



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

# **Bureaucracy politicization and its effects on human rights**

*A large-N analysis and the case of El Salvador*

**Mauricio Zamora Villalobos**

---

<b>Master's Thesis:</b>	30 credits
<b>Program:</b>	Master's Program in International Administration and Global Governance
<b>Date:</b>	September, 2020
<b>Supervisors:</b>	Marina Nistotskaya, Ph.D. & Stephen Dawson, Ph.D. Candidate
<b>Words:</b>	16 730

## Abstract

Bureaucracy represents the infrastructural power of a State, and by studying its configuration one can determine how effective the government can be on carrying on with its goals and promises. In this research, I explore if a bureaucracy controlled by politicians, and not by a professionalized civil service, is less conducive to better protection and fulfillment of human rights. I test a hypothesis that proposes that the higher the levels of politicization of bureaucracy, the higher the violations of human rights. To test this hypothesis a mix-method analysis was selected. First I run a Large-N Analysis of 100+ countries using OLS regression models of cross-sectional data to measure the strength of this focal relationship. I found it to be significant: Bureaucracy politicization affects negatively human rights outcomes, even in democratic countries with high GDP per capita. I then conducted a case-study analysis on El Salvador, a developing country that appears to be very well explained by the linear regression models. Using interviews with country experts, academic research, and official statistics I was able to identify key causal mechanisms undermining the state capacity to better protect and fulfill human rights.

*Key words: Bureaucracy, Public Administration, Politicians, Politicization, Human Rights, El Salvador.*

## Resumen

La burocracia representa el poder infraestructural de un Estado y, al estudiar su configuración, se puede determinar qué tan efectivo puede ser el gobierno para llevar a cabo sus metas y promesas. En esta investigación, exploro si una burocracia controlada por políticos, y no por un servicio civil profesionalizado, es menos propicia para una mejor protección y cumplimiento de los derechos humanos. Pongo a prueba una hipótesis que propone que cuanto más altos son los niveles de politicización de la burocracia, mayores son las violaciones de los derechos humanos. Para probar esta hipótesis, se seleccionó un análisis de métodos mixtos. Primero ejecuto un análisis cuantitativo de más de 100 países utilizando modelos de regresión OLS de datos transversales, para medir la fuerza de esta relación focal. El resultado probó que la relación es significativa: la politicización de la burocracia afecta negativamente la protección y el cumplimiento de derechos humanos, incluso en países democráticos con un PIB per capita alto. Luego realicé un análisis de estudio de caso sobre El Salvador, un país en desarrollo que parece estar muy bien explicado por los modelos de regresión lineal. Mediante entrevistas con expertos de este país, investigaciones académicas y estadísticas oficiales, pude identificar los mecanismos causales clave que socavan la capacidad del Estado para proteger y cumplir mejor los derechos humanos.

*Palabras clave: Burocracia, Administración Pública, Políticos, Politización, Derechos Humanos, El Salvador.*

## Table of content

Introduction .....	1
Chapter 1 Theoretical framework and literature review.....	4
1.1 The notion of Human Rights.....	4
1.2 Defining and understanding the bureaucracy.....	5
1.3 Specifying the notions of politization .....	6
1.4 Exploring the effects of politization.....	7
1.5 Nailing down the importance of meritocracy and professionalization of a bureaucracy .....	11
Chapter 2 Large-N Analysis.....	17
2.1 Methodological considerations .....	17
2.2 Bivariate Analysis .....	18
2.1.2 Dependent Variable.....	18
2.2.2 Independent Variables.....	19
2.2.3 Control Variables .....	19
2.2.4 Results of bivariate analysis.....	20
2.3 Multi-variate Analysis.....	24
2.3.1 Results of the multi-variate analysis .....	24
2.3.2 Robustness check .....	27
2.4 Conclusion of the Large-N Analysis.....	29
Chapter 3 Case study analysis: El Salvador .....	30
3.1 Methodological considerations .....	30
3.2 The Case of El Salvador.....	31
3.2.1 The situation of Human Rights .....	31
3.2.2 Linking the variables and unraveling the causal mechanisms.....	33
3.2.3 The big picture .....	44
Conclusions .....	46
References .....	48
Appendices.....	53

# Figures and Tables

## Figures:

Figure N.1: “Bivariate relationship between bureaucratic depoliticization and violations of Human Rights, using ICRG.....22

Figure N.2: “Bivariate relationship between bureaucratic depoliticization and violations of Human Rights, using G.E.I” .....23

Figure N.3: “Evolution of merit in the bureaucracies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 2004-2015”....39

Figure N.4: “Problem Tree showcasing how and why bureaucracy politization is less conducive to better protection of human rights in El Salvador”.....45

## Tables

Table N.1: “Descriptive Statistics for variables used in the Large-N analysis” .....24

Table N.2: “Description of OLS regression models presented in Tables 3 and 4”.....25

Table N.3: “OLS regression models for the effects of bureaucratic politization over human rights outcomes”.....26

Table N.4: “OLS regression models for the effects of bureaucratic politization over human rights outcomes, using alternative variable (G.E.I)” .....28

Appendix N.1 : “List of country experts interviewed for the case study” .....52

*To my mother*

# Introduction

Today, human rights have become the best benchmark and the most potent discourse across the globe to measure the legitimacy of the states, and are more embedded in the notions of development. Big topics in the international agenda such as economic development, business and trade, adaptation to climate change, migration, or even industry 4.0 are increasingly mainstreaming human rights on policies, agreements and governance mechanisms. As these rights transcend cultural, social, and historical differences and establish inherent and inalienable rights to every person in the world (Rajagopal, 1999).

When evaluating cross-country performance on human rights one can study a vast amount of factors, some scholars pay more attention to democratic levels, some focus on peace and conflict, others highlight the key importance of economic development. But these approaches sometimes ignore the state as variable in itself, taking it for granted and assuming it is an abstract element unable to affect the performance in ways as democracy or economic development do. It is common to find human rights reports from international NGOs stressing the obligation of the state to protect and guarantee, demanding immediate actions and highlighting prescriptive recipes, but rarely caring for understanding a wide variety of factors that may be undermining the state's capacity or polluting the institutional will to protect and guarantee.

Now we know that, even in democracies, a state's configuration can certainly affect a variety of social and economic outcomes, and scholars from a wide variety of disciplines are increasingly observing how and why the state capacity, with elements such as administrative capacity, territorial reach, and information resources, relate to these social and economic outcomes (Grundholm & Thorsen, 2019; Knutsen, 2013; D'Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2017) If these elements are not taken in consideration, the most probable scenario is that states will continue to fail and score negatively on its performance. Following this path, I have decided to pay attention to the infrastructural power of the state as a variable: its bureaucracy or public administration.

When it comes to the design and function of the public administration there has been a historical tension on how much control politicians and political parties should have over the bureaucracy, and how their influence is key to determine the successful implementation of goals. Therefore, bureaucracy literature distinguishes between politicized —to refer to an organization dependent on the political control of the parties, politicians and depoliticized bureaucracies —to refer to a relatively autonomous and professional organization. While most of the literature is keener to support a depoliticized bureaucracy, we will see how several schools of thought and even international organizations have advocated for a reconfiguration of the bureaucracy towards greater political control for the sake of more efficiency, flexibility and overall quality and performance. After all, when one thinks about bureaucracy the first thoughts in mind tend to be always negative concepts related to stiffness and disinterest. From this point of view, granting more control over bureaucracy to incumbent politicians to ensure efficient implementation of public policies. But is this what the empirical evidence is telling us?

By selecting bureaucracy as a variable, I will test if there is a relationship between types of bureaucracy and better protection of human rights. I will test if changes in levels of politicization of public administration have an effect on human rights outcomes. Specifically I'll test the following hypothesis:

**(H1): “Higher the level of politization in public administration, higher the level of human rights violations”**

Thus the objectives of the thesis are:

- 1) To empirically test the relationship between organizational design of bureaucracy and human rights violations.
- 2) To explore how and why bureaucracy politization is less conducive to better protection of Human Rights.

In order to reach these 2 objectives, I have structured the research in 3 main chapters: 1) Theoretical framework and review of current literature, 2) Quantitative Large-N Analysis to test the hypothesis and 3) A qualitative case study of El Salvador, where I further explore causal mechanisms.

In the theoretical framework and literature review, first I introduce the notion of human rights and frame the position and responsibilities of the State on this matter, according the international law.

After defining the concepts of bureaucracy and politicization I review the reported effects of different organizational forms of bureaucracy, including what the literature has found to be the different causal mechanisms and incentives for politicians and bureaucrats to engage in human rights violations. I end the chapter explaining the importance of depolitization of bureaucracy, first using principal-agent theory and the credible commitment argument and subsequently, linking it to other explored effects.

In the Large-N Analysis, I first conduct a bivariate analysis of 100+ countries using cross-sectional data, and depict the findings on two scatter plots to observe and interpret the behavior of the focal relationship. Later, I move to test this relation through the multi-variate analysis, where I run Ordinary Least Squares regression models on cross-sectional data, controlling for variables such as Democracy, Conflict intensity and Gross Domestic Product per capita. The results of the analysis provide broad support to the hypothesis, which is why then I move to delve how politicization leads to inferior record of human rights protection.

In chapter 3, I explore the case of El Salvador, a country with a highly politicized bureaucracy and high levels of human rights violations. Using a combination of qualitative methods I bring together the use of academic articles, international reports, country's laws, decrees, statistics, and interviews to experts. The specific selection was suggested first, by the results of the Large-N Analysis, as the country appeared close to the regression line and around the variables' mean; and second, because it represents a developing country. Today, the discussions on bureaucracy politicization are mainly focused on developed countries, where the debate goes around how parties aim to steer the implementation of policies (to left or right, for instance). In the developing world, where politicization has primarily manifested itself in the forms of nepotism and clientelism and where most of the human rights violations occur, the debate is still highly isolated and under-studied, making harder to demonstrate the possible implications of bureaucracy politicization (Llano, 2017). This is the main reasons why I have chosen El Salvador.

This research is also relevant in the way that it encourages more connection between political science and other disciplines such as public administration, international law, and global studies. By contributing to the debate with some evidence, the findings can help determine the importance and suitability of policy reforms in countries where certain institutional quality has not yet been reached or where debates about the capital importance of professionalization has not started.



# Chapter 1

## Theoretical framework and literature review

### 1.1 The notion of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 established a set of basic civil, political, socioeconomic, and cultural rights that have been supported by almost every country in the world. The Declaration aims to secure minimal levels of decent and respectful treatment so that human beings can live a minimally good life (Orend, 2002). It stands for equal protection, non-discrimination, privacy and personal integrity, due processes in legal proceedings, etc. In International Law, they are perceived as both international law mechanisms and universal moral rights by international organizations such as United Nations; by global NGOs and organized civil society, many corporations, and by the governments that subscribe the covenants. Therefore, they exist as standards of argument and criticism independently of legal implementation for both individuals and governments, in spite of whether or not individuals or governments express acceptance, recognition, or implementation (Nickel, 2007). Governments and people everywhere are obligated not to violate a person's rights. And governments have the main responsibility to take positive measures to protect and uphold that person's rights.

States are the main guarantor of Human Rights, but at the same time they can be their major threat and transgressor. One can count a vast amount of cases throughout History where the State has acted against civilians, supported genocides and pursued citizens in reaction to threat perception, and for the sake of control. Most of the current political tensions where Human Rights violations are happening, come from complex cultural and historical backgrounds with issues related to ethnic, linguistic and religious matters, i.e. former African colonies, Latin America or the Middle East.

The literature distinguishes three generations of human rights following its historical appearance (Torres, 2002), though lately this classification has been broadly challenged since it ranks them in importance and has been instrumentalized by States to neglect their responsibilities. The first

generation correspond to the civil and political rights. Among these can be mentioned the right to life, to liberty, personal integrity, freedom of expression, to choose and to be chosen, free transit, among others. While it mostly aims to limit the role of the state against the individual it also demands a positive obligation to ensure an effective oversight. The second generation corresponds to economic, social and cultural rights. These intend to secure economic well-being, access to work, education, food, housing, healthcare and culture, in a way that ensures proper human development. In this case, the State has to respect, protect and fulfil the realization of these rights in accordance to each country's economic possibilities. The enjoyment of these rights is interlinked with the possibility to exercise civil and political rights. For instance, if individuals have no proper education is harder to find a job, and are less likely to take part in political activities. It acts as a multiplier and enhances all rights and freedoms while its violation jeopardizes them all (Kalantry et al. 2011). The third generation is even more recent and still not fully endorsed by countries. It is focused on collective concepts, such as right to a sustainable development, right to natural resources or self-determination.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2) recognizes that the realization of many of these rights is highly dependent of resources and levels of economic development, so it established the progressive adoption of measures towards the full realization. This has raise serious concerns on whether these rights are judiciable or not and how accountable a government should be. For these reasons, in order to enhance compliance, states have to demonstrate that are actively adopting policies advocated to achieve a full realization, especially through the adoption of indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound. This allow for NGO's and international organizations to assess State's actions to respect, protect and fulfil these rights (OHCHR, 2008; Kalantry et al. 2011).

## **1.2 Defining and understanding the bureaucracy**

The bureaucracy represents the administrative or infrastructural power of the state, as Mann (2008) called it. This means that it embodies the state's capacity to implement its goals, enforce compliance, monitor and punish free-riders, and solve problems, within a set of preestablished rules. For Weber (1978) the best way to run a state and foster economic development was by defining formalized, standardized, hierarchical, and specialized offices, with unambiguous processes and clear legal-bound rules.

Each country, depending of its history has different sizes of bureaucracy. Its reach goes from ministerial offices to police forces, central banks, tax collection agencies, migration-border control, courts and judiciary branches, administration of schools, hospitals, municipalities, among others. The nature of each institution, the recruitment processes, the job functions, the methods of work, and the goals certainly vary significantly from one to another. In this thesis when I assess bureaucracy and bureaucrats I pay more attention to non-elected officials working in ministries and other structural units of central governments, such as agencies, boards, inspection offices, office of ombudsman, tribunals, publicly funded organizations such as schools, hospitals or state-owned enterprises. And very few attention to subnational governments (such as governments of regions/states or municipalities). This a notion inspired by the Quality of Government Expert's Survey (2015), which also assess these concepts on the survey.

### **1.3 Specifying the notions of politization**

Since the appearance of the modern state and well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the public administration was expected to be obedient to politicians. From a normative point of view, elected politicians determine actions and bureaucracy implements them (Peters & Pierre, 2004). A politicized bureaucracy therefore means that politicians and political parties can openly and directly decide, steer and handle every-day administrative processes and bureaucratic decisions (Dahlstrom et al, 2012; Cornell & Lapuente, 2014; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016). Patronage – a system that uses bureaucratic appointments/promotions as an electoral and reward tool and as ways to secure subsequent loyalty of clerks and constituencies – is a one of the empirical manifestations of politicized bureaucracy. A patronage system is an instrumental relationship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and benefits to a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron (Scott, 1972). Therefore, public officials are not selected by their skills and expertise but because they are close, due to political or personal (e.g. nepotism) reasons, to certain politicians in power. Thus, politicization of bureaucracy also means the control over discretionary appointment of clerks. In patronage systems, it is expected that leaders should have high levels of liberty to appoint, dismiss or promote their proteges or their partisans (Peters & Pierre, 2004; Kitschelt, 2000).

While politicization still exists in more subtle ways across developed countries, political patronage persists in many developing countries. Peters & Pierre (2004) pointed out that within developed democracies, politization is usually perceived as the attempts of parties and politicians to control public policies and its implementation, whereas in developing countries it still remains a matter of employment distribution, nepotism and corruption. However, reality is not black and white, and in the middle between high politization and professionalization dwell a big variety of hybrids across the globe. As Llano (2017) suggests, these hybrid systems have civil services and some meritocratic measures, but have developed more subtle, less obvious and more informal mechanisms of politization and other types of patronage, making it more difficult to study, detect and change. Situating this context within the sequencing debate (“What goes first? State Capacity or Democracy? see D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017) Llano (2017) observes that in many cases, civil services and meritocracy arrived way after the emergence of *mass democracies*. The author uses the example of populist parties in Latin America during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to demonstrate how these parties folded over fragile structures and build their own electoral machines, almost transforming agencies into partisan branches.

#### **1.4 Exploring the effects of politization**

The literature has identified several important effects of politicized bureaucracy, which are reviewed below.

The first effect of bureaucracy politicization can be detected in the area of work rights, specifically security and stability. If public administration has high levels of discretionary appointments, employees are very likely to be either removed or reassigned with every change of government or if they do not serve loyally to a politician’s interest (Morales, 2020). This certainly represents a violation of these people’s labor rights as there are no founded reasons for dismissals. In addition, a lack of clear compensation and career schemes also mean a deep internal compensation inequality.

In second place, if the assignment of personnel, and their respective salary, do not respond to a proper planning it can only mean a waste of public finances and inefficient allocation of these funds. If appointments represent political spoils, we are more likely to see patrons aiming to reward their protegees (Longo, 2002).

In third place, the arbitrariness of personnel management decisions, such as ad hoc rotation of personnel, represent a threat for policy continuity, and hence long-term development (Dählstrom & Lapuente, 2011). If such policies as poverty eradication, improvement in education or attraction of foreign investment are drastically altered with every change of government it is likely that no policy will demonstrate successful results (Grindle, 1997). A politicized bureaucracy therefore tends to prioritize short-sight solutions that can put sustainability at risk.

Fourthly and relatedly, organizational design of public bureaucracies affects overall level of economic development (Evans and Rauch 1999; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016; Rauch 1995). While exact mechanisms, linking depoliticized bureaucracies with economic development remain a subject of debate – ranging from longer-time horizons, to higher social capital and lower responsiveness to “the dangerous impulses of elected officials”, such as rent-seeking or reelection motivations (Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016, 520), cross country and sub-national data strongly supports the conjuncture that autonomous bureaucracies promote economic development.

Fifth, it generates an environment of mistrust between bureaucrats and politicians and a loss of public trust in the fairness of government institutions as citizens will face bureaucratic decisions founded not so much on rational thinking, but arbitrary, discretionary decisions informed by political cravings, or merely to respond to clientelist promises. It risks legal security to a wide variety of actors in topics as varied as international trade, foreign investment, public procurement, contract concessions, etc.

Politization also opens a gate for corruption and democratic decay. Cornell & Lapuente (2014) posit that when officials are conscious that their survival in office depends on a particular party winning elections, they are more likely to transgress rules in order to guarantee reelection of that party. Corruption erodes legitimacy by favoring certain parts of the population and excluding others from political processes. This exclusion is a breeding ground for social unrest and can produce outbreaks and civil wars, and therefore reduces the incentive to protect Human Rights. In contrast, Evans & Rauch (2000) suggest that when officials have joined by virtue of sharing similar abilities they internalize shared norms and goals better than those who have selected by favors. Such organizational culture reduces incentives for corruption and promote effective peer-to-peer monitoring.

In the case of human rights, the literature has paid insufficient attention to the question of bureaucracy politicization and its effects on human rights outcomes. Within this context, the role of bureaucrats has not been systematically or empirically studied, except for very visible cases where public office is used for the violation of private rights (Asthana, 2012). That is, when the instrumental effects of politicization and corruption are affecting individuals directly. Exceptions of Human rights literature studying politics and public bureaucracies can be found in Rajagopal (1999) and Cingranelli (2014). Rajagopal (1999) observed that politicization and corruption strike at the heart of the rule of law, which is central to human rights protection. “It introduces an element of subjectivity and arbitrariness into administrative discretion and enforcement of criminal law, which can result in many violations of human rights [...] it generally encourages a culture of institutionalized impunity of human rights violators”<sup>1</sup>. The author also saw that the very act of corruption may constitute the violation of the human right in question, i.e. freedom of speech, right to participation, etc.

Thus, politicians may use the repression of human rights as a strategy to redress an undesirable imbalance in the strength/ threat ratio (Gartner & Reagan, 1996). Mitchell (2004) also suggests that these Human Rights violations can become *a policy*, “not the inhuman outcome of impersonal, slow-shifting, historical, economic, international or sociological substructures”. If politicians engage and promote the violation of these human rights, they do it systematically, in reaction to either a power threat, or programmatically: hate, fear for specific groups, or as a cultural response for what has been called an Eurocentric agenda. Universal Human Rights are in constant tension with particular places of culture.

But politicians can also look the other way, and intentionally surrender control of bureaucrats to reward transactional favors or to achieve its policy goals without getting exposed. In here, political science literature has explored these dynamics in more detail. Englehart (2009) calls it artificial information asymmetry. Even in high-capacity states (let’s say high GDP), officials or politicians feeling unsafe or seeing opportunities to pursuit personal interests (of hate and violence) will take advantage of the state infrastructure to carry on with its goals, avoiding the blame. Low-capacity states tend to have weak bureaucratic professionalization regimes, and therefore low autonomy from politicians and low levels of job security (Dahlström et al. 2012). And Englehart (2009) observed that weak and failing states (as principals) suffer from “agency loss”, and politicians are unable to police effectively abuses from private individuals and rogue agents of the state. As mentioned, politicization

---

<sup>1</sup> Rajagopal 1999. P. 499

of bureaucracy allows incumbent leaders to increase incentives through patronage mechanisms: loyalty and personal reward.

In addition to the agency loss literature, there is an argument that agents may also have their own personal motivations to carry-on with these practices. Bureaucrats may use their authority to exercise violence for private reward and mean (Mitchell, 2004). According to Cole (2016) bodily integrity abuses (i.e. disappearance, torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, etc.) are often committed by local agents and officials acting without authorization and beyond the reach of their central governments. Officials in weak states could also fall prey to bribes and other clientelist methods to allow violations exercised not only by the state but by private actors such as corporations, mobs or racist, xenophobic, homophobic, misogynous, et al. groups. And in this case, loss of political control and oversight can also be a huge deterrent for rights.

When studying personal integrity rights such as disappearances, torture, political imprisonment and extrajudicial killing, Young (2009) observed that officials and leaders who feel insecure about their jobs are more likely to use repression or allow the use of repression. That leaders and officials with bargaining strength against other groups and that incur in small transaction costs to implement policies are less likely to violate or neglect human rights. Though, for Cole (2016) bureaucratic capacity only promotes respect to civil liberties in conjunction with democracy (executive constraints and competitive elections). This because strong states may have the capacity to protect but lack the will or incentives to respect human rights. Civil liberties, especially the ones that tend to disrupt cultural norms, such as women's sexual and reproductive rights or LGBTBI rights are either backed or rejected from top political structures. As Miller (2004) argued, their obstruction can become a programmatic policy. When democratic mechanisms in high-capacity states are absent, respect for civil liberties gets worse off.

For Cingranelli et al. (2014) the policy outcome of human rights protection is an increasing linear function of two independent components: the accountability of politicians and the accountability of bureaucrats. In particular, if poorly motivated politicians set low legal standards, the practices will be at a lower level still, due to subsequent bureaucratic agency loss. The authors found that "politicians and bureaucrats make strategic choices about how much effort to exercise to protect human rights. Both politicians and bureaucrats prefer to exert less effort than citizens want, but it is possible to change their motivations".

As observed, the literature so far has mainly focused on first generation human rights. Rarely one can find the link between second and third generation rights and the importance of bureaucracy professionalization. But if one connects the studied effects mentioned on the previous section and assess the needed elements to guarantee economic, social and cultural rights, one can say that when it comes to second generation rights, politicization undermines the state capacity to adequately provide these rights, and second, impose a threat to arbitrary decisions related to these rights. If politicization is a threat to ongoing policies, then policies in areas related to health and social security, adequate food, adequate housing, education, work rights, and access to water and sanitation, will suffer from it as well. As the OHCHR (2008) exemplifies, adequate housing not only suggests the possibility to receive proper assistance but the right to be free from forced evictions carried out by state agents.

The OHCHR (2008) also highlights that along consequences over general human development indicators such as child malnutrition and adequate livelihood, states failing to protect these types of rights in an impartial manner can result in breeding grounds for conflicts where systemic discrimination and inequality is at order. That programs aim to reduce poverty such as money transfers or food provision can be taken away from political opponents. That education can be used as a tool for propaganda and severe social control, disabling the youth's capacity to express freely and targeting hate speech against minorities such as LGTBQ groups and women, among other consequences.

## **1.5 Nailing down the importance of meritocracy and professionalization of a bureaucracy**

The first theoretical answers against complete level of liberty and discretionality over the public office were presented in macro by social contract theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau<sup>2</sup> and later by Weber when observing that the level of specialization of processes was also to act as a check and balance mechanism against abuse of power, since it exercised domination based on rational knowledge and the management of information, and not only on political cravings. This method of power also would allow bureaucrats to act in a more objective, accurate and consistent manner. In

---

<sup>2</sup> Later on I will return to social contract theory to further explain the credible commitment argument, as a powerful explanation for opposing politicization.



this sense, higher the level of expertise, training and professionalization of the clerks higher the objectivity, the certainty, the accuracy and the consistency on the use and implementation of resources. It is expected that professional employees, exercising their technical knowledge, act as checks against arbitrariness and protect legal security, strengthening the trust of a wide variety of actors when it comes to the fulfillment of commitments (Zuwanic & Iacoviello, 2010).

The state's bureaucracy is therefore more than a body of clerks following procedures, is a center of information and of technical expertise needed for the understanding and interpretation of this information, making it crucial when it comes to the effective design and execution of policies and goals; and the politicians-bureacrats relation should be complementing, interactive and interlocked rather than hierarchic (Aksan & Celik, 2011). It is important to make clear that almost all institutions have levels of political involvement, usually at the top management (ministers, board presidencies, agency directors, advisors, etc.), and at this level is usually considered appropriate and necessary. The problem, as Medellin (2004) suggests, is when the functional hierarchy is displaced by what is called hierarchy of prestige. The chain of command is not followed referencing the organizational chart but through direct line of trust through partisanship.

Throughout the 80s and 90s, bureaucracy was broadly challenged by *New Public Management* scholars as it became a rigid apparatus that was not responding to the speed of globalization. NPM scholars were looking at how effectively organized and how efficiently it carries out directives. They were concerned that an excess of autonomy and obsession for due process was stalling public policies. It was not only important to reduce the fat of the state but also to regain political control of inefficient institutions. In many developed countries where these theories were implemented, politicization was not perceived as a negative dynamic related to nepotism or clientelism but actually as a legit process to make institutions more efficient and more accountable to constituencies. During this period, scholars brought in economic theory to explain efficiency problems and how to achieve the ideal relationship between politics and administration.

Starting with game theory, economists problematized and compared typical scenarios that happened within firms and applied them to the public administration. For game theory, achieving a *Nash Equilibrium* represents the ideal outcome of any interaction<sup>3</sup>. According to John Nash, the ideal outcome occurs when players have settled for at least one output were their self-interest is maximized,

---

<sup>3</sup> Game theory is the formal study of decision-making where several players must make choices that potentially affect the interests of the other players (Turocy & von Stengel, 2001).

given the actions of the other participants. This means that both, incumbent politicians trying to carry-out policies, and professional officials committing to due process, agree on at least one same goal and vision of cooperation. They are therefore reaching an ideal equilibrium of efficiency for solving a specific collective action problem. However, this was hardly the rule, and empirical evidence showed bureaucrats not following through with principal's guidelines or not behaving like agreed, resulting in inefficiency. That excess of autonomy was now observed as weakness. Authors like Holmström (1982), Mitnick (1986) and Tirole (1992) brought in principal-agent dilemma to explain this organizational behavior in public administration.

For agency theory, one party (the principal) delegates work to an agent who performs that work. The theory wants to solve two main problems: 1) when both desires and vision are on conflict, and 2) when there is information asymmetry, that is for when is difficult for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhart, 1989). Both principal and agents may have different attitudes toward risk (to what extend am I willing to risk in order to see my self-interest maximized?) resulting in the predominance of different outcomes. When agents defect, and are more motivated to act in their own interest than to agree on a *Nash Equilibrium*, the dilemma may become a **moral hazard problem**<sup>4</sup>. For Voorn et al. (2018) this is particularly common in public institutions where there are multiple principals. If agents are been hold accountable by several political stakeholders, the opportunities to either free-ride or defect may increase. This also may expand opportunities for politicians to lobby and stablish informal incentive mechanisms that aggravate agent's shirking. Nevertheless, for agency theory the solution exists in the coalignment of incentives and the control of information by principals.

But in *Above Politics*, Miller (2000) revisits and reinterprets 1980s' agency theory to actually explain the importance of autonomy, meritocracy and hierarchy, and therefore the harmful effects of politization. Miller quotes Holmstrom's (1982) *Moral Hazard in Teams*. In this article, Holmstrom found that there is no reward system for the team that can distribute same incentives to everyone or make them reach a pareto optimality<sup>5</sup>. Basically, as long as incentives are been distributed equally, self-interest players will reduce their efficiency levels and free-ride. Therefore, in order to not sacrifice efficiency nor the minimum level of self-interest (Nash) "benefits must be distributed among

---

<sup>4</sup> Moral hazard arises when two or more parties form an agreement or contractual relationship and the arrangement itself provides the incentive for misbehavior by insuring one party against responsibility (Britannica, 2016)

<sup>5</sup> Pareto optimality happens when participants should not agree that there is any other outcome but the Nash equilibrium, in which they would all be better off (Miller, 2000)

a larger set of people than those whose actions determine the size of those benefits”, says Holmstrom (1982).

What is the practical implication of this assumption? Separation of ownership from control. Owners will now step back from managing the firm and hire an external agent: the manager. He or she is a hired professional, and in theory will work hard to achieve maximum efficiency. The owners/shareholders will passively receive their part. But, what stops a member of the board or a rich investor to bribe the manager in order to get higher residuals? And vice versa, what stops the manager to secretly engage in high moral hazard behavior by putting the firm to risk? Either by purely self-interest (agency loss) or by shirking and agreeing with certain unethical shareholders? This was exactly what happened in the 2008 financial crisis.

The same problem can be seen at the State. However, the state has both different origins and nature than firms. It has the capacity to control all resources within its territory and redistribute wealth at its desire. For Miller (2000), this qualities are already an obstacle to efficiency in itself. Having control over resources makes it alluring for self-gain. The very creation of the State was achieved through the exercise of coercive social domination at detriment of others. And by observing History, what has stopped kings and dictators to maximized residuals at expense of efficiency for the whole society? As Marie-Antoinette used to say: “*Qu'ils mangent de la brioche!*”. Here is where Miller (2000) introduces the role of **credible commitment**, by saying:

**The problem in any social organization is not that of finding an efficient incentive system; rather, the problem is finding an efficient incentive system that members believe will not be subverted by the owner of the residual.**

How can we make the State legitimate and its power credible? How can we justify the use of force, the creation of rules and the control of the territory and wealth? But most importantly, how can we make sure they will stay true to their goals, functions and limitations once in power? Only by credibly committing *ex ante* to the others, that power will be carried out in specific ways, and that politicians will not go beyond certain limits.

Credible commitment can be framed within social contract theory, started by classic authors like Rousseau, Locke and Hobbes. They were all concerned on how political authority could legitimately establish among a group of individuals. And following the social contract tradition is

where the author reacts to principal-agent theory, as the problem for the quality of government was not for principals to successfully impose their preferences on agents. The people who receive the surplus benefits (politicians) will always have the chance to impose their rent-seeking preferences. Therefore, a successful state is one where principals publicly constrain from influencing the activities of those who generate the benefits (bureaucrats & tax payers). It is only by credibly constraining the state, and its politicians, from the pursuit of the residual profits generated by state actions, that efficient economic growth is possible, points out Miller (2000).

In other words: Yes, politicians may find strong information asymmetries when dealing with bureaucrats, affecting efficiency of policy implementation. Administrative policymaking tends to be reactive and incremental rather than active. And institutions need political steering for implementing policies, reflecting the interests of voters. But, bureaucratic autonomy at the remaining levels must be there as the lesser of two evils, to constrain predatory preferences of politicians (Miller 2000). Hierarchy and professionalization would control against abuse and traditional patrimonial governments by transforming political decisions into technical policy (Dahlström et al., 2012).

When Weber first referred to meritocracy he was mostly referring to a system able to identify capable productive men and women and recruit them. People should be hired by their skills, their experience or their knowledge, and not because of their relationship with individuals on power. While professionalization was a consequence of specialization and the knowledge acquired by the command of processes (Dean & Parhizgar, 2007). Today the notions of meritocracy and professionalization have been expanded to include a variety of elements. For instance, Longo (2002) suggests that a professional bureaucracy should have 6 main pillars which are listed hereafter: 1) that human resources departments should plan and recruit based on real needs and supported by technical studies. 2) that there is a hiring system based on suitability, and selection processes are clear and impartial and established hiring rules. 3) that there is job security and stability, but also clear disciplinary mechanisms. 4) that there is a clear compensation scheme, internal equity, a reasonable incentive and benefit scheme and non-monetary rewarding. 5) that there are career paths to grow both vertically and horizontally and that these promotions are assessed according to performance, and 6) constant learning, formation and development of new capabilities.

If these 6 pillars represent the ideal of a well-functioning public administration, politicization can then be found at any level of these 6 pillars. Political influence can be exercised to neglect real

institutional needs; to manipulate the recruitment processes; to arbitrarily remove or reassign workers; to establish disparate salaries due to affinities with leaders, etc.

NPM scholars were convinced that incumbent politicians needed to regain control over bureaucrats to maximize efficiency. This may have made sense in developed countries, where already professional bureaucracies were stalling the political steering (and in this scenario we saw it is still debatable). But in developing countries, bureaucracies never departed from classic patronage systems—or were at least hybrids going halfway—that discretionally hire, assign, remove and promote personnel in a clientelist logic. For countries in Latin America for example, this optimistic take could only provide more foundations to keep the status quo for elites that concentrate power over political and economic sectors, that as of today still have a lot of liberty to hire, change and remove personnel with every change of government. More political intervention in the civil service can only cause concentration of power. As Rajagopal (1999) says, is not only the absence or decay of institutions that causes corruption as the disempowerment of the people who are the victims of corruption.

In this sense, professional and stable bureaucrats (with good accountability mechanisms) still represent the best way to enhance the mechanisms to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, by reducing both opportunities and incentives. Meritocratic bureaucracies have higher *bargaining power* and should have reasonable *transaction costs*. Bargaining power refers to the capacity of vis-à-vis negotiations as proportional to amount of resources each actor controls. Transaction costs are the costs of bargaining policy and of implementing policy once it has been bargained (Young, 2009; Cheibub, 1998; Levi, 1988). While economic development is usually the main mechanism to increase bargain power, professionalization, autonomy and job security correspond powerful mechanisms to increase bargain power among agents at the institutional level.

Based on the discussion above, I put forward the following testable proposition:

“Higher the level of politization in public administration, higher the level of human rights violations”

# Chapter 2

## Large-N Analysis

### 2.1 Methodological considerations

In this research I use one of the most popular quantitative methodologies in Political Science: Large-N analysis. This type of methodology allows to encounter patterns across a wide variety of countries around the globe and through time. The countries are picked randomly avoiding selection biases. Large-N analysis can have higher external validity and generalizability than small-N studies, due to the size of the sample and the techniques used to test the hypotheses. Conclusions can be extended over bigger populations, and findings can be tested outside the discipline and be relevant for a great variety of areas and topics (Coppedge, 2002). In comparison to small-N case studies where conclusions cannot be transferred to different circumstances.

The specific technique used corresponds to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis of cross-sectional data. This technique is useful to estimate relationships between independent and dependent variables, and to explain the effects of particular causes (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010). First, with help from a software, the technique determines if the relation is statistically significant. Second, it allows the researcher to assess how much the dependent variable gets affected by changes on the independent variable. In other words, OLS regressions can help me test *H1*, that says that “*higher the level of politization in the public administration, higher the level of human rights violations*”. And will give a numeric value of how much exactly it varies by moving one unit up or down the X axis. In practical words, it will showcase how violations can decrease by increasing depoliticization measures. This type of modelling is extremely valuable for defining effective policy responses, as policymakers can develop and implement more specific and efficient goals. The generalizability of this method also adds international relevance to the study. In this case, by testing the relationship, the thesis brings attention among researchers and politicians on observing more carefully how these two dynamics are performing across countries.

## 2.2 Bivariate Analysis

For my Large-N Analysis I first examine the bivariate relationship between measures of bureaucratic depoliticization and an indicator for the protection of human rights. I have selected 2 different measures of bureaucratic depoliticization to showcase the relationship: one in the main analysis and one in robustness checks. In the next paragraphs I will introduce the variables that I have selected to explore the relationship and why these variables are useful for this purpose.

### 2.1.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study is a measure of levels of protection and violations of human rights provided by the Fragile State Index (FSI), which is produced by Fund For Peace (FFP). With a N-sample of 177 countries, it pays special attention to identify pressures outweighing states' capacity. The index is highly useful due to its methodology, as it triangulates data from three streams: quantitative datasets, content analysis and qualitative expert analysis. The ratings are based on the total scores of 12 social, economic, and political indicators. For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable).

For this particular case, I have only used the data provided for the Human rights indicator (indicator N. 9). The Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator considers first, levels of human rights protection as they appear *de jure*. Second, it looks for abuse of legal, political and social rights by or against individuals, organized groups or institutions. With especial attention to measure violence exercised by the State against civilians, not only in terms of bodily integrity but in the form of forced relocations and partiality for denying permits and other rights to specific groups. Within its measures it actually considers politization of several governmental branches such as judiciary, and how they affect denial of due processes, persecution of political dissidents, etc.

### 2.2.2 Independent Variables

I used data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which collects information related to corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. The measure I use, was constructed by the QoG Institute, using the ICRG data. It has a scale of 0-1, where higher values indicate higher quality of government and less risk of corruption. The index consists of 3 indicators combined. All 3 indicators are highly useful and relevant to the research problem. For instance, when observing corruption, the index is more interested in examples of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favor-favor, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. These are politization examples that can be found at the bureaucratic level and that can become incentive for human rights violations. The Law and order indicator measures levels of impartiality of the legal system. And finally the Bureaucratic Quality indicator measures autonomy from political pressure, continuity of public policies and established mechanisms for recruitment and training.

Second, as a robustness check I used the Government Effectiveness Index from the World Bank. This index is relevant as it integrates a great variety of measures on quality of public service provision, quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. It has 192 observations and the cross-sectional data is from 2016.

### 2.2.3 Control Variables

The first control variable of this analysis is conflict intensity, measured by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). The index has a specific indicator that measures levels of social, ethnic and religious conflicts. With data from 177 countries, this categorical variable goes from 1-10, where 0 stands for the absence of conflict, and 10 for the presence of civil war or a widespread violent conflict based on social, ethnic or religious differences. Controlling for this is highly important as conflicts can undermine state capacity and government effectiveness. In recalcitrant conditions such as violent ethnic tensions, governments may find it more difficult to implement and carry on with its goals (e.g. tax collection or public goods provision). At the same time, conflicts will definitely put pressure or increase incentives from politicians and bureaucrats to violate human rights. Using the same example, a country with undergoing ethnic rivalry, bureaucrats and politicians may find it



reasonable and valid to discriminate or use the institutional power to pursue political dissent. Nevertheless, by including this variable I will be able to test that if the presence of conflict affects the focal relationship between bureaucracy and human rights.

I also control for Gross Domestic Product per capita. The information is provided by the World Bank and the numbers are in constant 2010 US Dollars. GDP is the total monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, it is broadly used to estimate the level of economic development of a country. GDP per capita is the GDP divided by midyear population. GDP per capita is a huge determining factor for a great variety of social and political phenomena, therefore is important to control for.

Democracy is also a relevant variable when it comes to assessing the protection of Human Rights. As discussed in the theoretical framework, democracies are always expected to perform better when it comes to protection of Human Rights. Therefore, I am controlling for Democracy to test the strength of the focal relationship under powerful alternative explanation. I am using the V-Dem dataset of Liberal Democracy Index (2019). The Index scores the strength of democratic institutions from weak to strong (0-1). The index aggregates variables across several dimensions, including suffrage rights, clean elections, equality before the law, constraints on the executive, and freedom of association and expression, among others.

## 2.2.4 Results of bivariate analysis

Figures N.1 and N.2 depict the relationship between the measures of depoliticized bureaucracy and human rights protection. As seen in these figures the scatterplots show strong, negative, linear relationships between both variables, that seem to support *H1*: Countries with high levels of politicization in the public administration also observe high levels of violations of human rights. The values of Y decrease as the values of X increase. And when assessing the  $R^2$ , 58-59% of the cases can be explained by this linear model, indicating a strong fit. Hardly any country seems to have low levels of violation of human rights and high levels of politicization of bureaucracy.


---

<sup>6</sup> Investopedia: "GDP"


In Figure 1, cases start to appear at a minimum of .4 on *X*, with countries like Romania and South Africa. In fact, the mean for the ICRG variable is of .53. Middle eastern countries like Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates appear to slightly move away from the line of best fit. Despite ranking quite high on quality of government, the reports for human rights violations remain extremely high for these countries. This may have to do with what Cole (2016) suggested by observing that bureaucratic quality only reduced incentives for violations in conjunction with executive constraints and competitive elections. So, how are democracies performing according to the scatterplot?

Democracies appear distributed across all the scatterplot. Which seems to indicate that democracy per se is not enough to protect against human rights violations (though they do not score highest compared to more authoritarian regimes). Anglo-Saxon and northern-European democracies appear close with good scores for bureaucratic quality and low violation of human rights, though the United States is an interesting case as it seems to rank slightly higher on Human Rights Violations in comparison to previous years, almost at the same level with former soviet countries such as Poland. By glancing over several Human Rights Watch reports, it looks this may have to do with recent immigration policies instructed by President Trump, and the ongoing protests against systemic racism and police brutality, topics that have been an issue for decades but simply swept under the rug. Latin American countries appear all very close together on around .4 on *X* and around .6 on *Y*. Countries known to have high levels of corruption or complex social conflicts like Mexico hold constant on Figures 1 and 2 very close to the line of best fit, with high levels of violations and high levels of politicization of its bureaucracy. Same for democracies that lately have manifested higher levels of authoritarianism like the Philippines or Russia. Democracies with low GDP per capita such as Somalia and Haiti appear at the very top of the slope with high levels of politicization and violations of human rights, which implies that levels of economic growth may be a contributing factor.

**Figure 1. Bivariate relationship between violations of Human Rights and bureaucratic depoliticization, using ICRG.**



**Figure 2. Bivariate relationship between violations of Human Rights and bureaucratic depoliticization, using G.E.I**



## 2.3 Multi-variate Analysis

I now move to test the relation suggested in my hypothesis (H1) in a multi-variate analysis. I have selected a cross-sectional regression analysis of 100+ countries with collected data from 2018. Cross-sectional data allow for observations of many subjects at the same time. While using time-series could have been interesting for monitoring change in policy implementation, cross-sectional data is sufficient as a first exploratory step in order to get the big picture of the issue, as bureaucracy is widely seen as a rather rigid and stable institution (Dahlström et al. 2015). Table 1 presents a summary statistics of variables used in this multi-variable analysis.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for variables used in the Large-N analysis**

	<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Dependent	Fragile State Index: Human Rights	177	5.77	2.57	1	9.8
Independent	International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)	139	0.53	0.20	0.08	0.97
	Government Effectiveness (WB)	192	-0.07	0.99	-2.35	2.20
Control	Conflict intensity (BTI)	136	4.83	2.20	1	10
	Democracy (V-Dem)	173	0.41	0.26	0.01	0.87
	GDP per capita (WB)	187	14,559	22,865	219.96	193,745

### 2.3.1 Results of the multi-variate analysis

Table 3 displays the results of the OLS regression models. The models show results attained holding or removing different controlling variables (a summary can be found in Table 2). Model 1 presents the results of the bivariate analysis of bureaucracy depoliticization and violations of human rights, with no control variables. In Model 2, I control for conflict intensity to observe if this affects the significance of the regression. In Model 3, I control for democracy holding conflict constant. While in Model 4, I remove democracy and hold GDP and conflict constant. In Model 5, I control for GDP holding democracy and conflict constant.

**Table 2. Description of OLS regression models presented in Tables 3 and 4**

Model 1	No control variables
Model 2	Controlling for conflict intensity
Model 3	Controlling for democracy holding conflict constant
Model 4	Controlling for GDP, no democracy, holding conflict constant
Model 5	Controlling for GDP, holding democracy and conflict constant

The results on Model 1 demonstrate that the effect of bureaucracy depoliticization over human rights is statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). The coefficient is negatively signed and together with its magnitude ( $\beta = -9.70$ ) suggests a strong positive effect of depoliticized bureaucracy on human rights protection. Specifically, going from 0 to 1 on the bureaucracy depoliticization, human rights violations go down 9.7 points on the  $Y$  scale, thus practically disappearing. However, as introduced on the control variables section, there are several contextual elements that may alter the effects bureaucracy, as social problems are multicausal. Therefore, Model 2 introduces the conflict intensity variable to assess if ongoing conflicts affect the focal relation. Though Conflict intensity enters significant ( $\beta = 0.46$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), bureaucracy depoliticization remains significant and signed as expected ( $\beta = -4.2$ , and  $p < 0.01$ ). Regarding the magnitude of bureaucracy's effect, existing social conflicts seem to diminish its strength – the coefficient is reduced almost in half, going from -9 to -4. This means that even in countries with pre-existing social, ethnical or religious conflicts, autonomy of bureaucracy can still protect against human rights violations.

In Model 3, I control for Democracy holding conflict intensity constant, to test if democratic measures such as competitive elections nullify the significance of H1. In this case, Democracy proves significance with  $\beta = -6.17$  and  $p < 0.001$ , affecting the bureaucracy variable. The high coefficient expresses the drastic change that can be achieved by implementing democratic regimes. In comparison to a more subtle  $\beta = -1.64$ , of bureaucracy depoliticization. But even so, the results for my I.V. show significance and probability with  $p < 0.05$ . One can see that Democracy certainly helps to reduce Human Rights Violations, but not the point where bureaucrats and politicians are exempt. The  $R^2$  of 0.7 express that a substantial amount of countries can be explained by the model and follow closely the best-fit line. What about the level of economic development? Does it affects the focal relationship? When I remove Democracy and hold GDP constant, as seen in Model 4, with  $R^2$  accounting for 47% of the observations around the mean, the significance stays at  $p < 0.001$  with Bureaucracy depoliticization showing a strong negative slope with a beta value of -5.34, in

comparison with  $\beta = 0.50$ ,  $p < 0.001$  of conflict intensity and  $\beta = 0.003$ ,  $p > 0.05$  of GDP. Changes in economy do not seem to be significant enough to be related to changes on Human Rights protection, when not controlling for Democracy. But in Model 5, when I hold everything constant (conflict, democracy, GDP) the relationship seems to lose statistical significance ( $\beta -1.15$ ,  $p = 0.26$ ). In this model, conflict and democracy remained significant, with Democracy's beta value of  $-6.18$ , pointing to the large magnitude of the effect of democracy.

**Table 3. OLS regression models for the effects of bureaucratic politization over human rights outcomes**

	Human Rights				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Bureaucracy Politization	-9.70*** (0.70)	-4.21** (1.25)	-1.64* (0.79)	-5.34*** (1.52)	-1.15 (1.02)
Conflict intensity		0.46*** (0.78)	0.27*** (0.50)	0.50*** (0.08)	0.27*** (0.05)
Democracy			-6.17*** (0.47)		-6.18*** (0.50)
GDP pc				0.003 (0.00)	-0.0008 (0.00)
Cons	10.71*** (0.40)	6.12*** (0.84)	8.15*** (0.54)	6.17*** (0.88)	7.96*** (0.57)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.46	0.79	0.47	0.78
N	137	108	108	105	105

*Std Errors* in parentheses

GDP pc: Gross Domestic Product per capita

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### 2.3.2 Robustness check

In order to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 3, I re-run the analysis using an alternative indicator for independent variable. Table 4 presents results, using the Government Effectiveness Index from the World Bank (2016). It includes indicators such as quality of bureaucracy, competence of civil servants, and the independence of the civil service from political pressures. In this case,  $R^2$  is accounting for around 50% in 3 cases and around 78% in 2 cases, which is substantial. The significance of the focal relationship stays for all 5 models, despite GDP, Democracy or Conflict intensity. With  $p < 0.001$  on Models 1,2,3,4 and  $p < 0.05$  on Model 5. However, their coefficients are way smaller than its correspondent models in Table 3. Highest coefficient starts at beta value of -2, with no control variables. This means that by dragging X on one unit of the scale, human rights violations would be reduced on around 2 numbers. In comparison to 9.7 on the original ICRG measure.

Since Model 5 of Table 3 was the model where H1 lost significance, I dedicate more attention to compare the results on this model. As mentioned above, unlike Table 3, the results on Model 5 for my alternative variable (Table 4) do show significance of H1 with  $p < 0.05$ . Though the beta value of -0.39 depicts a more subtle effect over human rights. According to this robustness check, bureaucracy depoliticization can reduce human rights violations on around 0.39 of the Y axis when moving one unit up on X. Conflict intensity and democracy both show  $p$  values minor to 0.001, and bigger coefficients of 0.2 and -6.02 respectively, sustaining the behavior and importance of democracy. In this case, control variables throw very similar results on Table 3.

Speaking about the effect of GDP. When observing Table 4 it shows significance without the presence of democracy, unlike Table 3 where it does not. But GDP seem to lose relevance in Model 5 of both tables, that is when democracy is also present. In both tables GDP throws positive beta values in a negative relation. This results allow me to support the idea that GDP can actually be an adverse element when not accompanied by a democratic regime.



**Table 4. OLS regression models for the effects of bureaucratic politization over human rights outcomes, using alternative variable (G.E.I)**

	<b>Human Rights</b>				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Bureaucracy	-2.004***	-1.206***	-0.435**	-1.444***	-0.394*
depoliticization (Government Effectiveness Index)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.18)
Conflict Intensity		0.298***	0.211***	0.336***	0.218***
		(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.75)	(0.05)
Democracy			-5.997***		-6.023***
			(0.44)		(0.48)
GDP per capita				0.00423*	-0.000388
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Cons	5.596***	4.752***	7.506***	4.164***	7.523***
	(0.12)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.37)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.59	0.49	0.78	0.49	0.77
N	177	135	135	130	130

*Std Errors* in parentheses

GDP per capita = Gross Domestic Product per capita

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 2.4 Conclusion of the Large-N Analysis.

The results of the Large-N analysis supported the hypothesis (H1), and showed that the relationship suggested has strength in all types of political regimes, even in democratic ones. In countries with ongoing social conflicts, or different levels of economic development. Nonetheless, in the first test (table 3) the relationship lost significance on Model 5, when controlling for democracy and economic development at the same time. This is probably because developed countries with strong democratic principles and high GDP already show low levels of human rights violations per se. And most of these already have professional civil services in practice. However, when running the same specific model with the alternate independent variable in the robustness check (table 4), the results did supported the hypothesis and depicted a subtle but significant relationship between human rights violations and depolitization measures, even for these countries ( $R^2 = .77$ ). This illustrates that overall, countries can always benefit from implementing meritocratic regimes, and that Human Rights seem to be better protected with these measures. The small difference obtained on each I.V also signals that politization still remains a complex concept to measure, and the results may be influenced by the empirical evidence that each dataset pays attention to. For these reasons, is always important to accompany the OLS regression analysis with additional quantitative or qualitative methodologies, such as case studies, that can help the researcher refine the concepts and nail down the mechanisms by which the relationship is significant. This is why therefore I selected a case study in the next chapter.

# Chapter 3

## Case study analysis: El Salvador

### 3.1 Methodological considerations

A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a single phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident (Yin, 2014). The purpose of this case study is to further develop the hypothesis tested on the Large-N analysis, and unravel some causal mechanisms affecting the phenomenon: How and why bureaucracy politicization is affecting human rights outcomes in El Salvador?

Case study analysis has a large tradition within political science. The work of King, Keohane and Verba in 1994 illustrates the academic efforts to provide more methodological robustness in the edge of computer science while still acknowledging its capital importance. George & Bennet (2005) identify four main strengths of case study methods: 1) strength on conceptual validity, case studies are extremely helpful to refine complex concepts that are difficult to measure (e.g. politicization) enabling for contextualized comparisons that help establish analytical equivalents. 2) strength for derivation of new hypotheses, it helps identifying new variables and hypotheses escaping the theory been tested. 3) strength for exploration of causal mechanisms and 4) capacity for modeling and assessing complex causal relations, allowing the researcher to identify unexpected aspects, relationships, and conditions activating the causal mechanisms. This is why therefore a case study analysis is proceeding the Large-N analysis. The holistic feature of this method helps approaching it from different epistemological orientations. In here, I am following an abductive reasoning, since I am using an over-arching pattern suggested by both the literature and the results of the Large-N Analysis to interpret and understand a single case (Alvesson & Sköldbberg, 2009).

The country selection corresponds with what Gerring (2008) categorized as a *typical case*. After interpreting the results of the bivariate analysis in Chapter 2, I have selected this country as it appears close to the variables' mean and the regression line. In the bivariate analysis El Salvador appears close to the line of best fit, and it's located around 6 on Y, and 0.3 on X. The mean of these variables is of 5.7 and 0.5 respectively. This helps me ensure that this country will be as representative

of the focal relationship as possible (causal typicality) and reduces the risk of selection bias. It also responds to my purpose of exploring a developing country, where politicization of bureaucracy is less explored and human rights violations tend to happen more often.

Applying Yin’s methodology of case study research (2014), I use a combination of techniques to analyze the case:

- Documentation (Academic articles, NGO reports, media reports, etc.),
- Archival records (Laws, decrees, official statistics, administrative documents, etc.) &
- Interviews to country experts<sup>7</sup>

Direct observations are also encouraged but they will not be included in this study due to geographical limitations.

The amount of sources is determined by what Marshall & Rossman (2016) call “theoretical sufficiency”, this is until I observe similar patterns coming repetitively on analyzing the evidence, or until I make sure that every defined category of analysis is well described and fitting the data.

## **3.2 The Case of El Salvador**

### **3.2.1 The situation of Human Rights**

The most visible human rights violations known to be perpetuated by the State are related to the abuse of force of the national police. Among the main abuses reported stand out arbitrary detentions, police harassment, and house break-ins without search orders. And among the most severe, and that represent a direct threat to life, stand out the use of lethal force in armed confrontations and extrajudicial killings of people involved in crime. This has been broadly reported by international NGOs such as Amnesty International<sup>8</sup> and Human Rights Watch<sup>9</sup>, as well as local institutions such as the Human Rights Institute of the Central American University (IDHUCA, 2020).

During the 90s the country saw the emergence of a strong gang culture called *Maras*. These gangs have assumed considerable transnational size, relevance and impact, with their participation in organized crime such as extortion, kidnapping, drug and human trafficking; and has become the main

---

<sup>7</sup> A table with names, jobs and expertise of the experts interviewed can be found as Appendix N. 1

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/el-salvador/report-el-salvador/>

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/americas/el-salvador>

source of violence and social unrest in the country (Ventura, 2010). Today, the number of gang members is of around 29 000 people. In 2017, the rate of intentional homicides reach 62 per each 100 000 habitants, which is considered high, almost 90% of these killings were related to gang activity (World Bank, 2017).

The State, regardless of political party, has traditionally justified the strong use of force as it believes to be the only method to eradicate criminality. The report of the University Observatory of Human Rights of El Salvador (OUDH, 2020) shows that in 2019, 8% of the homicides were victims of the national police. According to cross-country studies this number should never be more than 5%. This has demonstrated that far from tackling down the problems, the state has become yet another actor of violence in several territories where armed confrontations are the rule.

Among main human rights violations not perpetuated by the state, stand out forced displacement of populations and sexual violence. Force displacement is a direct consequence of violence, gang control and armed confrontations. The victims are constantly moving to avoid either conflict or been in the middle of inter-gang activity. Many of them end up migrating towards other countries such as the United States, under very irregular routes and mechanisms. This puts them at the mercy of human traffickers and other types of aggressions. Regarding sexual and gender violence, the OUDH reports that by 2019, there was an alarming result of 85 victims per 100 000 inhabitants, where 92% of the cases were women. In a country where sexual violence is so high, unwanted pregnancies are common, The country's approach to abortion continues to be disproportionate, since its punished with the most severe sentences and has put many women in jail.

Besides the visible problems with the national police, are other types of rights been violated by other ministries? When I asked this question to the 5 experts interviewed they all agreed that “yes”, pointing to different types of rights been violated by other bureaucratic agencies due to levels of bureaucracy politicization, but not in such levels of visibility, mostly because they do not represent direct attempts on other people's lives, which is why they tend to go unnoticed. For instance, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) —those rights that stipulate access to adequate health and social security, adequate food, adequate housing, education and culture, adequate working rights, and access to water and sanitation— the country holds the position 124 in the Human Development Index, with a value of 0.667 by 2019<sup>10</sup> next to countries like Vietnam, Morocco or India. Even though ESCR are highly dependent of economic development and are usually treated as secondary, the ineffectiveness of the state can only aggravate their deprivation, resulting in more poverty and

---

<sup>10</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SLV>

vulnerability (OHCHR, 2008). The report of the Human Rights Institute (IDHUCA, 2020) stress that if these are left unattended, is impossible to reduce and overcome the levels of structural and symbolic violence in the country.

### **3.2.2 Linking the variables and unraveling the causal mechanisms**

The success of goals and measures advocated to respect, protect and fulfil human rights in El Salvador is pressured by several factors. First, levels of economic development slow down the progressive realization of these rights, but also give excuses to governments to neglect its obligations. Second, the polarization of the political culture and the lack of institutionalized political parties with strong programmatic agendas is constantly adding high levels of tension over the design, negotiation, approval, implementation, and the continuity of policies, agreements, regulations, etc. Third, the discretionary levels of appointments without any merit-based standards make bureaucrats dependable on the will of their political masters, and undermines the capacity to secure the quality of human capital managing the policies that respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. . And fourth, the massive amount of dismissals every change of government makes almost impossible to sustain and accumulate knowledge and experience; it is hindering the capacity to establish strong measurement indicators that can provide information on progress.

As observed, the first and second factors are not directly associated to the focal relationship been explored (H1) but they can influence it, thus it results relevant to study how these are affecting both human right outcomes, and the incentives for establishing meritocratic regimes in the public administration. Therefore, I will digress a bit to investigate these two.

#### **Factor N. 1. “Levels of economic development slow down the progressive realization of rights, but also give excuses to governments to neglect its obligations”:**

El Salvador enjoys a GDP per capita of \$4027 (2019), which is considered medium-low, and locates it on a group of countries as diverse as Bolivia, Ukraine, Morocco or The Philippines. With an area of 21,041 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 6,704,121 habitants by 2018, the country is the most densely populated of the Americas. Nonetheless, while the country has been growing at a rhythm of 2-3% per

year in the last 20 years, it has managed to significantly reduce inequality levels, going from 0.5 to 0.38 on the Gini coefficient (World Bank, 2019). The country's economy has been traditionally dependent of agricultural exports. However, throughout the last 20 years it has pursued a stronger policy towards Manufacturing industrialization and Services. But here, violence and crime are the main threats for fostering investment and making business thrive, hindering the state capacity to create jobs. The violence and the lack of opportunities represent the two main reasons for internal displacement and migration of the population. Astonishingly, the inflow of foreign remittances account for 20,6% of the GDP (World Bank, 2019), which means that a vast amount of families is highly dependent of this informal income transferred by migrants and refugees from abroad. While this may be a palliative for many, it increases levels of economic dependency (especially of women and children), and of employment vulnerability (recipients are less likely to have formal work arrangements and therefore decent working conditions) (ILO, 2018).

The income that the central government “loses” on remittances and that could be receiving by generating formal employment, reduces the economic capacity of the state to implement policies advocated to the reduction of poverty, violence or tackling down job informality and indecent working and living conditions. When interviewed, Álvaro Artiga<sup>11</sup> suggested that given the scarcity of resources and the few opportunities that the economy offers to people in order to obtain legitimate means and ascend on the social structure; politics, along with the army and the church, still represents a legitimate opportunity for people to improve their quality of life, as well as those of their families and friends. The public administration is still perceived as a legitimate option for social mobility, at least while their political party is in office.

But as Young (2009) and Englehart (2009) pointed out, if getting to office or entering the public administration represents first an instrumental motive, the incentives of both politicians and bureaucrats for pursuing the fulfilment of human rights of others will certainly be weak. Nonetheless, as we saw in the results of the Large-N analysis, high levels of economic development are not a cure for human rights violations, and that even in scenarios of either very low or very high economic development, measures of depolitization of the bureaucracy can prove significant when it comes to better protection of human rights.

---

<sup>11</sup> Ph.D. in Political Science, Professor of Political Science at the Central American University (UCA)

**Factor N. 2. “The polarization of the political culture and the lack of institutionalized political parties with strong programmatic agendas is constantly adding high levels of tension over the design, negotiation, approval, implementation, and the continuity of policies, agreements, regulations, etc.”:**

Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the country was ruled mainly by authoritarian military groups. From 1982 to 1992 the country experienced a civil war between the right-wing in power and insurgent left groups. The war left almost 75 000 deaths in those 10 years (Falcon, 2015). Since the return of peace in 1992 these two groups have alternated power for periods of around 10 years. Last year, president Nayib Bukele took office with a third party coalition.

The historical confrontation of the two parties, and the most recent win of a third, has established a culture of deadlock in political agreements, and of riddance of any pre-existing programs. This low levels of cooperation impact the quality of the decision-making. At the same time, the lack of a strong programmatic agenda within the parties undermines the possibilities of designing and implementing proper long-term solutions (Alas, 2018; Stein & Tommasi, 2006). This perception is also supported by Manuel Escalante<sup>12</sup>, that stressed that campaigns are centered “on a rejection of everything that has been previously done, and focused on short-term electoral results”. This can have direct consequences over peoples’ lives. For instance, Wolf (2017) saw that the “Firm Hand Plan” against violence and gangs in 2003 was a mere punitive populist strategy to increase popularity for the upcoming 2004 elections and was willing to go beyond the respect of human rights. The plan included reforms to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedures that increased political harassment and arbitrary detentions under the basis of mere subjective suspicion. The law ended up being declared unconstitutional 1 year later. If policies are constantly changed or if there is no proper design, there can be no clear path to achieving results. But also when it comes to human rights, where the fulfilment of several of these rights is generally accomplished gradually, measuring the processes is as important as measuring the outcomes. The ends do not justify the means.

When interviewed, Nayda Medrano<sup>13</sup> pointed that more civil discussion and political representation is important for human rights protection, and what has historically happened in the country is the opposite: low levels of participation and low levels of individual empowerment. In El Salvador, politics is a process so disconnected from people and concentrated on such small elites and

---

<sup>12</sup> Lawyer, Sub-Director of the Human Rights Institute of the Central American University (IDHUCA)

<sup>13</sup> Political Scientist, independent consultant in Human Rights matters



groups of economic power, that they have had a free pass molding institutions according to their will. Thus, we could say that politization could also mean concentration and capture of what should be of public interest. In this sense, meritocratic measures will help reduce the levels of concentration of power and regain the institutionality from its capture. At the same time, the improvement on human rights realization as a consequence of these measures has a multiplier effect, citizens become more empowered and can participate more actively in the political culture.

**Factor N. 3. “The discretionary levels of appointments without any merit-based standards make bureaucrats dependable on the will of their political masters, and undermines the capacity to secure the quality of human capital managing the policies that respect, protect, and fulfil human rights”.**

The third factor brings us back to our focal relation between bureaucracy and human rights protection. El Salvador experiences a highly politicized and clientelist bureaucracy. This politization is mostly observed through: 1) a strong manipulation of the recruiting processes 2) High-levels of liberty and discretionality of authorities to assign people 3) the lack of standardized criteria for promoting personnel, mostly relying on political trust 4) the lack of security against arbitrary rotation and severance (Iacoviello & Strazza, 2014; FUSADES & IND, 2019; IDB, 2006). All of these elements evidence that in El Salvador bureaucratic offices remain a valuable political asset for incumbent parties.

Public Employment in El Salvador is regulated by the Civil Service Law of 1961. It aims to organize and shape the country’s bureaucracy, especially the conditions for entering, for promoting, for transferring, as well as for suspensions and severance<sup>14</sup>. However, the incumbent governments never released the executive decree the needs to accompany the law, leaving a huge gray area when it comes to defining, implementing and restricting public employment, as well as the governing authority in charge of the whole civil service. This means that there was no political will to guarantee the implementation of the law. As of today there is still no governing authority in charge of supervising the whole organization of public employment.

The only two bodies envisaged in the law to oversee the process of personnel management in public bureaucracy are ad-hoc bodies: the Civil Service Tribunal and the Civil Service Commission.

---

<sup>14</sup> Law of Civil Service of El Salvador N. 507 of 1961

The Civil Service Tribunal was conceived de jure as a body that should have both legal and administrative functions. It has to define, manage and oversee the required guidelines and necessary qualifications for entering the public service, while also making sure this is applied (enforce the law). But this tribunal is constituted by judges that only hold ad-hoc sessions, they are not dedicated full time to these matters. “It is a very fragile authority that has not manage neither conduct the process” says Jose Antonio Morales<sup>15</sup>. The second authority, the Civil Service Commission are actually institutional-level commissions comprised of: a representative of the minister or director of the institution, a representative of the employees, and a representative of the civil service tribunal. In the paper, these 3 persons are in charge of managing the whole process of admission and recruitment of the institution. If there is a vacancy available at a ministry, the commission is expected to hold a meeting to approve the recruitment of a new person, mandate when and how the tests and interviews will be, and select 3 final candidates.

“What has happened in practice?” says Morales “that these commissions have never worked properly. Either because they do not care to do it or just because they do not have the time to do so. Because this represents extra work form them. So at the end, what is actually happening is that the Human Resources department does not even take them in consideration for the recruitment process and assumes the whole process of recruitment. And these attributions are not stipulated in law, every vacancy should be reviewed by the commission...So, who is overseeing the impartiality of the processes and defining legal-bound rules? ...Some Human Resources departments have implemented regulations and are very good at it, but others do not. There is no standardized procedure for recruitment and there is no governing authority dedicated full time to the supervision of these processes” expressed the expert.

Mónica Tobar<sup>16</sup> believes that the negligence do not comes mostly from the H.R departments but from decisions from above, political decisions. When working on a study to map the current situation of the public service, she run focal groups with the HR directors of several ministries “and most of them were very committed people, that know very well the guidelines established in the law. They collaborate a lot to establish more standard criteria of selection and the homogenization of posts. They show openness to the implementation of performance reviews. For instance, the Ministry of Environment on its own developed a very thorough system of evaluation, training and non-monetary compensation scheme” For Tobar, the problem is that there is no actual limitation on levels of

---

<sup>15</sup> Former Sub-Secretary of Governance and Modernization of the State for the Presidents of El Salvador from 2009-2019 Current director of the Master’s program in Public Administration of the UCA.

<sup>16</sup> Economist, Researcher at the Department of Political Studies of FUSADES and author of the study “*Challenges and opportunities of the public service in El Salvador*” (FUSADES & IND, 2019)

discretionality when assigning the so-called people of trust. “Is not just 5 people been assigned every time a new minister comes on board. They can choose the leads on almost every department of the institution and that cascades down”. A study done by FUSADES & IND (2019) revealed that in the Ministries the number of appointments usually exceeds drastically the number of internal and external selection processes. For instance, between 2009 and 2018 the ministries reported 21,584 appointments and only 8,493 official selection processes. Trust appointments account for around 26%. In here, the authorities have the liberty to directly assign people of their trust, without mediation of any type of aptitude test. And an astonishing 38% of the appointments does not have any explanation of either selection process or direct appointment.


For Jose Antonio Morales this level of ambiguity of the law, and lack of governing authority derives in a clear violation of the Article 25 of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, that establishes that *“every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs; and to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his/her country. No distinctions are permitted between citizens in the enjoyment of this right on the ground race, color, sex, language, religion or political affiliation”*. “This is constantly violated” says Morales “citizens are discarded and discriminated because they do not have expected political affiliations or the right nexus to incumbent leaders. Even if they meet the expected criteria! And it’s a problem that when observed should lead to lawsuits...in international courts if citizens run out of local options. I’ve seen these lawsuits in other countries where people have appealed to court for to selection discrimination and have set a precedent”.

From 2004 to 2015 the country’s metrics on merit showed a slight but constant improvement (Figure N. 3) even though the regional average improved 12 points, still does not reaches 50%. And while El Salvador improved 20 points in 11 years, it only managed to reach a score obtained by the region back in 2004. Therefore, one could say that on merit the country is still a decade behind the regional average. The cases of Guatemala and Honduras are even more alarming.

Mónica Tobar suggests that the reasons of this improvement can be found in 2 main actions. The first one was that the government and party that took office in 2009, after 27 years of opposition, was very eager and open to receive the technical recommendations suggested by the international development agencies. And second, that the Secretary of Governance and Modernization of the Presidency demonstrated a stronger leading character and more commitment on the implementation of these reforms. This office tried to fill the gap of the non-existence of a governing authority, and developed certain key reforms. “This is why those numbers went up” says Tobar. However, this office

was recently shut down with the change of government in 2019, and the whole department and personnel scattered among several other offices. “We don’t know how these numbers are going to look in 5 years, honestly. We are yet to see!”

**Figure N. 3. Evolution of merit in the bureaucracies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 2004-2015.**



Sources: FUSADES (2019) & (OECD, 2017)

Iacoviello et. al (2012) highlights the capital importance of having a governing authority of the civil service with strong stability and leading capacity. These are necessary to provide coherence to the whole administration. To secure impartial recruitment and put a check on discretionality and nepotism, to tackle down inequalities in compensation and incentives, and to reduce the clear violation of the working rights related to arbitrary dismissals. As observed, if these initials elements are not in place, they trigger a domino effect that results in high levels of discretionality and liberty when it comes to decision-making and the possibilities to transgress rights.

Another consequence of the lack of a centralized governing authority of the civil service is that each ministry has the liberty to choose the type of contract and the level of compensation. Resulting in an astonishing violation of several working rights and promoting high levels of inequality within the same institution. Morales tells that when he took office as sub-secretary of modernization in 2009, they did an audit and found that around 3000 employees had wages below the minimum

wage stipulated by the law, and that 5200 had wages way over the top limit. “And not only that” he says “many of them were hired under temporary contracts or for fixed periods, not by what is called here national salary law” allowing the management a big flexibility for establishing these low levels of salary, and dismissing when necessary. “After that there was a huge effort to migrate many of these employees into salary law in order to provide them with more stability and reasonable compensation. But as of today, the practice of fixed term contracts is widely used”.

So far the only authority overseeing salaries is the Treasury Department, but the institution has a very basic payroll system that just allows them to pay wages. They do not have further tools defining categories or job descriptions. “And they do not have a saying regarding salaries” tells Morales “The director/minister sends the information of the new hire and he suggests the salary him/herself. The Treasury department just checks if they are able to allocate the resources to the institution that year...and that’s it, they just pay, regardless if that salary suits the position or not!”

By 2018, public employment in El Salvador occupied 7,7% of the total employment, representing about 2% of the total population. Despite the fact that the bureaucracy has been consistently growing around 1% per year in the last 10 years, going from 123,996 employees in 2014 to 128,106 in 2018; it still represents the second lowest in the region compared to a Latin American average of 12% of total employment. (IDB, 2018; FUSADES & IND, 2019). Nonetheless, public employment still accounts for about 40% of the fiscal revenues and around 20% of the public sector’s expenditure (Iacoviello & Chudnovsky, 2014; OECD, 2017). In 2018, the total wage bill of the central government was of 7% of the GDP (FUSADES & IND, 2019). These numbers suggest certain disconnection between size and spend. In a case like this, there is a risk that this may be related to a lack of planning in human resources and the inexistence of defined salary scales, which opens the gates for squandering. Public spend can be triggered when politicians broadly use appointments and promotions as political spoils and personal reward, in disconnection with real needs.

If by 2009 the state was paying salaries below the minimum stipulated by the law, while rewarding others with massive salaries, it directly contributed to a precariousness of the living conditions of its employees and this certainly represents a violation of human rights. This is what has been called management of poverty, it suits patrons and help politicians keep clientelist relations (Kitschell, 2000).

For both Morales and Tobar, politization of the bureaucracy is particularly affecting quality of the human capital of bureaucracy, which for them is key when it comes to secure the respect and the adequate protection of several human rights. Tobar asked: “if the personnel assigned to implement

a policy or safeguard the protection of rights is not at all selected by their merits but by their relationship, how can you guarantee quality on everyday tasks and their commitment to certain values and professional standards?”.

Discretionality or “at will systems” sets forth a dyadic relationship between the appointee and an individual with the appointing powers (the politician). If the politicians is directly providing the jobs their relationship is unequal in terms of power, and makes the bureaucrat responsive to the political preferences. In addition, if the threat of losing the job is very plausible, public managers will prefer to act upon political master’s preferences. Depolitization measures reduce “incentive intensity” and bargain power (Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). Under merit systems a politician, who wants to induce high responsiveness from her subordinates, can neither claim the credit for hiring the bureaucrats, nor credibly threaten with dismissal.

Let us analyze the case of the national police and the reports on abuse of force. The national police and the ministry of security are both institutions responding to the central government and hence follow political decisions. Regardless of political affiliations, fighting violence with stronger violence has become widely supported and promoted by the incumbent governments (OUDH, 2019, Alas, 2018). In a country so eager to reduce the number of homicides, a politicized police body is more likely to commit abuses, pressured by leaders that need to demonstrate results to their constituencies, even if this means neglecting international basic principles on the use of force and firearms<sup>17</sup>. In addition to this, if these officials are constantly feeling insecure about their jobs, and know that it depends on how successful they are suppressing crime and violence, they are more likely to use repression or allow the use of repression (Young, 2009). It is not necessarily that the minister or other politicians openly ask officers to go and execute people (which could be the case in many extrajudicial killings), it is that high levels of political responsiveness asked from bureaucrats cause the loss of bureaucratic autonomy, resulting in a disproportionate use of force. Since violations to bodily integrity rights are often committed by local agents and officials beyond the reach of their central governments Cole (2016), the absence of meritocracy and professionalization of the administrative staff in charge of defining and monitoring security tasks, there are few mechanisms in place that could filter and prevent the proportionate use of force, both for political orders from above as well as extra limitations of agents on the streets.

---

<sup>17</sup> As adopted by United Nation Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (Havana, 1990)

While more professionalization of the middle management should help reduce and prevent arbitrariness of political decisions demanding accountability and reduce levels of agency loss, there is still the problem of the actual professionalization and education of the lower levels: the police officers patrolling the streets. The mere recruitment process and career paths of police officers is of a slightly different nature than recruitment of bureaucrats at other central government institutions. Both the selection criteria for police officers and the approaches used to train them require more tailored and specific strategies. Thus tackling this problem will require a more tailored analysis.

Besides the cases of the National Police and the abuse of lethal force, direct evidence of bureaucrats failing to adhere to these standards, or openly crossing lines and neglecting the respect and protection of human rights are difficult to establish. This is because the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms do not facilitate the emergence of this evidence. Local NGOs sometimes assume this task by sharing scattered testimonies. At the same time, if the institutions are highly politicized it is expected that principals will be more willing to ignore this behavior, or as Cole (2016) suggested, either reward it or just deviate the blame if noticed. The fulfilment part has to do with the proper establishment of measurable indicators. As Kalantry et al. (2011) suggested, given that ESCR rights are gradually achieved, a state also violates ESC rights by not establishing proper compliance mechanisms.

Furthermore, the quality of human capital can also affect the proper design and implementation of policies aimed to achieved progressive realization of human rights, especially considering the context of polarization and clientelism in parties, as observed with the “Firm Hand Plan”. In the interviews, both Morales and Tobar expressed that the capacity of implementing policies to reduce poverty and violence and that affect human rights such as access to adequate nutrition, adequate health care, education and housing... “are all clear mirror image of how the institution is performing not just in terms of recruitment but in the way its organizing, its evaluating skills and performance”. In here the problem may not be values and ethics but actual skills. Especially if people performing technical jobs are swapped every change of government. This leads us to the next factor.

**Factor N. 4. “The massive amount of dismissals every change of government makes almost impossible to sustain and accumulate knowledge and experience”:**

In the interview Manuel Escalante brought the critical problem of arbitrary dismissals and renewal of personnel with every change of government. He commented that “the state is not fully capable of providing adequate standards, not only because of levels of economic development, but because even if there is explicit political interest in sustaining existing policies, the required knowledge to implement them disappears because you are constantly removing everyone”.

One of the first things President Bukele did when he took office in 2019 was to order the dismissal of thousands of public employees. The majority of these dismissals happened during the Christmas break while offices were closed, the employees just received their notification and had no opportunity to appeal<sup>18</sup>. For Álvaro Artiga, this behavior is not new and has been used by every party in power. “It has become relevant now because of the declarations and promises President Bukele did during his campaign” says Artiga “He emerged in a momentum when people was sick and tired of the two-party system, and especially after 10 years of the FMLN. He treated the opponents as thieves and proclaimed an anti-corruption raid. He justifies the dismissals as cleaning the institutions from corrupted people”. The FMLN has condemned the actions and expressed that public employees are suffering a witch hunt. “They are investigating you and finding out if you have any family or friend connection to the FMLN, and coming up with excuses to fire you” said to the press Roger Blandino Nerio, a leader of the FLMN, when he was disclosing that the President plans to dismiss around 20 000 employees due to the coronavirus crisis and following IMF guidelines<sup>19</sup>. These plans have not been officially announced by the President yet.

If the people with the practical experience is dismissed, the country is repetitively on a learning curve. One that looks very much like the J-shaped relationship illustrated by Bäck & Hadenius (2008), where they demonstrated that countries with low levels of state capacity saw their human development indicators decreased right after democratization processes. For Medellín (2004) even with policy continuity, the bureaucracy can generate a stagnation on the design and implementation as a mechanism of survival. A behavior that the principal-agent theory observed. But here, where there is a constant fear for losing its job, where there is no clear career paths to grow, and where there is strong patronage dependency, politicization is more likely what is generating a snowball effect, fragmenting and subjecting the policies to a wide variety of internal and external pressures. And therefore, been less conducive to the adequate protection of human rights.

---

<sup>18</sup> <https://verdaddigital.com/mas-de-1200-despidos-del-gobierno-bukele-en-vacaciones-dicembrinas/>

<sup>19</sup> <https://verdaddigital.com/bukele-pretende-despedir-a-20000-empleados-publicos/>





### 3.2.3 The big picture

In two thorough analyses that Zuvanic & Iacoviello (2010) and Iacoviello & Strazza (2013) did on public bureaucracy of Central American countries, they observed that bureaucracy works as a pyramid, or as a several story building (following a model suggested by Longo (2002) and discussed on Chapter 1). They commented that if the basement or the first pillars of the model are very weak or are missing, politization acts as a domino effect than can be tracked down to social and economic consequences . In this case I was able to explore the specific effects all the way down to human rights. I have showcased this phenomenon on Figure N. 4.

As observed in El Salvador, the two foundations are missing. No political party has committed to properly enable the civil service law of 1961. Consequently, El Salvador has no legal documents stipulating powers of the authority in charge of managing and overseeing the civil service. The lack of a governing authority with strong leadership and technical capabilities opens a legal loophole for exercising political discretionality in recruitment processes, resulting for instance in the discrimination in selection, nepotism and clientelist relations; and the every-day decision making, resulting for example in the disproportionate use of force by the national police, and the impossibility to internally sanction these actions. The politization has also allow the bureaucracy to be captured by private economic interests, reducing the incentives to put public interest at the center, empower individuals and promote citizen's participation. The massive amount of dismissals every change of government pose a threat for working rights and delays the learning curve, affecting quality. But also the level of control exercised by political parties means prioritization of short-term results only aimed to be appealing on election periods. This is hindering the adequate compliance and enforcement of the respect, protection and progressive realization of human rights.

**Figure N. 4. Problem tree showcasing how and why bureaucracy politization is less conducive to better protection of Human Rights in El Salvador**



## Conclusions

In this thesis I proposed the hypothesis that higher the levels of politization of a bureaucracy higher the violations of human rights in a country. Thus, I aimed to test if this focal relationship was significant, that is, if human rights outcomes have been affected by bureaucracy configurations or not; and if this was the case to further explore, through a case study, how and why this was happening. After performing a Large-N analysis of 100+ countries and using OLS regression models of cross-sectional data I found that this relationship proved significance, and that when mechanisms for depolitization of a bureaucracy increase, levels of human rights violations drastically decrease, depicting a strong negative linear relationship.

The results of the multi-variate analysis show the capital importance of Democracy when it comes to better protection of human rights, though not to the point to nullify the hypothesis, Democracy is not a cure in itself. And as expected, bureaucracy configurations are playing a key role. While levels of economic development and presence of conflict intensity also can affect the State capacity they didn't affect the focal relationship. Even in countries with high GDP per capita or with ongoing conflicts, measures for professionalizing the bureaucracy proved applicable and important. While the use of cross-sectional data in the Large-N analysis was helpful for a first exploratory step, further research should incorporate the use of time-series data to observe the historical evolution of bureaucratic reforms and how these can be affected by change of governments.

In the case study of El Salvador I explored how and why this configuration was less conducive to better protection of Human Rights. I was able to evidence that politization imposes high levels of discretionality across the public administration, resulting in opportunities for a) Principal's moral hazard behavior, especially responding to short-term electoral propaganda; b) Loss of agent's bargaining power, since agents fear to lose their jobs or are hold accountable by politicians and their authority to set limits and adhere to clear processes is reduced. And c) Agency loss, there is neither the ability and the incentives to actively monitor and control local rogue agents. At the same time, the manipulation of recruitment and appointment mechanisms is hindering the ability to secure the quality of human capital entering the civil service and undermines the capacity to efficiently implement policies and tasks aimed to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.

While case studies may have generalizability limitations, many of the key factors found in El Salvador seem highly relevant for a wide range of developing countries, and the lessons learned could be transferred and adopted by countries with similar contexts. In the literature review I was able to identify a research gap. Human rights literature has not paid enough attention to state configurations, and in Political Science and Public Administration, linking state capacity and human rights is a rather fresh topic, opening the possibilities to further develop these areas. It also seems that studies on bureaucracy politicization in developing countries is highly dispersed and isolated and it is here where researchers should direct their efforts, not only because of traditional levels of patronage on the public administration, but because is where human rights violations happen more often.

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. In times of disappointment for globalization and the Nation-State, the rise of populist and radical parties uses inefficiency arguments as valid motives to exercise the old patronage methods and reestablish loyal systems with high levels of clientelism for the sake of *efficiency*. Politization of bureaucracy is therefore not the answer for improving bureaucratic quality, and political oversight and control should not be distorted as a suggestion for politicization. In this topic the debate goes for instance, in the direction of what Peters & Pierre (2004) suggested with “responsive competence”, the government should be able to design recruitment mechanisms that foster the best professionals and expose unsuitability. Or what Evans & Rauch (2000) pointed out with effective peer-to-peer monitoring, among other strategies.

In conclusion, as long as the organization of the state in general and the quality of bureaucratic institutions in particular remain a secondary topic, countries’ performance in human development indexes will continue to disappoint.

## References

- Aberbach, J., Putnam, R., & Rockman, B., 1981. *Bureaucrats and politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P.
- Abouharb, R., & Cingranelli, D., 2007. Human Rights and Structural Adjustment. *World Politics*, 61(2), pp.360–401.
- AECID-FLACSO-SICA, 2012. 2nd Barometer of the Professionalization of Civil Service in Central America and Dominican Republic.
- Alas, 2018. La continuidad de las políticas públicas en El Salvador: Las políticas de seguridad ciudadana ante el fenómeno de las pandillas. *Revista Centroamericana de Administración Pública* N. 75. ICAP
- Alvesson, M. & Sköldbberg, K., 2009. *Reflexive methodology : new vistas for qualitative research*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.
- Amnesty International. “Everything you need to know about Human Rights in El Salvador 2019”. Accessed July, 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/el-salvador/report-el-salvador/>
- Asthana, A., 2012. Human Rights and Corruption: Evidence From a Natural Experiment. *Journal of Human Rights*, 11(4), pp.526–536.
- Berliner, D. et al., 2015. Building Capacity, Building Rights? State Capacity and Labor Rights in Developing Countries. *World Development*, 72, pp.127–139.
- Cheibub, José Antonio. "Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships." *World Politics* 50.3 (1998): 349-76
- Cingranelli, D., Fajardo-Heyward, P. & Filippov, M., 2014. Principals, Agents and Human Rights. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3), pp.605–630.
- Cole, W. 2016. Managing to mitigate abuse: Bureaucracy, democracy, and human rights, 1984 to 2010. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 57(1-2), pp.69–97.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Ziblatt, D. (2019). V-dem [country-year/country-date] dataset v9. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. doi: 10.23696/vdemcy19
- Coppedge, Michael, “Theory Building and Hypothesis Testing: Large- vs. Small-N Research on Democratization”, Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 25-27, 2002.

- Cornell, A. & LaPuente, V. 2014. Meritocratic administration and democratic stability. *Democratization*, 21(7), pp.1286–1304.
- Dahlberg, Stefan, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon & Sofia Axelsson. 2020. The Quality of Government Basic Dataset, version Jan20. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se> doi:10.18157/qogbasjan20
- Dahlström, C. et al., 2012. The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(3), pp.656–668.
- Dahlstrom, C., Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Hartmann, F., Lindberg, A., & Nistotskaya, M. (2015). The QoG Expert Survey Dataset.
- D’Arcy, M. and Nistotskaya, M. (2017). State First, then Democracy: Using Cadastral Records to Explain Government Performance in Public Goods Provision, *Governance* 30(2): 193-209.
- Dean, S. & Parhizgar, K. 2007. Comparative Strategic Positioning of Four Academic Administrative Models: Bureaucracy, Technocracy, Meritocracy, and Kakistocracy. *Competition Forum*, 5(1), pp.15–20
- ECLAC, 2014. Servicio civil en América Latina y el Caribe. *Serie Macroeconomía del Desarrollo N. 155*. Available at <https://www.cepal.org/es/publications>
- Englehart, N. 2009. State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(2), pp.163–180.
- Failed states index 2006-2019. The Fund for Peace (FFP). Retrieved from <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/Haken>, N., Messner, J., Hendry, K., Taft, P., Lawrence, K., Anderson, T., . . . Whitehead, A. (2019).
- Falcon, C. J. M. C. (2015). Guerra Civil en El Salvador (1980-1992): análisis de las causas socio-estructural y la actuación de las Naciones Unidas. *Conjuntura Global*, 4(2).
- FUSADES & IND. 2019. Desafíos y oportunidades de la función pública en El Salvador. Available at [www.fusades.org](http://www.fusades.org)
- Gartner, S., & Reagan, P. 1996. Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship Between Government and Opposition Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (3):273–87.
- George, A. & Bennett, A. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. MIT Press.
- Gerring, J., 2008. Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, pp.The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology.
- Heredia, B. & Schneider, B. 2003. Reinventing leviathan: the politics of administrative reform in developing countries. *Public Administration and Development*, 24(3), pp.277–278.
- Holmstrom, B. 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. *Bell Journal of Economics* 13.2. PP. 324-340.
- Human Rights Watch. “El Salvador”. Accessed July, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/americas/el-salvador>

Iacoviello & Chudnovsky, 2014. La importancia del servicio civil en el desarrollo de capacidades estatales en América Latina. *Documento de trabajo N. 2015/02*. CAF.

Iacoviello & Strazza (2013). La evolución de los servicios civiles centroamericanos y el desarrollo de las capacidades estratégicas para su profesionalización. *Revista Centroamericana de Administración Pública N. 65*. ICAP

Iacoviello & Strazza, 2014. La evolución de los servicios civiles centroamericanos y el desarrollo de las capacidadesdes estratégicas para su profesionalización. *Revista Centroamericana de Administración Pública. N. 65*. ICAP.

IADB. 2006. El servicio civil en los países Centroamericanos y República Dominicana. Available at [www.iadb.org/publications](http://www.iadb.org/publications)

IDHUCA, 2019. Informe de Derechos Humanos. Instituto de Derechos Humanos. Universidad Centroamericana.

International Labor Organization – ILO. (2018) Paid labor vs vulnerable employment. [http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/-stat/documents/publication/wcms\\_631497.pdf](http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/-stat/documents/publication/wcms_631497.pdf)

Jackman, R. 1993. Power without force: the political capacity of nation-states, *Ann Arbor, Mich.:* University of Michigan Press.

Johnston, Michael. 2005. Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kalantry et al. (2011) Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR. *Human Rights Quarterly N. 32*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Karklins, Ramsa. 2005. The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-communist Societies. New York: M. E. Sharpe

Kitschelt, H. 2000. Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (6–7): 845–79.

Llano, M., 2017. Discusión sobre las relaciones entre política y administración pública en américa latina: patronazgo y burocracia. Una interacción inexplorada. *Revista Enfoques*, 15(27), pp.43–67.

Longo, F. (2002). Marco Analítico para el diagnóstico Institucional de Sistemas de Servicio Civil. *Informe Elaborado para el Diálogo Regional de Políticas del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo*. IDB.

Mann, M. 2008. Infrastructural power revisited. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43(3–4): 355–365.

Medellín, P. (2004). La política de las políticas públicas: propuesta teórica y metodológica para el estudio de las políticas públicas en países de frágil institucionalidad. CEPAL.

Miller, G., 2000. Above politics: Credible commitment and efficiency in the design of public agencies. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 10(2), pp.289–327.

- Mitchell, N. 2004. *Agents of Atrocity: Leaders, followers and the violation of human rights in civil war*. Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Mitnick, B. 1986. The politics of regulation. *The Academy of Management Review*. Vol.9.
- Nickel, J.W., 2007. *Making sense of human rights* 2. ed., Oxford: Blackwell.
- Nistotskaya, M. & Cingolani, L. (2016). Bureaucratic Structure, Regulatory Quality and Entrepreneurship in a Comparative Perspective: Cross-Sectional and Panel Data Evidence, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 26(3): 519-534.
- OECD. 2017. *Panorama de las Administraciones Públicas de América Latina y el Caribe*. OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/1256b68d-es>.
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights - OHCHR (2008). *Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Factsheet N. 33*.
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights - OHCHR. *Covenant of Civil and Political Rights*. Art. 25. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>
- Orend, B. 1992. *Human Rights Concepts and Contexts*. Broadview Press.
- UDH, 2019. *Estado de los Derechos Humanos en El Salvador. Informe Anual*. Observatorio Universitario de Derechos Humanos.
- Peters, G. & Pierre, J., 2004. Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective: The Quest for Control. *West European Politics* N.28
- Price-Smith, 2001. *The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- PRS Group, et al. (2019). *International country risk guide*. Political Risk Services.
- Rajagopal, B., 1999. Corruption, Legitimacy and Human Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship. *Connecticut Journal of International Law*, 14(2), p.495.
- Rauch, J. (1995) Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities during the Progressive Era, *American Economic Review* 85(4): 968-979.
- Robert K. Yin. (2014). *Case Study Research Design and Methods* (5th Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Scott, J. 1972. Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66, No. 1. pp. 91-113
- Stein, E., & Tommasi, M. (2006). La política de las políticas públicas. *Política Y Gobierno*, N. 13(2), pp. 393-416.
- Tirole, J. 1992. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal. *Econometrica*. Vol 60.
- United Nations Development Program (UNDP). *Human Development Index 2019*. Accessed August, 2020. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SLV>



- Ventura, J. M. (2010). *Maras en El Salvador y su relación con el crimen organizado transnacional*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Voorn, B., Genugten, M. & Thiel, S., 2018. Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery. *Public Administration*, 97(3), pp.671–685.
- Weber, M. 1978. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wolf, S. (2017). *Mano dura: el populismo ante el crimen y las pandillas* [Blog]. Accessed August, 2020. <https://seguridad.nexos.com.mx/?p=49>
- Woodrow W., 1887. The Study of Administration. *Political Science Quarterly*, 2. PP. 209-210, as cited in Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, p.4.
- World Bank, 2019. UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International Homicide Statistics database. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5>
- World Bank. (2016). World development indicators. The World Bank Washington DC.
- Young, J.K., 2009. State Capacity, Democracy, and the Violation of Personal Integrity Rights. *Journal of Human Rights*, 8(4), pp.283–300.
- Zhou, M., 2012. Participation in international human rights NGOs: The effect of democracy and state capacity. *Social Science Research*, 41(5), pp.1254–1274.
- Zuñanic & Iacovello, 2010. La burocracia en América Latina. *Revista Centroamericana de Administración Pública* N. 58-59. ICAP.

## Appendices

### Appendix N.1 Country experts interviewed for the case study

Name	Job or expertise	Organization
<b>José Antonio Morales</b>	Former Sub-Secretary of Governance and Modernization of the State for the Presidents of El Salvador from 2009-2019. Current director of the Master’s program in Public Administration of the UCA	Central American University (UCA), El Salvador. Government of El Salvador 2009-2019
<b>Manuel Escalante</b>	Lawyer, Sub-director of the Human Rights Institute of the Central American University, El Salvador (IDHUCA)	Human Rights Institute of the Central American University, El Salvador (IDHUCA) <a href="http://www.uca.edu.sv/idhuca/">http://www.uca.edu.sv/idhuca/</a>
<b>Mónica Tobar</b>	Economist, Researcher at the Department of Political Studies. Author of the study: <i>“Challenges and Opportunities in the Public Administration of El Salvador”</i>	Salvadorian Foundation for Economic and Social Development (Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social, FUSADES) <a href="http://www.fusades.org">www.fusades.org</a>
<b>Álvaro Artiga</b>	Ph.D. in Political Science, Professor at UCA. Author of the book: <i>“The political system of El Salvador”</i>	Central American University (UCA), El Salvador
<b>Nadya Medrano</b>	Political Scientist, Consultant in Human Rights and expert in social organizations in El Salvador	Independent consultant