text is classified into pre-determined themes in relation to the research question: causes of the issues of the conflict, influences on conflict dynamics, and how the conflict would be de-escalated. Then, data that explains the underlying causes of the issues of the conflict is put in one group to be further polished for the final. For example, if the data says "*Both nationalism and political interest are the main causes of the tension of the conflict*", the words "nationalism and political interest" is grouped in the table of causes of the conflict. This process is constantly executed for all transcribed interviews until in-depth analysis of the themes starts to reach the main conceptualized themes.

5.5 Ethical Considerations

This research will inherently comply with the common ethical conduct within the sphere of personal, professional, and during-research activity. The level of attention on ethics will be incisively increased to ensure the research privilege by following all steps. During the Covid-19 pandemic, informed consent will be in a form of oral agreement online between the researcher and the participants. All of them will receive a notice for their availability of the voluntary and be asked for their permissions again with the research objectives, methods, significance and anticipated social contribution prior to commencement of each interview. By doing so, the researcher would like to ascertain that all agreed participants are well-informed of this study and conceptualize their rights to access to their information and the right to withdraw at any point. Moreover, this research will be conducted in accordance to the principle of no harm in any form of physical, resource loss, emotional and reputational along with the solemn assurance of participant anonymity and confidentiality. That means their identities or self-identifying statements and information will not be revealed.

6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

This chapter will dedicate to the findings of the study in response to the objectives and research questions. The first section begins with the tension of the conflict, focusing on the causes of the conflict between 2008 and 2011 and actors from different impacts on the conflict. Measures taken for the de-escalation of the conflict will ensue from various levels, and this chapter will end with the more actions for de-escalation suggested by the informants of the study. The results will be subsequently discussed and analyzed with reference to the theoretical perspectives, the outlined research questions, and the previous research studies in the following chapter.

6.1 Conflict Tensions and Issues

6.1.1 Causes of Conflict and Conflict Issues

This study discovers the causes of the revival of the 2008 conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple between Cambodia and Thailand. From the interviews, politics and nationalism were displayed as the main reasons as one Cambodian respondent stated:

If we notice, the tension stems from the nationalism and the falsification of history, which serves the politics. This is the root causes of the conflict.... Both nationalism and political interest are the main causes of the tension of the conflict. (P. 02)

Like others, this respondent claimed that nationalism and political interests play the underlying role in escalating the conflict dynamics, and historical narrative between Cambodia and Thailand was also utilized by both-side politicians to ignite the sense of nationalism among their own people for the political gain. From them, the reason for this is to distract their people from focusing on the internal issue amid the political chaos in Thailand to aim at the temple. One Thai respondent said:

The problem [temple conflict] right now during 2008 to 2011 maybe happen because of Thai politicians. They tried to raise this issue to make the conflict excite [tense]... they try to bring this issue to get involved from people... (P. 06)

From this utterance, politicians involved the public by provoking their sense of nationalism in the temple conflict. This might be due to the fact that there have been a challenge between the so-called Yellow-shirt forces and Red-shirt forces. One of these groups, known as a right wing Thai opposition force, took the temple as the political hostage to confront the incumbent Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, backed by the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

6.1.2 Key actors and Their Roles

From the interviews with all eleven respondents, the governments and politicians of both Cambodia and Thailand are the key actors in escalating the tension and attempting to engage

this conflict into their political interests by promoting nationalism among their people. One Cambodian respondent commented:

I realize that issue (the temple conflict) is the politics of the two government. The Thai and Cambodian governments also have their own internal politics in their respective countries, and promoting nationalism has helped them tremendously, helping them to win the election. (P. 11)

Like others, this respondent referred to the governments and politicians of both countries, who play the main role in determining the conflict dynamics. For Cambodia, he meant the Prime Minister Hun Sen and a potential opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva in Thailand, who headed the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) — backed by the monarchy, military, and urban elites— heats up the situation to confront the incumbent Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and populist former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by provoking the sense of nationalism in relation to the temple conflict. Moreover, other four respondents stated that media also took an active part in escalating the conflict dynamics through the heat-up speech of hatred and nationalism, especially on mainstream media. One quote from a Thai respondent said:

The politics again is to come back between media and politics. I think this [tension] is because of media.... Media is another challenge (for this conflict). Actually, [it is] like the TV and news. (P. 01)

From this quote, media is the other key player in escalating its dynamics and heating up the nationalism among people from both sides. Other Cambodian respondents also emphasized TV commentators and daily broadcasts promotes hatred speech and nationalism, which create a sense of belonging, thereby kindling the situation. From other respondents, talk shows and TV comments were discerned as the mutual hatred and nationalist responses between Cambodian and Thai sides with reference to the conflict.

6.1.3 More Important Actors for De-escalation

Most respondents (6 out of 11) prioritized the grassroots level's influential roles, ranging from local people to civil society leaders, in cooperatively de-escalating the tension of the conflict even though they cannot help solve the conflict directly. Those stakeholders are claimed to underlie the grassroots impetus for the machine of conflict resolution, pressuring the policy makers, governments, politicians and other relevant conflict actors to take their voices into alarming considerations. One respondent explained:

There are two points for this (de-escalation of the conflict tension). First, we think that it is the mass of the people. Whether they want it or not, politicians must listen to the people on both sides.... Second, the so-called key people are of importance. Those people refer to influential actors who can be civil society leaders, religious leaders, or academics (P. 02)

This quote can be conveyed that the main actors in defusing the conflict tension refer to diversity of grassroots level encompassing the religious entities and civil society actors. That means the engagement of all individuals are of the backbone of the solution despite the fact that they are not the direct conflict settlers. In contrast, other four respondents pointed out that local citizens are inferior to and victimized by those powerful group of people. For this, most respondents highlighted the potentials of third-party intervention and mediation efforts as one Cambodian respondent described:

Yeah, I think there must be at the international level; there must be the third party to involve.... I mean there must be the third party to involve in order to help facilitate and talk to the two countries, Thailand and Cambodia. (P. 05)

This respondent underlined the significance of the third-party intervention and mediation effort to facilitate and console the situation. Without the specific indication of the international actors, the respondent claimed that it is helpful for conflict settlement with an arbitrator, who has power within the domain of conflict resolution. Likewise, regional and international actors such as ASEAN, the ICJ and the UN are literally identified by other respondents to play roles although some respondents mentioned the limited role of the ASEAN in settling the conflict. For most respondents, the ICJ underlies the international judge with a judicial role in deciding on the case.

6.2 Influences on Conflict Dynamics

6.2.1 Local Level

Peace in mind was revealed by one of the respondents in the interview as a way that she observed and asked the borderline locals to practice. From this respondent, hatred or extreme nationalism were not expressed by the borderline locals, thereby claiming that they are like friends and family. They love and care about one another as friends and family because they have cordial relationships and long intimacy prior to the emergence of the conflict through goods exchange and some community activities such as religious rituals. One Thai respondent explained:

I can say they live in peace. They don't make more conflict....They don't complain about the Cambodian side at all. They also asked for the government to talk peacefully, not shooting each other. I think it is a way. (P. 01)

In light of intimate interconnectedness, she claimed the borderline locals were victimized by the politicians, imposing the darkness on their everyday life. Thus, they thought it was not necessary to make more conflict among themselves but build up peace in mind and plead with the government for the ceasefire. Despite limited impact on the governments' political decision, peace talks were a way the locals posed as the request to the politicians or governments to prevent the emergence of violence. A Cambodian respondent also described:

The locals have nothing but requests for both sides to stop because it affects their lives....If we can see in Thailand, most of the people who provoke the problem are half

from Bangkok. We think that they can come and mobilize some local people to participate with them. In fact, the people in the communities, villages, communes and borders will not participate in this event; they only want to end the conflict. (P. 04)

From this utterance, it can be seen that petitions were what the locals could do to get attention of the politicians or governments of both sides (Cambodia and Thailand) to end the conflict. Like others, this respondent also underpinned the most common means of narrow-coverage media (alternative media) and platforms organized by some civil society organizations to help raise the local voices of concerns. Another Thai respondent continued:

They (the locals) have no power to say anything to the government. I don't think that they will listen. So, that is what I feel. (P. 08)

Like most respondents, this civil society activist maintained the local activities were discerned less potential or no potent impact on the politicians or governments. Whereas a few appreciated the local touching and peaceful voices, the majority highlighted their despondency over the negligence of the politicians or the governments on the comfort of the locals.

6.2.2 Civil Society Level

From the interviews, civil society activists from Cambodian and Thai side had cooperatively administered various online and offline talks on account of settling the conflict at their level. They started to involve the borderline locals and youths from various backgrounds, to build up common understanding by conducting exchange visits between Cambodians and Thais and creating non-violent messages to the powerful people to not incite the tension or stir up the already sensitive situation among their own people. One Cambodian respondent pointed out:

We had an activity as a movement of our youth group, which we called MPJ [Mekong Peace Journey], and we also expanded the peace network among the youths.... There are also some major activities, including cross-border pilgrimage activities. (P. 03)

From this quote, both Thai and Cambodian civil society activists endeavored to promote peaceful interconnectedness among the locals and youths from both sides by organizing various activities. Most respondents also stressed the implementation of training and educational activities so as to strengthen the borderline connectivity and common understanding among people. For this, the Mekong Peace Journey (MPJ) the Working Group for Peace was established, including the youths from Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and China, and subsequently the Cambodian-Thai Exchange Program (CTEP) in the aftermath of continued discussions of the Work Group for Peace. In those programs that I myself attended, non-violent concepts were introduced, especially for the youths so that they could exercise their rights to voice up their concerns and demands. However, for the recent temple conflict, one Thai respondent did not hope to mitigate the tension much as she described:

I have no hope in the government now. I don't know. I think the people can take action by themselves because we are not sure whether the government will listen to us.... I think right now, focusing on educating the young people, the young generation. I think it is more important.... Yeah, somehow I still believe in the power of the CSO [Civil Society Organizations]. (P. 08)

Like others, this respondent emphasized the pivotal roles of civil society organizations in establishing the peace education programs for the borderline locals and helping them voice up their concerns from the frontiers. From the interviews, those respondents revealed their dissatisfaction with the politicians or governments on the grounds that there were no hopes from them. Apparently, this respondent emphasized the power of the civil society organizations in changing behaviors and the perceptions of people through youth-related educational activities of peace for satisfactory consequences in a long-run. From her experience, this marks more significance than just requesting the governments at the expense of time and effort.

6.2.3 National Level

From the interviews with the civil society actors from both Cambodian and Thai side, most of them expressed their resentment against the government over the conflict resolution, despite periodic bilateral talks ranging from low-profile level to the top-profile level. Those taken measures failed to combat violence along the border due to the political interests as one Cambodian respondent elaborated:

It [conflict] is associated with political interests of both sides. If we closely look at the situation, they [both leaders] are in positions of difficulty during that conflict. If any party decided to compromise, then one can lose his political interests and in his group. (P. 11)

From this utterance, both government seemed not to compromise for the settlement as political interests are of the emerging barriers. Those politicians are said to take action as the on-the-surface manifestation of conflict settlement for purpose of political gain for each government. Another Cambodian respondent also explained:

As I said, this is the internal politics of their parties for their political interests. This makes the problem unsolved, but that is solvable if actual peace talk can be implemented. (P. 10)

This quote shows that both government seemed to leave the problem unsolved to gain the mainstream support from the public and console the emerging political chaos between the so-called Red-shirt and Yellow-shirt group in the context of Thailand as explained in the previous sections. This respondent continued the Cambodian government also enjoyed playing that political game to manifest its nationalistic emotions for its own country. This might provide it with political benefits for the up-coming election (2008). However, one respondent claimed that both governments' endeavors in peace talks could be acceptable due to the emergence of small-scale military confrontations with the small number of casualties. He explained:

Like you, I have noticed that there were peace talks at the national level. There is the establishment of a sub-national committee for the negotiations between front-line military commanders. It also helps with some effectiveness if we look at casualties. (P. 11)

From this respondent, the number of casualties of the conflict was low due to the implementation of peace talks between Cambodia and Thailand. For this, there were fewer than 100 people dead along with approximately 27,000 displacing people during fighting after both Cambodian and Thai sides agreed to withdraw their troops from the disputed zone in December 2011 (BBC, 2013; Shadbolt, 2013). For him, without that, mass damage and death tolls would have been disastrous based on the conflict's level of tension if peace talks had not been implemented.

6.3 More Actions/ Measures for Conflict De-escalation

6.3.1 Local Level

Some respondents directly inferred the potentials from the locals' voices associated with the exercise of their existing rights in outspreading their feelings via various means. They were the direct victims of the conflict at the border, so their voices must be heard by the governments as well as the parliaments of both Cambodia and Thailand. One Thai respondent explained:

Actually nowadays, they can even come directly to the parliament, you know? But before maybe, we are not sure.... Some people make peace walks, can walk to the parliament [in both Cambodia and Thailand] to stop shooting or something. To ask more action from the governments to stop fighting. (P. 01)

This respondent stressed the locals can exercise their rights to voice up their concerns and worries in different channels and implement peace walks to the parliaments of both sides with the aim of stopping violence along the border. Strikingly, this can be inferred that an alarm of direct ravaging impact could be alerted to manifest the locals' political dissent against the nationalistic politicians or governments. From the above quote, more non-violent action of the government in relation to the conflict should be elevated from the grassroots level. For this, other respondents were also optimistic about the future outcomes from the grassroots as another Thai respondent commented:

I think, especially local leaders should try to raise peace activities, not just only in one side but try to create dialogues, for example, among people from both sides together to participate and involve people [...] about how to make peace and how to manage the area [border]. (P. 06)

More action of local leaders was highlighted in a way to promote peace-related activities among the borderline people, including Cambodian and Thai sides. From this perspective, dialogues could be cooperatively implemented to discuss and seek possible means of how to assure peace and manage the border area as the benefit sources for the locals rather than conflict. The

respondents also pinpointed the importance of involving more people beyond the border area into the activities so that their impact could be more potential. Further, other cultural festivals or religious rituals were mentioned by most respondents as a connecting approach for both sides to build up their open-minded relationship and common understanding from the grassroots level under the auspices of civil society organizations and media. One Cambodian respondent claimed:

Civil society would be one of the channels to help them raise their voice, and also the media can also help if they (are) neutral enough and they can report what is happening with the people and the people should bravely raise their voice to tell the government that it (conflict) is not good for their living. (P. 05)

From most interviews, civil society organizations and media are of significance in promoting the locals' voices and activities in a fashion to pressure the politicians or governments. With more activeness from the grassroots level, civil society actors could help and extend their voices for peace. Also, this respondent underpinned the level of fairness of media in broadcasting the realities of the locals' impacts and demands from all social aspects. From her, the locals should be braver in expressing themselves without fear to raise their voices for peace.

6.3.2 Civil Society Actors

Most respondents prioritized the youths' power through their collective activities and voices in a way to challenge the politicians or governments as well as the society as a whole. From past experiences for the recent conflict in regard to the Preah Vihear temple, the interviews showed that civil society actors' activities were little and less influential, but the potential would prosper in a long run. One Thai respondent explained:

If one people (young person) changes, it changes. Despite (a) small thing, it can be powerful. Small voice but powerful. Yes for long term.... We make many activities, and then bring the youth because we know we cannot change all people, so the youth is the powerful or the ones that can be the change makers for us. (P. 01)

From this quote, every individual would create a tremendous impact on the society. Like others, this respondent pointed out her past activities in immersing the youths not only Cambodians and Thais but also Vietnamese, Laos, Burmese, and Chinese in the realities of the conflict area. Those youths were claimed to eyewitness evidence of destructive impacts from the conflict with their moving emotions and sympathy among the locals. Thus, most respondents emphasized the noteworthy significance of further innumerable youth-oriented programs. Another Thai respondent suggested:

I want MPJ to continue, I mean the program because we need to, I would say, add more platforms. It doesn't have to be MPJ; it can be another program that includes peace building process like regional exchange forum more and more for the young people across the region. (P. 08)

This respondent strongly supported the progress of the Mekong Peace Journey, founded from the outset of the 2008 conflict. Like others, she appreciated the presence of this and profoundly recommended more peace building programs in company with more efficacious courses or platforms. Those may enable the youths to strengthen the youths' knowledge, mind and spirit as well as their emotional relationship with the locals by contextualizing the conflict realities. Other Thai and Cambodian respondents also highlighted more possible future public events under the auspices of peace journalists or mass media. One more Thai respondent described:

If I get back, I probably try to push the activities to be more advocacy activities, not just between thirty participants, try to reach more media, try to come up with after-activities like organize our documentary or doing some campaign in the public space. (P. 07)

Similar to other Cambodian respondents, this Thai underlined more possibilities for advocacy activities from the civil society organizations. From this perspective, their solidarity voices with the emergence of any advocacy strategy might be of primordial impetus for peace. Comparing to the past, most interviews manifested more public advocacy activities for peace with more participations of local leaders should be implemented on the grounds that there will be massive impacts and recognitions at both national and international levels. They provided the examples of press conferences, continued public campaigns and concerned mass petitions of both Cambodian and Thai peace activists with the vast promotion of media. Furthermore, one Cambodian respondent suggested another contributions for peace at the borderline. He explained:

What we did before was a contribution work, but another thing that needs to be added is to create some development organizations that exchange the development program is also a contribution. Another thing is related to the creation of social media, a shared (Facebook, etc) page (Cambodia and Thailand) to show solidarity. (P. 02)

From this quote, this respondent was also pleased with the civil society actors' past activities and further asked for the establishment of some borderline development organizations, dealing with the local lifestyles at the border. These organizations would work to advance the flow of goods exchange and business sectors with the help of social media power for the public. From the respondent's experience in Thailand, fewer Thais and Cambodians expressed hatred and nationalism towards each other, comparing that back in 1990s. Now, they seemed to care about businesses rather than historical narratives. Thus, this respondent stressed the significant role of development organizations in oiling the economic engines of the local media to jointly promote such intimate interconnectedness among borderline people.

6.3.3 National Level

Despite bilateral attempts of negotiations, clashes also happened, resulting in deaths, injuries, the loss of civilians' property, and the displacement of the locals around the disputed zone (BBC, 2011; Chor, 2008). From my interviews, there were 8 of 11 respondents who still recommended more peace talks between Cambodian and Thai governments so as to transform

the conflict by exercising their self-restraint with no violence or shooting. Closely worked with the locals, one Thai civil society activist explained:

I can say they (the locals) live in peace. They don't make more conflict.... They also asked for the government to talk peacefully, not shooting each other. I think it is a way.... The thing they can do (is that) they should talk more than this. (P. 01)

Like other respondents, this respondent pointed out the peaceful lifestyles of the locals prior to the outbreak of conflict. They enjoyed their lives through the shared collaboration between both sides of Cambodia and Thailand at the border through means of goods exchanges, businesses, tourism and also religious rituals. Thus, more peace talks were suggested for both sides to do in a sense of no violence, whatsoever, as she said it is a way to combat destructive consequences emerging from military clashes or confrontations. The other respondents stressed the need of pressing recommendations and education about the disastrous effects of the extreme nationalism from historical narratives for citizens in a way to accept the contemporary lifestyles and live in peace and harmony with others. Another Cambodian respondent explained:

Presently, we deal with the surface of the conflict. We see it (situation) as quiet and peaceful, but if we look deep, the conflict is not over. It is in the heart (of people), in the history; it goes deep. In order to solve the problem, we need to have a lot of curriculum to learn about it. In today's language, called the global population, we no longer think of Khmer-Thai, but we think that everything is the property of humanity, then we live in a humane way. (P. 03)

Means of education under the auspices of appropriate curricula was confirmed to be the only way to challenge the mainstream view of the public, especially for the younger generations in a long run, to avoid extreme nationalism and racial discrimination. From most respondents, these are the underlying causes of the conflict along with the ignition of opportunistic politicians. From him, the temple should not be only characterized as Cambodia's but a human treasure, so it must be internationally recognized, appreciated and valued from generations to generations; it is not Cambodians' nor Thais' but ours. To promote long-term peace, most respondents emphasized the roles of the governments from both sides were critically significant through continued practice of states' policies about education sector and more interconnected diplomacy between nation-states. Another Thai respondent commented:

The government should have some activities to support the people living in the area from both sides to have culture exchanges, for example, to support in terms of education of people to understand about the conflict, the root of the conflict, why did it happen?. Try to promote peace in the area. (P. 06)

From this quote, the respondent suggested both governments to implement any policy as a supportive manner for the locals to build up stronger bonds between Cambodia and Thailand, especially at the border. Activities such as culture exchanges and religious rituals should be encouraged and endorsed, particularly by the local government. All kinds of education forms

should be conducted in purpose of engaging people to promote peace and perceive multicultural lifestyle of a new era. In this sense, this respondent focused on educating younger generations, who will assume shared responsibilities in engendering peace and prosperity. He emphasized the difficulty in doing so, but the governments should take starting measures as of now.

6.3.4 Regional/International Level

From the interviews in relation to the Preah Vihear conflict, most respondents (8 out of 11) emphasized the importance of mediation efforts and third-party interventions such as the ASEAN, the ICJ, and the UNESCO in de-escalating the tension of the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. 1962 judgment of ICJ was reaffirmed by most respondents as an international mechanism as one Cambodian respondent stated:

It is a risk move, a dangerous choice, to promote extreme nationalism, to fuel hatred, and to have violence between Thailand and Cambodia..... I think this is the old story about the temple, which belongs to Cambodia, and ICJ has declared this judgment since 1962. Thus, there is nothing to worry about. (P. 11)

Most respondents confirmed the application of the international law and 1962 judgment of the ICJ to ward off the tension and subsequently solve the conflict without the use of arm forces. From the interview, military confrontations and violence must have been avoided and of unnecessary action because ICJ's judgment or the UNESCOs' interventions could be inferred to for the conflict resolution in a way to settle the conflict. For this, most respondents concurred with the third-party efforts by referring to the international procedure or mechanism after the unreconciled agreement between Cambodia and Thailand. One respondent explained:

Conflicts are always involved in conflicts of interest, so it has to be linked to legal mechanisms as this case (Preah Vihear conflict). This issue was brought to the UN [UNESCO] and ICJ. Well, it has to do with legal mechanisms. The first two points are the bilateral negotiation mechanism, the second is the legal mechanism that involves a third party for the settlement of disputes. The third-party mechanism is to put the situation in a manageable situation for further dialogues. (P. 02)

Like others, this respondent highlighted the international legal and bilateral negotiation mechanisms were proposed for the disputing parties subsequently in the domain of demilitarization or situation management for further discussions. No matter how conflict dynamics develops, a call can be made for the purpose of the mediation efforts and third-party interventions from the ICJ and the UNESCO to exercise existing legal mechanisms associated with the Preah Vihear Temple, issued in 1962. There was no need for fighting because such issue would end up with any legal intervention of the ICJ, known as provisional measures.

7. DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the discussions of the results will be done under the guidance of the outlined research questions. They will be associated with the findings from the previous studies and follow the themes related back to the research questions, objectives and the applied theoretical framework. This chapter will have four sections, beginning with how politics of nationalism is employed in the Preah Vihear conflict, and the second part will follow with the presentation of conflict actors and influencers. Outcomes of measures taken by various actors in de-escalating the conflict will be the third part in this chapter. Finally, improved action proposed by the respondents for conflict resolution will be displayed with regard to Cambodia-Thailand conflict from 2008 to 2011 over the temple.

7.1 Politics of Nationalism

From the respondents' perspective in the interviews, nationalism and politics are correlated and of the underlying factors behind the outbreak of the 2008 conflict over the PVT between Cambodia and Thailand. For this, the historical narrative of these neighboring countries is found as one of the aspects in the context of nationalism and politics in relation to the 1962 verdict of the ICJ. This judgment of the temple meant the territory loss for Thailand and has been of national humiliation (ICJ, 1962; Silverman, 2010; Lilja & Baaz 2016, p. 5). The finding of this study is aligned with what Lee (2014), Loch (2018), Osborne (2011), Strate (2013), and Yoosuk (2013) claimed that the temple dispute is associated with Cambodia's and Thailand's historical past within the domain of boundary settlements in the period 1904 to 1908 between France and Siam (Thailand) and again in 1962 by the ICJ in declaring that the PVT is in the Cambodia's territory. This judgment was made pursuant to the Annex 1 map (see Appendix 2), which Thai side did not approve and protest against the 1962 ICJ's verdict. For Thailand, this verdict represented the national humiliation and defeats, to which Thais are emotionally attached (Lee, 2014; Yoosuk 2013). Since 1962, the ICJ's judgment of the temple has been intertwined with the political problems, pushing Thailand to accept that verdict rather than violate the international relations and thus its security (Cuasay 1998, p. 881; Denes 2006, pp. 220-222). This occurrence marks a historical downgrading in a form of territorial loss and invasion, representing the violation of its dignity, glory past and pride which are still embedded in the political mindsets of Thai citizens (Osborne, 2008). Thus, when Cambodia proposed a plan to inscribe the temple as the World Heritage the UNESCO, the conflict over the PVT flared again in July 2008. The studies from these authors correspond to what is found from this research based on the semi-structured interviews from the civil society actors who were closely and actively engaged into the conflict on the field. From them, nationalism and politics underlie the concrete reasons in escalating the conflict dynamics with reference to the historical narratives between Cambodia and Thailand.

Nationalism in the Southeast Asia is not extinct and yet persists in political mindsets of individuals associated with an historical legacy of hostility and mistrust and "historical embeddedness" (Bazz& Lilja, 2018; Ngoun, 2018; Chachavalpongpun, 2013; Woon, 2013).

From these authors, the sense of nationalism within the already sensitive political situation could be easily provoked by opportunist politicians for their interests in any means. Such matter found in their studies is really in line with what was found in this research on the ground that the sense of nationalism was exploited by both Cambodian and Thai politicians to generate their political favor. Politics of nationalism becomes the underlying seed, manipulated by the politicians, and also reflected in the notions of Kasetsiri, Sothirak, and Chachavalpongpun to make sense that the revival of contested claims to the temple's surrounding area (4.6 square kilometers) was primarily attributed to political infighting in Thailand, and particularly, "part of a plot to remove the government of Samak Sundaravej" (Kasetsiri, Sothirak, & Chachavalpongpun, 2014, p. 25). According to Winichakul (1995), nationalists in Thailand conceptualize the whole complex of the temple, including its vicinity, as a "lost body part of the Thai nation", so it is easy for Thai politicians to employ politics of nationalism to flame Thais' anger and hatreds towards Cambodia for the sake of political gain. This can be characterized in course of Thailand's political chaos between two major opposing camps: the so-called Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts. The Yellow-shirt force led by an anti-Thaksin Shinawatra opposition leader of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) — backed by the monarchy, military, and urban elites—made a protest against the Red-shirt forces loyal to incumbent Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and populist former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This government was accused of ceding the temple's vicinity (4.6 square kilometers) to Cambodia by approving its bid to inscribe the temple as the World Heritage (Ciorciari, 2009). By doing so, the temple dispute would become the subject matter of Thais' nationalism and of a distraction from Thailand' domestic politics but engendered dreadful consequences (Silverman 2010, pp. 7-8; Chachavalpongpun, 2013). Meanwhile, Cambodia's UNESCO's application to register the temple as the World Heritage was manipulated for political gain with a hard-fought general election campaign (2008) for Prime Minister Hun Sen in Cambodia (Head, 2008). By doing so, they can gain their political mainstream support in their country for power by provoking the nationalists. This was discerned not only in Thailand's and also Cambodia's politics in a form that the politicians grabbed the opportunity to consolidate their political power by investing the nationalist endeavor with political support. From this perspective, Nhoun (2017) pointed out Prime Minister Hun Sen's attempt at "political legitimation to overcome constraints to his rule" (p. 111). Despite the critics as challenges for not paying enough attention to the borderland, his politics of nationalism provided him with fruitful results for his "political legitimacy" and laid more concrete political base for his rule. Ngoun concluded that nationalist sentiment featured prominently from all dimensions of Cambodians, ranging from the locals to the city dwellers in the course of the Preah Vihear dispute.

7.2 Influences on Conflict Dynamics

7.2.1 Local Level

From the finding of this study, the role of the grassroots level, ranging from the locals to civil society leaders, features prominently in defusing the conflict even though those grassroots actors do not really yield the direct impacts on the conflict. They are discerned as local catalysts

in a way to pressure the politicians as well as the policy makers to manage the conflict to some extent. From this perspective, their collective voices generate the tremendous pressure not only on their government but also the international community, engendering the involvement of third party or mediators in the conflict. This finding agrees with the perception of Ramsbotham, et al. (2016) in a form that conflict resolution efforts entails the engagement of all kinds of levels from diverse social dimensions (p. 213). This perception marks the significance engagement of the grassroots level within the social and political domain in maintaining social security and ensuring betterment of everyday life. Similarly, some other studies also support this finding in a way that national audiences from diverse groups of people with mixed social, economic, political, religious, gender, and ethnic backgrounds play significant roles in the societal process and movement (Billig 1995, p. 71; Billig 2009, p. 347; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Skey 2009, pp. 336-7). This heterogeneity deters elites from making storm in the nation as they wish for their self-interests, which threatens the social order and everyday comfort. Other studies manifest the failure of those elites in informing their compatriots' views (Rogers Brubaker & Al, 2008; Whitmeyer, 2002). The elites' nationalist discourse does not inclusively represent the collective perspective of all individuals; their perspectives embody one segment of the whole society (Whitmeyer 2002, p. 322). Ordinary people are noticed as active producers of popular national discourse in their everyday lifestyle and voice up their concerns in relation to the damage on their daily lives and interests (Edensor, 2002; Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008, p.550; Miller-Idriss, 2006). From these studies, local levels feature significantly to conceptualize the attributes and complexity and limited extent of the state in proceeding the policy. These local contexts and people's everyday experiences were reflected in my study within the domain of conflict resolution to some extent, from the civil society activists' perspectives. That means they are part of the solution when their action is taken, but they may be part of the problem if nothing happens from the local levels.

For contrasting view, some respondents from this study claimed that the grassroots actors were less effective in de-escalating the Preah Vihear conflict. Amid the political transition under the administration of a new appointed Prime Minister in Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, grassroots endeavors and civil movements did not influence the decision making of this government much, thus emerging the continued outbreak of violence along the border. This tension diminished in the aftermath of the collapse of this new leader's power. From the interviews of this study, politicians are the key actors in heating up the situations and manipulate the sense of nationalism in such a political spectrum for public supports. They play the primary role in escalating and de-escalating the conflict dynamics, the PVT conflict to be specific. This finding seems to align with Pawakapan, (2013, p. 87) and Ramsbotham, et al. (2016, p.212) in a fashion that how conflict dynamics develops entirely relies on the primary parties of the conflict, and those parties may exploit the advantages of sensitive issues for their interests. For this, Pawakapan continued with the tendency of Thai politicians who manipulated nationalist discourse against the pro-Thaksin governments by generating political support from mainstream public. As a result, their success was attained at the expense of negative effects on Thailand's relationship its neighboring country, Cambodia. The local contexts at the border were very likely to be neglected from the key actors of the conflict, and peace building was implemented at the too shallow and centralized extent (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009).

Furthermore, the finding of this study was to contradict with studies of Billig (1995), Billig (2009), Edensor (2002), Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008), Miller-Idriss (2006), Rogers Brubaker and Al (2008), Skey (2009), and Whitmeyer, 2002) in a way that diverse groups of people take roles in deterring the elites or high-rank people not to create troubles for the local everyday life. However, from the interviews about the Preah Vihear conflict, the locals were believed to be victims and had no power in informing the politicians or primary actors of the conflict, Cambodian and Thai politicians to be specific. As I experienced myself back in 2011, I also engaged with the civil society network and the local levels in enhancing mutual understandings among Cambodians and Thais at the shared border because we did not really believe in the states' peaceful measures. In this conflict, fire exchanges was discerned ranging from arms to rockets at the border despite the local heterogeneous efforts from various supranational organizations and various civil society actors in dampening the situation (Baaz & Lilja, 2016, p. 296). From this perspective, local levels are not displayed as anesthetic for the conflict and seem less effectual in mitigating the tension or settling the conflict. They expressed their concerns of their lifestyles and impacts from the conflict on mass media and through their local leaders as well as the government officials who visited the area. Their varied activities generated little pressure on the key actors, claimed as nationalist politicians in this study, of this temple conflict. The limited influence from the local levels was displayed in the data of this study, and this findings are not widely reflected in diverse studies. Rather, existing researches on the Preah Vihear conflict tend to conceptualize the historical and legal dimensions of disputed claims and on Thailand's roles. Thus, this concept helps add more value to the existing literature discourses with reference to the bounded extent of the grassroots action in conflict resolution.

7.2.2 Civil Society Level

From the interviews of the relevant Cambodian and Thai civil society activists, varied online and offline discussions and activities over the conflict issue were cooperatively implemented in both sides so as to seek a conventional method in challenging the mainstream views of the public in the context of nationalism, stirred up the politicians. The finding of this study corresponds with the case studies of Aliyev (2010), Baaz and Lilja (2016), Brett (2017) and comparative studies of Bell and O'Rourke (2007), Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney (2010), and Kim (2019) emphasized the potential role of the civil society in peace processes in societies, engendering humanitarian relief. From those studies, the involvements of civil society in any form help transform the political situation and better conflict dynamics in a way to promote peace from below, leading the solution to the protracted conflict. Kim (2019) claimed that such engagements effectively assist the progress of peace agreements among conflict parties due to the constrained efforts of high-level peace negotiations, both "in reaching an agreement and sustaining the peace process" (p. 01). In a similar vein, Baaz and Lilja (2016) contextualized the PVT conflict by characterizing the role of civil society actors as 'peaceful resistance' in the domain of political processes in relation to movements, space, things, and languages around the temple. From this perspective, civil society actors in the temple conflict constitute part in

challenging the escalation of the conflict dynamics with various forms of acts from the locals. Considering the temple conflict as the political issue at the national level, the finding of this research similarly found that civil society organizations characterized themselves, if not all, as part of the solution, thus organizing peace-related activities with the involvement of the borderline locals as well as the youths from not only Cambodia and Thailand but also Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and China. As one of the participants, I can witness those activities amid the intensified period with the aim to calm down the situation and instigate the social awareness of peace among the locals and the youth.

Nevertheless, the finding of this study show that the activities of the civil society yielded limited influence on the conflict dynamics, on the politicians' ambition for particular as they are the key actors of the conflict. The civil society organizations' endeavors seem not to pressure the governments as well as the other relevant politicians to prevent the PVT conflict from de-escalating. From this, they released unpublished joint-statement of diverse stakeholders over the catastrophe of the conflict over the locals at the shared frontier in July and September 2008. This was the concerned voices of protests from the grassroots level along with the civil society activists to challenge the politicians who flamed the sense of nationalism for their political purposes. Such matter contradicts what Aliyev (2010) Baaz and Lilja (2016), Bell and O'Rourke (2007), Brett (2017), Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney (2010), and Kim (2019) claimed that the civil society entities underlie the significant role in peace agreements and processes. From them, they are the oil in propelling engine of peace negotiations and peacemaking processes without the use of militarily violence or skirmishes from the disputants. In contrast, the finding of this study agrees with the claims made by Chambers and Kopstein (2001), Orjuela (2003), Ramsbotham et al. (2016, p. 212), and Pawakapan (2013) in a way that the conflicts are associated with the contrasting interests between two parties. That means they constitute the primary actors with the most important role in determining the outcomes of the conflict through the reconciliatory means of agreements on the shared goals. Chambers and Kopstein (2001) and Orguela (2003) highlighted the limited impacts of the civil society over the primary parities of the conflict due to its small-extent activities and potential spillover of extremist rhetoric into the mainstream of political discourse. Specifically, Pawakapan (2013) supports the finding of this study on the grounds that the conflict parties, Cambodian and Thai governments to be specific, manipulate nationalists discourse through their political game for the mainstream support from the public (pp. 87-88). Their political game for the PVT conflict was played with the critical support from various state and non-state bodies at the expense of the downturn of Cambodia and Thailand's relationship (*ibid*; Forum-Asia, 2011). As a consequence, the conflict dynamics develops with local tragedies rendered by the military confrontations between both countries, and the locals were the ones who suffered. To promote peace amid the intensified period, peace-related activities were locally organized by engaging the borderline locals as well as the youths from not only Cambodia and Thailand but also Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and China. Such efforts were implemented by varied civil society movements, the Working Group for Peace (WGP) as one example. Such activities constitute the benchmark of the assessment in 'peacebuilding from below' so as to evaluate the influence extent of particular action or movement on the overall conflict dynamics (Ramsbotham, et al.

2016, p. 283). From this, little impact of civil society actors' investment in preventing conflict remain unnoticed for the governments as well as the politicians as expressed in the data of this study. Limited in de-escalating the conflict that time, their peace-activities provided the locals and youths with the opportunities to eyewitness evidence of the conflict footprint and realities in the local area. The data displays that this fact will benefit the younger generations to promote peace and advocate peace networks in their contexts.

7.2.3 Regional Level: ASEAN

ASEAN (Association of South-east Asian Nations) is a regional institution that the informants of this study highlighted as one of the third parties in settling the Preah Vihear conflict in 2008 prior to the ICJ and United Nations (UNESCO). According to the informants, it seems that there are two opposing views over the role of the ASEAN in de-escalating the conflict. One view displays its potentials in having the conflict issue as an agenda in the regional ASEAN summit. In this sense, ASEAN has the authority to disseminate the conflict issues and take action at some level in a sense to damp the tension as well as to request the conflict parties to exercise their self-restraint with no emergence of violence. The involvement of the external agencies in the conflict resolution through mediation efforts and interventions has been on the move in a form of having supportive resources on the table, including “access to the parties, access to civil society actors, knowledge of past processes and specialized knowledge of constitutions, power-sharing arrangements, and the like” (Phan 2014, p. 13; Ramsbotham, et al. 2016, p. 212). This perception is consistent with what this study found in a way that ASEAN can help mediate and make decent suggestions for the parties to manage the conflict with high self-restraint. The studies of Phan (2014), Sothirak (2013), and Woon (2013) supported the matter that ASEAN plays an active role in mediating and observing the situation of the PVT conflict. From these studies, this organization can witness the situation and execute its measures at the level that it can exercise as seen from the past experience of its engagement under Indonesia's chairmanship (Phan, 2014). With external legal support, ASEAN takes a direct measure on the field by appointing observers to do their job in the provisional demilitarized zone, imposed by the ICJ (Woon, 2013). As found in this research, ASEAN strived hard with a mandate to instigate peace agreement between Cambodia and Thailand to avoid skirmishes and to provoke their bilateral negotiations at times (Sothirak, 2013).

In contrast, the ASEAN was also recognized and contradicted for its limited efforts in managing the conflict between its member states, Cambodia and Thailand. The involvement of this regional organization as the observer seemed ineffective prior to the intervention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in a form of request and the ICJ's action in invoking its original judgment. Its mediating measure could not prevent the conflict from escalating, thus emerging the militarily violence at the shared border between these two countries (Meskell 2016, p. 78). The data from this study concurs with this concept by illustrating ASEAN's inability in imposing any effective sanctions against the escalation of the conflict. Such matter is also in line with some previous studies of Chachavalpongpun (2013), Phan (2014), Singhaputargun (2016), Sothirak (2013), and Woon (2013). From these studies, ASEAN manifests its weak regional authority and incompetent capacity in settling the disputes in a way

to maintain peace and security in the region. Phan (2014) maintained that this regional organization has its essential rules, allowing for each member state with the power to veto if any institutional decision harms its Member States' interests (p. 14). This is the reason why any dispute settlement mechanisms did not feature successfully from 2008 to 2010 (*ibid*). This weakness was also found in this study that ASEAN could not take roles as a potential actor in determining the conflict dynamics. It seems that much trust in ASEAN's legitimate endeavors deteriorates and fades in a way to mitigate the tension in the Preah Vihear conflict and possible the future conflicts.

7.2.4 International Level: the ICJ

From the interviews in this study, significance of mediation efforts and third-party intervention is highly appreciated to make sense for the Preah Vihear conflict. Action of ASEAN's unarmed observer team under the chairman of Indonesia in 2011 did not prevent the conflict dynamics from developing; the subsequent eruptions of armed clashes ensued after this occurrence of monitoring. Bercovitch (2009) and Starkey, et al. (2005) also underlined the increasing endeavors of the mediators and third parties in the aftermath of Cold War conflicts from one-thirds to two-thirds of crises between 1918 and 1996. From them, it is clear that mediation efforts and third-party intervention feature prominently due to the rising needs and essence in the processes of conflict resolution. As a typical habit in conflict deals with the disputing parties' attempts to prioritize and defend their own interests, bilateral negotiations may fail at any point, thereby escalating the conflict dynamics along with the outbreak of violence (Ramsbotham, et al. 2016, pp. 17, 223). From this perspective, the engagements of external agencies in peace enforcement processes reflect satisfactory consequences obtained in the domain of unreconciled agreements between conflicting parties as the case of the Preah Vihear conflict. In this study, the ICJ is claimed to play more leading and influential actor on account of its judicial directives in enforcing peace by interpreting the 1962 judgment. Such perception corresponds with other numerous studies of Chachavalpongpun (2013), Phan (2014), Singhaputargun (2016), Tanaka (2012), Traviss (2012), and Woon (2013) in a way that the mandate of the ICJ is to reconcile the peace process and imposing its "provisional measures". From these measures, a demilitarized zone was determined by this court to authorize both Cambodia and Thailand to withdraw their troops from the disputing area. The ICJ underlies the judicial body, enabling the disputants to comply with non-aggravation measures and refraining from taking action to escalate the situation as the civil society respondents from this study argued. As found in this study, the intervention of the ICJ amid the ongoing PVT conflict was discerned to ward off the tension and subsequently settle the conflict without the use of arm forces but legal mechanism through the imposition of provisional measures to effectuate conflict resolution.

7.3 How Conflict would be De-escalated

7.3.1 Grassroots Level

From the findings, voices of the grassroots level are so potent in pressuring the government or politicians, for the locals are the direct victims of the conflict. With their existing rights of

expression, their voices must be widely heard, and solutions should be assured for the sake of their lifestyles. Considered as both actors and producers as the civil society respondents of this study have suggested in this study, the locals should be more active in their borderline locals as well as on social media by making their voices heard not only at the local but also international level. Such matter marks the significance of “peace from the bottom”, supported by the studies of Baú (2016), Le Billon, et.al. (2020), Leonardsson and Rudd (2015) Levy and Firchow (2021), Mac Ginty (2014), Mac Ginty (2010), and Mitchell and Nan (1997). From them, the local’s activities underlie the measures in effectively building peace and are considered as means of expressing the local voices and views of peace from below. With this, the local in peacebuilding can include the local agency in widely promoting their voices. Baú (2016) stressed the local’s participations from the community as a means of “communication for development (C4D)” in peacebuilding process and government decision making. The gap between the local and political leadership is characterized as hindrance of peacebuilding process, so the citizens’ participation formulates ‘everyday peace’ (*ibid*, Mac Ginty, 2014), Mac Ginty, 2010). Correspondingly, from this study about the PVT conflict the local can exercise their rights to do so with the aim to challenge the opportunist politicians and thus, de-escalate the conflict. They could engage more diversified channels of media so that their voices critically matter at different level; moreover, peace walks to the parliaments are also suggested as one of the influential ways of reconciling disagreements among conflict disputants. This is a practical method as Dudouet (2015) and Leonardsson and Rudd (2015) get the sense of justifications for having non-violence against violence. From this perspective, non-violence customary practices from the grassroots level in various forms provide a way to instigate mainstream views of the public over their concerns and traumas. For the sake of their own peaceful lifestyles at the Cambodia-Thailand border, the locals of both sides must take more action to create their atmosphere for everyday life by cooperatively working with their agency (Gaber, 2020, p. 2). In this sense, the agency refers to the states to which the locals need to challenge or voice their concerns and traumas for purpose of influencing them to settle the conflict. From past experiences, the locals were less active in involving in peace making processes, so well-informing and more active participations from the grassroots help mark the optimism displayed in the findings of this study.

“Where we make our worlds and where our worlds make us” (Pink 2012, p. 5). From this perspective, people are the ones who establish their own atmosphere for living and seek comfort for their everyday life. They deserve what they have done. From the interviews of the study, stronger interconnectedness between borderline residents (both Cambodian and Thai side) should not be overlooked. With such, the locals can extensively express their everyday activities at the border to both governments that they have peaceful life, not wanting conflict. Then more local peace activities should be organized amid the intensified situation as the warning sign to the governments. Such matter found in this study corresponds with what Baú (2016), Le Billon, et.al. (2020), Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015) Levy and Firchow (2021), Mac Ginty (2014), Mac Ginty (2010), Sharp, et al. (2000) mentioned that power is viewed as attempts to set up situations, groupings and actions which resist the impositions of dominating power. It can involve very small, subtle and some might say trivial moments, but it can also involve more developed moments when discontent translates into a form of social organization

which actively co-ordinates people, materials and practices in pursuit of specifiable transformative goals. Aiming to prevent violence, the finding of this study suggests the borderline locals from Cambodian and Thai side must take appropriate measures as resistance against the violent conflict for the sake of their everyday life. Similarly, Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) also claimed, ‘unarmed civilians routinely prosecute conflict without resorting arms- and they do so extremely forcefully and to great effect at times. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) claims that, between 1900 and 2006, non-violent campaigns were twice as effective in changing regimes as their violent counterparts. Chenoweth argues that non-violent campaigns derive their effectiveness from mass participation. This concept was found as the underlying foundations from the local levels in engaging in peace making processes and resisting the sense of extreme nationalism, flamed by opportunist politicians for their own sake. Their actions should also tie the network of local media and civil society organizations in a way to empower their voices and concerning goals (Dudouet, 2015; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015).

7.3.2 Civil Society Level

Despite limited influence on the states over the conflict settlement, the findings of this research show that the engagement of civil society organizations is of prominent impetus in elevating the social awareness among the locals instead, especially the youths for both Cambodian and Thai sides. With past activities, non-formal education programs were established with the aim to communicate peace concepts to the locals and youths, thus learn how to live in harmony and peace in the future. From this, peace networks among youths would be empowered to challenge the future intensified situation and be of potential resistance against the dominating powers. Such matter found in this research is considerably in line with the case studies of Aliyev (2010), Kim (2019) and Orjuela (2003). They showcased the role of civil society actors’ engagement in building peace through peace education from the bottom in the North Caucaus, South Korea and Sri Lanka respectively. From these studies, civil society actors have attempted to promote peace to equip the local with constructive concepts of peace through education and awareness-raising programs. Along with this, Orjuela (2003) underscored the grounds of peace processes in addressing (1) *ethnic divides and public opinion*, (2) *politics* with contemporary mobilization, advocacy activities, and informal diplomacy, and (3) *economic issues* through reconstruction and development. The past narratives of conflicts have been of the consequence of sense of nationalism and violence rather than pro-peace (*ibid*). For Kim (2019), the civil society plays a peacebuilding role by establishing relationships across the boundaries of the Korean conflict, by challenging the mainstream view of the public for social justice and peace, along with the humanitarian aids. He also highlighted some dangers emerging in the process of civil society’s duty performances due to the constraints from the states on the grounds of national security (*ibid*).

Such concepts go with the findings of this study in a way that civil society conceptualized itself as peace builders not only for the 2008 conflict but also future conflicts through the implementation of more exchange programs, empirical peace education for the locals and youths across the frontiers of Cambodia and Thailand. Civil society informants showcased the

long-term triggers for the protracted conflict of the Preah Vihear temple. The problem is deep-rooted and the sense of nationalism is mired in historical narratives in the mindsets of both sides. Thus, ‘peace process’ is associated with a matter of time and efforts as Selby (2008) mentioned ““phased processes for negotiating and nurturing peace” (p. 12). This is not one-shot measure but continued action to assure positive peace from the deep-rooted conflict in the context of ‘historical embeddedness’ in relation to the Preah Vihear temple (Ngoun, 2018; Chachavalpongpun, 2013; Woon, 2013). In the four phases of a peace process of Darby and Ginty (2003), all relevant aspects for negotiations are combined as firm foundation, which includes secret talks and contacts at the civil society level. Consistent with the data found in this research, civil society’s participations in peace building is inevitable through various means. In this context, more diversified engagement from various stakeholders was emphasized as more potential means for the temple conflict so as to cooperatively work with the governments and politicians in preventing the conflict from escalation. Civil society holds roles at varied levels, ranging from local to international levels (Kim 2019, p. 1). Its further measures are appreciated to prevent the conflict from happening again through the suggestion of some borderline development organizations, found in this research supported by Baú (2016) and Le Billon, et al. (2020). For such matter, mutual benefits were claimed as the concrete foundations for peace building at the shared border between Cambodia and Thailand, for economic relations help enhance the locals’ livelihoods and interconnectedness of borderline communities through the circulation of goods and services through more inclusive citizenship and new patterns of territorial development, plus bottom-up wishes.

7.2.3 National Level

The matter of more well-organized peace talks between Cambodia’s and Thailand’s governments were found in this study as a method to transform the conflict without the emergence of military confrontations or skirmishes. Noticed as the most common method of settling the conflict, negotiations were strongly recommended from this study’s informants for both key actors of the PVT conflict by exercising the self-restraint at the maximum level for the sake of the locals, who enjoy their peaceful and harmonized lifestyles without boundary. From the interviews, the borderline tension was flamed by the opportunist politicians and extremely nationalist city dwellers, who do not feel the emotions of the borderline locals, directly impacted from the conflict. This finding is consistent with what Darby and Ginty (2003), Kim (2009), Pawakapan (2013, pp. 53-54), Ramsbotham et al. (2016, pp. 212, 220, 223), and Zartman (2009, p. 322) underlined the prominent feature of negotiations and peace process through negotiations in the framework of conflict resolution. Kim (2019) stated that ‘peace process’ comes into theoretical and empirical discourses of conflict resolution, through which practices of building peace go through staged negotiations (p. 3). Part of conflict resolution, negotiations is defined as “the process of combining conflicting positions into a joint agreement” and becomes one of the most common ways of preventing, managing, resolving, and transforming conflicts (Zartman 2009, p. 322). Four phases of a peace process were explained by Darby and Ginty (2003) through his observation: pre-negotiation, the management of the process, the peace accord, and post-accord reconstruction. From these

perspectives, this study also further suggests both disputing parties to seek an acceptable formula for more fruitful negotiations by politically committing themselves to a process of peaceful settlement and managing the existing hindrance of this process.

For the long-run process of peace, economic collaboration through more investment should be fostered to elevate the local circulations of goods and services at the borderline. This perspective showcased in the data of this research in the domain of peace. As peace is conceptualized into “negative peace” and “positive peace”. Negative peace refers to the absence of violence or the termination of direct violence, whereas positive peace deals with “the integration of human society” focusing on individual well-beings (Galtung 1969, p. 2; Gordon Anderson, 2018; Ramsbotham, et al. 2016, pp. 13-14). Both conceptual forms of peace are really applicable in the context of the Preah Vihear conflict as found in this research in a way that the absence of direct violence is not adequate to dampen the heat of historical nationalism, provoked by the opportunist politicians. Further step should proceed with more borderline economic collaboration, more peace education and more borderline interconnectedness through means of goods exchanges, businesses, tourism and through culture exchanges including festivals and religious rituals, under the auspices of the state’s sound policies within the domain of positive peace. From the interviews, these matters were highly suggested for further states’ action to strategically settle the conflict not only on the surface (negative peace) but also from grassroots level for borderline economic growth and prosperity (positive peace). These findings are considerably aligned with the studies of Cohrs, et al. (2013), Gordon Anderson (2018), Fitz-Gibbon in Levitt (2014, p. 101), Mironova and Whitt (2015), Paulson and Bellino (2017), and Pawakapan (2013, pp. 53-54) in the form that peace is impacted and determined by economic sector, individual interconnectedness and education. Such foundations are laid by individuals and more importantly under the support of the states’ policies and accurate actions to ensure peace, from negative to positive peace as the data of this study displayed. From this, deep-rooted causes of the Preah Vihear conflict would be conceptualized as the past lessons, learned to build the contemporary community in the era of peace and prosperity through bilateral cooperation. The inter-dependence of Cambodia and Thailand over the PVT constitutes a multi-dimensional issue, not only about territorial sovereignty but also economic development at the temple, mainly on tourism sector (Pawakan, 2003, p. 53).

8. CONCLUSION

The revival of the Preah Vihear conflict resumed again in 2008 not focusing on the architectural structure of the temple but over the unclearly claimed the temple's vicinity of 4.6km² after the UNESCO registered the temple as the World Heritage. To dampen this flame of the conflict, bilateral talks ranging from frontline to high-profile stakeholders as well as both governments of Cambodia and Thailand were administered but failed to prevent of the military confrontations and skirmishes at the border till the intervention of the ICJ in 2011. Thus, this study aims to explore the perceptions of the civil society actors through semi-structured interviews to promote peace from the bottom in this conflict.

The findings of the study shows that politics and media underlie the concrete factors behind the tension of the temple conflict. This dispute is flamed by the opportunist politicians for political gain by stirring up the sense of nationalism of their own citizens from the historical narratives so as to restore its former glory and prestige. Along with this, the involvement of media played a part in promoting hatred speeches and inciting the nationalist emotions within the domain of political tension in Thailand and of political campaigning for the up-coming election of 2008 in Cambodia. Although the significance of the grassroots and civil society actors' participations in promoting peace at the border is highlighted from the interviews, limited impact on conflict dynamics during that time is also claimed. In contrast, their endeavors for peace would yield positive consequences in the future for younger generations. The findings of this study also suggests more convincing measures that the locals should take at their level such as joint act of voicing their concerns via mass media, joint peace walks, and joint activities for peace and interconnectedness at the shared border. From this, larger-scale activities with more stakeholders and the public would be critically considered as a tendency to reduce the tension and ensure sustainable peace. By doing so, both Cambodia and Thailand should prioritize peaceful lifestyles of the locals by establishing the policy to promote peace and borderline connectivity through business activities. Such policies hold up and formulate the peace education for the future generations and the tendency towards the contemporary lifestyles in a new era with peace and harmony.

This research sheds a new light for further consideration of the subject within the bottom-up peacebuilding. Politics of nationalism becomes dangerous for both Cambodia and Thailand when exploited for any political gain because it is closely associated with historical narratives. Thus, the inclusion of grassroots stakeholders in relation to the PVT conflict underlies the central component in the peacebuilding process as little studies focus on this. Previous studies highlight the significance and potentials of the grassroots in building peace, but this research does not tell much about their effectiveness as the conflict dynamics is solely determined by key actors, Cambodian and Thai states. In the past, their voices were not critically heard or ignored by the powerful groups of people. According to Lederach (1997), peacebuilding is done through interactions between three levels: the top leadership, middle-range, and grassroots. From this study, the middle-range and grassroots play very little role and have so limited influence on the conflict. Another thing deals with limited participation of locals within the process of the bottom-up peacebuilding. They seem passive and need to be motivated in

challenging the states more for the sake of their peaceful life at the border. They also should behave in their own ways to foster interconnectedness among the locals at the border. Lastly, this research provides further improvement for sustainable peace through supportive policy for the borderline people regarding the economic collaborations.

8.1 Recommendation for Further Research

For any research in the future, it will be important to cover a wider scope by involving more participants from diverse stakeholders ranging from the locals to high-profile officials so that the constructs are more comprehensive and complete. As this research deals with the past conflict, the new concepts are of profound interests by looking back how the conflict was managed in a way to circumvent the tension. Suggestions and recommendations for the conflict resolution in a new timeframe are considerable and may be in questions for some researchers. Thus, later research should engage larger numbers of participants from diverse social dimensions along with multiple techniques of data collection so as to formulate triangulation. Such research would provide a more comprehensive insight into the situation of the Preah Vihear conflict in order to conceptualize new and more effective strategies and mechanisms of conflict resolution.

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APPENDIX 1

Lederach's pyramid

Types of Actors

Approaches to Building Peace

Level 1: Top Leadership

Military/political/religious leaders with high visibility

Focus on high-level negotiations
Emphasizes cease-fire
Led by highly visible, single mediator

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership

Leaders respected in sectors
Ethnic/religious leaders
Academics/intellectuals
Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)

Problem-solving workshops
Training in conflict resolution
Peace commissions
Insider-partial teams

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership

Local leaders
Leaders of indigenous NGOs
Community developers
Local health officials
Refugee camp leaders


Local peace commissions
Grassroots training
Prejudice reduction
Psychosocial work in postwar trauma

Affected Population

Source: John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), page 39.

APPENDIX 2

Annex I map



Source: REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 JUNE 1962 IN THE CASE CONCERNING THE TEMPLE OF PRAH VIHEAR (CAMBODIA v. THAILAND) (Cambodia v. Thailand). At <http://www.icj-cij.org>.

APPENDIX 3

Empirical material

Interviews:

- 1) Semi-structured interview with a Thai member of the peacebuilding management team in Thailand - 27/03/2021 – online in English language (*P. 01*)
- 2) Semi-structured interview with a Cambodian member of the peacebuilding management team in Cambodia - 27/03/2021 – online in Khmer language (*P. 02*)
- 3) Semi-structured interview with a Cambodian member of the peacebuilding management team in Cambodia - 28/03/2021 – online in Khmer language (*P. 03*)
- 4) Semi-structured interview with a Cambodian founder of peacebuilding program and a member of the peacebuilding management team in Cambodia - 28/03/2021 – online in Khmer language (*P. 04*)
- 5) Semi-structured interview with a Cambodian peacebuilder and a former participant of 2011 peacebuilding journey - 23/03/2021 – online in English language (*P. 05*)
- 6) Semi-structured interview with a Thai peacebuilder and a former participant of the peacebuilding journey - 29/03/2021 – online in English language (*P. 06*)
- 7) Semi-structured interview with a Thai member of the peacebuilding management team in Thailand - 01/04/2021 – online in English language (*P. 07*)
- 8) Semi-structured interview with a Thai member of the peacebuilding management team in Thailand - 01/04/2021 – online in English language (*P. 08*)
- 9) Semi-structured interview with a local Thai and a former participant of the peacebuilding journey in Thailand - 01/04/2021 – online in English language (*P. 09*)
- 10) Semi-structured interview with a Cambodian founder of peacebuilding program in Cambodia - 02/04/2021 – online in Khmer language (*P. 10*)
- 11) Semi-structured interview with a Cambodian founder of peacebuilding program and a member of the peacebuilding management team in Cambodia - 04/04/2021 – online in Khmer language (*P. 11*)

Interview guide for semi-structured interviews:

- 1- Can you tell me where you come from? What is your nationality?
- 2- Where did you live during the conflict from 2008 and 2011?
- 3- How did you experience the conflict?
- 4- What are the challenges of this conflict?
- 5- Who were involved in this conflict? Who were the different actors or players?
- 6- There was the tension leading to violence (armed clashes). How did you feel when this happened?
- 7- Why do you think this tension happened? (What caused this conflict?)
- 8- Who do you think the key actors of the tension were? What are their roles?
- 9- Who do you think plays more important role in de-escalating the tension?
- 10- What do you think about the measures taken? How did they work in that area because there was still tension?
- 11- How did the tension affect the local residents living along the border?
- 12- What do you think what the two countries should do more to de-escalate the tension?
What do you think about Thai state and Cambodian state?
- 13- What do you think the locals should do to de-escalate the tension? What do you think you should do as a civil society actor or as an organization?
- 14- How much do you think you as well as the locals can do to reduce this tension?
- 15- Who do you think should get involved more according to your opinion?
- 16- What do you think about your past activities associated with this tension? (What was the result?)
- 17- What is happening today around the temple? (Is there peace now? Should there be peace? Has the issue been resolved? What is it that needs to be resolved?)
- 18- From your past activities, would you do the same things as you did towards the conflict? If not, what should be done in the future to defuse the tension?
- 19- How can you have your voice heard to the government about your concerns?
- 20- If your voice is heard, what do you want to say to the government regarding the temple conflict?