



DEPARTMENT

School of Global Studies

Effects of the neoliberal agenda on abortion policy and sexual rights in Poland and Ireland;

A Comparative Feminist Global Political Economy analysis

Author

Moa Berglund

Words: 19'937

Thesis:	30 hp
Program:	MSc Global Studies
Level:	Second Cycle
Term/year:	Spring 2022
Supervisor:	Erik Andersson
Examiner:	Joakim Öjendal

Abstract

Thesis:	30 hp
Program:	MSc Global Studies
Level:	First Cycle/Second Cycle
Term/year:	Spring 2022
Supervisor:	Erik Andersson
Examiner:	Joakim Öjendal
Grade:	Pass (G)
Keywords:	Feminist Global Political Economy, Abortion Policy, SRHR, Poland, Ireland, Process-Tracing

In Europe, abortion policy shifts drastically across the region despite the EU's efforts to make it equally accessible. The differences in access to abortion are often connected to the level of religious impact on the government, and Roman Catholicism is often viewed as the villain when an EU country restricts its abortion and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) policies. This thesis will through a process-tracing method and a Feminist Global Political Economy (FGPE) theoretical framework, look at two of the most Roman Catholic states within the EU, Ireland and Poland, to see if there are alternative explanations for the Catholic Church's influence. Ireland and Poland are interesting cases because they both have had major changes in their SRHR and abortion policies since 1990, however, the changes have been in the opposite direction. The background in this thesis shows an overview of Ireland becoming more liberal -and Poland's becoming more restricted- in their abortion policies. Later with the use of the FGPE theoretical framework, focusing on Neoliberalism, Household and Social Reproduction and Reproductive governance, this thesis examines alternative explanations for these shifts in abortion policy. This study found that there seems to be a correlation between the adaptation to the neoliberal agenda and abortion policies. However, one cannot argue state that there is a clear causality between the two, because many factors have affected the abortion policy in both countries.

Acronyms and glossary

GPE: global political economy

FGPE: feminist global political economy

SRHR: Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

NGO: non-governmental organization

ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights

HDI: Human Development Index

GDP: Gross domestic product

SR: Social reproduction

Acknowledgements and thanks

I would like to thank my supervisor, Erik Andersson, for the many hours of support, guidance, and discussions. Without your knowledge and guidance on the Global Political Economy, this thesis would not be what it is today.

To my friends and family, thank you for your endless support over these few years. It has been a fun ride, and I promise you that my next chapter is found at this finish line.

Content

1. Introduction	5
1.1 Research Problem	6
1.2 Aim	7
1.3 Delimitation	7
1.4 Relevance to Global Studies	8
2. Theory	9
2.1 Literature review	9
2.2 Feminist perspective on Global Political Economy (FGPE)	13
3. Method, Research & Analytical framework	16
3.1 Research Design	16
3.2 Method : Process-Tracing	16
3.3 Data	17
3.4 Analytical Framework	18
3.4.1 Neoliberalism	19
3.4.2 Household	19
3.4.3 Social Reproduction and Reproductive Governance	20
3.5 Ethics	21
4. Results	21
4.1 Abortion policy process in Ireland	21
4.2 Abortion policy process in Poland	23
4.3 Results analysis	26
4.3.1 Neoliberalism	26
4.3.2. Household	33
4.3.3 Social Reproduction and Reproductive Governance	38
5. Concluding Analysis	45
5.1 Conclusion	48
5.2 Comments and Recommendation for further research	49
6. References	51
6.1 Statistical data resources	64

1. Introduction

Access to safe and legal abortion is a public health matter, but not an outspoken human right. However, arguments for access to abortions are found in many human rights such as the right to life; rights to health and health care; right to information; right to privacy; right to decide the number and spacing of children; right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; and right to freedom of conscience and religion (Human Rights Watch, 2018). In European countries like Finland, Iceland, Poland, and the UK, abortion is not given on request, rather the woman must have a social, economic, or medical reason to get an abortion (Exelgyn, 2020a). So even if abortion is a public health issue, there seem to be different factors that affect access to abortion. The relationship between abortion and the state has been studied extensively, where scholars look at factors such as nationalism, stigmatization, social movements, and religion to explain the differences in accessibility (Nowicka, 2009; McMurtrie et.al, 2012; Kozolowska, Béland & Lecours, 2016; Calkin & Kaminska, 2020). However, religion seems to be discussed as one of the major hinders to the access to abortion. Scholars such as Blofield (2008) emphasize that Catholicism and Catholic democracies in western countries "consistently oppose any form of legal abortion" (Blofield, 2008:399); and other scholars such as Nowicka (2009) argue that the right to access abortion and SRHR in Central and Eastern Europe is not seldom hindered by religious fundamentalism and especially Christian fundamentalists (Nowicka, 2009: 252).

When thinking of Catholic democracies in Europe one often thinks of either the Republic of Ireland or Poland, which is not strange. Nowadays around 78 % of the Irish citizens identify as Roman Catholic (CSO, 2016), and around 87% of the Polish citizens identify themselves with the Roman Catholic Church (AECEA, 2021). What these two countries have in common more than just being European, members of the EU, and having big Catholic populations; is that they both have had over the last year a dramatic change in their abortion policies. However, their changes have been in opposite directions. In October 2020, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal banned abortion in cases of "serious malformation of the foetus" considering it to be "incompatible with the Constitution" (European Parliament, 2021). This ruling was passed into law on the 27th of January 2021, and it prohibits "all abortions in Poland except in cases of rape and incest, or when the mother's life is in danger" (ibid). The European Parliament is condemning this change of policy, and the European Parliament says that these new policies are "an attack on fundamental rights, the rule of law and core EU values" (ibid). Moreover, the new Polish policies are very similar to the policies that Ireland legislated in 1980, but which changed in 2018. Until 2018, Ireland had a "protection of life du-

ring pregnancy act”, which meant that abortion could only be carried out to “avert a real and substantial risk to the life of the pregnant woman” (Irish Department of Health, 2020:2). In 2018 the government of Ireland passed the new ‘Health Act’. This allows abortion in cases of: “risk to the life, or of serious harm to the health, of the pregnant woman, including in an emergency; where there is a condition present which is likely to lead to the death of the foetus either before or within 28 days of birth; and without restriction up to 12 weeks of pregnancy” (ibid).

The drastic changes in the opposite directions make one wonder both ‘how come?’ and ‘is it the influence of religion in the state, or are there other factors that can explain this phenomenon?’. Hence this study will instead of looking to religion as an explanation, look to feminist economics, and more specifically, feminist global political economy, to understand the legislative changes Ireland and Poland have made over the past years.

1.1 Research problem

In a broader sense, this study is an attempt to see how feminist global political economy (FGPE) arguments can be used to relate economic structures and patriarchal power systems. The different changes Ireland and Poland have made raise questions on whether the influence of religion on a state is the main reason for the pro-life agenda; or whether there can be other economic factors that can explain these different changes. Previous research has looked at the phenomenon of abortion policy, however, many theorists and scholars have neglected looking into political economy and economic indicator impacts on access to abortion and SRHR. Those who do look to these impacts tend to write the relationship off as a matter of ‘education level’, ‘number of women in parliament’ or a matter of ‘private and public issues’ (Bergeron, 2001; Tanyag, 2017; Blofield, 2008; Bedford and Rai, 2013; Dema Moreno et.al, 2020).

Feminist scholars have pointed out that the private is never private, rather the term ‘private’ is used as a tool to dismiss women’s issues from the public political agenda. As MacKinnon (1989) stated, “The private is public for those whom the personal is political. In this sense, for women there is no private[...].” (MacKinnon, 1989:191). For women the personal is political, so to dismiss issues such as abortion as a ‘private’ matter, could be understood as a tool feeding into the patriarchal systems that are controlling women's (and sometimes men's) bodies.

Moreover, it seems odd that abortion is not commonly looked at through the feminist global political economy perspective when the theoretical scholars acknowledge that we are living in a neoliberal capitalist society, where production and consumption are ruling our way of living. Hence this study will use feminist global political economy (FGPE) theory, to understand the causes of Ireland's and Poland's change of policy.

1.2 Aim

To seek the FGPE explanation for the different abortion policies, this study will be drawing on previous feminist, political, and economic research to explore the connection between FGPE and abortion policy in the cases of Ireland and Poland.

This study will be focusing on the cases of the Roman Catholic European countries Ireland and Poland because these two countries both have a strong Roman Catholic national identity, and they both have in recent years changed their abortion policy. However, they have changed it in the opposite direction; Poland has become more restrictive, whereas Ireland has adopted a more liberal abortion policy. Hence I argue that there must be other explanations than 'a high religious influence to state' or a 'strong feminist movement' to why the two countries change their policies. Moreover, through the FGPE theory, this study will compare legislation processes and governmental discussions of the two countries to explore an FGPE explanation of what else influenced the governmental decisions on the new abortion laws. Hence this is a comparative study that will through a process-tracing method examine if and how GPE have influenced the different changes in the two countries.

The research questions that will be investigated in this study are thereby:

- * What FGPE factors have had an impact on the different policy changes on abortion in Ireland and Poland?
- * When applying the theory of FGPE to the cases of Ireland and Poland, what are the biggest differences between the two countries?

1.3 Delimitation

Many factors could be seen as affecting abortion policy processes, however, this study is only interested in examining the economic politics through the FGPE perspective. To isolate the relationship between abortion policy and FGPE indicators in the specific cases of Ireland and Poland, this study

will not look to other explanations such as social movement and religion, which other scholars such as Cap (2004), Cullen & Korolczuk (2019), and Nowicka (2009) have. The choice to only look at abortion policy through the FGPE perspective might limit the results to a bigger discussion on "why implement restricted abortion policy?". However, this study intends to look at an FGPE explanation and see if the FGPE theory can provide a new way of looking at abortion policy rather than answering the big question of "why?" or "why not?" a country implemented restrictive abortion policies.

1.4 Relevance to global studies

The relevance of this study to the Global Studies field is broad. Previous courses in the Global Studies master's program have included theories and literature on international politics, environmental studies, sustainable development research, and other global matters. However, Global studies have also included studies and theories on power relations, gendering economics, feminizing labour, feminist readings on globalization, gendered governance and gendered global political economy; which could be seen as interlinked with the feminist global political economy perspective this study is utilising.

The literature in the Global Studies program included Husky and Rai (2005) who researches a gendered International political economy and the need to rethink globalization, and Waylen (2011) who says that a greater understanding of a gendered analysis on governance and globalisation "should be integrated" (Waylen, 2011:557). It also included Nagar et.al (2002) who problematized feminist understandings of economic globalization, where they state that feminist analysis of globalisation requires a "rethinking of how to conceptualize, study, and act in relation to economic globalization" (Nagar et.al: 2002:257). Standing's (1999) theories were also introduced that looked at the feminization of the labour market and states, and argues that there is a need for social protection systems was referred to in the courses (Standing, 1999:600). Lastly, there were many discussions about women's labour through scholars such as Domínguez et.al (2010) who have researched the labour standards for women in the maquiladora sector in Mexico and Latin America, where their research states that sexual harassments and systematic physical violence against women workers within the factory are a global phenomenon (Domínguez et.al 2010:194).

As one can tell, Global study is an academic field that looks to inter-discipline perspectives to understand global structures and matters; such as power relations. To clarify, this study relates to

Global Studies because it will look at power relations, and more specifically: political-economic power relations that influence women's health.

2. Theory

The theory section will firstly give a general literature review looking at both previously written comparisons between Poland and Ireland but also look at other alternative ideas that might explain restricted abortion policies. Thereafter, the text will go into the theories of "Feminist Global Political Economy" to provide a theoretical background for the analytical framework that will be introduced in the method section.

2.1 Literature review

To understand why the abortion laws in European countries are so different, scholars such as Malovic (2015) argue that it depends on a general lack of "recognition of abortion as a self-standing human right" (Malovic, 2015:14). The comparison between Ireland and Poland has been done many times, and it is important to keep in mind, as Levels et. al (2014) argue, that abortion reforms and laws do not happen in a vacuum, it is rather policies influenced by other developments in other states (Levels, Sluiter & Need, 2014:103). For example, the Catholic Church's influence has changed over the years, and since early 2000 the church has had much more "sway" over the Irish population than in Poland, which Cap (2004) explains is tied to the communist background of Poland (Cap, 2004:15). Today this is not the case; the Catholic Church has less "sway" over the Irish population with its declining religious population and distancing between its government and Church (Beesley, 2018).

Cullen and Korolczuk (2019) examine the "narratives of abortion" in Ireland and Poland by focusing on how "pro-choice organisations responded to attempts to stigmatize abortion in campaigns aimed at reducing access or maintaining- ing prohibition to reproductive care" (Cullen & Korolczuk, 2019:6-7). Here the stigmatization of abortion is seen as a "central component" in the pro-life campaigns, and it has allowed legislators to ignore the need for abortion and SRHR historically (ibid: 6, 16). The Catholic stigmatization around abortion is also recognized in a Mexican context, where scholars such as McMurtrie et.al (2012) claimed that women's "whole social network" could change if abortions were known (McMurtrie, García, Wilson, Diaz-Olavarrieta & Fawcett, 2012: 163).

Furthermore, Cullen and Korolczuk recognize that social mobilizing and social movement have a big impact on SRHR. They claim that the social feminist movement can address the discrimination against SRHR and de-stigmatize the ideas on abortion given by the Catholic Church's influence on the state (Cullen & Korolczuk, 2019:6-7). Mattalucci et.al (2018) claim that the impact of social mobilization has helped to stop restrictive abortion laws in Europe on many occasions eg. in Spain in 2014, and Poland in 2016 (Mattalucci, Mistal & Zordo, 2018:9). Other scholars such as Nowicka (2009) argue that both a weak civil society and religious fundamentalism are a "major obstacle to the realization of SRHR" in Central and Eastern Europe (Nowicka, 2009: 251). Nowicka separates religious fundamentalists and civil society and argues that a weak civil society is a big factor in the increased impact of religious and conservative forces influencing law and policy. Because the civil society and women's movement in these countries is not strong enough to fight these forces (ibid: 252,253).

However, all researchers do not agree on the potential impact of social movement and social mobilization. Calkin and Kaminska (2020) argue that social- and women's movements might not have a big an impact in Ireland or Poland because both countries have witnessed "large-scale pro-choice mobilizations and public protests" with the protests giving varying results (Calkin & Kaminska, 2020: 87). In Ireland the social movement helped the process of the referendum in 2018; however, in Poland, the social movement seemed only to intensify more restrictions on abortion and SRHR (ibid:87). They instead explain that it is the institutional position of the Catholic Church within the state that has had the biggest impact on different reforms in abortion rights (ibid: 97-98). Further, Kozlowski et.al (2016) agree that social movement does not sufficiently explain the changes in abortion policy, and they argue that religion, when it interacts with nationalism, has a significant impact on abortion policies (Kozolowska, Béland & Lecours, 2016:840, 841). They claim that a strong relationship between national identity and the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and Poland "helps opponents of an abortion enact and maintain such restrictions in the name of religious norms embedded in strong claims about national identities" (ibid: 825). It is here instead a "religion-nationalism nexus" that empowers actors such as the Catholic Church (ibid: 840).

Others discuss language as a tool for dismissing women's rights. Dillon (1996) compared Ireland, Poland, the US, the UK, and Wales- and argued that the language used by bishops in these countries has a big impact on how Catholics deal with women's issues and rights (Dillon, 1996, 34). In 1996

they state that Polish bishops gave women's issues the least attention in discussions, which they argue, was a strategy to dismiss the relevance of women's issues in Poland (ibid:34). To ignore talking about SRHR as a strategy is also discussed in Gideon et.al (2015) analysis of Brazil and Chile. Here they argue that the Catholic Church's influence is making the countries, despite having universal health care systems and economic development, ignore SRHR and these issues are "kept off the political agenda" (Gideon, Leite & Minte, 2015:10-16). They further argue that power relations are essential in understanding policy because the Catholic Church is influencing many more fields than the health sector (ibid:7, 10).

Furthermore, in studies that look beyond Ireland and Poland, some see a 'strong fight' between the feminist movement and the Catholic Church. Beattie (2010) researches the feminist vs Catholic debate on 'pro-life vs pro-choice' and she states that abortion is a human dilemma, not a scientific one (Beattie, 2010: 53). She relates to statistics that show that women are at a "much greater risk of death and injury in Catholic countries" because abortion is hindered in these countries and maternal death rates in these countries have little strength in comparison to the "millions of murdered babies" propaganda by the Catholic Church (ibid: 55-56). Further, the feminist scholar Weitz (1998) recognizes the debate of "women's life" vs "the life of the foetus", and argues that as long as women do not have "absolute control to their bodies" they cannot be "fully equal in society" (Weitz, 1998: 9-10). The discussion that restrictive sexual and bodily rights are hindering women from becoming full citizens has also been discussed by Hoff (1994) who insists that abortion is not simply about abortion; rather it is a gendered concept that when denied or forced upon are marking women "of their second-class citizenship" (Hoff, 1994: 621). The control of women's bodies can be understood through the term "reproductive governance". According to Morgan and Roberts (2012) the concept of "reproductive governance", refers to different mechanisms by "state, religious, and international financial institutions, NGOs, and social movements" and their use of "legislative controls, economic inducements, moral injunctions, direct coercion, and ethical incitements to produce, monitor, and control reproductive behaviours and population practices" (Morgan & Roberts, 2012: 241). Reproductive governance does not simply mean a way to control abortion rates, rather it is a way to facilitate "modern contraceptive methods" in developing contexts, where even the Catholic Church in some contexts has made efforts to support access to these contraceptive methods (ibid: 245)

Moreover, others look to neoliberalism as an explanatory factor for restrictive abortion laws. Mateo (2020) researches SRHR politics in Chile and states that "anti-genderism and the repression of re-

productive rights are such common motives in authoritarian neoliberalism” (Mateo, 2020: 598). The effect of authoritarian neoliberalism is also shown in Poland, an economically liberal country, that has taken "aggressive action” against LGBTQI persons and women’s rights and freedoms (ibid:598). In addition, Mateo claims that Hayek's neoliberal theory looks to the ”success of a group means surviving”, and successful capitalist life is equated with growth and a growing population (ibid: 605). This liberal social order is to be a spontaneous one, and all control would destroy the development and growth (ibid: 605). Thereby abortion has been seen as an economic issue because it touches upon growth and the ability to control it. Neoliberal impact on SRHR is found in other contexts, scholars such as Purewal (2018) argues that abortion policies in India are used for both a neoliberal economy and to keep traditional value (Purewal, 2018:21). Purewal claims that India’s neoliberal society has a high patriarchal influence, which affects ”women’s non-autonomous subjecthood in capitulating to the authority and structures of ’tradition’ ” (ibid: 21, 27). Patriarchy is here defined as a power system that excludes women, and the system maintained its dominance through the state, the communities, and family structures. The state patriarchy is also a type of governance that forces men and women to ”fit into a system of social organization” (ibid: 24).

Except for stigmatization, social movement, nationalism, neoliberalism and patriarchy, other such as Anderson (2017) argues that democratization processes were the main factor for the decriminalization of abortion in Uruguay. Anderson looks to theories that abortion reforms depend on institutional and political conditions such as ”the party system, the presidential commitment to gender issues, church-state relations, and authoritarian legacies” (Anderson, 2017:222). However, democracy was most important because that gave political and civil rights, which gave women activists a chance to advocate for the change (ibid: 230-233). That democratization has an impact on women's rights is recognized by Blofield (2008). Abortion policy Blofield argues can be affected by different factors such as: ”class division” and ”mobilization” of feminists and the Catholic Church, the Right vs Left political influence, women’s social, economic, and political status, education levels and participation, rates of women in labour, rates of women legislators, and economic development (Blofield, 2008: 400, 407-409, 416). In addition, she recognizes that income capita has an effect on women’s ability to get abortions, and those income distributions also ” influence the policy process on abortion” (ibid:409). Blofield argues that in southern Europe the relatively ”equal income distribution” is increasing the position of ”feminists versus the church” where an ”unequal distribution has the opposite effect” (ibid:409). The economic impacts on abortion legislation, scholars such as Dema Moreno et.al (2020) research look into the relationship between induced abortions and gen-

der equality in Europe. Here they found socioeconomic indicators such as employment, salary, and educational level impacts the induced abortion rates (Dema Moreno, Llorente-Marrón, Diaz-Fernandez, & Méndez-Rodríguez, 2020: 263). They state that women's social and economic rights have a big impact on their reproductive decisions, and when living conditions are worse; the abortion rates rise (ibid: 263). Because of this, it is shown that "women's sexual and reproductive rights are not only connected with the existence of more or less liberal laws on abortion but are also strongly associated with the development of women's economic and social rights" (ibid:263).

Additionally one can look to studies of the relationship between Catholicism and the economy where scholars such as Clark (2019) introduce the "Catholic social thought" (CST). CST is not an economic system or model, but rather a recommendation of policies addressed to issues that are concerning the Catholic Church (Clark, 2019: 423). The fundamental idea of CST is to care for the poor, and "care of creation", which refers to protecting "people and the planet, living our faith in relationship with all of God's creation" (ibid:425). Hence there seems to be a connection between the CST agenda and a "pro-life" agenda, which could explain why Catholicism is advocating for pro-life policies on a global scale. Thereby it is not farfetched for the Catholic Church to uphold anti-abortion ideas because all life must be protected and all humans can be saved. The Catholic approach could be seen as understandable, it looks to economic solutions for the poor, however, it is not to say that one cannot argue against CST. The fundamental idea is to care for the foetus as it is "one of the poor" and discriminates against the one being pregnant of their own choice to their own body. Consequently, this study will look at the theoretical concepts of feminist global political economy.

2.2 Feminist Global Political Economy (FGPE)

To understand FGPE, one can firstly look quickly at what Global Political Economy (GPE) is. Husky and Rai (2005) argue that the Global Political Economy "has sought to bring together the study of states and the study of markets in a global context", and they argued that the scope of GPE must transform "by incorporating the study of households and the function of social reproduction centrally in the analysis" (Husky & Rai, 2005:2). Following feminist research on GPE Bergeron (2001) argues much has looked into the "conflictual interaction among multinational corporations, households, the nation-state, and women" (Bergeron, 2001: 990). She explains that gender studies have often looked beyond the economy and have often talked about the "private and public" (ibid: 996). Bergeron claims that when working women take control of economic conditions they challenged

the public-private boundaries, the boundaries of productive and reproductive activities, and "their fragmented, marginal, and inconsequential "noneconomic" others" (ibid: 999). Others such as Marchand and Runyan (2010) state that feminist analyses on GPE look to the global as masculine and the local as feminine (Marchand and & Runyan: 2010: 10). Here women are both victims of globalization and also lack agency in the globalized world. Gender, they argue, functions in three ways: "1) ideologically, especially in terms of gendered representations and valorizations of social processes and practices; 2) at the level of social relations; 3) physically through the social construction of male and female bodies" (ibid:11). They further insist that neoliberalism has "cheapen women's labour in the workplace" and at the same time because of "dismantlement of the welfare" given women more "free reproductive labour in the home" (ibid:13).

Furthermore, there have been some different frameworks made by the previous scholars for feminist global political-economic analysis, although the concept of "household" is used by many researchers when making a feminist global political economy analysis. The household is argued to be a gendered and important activity, where Safri and Graham(2010) explain that the "household was as important (at least in magnitude) as the firm in terms of economic activity worldwide" (Safri and Graham, 2010:101). However, talking about the 'household' as an international actor "threatens to obscure the differences among, and divisions and struggles within, global households" (ibid: 118).

An example of an analytical feminist GPE framework is Peterson's (2010) analytical framing of GPE as an interaction of "reproductive, productive, and virtual economies" (RPV) (Peterson, 2010:4). This framework aims to bring a feminist and critical postmodernist perspective to globalization (ibid:20). Peterson seeks to "expose how gender and heterosexist coding permeates symbols, selves and systems and 'naturalizes' denigration of identities and activities deemed 'feminine'" (ibid:6). Further, Bedford and Rai (2013) use another framework to make an FGPE analysis, where they instead look to governance, social reproduction and work, and sexuality and intimacy (Bedford & Rai, 2013:2). Gender and governance they argue are "a multifaceted and complex nature of governance structures and discourses" where one must "grapple with both definitional parameters of governance as well as alternatives modes of governing" (ibid: 2). Social Reproduction and Work they say look to the public vs private dichotomy, where they also see that social reproduction is not recognized as work. Here sexuality and intimacy look to the household where they argue that "contemporary formulations of global capitalism open up for alternative sexual and gender po-

litics as well as the new sexual norms and regulations being forged in the neoliberal world order” (ibid 3). Social reproduction includes three key components, which are:

(1) ”biological reproduction, or the production of future labour, and the provision of sexual, emotional, and effective services (such as are required to maintain family and intimate relationships)”;

(2) ”unpaid production of both goods and services in the home, particularly of care, as well as social provisioning (by which we mean voluntary work directed at meeting needs in the community)”;

(3) ” the reproduction of culture and ideology, which stabilizes dominant social relations. These components are institutionalized through gendered labour, discourses, and the organization of everyday life”

(Bedford & Rai, 2013: 2).

Components of Bedford and Rai’s framework are used again by Rai et.al (2014) when looking at the depletion through social reproduction (DSR). DSR has historically been situated within ”markets and states” which are ”the sites of accumulation, regulation and struggle, with variable results in different social contexts” (Rai, Hoskyns & Thomas, 2014: 87). The DSR framework is categorized into three dimensions Individual, Household and Communities. Here the Individual level includes ”mental and physical health”; the Household-level include: ”levels of income and its distribution”, ”the changing patterns of labour and consumption”, ”tasks performed (including all forms of care)”, and ”decision making and the issues raised in intra-household bargaining”; and lastly, the Community level includes ”the ‘thickness’ of social networks” (ibid: 97).

Tanyag (2017) builds on this DSR framework to reveal how ”the work of social reproduction is harnessed to service economic activity at the cost of rights to bodily integrity” (Tanyag, 2017: 39). Tanya argues that the FGPE perspective is crucial for ”interrogating how different religious fundamentalist groups and conservative government normalize restrictions to sustaining social reproductive labour through undermining sexual and reproductive rights” (ibid:43). She uses ’Household and Community level, State level and Global level’ to make her analysis. Here the Household and Community connect to motherhood, where she sees that the Catholic global community describes motherhood as a ”life choice” and ”essential for a healthy society” (ibid: 43). She argues that DSR is ”about of control of women’s bodies”, where the claim over women’s bodies makes societies (ibid: 44). On the global level, she looks to developing countries that are already lacking infrastructure for reproductive health care, but the neoliberal economic policies are weakening these policies even more, where religious fundamentalists can fill in the gaps and influence the reproductive choices of many women (ibid:45). The neoliberal governance here looks to the private vs public relationship where the authors state that the neoliberal governance makes ”partnerships in deliv-

ering social welfare” which are enabling religious NGOs to gain influence (ibid:45). Further, Tanyag’s framework and the other mentioned frameworks for FGPE will be used when making the analytical framework for this study.

3. Method, Research & Analytical framework

3.1 Research design

The research design of this study is comparative. Bryman (2012) states that a comparative design ”entails studying two contrasting cases using more or less identical methods” (Bryman, 2012:72). Using a comparison design is based on the idea that a social phenomenon can be better understood when it is compared to contrasting cases or situations. This design can be used in both quantitative and qualitative research, and it will here be used in this qualitative research (ibid:72). Hence the comparative research design will help to look at the differences in the processes of Ireland and Poland’s abortion policy, which will help to understand the political-economic impacts of abortion policy. Bryman further states that the comparative design can be used in a ”variety of situations”, however, it is important to acknowledge its problems which are explained as: ”the differences that are observed between the contrasting cases may not be due exclusively to the distinguishing features of the cases” (ibid:74). Hence one must be cautious when explaining the contrasts between the cases (ibid:74). The chosen design can thereby be understood as a good tool for this study, however, to make the comparison and see the contrasts between the two countries, the history of abortion policy in the two countries will be explained separately. The comparison will happen throughout the different dimensions of the analytical framework that is presented below.

3.2 Method: Process-tracing

To understand the economic impacts of abortion policy this study will utilise a process-tracing method which according to Beach and Pedersen (2011) ”is arguably the political science method that best allows us to study causal mechanisms” (Beach & Pedersen, 2011:2). The process tracing’s ambition is to trace causal mechanism, where the process-tracing method can enable researchers to ”make strong within-case inferences about how outcomes come about”, which is strengthening the validity of the theorized causal mechanism (ibid: 3-4). Process tracing is said to allow us to ”study causal mechanism in social science” because it involves ”attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (ibid:4). Moreover, process tracing according to Collier

(2011) is a "fundamental tool for qualitative analysis"; because it helps identify and systematically describe political and social phenomena, gives insights into causal mechanisms, and provides an alternative way to address challenging problems (Collier, 2011:823-824). There can be different narratives to process-tracing, but according to Vannesson (2008) process-tracing is focused; which means that it "deals selectively with only certain aspects of the phenomenon" (Vannesson 2008:235). When using this method, the "investigator" is, therefore "aware that some information is lost along with some of the unique characteristics of the phenomenon" (ibid). Process-tracing is also "structured in the sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework identified in the research design" (ibid:235). And lastly, process tracing has the goal of "provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome" (ibid:235).

That process-tracing method allows one to study mechanisms, help identify and describe political phenomena, and that it is based on a theoretical framework is why it will be used in this study; where the political and social phenomena of abortion are being studied through the theorization of feminist global political economy. The method is suitable because it allows one to look at the processes around abortion policy in Ireland and Poland simultaneously, and the comparative research design, allows one to make the comparison in the processes between the two cases. The two countries have, as mentioned before, taken different paths in their recent abortion legislation and this method enables us to study the different processes behind the legislation, and what has made the countries go in different directions. Moreover, as Vannesson (2008) argued, the process-tracing method only deals with certain aspects of the phenomenon in question (Vannesson 2008:235); Hence this method is a favourable choice because it enables this study to only deal with a certain aspect of FGPE and its impacts on abortion legislation in Ireland and Poland- which is what this study intends to do.

3.3 Data

When gathering data, the Irish government is slightly more transparent and accessible when it comes to publicizing debates, policy briefs, and governmental official documents than the Polish government. Although, even if there is more data accessible from the Irish government, enough is gathered from Poland to conduct the analysis. To make sure that enough data is available for the analytical framework, the data will be from both primary and secondary sources. In both countries, I will draw on primary data which is collected from available publicity resources such as govern-

ment websites, inter-governmental organizations, previous research and organizational publications. To mix primary and secondary resources, organizational reports, inter-governmental, and governmental official documents, is an attempt to get a wider picture of the political-economic landscape in the two countries; and to also enable information to understand the political-economic processes that have led up to the abortions policies.

I will through the analytical framework structure the analysis of the data, where I through the chosen methodology will trace the development of the framework indicators. The data has been used to look into the past and follow the progress to the present time. However, there are some limitations to the data collection. For example, in the household dimension, single women are included because of the lack of separation between single and married women in the data collections. Hence the analysis will look at women as a gender rather than their single status. Further, the law processes and debates in Ireland are more accessible to me because of the English language use. I do not speak or read polish, which will make it more difficult to access documents in Polish. However, Poland is a part of the EU, and many documents must therefore be translated to English, and the ones that are not will be translated through translation tools such as Google Translate. Moreover, questions do arise regarding the accuracy of the translations. The general approach is that as long as the translation seems to be reasonable, and that they do not contradict each other, they will be used. To make it clear, they will be used with careful consideration.

3.4 Analytical framework

As shown in previous studies on Feminist Global political economy (FGPE), scholars tend to look at a general level on how FGPE mechanisms and indicators are affecting bigger structures or women's rights in general. This study will use these theories, but will instead look to the specific issue in two specific cases - abortion policy in Ireland and Poland. The literature review showed many different perspectives on how to conduct FGPE analysis. Further, this study will draw on these previous theories and frameworks when making the analytical framework. The framework is made as an attempt to understand how the states acting on SRHR policies are shaped by and shaped through FGPE mechanisms. The analytical framework is divided into three dimensions: Neoliberalism, Household, and Social Reproduction, which will lead the discussions and analysis, and hopefully help answer the questions asked previously.

3.4.1 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism plays a key role in today's GPE and FPGE theory. Tanyag (2017) argued that the neoliberal state enables NGOs and other actors to influence society on a higher scale, due to new public management and privatizing the social welfare (Tanyag, 2017, 45). Neoliberalism has also according to Marchand and Runyan (2010) cheapen women's labour, dismantled the welfare, and given women more free domestic reproductive labour (Marchand and Runyan 2010:13). Further, as Mateo (2020) states, Neoliberalism according to Hayek, is based on the idea that capitalism must be free from intervention regarding all types of growth; which also includes reproductive growth (Mateo, 2020:605).

Neoliberalism can have different expressions in the society, however, to understand the differences in the abortion policies in the catholic, EU membership countries Ireland and Poland, neoliberalism will be understood in terms of growth and the neoliberal market policy adaptation. Therefore this dimension will look at economic growth and the economic adjustments the states have made in the period of neoliberal governance. Following the process tracing will firstly look at the economic adjustments and policy adaptations to support the neoliberal market, this study will look at what politics has been made for the economic change towards a free and opened (neoliberal) market. Secondly, this analysis will see growth both in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) and GDP to get the full scope of the states' neoliberal development in the countries, and lastly, there will be a process-tracing on the discussions regarding growth policies.

3.4.2 Household

Bedford and Rai (2013) argue that the 'household' is where global capitalism opens up for alternative "sexual and gender politics" (Bedford and Rai, 2013: 3). Further, one can understand that neoliberalism brought new sexual norms, understood as heteronormative norms, where all that does not fit into this norm are rendered disposable (ibid). Moreover, Rai et al. (2014) look at the household dimension as income and distribution; changing patterns of labour and consumption; tasks performed (including all forms of care); decision making and the issues raised in intra-household bargaining (Rai, Hoskyns & Thomas, 2014: 97). However, the household have also other meanings. Tanyag's (2017) household includes ideas of motherhood, where she sees that the Catholic global community describes motherhood as a "life choice" and "essential for a healthy society" (Tanyag, 2017: 43).

All that is put into "household" is, as one can imagine, not useful in this analysis. To conclude, when looking at the Household Level, the analysis will be looking at income and distribution within households, and patterns of labour. To capture these subjects without interviewing people, the indicators will be operationalized to the gender pay gap, inequality of income distribution, and general differences in employment types between men and women. Ireland and Poland are both Catholic societies where 'motherhood' has become a subject of governmental policies. Hence this dimension will also be looking into the governmental discussions regarding "motherhood" to fully grasp the dimension.

3.4.3. Social Reproduction and Reproductive Governance

Social reproduction (SR) has been discussed by many. Bedford and Rai (2013), and Rai et.al (2014) share the same definition of SR, where they link SR to the famous 'public vs private' dichotomy. SR in their sense looks to 3 different themes, however, this framework will only use the first theme, because the second theme could be argued to be interlinked with Household, and the third theme could be argued is an effect of the first two. SR further will here thereby be understood as:

(1) "biological reproduction, or the production of future labour, and the provision of sexual, emotional, and effective services (such as are required to maintain family and intimate relationships)" (Bedford & Rai, 2013:2).

Furthermore, the theme of SR is understandably touching on Morgan and Robert's (2012) "reproductive governance". Hence to further make this dimensions analysis, this study will also be using reproductive governance indicators that Morgan and Roberts give. Reproductive governance refers here to the control of women's bodies and looks to different mechanisms such as "legislative controls, economic inducements, moral injunctions, direct coercion, and ethical incitements to produce, monitor, and control reproductive behaviours and population practices" (Morgan & Roberts, 2012: 241).

The different mechanisms in SR and reproductive governance areas one can tell many. The reproductive governance mechanism will be focused on economic inducements and moral injunctions. Economic inducements will be operationalised into maternity, paternity and paternal leave, and access and/or financial subsidies for contraception; and moral injunctions will be operationalised to governmental approach toward the unborn child. This dimension will also be looking at fertility rates to see if there is any correlation between GPE policies and fertility rates.

3.5 Ethics

The abortion debate is a very sensitive one where the pro-life and pro-choice doctrines have conflicted for a long time. The feminist economic perspective is an alternative root, hence this study needs to be careful in what is said and how it is delivered. However, the subject of abortion needs to be studied from different perspectives to understand the complex neoliberal and economic power relations that affect abortion policy. I am aware that the issue is controversial and sensitive in many contexts, which is probably why not many feminist economy theorists have touched on the subject on a more case-specific level. Further, it must be said, that I do support the Irish legislation process more than the Polish one, but it is not this attitude that drives this thesis, rather it is the FGPE framework that will lead the analysis.

4. Result

To get an understanding of the abortion policy processes in both countries, the next two sections will through a process-tracing method trace the development of abortion policy, firstly in Ireland and secondly in Poland. Afterwards, the analytical framework will be used to make the result analysis.

4.1 Abortion policy process in Ireland

In Ireland, abortion policies have changed over the years. The restrictive abortion legislation dates back to 1861 with the "Offences Against the Person Act 1861" where women and those who assisted abortions were first criminalized for "procuring a miscarriage" according to the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA) (2021). The punishment in both cases was life imprisonment, and the act 1861 was incorporated under criminal law until 2013 when the "Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013" replaced it (IFPA, 2021).

In 1983 the Irish government passed a Referendum on the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (Article 40.3.3) after a public vote; where more than two-thirds of the voters, voted in favour of the eighth amendment (IFPA, 2021). The Eighth Amendment states: "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right" (Government of Ireland, 2021). Going forward in 1991, new discussions regarding access to abortion for Irish women were held, and this time concerning information and possibilities to have abortions

abroad (IFPA, 2021). The Irish High Court back then requested the European Court of Justice to take on a case against a student group that was giving out information about abortions abroad. However, the European Court of Justice ruled that abortion "could constitute a service under the Treaty of Rome (Treaty of the European Economic Community)", which meant that the Irish government were not legally allowed to prohibit agencies from "distribution of information" regarding foreign abortion clinics (IFPA, 2021). This led up to a new Constitutional Amendment of 1992, which ruled that: "no limit to having information or travel for the purpose of having an abortion" (Exelgyn, 2020b). Although in 1995 the Irish government added regulation of Information to the Act 1992 which allowed doctors, agencies and counsellors to give information about having abortions abroad; as long as they also provided "information on parenting and adoption and may only be given the context of one to one counselling" (IFPA, 2021). The regulation also prohibited helping women have abortions in another state.

In the following years, abortion was heavily debated and there were many court cases both in the national court and in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). E.g in 2006 there was the case 'D v Ireland' in ECtHR where a woman with fatal foetal anomalies advocated that the abortion ban violated her human rights. Later in 2010, the case of A, B, C vs Ireland up in ECtHR, in which the women advocated that Ireland has failed in implementing existing constitutional rights "to a lawful abortion when a woman's life is at risk" (IFPA, 2021). The latter came to have a big impact on Ireland's abortion policy and had a big influence on the "Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013" (IFPA, 2021). The 2013 Act did not de-criminalise abortion in Ireland, but it permitted abortion to save pregnant women's life. There was according to IFPA concerns about the new Act 2013, and in 2014 a very strict guidance document was published to regulate the new policy (ibid). In 2014, 2015, and 2016, private member bills were put before the Dáil (lower house of the Oireachtas); two looked to repeal article 40.3.3, and two to legalize abortion in cases of fatal foetal anomaly, all were rejected.

In 2017, significant criticism was made against Ireland's abortion laws from different UN committees. A private member bill looked to reduce the penalty of abortion which is rejected by the Dáil. A Citizens Assembly was made to recommend Article 40.3.3, where 87% said that article 40.3.3 should not be retained to the fullest. A joint committee on the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution was formed to overlook recommendations made by the Citizens Assembly and by reports on SRHR in Ireland. This all lead up to a published report by the joint committee recommending that

abortion should be legal when: "the life or the physical or mental health of the woman is at risk, or in cases of fatal (as distinct from non-fatal) foetal anomaly and on a woman's own indication up to 12 weeks of pregnancy, so long as the termination takes places in a clinical setting" (IFPA, 2021).

Following, in January 2018, the Irish Cabinet gave formal approval for holding a referendum on abortion in May of the same year. In March a policy paper and a guidance scheme were published by the department of health which promoted a liberal abortion policy and paved the way for the referendum campaign. In May 2018 the referendum was held to repeal article 40.3.3 -Eight Amendment, which would allow the Oireachtas to legislate on abortion. The voter turnout in Ireland was 64.1% which made the referendum valid (IFPA, 2021). With 33.6% voting against the repeal and 66.4% voting in favour of it, the referendum was passed (Department of Health, 2020). There was some upholding with the decision, however, the Supreme court of Ireland refused a petition that challenges the outcome of the vote and argued that the petition was a "frustration of the democratic process" (IFPA,2021). In September, Article 40.3.3 -Eight Amendment, was formally removed from the Irish Constitution, and replaced by a new 40.3.3- Thirty Sixth Amendment, which stated that "provision may be made by law for the regulation of termination of pregnancy" (IFPA, 2021). This all lead to the Presidential signing of the new Health Act (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) in December 2018, which is still in place today. The Health Act 2018 was passed through "both houses of the government" (Exelgynb, 2020); and it is a legislative framework regarding abortion care, which means that abortion is permitted in Ireland if: "there is a risk to the life, or of serious harm to the health, of the pregnant woman, including in an emergency; where there is a condition present which is likely to lead to the death of the foetus either before or within 28 days of birth; and without restriction up to 12 weeks of pregnancy" (Irish Department of Health, 2020).

4.2 Abortion policy process in Poland

Back in 1932, Poland became one of the first countries in the world to legalize abortion in case of: "danger to the life or health of the woman, incest or rape" (Hussein, Cottingham, Nowicka & Kosmodi, 2018:11). In 1956 the Communist Polish government added that abortion also was permitted for "medical and social reasons", including "difficult living conditions" (ibid:11). The change to Poland's current abortion policy can be traced back to the beginning of the 1990' when the liberal abortion policies became associated with the old communist state; and new restricted abortion legislation defined a "renewal" of the traditional Polish values, which were closely linked to Catholicism (Koralewska & Zielińska, 2021:3). In 1993, the Polish government made abortion for social reasons

illegal, which was a specific request of the Polish Pope Johannes II (Exelgyn, 2020c). According to Zielińska (2008) the 1993 Act "Family planning and protection of the human and conditions for the admissibility of termination of pregnancy", only allowed abortion with the consent of the woman and by a doctor on three terms, where the first two legal grounds meant that the abortion had to be done at a hospital. The conditions were:

"1. When the pregnancy constitutes a risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman; "

"2. Prenatal tests or other medical evidence indicate a high probability of severe and irreversible disability to the fetus or an incurable illness threatening its life; "

"3. The existence of a justified suspicion that the pregnancy arose as a result of a crime (Article 41 par.1)" (Zielińska, 2008:12).

Further Nowicka (2007) states that there were some attempts to liberalize the abortion policy in the years to come. In 1995 a pro-choice president was elected, which led to the new Polish parliament voting to overturn the 1993 Act in 1996 (Nowicka, 2007:171). According to Czerwinski (2004) this 1996 "law" allowed abortion again on social grounds and permitted abortion up until week 12 (Czerwinski, 2004:658). However, in 1997 this was challenged and Nowicka (2007) states there was a Constitutional Tribunal that decided "that abortion on social grounds is unconstitutional", which made abortion on social grounds, yet again, illegal (Nowicka, 2007:171). The reintroduction of the 1993 Act came in 1997 and was in place up until the new reformation in 2020. After 1997 there were some attempts to liberalize abortion policy. E.g. Nowicka states that a left-wing parliament was elected in 2001, which had promised to liberalize abortion in their campaigns. However, when put into power they were reluctant to address the abortion policy and instead argued that they had other "more important issues" such as joining the EU (ibid: 172). Furthermore, in 2004 a "left-wing Women's Parliamentary Group" was put together to draft a liberalized abortion law. Yet, in 2005 the parliament decided that the subject would not be discussed further (ibid:172). Later in 2011, Hussein et. al (2018) explains that a bill "to ban abortion entirely" was suggested, however, it was rejected by the parliament (Hussein, et.al, 2018: 12). Following in 2013 and 2015, different legislative proposals for a total or near-total ban on abortion were introduced (IPPF, 2018).

In 2015 Poland had a drastic shift in Sejm (lower house of Poland's national legislature); the national-conservative Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość; PiS) won the majority which pushed left-wing representatives out of Sejm (Utrikespolitiska institutionen, 2021; Britannica, 2021). In 2016, large national women's rights protests also called "Black protests" swept over

Poland, which was a reaction to the new attempt to ban abortion in a so-called "Stop Abortion" bill (KRÓL and PUSTUŁKA, 2018:373). Król and Pustulka (2018) argue that the women's strike "successfully prevented the passing of the proposal, even though the ruling party initially supported it (ibid:376). The Sejm voted down the legislation proposal of "stop abortion" with a voting of 352-58 (Britannica, 2021). Further, the Federation for Women and Family Plannings (2018) report states that following in march 2018, a new "stop abortion" bill was conducted by the parliamentary Committee of Social Policy and Family. This bill was also met by large protests from the now #blackprotest movement; but also by a "Save women" bill which later was rejected by the Sejm (Federation for Women and Family Plannings, 2018:3-4). The federation states the parliamentary committee referred the new "stop abortion" draft bill to an "extraordinary subcommittee", however, at the end of 2018 there had been no meeting (ibid: 4).

In 2019, there were new parliamentary elections in Poland, where PiS afterwards still held a majority in Sejm (Britannica, 2021). According to the Federation for Women and Family Plannings (2019), a motion was filed by a group of MPs to the Constitutional Court in October, which seek to "consider the constitutionality of abortion due to fetal pathology" but it expired (Federation for Women and Family Plannings, 2019:3). A new motion was filed in December 2019 which intended "to force women to continue pregnancies despite severe and irreversible fetal defects", which the federation argues was a "contradiction to the public opinion, the abortion reality, the Constitution, and international law" (ibid:3). The "Stop Abortion" draft bill did not expire in 2019, and it followed into 2020 (ibid:3). In October of 2020, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled that "the termination of pregnancies in cases of severe fetal abnormalities was unconstitutional" (Britannica, 2021). The new ruling means a near-total ban on abortions in Poland, because of the small number of legal abortions that were made before the ruling, which were performed because of fetal abnormalities (ibid). The Center for Reproductive health and rights clears that change means that the "Act on Family Planning, Protection of the Human Foetus and Conditions for Termination of Pregnancy" only permits abortion in cases of 1. Threat to the life or health of a pregnant woman; 2. there is a justified suspicion that the pregnancy resulted from the act prohibited. Hence abortion is only legal to own cases of rape, incest and health (Center for Reproductive health and rights, 1992-2022). The ruling on the new restrictions was passed into law on the 27th of January 2021 (European Parliament, 2021).

4.3 Results analysis

Following, the result analysis will go through all three dimensions and their indicators where Ireland will be present first, and Poland second. Each indicator will be looked at through the process-tracing method, and at the end of each indicator, there will be a short reflection and analysis to follow up and discuss what has been found. The result analysis will first look at the dimension of Neoliberalism where it first will look at the economic adjustment, later the human development index (HDI) and the growth gross domestic product (GDP), then lastly the different growth policies. Secondly, the result analysis will look at the dimension of Household where it will look at Income distribution inequality, gender pay gap, and general differences in employment types, and afterwards, it will look at Motherhood. Lastly, the third dimension of Social Reproduction and Reproductive Governance will first look at Fertility rates, thereafter it will look at Maternity, paternity and paternal leave, later on, it will look at Access and financial subsidies for contraception, and lastly, it will look to governmental discussions on "The unborn child". After the analysis of the results, there will be a concluding analysis to conclude the results and reconnect the results to the questions asked previously.

4.3.1 Neoliberalism

Economic adjustments

Let us firstly look at Ireland's process. From the 1950's up until the early 1980's Keynesianism influenced the Irish public and economic policies (Hay & Smith, 2013: 12). This changed with the National Economic and Social Council's (NESCC) new "A Strategy for Development" report in 1986 that acknowledge that national debt is a policy issue and "Only by achieving economic growth, it argued, could Ireland address its high unemployment levels" (ibid:12). With the governmental shift in 1987, the new government "articulated the need for consensus in terms of a narrative of crisis" (ibid:13). Here ideas of competitiveness were launched which later "normalized and necessitated" the neoliberal economics in the Irish public policy discourse (ibid: 14). Ceallaigh (2018) argues that the new neoliberal policy was made through "new public management" reforms of the Irish public services which looked to the marketization of the public sector to increase efficiency and is according to Ceallaigh later found in 2017 political agendas (Ceallaigh, 2018: 135-136). Further theorists often refer to the period from the 1990' up until the financial crisis in 2008 in Ireland as the area of the 'Celtic Tiger', which was an economic model that was fostered by globalization, growth, and "deep liberalization" (Kitchin, O'Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson and Keaveney,

2012:1303). This liberalization Kitchin et.al refer to as a time where Ireland embraced "deregulation, entrepreneurial freedoms, and free-market principles and aggressively courted high-valued-added export-oriented FDI" which gave "rapid shift to high-skilled manufacturing, phenomenal growth in the service sector, the development of a domestic consumer society, a rapid growth in population through natural increase and immigration, and a housing and property boom" (ibid:1303). During this period, the Irish state adopted different policy formations, implementations and regulations that were "shaped by neoliberal policies", which promoted "the free market, minimising regulation, privatising public goods, and keeping direct taxes low and indirect taxes high" (ibid:1320).

The financial crisis in 2007-2008 hit Ireland hard and according to Dukelow (2015), it gave further problems in Ireland such as: "excessive growth in public expenditure, a related loss of competitiveness and loss of reputation" (Dukelow 2015:99). Competitiveness is said to have remained a policy goal after the financial crisis, where the government in 2013 set "restrictions on how much tax can be raised and who it can be raised from" (ibid:105). However, social protection was a "policy mistake" and became the object of re-thinking in the aftermath of the crisis where the new model needed to match Ireland's economic model, and not be "overly generous" which the public expenditure had been (ibid:105; Dukelow and Kennett, 2018:469). Kitchin et.al (2018) further states, after the financial crisis Ireland did not rethink its economic model, rather their solution to the crisis was to deepen neoliberal policy, protect the "interests of the developer and financial class" and "implement wide-scale austerity measures and severe cutbacks in public services and to consider the privatization of state assets—all framed within a post-political discourse of 'there is no alternative'" (Kitchin, O'Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson and Keaveney, 2012: 1317). The New Public management policymaking was thereby not changed after the crisis, and as Ceallaigh (2018) states, the government in 2017 continues to promote outsourcing and privatization to further public functions; but also implemented other neoliberal New public management matters such as "biometric clock-in requirements, mandatory unpaid overtime, and potentially making Saturday a standard working day" (Ceallaigh, 2018:139).

Liberal and neoliberal policies occurred around the same time in Poland as in Ireland. In 1990 the first "non—Communist polish government" since World War II, embarked on economic reform that aimed to "start the transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy" (Lehmann,2012:4). The plans had many disadvantages due to the inflation in 1989, how-

ever, nowadays Polish economy is often referred to as an example of great growth performance (ibid: 2). According to Åslund (2013), the Polish economic development up until 2012 can be seen in three periods, where the first period, the post-communist period, can be seen as the time area for reforms. The reform program adopted in Poland was scripted in 1989 by former Professor and Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz and included "privatization, liberalization of foreign trade, currency convertibility, and an open economy" (Åslund, 2013:4). Due to the hyperinflation in 1989 a "financial stabilization program" was added to the structural reforms of the Polish economy and politics (ibid:4). This "radical liberalization" of the Polish economy was implemented on January 1st 1990, and it involved reform measures "far-reaching price liberalization" and the "liberalization of domestic trade" (ibid:4). Åslund argues that Poland in early 1990 was "reminiscent of the Washington Consensus" and the country implemented the four tenets of "macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation, privatization, and a reinforcement of the social safety net" (ibid:4). At the end of the nineties, four other big reforms were implemented in Poland which were regarding health, pension, education and a regional democratic reform (Lehmann,2012:2). In the second period, Poland was in the process of joining the EU, and in 2004 other structural reforms were made such as "functioning financial sector, privatization, reforms of the labour market and social policies, of the corporate and personal income tax system and the development of civil legislation" (ibid:2). The overall goal for all these reforms over the years is said to "increase the competitiveness of the Polish economy", which is said to have increased the unemployment in Poland during 1990 (ibid:3). In the last period of 2008-2012, Åslund argues became Poland's success story, where Poland in 2009 was the only EU country that had an economic growth of 1.7% (Åslund, 2013:6). He explains it as Poland did not get itself overheated and had implemented strict monetary policies but they still uphold a rather large domestic market that gave some financial stability when the crisis hit (ibid:7).

Further, when the PiS government took place in 2015, the country moved away from neoliberal policies and the party, according to Economic Intelligence (2021), promoted "welfare and redistribution and is sceptical of foreign investments" (Economics Intelligence, 2021). According to Jasiewicz (2017), the neoliberal restructuring in Poland developed into a high rate of youth unemployment (50%), and many Poles began to leave the country to work abroad (Jasiewicz, 2017). When joining the EU, Jasiewicz reports, that the poorest benefited but the large middle class "got it worse"(ibid). The ones who had accepted the neoliberal ideology that advocates for individual success, small business owners, and self-employment were now competing in the free international market where they were competing against large corporations(ibid). This is said to have helped

raise the right-wing and gave PiS much support to make these political-economic changes in lines of national socialism when they got into governmental positions. The Policies have involved raising minimum wages, reducing the pension age, introducing minimum working hours for the gig economy, child benefits programs, and "government loans for families to buy property" (ibid). However, Jasiewicz argues that there has been no retribution of wealth, so the policies that seem to be social democratic can rather be classified as 'national socialistic'. Jasiewicz explains that the PiS ideology focuses on national identity ideas that exclude the 'others' that are not white and catholic, so even if policies seemingly are social democratic it still excludes 'others' (Jasiewicz, 2017).

There are many differences and similarities between the two countries. The obvious similarity is that both countries in the 1990 and early 2000 went through liberalization of the political economy, and the public institutions were put on the 'free- open- market'. The two countries were promoting a thrive for competitiveness in both economic markets; liberalization of the domestic markets to increase efficiency, and they were both making adjustments to EU regulations to join the Union. The difference seems to be the neoliberal policy adaptation after the financial crisis. In 2015 the PiS party was voted into parliament where they began to withdraw neoliberal policies and implement policies to promote welfare in Poland. During the same period, Ireland instead deepened their neoliberal adaptation with new public management policies and outsourced public matters to the open market. Ireland's governmental opinion was that the financial crisis got worse because of the high public expenditure and social protection policies. Hence despite the liberalisation in both countries in 1990, the ideology position seems to have changed differently in the mid-2010s. The Irish government deepened their liberalisation, whilst Poland's Pus government took a more conservative agenda, which later could be understood to have had impacts on policies such as SRHR.

Growth in HDI and GDP

The neoliberal economic adjustments started in both countries around 1990, which will be the starting point for tracking the development of HDI and GDP processes going forward. The processes of the development of the HDI, and the GDP, will be looked at. GDP can be looked at in different ways and one can first look at GDP as current billions of US dollars (USD). Here it shows that Ireland has generally had less economic growth than Poland over the years. An overview over the years shows that both countries have had an increase in economic growth since 1990, and Poland has had a bigger increase than Ireland (The World Bank, 2020a). However, to keep in mind, the countries are different in geographical and population size, and Poland has a current population of

around 36.9 million people, whilst Ireland has a population of 5.2 million people (UNDP, 2020). A quick overview shows that Ireland's current GDP in 1990 was 49.306 billion USD, which grew to 425.889 billion USD in 2020; whilst Poland's current GDP in 1990 was 65.978 billion USD, which grew to 594.165 billion USD in 2020 (ibid).

One further look at the GDP growth (annual %). In 1991 the World Bank started to track Poland, so this is where the tracking and comparison starts. In Table 1 you can see the GDP growth (annual %). The years pinned down in Table 1 are a selection over the years to see trends and crises. Firstly we can see that Ireland in 1991 had much higher economic growth than Poland (The World Bank, 2020b). The negative economic growth numbers in Poland can however be understood as a result of the big social and economic neoliberal adjustment between communist and post-communist Poland, where many people lost their employment. Table 1 shows that economic growth rates shifted a lot over the years and the countries were differently affected by the different crises and bank crashes. Poland had their highest annual growth in 2007, whilst Ireland had their highest growth rate in 2015. Further as said, the countries have been differently affected by crashes in the economy such as the financial crisis in 2008, when Ireland's annual growth dropped around 9% whilst Poland's only dropped around 3% between 2007 and 2008 (The World Bank, 2020b).

Table 1, GDP growth (annual %) by year

Year	Ireland	Poland
1991	1.93	-7.016
1996	7.373	6.115
2001	5.304	1.258
2006	4.981	6.131
2007	5.305	7.062
2008	-4.487	4.2
2012	-0.052	1.325
2015	25.176	4.236
2018	9.03	5.354
2019	4.917	4.154
2020	5.867	-2.702

Comment: GDP growth (annual %) - Ireland, Poland data from the World Bank data collection. Link: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IE-PL>

Lastly one can look at the GDP per capita which is presented next to the Human Development Index (HDI) development in Table 2. The GDP per capita does not seem to follow the trends of HDI in which Ireland has had a significant increase over the last years. Instead, this shows that Ireland has had an increase by 6 times whilst Poland over the same period has had an increase by 9 times. The HDI is produced by the UN Development program and its data is "sourced from international data agencies with the mandate, resources, and expertise to collect national data on specific indicators unless otherwise noted" (UNDP, 2020a). HDI looks to human development through the three dimensions long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living (ibid). Ireland was moreover ranked 2nd on the HDI ranking scale globally in 2019, whilst Poland was ranked 35th (ibid). So, when looking at Table 2 one can see that Ireland's human development can be understood as more successful than Poland's over the last years (UNDP, 2020c).

Table 2: GDP per capita (current USD) and the HDI progress by year

Years	Ireland (GDP per capita, current USD)	Ireland (HDI)	Poland (GDP per capita, Current USD)	Poland (HDI)
1990	14,031.3	0.773	1,731.2	0.718
2000	26,269.2	-	4,991.4	-
2010	48,607.9	0.901	12,613.0	0.840
2019	-	0.995	-	0.880
2020	85,267.7	-	15,656.1	-

Comment: GDP per capita data are from The World Bank's data collection, Link: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=IE-PL>. The HDI data of Poland and Ireland are from the United Nations Human Development Reports. Links: <https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRL> & <https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/POL>

The different numbers show that Poland has had a bigger growth, whilst Ireland has had more success in increasing HDI rates. However, what this depends on is hard to tell. The GDP per capita stays significantly higher in Ireland than in Poland, which might be an indicator on the wealth of the general population is higher in Ireland than in Poland, which could explain why Ireland would be better at improving its human development index. However, the following analysis will look at the growth policies, and later to the other dimensions to grasp why these differences.

Growth policies

When tracing the process of growth policies and discussions, the data used is found through the Irish Governments News site 'MerrionStreet' which goes back to 2011. When searching on discussions regarding 'growth' one finds that the An Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Mr Enda Kenny T.D

(2011-2017) often associated 'growth' with economic growth or employment rates. In 2012 he states that jobs, increased employment, and the export sectors are essential for growth (MerrionStreet, 2012). In 2014 An Taoiseach talks about growth in terms of restoring financial stability and "return the economy to growth"; but he also talks about growth in terms of Ireland's having the "fastest employment growth rates in Europe" (MerrionStreet, 2014). Again in 2016, the An Taoiseach relates Ireland's economic growth to its growing economy, however, even if he acknowledges the growing population he does not emphasize 'growth' in terms of population (MerrionStreet, 2016). The trend that 'growth' is associated with economic growth followed in other departments of the government during the same period (2011-2017). For example in 2013 the Minister for Finance talked about growth as GDP and employment rates (MerrionStreet, 2013a); and the same year the Minister for Justice, Equality, and Defence talked about 'growth' as digital and economic growth (MerrionStreet, 2013b). When the new government took place in 2017, the idea that 'growth' is connected to economic growth continued. For example, in 2017 and 2018, the Minister for Finance and Public Expenditure and Reform talked about growth as employment growth and economic growth (MerrionStreet, 2017: Government of Ireland, 2018a). Further in 2018, the Department of Social Protection highlighted that Ireland's common goal was to have inclusive growth and social fairness, which includes both integrating the European Pillar of 'Social Rights' while "continuing to drive" a sustainable economy (Government of Ireland, 2018b).

¹In comparison to Ireland's discussion of growth as economic growth, Poland has occasionally discussed growth in terms of fertility. In 2015 The Ministry of Family and Social Policy often discuss growth in terms of increased fertility, where 'growth' was an indicator of the increased birthrates in Poland (Government of Poland, 2015). The increase in birth rates has been a goal of the "Family 500+" project drafted by the Polish ministry in 2015, which has the idea to significantly increase the fertility rate in Poland (Government of Poland, 2016). The association of 'growth' as increasing fertility is found again in 2017, when Minister Elżbieta Rafaka of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, in an interview stated that fertility rates have increased and the project Family+500 has given the growth in pro-family policies (Government of Poland, 2017). However, in 2018, different Polish government departments do also talk about 'growth' as an economic matter such as employment rates, economic growth, and indicators of consumption and investment (Government of Poland, 2018a: Government of Poland, 2018b: Government of Poland, 2018c). Further in 2019, the

¹ When looking at growth on the polish governmental websites is not as generous with the tracing archives. However, we can on Poland's government official website trace back in the archive until 2015.

Ministry of Development and Technology talks about 'growth' in terms of the state budget, increased GDP, and a stable economy (Government of Poland, 2019a: Government of Poland, 2019b). Moreover, in 2019 the Ministry of Investments and Development introduced the "responsible development plan - an economy for people" where its strategy looks to combine economic growth and social program, where the Minister Jerzy Kwieciński argued that "water can be combined with fire, economic growth can go hand in hand with social programs" (Government of Poland, 2019c).

This indicator shows that when comparing the two countries the main difference is the 'growth' discussions regarding fertility. When tracing the process in Ireland back to 2011, up until the liberal abortion policy in 2018, there were no governmental discussions linking growth and fertility. However, since 2015 the Polish government have talked about 'growth' in terms of increasing fertility, where they have implemented policies and projects to increase the fertility rates. The differences between the countries indicate an ideological difference, where once again Poland's PiS government are focused on growth from a nationalistic/conservative ideology looking to a 'strong nation and strong population' agenda; whilst Ireland's government are more focused on growth from a neoliberal ideology focusing on employment and GDP. These differences in 'growth' are good to consider when later understanding the changes in social rights and SRHR; these different discussions give off different ideas on the importance of fertility policies and controlling women's bodies.

4.3.2 Household

Income distribution inequality, gender pay gap, and general differences in employment types

The gender pay gap, income inequality, and the general differences in employment are all found in different data sets from OECD, the World Bank and EUROSTAT. To look at income distribution inequality EUROSTAT shows data for the national and general inequality of income distribution throughout the populations which "must be understood as equivalised disposable income" (EUROSTAT, 2021a). The data measures the ratio of the total income of the top 20% to the total income of the lowest 20% of the population. Here Ireland has had more uneven progress e.g in January 2010 the ratio was 4.24, later in December 2014, the ratio was 4.9, to again began to drop until 4.23 in December 2018 (ibid). In Poland, the ratio was 4.97 in January 2010, which continued to be relatively high until 2016 when it started to drop to come to an all-time low in December of 2020 when the ratio was 4.07 (ibid). However, this does provide much more than an understanding of the un-

equal income distribution within the countries, where one can see that the general income distribution gap in Ireland has had a different evolution than in Poland.

If one further looks at the gender pay gap, one can look at EUROSTAT's "Gender pay gap in unadjusted form" which measures on average how much more men make than women earn (EUROSTAT, 2021b). This dataset started tracking the gender pay gap in 2002 and shows an overall picture of inequality in terms of pay, which makes it unjust, and it also includes all ages and working hours (ibid). Here it is shown that men in Ireland in 2002 earned 15.1% more per hour than women, and later in 2018 when abortion became free on request, this had dropped to 11.3%. Poland, however, has had another development where the men's earnings in 2002 were 7.5% more than women's but grew to 8.5% more in 2019. Poland has been and still is more equal in the earnings between men and women, however, the gender pay gap has grown from 7.3% in 2015 to 8.5% in 2019, which might indicate a slightly increased gender inequality with the PiS government, whilst Ireland's change indicates increased equality over the years of neoliberal policy changes (ibid).

To further look at the process of the employment rates, one can first look at Labor force participation in the two countries, where data from the World Bank shows that Ireland has since 1997 had a higher percentage of labour force participation than Poland (The world bank, 2021a). Since 1990, the labour force participation in Ireland has grown from around 65% to around 71% in 2000, and later to around 73% in 2018. However, Poland has had a less steady growth in labour force participation. In 1990 around 69% were in the labour force, in 2000 around 65%, in 2015 around 68%, and lastly in 2019 around 70% (ibid). Female employment over these years has not had the same progress in the countries (The World Bank, 2021b). When tracing female employment it is found that in Ireland in 1990, the female participation was around 34%, and later in 2018 the female employment was 45.8%, whilst Poland in 1990 had about 45% female participation, which decreased to 44.8% in 2015 and decreased later to 44.4% in 2019 (ibid). Again, we can see that over the neoliberal years in politics in Ireland, women's participation has gone up, whilst over the same years in Poland, a slight decrease has happened, especially over the last couple of years and since PiS got elected.

Furthermore, OECD's data measures part-time employment as a person who works less than 30h/week in their main job. OECD's data tracks from 1976 to 2020, however, Ireland's data starts in 1983 and Poland's in 1997. In Ireland, one can see that part-time employment has increased for

both men and women. In 1983 3.50% of the men were part-time employed, and 18.26% of the women were part-time employed, later in 1990 where 4.4% of all employment for men was part-time and 21.18% of all employment for women was part-time. In 2018 when the referendum was made, 10.23% of all men and 32.78% of all women were part-time employed. This shows a big difference in income and time spent away from home for the different genders (in general) where women in Ireland in 2018 were found two times more likely to work less than men (OECD, 2021a). Poland has had another development since OECD started to track the country. Back in 1997, part-time employment for men in Poland was 8.24% and part-time employment for women was 16.97%. However, later in 2010 5.21% of the men were in part-time employment and 13.07% of the women. Moving forward in 2020, 3.28% of the men and 8.86% of the women were part-time employed (ibid). Hence one can understand that part-time employment in Poland is generally much lower than in Ireland, however, women are also in Poland more likely to take a part-time job than men. One can understand this in terms of neoliberalism, which promotes individuality and freedom but also competition and small businesses, where Ireland has gone more neoliberal over the years whilst Poland has had a more controlled economy and since PiS took over the government their national socialism they are not promoting the neoliberal agendas of freedom and competitiveness.

Moreover, one can follow the process of the full-time employment rates in the two countries. Here the OECD data shows men and women separately when looking at the "full-time equivalent employment rate", which looks at persons working 40hours a week (OECD, 2021b). Here it is shown that women have generally engaged less in full-time employment in Ireland than in Poland, but men in both countries are generally more likely to be engaged in full-time employment than women. OECD figures show that in 1995 about 35.5 % of the women in Ireland were full-time employees in comparison to 75.3% of the men being full-time employees. The rates of full-time employment for women in Ireland have gone up over the years, whilst the full-time employment for men has gone up and down over the years. e.g in 2005 78.8% of the men were full-time employed, and 46.8% of the women; in 2010 63.4% of the men were full-time employed and 43.8% of the women, and in 2018 74.9% of men and 50.9% women were full-time employed (ibid). If one looks at Poland it is shown that both men's and women's full-time employment has gone up over the years, however, OECD started to track full employment rates in Poland in 2005, back then 63.9% of the men and 44.7% of the women were full-time employed. Later in 2015 73.4% of the men and 54.7% of the women were full-time employed, and lastly in 2019 78.8% of the men and 58.9% of the women were full-time employed (Ibid). The data does not show 2020 or 2021, but one can still see the trend

of the increasing full-time employment in Poland over the last two decades. Here we can see that the employment rates follows the same trend in both countries since 2005. The full-time employment rates have gone up generally, however, men have in both countries around 20-30% higher rate of full-time employment, which indicates inequality in the society.

Motherhood

When looking at the process of the countries' discussions regarding motherhood Kennedy (2004) argues that motherhood in Ireland has been a symbol of "political, cultural and social life" and has given much of who is a good and a bad mom (Kennedy, 2004:4). The track record of motherhood mentioned by the Irish government largely starts around 2015, however, these discussions have been centred around sorting out what happened in the "mother and child homes" (ibid:4). From 1922 to 1998 "mother and baby homes" were established in Ireland which housed unmarried women who became pregnant. The mother and baby homes were seen as a "relief" from "homelessness, loss of employment, destitution, possible rejection by their family" which was a result of women being dismissed from their jobs if they got pregnant (Government of Ireland, Chapter 8:5,53). However, the mothers did not have any say in the child's future and it was rather the family, political leaders, or the authority of the mother and child homes who decided the future of the two (ibid).

Why the woman did not have the power to decide for herself can be understood as a bad mom or a fragile women's burden, where the women were seen as unfit to care for the child if she was not married. This began to change in the 1970s when a "prohibition on married women working the public service ended" gave women legal protection not to get dismissed because of their pregnancy and gave them some economic autonomy (Government of Ireland, Chapter 12:1). Until 2002 unmarried mothers were singled out by the state as a group of "lone mothers" (ibid:86). If one looks at the Irish constitution motherhood and mothers, in general, are mentioned in peculiar ways. Kennedy explains that from 1973 the Irish constitution institutionalized "mothers" which can be found under Article 41.2 (Kennedy, 2004:5):

1. "In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved"
2. "The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home" (Government of Ireland, 2020).

This constitutionalization of motherhood can be understood as having positioned the women's role in the society, where motherhood is the expectation and not the choice of the woman herself, which can explain the long-term ban on abortion in Ireland.

The ideas of "good and bad mothers" are also found when tracing the discussions of "motherhood" in the Polish case. Król and Pustułka (2018) argued that there is a debate today in Poland which looks to a "Virgin Mary-based model of motherhood" on one side and the "other mother" who is "unmarried, divorced or not catholic" on the other side (Król and Pustułka, 2018:379). Motherhood can be understood as equally politicised in Poland as it is in Ireland. If one further looks at how Poland's government talks about motherhood in governmental media outlets, mothers are talked about in terms of the family and "pro-life policies" since 2015. Many programs have been put into place in Poland over the last decade that aims to "allow mothers to be more at ease and facilitate the reconciliation of family life with professional duties" (Government of Poland, 2020). Motherhood can further be understood in the Polish context as equally important as in Ireland, where motherhood is a part of the family, which is the "highest value" of Polish politics because they "will not survive as a nation without a strong family" (Government of Poland 2018). Polish constitution have also an interesting relation to motherhood and in Chapter I- Article 18 states that: "Marriage, being a union of a man and a woman, as well as the family, motherhood and parenthood, shall be placed under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland" (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, 2021). "Mother" is also mentioned under Chapter II- Article 71.2 which states that "A mother, before and after birth, shall have the right to special assistance from public authorities, to the extent specified by statute" (ibid). Further, the Polish constitution includes "pregnant women" under Chapter II- Article 68.3 which states that "Public authorities shall ensure special health care to children, pregnant women, handicapped people and persons of advanced age" (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, 2021). Motherhood in Poland seems to be a matter of where women need to be protected rather than motherhood being an obligation to the country. However, Article 68.3 separates motherhood and pregnant women which is indicative of the heated discussions regarding pregnancies vs motherhood in general; because when is she a mother and when is she just pregnant?.

To conclude, one can see the differences and the similarities between the two countries, where both countries have politicised "motherhood" and both share ideas of "good and bad mothers". Motherhood in Ireland is constitutionalized, but the ideas of motherhood in Irish society seem to have changed. However, motherhood can be understood as a symbol of the old and present Irish values,

where a mother should be someone who is bound to her home and taking care of her children- and not someone who is participating in the labour force. In Poland, mothers are drawn into the "family policies" through the idea that marriage is between different sexes. The process-tracing shows that nowadays motherhood in Poland becomes a symbol of Polish values, and is ensured protection by the state.

4.3.3 Social Reproduction and Reproductive Governance

Fertility rates

The "Our world in data" project provides good datasets on Fertility rates globally where they present different charts. The following section will look at "Total fertility rate, including UN projections, 1950 to 2020" which shows that Poland and Ireland have had the same progress since the 1950s (Roser, 2014). The "total fertility" rate shows the average number of children that a woman gives birth to over her lifetime. Both countries had a high and quite similar "total fertility" rate in the 1950s. Whilst table 3 shows that the rates drop over the years, they are still quite similar. In Ireland, the fertility rate has dropped since the 1990s, but it has been more modest than Poland's drop in fertility rates. As shown in 2000, Poland's rates dropped much more than Ireland's and in the following years, the countries have had larger discrepancies in their rates. Since 2015, the rates have gone up in Poland, which might be due to the extensive children and family policies that the PiS government has implemented; the restricted contraceptive policies in Poland; or the ideology shift where the government pushes for conservative thoughts and family ideas. Consequently, these changes could also make it harder for family planning and could be understood as pushing up fertility rates.

Table 3, Total Fertility rate- including UN Projections

Total fertility rate	Ireland	Poland
1950	3.45	3.53
1990	2.07	2.08
2000	1.91	1.35
2010	2	1.35
2015	1.91	1.37
2020	1.81	1.45

Comment: From Our World in Data, Link: <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-fertility-rate-including-un-projections-through-2100?time=earliest..2020&country=POL~IRL>

Maternity, paternity and paternal leave

In Ireland in 1981 maternity leave became 14 weeks with full pay with a medical certificate confirming pregnancy, with the policy securing 4 extra weeks for special needs but was added without pay (Government of Ireland, 1981). In 2001 the period of maternity leave was increased to 18 weeks (Government Of Ireland, 2001). And later in 2006, the 18 weeks was increased to 22 weeks (Government of Ireland. 2006). However, maternity leave is not as simple as that. In 2014 only employed women were "eligible to claim maternity leave" if they had "made at least 39 weeks of social security contributions in the 12 months before beginning maternity leave or since they started working" (Strong and Broeks, 2017: 5). Hence the number of maternity weeks in Ireland is conditional. If one looks quickly at parental and paternity leave, parental leave in Ireland consisted in 1998 of 14 weeks of unpaid leave with children up to 5 years and was granted to both men and women (Government of Ireland, 1998). In 2003 the maximum limit of the child's age increased to 8 years, and later in 2010, it increased to 13 years (Government of Ireland 2003; 2010). Paternity benefits and leaves were put into law in 2016, which gave fathers 2 weeks of paid paternity leave and "an associated social welfare benefit" (House of Oireachtas, 2016:1). Hence one could understand the progress of parental, paternity and maternity leave in Ireland as becoming more progressive over the years. However, paternity is relatively lower than the maternity leave indicated by patriarchal ideas that the fathers are not to be as involved in the child's upbringing as the mothers.

In Poland, the maternity leave with a 100% replacement allowance was 16 weeks from 1972 until 1999 (Zajkowska,2020:124). In 1999, the fertility rates had begun to decline so maternity leave was increased to 26 weeks. However, Poland's maternity leave shifts some over the years and in 2002 the maternity weeks went down to 16 again, to be 18 weeks in 2007, 20 weeks in 2009, 22 weeks in 2010-2011, and up until 26 weeks in 2013 (ibid:125). Like the Irish ones, the Polish laws generally give mothers more rights to leave than fathers. However, in 2010, it was decided that mothers after 14 weeks of maternity leave could give the rest of the weeks to their partner. Paid paternity leave was introduced in 2011, with a two-week paid leave (ibid:125). In 1989 parental leave was 16 to 18 weeks, but this changed in 2013 when parental leave became 26 weeks which was counted after the maternity leave (ibid: 125). The parental leave is reimbursed by 60-80% of the salary, consists of three blocks- one block for each parent which cannot be shared, and an extra one to share- which makes it possible for the mother and father to take weeks at the same time (Eurofound, 2021). In

2020 when the abortion policy was restricted, maternity leave also included longer leave if you gave birth to more than one child at the same time (Eurofound,2021).

Maternity, paternity, and parental leave are somewhat similar in the two countries, however, Poland can be considered more generous with public expenditures and reimbursements than Ireland. One might think that generous maternity, paternity, and parental leave are connected to ideas of gender equality. However, the generous policies can also be understood as conservative ones. In the case of Poland, the idea to support families is essential, where these generous family policies could be seen as nurturing conservative systems that promote 'having a family'. So rather than promoting equality policies, these policies can be understood as conservative ones. Therefore, one can see that the agenda behind these family policies in Ireland and Poland differ even if the outcome does not.

Access and financial subsidies for contraception

In Ireland in 1985, condoms and spermicides became legal to distribute without prescription at doctor's offices, hospitals and family planning clinics, however, birth control pills were still restricted (A&E Television Networks, 2021). But it was not until 1993 that condoms laws changed and from there on condoms could be sold legally in any store (Enright & Cloatre, 2018: 262). Since 2003 other types of contraception (hormonal contraceptives and long-acting reversible contraception) have been accessible through a prescription from a registered medical professional (Government of Ireland, 2019:9). In 2011 the emergency pill became accessible to get at a pharmacy without a prescription (Cullen, 2017). Moreover, in 2015 the Government introduced a strategy under the Healthy Ireland Framework for the period of 2015-2020 and beyond. The strategy goals were to give "comprehensive" and "age-appropriate" sexual health education/information and to give access to "prevention and promotion services" (ibid:5). But also "Equitable, accessible and high-quality sexual health services" which meet the individual's need, and " Robust and high-quality sexual health information will be generated to underpin policy, practice, service planning and strategic monitoring." (Ibid:5). Further, in 2017 the emergency pill became free without a prescription for women in Ireland who hold a "medical card" (Cullen, 2017).

Poland has had another journey than Ireland when it comes to legalization and policies regarding contraceptives. Family planning was a widespread interest by the public and the government in the 1950s when Poland became the first to domestically produce condoms (Okolski,1983:263). In the 1960s Poland began to produce the pill, and in the 1970s the means continued to spread, even so, if

the "production of contraceptives and the provision of family planning services" started to slow down (ibid). Later in the first period of the 1990's the Church's influence on the state resulted in the replacement of sexual health education with "Preparation for Life in a Family", which taught "abstinence before marriage and periodic abstinence during marriage as the only Church-sanctioned pregnancy prevention method and depicting condoms and hormonal contraceptives as physically and psychologically harmful" (Mishtal and Dannefer, 2010:233). The trend where the government restricted sexual health service continued and in 2002 the "contraceptive health insurance coverage" was eliminated (ibid). The process to restrict sexual health has not slowed down. In 2017 the Polish President Andrzej Duda signed off a law that "turns emergency contraception into a prescription drug", which is something that the health minister Konstanty Radziwiłł said to have been necessary to because hormonal means of contraception were being abused and could result in harmful health effects (Boffey, 2017). It is further reported by Broszkowski (2019), that PiS over the last years have tightened restrictions on IVF treatment, sex education, and maternal health measures (Broszkowski, 2019).

Access to contraceptives is not easy to track, because the dataset provided does not give a range of years. Hence different datasets will be used to grasp the processes regarding the issue. Further when studying contraceptives one can use "modern contraceptives" and "traditional contraceptives" where the traditional means rhythm, withdrawal and other traditional or natural methods (UN, 2015:35). The modern methods are a few more and include female sterilization, male sterilization, the pill, injectables, implants, intrauterine devices (IUD), male condoms, vaginal barrier methods and other modern methods (ibid). When studying the use and access to contraceptives the two methods are sometimes combined into "any methods" which are found in datasets from World Bank, UN, UNDP and The European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights. The different data sets are not following the countries over the same years, however, together they give a picture of how accessible contraceptives have been over the years.

Firstly if one uses the tracing method to look at the World Bank's "Contraceptive prevalence, any methods (% of women ages 15-49)" it shows that in Ireland the prevalence was 77% in 1998, 75% in 2002, and 73% in 2010; whilst Poland in the prevalence 72.7% in 1991, 50.6% in 2011, and 62.3% in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). This shows a trend that contraceptives have gotten less accessible in Poland over the years, but it was still quite high in 2014. Moreover, the "any method" does include "traditional methods" so if one instead looks to the "modern method" dataset instead of the

World Bank's data on Contraceptive prevalence, modern methods (% of women ages 15-49) shows that Poland has a much lower prevalence than Ireland. The data indicate that modern contraceptives in Poland are and have been less accessible for some time. Ireland had a prevalence of 67.6% in 1998, 66% in 2002, and 70.9% in 2010; whilst Poland had a 28% prevalence in 1991, and a 41.2% in 2011 (World Bank, 2011). In 2015 the UN's dataset shows that the prevalence of access to modern methods in Ireland was 62.4 % and in Poland, the prevalence was 47.7% (UN, 2015).

Furthermore, one can look to the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights, and their "Reproductive Atlas". Here they show the "Ranking Index of countries" which involves "access to modern, effective and affordable contraception" (The European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights, 2017 & 2018). Here one can see that the trend follows and Ireland in 2017 and 2018 had a 65% rate, whilst Poland during the same period had a rate of 42.7% in 2017 and 44.8% in 2018 (ibid). We are again only tracking Ireland up until 2018 because that is when the abortion policy became liberal. However, Poland is tracked up until 2021, and the rates for Poland in 2020 were 35.1% (ibid). One can see a further trend that the access is decreasing again in Poland after already being low to start with.

To sum up, what all these numbers can tell us is that over the last years access to modern, effective and affordable contraception has never been much accessible in Poland, but it has become much less accessible in Poland since 2015 when the PiS government was put into place. Ireland has generally had more access since 1990, which can be understood as depending on many factors. However, the general attitude from the state seems to be the biggest difference; where the Irish attitude has become more positive towards contraceptives whilst Poland has become far more negative. The growing negative attitude over the years could further be connected to the "renewal" of Polish values that the government has advocated for post the communist breakdown (Koralewska & Zielińska, 2021:3).

"The unborn child"

Ireland was the first country in the world "to constitutionalize foetal rights" through the 8th Amendment in 1983 which equalized the foetus's life with the mother (Londras, 2015:243). Foetal rights have been the centre of 'pro-life vs pro-choice' campaigning, and Londras (2015) argues that the legalization of foetal rights in Ireland started a global pro-life campaign for the personhood of the foetus (ibid:244-425). When tracking the process of the rights of an unborn in Ireland, there

were many different "Dáil Éireann debates" found between 1983 and 2018. In these debates, issues were mainly regarding the 8th amendment and Article 40.3.3° in the constitution and the unclarity of who has the primary legal right. In 1992, the Dáil discussed the right to 'give information to have an abortion abroad', where members of the Dáil openly opposed the idea of terminating pregnancies and as Miss M. Wallace states: "I believe that it is right to reaffirm the principle that unborn children should be afforded definite protection and that abortion on demand is wrong" (Oireachtas, 1992). However, during this time the government with the Minister for Justice and Minister of Health at the time advocated for the right to information about abortion abroad (ibid); which was later passed in legalization. (IFPA, 2021).

The pushback against the eighth amendment continued throughout the years and the discussion as such. In the mid-2010s the Act 2013 to 'permit abortion to save pregnant women's life' was voted on, which gives an example of the attitude towards the foetus during this time. In a "Dáil Éireann debate" during this period Deputy Mark Wallace pointed out that "According to the latest opinion poll in The Irish Times, 83% of voters support abortion where the foetus is not capable of surviving outside the womb." (Oireachtas, 2013). The Irish time's voters could indicate a general shift in the Irish public and their attitudes towards abortion and the 8th amendment. This attitude can also be seen as having spread into the Oireachtas where the discussion was based on emotions and rational thoughts. For example, Deputy Billy Kelleher stated: "I am pro-life in the sense that I believe we should do everything possible to vindicate the life of the unborn" but he also states that "I support the Bill on a personal basis" (ibid). Others such as Deputy Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin stated that "For many - I include myself - this has been and is a difficult issue. I have always been and remain pro-life, yet I must face the fact that the lives of some are placed at a real and substantial risk due to their pregnancy and only a termination of the pregnancy, is distinct from the termination of the life of the unborn, though that can be a consequence of the intervention, is going to save their lives" (ibid). The Act 2013 was passed into law and the attitude towards abortion seems to have evolved even further within the government. This can be seen as having given way for the change of the rights of the unborn by the Supreme Court in March of 2018, where it was ruled that "the unborn have no rights under the Irish constitution, other than the right to live in the Eighth Amendment" (BBC, 2018).

The foetal rights in Poland began to occur in 1989 when the Catholic Church and new liberal government gained authority and power. Already back then, a shift started around the legal language of

the "aborted foetus" to "unborn murdered child" (Szelewa, 2016:744). To trace the process of governmental discussions on the "unborn child" in Poland before 2015 was somewhat less accessible than in Ireland. However, what was found was that the pro-life agenda continued throughout the years which resulted in the restricted abortion laws in 2020. The process tracing shows that the government in 2013 introduced new "Proposals for amendments in the Polish Penal Code", which Urbaniak and Spaczyński (2015) state included "a new category of the entity, to be protected, which is "unborn child" and "unborn child able to live outside the mother's body" (Urbaniak and Spaczyński, 2015). Since 2013 the pro-life vs pro-choice campaigns in Poland have been loud, and in 2016 a citizen bill with 450,000 signatures was voted down in parliament which proposed to tighten the abortion laws even more (BBC, 2016). The PiS parliament during this period said that the bill gave "food for thought", and they were intentionally going to support the bill before 100'000 mostly women protested it (ibid). The citizen bill could be seen as reflecting the conflict in both society and parliament where the concerns of the 'unborn child' are at the centre of the discussions. The development of the government's position on the matter of the rights of the unborn is not unclear. In mid-2020, just months before the passing of the restricted abortion laws, Wądołowska reports that the Justice Ministry "awarded an honour to a pro-life activist" and they presented a medal for "the merit in the field of justice" (Wądołowska, 2020). Here Minister Marcin Romanowski is said to have "hailed" the activist for the "loud cry of protest when it was easiest to remain silent, for fighting for human life and compliance with the law, for courage, determination and not showing indifference" (Wądołowska, 2020).

The tracing process shows that the discussions of the 'unborn child', or the foetus, have been heavily discussed in both countries. What can be said is that there are different changes in the idea of the rights of the 'unborn child' over the last years in both cases. Poland's journey to talk about defining the rights of the unborn came around the same time as Ireland started to change their mindset. However, the public shift in Poland seems to have come before the PiS took over the government, and one can look to the progress of neoliberalism within the country where the liberal agenda could be seen as having failed the people around this time, pushing people to unemployment, which pushed the people to condone conservative thoughts in some matters of gaining the power back to control life. This could be an explanation of why PiS got a large mandate in the election in 2015. Their politics to restrict SRHR could be understood in the light of Tanyag's (2017) statement that the claim over women's bodies is making societies (Tanyag, 2017: 44). Hence could the SRHR policies to control women's bodies could be understood as a tool used to control society. Ireland on

the other hand has had the other progress, where the restrictions got lifted the more liberal the country got, which follows the whole way to freedom of choice in 2018.

5. Concluding analysis

By using FGPE theory and a process-tracing method, this study shows both differences and similarities between Ireland and Poland. A similarity is that the two countries adopted and committed to neoliberal agenda in the 1990s' until the financial crisis in 2007-2008; where the economic adjustments in both countries were focused on "competitiveness" and successful GDP growth from the late 90' to around 2007-2008. Another similarity is that the countries have had somewhat a similar full-time employment rate process. The process tracing also highlighted that the full-time employment rate has in both countries gone up over the years, where men's employment rates in both countries have generally been higher than women's. The process tracing also shows that since 2005 men's full-time employment rates have been around 20-30% higher than women's full-time employment rate in both countries. This similarity can understandably be connected to patriarchal structures, and through Purewal (2018) we can understand that the big gender gaps in the labour market are connected to patriarchal governance that forces men and women to operate within their structures and norms in both countries (Purewal, 2018: 24).

When utilising the FGPE analytical framework it also appears to be a big difference between the two countries in the terms of economic growth, fertility and access to contraception. To start, growth in Poland has been discussed alongside fertility and birth rates, but this has not been the case in Ireland. These discussions can be understood as an ideological agenda where Poland's PiS government are looking to 'nurture a strong nation and strong population'. However, the discussions on growth as fertility can also be understood in the light of the drastic drop in fertility rates in Poland in the 2000'. This study shows that the fertility rates dropped in Poland post-communism and the adaption of liberalism, however, since 2015 there has been another trend where the fertility rates have gone up. This change does not necessarily mean that the Polish government has succeeded in their promotion of family values, but it might indicate the difficulties of getting family-planning consulting or access to contraceptives and sex education. Before the late-1990s' Poland had a liberal policy regarding family planning, contraceptive pills and condoms, but since 2002 "contraception health insurance coverage" has been eliminated; and in 2017 emergency contraception (or "morning-after-pill") became a prescribed drug. The governments' restrictions on contraceptives

have made the fertility rates go up slightly, however, sexual health and sexual health education have become less accessible, which can lead to more unexpected pregnancies and give an increase in fertility rates.

Ireland's fertility rates have also decreased over the last 30 years, however, the decrease in fertility rates has been less than in Poland. The process tracing of Ireland showed that growth has been connected to economic expansion and economic development. The decreasing fertility rates and the economic focus on growth can be understood to be interlinked with matters such as the neoliberal economic adjustment in the 1990s; the decreasing influence of the Catholic Church on the institutions; and the access to contraceptives becoming more accessible. Ireland's liberal ideas regarding contraceptives from the 1990's seem to not have had that big of an impact when it comes to fertility rates. Here an important point is what feminist scholars such as Weitz (1998) and Hoff (1994) argue: women will not be 'fully citizens' and equal to society if they are denied dominance over their sexuality and bodies (Weitz, 1998: 9-10; Hoff, 1994: 621). One can also argue that with the liberal contraceptive policies in Ireland, women are becoming more 'fully citizens', whilst women in Poland are becoming less 'fully citizens'.

However, not to say that women in Ireland do not have their issues with dominance over their sexualities and bodies in terms of motherhood. In the case of Ireland, the idea of motherhood is politicized and could instead be an explanation for higher fertility. Motherhood in Ireland is constitutionalized in a way that it is not in Poland, and the changes for a liberal SRHR policy within Ireland have not yet changed its constitutional laws regarding what motherhood means; where motherhood is a duty to the country. This connects to Ireland's history with the Catholic Church where Tanyag (2017) argued that motherhood in the catholic community is a "life choice" and essential for a healthy society" (Tanyag, 2017: 43). This is a big difference from Poland, where mothers instead need to be protected by the state. However, these changes might become more present in future Poland if the Catholic Church continues to have an influence on the legislators, which is yet to be determined.

Moreover, when looking at Maternity, paternity and parental leave there is some similarity between the two countries, however, Poland can be considered more generous with public expenditures and reimbursements than Ireland when it comes to parental leave possibilities. This can be connected to Poland's conservative ideals to promote and support a family structure. As argued previously, the idea to support families is a conservative one rather than a liberal one, which explains the differ-

ences between the two countries in terms of the value of supporting the family in society. Paternity leave is interesting as it is relatively lower than maternity leave in both countries, which again indicates patriarchal structures; where fathers are not to be as involved in the children's upbringing. Both countries do offer paternity days, however, this can either be understood as a liberal and modern agenda "to make the parents more equal", or it can indicate a reinforcement of a "family-friendly" policy. The idea behind adopting parental leave is therefore not clear, but the outcome has in both cases made it possible for fathers to take time off and stay home with the child, which on a global scale is a progressive policy that promotes gender equality.

The last indicator, the 'unborn child', the process tracing showed that the two countries have had different changes in the idea of the rights of the 'unborn child'. Poland started to talk about defining the 'rights of the unborn' around the same time that Ireland started to change their mindset. Ireland's restrictions on SRHR seem to have been lifted the more liberal the country got, which follows the whole way to abortion on request in 2018. The public shift in Poland seems, however, to have come before the PiS took over the government, and one can look to the progress of neoliberalism within the country. In Poland, the liberal agenda could be seen as having failed the people around this time, as this study shows, there has been an unstable labour force participation in Poland since 1990', which one can imagine pushes people to nurture conservative thoughts in some matter of gaining the control. This could be an explanation of why PiS got a large mandate in the election in 2015. Their politics of restricting SRHR could perhaps be understood through Kozolowska et.al (2016) statement that religion combined with nationalism creates ideas of restricted SRHR which are promoted as "national identity" (Kozolowska, Béland & Lecours, 2016:825). Religion and nationalism seem to play a key role, as do the adaptation to liberalism and the neoliberal market.

This analysis showed that the most significant differences took place after the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. Back then Ireland intensified their adaption to neoliberal market ideas, where they pushed for more privatization and restructured the generous public expenditure that they had pre-crisis. This made them redirect the focus of control to liberal agendas of freedom and competitiveness. On the other hand, Poland has over the same period changed its focus away from the neoliberal agendas. Hence the case of Ireland shows that with adaptation to liberalism, other liberal ideas such as liberal SRHR policy followed; whilst in Poland, neoliberalism opened up the society to new ideas such as nationalism took place, which gave effect on SRHR policies. Mateo (2020) claims that Poland has taken an authoritarian neoliberal approach (Mateo, 2020:598), however, when

studying Poland one might consider that they are rather taking a more conservative and "social nationalistic" approach. Despite Mateo's claims that the economy previously had a liberal agenda and liberal social looks to control the growth of the population; one might understand Poland's agenda of retaking control of the country, as not a liberal one because it does not promote liberal agendas such as democracy, civil rights, and individual freedom which is the core of liberalism.

This study reveals that there is some sort of correlation between adaptation to neoliberal agendas and SRHR policy, but it does not mean that there is a specific causality between adaptation of neoliberal agenda and SRHR policy. The causality, a direct cause of neoliberal policy to a friendly and accessible SRHR cannot be determined, however, the process tracing of Ireland shows us that a positive and friendly SRHR legislation followed the neoliberal policy and economic adjustment agendas that were adopted during the Celtic Tiger period. The intense commitment to neoliberal agendas seems to have opened up spaces for discussions regarding the previously restricted, conservative and Catholic view on SRHR, where the new neoliberal society in Ireland seems to favour choice and gender equality. Hence one can argue against previous researchers Purewal (2018) and Mateo (2020), and their claim that the correlation and causality between neoliberal economic policies and patriarchal values gave restricted SRHR. However, in Poland it is shown that the neoliberal agenda does not give the liberal SRHR policies, it rather opened up the society to all actors where conservative and social nationalistic influences gain legitimacy in the public opinion. Simultaneously to the PiS government being elected in 2015, parts of the Polish society dismissed neoliberal agendas. During the years that followed, this study shows that the gender pay gap increased and contraception regulations became more restricted. Hence there seems to be a correlation between the neoliberal adaption and SRHR policy in some cases but not in all, which is something that needs to be further studied in other contexts.

5.1 Conclusion

To answer the research questions of this study (page 7), it is shown that when using process tracing and the FGPE analytical framework, one can understand that factor that has had the most impact on abortion policies is neoliberalism and the country's adaptation and commitment to the neoliberal agenda. This study shows that when adapting to the neoliberal agenda, Ireland's commitment opened up for liberal thoughts on SRHR and abortion policies; whilst in Poland neoliberalism rather opened up for conservative thoughts, which later restricted SRHR and abortion policies. To answer the second question, this study shows that when applying the theory of FGPE to the cases of Ireland

and Poland, the biggest differences are shown to be the recommitment to neoliberal politics after the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. However, there are also other differences, such as in discussions regarding the economic and fertility growth, the perception of motherhood, ideas of "the unborn child", fertility rates, and access to sexual health education and rights. These ideas seem to be connected with the different historical backgrounds such as motherhood being constitutionalized in Ireland, or after the breakdown of the Polish communist state where they associated liberal abortion policies with the old communist state. To conclude, this study shows that the government's approach toward women's bodies reflects the ideological ideas that underpin societal progress. Hence the Catholic Church's influence on the state is not the only explanation in all cases, as there are other aspects connected to neoliberal agendas that could be better used. The FGPE perspective can therefore be used for a deeper understanding of why a country adapts stricter SRHR policies. The economic policy processes are a part of the societal development which are affecting SRHR policies., hence the FGPE choices that each country makes are closely related to which type of SRHR development the country receives.

5.2 Comments and Recommendations for further research

One can again look to Tanyag (2017) and her claim that an FGPE perspective is crucial when looking at conservative governments and religious fundamentalists, which seems to be accurate (Tanyag, 2017: 39, 43). This process-tracing study has shown that the FGPE analytical framework can be very useful when understanding the economic policies' effect on SRHR. The take on FGPE, and this framework, made it possible to study the specific cases and the political and economic developments that affected the abortion policy away from religious and social movement assumptions.

Despite the limited access to polish governmental policies, it was still (through an FGPE perspective) possible to do this comparative study. The process-tracing method was said to "provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome" (Vannesson 2008:235); which it did in some ways. The method enabled the study to examine abortion policy and the governmental changes to understand what FGPE factor correlates with, and sometimes affects, the abortion policy. However, the study shows rather a correlation between abortion policies and neoliberal adaptation than a causal path between the two. So, could another method have been better to use? Possibly, but I do believe that with this method the study found some positive aspects of the neoliberal agenda, which might not have been found otherwise. So even if this analytical FGPE framework cannot ex-

plain everything, the process-tracing method helped to shine a new light on neoliberalism and its positive connections to SRHR policies.

Unlike much other research, this study found that the neoliberal agenda can open up for positive things such as a more liberal take on abortion policy, and not only feed the patriarchal systems of power which e.g Purewal (2018) argued. An important note is that the adaptation to liberalism depends on the political climate, where if the climate is more conservative the policies will follow and push away from liberal ideas. However, one must ask if there's something the framework cannot explain regarding the different abortion policies?. Understandably, this thesis does not give a general overview of the abortion matter, and the framework leaves out to discuss the impact that open spaces that the neoliberal spheres give. Freedom, access and competition are all liberal matters, but so are injustices and inequalities. Hence can the arguments that Tanyag (2017), Mateo (2020), and Purewal (2018) have can still be used; where Tanyag see that neoliberal policies are weakening the SRHR policies in developing countries, and Mateo and Purewal argue that neoliberalism feeds patriarchal systems (Tanuyag, 2017:45, Mateo, 2020: 598, Purewal, 2018: 21,27).

The results given show the processes of the specific cases, hence further research should use a similar framework and adapt it to another context to look at the relationship between abortion and neoliberalism. Lastly, this thesis does also not look at many matters such as queer theories of neoliberalism which is something that could be interesting to look at in future research.

6. References

- A&E Television Networks. (2021). Ireland allows the sale of contraceptives. Link: <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ireland-allows-sale-of-contraceptives>
- AECEA. (2021). Poland, Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions. Link: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions-56_en
- Anderson, F. C. (2017) Decriminalizing Abortion in Uruguay: Women's Movements, Secularism, and Political Allies, *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 38:2, 221-246, DOI: 10.1080/1554477X.2016.1219583
- BBC. (2016). Poland abortion: Parliament rejects near-total ban. 6th October 2016. Link: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37573938>
- BBC. (2018). Irish court rules on the rights of 'unborn. 7th March 2018. Link: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43319959>
- Beach, D. & Pedersen, R.B. (2011). What is Process-Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process Tracing Methods and Their Uses and Limitations. Link: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228162928>
- Beattie, T. (2009). Catholicism, choice and consciousness: A feminist theological perspective on abortion. *International Journal of Public Theology*, 4(1), 51-75.
- Bedford, K. & Rai, S.M. (2013). Feminists Theorize International Political Economy. *E-International Relations* ISSN 2053-8626.
- Bergeron, S. (2001). Political economy discourses of globalization and feminist politics. *Signs: Journal of women in culture and society*, 26(4), 983-1006.

Beesley, A. (2018). "Has Ireland lost faith in its church?". *The Financial Times Magazine*, 10th August 2018. Link: <https://www.ft.com/content/20987b3c-9a97-11e8-ab77-f854c65a4465#comments-anchor>

Blofield, M. (2008). Women's choices in comparative perspective: Abortion policies in late developing catholic countries. *Comparative Politics*, 40(4), 399-419.

Boffey, D. (2017). Polish government widely condemned over morning-after pill law. *The Guardian*. Link: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/26/polish-president-signs-off-widely-condemned-morning-after-pill-law>

Britannica. (2021). Poland Link: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Poland/The-constitution-of-1997#ref967178>

Broszkowski, R. (2019). Under Attack: Reproductive Rights in Poland. Link <http://politicalcritique.org/cee/poland/2019/under-attack-reproductive-rights-in-poland/>

Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Calkin, S., & Kaminska, M. E. (2020). Persistence and change in morality policy: The role of the Catholic Church in the politics of abortion in Ireland and Poland. *Feminist Review*, 124(1), 86-102.

Cap, K. (2004). The Roman Catholic Church and the Democratic Process: A Comparative Analysis of Abortion Policies in Ireland and Poland. *Critique*, 1.

Center for Reproductive Rights. (1992-2022). The Family Planning, Human Embryo Protection and Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion Act of 7 January 1993. Link: <https://www.reproductive-rights.org/sites/crr.civicaactions.net/files/documents/Polish%20abortion%20act--English%20translation.pdf>

Clark, C. M. (2019). Catholicism and Economics: Towards a "Deeper Reflection on the Nature of the Economy and its Purposes". *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 78(2), 409-441.

Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. *Political Science and Politics* 44. No. 4 (2011): 823-830. doi:10.1017/S1049096511001429

CSO. (2016). Census of Population – Profile 8 Irish Travellers, Ethnicity and Religion. Link: <https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-cp8iter/p8iter/p8rrc/>

Cullen, P. (2017). Medical card holders to get immediate access to morning after pill. *Irish Times*, Fri, May 5, 2017, 06:38. Link: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/medical-card-holders-to-get-immediate-access-to-morning-after-pill-1.3072572>

Cullen, P. & Korolczuk, E. (2019). Challenging abortion stigma: framing abortion in Ireland and Poland, *Sexual and Reproductive Health Matters*, 27:3, 6-19, DOI: 10.1080/26410397.2019.1686197

Czerwinski, A. (2004). Sex, Politics, and Religion: The Clash between Poland and the European Union over Abortion, 32 *Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y* 653. Link: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/323046914.pdf>

Dema Moreno, S., Llorente-Marrón, M., Diaz-Fernandez, M., & Méndez-Rodríguez, P. (2020). Induced abortion and gender (in) equality in Europe: A panel analysis. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 27(3), 250-266.

Dillon, M. (1996). Cultural differences in the abortion discourse of the Catholic Church: Evidence from four countries. *Sociology of Religion*, 57(1), 25-36.

Domínguez E., R. Icaza, C. Quintero, S. Lopez, and Å. Stenman (2010) 'Women workers in the Maquilas and the debate on global labour standards' *Feminist Economics* 16(4): 185-209.

Dukelow, F. (2015). 'Pushing against an open door': Reinforcing the neo-liberal policy paradigm in Ireland and the impact of EU intrusion. Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790 *Comparative European Politics* Vol. 13, 1, 93–111

Dukelow, F. & Kennett, P. (2018). Discipline, debt and coercive commodification: Post-crisis neoliberalism and the welfare state in Ireland, the UK and the USA. *Critical Social Policy* 2018, Vol. 38(3): 482–504

Enright, M., Cloatre, E. (2018). Transformative Illegality: How Condoms ‘Became Legal’ in Ireland, 1991–1993. *Fem Leg Stud* 26, 261–284 (2018). Link: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-018-9392-1> <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10691-018-9392-1> s 262

European Parliament. (2021). Brief: Parliament to discuss the de facto ban on abortion in Poland- Newsletter - 8-11 February 2021 - plenary session. Link: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/agenda/briefing/2021-02-08/16/parliament-to-discuss-the-de-facto-ban-on-abortion-in-poland>

European Parliament. (2021a). Poland: attacks on media freedom and the EU legal order need to stop. Link: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210910IPR11928/poland-attacks-on-media-freedom-and-the-eu-legal-order-need-to-stop>

Eurofound. (2021). Living and working in Poland. Link: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/country/poland#individual-employment-relations>

European Academy on Religion and Society (EARS). (2021). Conservative trends in Europe: The case of abortion in Poland. Link: https://europeanacademyofreligionandsociety.com/weekly_comments/conservative-trends-in-europe-the-case-of-abortion-in-poland/#_ftn4

Exelgyn. (2020a). Abort report.eu- European Data. Website: <https://abort-report.eu/europe/#ar1> Appendix

Exelgyn. (2020b). Abortion-Report: Ireland. Link: <https://abort-report.eu/ireland/>

Exelgyn. (2020c). Abort- Report: Poland. Link: <https://abort-report.eu/poland/>

Federation for Women and Family Plannings. (2018). 2018 Annual Report. Link: https://en.federa.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/annual-report-2018_Federation.pdf

Federation for Women and Family Plannings. (2019). 2019 Annual Report. Link <https://en.feder-ra.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2019-ANNUAL-REPORT.pdf>

Gideon, J., Leite, M., & Minte, G. A. (2015). What is hindering progress? The marginalization of women's sexual and reproductive health and rights in Brazil and Chile. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, 31(3), 255-270.

Government of Ireland. (1981). Circular 27/1981:- Maternity Leave. Reference No: E109/294/73. Date: 26/06/81. Link: <https://assets.gov.ie/17304/d56e2af9c0ce4baba1d53853d44c6efc.pdf>

Governemnt of Ireland. (1998). Circular 22/1998: Parental Leave. Reference No: E109/22/98; Date: 02/12/98. Link: <https://assets.gov.ie/16770/61b818cf356944288cdb44995ba319f0.pdf>

Government of Ireland. (2001). E 109/66/97 Maternity Leave. E 10.3/146/94 Adoptive Leave. Link: <https://www.gov.ie/en/circular/c7f72ed0260745428d20cf8611c3a41b/>

Government of Ireland. (2003). Circular 25/2003: Amendment to Parental Leave Entitlement (age). Circulars 22/98, 22/2000 and 39/2002 refer. Link: <https://assets.gov.ie/17246/be2ed720f549412780e68acfdac3ad50.pdf>

Government of Ireland. (2006). S.I. No. 51/2006 - Maternity Protection Act 1994 (Extension of Periods of Leave) Order 2006. Link: <https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2006/si/51/made/en/print?q=maternity>

Government of Ireland. (2010). Circular 13/2010: Amendment to Parental Leave Arrangements (age) Circular 20/2008 refers. Link: <https://assets.gov.ie/17074/85ca78d7c0c145d080c85c2638395-daa.pdf>

Government of Ireland. (2018a). Minister Donohoe welcomes CSO figures pointing to strong employment growth. From Department of Finance. Published on 16 January 2018. Last updated on 31 January 2019. Link: <https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/6384ea-t/>

Government of Ireland. (2018b). The 2018 European Semester: Inclusive Growth and Social Fairness for Ireland and Europe. From Department of Social Protection. Published on 31 May 2018. Last updated on 3 October 2019. Link: <https://www.gov.ie/en/speech/7411e1-the-2018-european-semester-inclusive-growth-and-social-fairness-for-/>.

Government of Ireland. (2019). Report of the Working Group on Access to Contraception. Link: <https://assets.gov.ie/38063/89059243e750415ebf7e96247a4225ae.pdf>

Government of Ireland. (2020). Policy Paper on Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy. From Department of Health Link: <https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/82a29f-policy-paper-on-regulation-of-termination-of-pregnancy/?referrer=http://www.health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Policy-paper-approved-by-Goverment-8-March-2018.pdf>

Government of Ireland. (2021). Final Report of the Commission of Investigation into Mother and Baby Homes. Chapter 8 & Chapter 12. Link: <https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d4b3d-final-report-of-the-commission-of-investigation-into-mother-and-baby-homes/>

Government of Poland. (2015). Czekam na cud narodzin, wywiad z minister Elżbietą Rafalską, wSieci, nr 50/51, 14-127 grudnia 2015 r. Ministry of Family and Social Policy. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/czekam-na-cud-narodzin-wywiad-z-minister-elzbieta-rafalska-wsieci-nr-5051-14-127-grudnia-2015-r>

Government of Poland. (2016). Rodzina 500 plus. Potrzebny był mocny bodziec! - wywiad z minister Elżbietą Rafalską, Nowy Przemysł, kwiecień 2016 r. Ministry of Family and Social Policy. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/rodzina-500-plus-potrzebny-byl-mocny-bodziec-wywiad-z-minister-elzbieta-rafalska-nowy-przemysl-kwiecien-2016-r>

Government of Poland. (2017). Wywiad z minister Elżbietą Rafalską: „Liczę na wzrost diety”, Nasz Dziennik z 20 lipca 2017 r. Ministry of Family and Social Policy. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/wywiad-z-minister-elzbieta-rafalska-licze-na-wzrost-dzietnosci-nasz-dziennik-z-20-lipca-2017-r>

Government of Poland. (2018). Family is the highest value. Ministry of family and social policy. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/family/family-is-the-highest-value>

Government of Poland. (2018a). Kolejny wzrost zatrudnienia. Ministry of Family and Social Policy. Link: (<https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/kolejny-wzrost-zatrudnienia>).

Government of Poland. (2018b). Gospodarcze Otwarcie Roku 2018: „Naszym zadaniem jest nie tylko utrzymać wysoki wzrost gospodarczy, ale go wzmocnić”. Ministry of Development and Technology. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj-technologia/gospodarcze-otwarcie-roku-2018-naszym-zadaniem-jest-nie-tylko-utrzymac-wysoki-wzrost-gospodarczy-ale-go-wzmocnic>

Government of Poland, (2018c). Komentarz ministra Kwiecińskiego do danych GUS o wzroście PKB w IV kwartale 2018 r. Ministry of Investments and Development. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/archiwum-inwestycje-rozwoj/komentarz-ministra-kwiecinskiego-do-danych-gus-o-wzroscie-pkb-w-iv-kwartale-2018-r>

Government of Poland. (2019a). Dynamiczny wzrost dochodów budżetu państwa. Ministry of Development and Technology. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj-technologia/dynamiczny-wzrost-dochodow-budzetu-panstwa>

Government of Poland. (2019b). PKB per capita – Polska pnie się w górę. Ministry of Development and Technology. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj-technologia/pkb-per-capita-polska-pnie-sie-w-gore>

Government of Poland. (2019c). Odpowiedzialny rozwój – gospodarka dla ludzi. Ministry of Investments and Development. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/archiwum-inwestycje-rozwoj/odpowiedzialny-rozwoj--gospodarka-dla-ludzi>

Government of Poland. (2020). ”We support mothers, we support families”. Ministry of Family and Social Policy. Link: <https://www.gov.pl/web/family/we-support-mothers-we-support-families>

Hay, C., & Smith, N. J. (2013). The resilience of Anglo-liberalism in the absence of growth: The UK and Irish cases. *Resilient liberalism in Europe’s political economy*, 289-312.

Hoff, J. (1994, November). Comparative analysis of abortion in Ireland, Poland, and the United States. In *Women's Studies International Forum* (Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 621-646). Pergamon.

Houses of the Oireachtas. (1992). Private Members' Business. - An Bille um an Dóú Leasú Déag ar an mBunreacht, 1992: An Dara Céim (Atógáil). Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 1992: Second Stage (Resumed). Dáil Éireann debate - Wednesday, 21 Oct 1992. Vol. 424 No. 1. Link: <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1992-10-21/27/?highlight%5B0%5D=unborn>

Houses of the Oireachtas. (2013). Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013: Second Stage Dáil Éireann debate - Thursday, 20 Jun 2013. Link: <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2013-06-20/5/?highlight%5B0%5D=fetus>

House of Oireachtas. (2016). Meabhrán Míitheach Explanatory Memorandum. An Bille um Shaoire agus Sochar Atharthachta, 2016 Paternity Leave and Benefit Bill 2016. Link: <https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/bill/2016/43/eng/memo/b4316d-memo.pdf>

Human rights watch. (2018). Q&A: Human Rights Law and Access to Abortion. Website: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/24/qa-human-rights-law-and-access-abortion>

Hussein, J., Cottingham, J., Nowicka, J. & Kismodi, E. (2018). Abortion in Poland: politics, progression and regression, *Reproductive Health Matters*, 26:52, 11-14. Link: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09688080.2018.1467361?needAccess=true>

IPPF. (2018). Poland: Parliament Should Reject Bill to Further Limit Abortion Rights - statement. Link: <https://www.ippfen.org/news/announcements/poland-parliament-should-reject-bill-further-limit-abortion-rights-statement>

Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA). (2021). History of abortion in Ireland. Link: <https://www.ifpa.ie/advocacy/abortion-in-ireland-legal-timeline/>

Irish Department of Health. (2020). In Accordance with section 20 of the Health (REGULATION OF TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY) Act 2018. Annual report 2019. Link: <https://www.gov.ie/>

en/publication/b410b-health-regulation-of-termination-of-pregnancy-act-2018-annual-report-on-notifications-2019/

Jasiewicz, E. (2017). Poland – this is what neoliberalism looks like. The Transnational Institute (TNI), 22 November 2017. Link: <https://www.tni.org/en/article/poland-this-is-what-neoliberalism-looks-like>

Kennedy, P. (2004). *Motherhood in Ireland: Creation and Context*. Publisher: Mercier

Kitchin, R., O’Callaghan, C., Boyle, M., Gleeson, J. & Keaveney, K. (2012). Placing neoliberalism: the rise and fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger Environment and Planning A. 2012, volume 44, pages 1302 – 1326 doi:10.1068/a44349

Kozolowska, I., Béland, D., and Lecours, A. (2016) Nationalism, religion, and abortion policy in four Catholic societies. *Nations and Nationalism*, 22: 824– 844. DOI: 10.1111/nana.12157.

Koralewska, I., & Zielińska, K. (2021). 'Defending the unborn', 'protecting women' and 'preserving culture and nation': Anti-abortion discourse in the Polish right-wing press. *Culture, Health & Sexuality*, 1-15.

Król, A. & Pustulka, P. (2018). Women on strike: mobilizing against reproductive injustice in Poland, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 20:3, 366-384, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2018.1460214 Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14616742.2018.1460214?casa_token=x_nOdiNtq40AAAAA:GwkUq24XaUZEm6nsx-V8CSpZ619jL67dwRlcZNv3pObKsKQQu_rC5qs36wCakOWgs048QUtCyPUsF

Lehmann, H. (2012). *The Polish Growth Miracle: Outcome of Persistent Reform Efforts*. University of Bologna and IZA. Policy Paper No. 40 April 2012 IZA.

Levels, M., Sluiter, R., & Need, A. (2014). A review of abortion laws in Western-European countries. A cross-national comparison of legal developments between 1960 and 2010. *Health Policy*, 118(1), 95-104.

Londras, F. (2015). Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutory Tale from Ireland, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L.243. Available at: <https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl/vol22/iss2/1>

MacKinnon, C. A. (1989). *Toward a feminist theory of the state*. Harvard University Press.

Malovic, N. (2015). *Access to Abortion Services in the Council of Europe: A Critical Analysis of Women's Reproductive Rights*.

Mattalucci, C., Mishtal, J., & De Zordo, S. (2018). Emerging Contestations of Abortion Rights: New Discourses and Political Strategies at the Intersection of Rights, Health and Law. *Antropologia*, 5(2 NS), 7-12.

Martinez Mateo, M. (2020). Life-protecting neoliberalism: Hayek and the biopolitics of abortion in Chile. *Economy and Society*, 49(4), 596-618.

Marchand, M. H., & Runyan, A. S. (2010). Introduction: Feminist sightings of global restructuring: Old and new conceptualizations.

McMurtrie, S.M., García, S.G., Wilson, K.S., Diaz-Olavarrieta, C., & Fawcett, G.M. (2012). Public opinion about abortion-related stigma among Mexican Catholics and implications for unsafe abortion. DOI: 10.1016/S0020-7292(12)60016-2

MerrionStreet. (2012). Speech by the Taoiseach, Mr Enda Kenny T.D. "Ireland Trading Its Way to Recovery", Reuters, Londo. Link: <https://merrionstreet.ie/en/news-room/speeches/speech-by-the-taoiseach-mr-enda-kenny-t-d-ireland-trading-its-way-to-recovery-reuters-london.html>

MerrionStreet. (2013a).Speech by Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan, TD at the IFIA Global Funds Conference. Link: <https://merrionstreet.ie/en/news-room/speeches/speech-by-minister-for-finance-michael-noonan-td-at-the-iffa-global-funds-conference.html>

MerrionStreet. (2013b). Speech by Alan Shatter TD, Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence at the Opening of the European Data Forum, Tuesday, 09 April 2013, Croke Park Conference Centre Link:(<https://merrionstreet.ie/en/news-room/speeches/speech-by-alan-shatter-td-minister-for->

justice-equality-and-defence-at-the-opening-of-the-european-data-forum-tuesday-09-april-2013-croke-park-conference-centre.49354.shortcut.html

MerrionStreet. (2014). Statement by An Taoiseach Enda Kenny at the Announcement of Government Priorities 11th July 2014. Link: <https://merrionstreet.ie/en/news-room/speeches/statement-by-an-taoiseach-enda-kenny-at-the-announcement-of-government-priorities-11th-july-2014.html>

MerrionStreet. (2016). Speech by An Taoiseach, Mr. Enda Kenny, T.D, at the IBEC President's Dinner. Link: https://merrionstreet.ie/en/news-room/speeches/speech_by_an_taoiseach_mr_enda_kenny_t_d_at_the_ibec_president%E2%80%99s_dinner.html

MerrionStreet. (2017). Budget 2018 Statement of the Minister for Finance and Public Expenditure and Reform Mr. Paschal Donohoe T.D.https://merrionstreet.ie/en/news-room/speeches/budget_2018_statement_of_the_minister_for_finance_and_public_expenditure_and_reform_mr_paschal_donohoe_t_d_.html

Mishtal, J. & Dannefer, R. (2010). Reconciling religious identity and reproductive practices: The Church and contraception in Poland, *The European Journal of Contraception & Reproductive Health Care*, 15:4, 232-242, DOI: 10.3109/13625187.2010.498595. Link: <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/doi/pdf/10.3109/13625187.2010.498595?needAccess=true>

Morgan, L. M., & Roberts, E. F. (2012). Reproductive governance in latin america. *Anthropology & medicine*, 19(2), 241-254.

Nagar, R, Lawson, V, McDowell, L. and Hanson, S. (2002). Locating Globalization: Feminist (Re)readings of the Subjects and Spaces of Globalization, *Economic Geography*, 78(3), 257-284.

Nowicka, W. (2007). The struggle for abortion rights in Poland. *SexPolitics–Reports from the Front Lines*, 167-196. https://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/book/pdf/capitulo5_poland.pdf

Nowicka, W. (2009). Working for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. *Development*, 2009, 52(2), (251–253). 2009 Society for International Development 1011-6370/09

- Ó Ceallaigh, B. (2019). Neoliberalism and language shift: The Great Recession and the sociolinguistic vitality of Ireland's Gaeltacht, 2008-18 . Thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Edinburgh 2019
- Okolski, M. (1983). Abortion and Contraception in Poland. *Studies in Family Planning* , Nov., 1983, Vol. 14, No. 11 (Nov., 1983), pp. 263-274 Published by: Population Council.
- Palan, R. (2000). *Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories*. Ripe Studies in Global Political Economy. Routledge: London. <https://doi.org/10.4324/978020397874>
- Peterson, V. S. (2002). Rewriting (global) political economy as reproductive, productive, and virtual (Foucauldian) economies. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 4(1), 1-30.
- Purewal, N. (2018). Sex selective abortion, neoliberal patriarchy and structural violence in India. *Feminist Review*, 119(1), 20-38.
- Rai, Sm., Hoskyns, C., & Thomas, D. (2014). Depletion. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. 16. 86-105. 10.1080/14616742.2013.789641.
- Safri, M., & Graham, J. (2010). The global household: Toward a feminist postcapitalist international political economy. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 36(1), 99-125.
- Standing, G. (1999) Global feminization through flexible labor: a theme revisited, *World Development*, 27(3): 583-602.
- Strang, L. and Broeks, M. (2017). Maternity leave policies. Trade-offs between labour market demands and health benefits for children.
- Szelewa, D. (2016). Killing 'Unborn Children'? The Catholic Church and Abortion Law in Poland Since 1989. *Social & Legal Studies*, 25(6), 741–764. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663916668247>

Tanyag, M. (2017). Invisible labor, invisible bodies: how the global political economy affects reproductive freedom in the Philippines, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 19:1, 39-54, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2017.1289034

The Economist Group. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. (2021). Poland- In brief. Link: <https://country.eiu.com/poland>

UN. 2015. Trends in Contraceptive Use Worldwide. (2015). Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division. Link: https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_report_2015_trends_contraceptive_use.pdf

Urbaniak, M. & Spaczyński, R.Z. (2015). Selected legal aspects of the protection of the unborn child in the light of the draft amendment to the Polish Penal Code. Link: https://journals.viamedica.pl/ginekologia_polska/article/view/45665

Utrikespolitiska institutionen. (2021). Landguiden: Polen. Link: <https://www.ui.se/landguiden/lander-och-omraden/europa/polen/aktuell-politik/>

Vennesson, P. (2008). "Case studies and process tracing: theories and practices", in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences : A Pluralist Perspective*, edited by Porta, Donatella Della, and Michael Keating, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Waylen G. (2004) 'Putting Governance into the Gendered Political Economy of Globalization', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6.4: 557-578.

Wądołowska, A. (2020). Polish government honours pro-life activist who stopped teen having abortion by informing her family. *Notes from Poland*. Publication: 18/5-2020. Link: <https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/05/18/polish-government-honours-pro-life-activist-who-stopped-teen-having-abortion-by-informing-her-family/>

Weitz, R. (1998). *The politics of women's bodies: Sexuality, appearance, and behavior*. New York: Oxford University Press

WHO. (2021). Global Abortion Policies Database. Poland. March 22 2021, Link: <https://abortion-policies.srhr.org/country/poland/>

Zajkowska, O. (2020). Parental leaves in Poland: goals, challenges, perspectives. *Problemy Polityki Społecznej: studia i dyskusje*. 46. 121-136. 10.31971/16401808.46.3.2019.6.

Zielinska, E. (2008). "Review of Polish legal regulations on reproductive rights". In *Reproductive rights in Poland. The effects of the anti-abortion law. Report 2008*. Federation for Women and Family Planning: Warsaw.

ÅSLUND, A. (2013). POLAND: COMBINING GROWTH AND STABILITY. CE-Sifo Forum 1/2013 (March)

6.1 Statistical Data resources

EUROSTAT. (2021a). Inequality of income distribution. Link: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tespm151/default/table?lang=en>

EUROSTAT. (2021b). Gender pay gap in unadjusted form 2019. 2002-2019, online data code: SDG_05_20). Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_05_20/default/table?lang=en

European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights. (2017). *European Contraception Atlas 2017*. Link: https://www.epfweb.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/map_cci-english_hires_1%20%281%29.pdf

European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights. (2018). *European Contraception Atlas 2018*. Link: https://www.epfweb.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/epf-contraception_atlas-online-2018.pdf

European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual & Reproductive Rights. (2020). *European Contraception Atlas 2020*. Link: https://www.epfweb.org/european-contraception-atlas?field_datamap_criteria_target_id=74

OECD. (2021a). Part-time employment rate. Indicators Poland and Ireland, measured in terms of both men and women separately. 1983-2020. Link: <https://data.oecd.org/emp/part-time-employment-rate.htm>

OECD. (2021b). Full-time equivalent employment rate, by sex and country. Link: <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54749#>

Roser, M. (2014). "Total fertility rate, including UN projections, 1950 to 2020". *Published online at OurWorldInData.org*. Substantive revision in 2017. Retrieved from: 'https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate'. Total fertility rate, including UN projections, 1950 to 2020: <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-fertility-rate-including-un-projections-through-2100?time=earliest..2020&country=POL~IRL>

The World Bank. (2014). Contraceptive prevalence, any methods (% of women ages 15-49) - Poland, Ireland https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CONU.ZS?locations=IE-PL&name_desc=false

The World Bank. (2011). Contraceptive prevalence, modern methods (% of women ages 15-49) - Poland, Ireland https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CONM.ZS?name_desc=false&locations=IE-PL

The World Bank. (2020a). GDP (current US\$) - Ireland, Poland, Link: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2020&locations=IE-PL&start=1989>

The World Bank. (2020b). GDP growth (annual %) - Ireland, Poland. License: CC BY-4.0. Link: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IE-PL>

The World Bank. (2020c). GDP per capita (current US\$) - Ireland, Poland. License: CC BY-4.0. Link: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=IE-PL>

The world bank (2021a). Labour force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-64) (modeled ILO estimate) - Poland, Ireland. Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS?locations=PL-IE&name_desc=true

The World Bank. (2021b). Labour force, female (% of the total labour force) - Ireland, Poland. Link: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS?locations=IE-PL>

United Nation Development Programme. (2020a). Human Development Report. Link: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data>

United Nation Development Programme. (2020b). Human Development Report: Ireland. Link: <https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRL>

United Nation Development Programme. (2020c). Human Development Report: Poland. Link: <https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/POL>