DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ANTI-PLURALIST ALL THE WAY?

The relationship between authoritarian support and anti-pluralist vote choice in Europe

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Abstract

Literature on anti-pluralism has mostly focused on states and failed so far to include the individual level. This thesis aims to fill this gap and explores individual-level anti-pluralism or more precisely the question why citizens vote for anti-pluralist parties. As a possible explanation, I identify authoritarian support from the literature. I expect authoritarian support to lead to anti-pluralist vote choice via individual authoritarian values and attitudes. As specific mechanisms, I analyse a backlash against cultural values and one particular authoritarian attitude, the wish for a strong leader. To test this, I conduct a large-N, longitudinal cross-country analysis with survey data. Novel data on anti-pluralism of parties is provided by the V-Dem party dataset (V-Party). Survey data on vote choice, values, and attitudes is provided by the European Social Survey in nine waves from 2002 until 2018. I conduct research on citizens from a sample of ten European countries. Using multilevel analysis, I find strong support for my expectations. Politicians or researchers who are concerned about potentially rising levels of anti-pluralism among citizens can therefore look into the relationship between authoritarian support and anti-pluralism. Political education towards democratic values could be a solution to work against anti-pluralist tendencies among the population.

Keywords: Anti-pluralism, authoritarian support, vote choice

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1) INTRODUCTION

A wave of protest rolled through Europe as the Hungarian parliament approved the heavily disputed anti-LGBTQ law on 15 June 2021. The European Union, many Western European states and civil rights organisations condemned the new legislation (e.g., the European Commission, 15 July 2021) that heavily restricts LGBTQ representation in media and bans it in schools altogether with the supposed gain of protecting children. As critics argue, this leads to a disrespect of fundamental minority rights and can be described as clearly opposed to a pluralist society. The LGBTQ minority in Hungary gets delegitimised as dangerous for minors and they are deprived of representation rights in the society. However, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party that spearheaded this law and showed other authoritarian and anti-pluralist tendencies in the last years is still highly popular in Hungary. This is shown in their success in the last two national parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2018, which Fidesz won both in supermajority. Similar trends of electing anti-pluralist parties to parliament can be observed in many European states, for example the AfD in Germany or Vox in Spain. This raises the following research question that I aim to answer with my thesis: *Why do citizens vote for anti-pluralist parties?*

Prior research on anti-pluralism is limited and mostly focused on the state level, while the individual level is neglected. For example, Lührmann et al. (2021) and Lührmann (2021) both investigate the impact of anti-pluralism on the state level. As can be seen in my research question, I try to explain anti-pluralism on the individual-level and fill this gap in the literature. Understanding the prevalence of anti-pluralism among individuals is important for both politicians and researchers. Not doing so can lead to gradual democratic backsliding or autocratisation of affected countries, as the Hungarian example shows. Moreover, compared to the closely related literature on populism, anti-pluralism is under-researched heavily. New research on the concept to expand the existing literature is therefore relevant.

To answer the research question, I first present an overview of the literature on anti-pluralism and authoritarian support, before forming my hypotheses. Then I formulate my research design and describe the operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables and the statistical methods. In the next step, I present my

findings in the form of regression outputs and predicted effects graphs. Finally, I conclude and discuss the findings, implications and limitations of this thesis.

For a summary of my thesis, I identify individual-level authoritarian support from the literature as a possible explanation for anti-pluralist vote choice. For my hypotheses, I expect authoritarian support to increase anti-pluralist vote via both authoritarian values (H1) and attitudes (H2). More precisely, I expect both the backlash against cultural values and one authoritarian attitude, the wish for a strong leader, to lead to higher probability to vote for anti-pluralist parties. To test this, I conduct a large-N, longitudinal cross-country analysis with survey data. The survey data is provided by the European Social Survey from 2002 until 2018 for a representative sample of ten European countries. The V-Party dataset with novel data on anti-pluralism from the V-Dem institute provides data on anti-pluralism of parties. To my knowledge, this thesis is the first to test existing explanations for authoritarian support with new party data. Therefore, it can help to validate old findings with new data. Accounting for the hierarchically structured nature of my data, I conduct multilevel analysis and find support for my hypotheses. Higher levels of authoritarian cultural values and the wish for a strong leader are both associated with higher levels of anti-pluralist vote choice, while holding constant for confounding factors.

2) THEORY

2.1) The concept of anti-pluralism

The first conceptual chapter introduces anti-pluralism as the central concept for my thesis. In contrast to populism as a closely related construct, anti-pluralism is heavily under-researched. Conceptual considerations and a clear differentiation to populism are important for my thesis for two reasons. Firstly, establishing conceptual precision is essential for theoretical considerations and the operationalisation later. This is only possible when the key concepts are clearly defined. Secondly, the existing literature includes highly similar definitions and typologies for anti-pluralism and populism. It is therefore important to differentiate between the two early in my thesis.

I follow Lührmann et al. (2021) for a definition of anti-pluralism, since their paper introduces the new V-Dem party dataset (V-Party) that contains a novel measure for the concept. Building up from earlier typologies of anti-pluralism by Linz (1978) and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), the authors describe and define their understanding of the concept, especially from the perspective of political parties. According to them, anti-pluralism has four key characteristics (Lührmann et al., 2021, p. 5-8).

Firstly, the “unwillingness to commit to the democratic process” (Lührmann et al., 2021, p. 5) and recognising it as the legal means for gaining power in the political system. The failure to respect the democratic process and its institutions is a sign towards an actors’ anti-pluralist tendencies.

The second characteristic is the “denial of the legitimacy of dissenting parties and opponents” (Lührmann et al., 2021, p. 6) opposed to the ideal of reciprocal tolerance between political opponents. Demonizing, discrediting or personally attacking political opponents signals anti-pluralism. The US election campaigns by Donald Trump provide a recent example. In both 2016 and 2020, he attacked his democratic challengers personally, described them as “foreign agents”, fabricated lies and tried to discredit them. Denying his opponents any form of legitimacy was one of his main strategies. Lührmann et al. note one exception to this rule, due to the paradox of freedom (Popper, 1945, p. 145). Democracies cannot include the right to abolish democratic freedoms, or they cease to remain free. Therefore, clear anti-pluralist parties cannot be tolerated in a democracy.

The third feature is the “toleration or endorsement of the use of political violence” (Lührmann et al., 2021, p. 7). Following the agreed rules and procedures of the election process as well as the rule of law is central for liberal democracy. If a party tolerates or even encourages violence in order to fulfil the will of a perceived majority against their opponents, these principles are clearly violated.

Finally, “disrespect for fundamental minority rights” (Lührmann et al., 2021, p. 8), especially curtailing civil liberties of minority groups, is the fourth indicator. Civil liberty rights are central for pluralism in a society. They provide citizens the right to life, economic choices and to express themselves freely. By undermining these rights for political opponents or minorities to create a concept of an enemy, pluralism is endangered.

Parties or other political actors that lack commitment on one or several of the described four characteristics show varying degrees of anti-pluralism. In their analysis, Lührmann et al. (2021, p. 22) find strong support that anti-pluralist parties are indeed much more likely to autocratise a country once they come into power. This can be a long process but is always accompanied by backsliding of liberal democratic values. Therefore, identifying and being aware of anti-pluralist parties is highly relevant for the stability of liberal democracies. Violation of any of the four characteristics, for example discrediting of opponents or encouragement of violence, are clear warning signs towards likely democratic backsliding, once this candidate or party come into power. At the same time, building up democratic resilience in functioning democracies is equally important. Avoiding discontent with democracy to hinder anti-pluralist onset, critical engagement with existing anti-pluralist parties and powerful institutional constraints that stop autocratisation once these parties reach power, are three important steps, as described by Lührmann (2021).

It is important to note that the term *illiberalism* is used almost interchangeably with anti-pluralism and other scholars do so (e.g., Pappas, 2016a). However, to prevent potential conceptional confusion, Lührmann et al. (2021, p. 5) chose anti-pluralism as their central term. I will maintain this choice for my thesis as well.

While there has been a wide increase of research regarding populism in recent years, anti-pluralism, as a closely related topic, is rather under-researched. For a better

understanding of anti-pluralism, the similarities and differences between the two concepts are important to highlight. Generally, populism is a highly contested concept, with varying or overlapping definitions and conceptional confusion. However, there are several attempts of a minimal definition that cover the key aspects of the concept. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) show their “ideational approach to populism” and define populism as a malleable and “thin-centred ideology” that can be adopted to definitive shapes and forms at different places and times (p. 8). They find three core concepts, the people, the elite and the general will. Populist actors emphasise the moral distinction between the “pure people versus the corrupt elite” (p. 10) and stress their aim of defending the general will of said people at any cost. ‘The people’ can be of a specific nationality, socioeconomic status or share cultural values, while ‘the elite’ is usually understood as political, cultural or economic establishment (p. 9f.). Finally, populists are not anti-democratic per se but against liberal democracy. Liberal or pluralist values, such as minority rights, are breached in favour of defending the general will of what they perceive to be ‘the people’, their electorate (p. 14f.). Finally, the authors describe pluralism and elitism as both direct opposites of populism (p. 7).

Similarly, with two papers, Pappas (2016a & 2016b) finds a minimal definition and describes populism as “democratic illiberalism” (2016b, p. 28). Populist parties favour the will of the majority against minorities or a perceived establishment. In doing so, they encourage polarisation, intolerance of minorities and breaking of institutional rules. They are democratic but illiberal. However, when they come to power, Pappas sees a high risk for populist parties to turn fully antidemocratic in favour of their illiberal beliefs (2016b, p. 31f.). Similarly to Mudde and Kaltwasser, the author stresses conceptual and methodological uncertainties regarding populism in the literature (2016a, p. 6ff.).

Brubaker (2017) builds up on Mudde and Kaltwasser’s definition and argues that their vertical division of society between ‘the people versus the elite’ is not enough. He adds a “horizontal opposition between ‘the people’ and outside groups and forces” (p. 362). While on the vertical dimension, ‘the people’ are defined along cultural, political or economic values against an elite, on the horizontal dimension they are defined against outsiders to their ‘normal’ and respectable collective. Said outsiders can be both elites ‘on top’ and opponents at ‘the bottom’, for example minorities (p. 362).

Overall, anti-pluralism can be seen as a closely related concept to populism or even as one of its flashed-out manifestations. However, the definition for anti-pluralism that I use is far more detailed and specific and goes beyond the minimal definitions for populism. Both concepts share important key features, most importantly opposition towards both minorities and liberal democratic or pluralist values. On the other hand, anti-pluralism is a deeper and more ambitious approach that goes beyond the minimal definitions of populism, for example regarding openness for political violence and discrediting political opponents.

2.2) Theory on authoritarian support

Anti-pluralist leaning parties and candidates are on the rise in western democracies. These parties display anti-pluralist, authoritarian, or anti-democratic values. One way to classify them is given in the typology on anti-pluralist parties and candidates in the chapter above. While Donald Trump can be named as a recent and highly prominent example, said parties increase their support in many established democracies, for example with the AfD in Germany, or even gain access to government with Viktor Orban's Fidesz in Hungary.

In the following section I am going to present two competing theoretical arguments that aim to explain rising support for anti-pluralist or authoritarian-leaning parties and candidates. The strand of literature that I focus on is theory on authoritarian support. According to Norris and Inglehart (2019), theory on individual-level authoritarian support either follows approaches from social psychology or political sociology (p. 6f.). The former links citizens' individual authoritarian values, for example their level of obedience, with support for such parties, while the latter focuses more on specific authoritarian attitudes, for instance the desired type of leader or government. Before I can introduce the two theoretical arguments, the difference between values and attitudes will be presented. Bergman (1998) addresses this difference in a theoretical paper. The author describes both concepts as "acquired behavioral dispositions" (p. 82f.) that are shaped by our past and socialisation with others and that influence our behaviour towards other people or objects. However, their relationship is extremely complex and always depends on the specific context or environment. Constructing a simple hierarchy, where attitudes emerge from values is dangerous and oversimplified. While such a relationship can be true, the specific context or mechanism has to be

analysed carefully (p. 90). Feldmann (2003) defines the distinction and argues that values are more general standards that act as basis for several specific evaluations across situations, whereas attitudes refer to evaluations of specific objects (p. 481). While there is evidence for many specific relationships between values and attitudes, there is little systematic evidence for a general relationship between the two (p. 488ff.). However, the author argues that values can at least help to understand the structure of political attitudes (p. 503). In a more recent article, Schwartz et al. (2010) develop a specific mechanism connecting values to voting behaviour. They argue that basic personal values influence core political values that in turn influence voting behaviour (p. 442ff.). So, for example citizens who are highly interested in tradition as a core value should be invested in parties that represent traditional morality and in turn vote for them. Specific political attitudes could also act as a mediator for the relationship between core values and behaviour (p. 428f.). For instance, security or tradition values underlie opposition towards immigration, which in turn leads to voting behaviour for anti-immigration parties. Overall, there seems to exist a relationship between political values and attitudes, but it always depends on the specific context and has to be developed carefully.

For my thesis, I will present two theoretical arguments for authoritarian support along this divide between individual-level authoritarian values versus attitudes. For the first argument, the focus lies on deep rooted authoritarian values. It is developed in a recent book by Norris and Inglehart (2019) and is often referred to as the “cultural backlash” theory. In short, support for authoritarian-leaning parties can be explained by a cultural backlash of formerly dominant electorates seeking to regain influence (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). The authors argue that a “silent revolution” of intergenerational value change has provoked a backlash from formerly influential groups over cultural issues (p. 87f.). These cultural issues are connected to deep rooted values and are for instance, a traditional image of women and family, high levels of religiousness or antagonism towards immigration and LGBTQ rights. The affected groups are mainly identified as social conservatives or traditionalists that lash back against perceived loss of respect and status in their own land, erosion of their core values and “political correctness” (p. 123). This only increases polarisation between liberal and conservative values and highlights the importance of the cultural cleavage in party

competition. Voting for parties that supply these traditional values and support the voters' image of an unwanted cultural change, even though they might be authoritarian-leaning or anti-pluralist, can be a seemingly rational strategy. However, this behaviour is only possible if an authoritarian party is available.

While the specific argument of a cultural backlash is new, an important strand of literature analyses the connection between individual authoritarian values and authoritarian support. A selection will be briefly presented here, with a special focus on cultural values.

The following papers address the US American context. Conway et al. (2018) and Conway and McFarland (2019) research authoritarian values in the US for left- and right-wing voters. While earlier studies focused mostly on right-wing authoritarianism, in the first study, the authors find highly similar levels of authoritarianism among left-wing voters (p. 1063). Conway and McFarland (2019) build up on this in the US context and successfully predict voting for Democrats with left-wing and for Republicans with right-wing authoritarianism, respectively (p. 86). Connected to these papers, Conway et al. (2017) argue that perceived communication restrictions towards Donald Trump lead to higher vote shares for him in elections than in prior surveys. Conservative voters that were confronted with constant reports about Trump's mistakes, felt threatened to not show their support for him before the election. This resulted in a backlash against perceived oppressive cultural norms and political correctness: conservatives still voted for Trump (p. 244f). While not directly talking about authoritarianism, this article nonetheless shows the possibility of a cultural backlash by conservatives that leads to a more illiberal leader. MacWilliams (2016) addresses the "authoritarian-driven partisan polarization" in the US. He argues that Trump's success is partly due to his us-versus-them rhetoric (p. 717f.). Said rhetoric finds significant appeal among authoritarian voters and resembles their values, for example regarding immigration or outsiders. Wronski et al. (2018) analyse authoritarianism within the democratic party. While earlier research often focuses on authoritarianism only on the right political spectrum, the authors find strong support for authoritarianism within the democratic party. Moreover, the concept can even predict voting for democratic primary elections (p. 1387).

For Europe, Tilley (2005) researches libertarian-authoritarian value change in the UK. The author finds significant generational differences. Younger voters have become more libertarian, while older voters remained more authoritarian. Todosijević and Enyedi (2008) analyse authoritarian values and political orientation in Hungary. They find support for right and to a lower degree left-wing authoritarianism. Especially, centre-right parties attracted voters with authoritarian values (p. 784f.). Vasilopoulos and Lachat (2018) address political choice and authoritarian values in France. They find authoritarianism to be correlated with intolerance on the cultural and economic conservativism on the economic level. Moreover, authoritarian citizens had a much higher chance to vote for the far right-wing Front National. Contrary to earlier research, the authors do not find a connection between authoritarianism and voting for far left parties. Finally, Dunn (2015) for Western Europe, analyses values of voters for right-wing populist parties. The author finds that said parties are strongly preferred by exclusively nationalist voters but only inconsistently by authoritarian voters (p. 375f.). This could mean a stronger impact of nationalist values than authoritarian values when voting for this specific type of party.

Based on the cultural backlash theory and existing empirical studies, I expect citizens with general authoritarian values, especially on the cultural level, to be drawn to authoritarian parties. If these parties exist within the political system, their values should resonate with said citizens' own values much more, compared to more liberal parties. Both, parties and voters, should prefer more conservative stances on issues such as immigration or women rights. A higher likelihood to vote for said parties in elections is a logical conclusion.

The second argument focuses on citizens' individual-level authoritarian attitudes or preferences and is part of the political sociological approach for explaining authoritarian support. Starting with Adorno (1950), many scholars argue that authoritarian support is connected with individual-level authoritarian attitudes, most notably the preference for a strong and unrestrained leader. In my thesis, I call this argument "strong leader" theory. This approach focuses not on general values, but more on specific attitudes. While there exists less research on authoritarian attitudes compared to values, several articles cover the specific connection between a desire for a strong leader and authoritarian support.

Ariely and Davidov (2011) compare democratic versus authoritarian attitudes in a global sample from the World Value Survey. They identify ‘support for a strong leader or government’ as one of the most relevant items for predicting authoritarian support on their "democracy-autocracy preference scale” (p. 7). Citizens with high levels on said attribute have a much higher likelihood to prefer an autocratic alternative to democracy if it emerges. Similarly, Foa and Mounk (2016) analyse the long-term development of democratic and authoritarian attitudes in democracies. They argue that while support for democracy has decreased significantly (p. 7-9), authoritarian support has increased. Especially, the preference for “a ’strong leader’ who does not have to bother with parliament and elections”, as a specific authoritarian attitude, has steadily risen over time (p. 13). These tendencies are stronger for young age groups and stronger in the US than in Europe. Foa and Mounk do not conclude that democracy is necessarily deconsolidating or eroding. However, they describe their findings above as worrying and call for further research (p. 16f.). Donovan (2019) researches the connection between authoritarian attitudes and support for radical right-wing parties in the US. He finds convincing evidence for the ‘strong leader’ argument in the 2016 US election. Authoritarian attitudes, especially the wish for a “strong and unchecked leader”, were a significant predictor of voting for Donald Trump in the election (p. 458f.). Donovan argues that the small share of the population that dislikes democracy and expresses authoritarian attitudes got “collected” by the Republicans in 2016 in the US two-party system. In a multiparty system, these voters would go to smaller radical right populist parties instead (p. 461). Singh and Dunn (2013) argue and find support that a higher number of powerful political veto players, for example a strong leader, can portray the image of a divided and heterogenous society and in turn increase authoritarian attitudes.

Based on the findings of existing literature and empirical studies, I expect citizens with specific authoritarian attitudes, most notably the preference for a strong and unrestricted leader or government, to be drawn to authoritarian parties. These parties actively cater to said citizens’ preferences, compared to more liberal parties. A higher likelihood to vote for said parties in elections is a logical conclusion.

After introducing both strands of literature for individual-level authoritarian support the question remains, which argument seems to be the more compelling one. While there exists generally more literature for the first argument, both show some academic

support and appear to be convincing. Moreover, they have a different theoretical basis, authoritarian support from individual values versus individual attitudes. So, they could both be in effect and are not mutually exclusive.

2.3) From individual level values and attributes to vote choice

Another central theoretical aspect for this thesis is how individual level values and attributes, for example authoritarian values, lead to political vote choice. The general connection between the concepts is well documented. In a first step, Blais and Labbé-St-Vincent (2011) show the general link between personality traits and vote propensity. Individual level attributes, such as altruism or efficacy, influence political attitudes and in turn affect the chance to vote (p. 406).

Moreover, there is evidence for both individual level attributes and values to influence vote choice directly and indirectly. For values, Schwartz et al. (2010) develop and find support for a causal chain how values influence voting. Basic core values shape political values of citizens, which in turn account for significant variance in political vote choice (p. 444). Leimgruber (2011) also finds evidence for the substantial impact of personal values on vote choice. Moreover, the author focuses on the indirect effect of personal values, mediated by political values (p. 122f.). For personal attributes, Schoen and Schumann (2007) find evidence that personality traits from the Five Factor Model of Personality, such as openness or neuroticism, indirectly influence partisan attitudes and vote choice among German citizens (p. 471). While Barbaranelli et al. (2007) find support for the direct effect of personal attributes on vote choice in the US, Wang (2016) only observes an indirect effect, mediated by other variables, for example policy preference or party identification (p. 32). Nevertheless, the overall existence of an effect is undisputed. Finally, Caprara et al. (2006) combine the two concepts and show that both values and attributes significantly influence vote choice among Italian citizens.

Earlier research often focused on specific attributes that influence vote choice. For example Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001), who focus on individual level risk propensity, or Knuckey (2007), who analyses moral values. In both papers, vote choice was strongly affected by the analysed attributes. Other research is targeted towards specific voter groups, especially undecided voters (Arcuri et al, 2008; Friese et al.,

2012). Both studies find evidence that decided as well as undecided voters are influenced by their individual level attitudes.

2.4) Research gap and hypotheses

In my theory section, I established a definition for anti-pluralism and its relationship to populism. Furthermore, I introduced two competing theoretical approaches that explain the connection between individual-level authoritarian values and support for authoritarian or anti-pluralist parties. Moreover, I showed that individual values and attitudes can indeed lead to political vote choice. From prior literature I discussed above we know that deep rooted authoritarian values and more superficial authoritarian attitudes can lead to authoritarian support. What we do not know is the exact relationship with said values and attitudes and anti-pluralism.

For my first hypothesis, I mainly follow the "cultural backlash" argumentation by Norris and Inglehart (2019). I expect authoritarian cultural values to lead to anti-pluralism on the individual-level, which in turn leads to anti-pluralist vote choice. Citizens with deeply internalised authoritarian cultural values, for example rejection towards free immigration or the LGBTQ community, should in turn show anti-pluralist behaviour and vote for anti-pluralist parties. This anti-pluralist vote choice due to cultural values should be measurable on the individual level. Here, voting is a good indicator for tangible anti-pluralist behaviour and easily measurable with most survey data. Overall, I formulate the following hypothesis along the "cultural backlash" argumentation.

> H1: The higher the level of individual-level authoritarian values among voters, ceteris paribus, the higher is their likelihood to vote for anti-pluralist parties.

Building on the literature I discussed, concrete authoritarian attitudes can as well lead to authoritarian support on the individual level. The most prominent example in the literature here was the wish for a strong and unrestrained leader or government. Again, the relationship with said attitudes and anti-pluralism is not explored yet and I aim to do so with my thesis. Therefore, for my second hypothesis I expect authoritarian

attitudes, specifically the wish for a strong government or leader to lead to anti-pluralism. Citizens who display said attitude should show anti-pluralist behaviour, and therefore vote for anti-pluralist parties. Here, I formulate the following hypothesis along the “strong leader” argumentation.

> H2: The higher the level of individual-level authoritarian attitudes among voters, ceteris paribus, the higher is their likelihood to vote for anti-pluralist parties.

The two hypotheses above will be the centre for the analysis of this thesis. Moreover, the relationship between the hypotheses will be interesting to analyse. While cultural values and the wish for a strong leader are likely not directly related, generally authoritarian values could very well lead to specific authoritarian attitudes. So, in my analysis I should control for both authoritarian values and attitudes together in an additional step or model.

As explained above, anti-pluralism is heavily under-researched especially compared to populism. While we know a lot about populism, the concept of anti-pluralism is also research worthy, since it is a deeper and more ambitious approach. Understanding the trends of anti-pluralism within individuals, parties or countries or antecedents that lead to it can be crucial for both scholars and governments. Not doing so can potentially lead to dissatisfaction with a pluralist society, gradual democratic backsliding and even autocratisation of states (Lührmann, 2021, p. 22f.). While Lührmann et al. (2021) and Lührmann (2021) both focus on the state level, my thesis aims to explain anti-pluralism on the individual-level. The novel V-Party dataset from October 2020 provides an ideal opportunity to bring new insights into the literature and better understand the concept. In sum, I bring new insights into the anti-pluralism literature with completely novel data and close the existing research gap regarding individual-level support for the concept.

3) METHODS

3.1) Research design

In the following chapter, I will introduce the methodological considerations for my thesis that will allow me to test the hypotheses I developed above. Firstly, my general research design will be presented. The next section deals with data and case selection, followed by the operationalisation of my dependent variable. Then the operationalisation of the independent variables from hypothesis one and two and potentially confounding control variables will be explained. Finally, I bring all this together by presenting the concrete methods for the analysis.

For the general quantitative research design of my thesis, I follow a Y-centric approach that focuses on anti-pluralist vote choice as my dependent variable. I identified authoritarian support as a fitting independent variable from the literature and split it into authoritarian values and attitudes, as two different manifestations of authoritarian support. In order to test my hypotheses, I conduct a large N longitudinal cross-country analysis with survey data. Why is this type of research design a good choice to answer my hypotheses? As explained above, most existing literature on anti-pluralism focuses on cross-country comparison, for example comparison of anti-pluralism of national parties between countries (Lührmann et al., 2021). At the same time the individual level is usually neglected, and my thesis aims to fill this gap. So, the inclusion of individual-level data is essential for my thesis. While the analysis of only one country is possible, survey data also allows for cross-country comparison, which I decided to do in my thesis. Cross-country comparison is not only a good method to increase variation in the data and allows for wider generalisability of the findings but is also an established method in the anti-pluralism literature. Finally, longitudinal analysis is also relevant for my thesis. As explained above in the theoretical chapter, the cultural backlash argument states that authoritarian values develop over time due to a backlash reaction of conservative groups against intergenerational value changes. (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 87f.). As these values develop over time, allowing for variation in time and controlling for differences over several years makes sense. Survey data with multiple panel waves and countries therefore is ideal to test for all levels of my analysis.

3.2) Data and case selection

To test my hypotheses, I combine party-level data with individual-level survey data. Anti-pluralism, the first part of my dependent variable, is measured with a novel party dataset by V-Dem (V-Party), directly from the University of Gothenburg that was released in 2020. The introduction paper for the dataset is Lührmann et al. (2021) from the theoretical chapter above. The operationalisation of the variable is described below. This completely new V-Party dataset analyses the policy positions and structure of political parties on a global basis for all political parties that were elected to parliament. This means for "1,943 political parties across 1,759 elections in 169 countries from 1970 to 2019" (Lührmann et al., 2021, p. 1). The methodologically interesting contribution of this dataset is the way parties are assessed. This is done via cross-national and cross-temporal country expert ratings. Prior party policy datasets, for example the Manifesto Project dataset (see Volkens et al., 2019), analyse political manifestos of parties via quantitative text analysis methods in order to determine a party's policy position. Lührmann et al. (2021, p. 7f.) criticise this method, since parties could simply pay lip service to democracy or pluralism in their public party documents, while hiding their actual policy intentions. In their example, the far-right German AfD scores high (4.08) and the more central CDU scores low (0.74) regarding democratic values in their manifestos. The new expert coding method is likely more extensive and costly but allows for greater qualitative analysis for each party and hopefully better results. Moreover, another contribution is the focus not on populism but on anti-pluralism as their main index. The difference of the concepts is explained in the theoretical chapter above. In short, anti-pluralism is a deeper and more ambitious concept and goes beyond the minimal definitions of populism. This main anti-pluralism index gives information for every party for each election regarding their level of anti-pluralism. It is important to note, that the index is called "illiberalism index" in the initial version of the dataset. However, the authors changed that shortly after with the publication of their paper.

For vote choice, the second part of the dependent variable, and for all independent variables, I use existing panel wave survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The dataset provides detailed information about vote choice and value orientation for citizens from all European countries in nine waves from 2002 until 2018. European here means not the European Union but the continent. Moreover, the ESS

survey contains a wide range of questions, for example about socio-economic information, political preferences, or cultural values, all on the individual level. This allows for relatively easy large scale quantitative analysis with statistical software. All countries that are part in the European ESS dataset are also included in the more global V-Party dataset.

For case selection from the ESS data I preselected countries based on two decisions. Firstly, not all countries took part in every ESS wave. I only selected countries that participated in every wave of the dataset. For the formation of my dependent variable the information of individual vote choice is needed in the year the election took place. Values, attitudes, and party support of citizens are all likely heavily influenced by the political context of each election and change over time even within a country. I want to maximise variation within every country and therefore need as many elections as possible. When a country is missing one or several waves this is not the case anymore. Moreover, if a country is only represented in one or two waves it is underrepresented in the sample and the statistical models could lose significance. Therefore, this exclusion criterion is sensible overall. From initially 38 countries from the ESS, only 15 remain. The next criterion is population size. Even though the ESS tries to prevent this, for smaller countries the number of respondents is usually smaller. Compare for wave 1, Germany with 2272, Belgium with 1494 and Slovenia with only 671 respondents. This could be problematic for the dependent variable, since the number of anti-pluralist voters might be not significant if the overall sample size is quite small to begin with. This would mean only around 150 anti-pluralist voters in Slovenia, compared to Germany's 550 for wave 1. I decided to exclude countries with less than 5 million inhabitants. This leaves 10 remaining European countries that are Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, France, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. These countries have a large enough population to guarantee for enough anti-pluralist voters and appear in every ESS wave. A good argument for this selection is the diversity and representativeness of the country sample. All major European regions are represented with at least one country. This leads to much greater variation in the data compared to for example an only Western European sample. Findings of my thesis therefore could be generalised for all of Europe due to the diverse data.

3.3) Dependent variable: anti-pluralist vote choice

For the operationalisation of my dependent variable, the individual vote choice of citizens is matched with the level of anti-pluralism of the party they voted for. From the V-Party dataset I selected information from 2001 until 2018 for my ten preselected countries for their performance in the final anti-pluralism index. This means a total of 281 party-year data points. The index is a standard cumulative density function, derived from the four indicators for anti-pluralism that are introduced in detail above. In short, these indicators are “demonizing opponents”, “low commitment to democratic processes”, “disrespect for fundamental minority rights”, and “encouragement of political violence”. The final index can range from “0”, which represents a fully pluralist party, to “1”, which represents a completely anti-pluralist party. For my sample, the index actually ranges from “.018” for the Portuguese “Left Bloc” in 2005 until “.876” for the Hungarian Fidesz party in 2018. The mean is “.1221”, which means a strong clustering towards 0, which can be seen in a histogram for the full dependent variable in *Figure 1*. This makes sense, considering that my sample includes mostly stable and established democracies. Most parties in these countries should represent pluralistic and democratic values.

Figure 1: Histogram of the dependent variable anti-pluralist vote choice. Data on anti-pluralism from V-Party, on vote choice from ESS (2002-2018). Own illustration in Stata.



In the next step, I matched these values with the individual-level vote choice data provided by the ESS. For every country, there is a variable that asks respondents for their vote choice in the last national parliamentary election. There are nine survey waves from the ESS data, a new wave every two years. Naturally, not every two years there are elections in the countries from my sample. And the V-Dem dataset provides information on the level of anti-pluralism for each party only in the election years. Therefore, I decided to include only waves, if an election took place in the two years between the current and the last wave. For example, for Germany this means that wave 1 for the election in 2002, wave 3 for 2005, wave 5 for 2009, wave 7 for 2013 and wave 9 for 2017 are included. The other four waves are excluded since no election took place close to them. This results in the exclusion of about 50 percent of waves and therefore respondents from the survey. However, this makes sense to increase validity. Individual-level authoritarian values or attitudes of a person could have changed drastically three years after an election. For instance, using information on authoritarian values from wave 3 in 2006 for the independent variables, combined with the level of anti-pluralism of a party from an election in 2003 as the dependent variable is questionable. In short, it is not logical to predict vote choice in 2003 with current values from 2006. Overall, my approach follows the chronological sequence of the hypotheses in measuring dependent and independent variables at the same time. A descriptive overview of the number of citizens per country and year and the elections that were included can be seen in more detail in *Table 1*. Here, the top row shows the ESS wave, the left column shows the country. Empty table cells indicate that no election took place shortly before the ESS wave was conducted. Full cells show the year of the respective national election. Finally, the table gives information about the number of respondents that were included per country and wave. This shows quite large differences for each wave and country, due to the differing election timing. For example, wave 1 and Germany are overrepresented, while wave 2 and France are underrepresented. The inclusion of survey weights, which are added in the ESS dataset are therefore important to account for these differences. I use the default weight “anweight” as analysis weight as suggested by the ESS manual (Kaminska, 2020, p. 4f.).

Table 1: Overview for elections and respondents for the dependent variable. Based on the full ESS cumulative dataset (2002-2018).

wave / country	1 (2002)	2 (2004)	3 (2006)	4 (2008)	5 (2010)	6 (2012)	7 (2014)	8 (2016)	9 (2018)	Respond.
Belgium	.	2003	.	2007	2010	.	2014	.	.	5751
Germany	2002	.	2005	.	2009	.	2013	.	2017	10810
Spain	.	2004	.	2008	.	2011	.	2016	.	5941
France	2002	.	.	2007	.	2012	.	.	2017	4979
UK	2001	.	2005	.	2010	.	.	2015	2017	7818
Hungary	2002	.	2006	.	2010	.	2014	.	2018	5871
Netherlands	2002	2003	.	2007	2010	2012	.	.	2017	9112
Poland	2001	.	2005	2007	.	2011	.	2015	.	5.856
Portugal	2002	.	2005	.	2009	2011	.	2015	.	6473
Sweden	2002	.	2006	.	2010	.	2014	.	2018	7462
Respond.	11914	4208	9161	7242	10665	6837	6482	5031	8533	70073

Descriptive table. Cells are election years. Own calculation and formation in Excel.

For the actual coding, in a first step all non-voters were excluded. Then, I created the new variable “Anti-pluralist vote”, as my dependent variable for the analysis. My code replaces the empty new variable one by one with the information from the V-Dem dataset. To show one example, the “Spanish Socialist Workers' Party” (PSOE) has a value of “.028” in the V-Dem dataset for the election in 2004. Now for my new variable “Anti-pluralist vote”, every Spanish citizen that voted the PSOE in wave 2, the corresponding wave for this election, receives the value of “.028”. I repeat that for every party for every election year. There occurred four to six elections in the time frame for each country and there are usually four to eight parties in each parliament, resulting in about 380 lines of code. The coding was time intensive out of several reasons. Firstly, party names of course differ between countries. Unfortunately, the coding also often differs between different ESS waves for one country. As an example, the Hungarian Fidesz party is coded as “2” in wave 1, as “1” in wave 3 and finally “3” in wave 9. Problems like this led to high levels of cross-checking that I had to do. By this design, respondents that voted for a party that was not represented in the V-Party dataset or refused to state their vote choice were excluded. The final result is a variable for individual-level anti-pluralist vote choice. It contains information about 53,984 individual European citizens regarding their vote choice, matched with the level of anti-

pluralism of the party they voted for. The distribution, maximum, minimum, and mean of this variable is already shown above in the text on page 20 and in *Figure 1*.

For their analysis on autocratisation with V-Party data, Lührmann et al. (2021, p. 15) decided to dichotomise their anti-pluralism variable. They consider every party from their sample above the 75th percentile in the anti-pluralist index as anti-pluralist and code it with “1”. All others below their threshold of 0.429 are coded as “0”. This method of dichotomisation gives their statistical analysis more power but a lot of variation within the data is lost. Moreover, it is unlikely to believe that two parties just below and just above the threshold are that different in their level of anti-pluralism. Therefore, I decided to not follow the approach of Lührmann et al. for my main models. However, in a robustness check I will test whether this makes a difference and conduct an analysis with a dichotomised dependent variable. The threshold for the 75th percentile for anti-pluralist vote choice in my sample is 0.092.

On the other hand, the operationalisation of the dependent variable with values between “0” and "1” representing anti-pluralist vote choice and clustering towards zero has an important implication. It does not show a clear-cut distinction between vote choice for anti-pluralist parties versus non-anti-pluralist parties. Instead, it shows the tendency to vote for an anti-pluralist party given the available party options. All countries in the sample provide some non-anti-pluralist option with values close to zero for anti-pluralism in V-Party. However, not all of them have highly anti-pluralist options. For example, for Swedish voters the “Sverigedemokraterna” are the most anti-pluralist option with values around “0.152” in the anti-pluralism index. Therefore, Swedish voters cannot vote more anti-pluralist than the “Sverigedemokraterna” and reach a higher value than “0.152”, even if they wanted to. There could be an even higher potential for anti-pluralist vote in such countries. This underlines the importance of a robustness check with a dichotomised dependent variable.

3.4) Independent variables: authoritarian support

The independent variables are of course closely related to my hypotheses and aim to measure authoritarian support. Firstly, I need to identify variables for authoritarian support via cultural values along the cultural backlash argumentation

particularly by Norris and Inglehart (2019). The authors focus on cultural variables and name especially attitudes towards women, immigration, religion, and the LGBTQ community. Authoritarian respondents should show conservative stances regarding the topics mentioned above. This entails a rejection of immigrants and LGBTQ communities and a traditional view on the role of women and religion. All four variables are present in the ESS dataset, unfortunately only three for all nine waves.

The variable “impcntr” asks respondents regarding their openness to accept immigrants from countries outside the EU. It ranges from “1”, a high level of openness for immigrants, to “4”, which represents total rejection of any immigration. For LGBTQ acceptance, the variable “freehms” asks respondents if LGBTQ people in their country should be free to live life as they wish. The variable ranges from “1”, which means full acceptance, to “5”, which means full rejection of the question. Next, the variable “rlgdgr” measures the self-reported level of religiousness of respondents from “0”, “not religious” to “10” “very religious”. For the role of women, the ESS has a fitting variable, called “wmcpwrk”. Here, respondents are asked if they think women should cut down on work for the sake of family. Unfortunately, the variable is only included in waves 2,4 and 5. For my analysis this does not work, as it would effectively exclude all individuals from six waves. Therefore, I decided to not use this variable.

The other three variables should ideally capture the same concept or latent construct, authoritarian support resulting from a cultural backlash. If this is the case creating an additive index out of the three individual variables would make sense. In order to check for this, I conducted an explorative factor analysis. The analysis only retained one factor, which is a positive indicator. However, the factor loadings are relatively small and vary between 0.48 for LGBTQ support, 0.37 for immigration support and 0.31 for religiousness. Such relatively small factor loadings indicate a rather minor relation to the latent construct. In a next step, I calculated Cronbach’s Alpha for the three variables to derive the internal consistency of the potential index. Unfortunately, the result of 0.2549 is very low and an indicator against a shared index. So overall, I decided against the use of a shared index and treated the three variables as independent.

For hypothesis 2, I selected a variable that checks for authoritarian attitudes, specifically the desire for a strong and unchecked leader or government. The closest variable in the ESS is “ipstrgv”, which asks respondents if they view it important that the government or country leader is strong and ensures safety. This variable does not

contain the “unchecked” part from the literature, but exactly the focus on a strong leader or government. Therefore, it should still be fitting for the authoritarian attitude that I aim to capture. After reversing the score of the variable, it ranges from “1” to “6”, where high levels of the variable indicate a high desire for a strong leader and vice versa. Together, the four variables that I describe in this chapter should measure authoritarian support via values and one specific attitude on the individual level.

For a simple descriptive overview of the main variables, I correlate my dependent and the four independent variables. The results can be seen in *Table 2*. Anti-pluralist vote choice shows almost no correlation with religiousness (0.05), a weak positive correlation with the desire for a strong leader (0.12) and a slightly stronger positive correlation for negative attitudes towards the LGBTQ community (0.23) and immigrants (0.22). The correlations between the four independent variables are all of a similar small but positive nature. Moreover, all of the analysed correlations are statistically significant at the five percent level. Of course, correlation does not imply causation, however the consistent positive correlations indicate a connection between the variables. Information on the four independent variables, such as mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum is shown in the appendix in *Table 5*.

Table 2: Correlation table for the dependent variable and the four independent variables.

	Anti-plur. vote	Religiousness	Oppose LGBTQ	Oppose immigration	Wish strong leader
Anti-plur. vote	1.0000				
Religiousness	0.0502	1.0000			
Oppose LGBTQ	0.2322	0.2165	1.0000		
Oppose immigration	0.2214	0.0580	0.2596	1.0000	
Wish strong leader	0.1170	0.1132	0.1350	0.1887	1.0000

Descriptive table: Data from V-Party and the ESS for 50,439 individuals. Own calculation.

3.5) Control variables

When selecting fitting control variables for a study, a theoretical argument for the specific research design or prior inclusion from similar research are two good indicators. Moreover, control variables should ideally impact both the independent and the dependent variable. Socio-economic control variables for a research design with individual-level survey data are a good choice for this. An example provide Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016, p. 33), with survey data also from the ESS, who utilise indicators for age, gender, education, income and a left-right scale in their study. For my design, I decided to mostly follow the authors and include the five variables as controls.

The variable “agea” measures the age of respondents, that ranges from “14” until “101” with a mean at 51.8. Since only voters are included in the analysis later, respondents under 18 are excluded from the sample. For gender, the variable “gndr” shows men as “1” and women as “2”. Interestingly, while respondents can decide to give no answer, there are no options for “transgender”, “diverse” or similar choices from the ESS. Regarding education, there are several possibilities to control for this variable with ESS data. I decided to use the variable “edulvla” that asks for the respondent’s highest level of education. The relatively broad variable ranges from “1” to “5”, which means from “less than lower secondary education” to “tertiary education completed”. Another option would have been the number of years of education, but this does not include information about the quality of education. Since the average income can differ greatly between nations, average income is a subpar variable in cross-country comparison. The ESS provides a better variable “hincfel” that measures the “feeling about household's income”. Here, “1” means a comfortable situation on the current income, while “4” represents a very difficult financial situation.

Furthermore, I select two more specific control variables, fitting for my case. The first is the dummy variable “Eastern” that controls for former membership in the Warsaw pact. These countries, in my case Poland and Hungary, were exposed to communism and democracy developed much later. According to Norris’ and Inglehart’s (2019) “cultural backlash” argument, authoritarian values need time to develop in a society. Only when progressive or post-materialistic values have formed, conservatives can lash back against them. Moreover, in the much younger democracies, citizens could be more used to anti-pluralist behaviour of parties, such as delegitimising opponents

or threatening violence. Therefore, both independent and dependent variables are affected. The former communist countries are coded as “1”, the other older democracies coded as “0”. Finally, I created the variable “Extreme” that measures the distance of a respondent from the political middle. The variable is created from a self-reported placement on a political left-right scale. The value “0” in my new scale represents a placement in the exact middle of the old left-right scale. My new scale ranges until “5”, which represents either a fully right or left placement on the initial left-right scale. Measuring the distance from the middle is a much better indicator for my case than the simple left-right scale that is used by Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016, p. 33). Citizens on both the extreme right and left have shown in the literature to express authoritarian support (Conway & McFarland, 2019), the same can be expected for anti-pluralist tendencies. For better comprehensibility in the regression outputs, I changed the names of all independent and control variables. So, for example the variable “rlgdgr” that measures the self-reported level of religiousness of respondents in the ESS, is named “Religiousness” for my outputs and graphs.

3.6) Methods and methodological contribution

Multilevel analysis is an ideal method to analyse large scale longitudinal cross-country research designs (Singer & Willett, 2003, p. 45ff.). I follow Singer and Willett (2003) for multilevel analysis, Fairbrother (2014) and Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016) for multilevel analysis for survey data, especially for data from the European Social Survey. With data for this type of research design, such as the survey data of my study, individuals are nested within higher levels, for example countries or years which calls for multilevel analysis. Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016, p. 27) suggest using a four-level model for multilevel analysis with such survey data. Individual citizens on the lowest level, the country level, the year, or wave of the survey, and finally the country-year level are four relevant levels that I need to include into my analysis.

For my models, I run a multilevel linear regression model, with four variables for authoritarian support as independent variables. The dependent variable is anti-pluralist vote choice and I control for potentially confounding variables. The operationalisation for all the mentioned variables is described above. The software of my choice for the

analysis is Stata. In the appendix, my entire Stata code with information on the formation of all models and variables is included. Multilevel analysis controls for both variance in the data that is due to fixed effects of the independent variables that are constant across individuals but also controls for random effects variance in the data due to the different analytical levels (Singer & Willett, 2003, p. 75ff.). The basis for the complex multilevel Stata code was given by Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016) in their supplementary information. The statistical approach for estimation for this type of model is maximum likelihood estimation.

According to Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016, p. 24), most contemporary articles omit the inclusion of at least one important level, mostly the country-year level. Omitting this level would imply that a German citizen from 2002 has no more in common with another from Germany in 2002, as with one from Germany in 2006, which is unjustified. This would lead to several methodological problems, most importantly “ignoring important clustering in the data and downward biases in the standard errors” (p. 23). In Stata, the main method to decide whether to include a level or not is constructing two empty models with just the dependent variable for one and two levels and then comparing the two. This comparison is done with a likelihood ratio test between the baseline mode and the new model with an additional level (Garson, 2019, p. 71ff.). This is then repeated with additional levels, if necessary, in my case up to four levels. For all three tests, between only one and two, between two and three and between three and four levels, the likelihood ratio test was significant (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 for every test). This suggests that the reduced model is nested in the full model and an additional level is necessary for a better model fit. Moreover, the tests show that the four-level model represents the underlying data structure better than a model with less levels. So overall, the reasoning from Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother and the results of the likelihood ratio tests all justify the inclusion of all four levels for my models.

My thesis also provides several methodological contributions. Reasons explaining anti-pluralism on the individual level and concrete anti-pluralist voting behaviour are both part of my analysis. While some research was conducted for anti-pluralism on the state-level, my thesis is the first to focus on the individual-level of the concept and does so by using survey data. Therefore, my dependent variable, which combines the novel V-Party data with existing ESS survey data provides a clear innovation to the existing

literature. Another contribution is the testing of established explanations for authoritarian support with new party data (V-Party). If the old explanations hold for my data, this validates the existing findings from the literature. Moreover, the multilevel analysis I perform controls for the variance of the four levels that are present, the individual, country, year, and country/year level. This statistically advanced approach is not commonly applied in scientific articles to date but provides great advantages as described above (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2016, p. 34f.). Checking for all four levels means inclusion of random effects on every level, which is a much safer method. Not doing so would lead to biased results in the case of my survey data. Applying this type of multilevel analysis is therefore a meaningful methodological contribution to the anti-pluralism literature but also an advisable method for other research with similar survey data.

4) FINDINGS

4.1) Findings of the main models

The findings of the three main multilevel linear regression models, model 1 for hypothesis 1, model 2 for hypothesis 2, and a third full model with all independent variables are presented in *Table 3*. All models are estimated with maximum likelihood estimation, and they share the same six control variables. All models are based on around 50,000 individual observations and data from 10 countries, 9 waves and 47 country-years. The number of country-years is 47 and not 90, because waves without elections were excluded as explained above in the methodological chapter. Moreover, the number of individuals differs slightly between the models, since the independent variables have different missing values. However, this difference is minimal and should not matter for the results. The regression outputs of course show the changed names of the independent and control variables. So, for example “Opposition towards LGBTQ” is more apparent than “freehms” for the reader. For all of my findings, the effect sizes of the variables are very small due to the dependent variable with values only between “0” and "1”. Below the coefficients for the independent and control variables, the random-effects parameters for the models are presented. They show the variance of the four included levels and ideally reconfirm the relevance of the multilevel structure for the models.

For the results in the first model, for hypothesis 1 regarding the effects of authoritarian cultural values, the three independent variables “Religiousness”, “Opposition towards LGBTQ” and “Opposition towards immigration” are all statistically significant predictors of anti-pluralist vote ($p < 0.001$ for all three variables). The direction of the effect is positive for all variables. This means that a higher level of religiousness, a higher level of opposition towards the LGBTQ community and a higher level of opposition towards immigration all lead to higher levels of anti-pluralist vote. This follows the theoretical expectation and hypothesis 1 receives support. Moreover, the cultural backlash argumentation for anti-pluralism is supported. Apparently, the analysed authoritarian cultural values do have an effect on anti-pluralist vote choice.

Table 3: Results from the multilevel regression models

	(1) Anti-plu. vote	(2) Anti-plu. vote	(3) Anti-plu. vote
Religiousness	0.001442***		0.001393***
	(0.0002)		(0.0002)
Opposition towards LGBTQ	0.007338***		0.007347***
	(0.0005)		(0.0005)
Opposition towards immigration	0.011833***		0.011391***
	(0.0006)		(0.0006)
Wish for strong leader / government		0.004101***	0.002830***
		(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Feeling about household's income	0.003141***	0.004902***	0.002973***
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Distance to political middle	0.004933***	0.005213***	0.004953***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Gender (female)	-0.004718***	-0.004839***	-0.004618***
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0010)
Highest lvl of education	-0.000222	-0.000542**	-0.000184
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Age	-0.000377***	-0.000188***	-0.000386***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
East	0.236111***	0.244691***	0.233770***
	(0.0405)	(0.0412)	(0.0402)
Constant	0.030422	0.047760*	0.019298
	(0.0229)	(0.0228)	(0.0228)
Observations	49248	50000	48151
logL	41282.038510	40817.890676	40333.793176
Chi squared	1183.314524	506.838389	1212.469804
Random-effects parameters			
Wave	0.0015964	0.0014043	0.001572
	(0.0012925)	(0.0012164)	(0.0012718)
Country	0.001364	0.0014339	0.0013428
	(0.0012425)	(0.0012815)	(0.0012251)
Country-wave	0.0059938	0.0061551	0.0059053
	(0.0015153)	(0.0015539)	(0.0014929)
Individuals	0.0108815	0.0113697	0.0108933
	(0.0000694)	(0.0000719)	(0.0000702)

Regression output: Multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood estimation. Data from 10 countries, 9 waves and 47 country-years. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Own calculations using Stata with the “mixed” command.

Model 2 for hypothesis 2 shows the effects of one specific authoritarian attitude. Here the variable “Wish for strong leader / government” is statistically significant in predicting anti-pluralist vote ($p < 0.001$). The direction of the effect is positive, meaning that higher levels of the independent variable increase the likelihood to vote for an anti-pluralist party. This is according to the expected theoretical argument. Therefore, hypothesis 2 receives support, too. The last model, model 3, shows findings for all four independent variables and allows for comparison between the two hypotheses. While the effect sizes for the three authoritarian value variables barely change compared to model 1, the effect size for the attribute variable decreases by about a third. Therefore, this full model does bring support to both hypotheses, yet hypothesis 1 appears to be stronger and more stable.

Another approach to interpret the findings is to compare the magnitude of effects of the independent variables with an established control variable. In several papers on voting behaviour, the income of individuals is a significant and reliable predictor for voting behaviour such as turnout (Filer et al., 1993) or vote choice (Brooks & Brady, 1999). Income is a significant predictor for vote choice in my models as well. A negative feeling about a respondent’s income is associated with higher levels of anti-pluralist vote choice. Compared to the independent variables, the effect of “Religiousness” is about half the effect of income and the effect of “Wish for strong leader” is similar to it. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect for “Opposition towards LGBTQ” is two times larger, the magnitude of effects for “Opposition towards immigration” is about three times larger than the effect for income. Therefore, all effects of the analysed independent variables are in the same area or even larger compared to the effects of an established control variable such as income. This gives support to the significance of the findings.

Findings for the random-effects parameters of the models reconfirm the relevance of the four levels. For all three models, Chi square is equal to “0”, which indicates the significance of the included levels in comparison to a linear model. Exemplary for the first model, 0.00159 is the variance between waves; 0.00136 is the variance between

countries within one wave; 0.00599 the variance between country/waves within one country and wave; and finally, 0.01088 is the variance between individuals within the same country, wave, and country/wave. The values differ only slightly for model 2 and 3 and are in the same magnitude. This means that the largest variance is between individuals, around half of it between country/waves and the smallest variance between countries and waves. Overall, the largest variation lies between the individuals, it is by far greater than the variance between states or years. All these variances are of course conditional on the included independent and control variables in the models.

4.2) Visualisation of effects

It is difficult to identify the exact substantial effects of the independent variables on anti-pluralist vote choice from the regression outputs above in *Table 3* as the effects are displayed as rather small linear regression coefficients. Therefore, the effects are visualised in the form of predicted effects (Hanmer & Kalkan, 2013) in *Figure 2*. Here, the predicted effect of each independent variable on anti-pluralist vote choice is shown. For the first three independent variables, model 1 with the respective independent variable and all control variables is used. For the final independent variable, measuring the wish for a strong leader or government, model 2 is used.

The first graph in *Figure 2* shows that, ceteris paribus, a highly religious respondent is predicted to vote for a party that ranks one percent higher on the anti-pluralism index compared to a non-religious one. This effect is rather small. The predicted effect is even smaller for respondents in between the two extremes for “Religiousness”. In Graph 2, the effect is slightly larger. A respondent with very high levels of opposition towards LGBTQ people is expected to vote for a party about 2.5 percent higher on the anti-pluralist index compared to another citizen who is highly open towards them. For graph 3, the predicted effect to vote for anti-pluralist parties is about four percent higher for respondents highly critical towards immigration compared to citizens that are very immigration friendly. And finally for model 4, if a respondent strongly wishes for a strong leader or government, the predicted effect to vote for an anti-pluralist party is about two percent higher, compared to a citizen who does not share this attitude at all. All four effects are rather small; however, they still support both hypotheses and the regression models. The direction of the effects is always following the expectation of the hypotheses.

Figure 2: Predicted effects graphs for the independent variables



Predicted effects graphs. Model 1 for graphs 1-3, model 2 for graph 4. Own illustration from Stata with the “marginsplot” command.

4.3) Robustness checks

For a robustness check of my findings, I test a model with a dichotomised dependent variable to see if this changes the results. Therefore, I constructed model 4, an additional full model with all four independent variables. As described above, the threshold for anti-pluralist vote choice in my sample is 0.092. Voters above that threshold are coded as “1”, below the threshold as “0”. Only the findings for the dichotomised model are discussed here, it can be seen in the appendix in *Table 4*. Fortunately, the findings of model 4 do not differ strongly compared to the main models in *Table 3*. All four independent variables remain statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), and the direction of the effects remains positive. However, the effect sizes increase for some of the independent variables. In the dichotomised model the effect of

“Religiousness” is only slightly increased but the effect for the variables “opposition towards LGBTQ” and “wish for a strong leader” is approximately doubled compared to the main full model. The effect of “Opposition for immigration” is even three times as large. This confirms the speculation from the operationalisation chapter above. A dichotomised dependent variable gives stronger power to the model and the effects appear to be larger, while losing variation in the data. Yet this does not change the statistical significance or direction of the findings. Due to the higher variation in the data, the findings from the main model are the more conservative estimation.

Another robustness check is to control for sensitivity of effects. For this, model 1 was build up step by step. Doing so controls for variations of variable effects in case of changed model specification. This is not necessary for model 2 since there is only one independent variable. The results are discussed here, the respective models 5 to 7 can be seen in the appendix in *Table 4*. All three independent variables for authoritarian values remain statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) with a positive effect. The effect sizes for all variables are slightly larger but this change is negligible. Overall, these models confirm the stability and results for the full models 1 and 3. A change in model specification did not change the results for the three selected variables.

5) DISCUSSION

5.1) Discussion of findings

The findings above indicate support for both hypotheses. While the actual effect sizes of the four independent variables are small, they are all significant and follow the expectation from the literature. Regarding the first hypothesis, all three variables for authoritarian support were significant predictors for anti-pluralist vote choice. All variables in the model had a positive effect, which supports hypothesis 1 and the "cultural backlash" expectations from the literature (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). The same is true for hypothesis 2 that receives support with model 2. The expectations from the literature for the "strong leader" argument (e.g., Donovan, 2019) are confirmed. Therefore, both analysed mechanisms for authoritarian support, authoritarian values and attitudes, are shown to predict anti-pluralist vote choice. These general findings are stable for two types of robustness checks that are a dichotomised dependent variable and specification of model 1. When comparing the effects in model 3 or in the predicted graphs, the authoritarian value variables were usually stronger predictors for anti-pluralist vote choice. Especially "Opposition towards immigration" and "Opposition towards LGBTQ" had stronger effects, even compared to established controls such as income of respondents. The independent variables "Religiousness" and "Wish for a strong leader" had a considerably weaker effect. Overall, the tendency for a slightly stronger effect of values compared to attitudes is visible in my models. However, there is no indication for an interaction effect or hierarchy between the two. Deeply rooted values simply appear to have a stronger effect on anti-pluralist vote choice compared to the analysed attitude. In summary, the findings support expectations from the literature for authoritarian support with new party data (V-Party). Therefore, this thesis validates the established expectations and contributes to the authoritarian support literature.

As the random effects from the analysed models have shown, the level with the largest variation by far was the individual level. This supports the relevance of this thesis for the literature on anti-pluralism, compared to existing papers that focus mostly on the state-level (e.g., Lührmann, 2021). While these papers neglect to include the highly relevant individual level in explaining anti-pluralism, my thesis does include the level

and can be an important step forward for the debate. Inclusion of the individual level is therefore not only a statistical gimmick but a relevant gap in the literature that this thesis fills successfully.

5.2) Limitations

For the limitations of this study, a first topic is the case selection of only ten countries. Unfortunately, the case selection was not purely theory driven, but made out of necessity from the available data. While including more countries would be superior, the ESS data was restricted and excluded many countries due to a small number of respondents per wave or omission of several waves for many countries.

Another limitation is the lack of further authoritarian attitudes as independent variables to test for hypothesis 2. I only identified one attitude from the literature, the wish for a strong leader or government. Including more attitudes would increase the generalisability of the findings for hypothesis 2. So far, this thesis can confirm the effect for one attitude, but not for attitudes in general. The same is true for additional control variables. Including more controls, for example the occupational status of respondents or further economic variables, such as the fear of economic decline, could improve the models. Doing so would control for the possibility of economic voting of citizens.

While this thesis focuses on explaining vote choice based on values and attitudes, competing explanations for vote choice are neglected. For example, the prominent Michigan Model (Campbell et al., 1960) that explains vote choice with party identification and sociological factors is not discussed. While such theory is important for vote choice models, this thesis focuses specifically on anti-pluralist vote choice. I decided to mostly include theory and controls for this type of vote choice. Therefore, more general competing models are not essential and excluded.

5.3) Conclusion

In this thesis, my aim was to answer the question why citizens vote for anti-pluralist parties. I introduced the concept of anti-pluralism in comparison to populism and identified authoritarian support as a possible explanation from the literature. I expected both authoritarian values and attitudes to influence anti-pluralist vote choice.

In the next step, I presented the large-N, longitudinal cross-country research design, selected a sample representative for Europe and operationalised the dependent and independent variables. Then I introduced multilevel analysis as testing method for the hierarchical data. The findings of this thesis are statistically significant and support the theoretical expectations. They are relevant compared to established controls and remain stable during robustness checks. The major contributions regarding theoretical relevance of this thesis are the inclusion of the individual level for anti-pluralism and the use of novel data to test existing expectations for authoritarian support. A methodological contribution is the application of four-level multilevel analysis as suggested by Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016). Overall, this thesis advances both the literature on anti-pluralism and authoritarian support.

Given the limitations above, there is ample room for future research. Conducting a similar study with more countries, possibly even beyond Europe would be ideal to increase generalisability. Inclusion of more complex theoretical models or control variables for vote choice or authoritarian attitudes are another avenue for further research. This would increase the validity of findings compared to existing models for vote choice and authoritarian support. Moreover, the concept of anti-pluralism, as a related but deeper approach compared to populism, appears to be a promising candidate for new studies. Expanding the literature for this concept with new data and especially focusing on the individual level, could bring great insights into the literature on populism and autocratication.

The policy implications of this thesis are equally important. Neglecting the effects of rising anti-pluralist tendencies among citizens can lead to harmful consequences, such as dissatisfaction with pluralist values, democratic backsliding and even gradual autocratisation (Lührmann, 2021, p. 22). It is therefore paramount for both politicians and researchers to identify and work against the rise of anti-pluralism in society. The connection between authoritarian support and anti-pluralism that was identified in this paper can be valuable for this. A stronger focus on political and social education of citizens towards democratic and pluralist values would be an important practical first step. Better political education could lead to lower levels of authoritarian support and in turn to lower levels of anti-pluralism among citizens. This individual-level strategy could help to stop the onset of anti-pluralist tendencies and autocratication in a country.

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7) APPENDIX

Table 4: Results from the robustness check models

	(4) Anti-plu. vote dichotomised	(5) Anti-plu. vote	(6) Anti-plu. vote	(7) Anti-plu. vote
Religiousness	0.001994***	0.001889***		
	(0.0004)	(0.0002)		
Opposition towards LGBTQ	0.016628***		0.009317***	
	(0.0014)		(0.0005)	
Opposition towards immigration	0.028988***			0.013280***
	(0.0016)			(0.0006)
Wish for strong leader / government	0.006119***			
	(0.0011)			
Feeling about household's income	0.009880***	0.005103***	0.004217***	0.003941***
	(0.0017)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Distance to political middle	0.016823***	0.005232***	0.004895***	0.005117***
	(0.0009)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Gender (female)	-0.014993***	-0.006417***	-0.003313***	-0.004604***
	(0.0025)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Highest lvl of education	-0.002441***	-0.000583***	-0.000452**	-0.000352*
	(0.0004)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Age	-0.000884***	-0.000228***	-0.000269***	-0.000261***
	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
East	0.352351	0.246073***	0.238828***	0.243807***
	(0.1931)	(0.0423)	(0.0417)	(0.0396)
Constant	0.049725	0.062235**	0.052860*	0.038939
	(0.0888)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0223)
Observations	48151	51019	50348	50137
logL	-5228.135055	41767.823565	41708.484205	41417.945318
Chi squared	1276.810485	538.641751	717.799014	906.980595
Random-effects parameters				
Wave	.0029779	.0014568	.0015312	.0014929
	(.0025081)	(.0012515)	(.0012713)	(.0012525)
Country	.057537	.001553	.001508	.0012321
	(.0266943)	(.0013433)	(.0013077)	(.0011928)
Country-wave	.00997	.0062477	.0060798	.0061028

	(.0025919)	(.0015778)	(.0015374)	(.0015405)
Individuals	.0723423	.0113181	.0110992	.0111505
	(.0004665)	(.0000709)	(.00007)	(.0000705)

Regression output: Multilevel analysis with maximum likelihood estimation. Data from 10 countries, 9 waves and 47 country-years. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Own calculations using Stata with the "mixed" command.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables

	min	max	mean	standard deviation
Religiousness	0	10	4.527653	3.019212
Oppose LGBTQ	1	5	1,984628	1.066643
Oppose immigration	1	4	2.480567	0.902068
Wish strong leader	1	6	4.598528	1.187908
Anti-plur. vote	0.018	0.876	0.106106	0.166435

Descriptive table: Own calculation with data from ESS and V-Party for 2002-2018.

7.1) Stata code

For V-Party:

```
*set wd
clear all
cd "C:\MA\Stata"

*import data
import delim using V-Dem-CPD-Party-V1.csv, clear
count

*drop vars
*only Europe
keep if e_regiongeo == 1 | e_regiongeo == 2 | e_regiongeo == 3 | e_regiongeo == 4
count
*only recent years
drop if year < 2001
drop if year > 2018
count

*only PL (17), HU (210), GB (101), SE (5), DE (77), PT (21), FR (76), ES (96), BE (148), NL (91)
keep if country_id == 17 | country_id == 210 | country_id == 101 | country_id == 5 | country_id == 77 |
country_id == 21 | country_id == 76 | country_id == 96 | country_id == 148 | country_id == 91
count
*auslesen
keep v2paenname v2pashname pf_party_id country_name country_id year v2xpa_illiberal
count

hist v2xpa_illiberal
```

For ESS:

```
*****Do-File MA Raphael Schenkel

*set up working directory
clear all
cd "C: \MA\Stata"
ssc install estout, replace

*read data: it is the cumulative dataset from the ESS website for the 10 selected countries
use ESS1-9e01_1
count

****prepare data
*keep only voters and citizens from DE, GB, HU, PL, SE
keep if vote == 1
count
*keep if cntry == "BE" | cntry == "DE" | cntry == "GB" | cntry == "HU" | cntry == "PL" | cntry == "SE" |
cntry == "PT" | cntry == "NL" | cntry == "ES" | cntry == "FR"
*count

*generate time var
gen time = essround
*id var per individual
gen id = _n
*id var per country
egen newid = group(cntry)
```

```
rename newid cntry_id
*id var per country year
egen newid = group(cntry time)
rename newid cntry_year_id

****generate DV
gen illibvote = .

*now the values from the V-Party dataset have to be matched manually with the new DV for every country for each election for each party.

*values for BE: for 1Groen1, 2CD&V2, 3NVA3, 4SPA5, 5VB7, 6openVLD8, 7ecolo10, 8MR12, 9PS13
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 1
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 1
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 1
replace illibvote = .056 if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 1

replace illibvote = .055 if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 2
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 2
replace illibvote = .055 if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 2
replace illibvote = .036 if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 2

replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 3
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 3
replace illibvote = .073 if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 3
replace illibvote = .073 if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 3

replace illibvote = .056 if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 5
replace illibvote = .056 if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 5
replace illibvote = .056 if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 5
replace illibvote = .056 if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 5

replace illibvote = .205 if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 7
replace illibvote = .205 if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 7
replace illibvote = .205 if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 7
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 7

replace illibvote = .036 if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 8
replace illibvote = .036 if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 8
replace illibvote = .055 if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 8
replace illibvote = .055 if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 8

replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 10
replace illibvote = .036 if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 10
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 10
replace illibvote = . if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 10

replace illibvote = .037 if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 12
replace illibvote = .037 if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 12
replace illibvote = .037 if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 12
replace illibvote = .037 if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 12

replace illibvote = .056 if cntry == "BE" & time == 2 & prtvtabe == 13
replace illibvote = .056 if cntry == "BE" & time == 4 & prtvtbbe == 13
replace illibvote = .073 if cntry == "BE" & time == 5 & prtvtcbe == 13
replace illibvote = .073 if cntry == "BE" & time == 7 & prtvtcbe == 13
```

(This repeats for every country for a total of 6 pages. I decided to omit that to not fill the paper with unnecessary code. The structure is always the same for the variable: “country”, “wave” and “party they voted for” sets the value for the DV. This value for the DV is added manually and taken from the V-Party dataset.)

```
*rename DV
gen anti_pluralist_vote = illibvote
inspect anti_pluralist_vote


****recoding of IVs
*fit IVs: change direction of IVs so that high lvls of IV means high lvls of authoritarian support
inspect ipstrgv
gen strgov=7-ipstrgv
inspect strgov

inspect wmcpwrk
gen womenwrk=6-wmcpwrk
inspect womenwrk

 *check missings
inspect anti_pluralist_vote rlgdgr freehms impcntr womenwrk strgov


****descriptive stats
*for party table
tab cntry time
hist illibvote

*authoritarian values
cor anti_pluralist_vote rlgdgr    // how religious
cor anti_pluralist_vote freehms   // support lgbt
cor anti_pluralist_vote impcntr   // support immigration outside EU
cor anti_pluralist_vote womenwrk   // women work at home

*aut attitude
cor illibvote strgov   // strong government / leader

*all together without womenwrk because of low observations
cor anti_pluralist_vote rlgdgr freehms impcntr strgov
pwcorr anti_pluralist_vote rlgdgr freehms impcntr strgov

*info for IVs
summarize rlgdgr freehms impcntr strgov anti_pluralist_vote


****recode control vars
*generate dummy former communist states
gen east = 0
replace east = 1 if cntry == "PL"
replace east = 1 if cntry == "HU"

*fit lrscale: not lrscale anymore but distance to middle
gen extreme = .
replace extreme = 0 if lrscale == 5
replace extreme = 1 if lrscale == 4 | lrscale == 6
replace extreme = 2 if lrscale == 3 | lrscale == 7
replace extreme = 3 if lrscale == 2 | lrscale == 8
replace extreme = 4 if lrscale == 1 | lrscale == 9
replace extreme = 5 if lrscale == 0 | lrscale == 10

*controls: feeling about household income, lrscale, gender, highest lvl of education, age, dummy east
bloc
inspect hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east
```

```
*IVs for H1 factor analysis and cronbachs alpha
inspect freehms impcntr rlgdgr
factor freehms impcntr rlgdgr
alpha freehms impcntr rlgdgr
alpha freehms impcntr

*75th percentile illibvote
_pctile illibvote [pweight=anweight], p(75)
return list

****generate dichotomised DV
gen illibvote_dich = illibvote
replace illibvote_dich = 0 if illibvote <= 0.092
replace illibvote_dich = 1 if illibvote > 0.092 & illibvote != .
inspect illibvote_dich



*****multilevel models

****compare empty models then lrtest to check for relevance of levels
*1 vs 2 lvls empty: include country level
mixed illibvote  || cntry_id: , mle var
estimates store full
mixed illibvote , mle var
estimates store reduced

lrtest full reduced


*2 vs 3 lvls empty: include time level
mixed illibvote || _all: R.time || cntry_id: , mle var
estimates store full
mixed illibvote || cntry_id: , mle var
estimates store reduced

lrtest full reduced


*3 vs 4 lvls empty: include country-year level
mixed illibvote || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store full
estat ic
mixed illibvote || _all: R.time || cntry_id: , mle var
estimates store reduced
estat ic

lrtest full reduced




*****hypotheses tests with all 4 lvls

*H1
mixed illibvote rlgdgr freehms impcntr hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east [pw=anweight] || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store model1
estat ic
```

```
*H2
mixed illibvote strgov hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east [pw=anweight] || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store model2
estat ic

*model with all four IVs
mixed illibvote rlgdgr freehms impcntr strgov hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east [pw=anweight] || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store model3
estat ic

*create models for text
*estout model* using Figure_1,
esttab model* using Figure_1, html replace b(6) se(4) scalars("ll logL" "chi2 Chi squared") label interaction("*")


*****robustness checks

*previous model with dichotomised DV
mixed illibvote_dich rlgdgr freehms impcntr strgov hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east [pw=anweight] || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store rob1
estat ic

*3 models for H1 with only 1 IV:
mixed illibvote rlgdgr hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east [pw=anweight] || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store rob2
estat ic

mixed illibvote freehms hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east [pw=anweight] || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store rob3
estat ic

mixed illibvote impcntr hincfel extreme gndr edulvla agea east [pw=anweight] || _all: R.time || cntry_id: || cntry_year_id: , mle var
estimates store rob4
estat ic

*create models for text
*estout model* using Figure_1,
esttab rob* using Figure_2, html replace b(6) se(4) scalars("ll logL" "chi2 Chi squared") label interaction("*")


***** create visualisation
*for religiousness
est restore model1
margins, at(rlgdgr = (10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0))
marginsplot, ytitle("Anti-pluralist vote") ///
        ylabel(0(0.05)0.2) ///
        ciopts(msize(0)) plotopts(ms(o) connect(i)) title("Religiousness") ///
        xlab(-1.5 "" 0 " " 1 "" 2 "" 3 ""4""5"" 6""7""8""9""10""11, notick) xsize(3)

*for lgbtq opposition
est restore model1
margins, at(freehms = (5 4 3 2 1))
marginsplot, ytitle("Anti-pluralist vote") ///
```

```
        ylabel(0(0.05)0.2) ///
        ciopts(msize(0)) plotopts(ms(o) connect(i)) title("Opposition LGBTQ") ///
        xlab(0 " " 1 "" 2 "" 3 ""4""5"" 6 , notick) xsize(3)

*for immigration opposition
est restore model1
margins, at(impcntr = (4 3 2 1))
marginsplot, ytitle("Anti-pluralist vote") ///
        ylabel(0(0.05)0.2) ///
        ciopts(msize(0)) plotopts(ms(o) connect(i)) title("Opposition immigration") ///
        xlab(0 " " 1 "" 2 "" 3 ""4"" 5, notick) xsize(3)

*for strong leader
est restore model2
margins, at(strgov = (6 5 4 3 2 1))
marginsplot, ytitle("Anti-pluralist vote") ///
        ylabel(0(0.05)0.2) ///
        ciopts(msize(0)) plotopts(ms(o) connect(i)) title("Wish strong leader") ///
        xlab(0 " " 1 "" 2 "" 3 ""4"" 5" "6 "" 7 " ", notick) xsize(3)

*combination of graphs
graph combine graph1.gph graph2.gph graph3.gph graph4.gph, cols(2) ///
iscale(0.7) ycommon
```