



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE EFFECT OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC INSECURITY ON AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES

A study on the effect of cultural and economic insecurity on authoritarian attitudes depending on level of post-materialism

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Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between cultural and economic insecurity in post-materialist and materialist countries. This is done using OLS regression to test whether the effect of different forms of insecurity on authoritarian attitudes differs between materialist and post-materialist countries. Whilst previous research has focused primarily on economic factors affecting democratic backsliding, this thesis argues that in societies where cultural questions dominate, other forms of existential insecurity may threaten democratic values. Using Ulrich Beck's theories on the world risk society and reflexive modernization, it is argued that we are living in a time of greater cultural change and cultural risk. Individuals who feel heightened cultural insecurity may be more prone to favor authoritarian leadership at the expense of civil liberties. In materialist countries where economic values dominate, it is believed that the main sources of insecurity will stem from economic factors rather than cultural ones. Where economic questions dominate, support for authoritarian leadership is sought to protect material interests. Where cultural questions dominate, support for authoritarian leadership is sought to protect cultural interests. The results confirm that cultural insecurity influences authoritarian attitudes and that there is greater effect past a certain threshold of post-materialism. Economic insecurity has no effect in either materialist or post-materialist countries. At a certain threshold of post-materialism however, economic insecurity was a stronger predictor for authoritarian attitudes. Future research should develop more precise ways to measure subjective feelings of cultural and economic insecurity.

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Introduction

In recent years, several scholars have identified a trend towards democratic backsliding. Freedom House (2019) points to worldwide democracy in decline for 13 years. Larry Diamond (2015) has claimed we are witnessing a democratic recession and Gandhi (2018) has found that countries declining in democracy match those advancing in democracy. This trend is not limited to developing countries. Foa and Mounk (2016) found in their article on the democratic disconnect that trust in institutions, voter turnout and party identification has decreased in well-developed democracies. Using WVS data they found that support for the democratic system, not just the government, has decreased especially amongst youth. Although no well-developed democracies have yet turned authoritarian, the trends identified could point to a ‘hollowing’ democracy (Greskovits, 2015). Greskovits argues that this hollowing out is identified by declining turnout, less citizen identification, volatility and the atrophy of party relationships with civil society, similar to the results from Foa and Mounk (2016). Rather than there being an immediate shift to authoritarianism, it is more likely that developed democracies slowly and gradually backslide. This is further supported by Waldner and Lust (2018), who argue that what we are likely to witness and should pay attention to is incremental changes. Somer and McCoy (2018) look at polarization and argue that this has created different expectations from democracy which has triggered clashes between groups who seek to be represented and deepened the democratic crisis. For them, new and changing cultural values are often related to the terms of division in polarized societies.

This thesis seeks to look deeper into what the possible mechanisms behind increasing support for authoritarian rule in traditionally stable democracies are. This is done by analyzing how economic insecurity and cultural insecurity affect authoritarian attitudes in materialist and post-materialist countries. Using modernization theory based on Inglehart, as well as Beck’s theories on reflexive modernization and the world risk society, it is argued that post-materialism has been treated as a phenomenon that is independent of the context it exists in. Modernization theory stipulates that post-materialism is conducive to democratic development and is created through existential security. For modernization theory, this is economic security and it allows individuals to place value in questions that are cultural rather than economic. However, what is not discussed in modernization theory is what possible new sources of existential threat post-materialist societies are vulnerable to, and whether new forms of existential insecurity can affect democratic values. With the help of Beck’s world risk theory, the concept of cultural

insecurity is formed. Through globalization and the blurring of boundaries in most aspects of life, whether this be political, economic, or social, there are less certain truths in society. It is argued that this may create a new insecurity that post-materialists, who identify themselves through culture rather than economy, are more susceptible to feel. This cultural insecurity may lead individuals who are faced with a new perceived existential threat relating to their identity to form 'risk consciousness'. That is, to ensure their own security, they are willing to infringe on civil liberties.

Research questions

- To what extent are attitudes towards authoritarian alternatives in post-materialist countries more greatly affected by cultural insecurity over economic insecurity?
- To what extent are attitudes towards authoritarian alternatives in materialist countries more greatly affected by economic insecurity over cultural insecurity?

Hypotheses

- In post-materialist countries, cultural insecurity will be more influential than economic insecurity on holding authoritarian views.
- In materialist countries, economic insecurity will be more influential than cultural insecurity on holding authoritarian views.

The hypotheses are answered using OLS regressions with WVS data measuring authoritarian attitudes, economic and cultural insecurity and are tested separately with level of post-materialism as an interaction variable.

Disposition

The thesis is structured as follows; the literature review is followed by a theoretical discussion. After this, the empirical analysis and methodology is explained, followed by the results, analysis and concluding remarks.

Literature review

This section focuses on the qualities of post-materialism and why democratic backsliding may be triggered by different sources of insecurity depending on these qualities. Post-materialism per the literature has two main different understandings. For Inglehart and Welzel (2005) post-materialist values are the result of generational change in levels of existential security.

According to Welzel's (2013) utility ladder, as individuals grow accustomed to greater existential security the sacred loses authority, this in turn creates a greater sense of autonomy. A desire for the freedom to act on this autonomy is thereby created which then motivates the demand for democracy. The demand for democracy created by this shift in security is operationalized by Welzel as emancipative values. These values are regarded as the 'psychological bedrock of pro-democratic mass culture' (Deutsch & Welzel, 2016, s. 563). Inglehart bases his theory on a similar logic, as younger generations grow up with greater prosperity and peace, their needs transition from materialist basic needs to post-materialist self-actualizing needs which he refers to as 'self-expression values' (Inglehart, 1977) . Over time, higher priority is placed on values of freedom of speech, self-expression, emancipation and autonomy.

Whilst post-materialist values are primarily described as positive changes for Inglehart and Welzel, other scholars have argued that post-materialism can also create 'uncivic' attitudes. Flanagan and Lee (2003) posit that post-materialism and its subsequent individualism creates self-serving individuals who are unwilling to make sacrifices and that this will lead to self-interested politics. For Putnam (1993) this too holds true; he argues that individualism is part of what drives the decline of social capital. Flanagan and Lee (2003) argue post-materialism leaves authority with the individual, meaning that truth becomes relative and that moral principles are ruled by personal preferences. Post-materialism for these authors implies primarily the autonomy of the self and the use of others for personal gain. Gustavsson (2012) on the other hand argues that emancipative values measure different dimensions of freedom and bases her analysis on Isaiah Berlin. Gustavsson claims that the way post-material cultural changes are viewed depends on a notion of freedom and that both positive and negative freedom can be captured depending on how we measure these values. Negative freedom is anti-authoritarian and values relativism whereas positive freedom relates to an inner freedom focusing on autonomy, authenticity and self-realization. Flanagan and Lee can be said to have based their analysis on a conceptualization of negative freedom whereas Inglehart and Welzel have an understanding based on positive freedom. It may therefore be necessary to identify what triggers uncivic or civic attitudes to understand democratic backsliding in developed democracies.

Research made with attempts to resolve the differences in understanding what post-materialism implies has had mixed results. With regards to pro-social behavior, Welzel, Thöni, and Kistler

(2017) find that individuals with high emancipative values had higher rates of altruism measured through donations and public goods contributions. Secular values on the other hand had weaker correlations with altruistic attitudes. Welzel, Kratochvíl and Oschpokvo (2017) look at how post-materialists view bribery, they find that on an individual level there is no linear relationship between post-materialism and views on bribery. On the country-level, post-materialists were more positive towards bribery in the case that a majority in the country were not post-materialists. This is argued to be an effect of social pressures, with more post-materialists, certain behaviors are less accepted than others. Thus, a society with widespread post-materialist values sees a weaker relationship between these values and views on bribery. Similar to the effect of widespread post-materialism values, Welzel (2010) finds that the more altruistic understanding of self-expression holds true in the case that a society has an abundance of self-expression values on the country level. His results indicate self-expression values have a strong association with in and out group trust, high levels of social capital and collective action. Flanagan and Lee (2003) on the other hand, find using data from the 1990's wave that post-materialists have lower levels of life satisfaction due to higher expectations. They are also less trusting of institutions, and feel alienated whilst also being more politically engaged. The contradiction of both feeling alienated but more politically engaged is believed to be since post-materialists are more engaged in elite challenging movements that fit their 'narrowly defined self-interest' (Flanagan & Lee, 2003, s. 267). This contrasts with being engaged in more mainstream political movements.

Based on these findings it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about post-materialism. On the individual level, it seems that these can increase uncivic behavior. However, when post-materialism is widespread in a country the civic nature of post-materialism increases instead. This suggests there is a duality within post-materialism and this duality is dependent on how widespread post-materialism is. That said, civic values, such as civic activism, democratic support and generalized trust have recently been decreasing in societies where you have widespread post-materialism (Foa & Mounk, 2016) . Given these values are part of what forms the 'psychological bedrock' (Deutsch & Welzel, 2016, s. 563) of democracy it is problematic that we cannot explain well enough how they are affected. Uncivic post-material values could be a cause of the polarization identified by Somer and McCoy (2018). They find that polarization based on different understandings and expectations of democracy has led to a crisis where you have democratic loyalists and cynics who are polarized over different discourses and identities. Using Flanagan and Lee's (2003) conceptualization of post-

materialism or Gustavsson's (2012) negative freedom, the polarization seen which is leading to a democratic crisis could be attributed to a surge in self-interested politics or the uncivic side of post-materialism.

This thesis proposes that there may be causes of perceived existential insecurity which are not economic that societies with post-material values are more vulnerable too. In instances where post-materialists are confronted with existential insecurity, there may be an increase in self-serving attitudes which may threaten established democracies. The next section will expand on this and identify which possible sources of existential insecurity can be prominent in post-material society and how these may affect civic values.

Theory

Inglehart and Welzel's views on existential insecurity stem from Inglehart's scarcity and socialization hypothesis (1977). As an individual grows up, their goals reflect what is scarce in their lives. For Inglehart this is understood as economic scarcity. When material goods are scarce, individuals face an economic existential insecurity which prevents them from seeking goals which are not materialistic. Similarly, Welzel's (2013) idea of the utility ladder argues that to crave emancipation, individuals need economic security. The socialization hypothesis implies that value change arising from existential security is slow moving, thus changes are seen across generations and not in one lifespan.

The perspective this thesis takes is that sources of existential insecurity depend on what is valued in a society. In materialist societies where economic security is most valued this will also be regarded as the greatest threat. In post-material societies, culture and identity have risen in importance. This is reflected in political scales that no longer divide parties or politicians as economic right and left wing, but rather in liberal/authoritarian dimensions. Possibly this may mean that post-materialists are more affected by cultural existential insecurity rather than economic existential insecurity. If cultural security is scarce, and new generations are socialized within this scarcity this may impact post-material values. What is suggested is not a backlash which implies reverting back to a traditional understanding of values but rather that cultural insecurity triggers another side of post-materialism. The duality of post-materialism may be explained by the extent to which an individual feels culturally secure. The idea that threats to post-materialism are not limited to economic security has also been proposed by Robert Brym (2016). In his paper on trends in the USA, China and Russia, he argues that insecurity is based

on a 'reorientation of the international system' which has triggered value change. This indicates that other sources of threats may have been overlooked. To place the idea of alternative existential insecurity within a theoretical framework, Beck is used to analyze post-material countries and help identify how cultural insecurity may be perceived as potentially risky.

For Beck (2003), developed countries are going through reflexive modernization. He argues this is the radicalization of modern society. In the new reflexive society, things that were taken for granted such as class culture, welfare, tradition, and gender roles no longer are secure. Reflexive modernization, however, differs from post-modernization. Rather than just looking at how social structures are being deconstructed, it seeks to answer what, instead, is taking the place of previously stable social constructs. As modernization has progressed, so has globalization. This has undermined the economic foundations of the nation state, the loosening of borders has impacted the political and cultural foundations, and thus, social structures have changed. Without the same economic foundations, the welfare state loses legitimacy. Simultaneously, the universality of freedom and increased equality changes gender roles, whilst a lack of social security affects the traditional family structure. For Beck, the loss of these traditional forms of community; the nation state, religion, workplace, or family, forces individuals to seek new forms of community. Modernization theory places these new forms of engagement in a solely positive light i.e. environmental groups, or female rights activists. Beck, instead, highlights how the deconstruction of social structures also has the potential of creating more controversial structures.

Individuals in reflexive modernization are faced with uncertainties. In the process of creating new stable social structures, individualization means that all possible choices can be deemed legitimate. In this vacuum of boundaries, new boundaries can be redrawn and changed to fit one's identity. This applies also to expert knowledge; boundaries are blurred. Through technological advancements, it is possible for knowledge to be democratized, and in that, it becomes more important for all voices to be heard rather than to identify truth. In the context of reflexive modernization, individualization and relativism can be a source of insecurity. In contrast to Inglehart, Beck demonstrates how these aspects rather undermine than support democracy.

The uncertainties of reflexive modernization also mean that we are living in a risk society (Beck, 2006). These two aspects together can help explain how the process of democratic

backsliding is possible. In Beck's reflexive modernity, threats have been reduced. These threats can be considered synonymous to the material existential insecurity of which Inglehart speaks. What Beck, however, argues we have instead today, which is overlooked in modernization theory, is risk. Through modernization we can reduce threats such as disease and anticipate natural disasters such as floods. However, with technological advancements we have created new risks. Given the increased accessibility to knowledge, the responsibility lies with the individual to navigate which risks are worth taking. With the blurring of boundaries between what is fact and fiction it is difficult for individuals to make such decisions. The world risk society therefore deals with 'debating, preventing and managing risks it itself created' (Beck, 2006, s. 332).

The breaking down of social constructs through reflexive modernization and increased awareness of risks create an environment of uncertainty. The lack of trust in knowledge, authority, and loss of tradition in both the work environment and family life leaves individuals to create their own truths. The lines of division however are with risk rather than class; the drawing of new boundaries and creation of new communities compete over risk. The goal is to become socially secure in an insecure world. The boundaries created by one group or individual can pose a risk to another's. For example, women's rights movements defined boundaries as to who was included in the struggle and sought to minimize risk for its members. In response, men's rights activists have started emerging that see women's rights as a risk to themselves. They draw their own boundaries in the hopes of minimizing the risk of losing social status and power. For Beck, this implies that individualization deepens in the risk society and creates new asymmetries. In time, this can form what Beck calls the 'risk consciousness' (Beck, 2006, s. 341). In the vacuum of the state and truth, the anticipation of risk may lead individuals to seek remedies, or support the new drawing of boundaries, that infringe on civil liberties in turn for security.

As Inglehart (2008) argues, the political map for post-materialists with regards to lines of conflict are along cultural dimensions rather than economic ones '...as Post-materialists became more numerous they would bring new issues into politics and declining social class conflict' (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Simultaneously, risk has created new inequalities in globalized societies. New identity based groups increase in importance and size in the political sphere, further deepening inequalities based on cultural signifiers. Risk to one's self-created identity becomes the inequality signifier rather than class. Groups may then seek to increase cultural

capital so that their interests are the most accepted and represented to ensure risk minimization. In the ‘liberal/authoritarian’ dimensions in political maps, the liberal dimension can fall into what Inglehart defines as ‘post-materialism’, whilst the authoritarian side is regarded as the reactionary, traditional backlash side (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). Based on Beck, however, it is argued that the authoritarian side is not necessarily a backlash but a different understanding of risk. For those on the liberal side, the greatest risk may relate to the environment, gender, or racism whereas for the other side risks may relate to immigration, crime or law and order. These risk groups are formed based on different interpretations of reality as they exist in societies where social relativism dominates.

Modernization theory as proposed by Inglehart was developed in the 1970’s, prior to the extent of globalization and technological advancements we have today. The cultural changes predicted may have been accurate in what post-materialists under those circumstances would develop. However, with decreasing universal truths, individuals create their own post-materialist values which also reflect a questioning of the dominant status quo. These alternative values possibly held by post-materialists may also reflect self-actualization and emancipation even if they do not fit into the index proposed by Inglehart. At the time of Inglehart’s original thesis, post-materialism implied opposition towards traditional values, gender inequality, or discrimination. Today gender equality and inclusion are instead dominant cultural values in most developed societies, thus, being relativistic or insubordinate today as a post-materialist may mean going against these values. Whilst opposing egalitarianism may not be regarded as such, it can still be an expression of self-actualization and of risk minimization for some. This would mean authoritarian development does not necessarily indicate individuals are more traditional. Rather they are post-material in a different sense with a different risk consciousness.

The development of authoritarian attitudes may reflect this heightened risk consciousness. Certain groups may be more susceptible to value authoritarianism as a source of security. Whilst most previous research looks to economic explanations for these trends, based on the theories put forward by Beck and the logic of post-materialism, this thesis asks whether cultural insecurity is instead the main factor driving post-materialists in developed democracies to question the democratic system. In post-material societies where cultural questions dominate these risks may be related cultural questions rather than economic ones. Certain groups or individuals may have a different interpretation of cultural risk, participate in self-actualizing

movements in support of this interpretation, and be willing to give up civil liberties in exchange for risk minimization.

The implications of this argument are that the core of post-materialism relates to individualization which is also supported in Beck's theories. However, rather than arguing that post-materialism is either altruistic or self-serving, it is suggested that depending on the extent of risk felt post-materialists can be either self-serving or altruistic. Increased relativism and skepticism, which Beck identifies as the main sources of cultural insecurity in reflexive modernized societies, can possibly lead to support for authoritarian sources of security. The democratic backslide identified by Foa and Mounk may be explained by the fact that younger individuals are growing up in heightened cultural insecurity. Depending on how they view cultural risk relative to their identity, it is possible this will also affect how secure they feel with the political system governing them.

To test this, measures for cultural insecurity and economic insecurity are used as independent variables. To see whether the reflexive modernization/post-materialist hypothesis holds, post-materialism is used as an interactive variable, and attitudes towards authoritarianism as the dependent variable. In the case that the hypothesis holds, cultural insecurity should be more influential on autocratic attitudes than economic insecurity in post-materialist countries. In materialist countries, the question of cultural risk will be less important, leaving economic questions to dominate attitudes towards autocracy.

Empirical Analysis

OLS regression models are used to test the relationship of economic and cultural insecurity on authoritarian attitudes using the post-materialism score as an interaction variable. This post-materialism moderator is used to indicate whether the effect of either cultural or economic insecurity increases or decreases given the level of post-materialism. The results from the analysis should point to which of the IV's is best at predicting authoritarian attitudes and whether this relationship is affected by how post-materialist the country is. The data for the IV's, DV and interaction variable are continuous and collected from the most recent WVS from 2010-2013 (World Value Surveys, 2011) and is aggregated to capture country level scores. Based on the theory and subsequent hypotheses, we should expect that greater cultural insecurity has a greater positive effect on authoritarian values in countries with high levels of

post-materialism, and that greater economic insecurity has a greater positive effect on authoritarian values in countries with lower levels of post-materialism.

Independent Variables

This study uses two independent variables and tests their effects in separate OLS regressions. Both independent variables are collected and aggregated from the latest WVS dataset. The variables are all recoded if needed so that higher scores indicate higher levels of insecurity.

Cultural Insecurity¹

Relativism

Given the lack of research and existing ways to operationalize the concept, an index was created to measure cultural insecurity. This sought to capture cultural insecurity as defined by Beck. The index was created using the WVS scores for ‘Relativism’ and ‘Scepticism’. The two variables were chosen to represent Beck’s ideas as the reflexive modernization theory argues that cultural insecurity is created through a loosening of truth, that is relativism, and a distrust for experts and authority, that is, scepticism. Problematic with the index was the low Cronbach’s Alpha score, at 0.173. This indicates that the two variables used to form the index are barely correlated.

Whilst a comprehensive index capturing several aspects would have been ideal, given the weak Cronbach’s Alpha, this was not possible. The variables were tested separately with authoritarian attitudes, and the strongest of the variables was chosen as the operationalization for cultural insecurity. Thus, relativism is the independent variable representing cultural insecurity. The ‘relativism’ (Welzel C. , 2013) index is taken from the WVS Secular index, and is formed based on attitudes towards sacred sources of authority in the normative domain. These are anti-bribery, anti-cheating, and anti-evasion. Here a score of 1 signifies higher levels of relativism, that is more positive attitudes towards bribery, cheating and evasion. Seeing as this is a new concept it is difficult to find variables better suited for the concept as described by Beck. Relativism captures how individuals regard normative certainties in societies, people who are vulnerable to the changes described in reflexive modernization and the world risk society are arguably more likely to regard such rules as subjective. Rather than abide by societal rules they may depend on internal authority and abide by individual moral codes. This, by extension, may

¹ For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2

also apply to opinions on regimes, and is possibly heightened among post-materialists who value their individual opinions greater than in traditional societies.

Economic Insecurity²

The second independent variable represents economic insecurity. Given that this thesis looks at subjective feelings of insecurity, the question ‘Worries: Losing your job or not finding a job’ is used to operationalize economic insecurity. Being worried about keeping your job or not finding one, should indicate that the individual is concerned about their economic situation.

Moderating Variable

Post-materialism³

Inglehart’s 12-item measure for post-materialism is used as the moderating variable. The reason this measure is chosen rather than the 4-item measure for post-materialism is because this is deemed by Inglehart (1990) to be less susceptible to short term changes, and a better predictor for stable post-materialism values as it taps into long-term aims. The questions included here are on the aims for the country for the next 10 years, and on what is most important for the country. Answers include options such as protecting freedom of speech or maintaining order in the nation, where freedom of speech would be deemed as a post-materialist answer. In countries where more respondents chose options that relate stronger to cultural values rather than economic or security values, they are more post-materialist. As an interaction variable, it is included in the model in combination with one of the independent variables to give the effect of the IV’s given higher levels of post-materialism. This is done by multiplying the post-materialism variable by each of the IVs separately and creating a new interaction variable. Whilst the separate IV’s influence authoritarian attitudes, and post-materialism influences authoritarian attitudes, the main point of interest here is the effect of post-materialism on the effect of the IV’s.

Dependent Variable

Authoritarian Attitudes⁴

This index is formed by combining responses to three questions from WVS looking at political systems. These are attitudes towards political systems with strong leaders who do not have to

² For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2

³ For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2

⁴ For exact wording of variable questions see Appendix 2

bother with parliaments and elections, political systems where the army rules, and political systems where experts not governments make decisions. These are the same questions used by Foa and Mounk (2016) to look at increasing authoritarian attitudes which suggests that these are also suitable for this thesis. Important with these questions is that they tap into regime satisfaction rather than government satisfaction. The Cronbach's Alpha here is 0.654 which is not very strong but still an acceptable score. The reason why it may be slightly weak could be that the concept of authoritarianism here is very broad and looks at all forms of non-democratic support. Individuals who support expert governments may not be supportive of army rule, but they would still fall under authoritarian attitudes.

Control Variables

Standard control variables are used such as GDP per capita and are collected from the World Bank (reference). The GDP per capita used is the average of 3 years, 2010-2013 to capture the time span in the WVS surveys. GDP per capita is correlated with post-materialism, with post-materialist countries often having higher GDPs (Inglehart, 1999). Polity IV (2010) scores are used to control for regime type which could influence authoritarian attitudes, countries with strongman leadership for example may be more prone to see it as a positive political system. The percentage of Muslims collected from the Pew Research Center (2009) in a country is also used which is common in social science research given its negative correlations with democratic regimes (Norris, 2013). Finally ethnic fractionalization taken from the Alesina et al. (2003) dataset is used. This confounder is included in the model to control for the possibility that increased cultural insecurity and the increase in authoritarian values may be due to an increased heterogeneity in traditionally homogenous European and Western states. A caveat with this control, however, is that Alesina et al.'s measures are from 2003, thus recent migration flows for example that can have affected ethnic compositions are not captured. The regressions were therefore also tested using the more recent Social Diversity Index from Okediji (2011). However, many countries were missing from the Okediji dataset and SDI was insignificant, thus it was not included in the final models.

Table 1: Variable Descriptives

	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
DV: Authoritarian attitudes	55	6.5	0.84	4.8	8
IV: Cultural insecurity	55	0.37	0.12	0.14	0.66
IV: Economic insecurity	55	2.8	0.46	1.9	3.6
Moderator: Post-materialism	55	1.9	0.37	0.9	2.8

The above table gives an overview on the key variable information for each of the IV's, DV and moderator variable. Data was found for each of the variables for 55 countries⁵. 3 countries were removed as outliers, Haiti, Morocco and Egypt which had scores far outside the interquartile range. Kuwait and Qatar were removed from the data set as they had missing information on authoritarian attitudes and cultural insecurity.

⁵ For a full list of countries included see appendix 1

Preliminary Analysis

Figure 1: Cultural insecurity and authoritarian attitudes.

$$R^2 = 0.090$$




Figure 2: Economic insecurity and authoritarian attitudes

$$R^2 = 0.015$$





Figure 3: Post-materialism and authoritarian attitudes. $R^2 = 0.042$



is, the less likely authoritarian attitudes are prevalent which would support previous research. The graphs above, however, do not indicate whether the level of post-materialism influences the impact of the independent variables. To better illustrate the relationship with the interaction variable, a dummy post-materialism variable was plotted in the scatter graphs. A score of 1 signifies post-materialism above 2 (plotted in green), and 0 signifies post-materialism below 2 (plotted in blue).

Figure 4: Cultural insecurity and authoritarian attitudes.

Post-mat 1: $R^2 = 0.276$

Post-mat 0: $R^2 = 0.017$





Figure 5: Economic insecurity and authoritarian attitudes.

Post-mat 1: $R^2 = 0.138$

Post-mat 0: $R^2 = 0.014$



In these plots, we can see that post-materialism does indeed impact the effect of the independent variables. In comparison to the prior plots, the R^2 is stronger. This indicates that levels post-materialism influence the strength of the independent variables. Further, for all variables, being a highly post-materialist country increases the explanatory variables predicting power. From the hypotheses, we expected the cultural insecurity effect on authoritarian values to increase with increased post-materialism. Plot 4 suggests that this may be the case. That said, the hypotheses also expected the effect of economic insecurity to have a greater effect on authoritarian attitudes in less post-materialist countries. Plot 5 suggests that this is not the case. Rather than seeing economic insecurity affecting authoritarian attitudes more in materialist countries we see the opposite. Contrary to the hypothesis, greater economic insecurity in materialist countries in fact decreases authoritarian attitudes. These results give some indication as to what to expect, however for a more robust analysis OLS regression is used to give us information about which of these relationships is significant and whether the relationships hold with an interaction variable and more controls.

Regression Models

In designing the regression models, data is taken from the 2010-2013 WVS survey wave. New variables were created for the independent, dependent and moderating variables and then aggregated from the individual level to the country level. For the interaction variable, the independent variables and post-materialism variable were mean centered. This was done to avoid multicollinearity which could affect the models. The interaction term was formed by multiplying the mean centered independent variable with the mean centered post-materialism variable. It was decided to keep it as a continuous variable to capture greater variation and produce more robust results. The regressions were also repeated using post-materialism as dummy variable to identify if there were any threshold effects⁶. Two separate regressions were run for each independent variable, each regression included five models. The first including the centered IV, the second adding the centered moderating variable, the third adding the centered interaction term, the fourth includes all control variables, and the final fifth model includes the other independent variable. It is difficult to establish causality through this cross-sectional method, and it would have been preferable to include time series data. Time series data would have been better in establishing a cause and effect sequence, it is also possible that the effects of cultural insecurity are slow moving which would imply that this would only affect authoritarian attitudes in the long term. The results however should inform us of whether the independent variables are influenced in their effect by post-materialism.

⁶ For regression results using dummy variable see appendix 4

Results⁷

Table 2: Cultural insecurity regression results

Cultural insecurity effect on authoritarian attitudes. Unstandardized B-coefficients. Standard error in parentheses. Dependent variable: Authoritarian attitudes index.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Cultural insecurity (Beck)	1.976* (0.880)	2.111** (0.867)	2.256** (0.889)	1.918* (0.888)	1.894* (0.881)
Post-materialism		-.510 (0.295)	- 0.427 (0.314)	- 0.246 (0.373)	-0.267 (0.370)
Interaction			2.516 (3.129)	1.632 (2.930)	1.513 (2.908)
% of Muslims				0.387 (0.337)	0.398 (0.334)
Democracy				0.016 (0.25)	0.014 (0.025)
GDP				- 0.011 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)
Ethnic Fractionalization				1.083* (0.483)	1.085* (0.480)
Economic insecurity					0.291 (0.222)
Intercept	6.552*** (0.113)	6.550*** (0.111)	6.540*** (0.112)	6.175*** (0.345)	5.343*** (0.722)
N	52	52	52	52	52
R² (adjusted)	0.072	0.107	0.101	0.231	0.243

* Denotes significance at 95%

**Denotes significance at 98%

*** Denotes significance at 99%

The results tell us that cultural insecurity based on Beck's understanding has a significant and strong effect on the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes in all five models and regardless of level of post-materialism. Post-materialism on the other hand as predicted has a negative effect on authoritarian attitudes. The interaction term however affects authoritarian attitudes in the expected positive direction, and the effect of cultural insecurity in countries with greater post-materialism is stronger, however the interaction term was not significant in any of the models.

⁷ For regression and multicollinearity results see appendix 3

That said, the regressions were also run using post-materialism as a dummy variable instead and, here, when included, the interaction was significant at 93%, and cultural insecurity was not⁸. This may suggest that for cultural insecurity to have an increase in authoritarian attitudes the country must cross a certain post-materialist threshold.

Table 3: Economic insecurity regression results

Economic insecurity effect on authoritarian attitudes. Unstandardized B-coefficients. Standard error in parentheses. Dependent variable: Authoritarian attitudes index.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Economic insecurity	0.222 (0.253)	0.269 (0.251)	0.223 (0.249)	0.251 (0.225)	0.248 (0.217)
Post-materialism		- 0.486 (0.310)	-0.351 (0.319)	-0.080 (0.351)	-0.239 (0.349)
Interaction			0.905 (0.604)	1.046 (0.578)	0.957 (0.561)
% of Muslims				0.060 (0.338)	0.241 (0.339)
Democracy				0.001 (0.24)	0.017 (0.024)
GDP				-0.015 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)
Ethnic Fractionalization				1.312** (0.449)	1.173** (0.469)
Beck cultural insecurity*					1.710*** (0.848)
Intercept	6.547*** (0.118)	6.545*** (0.116)	6.527*** (0.115)	6.310*** (0.338)	5.552*** (0.498)
N	52	52	52	52	52
R² (adjusted)	-0.004	0.24	0.47	0.237	0.364

* Denotes significance at 95%

**Denotes significance at 98%

*** Denotes significance at 99%

Economic insecurity has only a weak effect on authoritarian attitudes, and was not significant at the 95% level in any of the models. Similar to the regressions with cultural insecurity, post-materialism has a negative effect on authoritarian attitudes here. In terms of the interaction, economic insecurity in post-materialist countries has a weak positive effect, but this was not

⁸ For regression results using dummy variable see appendix 4

significant either. However, whilst this was not significant, the direction of the effect is contrary to the hypothesis. It was predicted that economic insecurity would have a stronger effect in materialist countries, thus a negative direction was expected. Further when running the regressions using the dummy variable, the interaction was significant in the 4th and 5th models, but not as strong as the interaction with cultural insecurity. The dummy regressions suggest that economic insecurity has a stronger effect in post-materialist countries past a certain threshold.

Analysis and discussion

Based on the results, cultural insecurity does seem to affect authoritarian values in countries regardless of their materialist status. Using the threshold format with a dummy interaction variable, cultural insecurity had a greater effect in post-materialist countries. Economic insecurity on the other hand did not have a significant effect on authoritarian attitudes, however, here the threshold format showed a significant effect with the interaction variable indicating that economic insecurity has a greater effect in post-materialist countries, albeit weaker than cultural insecurity. Thus, we have mixed results for the hypotheses. What can be claimed is that the second hypothesis was incorrect, economic insecurity does not affect authoritarian attitudes more in materialist countries. For the first hypothesis, there is evidence to suggest that cultural insecurity is a stronger predictor of authoritarian attitudes in both materialist and post-materialist countries, and when crossing a certain level of post-materialism this effect is heightened, but past this, the effect does not necessarily increase as post-materialism increases.

When looking at the continuous interaction variable of post-materialism which was not significant, it is possible that the disembedding of democracy is, as Brym argues, a reflection of the changing international system. With new global powers, such as China and Russia led by autocrats, the cultural dominance of democracy is threatened in both materialist and post-materialist countries. Global risks such as terrorism, financial crises, and climate change for instance, can for individuals regardless of materialism status be a motivating factor for instating authoritarian leadership. This provides clearer responsibility and compensates for a lack of sovereignty and the interdependence of actors. To ensure social security for oneself in times of personal insecurity, creates external security through the regime.

Economic Insecurity

The results from the regressions using the dummy post-materialist variable gives some strength to the first hypothesis. However, it may also suggest that in post-materialist countries short term

fluctuations or worries have a greater effect on authoritarian attitudes whether these be economic or cultural. The variable used to measure economic insecurity, ‘worries about losing or not finding a job’ was significant in interaction with post-materialism for authoritarian attitudes. This could indicate that in a climate of neoliberalism, stable jobs have become more difficult to find, and that jobs also play a role in the self-actualization process. This may mean that this is not a true reflection of economic insecurity, but rather a reflection of individualization and the new role of work as not just a source of income but a creator of identity. If this indeed is the case, then worries about losing your job could also be an indication of concern about losing one’s identity. This fear in tandem with identity creation through work, could explain why in post-materialist countries those with such worries are more likely to view authoritarian alternatives as positive and as a source of security.

On the other hand, dummy results for economic insecurity could also reflect growing inequality in post-materialist countries. Increased inequality per Alexander and Welzel (2017) has created a divergence in how quickly liberal emancipatory values develop across classes. Individuals who are most concerned about losing or not finding jobs may also belong to the lowest economic classes. Given growing inequality, these individuals develop liberal values slower than those belonging to more economically secure classes. This may result in individuals who are left behind, both in terms of economic questions and moral values. These left behind and ostracized groups may have greater woes with the democratic system and thus be easier targets for illiberal populist messages. This could also possibly explain why economic insecurity in post-materialist countries is a greater predictor for authoritarian attitudes. In more materialist countries, inequality may not cause as stark of a divergence in moral attitudes. In post-materialist countries however, economic insecurity may have a much greater effect on liberal values relative to those predominant in society.

Cultural Insecurity

The results could indicate that the increase in authoritarian attitudes is a recent effect of heightened cultural insecurity in post-materialist countries that has existed in materialist countries for longer. The results for ethnic fractionalization would suggest this, the variable was significant in both tests. Many post-materialist countries have experienced recent increased heterogeneity which may influence cultural insecurity whereas many materialist countries have been heterogeneous longer. That said, the data for the ethnic fractionalization variable is taken from 2003, whereas the data from the surveys is more recent. Possibly the effect of ethnic

fractionalization would even be a greater predictor for authoritarian attitudes today. Seeing that cultural insecurity was significant even when ethnic fractionalization was included in the models, there does seem to be an effect independent of possible increased heterogeneity, but testing with more current demographic data would strengthen the results.

In terms of democratic backsliding, support for authoritarian alternatives is affected by cultural insecurity. However, it may be appropriate to understand the results through Greskowitz (2015); both relativism and worries about losing your job, may be symptoms of neoliberalism that increase the chances of the hollowing out of democracy. Somer and McCoy (2018) suggest that polarization has weakened democratic support by creating different expectations for democracy. The results here may be tapping into a similar logic. Moral relativism; the acceptance of bribery, avoiding fares and cheating on taxes could suggest a relativism with regards to the importance of civil liberties and democratic systems. Possibly individuals who are highly relativistic can view some groups as more important to protect than others. They may have different expectations for whose rights democratic institutions are protecting, in extension this may explain why those who are highly relative may believe authoritarian alternatives would be better at representing and protecting personal interests. For Beck, this would be an indicator of their risk consciousness triggered by cultural insecurity. Perceiving cultural insecurity through the loosening of boundaries could motivate support for authoritarian alternatives which can draw new boundaries that protect specific personal interests. Possibly, we are seeing a process of disembedding and embedding of regime types through cultural insecurity.

The strength of the cultural insecurity variable also suggests that this is indeed not a backlash which is increasing authoritarian support, individualization is part of the process of post-materialism; relativism is included in the secular index of WVS because it is part of a country's development from survival and traditional values. This would strengthen the idea that post-materialism is not on its own a guarantee for democratic support, but as mentioned in the theory, is multi-faceted, which can, under certain conditions, trigger support for authoritarian attitudes.

Future Research

The results indicate that cultural insecurity influences authoritarian attitudes more so than economic insecurity and that there is some evidence to suggest that the effects of insecurity; both cultural and economic is heightened when a country is more post-materialist. However, for more clear, robust results, future research could use time-series data. Values are slow

moving and changes in the early 2000's may only be reflected in values today, thus this would be beneficial for establishing clearer causality. Further as Foa and Mounk found, younger people today are more supportive of authoritarian attitudes. Cultural and economic insecurity may be clearer amongst youth, based on Inglehart's socialization and scarcity hypothesis, this would also make sense. Youth today who grow up in a greater risk society will also be socialized with greater cultural insecurity and thus the effect on authoritarian attitudes may be greater. In combination with time-series data, it would be possible to look at how young cohorts have been affected in different points of time which could tell us if the effect of cultural insecurity is a new phenomenon, if it is limited to youth today, and consider if this is tied to changes in ethnic diversity. Hierarchical multilevel models can also shed light on whether the effects of cultural insecurity occur on an individual level for post-materialists instead of country aggregates. With individual level data, the effects of social pressures highlighted by Welzel, Kratochvíl and Oschepkova (2017) and Welzel (2010), can be considered. In countries with widespread post-materialism, post-materialists on an individual level may express cultural insecurity differently than post-materialists in materialist countries. This would be related to which values are amplified and emphasized in the society, and which values are predicted to further one's social status.

Conclusion

This thesis sought to explore how economic insecurity and cultural insecurity affected authoritarian attitudes in materialist and post-materialist countries. The first hypothesis was that in post-materialist countries, where cultural values dominate, cultural insecurity would be a greater explanant than economic insecurity for authoritarian attitudes. The second hypothesis was that in materialist countries, where economic values dominate, economic insecurity would be a greater explanant than cultural insecurity for authoritarian attitudes.

Using modernization theory based on Inglehart's research as well as Beck's theories on reflexive modernization and the risk society, it was argued that post-materialism has been treated as a phenomenon that is independent of the context in which it exists. Modernization theory stipulates that post-materialist values conducive to democratic development are created through existential security. For modernization theory, this is economic security and it allows individuals to place value in questions that are cultural rather than economic. However, what is not discussed in modernization theory is what possible new sources of existential threat post-materialist societies are vulnerable to, and whether new forms of existential insecurity can

affect democratic values. With the help of Beck's world risk, the concept of cultural insecurity was formed. Through globalization and the blurring of boundaries in most aspects of life, whether this be political, economic, or social, there are less certain truths in society. It was argued that this can create a new insecurity that post-materialists, who identify themselves through culture rather than economy, are more susceptible to feel. This cultural insecurity may then lead individuals who are faced with a new existential threat relating to their identity to form 'risk consciousness'. That is, to ensure their own security they will be willing to infringe on civil liberties.

To test the hypotheses OLS regressions were conducted using WVS survey data which measured authoritarian attitudes. Cultural insecurity and economic insecurity were tested separately and an interaction term was formed with post-materialism for each independent variable. The relationship was tested twice, once using a continuous interaction variable, and once using a binary materialist/post-materialist variable. The results showed that cultural insecurity had a significant effect on authoritarian attitudes for both materialist and post-materialist countries, and the results using the binary interaction showed that the effect of cultural insecurity was stronger in post-materialist countries. Taken together, it was understood that past a level of materialism, cultural insecurity has a stronger effect on authoritarian attitudes, but that this effect did not increase with increasing post-materialism past a certain threshold. With regards to economic insecurity, when using a continuous interaction variable, the effect was not significant for materialist or post-materialist countries. The effect was significant however when using the dummy interaction, with post-materialist countries being more affected by economic insecurity. The results suggest that the first hypothesis was correct, and the second hypothesis was not. To attain better, more robust results, a stronger measure for cultural insecurity and economic insecurity can be formed, and time series and generational data may be more appropriate to use. Overall the results here suggest that questions such as cultural insecurity may be of relevance for future research on democratic backsliding.

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Appendix 1: Included Countries

List of countries included in dataset

Algeria	China	Hong Kong	Lebanon	Pakistan	Slovenia	Turkey
Argentina	Colombia	India	Libya	Peru	South Africa	Ukraine
Armenia	Cyprus	Iraq	Malaysia	Philippines	Spain	United States
Australia	Ecuador	Japan	Mexico	Poland	Sweden	Uruguay
Azerbaijan	Estonia	Jordan	Netherlands	Romania	Taiwan	Uzbekistan
Belarus	Georgia	Kazakhstan	New Zealand	Russia	Thailand	Yemen
Brazil	Germany	Korea, S	Nigeria	Rwanda	Trinidad and Tobago	Zimbabwe
Chile	Ghana	Kyrgyzstan	Palestine	Singapore	Tunisia	

Appendix 2: Variable Questions

Source: WVS 2010-2013 Official Questionnaire

Dependent variable: Authoritarian attitudes

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (Read out and code one answer for each):

Very good = 1, Fairly good = 2, Fairly bad = 3, Very bad = 4*

V127. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections

V128. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country

V129. Having the army rule.

*Variable recoded in authors dataset so that Very bad = 1 and Very good = 4.

Independent Variable: Cultural insecurity

Relativism

Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out and code one answer for each statement):

Scale from 1-10: Never justifiable = 1, Always justifiable = 10

V199. Avoiding a fare on public transport

V201. Cheating on taxes if you have a chance

V202. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties

Independent Variable: Economic Insecurity

To what degree are you worried about the following situations?

Very much = 1, A good deal = 2, Not much = 3, Not at all = 4*

V181. Losing my job or not finding a job

*Recoded as Very much = 4, Not at all = 1

Moderator: 12 item Post-materialism

V60. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? (Code one answer only under "first choice"):

V61. And which would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under "second choice")

- A high level of economic growth
- Making sure this country has strong defense forces
- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful

V62. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):

V63. And which would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second choice”):

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Giving people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech

V64. Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):

V65. And what would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second choice”):

- A stable economy
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society
- Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money
- The fight against crime

Appendix 3: Output tables (continuous interaction)

Output table: Cultural Insecurity

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	6.552	.113		57.896	.000	
	relativismc	1.976	.880	.300	2.245	.029	1.000
2	(Constant)	6.550	.111		59.004	.000	
	relativismc	2.111	.867	.320	2.435	.019	.992
	postmaterialism_c	-.510	.295	-.228	-1.730	.090	.992
3	(Constant)	6.540	.112		58.281	.000	
	relativismc	2.256	.889	.342	2.539	.014	.951
	postmaterialism_c	-.427	.314	-.190	-1.361	.180	.883
	relativismc_postmatc	2.516	3.129	.115	.804	.425	.847
4	(Constant)	6.175	.345		17.891	.000	
	relativismc	1.918	.888	.291	2.160	.036	.814
	postmaterialism_c	-.246	.372	-.110	-.661	.512	.537
	relativismc_postmatc	1.632	2.930	.075	.557	.580	.826
	ethnicfrac	1.083	.483	.291	2.240	.030	.878
	muslim_pop	.387	.337	.177	1.149	.257	.625
	polity	.016	.025	.111	.650	.519	.504
	GDP	-.011	.008	-.191	-1.351	.183	.739
5	(Constant)	5.343	.722		7.405	.000	
	relativismc	1.894	.881	.288	2.149	.037	.814
	postmaterialism_c	-.267	.370	-.119	-.722	.474	.536
	relativismc_postmatc	1.513	2.908	.069	.520	.605	.825
	ethnicfrac	1.085	.480	.291	2.262	.029	.878
	muslim_pop	.398	.334	.182	1.191	.240	.625
	polity	.014	.025	.097	.570	.571	.502
	GDP	-.011	.008	-.195	-1.385	.173	.739
	economicinsecurity	.291	.222	.160	1.309	.197	.976

a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes

Coefficients^a

Model		Collinearity Statistics VIF
1	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.000
2	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.008
	postmaterialism_c	1.008
3	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.052
	postmaterialism_c	1.132
	relativismc_postmatc	1.181
4	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.228
	postmaterialism_c	1.862
	relativismc_postmatc	1.210
	ethnicfrac	1.139
	muslim_pop	1.599
	polity	1.983
	GDP	1.353
5	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.228
	postmaterialism_c	1.866
	relativismc_postmatc	1.211
	ethnicfrac	1.139
	muslim_pop	1.600
	polity	1.991
	GDP	1.354
	economicinsecurity	1.025

Output table: Economic Insecurity

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	6.547	.118		55.554	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	.222	.253	.122	.877	.384	1.000
2	(Constant)	6.545	.116		56.325	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	.269	.251	.148	1.074	.288	.985
	postmaterialism_c	-.486	.310	-.217	-1.571	.122	.985
3	(Constant)	6.527	.115		56.550	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	.233	.249	.128	.935	.355	.976
	postmaterialism_c	-.351	.319	-.157	-1.101	.276	.906
	postmatC_economicinsecC	.905	.604	.212	1.498	.140	.916
4	(Constant)	6.310	.338		18.654	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	.251	.225	.138	1.116	.270	.962
	postmaterialism_c	-.080	.351	-.036	-.228	.821	.599
	postmatC_economicinsecC	1.046	.578	.245	1.810	.077	.804
	ethnicfrac	1.312	.479	.352	2.736	.009	.886
	muslim_pop	.060	.338	.028	.178	.859	.617
	polity	.001	.024	.009	.054	.957	.566
	GDP	-.015	.008	-.259	-1.856	.070	.754
5	(Constant)	5.552	.498		11.140	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	.248	.217	.136	1.141	.260	.961
	postmaterialism_c	-.239	.349	-.107	-.685	.497	.568
	postmatC_economicinsecC	.957	.561	.224	1.707	.095	.799
	ethnicfrac	1.173	.469	.315	2.501	.016	.867
	muslim_pop	.241	.339	.110	.710	.481	.574
	polity	.017	.024	.114	.693	.492	.509
	GDP	-.012	.008	-.217	-1.587	.120	.736
	RELATIVISM_mean	1.710	.848	.259	2.016	.050	.829

a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes

Coefficients^a

Model		Collinearity Statistics VIF
1	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	1.000
2	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	1.015
	postmaterialism_c	1.015
3	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	1.025
	postmaterialism_c	1.103
	postmatC_economicinsecC	1.091
4	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	1.040
	postmaterialism_c	1.670
	postmatC_economicinsecC	1.244
	ethnicfrac	1.129
	muslim_pop	1.621
	polity	1.767
	GDP	1.326
5	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	1.040
	postmaterialism_c	1.760
	postmatC_economicinsecC	1.252
	ethnicfrac	1.154
	muslim_pop	1.743
	polity	1.965
	GDP	1.358
	RELATIVISM_mean	1.206

Appendix 4: Output tables (dummy interaction)

Output table: Cultural Insecurity

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	6.552	.113		57.896	.000	
	relativismc	1.976	.880	.300	2.245	.029	1.000
2	(Constant)	6.661	.153		43.596	.000	
	relativismc	1.995	.879	.303	2.269	.028	1.000
	postmatcdummy	-.242	.227	-.142	-1.065	.292	1.000
3	(Constant)	6.658	.149		44.709	.000	
	relativismc	.706	1.091	.107	.647	.521	.616
	postmatcdummy	-.245	.221	-.144	-1.106	.274	1.000
	dummyrelativismc_postmatc	3.361	1.762	.316	1.907	.062	.616
4	(Constant)	6.286	.326		19.300	.000	
	relativismc	.558	1.030	.085	.541	.591	.574
	postmatcdummy	.007	.233	.004	.030	.976	.747
	dummyrelativismc_postmatc	3.006	1.614	.283	1.863	.069	.611
	ethnicfrac	.971	.475	.261	2.047	.047	.864
	muslim_pop	.441	.326	.201	1.351	.184	.634
	polity	.009	.023	.064	.407	.686	.575
	GDP	-.013	.008	-.234	-1.770	.083	.803
5	(Constant)	5.473	.690		7.931	.000	
	relativismc	.553	1.022	.084	.542	.591	.574
	postmatcdummy	-.049	.235	-.029	-.209	.836	.723
	dummyrelativismc_postmatc	3.007	1.600	.283	1.879	.067	.611
	ethnicfrac	.958	.471	.257	2.035	.048	.864
	muslim_pop	.446	.323	.204	1.379	.175	.633
	polity	.008	.023	.057	.371	.713	.574
	GDP	-.013	.008	-.235	-1.795	.079	.803
	economicinsecurity	.293	.219	.161	1.334	.189	.947

a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes

Coefficients^a

Model		Collinearity Statistics VIF
1	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.000
2	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.000
	postmatcdummy	1.000
3	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.623
	postmatcdummy	1.000
	dummyrelativismc_postmatc	1.623
4	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.741
	postmatcdummy	1.340
	dummyrelativismc_postmatc	1.638
	ethnicfrac	1.157
	muslim_pop	1.579
	polity	1.740
	GDP	1.246
5	(Constant)	
	relativismc	1.741
	postmatcdummy	1.384
	dummyrelativismc_postmatc	1.638
	ethnicfrac	1.157
	muslim_pop	1.579
	polity	1.741
	GDP	1.246
	economicinsecurity	1.056

Output table: Economic Insecurity

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance
		B	Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	6.547	.118		55.554	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	.222	.253	.122	.877	.384	1.000
2	(Constant)	6.678	.160		41.843	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	.292	.258	.161	1.132	.263	.949
	postmatcdummy	-.293	.242	-.172	-1.214	.230	.949
3	(Constant)	6.640	.158		42.097	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	-.217	.382	-.119	-.568	.573	.416
	postmatcdummy	-.309	.237	-.182	-1.306	.198	.948
	postmatdummyc_x_e coninsecC	.906	.509	.371	1.778	.082	.421
4	(Constant)	6.346	.329		19.293	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	-.283	.353	-.156	-.803	.426	.381
	postmatcdummy	-.056	.241	-.033	-.234	.816	.717
	postmatdummyc_x_e coninsecC	1.016	.479	.416	2.119	.040	.373
	ethnicfrac	1.252	.472	.336	2.653	.011	.895
	muslim_pop	.131	.324	.060	.404	.688	.656
	polity	.002	.023	.017	.109	.913	.603
	GDP	-.017	.008	-.296	-2.208	.032	.798
5	(Constant)	5.685	.461		12.325	.000	
	economicinsecurity_c	-.276	.342	-.152	-.806	.425	.381
	postmatcdummy	-.107	.235	-.063	-.455	.651	.709
	postmatdummyc_x_e coninsecC	.999	.464	.409	2.151	.037	.373
	ethnicfrac	1.091	.464	.293	2.350	.023	.868
	muslim_pop	.301	.326	.137	.924	.360	.611
	polity	.015	.023	.100	.642	.524	.560
	GDP	-.015	.007	-.270	-2.065	.045	.790
	RELATIVISM_mean	1.634	.823	.248	1.986	.053	.865

a. Dependent Variable: authoritarianattitudes

Coefficients^a

Model		Collinearity Statistics VIF
1	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	1.000
2	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	1.053
	postmatcdummy	1.053
3	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	2.406
	postmatcdummy	1.055
	postmatdummyc_x_econinsecC	2.374
4	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	2.623
	postmatcdummy	1.395
	postmatdummyc_x_econinsecC	2.683
	ethnicfrac	1.117
	muslim_pop	1.525
	polity	1.657
	GDP	1.253
5	(Constant)	
	economicinsecurity_c	2.623
	postmatcdummy	1.411
	postmatdummyc_x_econinsecC	2.684
	ethnicfrac	1.152
	muslim_pop	1.638
	polity	1.786
	GDP	1.266
	RELATIVISM_mean	1.156