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UN Organs' Strategies for Protection of Civilians: Coherent, Adaptable or Both?

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Abstract

This thesis examines the coherence and adaptiveness of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Security Council in the case of protection of civilians in peacekeeping missions. Ignasi Torrent's conceptualisation on coherence and adaptiveness, that coherence limits adaptiveness, is used to analyse if there is a correlation between the two. The UN wants to achieve system wide coherence in peacekeeping missions, meaning that the UN policy is that every stakeholder within a peacekeeping mission should be on the same page. This attempt to be coherent throughout the whole system within a mission limits the adaptiveness of the UN. In an unpredictable setting like a conflict environment it is difficult to know which plan is going to be a failure and which is going to be a success. Therefore, high adaptiveness is important in order to be able to make changes to a plan when unforeseen events occur. The question of how coherent both organs are is answered by a qualitative content analysis over time of both organs plans on how to protect civilians and coherence is measured by how many similarities or differences there are in both organs' plans. The question of how adaptive the two organs are is answered in the same way and the adaptiveness is measured by how many changes to the plan are made. Finally the correlation is studied. If the two organs are coherent, does that limit adaptability? Or if the two organs are not coherent, does that lead to more adaptability?

Keywords

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1. Introduction

1999 was the first time that the United Nations (UN) mandated the task "protection of civilians" in one of their peace missions. This addition to peace mission mandates came as a response after failures in preventing genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan made protection of civilians a peacekeeping norm (Hunt & Zimmerman, 2019, p. 51-52). Protection of civilians was already at the forefront of international peacekeeping around ten years later (Hultman, 2013, p. 59). Right now the majority of UN peacekeeping missions have a mandate where protection of civilians is one of the tasks, however the UN is still in some cases unsuccessful to protect civilians (Hunt & Zimmerman, 2019, p. 52-53). There are cases where peacekeeping forces have not been adequately trained, lacked the resources to act or not had the intelligence information to respond to attacks (Hunt & Zimmerman, 2019, p. 64-66).

However, research also points to the UN's protection of civilians as being effective in establishing an environment where violence is reduced and contained (Fjelde, Hultman & Nilsson, 2019, p. 106). For UN troops to become even more effective, UN analysis and mandates need to become more informed and adaptive. UN peacekeepers could have been used effectively in Mali if they had been tasked with active patrolling. Instead they were ineffective and static in the operating bases which made them miss moments when civilians were targeted (Hunt & Zimmerman, 2019, p. 69). The mission in Darfur has received criticism for only existing around mission headquarters and not being able to establish presence around the region. A substantial presence in the civil societies should also be sought by UN peacekeepers. A lot of information could be gained from the local population about who is their aggressor, where the attacks come from and etc. (Fjelde, Hultman & Nilsson, 2019, p. 104). Arguments have been made that local communities need to be given an opportunity to heal themselves. This requires UN peacekeepers to have a comprehensive understanding of how to provide the human rights needed for healing (Mueller, 2020, p. 761).

Conflict societies are complex and develop in a non-linear way (De Coning, 2018, p. 305-306). So how does the UN build peace in regions where the next happening can not be

predicted? Adaptive peacebuilding is an approach that embraces uncertainty. The basis of adaptive peacebuilding is that multiple strategies should be implemented to build peace. These strategies are then carefully monitored to see if the strategies create the desired outcome. If not, the strategy shall be abandoned and peacebuilding continues only with the attempts that are successful. Adaptive peacebuilding is based on the feedback that interventions bring and adapt from this feedback (De Coning, 2018, p. 106).

Tensions are pointing in the direction that the UN is not suited for adaptiveness. The Secretary-General and Special Committees of the UN might have one view on how to build peace, a view that is focused on achieving the best possible peace. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is the Committee instructed to come with recommendations on how to improve peacekeeping missions. Here all the UN members that contribute troops and resources to peacekeeping have their say on how to develop UN peacekeeping (Jorgensen & Giffen, 2021). This Committee's view can though easily be lost when the Security Council is to create the resolutions for peacekeeping missions. Strong states have the most power in the Security Council and the coordination between these organs in the UN might in cases be failing. The Special Committee can recommend implementations in mandates for UN peace missions that the Security Council just does not agree with (Beardsley, 2013, p. 373).

The UN wants to protect civilians and adaptiveness could be an approach that improves this task and prevents previous failures. The paragraph above however paints a picture that the UN has problems with both adaptiveness and coherence.

Ignasi Torrent brings up examples where the UN has highlighted coherence between the UN headquarters, host state, field mission, international and national stakeholders as important to the peacekeeping process. Torrent mentions how the UN policy of reaching coherence between all different parties in peacekeeping missions hinders them to be adaptive. Torrent argues that with this view, that all parties shall be coherent, the UN enters peace missions with a mindset that if tasks are done, goals will be reached in a linear and predictable process (Torrent, 2021, p. 7). Conflicts instead evolve in a very unpredictable way and peacebuilders need to adapt to this to be able to build a sustainable peace (Torrent, 2021, p. 8-9). So with coherence, adaptability is sacrificed and without coherence adaptability is more easily attained according to Torrent.

1.1 Aim and Research question

The aim of this thesis is to see if two UN organs are coherent and adaptable in the case of their plans for protecting civilians and to see if coherence and adaptability are correlated in the sense of Torrent's claim, that coherence limits adaptability. Recommendations from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations will be analysed together with the mandates for United Nations Organisations Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The reason for studying these mission mandates is that both of them are still ongoing missions which means I can study the UN's current adaptability and coherence in recommendations and mandates. Also, in both Mali and DR Congo, violence against civilians is on the rise in recent years according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2021). This makes it interesting to see if the UN can be adaptable with their strategy which, according to the numbers, is not being successful. Comparison between the two mission mandates will be conducted to see if two missions that share similarities in violence from armed groups receive the same mandates or not.

In analysing the documents from the different UN organs I will have the opportunity to see how adaptive the organisation is in its plan to protect civilians. At the same time I can see if there is a disconnect between The Special Committee and the Security Council in priorities in peacekeeping plans. The results from studying the adaptiveness and coherence will together test Torrent's conceptualisation, that coherence limits adaptability. If the Special Committee and the Security Council are coherent in their recommendations and mandates, does this correlate with the organs not being adaptable? And if they are not coherent, are they also more adaptive? In Torrent's theory adaptiveness is dependent on coherence. If the organs are coherent it leads to limited adaptiveness. If they are incoherent it opens up adaptiveness. Therefore coherence will be analysed first and adaptiveness second because adaptiveness is dependent on coherence.

Research questions:

Q1: How coherent are the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations' recommendations and the Security Council's mandates of how to protect civilians in Mali and DR Congo?

Q2: How adaptive is the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in its recommendations on protection of civilians and how adaptive is the Security Council on its plans of protection of civilians in the DR Congo and Mali?

Q3: Is there a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness in the case of protection of civilians?

The first question is going to be answered by comparing the Special Committee's recommendations with the Security Council's mandate from the same time period. I will be analysing if the two organs have the same plan or if they are different. If the plans on how to protect civilians are the exact same, then high coherence is the result but if the plans are very different then low coherence is the conclusion.

The second research question is going to be answered by using a simplified version of adaptive peacebuilding. The adaptive peacebuilding approach includes themes like nonlinearity and complexity theory but I am going to be analysing what and how many changes the Special Committee and the Security Council make from year to year, which in this theory is called variation and selection. If they make many changes then they are highly adaptive and they achieve low adaptiveness if the plan remains the same every year.

The last question will be answered by compiling the results from the previous two analyses of adaptiveness and coherence. For example, if my result is high coherence and low adaptiveness, it matches Torrent's conceptualisation that coherence limits adaptiveness. It also matches the conceptualisation if the result is low coherence and high adaptiveness. If the analyses show low coherence and low adaptiveness or high coherence and high adaptiveness the result does not match Torrent's idea and therefore there is no correlation between coherence and adaptiveness.

1.2 Relevance to Global Studies

Whether or not there is a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness in such an important global organisation such as the UN is more than relevant to Global Studies. This thesis examines the relationship between organs in a global actor and how these affect each other. Their impact on one another could be one explanation to, for example, why peacekeeping mandates look the way they do. Coherence between the Special Committee and the Security Council might be one aspect that leads to low adaptiveness in mandates. This has implications for International Relations since the UN is the organisation where all the countries of the world meet to discuss how to achieve sustainable peace.

Policies with protection of civilians will be studied over time in this thesis and shifts in these policies can, according to Branch, be a sign of global politics changing overall. For example, turning more towards local interactions while protecting civilians or increasing the use of force to protect innocent populations can show global politics changing to either be grounded more in local communities or shifting in the way of creating more robust interventions (Branch, 2012, p. 162-163).

1.3 Delimitations

The previous research within protection of civilians consists of various studies suggesting how the UN's work in this particular duty could improve. I am trying to study if the UN listens to the criticism and possibly make changes in the recommendations and mandate to the way they protect civilians. The section of previous research brings up issues that experts within the field have seen with the UN's protection of civilians. I then use these issues to make the case that the UN should be adaptable to improve. The UN is however a large organisation so in order to study which part of the UN might be adaptable or non-adaptable but still manage the time frame, I have limited the thesis material to documents from the Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations, which generally represents the view of the General Assembly, and the Security Council.

There are other mandated tasks in UN peacekeeping missions such as "extension of state authority" and "promotion of human rights" but I have limited this thesis to "protection of civilians" to make a coherent study. There are also other UN missions that include this task in

the mandate. However, I personally think that two cases is the perfect amount. With one case the question of a one-off arises and three cases can become superfluous. Three cases would also not fit the size of this thesis, the analysis would have to be shorter for each case leading to important points being missed.

2. Background

This chapter gives background on the two UN organs that are going to be studied in this thesis. Their purpose is explained and the reason behind studying precisely these two organs are discussed. The history behind protection of civilians mandates is the next part of the background where I frame how protection of civilians became a significant part of peacekeeping missions. The last part of this chapter is background to the conflicts in Mali and DR Congo and how civilians are targeted in both of the conflicts. This is to give a picture about what has happened in the conflicts that lead to the UN establishing peacekeeping missions with a protection of civilians mandate there.

2.1 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations/General Assembly and Security Council

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was created back in 1965 by the UN General Assembly. The UN General Assembly can be seen as the UN parliament where all UN Member States are present with one vote each to cast on whatever issue is brought up (Peterson, 2018, p. 2). The duty of the Special Committee is to analyse UN Peacekeeping Operations and after the analysis come with recommendations on how to improve these operations. The Special Committee is made up of the military and financial contributing Member States. Today the Special Committee has over a hundred members. For many UN Member States the recommendations of the Special Committee are seen as a strong guideline to how peacekeeping operations should continue to evolve. The UN General Assembly calls upon the recommendations mentioned from the Special Committee to be implemented in operations (Jorgensen & Giffen, 2021).

These recommendations are then presented to the UN Secretariat and the Secretary-General writes a report to the Security Council on which measures should be mandated to implement the recommendations (UN, 2022). I could have chosen the Secretary General's report to study coordination between the General Assembly and the Security Council but that report is based on the recommendations from the Special Committee. The recommendations become the source for the report. If I am to draw any conclusions on why the recommendations look the way they do I should study the original documents.

It is the Security Council that creates the mandates for the peacekeeping missions and the Security Council is not constructed in the same way as the General Assembly. The Security Council was created after World War II (WWII) with the task of preventing future world wars. To establish a lasting engagement within the Council from the main power states and victors of WWII they received a veto power and permanent membership. Aside from the permanent members (USA, UK, China, Russia and France) there are also ten non-permanent members in the Security Council (Von Einsiedel & Malone, 2018, p. 2-3). Given their permanent membership and veto right the permanent members have a lot more power in the Security Council compared to the ten non-permanent members. Decisions in the Security Council are therefore dominated by the political will of the permanent members (Von Einsiedel & Malone, 2018, p. 19-20). Oksamytna and Lundgren however argue that the Security Council is strongly guided by the recommendations from the Special Committee. The recommendations are rarely ignored by the Security Council (Oksamytna & Lundgren, 2021, p. 231-232). The organisational makeup is evidently very different in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Because of the Security Council's definite power to decide what a peacekeeping mandate shall include, the choice to study them was easy.

2.2 Mandates to protect civilians in previous UN Missions

As mentioned earlier, the first time that the UN used the phrase "Protection of civilians" in a peacekeeping operation mandate was in 1999 for the mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Canada was the first member state to bring up protection of civilians in the Security Council. This inclusion of protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations came from a wish to

create more proactive interventions (Bachmann & Gelot, 2012, p. 134) that would be grounded in ensuring human rights. Humanitarian interventions were now the focus (Sheeran & Kent, 2016, p. 42), the UN could not let another genocide like the one in Rwanda or Srebrenica happen again. Secretary General Kofi Annan was a driving force in establishing protection of civilians by questioning how systematic violations of human rights, like the ones in Rwanda and Srebrenica, were going to be responded to (Bachmann & Gelot, 2012, p. 134). In both of these cases the UN was criticised for being bystanders to massacres of unarmed civilians (Boulden, 2018, p. 15).

The protection of civilians agenda was the UN's attempt to address the complexities of intrastate conflicts. The establishment of protection of civilians became one answer to the uncertainty on who is an aggressor and who is a civilian that came with the shift towards intrastate conflicts (Bachmann & Gelot, 2012, p. 134). The description of the task for UNAMSIL was to "take the necessary action within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (Willmot & Sheeran, 2013, p. 521).

Even though UNAMSIL was the first official use of the term the UN had mandated a very similar task a lot earlier. The peace operation in Congo (ONUC) 1960 had the duty to protect unarmed groups from violence and resort to the use of force if necessary to prevent the loss of life (Willmot & Sheeran, 2013, p. 520). According to Boulden the mandate in 1960 for ONUC was an interpretive one for the field officers to make decisions on how to best protect the civilians in question (Boulden, 2018, p. 15). Willmot and Sheeran shed light on how this ambiguity continued many years after ONUC. In both UNAMSIL and peace operations after 1999 protection of civilians was included in the mandates but without any clear instructions on how this task was going to be carried out. Willmot and Sheeran argue that this ambiguity led to field officers not having the capacity to implement the mandated task in a significant way. In more recent peace operations like MONUSCO and MINUSMA protection of civilians started becoming more prioritised and heavily mentioned within the mandates. In 2009 The Security Council decided that protection of civilians were to be prioritised in discussions of division of resources (Sheeran & Kent, 2016, p. 45). Willmot and Sheeran mentions the unsuccessfulness of protection of civilians in DR Congo as a driver of this shift in focus (Willmot & Sheeran, 2013, p. 521-522).

2.3 Conflict in Mali

For a long time there has been tensions between Tuareg separatists in northern Mali and the Malian Government that has a larger presence in southern Mali. In 2012 a rebellion was launched by the Tuareg separatists under the name of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The rebels accused the Malian Government of excluding the Tuareg population in political decisions and economic developments (Gauthier Vela, 2021, p. 846). Islamist groups saw an opportunity to take advantage of this chaos and pushed the MNLA out of northern Mali to themselves push closer to the capital. The international community, fearing that Mali would soon become a safe haven for terrorists, responded in April 2013 with mandating MINUSMA. MINUSMA was tasked with for example stabilising key population centres, extending state administration and protection of civilians (Zimmerman, 2020, p. 5-6).

2.3.1 Targeting of civilians in Mali

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program the groups that attack civilians in Mali is mostly islamic terrorist organizations, forces linked to the Government of Mali and governments of neighboring African countries. There are also attacks on civilians from a Dogon ethnic militia called Dan Na Ambassagou that does not sympathise with islamic terrorists. Dan Na Ambassagou has carried out attacks against villages rumoured to host islamic militants and in the process killed civilians (UCDP, 2021).

Moe reports that the Malian Armed Forces and the G5 Sahel Joint Forces have conducted several abuses against civilians in Mali. According to Moe these two forces have been the perpetrators behind extrajudicial killings, forcing civilians into displacement and unlawful arrests. Moe also accused the forces for pitting ethnicities in Mali against each other, igniting interethnic violence (Moe, 2021, p. 15-16). Gauthier Vela brings up the case of terrorist attacks targeted against civilians by the islamic terrorist organizations in Mali. She

specifically mentions the case of the 2015 attack on the Raddisson in Bamako showing that civilians can never be prepared for the terrorist attacks. (Gauthier Vela, 2021, p. 848).

2.4 Conflict in DR Congo

The Rwandan Civil War in 1994 that led to the genocide of the Tutsi population had spillover effects on DR Congo. Hutu militias fled from Rwanda into neighbouring parts of the DRC after the civil war and started attacking Congolese Tutsis. At this time the DRC was in a very unstable situation with poor economic growth and tensions between multiple ethnic groups. This led to a Tutsi-led Rwanda and Uganda to support rebel forces in the DRC to eliminate any Hutu forces and ultimately take control of the DRC. This succeeded and Kabila became the new leader of the DRC (Barrera, 2015, p. 2). Kabila later turned on his supporters which sparked the beginning of a new war. The Second Congo war as it was called came to engage a large number of African countries and was one of the bloodiest conflicts in history (Tamm, 2016, p. 147-148).

In 2003 a peace agreement was reached officially ending the Second Congo war but violence would continue and is still ongoing. Since the peace agreement the DRC has been plagued by different conflicts between ethnic groups, militias and government forces. The UN deployed their first mission in 1999 with tasks such as disarmament, stabilisation and protection of civilians under the name "The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (MONUC). The mission was updated 11 years later with MONUSCO that was given a more comprehensive stabilisation mandate (Barrera, 2015, p. 3-4).

2.4.1 Targeting of civilians in DR Congo

Islamist militias and the Government of DR Congo represent a substantial number of cases in one-sided violence. There are also many different rebel groups belonging to different ethnicities and regions committing attacks on civilians (UCDP, 2021). Barrera mentioned that more than 30 armed groups can be identified to have harassed civilians from the time of the

Second Congo War and still doing it today (Barrera, 2015, p. 7). DW Documentary however reports that 120 armed groups are active in DRC today (DW Documentary, 2021).

One of these groups is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group with the goal of creating an islamic state (Titeca & Fahey, 2016, p. 1193). ADF is active in the north eastern parts of the DRC, attacking villages and taking their resources. Many victims of these attacks see no other option than to join another rebel group and survive through participation (DW Documentary, 2021).

The armed group "Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda" (FDLR) has also been an active aggressor in the DRC against civilians. The FDLR has members that took part in the Rwandan genocide and has been able to sustain itself through attacking civilians in DRC (Barrera, 2015, p. 3-4). Bulambo sheds light on how the FDLR targeted specific groups to diminish them both physically and mentally by raping the women and making their husbands watch (Bulambo, 2016, p. 573). The FDLR uses rape as a biological weapon. A large number of the rebels are HIV/AIDS positive leading to them transmitting their disease to the victims, which means they can wipe out societies that lack the medical drugs to treat this disease (Bulambo, 2016, p. 574).

3. Previous research

In the first part of this chapter previous research on issues with the protection of civilian mandates in MINUSMA and MONUSCO will be presented. This will highlight the need for the UN to be able to make changes to improve the two peacekeeping missions' potential to protect civilians. Secondly, previous research on the relationship between the organs that are meant to recommend and implement changes to improve protection of civilians are explored. This part will present different views on the possibility of these organs working together.

3.1 The UN and the Host State, Issues with Protection of Civilians Mandates

According to Zimmerman's study from 2020 the UN will deploy peace missions with an expectation that the government in the concerned state already has legitimacy and support from the population (Zimmerman, 2020, p. 1). Zimmerman proves this by highlighting the mandate for MINUSMA. She brings up examples where the UN Security Council has mandated the mission to help the Malian government extend state authority. For instance, the mandates for MINUSMA include tasks such as supporting the government's military authority and increasing political legitimacy by re-establishing state administration. Zimmerman argues that this implies that the UN has expectations of the host state already having legitimacy. The best way to build sustainable peace in the eyes of a state centric organisation like the UN is to support the state and improve its legitimacy (Zimmerman, 2020, p. 6).

Zimmerman mentions the importance of consent in peace missions, the host state must consent to a peace mission before it can be deployed and if the current government starts disagreeing with the actions of peacekeepers it can limit, downsize or even demand the mission to leave (Zimmerman, 2020, p. 4-5). Zimmerman's study collides with the fact that government forces sometimes attack civilians (Fjelde, Hultman & Nilsson, 2019, p. 104-105). The UN are both mandated to support the state's military authority and protect civilians (Hunt & Zimmerman, 2019, p. 52-53). Moe argues that the different international forces that are present in Mali are closely linked together. The UN does not act as a counterterrorism force but lends its support to the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and the G5 Sahel Joint Forces (FC-G5S, A force created by Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, Chad and Mali). As mentioned before these two forces have abused civilians in Mali in different ways. It is not easy for the Malian population to differentiate between the FAMA, FC-G5S and the UN forces, so when a person has been abused from the FAMA or FC-G5S their trust in the UN forces will sink lower (Moe, 2018, p. 15-16).

So how does the UN handle the fact that the ones they are supposed to support attacks the ones they are supposed to protect? This will be interesting to analyse in the recommendations from the Special Committee and in the mandates from the Security Council to see if and how they address this issue.

The Mission in Mali is one of the most dangerous if you look at statistics for attacks aimed at peacekeepers. This produces a number of obstacles for the UN and their protection of

civilians mandate. To be able to protect civilians peacekeepers need to be present within local communities that are identified as possible targets for attacks. The deadliness of being outside the UN bases has limited the peacekeeping patrols in Mali. Resource priority has shifted in the favour of protecting the UN's own peacekeepers instead of civilians. This in turn has led to a perception among the local population that the UN is more willing to protect their own personnel than protecting civilians (Moe, 2018, p. 17-18).

To solve this problem some argue that the peacekeepers shall be given a more robust mandate where they have the ability to use proactive force in high-risk situations. The idea to basically create another counterterrorist force alongside the FAMA and FC-G5S would create problems for the protection of civilians. The Malian population already sees MINUSMA as a counterterrorist force according to Moe and this has big implications for the UN's impartiality, which is an important part of any UN peacekeeping mission. In areas where civilians have been more abused than helped by state forces they may seek protection among the armed "terrorist" groups. If the UN peacekeepers become even more difficult to differentiate from counterterrorist forces civilians might start seeing the UN as an enemy instead of as a protector. This strong linkage between the UN and other forces trying to eliminate non-state armed groups worsen the UN's possibility of staying impartial and being a relevant actor for advocacy and conflict resolution, which are important for the protection of civilians (Moe, 2018, p. 18-20).

MONUSCO has suffered the same complications as MINUSMA when it comes to the relation to the host government. Peacekeepers in DR Congo are mandated to work with and support the government to achieve the consent of the host government. The government forces have committed many abuses on the local population. The cooperation between MONUSCO and the host government produces a strong dislike towards MONUSCO among victims of government abuse. Thanks to their relation to the government of the DR Congo MONUSCO loses their legitimacy as a reliable protector of civilians (Berdal, 2018, p. 739-740) .

The mission in DR Congo suffers from having a strong offensive military mandate. This creates a situation where civilians raise their expectations of the peacekeepers ability to protect them according to Berdal. It also leads to the armed groups increasing their attacks before the peacekeepers arrive because when they arrive they won't have the same access to

their prey. Even when the peacekeepers do arrive they lack the resources to keep areas protected in such a vast landscape as the DR Congo. UN peacekeepers are unable to protect civilians when they are too thinly spread out. Armed groups can gather and attack villages and the UN will be unable to protect the civilians because they try to protect a larger region while not having the numbers to do so (Berdal, 2018, p. 739-740). Connected to this, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon argue that the most important part if a mission is going to be successful or not is decided by the mission size. According to their study the more peacekeepers are present the better they are at protecting civilians. The most effective way for peacekeepers to protect civilians is to put themselves between the civilians and the armed groups attacking civilians. With more boots on the ground it becomes easier to prevent combatants from controlling territories where they can abuse civilians and forcefully take their resources (Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013, p. 877-879).

3.2 The relation between UN Organs

The General Assembly has a recommendatory status in peacekeeping issues. The General Assembly calls upon the Security Council, through the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, to improve peacekeeping. A well covered issue with the Security Council is the risk of a deadlock situation when one of the permanent members, with a veto right, does not agree with the rest of the Council. Zavoli studied what the General Assembly's opportunities are in the case of a deadlock in the Security Council. Zavoli analysed the case of the General Assembly's possibilities of legitimising a peacekeeping operation in Ukraine, thereby bypassing the deadlock in the Security Council where Russia would put a veto on such a suggestion. Zavoli came to the conclusion, from strictly looking at the legislation on authorising peacekeeping forces, that the General Assembly could act on its own by deploying troops with a non-use of force mandate and consent from the host state Zavoli, 2017, p. 163-164).

Zavolis study shows that there can be conflicting interests between the General Assembly and the Security Council and that a new interpretation of the UN Charter can give the right to the General Assembly to authorise peacekeeping forces to deploy. Zavoli argues that the UN Charter is a constantly evolving thing and the competence of the different organs can change

over time (Zavoli, 2017, p. 171). This study analyses a case where there is a clear difference in the political will in the General Assembly and the Security Council which gives an opening to the question of the General Assembly's possibility to bypass the Security Council. If the results of my study show a clash of two different plans of peacekeeping missions, the question of how future peacekeeping missions will be mandated becomes even more appropriate.

Hirschmann conducted a similar study to mine in the sense of examining the relationship between the Secretary General/General Assembly and the Security Council. Instead of focusing on protection of civilians she analysed whether or not the Security Council changed mandates when met with criticism on their exit strategies in peacekeeping missions. Before 2000 the strategy for withdrawing UN forces from a peacekeeping mission was to hold elections in the country then leave directly after the elections had been conducted, sometimes even as soon as 15 days (Hirschmann, 2012, p. 176-177).

A General Assembly debate was held in 2000 where members stressed the issue of elections not being a suitable exit strategy. Elections alone were not creating a sustainable peaceful society, members argued. There needed to be a transition from elections to sustainable peacebuilding before peacekeepers could exit. The Secretary General issued a report under the name "No exit without strategy" and the Security Council responded to this loud criticism. The Security Council adapted the mandates in the years after the debate in 2000 from exit after elections to exit only being possible once a safe and politically stable society had been established (Hirschmann, 2012, p. 175). For example the mandate for The UN-Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was remodelled to put peacebuilding processes after election as the main objective. The UN-Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) did not even include the mentioning of elections in its renewed mandate and only focused on more sustainable peacebuilding processes (Hirschmann, 2012, p. 176-177). This study by Hirschmann shows that the Security Council can be adapted when faced with criticism coming from the General Assembly and Secretary General.

4. Theory

In this chapter three theoretical claims will be presented. These three will together establish the theoretical background that will be applied for the analysis of the results. First off, White's claim that coordination issues between the General Assembly and Security Council will be presented (White, 2015, p. 12). This will then be used in the analysis to see if there are coordination issues or if, in this case, this claim is not applicable and the two organs are coherent. Secondly, adaptive peacebuilding will be discussed and the aspects of this theory that will be used in this thesis will be presented. These aspects will later be applied in the analysis to see if the UN are adaptive or not. The third and final theoretical claim is Torrent's argument that coherence limits adaptiveness. This will be presented in this chapter and in the final parts of the thesis it will be applied to see if there can be a correlation between coherence and limited adaptiveness or incoherence and high adaptiveness.

4.1 Coordination issues between the General Assembly and Security Council

The previous research on the relation between the organs within the UN offer different takes. Zavoli's research paints a picture where there are different political wills in the General Assembly compared to the Security Council (Zavoli, 2017, p. 171). The deadlock in the Security Council puts the General Assembly at risk of not getting its will heard or having to find a way to bypass the Security Council. Hirschmann's study on the other hand shows that by pushing the Security Council, the General Assembly can make the changes to peace mission mandates and the two organs become coherent. White discusses the relationship between the General Assembly and Security Council in his article and makes the point that there is a disconnect between the General Assembly and Security Council in priorities when it comes to issues of international peace and security.

The Security Council is the organ within the UN that has the final word in mandating peacekeeping missions. This is their main task, to sustain peace and security throughout the world by mandating peace missions. The General Assembly has the competence to discuss any issue that is relevant to the UN Charter and then put forth recommendations to the Security Council. The General Assembly becomes the location where all the people are heard, White calls it "the town meeting place of the world" (White, 2015, p. 8). White argues that this leads to the General Assembly being able to discuss wider issues of international

peace and security such as humanitarian and social aspects, which the Security Council does not (White, 2015, p. 12).

However the General Assembly, similar to the Security Council, also has the task to identify threats to international peace and security. The precise competence of the General Assembly has been debated throughout the years but the Assembly received legal permission to identify threats in 2004. The International Court of Justice gave the right to the General Assembly to do so under Article 10 and 11 in the UN Charter. The two organs could both be working on identifying threats but come to different conclusions. (White, 2015, p. 8).

According to White there is nothing in the UN Charter stopping the General Assembly from having an evidently overlapping task with the Security Council and White contends the notion of the Security Council having all the power when it comes to deciding mandates for peace missions. In White's claim of the relationship between the organs, the UN Charter can be interpreted as giving the General Assembly the right to identify a threat and recommend military action in peacekeeping missions to the Security Council. Even if the Security Council authorised military action, White sees it as being ordered from the General Assembly. In the General Assembly all the Member States are present and it is the Member Stats that volunteer forces to the UN peacekeeping missions (White, 2015, p. 10-11).

White also mentions that in the UN Charter it is said that once an issue has been brought up in the Security Council the General Assembly should leave the Security Council to deal with this issue. Despite this fact, the General Assembly has kept on pushing the Security Council to resolve issues that have already been brought up multiple times (White, 2015, p. 12).

White describes tensions between the Security Council and the General Assembly that will be very interesting exploring in the material that is going to be analysed in this thesis. Will I possibly identify different focuses in the recommendations from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in comparison to the mandates from the Security Council? The recommendations from the Special Committee might be more focused on humanitarian aspects when it comes to the protection of civilians while the Security Council has the target on how protection of civilians can lead to international security. Traditional literature about these two organs within the UN lean towards explaining the relationship as the General Assembly recommending implementations and the Security Council having the larger power

in deciding what is implemented. However White argues that the General Assembly holds more power than that, so will I see that the two organs are coherent in the case of the Security Council following the lead of the General Assembly? Also will the Special Committee keep on recommending an improvement to peacekeeping missions even though the Security Council already has addressed that improvement showing that these two organs are not coordinated?

4.2 Adaptive Peacebuilding

The previous research on issues with the UN's strategy of protecting civilians enables the argument of the UN needing to make changes to their plan. Issues mentioned, such as not having enough resources, civilian deaths still being high, supporting forces that attack civilians and losing legitimacy among the local population, hinders the UN peacekeeping forces being able to effectively protect civilians. To address these issues changes should be made to the UN's plan on how to protect civilians.

De Coning is a promoter of changes being made to a peacebuilding plan that is failing. His theory, "adaptive peacebuilding", stems from the idea that conflict societies are extremely complex. When talking about complexity in conflict environments De Coning points to these societies evolving in a non-linear way. Social systems are complex, all moving parts make it impossible to analyse it in a cause and effect manner. De Coning argues that the way peace missions can be mandated in order to follow this non-linearity of conflict societies is by experimenting and valuing feedback (De Coning, 2017, p. 305).

To have success in establishing peace when consequences can not be predicted, multiple methods must be implemented. Some methods might not work at all, some might be successful. To know how a method is working or not working, a theory of change needs to be established. A theory of change is what the implementers think that a specific method will achieve. If the method achieves the goal, then the method is successful but if the method leads to an unexpected negative consequence, it is a failure. This is why, according to De Coning, the important step after implementing different methods is monitoring them. Monitoring the methods will lead to feedback about how each method achieved the intended goal, the

successful ones shall be continued and the failing ones need to be abandoned. De Coning explains this with "variation" and "selection". Variation means that there has to be a multiple amount of different strategies in a peace mission and selection means that only the effective strategies are selected to be continued (De Coning, 2017, p. 306). Variation and selection will be the aspect of this theory that I will focus on in the analysis. If the Special Committee or the Security Council recommends or implements a high number of different strategies, variation is achieved and therefore adaptiveness. The other part of adaptiveness is being able to select which strategies to continue and which to discontinue. The two organs will have to show signs of being able to remove strategies and implement new ones in order to be adaptive.

De Coning argues that even effective methods in peace missions shall still be adjusted and experimented with. Because of the conflict environment being non-linear the methods trying to create a peaceful situation needs to follow this non-linearity. In De Conings theory, the idea that effective methods someday stop being effective is central. That's why plans on how to build peace always have to be ready for adjustments (De Coning, 2017, p. 306).

To conclude, De Conings theory of adaptive peacebuilding argues that the UN needs to be adaptable in order to succeed with protecting civilians. If the UN only implements a single method to protect civilians they run the risk of not being able to do so because the conflict will evolve unpredictably leaving the UN vulnerable with only one strategy. Even if the UN implements multiple successful methods to protect civilians they must still be adaptable because in a complex social system, methods working now will not work forever. Variation and selection will be guiding aspects of this theory to analyse if the Special Committee and Security Council are adaptive or not.

4.3 UN wide coherence

Ignasi Torrent's claim on UN institutional relations is that the UN desires the organs to be coherent but that this coherence is hindering the UN to be adaptable. Torrent brings up many examples of former UN Secretary Generals and UN commissions stressing the issue of coherence between all parties involved in peacekeeping missions, including within the UN

itself. The UN time and time again mentions that to build peace, coherence between different stakeholders is needed for the peace to be sustainable (Torrent, 2021, p. 7).

Torrent argues that what makes this coherent approach to creating peace problematic is that the UN tries to achieve system wide coherence. It is extremely problematic, according to Torrent, to achieve coherence throughout the system, the system meaning the whole list of actors in any way involved in the peace mission. For example those actors could be the host state, other large organisations like the African Union (AU), European Union (EU) and non governmental organisations. There will always be a high number of different views between so many actors and to get all of these on the same page is an incredibly daunting task (Torrent, 2021, p. 7).

However, Torrent means that even if the UN would achieve a system wide coherence, this would still not be good for peacekeeping missions. In the author's words, a system wide coherence signifies an idea that as long as all of the actors get on the same page all of the issues in the conflict will be resolved. This UN policy points to the UN believing that conflicts are not that complex and all that is needed is coherence between the interveners and the host state. Torrent means, in similarity to De Coning, that conflict environments need to be seen as chaotic situations that can change rapidly in unexpected ways. The UN's coherent approach to achieving peace resonates with an understanding of the world moving in a linear direction. Local communities affected by conflicts are seen to just be waiting for stakeholders to coordinate to then have the chance to be freed. Torrent argues that universal norms do not lead to good decisions in such a fast changing situation as a conflict environment. Actions in such a situation are decided by emergency and uncertainty, not long waitings of becoming coherent (Torrent, 2021, p. 8-9).

The first part of achieving this system wide coherence is by the UN being coherent within itself. If it can not achieve this, how could possibly system wide coherence be achieved? The UN must start by facilitating internal coherence in order to address the other stakeholders with their coordinated view on how to achieve peace (Torrent, 2021, p. 7). So the question that will be analysed in my thesis is if the UN can achieve coherence between its own internal parts, specifically the General Assembly, represented by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Security Council. If they are coherent, does this lead to the UN not being able to be adaptable in the case of protection of civilians? Or does the UN fail

to facilitate internal coherence and does this lead to them possibly being more adaptable in protection of civilian mandates? In Torrent's claim adaptiveness is dependent on being coherent. Whether or not the organs can be adaptable relies on how coherent they are. If they are coherent, they can not be adaptable but if they are not coherent they can be adaptable.

4.4 Key concepts

The two key concepts in this thesis are adaptability and coherence. The three research questions seek to find out the answers to if the UN possesses the ability of being adaptable in the case of protection of civilians and if the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Security Council are coherent. Lastly, does the coherence between the two affect their adaptability.

Adaptability in this instance is achieved when the UN is able to change their plan on how to protect civilians. To explain the concept of adaptability, let's imagine the scenario of the UN mandating three tasks for achieving protection of civilians in Mali when the mission is first deployed in 2013. If the UN would have a high adaptiveness, to follow the definition of De Coning, the mandated tasks for protection of civilians 2021 would look very different, thanks to variation and selection. With a high adaptiveness there should be more tasks increasing the experimentation and the ones that are remaining from 2013 should have been adjusted to follow the non-linearity of a conflict environment. With a low adaptiveness the tasks might be exactly the same in 2021 as in 2013. In De Conings theory, this would lead to ineffective protection of civilians because the tasks from eight years ago can not attend to the changes that happen in a conflict over that time.

Coherence is attained when, in this case the Special Committee and Security Council, express the same view on how to protect civilians in Mali and DR Congo. For example, the Special Committee recommends the Security Council to mandate peacekeeping forces to engage more with local communities, and the Security Council does this exactly, it shows a high coherence between the two organs. However if there is a visible difference in the views on how to protect civilians expressed by the Special Committee and Security Council then there is evidently low coherence between them.

4.5 Theoretical claims

To answer my research questions three theoretical claims will be applied. These will be applied when I gather the data for the results of this thesis. The three claims are based on the theories presented above and they complement each other and together they will answer all of my research questions.

White's claim on coordination issues between the General Assembly and Security Council argues that the two organs will not be coherent. If that is the case, that the two have different views on how to effectively protect civilians then the result supports this claim. However if there is high coherence between the General Assembly and Security Council White's claim is disproved. This analytical tool will help answer the research question: How coherent are the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations' recommendations and the Security Council's mandates of how to protect civilians in Mali and DR Congo?

Table 1: Coherence

The General Assembly and Security Council	White's claim on coordination issues between the two organs
High coherence	Not support for claim
Low coherence	Support for claim

De Conings theory on adaptive peacebuilding argues that adaptiveness is required to sustain peace. If the UN shows high adaptiveness in terms of variation and selection in the case of protection of civilians the result is that they are adaptive. If the UN instead shows low adaptiveness, it is a result that the UN is not adaptive. This analytical tool will help answer the research question: How adaptive is the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in its recommendations on protection of civilians and how adaptive is the Security Council on its plans of protection of civilians in the DR Congo and Mali?

Table 2: Adaptiveness

The UN in the case of protection of civilians	Adaptive Peacebuilding
High adaptiveness	Variation and selection is attained
Low adaptiveness	Variation and selection is not attained

Complementary to these two theories is the claim of Torrent combining coherence and adaptiveness. Torrent argues that high coherence between all parties involved in a peacekeeping mission leads to low adaptiveness and that less coherence may lead to high adaptiveness, if this is the case in my study then there is a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness. If there is high coherence and high adaptiveness it does not support Torrent's claim. With high coherence Torrent argues that this leads to the thinking of the conflict environment being linear and the UN not needing to make a lot of changes to their peacekeeping plan. The opposite becomes the case when there is low coherence and low adaptiveness, if they are not seeking to be coherent, the freedom of adaptiveness should be available. Does this claim possibly apply to the UN's internal coherence as well? This analytical tool below has been established to analyse if this claim can be applied to the internal coherence of the UN and to answer the research question: Is there a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness in the case of protection of civilians?

Table 3: Coherence and adaptiveness

Coherence and adaptiveness together in the UN	Torrents claim on UN wide coherence
High coherence, high adaptiveness	Not support for claim
High coherence, low adaptiveness	Support for claim
Low coherence, high adaptiveness	Support for claim
Low coherence, low adaptiveness	Not support for claim

5. Material and Methodology

5.1 Material

The material that will be analysed to answer this thesis research questions are recommendations from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and mandates from the Security Council for MINUSMA and MONUSCO. The recommendations will serve as the view of the Special Committee and General Assembly on how protection of civilians shall be conducted in peacekeeping operations. These views will be compared to what the Security Council mandates for two missions that experience a rise of violence against civilians from armed groups. Will the Security Council follow the views of the Special Committee and will it mandate different strategies for each mission. How adaptable will the organs be in their strategies in terms of how many changes are done to the plan? This material will lastly answer the question of a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness. Does a possible coherence between the organs limit adaptiveness or does potential incoherence lead to adaptiveness?

5.1.1 Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping operations meets in the beginning of every year to, mandated by the General Assembly, review the whole question of peacekeeping operations. The aim of these meetings is to adopt a report overviewing the peacekeeping operations. As mentioned in this thesis background, the Special Committee comes with recommendations on improvements which the Secretary General brings forth to the Security Council. According to Sharland, many countries that contribute peacekeeping forces to the UN missions see the Special Committee as the most important political platform for discussing the future of peacekeeping missions. Within this committee, these countries, that are the largest contributors of forces, get to regularly participate in shaping the structure of the missions to where they send their forces (Sharland, 2020, p. 3).

The reports of the Special Committee are quite large because they review the whole question of peacekeeping operations (Sharland, 2020, p. 2). That is another reason why I have limited this study to only the topic protection of civilians, which in the reports of the Special Committee is substantive enough to study but not too long for the timeframe and length of

this thesis. The part of where the Special Committee writes about protection of civilians is usually structured with an overview of the issue and then recommendations are suggested. I have chosen to study three recommendations of the Special Committee to be able to analyse their adaptiveness in plans on how to protect civilians over time (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, p. 7). The first report of the Special Committee will be from 2012, then two more will be studied with a four year gap between each report, meaning the reports from 2016 and 2020.

The focus when analysing these reports will be on summarising the Special Committees plan on how to protect civilians. This will enable me to see if the plan from 2012 is similar or different to the plans from 2016 and 2020, hence highlighting the Special Committees adaptiveness or non adaptiveness.

5.1.2 Resolutions of the Security Council

As mentioned in previous chapters, the Security Council has the power to decide how UN peacekeeping missions will be conducted. This is the organ that has the final say in what kind of tasks are going to be included in a peacekeeping mission and how these tasks are going to be prioritised. It is in the resolutions of the Security Council that the mandate for a peacekeeping mission is presented, within the mandate the tasks for a mission are described and prioritised. According to Bourgeois the Security Council does not only describe how the peacekeeping operation is going to be conducted within the mandates, it can also decide the level of use of force that peacekeeping forces are allowed to possess in a specific mission context (Bourgeois, 2020, p. 62).

The Security Council mandates can sound very definitive given the fact that they even have the possibility to completely ignore recommendations from other organs within the UN, such as the Special Committee. However, Oksamytna and Lundgren mention that recommendations on Peacekeeping Operations are widely regarded as shaping the discussions and decisions that are then held in the Security Council. The Security Council can act freely but mostly they are significantly affected by the recommendations of the Special Committee, the recommendations create a box that the Security Council rarely steps out of according to Oksamytna and Lundgren. (Oksamytna & Lundgren, 2021, p. 231-232).

The specific material that will be used in this study is three mandates from the UN mission in Mali and three mandates from the UN mission in DR Congo. To coordinate with the analysis of the recommendations from the Special Committee I have chosen to study the mandates from 2013 and onwards with a four year gap. From studying the mandates in both peacekeeping operations from 2013, 2017 and 2021 I will be able to analyse how adaptive the Security Council is in its efforts to protect civilians. The choice of these exact mandates and recommendations is based on the 2013 mandate for MINUSMA being the first one for the mission. The recommendations from the Special Committee and mandates for MONUSCO are adjusted to fit accordingly to this which enables comparisons between the material. Summaries of the Security Councils idea on how to protect civilians from each mandate will be presented in the section of results to compare the mandates within each mission. The coordination between the analysis of both organs (studying the mandates that are decided a year after the recommendations) also allows this study to see if there is a coherence between the recommendations and the mandates. For example if the 2012 recommendations from the Special Committee can be significantly traced in the 2013 mandate, a strong coherence between the organs becomes the result.

As my research questions aim to answer how coherent both of these organs of the UN are, how adaptive they are and if there is a correlation with coherence limiting adaptiveness, this material fits well. Both of these types of documents address each organ's idea on how to most effectively protect civilians in UN peacekeeping missions. By studying these ideas I can analyse how coherent both the Special Committee and Security Council are from year to year in this particular aspect of peacekeeping missions. When combining these results this study will be able to answer the question of how adaptive the Special Committee and Security Council are. Indirectly, by analysing the coherence between the organs and by studying the adaptiveness, this thesis will answer the last research question, if adaptiveness and coherence are correlated. Following Torrent's claim, for example if the Special Committee and Security Council are coherent and there is low adaptiveness within them, then there is a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness. However, if both adaptiveness within the organs are high and coherence between them are high, adaptiveness and coherence are not correlated.

5.2 Methodology

The method that is going to be adopted to answer the research questions of this thesis is a qualitative content analysis. The parts of the documents that contain ideas about how to protect civilians need to be analysed in order to answer the research questions. These ideas are then going to be summarised in order to compare the documents from a specific time but also documents from different times (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, p. 7). I will study the parts that are about how to protect civilians but what I am really studying is adaptiveness and coherence. Qualitative content analysis helps me analyse this underlying theme. In order to highlight this underlying theme I will quote the documents frequently, showing either how adaptive or coherent the Special Committee or the Security Council are (Bryman, 2012, p. 557).

The coding scheme that will be used to analyse the material is focused on pointing out specific plans on how to protect civilians. Only the parts that are of importance to answering the research questions will be collected (Bryman, 2012, p. 568). The only data that needs to be collected to answer the research questions are plans on how to protect civilians. Coherence, adaptability and correlation between these two are later analysed on the basis of the plans on how to protect civilians. Are the Special Committee's recommendations and the Security Council's mandates for civilian protection coherent? Do each organ make changes to their recommendations or mandates? And can a correlation, from Torrent's claim, be recognised between coherence and adaptability? Everything that is mentioned in the recommendations and mandates as a specific strategy on how to protect civilians will be collected as data to later be analysed. Examples of specific plans to protect civilians are interaction with local communities to enhance understanding on how to protect civilians, implementing mobile task forces to eliminate threats towards civilians, scenario based training for UN troops to be prepared for protection of civilians under imminent threat, deploying expertise personnel that can adress the needs of victims of sexual abuse and etc.

To gain good reliability I will be very clear in presenting my interpretations of the material. For example why I deem a subtle change in the mandate as the Security Council being adaptive and attaining variation or selection. This might very well be interpreted in another way by another scientist but if I am clear in how and why I interpret certain parts of the

material in the way I did it will become easier for the reader to understand how I came to my conclusion (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, p. 18-19).

An important step in qualitative content analysis is becoming familiar with the documents and context for the documents (Bryman, 2012, p. 559). Hence one of the first things I did was summarising all mandates for MINUSMA and MONUSCO to achieve a deeper understanding of the nature of these documents. I then tested to see if adaptiveness in mandates was possible to study and came to the conclusion that protection of civilians chapters fitted my theoretical backdrop. I still had to make some changes to the data collection scheme, as in focusing on variation on selection, to fit the documents even better. Complexity theory and nonlinearity which are a part of adaptive peacebuilding did not fit the mandates or the recommendations. I then summarised all of the chosen mandates and recommendations once again and from the summaries I drew analysis on coherence and adaptiveness from seeing if the organs had the same plans and if they attained variation and selection.

The structure of the results in this thesis will start with summaries of the 2012 recommendations from the Special Committee and the 2013 mandates for MINUSMA and MONUSCO. This is to make it possible to trace the coherence between the recommendations and mandates that are only a year apart. The results will continue with the 2016 recommendations and 2017 mandates and lastly with the 2020 recommendations and 2021 mandates.

The analysis is the chapter that will answer the research questions in this thesis. The three theoretical claims will be applied to the results. The first theoretical claim will be applied separately to the documents from the similar time period, meaning the first analysis will be of the 2012 recommendations from the Special Committee and the 2013 mandates from the two peacekeeping missions, the second of the 2016 and 2017 documents and finally the texts from 2020 and 2021. To answer the first research question: "How coherent are the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations' recommendations and the Security Council's mandates of how to protect civilians in Mali and DR Congo?" analysis of the two organs' views need to come from a single time period. I can not compare the recommendations from 2012 with the 2017 mandate and argue that the Special Committee and Security Council are not coherent, in this five year gap the Special Committees view on how to protect civilians

could have changed making it possible for the 2017 mandate to for example be coherent with the 2016 recommendations. The recommendations are presented for the Security Council and the thought is that the Council then takes these recommendations into account when shaping mandates. The reason why I am using recommendations from one year ahead of the mandates is to make sure that the recommendations were published before the mandates. In some cases the recommendations from 2013, 2017 and 2021 are published after the mandates. If I analyse these I can not say that the Security Council is following the Special Committee or not because they have not seen the recommendations from the Special Committee that I analyse.

The second theoretical background on adaptive peacebuilding will compare the recommendations to each other, the MINUSMA mandates to each other and the MONUSCO mandates to each other. This analysis will answer the second research question: How adaptive is the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in its recommendations on protection of civilians and how adaptive is the Security Council on its plans of protection of civilians in the DR Congo and Mali? For example, by first summarising the 2013, 2017 and 2021 MINUSMA mandates and then comparing the summaries on the Security Councils ideas on how to most effectively protect civilians, the analysis will show if they are adaptive or not in terms of variation and selection. If the analysis discovers many changes to the plan in 2017 compared to 2013 then the conclusion becomes that the Security Council has been able to be adaptive in this four year gap. However the Security Council might have the same exact plan 2021 as the one in 2017, then the result is that they do not currently achieve high adaptiveness.

The third and final theoretical claim will answer the last research question of this thesis: Is there a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness in the case of protection of civilians? The analysis and results from the two previous theoretical backgrounds will guide this last part of the analysis. For example, if the result from the first analysis is that the Special Committee and Security Council are strongly coherent and the result from the second analysis is that the organs are unable to be adaptive, the result in the third analysis is that this study gives support to Torrents' claim that coherence limits adaptability. The other way around, let's say that the Special Committee and Security Council are strongly coherent but both of the organs attain high adaptiveness this study would instead not support this claim.

This thesis does not set out to establish a causality between coherence and adaptiveness, its aim is to see if there is a potential correlation between the two concepts.

The material that is going to be studied in this thesis contains what needs to be studied in order to answer the research questions. The method chosen will adequately answer the question of adaptiveness, coherence and correlation between these two, giving the study good validity. That a study has good validity means that it studies what it sets out to study (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, p. 17). A qualitative content analysis of the recommendations from the Special Committee and the mandates from the Security Council will answer the question of how coherent and how adaptive these two are in the case of protection of civilians. By having done these two parts with a qualitative content analysis I will be able to answer the last question if there is a correlation between adaptiveness and coherence.

Torrent's claim is that coherence affects adaptiveness. High coherence limits adaptiveness because all parties need to be on the same page making it impossible to quickly adapt and change (Torrent, 2021, p. 7). In Torrent's claim adaptiveness is dependent on coherence. How adaptive the UN is able to be in a peacekeeping mission depends on how coherent they aim to be. If they want to be coherent, adaptiveness is lost but if they do not prioritise coherence, adaptiveness is on the table. The causality of coherence and adaptiveness can be argued and because this thesis is making use of this claim the internal validity can seem poor (internal validity meaning that x leads to y, in this case coherence leads to limited adaptiveness) (Bryman, 2012, p. 47). However the structure of this thesis is to test Torrent's claim to see if there might be a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness. The analysis in this study wont say that coherence leads to less adaptiveness, even if the result is that the Special Committee and the Security Council are coherent and they both have low adaptiveness. It is instead a test to see if Torrent's claim is applicable in this specific case.

A quantitative method can be suitable for this type of thesis but I would argue that by choosing a quantitative method in this exact study you run a risk. Possible changes in these types of documents can be subtle and some changes may be significant. If these get grouped up as the same type of changes, it will have negative effects on the validity of the thesis (Bryman, 2012, p. 47-48). If big and small changes equals the same it damages the possibility of answering the question of exactly how adaptive the Special Committee and Security Council are. The coding would have to be extremely precise for a quantitative method to not

miss these important factors when studying this material. A qualitative method like the one I have chosen covers these changes better but the problem of interpretation arises when analysing documents like these with this method. I need to be careful when interpreting so I dont let anything affect how I interpret the material. That is another reason why I will be quoting the texts often in the results so the reader is also able to make interpretations (Boréus & Bergström, 2017, p. 18).

Because the material for this study is official UN documents that are available to the public the ethical risks are low. The UN knows that these documents can be studied by scientists and students like myself when they publish them. There are still ethical considerations to be made in how I study these documents. I am going to attempt and establish impartiality as best as I can while analysing the chosen material. I am a student of peace and conflict studies and I might have my own opinions of how peacekeeping should be conducted (Bryman, 2012, p. 149-150). This bias can turn the result in either way, criticising the UN too harshly for not following my opinion on how peacekeeping shall be conducted or praising the UN too much when the organisation is following my opinions. I will thread carefully in the analysis, going over it multiple times in order to establish this impartiality. Being clear in how and why I analyse the results in the way I do will hopefully eliminate this biasy.

6. Result

6.1 The 2012 Recommendations and 2013 Mandates for MINUSMA and MONUSCO

In this first part of the results, the plans for how to protect civilians that are described in the 2012 recommendations from the Special Committee and the 2013 mandates from the Security Council for MINUSMA and MONUSCO are going to be summarised.

6.1.1 The 2012 Recommendations from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

The first recommendation that the Special Committee, in 2012, wants to see being implemented is close cooperation with national authorities in the carrying out of mandated tasks to protect civilians. The Special Committee underlines the importance of national ownership in the peacekeeping mission and that the UN forces acknowledges this without prejudices to the host government. However the Special Committee is of the opinion that close consultation and cooperation from UN forces with government forces and local authorities is the most effective way to protect civilians (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 38-39). The Special Committee recognises the physical threat that civilians are under and the Special Committee argues that the best way to protect the civilians is by a "coordinated response from all relevant mission components" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 39).

The Special Committee further recommends that achievable and clear mandates are created through close cooperation between the UN Secretariat, Security Council and countries that contribute the forces to the peacekeeping missions. The tasks on how to protect civilians need to be clearly defined in order for the forces to effectively carry them out. To achieve success in protection of civilians the Special Committee stresses that necessary resources need to be delivered and used effectively. Without proper equipment and training UN forces can not effectively protect civilians. The Special Committee also recommends that lessons learned from previous missions are used to train forces in protection. According to the Special Committee this will "enhance operational capacity" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 39). Delivering resources to UN peacekeeping forces will also enable them to improve their gathering of information which in turn helps them understand how to better protect civilians (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 39).

The Special Committee further recommends that reporting on how the mandated tasks to protecting civilians turns out is kept as a central aspect of peacekeeping missions (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 40).

The Special Committee again stresses the importance of training the peacekeeping forces for the protection of civilians mandate to have success. Not only combat training for regular forces are mentioned but also leadership training for officers. The Special Committee recommends that these training sessions are not only held before deployment but during the

mission as well. The Special Committee also mentions that these trainings should be based on lessons learned from previous missions once again (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 40).

The Special Committee also wants to see that peacekeeping missions "interact closely with the host Government, local authorities and the local population in order to raise awareness and understanding of its protection-of-civilians mandate and activities." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 41). The Special Committees view is that deeper understanding between mission forces and local population increases the chance of more effective protection of civilians. The Special Committee recommends that resources be used to improve the management of expectations from the local communities on the peacekeeping missions so that limitations and possibilities within the mission are understood by the local population. The Special Committee specifically "welcomes practices such as the fielding of joint protection teams, host-country community liaison assistants and civil affairs officers", meaning that these efforts will improve the relationship between the mission, local authorities and local population (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 41).

6.1.2 The 2013 Security Council Mandate for MINUSMA

The section describing the tasks for protection of civilians in the first mandate for the mission in Mali is considerably short. The first task that is mandated to ensure protection of civilians is that the UN peacekeeping forces deployed protect civilians "within its capacities and areas of deployment" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2013, p. 8). However the Security Council tasks the forces with only protecting civilians under "imminent threat of physical violence" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2013, p. 8). The Security Council also clearly states that the forces are to do so without prejudice to the transitional authorities of Mali. The host government holds the main responsibility for this task, the Security Council argues (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2013, p. 8).

The Security Council also tasks the mission in Mali with "provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2013, p. 8). This is to be achieved by deploying "Children Protection Advisors" and "Women

Protection Advisors". These will contribute to understanding the needs of victims that have been abused sexually or fallen victim to gender-based violence during the armed conflict (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2013, p. 8).

6.1.3 The 2013 Security Council Mandate for MONUSCO

The mandated tasks for protection of civilians for the peacekeeping mission in DR Congo from 2013 starts off with the Security Council giving the UN forces the duty of "effective protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2013, p. 6). The Security Council further states that civilians within camps for refugees and displaced people shall also receive protection (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2013, p. 6). To achieve effective protection of civilians the Security Council also addresses that peacekeeping forces are able to protect civilians no matter which group of the conflict the threat comes from. The Security Council mandates that civilians are to be protected "of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2013, p. 6). The forces are also tasked with mitigating risks to civilians throughout the whole period of any military operation, meaning before, during and after (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2013, p. 6).

The Security Council also mandates the UN forces in DR Congo to work with the national authorities to "identify threats to civilians and implement existing response plans to ensure the protection of civilians from abuses and violations of human rights" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2013, p. 7). The last part of the section on protection of civilians in this mandate is focused on how to combat sexual violence. The Security Council wants concerns about child protection to be integrated within every aspect of the mission in DR Congo. The Security Council tasks the peacekeeping force with, monitoring, reporting and analysing sexual abuses that happen during the conflict (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2013, p. 7).

6.2 The 2016 Recommendations and 2017 Mandates for MINUSMA and MONUSCO

In this second chapter of the results the ideas of how to protect civilians that exist in the 2016 recommendations from the Special Committee and the 2017 mandates for MINUSMA and MONUSCO will be summarised.

6.2.1 The 2016 Recommendations from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

The Special Committee starts off the section on protection of civilians in their 2016 recommendations by stressing the importance of supporting the host government. They have the main responsibility when it comes to the protection of civilians, the UN forces should be tasked with helping them with this duty but doing so without any prejudices. The Special Committee recommends "a comprehensive peace process underpinned by national ownership" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 53).

The Special Committee argues that close cooperation between military, police and civilian components within the mission are vital for succeeding with the task of protecting civilians. According to the Special Committee a task such as protecting civilians needs a "whole-of-mission" approach (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 54).

The Special Committee further recommends that the Security Council, Secretariat and troop-contributing countries should cooperate closely to create clearly defined and achievable mandates (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 54). To then achieve these mandates the Special Committee stresses the importance of delivering resources in an efficient and timely manner. The Special Committee mentions that the resources shall mostly be made up of training for the UN peacekeeping forces. According to the Special Committee this will "enhance operational capacity" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 54). The Special Committee stresses the importance of improving planning and training processes "for peacekeeping personnel, including senior mission leadership before and during deployment, based on lessons learned from past and existing peacekeeping missions and case analysis" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 56).

The Special Committee sees unarmed strategies to protect civilians as important to establish safe environments. The Special Committee means that unarmed strategies can lead to confidence being built for peaceful solutions. The Special Committee recommends peacekeeping missions to "make every effort to leverage the non-violent practices and capabilities of local communities" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 54). The Special Committee argues that if every possible effort is made to incorporate unarmed strategies, a protective environment could be established (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 54).

The Special Committee mentions the importance of assessment reports on the availability of both human and material resources to a peacekeeping mission with a protection of civilians mandate. In order to have success with protecting civilians the necessary resources must be provided, such as "personnel, mobility assets and capabilities for gathering timely, reliable and actionable information on threats to civilians and the analytical tools to use it." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 54-55).

The Special Committee again addressed the importance of the host government having the main responsibility when it comes to protection of civilians and that UN forces are to assist government forces in carrying out this task without prejudice. The Special Committee also mentions that for protection of civilians being successfully carried out it "requires a coordinated response from all relevant mission components." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 55). The Special Committee also argues that for peacekeeping missions with mandates to protect civilians it is crucial to "develop or update, as appropriate, comprehensive protection strategies for incorporation into overall mission implementation plans and contingency plans, in consultation with the host Government, local authorities, troop-contributing and police-contributing countries, and other relevant actors" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 55).
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The Special Committee recommends that reporting on all mandated tasks be improved and stresses the importance of reporting to gain an understanding of how protection of civilians is developing. The Special Committee also mentions that these reports shall be "brought to the attention of Headquarters and the Security Council in a timely manner." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 56).

The Special Committee recommends that peacekeeping missions with a protection of civilians mandate "interact closely with the host Government, local authorities and the local population in order to raise awareness and understanding of its protection-of-civilians mandate and activities and to help to build trust and protective environments." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 57). The Special Committee further recommends that outreach strategies are used to establish interaction with the local population. The Special Committee promotes the deployment of "joint protection teams, host-country community liaison assistants and civil affairs officers" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 57). The Special Committee argues that this will improve the management of expectations within local communities, enabling the peacekeeping mission to communicate its possibilities and limitations to the local population (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, p. 57).

6.2.2 The 2017 Security Council Mandate for MINUSMA

The first task that is mentioned in the section for protection of civilians in the Security Councils 2017 mandate for MINUSMA is to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence but to do this "without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2017, p. 9).

The Security Council continues by mandating stabilisation efforts of "key population centres" specifically in the North and Centre of Mali but also other areas of the country where civilians might be at risk (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2017, p. 9). One strategy that the Security Council mandates to achieve this task is to improve early warning systems when threats to civilians are approaching. The efforts to anticipate, deter and counter these threats also needs to be enhanced (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2017, p. 9). The Security Council also mandates "active and effective patrolling in areas where civilians are at risk" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2017, p. 9). This task is followed by the duty of not letting armed elements return to areas where patrols have been conducted, if they return UN forces are mandated to pursue these threats and eliminate them to improve the protection of civilians (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2017, p. 9).

The peacekeeping mission in Mali is also mandated with the task "To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2017, p. 9). This is meant to be achieved through deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors. Consultations with women's organisations are also mandated to best address the needs that victims of sexual or gender-based abuses might have in an conflict environment (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2017, p. 9).

6.2.3 The 2017 Security Council Mandate for MONUSCO

The Security Council begins the 2017 mandate for MONUSCO with tasking the peacekeeping forces with protecting civilians that are under threat of physical violence. The Security Council mandates the mission with the duty of protecting civilians from what armed groups the threats may come from, "with a focus on violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 10). The Security Council orders the mission to "support and undertake local mediation efforts" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 10). According to the Security Council this will help to de-escalate the conflict and create a safer environment for civilians. The mission is also mandated with preparing for potential violence against civilians around elections (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 10).

The Security Council further mandates the mission with working, together with the government of DR Congo, towards identifying potential threats to civilians and then implementing "response plans" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 10). Joint planning together with the national authorities is mandated to have a better chance at ensuring protection from sexual or gender-based abuses. The Security Council also wants to see that the mission improves its monitoring and analysis of sexual abuses committed against civilians (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 10).

The Security Council tasks the peacekeeping force with enhancing their interaction with the local population in DR Congo. This is mandated so the civilians in the region can gain a better understanding of what the force is there to do, protect the civilians. The Security

Council mentions that enhanced interaction leads to improved early warning systems (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 10-11).

The Security Council mandates a special "Intervention Brigade" to "neutralise armed groups" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 11). The Security Council gives this force the mandate to carry out "targeted offensive operations" in support of the local authorities and with the support of MONUSCO (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 11). This force needs to put protection of civilians into account at every military operation, mitigating the risks of civilians before, during and after any military operation. The Security Council further reiterates that this force has the mandate to prevent armed groups from extending by neutralising and disarming them. This is made to achieve success with the objective of establishing a secure environment for civilians in DR Congo (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 11).

The Security Council mandates the mission with the task to "Provide good offices, advice and assistance to the Government of the DRC to ensure actions against armed groups are supported by civilian and police components" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 11). The Security Council sees this action contributing to "a comprehensive response to area-based stabilisation efforts" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 11). The mission is also tasked with supporting the authorities with bringing people responsible for war crimes and genocides to justice. Lastly the Security Council mandates the mission with the duty of cooperating with the government of DR Congo to promote human rights and facilitation of mediation efforts at the local level (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2017, p. 11).

6.3 The 2020 Recommendations and 2021 Mandates for MINUSMA and MONUSCO

This is the third and final chapter of the results in this thesis and here the opinions on how civilians are to be protected that the 2020 recommendations from the Special Committee and 2021 mandates for MINUSMA and MONUSCO contain will be summarised.

6.3.1 The 2020 Recommendations from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

The Special Committee hands the primary responsibility to the host State for protection of civilians. The UN peacekeeping forces, where mandated, will support the national authorities in military operations. The Special Committee stresses the importance of peacekeeping missions with a protection of civilians mandate to undertake a whole-of-mission approach. Close cooperation between military, police and civilian components are recommended. The Special Committee argues that this could "create and sustain a protective environment for civilians." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 29). The Special Committee also sees "the use of force as a last resort when required to prevent and respond to threats of physical violence against civilians." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 29).

The Special committee mentions that vital parts of being able to effectively implement a protection of civilians mandate includes creating clear and achievable mandates, proper training and delivering of necessary resources. Resources includes for example personnel "who can enable expertise on protection efforts as well as human rights, sexual violence in conflict, gender perspectives and child protection," (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 29). The resources to be able to assess potential threats to civilians and improve operational planning also needs to be distributed to peacekeeping missions. The responsibility to deliver all of these parts rests with "all in-mission stakeholders" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 29). To gain a deeper understanding of the resources available, the Special Committee recommends that information is wider shared about what resources can be delivered to peacekeeping missions (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 31).

The Special Committee further recommends that peacekeeping missions support the host State with bringing people responsible for sexual or gender-based violence to justice. The Special Committee puts specific importance on child protection mandates through recommending prioritisation of prevention and response to sexual or gender-based importance and deployment of child protection advisers (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 30). The Special Committee again stresses the importance

of prioritising protection of women and children by strongly recommending that all UN troops are fully trained before being deployed. This training includes scenario-based training in how to most effectively protect women and children. (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 31). The Special Committee also mentions the womens protection advisers capability of delivering on their mandates as crucial to addressing sexual abuses towards women in conflict and establishing a safer environment for women. The Special Committee also stresses the importance of listing sexual offenders to help decreasing the number of abuses. (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 32).

To improve "gender-sensitive threat analyses" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 31) the Special Committee recommends that collection and use of data on threats towards civilians should be enhanced. (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 31). The Special Committee also recommends that after operations have been carried out, either solo by UN forces or together with other troops, threats to civilians should be tracked, prevented and minimised (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 31).

The Special Committee wants UN peacekeeping forces to have "safe and effective community engagement and confidence-building, and ensuring a good understanding of the protection needs and capacities of the communities," (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 32). The Special Committee argues that this will help the UN forces to improve their analysis of how to most effectively protect civilians. By interacting with local communities the local population is able to express their views and give the UN forces a more detailed view of what is happening and how to best prevent physical violence towards civilians (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 32). The Special Committee also wants peacekeeping forces to work together with national authorities to establish "strategic communications" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 32). These communications, according to the Special Committee, will then be used for reaching out to local communities to manage the expectations from the local population on peacekeeping missions (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 32).

The Special Committee also " requests a briefing, before its next substantive session, on the pilot projects of leveraging unarmed practices and capabilities of local

communities to support the creation of a protective environment." (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2020, p. 32).

6.3.2 The 2021 Security Council Mandate for MINUSMA

The first task that the Security Council mandates in 2021 for the peacekeeping mission in Mali is to ensure civilian protection without prejudice towards the host States main responsibility of protecting civilians. UN peacekeeping forces are mandated to support national authorities in the mission of anticipating, deterring and responding to threats that are aimed towards civilians. This is to be made through a comprehensive and integrated approach (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11).

The Security Council tasks MINUSMA with improving their early warning systems plus enhancing their interaction with local communities. The Security Council mandates that MINUSMA should be engaged more with the local population and to strengthen their mediation efforts at this level (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11).

The Security Council further mandates MINUSMA "to take mobile, flexible, robust and proactive steps to protect civilians, including through the set-up of a Mobile Task Force" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11). This task force is to deploy both ground and air assets to areas where civilians are most at risk (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11). The peacekeeping mission is also given the duty of "tracking, preventing, minimising, and addressing civilian harm resulting from the mission's operations" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11). After any military operation is carried out these four steps are to be followed (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11).

The Security Council gives the mission in Mali the mandate to pursue credible threats of armed elements returning to "key population centres" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11).

Lastly the Security Council tasks MINUSMA with specific protection of women and children through deployment of women and children protection advisers and consultation with

women's organisations. This is to "address the needs of victims and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;" (UN Security Council, MINUSMA, 2021, p. 11).

6.3.3 The 2021 Security Council Mandate for MONUSCO

The first task that the Security Council mandates for MONUSCO in 2021 is protection of civilians under threat of physical violence. Focus of the protection forces are to be in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu but good offices are mandated to be established elsewhere so that protection of civilians can be ensured in other regions if civilians would come under threat there. This protection is to be achieved through comprehensive operations and consultation with local communities. MONUSCO is mandated with stopping and disarming all armed groups from inflicting violence on civilians. Attention will also be specifically paid to protect people within refugee camps. During and after any military operation, threats towards civilians shall be tracked, prevented, minimised and addressed to decrease harm done towards civilians (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 10).

MONUSCO is mandated with the task to "Maintain a proactive deployment and a mobile, flexible and robust posture, including by conducting active patrolling by foot and by vehicle, in particular in high risk areas;" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 10).

To decrease sexual and gender-based abuses of civilians the Security Council mandates that the mission in DR Congo is to cooperate with national authorities in the duty to "identify threats to civilians and implement joint prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 10).

MONUSCO is tasked with strengthening its engagement with local communities to inform the local population on the purpose of the mission. This will also help with improving early warning systems and documenting abuses of human rights. MONUSCO is further tasked with working together with national authorities creating a strategy "containing concrete measures to build trust and understanding among the population regarding MONUSCO's efforts in the DRC and to prevent disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining the mission's credibility and hindering its performance, and by ensuring mobility of the mission" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 10).

The Security Council mandates that a special "Intervention Brigade" is to continue its efforts to protect civilians through "carrying out targeted offensive operations in the DRC to neutralise armed groups, to ensure effective, timely, dynamic and integrated protection of civilians" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 10). This force is to undergo training before being deployed to ensure civilians are protected in the best way possible. The task is given to the Intervention Brigade to "prioritise the implementation of its protection of civilians mandate, including through a mobile, flexible and robust posture;" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 11).

The Security council tasks MONUSCO with leveraging the expertise of different UN components such as UN Police, UNCT Justice and UN Prosecution Support Cell to "strengthen and support the DRC judicial system in order to investigate and prosecute all those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 11).

The mission in DR Congo is also mandated with supporting the national authorities with promoting human rights, specifically civil and political rights (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 11).

The last mandated task that the Security Council hands MONUSCO is to "Strengthen the Mission's early warning and response mechanisms, including by systematically recording and analysing its rate of response and ensure that risks of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations are included in the Mission's data collection, threat analysis and early warning system;" (UN Security Council, MONUSCO, 2021, p. 11).

7. Analysis and Discussion

In this chapter the three research questions of this thesis will be answered. In the first part of the analysis the theoretical claim on coherence will be applied to see how coherent the Special Committee and Security Council are. First the 2012 recommendations will be compared to the 2013 mandates to see how coherent the two organs were in that time.

Secondly the 2016 recommendations will be compared to the 2017 mandates to see if the coherence changed within that four year gap. Finally the 2020 recommendations will be compared to the 2021 mandates to analyse the current coherence between the Special Committee and the Security Council.

Secondly the three recommendations of the Special Committee will be compared to each other to see how adaptive the Special Committee is. Then the MINUSMA mandates will be compared to each other and finally the comparison of the MONUSCO mandates will be conducted to answer the first research question: How adaptive is the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in its recommendations on protection of civilians and how adaptive is the Security Council on its plans of protection of civilians in the DR Congo and Mali?

The last part of the analysis before the discussion is seeing if there is a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness. The third theoretical claim will be applied to see whether coherence limits or enables adaptiveness or if incoherence limits or enables adaptiveness depending on the analysis before this part.

7.1 Analysis of Coherence

7.1.1 Analysis of Coherence between the Special Committee and Security Council in 2012/13

In 2012 and 2013 the Special Committees recommendations and the Security Councils mandates were not coherent at all. The Special Committee for example recommends training, reporting and local interaction. The mandates for both MINUSMA and MONUSCO did not mandate any of these tasks in 2013. Both of them instead mandates strategies to prevent sexual abuses, which the Special Committee does not mention in its recommendations. They are however coherent in that the host State shall be supported in the duty of protecting civilians but this is a quite obvious task to be included in any of these documents. The mandate for MONUSCO also mandates that peacekeeping forces are to protect civilians from any armed group, making it sound like the Security Council is recognising that soldiers from

the national military might also commit abuses. This is something that the Special Committee does not mention in the same way.

7.1.2 Analysis of Coherence between the Special Committee and Security Council in 2016/17

There is more coherence between the organs in one aspect in their documents this time period than in the previous one but the main focuses of the Special Committee and Security Council are still different. The Special Committee and the mandate for MONUSCO mentions interaction with local communities. MONUSCO is now mandated with enhancing interaction with civilians to create deeper understanding for what the local population needs and for the local population to understand the possibilities and limitations of MONUSCO.

Except for the case previously mentioned, the two organs become even less coherent in this time period compared to 2012/13. Both of the peacekeeping missions still focus heavily on decreasing sexual abuses while the Special Committee makes no mentioning of this. Another aspect of these documents that proves incoherence is that the Special Committee wants to see unarmed strategies being implemented while MONUSCO is mandated with creating a task force meant to eliminate any armed group threatening civilians. I interpret this as two different ideas on how to best protect civilians. The Special Committee wants to take the route of unarmed strategies, focusing on mediation and so on, meanwhile the Security Council sees a task force with the mandate to carry out targeted military offensives as the most efficient plan to protect civilians.

7.1.3 Analysis of Coherence between the Special Committee and Security Council in 2020/2021

In the third and final time period the two organs now become slightly more coherent compared to the previous analysis of coherence. In 2020 the Special Committee is recommending various methods of decreasing sexual abuses and the peacekeeping missions are also keeping their mandates for combating sexual abuses. In 2020/21 all three documents include plans on how to decrease sexual abuses which makes them more coherent. All three

documents also now include plans to improve interaction with local communities. The Security Council has given MINUSMA the mandate to interact more with civilians so that both parties will gain deeper understanding for each other. The two organs are also coherent in recommending or mandating support for the national authorities in the task of protecting civilians.

However the Special Committee and the Security Council grow more incoherent in the aspect of use of force. The Special Committee continues to recommend its project of unarmed strategies while MONUSCO keeps mandating the Forward Intervention Brigade (FIB) to eliminate any threat to civilians and taking proactive steps. Further the Security Council also tasks MINUSMA in 2021 with creating a Mobile Task Force that are to receive ground and air assets and are to take mobile, flexible, robust and proactive steps to protect civilians. This again signifies the two organs taking different approaches to protecting civilians which shows incoherence.

To answer the research question: How coherent are the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recommendations and the Security Council's mandates of how to protect civilians in Mali and DR Congo? The two organs are becoming slightly more coherent over time but I would still argue that they are not coherent in their plans of how to protect civilians. Policy differences lead them on to too different paths for me to be able to call them coherent. I am mainly thinking of the Special Committee recommending unarmed strategies while the peacekeeping missions are focusing on mandating proactive task forces. Also the two organs were incoherent in the case of decreasing sexual abuses for a long time. For the first time periods this was something that the Security Council focused heavily on while the Special Committee did not recommend this in any of the first two publications.

7.2 Analysis of Adaptiveness

7.2.1 Adaptiveness of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

My analysis of how adaptive the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations are in its recommendations on how to protect civilians is that they are limited and have low adaptiveness both in variation and selection. When comparing the 2012 recommendations to the 2016 recommendations it is visible that the Special Committee only recommends one completely new strategy to protect civilians in the 2016 recommendations beyond recommending the strategies that already exist in the 2012 recommendations, which equals low variation. That recommendation is implementation of unarmed strategies. This is a whole new idea on how to improve the protection of civilians that is not at all mentioned in the recommendations from 2012.

There are also two signs of smaller adaptation and that is that assessments of resources available are recommended together with developing or updating comprehensive protection plans. The reason why I interpret these as smaller signs is because they are recommended improvements of already existing plans. The assessment of available resources is connected to the overall plan of delivering the necessary resources in an effective manner. Developing or updating comprehensive protection plans is linked to implementing comprehensive protection plans in the first place.

Except for these changes the 2016 recommendations are very similar to the 2012 recommendations. The first recommendation is identical in the two documents, supporting the host State with protection of civilians without prejudice while acknowledging that the national authorities have the main responsibility to protect civilians. A coordinated response is recommended in both texts. The Special Committee wants the Security Council, Secretariat and troop-contributing countries to create clear and achievable mandates in both 2012 and 2016. The stressing of the importance of reporting is mentioned in the same way as is interaction with the local population. How training of troops is meant to be conducted and what it is supposed to lead to, "enhanced operational capacity", is recommended the same way in both texts. This shows low selection, no strategies are discontinued which leads to low adaptiveness.

The Special Committee is a little bit more adaptive in its 2020 recommendations in comparison to the 2016 recommendations. However there are still a lot of similarities with the plans from 2016. The host State shall still have the main responsibility to protect civilians and peacekeeping missions are to support them. It is recommended to use a whole-of-mission

response and to coordinate all mission components. Clear and achievable mandates are again recommended and interaction with the local population is described in the same way as previous recommendations. The Special Committee also continues to recommend unarmed strategies.

However there are signs of adaptiveness seen in the case of how to decrease sexual and gender-based abuses. The Special Committee recommends closer cooperation with national authorities to bring abusers to justice. Scenario-based training is also recommended to improve protection of women and children. Enhancing data collection and use to improve gender-sensitive threat analyses is also a new recommendation as is listing of sexual abusers. Altough multiple new recommendations are seen in 2020, they all touch on the same subject, how to improve protection from sexual or gender-based abuses. There is no real adaptiveness in any other subject of how to protect civilians. Overall the variation and selection is low, multiple strategies are recommended but no changes are recommended to these strategies and a selection of which strategies that are to be continued and discontinued cant be seen because no strategy is ever removed. Therefore the Special Committee is not adaptive in its recommendations on how to protect civilians.

7.2.2 Adaptiveness of the Security Council in Mandates for MINUSMA

The Security Council is able to be adaptive in terms of variation in its 2017 mandate for MINUSMA when compared to the first mandate for the mission. The two mandated tasks of supporting the national authorities with protection of civilians without prejudices and addressing the needs of sexually abused victims through expert protection advisers are kept from the first mandate. The Security Council mandates several new tasks for the mission in 2017 such as active patrolling, stabilising key population centres, not letting armed elements return to these areas and anticipating, deterring and countering threats towards civilians. It is also mentioned that consultations with womens organisations are going to be conducted to better adress needs of sexually or gender-based abused victims.

In its 2021 mandate for the mission in Mali the Security Council keeps the tasks of supporting the national authorities with protecting civilians without prejudice. Addressing the needs of victims of sexual or gender-based abuses are also mandated in the same way. The

mission is also mandated to stabilise key population centres in this mandate but to do so in a comprehensive and integrated approach is a new mandated task. To interact with the local population to improve mediation efforts is also a new task compared to the 2017 mandate. A big change is that the Security Council mandates MINUSMA to protect civilians with proactive steps and the creation of a Mobile Task Force that receives ground and air assets. Interaction with the local population and the creation of a Mobile Task Force are two completely new tasks compared to the 2017 mandate which shows adaptiveness from the Security Council. So to answer the research question, the Security Council achieves high adaptiveness on its plans of protection of civilians in Mali. High variation is once again attained in the 2021 mandate but selection is low since every strategy is chosen to be kept, there is no mention of removing any strategy.

7.2.3 Adaptiveness of the Security Council in Mandates for MONUSCO

The Security Council is also able to achieve high adaptiveness in the case of mandates for MONUSCO in terms of variation but also a little bit in selection. The number of tasks in the 2017 mandate is significantly higher compared to the 2013 mandate. The Security Council keeps the three tasks from the 2013 mandate in the 2017 mandate of protecting civilians from any armed group, cooperating with national authorities to identify threats towards civilians and monitoring and analysing sexual abuses. The Security Council also mandates five completely new tasks in 2017, which shows high variation, consisting of interacting with local communities, the creation of the Forward Intervention Brigade (FIB), supporting the host State with ensuring operations are supported by civilians and police by providing good offices, supporting local authorities with enhancing the judicial system and supporting the government with promotion of human rights.

The Security Council adapts its plan to protect civilians in DR Congo once again in 2021. The Security Council removed the task of supporting the host State by providing good offices to ensure actions are supported by civilian and police components. This shows that there is a selection process for MONUSCO. Except for that one every task that was in the 2017 mandate exists in the 2021 mandate. However there are multiple additions of new tasks in the 2021 mandate, which again shows high variation. Focus of the peacekeeping forces is now

going to be on protecting civilians in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu. The mandate to track, prevent, minimise and address civilian threats after any operation is also a new addition.

To improve local interaction MONUSCO is mandated to cooperate with national authorities to build trust for the mission among the local population and to prevent any disinformation to be spread about MONUSCO. The Security Council has also become more specific in its mandate, mentioning certain UN components that shall leverage their expertise to support the judicial system in DR Congo. The Security Council describes a more detailed plan of how to monitor and analyse how MONUSCO is responding to sexual abuses.

To answer the research question on how adaptive the Security Council is in its plan to protect civilians in Mali and DR Congo my answer is that they are adaptive. They multiple times attain variation within their mandates for the two missions. The Security Council continuously implements new strategies to develop protection of civilians. Selection could be higher but there are signs of selection as well and selection can not only be counted in what is discontinued. The fact that the Security Council however did remove a strategy from MONUSCO shows high adaptiveness.

7.3 Analysis of Correlation between Coherence and Adaptiveness

The result of the first analysis is that the Special Committee and Security Council are not coherent. The differences in priorities in the recommendations and mandates are significant enough for the result to be incoherence between the Special Committee and the Security Council. The strategy when it comes to the use of force is completely different and shows a disconnect in ideas on how to protect civilians between the two organs. This is not a definitive answer saying that the Special Committee and Security Council are completely disconnected but in this case there is significant incoherence between the two.

The second analysis brought the conclusion of the Special Committee not being adaptive while the Security Council is adaptive. The Special Committee shows low selection as it does not remove any task over time. Variation is also low, few new tasks are recommended over time. The Security Council however shows signs of selection and attains high variation

because of the multiple tasks implemented from mandate to mandate. This is one method to measure adaptiveness but this is also not a definitive answer saying the Special Committee is never adaptive in any case and the Security Council is always adaptive. With this case and method, the answer is that the Special Committee attains low adaptiveness and the Security Council attains high adaptiveness.

Torrent argues that coherence leads to limited adaptiveness, getting everyone on the same page in peacekeeping plans removes the room for fast changes. A correlation can be argued for, following Torrent's claim, in this case that low coherence leads to high adaptiveness. By not following the recommendations from the Special Committee the Security Council is able to more freely decide on what tasks are to be mandated. The UN's failure with facilitating internal coherence lets the Security Council to be adaptive in its plans of civilian protection. Torrent's claim is that the Security Council not being coherent with the Special Committee should free up the Security Council to be adaptive and in this case they are adaptive. Incoherence, according to Torrent, removes the need to follow universal norms and the linearity of a coherent peacekeeping plan. With its adaptiveness, the Security Council does not seem to have the idea that the conflict will solve itself with just a coordinated plan.

I draw conclusions on how the Special Committee and the Security Council affect each other's adaptiveness by, in this case, being incoherent. I study coherence between these organs but adaptiveness is analysed separately for each organ. This can be seen as a problem but in order to answer how coherence affects adaptability I need to answer the question of how adaptive one organ is. This answer is connected to the coherence between the two organs which then answers the question of correlation, following Torrent's theory. In this case incoherence between the recommendations and mandates was established. Adaptiveness was attained by the Security Council but not by the Special Committee which gives a weaker result. The Security Council, in this case, chooses not to be coherent and follow the recommendations of the Special Committee and the Council attains high adaptiveness. I am not saying it is a direct causality but it correlates with Torrent's claim that incoherence enables adaptability.

To conclude, the findings in this thesis supports Torrent's claim because the finding is low coherence between the two organs and the organ implementing the mandates attain high adaptiveness. The Special Committee seems to fit in more on Torrent's claim that a

coordinated response is wanted from the UN. The Special Committee mentions in 2012 that they wish for a "coordinated response from all relevant mission components" (UN. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, p. 39). Still internal coherence is not facilitated. Their rigidness also correlates with Torrent's claim that wishing for a coordinated response limits adaptiveness. The Security Council on the other hand goes against this claim by Torrent and does not wish for a coordinated response despite being a UN organ. Their adaptiveness and non-promotion of coordination correlates with Torrent's claim that incoherence enables adaptiveness. This is not a direct causality but it is support for Torrent's claim that incoherence allows adaptiveness. To answer the research question there is a correlation between coherence and adaptiveness. In this case low coherence correlates with high adaptiveness.

7.4 Discussion

In Torrent's claim incoherence should also result in the Special Committee being able to attain variation and selection. In my findings they are not adaptive and the explanation for this might be what White mentions in his theoretical claim on coordination issues. The General Assembly and the Special Committee are more of "the town meeting place of the world" (White, 2015, p. 8). Many voices are to be heard and coordination between all of these different views can be a difficult task. Adopting fast changes in the recommendations might be rare thanks to different views hindering such development. In the Security Council it is however a smaller number of states that participate from time to time. In matters where the permanent members do not have any specific interest, adaptiveness can be on the table, fewer voices have to be accounted for.

The Security Council seems to be the driving force in creating change for civilian protection plans. The Council attains high variation and implements multiple new strategies every four year gap for how to protect civilians. The Security Council was first with implementing strategies for addressing sexual abuse in conflicts. In recent years the Special Committee started following the Security Councils lead on implementing this strategy when protecting civilians. However, the Special Committee was first to recommend interaction with local communities to improve protection of civilians. It took some time for the Security Council to

follow this recommendation but they later did. The results in this thesis point towards the Security Council driving changes forward within strategies for protection of civilians but the Special Committee has also been first with recommending certain strategies.

The Security Council is adaptive in my findings but does this necessarily lead to more effective protection of civilians? One collision between adaptiveness and previous research is the aspect of creating mobile task forces with the aim to eliminate armed groups. Creating these forces is adaptive in the sense of variation, implementing a new strategy, but according to Moe they can risk the UN's impartiality which is important for the UN to keep the role as a mediator (Moe, 2018, p. 15-16). Berdal argues that militarised interventions also puts civilians in risk for attacks just before these forces arrive to protect them. The Intervention Brigade is also often unable to cover the vast landscape of DR Congo and falls short in protecting civilians under threat (Berdal, 2018, p. 739-740).

8. Conclusion

This thesis has examined the coherence between the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Security Council in the case of MINUSMA and MONUSCO and the adaptiveness of each organ. Torrent's claim on coherence limiting adaptiveness and incoherence enabling adaptiveness have been tested and the conclusion is that the case in this thesis supports the claim that there is a correlation between incoherence and adaptiveness. The answers to the research questions is that there is low coherence between the organs, the Special Committee has low adaptiveness, the Security Council has high adaptiveness and therefore there is a correlation between incoherence and adaptiveness to follow Torrent's theoretical claim. There is low coherence and in this case the low coherence seems to help the Security Council to be adaptive.

The findings in this thesis support the claim that whenever incoherence exists between UN organs, one of the organs is enabled to be adaptive and make fast changes. This claim has big implications for the UN as it risks their own wish of coordinated responses in peacekeeping plans. It indirectly also supports the claim of coherence limiting adaptiveness. If the Security Council would have been coherent with the Special Committee their adaptiveness would have

been sacrificed. This claim also puts the UN in a tricky situation, whenever coherence is achieved the UN loses the possibility to be adaptive which, according to Torrent and De Coning is a more fitting strategy to the nonlinearity and complexity of conflicts.

Similar research has to be conducted before any bigger conclusions can be drawn about the coherence, adaptiveness or the correlation between these two concepts. Similar research includes studying these organs but a different aspect of peacekeeping operations other than protection of civilians. It could also be analysing other peacekeeping missions or other UN organs, like the reports from the Secretary General or documents from the Secretariat to see if internal coherence is better facilitated between them and the Security Council.

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