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FROM SWEDEN, 12 POINTS AND 55.27 % TURNOUT TO THE EU

Attitudes towards the European Union and the electoral turnout in the Swedish elections for the European parliament 2019.

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Abstract

This thesis investigates if attitudes and extreme attitudes towards the European Union and on the left–right ideology scale affect the electoral turnout in the European parliament elections among Swedish citizens. Previous research lifts the importance of citizens' perceptions and attitudes towards the EU as one explanation of many for the low turnout in these elections. All of these studies use data on the macro level comparing member states, and therefore further research is needed on the micro-level between citizens'. Braun and Schäfer (2022) and Hernández and Kriesi (2016) find that citizens with more extreme opinions on the issue of European integration increased the likelihood of voting compared to a citizen with a more moderate view, suggesting that the correlation might be linear-curved. Research also finds a moderating effect between left-right ideology and attitudes towards the EU (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). Sweden was chosen because it has an electoral system that includes reforms enhancing a high turnout and its trend breaking and increasing turnout. Therefore, this thesis believes that a linear curve pattern appears more clearly in the Swedish electorate.

The thesis investigates this by a quantitative method using logistic regression analysis with data from the Swedish national election studies (Oscarsson & Karlsson, 2019) and their dataset for the Swedish election for the European parliament in 2019. The results show that the citizens' attitudes towards the EU and ideology considerably affect the electoral turnout and that there is a moderating effect. However, it does not show linear curve correlations.

Keywords: *Electoral turnout, European parliament elections, voting behaviour, attitudes among citizens', European Union.*

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Abbreviations.

EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
SNES	Swedish national election studies

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Introduction

In the last election of 2019 for the European parliament, the overall level of participation among the Swedish citizens was at the highest level ever, at 55.27% (Valmyndigheten, 2020). Previous research on turnout in elections for the European Union points out several factors affecting participation levels. Among these, we find, for example, attitudes towards the EU (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Schäfer, 2021; Stockemer, 2012), extreme attitudes towards the EU (Braun & Schäfer, 2022; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016), political knowledge (Bhatti, 2010) and political interest (Nonnemacher 2021).

In the previous research, several studies point to the importance of the citizen's perceptions and attitudes towards the EU as a primary explanation for electoral turnout (Braun & Schäfer, 2022; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Schäfer, 2021; Stockemer, 2012). In the research field, I would argue there is a disagreement in perspectives on how attitudes towards the EU affect electoral turnout and how this correlation is formed. Some studies argue that a more positive attitude towards the EU affects the correlation positively, meaning positive attitudes lead to turnout while negative or Eurosceptic attitudes lead to abstaining from turnout (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Schäfer, 2021; Stockemer, 2012). On the other hand, some of the studies argue for further development of this theory and that a linear curve correlation between attitudes towards the EU and the electoral turnout is present, meaning that citizens with more positive or negative views and attitudes are more likely to vote than those with moderate views in between (Braun & Schäfer, 2022; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016).

All these mentioned previous studies use data on a multi-national or macro level to capture differences between member states rather than differences between individual citizens at the micro-level to compare citizens' attitudes in one electorate. This lack of capturing differences between individuals is possibly a potential problem for the research field because we cannot know how differences between individuals' attitudes affect electoral turnout at the national level. This finding lays the ground for a potential research gap with the possibility of considering the correlation between citizens' attitudes towards the EU and the electoral turnout in European parliament elections both as linear and curve linear. Either to see the correlation as the more positive attitude increases the turnout, or the more extreme attitude increases the turnout compared to the citizens with more moderate views of the EU decreasing the turnout.

Remer-Bollow et al. (2019) see that the electoral turnout in EP elections is related to left-right ideology and finds a moderating effect on attitudes towards the EU. So does also the study by Hernández and Kriesi (2016). Therefore, this thesis will also investigate if attitudes and extreme attitudes on the left right scale affect the electoral turnout and if there is a moderating effect between attitudes towards the EU and ideology.

The thesis test this in the Swedish electoral system, which includes most central factors required to promote high electoral participation, such as the proportional election system, the one-chamber system, and generous early voting, according to Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016). However, there are significant differences in turnout when comparing the turnouts in the most recent Swedish elections for the European Parliament and the election for the Swedish national parliament. The difference in turnout of the Swedish national election in 2018 and EP elections in 2019 was 32 percentage points, which is the most considerable difference in turnout rates except for the Netherlands and Slovakia (European Parliament, 2019).

It is also important to acknowledge that Sweden did break a negative trend in the EP elections in 2004 and has, in the elections after that, increased the electoral turnout for the EP elections. (Centre for European Research CERGU, 2019). Sweden did increase the turnout in the last 2019 EP elections (Centre for European Research CERGU, 2019). A conclusion of the increased voter turnout in Sweden is that the interest in the Swedish electorate for the EU and the European parliament elections is increasing. The Swedish citizens' attitudes also increased in support of the EU at the time of the article by Berg et al. (2019). The attitudes of the Swedish electorate and the electoral turnout are thereby an exciting research object for understanding the increasing voting turnout of the country. As for the case, Sweden is chosen due to its trend breaking and increasing turnout and that the electoral system includes most of the institutional reforms enhancing a high turnout. Therefore, the linear curve pattern could appear more clearly in the Swedish electorate. To summarise, concerning if attitudes towards the EU affect electoral turnout in the elections for the voting turnout, the case of Sweden is an excellent case to investigate if there is such a correlation

Throughout this thesis, it is also important to remember that there is no statistical evidence of a causal correlation if this thesis finds a correlation per se. Although this thesis argues that attitudes affect electoral turnout, even if it is possible that the correlation could be the other way around and that the turnout could possibly affect the attitudes.

Therefore, this thesis will aim to investigate if and how the attitudes towards the EU and attitudes on the left–right ideology scale among Swedish citizens affect the electoral turnout in the elections for the European parliament. The thesis will also investigate if there is a moderating effect between attitudes towards the European Union and attitudes on the left–right ideology scale.

Disposition

The thesis starts with an introduction. Previous research will then follow with a comprehensive review of previous literature on what factors affect the election turnout in the elections for the European parliament. The section for method and material follows by operationalisation, the results, and a conclusion. Every new section will include a description of the content for each section.

Previous research and theory

This section will first present previous literature discussing electoral turnout in general. After that comes this thesis's individual and contextual explanations for voter turnout motivating control variables, followed by a section looking at the attitudes among Swedish citizens towards the EU. The thesis will then explore the research field of attitudes towards the EU and the attitudes' effect on electoral turnout. Lastly, we will look at the effect of ideology on voter turnout in the EP elections and the moderating effect between attitudes towards the EU and ideology for electoral turnout.

In the research field of electoral turnout, many studies focus on institutional explanations of differences between member states rather than individual citizens. This thesis will not investigate these explanations further but shortly acknowledge them below. Among these, the Second-order election theory by Reif and Schmitt (1980) is central. The theory means voting behaviour differs between first-order elections as national elections and second-order elections as the EP elections. The theory means that society does not see second-order elections as essential nor as exciting and thereby unimportant for citizens' to vote in (Franklin, 2001; Gattermann et al., 2021; Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010; Nonnemacher, 2021; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Wessels & Franklin, 2009). Some expectations from the second-order election theory have proven accurate, but the theory itself is not commonly confirmed. The research field of electoral turnout has although developed, and

several recent articles criticise the view of the EP elections as second-order elections (Ehin & Talving, 2021; Gattermann et al., 2021; Marquart et al., 2020)

The alternatives for the theory include the "Europe matters" perspective (Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011), the Europe Salience theory (Viola, 2015), and the sui generis hypothesis (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009). Their critique is mainly about how the second-order election theory mainly is about aggregated patterns that can appear for more reasons than what the theory captures and misses out on more explicit mechanisms on the individual level (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009). Alternative explanations also share the belief that some voters care about the elections for EP and consider EU issues when voting (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; Hobolt, 2015; Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010).

Electoral turnout

This section will briefly overview the research on electoral turnout in general.

According to Verba et al. (1995), the act of voting is the far most common form of political participation that citizens can engage in, among other political activities. Thereby the electoral turnout is an essential measure for evaluating the functioning of electoral democracy. If the citizens do not turn out to vote, it can be a sign that some of these voters do not see the election as important or exciting. It can also be a sign of low trust for the politicians in the democracy (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016).

Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) call electoral turnout a profound consideration in which the voter decides if he or she will participate or not in an election. From a rational theoretical perspective, one can argue that the act of voting is time-demanding, and an individual vote is not likely to be determinable for the election result. So why should citizens go out and vote during an election? The importance of voting goes behind what is most rational. It is a right and freedom for citizens in a democracy (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). The aggregated electoral turnout is seen as a grade for a democratic election and how well the democratic system delivers. According to Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016), a high turnout indicates an engaging and meaningful election campaign that discusses meaningful issues and where ideological differences between the alternatives have been apparent to the voters and in which they are pleased with the functioning of democracy. A low turnout can point towards the opposite.

Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) derive a categorisation in a political system between contextual differences, individual differences, and institutional differences. Among the institutional

differences is the demand to register to vote, majority election systems, a high percentage bar for gaining seats in the parliament, two-chamber systems, elections in the winter, separate election days and elections on working days, which leads to decreasing electoral turnout. In the same way, proportional election systems, one chamber systems, joint election days, and generous early voting increase the possibility for citizens to vote. The institutional explanation for turnout is powerful and widespread in the research field and creates differences mainly across political systems. The power explains that the different formal features of political systems create obstacles or opportunities for the citizen's ability to vote. The most effective way to increase the turnout is to perform institutional reforms to increase citizens' instrumental motivation to vote (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). However, this thesis will not look further at these contextual differences for electoral turnout as they explain differences on the macro level.

Attitudes among Swedish citizens towards the EU.

This section will mainly present research considering the current attitudes among Swedish citizens towards the EU and not on the possible correlation these attitudes have for the electoral turnout in the elections for the European parliament.

Previously this thesis wrote about research from Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) that lifted institutional differences of reforms that enhanced turnout. Many of these mentioned reforms for increasing electoral turnout are already in the current electoral system of Sweden, and thereby, one could see the system as custom made to enhance a high electoral turnout (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). Therefore, I would argue that other factors in Sweden likely play a more significant part in the electoral turnout in the EP elections, such as the citizens' attitudes towards the EU or attitudes on the ideology scale.

Among the Swedish citizens, the support for the EU is at an all-time high (Berg et al., 2019). There are more Swedish citizens in favour of the membership than those who support leaving the union. More Swedish citizens than ever are pleased with the democracy in the union. At the same time, the support for the EU institutions is still noticeably lower than for the national institutions. This also counts for the support for further integration of the union. The results of Berg et al. (2019) also point out that the difference between women and men, where men were more in favour of the EU twenty years ago, does not appear in 2018. This lack of gender gap in the results is contrary to the results of Dassonneville and Kostelka (2020). It might indicate that the gender gap does not appear in the Swedish elections for the EP. The results also indicate an age difference. In 2018, the result showed that the youngest age group is more positive towards

the Swedish membership in the EU than the other groups. The citizens with higher education and income are also more favourable than those with a lesser education and income. Citizens' positive or negative attitudes also depend on whether they live in a rural area versus a city (Berg et al., 2019).

Berg et al. (2019) conclude by talking about the effect of the Brexit referendum in 2016. The opinion for the EU has increased in favour of the memberships across Europe, including Sweden. The patterns that appear in the results with people living in the bigger cities with a higher level of education, a higher income and a high-status job are more positive towards the EU. The authors argue it is because their self-interests align with being in favour of the union. After all, that is assumingly because the EU favour the group's interests. However, the results indicate that the Swedish citizens do not welcome the Euro as a new currency or like the idea of the united European states. Therefore, one can describe that Swedish citizen wants the status quo or an EU that is just much enough. A finding by Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) supports this conclusion in which they say that political and instrumental Euroscepticism is particularly strong in Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Another theoretical perspective in the research field of voting behaviour lift that some elections are perceived as more exciting and essential than others by the voters. Therefore, the voters prioritise different issues and participate and vote differently in different elections (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016). In the Swedish elections for the European parliament, the participation is lower than in the elections for the national parliament (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016), which from this theoretical perspective, is a sign that the EP elections are not as important or exciting as the national elections.

Individual and contextual explanations for voter turnout

This section will provide an overview of the research on individual and contextual explanations for electoral turnout in general and different explanations affecting turnout. Some of these explanations this thesis includes as control variables.

Hobolt and Wittrock (2011) mean that the amount of consideration about EU affairs when voting in the EP election depends on individual-level factors and factors concerning the election campaigns. Hobolt and Wittrock (2011) see that the more citizens become more informed about EU and the EP elections, the voters would base their vote in a higher degree on EU issues and not on national issues. Wessels and Franklin (2009) mentioned that an essential purpose of political campaigns is to provide the citizens with information and political knowledge. News consumption also plays an essential role for voters to receive this information and knowledge.

The study of Bhatti (2010) tackles the subject of political knowledge and investigates the consequences of increased political knowledge on the elections for the European parliament. Bhatti (2010) tested this in a Nordic context with Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. The results indicate that only a moderate increase in political knowledge would result in more than a three-percentage point higher turnout. The conclusion of Bhatti (2010) is similar to the significance that Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) give to political knowledge and its influence on electoral turnout.

Viola (2015) develops this argumentation and explains how political knowledge affects electoral turnout. Viola means that some voters have insufficient knowledge about the EU, the structure of the EU, and the issues that the EU has power over or feel that the EU is too distant from the average citizen, thereby making a choice harder, which can make voters abstain. Therefore, trust in the EU and the European parliament is one factor that can affect the electoral turnout.

In the categorisation of Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016), they mention high ideological polarisation, apparent differences between alternatives, and engaging campaigns among the contextual factors. In the research field of electoral turnout, several studies lift that the election campaign efforts deliver citizens with essential information, motivate them to seek additional information about the election and mobilise citizens to go out and vote in the election and thereby enhancing the electoral turnout (Wessels and Franklin (2009); Marquart et al. (2020); Schmitt et al. (2015)).

Among the individual factors, we see explanations relating to resources (such as social class, gender, income, education level and profession), strong social integration (as age, marital status, social network, geographic heritage or place of residency, and citizenship), political knowledge and motivational factors (party identification, political interest, political news consumption, ideological extremism, and a feeling of duty to vote) (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). Previous studies also show that age affects electoral turnout with lower voting levels among young and older adults, indicating a linear curve correlation (Bhatti et al., 2012). Dassonneville and Kostelka (2020) mean that recent articles in the research field argue that the gender gap in voter turnout has decreased or reversed in many democracies. However, the decrease may only apply in some cases. Dassonneville and Kostelka (2020) describe that previous research shows that women seem to participate less in supranational elections such as the elections for the European parliament. Dassonneville and Kostelka (2020) study give three insights into the results. First, it

shows the presence and the stability of the traditional gender gap in elections for the European parliament. Secondly, it finds that gender differences in political interest are the main reason for the gender gap. Thirdly, these gender differences in political interest are context-dependent and strongly correlate with cultural gender differences. Dassonneville and Kostelka (2020) insights lift political interest as a factor for the gender gap in the turnout for the elections to the European parliament.

Attitudes towards the EU's effect on electoral turnout

This section provides an overview of research on citizens' perceptions of and attitudes towards the European Union and its effect on electoral turnout in the European Parliament elections.

In this research area, I would argue there is a disagreement in perspectives of how attitudes towards the EU affect electoral turnout and how this correlation is formed. Some studies argue that a more positive attitude towards the EU affects the correlation positively, meaning positive attitudes lead to turnout while negative or Eurosceptic attitudes lead to abstaining from turnout (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Schäfer, 2021; Stockemer, 2012). On the other hand, some of the studies argue for further development of this theory and that a linear curve correlation between attitudes towards the EU and the electoral turnout is present. Citizens with more positive or negative views and attitudes are more likely to vote than those with moderate attitudes in between (Braun & Schäfer, 2022; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). I will start with those studies arguing that a more positive attitude leads to a higher turnout, followed by studies arguing for a linear curve pattern and then a discussion about all these articles' choice of data.

Lubbers and Scheepers (2005), Schäfer (2021), and Stockemer (2012) point toward the importance of attitudes for electoral turnout in general and that positive attitudes generate a higher electoral turnout and that a negative or Eurosceptic attitude generates a lower turnout. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) write that there has been a discussion about the principle of subsidiarity since the ideas of further European unification. The question is what a national legislative or government manages best versus what the EU manage best, which Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) see as a cause for Euroscepticism or what Schäfer (2021) called a distrust towards the EU and its democratic procedures.

Ehin and Talving (2021) write that with decades of increased and widening integration of the EU and in the context of increasing transnational challenges, the current EU, with solid supranational institutions and an increasing body of EU law, EU exercises real power over the European

citizens. The European Parliament has undergone a tremendous change from a representative body with little real power to becoming a powerful co-legislator with budgetary and scrutiny powers since the Lisbon treaty in 2009, increasing its influence in the legislative process. People are thereby more affected by the EU in their life (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009). Several studies share the belief that at least some voters care about the European parliament's elections (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; Hobolt, 2015; Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010). These articles argue for the European parliament's increasing influence. One interpretation is that when the parliament's influence increases, the value of the citizens' perceptions and attitudes increases with the parliament's increasing influence, which could explain an increasing electoral turnout. However, the decision for an individual citizen to vote is, according to Clark (2014), not because of a lack of interest in EU affairs. However, it is dependent on the citizens' feeling of uncertainty if whether the European parliament has absolute power over the decision-making in the EU and if the parliament represents the citizens' opinions, views, and values. According to Clark (2014), a common perception is that many citizens in the EU see the European parliament as distant from their everyday life and believe that the parliament cannot influence the EU politics, which creates a feeling of meaninglessness in voting in the EP elections. An interpretation of the results by Clark could be that the feeling that it is meaningless to vote in EP elections is decisive for the group with negative attitudes towards the union

Stockemer (2012) means that the findings on the effect of citizens' attitudes towards the EU on electoral turnout have empirical and theoretical consequences. Empirically a low turnout in the elections for the European parliament is directly related to citizens' rejection of the EU project. Theoretically, the turnout at the elections for the European parliament is driven not only by national-level factors but also by individual factors such as citizens' satisfaction with the EU. Schäfer (2021) means that the motivations of citizens who participate in the national elections but not in the European elections show that the so-called "EU-only abstainers" have a low general interest in politics and especially EU-specific political sophistication with distrust towards EU institutions. Schäfer (2021) says that the gap between voting in national elections and the election for the European parliament is a result of a spread perception among citizens across Europe that it is less at stake during EP elections. The gap is also a result of individual citizens' Eurosceptic attitudes deriving from the distrust towards the EU institutions and their democratic or lack of democratic procedures. The lack leads to voters with Eurosceptic or negative attitudes being less likely to vote. In opposite to the results by Schäfer, the results of Stockemer (2012)

confirms that citizens who consider their country's membership in the EU as good have a higher probability of voting in the EP elections than those who reject it. However, both these studies show that the likelihood of voting increases with positive attitudes and decreases with negative attitudes.

The results of the study by Braun and Schäfer (2022) and Hernández and Kriesi (2016) indicate that both citizens with an extremely positive and extremely negative attitude towards the EU felt more incentivized to express their views at the ballot box during electoral contests on the EU level than ambivalent citizens in between. Thereby these studies show that citizens having more extreme opinions on the issue of European integration increases the likelihood of voting in the EP elections.

Hernández and Kriesi (2016) analyse how dissatisfaction with the union affects citizens' likelihood of voting. Hernández and Kriesi (2016) argue that the degree to which political parties oppose European integration and the ideological leaning of these Eurosceptical parties should influence the likelihood of electoral turnout. The study's findings show that in the presence of a strongly opposed party to European integration, disaffected citizens are more likely to turn out and vote for a Eurosceptic party, provided that this party also shares their ideological leaning in the left-right dimension. These results indicate that Eurosceptic parties are essential actors in politicising the European integration conflict and the Europeanization of EP elections. At the same time, these results suggest that opposition to European integration is subordinate to the traditional left-right conflict, which indicates a moderating effect between the attitudes towards the EU and the left-right ideological scale. Hernández and Kriesi (2016) say that several models explain the link between the European integration scale (measuring attitudes towards the union) and the left-right ideology scale. The dominant view now is that their relationship is best described as an inverted U-curve. Also, Hobolt (2015) means that Eurosceptic and extreme parties (both positive and negative towards the EU) perform better in the EP elections than in national elections. One reason for this is protest voting, which signifies the citizens' dissatisfaction with the EU and an increasing European integration which shows the impact of attitudes on the electoral turnout and the inverted U-curve.

All the studies mentioned use data on a multi-national or macro level to capture differences between member states rather than differences between individual citizens at the micro-level.

The material for Braun and Schäfer (2022) is the RECONNECT panel survey which included respondents from seven different member states: Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Spain; however, Braun and Schäfer (2022) also uses the Eurobarometer post-election survey to test other hypotheses. Also, Stockemer (2012) investigates if attitudes affect electoral turnout by analysing all elections for the European parliament since 1979 at an aggregated macro level. So is also the case for the study by Schäfer (2021). The study of Schäfer (2021) analyses the empirical data from the European social survey from 2019. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) also use the Eurobarometer, but between 1995 and 1999, among the old member states of the EU. Hernández and Kriesi (2016) use the multi-level European social survey (EES). All the studies mentioned thereby use data on a multi-national or macro level to capture differences between member states rather than differences between individual citizens at the micro-level. This lack of capturing differences between individuals is possibly a potential problem for the research field because we cannot know how differences between individuals' attitudes affect electoral turnout at the national level.

The different perspectives in the research field are interesting and provide the possibility for further research across Europe and a potential research gap for this thesis to consider the correlation between citizens' attitudes towards the EU and the electoral turnout in European Parliament elections, both as linear and curve linear. As I previously mentioned, all these studies derive their material on a macro-level and thereby analyse differences between member states, thereby delivering a potential research gap in which this study will look at differences among citizens in one member state (Sweden). With these insights from the research on attitudes' effect on electoral turnout, this thesis presents the first hypothesis:

H1a: Attitudes towards the EU affect the voting turnout in Swedish elections for the European parliament.

H2a: More extreme attitudes for or against the EU increased the likelihood of voting in the Swedish elections for the European parliament.

Ideology

This section will provide an overview of the research on ideology and its effect on electoral turnout.

Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) mean that the probability of voting tends to increase among citizens who place themselves far to the left or far to the right, as stated by data from the national election survey in 2014 coded as a scale ranging from 0 (far to the left) to 10 (far to the right).

(Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). According to the findings of Remer-Bollow et al. (2019), the voter turnout in the elections for the European parliament is related to left-right ideology. While the party's position on European integration does not influence the extent to which parties gain from changes in voter turnout. Remer-Bollow et al. (2019) mean that this gives indirect support for an implication of the EU issue voting perspective; left-right extremism and Euroscepticism are distinct dimensions but parties that are extreme in left-right terms frequently also hold Eurosceptic positions. Even though Remer-Bollow et al. (2019) look at the effects that the voter turnout has on party choice and not on the ideological positioning of the voters affecting the turnout, it indicates a possible correlation between left-right ideology and voter turnout. It also indicates a moderating effect between the distinct dimensions of attitudes towards the EU and left-right ideology. Hernández and Kriesi (2016) confirm this possible moderating effect. They suggest that opposition to European integration is subordinate to the traditional left-right conflict, indicating the moderating effect between the attitudes towards the EU and the left-right ideological scale. Thereby this thesis presents the last hypothesis of the study.

H1b: Attitudes on the left-right ideology scale affect the voting turnout in Swedish elections for the European parliament.

H1c: Attitudes on the left-right ideology scale moderate the correlation between attitudes towards the EU affecting the voting turnout.

H2b: More extreme attitude on the left-right ideology scale affects the voting turnout in Swedish elections for the European parliament.

H2c: More extreme attitudes on the left-right ideology scale moderate the correlation between more extreme attitudes towards the EU affecting the voting turnout.

Hypotheses

H1a: Attitudes towards the EU affect the voting turnout in Swedish elections for the European parliament.

H1b: Attitudes on the left-right ideology scale affect the voting turnout in Swedish elections for the European parliament.

H1c: Attitudes on the left-right ideology scale moderate the correlation between attitudes towards the EU affecting the voting turnout.

H2a: More extreme attitudes for or against the EU increased the likelihood of voting in the Swedish elections for the European parliament.

H2b: More extreme attitude on the left–right ideology scale affects the voting turnout in Swedish elections for the European parliament.

H2c: More extreme attitudes on the left–right ideology scale moderate the correlation between more extreme attitudes towards the EU affecting the voting turnout.

Method & material

The section on method & material will first discuss the chosen case of Sweden, followed by a description of the material for the analysis and the advantages and disadvantages compared to other material sources. Then follows a discussion of the case selection and a presentation of the operationalisations of the variables of choice. The section will end with an overview and discussion of the research method in the form of quantitative analysis.

Case selection

For the thesis, Sweden was chosen as the case selection and, more specifically, the election for the European parliament 2019 in Sweden. There are multiple reasons why it is interesting to study attitudes towards the EU with voter turnout in a Swedish context. It is because Sweden has an interesting relationship with the EU and the EP and the voting behaviour of the Swedish residents.

The Swedish electoral system includes most of the central factors required to promote high electoral participation. Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) say that the current electoral system of Sweden is suitable for achieving a high turnout. There are significant differences in turnout when comparing the turnouts in the most recent European Parliament elections and the Swedish national parliament election. The difference in turnout of the Swedish national and EP elections was 32 percentage points, which is one of the most considerable differences in turnout rates in the EU (European Parliament, 2019). Nonetheless, in the EP elections of 2014, Sweden did break the negative trend (Centre for European Research CERGU, 2019). Instead, it increased the turnout in the 2019 EP elections (Centre for European Research CERGU, 2019) compared to the still decreasing turnout rates in the EU. A conclusion of the increased voter turnout in Sweden is that the interest in the Swedish electorate for the EU and the European parliament elections is increasing.

The Swedish citizens' attitudes also increase in support of the EU (Berg et al., 2019). These attitudes thereby are an interesting research object for understanding the increasing voting turnout of the country. The Swedish relationship with the EU is interesting partly because Sweden joined the EU in 1995. Therefore, Sweden is not one of the more recent member states that joined the EU in the 2000s with electorates that are not yet very familiar with the EP elections. Thereby the Swedish population have a generally good understanding of the union and the election for the European parliament. To summarise, the case of Sweden in terms of voter turnout in the last elections for the European parliament is an interesting case for further investigations concerning attitudes and turnout. Sweden was chosen due to its trend breaking and increasing turnout and had most of the institutional reforms included to enhance a high turnout, according to Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016). Thereby the curve linear pattern could appear more clearly in the Swedish electorate.

Material

The thesis will use the election study for the elections to the European parliament in 2019 by the Swedish national election studies (Svenska valforskningsprogrammet) at the Department of political science, University of Gothenburg. The data is collected in cooperation with Statistics Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån, SCB). When collecting the data, the Swedish national election study (SNES) uses a simple random net sampling which means that every citizen has the same likelihood of being selected for the survey, which results in a representative sample. SNES also cooperates with international databases, such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Studies (CSES) (Swedish National Election Study, 2021).

Since 1956, Swedish statistics, the Swedish national election studies and the University of Gothenburg have conducted recurrent election studies at each election to the Swedish parliament, referendums, and since 1995, the Swedish election studies for the European parliament. The Swedish European Parliament election study 2019 dataset is cross-sectional. It provides an extensive range of questions, including general questions about voting behaviour and detailed questions regarding the citizens' attitudes towards the European Union and the elections for the EP. The dataset also includes other aspects such as migration, labour market, citizens' consumption of news, and the economy (Swedish National Election Study, 2021).

A positive and unique aspect of the election surveys by the Swedish national election study is that their final datasets include registered data from Statistics Sweden that holds information about the Swedish citizens with the respondents' answers. This opportunity is unique compared with

other election studies. The information includes, for example, income, electoral turnout, country of birth, job and more. The information cannot be traced to specific citizens, and the SNES needs permission to retrieve this data from the Swedish statistics. The usage of registered data ensures the correctness of the data material and allows researchers to bypass misinformation that is given to the respondents. Below is a description of the material.

Table 1: Description of the Swedish European parliament election study 2019.

Sample size	10,000
Net response rate	41,39 %
Field period	27 th of May – 2 nd of September 2019
Number of editions	2
Survey method	Mail or internet
Age of respondents	18 (and eligible to vote) to 82

Source: Oscarsson and Karlsson (2019)

The national election study for the Swedish election to the European parliament in 2019 was sent out to 10000 Swedish citizens and had 4139 respondents and a response rate of 41,39 %. The survey was sent out on the 27th of May as a postal questionnaire, with the possibility of answering online. The answered questionnaire needed to be submitted before the 2nd of September 2019. There are two editions of the questionnaire. Most of the questions are the same between the two editions, but some of the questions are only included in one of the two editions (Oscarsson & Karlsson, 2019). Therefore, a requirement for selecting variables is that the question in the questionnaire was included in both editions.

With a response rate of 41,39 %, the possible results of this thesis could look different if all of the requested respondents had answered, which will be discussed later on in the discussion section.

Operationalisations

The following variables will be used to operationalise the thesis hypothesis between attitudes towards the union and electoral turnout. Since the survey used in this thesis is in Swedish, I translated the survey questions.

Dependent variable – Electoral turnout

The dependent variable of the thesis is electoral turnout in the Swedish election for the European parliament 2019. For the operationalisation of the variable, the thesis will use the question in the dataset, *"Did you vote in this year's election for the European parliament?"*. The survey had the response options "Yes", "No", and *"Do not want to answer"*. The variable in the dataset was then checked against the register data, and any incorrect answers were corrected. The variable in the analysis will thus only distinguish whether the voter did or did not vote.

Table 2: Summary statistics of the dependent variable Electoral turnout.

	Percent	Frequencies	Coded as:
Voted	79,22 %	3229	1
Not voted	20,78 %	847	0
Total	100,00 %	4076	
Official turnout rate	55,27 %	4 187 848	
Mean	0,79		
Std. Dev.	0,40		
Min/max	0 / 1		

In Table 2, we can see a much higher degree of respondents who voted in the elections than the actual turnout rate of the 2019 EP election in Sweden (Valmyndigheten, 2020).

An advantage of using the EP election with a lower turnout than the national election in Sweden is that the proportion is more equally distributed. The election study thereby captures a higher degree of respondents who do not vote in the EP elections than in an election for the national parliament. Therefore, it is easier to analyse variations in turnout in elections such as EP elections with more equal groups of respondents that vote and do not vote than in elections where almost everyone votes, as in elections for national parliaments.

It is important to remember that politically interested citizens who are more likely to vote are the same citizens with a higher likelihood of answering these kinds of surveys (Voogt & Saris, 2003). Therefore, it is vital to have in mind that the reported electoral turnout rates in surveys tend to be higher than the official turnout rates in EP elections which explains the gap between the official turnout rate and the turnout rate of the survey that occurs in table 2. Thereby the survey and this

thesis results will capture a higher degree of people that voted compared to the official turnout rate of the EP election.

The dataset coded the variable as (0) if a respondent did not vote and (1) if the respondent voted in the election. I chose to keep this coding as it is already dichotomous and renamed the variable to Electoral turnout. Previous studies have also coded the electoral turnout in the same manner. (Braun & Schäfer, 2022; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016)

Independent variables - EU attitude variable

The first independent variable of the thesis is citizens' attitudes towards the EU. The thesis will primarily use the question in the dataset, "*In general, what is your attitude towards the EU*", to operationalise the variable. The survey had the response options "*Strongly negative*", "*Somewhat negative*", "*Neither positive nor negative*", "*Somewhat positive*", "*Strongly positive*", and "*No perception*". The option "*No perception*" is excluded from the analysis. The main reason for choosing this operationalisation is that it is a scale that measures citizens' attitudes towards the EU on a scale. It is, although, a scale in attitudes in which the respondents' self-perception is what is measured. In the research field, different operationalisations are made to measure EU attitude. In some, it is, for example, measured if the respondents want further European integration or if the respondents are negative about the state's membership (Braun & Schäfer, 2022; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Schäfer, 2021; Stockemer, 2012). As this thesis wants to capture the attitude towards the EU, I, therefore, chose this operationalisation instead as I believe it is more accurate to capture this variable in that way and suits the data material for this thesis.

The thesis will test the hypotheses in two ways. First, the thesis needs to capture if attitudes towards the EU affect electoral turnout as described in H1a. Secondly, the thesis needs to see if extreme attitudes affect electoral turnout as described in H2a. Therefore, I code the variable into three variables, EU attitude for H1a and H2a and the EU attitude squared and EUattitude_cat for H2a, which I will explain more in this section.

I chose to reverse the scale for the EU attitude variable as there is reason to believe that a more positive attitude towards the EU should increase the electoral turnout. Therefore, the strongly positive option should be coded as the highest value instead of the original coding. Therefore, the EU attitude variable progresses from strongly negative to strongly positive and is described in Table 3. The EU attitude variable alone will test Hypothesis 1a.

To test H2a and if extreme attitudes towards the EU affect electoral turnout, I will do this in two separate ways in further analysis. First, in table 7, the main version of the EU attitude variable will be used together with a squared version of the variable, which is the original variable coded to be multiplied by itself. Therefore, the squared version builds on the same coding as the primary EU attitude variable. In the regression, if the original variable is positive, the squared version of the variable should be negative if the correlation is curvilinear. In this case, the more positive or negative a respondent is towards the EU should have a higher voter turnout than in the middle. Therefore, the original variable should be negative, and the squared term be positive according to hypothesis 2a.

Secondly, in table 8, a version of the current EU attitude variable is built that divides the response options into three categories: Extremely positive coded as 2, extremely negative coded as 1, and moderate opinion coded as 0, in which the moderate opinion will serve as a reference category. The frequencies and coding of this categorical variable are found in table 3. An advantage of this is that we thereby can measure moderate attitudes towards the EU against what the thesis calls extreme attitudes, which in this case reflects the options strongly positive or strongly negative.

The main advantage of these codings is that we both capture if attitudes towards the EU affect electoral turnout overall. The alternative variables of EU attitude capture if extreme attitudes affect the turnout and thereby test all the thesis hypotheses. The main disadvantage of these codings for capturing extreme attitudes is that it is more complicated to interpret the squared versions.

Table 3: Summary statistics of the independent variable of EU attitude.

	Percent	Frequencies	Coded in the dataset as	Recoded in EU attitude:	Coded in EUattitude_cat as:
<i>Strongly positive</i>	13,29 %	543	1	4	2, (Extremely positive)
<i>Somewhat positive</i>	45,58 %	1862	2	3	0, (Moderate opinion)
<i>Neither positive nor negative</i>	22,35 %	913	3	2	0, (Moderate opinion)
<i>Somewhat negative</i>	11,73 %	479	4	1	0, (Moderate opinion)
<i>Strongly negative</i>	4,11 %	168	5	0	1, (Extremely negative)
<i>No perception</i>	2,94 %	120	6	Excluded from analysis	Excluded from analysis
<i>Total:</i>	100,00 %	4085			

N	3965	
Mean	2,54	
Std. Dev.	1,00	
Min/max	0 / 4	
EUattitude_cat		
Moderate opinion	82,07 %	3254
Extremely negative	4,24 %	168
Extremely positive	13,69 %	543
Total:	100,00 %	3965
N	3965	
Mean	0,32	
Std. Dev.	0,70	
Min/max	0 / 2	

From table 3, we see the distribution of the independent variable and the frequencies of the response options. There is also the coding of the different versions of the EU attitude variable. As one can see, more than half of the respondents are strongly or somewhat positive towards the EU, in contrast with the 15,84 % that answered they are somewhat or strongly negative, which indicates that most of the respondents seem positive rather than negative towards the EU. This also reflects the mean of 2,54, which is between neither positive nor negative and somewhat positive response options.

This overweight of positive respondents can affect the results negatively because the strongly negative groups are not captured as much. This overweight can thereby make the results insignificant, making it harder to capture the effect of the extreme attitudes on electoral turnout.

Independent variables - Left-right ideology variable

The second independent variable of the thesis is ideology. The thesis will primarily use the question: *"In politics, there is sometimes a discussion about left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale between 0 and 10 where 0 represents far to the left and 10 represents far to the right?"* to operationalise the variable. The survey had response options between 0 and 10. Response option 0 represents *"Far to the left"*, 5 represents *"Neither left nor right"*, and 10 represents *"Far to the right"*.

The main reason for choosing this operationalisation is that it is a scale that measures citizens' position on the classical ideological scale between left and right. An advantage of this is that we thereby can measure moderate attitudes towards the EU against what the thesis calls extreme attitudes, which in this case reflects the options close to far to the left and far to the right. It is, although, a scale in attitudes in which respondents' self-perception is what is measured.

The thesis will use this second independent variable to investigate a possible moderating effect between the distinct dimensions of attitudes towards the EU and left-right ideology. As Remer-Bollow et al. (2019) and Hernández and Kriesi (2016) stated, parties and, thereby also, voters hold extreme opinions on the left-right scale and the scale of attitudes towards the EU.

For the ideology variable, I chose to remain the variable as it was coded in the dataset because it ranges from far left (0) and progressing with one step to far right (10), which also previous studies have (Bhatti, 2010; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). Table 4 describes the ideology variable in detail. The ideology variable alone will test Hypothesis 1b in Table 6. Together with the EU attitude variable, it will test if there is a moderating effect between them on electoral turnout, as stated in Hypothesis 1c.

To test H2b, extreme attitudes on the ideology scale, I will do this in two separate ways in further analysis. First, in table 7, the main version of the ideology variable will be combined with a squared version of the variable, which is the original variable coded to be multiplied by itself. Therefore, the squared version builds on the same coding as the primary ideology variable. In the regression, if the original variable is positive, the squared version of the variable should be negative if the correlation is curvilinear. In this case, the far left and far right alternatives should result in a higher voter turnout than in the middle. Therefore, in the result table, the original variable should be negative, and the squared term be positive according to hypothesis 2a.

Secondly, in table 8, a version of the current ideology variable divides the response options into three categories: Far right coded as 2, far left coded as 1, and moderate opinion coded as 0, in which the moderate opinion will serve as a reference category. The frequencies and coding of this categorical variable are found in table 4. An advantage of this is that we thereby can measure moderate attitudes towards the EU against what the thesis calls extreme attitudes, which in this case reflects the options far right and far left. This variable was coded in this way because of the distribution of the variable, as seen in table 4, to achieve somewhat equal groups on both sides but at the same time hold the category of moderate opinion somewhat broad.

The main advantage of this coding is that we both capture if attitudes of left-right ideology affect electoral turnout overall, especially the alternative variables of ideology capture if extreme attitudes affect the turnout. Thereby the thesis tests the hypothesis. The main disadvantage of this coding is that the interpretation is more complicated when looking at the squared version. Another disadvantage is that the ideology variable has ten steps, making the predicted probabilities smaller and harder to interpret.

Table 4: Summary statistics of the independent variable left-right ideology.

	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequencies</i>	<i>Coded in Ideology</i>	<i>Coded in Ideology_cat</i>
0 Far to the left	2,82 %	83	0	1 (Far left)
1	4,72 %	137	1	1 (Far left)
2	8,54 %	248	2	1 (Far left)
3	10,51 %	305	3	0 (Moderate opinion)
4	7,99 %	232	4	0 (Moderate opinion)
5 Neither left or right	15,16 %	440	5	0 (Moderate opinion)
6	9,47 %	275	6	0 (Moderate opinion)
7	15,09 %	438	7	0 (Moderate opinion)
8	15,74 %	457	8	2 (Far right)
9	6,65 %	193	9	2 (Far right)
10 Far to the right	3,27 %	95	10	2 (Far right)
<i>N</i>	2814			
<i>Mean</i>	5,39			
<i>Std. Dev.</i>	2,58			
<i>Min/max</i>	0 / 10			
<i>Ideology_cat</i>				
0 Moderate opinion	57,82 %	1627		
1 Far left	16,56 %	466		
2 Far right	25,62 %	721		
<i>N</i>	2814			
<i>Mean</i>	1,09			
<i>Std. Dev.</i>	0,64			
<i>Min/max</i>	0 / 2			

Table comment: The leftright_cat variable is built on the leftright variable but recoded. Thereby the response options of 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are coded as (0) and called "Moderate opinion. 0 1 and 2 are coded as (1) and called "Far left". 8, 9 and 10 are coded as (2) and called "Far right".

Table 5 includes the distribution of frequencies and a summary of the ideology variable. The frequencies are somewhat equally distributed on both sides of the scale.

Control variables

The control variables in this thesis aim to control for underlying mechanisms that may affect the relationship between the main variables. Therefore, the control variables need to capture factors affecting both citizens' attitudes towards the EU and on the left-right ideology scale and electoral turnout in EP elections. As previously stated in previous research, the thesis looks to understand explanations among individuals and their surroundings and not compare or explain differences in turnout between EU member states.

The variables that the thesis chosen as controls are *Gender, Age, Education level, Income, Place of residence, Political interest, Political interest in the EU, Political knowledge, Consumption of news regarding the EU* and *Trust in the European parliament*. All the variables are related to survey questions in the dataset and are in detail described in *Appendix 1*.

Here follows a motivation of the chosen control variables and a short description of how the variables are coded. The thesis controls for gender because the study of Dassonneville and Kostelka (2020) shows evidence that women seem to participate less in supranational elections such as the elections for the European parliament. Interestingly, Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) mean that previous research found it more likely for women to vote in the EP elections than men. However, Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) mean that gender differences have diminished over the years. However, they are still necessary to control for in the analysis of voter turnout. The gender variable codes males as 1 and women as 2, so the groups are differentiated as a dummy variable which also is done by, for example, Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) and Bhatti (2010).

Previous studies show that age affects electoral turnout, with lower voting levels among young and older adults. Therefore, an age variable is made of a variable in the dataset with the respondent's birth year. The age variable is then recoded to show the respondents' age as it was in 2019, which also Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) did. As previous research found that the young and the old groups participate less than the age group in the middle, the thesis includes a squared version to see if there is a curve linear correlation of age (Bhatti et al., 2012).

Also, education and income are said to affect since citizens with high education and income are more likely to turnout. Even place of residence is included since there is evidence that people living in cities are more likely to vote (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). Therefore, the education variable is coded into three categories. Low education in which the respondent completed primary school. Medium education if the respondent studied at upper secondary school or has a degree from upper secondary school and high education, representing at least studies at college or a university in which those with higher education are predicted to participate to a higher degree. The income variable is based on the respondent's household's total annual income before tax and coded into three categories; low income ranging from less than 100 000 – 400 000 SEK/year; medium-income ranging from 400 001 – 800 000 SEK/year; and high income ranging from 800 001 – more than 1 100 000 SEK/year. The place of residency variable is coded into three

categories; rural area as 1, small town and village as 2, big town and city as 3 and large city (outer areas and central areas) coded as 4. All these variables are coded in this way so that the alternatives that are thought to increase the electoral turnout are of the highest value.

The other individual factors chosen as control variables for this thesis are political knowledge (Bhatti, 2010) and motivational factors such as political interest, political interest in the EU, and political news consumption. These variables are reasonable to believe should affect electoral turnout and attitudes towards the union. The political knowledge variable is coded into four categories; Not good at all coded as 1; Not very good as 2; Pretty good as 3 and Very good as 4. The variables of political interest and political interest in the EU are coded in the same way into four values; 1, Not at all interested. 2, Not very interested. 3, Quite interested and 4, Very interested. The variable of EU-news consumption is coded into four values and measures how much a respondent usually takes part in the news about the EU or politics concerning the EU. 1, Not very much. 2, Pretty much. 3, Pretty much and 4, Pretty much everything. These factors are all coded so that the prediction is that the more knowledge, the more interest, and the more news consumption should increase the likelihood of voting.

Finally, the thesis will include a variable that measures respondents' trust in the European parliament, likely affecting the turnout. If a citizen trusts the politicians in the parliament, it seems reasonable that the citizen would be more positive towards the EU and vote in the EP elections. The variable is coded into four categories; 1, Very little trust; 2, Quite a bit of trust; 3, Quite a lot of trust and 4, Very much trust. It is reasonable to believe that the more trust the respondent has should positively affect the likelihood of voting.

Table 5: Summary statistics of the control variables.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Coded in the thesis as:	Coded in the original dataset as:
<i>Gender</i>	4074	1,50	0.50	1 - 2	1 - 2
<i>Age</i>	4083	53.75	16,99	18 - 82	1937 - 2001
<i>Age (squared)</i>	4083	3178,30	1753,20	324 - 6724	1937 - 2001
<i>Education</i>	4004	2.36	0.69	1 - 3	1 - 9
<i>Income (categories)</i>	3949	1,93	0,78	1 - 3	1 - 12
<i>Place of residency</i>	4053	2.78	1,03	1 - 4	1 - 7
<i>Political interest</i>	4082	2,74	0,77	1 - 4	1 - 4
<i>Political interest in EU</i>	4076	2,57	0,73	1 - 4	1 - 4
<i>Political knowledge</i>	4082	2,57	0,70	1 - 4	1 - 4
<i>Consumption of news regarding the EU</i>	3900	2,53	0,81	1 - 4	1 - 4
<i>Trust in the EP</i>	3335	2,12	0,81	1 - 4	1 - 5

Table comment: Figure 5 includes the summary statistics of the already recoded variables for the thesis.

In table 5, we see an overview of descriptions of the control variables. In figure 1, there is a summary of the chosen variables for this thesis and the coding of the variables. The order in the following variables is reversed in the recode for this thesis. The categories expected to increase electoral turnout are the highest; place of residency (living in more urban areas), political interest, political interest in the EU, political knowledge, consumption of EU news, and trust in the EP.

Figure 1: Summary of chosen variables and their coding.




Figure comment: Figure 1 summarises all the chosen variables and their coding.

A bivariate correlation matrix over the chosen variables' correlation with one another separately is found in *Appendix 2*. The correlations in the appendix show that the coding and predictions are correct because all the variables are positive (except for ideology, which was predicted to be negative) and increase the turnout as expected from previous literature and the thesis hypotheses.

Method

The thesis will use a quantitative method to investigate the hypothesis, which is an appropriate approach. Based on the thesis hypothesis, the dependent variable is the voter turnout at the Swedish election for the European parliament in 2019. The independent variable is the attitude among the Swedish citizens towards the European Union and the citizens' perception of themselves on an ideology scale.

I choose to use a binary logistic regression suitable for the dependent variable to analyse the thesis hypothesis because it is a yes or no question. Which is the best alternative since the dependent variable of voting is dichotomous. As Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen (2017) explain, in the OLS (ordinary least squares) regression analysis, the prerequisite is that the dependent variable is continuous. However, when we wish to investigate whether a specific phenomenon is present (whether a citizen voted or not), the dependent variable only varies between two values. The OLS regression is problematic because it does not provide a linear association between X

and Y. Therefore, it will be heteroscedasticity present, meaning there is a risk of predicting values outside the dependent variable's two values. Therefore, logistic regression is more suitable to use in this thesis when the dependent variable varies between yes and no in whether a respondent has voted in the EP election or not. Another advantage of the logistical regression is, as Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen (2017) say, that the output of the analysis interprets in probabilities which is more precise than looking at what happens with the dependent variable when the independent variable increases with one step on the x-axis. The logistic regression is aimed to show the probability for a voter to vote. Logistic regression is the most used method with dichotomous variables and will therefore be used for this thesis. As a robustness check, however, the thesis includes an OLS regression which is suitable to control the results from the logistic regression to see if the same variables still are significant.

In logistic regression, as in OLS regression, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables can be evaluated by statistical significance. If a correlation between variables is statistically significant, we can confidently believe that the variables are related. Different scholars accept different significance standards, but the p-values of 0,05 or lower are the most common limit for statistical significance. When and if a correlation has a p-value of 0,05 or lower, we can with 95 per cent confidence of an exciting relationship between the variables (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2018).

The logistic regression has no coherent norm for interpreting variance measures, and thereby, several different types of R-squared statistic measures exist. The usefulness of R-squared statistics also differs between scholars. Some say R-squared statistics help interpret precise variance measures in logistic regression models. Others argue that one should be careful to interpret precise measures of the R-squared values in logistic regression or not use the R-squared values. With this in mind, this thesis will present the R-squared statistics using the Pseudo-R measure but will be aware of the potential limits of the measure (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017).

The main disadvantage with the logistic regression is that the interpretation of the coefficient is more complicated than in OLS regression. While the b-coefficients in OLS show the change in the dependent variable when the independent variable increases with one unit, logistic regression shows the change in the natural logarithm of the odds for (Y=1) for a +1 step change in the independent variable (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017). The natural logarithm of the odds for when y is 0 does not provide much information. It can thereby only be interpreted by the

direction of the correlation and by the statistical significance. Instead, one can calculate predicted probabilities of the natural logarithm for ($Y=1$), which gives a more precise and interpretable measure for the regression analysis (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017).

There are multiple ways to calculate predicted probabilities. For this thesis, the predicted probabilities compare the values of the several independent variables (the independent variables + the control variables) with each other and how these different values relate to the dependent variable when holding the remaining variables at their mean values. The predicted probabilities vary between 0 and 1 and can thereby interpret as percentage points. For example, if the predicted probabilities show 0,05, this means a five percentage points increase in the probability of the dependent variable (Williams, 2012). Therefore, an increase in the predicted probability for the EU attitude variable or the left-right ideology variable can confirm if hypotheses 1a and 1b are correct. If there is no such increase in the predicted probabilities for these variables, the study can reject the hypothesis instead.

The same idea applies to the categorical version of the EU attitude variable and the left-right ideology variable in Table 7. If both categories are positive or negative and significant, there is a curve linear correlation. However, if one of these categories is positive and the other is negative, there is no curve linear correlation. There will also be figures that will illustrate to see if there is a curve linear or linear correlation.

All regression tables of the results include squared versions of some of the variables as the age variable, including a squared version in all regression tables in the results section. The study hypothesises that the EU attitude and left-right ideology variables are presumably curved linear and will therefore include squared versions in Table 8. To interpret a variable with a curve linear correlation, either one of the original variables or the variable's squared version is positive. The other one should be negative if the correlation is curvilinear. For example, in this case of left-right ideology, the more left or right a respondent should have a higher voter turnout than the moderate opinion. Therefore, the original variable should be negative, and the squared term be positive or vice versa. If this is the case, the study can confirm if hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c are correct.

A quantitative method for answering the thesis research question is the most suitable choice since the method allows us to test the hypothesis with many respondents, which increases the capacity

to generalise the results to the whole population. The choice also gives the advantage of elaborating on the variables in detail. Nonetheless, a qualitative approach by interviewing individual citizens would also give possible insights concerning the research field by asking questions about their view of the EU and their voting behaviour. Interviews could have deepened the knowledge of the factors behind the citizens' attitudes and the electoral outcome and would enhance the possibility of investigating more precise questions. However, a qualitative method could not test the hypothesis of this study. Also, the generalizability of the results might have been negatively affected by interviews because interviews are time-consuming to make and perform and therefore provide a smaller sample to analyse. However, with another set of hypotheses, a qualitative study would be a positive complement to this thesis.

Results

The results section will first look at the results that connect to hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c of Table 6, namely does, attitudes towards the EU and, separately does, left–right ideology, and is there a moderating effect that affects the electoral turnout.

After that comes if extreme attitudes towards the EU or extreme attitudes in the left–right ideology scale affect electoral turnout, which we can discover in Tables 7 and 8. These tables will give the results that test hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c. After presenting the results comes a section describing the results of the diagnostics tests and a robustness check for table 6, which one can see in *Appendix 3*.

In each section, there will be a short explanation of the structure of the regression models and tables of the section, followed by the regression table and then a descriptive review of the results and if the results confirm or reject the thesis hypotheses. Some graphs are included throughout the section to illustrate the correlations of the tables.

Attitudes effect on electoral turnout testing hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c.

In the following regression analysis, Model 1 includes the dependent variable and the independent variable of EU attitude. Model 2 includes the dependent variable, the independent variable of EU attitude, and the control variables. Model 3 includes the dependent variable, ideology's independent variable, and control variables. Model 4 includes the dependent variable, the two independent variables of EU attitude and Ideology, and the interaction term them

between. Model 5 includes the complete model of the dependent and independent variables, including the interaction term and the control variables.

So, to interpret the table, it is good to keep in mind how the variables are coded. The dependent variable of electoral turnout ranges between 0 (not voted) and 1 (voted) for the main variables. The independent variable of EU attitude ranges from 0 (strongly negative) to 4 (strongly positive). The independent variable of ideology ranges from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). The coding of the other variables can be found in the method and material section in Figure 1 or in *Appendix 1*.

Table 6 provides the result with the coefficients and the predicted probabilities for every variable. In model 1, there is a positive and significant correlation between electoral turnout and respondents' attitudes towards the EU. The predicted probability tells us that for every step of the four steps between being strongly negative and strongly positive towards the EU, the predicted probability increases five percentage points on average. This correlation is illustrated in figure 1, in which we can see the overall increase between "Strongly negative" and "Strongly positive" is 30 percentage points. In the full model, Model 5, the predicted probability only increases by one percentage point for each step of the EU attitude variable, which is about four percentage points difference between strongly negative and strongly positive, illustrated in figure 2.

The value of the Pseudo R^2 is 0,029 for model 1 and 0,124 for model 5. As described in the method section, these values should be interpreted carefully. At the same time, one can argue that the full model (Model 5) is more likely to explain more of the variance in the dependent variable than the other models in the table.

Table 6: Effects on the dependent variable Electoral turnout of the independent variables of EU attitude and ideology and the control variables.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP
EU attitude	0.409*** (8.65)	0,05	0.143** (2.32)	0,01			0.744*** (6.74)	0,06	0.473*** (3.72)	0,01
Ideology			-0.0276 (-1.25)	0,00	-0.0266 (-1.20)	0,00	0.114*** (2.61)	0,00	0.104** (2.09)	-0,005
EU attitude## Ideology							-0.0595*** (-3.39)		-0.0583*** (-2.96)	
Gender (ref: male)										
Women			0.265** (2.32)	0,03	0.259** (2.27)	0,03			0.260** (2.27)	0,03
Age			-0.0499** (-2.17)	0,00	-0.0546** (-2.38)	0,00			-0.0467** (-2.03)	0,00
Age squared			0.000608*** (2.65)	0,00	0.000653*** (2.85)	0,00			0.000586** (2.54)	0,00
Education level (ref: Low education)										
Medium education			0.252 (1.34)	0,03	0.270 (1.44)	0,04			0.233 (1.23)	0,03
High education			0.524** (2.53)	0,07	0.554*** (2.69)	0,07			0.514** (2.47)	0,06
Income (ref: Low income)										
Medium income			0.366*** (2.85)	0,05	0.377*** (2.94)	0,05			0.373*** (2.89)	0,05
High income			0.734*** (4.54)	0,08	0.775*** (4.82)	0,09			0.755*** (4.66)	0,09
Residence (ref: Rural area)										
Small town/village			-0.138 (-0.79)	-0,01	-0.147 (-0.84)	-0,02			-0.124 (-0.71)	-0,01
Big town/city			-0.357** (-2.08)	-0,04	-0.346** (-2.02)	-0,04			-0.344** (-2.01)	-0,04
Big city			0.0563 (0.31)	0,00	0.0678 (0.38)	0,00			0.0587 (0.33)	0,00
Political interest			0.323*** (2.79)	0,04	0.319*** (2.75)	0,04			0.322*** (2.76)	0,04
Political interest in EU			0.280** (2.31)	0,03	0.300** (2.48)	0,03			0.257** (2.11)	0,03
Political knowledge			0.280*** (2.60)	0,03	0.260** (2.43)	0,03			0.284*** (2.63)	0,03
News consumption of EU-news			0.0884 (0.98)	0,01	0.0957 (1.06)	0,01			0.0914 (1.01)	0,01
Trust in EP			0.322*** (3.84)	0,03	0.411*** (5.52)	0,05			0.325*** (3.86)	0,04
Constant	0.595*** (4.90)		-1.658*** (-2.63)		-1.423** (-2.29)		-0.0531 (-0.20)		-2.459*** (-3.59)	
Observations	2814		2814		2814		2814		2814	
Pseudo R ²	0.029		0.120		0.118		0.034		0.124	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

The independent variable of ideology is significant, and so is also the interaction term. The predicted probability of the ideology variable is in model 5 approximately about 0,5 percentage points which is a slight decrease. The ideology variable ranges with ten steps, which means that there is a five percentage point difference between being far left and far right. However, the ideology variable is not significant in models 2 and 3. However, the variable is significant but close to zero in model 5. Therefore, it is possible to confirm hypothesis H1b, that such a correlation might exist, but it is relatively small. The correlation is illustrated in figure 3.

For the control variables in model 5, we see an increase of three percentage points for being a woman, a six-percentage point increase for high education, an increase of 5 percentage point for medium-income and a nine-percentage point increase for high income. Political interest and political interest for the EU show an increase with 4 and 3 percentage points, and political knowledge also increases by three percentage points. The variable of trust for the European parliament gives a 4-percentage point increase. All the variables mentioned above significantly correlate with the dependent variable, increasing the likelihood of a higher turnout and is similar to the results from the previous research.

To illustrate the correlations a little bit further comes Figures 1 and 2 over the effects the EU attitude variable has on the electoral turnout. Figure 1 shows the correlation in model 1, and figure 2 shows the correlation in model 5, which is the complete model that includes the control variables. Figure 3 will show the predictive margins for the effects of left–right ideology on the electoral turnout in model 5. Figure 4 will show the predictive margins of the moderation between EU attitude and left–right ideology’s effect on the electoral turnout.

Figure 3: Adjusted predictions for the effects of EU attitude on the electoral turnout (to the left).




Figure 2: Adjusted predictions for the effects of EU attitude on the electoral turnout (to the right).




Figure comment: Figure 2 (model 1) and figure 3 (model 5) illustrate EU attitude's effect on electoral turnout. On the x-axis, we see the response options of the EU attitude variable, and on the y-axis, the probability of voting in the EP19 elections.

Figure 2 over model 1 shows the potential effect that the attitudes towards the EU have, ranging from strongly negative at the 60 % probability to the strongly positive at the 90 % probability to vote in the Swedish elections for the European parliament. Figure 3 shows the EU attitude variable and its relationship with electoral in the full model 5 with the control variables instead. The correlation remains, but the curve is not as steep as Figure 2. However, these figures, together with the predicted probabilities, confirm hypothesis 1a, that attitudes towards the EU affect the electoral turnout in the Swedish elections for the European parliament in 2019.

Figure 4: Predictive margins for the effects of left-right ideology on the electoral turnout in model 5.




Figure comment: Figure 4 illustrates the effect of ideology on electoral turnout. On the x-axis, we see the response options of the Ideology variable. On the y-axis is the probability of voting in the EP19 elections. 0 = far left 5= neither far or right and 10=far right.

Figure 4 over model 5 shows the potential effect that the left-right ideology variable has, with a range from far left at the 85 % probability down to the far right at the 81 % probability to vote in the Swedish elections for the European parliament. Figure 4, together with the predicted probability, indicates that ideology has a negligible effect on the electoral turnout in the Swedish elections for the European parliament in 2019; therefore, hypothesis 1b can be confirmed, but the size of the effect can be questioned.

Figure 5: Moderating effect between ideology and attitudes towards the EU on the electoral turnout.




Figure comment: Figure 5 illustrates the effect of the moderation between EU attitude and left–right ideology on electoral turnout. On the x-axis, we see the response options of the EU attitude variable, and on the y-axis, the probability of voting in the EP19 elections. The coloured lines represent the far left, far right and neither left nor right responses.

Figure 5 shows the predictive margins of the moderation between EU attitude and left–right ideology’s effect on the electoral turnout. The figure is essential for enlightening us about if there is a moderating effect. Here we can clearly see the differences between standing far to the left and right while being strongly negative or positive towards the EU. It also reflects that the table shows a significant moderating term between EU attitude and the ideology variable. The likelihood for a respondent that is far left and strongly negative towards the EU is just under 70 % probability of voting compared to the respondents that are strongly positive that is the most positive, with about 92 % likelihood of voting. The EU attitude has the most effect on respondents far left. The respondents that are far-right and strongly negative towards the EU are more likely to vote with a probability of 85 % than those who are strongly positive towards the union, which have a probability of voting by about 80 %. Figure 3 thereby confirms H1c, that

there is a moderating effect between EU attitude and ideology on the probability of voting in this election.

Extreme attitudes effect on electoral turnout, testing hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c.

In different ways, Table 7 and Table 8 will measure the extremism of attitudes towards the EU and on the left-right ideology scale. In table 8, the extremism is measured with the original variables and includes squared versions of the EU attitude variable and the left-right ideology variable. Table 7 is done with a recode of these variables, including three categories: moderate opinion, extremely positive, and extremely positive for the EU attitude variable. For the left-right ideology, the three categories are moderate opinion, far left and far right. In the following regression analysis, the models are structured the same way as in Table 6. However, the control variables in Tables 7 and 8 are repressed, meaning that models 2 and 4 do not appear in Tables 7 and 8. However, the full versions of these tables (including Models 2 and 4) can be found in *Appendix 4 and Appendix 5*.

The value of the Pseudo R^2 is 0,031 for model 1 and 0,124 for model 5. As described in the method section, these values should be interpreted carefully. At the same time, one can argue that the full model (Model 5) is more likely to explain more of the variance in the dependent variable than the other models in the table.

Table 7: Effects on Electoral turnout including squared variables of EU attitude and ideology.

	Model 1		Model 3		Model 5	
	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP
EU attitude	0.0390 (0.22)	0,01			0.473** (2.21)	0,02
EU attitude squared	0.0910** (2.19)	0,01			0.000575 (0.01)	0,00
Ideology			-0.0409 (-0.48)	-0,00	0.0821 (0.85)	-0,01
Ideology squared			0.00140 (0.18)	0,00	0.00210 (0.26)	0,00
EU attitude ## Ideology					-0.0584*** (-2.95)	
Constant	0.859*** (4.95)		-1.391** (-2.15)		-2.410*** (-3.34)	
Observations	2814		2814		2814	
Pseudo R ²	0.031		0.118		0.124	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table note: Control variables are repressed (including the same control variables as in table 6).

The full Table 7, including Models 2 and 4, can be found in Appendix 4.

In table 7, the squared versions of the independent variable attitudes towards the EU and left-right ideology are included alongside the original versions to capture possible curve linear correlations with the dependent variable. When looking at the EU attitude variable and its squared version, there is no sign of a linear curve correlation for the electoral turnout. This is the case for the ideology variable and its squared version too. However, the interaction term is significant and indicates a moderating effect of left-right ideology on the main correlation between the independent and dependent variables, which is illustrated in figure 6. The control variables (found in Appendix 4) are similar to the results in the previous table.

Figure 6: Predictive margins over the effects of ideology on the correlation of EU attitude and electoral turnout, including squared versions.




Figure comment: Figure 6 illustrates the moderation effect between extreme EU attitude and extreme left-right ideology on electoral turnout from table 7. On the x-axis, we see the response options of the EU attitude variable, and on the y-axis, the probability of voting in the EP19 elections. The coloured lines represent the far left, far right and neither left nor right responses.

Figure 6, which comes from table 7, shows the same moderation between EU attitude and left-right ideology’s effect on the electoral turnout as figure 5 did for table 6. It reflects that the table shows a significant moderating term between EU attitude and the ideology variable. Figure 6 thereby confirms H2c, that there is a moderating effect between extreme attitudes towards the EU and extreme attitudes of ideology on the probability of voting in this election.

Table 8: Effects on Electoral turnout with EU attitude and left-right variable measuring extremism compared with moderate opinions.

	Model 1		Model 3		Model 5	
	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP
EU attitude						
(ref: Moderate attitude)						
Extreme negative	-0.863*** (-4.23)	-0,16			-0.285 (-0.89)	-0,07
Extreme positive	0.898*** (4.86)	0,10			0.0776 (0.31)	0,02
Ideology						
(ref: Moderate attitude)						
Extreme left			0.227 (1.38)	0,02	0.258 (1.43)	0,03
Extreme right			-0.00122 (-0.01)	0,00	-0.0134 (-0.10)	0,00
EU attitude#						
#Ideology						
(ref: Moderate attitude)						
Extreme negative # Extreme left					-1.253* (-1.95)	
Extreme negative # Extreme right					0.0781 (0.16)	
Extreme positive # Extreme left					0.780 (1.18)	
Extreme positive # Extreme right					0.0734 (0.17)	
Constant	1.543*** (27.95)		-1.582*** (-2.59)		-1.552** (-2.53)	
Observations	2814		2814		2814	
Pseudo R ²	0.019		0.118		0.123	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Note: Control variables are repressed (including the same control variables as in table 6).

The full version of Table 8, including Models 2 and 4, can be found in Appendix 5.

Table 8 serves us with another type of operationalisation of the independent variable EU attitude and the variable of left-right ideology than in previous tables. The dependent variable of electoral turnout ranges between 0 (not voted) and 1 (voted). The independent variable of EU attitude ranges from 0 (Moderate opinion) to 1 (Extreme negative) to 2 (Extreme positive). The independent variable of ideology ranges from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). The coding of the other variables can be found in the method section or *Appendix 1*.

In model 1, both the Extreme negative and Extreme positive category is significant, while the extreme negative category indicates a decrease of 16 percentage points compared to the moderate opinion category. The extreme positive category indicates a 10-percentage point increase compared to the reference category. The effects of the EU attitude variable are not significant in model 5. The extreme negative category shows a decrease of seven percentage points. The extreme positive category increases two percentage points compared to the reference category of moderate opinion. For the ideology variable in model 5, the option extreme left show an increase by three percentage point, while the extreme right option does not indicate a change. However, these variables are insignificant in model 4 and model 5.

The variables of EU attitude and ideology are shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9. These results indicate that we cannot find a linear curve relationship in either of these variables like the results in Table 8. To confirm hypotheses H2a and H2b, Extreme negative and Extreme positive or Extreme right and Extreme left should both increase or decrease from the reference category of moderate opinion. In Table 8, this is not the case, in which one of the values increases and the other one is close to zero or decreases from the reference category. At least for the EU attitude variable, the thesis can reject hypothesis H2a with the significant results. Because there are no significant results for the ideology variable, it is more complicated to confirm hypothesis 2b. Thereby, the thesis rejects hypothesis H2a.

The moderating terms between EU attitude and ideology are insignificant in model 5, which is unexpected with the moderating effect seen in table 7. The moderating variable is likely insignificant because there are too few respondents in these categories, making the interaction insignificant. However, as we saw in table 7, the moderating term was significant, and therefore, there is reason to believe that H2c still might be correct.

In Figures 7 and 8, we see the predictive margins for EU attitude over the electoral turnout in models 1 and 5. In figure 9, we can see the predictive margins for the ideology variable.

Figure 7: Predictive margins for EU attitude and electoral turnout over model 1.




Figure 8: Predictive margins for EU attitude and electoral turnout over model 1.




Figure comment: Figure 7 (model 1) and figure 8 (model 5) illustrate extreme EU attitude's effect on electoral turnout compared to moderate opinion. On the x-axis, we see the response options of the categorised EU attitude variable, and on the y-axis, the probability of voting in the EP19 elections.

Figure 7 shows the predicted probabilities of voting from model 1 that are statistically significant. There is a large decreasing effect of being extremely negative towards the union and a sizeable increasing effect of being extremely positive towards the union compared to the reference category of moderate opinion on the electoral turnout. In figure 8, predicting the probability for model 5, these effects are minor and not significant, as previously stated.

Figure 9: Predictive margins for ideology and electoral turnout.




Figure comment: Figure 9 (model 5) illustrates the effect of being far left or far right on electoral turnout compared to moderate opinion. On the x-axis, we see the response options of the categorised ideology variable, and on the y-axis, the probability of voting in the EP19 elections.

Figure 9 shows the predicted probability of Ideology from model 5. As previously mentioned, the effect of ideology is close to zero and insignificant, which the figure illustrates. Thereby the result rejects hypothesis H2b of that extreme attitude toward the left-right ideology scale affects the electoral turnout.

Likelihood ratio tests

Table 9: Likelihood ratio tests for tables 6, 7 and 8.

	<i>Likelihood ratio test model 1 and model 3</i>	<i>Likelihood ratio test model 1 and model 5</i>
Table 6:		
LR chi2(1)=	226.43	240.70
Prob > chi2=	0.000	0.000
Table 7:		
LR chi2(1)=	221,51	235,81
Prob > chi2=	0.000	0.000
Table 8:		
LR chi2(1)=	251.52	262.83
Prob > chi2=	0.000	0,000

When conducting likelihood ratio-tests between model 1 and a model where the independent variable of attitudes towards the EU excludes (model 3), rejects the null hypothesis for all tables, confirming that model 1 better fits the data than model 3.

The thesis rejects the null hypothesis when conducting an LR-test for model 1 and model 5 for all tables, suggesting that the elaborated model better suits the data than model 1. In other words, the fully integrated model is better suited for explaining voting than the previous models in all the regression tables.

Diagnostics and robustness checks

The thesis conducts several diagnostics tests to ensure good predictors for the models. The following paragraphs will give insight into these. Diagnostics do not show tendencies of multicollinearity. According to the goodness of fit tests, the models are correctly specified

Robustness checks:

As discussed earlier in the method and material section, OLS regression is the major tradition in quantitative methods. An OLS regression was made for 'Table 6 to check for the results' robustness compared with the logistic regression result. In *Appendix 3*, the full model (model 5) results indicate a significant correlation between citizens' attitudes towards the EU and the

electoral turnout of the Swedish EP election in 2019 in both tables with and without the participation index. There are, however, some differences in the notice of the OLS regression. The big town/city variable is significant, with two stars in the logistical analysis (Table 6) and only one star in the OLS regression for the same model.

Checking the goodness-of-fit:

A correctly specified model should have a statistically significant “_hat” value, while the “_hatsquare”-value should not be statistically significant. The table shows that the models are correctly specified. The further tests of the goodness-of-fit also indicate that the models have chosen good predictors.

Table 10: Goodness of fit test.

	Table 6 (Model 5)	Table 7 (Model 5)	Table 8 (Model 5)
<i>Hat</i>	1.136*** (0,16)	1,129*** (0,16)	1,040*** (0,15)
<i>Hat squared</i>	-0.048 (0,05)	-0,045 (0,05)	-0,014 (0,05)
<i>Constant</i>	-0,059 (0,12)	-0,057 (0,12)	-0,017 (0,11)
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0,1239	0,1239	0,1226
<i>N</i>	2814	2814	2814
<i>Goodness of fit</i>	84.01 %	84,01 %	83,90 %

All tables show that the models are correctly specified, and all tables have a goodness-of-fit value of around 84 %.

Test checking for multicollinearity in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8:

Values above five perceive as problematic. Results show no signs of multicollinearity when we exclude squared versions of variables, and the interaction term of attitudes towards the EU and ideology, as Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen (2017) suggest. The tables that test multicollinearity are found in *Appendix 6*.

Discussion and conclusions.

To start this last section of this master thesis comes a recurrence of the thesis aim and the hypothesis. This chapter includes an analysis of the regression analysis results presented in the previous chapter and tries to put them in the context of the research field to which this thesis contributes. This chapter also identifies some problems with the chosen method. Further, there is a discussion about the implication and impact of the results on the research field and society and delivers proposals for further research.

This thesis aimed to investigate if the support or attitudes for the EU and attitudes on the left-right ideology scale among Swedish citizens affects the electoral turnout in the elections for the European parliament, as suggested by Stockemer (2012), Schäfer (2021) and Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) according to hypotheses H1a and H2b. The thesis also tested H2a and H2b if extreme attitudes towards the EU or the ideology scale affected the voting turnout. The thesis also investigated a possible moderating effect between attitudes towards the European Union and attitudes on the left-right ideology scale according to H1c and H2c.

It is also important to remember that there is no statistical evidence of a causal correlation if this thesis finds a correlation per se. Although this thesis argues that attitudes affect electoral turnout, even if it is possible that the correlation could be the other way around and that the turnout could possibly affect the attitudes.

This study shows that attitudes towards the EU affect the voter turnout in the Swedish elections for the European parliament, as suggested by Hypothesis 1a, but the effect is relatively weak. The average increase in predicted probability with four percentage points testing the main correlation, but in the full model, including control variables, the probability decreased to about one percentage point for each of the five response options (Table 6).

Regarding the effect of ideology, Figure 4 shows the potential effect of the left-right ideology variable. The variable ranges from the far left at the 85 % probability to the far right at the 81 % probability of voting. The predicted probability indicates that ideology has a negligible effect on the electoral turnout in the Swedish elections for the European parliament in 2019; therefore, hypothesis 1b can be confirmed, but the size of the effect can be questioned. In figure 3, we also see a moderating effect of the variable of left-right ideology, as suggested by Remer-Bollow et al. (2019) and Hernández and Kriesi (2016). The existence of the moderating effect confirms H1c:

The EU attitude variable has the most effect on respondents' far left for increasing voter turnout and shows the opposite for respondents on the far right, indicating that those strongly opposed are more likely to vote than those that are strongly positive.

As suggested by Hypothesis H2a and H2b, the thesis expected a linear curve relationship between attitudes towards the EU and the electoral turnout, as suggested by Braun and Schäfer (2022) and the same with the left-right ideology variable and its effect on the main relationship. Tables 8 and 9 suggest no curvilinear relation between any of these variables. However, some of these results were not statistically significant, indicating that we cannot know this for sure. One reason for the insignificant results might be the structure of either the dependent variable of electoral turnout or the independent variables of attitudes towards the EU or ideology. The dependent variable had an overweight, with people answering that they voted in the elections (79,22 %) compared to those answering that they do not vote (20,78 %). The EU attitude variable also had an overweight, with respondents saying they were strongly positive (13,29 %), somewhat positive (45,58 %) compared to those who were strongly negative (4,11 %) and somewhat negative (11,73%). This can also reflect the increase in support for the EU and a higher interest in the European parliament elections in Sweden that Berg et al. (2019) mention. In figure 6 and table 7, we also see a moderating effect of the variable of left-right ideology, as suggested by Remer-Bollow et al. (2019) and Hernández and Kriesi (2016) confirming H2c and the same pattern appears as discussed for H1c.

The response rate of 41,39 % could possibly have affected the thesis results of this thesis and might have looked different if all the requested respondents had answered. This difference may explain the overweight saying they were positive towards the EU in independent variable of EU attitude. It is also possible that the response rate affects the dependent variable of electoral turnout because politically interested citizens are more likely to vote and also have a higher likelihood of answering these kinds of surveys (Voogt & Saris, 2003). If the data captured a higher degree of those who did not vote, it would give a more accurate result. For example, this can explain the non-significant results of the curve linear correlations of extreme attitudes towards the EU and on the ideology scale in Tables 8 and 9. As these correlations were not significant, these linear curve relationships towards the electoral turnout may exist, but now we cannot know this for sure. The groups with moderate or negative attitudes towards the EU possibly participated less in this survey. The possible absence of these groups could thereby affect this thesis results.

Another disadvantage of this study is that the design does not allow comparing these results to another electoral context, which was one of the main points of this study in contrast to the previous research that compared member states at the macro level.

The thesis confirms the importance of understanding attitudes and attitudes' effect on the electoral turnout in EP elections. More research is needed for the field to look at how attitudes are formed, as Braun and Schäfer (2022); Hernández and Kriesi (2016) and this thesis done by also looking at extreme attitudes.

Another critical factor is that this thesis only investigates these correlations in the Swedish election for the European parliament in 2019. Further studies need to investigate if this correlation exists over several elections to see if this theory has explanatory power beyond the election of 2019. Otherwise, it is impossible to confirm or reject the theory applicable to the EP elections.

For society, this thesis has essential reflections for enhancing and increasing electoral turnout in the elections for the European parliament. First, we see that the more positive citizens are to the union, the more likely they vote in the elections. As Stockemer (2012) mentioned, a low turnout in the EP elections relates to citizens' rejection of the EU project. Thereby it is essential to look at factors to increase both the attitudes and the turnout. One possible answer to increasing turnout is an information campaign to citizens about the EU's positive decisions for the European citizens, thereby increasing the citizens' positive attitudes. As Stockemer (2012), a critical factor for the gap in turnout between national elections and elections for EP is individual citizens' Eurosceptic attitudes deriving from the distrust towards the EU institutions and their democratic or lack of democratic procedures. Thereby I argue it is also reasonable to ensure the EU institutions' trust via strengthening the democratic procedures and involving and enhancing the citizens' influences over the EU politics in the member states via the governments as well as for the state's representatives of the European parliament. I would also argue for the importance of strengthening and increasing the presence of a debate concerning EU affairs at the national level, as political campaigning is mentioned in previous research as an essential factor for enhancing electoral turnout (Marquart et al., 2020; Schmitt et al., 2015; Wessels & Franklin, 2009).

Another point from previous literature is the European parliament's increasing influence. One interpretation is that when the parliament's influence increases, the value of the citizens' perceptions and attitudes increases with the parliament's increasing influence, which could explain an increasing electoral turnout (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; Ehin & Talving, 2021; Hobolt, 2015; Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010). Therefore, the increasing influence could explain the increasing electoral turnout, as Berg et al. (2019) mentioned previously.

Of the control variables of this thesis, there is evidence that gender, political interest, education level, income, political interest, and political knowledge and trust for the European parliament increase the probability of turnout. Thereby to enhance electoral turnout on the individual level, one way is to spread more knowledge about politics in general and the EU especially.

Oscarsson and Holmberg (2016) said the interest and turnout for the elections to the EP are lower than for the national elections. From this theoretical perspective is a sign that the EP elections are not as important or exciting as possible the national elections. Although the negative trend for turnout in these elections in Europe, Sweden has turned a negative trend, and more citizens are positive towards the union (Berg et al., 2019), the results of this thesis can also point in that direction. As for the case, Sweden was chosen due to its trend breaking and increasing turnout and that the electoral system includes most of the institutional reforms enhancing a high turnout. Therefore, it was argued that the linear curve pattern could appear more clearly in the Swedish electorate. However, this may not seem correct for the results of this thesis, which does not support a linear curve pattern. Therefore, it would be interesting with a similar study but with another member state's electorate with another composition of attitudes towards the EU.

A final remark. As this thesis previously stated, it builds on a research gap where all previous studies investigating attitudes (and extreme attitudes) effect on electoral turnout on a macro level. This gap is thereby still open for further research on the micro-level between citizens' attitudes in other electoral contexts of the EU member states.

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Appendix 1: List of the coding of variables

Dependent variable

Electoral turnout

Variable name in the dataset: v7007b
Renamed as EP19turnout

"Did you vote in the 2019 European parliamentary elections?"

Answer options: Yes, coded as (1) and No, coded as (0).

The "Do not want to answer" option excludes from the analysis. The respondent's answers were checked and corrected with the register data

Independent variable

Attitudes towards the EU

Variable name in the dataset: Q27
Renamed as EUattitude

Squared variable: EUattitude_sq

Categorical variable measuring
extremism: EUattitude_cat

"In general, what is your attitude towards the EU?"

Answer options: Strongly negative coded as (0), Somewhat negative as (1), Neither positive nor negative as (2), Somewhat positive as (3) and Strongly positive as (4).

The option "No perception" is excluded from the analysis. The order of the variable options is reversed, so the more positive perception is ranked as the highest value. The variable will in the analysis also include a squared version to capture the potential effect of a curvilinear correlation with the dependent variable.

The EUattitude_cat variable is built on the EUattitude variable but recoded. Thereby the response options of "Somewhat negative", "Somewhat positive", and "Neither positive nor negative" is coded as 0. "Strongly negative" is coded as 1, and "Strongly positive" is coded as 2.

Ideology

Variable name in the dataset: Q46
Renamed as leftright

Squared variable: leftright_sq

Categorical variable measuring
extremism: leftright_cat

"Where would you place yourself on a scale between 0 and 10 where 0 is far to the left and 10 is far to the right?"

Answer options: 0 = far left; (1); (2); (3); (4); (5) = neither left nor right; (6); (7); (8); (9); and (10) = far right.

The variable will in the analysis also include a squared version to capture the potential effect of a curvilinear correlation with the dependent variable.

The leftright_cat variable is built on the leftright variable but recoded. Thereby the response options of 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are coded as (0) and called "Moderate opinion. 0 1 and 2 are coded as (1) and called "Far left". 8, 9 and 10 are coded as (2) and called "Far right".

Control variables

Gender

Variable name in the dataset: Q59
Renamed as gender

"Are you?"

With the answer options: Male coded as (1) and woman coded as (2).

Age

Variable name in the dataset: Q60
Renamed as age

Squared variable: age_sq

"What year were you born?" Respondents fill in their birth year. The variable recodes to the respondent's age. The variable will in the analysis also include a squared version to capture the potential effect of a curvilinear correlation with the dependent variable.

Education

Variable name in the dataset:
Renamed as educationlevel

"What is your highest completed level of education?"

Answer options:

Not completed primary school, or corresponding, Primary school or corresponding compulsory school is coded together as Low education (1).

Studies at upper secondary school, folk high school, junior secondary school (or corresponding), a degree from upper secondary school, junior secondary school (or corresponding), folk high school and tertiary education, not college or university, coded together as Medium education (2).

Studies at college/university, a degree from college/university, a degree or present studies at a postgraduate education merged and coded as High education (3).

Answer option: "Other" excludes from the analysis.

Income

Variable name in the dataset:
Renamed as incomecat

"What is your household's approximate total annual income in Swedish crowns before tax (including pension, student loan, etc.)."

Answer options:

Less than 100 000, 100 001 – 200 000, 200 001 – 300 000, 300 001 – 400 000 coded as Low income (1). 400 001 – 500 000, 500 001 – 600 000, 600 001 – 700 000, 700 001 – 800 000 coded as Medium income (2). 800 001 – 900 000, 900 001 – 1 000 000, 1 000 001 – 1 100 000 and more than 1 100 000 coded as High income (3).

Place of residency

Variable name in the dataset: Q62
Renamed as area

"Where do you live?"

Answer options: Rural area coded as (1), Small town and village as Small town/Village (2), Big town and City as Big town/City (3) and Large city: outer areas/suburb and Large city: central area as Big city (4),

Political interest

Variable name in the dataset: Q6
Renamed as pol_intr

"Overall, how interested are you in politics?"

Answer options: Not at all interested coded as (1). Not very interested as (2). Quite interested as (3) and Very interested as (4).

Political interest in the EU

Variable name in the dataset: Q7
Renamed as EUpol_intr

"In general, how interested are you in political issues concerning the EU?"

Answer options: Not at all interested coded as (1), Not very interested coded (2), Quite interested coded as (3) and Very interested coded as (4).

Political knowledge

Variable name in the dataset: Q8
Renamed as pol_knowledge

"In your opinion, how good is your knowledge of politics?"

Answer options: Not good at all coded as (1), Not very good coded as (2), Pretty good coded as (3) and Very good coded as (4).

Consumption of news regarding the EU

Variable name in the dataset: Q5c
Renamed as EUnews

"When you read the news coverage in the media, how much do you usually read about politics concerning Europe or the European Union?"

Answer options: Nothing or almost nothing coded as (1), Not very much coded as (2), Pretty much coded as (3) and Pretty much everything coded as (4).

Trust in the European parliament

Variable name in the dataset: Q11d
Renamed as EPtrust

"In general, how much trust do you have in the European parliament?"

Answer options: Very little trust coded as (1), Quite a bit of trust coded as (2), Quite a lot of trust coded as (3) and Very much trust coded as (4). Response option "No perception" was excluded from the analysis.

Appendix 2: Correlation matrix over variables

	EP19 turnout	EU attitude	Ideology	Gender	Age	Education	Income
EP19 turnout	1.0000						
EU attitude	0.1663	1.0000					
Ideology	-0.0241	-0.0340	1.0000				
Gender	0.0316	0.0377	-0.1582	1.0000			
Age	0.0374	-0.0537	0.0389	-0.0596	1.0000		
Education	0.1445	0.2214	-0.0025	0.1525	-0.2681	1.0000	
Income	0.1121	0.1486	0.1653	-0.0720	-0.1653	0.2696	1.0000
Place of residency	0.0633	0.1340	-0.0070	0.0381	-0.1648	0.2394	0.0991
Political interest	0.2317	0.1353	-0.0128	-0.1332	0.1117	0.1707	0.0617
Political interest in EU	0.2342	0.2420	-0.0189	-0.0699	0.1277	0.1705	0.0433
Political knowledge	0.1950	0.0846	0.0547	-0.1702	0.0967	0.1556	0.0770
News consumption of EU news	0.1983	0.2003	-0.0113	-0.0253	0.1686	0.1661	0.0484
Trust in EP	0.1904	0.5466	-0.1516	0.0945	-0.0496	0.2512	0.0958

	Place of residency	Political interest	Political interest in EU	Political knowledge	News consumption of EU news	Trust in EP
Place of residency	1.0000					
Political interest	0.0833	1.0000				
Political interest in EU	0.1011	0.7029	1.0000			
Political knowledge	0.0794	0.6520	0.5144	1.0000		
News consumption of EU news	0.0994	0.5170	0.6132	0.4251	1.0000	
Trust in EP	0.1195	0.1717	0.2787	0.1316	0.2448	1.0000

Table comment: The correlation table includes all variables except the categorical and squared versions of the variables EU attitude, ideology and age.

Appendix 3: OLS regression over the whole model of table 6.

	Model 5
EUattitude	0.0586*** (3.72)
Ideology	0.0149** (2.22)
EUattitude##Ideology	-0.00697*** (-2.88)
Gender	
(ref: Male)	
Female	0.0347** (2.46)
Age	
	-0.00542* (-1.91)
Age squared	0.0000663** (2.37)
Education	
(ref: Low education)	
Medium education	0.0365 (1.36)
High education	0.0683** (2.42)
Income	
(ref: Low income)	
Medium income	0.0506*** (3.00)
High income	0.0919*** (4.72)
Place of residency	
(ref: Rural area)	
Small town/village	-0.0145 (-0.64)
Big town/city	-0.0383* (-1.75)
Big city	0.00419 (0.19)
Political interest	
	0.0461*** (3.15)
Political interest in the EU	
	0.0300** (1.98)
Political knowledge	
	0.0362*** (2.63)
EU news consumption	
	0.0154 (1.36)
Trust in the EP	
	0.0392*** (3.80)
Constant	0.247*** (2.81)
Observations	2814
R ²	0.108

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Appendix 4: Full version of Table 7: Effects on Electoral turnout including squared variables of EU attitude and ideology.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP
EU attitude	0.0390 (0.22)	0,01	0.157 (0.83)	0,2			0.413** (2.06)	0,01	0.473** (2.21)	0,02
EU attitude squared	0.0910** (2.19)	0,01	-0.00309 (-0.07)	-0,0			0.0895** (2.12)	0,01	0.000575 (0.01)	0,00
Ideology			-0.0548 (-0.64)	-0,01	-0.0409 (-0.48)	-0,00	-0.0371 (-0.41)	-0,02	0.0821 (0.85)	-0,01
Ideology squared			0.00264 (0.33)	0,00	0.00140 (0.18)	0,00	0.0154** (1.98)	0,00	0.00210 (0.26)	0,00
EU attitude ## Ideology							-0.0639*** (-3.39)		-0.0584*** (-2.95)	
Gender (ref: Male)										
Women			0.262** (2.29)	0,03	0.257** (2.25)	0,03			0.258** (2.25)	0,03
Age			-0.0498** (-2.16)	-0,01	-0.0546** (-2.38)	-0,01			-0.0467** (-2.02)	-0,01
Age squared			0.000609*** (2.65)	0,00	0.000654*** (2.85)	0,00			0.000586** (2.54)	0,00
Education level (ref: Low education)										
Medium education			0.254 (1.35)	0,03	0.271 (1.44)	0,04			0.235 (1.24)	0,03
High education			0.527** (2.54)	0,07	0.556*** (2.69)	0,07			0.517** (2.48)	0,06
Income (ref: Low income)										
Medium income			0.367*** (2.85)	0,05	0.377*** (2.94)	0,05			0.373*** (2.90)	0,05
High income			0.734*** (4.54)	0,09	0.775*** (4.82)	0,09			0.755*** (4.66)	0,09
Place of residency (ref: Rural area)										
Small town/ village			-0.140 (-0.80)	-0,02	-0.148 (-0.85)	-0,02			-0.126 (-0.72)	-0,01
Big town/city			-0.357** (-2.08)	-0,04	-0.346** (-2.02)	-0,04			-0.344** (-2.01)	-0,04
Big city			0.0538 (0.30)	0,01	0.0664 (0.37)	0,01			0.0564 (0.31)	0,01
Political interest			0.321*** (2.76)	0,04	0.318*** (2.74)	0,04			0.320*** (2.74)	0,04
Political interest in EU			0.280** (2.30)	0,03	0.300** (2.47)	0,03			0.257** (2.10)	0,03
Political knowledge			0.278** (2.57)	0,03	0.258** (2.41)	0,03			0.282*** (2.60)	0,03
Consumption of EU news			0.0882 (0.98)	0,01	0.0956 (1.06)	0,01			0.0910 (1.00)	0,01
Trust in EP			0.322*** (3.84)	0,04	0.412*** (5.52)	0,05			0.324*** (3.86)	0,04
Constant	0.859*** (4.95)		-1.609** (-2.40)		-1.391** (-2.15)		0.460 (1.40)		-2.410*** (-3.34)	
Observations	2814		2814		2814		2814		2814	
Pseudo R ²	0.031		0.120		0.118		0.038		0.124	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Appendix 5: Full version of Table 8: Effects on Electoral turnout with EU attitude and left-right variable measuring extremism compared with moderate opinions.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP	Coef. (SE)	ΔPP
EU attitude (ref: Moderate attitude)										
Extreme negative	-0.863*** (-4.23)	-0,16	-0.456** (-1.98)	-0,06			-0.846*** (-2.88)	-0,17	-0.285 (-0.89)	-0,07
Extreme positive	0.898*** (4.86)	0,10	0.196 (0.98)	0,02			0.809*** (3.45)	0,09	0.0776 (0.31)	0,02
Ideology (ref: Moderate attitude)										
Extreme left			0.234 (1.42)	0,03	0.227 (1.38)	0,02	0.425** (2.50)	0,05	0.258 (1.43)	0,03
Extreme right			0.00461 (0.04)	0,00	-0.00122 (-0.01)	-0,0	0.104 (0.79)	0,02	-0.0134 (-0.10)	0,00
EUattitude# #Ideology (ref: Moderate attitude)										
Extreme negative # Extreme left							-1.035* (-1.80)		-1.253* (-1.95)	
Extreme negative # Extreme right							0.384 (0.82)		0.0781 (0.16)	
Extreme positive # Extreme left							0.618 (0.95)		0.780 (1.18)	
Extreme positive # Extreme right							0.0100 (0.02)		0.0734 (0.17)	
Gender (ref: Male)										
Female			0.249** (2.18)	0,03	0.255** (2.24)	0,03			0.249** (2.18)	0,03
Age										
			-0.0509** (-2.21)	-0,0	-0.0542** (-2.36)	-0,0			-0.0504** (-2.19)	-0,0
Age squared										
			0.000619*** (2.69)	0,00	0.000650*** (2.84)	0,00			0.000616*** (2.68)	0,00
Education (ref: Low education)										
Medium education			0.255 (1.35)	0,04	0.269 (1.43)	0,04			0.257 (1.36)	0,04
High education			0.541*** (2.62)	0,07	0.557*** (2.70)	0,07			0.544*** (2.62)	0,07
Income (ref: low income)										
Medium income			0.357*** (2.78)	0,05	0.374*** (2.92)	0,05			0.366*** (2.84)	0,05
High income			0.738*** (4.60)	0,09	0.767*** (4.80)	0,09			0.756*** (4.70)	0,09
Place of residency (ref: Rural area)										
Small town/village			-0.137 (-0.78)	-0,02	-0.150 (-0.86)	-0,02			-0.133 (-0.76)	-0,01
Big town/city			-0.340** (-1.99)	-0,04	-0.344** (-2.01)	-0,04			-0.326* (-1.90)	-0,04
Big city			0.0618 (0.34)	0,01	0.0615 (0.34)	0,01			0.0661 (0.37)	0,01
Political interest										
			0.309*** (2.66)	0,04	0.315*** (2.71)	0,04			0.323*** (2.76)	0,04

Political interest in EU		0.295** (2.43)	0,03	0.301** (2.48)	0,03	0.281** (2.31)	0,03
Political knowledge		0.269** (2.50)	0,03	0.254** (2.37)	0,03	0.258** (2.39)	0,03
Consumption of EU news		0.0910 (1.01)	0,01	0.0944 (1.05)	0,01	0.0953 (1.05)	0,01
Trust in EP		0.363*** (4.64)	0,04	0.413*** (5.53)	0,05	0.362*** (4.62)	0,04
Constant	1.543*** (27.95)	-1.537** (-2.51)		-1.582*** (-2.59)		1.457*** (20.87)	-1.552** (-2.53)
Observations	2814	2814		2814		2814	2814
Pseudo R ²	0.019	0.120		0.118		0.025	0.123

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Appendix 6: Test for multicollinearity in tables 6, 7 and 8.

Table 10: Test for multicollinearity in tables 6 and 8.

	VIF-values, Table 6 (Model 5)	VIF-values, Table 8 (Model 5)
<i>EU attitude</i>	1,49	14,27
<i>EU attitude squared</i>	-	14,20
<i>Ideology</i>	1,10	16,20
<i>Ideology squared</i>	-	16,08
<i>Gender</i>	1,11	1,12
<i>Age</i>	1,20	1,24
<i>Medium education</i>	3,80	3,85
<i>High education</i>	4,37	4,45
<i>Medium income</i>	1,49	1,54
<i>High income</i>	1,63	1,79
<i>Small town/village</i>	2,03	2,04
<i>Big town/city</i>	2,27	2,29
<i>Big city</i>	2,38	2,40
<i>Political interest</i>	2,61	2,62
<i>Political interest in the EU</i>	2,48	2,50
<i>Political knowledge</i>	1,83	1,85
<i>Consumption of EU news</i>	1,72	1,72
<i>Trust in the EP</i>	1,56	1,56

Table 11: Test for multicollinearity in table 8.

	VIF-values (Model 5)
<i>EU attitude</i>	
<i>Extreme negative</i>	2,24
<i>Extreme positive</i>	2,02
<i>Ideology</i>	
<i>Extreme left</i>	1,41
<i>Extreme right</i>	1,40
<i>EUattitude##Ideology</i>	
<i>Extreme negative # Extreme left</i>	1,40
<i>Extreme negative # Extreme right</i>	1,91
<i>Extreme positive # Extreme left</i>	1,62
<i>Extreme positive # Extreme right</i>	1,74
<i>Gender</i>	1,11
<i>Age</i>	1,20
<i>Medium education</i>	3,84

<i>High education</i>	4,43
<i>Medium income</i>	1,54
<i>High income</i>	1,76
<i>Small town/village</i>	2,04
<i>Big town/city</i>	2,29
<i>Big city</i>	2,40
<i>Political interest</i>	2,63
<i>Political interest in the EU</i>	2,49
<i>Political knowledge</i>	1,84
<i>Consumption of EU news</i>	1,72
<i>Trust in the EP</i>	1,34