



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

Climate on the Horizon?

Gothenburg dockworkers' framings of their political horizon regarding climate change

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Author: Jakob Gometz

Supervisor: Rikard Warlenius

Abstract:

The climate is rapidly warming, and this has triggered a global trend in mobilisation against climate change. Due to workers' unique position within the capitalist mode of production the interest in the potential for labour mobilisation against climate change is growing. Workers in environmentally degrading industries prove an interesting contradiction, and a window into thinking about the relation between labour and nature, as they are both dependent on nature, i.e. their living conditions, but also seemingly on the survival of the polluting industries. This has led some to pose a dichotomy between 'jobs' and 'the environment'. Unsatisfied with that explanation, this qualitative interview study with members of the dockworkers' union Hamnarbetarförbundet in the Port of Gothenburg instead explores the framings of the dockworkers' political horizon regarding climate change. Drawing on recent research and theoretical debates in the nascent field of Environmental Labour Studies, along with an engagement with Marxist debates on ecology, this explorative study attempts to stake out new paths for labour environmentalisms. My findings show the workers' framings are bound up in the practical experiences of work and the institutional arrangements of the labour market, limiting the focus of climate mitigating measures to the workplace. I argue that these narrow workplace environment-related issues could be the initial focus of alliance building between unionists and climate activists for I find that Critical Materialism reveals the potential for a radical critique residing in the workers' intuitive sense of capital's joint degradation of workers and their environment.

Keywords: Labour Environmentalism, Critical Materialism, Frame Analysis, Critical Theory, Ecological Marxism, Environmental Labour Studies.

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Abbreviations

ACTU	– Australian Council of Trade Unions
CCS	– Carbon Capture and Storage
COSATU	– Congress of South African Trade Unions
IDC	– International Dockworkers’ Council
ILO	– International Labour Organisation
IO	– International Organisation
IPCC	– Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITF	– International Transport Workers’ Federation
ITU	– International Trade Union
ITUC	– International Trade Union Confederation
LO	– Landsorganisationen
LNG	– Liquefied Natural Gas
NGO	– Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	– Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SMO	– Social Movement Organisation
SMU	– Social Movement Union or Social Movement Unionism
STTR	– Sindicato dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras Rurais
TAN	– Transnational Activist Network
T&GWU	– Transport and General Workers’ Union
TUCA	– Trade Union Confederation of the Americas
UNEP	– United Nations Environmental Programme

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1 Introduction

In the face of potentially irreversible changes to the earth's climate due to global warming, increased effort is put into thinking around the rapid transition from a fossil fuelled economy to low-carbon solutions for “electricity, transport, heat, industrial, forestry, and agricultural systems” (Geels et al. 2017, 1242). This transition is a necessary part of reaching the IPCC goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited overshoot (2018). As environmental risks and burdens are distributed unevenly across the world, calls have been made for this transition to a low-carbon economy to also be socially *just* (Felli 2014, 379).

Due to workers' unique role in the capitalist mode of production, the cultivation of alliances between workers and environmentalists have become a key strategic and theoretical concern of those pursuing a transformative post-capitalist agenda pushing for a so-called *just transition* (Russel 2018, 109; Felli 2014, 379). Yet, with a few exceptions, these alliances do not seem to materialise (Loomis 2018; Obach 2003; Parkin 2015; Russel 2018). In fact, Loomis even suggests a growing rift between workers and environmentalists (Loomis 2018) while Obach (2003, 97) instead describes these relations as ‘far better’ than suggested by other research.

Today capitalist social relations are characterised by a ‘logistics revolution’, focusing the operations of capital and the production of space around abstract and continuous flows of money and commodities (Chua et al. 2018). As capital accumulation relies on these continuous flows, workers within logistics networks are well positioned for disruptive and counter-hegemonic politics (Kinder 2016, 11).

This is not least true of international ports of trade – literally the moors of global circulation capital (Danyluk 2018; Watts 2019). One such port that has recently seen blockades performed by both logistics workers and climate activists respectively, is that of Gothenburg, Sweden. In 2019 a three-year long conflict between the dockworkers' union, Hamnarbetarförbundet, and the representative organisation for the ports of Sweden, Sveriges Hamnar, culminated in a strike in January 2019, which was answered by a lockout from the employer (Olsson 2019). Spreading to other Swedish ports, the repercussions of the conflict were felt nationally as it prompted the government to start the process of looking over its labour laws, with a specific focus on the right to strike (Berggren 2018). The disruption this

conflict caused to the flows of capital and commodities thus prompted the government to revise its laws (ibid). As Kinder argued (2016), it thus seems there is potential political influence for workers within logistics networks – like the dockworkers of Gothenburg.

But the Gothenburg port also saw a blockade by climate activists the same year, protesting the planned connection of an LNG terminal (Liquified Natural Gas) in the port of Gothenburg to the Swedish gas grid (Dau and Moran 2019). The LNG permit request was later rejected (Ljungström 2019). Thus, both dockworkers and climate activists, in the same year and with at least some level of success, have performed blockades in the port of Gothenburg. They have not to date however, cooperated. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that their immediate goals are very different. But moving beyond the hegemonic rhetoric of “jobs versus environment” (which is a false dichotomy anyway) (Burgmann 2013), encourages us to pose important questions about the relation between work and the environment, of the environmentalism within the ranks of labour unions, and of the potential for broad political mobilisation against climate change and capital.

1.1 Problem Formulation

In the debate on the theoretical and practical potential for climate mobilisation within the labour movement, much of the existing research is, quite understandably, focused on instances of actually occurring environmentalism within the ranks of labour (Räthzel and Uzzell 2013). Some focus on the *structural opportunities* for movement organisation, the opening and closing of which determine the success of mobilising efforts (Van Der Heijden 2006; 1999; McCammon et al 2007). Others focus on the *interpretive frame-work* of Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) and how these are related to the success of movement mobilisation efforts (Snow and Bedford 1988; 1992; Lindekilde 2014). In the present case there is no movement mobilising effort: the dockworkers of Hamnarbetarförbundet in Gothenburg were involved in strikes and lockouts of parts of the harbour during roughly the same time period as the climate activist group Fossilgasfällan performed a blockade of a terminal of the same harbour – yet they did not cooperate. Unsatisfied with explanations stuck in the ‘jobs versus environment’ dichotomy, this study is looking for clues to the potential for labour environmentalism within the labour movement by prompting and analysing the framings of the Gothenburg dockworkers’ political horizon regarding climate change, even as they are not yet linked to any mobilising move on their part. Even as the framings of ‘agency’ is an empirical question for this study (see Aim and Research

Questions), it would perhaps be prudent to clarify that in an analytical sense this thesis' stance on agency differs somewhat from orthodoxy. Following Cassegård's (2021, 172) reading of Bennett, agency is understood as emerging from assemblages and being "distributed across a heterogenous field" rather than emanating from individual capacities located in a single body. However, this understanding is necessarily tied to a critical materialist critique of reification, represented by Adorno's negative dialectics, and discussed at length in the Theory chapter (Cassegård 2021, 13).

The study's focus on interpretive frames is not a rejection of the necessity of understanding structural opportunities but should instead be read alongside those attempts to explain the structural blockages to labour mobilisation as these processes are understood to influence each other dialectically (Cassegård 2021).

This is not to say that workers are inherently environmentalist – far from it. The dialectical relation between labour and nature produces contradictions (Cassegård 2021; Räthzel and Uzzell 2013). To better understand if, how, where, and when these contradictions can prove productive – and not just drive the continuing accumulation of capital – it could be useful to better understand the framings of unionised workers around the politics surrounding these contradictions, even as climate change or 'the environment' is not headlining their union agenda.

Thus, what at first may appear as a non-phenomenon may in fact prove to be an understudied and misunderstood but integral part of the political horizon of workers.

1.1.1 Aim and Research Questions

In order to stake out paths for labour environmentalism transcending the contradiction between jobs and environment, the aim of this thesis is to explore, in the context of labour environmentalism, the political horizon of members of the dockworkers' union, Hamnarbetarförbundet, regarding climate change.

How is the issue of 'climate change', and the movement mobilising against it, framed by dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour?

How do dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour frame a 'just transition' towards a sustainable economy?

How do dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour frame their own agency in relation to 'climate change' and 'just transition'?

1.2 Delimitations

From the aim and research questions, it follows that the study is already limited in scope to the framings of the members of a local dockworkers' union in Gothenburg, Sweden. It is a small, qualitative study built on a short number of interviews and the purpose is explicitly explorative. One should not therefore, expect to be able to draw definitive and generalisable conclusions from such data. This study is not for instance, attempting to answer the question of what the potential for mobilisation against climate change and capital *actually is*, neither within Hamnarbeträrförbundet in Gothenburg nor in the global labour movement. Nor is this study an evaluation of the environmental engagement of Hamnarbeträrförbundet or its members, but rather seeks to give an exploration of their framings of climate change within their larger political horizon, as dockworkers and union representatives.

1.3 Relevance to Global Studies

The empirical focus of this study is very much local, but both its practical and theoretical context and implications are in many ways global. First of all, global flows of circulation capital puts dockworkers at the centre of the process of capital accumulation, as explained in the introduction of this paper (Kinder 2016; Chua et al. 2018). Climate change of course is global in and of itself (IPCC 2018), but so are many of the mobilising efforts rising in response to it (Klein 2014). Activism mobilising against climate change and capital are transnational in the spread of information as well as people, and even sometimes in its organisation (ibid). This activism is also working in an international political context of political parties, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs) (ibid). The labour movement too organises across scales from the highly local workplace to transnational class solidarity (Stevis and Felli 2015).

This study draws on theoretical debates originally concerned with making sense of the global labour movements in relation to environmentalism and tries these ideas on a highly localised context. Hopefully, this will aid our understanding of the reflexivity of local actions and global processes.

1.4 Disposition

In the subsequent section I will provide a brief history of Hamnarbetarförbundet and the conflict culminating in 2019. In chapter two the reader will be introduced to previous research, chiefly from the nascent field of *environmental labour studies* which is focused on the nexus of environmentalism and labour mobilisation, but which is also trying to make sense, philosophically, of the relation between labour and nature in general. This is followed by a chapter on Methods where details about the collection and analysis of data will be discussed, along with the methodological position of this paper. Thereafter the Theory chapter follows, where the operationalisation of the theoretical concepts into analytical tools will be discussed. These concepts are derived from the field of environmental labour studies and Marxist debates on ecology. In chapter five the results from the interviews are presented, along with its analysis using the tools derived from research on global labour environmentalisms. Lastly is a chapter with concluding remarks on the study, suggesting directions for future research.

1.5 Background

The story of Hamnarbetarförbundet, as it is told by representatives of the union itself, begins in the late 1960s with a growing discontent among the dockworkers with the centralised rule of the transport workers union (Hallgren 2008). The dockworkers' frustration with the union government was chiefly with recent attempts to increase the power of the central organisation at the expense of participatory democracy (ibid). The local union ombudsmen for instance, who were previously democratically elected by the membership, were now to be appointed by the union governing body and the smaller districts were merged into larger regional offices (ibid). Another aspect of the conflict had to do with the dockworkers' feeling that their representatives were being ignored on key issues (ibid).

From the perspective of the Transport Workers' Union government, these changes to the governing structure, which had significant impact on the highly localised dockworkers' councils, were motivated by increasing the workers' bargaining power against their employers (Wik 2019). By centralising the organisation and leaving the negotiation to professionally trained ombudsmen, the argument went, the union stood a better chance against the employers' lawyers (ibid). The previously democratically elected representatives of the local unions on the other hand had little legal training, or time in which to gain such knowledge (ibid).

In either case, dockworkers in several important Swedish ports subsequently broke out from the Transport union and created Svenska Hamnarbetarförbundet, which was founded on principles of participatory membership democracy (Hallgren 2008). Since then, workers in Swedish ports have been represented by two labour unions, one characterised by rank-and-file democracy and the other by bureaucratic centralisation, both locked in a decade long conflict which culminated in Gothenburg in 2019 (Wik 2019). This conflict centred around the issue of whether the younger Hamnarbetarförbundet should have its own collective agreement with the employer as Transport already had one in place.

To get more context and background information in preparation for this study an interview was done with an informant employed by the union who has insight into the union history and the conflict. This interview is separate from the main results of the thesis, derived from the interviews with the union member respondents (see Methods chapter for definitions separating the concepts informant and respondent) and presented in the Results and Analysis chapter. From this interview, and supported by the results in the respondent interviews, was gleaned that the conflictual relation between the two unions lives on but is felt differently in the different ports across the country (Informant interview).

The Transport Workers' Union belongs to a centralised national labour organising body, the Swedish Trade Union Federation (LO), which Hamnarbetarförbundet does not. LO is closely tied to the Social Democratic party and thus also to an extent to the policies of the national government. In contrast, the rank-and-file democratic Hamnarbetarförbundet and its militancy, enabled and emboldened by not being bound to a collective agreement, has sometimes been viewed as a thorn in the side of the Transport Workers' Union and LO (Hallgren 2008; Informant interview).

Without drawing a direct parallel there is a comparison to be made with the two unions' respective international bodies. For as the Transport Workers' Union is a member of the bureaucratic trade union federation the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), so too is Hamnarbetarförbundet part of a transnational network of workers through the International Dockworkers' Council (IDC) (Fox-Hodess 2020; Wreeth 2021). Much like Hamnarbetarförbundet, and in contrast to the centrally governed, bureaucratic 'professional unionism' of the ITF, the IDC's organising principles are those of voluntarism, horizontalism, and rank-and-file democracy (Fox-Hodess 2020, 92,95).

The IDC was founded in 2000 after the culmination of a multi-year conflict in the Port of Liverpool in the 1990s (Fox-Hodess 2020, 95). The national union of the Liverpool dockworkers, the T&GWU, had refused to back them and blocked support from the ITF (ibid). The experience prompted the dockworkers involved in the campaign to opt for a more horizontally organised body as bureaucratisation was believed to be at the heart of the outdrawn conflict (ibid). The IDC is organisationally modelled on the Spanish dockworkers' union La Coordinadora and builds on the long tradition of ad hoc rank-and-file internationalism in the transport sector (ibid).

2 Previous Research

This chapter will discuss previous research related to the present case. A large part will be devoted to the emerging field of environmental labour studies, which is focused on understanding labour environmentalism in a broad sense, as well as the overall relation between nature and work (Stavis, Uzzell, and R  thzel (2018). The chapter will also briefly return to the subject of social movement unions (SMUs) as this is closely related to labour environmentalism when it comes to wider debates on counter-hegemonic politics and transformative environmental justice (Stavis and Felli 2015).

2.1 Environmental Labour Studies

Environmental labour studies has emerged as a field grappling with the relationship between work and nature, with a particular focus on the environmental engagement of workers' organisations (Stavis, Uzzell, and R  thzel 2018). Nora R  thzel and David Uzzell, who are responsible for the name 'environmental labour studies', argue that the organisation of workers in this context should be understood in a broad sense and include for instance, the organisation of small farmers and fishers (ibid). One of the reasons being that traditional trade unions (the foci of much of the labour studies literature) only organise a minority of workers in countries where many work in 'informal employment', such as in India where that number is over 90% (ibid, 440).

Apart from R  thzel and Uzzell, who have written extensively on both the environmental engagements of trade unions (2013; R  thzel, Uzzell, and Elliot 2010) and the relation between nature and work (2013; Stevis, Uzzell, and R  thzel 2018), Dimitris Stevis and Romain Felli (2015) are also important contributors to the nascent research field. They have

written, among other things, on ‘global unions’ commitment to a just transition to a ‘green’ economy (ibid). These authors will be revisited in the Theory chapter.

While highly influential, these authors are hardly alone in the field of environmental labour studies, and we will now turn to a sample of contributions to the field that each engages with different aspects of labour environmentalism.

Verity Burgmann for instance, uses the Australian trade unions’ engagement in the climate change debate, calling for so called ‘green collar jobs’, to problematise the rhetorical dichotomy between ‘jobs’ and ‘the environment’ (Burgmann 2013, 131). She argues that this previously hegemonic ‘red/green’ binary is false yet possible to transcend through the scope offered by “twin crises of economy and ecology” (ibid, 143-144). According to Burgmann, Australian unions have a long history of engagement in environmental issues and the rhetoric of ‘green jobs’ has a broad acceptance among the ranks of unionists, as it does not challenge the traditional union focus on employment security (ibid). While this argument is useful for shifting the discussion on environmental activism and who are involved, in making it, Burgmann downplays the differences among unionists, between different sectors and scales. In trying to map out the horizon of labour environmentalism, differences in framings and strategies are at least as important to understand as continuities. Burgmann rightly admits that the ‘green jobs’ initiatives always fall short of fundamentally challenging capitalism but goes on to argue that they break down the division between environmentalists and unionists, a division that have long enabled capital’s exploitation of both nature and labour (ibid). This is an insight to build from.

In a similar vein, Jacklyn Cock and Rob Lambert take stock on developments within two labour federations, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and speculate on the emergence of a “new kind of transnational solidarity” (Cock and Lambert 2013, 89). Cock and Lambert thus join the growing ranks of voices stressing the need for labour, in the face of neo-liberal globalisation and the ecological crisis, to embrace a broader social agenda, including environmental issues (ibid). The globalisation of production, along with the planetary crisis of climate change, has produced a new ‘moment’ in neo-liberal globalisation, the authors claim (ibid, 97). They ask if this moment can produce a global social movement committed both to ‘nature’ (the climate and the fragile ecosystems) and to ‘society’ (work insecurity) (ibid). The empirical support for these speculations is the growing *climate justice movement* demanding a *just transition*,

which the authors find embodied in the South African *eco-socialist* call for ‘climate jobs’ as well as the Australian case of ‘green collar jobs’ (ibid, 91, 93). Having no quarrels with the authors’ diagnosis of the *need* for labour to broaden its political agenda to include climate- and environmental issues, or to widen its scope of solidarity to global proportions, I do take issue with their idealist position. The solution, Cock and Lambert believe, lies in redefining “the core value of the labour movement – solidarity” (ibid, 99). Their idealism here causes them to overlook that which structurally obstructs solidarity (Cassegård 2021, 178).

A distinctly more bottom-up approach to engaging with labour environmentalism can be found in Cândia Veiga and Martin, who have studied a community-based approach to sustainable resource management in the Amazon rainforest (Cândia Veiga and Martin, 2013). They studied a project managed by the Rural Workers Trade Union (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras Rurais, STTR), the aim of which was to prevent deforestation and strengthen communities (ibid, 117). Climate change affects the living conditions of rural communities who are mostly self-employed labourers, dependent on small-scale subsistence activities (ibid, 118). Apart from the asymmetrical conflicts with landowners and the timber industry, there is also the complex set of impacts that federal forestry policies have locally (ibid, 117-118). The project worked under the assumption that local governance improves the effectiveness of forest management while also increasing the legitimacy of institutional arrangements (ibid, 118). Another part of the project was a discussion on the impacts of climate change on the local communities, which was initiated by the STTR and from the point of view of labour (ibid).

From their research on the project the authors derive a new theoretical framework dealing with the “under theorised” relation between nature and labour (Cândia Veiga and Martin 2013, 118). Much of the labour literature is interest-based, investigating unions’ strategic and tactical capabilities, or analysing bargaining arenas. Cândia Veiga and Martin’s approach to understanding labour-environmental alliances on the other hand is cognitive, focusing on ‘sharing understandings’ (ibid). ‘Sharing understandings’ in this case means “taking the ways in which local communities interpret the impacts of climate change on the forest as a point of departure” by which “the social and environmental sustainability of governance systems” is understood to be enhanced (ibid). This approach makes the rural communities into key actors, necessitating the transfer of some of the decision-making power to the community level (ibid). The conclusions Cândia Veiga and Martin draw from their discourse analysis of these

shared understandings is that “the labour movement is developing new values and identities when it becomes aware of environmental issues such as climate change” (ibid, 119). This synthesis of labour and environmental issues, the authors explain is enabled by the fact that the environment is essential for the living and working conditions of the communities (ibid, 128). Here the analysis focus on *understandings* and *values* but it does not render their relation to the material conditions and workers’ praxis invisible, as I would argue is the case with Cock and Lambert. The lesson here for further theorising the political horizon of labour environmentalism and the relation between nature and labour more generally, is that it ought to be anchored in the practical experiences of working people and their communities, even as the empirical focus is on processes of sense-making or the production of meaning.

Looking instead at broader trends in political mobilisation, Cecilia Anigstein and Gabriela Wyzcykier (2019) describe a “socio-environmental turn” in Latin American union action, although they admit it is still rare (Anigstein and Wyzcykier 2019, 110). According to Anigstein and Wyzcykier the Latin American context, which is already characterised by a critical stance on neoliberalism, has seen a certain consensus taking root among different political and social sectors. In this consensus the climate crisis is closely linked to the asymmetric processes by which capital appropriates nature to consolidate further accumulation of capital (ibid). The Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA) is the regional branch of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Following the ‘environmental/territorial’ turn of collective action that Anigstein and Wyzcykier describe, TUCA has promoted the concept of ‘just transition’ reinstating workers at the centre of mitigating the climate crisis and transitioning to a low-carbon economy (ibid). Seeing this idea applied to problems specific to the Latin American context, such as colonial extractivism at the expense of indigenous populations for instance, Anigstein and Wyzcykier identify what they call a ‘Latin-Americanization’ of the just transition (ibid). Latin American labour environmentalism is interesting for many reasons, not least the tendency toward broader forms of mobilisation reaching outside of trade unionism into other parts of civil society (Serdar 2011). But before returning to the implications of this, in a discussion of the phenomena of *social movement unionism*, we will now turn to discuss the implications of the conceptual ‘openness’ or fluidity of the just transition that the aforementioned ‘Latin-Americanization’ implies.

2.1.1 *Just Transition*

Felli explains how ‘just transition’ has been at the centre of tactical debates regarding unions’ engagement in global efforts of combating climate change (Felli 2014, 379). The idea, according to Felli, is essentially that workers and their communities shall not have to bear the cost of a transition to a low-carbon economy (ibid). For example, in sectors being negatively affected by environmental regulations, the transition plan should include compensations as well as retraining and reskilling of workers (ibid).

The success of the concept, Felli however attributes to the fact that it has become an ‘empty signifier’, meaning conflicting views can be ascribed to the concept without having to expose the disagreements (ibid). In other words, it can be employed in service of different and even opposing political agendas. This is perhaps why Felli and Stevis have made the framing of ‘just transition’ the empirical question in a study of the engagement with environmental justice in global labour environmentalism (Stevis and Felli 2014). It becomes important to know the scope of the idea of ‘just transition’ among labour unions as the concept means little on its own (ibid).

2.1.2 *Social Movement Unionism*

Social movement unionism is a term coined in an attempt to capture the phenomenon of political mobilisation of workers *and their wider communities* on issues that do not exclusively relate to the workplace (Parker and Alakavuklar 2018, 792). These ‘union-civil coalitions’ sometimes appear out of instrumental and tactical necessity, but they are also sometimes born out of workers’ struggles’ “wider efforts to qualitatively change society” (ibid). Even as the collaboration does not stem from a transformative political agenda, it may have unintended democratising effects as for instance the partners may adopt the other’s aims along with their own (ibid, 791). Social movement unions (SMUs) are of great interest to those trying to both understand and promote labour environmentalism (c.f. Felli 2014; Uzzell and Rätzzel 2013). The SMU is seen to offer a way towards “democratisation and re-politicisation of the international labour movement” as Felli puts it (2014, 392). From this point of view then, alliances between climate/environmental activists and labour unions make out a desirable ‘socio-ecological’ strategy on which to build broad movements mobilising for both ecological and social sustainability (ibid). If Felli is right in the desirability of the ‘socialist’ socio-ecological strategy, and hence the necessity of unionism moving towards

SMUs (ibid), this point of comparison will make for interesting discussions on the possible futures of labour environmentalism.

3 Methods

In this chapter the methodological considerations of the study will be discussed. First the choice of the semi-structured interview as the method of collecting data will be introduced, along with an account of this process. After a brief discussion on the ethical considerations connected to the thesis the method of analysis, frame analysis, will be introduced and discussed.

3.1 Semi-structured Interviews

As part of the aim is to find out what the dockworkers themselves think is important to explain and understand about their political horizon regarding climate change, I agree with Bryman (2012, 471) on the aptness of the *qualitative interview*. To be able to identify continuities and differences among the answers of the interviewees, as the coding of frames requires for performing a frame analysis (see below), there is a need for some level of structure to the interviews. The study therefore consists of *semi-structured* interviews, employing an interview guide of questions and topics that is essential to address, but with ample space for the interviewee to elaborate and even digress somewhat (ibid). The *unstructured* interview on the other hand, more closely resembles a *conversation* and generally allows the interviewee more freedom in steering the conversation (ibid). This could potentially allow for a richer understanding of the interviewee's point of view, but at the same time this loose approach is likely to make comparisons more difficult.

The role of Fossilgasfällan in this study is important, even though the organisation is not itself subject to empirical investigation. For example, the closeness in time and the similarity in methods (i.e. blockades) in the same geographical area (the Port of Gothenburg) makes it a useful heuristic device as it allows for some concreteness to the discussion about the potential of worker-environmental cooperation, even as it is hypothetical in nature. Fossilgasfällan can thus be used as an 'in' to discuss the climate movement, not as an abstract or global (i.e. distant) phenomenon, but as something more tangible.

Fossilgasfällan should not, however, be read as an accurate and exhaustive representation of the climate movement. Nor is it the focus of this paper to ultimately *define* what the climate movement is. The interest of this paper here lies with the way that the dockworkers of

Hamnarbetarförbundet make sense of and *frame* the climate movement, as it relates to the issue of climate change and the dockworkers' own politics.

3.1.1 The interviews

To collect data for analysis I performed four interviews, lasting between one and two hours. Three of them were respondent interviews and the participants were *purposively* sampled, each holding elected responsibilities within Hamnarbetarförbundet (Bryman 2012, 420). This study is not attempting to ascertain the *likeliness* of labour climate mobilisation or the level of environmental engagement within Hamnarbetarförbundet (ibid, 416). Instead, it is designed to prompt an exploration of *how* these workers try to make sense of their horizon for political change regarding climate change. Indeed, already the formulation of the research problem defines the purpose for the sampling, both in terms of context and participants: from the hypothesis that the dichotomy of “jobs versus environment” is false, the unionists' framings are explored to stake out new paths for labour environmentalism (ibid, 418). There is nothing in the research questions explicitly demanding the sample of respondents to focus on elected union representatives, yet this is how they have been purposively sampled. The a priori assumption driving this decision is that the elected representatives, due to their specific roles and responsibilities, have more insight and oversight of the strategic considerations of the union than does the average member. It is probably true that a larger sample would show a wider variety of interpretive framings of climate change, but this study is not looking for what the union as such thinks of climate change, or dockworkers more generally for that matter. It is looking for suggestions for ways of rethinking labour's role in combatting climate change, and here I will show that the small purposive sample of elected union representatives has proven sufficient.

The fourth interview was done to gain broader context and background knowledge, not least about the conflict between the dockworkers and their employer, which is the backdrop to the whole thesis. This interviewee has functioned less as a respondent, answering the investigator's questions as a subject of study, and more as an *informant*, offering inside information as one of few employed by the union and with knowledge of the history of the union and its conflict with the employer (Morse 1991, 403). The concepts of respondent and informant are in the literature sometimes used interchangeably, and the definitions of the concepts vary, but for the purposes of this thesis, namely separating the context generating interview from the data generating ones, I rely on Janice M. Morse's definition (1991, 403).

By Morse's account 'respondent' is more common in sociological semi-structured (or structured) interview studies whereas 'informant' is associated with anthropological ethnographies where the investigator is considered naïve and in need of *instruction* about what is happening in a given setting (ibid). While insufficient for disentangling the two concepts entirely, I believe this definition to be enough to separate, within the context of the present study, the informant (context generating) interview from the respondent interviews.

The interviews were conducted on telephone in Swedish and recorded, transcribed, and translated by the author.

3.1.2 Ethical Considerations

Being 'political' in the workplace is by no means risk free and prompting workers to talk about their potentially disruptive and transformative political horizon can put those workers in uncomfortable or even dangerous positions. For these reasons, and in line with the ethical guidelines of the Swedish Research Council (2017), confidentiality and protection of the integrity of the participants was ensured by carefully anonymising and avoiding any identifying characteristic or information in the presentation of the results. Furthermore, the interviews have all been performed following the principle of informed consent (Bryman 2012; Swedish Research Council 2017): the interviewees were fully informed of the purpose of the study, the conditions of the interview, and that participation was voluntary before they consented to participate.

3.2 Frame Analysis

The method of analysis in this study is interpretivist in that it focuses on the actors' own perceptions of their horizon for political change. To operationalise this in the analysis of the interview data, I have performed a kind of frame analysis, which is to say that analysis is centred on identifying, reconstructing, and contextualising the *interpretive frames* of the interviewees (Snow et al. 1986). Lindekilde (2014, 28) argues that the frame analysis is particularly suited for "explaining similarities and differences in mobilization among various actors" as well as in understanding "social movement actors as strategic agents". Lindekilde draws on the work by David Snow et al. (1986), which is also what the present study will do.

Frame analysis has grown in popularity in recent decades and is used in a growing number of research fields, but in particular the work of Snow et al. (1986) on *frame alignment processes* has been very influential in research on social movements (Chesters and Welsh 2004). Frame

alignment refers to the “linkage of interpretive orientations” of different social movement organisations (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Both the terms ‘frame’ and ‘frame-work’ are borrowed from sociologist Erving Goffman who used the terms to denote interpretive schemata rendering occurrences or events meaningful by locating, perceiving, identifying, and labelling them (ibid). Frames thus function to “organize experience and guide action” (ibid).

David Snow and Robert Benford’s analysis of social movement organisations builds on assumptions of the organisations as more or less unified social actors whose framing and consequent mobilising actions are driven by strategic rationality (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986). While I do not dispute that social movement organisations can act both rationally and strategically, this is not an assumption from which I build my analysis. While the type of frame analysis represented by Snow and Benford (1988) in a sense is geared towards understanding why the mobilising efforts of certain social movement organisations succeed or fail, the analysis of this thesis is focused on the content of the framings as such.

I agree with the critique put forward by Graeme Chesters and Ian Welsh (2004) who point out that the focus on frame alignment has tended to lead the analyst towards studying relatively durable movement agendas, or frames. As this study is looking for interpretive frame-work on issues not historically or typically associated with the movement organisation’s main agenda, a specific focus of analysis on frame alignment processes seems an ill fit and we must turn to other tools of understanding and identifying frames and framing.

Chesters and Welsh (2004) point out that there is little agreement on what frames are and how they are identified. Apart from the work of Goffman, they also trace framing back to social anthropologist and complexity theorist Gregory Bateson (1972) and use the latter to argue for understanding framing as a reflexive iterative process (Chesters and Welsh 2005). Their interest in what they refer to as the ‘action frames’ of social movement organisations involved in conflictual global politics lead them towards focusing on the highly intensified moments of protest, like the Seattle protests of 1999, where movement networks are manifest (Chesters and Welsh 2004). The reflexive iteration of sense-making in Chesters and Welsh’s model of frame analysis could be read as an answer to the more reductionist version of Snow et al. (Chesters and Welsh 2005; Snow et al. 1986). In any case, it is a welcome change that framing can be thought of in a context where the production of meaning is not unidirectional.

The moments of heightened political activity and iterative movement framing are called ‘plateaux’ which is a phrase Chesters and Welsh have borrowed from Bateson (1972). However, the *plateaux* of reflexive iterative framing are loud and colourful and far from the comparatively quiet interpretive work of a local dockworkers’ union. So why insist on performing a frame analysis if most of the previous uses of the method is either focused on durable political agendas and their mobilisation, or highly intensive plateaux of movement network manifestation, neither of which seems true in the case of this study? It is exactly *because* of the quietness that Hamnarbeträffbundet’s interpretive work on the climate and on environmental politics is interesting to think of in terms of movement frames. Instead of analysing the success of ‘action frames’ or ‘alignment processes’ of social movement organisations after the fact, we can use frames to understand the interpretive work of a social movement organisation on issues it is not normally associated with.

In the exploratory effort of this paper, frame analysis will be reduced, in lack of a better word, to focusing on what Snow and Benford call the ‘core framing tasks’ (Snow and Benford 1988). These core tasks are *diagnostic framing*, which involves identifying a problem and its causality; *prognostic framing* which means proposing a solution to the problem as well as tactics, strategies, and targets; the last task is providing a *rationale for action* or a call to arms (ibid, 200-202). The data collection i.e., the interviews, will thus focus on probing the interviewees for a *diagnosis* of the issue of climate change and a *prognosis* of what ought to be done about it, as well as the *motivation* for why it is necessary.

3.2.1 Framing Labour Environmentalism

The diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation will be analysed in terms of what it says of the *depth*, *breadth*, and *agency* of Hamnarbeträffbundet’s elected representatives’ engagement in labour environmentalism. Each category of framing tasks does not correspond perfectly to an equivalent evaluative criteria of labour environmentalism but the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings each provide stuff for the analysis of the depth, breadth, and agency of the political horizon of the Gothenburg dockworkers regarding climate change.

The analysis of the framings will focus on the three categories of Stevis’ typology: depth, breadth, and agency (Stevis 2018), which together roughly translate to the research questions presented in the introduction chapter. The research questions again, are:

How is the issue of 'climate change', and the movement mobilising against it, framed by dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour?

How do dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour frame a 'just transition' towards a sustainable economy?

How do dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour frame their own agency in relation to 'climate change' and 'just transition'?

In truth, there is some overlap concerning the relation between Stevis' typology and the research questions. For instance, the category of depth, dealing with the aspects of socio-ecological justice within the political horizon of the respondents, relies on both the first and second question (Stevis 2018). The same is true of the category of breadth, which deals with the geographical and functional scale and scope of the respondents' diagnostic and prognostic framings (ibid). The last research question, however, explicitly deals with the framings of agency and thus corresponds more closely to Stevis' typological category of agency (ibid). While the partial conceptual overlap is far from ideal from an analytical standpoint, I believe it a necessary concession considering the seriously under theorised state of the research field and the limited scope of this thesis. The hope is that this explorative work will provide useful tools for further theorising of labour environmentalism.

Let us now turn to the chapter on Theory, to discuss what these categories entail and how they will be operationalised in the present analysis.

4 Theory

In this chapter I return to the field of environmental labour studies to chisel out a theoretical framework that enable us to understand the framings of Hamnarbeträffbundet; on climate change, the climate movement, 'just transition', and the dockworkers' own role in the politics of these issues, and to put these framings in the context of a wider theoretical and political debate. As the empirical case of this study is small in scope one should be careful with drawing conclusions from the data itself. With theory however, and in this case, theory derived from research on the national, international, and global scales, we can place the data in a larger set of processes and look for continuities and contradictions. By viewing the sense-making processes and strategising of a local labour union through the lens of environmental

labour studies we can hope to say something both about the present case and how it relates to the theoretical debates on labour environmentalism.

The chapter will begin with positioning the thesis in relation to Marxist debates on ecology. This largely ontological discussion is necessary as it frames and grounds an otherwise explorative study of a methodologically immature and under theorised field. Then follows an account of Stevis' analytical scheme of "depth, breadth, and agency" (2018) and how it will be adopted to the present case. Felli's categories of 'deliberative', 'collaborative growth', and 'socialist' strategies of labour engagement in environmentalism (Felli 2014) will then be revisited to aid and nuance the analysis of Stevis' *agency*. Stevis and Felli's joint work on an analytical scheme of affirmative or transformative environmental or ecological justice (Stevis and Felli 2015) will also be consulted, to deepen as it were the analysis of the *depth* of Hamnarbetarförbundet's environmentalism. Writing on the international and global scale, Felli's and Stevis' respective overlapping conceptualisations of labour environmentalism(s) are very useful for categorising and analysing both the level of engagement of workers' organisations in environmental or ecological issues as well as their socio-ecological strategies to reach these goals (Stevis and Felli 2015). Lastly, the process of operationalising the theoretical framework is explained in greater detail.

4.1 Marx and Ecology

Drawing on heterodox Marxist debates such as eco-Marxism, Critical Theory, and the communisation debate (e.g., Hornborg 2013; Saito 2017; Endnotes 2015, 2019; Cassegård 2021), this study springs from the understanding that workers inhabit a unique role within the capitalist mode of production, with a unique potential for political change. This potential is not due to any 'worker's essence' or any other deterministic explanations, but simply due to the worker's position within the capitalist mode of production as such (Endnotes 2016). The exact nature of the relation between labour (society) and nature, however, has been subject to much debate within Marxist circles (c.f. Moore 2011; Malm 2016; Cassegård 2021).

One influential such debate is between what Carl Cassegård (2021, 19) refers to as the "production-of-nature approach" and eco-Marxists. The production-of-nature approach, represented by geographers like David Harvey, Neil Smith and Jason W. Moore, does not view nature as something external to capitalism, but as an integral part being reproduced by it (ibid, 18-19). They therefore tend to reject dualisms separating nature and society and to not focus on questions like natural limits (ibid, 19). Eco-Marxists on the other hand, like John

Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett, are especially concerned with those natural limits to capitalism and human life, focusing on Marx's *metabolic rift* and the *value-form* to understand the relation between nature and capitalism (ibid, 18). The relation to nature is understood as capitalism's primary contradiction (ibid, 18) and climate change is thus fundamentally linked to the capitalist mode of production, from which follows that they ought to be combatted concomitantly (Malm and Hornborg 2014). The eco-Marxists tend to adhere to a naturalist realism, whereby nature is an "objective ecological realm" constituting the "material base for everything" (Cassegård 2021, 18). This understanding of the dialectics of nature and society, along with an insistence on incorporating the methods and theories of natural science in them, has led some from the production-of-nature approach to criticise eco-Marxism of resorting to cartesian dichotomies and positivism (Moore 2011). But the eco-Marxists are in turn critical of the constructivist production-of-nature approach (Cassegård 2021, 18). As the eco-Marxists see it, exclusively relying on cultural or social analysis to understand the human metabolism with the objective ecological realm of nature is a serious mistake (ibid).

One such exchange followed Moore's work on a *world-systems ecology*, by which he claims to have created a complete theory of capital accumulation as an *ecological* process by trying to combine the logic of capital as a totality, explained through the value form, with the (ecological) history of capitalism (Moore 2011, 118). Moore's attempt at conflating labour, or society, and nature has received harsh criticism from Andreas Malm (2016) who accuse him of, among other sins, 'holism', 'obscurantism', and 'hybridism' (ibid).

Timothée Haug (2018) attempts to salvage the idea of the "socio-ecological constitution of capitalism's value-form" from Moore's ecological world history (Moore 2011, 108). Claiming that the conflation of nature and the economy under the term 'oikeios' is not antithetical to the metabolic rift but helps unfold "the dialectical relation between the destruction of human and non-human life" (Haug 2018, 198). While Malm chides Moore, claiming that "Capitalism emphatically does not make nature", Haug points to how Marx himself (in *Grundrisse*) actually argues that "the capitalist mode of production concretely (re)produces the natural environment from within" (ibid, 197). From an eco-feminist engagement with the Neue Marx-Lektüre and Value-Form Theory Haug finds that there is a limit to capital's real subsumption of life (ibid, 200): the biological metabolism (human and non-human) cannot be wholly integrated in the value-form.

4.1.1 *Critical Materialism*

Cassegård, throughout his recent book *Towards a Critical Theory of Nature* (2021), engages in dialogue with both eco-Marxism and the production-of-nature approach, staking out a third path to understanding the relation between nature and capitalism dialectically which draws heavily from the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. According to Cassegård, much of the disagreements between the camps are due to differences in their understanding of materialism (ibid). On one side of the debate is the *causal* materialism, associated with Engel's law-bound dialectics of nature and 'scientific' Marxism in which matter is understood to be a causally determining factor, expressed in the base-superstructure metaphor (ibid, 11). Modelled after natural science rather than Hegelian dialectics, causal materialism seeks to explain history using scientific methods, leading to the discovery of historical laws (ibid). As matter is causally determinant of form, so too the relation between base and superstructure must be unidirectional, leaving little opportunity to grasp this relation dialectically (ibid).

Causal materialism has often been associated with Soviet-style so-called "official Marxism" (Cassegård 2021, 88). The causal materialist camp has subsequently been attacked by Western Marxists like Antonio Gramsci and György Lucács, who instead present what Cassegård calls a *practical* materialism (ibid, 11). Here it is human praxis mediated through meaning-producing 'totalities' that make up the materialism, rather than the economy conceived of as a base (ibid). Conceptual necessity replaces causal necessity as the totality is the "meaning of life contexts" reconstructed retrospectively (ibid). Hence, this form of dialectics is used to make sense of struggle and to elucidate why the negation of capitalism is a meaningful pursuit, as opposed to the determinist attempts of causal materialism to scientifically predict revolution and the evolution of capitalism (ibid). Future developments can thus only be grasped dialectically to the extent to which they have already emerged and become integrated into the totality – how we make sense of the present (ibid).

Against these two forms of materialism Cassegård presents a third kind, calling it *critical* materialism (Cassegård 2021, 12). Taking as a model Marx's critique of political economy in *Capital*, critical materialism differs from the other two in that it uses materialism as *tool for critique* (ibid, 12). It presents no positive account of history but offers instead an immanent critique of the capitalist system and its constitutive relations by showing their "dependency on nature and the exploitation of labor" (ibid, 12). The capitalist economy is not a base but an

idealist system imposing its forms on the external reality of human and non-human nature alike (ibid). It is this real world outside the system but on which the system depends that is the material in this materialism, and it is by not fitting in to our conceptual systems, by its *non-identity*, that matter can “undermine and disrupt the categories that constitute the system” (ibid, 11-12). Here Cassegård argues for the negative dialectics of Theodor Adorno and what he calls the *non-identity* between concept and object (ibid, 5). The material reality outside our conceptual forms is what ‘hurts’, reminding us that, as Adorno is quoted in Cassegård (2021, 13): “the true is what does not fit in”. Reality in this sense is not an objective collection of facts, but that which “disrupts, resists or fails to conform” to our conceptual systems (ibid). Reality cannot be ‘directly expressed’ through these systems, but rather reality can be known by what is non-identical to them: by not being entirely subsumed by the concept, the object shows what the concept is not (ibid). Critical materialism is thus a tool for an immanent critique of the reified forms of both nature and society, made available to us in instances of hurt or discomfort (ibid).

Stavis and Felli argue that the viable route towards an economy that is both socially and ecologically just is to build the kind of broad mobilisation that reaches beyond the workplace to other segments of civil society, pushing for a socio-ecological transformation of the political economy (Stavis and Felli 2014). For these socio-ecological strategies to succeed there need to be *environmentally minded* workers (ibid, 36). Stevis and Felli do not qualify exactly what an ecologically minded worker is or how workers become environmentally minded, but the critical materialism of Cassegård, and the tools for an immanent critique residing in the non-identity between concept and object, offers a route towards understanding workers as socio-ecological agents, whether *environmentally minded* or not (Cassegård 2021, 11-12). In the analysis of the dockworkers’ framings, I will thus look for instances where this *non-identity* between concept and object is visible; where the respondents express the dissonance between the conceptual and the material reality (ibid, 12). This use of non-identity, where it is visible in the pain or discomfort of workers, offers a way of viewing the exploitation of labour and nature jointly, and can therefore be a springboard not only for the immanent critique of capital but also for staking out paths for labour environmentalism.

4.2 Depth Breadth, and Agency

Demitris Stevis’ research on the internal characteristics of labour environmentalism (2018) offers a way to categorise labour unions engagement in environmental issues. His analytical

scheme evaluates labour environmentalism in terms of its *depth*, *breadth*, and *agency* (ibid). This scheme does not take into account the *external* characteristics of labour environmentalism, i.e. to which degree or how labour unions impact and shape the wider political economy. Yet for the sake of the present study, this is less of a problem as the focus is very much on the *internal* processes of sense-making, framing, and strategizing.

Each of the three of Stevis' categories of depth, breadth, and agency will be analysed with the help of its own set of indicators. This is because, while the typology of depth, breadth, and agency is a useful and illustrative way of conceptualising labour environmentalisms, it is too broad and vague a categorisation without first specifying how the content of each category is to be understood and analysed. This necessary detour via complementary categories risks making the reading of the analysis messier than I would like, but the phenomenon being as under theorised as it is, and as this thesis lacks the scope for developing a framework of its own, this messiness should be read as a productive step towards theorising an emergent research field.

4.2.1 Depth

By depth, Stevis is talking about the degree to which the “combined social and ecological priorities and commitments of labour unions” is transformative (Stevis 2018, 456). In Stevis scheme, the most transformative, or *deep*, is simply that which shows a high concern for both social equality and the environment (ibid). On the other side of this spectrum are market-based policies reinforcing a “hyper-liberal political economy” by treating nature as a resource and not showing much concern for social equality (ibid). The point with combining the analysis of ecological and social dimensions of the *depth* of the commitment of labour unions is to be able to differentiate between socially egalitarian and inegalitarian environmental practices (ibid). This is an important point for the overall debate on the transition toward a low-carbon economy. But to make this rather broad idea operationalisable for this study we need to break it down further, and for that we turn to Stevis and Felli's model of affirmative/transformative environmental/ecological justice. It should be noted that the matrix seen in Table 1 is a simplified heuristic device and that each approach can itself be understood as a continuum of different positions (Stevis and Felli 2015, 35).

Table 1. Definitions of socio-ecological justice frames (Depth)

	Affirmation (Allocation)	Transformation (Reorganisation)
Environmental Justice (Justice to humans)	Affirmative Environmental -Distribution of environmental harms and benefits amongst humans within existing capitalist political economy	Transformative Environmental -(Re)distribution of environmental harms and benefits within a reformed/transformed political economy
Ecological Justice (Justice to nature)	Affirmative Ecological -Distribution of harms and benefits between humanity and nature without considering justice amongst humans	Transformative Ecological -Redistribution of harms and benefits between humanity and nature within a reformed/transformed political economy

(Source: Stevis and Felli 2015, 35)

4.2.1.1 Justice frames

Stevis and Felli have written together on the varieties of environmental justice (Stevis and Felli 2015). In their matrix they distinguish between justice to humans, which they call *environmental justice*, and justice to nature, or *ecological justice* (ibid, 34). Stevis and Felli break down labour unions’ call for social justice into a call for *redistribution* to the working class, a call for the *recognition* of workers and their communities, and a call for greater *representation* of workers (ibid). The way that labour unions differ however, according to the authors, is on whether the work for more just outcomes should be pursued *within* existing rules or whether justice requires profound changes to these rules (ibid). Borrowing Nancy Fraser’s wording they call the perspectives striving for justice within the parameters of the existing political economy ‘*affirmative*’ and those that call for the political economy to be profoundly changed ‘*transformative*’ (ibid). In a heuristic move to make these differences of labour environmentalism legible for analysis, a matrix is thus presented where labour unions’ commitment to socio-ecological struggle is categorised as *affirmative* or *transformative environmental* or *ecological* justice (ibid, 35).

The *affirmative environmental* frame of justice, which Stevis and Felli also call the “shared solution approach” to a just transition, seeks to redistribute the environmental risks and burdens and thus limit the impact the move toward a green economy could have on ‘the weak’ (Stevis and Felli, 2015, 35-36). These policies are not aimed at the changing of social relations or the renegotiation and extension of nature’s axiological and ontological standing (ibid). Instead, they focus on making “workers’ voices” heard in the already existing

institutional settings of formal negotiations and informal initiatives (ibid, 36). Without interrogating “liberalism’s atomistic ontology” these policies of ecological modernisation instead aim to provide environmentally beneficial outcomes by harnessing the power of the capitalist market (ibid). The shared solution approach thus employs a form of “green Keynesianism” advocating for “green and decent jobs” instead of relying entirely on capital-intensive innovations (ibid). The economy, the environment, and society are understood to be winners in a properly managed transition towards a sustainable economy, which is to say a transition not entirely left to market forces (ibid).

The *transformative environmental* justice frame Stevis and Felli argue corresponds with an approach to socio-ecological justice which they call the “differentiated responsibility” approach (Stevis and Felli 2015, 37). This approach has a stronger emphasis on protecting the ‘losers’ of the transition than does the shared solution approach (ibid). It is also emphasising workers’ and unions’ power as well as their role in producing a *just* transition (ibid). In this approach demands are made for transforming existing jobs into sustainable jobs, rather than just ‘green’ ones (ibid). This means investments in research and development, in “job-generating innovations”, including fixes like carbon capture and storage (CCS), delaying the disappearance of specific industries (ibid). Another important difference is that the state is called upon to manage the transfer of workers to other economic sectors, meaning retraining and wage subsidies while guaranteeing “[s]ocial protection, unemployment and retirement benefits” (ibid). The ecological priorities of the transformative environmental approach are limited and its scope of justice narrow, although more redistributive than the affirmative environmental, or shared solution approach (ibid). Nature is not given “ontological and axiological standing”, meaning nature is understood from an anthropocentric point of view as a resource and is therefore also valued as such (ibid, 36). This also means however, that nature is the responsibility of mankind, which is why the transformative environmental justice perspective acknowledges obligations toward nature (ibid). Stevis and Felli claim to have found that this approach is based on a “specific European model of industrial relations” (ibid, 38). According to them this approach is likely to produce strategies like militant particularism which, they suggest, can seem equitable at the local level but would prove inequitable at the global level (ibid).

The *affirmative ecological* justice frame has no corresponding strategic approach to a just transition, as Stevis and Felli could find no instance of it in international or global labour

environmentalisms (Stevis and Felli 2015, 36). This they argue is understandable given the relative disregard to social justice within this approach (ibid). This justice frame motivated by the extended recognition of nature's ontological and axiological status, may actually call for changes to the political economy, as exemplified by deep ecologists or Malthusian concerns for 'limits and scarcities' (ibid, 35). Here Stevis and Felli concede that proponents of the affirmative ecological justice frame have a point, exemplified by the ecological record of bureaucratic collectivisms like the USSR (ibid). As the authors point out however, this position does not account for the social impacts of curbing accumulation and growth (ibid).

The last part of the heuristic scheme, the *transformative ecological* justice frame, is less prevalent in labour environmentalism than the affirmative environmental or the transformative environmental ones, which are the most prominent approaches according to Stevis and Felli (2015, 38). Yet on the global and national scales, the authors of the scheme acknowledge this approach to a just transition as a 'distinguishable trend' among the rest, naming it the 'social ecological' approach (ibid). A just transition under the social ecological approach is fundamentally concerned with the democratisation of economic and social relations: production and exchange should not be subordinated to market forces but to human and planetary needs (ibid). Nature is seen to have rights that are, crucially, extended by humans, and this has both ecological and social consequences (ibid, 35) The transition to a low-carbon economy thus implies a democratically planned economy and public ownership of the fossil fuel supplies, along with the socialisation of the development and production of technology (ibid, 38). For while technological developments are seen as central to a transition to a low-carbon economy, they are currently constrained by the parameters of a capitalist economy (ibid). Therefore, the strategy advocates for open-sourced intellectual property rights and more 'public-public' cooperation ensuring that green technological advancements are driven by a *common* social and ecological good, rather than simply profit maximation (ibid). A just transition requires a reorganisation of the relations between labour, capital, and the state, but it is not enough to recognise workers' voices or the asymmetrical power dynamics between capital and labour (ibid). It requires that "labour itself re-imagines its place in the political economy" and that it 'embraces' both the social and ecological imperatives of a just transition (ibid). Workers' power is not enough for guaranteeing 'ecological sanity' unless it is the power of 'ecologically minded workers' (ibid, 35).

Given these clarifications of the four approaches to socio-ecological justice and a transition to a low-carbon economy, we can now place some more concrete examples into the Stevis and Felli’s scheme (see Table 2). These function as indicators suggesting which of the justice frames the respondents’ framings belong to, in terms of analysing the *depth* of the labour environmentalism.

Table 2. Indicators of socio-ecological justice frames (Depth)

	Affirmation (Allocation)	Transformation (Reorganisation)
Environmental Justice (Justice to humans)	Affirmative Environmental - ‘Better managed capitalism’; green jobs and technology, ‘win-win’ - ‘Shared solution’	Transformative Environmental - Workers’ power, sustainable jobs, retraining, state-led ‘green industrial policies’, CCS - ‘Differentiated responsibility’
Ecological Justice (Justice to nature)	Affirmative Ecological - Deep ecology, natural limits, degrowth, ecocentric ethics	Transformative Ecological - Democratic planning, public ownership, human/planetary needs, confrontational politics - ‘Social ecological’ or eco-socialist

(Source: the author; Stevis and Felli 2015)

4.2.2 Breadth


Stevis argues that a focus on the depth of labour unions’ commitment to a just transition is not enough, and in geographical terms claims that “islands of best practices” could “externalize adverse impacts across the landscape” (Stevis 2018, 456). In a ‘hyperliberal’ world where negative externalities are a virtue, Stevis argues that the need for a spatial dimension of analysis is especially necessary (ibid, 457). But the next dimension of his analytical scheme, *breadth*, is not only spatial, but also functional. He thus means that the environmentalism of labour unions should be differentiated in terms of *scale* and *scope* (ibid). Scale refers to the geographical reach of the practices, policies, or proposals of unions, and can range from local to global (ibid). But environmental initiatives on both global and local scales can vary in focus, from a “single product or the whole political economy”, and this is what *scope* is meant to capture (ibid).

Both Stevis and Felli study labour environmentalism on the national and global scales, but this study’s focus is on the framings of members of a local dockworkers’ union. Where an ITU for instance can be expected to strategize and mobilise on an international scale, this is not necessarily true of Hamnarbetarförbundet in Gothenburg. It does not mean however, that

the scale of the union’s understanding of and engagement in environmentalism cannot be global. Both the scale and the scope of the environmental engagements of Hamnarbetarförbundet remain an empirical question of this study.

In terms of analysing Stevis’ *breadth* category (Stevis 2018), the scale and scope of the respondents’ framings of their political horizon regarding climate change can be put somewhere along the two-axis represented in Figure 1-motivated labour initiative for instance focused on a single technical innovation in the production line but which is readily globally scalable or is it rather concerned with gaining complete worker control of the whole production process, but in a single local site? In Figure 1 are examples of four possible positions along the axes of scale and scope.

Figure 1. Geographical scale and functional scope of labour environmentalism (*Breadth*)



(Source: the author)

4.2.3 Agency

Lastly, the question of *agency* will be analysed with the help of Felli’s three ‘socio-ecological strategies’ (Felli 2014). Felli finds these strategies to be either ‘deliberative’, focused on ‘collaborative growth’, or ‘socialist’ (ibid). Each strategy is broken down and summarised by Felli in the matrix seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Socio-ecological strategies (Agency)

	Deliberative	Collaborative growth	Socialist
Ultimate goal	'Green economy' (unspecified)	Return to a regulated capitalism, with a sustainable face	Democratic ecological socialism
Alliances	International organisations (ILO, UNEP, OECD, etc.)	States, business (industrial fraction of the bourgeoisie), social-democratic political parties	Social movements, environmental NGOs, radical political parties ('Social movement unionism')
Privileged scale of action	International environmental and human rights NGOs	Tripartite model of industrial relations	Local/regional
Actions	International (institutional arenas)	National states (including supranational regional institutions)	More confrontational perspective
Policies for mitigation	Discussions, dialogues with stakeholders, expertise, non-consequential mobilisations (demonstrations, voice, etc.). Unions must be 'part of the solution'	Global social dialogue Expertise Mobilisation/struggles within the parameters of tripartite agreements	Development of political education
Internationalism	Fixing/reforming carbon markets, REDD, PES (not contesting them) Social and environmental safeguards Promotion of win-win solutions	Technological fixes (e.g., carbon capture and storage; clean coal) Carbon markets Greater public control over the investment	Democratic control of the economy Ecological planning Reduction of working hours Reduction in consumption Class based internationalism
	Humanitarian-cosmopolitan vision, not class-based Focus on the 'poorest' or the 'most vulnerable'	Level playing field for competition Developmental/aid type solidarity; unequal relations (Northern unions 'helping' Southern ones)	

(Source: Felli 2014, 382)

The categorisations seen in Table 3 are obviously derived from research on the international and global scale of labour environmental politics. But while some of the examples are more probable to appear in the political framings of labour organisations operating on the international or transnational level, I would argue that the overall points as to where agency is situated in the different strategies remain possible to scale down to the level of analysis of this study. Take 'actions' for instance: the deliberative strategy's focus on expertise, stakeholder discussions, and demonstrations is not entirely different from collaborative growth, but the latter does pursue mobilisation "within the parameters of tripartite agreements", thus adhering to the European social democratic institutional model (Stevis 2018, 382). The socialist strategy on the other hand pursues more confrontational politics, just as it advocates for the most far-reaching mitigation policies (ecological planning and democratic control of economy) compared to the other two (CCS, clean coal and carbon markets or other win-win solutions respectively) (ibid). The typology of socio-ecological strategies, whether it is applied to transnational labour policy documents or the framings of local rank-and-file unionists, is not a precise measurement but a heuristic device for categorising and analysing general tendencies of how agency is understood within a specific horizon for political change (ibid).

All forms of labour environmentalism necessarily involve some level of labour agency, but the term in this case refers to what form this agency takes (Stevis 2018, 457). Simply put, Stevis' agency refers to whether the environmental engagement of labour unions is *reactive* or *proactive* (ibid). This is not a binary relation but two extremes of a spectrum, upon which

unions vary greatly, just as they vary in history and internal dynamics (ibid). Labour unions also vary in what degree they are centralised or decentralised; hierarchical or democratic, meaning proactive policies are not always necessarily shared by the whole membership or leadership of a union (ibid). Neither are proactive policies necessarily a challenge to capitalism, but a union's agency in this analytical scheme is independent of the depth and breadth of its initiatives (ibid). We thus need all three variables to be able to say whether the socio-ecological framings and strategies of a union are transformative or not.

It must be noted that Felli's framework does not only deal with the question of agency or how labour unions understand action but rather overlaps to a certain degree with Stevis' *depth* and *breadth* as well (Felli 2014). In reconstructing the strategies of international labour environmentalism Felli necessarily also deals with questions such as how nature is being perceived in relation to labour and society (depth) or who the preferred allies are (breadth) (Felli 2014; Stevis 2018). Thus, a reading of Felli's analysis of strategy can inform the reading of Stevis' analytical scheme as a whole, but as it is *strategy* that is the focus, it shall here serve as illustration for different ways of understanding worker *agency*.

4.2.3.1 *Strategies of Labour Environmentalism*

International trade unions are representative institutions of the many national workers' organisations, organised along sectoral lines, and do not, as such, organise any workers directly (Felli 2014, 373). As Felli argues however, they still to some degree must express the policies and preferences of their members, just as they in turn contribute to shaping them (ibid). Given this dynamic relation, it may prove especially fruitful to bring Felli's typology (and associated arguments) to the highly localised case of this study.

Observing the increased engagement of the ITUs in the debates and negotiations on climate change, Felli presents his analytical framework to assess the *kinds* of environmentalisms promoted by the ITUs (ibid). It is important to here point out that the possible differences among ITUs in their way of understanding and therefore dealing with climate change are here considered as *political* differences which lead to different strategic choices (ibid), rather than as differences between individuals and their values (Räthzel and Uzzell 2013).

Felli finds three different strategies which the different ITUs follow and argues that the different strategies reflect broader political differences between them (Felli 2014, 374). These differences to a varying degree enable and constrain labour unions' engagement with other

social forces and alliance building (ibid). The threefold typology consists of a ‘deliberative’, a ‘collaborative growth’, and a ‘socialist’ strategy (ibid, 381). These reconstructed strategies are ideal types however, and elements of labour environmentalism are rather to be found on “the spectrum of strategies” rather than in any clear-cut distinctions, ITUs being the contradictory institutions that they are (ibid, 377).

4.2.3.1.1 Deliberative

The first, *deliberative*, strategy is also the dominant one in the ITU movement according to Felli (Felli 2014, 381). In this strategy ‘climate change’ is understood as a non-social external threat which a united humanity is fighting by ‘saving the environment’ (ibid). Felli identifies a “non-conflictual understanding of social relations” in this ‘deliberative’ perspective and argues this is fundamental to what he calls the “post-political rhetoric of human rights, ecological sustainability and social justice” (ibid). The deliberative strategy is similar to that of international environmental and human rights NGOs, which are also the preferred allies of the strategy, along with international organisations like ILO, UNEP, OECD etc. (ibid, 381-382). The deliberative strategy believes in a ‘meaningful dialogue’ with political ‘leaders’ where different social voices need to be heard, but the power of transformation is ultimately located within politicians’ ‘will’ to act (ibid, 382).

Central to this strategy is also a belief in, or at least acceptance of, market solutions to the climate crisis (Felli 2014, 384). This is partly explained by what Felli identifies as a ‘neoliberal governmentality’ which is not least prevalent in the deliberative model’s understanding of the ‘just transition’: workers are to be made adaptable and resilient to the consequences of the climate crisis while leaving fundamental property relations unchallenged (ibid). The non-conflictual understanding of the causes of climate change and of society in general, along with the focus on adaptation and resilience, places most of the agency somewhere else than with the workers, with ‘political leaders’ and large NGOs (Felli 2014, 384), making it a more *reactive* than *proactive* strategy (Stavis 2018, 457).

4.2.3.1.2 Collaborative Growth

The second strategy, called *collaborative growth* is closely tied to the economic sectors that are expected to be negatively affected by a transition to a low-carbon economy (Felli 2014, 385). It recognises the potential for ‘sustainable’ jobs, as well as the need to plan for environmental regulations, a need not met with much enthusiasm (ibid). The collaborative growth strategy is also a sectoral critique of the deliberative model, seen as disregarding

workers' interests in favour of business and environmentalists (ibid). Felli calls this strategy the most vocal advocate for a 'just transition', which is understood as a compensatory package for workers and their communities should environmental regulations lead to job loss (ibid). The solutions to the climate crisis are to be found in the 'ecological modernism' of carbon capture technologies and emission trade (ibid, 388).

The sectors associated with the collaborative growth strategy are also the ones most heavily unionised historically, such as extractive and other heavy industries (Felli 2014, 385). The unionisation of these sectors was instrumental in the labour movement's development, and it has translated into the European social-democratic compromise and the tripartite structural frameworks (state, business, and labour) of the European social models as well as the ILO (ibid). This history leads the collaborative growth strategy of ITUs to tend to favour the global North (ibid). It also makes nation-states, and in particular social democratic parties, preferred allies (ibid). Compared to the win-win narratives of the deliberative model, under the collaborative growth model labour defines its position autonomously from business and environmental groups' interests (ibid). Yet the structural organisation along sectorial lines means ITUs are ultimately dependent on the growth of their particular sector, even as they are sometimes involved in conflictive action against, for instance, specific multinationals within the sector (ibid, 386). While recognising some fundamental contradictions of capitalist social relations, the collaborative growth strategy relies on these contradictions being managed by stronger state involvement in otherwise market-based solutions, through provision of welfare benefits and aggregate demand (ibid).

The alignment with national economic policies in terms of both welfare and climate regulations encourages international and interregional competitiveness along with the competition along sectorial lines (Felli 2014, 387). This 'geographical dilemma' reinforcing uneven accumulation lead trade unions into siding with nationally based segments of the capitalist class against workers and capitalists elsewhere (ibid, 388). As such, the ITUs should not be read as attempts at internationalism, but as an attempt to make the sectorial and international competition 'fair' (ibid). In much the same way the strategy's reliance on states for regulation and investment is not a call for socialisation of production (ibid). With the recognition of capitalist social relations and some of their underlying contradictions the strategy seeks to improve workers' conditions within these social relations, not reorganise the production of commodities based on socio-ecological needs (ibid). In terms of *agency*, while

placing workers closer to the centre of action the collaborative growth strategy is still very much *reacting* to both climate change and capital and is looking to states to *manage* the mitigation of both, while promoting sectoral economic growth.

4.2.3.1.3 Socialist

What Felli calls the *socialist* strategy is by far the most transformative model for labour environmentalism, or *deep* in Stevis' terms. The origins of environmental destruction are located in the contradictory nature of the production of wealth under capitalism (Felli 2014, 389). Therefore, the solution to the climate crisis is not found in merely strengthening public regulations on this production of wealth, but in the transformation of the social relations of productions as such (ibid). Felli identifies one ITU that represents the socialist strategy and that is the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) which offers a critique of both 'global capitalism' and the 'growth imperative' (ibid). Felli therefore draws heavily from the ITF's documents on their strategy on dealing with the climate crisis to illustrate what constitutes the socialist strategy of labour environmentalism (ibid).

While the two other strategies to a varying degree are associated with "neoliberal market environmentalism" the socialist strategy rejects the market solutions of 'green capital' and 'ecological modernism', calling for an approach to social and technological transformation that is "grounded in the primacy of social and environmental priorities over the imperatives of private profit" (Felli 2014, 389; ITF 2010: 18). The strategy aims to build a political movement against climate change through unions and sees social movements like the climate justice movement as preferred allies (Felli 2014, 390). Tactically, the strategy argues for alliance building from the local and national levels and upward, and to avoid organisations that do not share the labour unions' struggle against neoliberalism (ibid). The socialist strategy recognises the need to nurture amongst workers a political consciousness that would enable the thinking of alternative relations of productions that can satisfy sustainable socio-ecological relations (ibid). The strategy therefore relies on the political education of workers, linking the climate crisis to capitalism (ibid).

Felli identifies the perceived possibility and need for organising the democratic control over the economy as the main distinguishing element of the socialist strategy (Felli 2014, 390). He also argues this makes the strategy unique in truly aiming at transforming the broader political economy (ibid). The socialist strategy is the only model that represents a move

towards social movement unionism which Felli argues is part of the “democratisation and re-politization of the international labour movement” (ibid, 392).

The lack of attention given to the content of the strategy regarding workplace-based rank-and-file militancy presents somewhat of a contradiction as mobilisation from below is an explicit part of the strategy (Felli 2014, 391-392). The top-down aspect of the strategy is also present in the model’s perceived need to *educate* the workers to a political awakening (ibid, 390). As there is little attention given to the practice of rank-and-file union democracy in Felli’s analysis of labour environmentalism on the global level, even as this is an explicit part of his analytical scheme, turning our gaze to the present case of a local rank-and-file democratic trade union becomes increasingly interesting.

Let us next turn to the analysis of the framings found in the interviews with the Gothenburg dockworkers.

5

5 Results and Analysis

In this chapter the results from the interviews and the analysis thereof will be presented jointly. This is done partly because of the limited scope of this thesis, but also because I believe this will make the interpretive work more transparent to the reader. The chapter will be structured using the three categories of Stevis’ typology: depth, breadth, and agency (Stevis 2018), discussed at length the Theory chapter. These analytical categories are not correspondingly isolated in reality, where there is significant overlap: the socio-ecological justice frames used to gage the ‘depth’ of the engagement to justice is not completely detached from issues of agency, scale, or scope. Nor is the geographical scale of solutions on the political horizon entirely unaffected by the question of where agency is understood to reside, or how socio-ecological justice is framed. For the sake of analytical rigour, each segment of this chapter will focus on the concept at hand, while not ignoring the connections and overlaps.

5.1 Depth

Labour unions are not monoliths, imbued with some mystical workers’ essence and presenting a unified front on any and every issue. The respondents made sure to stress this point on more than one occasion. Union members hold all manners of private opinions and vote for different political parties, both to the left and to the right. This holds true of issues

surrounding climate change as well and one respondent explained the union membership houses a wide spectrum of positions, from those doubting the very existence of anthropogenic climate change to those who are referred to as “vegan moonlight farmers”. The respondents all showed concern for ‘the environment’ and ‘the climate’, expressing this in changed behaviour outside the workplace such as riding a bicycle to work, adjusting the diet and consumer patterns. While not representative of the union as a whole, these attitudes are still highly relevant because juxtaposed with the framings around a stricter union context they suggest there is a qualitative difference in how issues are framed in the context of work and as private citizens. This is significant for how we understand the political horizon of workers or of labour as a political force.

One respondent described the frequent and general discussions taking place at work, often initiated by the more ‘reactionary’ individuals, and expressed frustration with the ‘anti-scientific’ attitudes towards climate change. In a union built on rank-and-file democracy these kinds of schisms are far from insignificant, but where my results at times show framings of a narrow horizon in relation to climate change, this is with reference to national labour market policies and developments in the larger political economy rather than internal divides over issues within the union membership.

In the interviews I used the blockade actions of Fossilgasfällan as a way of talking both concretely and hypothetically about climate activism, alliances, and confrontational politics. One respondent remembered the action clearly. He had even been down to talk to the activists and remembered the role it played in sparking discussions at work about LNG technology and the climate. For the other respondents, the climate action had barely been registered at the time, as they were still locked in the conflict with the employer. Everyone expressed support however, both for the cause and for the kind of politics, or methods, although one respondent professed to be “too much of a coward” to perform that kind of blockade. This respondent perceived of the civil disobedience of the climate activists as more risk ridden than the picketing of union militancy.

The respondents all talked about the necessity of transitioning to a more sustainable economy in the face of escalating climate change which is seen to be heading towards devastating proportions. They expressed doubts about the efficacy of the current system to orchestrate the necessary transition itself. One respondent argued that the necessary transition within the necessary time frame “demands a socialist restructuring of society” finding it “incredibly

hard to believe” that “states which are in practice controlled by business – that is, right wing forces (...) should in any way enforce sufficiently powerful changes”, while also admitting to not knowing “where that change will begin”. The respondent’s call for a “socialist restructuring” is here taken to refer to the transformative political agenda being prescribed, i.e. a question of *depth*. It should not be confused with the analytical category of the socialist *strategy*, which is aimed at capturing how *agency* is framed with the socialist strategy being the most proactive strategy. Translating the depth-related use of ‘socialist’ would risk censoring the respondents while still creating further conceptual confusion. Bear in mind therefore that the concept appears both as an emic category to reflect on the transformative depth of the political horizon, and as an analytical category approximated to analyse the agency framings of the unionists.

Having already offered the state, governed by capitalist interests, up as the resistance to the necessary transformation, I asked what the role of workers and unions may have in this struggle:

“It is not who you are, but what role you happen to hold. (...) [W]orkers hold an enormous power – workers and professionals – to, so to speak, sabotage the system in a way that the poor fellas that were shot to death in the streets before World War One never did. You can paralyze dozens of companies and in principle grind the whole world trade to gravel, and we always have that possibility.”

On the slow pace of parliamentary democracy to deliver the necessary changes the same respondent continues:

“That development is too fucking slow unless they have miscalculated – unless we have another 100 years – then it’s completely hopeless and then you have to have that kind of weapon to strike directly at capitalism’s motor or heart or whatever it is. And that [weapon] is the labour force.”

From these excerpts, climate change appears as an impending catastrophe that is morally imperative to avoid. The respondents expressed in different ways an imperative to protect nature, be it maritime wildlife directly affected by the shipping companies active in the port or more abstract ideas of the climate and environment, embodied by melting ice caps and rising sea levels. This, combined with the transformative outlook on politics and labour’s

role in it expressed in the two quotes above, suggest a justice frame in line with the one Stevis and Felli called *transformative ecological* or eco-socialist and which can be found in Table 2 (Stevis and Felli 2015). This is undoubtedly interesting, not least to anyone believing workers to be essentially and necessarily detrimental to the environment or a hindrance to the climate movement. This is not however, proof of any deep or far-reaching labour environmentalism in Hamnarbetarförbundet nor the labour movement. There is more to the picture.

For something interesting happens when focus is shifted from the more abstract issues of the warming climate or the prospect of a political transformation somewhere in the future, back to the concrete and lived context of the workplace and the union's struggle there. Focus turns to the workplace environment and technical fixes that reduces harm to workers in the short term but that can turn to win-win-win scenarios with time as less fuel equals economic gain for the employer and their customers, and less pollution is obviously beneficial for the environment. On the specific focus on the workplace environment one respondent had this to say:

“When I’m out in my workplace I see to me as a person in the first place. I mean, it’s not an entirely good working environment [...]. There’s a lot of exhausts and a lot of brake dust, tire shreds, dust and stuff like that that you keep breathing in all the time. I believe this environment – and it’s connected to the climate too I can imagine – [...] the environment we’re working in would be better if they ran on electricity and the boats were electrically connected.”

This is not to say that the respondents stop ‘caring’ about the climate or the environment, or that a transformation of society is no longer viable or necessary. What it does seem to suggest however, is that the practical reality of work and the relation between workers and employer impact how issues, and indeed the horizon for political change, is framed.

Here we also find the intuitive notion that what is hurtful to workers is also hurtful to non-human nature in the form of the climate and ‘the environment’. Not only is this sense of non-identity between concept and object expressed in the most direct way, in the form of work literally hurting workers and their environment (Cassegård 2021, 5). It also bears the seed of a workplace critique of the employer’s policies regarding pollution, which is

experienced to degrade human and non-human nature concomitantly. We will return to this point when analysing the *scope* of the dockworkers' framings in the segment on 'breadth' and discuss what it means for future forms of labour environmentalism.

5.1.1 *Just transition*

As alluded to earlier in the chapter, the respondents all talked of the need to transition the economy to one that is ecologically sustainable. When prompted about what would make this necessary transition *just* their initial reactions were somewhat different, although what united them was their opinion that the idea of a 'just transition' was naïve. One respondent expressed this by arguing that the end justifies the means: the imperative of protecting our climate and environment is so strong that those who are left without a job for a time will have to bear that burden. The respondent likened the consequences to those of the internet boom and the advent of internet commerce which left a lot of people without a job. He experienced these developments as inevitable consequences of 'development'. Yet when talking about justice in the face of transitions in a more practical context, focused on the workplace, the respondent explained how the union does "everything [they] can" to help workers affected by restructuring, or indeed anything. This could mean retraining and new responsibilities within the company and is the union's approach whether the restructuring measures originate with the employer, or the union ranks. This is no doubt reminiscent of Stevis and Felli's *transformative environmental justice* frame (see Table 2), albeit on the micro-level of the workplace.

Another respondent found the idea naïve for slightly different reasons. He emphatically agreed with the sentiment of an equitable transition towards a low-carbon economy, but was highly sceptical towards the notion that "the people in power" would implement such policies:

"[B]ecause they talk like this about "the global stability" and "social unrest" and you know, if this was a factor people cared – or people – the people in power gave a shit about, then the world wouldn't look the way it does. But it isn't a factor – they are completely uninterested in these things, and they are showing it in 100 different ways."

The respondent, who is involved with the union's international solidarity work, makes comparisons with dockworkers' experiences in other countries and draws two conclusions:

first, that any “sensitivity” towards social or ecological sustainability from business interests is simply a marketing gimmick, and secondly, that it is not evenly shared across sectors or across the world. The respondent claims to find the ‘sensitivity’ gimmick only among investors and owners but “not on the production side” who are said to be “completely insensitive to this shit”.

The respondent equates justice in this context with socialism and argues that if that is the only route towards a transition to a sustainable economy, then the “transition will not happen” due to the resistance of “the people in power”. This should not be read as a resignation, but as an expression of scepticism towards the sincerity of corporations and national governments commitment to provide a ‘just’ transition. This scepticism is illustrated again when a respondent discusses state-led ‘green’ industrial policies like ‘green steel’. Here the problem is not government investment in carbon-reducing technologies. On the contrary the respondent sees potential for red-green alliances around a question like carbon-reducing steel production. Instead, the respondent sees a risk for division within the union on a national level as different ports and hubs in the transport sector for instance, are affected disparately. If all are not brought along on the ride there will be resistance from those left out. Why this analysis lands in scepticism towards state-led ‘green’ industrial policies has nothing to do with a resistance towards ‘greening’ the industry but is a product of the experience of a labour movement that has been in retreat for decades and a union that must take a defensive position more often than it used to. These strategic considerations will be discussed in greater detail in the segment on ‘agency’ as they better fit the analysis of socio-ecological strategies.

Justice is an elusive concept, and it is perhaps not surprising that the respondents found it difficult at times to entirely pin it down for themselves. The fact that justice seems to *come* from somewhere e.g. “the people in power” is interesting, and something we will return to in the segment on ‘agency’. For now, let us focus on the content of the concept and where the socio-ecological justice frames of the dockworkers fit into Stevis and Felli’s (2015) analytical scheme.

5.1.2 Socio-ecological justice frame

One respondent’s claim that a socially and ecologically sustainable future necessitates a complete restructuring of the economy should by no means be ignored, but its importance for understanding the depth of the immediate political horizon of the dockworkers of the

Port of Gothenburg should not be overstated either. It is analytically interesting since it puts the framings of the more immediate political outlook of the respondents, from their positions as workers and elected union representatives, in a wider political context. It is also interesting as the framings more closely connected to the quotidian struggle of the workplace and the union appear less transformative in their outlook. The question of what can be done through the union is answered with a focus on technical fixes in the workplace. The scepticism towards state-led ‘green’ industrial policies like ‘green steel’ is grounded in doubts about capital and the state’s ability to deliver just and equitable results and not because of a disagreement about the need for such grand projects. Although these framings are arguably less transformative than the call for a “socialist restructuring of society”, they still fit firmly within the continuum that is Stevis and Felli’s (2015) category of *transformative justice*.

There was a shared yet vague perception among the respondents of a moral imperative to protect the environment and halt the warming of the climate. There is not however, anything to suggest a view among the respondents of nature as a bearer of rights. Nature thus remains under human control and responsibility, qualifying the dockworkers’ framings as ‘environmental’ rather than ‘ecological’ in Stevis and Felli’s terms (2015). As seen in Table 4, this puts the framings of the dockworkers within the category of the *transformative environmental* socio-ecological justice frame.

Table 5. Results: socio-ecological justice frame (Depth)

	Affirmation (Allocation)	Transformation (Reorganisation)
Environmental Justice (Justice to humans)	Affirmative Environmental	Transformative Environmental - Workers’ power, sustainable jobs, retraining, state-led ‘green industrial policies’ - Imperative to protect nature
Ecological Justice (Justice to nature)	Affirmative Ecological	Transformative Ecological

(Source: the author; Stevis and Felli 2015)

5.2 Breadth

The geographical scale and the functional scope of the framings of the dockworkers' union representatives also varies somewhat depending on the context. For instance, the diagnostic frames of climate change are largely global and focus on consequences like melting ice caps and rising sea levels. But other environmental impacts of the shipping industry are felt in their locality, such as air pollution, reduced fishing stocks, and the extinction of local marine life.

It is perhaps not surprising that the immediacy of working life and the struggles that surround it puts focus on the workplace. As we have seen the practical measures suggested by the respondents in terms of combatting climate change in the role of workers and unionists are centred around technical fixes which benefit both the work environment and the climate. There is also the question of state-led industry wide projects of 'greening' the economy but while this is definitively a question of scale in the sense that it presents a potential opening for labour environmentalism on a national level, its role in the framings of the respondents has more to do with where power resides and change ultimately comes from. It will therefore be analysed in more detail in the segment on 'agency'. Let us instead turn to the issue of international solidarity, which in this case is not directly linked to any actual instances of labour environmentalism but nonetheless relevant for understanding the dockworkers' political horizon.

5.2.1 *International solidarity*

The international solidarity work of Hamnarbetarförbundet is organised through the international network of dockworkers' unions, the IDC, which gathers unions with a similar structure of horizontalism, voluntarism, and rank-and-file democracy as Hamnarbetarförbundet. As decisions on solidarity actions are voted upon most members have some insight into the process surrounding these actions, but they are not involved in the continuous networking and the personal relations on which the international solidarity work is built. The respondents who were not engaged personally in this process still recalled actions they had voted on or in other ways participated in. Or indeed support they had themselves received, as in the conflict of 2019. However, one respondent has represented the union members both internationally and nationally for several years and has significant insight into the proceedings.

When asked what it would take to see solidarity actions among dockworkers on climate change the respondent first answers that the ‘cynical’ answer is that the way the IDC is set up it is what is beneficial in the US context that sets the agenda. He then clarifies that this is only half true as what is communicated from the IDC centrally has less practical impact than when the unions manage to mobilise around an issue. The national and regional differences in how the labour market is organised are sometimes a hindrance but the respondent explains that these differences become less of a problem over time as the organisers get to know each other and the different national conditions for labour militancy. One example of these actions that stand out is that in solidarity with the people of Gaza. It stands out partly because “Gaza has no port to speak of and hasn’t had one for years” but also because it is a case of what horizontalism and membership democracy can sometimes mean for successful international mobilisation. The rank-and-file democracy means that decisions need to be anchored among the membership before decisions are taken, which is time consuming but when successful it lends robust support and legitimacy to new policies. What this meant in the case of Gaza is that although the powerful US union, which was not in favour of supporting Palestine, could not stop the process without paying too high a political prize. Speculating on what this means for the prospect of international climate solidarity actions the respondent argues that,

“if you are to have a real breakthrough, you need get things happening in one or two countries – or maybe four to five ports – where the environmentalist movement is involved.”

While admitting it would be difficult to imagine a general strategy the respondent returns to the issue of onshore power as the focus of an initially local, but scalable, alliance between workers and environmentalists.

While there is a structure for international mobilisation that influences the framing of the political horizon of the Gothenburg dockworkers to some degree, this should not by any means be read as a comprehensive strategy for international labour environmentalism. It is interesting to note however, how the member base democratic structure connects workers on the shopfloor level with the global political arena. And when a decision or cause is sufficiently rooted in the membership networks of international solidarity can be a strong mobilising force.

Let us now turn to the recurring example of onshore power as an issue on which to build that kind of red-green solidarity, and discuss it in terms of *scope*.

5.2.2 *Onshore power*

One of these win-win technical fixes is so called *eco-driving*, which is to say, the practice of driving in such a way as to consume less fuel and produce less exhaust gas. The other, which appeared in all interviews, is the question of onshore power supply for vessels. This means that the harbour provides access to electricity for vessels while docked meaning they do not have to run the auxiliary engines. The port and the municipality have won “countless prizes” for being early adapters to this technology and it is undeniably great PR, used to market the port on their webpage (portofgothenburg.com). The problem according to the respondents is that it is barely used. The shipping companies claim it is too expensive and they will not connect to the grid unless electricity is subsidised. One respondent told me companies claim their newly built ships do not have the technological capacity to receive electricity for the support systems from the onshore power cables. The respondents use the onshore power question as an example of how one could, from what is initially understood as a workplace environment issue, build a broader mobilisation reaching outside the port to people engaged in the issue of climate change.

5.2.3 *A narrow scope*


From the vantage point of the respondents the political horizon regarding climate change is chiefly made up of what is possible to mobilise around. Tangible measures that benefit the workers environment, in and around the workplace, but that can have the double effect of also being beneficial to the environment writ large. Recall the discussion on critical materialism and the powerful critique residing in the non-identity between object and concept: here is matter, the reality that exists beyond the full reach of our concepts, visible in the suffering of human and non-human nature alike under the toxic fumes from the cargo ship chimneys. The dockworkers framings show an acute awareness of this connection between the degradation of the workers and the degradation of the environment. Recall for instance the discussion on workplace environment in the segment on ‘depth’. There is nothing automatic in the relation between this intuitive grasp of the non-identity with the material and a successful mobilisation, or even explicit formulation, of a workplace critique focused on the joint exploitation of labour and nature. But through the lens of critical materialism, we can

see that the *potential* for such a critique exists in unionists’ struggle over the workplace environment. This is an important point for future thinking on labour environmentalism.

The scope of the measure of onshore power, however, is by all accounts narrow. It is not a system-wide solution but a fix to an isolated problem. Yet, as the discussion of international solidarity suggests, there is at least a theoretical potential of scaling this narrow measure up geographically from ‘below’ through democratic mobilisation of labour unions.

As it stands, the framings of the dockworkers’ political horizon regarding climate change falls somewhere in the local and narrow on the two-axes in Figure 2. The dashed line represents the suggested scalability of this measure.

Figure 3. Results: Geographical scale and functional scope of labour environmentalism (Breadth)



(Source: the author)

When discussing the framing of the prospect of mobilising workers around environmental issues or climate change, whether in the local workplace or in the global arena, one cannot ignore the question of agency; where it is understood to reside or come from, and how it impacts the political horizon of the workers. Let us therefore turn to the dockworkers’ framings of ‘agency’.

5.3 Agency

The question of agency is perhaps the most significant analytical category in this particular case because by lifting the category down from the level of international policy documents to that of the lived experiences of workers and their immediate political horizon shows how

complex the relation to agency actually is. Although Felli (2014) calls his categories ‘strategies’ the goal with this exercise is not to identify a coherent socio-ecological strategy of the rank-and-file dockworkers. The ‘deliberative’, ‘collaborative growth’, and ‘socialist’ strategy are used to understand the general tendencies of the political outlook of the respondents, but also to illuminate what separates the global and the local levels of analysis in terms of understanding the political horizon of labour environmentalism.

What emerges from the interviews is an image of a labour movement on the back end of several decades in retreat. Respondents connect their experience of finding themselves increasingly on the defensive to more general developments in society. Because of this general trend they are more selective about when to act on the offensive and otherwise “lie low”, focusing on the quotidian tasks of defending their members interests, awaiting an opportunity.

One respondent connects the tendency among some union members to distrust climate science with a growing distrust generally with the societal institutions. According to the respondent, if politicians said 40 years ago that “if we are to get emissions down, we have to do something about the inequality” people would have trusted in that measures would be taken to do so. Emphasising the importance of trust for successful mobilisations, the respondent points to the difficulty of building broad support for a transition to a low-carbon economy if there is no trust in ‘society’ to deliver just and equitable outcomes. Society here is taken to mean capital interests as well as the state and its institutions. In the absence of this trust, the respondent argues, people tend to retract into their self-interest, limiting the scope of what is politically possible or even desirable to achieve through unionising. In other words, narrowing the political horizon.

This chapter began with the acknowledgement that opinions regarding politics and climate change vary within the ranks of the union. While the respondents themselves sympathise to a varying degree with both the motives and the methods of climate activist groups like Fossilgasfällan, there are union members who are sceptical towards climate science. For instance, the general sentiment towards the Green Party is that of ‘hatred’ as they are seen to represent middleclass interest and “don’t know anything”. Yet, one respondent explained how these attitudes can shift when new information is anchored properly. He described how the discussions in the workplace concerning the air pollution control technology known as ‘scrubbers’ had shifted since they had brought up the science that said that the pollution

killed of the copepod, a small kind of crayfish, which in turn knocks out big parts of the ecosystem. Suddenly there was a whole new level of acceptance to the new policy. The respondent talked of the need to focus on “low hanging fruit” when it comes to finding allies and issues on which to find common ground, arguing again that onshore power is just that.

“[T]hat type of question [...] where you are not dependent on the environmental thinking of dockworkers, but where the consequences could simultaneously be beneficial from a workers’ perspective. Those alliances I believe are the easiest to build”

Seen in this light the seemingly narrow ‘breadth’ of the dockworkers’ horizon should not necessarily read as a sign of resignation or that one does not grasp ‘the big picture’, but as a strategic choice to focus time and resources where it is possible to succeed and to anchor the choices with the membership base. This brings us to the question of what role the rank-and-file democratic structure has for the framing of the political horizon regarding climate change.

5.3.1 *The role of democracy*

The significance of the democratic structure to the political outlook of the dockworker unionists has already been alluded to. It has been suggested that it can affect the course of international solidarity actions, impact membership attitudes on specific issues, and influence the strategic outlook of the union.

As one respondent explains it, a bureaucratic union like those of LO can introduce any kind of statement or policy from the governing body and claim that it is the position of the union, although shopfloor level members might not even have heard of the policy, let alone agree with it. A member base democratic union on the other hand, *must* have the support of its members. This means that a union vote needs to be preceded by a process of talking to the members, explaining the issue and how it affects them. If this anchoring process is successful and the decision gets the support of the membership, this lends significant power to the decision with members ready to support it, sometimes even when the price is high. This kind of backing is harder to achieve with a bureaucratically decided policy, the respondent argues.

“What I like about this structure is that it puts much higher demands on having a broader dialogue before making decisions. That’s a hell of a difference from LO. They can decide over night that, “we are 100% behind

this” or, “not behind this”. It has no actual impact out in the workplaces but just becomes another party that you can’t vote for.”

The bureaucratic and centralised union can come out tomorrow with an ambitious climate policy, but it may barely reach the workers on the shopfloor, let alone gain the broad support needed for a successful mobilisation. Here, the rank-and-file democracy appears as a double-edged sword: it can have a cooling effect on political ambitions, yet it can also be a strong mobilising force within a limited horizon where support is mustered.

In explaining the powerful potential in this democratic process, the respondents express a sense of agency, as workers and as a union. But it is conditioned and not absolute. It does not dissolve the decade long trend of diminishing workers’ power in favour of capital interests or the tendency of the primacy of self-interest, as identified by a respondent. It is grounded in the practical and lived experiences of work, which means it is also limited by the confines of the same practical reality. Next, we will discuss what this sense of agency can mean for the potential for cooperation or alliances between labour unions and environmentalist and climate activists.

5.3.2 *Could there be alliances?*

When asked hypothetically, all respondents were positive towards the idea of cooperation with climate activists, but they all stressed that it would most likely need to concern issues directly connected to the workplace and the union role. It is important to remember that while labour unions are sometimes understood to be a force for general social change in society (Räthzel and Uzzell 2013) the union’s chief objective is to protect the interests of its members. This directs their gaze firmly on their counterpart, the employer. When speculating about red-green alliances or social movement unionism, this bears being reminded of. For instance, apart from specific support for the implementation of mandatory onshore power, other possible avenues for cooperation suggested by the respondents concerned exchange of information and knowledge: what can a climate activist group learn from the dockworkers’ experience of unionising? And vice versa: what lessons from civil society mobilising efforts can be of benefit to the members of Hamnarbetarförbundet? When asked about what might stand in the way of these kinds of exchanges, as well as more practical forms of cooperation, one respondent answers that workers are limited in what information they are allowed to diverge about their employer as employment contracts include a *duty of loyalty clause*.

5.3.2.1 *Questions of legality*

The duty of loyalty regulates what the worker is allowed to pass along to the public, in terms of information about the firm. This is to protect the business interests of the firm. Aside from the issue of how it relates to the question of freedom of speech, this has consequences for union organising, and by extension, for the potential of red-green cooperation. If for instance, the compliance of a corporation with environmental regulations or union policies is considered a business secret, workers could be punished for sharing that information with civil society organisers, who could have otherwise, in this scenario, have functioned as a megaphone the way Transnational Activist Networks (TANs) do (Della Porta 2006), to put pressure on the employer from the ‘outside’.

One respondent also expressed a general concern about the legality of a hypothetical ally’s other organising efforts. Not out of any moral concerns but because of how that could affect the union members and their relation to the employer. Here is another example of how the political horizon of workers, whether regarding climate change or not, is bound up in the institutional arrangements of the labour market. One respondent expressed as much when discussing the decline of worker militancy in the port. When Hamnarbeträrförbundet was founded in 1972, dockworkers were badly paid with few rights. But with that little to lose and with an inherently powerful position within the capitalist economy, as international ports of trade are, they could risk being more confrontational with the employer. Nowadays, dockworkers are relatively well paid at the same time as the social security systems are perceived to be crumbling along with the overall trust in societal institutions as workers’ influence in general is on the decline. Also, now that Hamnarbeträrförbundet has achieved its goal of a collective bargaining agreement with the employer, which grants them some benefits and securities, but which also blocks some tactics from their arsenal of worker militancy as they are now more firmly locked in the tripartite model. This, the respondent argues, has workers thinking twice before sticking their neck out risking their livelihoods:

“[T]he downside with making certain advancements in the union struggle is that the job becomes more attractive, and people think again before, so to speak, putting it at stake.”

This is not the same as pitting jobs against ‘the environment’ but an acknowledgement that the framings of workers’ horizon for political change are not formed in isolation from structural and institutional constraints.

5.3.3 *What strategy?*

As will have become clear by now, there is no socio-ecological strategy to speak of among the dockworker unionists. The ‘strategies’ of Felli’s international labour environmentalism are used as approximations in order to place the framings of the respondents somewhere on a continuum from liberal cosmopolitanism to ecological socialism (Felli 2014, 382). When diagnostically framing the issue of climate change, the climate movement, and the developments concerning workers’ power and union influence, as well as when speculating about a just transition, the dockworkers’ horizon fits well within Felli’s ‘socialist strategy’ (2014, 382) illustrated in Table 3. The ultimate goal being ‘democratic ecological socialism’, seeing potential allies in environmental NGOs and social movement unionism, and having an international outlook built on international class solidarity all fits this category (ibid). So too does the focus on the local and regional scale for political action as well as a moral imperative for reduced consumption (ibid). But when talking about the immediate strategic choices for mobilising successfully around issues of climate and environment in and around the workplace, some of the respondents’ answers also fit under the category of ‘collaborative growth’ (ibid). They focus on technical fixes and find themselves confined to the tripartite model, but they do not see corporations and states as potential allies. Neither do they put much stock in state- and capital led ‘greening’ industrial programs or put their faith in expertise instead of worker democracy.

Taken as a whole, the respondents’ framings match the ‘socialist’ strategy best (Felli 2014, 382). But the difference between diagnostic and prognostic framings of climate change and the politics surrounding a transition towards a low-carbon economy is interesting because it says something of what *makes* a political horizon that is missed by models such as Felli’s socio-ecological strategies, which analyse the eco-political framings as more or less coherent programmes (Felli 2014). I suggest that we must take the fact seriously that the framings of workers’ horizon for political change regarding climate change are not formed in isolation from structural and institutional constraints but are bound up in the institutional arrangements of the labour market.

6 Conclusion

Let us first return to the research questions of the thesis to see to what extent they have been answered, before we turn to a discussion of future paths for labour environmentalism.

“How is the issue of ‘climate change’, and the movement mobilising against it, framed by dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour?”

The first finding is that the dockworkers’ framings are bound up in the practical experiences of work and the institutional arrangements of the labour market. Climate change is framed as a looming global catastrophe that it is morally imperative to do something about, yet the measures suggested to combat it are technical fixes, narrow in scope and focused on the workplace. This is partly because the union’s chief objective is the protection of the members’ interests, which is constantly negotiated with the counterpart, the employer. Another reason is the union’s rank-and-file democratic structure which means union policies and decisions must be anchored with the membership base, all of whom do not share the respondents’ views on climate change. The member base democratic structure limits the scope of what political stances the union can take in some areas, but when a decision has the support of the base it can produce a strong mobilising force which bureaucratic unions seldom achieve. There are examples of when opinion has turned on an environmental issue within the membership base as the science on the matter was properly communicated.

The climate movement is not particularly well known to the union membership, yet the respondents were positive towards the idea of cooperation with climate activists around workplace related environmental issues. Some even admired the ‘courage’ of the climate activists’ confrontational politics. The respondents did however profess to a deep dislike of the Green Party among the membership. I would warn against reading this as an aversion towards environmental politics as such, rather than as a reaction to the perceived class prejudice of liberal greens, embodied in consumer-oriented policies that do are not believed to take the plight of workers seriously.

“How do dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour frame a ‘just transition’ towards a sustainable economy?”

The debate on a ‘just transition’ towards a low-carbon economy is met with scepticism, calling it naïve in terms of the likeliness of capital and state-led industrial policies delivering just and equitable results. In fact, any ‘sensitivity’ towards social or ecological sustainability on the part of capital is viewed as a marketing gimmick betraying the ‘insensitivity’ of business interests towards the reality of climate change. However, when framing issues of transitioning equitably to a sustainable economy in their own terms the respondents’ political

horizon falls within Stevis and Felli's category of a *transformative environmental* socio-ecological justice frame (2015). One respondent professed the ultimate goal, and only viable route to sustainability, to be a "socialist restructuring of society". 'Just transition' is thus framed as a concept already appropriated by "the people in power", i.e. capital and the state, and is not seen as a useful tool in framing the climate-political horizon of the dockworkers.

Rather than being a definitive answer as to the usefulness of the concept of 'just transition' in building a labour environmentalism capable of challenging climate change and capital, this study shows the need for continued investigation of how concepts like 'just transition', and perhaps also 'Green New Deal', are used and framed at the shopfloor level. In terms of thinking about the future of labour climate mobilisation, the significance of the dynamic of progressive or counter-hegemonic language being adopted by business interests and policy makers should not be underestimated. Future labour environmentalisms must be able to reveal this dynamic while not resigning or retreating the horizon for political change in the face of climate change and capital.

"How do dockworkers in Gothenburg harbour frame their own agency in relation to 'climate change' and 'just transition'?"

While a "socialist restructuring of society" may be the ultimate goal, the framings of the more immediate political horizon were narrower. This can be explained partly by a perception of a general decline in workers power over the last decades, leaving unionists largely on the defensive. A weakening of social security systems paired with the historical victories of Hamnarbeträffbundet in terms of better pay and other benefits, have left dockworkers' less inclined to take unnecessary risks.

The hypothetical alliance with climate activists was thought possible and viewed with positivity, given that it would concern issues directly linked to the union role and the workplace. One recurring example was that of onshore power, which has the double effect of being beneficial to both workers' environment and the climate. One hindrance to this kind of alliance I identified is that of the duty of loyalty, which regulates workers' ability to share information about the employer.

The narrow focus on technical fixes might be construed as a failure by unionists to 'see the bigger picture' or lead deep ecologists to see them as a hindrance to the climate movement. But this ignores the practical reality of work. And indeed, the intuitive notion that what is bad

for workers' health is also fundamentally bad for 'the environment' is an insight from which to build the kind of critical materialist critique that would help us understand the potential in "environmentally minded workers".

In terms of the first part of the thesis aim', to "stake out paths for labour environmentalism transcending the contradiction between jobs and environment", this is where I think we should start from: the sense of non-identity between concept and object that can be observed in workers' intuitive notion of work as *hurting* both human and non-human nature.

This study also found that the respondents' framings of climate change in the context of their personal lives differed from the framings in the role as unionised workers, which were consequently found to be bound up in the practical realities of work and the labour market. I would argue that this is an implication of the insufficiency of idealist understandings of politics and an important lesson for those wishing to build alliances between workers and climate activists. The idealist position cannot explain how workers can appear unwilling to challenge employers in carbon-intensive industries even as they, personally, are appalled by the advent of climate change.

If we therefore instead employ the *critical materialist* position, we can observe how capital degrades both workers and their environment. And from this position we may take the respondents' suggestion of red-green cooperation around small-scale measures more seriously. These workplace environment related issues will not of themselves tip the scales against capital and climate change, but they may prove an opportunity for climate activists and unionists to cooperate in climate advocacy by putting both inward and outward pressure on the employer. As the research of Cândia Veiga and Martin (2013, 119) has shown, this kind of cooperation and the relationships it may result in, can have the effect of changing the values and identities, or *horizon*, of the labour movement. In which case we may be moving toward a more robust understanding, necessarily rooted in praxis, of the hitherto vaguely defined ideal of the environmentally minded workers who can challenge climate change and capital.

6.1 Future Research

This study has focused on the framings of a political horizon regarding climate change, but from the findings it is clear that this research would be well accompanied by studies that focus on the structural opportunities surrounding these framings in order to further our

understanding of the dialectic relation between them. More specifically, my findings suggest the need to investigate the importance of the duty of loyalty as a constraint on labour environmentalism and alliances between environmentalists and labour unions. It could also prove fruitful to probe whether this could become a mobilising issue in and of itself.

My findings suggest that instead of treating the relatively narrow focus on environmental issues of trade unions as a failure to grasp the issue of climate change, more attention should be paid to how a critical materialist critique can unlock the radical potential in the practical experience that the degradation of the environment and workers' health are often one and the same. This can be done while also scaling up the research on trade unions' socio-ecological justice frames and political horizons regarding climate change, which would be scaled up in tandem with that of the analysis of political opportunity structures. This could prove fruitful in finding new avenues for red-green partnerships and other forms of mobilisation against capital and climate change.

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8 Appendices

8.1 Appendix 1: Interview guide (in Swedish)

Intro:

- Hur länge har du arbetat i hamnen? (Har du haft några andra arbeten/yrken tidigare?)
- Vad består ditt arbete av? Kan du förklara hur en arbetsdag ser ut för någon som jag som inte kan någonting?
- Vad är din roll i förbundet?
- Vilka frågor driver facket i huvudsak?
- Vilka typer av frågor ryms i det fackliga arbetet?
- Finns det andra typer av frågor som skulle kunna drivas inom facket men som inte gör det idag?
- Tycker du att facket borde driva frågor även utanför arbetsplatsen?

Strategi och allianser

- Under konflikten med arbetsgivaren som kulminerade 2019, såg ni solidaritetshandlingar från andra förbund? – Andra organisationer?
- Vad skulle du säga kännetecknade er strategi under konfliktens gång? Hade ni en medveten strategi för att engagera folk som inte var kopplade till hamnen eller facket?

- Är det något annat förbund ni står extra nära? På vilket sätt?
- Hur är er relation till andra förbund internationellt?
- Har du insyn i hur organisationen av IDC ser ut?
- Sker samarbete och dialog på internationell nivå främst inom IDC eller har ni andra former av samarbeten?

- vad är din syn på hur den här basdemokratiska strukturen påverkar det här internationella samarbetet? För vi har pratat om stödaktioner i specifika fall men vad jag menar med frågan är till exempel, sker det några långtgående diskussioner och mer strategiska samtal på den internationella nivån vad du vet?

- Har facket som du ser det möjlighet att påverka andra delar av samhället? Hur då? (Varför inte?)
- Hur ser du på att samarbeta med andra organisationer i samhället?
- Finns det några frågor som lämpar sig bättre för samarbete med organisationer utanför arbetsplatsen?

- Känner du till Fossilgasfällans blockad av LNG-terminalen i hamnen 2019?

- Vad tyckte du om den när den skedde? Snackades det om Fossilgasfällans blockad på jobbet/i facket?
 - Hur uppfattade du Fossilgasfällans motiv för blockaden?
 - Kan du sympatisera med, eller relatera till, Fossilgasfällans aktion? Varför/varför inte?
-
- Skulle du säga att det finns en intressekonflikt mellan å ena sidan miljö- och klimatorganisationer som exempelvis Fossilgasfällan och fackförbund å andra sidan?
 - Skulle du i stället säga att mer samarbete mellan dessa grupper vore önskvärt? Vad skulle man i så fall enas kring för frågor?
 - Vad är viktigt för att ett samarbete ska bli lyckat?

Klimat

- Vad associerar du med begreppet 'klimatförändringar'?
 - Har debatten om klimatförändringarna påverkat dig på något märkbart sätt? I vardagen, i arbetet, eller din syn på framtiden och politik?
 - Är 'klimatet' något ni pratar om på arbetet eller i facket? – hemma eller någon annanstans?
-
- Tror du att fackföreningar kan påverka arbetet att motverka klimatförändringar?
 - Hur skulle den typen av facklig påverkan kunna se ut?
 - Är det något som facket borde syssla med? Varför/varför inte?
 - Vad finns det för hinder för att driva klimatfrågor inom facket?

Rättvis omställning?

- För att bromsa den globala uppvärmningen behöver ekonomin ställas om från fossil till fossilfri. På många håll i världen, inte minst inom arbetarkollektivet, hörs därför krav på att den här omställningen måste vara *rättvis*. (Men det betyder förstås olika saker beroende på vem man frågar)
- Är det här en diskussion du känner igen?
Är det något ni diskuterat inom Hamnarbetarförbundet?
- Har du själv några tankar om vad en sådan rättvis omställning skulle behöva innebära för att vara just rättvis?
- Vem tänker du att "rättvisan" borde åsyfta i en s.k. rättvis omställning av ekonomin?
- Vad är arbetares roll i den här frågan, tycker du?
- Hur ser Hamnarbetarförbundets möjligheter att påverka i den här frågan ut?

- På vilken nivå i samhället tror du att den här frågan i första hand kommer att avgöras?
(Är det exempelvis på arbetsplatser eller i lokalpolitik, är det på sociala medier eller hos nationella regeringar, eller är det EU, FN, eller kanske hos globala företag?)

8.2 Appendix 2: Consent form (in Swedish)

Informationsbrev och förfrågan om medverkan i en intervjustudie om Göteborgs hamnarbetares politiska horisont rörande klimatförändringarna.

Jag heter Jakob Gometz och studerar sista terminen på Masterprogrammet i Globala studier, vid Göteborgs Universitet. I utbildningen ingår att utföra en kvalitativ studie som presenteras i en masteruppsats vid universitetet. Studiens syfte är att utforska Göteborgs hamnarbetares politiska horisont rörande klimatförändringarna.

Deltagandet i studien innebär att en intervju kommer att genomföras via den digitala mötesplattformen Zoom. Intervjun beräknas ta omkring 50-60 minuter. Hela intervjun kommer att spelas in. Intervjuerna kommer att behandlas konfidentiellt vilket betyder att intervjuerna kommer att avidentifieras och behandlas i enlighet med bestämmelser i Sekretesslagen. Din medverkan är frivillig och kan när som helst avbrytas. Studien genomförs som en del av min vidareutbildning i Globala studier vid Göteborgs Universitet. Om du accepterar att medverka i studien kommer du att kontaktas per telefon för att bestämma en tid för sammanträffande och genomförande av intervjun.

Hälsningar

Jakob Gometz
Göteborgs Universitet
Box 100
405 30 Göteborg
0737-490313
jakob@gometz.se

Handledare: Rikard Warlenius
Institutionen för Globala Studier
Göteborgs Universitet
rikard.warlenius@gu.se