

# Everyday (Anti-)Nationalization

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Power and Resistance in Khao Phra Wihan Conflict Narratives



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**SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES**



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## Abstract

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Through a compilation of four research articles, this Ph.D. thesis investigates everyday life nationalization processes in Thailand in relation to expressions of power and resistance. How individuals sustain and challenge the performance of the Thai nation through social practices is in focus. In particular, the analysis examines how interlocutors describe everyday forms of power and resistance vis-à-vis the nation in conflict narratives around the Khao Phra Wihan temple. The thesis employs a phenomenological research position, with a focus on subjective experiences and uses material from fieldwork in Thailand. The analysis combines social constructivist theory on everyday nationalism with the theory on everyday resistance to analyze individuals' participation in nationalization from a power/resistance perspective. The research contributes with conceptual and empirical insights to studies of nationalism with concepts of 'affective self-nationalization' (which captures the connection between the nationalist emotional socialization and individual experience of nationalizing) and 'nationalist everyday resistance'. The study also contributes to resistance studies and the theorization of 'everyday resistance' through the conceptualizations of nationalist everyday resistance, online everyday resistance, evasive everyday resistance, re-categorative everyday resistance, and re-imaginative everyday resistance. This thesis also provides new empirical insights to Thai studies concerning nationalization and the Khao Phra Wihan temple.

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## List of Articles

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Article 1: Gaber, K. (2019) 'To Belong or Not to Belong: Affective Self-Nationalization in Thailand', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 41, No. 2. pp. 323-341. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12617>

Article 2: Gaber, K. (2018) 'Disturbing the Nationalist Imaginary. Everyday Resistance to Nationalism in the Thai-Cambodian Borderland', *Journal of Political Power*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 403-418. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2018.1525178>

Article 3: Gaber, K. (2018) 'Contesting the Thai Hyper-Royalist Nationalist Imaginary through Infrapolitical Everyday Resistance Online', *International Journal of Conflict and Reconciliation*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 1-21. <https://www.scribd.com/document/398565783/Contesting-the-Thai-Hyper-Royalist-Nationalist-Imaginary-through-Infrapolitical-Everyday-Resistance-Online>

Article 4: 'Everyday Nationalizing in the Asoke Movement. Constructing Nationalism around Territorial Loss, Corruption, Western Influence, and Everyday Routine in Thailand', under review at *Nations and Nationalism*



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# 1

## Introduction

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The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say *this is mine* and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: “Do not listen to this impostor. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth to no one!”

(Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, 1992 (first published 1755): 44)

### 1.1 Research Problem

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Our planet is divided into state territories by borders.<sup>1</sup> Almost wherever you are on the land of the planet, you are on the territory of a state. How the division of land should be made “right,” “natural,” or “fair” is a question for which many people have fought and died. The nation-state (i.e., linking state borders to a national community) is the main answer to this question in modern times. There are around 200 nation-states in the world, but there are also over one hundred nations that still seek self-determination and exclusive control over a specific territory (Cunningham 2014: 2). Most violent conflicts in the world today are intra-state conflicts, often concerning several national groups asserting their claims on the land. Nationalism and connected questions are also important in many inter-state struggles and continue to impregnate much contemporary political life all over the world.

Nations are performed. Similar to Butler’s theory of gender performativity, wherein gender is to be understood as not a noun or an adjective but a verb (Butler 1990), the nation can be understood as constructed through a performance of nationalizing acts. Much feminist research has focused on how patriarchy is played out in everyday life (for example, Carole Pateman 1989; Ah-

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<sup>1</sup> With the exception of the seas, Antarctica and the outer atmosphere.

med 2017), based on the slogan from the feminist movement in the 1970s that “the personal is political” (Hanisch 1970; Enloe 1989). This activism and research have generated the feminist understanding that acts in the everyday (such as speech acts, clothing, hairstyles, or relationship patterns and many more) should be understood as political in character.

In the same way, many everyday acts are important for nationalist politics, as performative acts that create nations into being. As David Courpasson explains in the article ‘The Politics of the Everyday’:

Studying the ‘micro’ everyday things and doings may reveal what the macro structures and decisions taken elsewhere could obscure, in particular the political texture of everyday life, how politics bring life back in places from which it may have been merely removed (2017: 847).

Nations are ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 2006) that are mainly performed into creation through (unimaginative) actions (Skey and Antonsich 2017: 327). Nations exist on a ‘macro’ material level of borderlines, passports, and asylum- and visa regimes of exclusion/inclusion, which are not possible to change by simple ‘imagining’ or even individually performing an alternative into existence.

The idea of dividing humanity into nations is closely connected with granting states legitimacy to rule and is an idea that often serves the interests of governing powers (Martin 2017). Much attention therefore focuses on nationalism *from above*. In top-down dynamics, as Fox and Miller-Idriss state, “to make the nation is to make people national... Nationalism recasts the mosaic of diverse peoples within the boundaries of the state (or polity) into a uniform and unified national whole” (2008: 536f).

However, this thesis examines how this “recasting” is experienced on the ground: how individuals negotiate this landscape in everyday life and utilize their agency. As Sarah Pink explains in her book, *Situating Everyday Life*, the everyday is: “where we make our worlds and where our worlds make us” (2012: 5). Of interest in this study is the making of nations in the everyday. Within nationalism studies, the arena of the everyday has been in focus in research on banal and everyday nationalism.

In his book *Banal Nationalism*, Michael Billig presents what he calls “the ideological habits” of established states that reproduce nations in mundane ways (1995: 6). He states that nations are not only created in dramatic events during wartime, when flags are being waved “consciously with fervent passion,” but also in small everyday unnoticed ways, for example, through the “flag hanging unnoticed on the public building” (1995: 8). Billig emphasizes how we should not see these banal expressions as insignificant, as they are necessary for the possibility to mobilize a population for war (1995: 7).

The study of ‘everyday nationalism’ concerns how the nation is produced (and potentially also challenged) by “ordinary people doing ordinary things in their ordinary lives” (Fox 2018: 862). This study contributes to this line of research. Of course, some might object to the focus on the everyday and the individual, especially as nationalism is such an important factor in conflicts, wars, and extraordinary events. Although states are powerful actors of nationalization, and extreme forms of nationalism are present in many conflicts, everyday nationalism research maintains that the nation is also created from below, by individuals in everyday acts. Krasniqi, Sokolic, and Kostovicova explain that everyday nationalism should be focused on in this way:

Everyday nationalism directs attention to mundane aspects of nationhood. It also offers a bottom-up perspective on top-down processes of “formal” nationalism and their interplay with everyday constructions of nationhood (2020: 462).

Hence, everyday nationalism theory is not only about experiences of being “recast” from above into a “national whole” (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008: 536ff), but also how individuals in their everyday lives activate (and potentially resist) this process from below. This thesis suggests that, in addition, everyday resistance theory can help us to gain a deeper understanding of this interplay between top-down state-initiated nationalizing and bottom-up constructions of nationhood.

Everyday resistance theory looks at practices that engage with power relations or the effects of power in everyday life (Johansson and Vinthagen 2020: 3). Different scholars in resistance studies define ‘resistance’ in different ways (as will be elaborated on in the theory chapter below), but common in all approaches is the acknowledgement that resistance must be understood in relation to power. It is this relational character that makes everyday resistance useful in the analysis of everyday nationalism.

This Ph.D. thesis makes a significant original contribution to knowledge by analyzing everyday nationalism through the interplay of power and resistance. In this way, we can learn about the relational character of nationalizing, when it is sometimes a tool of power (in governing or authoritarian rule, for example) and other times performed as resistance (against colonial power, for example). This complex dynamic shows how individuals engage in the (re)production of the nation by variously sustaining, resisting, or activating nationalism.

Among the many nations across the world, this study is centered on the piece of humanity called the ‘Thais,’ who inhabit the specific territory and nation-state ‘Thailand.’ On the one hand, nationalism in Thailand has been a way to resist colonialism and Western influence. Thailand, with its earlier name Siam, was never directly colonized by Western powers, but some accounts regard Siam as semi-colonized, as it was in a subordinate position to-

ward Western powers (Jackson 2010: 38f). While on the one hand being semi-colonized, Siam on the other hand also participated in the conquest of territories and peoples in the region, as a colonial power (Strate 2015: 8). In order to enable its extended rule, Siam used nationalization, referred to by some as ‘internal colonization’ (Zackari 2016: 74) to nationalize/colonize “itself”.

Nationalism was an important force in Thai struggles against Western domination. Yet, nationalism has at the same time been an oppressive force, experienced by minority groups in Thailand as another form of colonialism (Chinyong Liow and Pathan 2010, Mc Cargo 2010). This study looks at nationalism in Thailand from both of these angles and investigates everyday (anti-) nationalizing acts and their relation to power and resistance. The dual forms of nationalism in Thailand and the country’s historical role makes it a well-suited case to illuminate the importance of the contribution in this study: to attend to power and resistance when understanding everyday nationalizing processes.

The more specific entry point of this study is the conflict over Khao Phra Wihan,<sup>2</sup> the ruins of a Hindu temple built by the Khmer Empire in the 11<sup>th</sup> century, located in Cambodia,<sup>3</sup> right at the border with Thailand. The border between Thailand and Cambodia was created through an agreement in 1867 between Siam and France, the then colonial power over what is Cambodia today. After decolonization, Thailand and Cambodia disputed the border demarcation. Khao Phra Wihan is located within this disputed area. Khao Phra Wihan is a good entry point, as considerable nationalist debates in Thailand have circled around the temple since it was granted World Heritage Status in 2008. Khao Phra Wihan, therefore, is an illuminating setting for everyday nationalization processes, which highlight different ways to relate to nationalizing as power and as resistance.

The material for this thesis has been collected mainly through narratives of the temple conflict, providing information on how interlocutors make sense of the conflict and thereby of nationalization. The material shows how individuals through their everyday acts participate in nationalization by activating, sustaining and/or resisting nationalism in various ways. The people whose everyday performances I examine are the general public in Bangkok, various grassroots

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<sup>2</sup> In translations of names from Thai to English, different spellings of the same names are common. In the case of Khao Phra Wihan, all the three parts of the name can be spelled differently as ‘Khao’ or ‘Kao,’ ‘Phra’ or ‘Pra,’ and ‘Wiharn,’ ‘Vihan’ or ‘Wihan.’ In English translations of Khmer, the temple is usually spelled Preah Vihear, which is the most common way to name the temple in English. As this project focuses on Thailand, the Thai appellation Khao Phra Wihan has been used in the interviews and in the written thesis. However, when interlocutors have used ‘Preah Vihear’ in interviews, this naming has been kept in quotations.

<sup>3</sup> This wording does not take a position in the conflict, but reflects rather the decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that Cambodia is the owner of the temple.

groups in the borderland, and members of the Asoke group (a Buddhist nationalist group).

## 1.2 Research Aims and Contributions

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The overall aim and contribution of this thesis is to develop our knowledge of nationalism, in particular, by deepening our understanding of individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism.

Theoretically, the thesis aims to advance everyday nationalism research by exploring the interplay of power and resistance in everyday nationalizing processes. This is a unique contribution to knowledge, as it synthesizes research on everyday nationalism research on everyday resistance. This integration generates new theoretical insights on everyday nationalizing, specifically with the theorization in this thesis of nationalist emotional socialization as well as new conceptualizations of everyday resistance against nationalism and everyday resistance through nationalism.

Empirically, the thesis aims to provide new concrete evidence about everyday forms of power and resistance in relation to nationalizing processes in Thailand, and more specifically in terms of conflict narratives around the Khao Phra Wihan temple. In contrast to earlier research on nationalism in Thailand, which has focused mainly on nationalizing from above, this thesis adds knowledge on Thai nationalism with its perspective on everyday nationalization in Thailand. Fieldwork for the thesis brings new empirical evidence around these questions, especially through interviews in which the affected people relate their experiences of everyday nationalization.

In sum, as reviews of literature confirm later in this thesis, this analysis contributes new insights about the dynamics of political life in Thailand in particular as well as political agency in relation to authoritarian regimes in general.

### 1.3 Research Questions

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In order to reach the above aims and contributions to knowledge, this dissertation explores the following central research question: **How do power and resistance unfold in everyday performances of nationalism in Thailand?** The focus is on the different ways in which individuals participate in nationalizing through their routine acts. This overarching question encompasses three sub-questions:

1. *How do everyday practices sustain nationalism in Thailand?* “Sustain” here refers to compliance with the official nationalizing project, which is perceived as a form of governing power in the everyday. Through this question, this study looks at how and why ordinary citizens in Thailand comply with state-led nationalizing. The analysis focuses especially on individual motivations and emotions.
2. *How do everyday practices resist nationalism in Thailand?* “Resistance” here refers to acts aiming to challenge power, from a position experienced as in subordination to that power. This question concerns everyday resistance, both to Thai nationalism in particular as well as to nationalism as a general idea.
3. *How do everyday practices activate counter-hegemonic nationalism in Thailand?* “Activation” here refers to the strengthening of nationalism, in particular how and why individuals participate in the production of nationalism as part of a resistance struggle. In focus in this question are the acts of counter-hegemonic nationalist performativity and the motivations for these acts.

These three sub-questions relate to different aspects of the overall research question. As further elaborated in chapter 5 below, the three sub-questions are addressed in four articles that together constitute the compilation thesis. By answering these questions, this thesis contributes to our knowledge of nationalism and especially our understanding of individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism.

Concrete material for the thesis covers individuals of different political colors at two main sites: in Thailand’s capital of Bangkok and at the Khmer borderland in the Isaan region. The thesis examines acts of sustaining, resisting, and activating nationalism at these two locations. As will be elaborated on in the methods section, these two sites are suitable for the study as they involve different contexts (in the capital and periphery of Thailand) where individuals participate in (anti-)nationalization.

## 1.4 Delimitations

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In focus of the thesis is how individuals relate to state-led nationalization in Thailand through the entry point of the Khao Phra Wihan conflict. Other entry points of nationalist contestation – for example, the situation in Southern Thailand with violent resistance against Thai nationalism – would provide other types of results, as the context of power toward the Thai state is not the same. This study reveals examples of how individuals participate in nationalizing and how they understand and practice power and resistance, but the study does not aim to give a full picture of nationalization in the whole country of Thailand.

State-led nationalization in Thailand is promoted by the military together with the network around the monarchy, which together constitute the authoritarian regime in Thailand. How individuals relate to nationalism is therefore connected to larger issues such as the overall struggles around democracy in Thailand. This means that both resistance against official nationalizing processes, as well as everyday nationalist resistance, are formulated within environments focused on more issues than nationalism alone. However, in focus here are individuals' relationships to nationalism, not to wider political concerns and social movements (in particular, the Red/Yellow Shirt movements) *per se*.

It is important to note the point in time of collecting the empirical material in the thesis. The last interviews were conducted in April 2016, i.e., before the death of King Rama IX Bhumibol Adulyadej in October 2016. All references to the 'monarchy' or 'monarch' hence refers to King Bhumibol. As the current King Maha Vajiralongkorn holds a different position in the Thai society, the descriptions of the former king are not transferable to the present king.

Narratives on the conflict over Khao Phra Wihan could be collected in many different ways. Since the focus of the thesis is on human experience, the everyday and the 'ordinary person', no official representatives for the state have been interviewed.

## 1.5 Outline of the Thesis

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To further develop the research problem, aim, and question just introduced, the rest of this thesis has five additional chapters.

Chapter 2 provides a *Contextualization* of the thesis. This chapter presents the Thai political context and Thai nationalism as formulated through the ‘three pillars’ of the nation, religion, and the monarchy. The chapter finishes with a background account of the Khao Phra Wihan territorial conflict.

Chapter 3 presents the *Theoretical Framework* and starts by discussing the meta-theoretical positions on which the theoretical choices are based. The next section discusses the concepts of nation, nationalism, and nationalization. This is followed by a section on earlier research on Thai nationalism. Thereafter follows a section on power and resistance. Then come three sections concerning the ‘everyday’: one discussing the everyday as a general concept, followed by sections on everyday nationalism, and everyday resistance. The theoretical chapter ends by pulling together these various theoretical threads.

Chapter 4 covers *Methods*. This chapter starts with a discussion of the case study research design of the thesis. It continues with a description of how ethnography has inspired the research methods. Then follows a section on narrative methods, including a discussion of conflict narratives. A subsequent section on interviews describes how, where, and with whom I conducted the interviews. The methods chapter ends with a discussion on the ethical considerations in the thesis as well as my researcher positionality.

Chapter 5, *Review of the Articles*, discusses each of the articles in three steps: 1) a specification of how the article relates to the research questions, 2) a summary of the content in the article, and 3) a discussion of how the article contributes to realizing the research aims of the thesis. This chapter ends with a summary of how the articles collectively relate to the aims of the thesis.

The thesis finishes with a *Conclusion*, which is divided into a section on the overall conclusions and a discussion on suggested further research.

# 2

## Contextualizing the Thesis

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Chapter 1 laid out the research problem, aims, and questions. This chapter now elaborates the empirical setting of this thesis, drawing upon earlier research and interview material. The chapter is divided into three sections: 2.1 presents a short overview of the Thai political context of this thesis, 2.2 describes the ‘three pillars’ of Thai nationalism, and 2.3 presents the background to the Khao Phra Wihan conflict. This chapter is important in order to be able to understand how official nationalism permeates Thai society and how the Khao Phra Wihan conflict is connected to nationalism as well as the larger political struggle in Thailand. With this empirical context in hand, we can proceed to theoretical considerations in Chapter 3.

### 2.1 Politics in Thailand

---

Known the world over as the Land of Smiles, Thailand is famous for being the principal tourist destination in South East Asia. This tropical fun loving and friendly country really does have something for everyone of every age and every budget. From golden, sandy beaches to lush steamy jungles, bustling busy cities to traditional squat villages, 5 star a la carte menus to roadside noodle stalls, historic Buddhist temples to 21st century sky scrapers Thailand never fails to delight, amaze and captivate all who visit.

(The tourist guide <https://www.amazing-thailand.com>)

Besides being a major tourist destination, famous for its smiles, the Kingdom of Thailand is ranked top in the world for several other things: for being the country with the highest number of military coups (Desilver 2017); for having the richest monarchy in the world (Winichakul 2014: 87); and for having the largest wealth gap, in terms of the percentage of the country’s wealth owned by the richest one percent (Shorrocks, Davies and Lluberas 2018: 117). At the same time, the World Bank categorizes Thailand as a ‘upper middle-income country’ (Ariyapruhya<sup>4</sup> 2018). The rendition illustrates a developed

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<sup>4</sup> In academic texts, Thai names are often referred to by the first name instead of by surname. In this text, I treat all names the same and refer to authors in references by their last name, even if some Thai names are very long.

country of great wealth and resources, but also one of extremely slanted wealth distribution, which in itself typifies a highly unequal society.

Modern Thailand is situated on a large territory with borders to Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Laos. It hosts a population of 69,4 million people. In northern Thailand toward Laos, a large population speaks Lao (around 20 million people). Toward Cambodia in the northeast, a population of around 1 million people speak Khmer. In the south of Thailand, around 3 million people speak a form of Malay. There is also a large Chinese-speaking group in Thailand, plus several different groups called “hill tribes,” as well as many other ethnic groups.

The Khmer borderland area is located within Isaan, the north eastern part of Thailand. Isaan is populated by more than 22 million people, i.e., one-third of Thailand’s total population. Most of the population speaks Lao. Isaan is the poorest part of Thailand, with a long history of economic marginalization. The use of both the Lao and Khmer languages has been banned in schools (McCargo and Hongladrum 2004: 221). Khmer identity in Thailand is generally associated with cultural and social stigma, because of Thailand’s economic superiority in relation to Cambodia and because public discourse constructs Khmer as an inferior race (Vail 2007: 121).

Thai language, Buddhist religion, and love for the monarchy form the most central characteristics of the national Thai identity. The Thai nation is based on the people traditionally living at the Chao Phraya delta - the central Thai (or ethnic Thai/Tai). The nationalizing process has forced many of Thailand’s other groups to assimilate, deny, or play down other cultural or ethnic origins (Satha-Anand 2009; Liow and Pathan 2010; Mc Cargo 2011). This nationalization process has been referred to as ‘internal colonialization’ (Zackari 2016: 74). Thailand has a long history of state violence. The state has used violence toward protestors and earlier suspected communist insurgents. Its abuses of hill tribes, refugees, convicts, suspects, activists, and human rights defenders are also well known (Haberhorn 2015).

The idea of a Thai nation was first articulated by King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) and popularized by King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) and later the Field Marshall Phibunsongkhram’s Government (1938-1945). The state has used Thai nationhood as a tool to be able to rule the vast area inhabited by the different ethnic, cultural, and religious groups (Chachavalpongpun 2005: ix). The two kings centered the idea of Thainess on the ‘three pillars’ of nation, religion, and monarchy (*chat, satsana, phra mahakasat*). In a discussion on the rule of law in Thailand, Björn Dressel describes the three pillars as the traditional trinity of official state ideology (2018: 271). The military has used - and continues to use - this ideology to justify authoritarian rule (Phatharathana-

nunth 2006: 35). In the program “Return Happiness to the People,” the leader of the current junta, General Prayut, presents “12 core values of Thai people,” of which the first core value is: “Upholding the three main pillars: the Nation, the Religion, and the Monarchy” (National News Bureau of Thailand 2014).

Until 1939, Thailand was called Siam. Siam was never formally colonized, which strengthened the power of the monarchy in several ways. First, unlike in neighboring countries, it gave the monarchy an opportunity to consolidate their power during colonial times. Second, it nourished the popular belief that Siam escaped colonization, thanks to the monarchy institution (Winichakul 2014: 82; Jackson 2010b: 191). This belief continues to legitimize the position of the monarchy today (Strate 2015: 3). Since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, the military has been the leading actor in Thai politics, and Thailand has experienced twelve military coups. The position of the military, however, must be examined together with the monarchy, as the two authoritarian institutions have a very close relationship in a “monarchised military” (Chambers and Waitoolkiat 2016: 426).

The three pillars represent the traditional hierarchical undemocratic power structure in Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawtra, elected by popular vote in 2001, challenged this structure until the military took power in a coup in 2006 (Chachavalpongpun 2014: 4). This event spurred two mass political movements: the so-called Yellow Shirts in support of the coup, nationalism, and the monarchy; and the so-called Red Shirts in support of Thaksin and/or democracy.

The Yellow Shirts are formally named the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and are aligned with the Democratic political party. The formal name of the Red Shirts is United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) and are connected to the political party Pheu Thai. PAD uses the color yellow to connect itself with royalism, and UDD uses red to signify rebellion and democracy, hence the popular names of Yellow and Red Shirts (Banpasirichote 2016: 217).

One interlocutor said in an interview that when Khao Phra Wihan came to be about Thaksin, suddenly everyone had an interest in the temple conflict, since everyone has an opinion about Thaksin.<sup>5</sup> He has his largest support base in the rural areas, especially Isaan and made many political changes that economically benefited poor rice farmers. As he was elected mainly by people without much power in society, he has been seen as a challenge to traditional powers in a way that has never existed in Thailand before. He has therefore become a symbol for democracy. Thaksin is a very controversial figure; he is a rich media mogul, and a strong believer in capitalism, who stands accused of

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<sup>5</sup> Interview 21, young farmer and Red Shirt activist, Bhumisarol, 2016-03-06

not paying his taxes and has left Thailand (Pawakapan 2013: 58). Even from abroad, he has a large influence in Thai politics. The Prime Minister at the time of the latest military coup in 2014, Yingluck Shinawatra, was Thaksin's sister. Thaksin has close ties with Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, and supported that Cambodia applied to UNESCO to grant Phra Wihan World Heritage Status. All Red Shirts do not support Thaksin, but most do.

The Yellow Shirts, on the other hand, accuse Thaksin of corruption and of "buying" votes from rural areas and "selling" the country for business interests as Thaksin's good relationship with Cambodia is seen as disloyalty toward Thailand. Yellow Shirts are mostly urban, middle class, royalist who generally are critical of democracy. They support the traditional power structure in Thailand. Political Science Professor Phuangtong Pawakapan writes in her book *State and Uncivil Society in Thailand at the Temple of Preah Vihear* that PAD's actions regarding the temple conflict should be regarded as "uncivil," as it started border clashes, caused deaths, and damage in the borderland and destroyed Thailand's relationship with Cambodia (2013: 99). She also states that the success of PAD's campaign is that PAD referred to royal-nationalist history regarding lost territories (Pawakapan 2013: 101).

The Buddhist group Asoke<sup>6</sup> have been very active in the Yellow Shirts movement, especially in activities regarding Khao Phra Wihan. The 'Dharma army' is made up of Asoke members who worked intensively with politicizing the granting of World Heritage Status to Khao Phra Wihan, and to resist that Thailand should accept the territory around Khao Phra Wihan to be Cambodian. Their activities involved organizing a 'Dharmayatra', a religious and political walk in the borderland. By that time, in 2009, residents in the borderland area tried to stop them from entering, as the borderland residents wanted to have a continued good relationship with their Cambodian neighbors and no conflict at the border (please see Article 3 for more on the resistance against the territorial conflict in the borderland).

More than being a Buddhist group, Asoke is a nationalist, conservative, ultra-royalist, and anti-capitalist group promoting 'self-sufficiency economy' in order for Thailand to be free from capitalism and influences from the West (Heikkilä-Horn 2010: 39). Asoke, together with the rest of the Yellow Shirt movement, generally support the coup d'état(s) as they mean that since Thaksin is so powerful it is not possible to have democracy, as he can buy all the votes he needs.<sup>7</sup> The political rivalry between the movements is identified

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<sup>6</sup> The name of the group is 'Asoke,' but is often referred to as 'Santi Asoke,' which is actually the name of the main center of Asoke, located in Bangkok. The other centers have other names, for example, the name of the Asoke center in Sisaket is Sisa Asoke.

<sup>7</sup> Brought up many times, for example, in interview 16, middle-aged Asoke member, Sisaket, 2016-03-06

by many researchers as the main reason for the border conflict over Khao Phra Wihan (Pawakapan 2013; Chachavalpongpun 2014; Strate 2015; Kaset-siri et al. 2013). For the context of this dissertation, it is also important to see the Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt movements as resistance movements with highly differing views on Thai nationalism. In the section on Khao Phra Wihan, I will return to the political conflict between these movements.

## 2.2 The Three Pillars of Thai Nationalism

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As noted above, the ‘three pillars’ enshrine the official form of nationalism in Thailand, comprising the (Thai) nation, the (Buddhist) religion, and the (Chakri) monarchy. It suggests that to be Thai means to respect the monarchy and Buddhism. It also refers to the connection between the institutions of the military (representing the nation), the Sangha Supreme Council, the governing body of the Buddhist order (religion), and the monarchy. The monarchy is the supreme institution of the country (Chachavalpongpun 2014: ix), and the military is in a subordinated position in relation to the monarchy (Chambers and Waitoolkiat 2016: 426).

As with other national constructions, Thainess is also created in relation to what it is not. It is, for example, not *farang* (Western) and it is not *khaek* (peoples and countries of the Malay peninsula, South Asia, and Middle East. ‘Khaek’ can refer to Muslim, but not exclusively) (Winichakul 1994: 5).

Thainess is also constructed as a hierarchy with different levels of Thai. Karin Zackari states,

“People are situated, by state actors and through cultural political discourse, further or closer to the center of nationhood ... The construction of anti-thesis to Thainess to legitimize state violence is at the core of the long line of cultural violence performed in Thai history” (2016: 73f).

The state has used the notion of different levels of Thai to attack critics of the monarchy, who have been explained to not be Thai (Streckfuss 2012: 438). The further you get from Bangkok (Buddhism, the monarchy, the state, the Thai language), the less Thai you can possibly be. Because of the hierarchy within Thainess, the concept of indigeneity is difficult to apply to Thailand. Indigeneity would mark difference from the central Thais, a difference recognized as impossible to combine with being fully Thai (Baird et al. 2016: 15). That an anti-thesis to Thainess is used to legitimize state violence (Zackari 2016: 74) explains why many interlocutors in the interviews for this thesis are very keen to state that they are Thai. Individuals who are not part of the ethnic Thai group often downplay characteristics that might label them as ‘un-Thai’. Micah Morton and Ian Baird state in one article concerning the situation for

'hill tribes' in Thailand that: "Indigenous people must address the accusation of being not Thai enough to gain any political recognition whatsoever" (2019: 30).

The historian Shane Strate argues that the creation of a Thai national identity must be understood in relation to colonialism, even though Siam was never a colony of France or Britain (2015: 2). He notes that Thai historiography presents two competing contradictory narratives of royal nationalism - 'Thailand was never colonized' - and national humiliation - 'lost territories'. Strate argues that these narratives rely on historically incorrect assumptions. Regarding the "lost territory" narrative, for example, he writes:

It projects modern conceptions of boundaries into the past to designate a geographical space, and the people within it, as Thai. The extent of this imagined territory fluctuates depending on the period, but once defined within a discourse the boundaries become sacred and inviolable. The borders of the nation-state are perceived as eternal, an inheritance from an ancient past (rather than a recent construction); therefore it naturally follows that the areas in question rightfully belong to the kingdom and have indeed been lost (2015: 3).

Strate explains how Thai elites have used the rhetoric of victimization to mask neo-imperialistic ambitions (2015: 20) and that Siam during colonial times did not succeed in getting all of the territory it aimed for when participating in the "scramble for Southeast Asia" (Strate 2015: 8).

Religion is also an important pillar in the three pillars of the official state-promoted top-down form of Thai nationalism. In an interview for this thesis, a scholar in Religious Studies stated that in Buddhism, ethics are more important than the law.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, what is seen as Buddhist ethics has a very high status in Thailand. Thai society is strongly influenced by the belief of *dhamma*, the Buddhist highest truth, and it is generally perceived to not be available for everyone, but only for the religiously pure. In this belief, the purest person, above anyone else, is the king (who is seen as a righteous king, a *Dhammaraja*). Mainstream belief also holds that other people in the upper classes possess a religious wisdom that ordinary people lack. They are seen as being reborn into their privileged positions because of having lived righteously in earlier lives (Sköld 2015: 17f; Sturm 2006: 37). In this way, the pillar of 'religion' in official Thai nationalism is also used as a tool of governing power that legitimizes hierarchies in the society. Buddhism has been important in the nationalizing process and in legitimizing the role of the monarchy (Heikkilä-Horn 2010: 44). Some authors even argue that Buddhism in Thailand has consciously been used by the state with the aim to subordinate citizens (McCargo 2004: 167). Björn Dressel writes:

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<sup>8</sup> Interview 8, middle-aged academic in Religious Studies, Salaya, 2014-07-17

In fact, Buddhism, often coupled with nationalism, has been employed to justify human rights violations: for instance, during the war against communist insurgents in the 1960s and 1970s, a monk, Phra Kittiwuttho, claimed that killing communists was not a sin (2018: 274).

Buddhism legitimizes the monarchy, which in turn legitimizes the military. The Thai state prefers a version of Buddhism promoting nationalism and teaches people to accept their socio-economic status. Karma is typically defined in a narrow way in Thailand – those who have been good in past lives are born rich, and those who have been bad are born poor. If you, as a poor person, want to raise your status, you need to do good deeds in order to be rich in your next life. This mainstream Buddhist interpretation of karma results in large groups of people being complacent with their lot in life, especially without challenging what Subpawanthanakun calls the “caste-like social hierarchy” (2016). The hope for a better next life, instead of trying to change this life, was also encountered in interviews for this thesis with members from the Asoke group, who explained that since they had problems in their lives they joined Asoke and will serve the sect for the rest of their lives, in order to improve their karma and get a better life in their next life.<sup>9</sup>

Many researchers point out that Thai monarchy is always at the center of Thai nationalist discourse (e.g., Jackson 2010; Streckfuss 2010; Winichakul 1994). This discourse presents the king as the Thai nation personified (Sturm 2006: 40). Hence, the monarchy is omnipresent in this thesis on Thai nationalism. One person describing himself as a ‘Red-Shirt Academic’ sees the military coups as an attempt by the monarchy to protect its interests (after the death of the king):

The nation and the territory do not belong to the people, they belong to the king. The people are not the owners of the territory; the territory belongs to the king. When you reside in this territory, you have to respect the king. The king is the center of the three pillars in Thailand. The 2006 and 2014 coups happened to protect the king and the interests of the monarchy.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, the term ‘monarchy’ refers to much more than the king. As another interviewee explained:

You should be careful about how you write about [the three pillars] in your thesis. They are about protecting the power of the king. You know, the king has a big family. When we say ‘royal family,’ we mean everyone who benefits from the royal system, they are thousands.<sup>11</sup>

Political scientist Duncan McCargo describes a situation of network-based politics and coined the widely used term ‘network monarchy’ to designate the most significant political network in Thailand (2005). The network monarchy

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<sup>9</sup> Interview 32, elderly member of Asoke, Bangkok, 2016-03-27, Interview 40, middle-aged member of Asoke, Bangkok, 2016-04-03

<sup>10</sup> Interview 31, middle-aged “Red-Shirt” academic, Bangkok, 2016-03-24

<sup>11</sup> Interview 10, middle-aged human rights activist, Bhumisarol, 2016-03-05

is active in cultural, social, economic, and political life in Thailand and has power over the government, the administration, the army, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the budget system (Winichakul 2016: 6).

Economically, the network monarchy acts through the Crown Property Bureau (CPB), which owns many companies such as banks, insurance companies, the largest cement-producing company, hotels, and shopping centers in Thailand, while not paying any tax (Winichakul 2014: 88). There are hence large economic interests connected with protecting the position of the monarchy.

It is illegal to discuss the position of the monarchy through Article 112 in the Thai Criminal Code. This article states that defamatory, insulting, or threatening comments about the King, Queen, Heir Apparent, and Regent are punishable by three to fifteen years in prison. Exactly what is meant by ‘defamatory’ or ‘insulting’ is unclear. This law is constructed so that anyone can bring charges against anyone. It is often used to silence political dissidents as well as in personal conflicts (Winichakul 2014: 91).

To summarize, the idea of the three pillars of Thai nationalism has been very influential. It has successfully connected freedom from colonialism with respect for the monarchy and belief in karma (that attributes social injustice to individual responsibility). The success of this narrative supports the position and wealth of the highest elite in society, the large network around the monarchy, and it is made immoral and even illegal to discuss let alone challenge this situation.

A young academic in Bangkok with a background in the Thai-Cambodian borderland explained in an interview when asked to tell about Khao Phra Wihan:

The central government is afraid of losing their power and control. We had a coup d'état, we have absolutism ... This is related. Preah Vihear is not just about Preah Vihear. Preah Vihear is a problem of identity crisis in Thailand. The crisis is that the nation-building, making unity in this country, is not completed. Because they built the identity on that: If you are not with me, with Bangkok,<sup>12</sup> you are useless. So, the parents-generation wanted to be with Bangkok, because they relied on Bangkok for support. But since Thaksin came in, Thaksin proved that no matter who you are, you can get the benefits of electoral vote. There is no need to rely on the three pillars anymore. There is no need to wait for the merciful Bangkok to give you something anymore. Thaksin set up a system that no matter who you are, Cambodian, Lao, Malay, you can go to the city hall and say “I have the citizenship, no matter who I am.” That is the Thaksin system. The military people, the bureaucrat people, hate this system that Thaksin created for the last ten years.<sup>13</sup>

This quotation summarizes this section well: Thai national identity has been based on the characteristics of the ethnic Thai (“Bangkok”), and other groups have been forced to adjust to this formulation in order to be seen as

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<sup>12</sup> Referring to the state and to the idea of Thainess based on the ethnic Thai around the Bangkok area.

<sup>13</sup> Interview 29, young academic in Bangkok, with a background in the borderland, 2016-03-22

nationals. Thaksin challenged this system by getting into power through electoral vote. This created a political conflict regarding what role the three pillars should have in Thai society, and in extension therefore also the future of democracy in Thailand. It is in this context that the ruins of a Hindu temple in a remote location between Thailand and Cambodia became politicized.

### 2.3 The Khao Phra Wihan Temple Conflict

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What is referred to as the Khao Phra Wihan temple are the ruins of a temple dedicated to the Hindu God Shiva built in the 11<sup>th</sup> century by the Khmer empire. The temple is located in Cambodia, right at the border with Thailand, in an area where the two countries have disputed the border demarcation. One well-known Thai academic puts it like this: “the temple is located in disputed territory, sitting on top of colonial landmines that have been waiting to explode (Chachavalpongpun 2010: 85).

The border was created in 1904 through agreements between the Siam and the French colonial authorities. King Chulalongkorn negotiated with the French, but did not get as much territory as he aimed for (Wagener 2011: 31). Thai nationalist history discusses this situation with a narrative of national humiliation, together with the ‘Thailand was never colonized’ narrative (Strate 2015).

The 1904 agreement specified that the border between the countries followed a watershed. That watershed placed the Khao Phra Wihan temple on the Siamese side of the border. However, contrary to this agreement, a map made by the French in 1907 in connection with the demarcation, called the Annex 1 map, put the temple on the Cambodian side of the border. Interpretations of this agreement became a matter of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia after Cambodia’s independence from France in 1954. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 1962 that the temple Khao Phra Wihan lies in Cambodian territory.

The topic became a political issue again when UNESCO awarded Khao Phra Wihan World Heritage Status in July 2008. This was a time of political turmoil in Thailand, two years after the military coup that removed Thaksin Shinawatra. When the Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej appointed Thaksin’s former private lawyer as a foreign minister, it was seen as a sign by the Yellow Shirts that Thaksin still had a lot of political influence (Kasetsiri et al. 2013: 25; Pawakapan 2013: 2). The Yellow Shirts accused their political opponent Samak Sundaravej of not caring about the piece of territory around Khao Phra Wihan. Then in October 2008, the Thai military attacked the Cambodian military, killing one Thai soldier and three Cambodian soldiers (Kasetsiri et al.

2013: 28). In September 2009, the Yellow Shirts tried to occupy the Khao Phra Wihan temple to drive out Cambodians from the area, but (Red Shirt) borderland residents blocked the Yellow Shirts from entering Cambodia (Pawakapan 2013: 3). In December 2009, the Yellow Shirts occupied Bangkok's international airports and forced a removal of the pro-Thaksin Government. In 2011, the Yellow Shirts crossed the border into Cambodia and set up Thai flags as a statement that Cambodian forces were occupying Thai territory. Seven Thai nationalist activists were arrested and put in Cambodian prison. The militaries clashed at the border again in February 2011, which left 18 people dead and caused damage to the temple (Kasetsiri et al. 2013: 34). The Yellow Shirt leader Sondhi Limthongkul tried unsuccessfully to convince the army to occupy Angkor Wat and then negotiate an exchange of Angkor Wat for Khao Phra Wihan (Pawakapan 2013: 77).

In 2014, the ICJ issued a clarification of the verdict from 1962, saying that both militaries should immediately leave the area and that the land adjacent to the temple in the east and west belonged to Cambodia. The Yellow Shirts have campaigned that Thailand should resist the ICJ ruling (Kasetsiri et al. 2013: 84). Since then, there is no access to the temple from the Thai side of the border. The demarcation of the border remains unresolved. (For further details on the temple conflict see e.g., Kasetsiri et al. 2013; Turcsányi and Kříž 2017).

Shane Strate states that: "Preah Vihear's significance now transcends its association with architecture, culture, or religion. It has become a discursive symbol of National Humiliation" (2015: 22). An academic interlocutor describes Khao Phra Wihan in this way:

It was built in the 11<sup>th</sup> century with Angkorian architecture. It became a conflict between Cambodia and Thailand during the Cold War period. The temple, because of its Angkorian style, means a lot to the Cambodian people, as it is a Cambodian cultural heritage. For Thailand, considering the treaty between Siam and France, it should belong to Thailand. The conflict over Preah Vihear is not just a territorial issue. It is an issue about nationalism, cultural pride, and the antagonized relationship between two countries ... Nationalism, with regard to territorial integrity, is very important to the Thai people. In our historical texts, we see territory as sacred; it is the most important aspect of sovereignty. We have to protect it. We have to protect every inch of the Thai territory. We have to fight for it and be ready to die for just one inch of the territory. This nationalism is imbued in the Thai mind and it can be stirred up by any group. Khao Phra Wihan is a case study of how Thai nationalism works.<sup>14</sup>

Precisely because Khao Phra Wihan has this symbolic value in Thailand, narratives on the conflict provide a good entry point to the study of nationalization, as elaborated later in the methods chapter.

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<sup>14</sup> Interview 3, Middle-aged academic in Political Science, Bangkok, 2014-07-07

# 3

## Theoretical Framework

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This thesis is situated in the fields of nationalism studies as well as resistance studies, since it combines and contributes to both of these research fields. In terms of theory, the thesis mainly examines the interrelationship between the three conceptual lynchpins nationalism, resistance, and the everyday. The interest lies not in each concept individually, but in how they intersect in contemporary political life in Thailand.

This theory chapter develops in eight parts. The first section, 3.1, reflects on the post-positivist, phenomenological and constructivist meta-theoretical points of departure. The following section, 3.2, presents how the concepts nation, nationalism, and nationalization are approached in the thesis. In 3.3, this thesis is situated within the earlier research in Thai nationalism. Thereafter, section 3.4 concerns concepts of power and resistance. Then, section 3.5 presents the focus on the everyday, section 3.6 discusses everyday nationalism, and section 3.7 considers everyday resistance. This theoretical framework is concluded in section 3.8, which brings together power, resistance, and everyday (anti-) nationalizing.

### 3.1 Meta-Theoretical Reflections

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As the meta-theoretical positions set the wider framing for the more specific theoretical points, this is where the theory chapter starts. First of all, the thesis builds on the epistemological position of post-positivism, and interpretivism, which holds that social sciences need to follow a different logic of research than natural sciences, as humans and social relations are fundamentally different from the research subjects in natural science (Bryman 2012: 28ff).

One of the most central approaches to post-positivist ontologies is phenomenology, a philosophical approach related to how individuals make sense of the world. According to this approach, the largest difference between social

and natural sciences lies in that humans act from the meaning they attribute to acts, which make social meanings, and how people interpret the social world, the subject of study (Bryman 2012: 30). This dissertation adheres seriously to this logic, by searching for the subjective meanings that individuals attach to nationalism. To give one example, in Article 1, which discusses nationalist socialization, interlocutors describe how the Thai King is like a father to the country, which they explain is comparable to having a father in a family.

To focus research on subjective meanings attached to nationalism has been encouraged by a number of nationalism scholars. For example, Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich state,

“We can track markers of nationhood – symbols and signs, language and activities, building styles and consumer goods – until the cows come home but we also need to move beyond this to think critically about what they mean and why they might matter” (2017: 324).

What nationhood means and how it matters is highlighted in the articles of this thesis. Another example of how this thesis puts subjective meanings of nationalism in the center arises when Article 4 discusses nationalist everyday resistance. This article presents how nationalism is necessary in order to resist Western influence. One interlocutor explains the meaning of nationalism for them:

For me, nationalism does not mean just the nation-religion-monarchy, it means everything ... The concept of nationalism for me is like the concept of a house ... When you have a home, you got borders, a fence, a loving family inside, and your neighbors shouldn't infringe on your territory.<sup>15</sup>

The ontological position in the thesis is constructivist, seeing social phenomena and meanings as continually constructed through regulations and acts by social actors (Bryman 2012: 33). This is important, as another ontological position, such as institutionalism or historical materialism, would not give the acts, feelings, or experiences of individuals the same importance. The focus on how ordinary people participate in everyday national construction is based on the view that it matters what individuals do: we are all participating in the inter-subjective construction of our social reality.

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<sup>15</sup> Interview 36, young Asoke member, Bangkok, 2016-03-29

## 3.2 Nation (-alism, -alization)

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As understood in this thesis, the nation is a particular kind of community; nationalism is the ideology that promotes these communities, and nationalization is the process of creating these communities. There is vast literature on nations and nationalism, in which one can find a plethora of theoretical approaches. My particular approach, elaborated in the following pages, stresses how the nation is performed in relation to power and resistance.

Research on nations and nationalism has a long history and has covered debates ranging from a discussion on *when* we have had nationalism (Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1983), to *what* nationalism is (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, or Smith 1988). Later research on nationalism has focused on *how* nations and nationalism are reproduced as discursive formations (Calhoun 2007), as events of group-ness (Brubaker 2004), through boundary making processes (Wimmer 2013) or as performed through banal repetition (Billig 1995). Common in these perspectives is the focus on the state as the main actor in the production of the nation, with little focus on individual involvement and motivation to participate in what this thesis calls nationalization.

Etymologically, the word ‘nation’ derives from the Latin *nasci* (to be born) and *natio* (belonging together by birth or place of birth), meaning people related by chance of birth or birthplace. These etymological roots have created a connotation between nation and “natural” (Vincent 2013: 1). In this way of looking at nations as natural forms of association, the concept of nation is often used synonymously with ethnicity, tribe, or kinship group and viewed as something that has always existed.

In contrast to the view of naturally occurring non-historical nations, there are several other ways to understand nations and nationalism. A social constructivist view treats nations as made or created. In this research tradition, the nation is seen as an imagined political community (Anderson 2006: 6) and nationalism as an ideology, which requests that the “political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 2006: 1). In an oft-cited statement, Eric Hobsbawm asserts that: “for the purposes of analysis, nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around” (1990: 10). Nationalist ideology aims that each state should have a nation and that each nation should have a state. One of the most famous researchers within this research tradition, Ernest Gellner, argues:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men [sic], an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-

existing cultures: *that* is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one (2006: 47).

Nationalism is also a discourse, a specific way of viewing, talking about, and understanding a reality. Nationalist discourse holds that humanity is divided into nations, the Earth is divided into territories, and the entities of nations and territories should be matched into nation-states. This nationalist discourse is a dominant way of viewing the world and, in reference to Benedict Anderson's description of the nation as an imagined community, the general nationalist discourse can be called the nationalist imaginary (Closs Stephens 2013).

Contrary to what one might expect, nationalism has not subsided with globalization. Nationality can be a way to feel anchored in the vastness of globality: nationality and globality simultaneously mutually reinforce as well as contradict each other (Scholte 1995; Calhoun 2007; Skey 2013). Never before have people had as much contact over vast distances as in recent times. Not only do we travel and move more, but modern information technology also gives the possibility to connect over the planet without physical travel. However, affinity to a certain territory and identification with specific imagined communities continues to be important, which the myriad of different expressions of nationalism convey. Stricter asylum laws in Europe, the growth in the popularity of anti-immigration parties in Europe, Brexit, Donald Trump, as well as numerous resistance movements around the world mobilizing around national identity (such as in Western Sahara, Tibet, Kurdistan, Palestine, the Basque Country, and many more) are all examples of such expressions.

Nationalism is created by human actions. In order to highlight the process and practice of nationalism, this thesis uses the concept of *nationalization*. Michael Billig advocates for the use of verb phrases (he gives the examples of heating and cooling of nationalist temperatures), instead of noun phrases (hot and cold nationalism) to stress how nationalism is created by human actions (2017: 314). In her ethnographic study of Palestinians in the West Bank, Iris Jean-Klein (2001) studies a practice she calls 'the suspension of everyday life' in occupied territories during the intifada. She comes to the conclusion that the practice exemplifies a process of 'domestic self-nationalization' (2001: 115). Ahead of most literature on 'everyday nationalism,' she looks at the 'nationalizing efficacy' of everyday acts by 'ordinary persons' (2001: 83). However, the term 'nationalizing' is more commonly used as an economic term referring to the process of transforming private assets into public. There are very few political studies concerning nationalism that use the term nationalizing in this way, but there are some exceptions. One is Mihai Rusu, who in his work on Romanianism refers to 'nationalization' as a process initiated by the state, with the end-result of 'the political molding of the national unit' (2014: 100). Another

exception is Allen Chun's analysis of Taiwan. He describes nationalizing as: "The need to constantly reinforce a national frame of mind or imagined community through social practice" (1994: 49).

### 3.3 Thai Nationalism

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There is considerable literature concerning *Thai* nationalism, including many historical accounts of how the Thai nation developed into its current state. One of the most famous books is the historian Thongchai Winichakul's *Siam Mapped. A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (1994). Winichakul explores the role of geography, specifically mapping, in the creation of nationhood. He uses a constructivist approach and states: "Even the most concrete identification of a nation, such as its territory, and its related values and practices, all of which I term the "geo-body," was discursively created" (Winichakul 1994: x). In the article 'Nationalism and the Radical Intelligentsia in Thailand,' he describes different forms of nationalisms in Thailand, such as conservative, racial, and left-populist/anti-Western nationalisms (2008). He has also more recently written on the status of the monarchy in Thailand (cf. 'The Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Two Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics and the State of Denial' (2014).

Another example of historical analysis of the emergence of Thai nationhood is Shane Strate's *The Lost Territories. Thailand's History of National Humiliation* (2015). This book looks at ideas of loss by nationalists in newspapers from the 1930s and the 1940s, as well as parliamentary debates during the period 1914-1946. Peter Vandergeest (1993) combines two works that are important for this thesis: *Weapons of the Weak* (Scott 1985) with *Imagined Communities* (Anderson 1983) in his article 'Constructing Thailand: Regulation, Everyday Resistance, and Citizenship.' He bases his analysis on archival and library research and ethnographic research in southern Thailand in 1985 and 1987-88 to draw conclusions on processes of regulation and institutionalization.

Another historian who studied Thai nationalism is Charnvit Kasetsiri. He has written historical accounts on the development of the Thai state and nation (i.e., *The Rise of Ayudhya*). Coming closer to the field study of my dissertation, Charnvit has also co-authored *Preah Vihear. A Guide to the Thai-Cambodian Conflict and Its Solutions*, together with Pou Sothirak (a diplomat from Cambodia) and Pavin Chachavalpongpun (a scholar of politics in Southeast Asia from Thailand). This book also focuses on state-level nationalism and stresses how nationalism has been stirred up by leaders to fulfill their political purposes.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun has focused much research on how Thai nationalism has been discursively exploited and used by the state (i.e., ‘From Marketplace Back to Battlefield: Thai-Cambodian Relations in the Age of a Militarized Politics’ (2014); ‘Temple of Doom: Hysteria about the Preah Vihear Temple in the Thai Nationalist Discourse’ (2010); and *A Plastic Nation. The curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese relations* (2005). Also, Puangthong R. Pawakapan’s book *State and Uncivil Society in Thailand at the Temple of Preah Vihear* (2013) looks at how nationalism in Thailand has been manipulated and used for specific purposes.

This thesis adds to the above research on Thai nationalism with its perspective on everyday nationalism, which is missing in earlier work. In an article about the construction of national heroes, Charnvit Kasetsiri mentions how imagining the nation is manifested in everyday acts, referring to ‘the invention of various symbolic forms which manifest the nation or are insistently marked by it – e.g. flags, clothing styles, foods, flowers, animals, and so on’ (2003: 528).

One more explicit everyday approach to nationalism in Thailand is Marte Nilsen’s dissertation *Negotiating Thainess: Religious and National Identities in Thailand’s Southern Conflict* (2012). Nilsen looks at local identities in Patani, southern Thailand, and the separatist resistance movements there. However, her research mainly focuses on how local people experience the communities in which they live and the violence around them (2012: 17), not constructions of everyday nationhood per se. The explanatory framework in this thesis, the (de)construction of Thai nationhood of everyday practices (particularly as they unfold through relations of power and resistance) has not been developed in earlier research.

### 3.4 Power and Resistance

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What power is and how it works is an eternal puzzle for social science research. A common-sense understanding of power sees it as the capacity of one person to make someone else do something that they would not do but for the influence of the powerful person. However, this very limited understanding of power excludes many other forms of power. Power of some groups over other groups is not covered in this understanding of power. Neither are questions of how come people obey power or the understanding of power as a capacity to act. In the word ‘power’ itself, there is no distinction as to whether it is a dominating ‘power over’ or a ‘power to’ act, for example, by resisting (Lukes 2008). Power can be viewed as a capacity, which when operating from above is domination and when operating from below is resistance (Ortner 2006: 139).

Similarly, in the word ‘resistance’ itself, there is no distinction between emancipatory resistance and resistance to emancipation. As a result, David Couzens Hoy suggests that emancipatory resistance should be called critical resistance, as ‘critique’ is what distinguishes the two forms of resistance (2004: 2). In the *Sage Handbook on Resistance*, the editors Courpasson and Vallas, use the term ‘negative resistance’ for non-emancipatory forms of resistance (2016: 5).

In a commonsense understanding, power and resistance are clear opposites. However, as Sherry Ortner puts it, “then Foucault made us draw attention to less organized, more everyday forms of power, and James Scott to less organized more everyday forms of resistance” (1995: 175). In post-structuralist understandings, power and resistance are mutually entangled (Sharp et al. 2000). On the one hand, being so intertwined, there is no “pure” resistance totally outside of the effects of power, and there is always at least small seeds of resistance in all forms of power. Similarly, there are certainly no people who are only and always resisters or only and always in positions of power. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that power and resistance are not the same thing. Even though they are closely connected, it is possible to tell them apart. No matter what understanding one use of these concepts, resistance can only be analyzed together with an analysis of power (Vinthagen and Johansson 2020: 63). This thesis looks at this relationship in connection with Thai nationalizing.

Stellan Vinthagen and Anna Johansson describe “power over people” as something which is:

fundamentally limiting their potential (possible ways of life, identities, subjectivities, discourses and ways of behaving) through a variation of techniques (including hierarchies, stereotyping, discipline, violence, etc.) that is forming human existence in particular ways (Vinthagen and Johansson 2020: 18).

This thesis builds on the understanding of power as “power over” rather than as the capacity to act. But this form of power is also reproduced by individuals in their everyday lives by accepting it; normalizing it; and by following and enforcing norms, rules, hierarchies, stereotypes, discourses, orders and laws, often without conscious intent to reproduce power (Vinthagen and Johansson 2020: 28).

Furthermore, in this thesis, an intersectional conceptualization of power is used, meaning that power around nations, nationalism, and nationalizing processes is interconnected with questions of race, class, gender, ethnicity, age, and other hierarchies and relations of power (Collins 2015; Naples and Bickham Mendez 2015). This means that a person can be in subordinated and dominant positions at the same time, based on different hierarchies. An inter-

sectional approach acknowledges diversity in terms of power; that a governed population is not homogenous and that people cannot easily be divided into the subordinated and the powerful. Resistance is also intersectional and operates in relation to several forms of power simultaneously. In a resistance activity, one type of power might be challenged, while at the same another type of power might be strengthened (Vinthagen and Johansson 2020: 63). One example from the nationalizing project in Thailand is the possibility to be, on the one hand, in a dominant position as an Asoke member in a nationalist struggle in relation to minority groups while, on the other hand, simultaneously identifying as oppressed by international institutions dominated by the west, as the International Court of Justice, in relation to the Khao Phra Wihan case.

An important concept in relation to power in this thesis is agency, as the thesis looks at how individuals make sense of, activate, sustain, and challenge nationalism. In the words of Sherry Ortner:

“agency” can be virtually synonymous with the forms of power people have at their disposal, their ability to act on their own behalf, influence other people and events, and maintain some kind of control in their own lives. Agency in this sense is relevant for both domination and resistance. People in positions of power “have” – legitimately or not – what might be thought of as “a lot of agency”, but the dominated too always have certain capacities, and something very significant, capacities to exercise some sort of influence over the way in which events unfold (2006: 143f).

Even though the nationalizing project in Thailand is promoted by an authoritarian state with “a lot of agency,” the approach in this study is that ‘ordinary individuals’ also have the capacity to exercise some sort of influence over the creation of (and resistance to) the nation.

The field of Resistance Studies has focused on many different ways that people have protested, challenged, undermined or disturbed power, domination, oppression, injustices, inequalities or repressive structures, norms or relations. This field is related to, but not the same as, social movement studies, which focuses on organized forms of resistance. Resistance Studies also includes research into other forms of resistance, such as non-organized, individual, dispersed, or hidden forms of resistance. In authoritarian contexts such as Thailand, organized resistance might not be possible. In situations when open collective forms of resistance are not possible, people often still resist, but in more subtle forms (as will be presented further in section 3.5).

Even though there is a common-sense understanding of what resistance means, the field of Resistance Studies is replete with debates on how exactly to define the concept. In the article ‘Conceptualizing Resistance,’ Hollander and Einwohner point out that the main controversial points on which scholars disagree regarding the conceptualization of resistance are the roles of intention, duration, and effects of resistance acts (2004). The most controversial issue

within discussions on how to define resistance is what role the intention of acts should have. In this thesis, the definition of resistance is important, as the definition delimits what acts should be seen as resistance and not. I will therefore now present how different scholars treat the matter of intention in relation to definitions of resistance.

One definition of resistance is:

a subaltern practice that might challenge, negotiate, or undermine power. Such subaltern practice arises from below and might be performed by someone from a subordinated position or on behalf of and/or in solidarity with someone in a subaltern position (proxy resistance) (Baaz et al. 2017: 26).

This definition does not mention intentions of acts as a criterion for analyzing an act as resistance. This understanding is contrasted in Chandra's description of resistance as:

to minimally apprehend the conditions of one's subordination, to endure or withstand those conditions in everyday life, and to act with sufficient intention and purpose to negotiate power relations from below in order to rework them in a more favourable or emancipatory direction (Chandra 2015: 565).

In this definition, intention is lifted up as crucial for the understanding of resistance. In many definitions, the conscious *attempt* to create change is what gives resistance its specific character. For example, in the Sage Handbook of resistance, the following definition is used:

We view resistance here as any practice that attempts to challenge, change, or retain particular circumstances relating to societal relations, processes, and/or institutions. These circumstances may involve domination, exploitation, subjection at the material, symbolic, or psychological level (Courpasson and Vallas 2016: 33).

So, intention is crucial to resistance. While intention is difficult to specify exactly, James Scott rightly notes: "How, otherwise, can we distinguish between say, a pure theft of no political interest and a theft that likely represents everyday resistance?" (2020: xi). As this thesis examines acts in the everyday that are politically significant in relation to nationalizing, it is important to understand resistance as an intentional act, to be able to tell resistance apart from other everyday acts.

Another important concept in the analysis of resistance is 'subalternity.' Some authors have tried to define what subalternity means in specific detailed ways. One example of this is how Marta Iniguez De Heredia writes: "In the everyday framework, subjects of resistance are 'fleshed' people with a particular experience of subordination, with difficult or no access to decision-making power at the institutional level and with difficult or no access to sufficient means of living" (de Heredia 2017: 182). In anthropology, emic and etic research positions highlight the position of the researcher toward the research subjects with regard to belonging to the group studied, where an emic position

is an insider position, when the researcher is a member of the studied group (Eriksen 1999: 38). The reasoning can also mean that the researcher describes the studied phenomena from the point of view of the studied, taking an “insider perspective” in research without being a member of the group. Following the definition on resistance by Baaz et al. (2017: 26), this would mean to describe subalternity from the position of the person studied. In the article “Negotiating White Power Activist Stigma,” the authors Pete Simi and Robert Futrell (2009) do this in an extreme form by adopting the term “Aryan” in their article, which is not an acceptable term generally, but an emic term used by the activists under study. This type of reasoning is criticized by Uday Chandra who states:

In particular, we avoid the postmodern temptation (...) to stretch the notion of subalternity to embrace any situation in which individuals may *feel* deprived of power. The material forces that produce and sustain subalternity as well as state power are laid out elaborately in each empirical context (2015: 565).

I think that how one should treat who it is that should define relations of power depends on the aim of the research. If the aim of the research is, as in this thesis, to understand motivations to participate in resistance acts, then the *feelings* of deprivation of power are highly relevant. In this thesis, I will therefore look at subalternity as presented to me by interlocutors, from an emic research position, not by any objective measurements or through my own analysis of power. For example, Article 4 looks at everyday nationalist resistance against Western influence, and Articles 2 and 3 examine everyday resistance against Thai nationalism. The articles present different views and experiences of nationalism and subalternity. More on how this thesis understands resistance will be developed in the section on everyday resistance.

### 3.5 The Everyday

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The everyday is a “domain of activity” (Pink 2012: 5), which is “neither an analytical category nor an object of investigation per se, but a mere domain of enquiry into other phenomena” (Antonsich 2015: 33). Research on the everyday uses the ordinary as a category of analysis (Neal and Murji 2015: 812). The study of the everyday emerged in sociology as a critique to macro theory explanations of behavior (Courpasson 2017: 844). Research on the everyday typically includes bottom-up level of politics, the scales of local and micro-political, and the practice of routine rather than disruption (Guillaume and Huysmans 2019: 280). What is *not* everyday are hence the opposite political expressions: top-down, organized, open, macro, and spectacular domains of activity.

To look at the ordinary is a self-evident logic for sociological and anthropological research traditions, but less so in other social or political sciences. In the introductory article for a special issue entitled ‘Sociologies of Everyday Life,’ the authors motivate the study of the everyday in this convincing way:

micro social life, the banal and the familiar are co-constitutive of the wider complexities, structures and processes of historical and contemporary social worlds. In this context of inquiry and excavation, we suggest, everyday life can be thought of as providing the sites and moments of translation and adaption. It is the landscape in which the social gets to be made - and unmade (Neal and Murji 2015: 812).

The everyday is where we as human beings can feel the effects of power structures, which (at least in situations with absence of direct violence) might seem vague or ambiguous. For example, Article 2 in this thesis examines how self-nationalization in Thailand is instigated through obligatory rituals of loyalty in the everyday, such as the expectation of standing still when the national anthem is played in public spaces twice daily. This nationalizing propaganda works as a form of emotional socialization, creating norms of correct feelings toward the Thai nation. This nationalizing takes place in the everyday, making nationalizing routine. Article 2 develops the concept of ‘affective self-nationalization,’ which connects nationalist emotional socialization with individual self-nationalization.

The everyday is a concept to explore the social and political significance of what might seem as “little nothings” (Guillaume and Huysmans 2019: 279). The understanding of ‘political’ here is as in “having to do with power relations” (as Hanisch 2006 describes the meaning of ‘political’ in ‘The Personal is Political’). In a similar, but more precise way, Chantal Mouffe describes the

‘political’ as a space of power, conflict, and antagonism, a form of antagonism that she affirms is “constitutive of human societies” (2005: 9), as distinct from “politics” as the practices concerning the governance of states. Together with the understanding of power in this thesis (Vinthagen and Johansson 2020: 18), the ‘political’ is referred to as a space where people engage with techniques, including hierarchies, stereotyping, discipline, violence etc., which limit possible ways of lives, identities, subjectivities, discourses, and ways of behaving.

The concept of the everyday widens what is seen as the political sphere and adds subjects, practices, sites and objects, which have not been considered political into analysis (Guillaume and Huysmans 2019: 280). Everyday practices must be understood together with the context and processes of which they are a part. Everyday acts are not random, but part of specific historical contexts (de Heredia 2017: 12f). This is an important point, because even though it is in the everyday that “we make our worlds and where our worlds make us” (Pink: 2012:5), we are not individually creating our worlds, but participating collectively in social, cultural, and political creation. For example, the creation of each nation, including the Thai nation, is closely connected to specific historical and geographical contexts.

This thesis looks at ordinary acts that are given political importance for individuals in Thailand in relation to Thai nationalism. Acts such as cooking Thai food, wearing traditional cloths, or using social media are ordinary acts to which the actors give political significance. These acts are also considered resistance acts, with the intention of challenging power. This thesis also looks at routine forms of nationalizing, such as participation in daily loyalty performances. These everyday acts are political as they concern power, although the participating individuals do not necessarily intend to act politically.

This does not mean that analysis of the everyday is the same as analysis of the individual, as in individual forms of resistance. There are individual forms of resistance that are not everyday resistance, such as spectacular protest acts or violent resistance in the form of suicide bombers, for example. In contrast, the everyday focuses on the ordinary, the routine, the familiar, the common, the quotidian, and the ‘normal.’ To have a picture of the king in your restaurant, business, or home is the normal thing to do in Thailand, in the same way as eating Thai food or scrolling through social media. Yet, these ordinary things are examples of acts relating politically to nationalism in different ways. As presented in Article 2, the act of having the picture of the king can be to show loyalty to the idea of the three pillars of nation, religion, and the monarchy. This act is reproducing and sustaining the official nationalization. The act of cooking Thai foods is lifted up in Article 1 as an act understood as nationalist everyday resistance against Western influence in Thailand. To scroll through

social media is explained in Article 4 as a subtle form of everyday resistance to nationalization, as social media is a tool to spread anti-nationalist information and disturb propaganda.

### 3.6 Everyday Nationalism

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In contrast to top-down macro analysis of nationalism, everyday nationalism looks at how the nation is performed by individuals in their everyday lives (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008: 554). One famous quotation by Eric Hobsbawm is that “nations are essentially constructed from above but cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below” (1990: 10). Research on everyday nationalism aims to understand nationalism from below, but also to include individuals as actors constructing nationalism. Everyday nationalism focuses on human agency in nationalizing processes (Duchesne 2018: 841), i.e., how the nation is produced by “ordinary people doing ordinary things in their ordinary lives” (Fox 2018: 862). Everyday nationalism also looks at the interplay between bottom-up and top-down constructions of nationhood (Krasniqi, Sokolic and Kostovicova 2020: 462).

Another area of research related to everyday nationalism is the study of affective nationalism. This field also looks at how individuals reproduce nationalism, but focuses on emotional and embodied practices. Examples of this research include Elizabeth Militiz’s book concerning affective encounters between bodies, objects, and places in Azerbaijan (2008) and Elizabeth Militiz and Carolin Schurr, who argue that the “the nation emerges in moments of encounter between different bodies and objects through embodying, sharing, enjoying or disliking what feels national” (2016: 54). Angharad Closs Stephens looks at “affective atmospheres” and how they matter politically in relation to nationalism (2016). Yet, affect theory and research on everyday nationalism are dissimilar in that, as clarified by Marco Antonsich and Michael Skey, “the great irony of the focus on affecting and affected bodies is that people are absent” (2017: 2). In response to this contradiction, this thesis combines affect theory with theory from psychology on feeling norms and group emotions to theorize collective emotion in relation to the nation, as seen especially in Article 2.

Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss present four ways that the nation is created in everyday life by discursive construction: ‘talking the nation,’ ‘choosing the nation,’ ‘performing the nation,’ and ‘consuming the nation’ (2008: 537f). First, with ‘talking the nation,’ they argue that ordinary people talk with and about the nation in ways that do not necessarily correspond with the elite (2008: 539). Second, Fox and Mille-Idriss argue that the nation is discursively created in everyday life by “choosing the nation.” They give examples of situa-

tions when choices become relevant for national production, for example, the choice of putting a child in a minority school (2008: 544). Third, they present what they call “performing the nation,” which they explain as how ordinary people engage and interpret public rituals initiated by the state such as national holidays and sports events (2008: 547). The fourth way that Fox and Miller-Idriss present the nation to be created discursively in everyday life is through “consuming the nation.” They describe how nationalism is in many ways an act of production by the state, but that attention also needs to focus on ordinary people as the consumers of this production (2008: 550). They also explain how the consumption of national goods such as films and food function as a way of creating the nation (2008: 551).

Jon Fox and Maarten Van Ginderachter have further developed this argument to mean that beyond talking, choosing, performing, and consuming, people also reject, resist, ignore, and avoid the nation (Fox and Van Ginderachter 2018: 546). In this understanding, everyday nationalism no longer concerns only the production of the nation, but also resistance to its production. This argument is very much in line with this thesis, which looks at how individuals participate in nationalizing by activating, sustaining, and resisting the production of the nation. The choice of these three concepts relates to the choice of focusing on power and resistance in relation to nationalizing and the idea that there are roughly three ways that individuals can relate to any social phenomenon: by actively participating in it, by not taking any particular stance (and mainly following the norm), or by resisting the phenomena. There are always of course combinations of different ways of relating, where a person can sustain a norm on one occasion and resist it on another.

Another related research field to everyday nationalism is banal nationalism. Michael Billig’s influential study on banal nationalism explains how nationalism is constantly present in established states in the West, without being paid much attention (1995). He describes how nationhood is reconstituted in daily routines of which we generally are unaware. He gives the examples of language such as “we” (as reference to the nation) – for example, when the weather forecast or the news is presented on television. The audience is thereby reminded of what the weather “here” means (1995: 116). Billig argues that the nation and the feeling of national belonging are created not only during times of conflicts or war when flags are waved in passion, but also through constant repetition in the everyday with acts such as flags hanging on official buildings (1995: 7). Banal nationalism concerns the state’s performance of the nation, and Billig stresses that even though it is reproduced in banal ways, it should not be understood as benign, as it is produced by actors with military power (1995: 7).

Recent discussions in nationalism studies address the similarities and differences between banal and everyday nationalism. Sophie Duchesne criticizes that many scholars connect banal and everyday nationalism too closely and argues that they seem to miss Billig's negative opinions about nationalism (2018: 850) as well as his main point that citizens in established democracies are subjected to an unconscious process of "flagging" (the process referred to in this thesis as nationalizing) (2018: 845). In contrast, Michael Skey argues that banal nationalism and everyday nationalism are two different vocabularies for studying the same phenomena (2018: 857). Jon Fox contends that banal and everyday nationalism are two sides of the same coin, as everyday nationalism research focuses on how ordinary people are agents in the reproduction of nationhood. This everyday production is not simply separate from the state-produced banal nationalism, but it is also not simply created by it (2018: 863).

There is also research within everyday nationalism that more closely focuses on relationships between macro and micro levels of nationalism. Examples are Gesine Wallem's analysis of the practice of name change by migrants to "more German" names, where she looks at individual agency in relation to what she calls "institutionalized power of normalization" (2017: 92). Paul Goode looks at what citizens in Russia do with official nationalism in their everyday lives and makes the explicit point that:

regime type and especially authoritarianism plays a significant role in mediating between public and private identities. With few exceptions, the literatures on banal nationalism and everyday nationhood tend to neglect the effect of regime type or treat regime dynamics as a background condition (2017: 138).

Thus, the macro circumstances of power in specific contexts matter for how individuals participate in nationalizing. The understanding of nationalism will not be advanced if we isolate everyday nationalism from its macro context. One way to avoid analyzing everyday nationalism out of context is to adhere to the presence of power in the everyday. The focus in everyday nationalism research could be the individual and the nation, but not only individuals reproducing the nation, but also individuals seeing the creation of the nation as a form of power to be resisted. The study of how the nation happens in the everyday should pay as much attention to how individuals participate in its construction as to how individuals participate in its deconstruction, and always understand it in relation to the macro-political context, especially to relations of power.

### 3.7 Everyday Power and Resistance

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Often, resistance is associated with its overt forms of demonstrations, strikes, and rallies - acts that are easily identified as resistance. However, resistance can also take subtle forms and includes different acts that are not as easily identified, since they are carried out in a way that will often not be identified as resistance acts. Some forms of power that limit all types of overt forms of resistance might still be resisted through low profile, individual, non-organized, covert forms of resistance (Scott 1985). Everyday resistance is the type of resistance in which people engage with power relations in the everyday (Vinthagen and Johansson 2020: 3). It is ordinary acts that can “give birth to silent micro explosions of freedom” (Courpasson 2017: 855). These types of acts are central in this thesis and in focus in Articles 2, 3, and 4.

The study of everyday resistance is mainly associated with the work of James Scott (*Weapons of the Weak. Everyday forms of Peasant Resistance* (1985) and *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (1990)). The subject has later been developed also by Asef Bayat (*Life as Politics* 2013); David Courpasson (*The Politics of the Everyday* 2017); Marta Iniguez de Heredia (*Everyday Resistance, Peacebuilding and State-Making* 2017); and Anna Johansson and Stellan Vinthagen (*Conceptualizing “Everyday Resistance”* 2020).

In this context, James Scott has formulated the idea of infrapolitics, namely, politics that are like infrared lights and not possible to see. He describes infrapolitics as “hidden transcripts of the weak” - sites for non-hegemonic, contrapuntal, dissident, subversive discourse (Scott 1990: 25). Hidden transcripts can be expressed openly, but in a way that they will not be identified as resistance if you are not familiar with the transcript. Examples of this type of resistance are rumors, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, jokes, and theater (Scott 1990: xiii). Scott argues that if we only focus on open resistance, then we get a very narrow picture of political life (Scott 1990: 20). He describes everyday resistance in this way:

Everyday forms of resistance make no headlines. Just as millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do thousands upon thousands of individual acts of insubordination and evasion create a political or economic barrier reef of their own. There is rarely any dramatic confrontation, any moment that is particularly newsworthy. And whenever, to pursue the simile, the ship of state runs aground on such reef, attention is typically directed to the shipwreck itself and not to the vast aggregation of petty acts that made it possible (Scott 1985: 36).

There are many reasons to study everyday forms of resistance. First, in some power configurations no other form of resistance is possible. Second, big

changes come from somewhere; big revolutions do not simply happen out of nowhere; they are preceded by smaller changes. Roland Bleiker argues in *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics* that the big events are not actually the big events, since they occur so rarely. It is rather the accumulation of many small acts that create the overt form of resistance (2000: 203). In order to learn about social change and overt forms of mobilizations demanding change, covert forms of resistance need to be studied.

Asef Bayat explains that when organized open resistance is not possible, people have turned to forms of resistance that are closely connected to their everyday activities. Bayat focuses on the Middle East and how collective non-organized everyday acts cause social change. He describes how survival techniques for the urban poor impinge on the “propertied and powerful” when a large number of individuals engage in the same activities. He calls the non-movement of the urban poor the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” (2013: 15f). Bayat has also studied how women in situations where organized feminist movements are not possible challenge gender discrimination in everyday acts. He explains:

Muslim women under authoritarian regimes may, consciously or without being aware, defy, resist, negotiate, or even circumvent gender discrimination – not necessarily by resorting to extraordinary and overarching “movements” identified by deliberate collective protest and informed by mobilization theory and strategy, but by involving ordinary daily practices of life – by working, playing sports, jogging, singing, or running for public offices. (...) The effective power of these practices lies precisely in their *ordinariness*, since it is irrepressible actions they encroach incrementally to capture trenches from the power base of patriarchal structure, while erecting springboards to move on. Conventional social movements with identifiable leaderships may be more readily prone to repression than such dispersed intertwined with the practices of daily life (Bayat 2013: 88).

Even though everyday resistance looks very different in different contexts, it involves ordinary activities; therefore, it is not an obvious form of resistance to the outside eye. Similarly, David Courpasson writes about resistance at workplaces such as banks, stating that: “resistance is made possible by the fact that the micro-social activities (walking, reading, cooking...) are invisible to forces of control” (2017: 846).

Building on Scott’s classic work, Stellan Vinthagen and Anna Johansson define everyday resistance as “a practice/technique (not an intention, consciousness, ideology, recognition, or outcome/effect), and always oppositional or related to power/dominance/hegemony” (Vinthagen and Johansson 2020: 45). They describe how everyday resistance is typically carried out as a way to both survive and undermine repression (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013: 10). With this definition, acts like smuggling, which might aspire only to create a better life rather than express political resistance (Soto 2015: 269) can, following Vinthagen and Johansson’s definition, still be analyzed as resistance, be-

cause it is not necessary for an act to be intended as resistance to count as resistance. Another description of everyday resistance is made in the volume *Resistance in Everyday Life. Constructing Cultural Experiences*, where the authors conceive of everyday resistance:

as an intentional process where new meaning constructions emerge in thinking, feeling, acting or simply living with others. Resistance is thus conceived as a meaning-making activity at the intersection of personal and collective systems ... Ordinary life events contain innumerable instances of agency and resistance (Chaudhary et al. 2017: 1).

Aligned with the position in this thesis, to base research on the experiences and understandings of the people in focus of the research, this description highlights the intentionality of everyday resistance acts. Vinthagen and Johansson argue that if intention is necessary for an act to count as resistance, then it risks excluding resistance from lower classes and focusing on the politically educated (2013: 21). In this thesis, the contrary is believed, i.e., socio-economically weaker classes and politically uneducated also do intentional everyday resistance. In other aspects, the understanding of everyday resistance in this study follows the description by Vinthagen and Johansson of everyday resistance as non-dramatic, non-confrontational, and non-recognized; resistance that has the potential to undermine power without revealing itself; and resistance that is individual, without any leadership or organization (2013: 37).

### 3.8 Bringing it Together: Power, Resistance, and Everyday (Anti-) Nationalization

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This thesis argues that the nation is performed in everyday processes that can be understood in relation to power and resistance. Similar to how performativity theory has explained gender as a verb, the nation can be understood as performed through a process of nationalizing acts. Everyday processes include bottom-up politics, the scales of local and micro-political, and the practice of routine rather than disruption. Nationalism can be experienced as domination as well as a challenge to domination. Hence, power and resistance are important in order to locate, attend to, and understand (anti-)nationalizing practices.

Regarding the power side of the dynamic, this thesis treats it as a force that limits possible ways of life, identities, discourses, and ways of behaving through varying techniques such as hierarchies, stereotyping, discipline, and violence (Johansson and Vinthagen 2020: 18), which enables us to see many expressions of nationalism as expressions of power. The history of nationalizing is largely about processes of homogenization of people by states (Hall 2006: 39).

These processes have often been violent and oppressive of minorities in the same way as in Thailand. In such cases, it has been taken to its most extreme results with ethnic cleansing and genocide. Also in less violent assimilation processes, the nation is imagined through negative identification, the nation is defined by what it is not (Cox 2002: 184). States, and other governing agencies, create the nation both through ‘banal’ everyday repetitions, but also through homogenization programs that are sometimes violent.

Regarding the resistance side of the dynamic, nationalism has been important in emancipatory resistance struggles over the world against colonial forces (cf. Chatterjee 1993). Using a definition of resistance as an oppositional act from a position experienced as in subordination to oppressive power, enables us to see many expressions of nationalism as resistance. Rahul Rao writes in the book *Third World Protest. Between Home and the World* how the construction of community has been central in resistance against oppression and that resistance has often been about the ability to express suppressed identities (2010: 20). Also in these instances, it is illuminating to look in relation to what power that nationalism is performed. Rao describes how postcolonial thinkers such as Edward Said and Franz Fanon have defended subaltern nationalisms while at the same time being critical about nationalism as an idea. He explains:

we can see clearly the tension between a communitarian impulse to construct unified collective agency against external imperialist oppression and a simultaneous cosmopolitan inclination to deconstruct such communitarian fictions out of an acute awareness of their tendency to stifle the very freedoms they claimed to fight for (Rao 2010: 197f).

An intersectional view of power and resistance helps to map and make sense of the different contradictory logics of nationalism of being oppressive and liberating at the same time. Umut Özkırmılı makes the point that new states that are created through anti-colonial nationalist struggles have often been just as hostile to minorities as the colonial powers that they replaced (2005: 66). Thus, resistance, when successful, can turn into a form of power (Tripp 2013: 315).

Power and resistance are readily apparent in top-down, organized, open, macro, spectacular domains of nationalizing activities. However, this thesis focuses instead on the “little nothings,” the bottom-up, local, micro, and routine forms of nationalizing, on the sides of both power and resistance. The emic research position in this thesis enables multiple interpretations of subalternity, which is key for the analysis of individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism. Hence, a key theoretical contribution in this thesis is a more developed understanding of everyday nationalism as an interplay of power and resistance.

In positions experienced as being subaltern toward power, nationalizing might be performed in order to resist that power. Everyday resistance literature has shown that non-dramatic, non-confrontational, and non-organized resistance matter for mainly three reasons: First, everyday resistance matters in its own right, as it challenges power, and creates new meanings (Chaudhary 2017: 1). Second, everyday resistance matters because each small claim made creates a stepping-stone for a new claim (Bayat 2013: 18). Third, everyday resistance matters because all large social change starts with something small (see for example, Bleiker 2000: 203). Therefore, in order to understand the myriad of large-scale macro level turns toward nationalism in the world, focus should also be on all the everyday resistance acts that enable the larger social changes. In order to understand what appears as a “sudden” heating of nationalist temperatures, we should study all the small everyday forms of nationalist resistance. The reason to see these acts as resistance, and not just as everyday nationalism, is that when understanding them as resistance we can understand them in relation to social change in favor of nationalist politics, and learn about how activation of nationalism is connected to feelings of subordination.

We also need to study everyday resistance in order to see and learn more about how nationalism might be resisted. As nationalism in many situations has been a tool of governing, dominance, and control, people might participate in national construction because of authoritarian power. In these situations, individuals might participate in nationalizing by sustaining dominant norms and in that way reproducing everyday forms of power. Beyond enriching the understanding of motivations to participate in everyday nationalizing, resistance studies can also help to identify where individuals may participate in everyday anti-nationalizing that challenges power.

Power and resistance are hence crucial for the understanding of everyday (anti-)nationalization. In this thesis, this theoretical framework is applied to the case of everyday (anti-)nationalization in Thailand. To indicate in more detail how this application is done, the following chapter presents the research methods used in this thesis.

# 4

## Methods

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This study has a qualitative research design rooted in post-positivist epistemology and social constructivist ontology. These epistemological and ontological positions were described earlier under 3.1 ‘Meta-theoretical reflections.’ These positions make subjective experience and interpretation the focus of analysis, in contrast to positivist positions searching for “facts” similar to natural sciences (Bryman 2012: 28).

The project also utilizes an *iterative* modus (Bryman 2012: 26). Data were collected in a pilot study and a main fieldwork, where the pilot study was influenced by earlier research on nationalism, power, and resistance. After the pilot study, I went back to earlier research, in a continued process of moving between the theoretical material and narratives encountered in the fieldwork, where each has informed the other. Informed by narratives in the field, I searched for specific literature, and informed by that literature I interpreted the interview material differently.

The thesis offers a case study of everyday life nationalization processes, analyzed through narratives in Thailand on the territorial conflict between Thailand and Cambodia regarding the Khao Phra Wihan temple. To recall, the research question is: ‘How do power and resistance unfold in everyday performances of nationalism in Thailand?’ In focus are acts of doing (nationalist performativity) and undoing (anti-nationalist performativity) nationalism, i.e., how individuals that official Thai nationalization aims to recast into a national whole (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008: 536f), through their everyday practices, activate, sustain, or challenge nationalism in various ways.

This chapter consists of six sections. It starts with 4.1 presenting the case study research design of the project. The data were collected with methods inspired by ethnography through a pilot study of one month and a main fieldwork of three months in Thailand. Section 4.2 discusses the ways that the methods used in the thesis are inspired by ethnography. This section is followed by 4.3 with a presentation of the narrative method, which is used to learn about the subjective experiences, motivations, and acts of participating in

the doing and un-doing of the nation in the study. This section is followed by 4.4 on interviews, discussing who I interviewed and how. This chapter on methods ends with section 4.5 discussing the particular ethical problems and considerations in this study and 4.6 discussing researcher positionality.

## 4.1 Research Design

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In his influential book *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*, Robert Yin describes a ‘case study’ as an empirical inquiry of a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context (2009: 18). The study in this thesis is an empirical inquiry of everyday life nationalization processes in Thailand, which specifically focuses on how these processes are made visible in relation to the Khao Phra Wihan conflict. It is a single case study that can help us to learn about nationalism, power, and resistance: about how nationalism can be a tool of power and how nationalism can also be a tool of resistance. Thailand is a unique case of nationalization because of the specific political, cultural, and historical context.

Thailand was not colonized by Western powers, which makes Thailand an interesting case to study, as the creation of the nation-state is not a direct Western colonial creation. There is rather the idea that Thailand colonized “itself,” as developed earlier in Chapter 2, ‘Contextualizing the Thesis.’

The impossibility of the nationalist idea, to divide the world and humanity into entities of nations and territories creating nation-states, is often visible in borderlands, as here the empirical reality often does not correspond to this idea. Some state borders mark a strong contrast as to where one nation starts and another one ends, but in many places the idea of the nation is especially ambiguous. The idea of where a nation starts and where it ends is often formulated from capitals far away from the borders.

Populations at the borders of Thailand relate in different ways to the nationalizing project of the state. The borderland toward Cambodia is interesting, as there seems to be compliance with the nationalizing program, in contrast to the violent resistance in the south of Thailand. The circumstance of a territorial conflict with the neighboring country in this latter space is particularly interesting, as it puts questions of loyalty to the national construction in the forefront. With the entry point of Khao Phra Wihan, it becomes clear that activation of nationalism is formulated from the heart of power in Thailand. It comes from activists in Bangkok, far from the Thai-Cambodian border, who engage in the question of where the Thai territory starts and ends and who belongs to its community.

Although each case, such as Thailand, has its specifics, individuals relate to authoritarian power that uses nationalization processes also in many other contexts. There is no other case that is exactly similar, with especially the position and the protection of the network monarchy making Thailand unique. But there are many other situations in the world with authoritarian governments, where nationalism is used to rule populations and/or freedom of expression is limited. Hence, my findings from Thailand can add to a broader understanding of the possibilities to resist oppression.

In the pilot study for this research, a interlocutor who is a Professor of Social Science stated: “Khao Phra Wihan is a case study of how Thai nationalism works.”<sup>16</sup> This study is inspired by this statement, but uses nationalism in relation to the Khao Phra Wihan conflict as a window through which we can see how everyday life nationalization processes work. The point is of course not to say that nationalization processes work in the same way in all places at all times, but rather the study gives examples of how individuals relate in very different ways to the official nationalization program in Thailand depending on how power is understood and located (This point is developed further in the concluding chapter of the thesis). The general insight that how one locates power in one’s life matters for how one participates in nationalization is not unique for Thailand.

Robert Yin argues that “case studies are the preferred method when (a) “how” or “why” questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context” (2009: 2). All of the mentioned factors are present in this study, which makes a case study research design suitable.

To summarize, the case of Thai nationalism with the entry point of Khao Phra Wihan offers a particularly good case for the study of individuals’ participation in and resistance to nationalization processes for three reasons. First, individuals have engaged in different ways with the temple conflict, which provides a variety of material on participation in as well as opposition to nationalization. Second, the Khao Phra Wihan conflict provides access to discussing nationalism in Thailand, which can be a sensitive subject because of its connection with the monarchy. Ideas of the nation in Thailand are closely connected with ideas of the monarchy, and it is illegal to discuss the position of the monarchy. As the position of the monarchy is such a sensitive political issue (see Section 2.1 The Three Pillars of Thai Nationalism), it would be much more difficult to approach nationalism or nationalization processes in Thailand without the less sensitive entry point of the temple conflict. To look at nationalism in relation to Khao Phra Wihan offers interlocutors a possibility to choose

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<sup>16</sup> Interview 3, Middle-aged academic in Political Science, Bangkok, 2014-07-07.

how much they want to say about the monarchy. Third, the temple conflict itself is created and brought to the border by Bangkok nationalists living far from the border, which illuminates the position of nationalism, and nationalists in Thailand, i.e., who in Thai society activates nationalism.

## 4.2 Ethnographic Inspirations

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The research methods for this thesis have been inspired by ethnography in several ways. The fieldwork is what Alan Bryman describes as a ‘micro-ethnography’ (2012: 433), as I spent a relatively short period of time (4 months) in Thailand, compared to a full-scale ethnography. I first conducted a one-month pilot study in July-August 2014. Then, between February-April 2016, I did the main fieldwork. However, before starting this study I was already familiar with the cultural and political context of Thailand, which made the starting point for this study different than if Thailand had been a new context for me. Together with my earlier work and research, I have spent in total around 13 months in Thailand. Less time spent earlier in Thailand would have required a lot longer fieldwork for this project. In Section 4.6 on ‘Researcher Positionality,’ I will further present my experiences with nationalization processes in Thailand before starting this research.

Even though I am not an anthropologist, I have been inspired by what the anthropologist Sherry Ortner describes as an “ethnographic stance.” She describes it as an intellectual and moral positionality, which means the attempt *to understand another life world using the self*—as much of it as possible—as the instrument of knowing (Ortner 1995: 173). I am trying to learn about the life worlds of individuals concerning nationalism, with myself and my contact with people as one important instrument of knowing.

Since I see social phenomena such the nation as constituted by social actors, the data collected and used need to be the acts, feelings, and meanings that individuals attach to participating and not participating in performing the nation into being. As the aim of the thesis is to learn more about everyday life nationalization, access to these points of view is necessary.

To achieve this insight requires more than the actual interviews alone. It also means observing and participating in the everyday life of interlocutors, spending time together outside of interview situations, and honestly and full-heartedly trying to understand how interlocutors made sense of the official nationalizing program in their lives. Following the fieldwork, I have kept an “ethnographic stance” toward the collected material, with a commitment to provide “richness, texture and detail” (Ortner 1995: 43) in the produced articles.

I did the fieldwork in Bangkok and in the borderland area close to the Khao Phra Wihan temple on the Thai side (in the villages of Bhumisarol and Khantarak, Sisaket Province). I have collected material through semi-structured interviews (discussed under 4.4) and participatory observations. The observations are mainly on visible expressions of everyday power and resistance in the public. In Bangkok, I have observed and participated in obligatory state-initiated rituals where individuals participate to show their loyalty to the nation. Inspiration to conduct these participant observations came from statements in the conflict narratives, where interlocutors described state-initiated nationalizing rituals in the everyday (such as standing still for the national anthem twice daily in all public spaces).

The material collected in the borderland is used in Article 2 ('Disturbing the Nationalist Imaginary'). The material in the other three articles are collected in Bangkok. Most nationalist activism in Thailand takes place in Bangkok, or departs from Bangkok (covered in Article 4 'Nationalist Everyday Resistance'). As Bangkok is the capital, nationalizing propaganda is most visible there. The conflict narratives pointed me toward observing loyalty performances in the public (in focus in Article 1 'To Belong or Not to Belong'). The material for Article 3, focusing on everyday resistance online, was collected from interlocutors based in Bangkok, who have been engaged in the conflict through peace work and academic and journalistic writing on the conflict. How the interviews were conducted will be presented in detail in section 4.4.

During the fieldwork, I also visited Khao Phra Wihan. It would have been possible to conduct the fieldwork without a visit to the temple site but since I used Khao Phra Wihan as an entry point for this research, it was interesting for me to see it with my own eyes. In the interviews when interlocutors referred to geographical circumstances around the site, I could understand them easily as I had been there. For example, statements describing that the access would be much easier from the Thai side if the border was open, since the mountain is much more steeper toward the Cambodian side or that the "temple" should rather be referred to as ruins of a former temple. I think that provided me trust, in the same way as appearing knowledgeable about Thai politics or culture in other ways.

This study has also been inspired by ethnographic research methods through the use of field notes. Anthropologists use field notes as a main data source (Bryman 2012: 450). While the main material for this study is collected from interviews, I have also collected field notes on everything I observed, felt, and encountered that I thought could be of relevance for the research. In particular, I took extensive notes on the different interview situations.

The aims of the notes are several. During the fieldwork, it was a way for me to reflect on the research process and over initial ideas of interpretation of the conflict narratives. It has also been a tool to reflect on the interview settings as I tried to be conscious about what decisions I could make in order to make interlocutors comfortable with the interview situation. I also took detailed notes on the ‘loyalty performances’ in the public spaces in Bangkok, writing down specifics of when the national anthem is played in the middle of rush hour and also reflections on what emotions were provoked in myself. How the loyalty performances made me personally feel became helpful in my analysis of emotional socialization to nationalist feeling rules, group emotion, and emotion management. This in turn helped me in the analysis of the relationship between the individual and the collective in nationalization processes. I have used field notes on how the nationalizing propaganda made me feel in Article 1 on affective self-nationalization.

### 4.3 Narrative Method

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An analysis of narratives is an approach to analyze qualitative material that emphasize the *stories* that people use to describe and understand events (Bryman 2012: 584). A focus on narratives brings out the context and the framing that individuals construct to explain something. It focuses on how individuals make sense of something that happened, rather than the details of exactly what happened (Bryman 2012: 582). As our understanding of the world is always mediated through interpretation, narratives are an important way to get at how individuals make sense of things happening in their everyday lives and how this affects people’s actions (Hinchman and Hinchman 1997: xiv).

In her book *Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution*, Sara Cobb convincingly advocates that research should focus on narratives regarding conflicts:

Stories matter. They have gravitas; they are grave. They have weight. They are concrete. They materialize politics, institutions, relationships, and identities that circulate locally and globally, anywhere and everywhere. (...) Indeed, the specific issues associated with the conflict (...) arise from the conflict narratives, the overlapping and layered stories that provide a plot sequence, a set of characters, and moral frameworks that authorize and legitimize a particular history, a given identity. And these stories are not simply representations of history, even though they operate as if that is all they do. Rather, these stories provide the architecture for hate and distrust at all levels of social relations, from international to interpersonal conflicts (2013: 3).

Thus, in order to understand conflicts, we need to study different narratives around them. In this study, however, the conflict is not the main focus of research, but the entry point to reach knowledge on nationalism, which, when

using the wording of Cobb, is found in the layered stories that provide the plot for the Khao Phra Wihan conflict.

Narratives can be collected in different ways. Some researchers look for stories in transcribed interview material, while others design questions in order to stimulate interlocutors to provide stories. One way to do this is to formulate questions such as “Tell me what happened” (Bryman 2012: 582). The material for this thesis has mainly been collected through interviews and the opening question for our conversation: “Tell me about Khao Phra Wihan.”

By asking this question, interlocutors told me their understanding of the story plot about Khao Phra Wihan. Interlocutors provided different story plots, but nationalism was a recurring theme in all of the narratives. However, the way that nationalism was talked about varied immensely in the narratives. In order to understand this variation, I used theory from resistance studies. Another way to put it, my own narrative of the narratives is that nationalism is understood differently and therefore participated in differently, depending on how the interlocutors understand power in their everyday lives.

After transcribing all of the interviews, I went through the whole material of interview transcripts and field notes and mapped the different ways in which individuals participate in nationalization. I divided the material into themes of sustaining nationalism, resisting nationalism, and activating nationalism. Based on these different themes, I wrote the research articles in this thesis.

To summarize, what is referred to as “conflict narratives” in this study are the answers to the opening of conversations with “tell me about Khao Phra Wihan.” Interlocutors answered in different ways and described what they saw as root causes of the conflict, or how it affected their lives, or who/what to blame, i.e., they put the temple conflict in a context that made sense to them. These ways of making sense of the conflict is what I refer to as a “conflict narrative.” Contributors answered by telling me about nationalism in Thailand and about circumstances in their lives and engagements with the conflict over Khao Phra Wiha in ways that I could map into understandings and experiences of everyday power and everyday resistance.

## 4.4 Interviews

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In total, I conducted 42 semi-structured interviews with people engaged in the conflict over Khao Phra Wihan, both in Bangkok and in the borderland itself. As the focus is on the everyday level, the people that I interviewed include peace activists, nationalist activists, academics, and borderland residents whose lives are affected by the conflict (even though they might not themselves have been directly engaged in the conflict at the borderland). Two of the interviews were group interviews, so taken altogether I interviewed 60 people.

The semi-structured mode of interview was chosen rather than structured interviews, because this thesis focuses on subjective experiences. Semi-structured interviews were preferred rather than non-structured interviews, since I wanted interviews to address the temple issue. I used an interview guide that is attached as an appendix to this thesis.

Every interview started with me presenting myself and the study. Then I moved on to ask interlocutors the following: 1) Tell me about yourself, 2) How should I describe you without using your name?, 3) Tell me about Khao Phra Wihan, 4) In what ways have you been engaged with Khao Phra Wihan?, 5) What does Khao Phra Wihan mean to you?, 6) Would you say Khao Phra Wihan is something Thai people in general care about? Depending on the answers I got and how the conversation was going, I followed up with different questions.

In the interview guide I prepared many follow-up questions, but how much they were used varied. However, the six above-mentioned questions were discussed in all of the interviews, sometimes initiated by me asking the question and sometimes spontaneously by the interlocutor. All interviews ended with a possibility for the interlocutors to ask me questions. My preference was to record the interviews. However, I turned off the recorder and took notes instead when requested by the interlocutors, which happened in almost half of the interviews (for fear of the lese majesty law). I have not provided direct quotations to passages of interviews that I have not recorded and therefore could not quote literally.

In the pilot study and in the initial interviews for the main fieldwork, I asked the interlocutors about their nationality and ethnicity. Later, I modified the question, since I could sense that it was sensitive. Since Thainess is constructed as a hierarchy, where it is possible to be different levels of Thai (please see section 2.1 on ‘The Three Pillars of Thai Nationalism’ for more on this), I got worried that interlocutors would think that I might take their experiences

more seriously depending on how much Thai they were. In order to avoid participating in this hierarchy construction, I stopped asking about nationality and ethnicity.

The interview sample has been created through “snowballing,” where initial contact was made with organizations and individuals known to be engaged with the issue, who then gave suggestions on new people to interview (Bryman 2012: 202). The sample covers individuals with different roles in civil society, such as nationalist activists, peace activists, academics, journalists, and people who live close to the border and the temple. Interlocutors have been chosen on the basis of their engagement with the temple issue. Some have been Yellow Shirt activists who engaged with the temple issue by trespassing the border, putting up Thai flags on disputed territory, and actively politicizing it being granted a world heritage status. Others have written about or researched the conflict. Some have been campaigning for peace, and some have been affected by the conflict because the border was closed or they lost access to farmland in the border area. Thus, “engaged in” covers both persons acting in and taking an active role as well as people who are passively affected by the conflict.

I describe interlocutors according to the categories of age, profession, and location. With regard to age, I divided the 40 interlocutors in my individual interviews into the following:<sup>17</sup> 12 young, 22 middle-aged, and 6 elderly interviewees. To summarize the numbers of class belonging is difficult. For example, how should I categorize a well-educated monk who before joining the Asoke group lived a middle or upper class life? In order to give a sense of the sample used I tried to do this anyway. When putting interlocutors like monks into the category of middle class/educated, I interviewed 29 people who would fall into the middle (or upper) class/educated group and 11 people who could be put in a category of working class. The question of where the interviews took place is easier to answer. I conducted 26 interviews in Bangkok and 14 in the borderland.

The sample of people engaged in the Khao Phra Wihan conflict can therefore be generalized to consist mostly of middle-aged and young, middle-class individuals in Bangkok. The sample could also be divided into different ways in which interlocutors have been engaged with the conflict. Thirteen of the interviews were conducted with members of Asoke who have been active in politicizing the temple issue. Fourteen interviews were conducted in the borderland with people whose lives have been directly affected by the conflict, of whom some might only passively been engaged in the conflict. Fifteen interviews were made with people who have been engaged with Khao Phra Wihan through peace work, academic writing, journalistic writing, or similar. Both

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<sup>17</sup> These numbers exclude the two group interviews.

individuals promoting nationalist activism and peace activists or analysts of the conflict make the connection between the temple conflict and nationalism.

As the focus in this thesis is on human experience, the everyday and the 'ordinary person,' no official representatives of the state, the military, or anyone close to the network monarchy have been interviewed. Although their narratives are beyond the scope of this thesis, it would have been interesting to see how similar or different their accounts would have been from the narratives that were collected.

In addition to the 40 semi-structured individual interviews with people engaged with Khao Phra Wihan, I conducted two group interviews in the hope that the group format would make participants talk more freely about the topics amongst each other, with less interference from the researcher (Bryman 2012: 503). One focus group involved six middle-aged farmers in the borderland, while the second involved 14 young students in the borderland. The focus group discussions were held in Thai with an interpreter who translated into English. It quickly became clear that the focus group was not a successful format for conversation, out of the widespread fear for the lese majesty law. In both focus groups all participants described how they helped to sustain the nationalizing program, often confirming the views of one dominant group member who affirmed loyalty to the state and the 'three pillars.' I did not manage to create a situation where all participants felt safe to voice their critical opinions. As freedom of expression is restricted in Thailand, it was much easier to create an atmosphere of trust in interview situations with only the participant and an interpreter whom the interlocutor trusted (or no interpreter) and me. Still, these group interviews provided me with valuable insights on what can and cannot be talked about openly, and to what extent individuals adjust the way they talk about the nation, religion, and the monarchy, depending on the setting.

When doing a micro-ethnography it is an advantage to speak the languages, but this study was possible to do without fluency in Thai or Khmer. Many contributors spoke English, so interpreters were not needed for all interviews. I conducted 19 interviews with interpreters and 24 interviews without interpreters.

For the interviews that required an interpreter, non-professional interpreters were used, owing to restrictions on freedom of expression in Thailand. During the initial interviews for the pilot study, I thought about hiring a professional interpreter. However, one interlocutor informed me that they would not participate in the study if I used a hired interpreter, because it was not possible to know that person's political views. We ended up meeting without an inter-

preter. For the pilot study I did not have to use any interpreter, as all of the interlocutors spoke English.

For the main fieldwork, I started by travelling to the borderland. I planned this part of the fieldwork together with an acquaintance whom I knew from earlier and who had been working with the conflict. This person thought that it would be problematic to come with an interpreter from Bangkok to the border area and did not know of any local interpreter and therefore offered to help with the translations. This turned out to be a more important decision than I could have imagined.

The person who helped me with translation was known to many of the interlocutors as a human rights activist. They had a lot of respect in the community, and people knew that they were not afraid of upsetting authorities or scared into silence by the restrictive laws on expression. If I had travelled to the borderland with a professional interpreter, I would have needed a very long time there before anyone would trust me with talking about issues deemed by the state as illegal to discuss. This would have provided me with other types of narratives. It is also possible that interlocutors provided more critical narratives and downplayed opinions more supportive of the state because of the interpreter's personality as opposition activist than they would have with another interpreter.

The use of non-professional interpreters brought other challenges as well. I was not always comfortable with my friend's way of translating because it was sometimes a summary of what had been said instead of a thorough translation. Interviews were also sometimes interrupted by the translator's own comments and questions. I kept reminding of how I would prefer strict translation, but I tried to be flexible and adjust to how the interviews turn out. Overall, the interpreter's personality was an advantage for the interview situation, which I tried to keep in mind when frustration arose.

If I had travelled without my interpreter, then I would have had to spend at least a few months to be able to get access to the same situations. We spent one week together with old and new friends in the borderland. We spent the whole time in conversations with other people during walks in villages, visiting restaurants, schools, community centers, markets, temples, massage places, and farmlands. My interpreter friend has a great ability to get in contact with people and just by waving at people where we were, it led people to join us in conversations. When someone passed by to sell fruit, they were invited to come and sit with us and tell "the foreign researcher" about life in the borderland. Thanks to my interpreter's extrovert personality and love for all humans, it managed to bridge contact between me and people in the borderland in very little time. Time spent sitting and learning about betel chewing, rice farming,

ant eating, and learning about the local massage practice, all provided context when trying to understand the dynamics of power and resistance in the everyday life of individuals.

During my pilot study, I failed to contact members of the Asoke group; as a result, no one was ready to talk with me. The first member I met was at the Sisa Asoke center in the borderland at the beginning of the main fieldwork. That member put me in contact with another member in Bangkok who became my non-professional interpreter for interviews in the Asoke group. To get a person from within Asoke who was willing to help me with translation was a great advantage. Many members were not interested in being interviewed, but were convinced by my interpreter that I was genuinely interested in hearing about their opinions. Without gaining this interpreter's trust, it would have been much more difficult to gain any access to members of the Asoke group.

In these ways, both of my non-professional interpreters therefore were also important 'gatekeepers' (Bryman 2008: 151) in my research, as they did more than interpret and also helped me to get access to interlocutors.

During interviews I took notes and tried to end all interviews by summarizing the main points, in order to make sure that I had correctly understood the main points. However, in many interview situations I had already used a lot of the interlocutors' time, so when I felt the interview had taken a long time, or that the interlocutor seemed to be in a hurry, I did not read out my notes in the end. I have recorded and transcribed all interviews (even though in many interviews I was asked to turn off the recorder during the interview). I started each interview transcript with a few notes on the interview situation itself: the atmosphere in the interview (how formal or informal I found it to be), where we met, how we got in contact, if I am using an interpreter, how the person seemed to view the interview situation and me, if there were people who could hear us, etc. From the transcriptions, I have coded material in different themes, departing from my research questions, which I have analyzed with the help of the theoretical framework. Non-recorded material has not been directly quoted, but instead referred to as "informal conversation" that has mostly functioned to add knowledge for me as a researcher.

In this study, in references to interviews, the identity markers of occupation, age, and the place where the interview took place are what is presented as opposed to other markers such as gender, ethnicity, or nationality. This section discusses why. How to relate to subjectivities has been given serious consideration in this study, inspired by Christine Sylvester:

Some social science methods can seem more invested in counting or schematically mapping an interview narrative than in making sure the person's voice and context are highlighted in its contextual fullness. Researchers might unquestioningly assume, assign or report certain subjectivities - like 'women' - without investigating whether that subjectivity is

actually salient for the person speaking. It is a mistake of reading gender off the body. (...) The point is that if we assume that people in developing countries are as complex as we are, then we will avoid mistaking the person in front of us the holder of our pre-given sense of them, as in “woman farmer”. She might think of herself quite differently, slotting herself into more complex registers. Getting at what s/he thinks is far more important than getting her or him into our schemata. When in doubt, ask people who they are. They will tell you (2014: 64f).

I have started all interviews with presenting myself, my study, and explaining that all contributors’ identity will be kept anonymous. Thereafter, I have asked “As I will not write your name, how would you like me to present/describe you if I quote what you tell me in my articles?” To this question, I received different types of answers, many stating their professions, some their political views. I had expected that people would present themselves from categories of gender, nationality, and ethnicity, but this rarely happened. As I did not ask about gender, and interlocutors very rarely mentioned gender, I will not make the mistake of “reading gender off the body” of contributors, and gender is therefore not mentioned. Aspects that were raised in the interviews as important factors in relation to nationalizing were age, class, and locality. These were the factors that were mentioned as dividing lines for different views on nationalizing processes. In referring to interviews, these factors are therefore the subjectivities that are taken into consideration. However, reference is made to the contributor’s profession, and not explicitly to class, as they often described themselves from their profession. Without asking about age, I am guilty to “read age off the body” and categorize interlocutors into young/middle-aged/elderly, their profession, and the place where the interview took place.

## 4.5 Ethical Considerations

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In the book *Social Research Methods*, Alan Bryman describes four main areas of discussion about ethical principles in social research: whether there is harm to participants, whether there is lack of informed consent, whether there is an invasion of privacy, and whether deception is involved (2012: 135). In practice, these issues often overlap.

The most important ethical question to take into consideration concerns the safety of interlocutors, especially in relation to the military junta’s escalated sentencing of civilians in military courts for violating the lese majesty law. I have tried, in all situations, to take responsibility for keeping interlocutors’ identity anonymous. I have saved recorded interview material online in protected places, instead of on devices that I carried with me. I have also had my

hard drive encrypted, in case my computer would be stolen or searched. I have kept field notes anonymous as well.

My case of the temple conflict makes it possible to talk about issues otherwise difficult to approach, both for a researcher as well as for interlocutors. I asked for interviews about Khao Phra Wihan and asked open-ended questions with the hope that the conversation would specifically turn to nationalism, power, and resistance, instead of describing beforehand exactly what I searched for in the Khao Phra Wihan narratives.

There are several reasons why I think this approach is possible to justify. First, I felt generally that people were very keen to talk about power and resistance in relation to nationalizing because of injustices in the everyday lives of many interlocutors. With open-ended questions, this was the direction many interviews took. The fact that I asked about Khao Phra Wihan was a way for interlocutors to freely decide how much they wanted to touch upon issues related to the monarchy that might be perceived as sensitive. If I had asked more directly about nationalizing, I would have added more pressure on interlocutors. Indeed, I would probably have found it difficult to get anyone willing to participate at all. Second, some interlocutors did ask why I was asking about the temple conflict. In these cases, I, of course, disclosed what I was going to look for in the interview material. Third, as freedom of expression is restricted by law, in all interviews and conversations one of my main concerns has been to be attentive to any type of discomfort for the interlocutors. All interviews conducted have paid attention to the wishes of the interviewees regarding where the interview will take place, if an interpreter can be used, what type of interpreter in that case, and when I should turn off the recorder.

I have tried to step carefully with these issues while at the same time keeping in mind the encouragement by human rights activists to encourage people outside of Thailand to use the possibilities we have to speak about lese majesty. For example, the Asian Human Rights Commission, a regional NGO based in Hong Kong, made the following statement at the independent Thai online news site Prachatai:

As in the present circumstances an intelligent and unhindered debate on lese-majesty and related concerns is impossible in Thailand itself, for the time-being it falls upon those working and residing outside the country to break open the many heavy silences that are hanging around the topic there until such a time that people in the country are able to do the same without fear of arrest and jail, or worse.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> <https://prachatai.com/english/node/988>, Accessed 200318

Another ethical question that I have needed to give serious consideration is that many of the resistance acts that I study are not meant to be open, and by disclosing them my research might undermine the possibility to continue to carry out that resistance. The borderland area in close connection to the Khao Phra Wihan is a specific small area where detailed descriptions about people could possibly be traced to a handful of people. I have therefore been conscious about how I write my references to fieldwork sites and conversations; moreover, I have been aware that there could be consequences of anything I write on people who have helped my research. I have tried to anticipate what possible ways my research could be used by others and not use material that could be harmful to any participant. At the same time, I want to be clear about the context when quoting someone. In the articles, I often have lengthy excerpts from interviews in order not to take quotations out of their contexts. To do this while protecting the anonymity of interlocutors has required careful choices of the quotations used.

Finally, there are ethical dimensions to how I call things. For example, to describe a group as a ‘minority group’ might reproduce the narrative of the state. In the view of the group itself, they might be the majority in an area that does not necessarily correspond to the territory of the state, or any state. I have tried to be aware about the categories that I am (re)producing. Thus, I find it important when referring to interlocutors to use the identity categories that they themselves have emphasized in the interviews as important.

In this section on ethical concerns, I would also like to discuss my “socio-political location” (Ackerly and True 2010: 36) in relation to this research. How my positionality directly affected research was in the position of *farang*, which is a well-known pan-Asian term used for the West, Western peoples, and Western-derived things (Kitiarsa 2010: 61). One of the most famous historians in Thailand, Thongchai Winichakul, writes:

Thai people, scholars or not, have always been warned not to *tamkon farang* (“tag along behind the Westerners”). For them, Thainess, Thailand, Thai people, Thai studies, or whatever Thai, is something the *farang* can approach but never reach with the utmost intimacy that Thai people can (1997: 7).

This quotation points at two ethical problems with my thesis. It insinuates that foreigners can never really understand Thainess, but also that it might be experienced as difficult to express critical views on Thainess toward a foreigner, as it might be seen or felt like “tagging along behind Westerners.” I have been aware of this problem and tried to tread carefully in conversations. Consequently, I sometimes did not ask questions that I wanted to ask when I was not sure if it would be appropriate. The details of how my position as a Westerner affected how contributors viewed the research and me are not possible to

know. However, I am sure that it did affect the interview situations. For example, in interviews with Asoke members, there were several occasions where contributors excused themselves for expressing critical views on Western influence and dominance in Thailand.<sup>19</sup> As people apologized for expressing these views, it can be assumed that they adjusted their answers based on how they perceived me.

This also happened when approaching individuals whom I invited to participate. There were some who stated that they did not have anything *important enough* to tell about their views on Khao Phra Wihan to me as a foreign researcher. In these situations, my local interpreters became very significant in convincing people how important their views were for me and to participate (sometimes successfully and sometimes not).

## 4.6 Researcher Positionality

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Feminist research methods emphasize the importance of reflexivity and positionality of the researcher (for example, Ackerly and True 2010; England 1994; Sultana 2007). Therefore, I try to keep my own voice, feelings, and positions clear. I see this as an important matter of reliability. I aim to keep reflexive and open about how I conducted fieldwork and the whole research process (a point raised by Sultana 2007: 375). Therefore, I will describe my relationship to nationalism and to Thailand below.

First of all, the first language I learned, my mother tongue, is Finnish. I was born in Sweden, but when starting pre-school I did not speak Swedish. Later in my life in Sweden, I was seen as Finnish, but when visiting Finland I was seen as Swedish. I think this matter of my personal dual belonging /non-belonging has affected my fascination with nations, nationalism, national identities, and feelings of national belonging. Furthermore, the area where my grandparents were born in Finland is part of Karelia, “lost” to Russia. Decisions over state borders have thus directly affected my own and my family’s life. I studied Peace and Conflict Studies and Human Rights in Malmö, a city in southern Sweden connected with Denmark by a bridge. I worked in Denmark while living in Malmö, which gave me further personal experience of borders and living in a borderland area.

Where one is born is just a matter of chance. Therefore, I do not feel that anyone, merely through birth, has more of a right to a territory than others. This led me to turn my interest as an activist toward the rights of asylum seekers and the idea of a world without borders. When working at a center for

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<sup>19</sup> For example, in Interview 33, young Asoke member, Bangkok, 2016-03-27

asylum-seeking minors that was vandalized, I started to follow webpages discussing the vandalization and found a whole online environment of anti-foreigner hate, which made me write academically on nationalist developments in Sweden (Hirvonen 2013, 2014).

In 2009, I worked for six months at the secretariat in Bangkok for a large human rights organization called Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA). Spending this time in Thailand made me very familiar with Thai culture and the position of the monarchy in Thailand. FORUM-ASIA is an umbrella organization consisting of smaller organizations that have provided me with an important contact network for this study. During 2009, I visited Isaan for the first time. I visited the Khmer temples Phnom Rung and Ta Muean Thom in the Thai-Cambodian border area. My friend who took me had lost their father because of a mine at the border, and we met their uncle who lost one leg. They were expressing nationalist feelings about protecting Thai territory, talking with each other in Khmer language. This trip was the first time I heard about the Khao Phra Wihan temple, and my friend was sad that they could not take me there since the border was closed.

The next time I came to Thailand was in the spring of 2010 to conduct fieldwork for my Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies. The thesis was partly based on three months of fieldwork that I gathered with peace and human rights organizations, working with questions related to the insurgency in southern Thailand. During this time, I further expanded my knowledge on power and resistance in Thailand, especially related to imposed national identity and assimilation policies in southern Thailand, and violent resistance to these practices (Hirvonen 2010). I also started to think about different ways that groups and individuals relate to the nationalization project by the Thai state.

Also during my time in Thailand in 2010, some very important political events took place. Red Shirt demonstrations demanding elections were brutally stopped by the military in a crackdown in Bangkok that saw 85 protestors killed and 1,400 people injured (Dalpino 2010: 258). The military killed six people seeking protection in the temple Wat Pathum (Buncombe 2013). I participated in a rally outside the UN building to protest against the violence, and there were snipers surrounding the rally. The violence toward peaceful Red Shirt protests created anger toward the Palace, as the monarchy and military are closely connected. In a protest against the violence by the military, more than 30 of Bangkok's most important buildings, like the stock exchange, main banks, and a shopping mall were set on fire. Anger was further invigorated by the fact that the queen decided to participate in a funeral of a Yellow Shirt protester killed in events when the elected government was forced to step

down, but responded with silence over the killed Red Shirts. These experiences of political conflict in Thailand have provided me with important knowledge of the political context in Thailand, crucial to gain trust in interviews and contacts for this study.

# 5

## Review of the Articles

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The four articles in this thesis relate to different aspects of the research question: *How do power and resistance unfold in everyday performances of nationalism in Thailand?* This research question is divided into three sub-questions on how everyday practices sustain, resist, and activate nationalism. Taken together, the four articles provide new knowledge on both how individuals strengthen as well as challenge Thai nationalism. Theoretically, they contribute with insights into the knowledge on everyday nationalizing, specifically with the theorization in this thesis of nationalist emotional socialization as well as new conceptualizations of everyday resistance against nationalism and everyday resistance through nationalism. Empirically, they contribute to knowledge about the (de)construction of Thai nationhood with everyday practices.

The order of the articles is based on the relationship of the acts in focus to power. Article 1 analyzes nationalism as power and looks at how individuals participate in sustaining this power through their everyday acts. Articles 2 and 3 focus on everyday acts that resist nationalism as a tool of power. Article 4 looks at how everyday acts of nationalism can be a tool of resistance.

This chapter will review the four articles that comprise this thesis. Each article is discussed in three steps: 1) a specification of how the article relates to the overall research questions of the thesis, 2) a summary of the content in the article, and 3) a discussion of how the article contributes to the research aims of the thesis. The chapter ends with an overall reflection on how the articles contribute to realizing the aims of the thesis.

## 5.1 Everyday Nationalizing Power

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The first article is entitled ‘To Belong or Not to Belong: Affective Self-Nationalization in Thailand’. This article addresses the first sub-question in the thesis: *How do everyday practices sustain nationalism in Thailand?* “Sustained” refers to how individuals comply with the state-led nationalizing process. Through this question this study looks at how and why state-led nationalizing norms are reproduced.

The article looks at the connections between individual nationalizing and nationalist emotional socialization. This article contributes to knowledge by a theorization of feeling norms and collective emotions in relation to the nation and by proposing the concept of ‘affective self-nationalization,’ understood as the emotional and embodied practices through which individuals fashion themselves into nationalized subjects. The analysis is based on sociological and psychological theory on feeling norms, group emotion, and obedience, which is applied to the case of Thai nationalization.

The material shows that the Thai state instigates self-nationalization through repeated, regular, mandatory, public performances of loyalty, through which individuals create the nation collectively. These public performances consist of rituals in the everyday such as standing still when the national anthem is played in public spaces twice daily, wearing clothes of certain colors on certain days, standing up for the king’s song before watching a movie in a cinema, and having a picture of the king in your home and business. Individual experiences are in focus in the article, but individuals can only perform nationalizing together with others. Also, as nationalizing is governed by social emotion norms, nationalizing practices must be understood as concerning individuals who participate as group members, with a social, rather than personal, identity.

The article displays how nationalist emotions cannot be seen as only private, as coming from the inside of individual selves, but must also be understood in relation to social power dynamics. This is because how we feel and react to situations is closely connected to how we are socialized to feel through collective emotions and emotional norms. It is not possible to differentiate what is a feeling of an individual, or a group, or a political program designed to create certain feelings. We are all part of feeling rules, emotional cultures, social groups, and collective emotions outside and inside of our social and personal selves. The public performances of loyalty in public spaces in Thailand are therefore a way to create certain nationalist emotions.

In interviews about Khao Phra Wihan, interlocutors often returned to the ‘three pillars.’ Across locations as well as age groups, the ‘three pillars’ were described as a tool of power. Interlocutors described how the ‘three pillars’ aim to: “control people in the country,”<sup>20</sup> are “a mechanism to lead people to feel they are Thai,”<sup>21</sup> be “drilled” until becoming an “automatic instinct,”<sup>22</sup> and cause people to be “socialized through textbooks.”<sup>23</sup> These quotations from interviews show that the Thai state makes a lot of effort to create certain nationalist emotional norms. To respect the three pillars is a feeling rule that could be understood as part of a nationalist emotional socialization. Obligatory performances of loyalty through synchronized flash mobs (e.g., when a large number of people suddenly stop in the middle of rush hour) create a sense that “everybody feels the same,”<sup>24</sup> which creates group emotion.

Furthermore, the material in the article displays many emotional practices and the role of affect on an individual level in connection with nationalization, ranging from love to the king, gratefulness toward the palace for the independent state, fear of non-conforming, fear of repression for disobeying the network monarchy, and fear of discrimination. The exploration of the emotional practices through which individuals perform Thainess shows that the performances are connected to the human need to belong, and to identify with and privilege what is seen as the in-group. The fear of non-belonging is strong, especially in situations of social injustice. (See Chapter 2 for more on social injustice in relation to nationalism in Thailand).

Considering the research aims on shedding light on how individuals participate in nationalization, this article looks at how nationalism is neither activated nor challenged, but instead complied with and obeyed by individuals nationalizing themselves. This article contributes to the theoretical discussion on everyday power and resistance in relation to nationalizing by showing how agency in relation to everyday nationalizing is affected by authoritarian power as well as emotional nationalist socialization and feeling rules. The article also contributes to the empirical aims of this project with concrete examples of nationalizing practices, such as loyalty rituals.

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<sup>20</sup> Interview 2, young media-worker, Bangkok, 2014-07-04

<sup>21</sup> Interview 13, middle-aged person working for a local authority, Khantarak, 2016-03-05

<sup>22</sup> Interview 34, middle-aged famous nationalist campaigner and member of Asoke, Bangkok, 2016-03-28

<sup>23</sup> Interview 29, young academic in Bangkok, with a background in the borderland, 2016-03-22

<sup>24</sup> Interview 38, elderly member of Asoke, Bangkok, 2016-04-27

## 5.2 Everyday Resistance Against Nationalism in the Borderland

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The title of the second article is ‘Disturbing the nationalist imaginary. Everyday resistance to nationalism in the Thai-Cambodian borderland.’ This article answers the second sub-question: *How do everyday practices resist nationalism in Thailand?* This article looks at everyday resistance to state-led Thai nationalism in the borderland of Thailand toward Cambodia.

This article maps how people in the borderland resist official nationalizing. The analysis classifies the resistance practices into three categories: evasion, re-categorization, and re-imagination. Through this endeavor, the article also explores the process through which the nation is and is not performed into being. The imagined community of the Thai nation is constructed and enforced through the economic, religious, and political structure of the three pillars in Thailand. In this way, the discourse of Thai nationalism becomes a social fact, which is not imaginary, even though imagining is part of how it is produced. Therefore, resistance to nationalism can be carried out by acts that have the potential to undermine the economic, religious, and political structure, but also acts that have the potential to disrupt the imaginary within which the ‘three pillars’ are performed.

The research found that nationalism was resisted in three main ways. First, nationalism was resisted in the borderland through everyday resistance by evasion. Examples include how interlocutors described how they resist participating in a certain logic and how they prefer that the conflict around Khao Phra Wihan does not get resolved or get any attention at all. Interlocutors described that they were trying to ignore propaganda as much as possible, for example, by turning off the TV during certain programs. They described how they were not participating in creating difference, or simply ignoring national affiliation and expected loyalty (for example, by not asking about nationality at hospitals).

Second, nationalism was also resisted through everyday resistance by re-categorization. Examples of this type of resistance include re-categorizing the conflict as a conflict between Bangkok and Phnom Penh (rather than a border conflict) and stating that difference was created by the two states (instead of by the border people). The binary of inside and outside of the nation was disturbed by so-called “People’s Ambassadors” who, throughout the time of military border clashes, walked from village to village on the Cambodian side to

show their sympathies with peace and the border community (rather than with the idea of nations, territory, or with the conflict).

Third, nationalism was resisted through re-imagination, where interlocutors presented alternatives to inside/outside to the political community of a Thai nation matching a Thai state. Examples include re-imagining the area as a world heritage that does not belong to any state, as an area under the auspices of UNESCO or ASEAN, as a special zone, as a non-state peace park, as a jointly managed border crossing, as a joint development area that is not entirely Thai or Cambodian, or as a supra-national national park. Community was also re-imagined in terms of regional and local borderland identities, instead of national frameworks.

In conclusion, the article discusses how it takes more than the resistance practices presented to challenge the consequences of nationalism in the Khao Phra Wihan borderland. The resistance acts are also classified into deep versus shallow, where the deep resistance challenges the global nationalist imaginary and structure of using nationalism, whilst the more shallow forms are related to the specific formulation of the official Thai nationalism. The article offers instances of both forms. All of the everyday forms of resistance presented are the type of acts James Scott describes as “making no headlines” (1985: 36). However, when the subjects of a nationalizing program do not perform the nation into being “accordingly,” the nationalist imaginary is at least disturbed. Seemingly small acts such as friendship over a border, evoking different identities, avoiding propaganda, can in this context be interpreted as resistance, which has the potential to undermine nationalist governing and create change.

This article contributes to the overall aim of the thesis by presenting insights on how everyday acts can challenge nationalism. The article shows how state-sponsored nationalizing is not always reproduced, but also resisted in everyday life. Furthermore, the article provides rich empirical material on the possibilities of political agency in relation to nationalization, also in authoritarian contexts.

### 5.3 Everyday Resistance Against Nationalism Online

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The title of the third article is ‘Contesting the Thai Hyper-Royalist Nationalist Imaginary through Infrapolitical Everyday Resistance Online.’ Like Article 2, this piece explores the possibilities to challenge nationalism and relates to the research question: *How do everyday practices resist nationalism in Thailand?* While the location of the second article was the borderland area around the temple, the location of the third article is the online world.

The role of online worlds and social media for organized, open, collective forms of resistance is well known and researched (cf. Breuer, Landman and Farquhar 2015; Tufekci and Wilson 2012; Jost et al. 2018; Lee 2018). In contrast, this article explores the role of social media for covert, individual, non-organized forms of resistance in repressive contexts. Based on research on everyday resistance, the article concerns how interlocutors describe the role of social media for everyday resistance against the official Thai nationalizing program. As for all interviews in this thesis, the material comes from conversations about Khao Phra Wihan. Interestingly, interlocutors with different political affiliations (i.e., both from the nationalist Asoke group as well as the Red-Shirt activists and scholars) stated similar views on the importance of online social media.

The article explains how the role of social media for political agency is peculiar in Thailand, because the country ranks among the highest in the world regarding time spent on the internet per day, and fourth in the world on time spent per day on social media (‘We are social and Hootsuite’ 2018). At the same time, Thailand has one of the strictest laws in the world restricting freedom of expression and ranks 140 out of 180 countries listed in the World Press Freedom Index 2020. If the online world matters for political agency, it could have a big influence in a place with such high online activity. As a general trend in interviews, interlocutors revealed how social media has created a new opportunity to communicate and share information in by the military highly controlled and restricted political environment. As online media provides a new platform to spread information, it becomes a tool against propaganda. It is not possible for authorities to control all information, even if the military tries to do so.

As it is not possible to criticize the state-initiated official Thai nationalizing openly without risking being jailed for years, resistance has taken disguised,

low-profile, undeclared, everyday, informal, and personal forms. And one of the sites for expression is social media. Yet, without any organization, it has become a place to voice critique.

The everyday act of using Facebook becomes a way to get information that would be stopped by the restrictions of expression in traditional media. To access pictures that mock the morals of monks, making fun of the military and the monarchy is disturbing the carefully designed idea of the ‘three pillars’ as being above politics and possibilities of critique. In this way, social media is a site for everyday resistance, where, as James Scott described, like “millions of anthozoan polyps willy-nilly create a coral reef, thousands of individual acts of insubordination create a political barrier reef of their own” (1985: 36). Through social media, the spread of information and the possibility of finding like-minded might create a coral reef of dissent. This coral reef is a work in progress at this very moment and the eventual consequences of it are still to be seen.

This article adds knowledge on nationalism and how individuals might challenge nationalism, as well as authoritarianism generally. In focus are examples from interlocutors on information that disturbs the propaganda concerning the ‘three pillars’ in Thailand. The fact that so many have mobile phones creates an opportunity to reach information outside of state control.

However, the article also shows that while social media can be a tool for everyday resistance, the online world is equally a tool of everyday power. The Thai military monitors sites such as Facebook and has jailed people based on activities such as “liking” of posts. Hence, the use of social media can also be a tool of control by authoritarian power.

This article adds to the theoretical discussion on how nationalizing can be understood in relation to power and resistance, as it shows how nationalizing functions as a tool of everyday power and how individuals engage in resisting this power. The article provides empirical data on everyday anti-nationalization in Thailand, insights that might have relevance for understanding other situations where governments try to limit access to information or freedom of expression.

## 5.4 Everyday Nationalist Resistance

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The fourth article is entitled ‘Nationalist Everyday Resistance. Contesting Western Influence and Corruption through Everyday Acts in Thailand.’ This article addresses the third research question in this thesis: *How do everyday practices activate counter-hegemonic nationalism in Thailand?*

The material used in this article is collected from interviews with members of the Asoke group, a Buddhist sect that is politically active in nationalist questions as well as the Yellow Shirt movement as a whole. When the Khao Phra Wihan temple became a Cambodian world heritage site in 2008, the Asoke group was active in politicizing that largely as a critique toward their political opponents in government, but also because of their strong nationalist beliefs.

The Asoke group has community villages in several places in Thailand, the most famous being Santi Asoke in Bangkok. In the village centers, they practice organic agriculture and self-sufficiency. They produce herbal products, as well as hold courses in sustainable farming and herbal medicine. Often, visitors, including from abroad, come to the village centers to learn about Buddhism, anti-consumerism, and agriculture. In the village centers, as well as in other places in Thailand, Asoke members run vegetarian restaurants. Vegetarianism is an important principle for the Asoke group, in contrast to mainstream Buddhist practice in Thailand. The village centers also have primary and secondary schools. The Asoke group has monks and nuns who practice Buddhism from very strict principles, such as only eating one meal per day. But the village centers are also home for many laypeople and volunteers.

The Asoke group was founded by a Buddhist monk called Bodhirak who thought that official Buddhism in Thailand had been watered down (Ekachai 2002: 8). The Asoke group instead practice strict adherence to Buddhist precepts, vegetarianism, anti-materialism, and celibacy (Heikkilä-Horn 2002). The Asoke group attract people both because of their religious as well as nationalist activities. In one interview, for example, one interlocutor described the interest in joining the group in this way:

Katrina: How come you decided to join Santi Asoke?

Interlocutor: I identify with the goals of Santi Asoke: selflessness and love for the nation. I like the way of life here, an aesthetic way of life. I search for the ultimate goal of becoming selfless.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Interview 36, young Asoke member, Bangkok, 2016-03-29

This article explores what is labeled ‘nationalist everyday resistance’ by the Asoke group, utilizing insights on ‘everyday resistance’ to show how everyday acts perform the nation into being. It displays how nationalist practices by the Asoke group are formulated as being in relation to power, from a position *experienced* as subaltern, which makes it possible to understand nationalism as ‘resistance.’ Theoretical tools from Resistance Studies elucidate this relational character of nationalism. The paper develops an understanding of nationalism from the point of view of nationalists, a perspective that is missing in much nationalism research.

The article builds on Michael Billig’s statement that the daily reproduction of nationalism is not happening automatically, spontaneously, or “naturally”, but together with a “complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practice” (Billig 1995: 5). The article presents quotations from the interviews with Asoke members to illuminate “the complex of beliefs” around the activation of nationalism.

The qualitative data show how members of Asoke tend to frame their nationalist activities as religious, anti-colonial, anti-Western, and anti-corruption.<sup>26</sup> In their view, these different struggles are interconnected, and nationalism is important in order to resist domination by the West. Asoke members perform the nation in close connection with Buddhist beliefs, as they regard nationalism and Buddhism to be closely connected.

The three pillars ‘nation, religion, monarchy’ are made sense of in the everyday. It could be said they are *operationalized* into the everyday, as questions of cooking, washing clothes, and cleaning the house. Nationalism is present in life choices through strivings for self-sufficiency and independence and through Buddhist ethics. Daily habits, such as cooking, are given value in the context of nationalizing and Buddhist ethics.

The article adds directly to the thesis aim of developing our knowledge about individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism, by its focus on how individuals strengthen nationalism. Theoretically, the article develops everyday nationalism research by demonstrating how nationalizing can be a form of everyday resistance. Empirically, the article adds knowledge on everyday acts that can be viewed as politically significant in relation to nationalism in Thailand.

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<sup>26</sup> For example, in Interview 42, young Asoke member, Bangkok, 2016-04-04; Interview 28, middle-aged Asoke member, Bangkok, 2016-03-14, and Interview 16, middle-aged Asoke member, Sisaket, 2016-03-06

## 5.5 Summary

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To conclude this chapter, I present how the four articles have together advanced the research aims of the thesis in terms of the overall aim, the theoretical aim, and the empirical aim, as set out in Chapter 1.

The overall aim of this thesis is to develop our knowledge on nationalism and deepen our understanding of individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism. The articles have shown that individuals strengthen and challenge nationalism by sustaining, resisting, and activating nationalism. Article 1 describes how individuals govern themselves in relationship to power, in order to sustain nationalism. Articles 2 and 3 present different forms of resistance against nationalism: Article 2 shows how nationalism is resisted in the borderland between Thailand and Cambodia, and Article 3 how nationalism is resisted online. Article 4 shows how individuals activate Thai nationalism as an expression of resistance against Western dominance. Taken together, the four articles thereby realize the overall aim of the thesis to deepen knowledge on nationalism and advance knowledge on individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism.

Theoretically, the thesis aims to advance nationalism research by exploring nationalization processes in relation to everyday forms of power and resistance. Interlocutors understand nationalism differently; some understood nationalism as a tool of power and others as a tool of resistance. Article 1 treats nationalism as a form of everyday authoritarian power. This article provides theorization on emotional socialization by feeling rules and a conceptualization of ‘affective self-nationalization.’ Articles 2 and 3 provide conceptualizations of (evasive, re-categorative, re-imaginative, and online) everyday resistance to authoritarian power. Article 4 analyzes the activation of nationalism by individuals as everyday nationalist resistance.

The articles also advance the empirical aim of the dissertation to describe power and resistance in relation to nationalization processes in Thailand. The articles show with extensive concrete material how everyday practices sustain, resist, and activate nationalism. Article 1 presents how nationalizing power is reproduced in the everyday in routine ways. It describes obligatory rituals in Thailand to show loyalty. The rituals are collective, for example, to stop in the midst of rush hour to listen to the national anthem, which create group emotions that “everybody feels the same.” Articles 2 and 3 show that even though nationalizing is promoted by an actor with authoritarian power, individuals can resist this process in everyday practices. The articles give many empirical ex-

amples such as the avoidance of propaganda and the use of social media. Article 4 gives examples of everyday practices that activate counter-hegemonic nationalism, practices such as wearing traditional clothing and working for the Buddhist nationalist sect Asoke.



# 6

## Concluding the Thesis

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This chapter brings together the insights from the theory chapter with the findings from the articles to a discussion on conclusions for the dissertation as a whole. What can we learn by taking the different components of the dissertation together? What overall contribution does this thesis make to further knowledge? After summarizing the main thesis findings, we finish with some thoughts on further research that these findings might stimulate.

### 6.1 Overall Conclusions

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This project departed from the genuine drive to learn about the different ways in which individuals participate in the making of and resistance to nationalism. The overall aim of this thesis has been to add to knowledge on nationalism and deepen our understanding of individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism. By putting together the literature on everyday nationalism with everyday resistance and applying this framework to everyday life nationalization processes in Thailand, this thesis has contributed toward realizing that objective.

To recall, the central research question that has guided me throughout the study is: *How do power and resistance unfold in everyday performances of nationalism in Thailand?* In the same way as feminists pay attention to what everyday acts strengthen, sustain, and challenge gender and gender hierarchies (cf. Hanisch 1970; Budgeon 2001; Kelly 2015; Warren 1999; Schuster 2017), this thesis has tried to do the same with performances of the nation.

Three main ways are identified regarding how individuals perform official forms of nationalism: (1) sustaining it through “doing what they are told,” (2) resisting official forms of nationalism, and (3) activating nationalism in their own everyday lives. In this way, the thesis concerns nationalist performativity as well as anti-nationalist performativity. This does not mean that it is possible to

divide *persons* neatly into nationalists or anti-nationalists. The division into sustaining, resisting, and activating refers to the *acts* in focus.

To look at how power and resistance are understood in relation to nationalizing draws on and develops the understanding that nationalism happens on different levels of politics (top-down state-initiated, macro, banal *and* bottom-up, micro, everyday) at the same time. In all of the approaches, there are some elements of power and some of resistance, and these two qualities (power and resistance) should not be analyzed as separate phenomena, but as closely connected to each other. Hence, the subjective meaning of nationalism can be understood, felt, and acted upon as a tool of (governing/authoritarian form of) power *and* as a tool of resistance. This thesis applies an emic research approach to the empirical material, which enables multiple interpretations of subordination and domination in relation to nationalizing processes. This conception is key for the analysis of individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism, as nationalism is experienced both as a form of power and as a form of resistance. Power and resistance – and their interrelations – impregnate nationalization processes; thus, an explicit focus on these factors adds an important layer of understanding to nationalism research.

Everyday nationalism literature focuses on how individuals reproduce nationalism in the everyday. This thesis complements this line of research by adding that the significance of individual agency and activity in relation to nationalizing depends on the context and understanding of power. Importantly, in authoritarian contexts, nationalism can be reproduced not willingly, but out of fear of upsetting authorities or out of fear of non-conforming. The fact that national reproduction is visible everywhere in public spaces in Thailand might not be evidence of strong nationalist feelings in the general population, but perhaps actually the opposite.

This thesis has shown how individuals participate in sustaining nationalizing power through their participation in loyalty performances and through their reproduction of collective emotions by the effect of feeling norms. This is an important contribution to knowledge, since earlier research on nationalist emotion (cf. Militiz and Schurr 2016; Closs Stephens 2016) has focused on “moments of affective encounter” and “atmospheres,” rather than on psychological mechanisms in relation to nationalism. The theorization of nationalist emotional socialization in this thesis adds new knowledge to how nationalist feelings are created.

More than in acts when individuals sustained nationalism, individual’s understanding of power was crucial when activating nationalism. The thesis has explained some acts of performing the nation as resistance toward power. For example, members of the nationalist Buddhist sect Asoke activate everyday

nationalist resistance in order to resist the power of Western influence and to protect the three pillars of nation, religion, and monarchy.

The articles also answer the aim of this dissertation to empirically describe everyday forms of power and resistance in relation to nationalizing processes in Thailand. From this empirical account, the thesis concludes that individuals not only perform nationalism (through nationalist resistance and by reproducing nationalizing norms), but also engage with state-led nationalizing by anti-nationalist performativity. Even though nationalizing is promoted by the military and other coercive powers, individuals resist nationalizing in creative ways.

Resistance studies conceptualize different forms of resistance acts (cf. Koefoed 2017; Hollander and Einwohner 2004; Lilja et al. 2017; Johansson and Vinthagen 2020). This thesis contributes to this line of research with new conceptualizations of everyday resistance. This is an important contribution to the development of the knowledge on resistance that can be used in research on everyday resistance in other contexts.

The study distinguishes five different forms of everyday resistance. First, *nationalist everyday resistance* is everyday resistance with nationalist motives (with examples of acts such as to dress in traditional cloths, cook Thai food, or to grow vegetables in order to not participate in West-dominated capitalism). Second, *online everyday resistance* is the routine use of social media, which gives access to a wide range of information and opinions (with examples of such acts as to “like” articles and pictures with a subtle critique of power, to scroll through large amounts of information). Third, *evasive everyday resistance* is about keeping out of reach of nationalizing (for example, by turning off the TV, not participating in meetings on border demarcation). Fourth, *re-categorative everyday resistance* is a discursive form of resistance (for example, to emphasize border identity instead of national identity, not using the wording “border conflict” but instead saying it is a conflict between the governments in Bangkok and Phnom Penh). Fifth, *re-imaginative everyday resistance* is also a discursive form of resistance that suggests other forms of imagining co-existence than the national. For example, people might re-imagine the area around Khao Phra Wihan as a joint development area that would not be entirely Cambodian or entirely Thai. Rather, it could be a non-state peace park that belongs to everyone, and not to any country.

These different conceptualizations of everyday resistance add to knowledge on the myriad of possibilities to resist oppressive orders. This study provides insights into everyday resistance in the Thai political context, but these forms of resistance might be possible also in other authoritarian situations.

## 6.2 Suggestions for Further Research

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Finally, on closing this kappa, we may consider the lines for further research that flow from this thesis. The following paragraphs identify two main strands for future empirical work and two main strands for future theoretical development. We close with mentioning a suggested link between this research and future practical political work.

The rationale of this study was to deepen the knowledge of individual participation in strengthening and challenging nationalism. This task needs to be continued with additional case studies from different nationalist projects in order to understand this phenomenon further. This thesis suggests two main strands for future empirical work.

First, this dissertation's suggestion that everyday nationalism is fruitfully analyzed in relation to power and resistance could be explored in other contexts to further develop the understanding of everyday nationalizing. Considerable research focus could also be directed toward further exploration and mapping of nationalist feeling rules in different contexts of nationalist emotional socialization. This framework would be possible to apply to both authoritarian as well as democratic contexts. I hope that such studies would focus more on the everyday human experiences of nationalizing, especially the emotions and motivations of people activating nationalism. Human voices and emotions deserve to be taken more seriously in all analysis of social and political life.

A second line of further empirical research could look further at nationalizing processes in social media. The growing access to the online world, even in highly controlled societies, changes the frames of political life. Since we see a lot of activation of nationalism in the world, as well as a boom in digital connectivity, further research should look at this connection and specifically on how activation, sustenance, and resistance to nationalism happens in online worlds (and their connection to the offline).

In addition, this thesis suggests two strands for future theoretical work. First, in order to further understand the connection between nationalism and power, nationalism could be analyzed through a governmentality framework. Governmentality fits well to analyze nationalism, as this perspective has the dimension of governing power, but also focuses on how individuals govern, and in the case of this study, nationalize, themselves. As the governmentality framework presents how individuals govern themselves, it is especially useful when trying to understand why individuals participate in nationalization. As explored in this thesis, the state-imposed official form of nationalizing in Thailand could be understood as a specific form of governmentality, where the

rationality, techniques, and technologies of governing are based on nationalism.

Second, this thesis encourages future nationalism research to prioritize the focus on everyday politics. We need to study all the “little nothings” activating as well as resisting nationalism that precede and feed into bigger social changes. I especially have in mind current trends in many places toward increased authoritarianism and populism. One way of approaching these trends in research could be to try to understand how individuals perceive relations of power and subordination and how that influences their support for nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism. The tools from theorization on everyday resistance provide a possibility to analyze nationalism in this way as a form of everyday nationalist resistance also in other cases than in Thailand.

Finally, the findings of this thesis might be further explored in political practice. While this thesis is in the first place an academic exercise, hopefully its insights can also inspire and inform political struggles for emancipatory social change, also in situations when resistance might seem impossible. Lastly, at the level of the everyday, the thesis encourages all of us to pay greater attention to how we all participate in performing (anti-)nationalism in our everyday lives



## Svensk sammanfattning

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Titeln på avhandlingen: 'Vardags(anti-)nationalisering i Thailand. Makt och motstånd i Khao Phra Wihan narrativ'.

Genom en sammanläggningsavhandling omfattande fyra forskningsartiklar samt kappa undersöker denna avhandling nationaliseringsprocesser i vardagslivet i relation till makt och motstånd i Thailand. Hur individer upprätthåller och utmanar den thailändska nationens performativitet genom sociala praktiker är i fokus. Avhandlingen tar en fenomenologisk forskningsposition med fokus på subjektiva erfarenheter och använder sig av material från fältarbete i Thailand. Analysen kombinerar socialkonstruktivistisk teori rörande vardagsnationalism med teori om vardagsmotstånd för att analysera individers deltagande i nationalisering från ett makt-/motståndsperspektiv.

Vardagsnationalismforskningen berör hur nationen konstrueras (och utmanas) i vardagslivets praktiker. Nationer existerar på en materiell makronivå av statsgränser, pass, asyl- och visumsystem med inkludering/exkludering, som inte är möjligt att ändra genom att endast förstå sig eller individuellt konstruera alternativ. Idén med att dela in mänskligheten i nationer är nära sammankopplad med att ge stater legitimitet att styra och är idén om nationen är en idé som ofta gagnar styrande makts intressen. Mycket fokus inom nationalismforskning har därför varit på staters skapade av nationalism "uppifrån", på hur stater skapar nationer. I forskningen om vardagsnationalism är det istället individers deltagande i skapandet av nationer som är i fokus. Det är till detta forskningsfält som den här avhandlingen bidrar. En invändning mot att fokusera på vardagspraktiker i nationalismforskningen är att nationalism är en faktor i många krig, konflikter samt andra icke-vardagliga händelser. Vardagsnationalismforskningen hävdar dock att även om stater är viktiga aktörer för nationalisering och att extrema former av nationalism är del av många konflikter, så skapas nationer också "underifrån", av människor, i vardagslivets praktiker.

Vardagsmotståndsforskningen behandlar praktiker gällande maktrelationer samt effekten av makt i vardagslivet. Motståndsforskning fokuserar på alla olika sätt som människor protesterar, utmanar, underminerar och stör makt, dominans, förtryck, orättvisa, ojämlikhet, repressiva strukturer, normer eller relationer. Detta forskningsfält behandlar således mer än organiserade motståndsverksamheter utan även oorganiserat, individuellt eller dolda former av mot-

stånd. I auktoritära kontexter när organiserat kollektivt motstånd inte är möjligt har människor använt sig av mer subtila motståndspraktiker. Vardagsmotståndsforskningen inom motståndsforskningen studerar hur vardagslivets praktiker kan användas som motståndspraktiker, inte minst i situationer där andra former av motstånd inte är möjliga.

Den här avhandlingen kombinerar vardagsnationalismsforskning och vardagsmotståndsforskning vilket gör att vi kan vi lära oss om den relationella karaktären i nationalisering; hur nationalisering kan fungera som ett maktinstrument (i auktoritära styren exempelvis) samt hur nationalisering även används som ett motståndsinstrument (exempelvis mot kolonial makt). Människor deltar i (re)produktionen av nationen genom att upprätthålla, utmana eller aktivera nationalism.

Nationalism är idén att dela in mänskligheten i nationer och världen i territorium och att matcha ihop dessa två enheter till nationsstater. Den delen av mänskligheten samt det territorium av jorden som är i fokus i denna avhandling är Thailand. Thailand, tidigare Siam, var aldrig under direkt kolonial kontroll av kolonialmakter men påverkat av den koloniala ordningen i världen och i vissa avseenden semi-koloniserat. Samtidigt deltog Siam i erövringen av territorium och människor i regionen, som en koloniserande makt. För att kunna styra över sitt stora territorium använde staten nationalisering i process kallas intern kolonisering för att nationalisera/kolonisera "sig själv". Nationalism har samtidigt varit en förtryckande makt som minoriteter i Thailand beskrivit som en annan form av kolonisering samtidigt som nationalism var viktigt i Thailand mot västerländsk dominans. Den här studien analyserar nationalism i Thailand utifrån båda dessa förståelser och undersöker element av både maktutövning och motstånd i vardagsnationalism i nutidens Thailand.

Mer specifikt så utgår denna studie från förståelsen av konflikten över templet Khao Phra Wihan, ruinerna från ett hinduistiskt tempel byggt av khemerriket för mer än tusen år sedan. Templet ligger i Kambodja, precis på gränsen till Thailand. Gränsen skapades i en överenskommelse 1867 mellan Siam och Frankrike, som koloniserade det som idag är Kambodja. Efter avkoloniseringen av Kambodja 1953 har den exakta gränsdragningen mellan länderna varit omtvistad. Khao Phra Wihan ligger i det omtvistade området. Den internationella domstolen i Haag dömde 1962 att templet ligger på kambodjansk mark. Domen var relativt oomtvistad i Thailand fram till 2008 när templet fick världskulturarvsstatus från UNESCO. Då fick templet en viktig roll i diskussioner om nationalism i Thailand, vilket är anledningen till att templet används som utgångspunkt i denna forskning om vardagsnationaliseringsprocesser.

Materialet till denna avhandling har samlats in genom narrativ om tempelkonflikten som ger information om hur respondenter förstår tempelkonflikten och nationalisering. Materialet är insamlat i Bangkok, bland gräsrotsorganisationer i gränsområdet i Thailand/Kambodja samt hos medlemmar i Asoke (en radikal buddhistisk och nationalistisk grupp).

Det specifika övergripande syftet med den här avhandlingen är att utveckla vår kunskap om nationalism genom att fördjupa förståelsen för individers deltagande i stärkandet och utmanandet av nationalism. Det teoretiska syftet med den här avhandlingen är att undersöka samspelet mellan makt och motstånd i vardagsnationaliseringsprocesser. Det empiriska syftet med avhandlingen är att bidra med nya insikter om vardagsmakt och motstånd i relation till nationalism i Thailand specifikt, samt politisk agens i relation till auktoritära regimer mer generellt.

De fyra forskningsartiklarna behandlar olika aspekter av makt, motstånd och nationalism i Thailand. I den första artikeln beskriver respondenter nationalisering som en slags makt samt hur individer upprätthåller den makten genom att reproducera nationalism. I den andra och tredje artikeln beskrivs nationalisering också i form av maktutövning och i fokus i dessa artiklar är hur individer gör motstånd mot den maktutövningen. I fokus i artikel två är motståndshandlingar mot nationalism i gränsområdet mot Kambodja, där templet ligger, och fokus i artikel tre är digitalt motstånd mot nationalism. I den fjärde artikeln förstås nationalism på ett annat sätt av respondenterna. I den fjärde artikeln används material från medlemmar i Asoke och där beskrivs nationalism som ett vardagsmotstånd mot västerländskt inflytande samt andra hot.

Den här forskningen bidrar med konceptuella och empiriska insikter till nationalismforskningen med koncepten 'affektiv självnationalisering' (som berör kopplingen mellan nationalistisk emotionell socialisering och individuella erfarenheter av nationalisering) och 'nationalistiskt vardagsmotstånd'. Studien bidrar också till motståndsforskningen och teoribildningen av vardagsmotstånd genom konceptualiseringar av nationalistiskt vardagsmotstånd, digitalt vardagsmotstånd, undvikande vardagsmotstånd, omkategoriserande vardagsmotstånd och om-föreställande (refererar till 'Den föreställda gemenskapen' av Benedict Anderson) vardagsmotstånd. Den här avhandlingen bidrar även med nya empiriska insikter till Thailandsforskningen rörande nationalisering samt Khao Phra Wihan templet.

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## Appendix: Interview Guide

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- My name is Katrina Gaber and I am a Ph.D. Student writing about the Kao Phra Viharn / Preah Vihear conflict.
- I use broad and open-ended questions since I want to hear how you would like to describe things instead of me asking more exact questions.

In borderland: I would like to know more about how the conflict over the temple and Thai nationalism have affected your lives here in the borderland

- Therefore, I will do interviews here now to gather knowledge and information that I will use when I write academic papers. The identity of the people I interview will be kept anonymous so you can tell me what you want and I will not say to anyone who I heard it from and will never tell your name, or describe you in a way so that what you say can be traced back to you. It is important for me and my research that we understand each other well, so if there is anything in the way I ask questions (or in how the translator translates) that you feel impedes in our discussion, I would feel grateful if you tell me directly so that we can try to sort it out.
- First, I would just like to ask you to **tell me about yourself**. I ask because maybe later when I analyze all the interviews that I have done, I will find that women answer in a specific way, or maybe that borderland people answer differently than Bangkok people. So, would you like to tell me about yourself? (For example - where do you come from? How old are you? What do you work with?) **How should I describe you without saying your name?** (Repeat and summarize after and mention my assumed gender identity on the person to see if the person wants to correct me or if I made the correct assumption)
- What is your nationality? (Are you Thai?)
- How would you define your ethnicity? (Are you Khmer?)
- (How is it to be both Khmer and Thai? Or: How is it to be Khmer in Thailand?)

Now, I would like to move on to ask you about the conflict over the temple Kao Phra Viharn, since I am studying the question about the temple conflict (in order to learn about nationalism and resistance in Thailand)

- **Tell me about Khao Phra Wihan**
- **What does Kao Phra Viharn mean to you?**
- How did you learn about the temple? When did you hear about Kao Phra Viharn for the first time?
- Tell me about the temple conflict (What caused the temple and border conflict?)
- How do you feel about that?
- Are there any other people who think like you? Who are they?

In the borderland:

- Did you live here at the time of the border clashes in 2008 and 2011?
- Would you like to tell me about what happened then? Did the temple conflict affect you and your family's life in any way? How?
- What would you say that people here in general think about the temple conflict?
- Did anyone protest against the temple conflict? Who? Why? How?

For Asoke members and other interlocutors from organizations:

- How have you and your organization worked with the temple conflict?
- How have other organizations worked with the conflict?
  
- **Is Kao Phra Viharn something Thai people in general care about?**
- Is Thai nationalism something Thai people in general care about? (What is Thai nationalism? The three pillars Nation-Religion-Monarchy - what is that? Who decided on that? Why? Are you a nationalist? What is the nation? Nationalism?)
- Are the three pillars something Thai people in general care about? (What about you? Are there other people who think like you? Is it possible to think differently?)
- **What is happening today around the temple?** (Is there peace now? Should there be peace? Has the issue been resolved? What is it that needs to be resolved?)

In the borderland:

- What do you think people here in the borderland generally feel about the Thai state?
- What do you feel about the Thai state?

- When people in the borderland don't agree with Bangkok politics, is it possible to act differently?

End all interviews similarly:

- These were all my questions. How did you experience this interview?  
**Is there anything that you think that I should have asked you?** Have you understood all the questions? Have you understood the interpreter? (Read my notes and ask if I understood everything correctly)