Clientelism, conditional cash transfers, and cross-class coalitions
Why governments expand pro-poor redistribution

Conditional cash transfers allow poor individuals and households access to income assistance in return for investments in health and education. CCTs were first adopted in countries in which politicians had a long tradition of using material benefits to receive a promise of political support from voters — the practice of clientelism. CCTs in these countries have, in contrast, largely been free from such manipulation. This puzzling observation raises the question: why would politicians undermine their ability to use clientelism to capture the support of poor voters by introducing hard-to-manipulate CCTs that raise the reservation price of vote sellers?

The theory of the dissertation provides a solution to this puzzle and answers the question by emphasizing that it is precisely the undermining effect of CCTs on clientelism that makes CCTs so attractive to politicians who seek the support of not only the poor but also that of the upscale electorate. CCTs respond to the demand for redistribution among the poor. CCTs simultaneously respond to upscale demands for cheap redistribution and improvements in the productivity of the low-skill labor force. Upscale voters want to end clientelism for two reasons: its lack of an observable volume of redistribution (from which tax rates primarily carried by the upscale group can be inferred) and its inability to end the dependency of the poor on government handouts. By supporting CCTs, upscale voters can reduce the use of clientelism.

The theory is tested through a mixed-methods research design that draws on large-*n* experimental and observational data as well as in-depth longitudinal case study analysis. The cases range from subnational Brazil to national governments in Latin America and the Caribbean during two decades. The results corroborate the hypotheses and give strong support for the theory.

Existing theories emphasize increased responsiveness to the LAC poor despite the common assessment of the poor in the advanced economies as a politically weak group with low efficacy. The dissertation makes a key contribution to the literature by theorizing on the appeal of CCTs in different parts of the electorate, and on when we should expect the emergence of a cross-class coalition of voters in favor of pro-poor redistribution. Beyond advancing our understanding of why politicians sometimes choose to include the poor in the welfare state after a long history of exclusion, the dissertation has relevance for the many individuals across the world who lack economic security and protection from adverse life and market events.

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

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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To my mother Lena and my late father Åke for their love and support

Sammanfattning

Conditional cash transfers medger fattiga familjer och individer ett kontantbidrag i utbyte mot att bidragstagarna gör investeringar i hälsa och utbildning, t.ex. genom besök på mödravårdscentralen och en regelbunden skolgång. Dessa villkorade kontantbidrag har sedan 1996 spridit sig till utvecklingsländer i alla världsregioner. De uppstod först på platser i världen där fattiga medborgare under lång tid hade mottagit materiella fördelar genom klientelism, dvs. de utväxlingar genom vilka politiker ger t.ex. kontanter, mat och byggmaterial i utbyte mot ett löfte om att stödja politikern i fråga vid val och i mellanvalsperioder. Det är överraskande att villkorade kontantbidrag har införts i länder som Brasilien och Mexiko där politiker länge har försökt vinna val genom klientelism eftersom en högre inkomst höjer bidragstagarnas reservationspris för att sälja sitt politiska stöd. Varför inför politiker villkorade kontantbidrag som underminerar klientelism?

Enligt avhandlingens teori använder politiker villkorade kontantbidrag för att fånga politiskt stöd bland såväl fattiga som rika väljare. Klientelism (avseende hela mandatperioden) och röstköp (avseende klientelistiska utväxlingar inför val) gör villkorade kontantbidrag mer sannolika eftersom rika väljare eftersträvar låga skatter och en produktiv arbetskraft. Klientelism är en informell och ofta olaglig form av omfördelning som inte går att utläsa från den offentliga budgeten. Den tillhörande skattenivån är därmed okänd. Klientelism villkorar materiella fördelar på politiskt stöd snarare än investeringar i humankapital. Rika väljare kan genom att stödja villkorade kontantbidrag till den fattiga befolkningen vänta sig ett lågt skattetryck och en ökad produktivitet hos den lågkvalificerade arbetskraften. Fattiga väljare föredrar villkorade kontantbidrag framför klientelism eftersom rätten till det förra regleras genom offentliga lagar och regler snarare än enskilda politikers godtycke.

Teorin finner stöd genom analyser av väljarpreferenser och införande av villkorade kontantbidrag på subnationell nivå i Brasilien och under två decennier på nationell nivå i Latinamerika och Karibien. Avhandlingen innehåller analyser av både experiment och observationsstudier. Rika väljare som oroas av klientelism uttrycker mer stöd för villkorade kontantbidrag, vilket i många fall gör att deras preferenser sammanfaller med de fattigas preferenser. Politiker med ett klientelistiskt rykte som behöver stöd från såväl rika som fattiga väljare inför villkorade kontantbidrag och åtnjuter efter införandet ökat stöd från rika väljare. Det är högre sannolikhet att nationella regeringar i länder med större risk för omfattande klientelism inför villkorade kontantbidrag än regeringar i de kontexter där klientelismen är av en mindre omfattning.

Till skillnad från tidigare teorier kan avhandlingen förklara varför ett par mycket klientelistiska länder (Brasilien och Mexiko) var först med att införa villkorade kontantbidrag. Tidigare teorier har också haft svårt att förklara varför de fattigas preferenser styr omfördelningspolitiken när de fattiga i de avancerade ekonomierna betraktas som en politiskt svag grupp. Avhandlingens teori kan även förklara det för tidigare teorier svårförståeliga valet av Brasiliens expresident Lula da Silva (Arbetarpartiet, PT) att enbart låta fattiga familjer ta emot det villkorade kontantbidraget *Bolsa Família* snarare än att åtminstone inkludera arbetarna. Avhandlingen bidrar till litteraturerna om informell såväl som formell omfördelningspolitik och väljarkoalitioner. Teorin utvidgar vår förståelse för när koalitioner som exkluderar medianväljaren kan uppstå och vad konsekvenserna blir för omfördelningen. Den utomvetenskapliga relevansen av avhandlingen understryks av den minskning av fattigdom och ojämlikhet som har följt införandet av villkorade kontantbidrag.

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List of abbreviations

BFP	*Bolsa Família* (Family grant) program
CCT	Conditional cash transfer
CFC	*Cartão Família Carioca* (Rio Family Card)
IFI	International financial institution
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
Oportunidades	*Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades*
PAN	*Partido Acción Nacional*
PCdoB	*Partido Comunista do Brasil*
PDT	*Partido Democrático Trabalhista*
PETI	*Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (Child Labor Eradication Program)
PFL	*Partido da Frente Liberal*
(P)MDB	*(Partido) do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*
PRI	*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*
Progresa	*Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación*
Pronasol	*Programa Nacional de Solidaridad*
PSDB	*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*
PSOL	*Partido Socialismo e Liberdade*
PT	*Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Fund for Children

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Backbyn July 2019

1
Chapter 1. Introduction

The puzzle of social assistance expansion in clientelist contexts

In this dissertation, I develop and test a theory about why conditional cash transfer programs for poor families and individuals are adopted. CCTs provide additional income to those below a nationally established poverty line. They are targeted, income or means-tested, and non-contributory programs that benefit the poorest in society. Eligibility may be decided by either household *per capita* income or through a proxy means-test based on factors such as household characteristics or assets (Levy and Schady 2013; Stampini and Tornarolli 2012). CCTs are, in other words, social assistance-style benefits that require no contribution history unlike income-based social insurance that protects against the economic shocks of unemployment, old age, and illness. In return for the income supplement, CCT beneficiaries should comply with requirements intended to increase human capital. This means that CCTs are designed to reduce poverty in two ways: by providing income support to poor households today and by incentivizing parents to invest in the future of their children through some combination of school attendance and health interventions in order to stop the intergenerational transmission of poverty (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012; Molina-Millan et al. 2016). Typically, education investments entail a primary and secondary school attendance of 80-85 percent while health and nutrition requirements encompass preventive check-ups, vaccinations for small children, and maternal care (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

National governments in Latin America and the Caribbean have adopted 46 CCTs since 1996. This represents a radical reshaping of social policy given the far-reaching exclusion of poor voters from the welfare state that characterized most of the 20th century (Holland 2013; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006). By 2014, 64 countries across the world had adopted CCTs (Gentilini, Yemtsov, and Honorati 2015). The sudden expansion of what De La O (2015) refers to as an example of "pro-poor redistribution" is puzzling since CCTs first emerged in places where politicians have historically courted the poor with clientelist offers, namely Brazil (Hagopian 1996; Gay 1994; Zucco 2013; Kuschnir 2000; Nichter 2011, 2014; Sugiyama and Hunter 2013; Perlman 1976) and Mexico (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Schaffer and Baker 2015; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; De La O 2015; Greene 2007; Lawson and Greene 2014). Why would politicians adopt a social policy that undermines their ability to

continue to pursue clientelist strategies, that is, to secure the support of the poor with the delivery of benefits that are contingent on political support?

Current theories, which I discuss in Chapter 2 and summarize in the next section, point to the failure of earlier social policy to alleviate poverty and the demand among newly enfranchised poor voters for access to the welfare state (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; De La O 2015). Social policy before the expansion of social assistance programs had low coverage of the poor (Holland 2013; Pontusson 2005) and welfare transfers were characterized by weak progressivity or even regressivity (Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006), giving rise to assessments that the Latin American welfare state had "traditionally failed to benefit the poor" (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009, 36). Given its reliance on formal occupational status and contributions, social policy in Latin America effectively excluded the numerous individuals who lacked employment or worked in the informal sector. Protection was only granted to the relatively privileged segment of the population that worked in the formal sector (Carnes and Mares 2014; Mares and Carnes 2009; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; Ferranti et al. 2004; Garay 2016; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Holland 2013; Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006; Pribble 2013; Stampini and Tornarolli 2012). Earlier theories have rightly emphasized the insufficiency of previous social policy for the poor. However, they lack an answer for why CCTs have such limited coverage among the poor. It is also difficult to understand why the poor in the LAC region effectively received policy responses to their demands when their peers in the advanced economies are often viewed as a politically weak group that faces high obstacles to coordination.

While the theory of the dissertation, too, emphasizes the improvement CCTs represent to welfare state exclusion and clientelist redistribution, I argue that CCTs are not exclusively adopted for the benefit of the poor but also to attract support of the top of the income distribution. The identification of an additional constituency of CCTs resolves the tension in the extant literature of what appears as unusual responsiveness to the preferences of the poor as well as the low coverage rate of CCTs. The argument of the dissertation, presented in detail in Chapter 3, is that CCTs are more likely to be adopted when there are greater incentives to craft a cross-class coalition at the ends of the income distribution: upscale and poor voters. I model a tripartite electorate of three equally sized groups along the income distribution. In similarity with Rueda (2005), I refer to the top group as the upscale group.[1] I refer to the middle as vulnerable or strugglers (following the labels used by Ferreira et al. 2013; and Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer 2014, respectively). The poor are at the bottom of the income distribution. In addition to the agreeableness of CCTs to its poor beneficiaries, I argue that the upscale electorate, too, supports CCTs since CCTs represent an improvement to clientelist redistribution as well as the more extensive redistribution that would take place if politicians went to the vulnerable and the poor for electoral support.

[1] Rueda (2005, 62) uses a slightly different definition of upscale groups in the advanced market economies as "employers, the upper middle-class, and the business and financial community". The definition used by Rueda mixes classes and occupational category whereas my definition solely relies on placement in the income distribution.

I understand the practice of clientelism as a form of pro-poor redistribution of unknown volume that lack, for the upscale electorate, valuable eligibility criteria. In clientelist exchanges between voters and politicians, material benefits are given to the voter in return for the promise of supporting the politician. Clientelist redistribution allows poor voters throughout the electoral cycle to access material benefits in return for the promise of political allegiance. Vote buying similarly allows the poor to receive material benefits but only in the more limited time frame of campaigns.

Upscale voters want to end clientelism for two reasons: its lack of an observable volume of redistribution (from which tax rates primarily carried by the upscale group can be inferred) and its inability to end the dependency of the poor on government handouts. CCTs, in contrast, have public and observable budgets. CCT benefits are conditional on educational and health investments to incentivize poor individuals to increase their human capital. By so doing, CCTs respond to upscale demands for cheap redistribution and improvements in the productivity of the low-skill labor force.

To see how the poor can be allies of the upscale electorate, consider that the welfare state redistributes via a range of transfers (encompassing non-contributory, means-tested social assistance and contributory, income-based social insurance) as well as services. Given a declining marginal utility of income, the poor are more likely to value a relatively cheap cash transfer today over relatively expensive investments in public services (health and education) than those with higher incomes. Consider also that there are private options to public services. Upscale individuals who purchase private insurance or education share with the poor a smaller interest than the middle of the income distribution to invest in public provision of health and education services. Upscale and poor voters have a shared interest in spending on cheap cash transfers and may defeat median demands for costly investments in public services (Iversen and Goplerud 2018; Epple and Romano 1996; Ansell 2006).

The general opportunity for a convergence of upscale and poor preferences for cheap cash transfers over public services has been studied before. The novel contribution of the theory is to elaborate on the role of clientelism and vote buying in the adoption of CCTs. Previous research has found that political manipulation of social assistance benefits is smaller in places with a large non-poor population and high electoral competition, suggesting a political price to clientelism when the pool of vote sellers shrink (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Holland (2015) has similarly found that forbearance of property rights violations follows the mandates of electoral competition on a class basis. Unlicensed street vendors and their families benefit from forbearance as informal redistribution of wealth in districts where the poor make up larger proportions of the electorate (Holland 2015).

I argue that clientelism and vote buying function as a signal to the upscale electorate of efforts to capture the poor vote. As I stated above, upscale voters should be expected to dislike this way of gaining the support of the poor since the taxation effort required to sustain clientelism is unknown as a consequence of the unknown volume of clientelist redistribution. Politicians who give benefits to poor people simply in return for a promise of political or electoral support also do little to respond to upscale demands for a more productive labor force. When clientelism and

vote buying signal an effort to make the poor part the intended collection of voters that ensure the electoral success of at least some politicians (similar to the concept of the winning coalition, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), the upscale electorate and poor voters converge on a preference for CCTs. Politicians can attract these groups at the top and the bottom of the income distribution by adopting CCTs. The redistributive preferences of the different groups of voters are discussed more in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, there is also a closer specification of the conditions under which poor-upscale convergence for CCTs occurs and results in the adoption of CCTs.

The different scopes of CCTs (throughout the electoral cycle) and vote buying (limited to the short time period of campaigns) indicate that the use of CCTs and vote buying can co-exist. An empirical implication of the theory is that clientelism will be reduced after the introduction of CCTs. But there may still be attempts to buy votes in the lead-up to elections after the poor have gained access to CCTs. The co-existence of hard-to-manipulate CCTs and vote buying efforts has been documented in at least Mexico (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016) and Brazil (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013). In summary, the theory gives rise to the expectation that clientelism by the incumbent be severely undercut in the presence of difficult-to-manipulate CCTs assuming a hard budget constraint (I explain the reasons for this expectation more closely in Chapter 3) although we may still observe vote buying attempts during campaigns as a last-minute push for electoral support.

Extant theories in brief

The literature contains theories of CCT adoption that focus on bottom-up forces in the form of democratic responsiveness to the demands of the poor as well as theories that emphasize top-down pressure from international finance institutions and peer learning. Beginning with the former type of explanation, Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) argue that rising poverty rates in tandem with democratization compelled the Mexican government to expand and reform social assistance systems. The 1997 adoption of the CCT *Progresa* (succeeded by *Oportunidades* in 2001 and *Prospera* in 2014) responded to demands from the poor for effective poverty reduction. The threat of growing "social unrest among the poor" paved the way for CCTs (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, 13). In other words, demands from the poor are put forth as the reason for why CCTs were adopted in Mexico. This argument is similar to that of De La O (2015) who argues that the decision to adopt CCTs is driven by economic crises that resulted in rising poverty rates and heightened attention to the insufficiency of *status quo* antipoverty strategies, which excluded the informal sector from the welfare state while targeting some poor voters with clientelist benefits. In similarity to Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016), De La O argues that the insufficiency of antipoverty efforts led to social tensions that "in many countries in the region" manifested themselves as protests, strikes, and even armed rebellion (De La O 2015, 46).

While the theory of the dissertation, too, emphasizes the insufficiency of previous social policy for the poor, I argue that extant theories take insufficient heed of the limited coverage of CCTs in the poor population and the weak political clout of the unorganized poor that belies their numbers. Beginning with the former point, these theories cannot readily explain why so few of the poor benefit from CCTs if the rationale of such programs is to win the poor vote. If the poor were the only constituency for CCTs, it should be expected that politicians maximize the electoral utility of these programs by including the entirety or at least close to the entirety of the poor population. As I show in Chapter 2, CCTs cannot benefit the entire poor population since its coverage rates are on average below the moderate and in the vast majority of cases also the extreme poverty rate when we consider aggregate, regional averages by year. The low coverage rate that in most years do not even cover the extremely poor population is consistent with the notion that CCTs do not only seek to attract the support of the poor population. If the programs were truly catering *exclusively* to the demands of the poor, we should expect that CCTs cover most of the poor to maximize electoral gain in this constituency. If, however, CCTs *additionally* respond to the redistributive preferences of another constituency (the upscale electorate), suppressed program coverage is consistent with upscale preferences for low redistribution.

CCT explanations that center on responsiveness to the demands of the poor additionally need to contend with why the poor in Latin America appear to have high political efficacy compared to their peers in the advanced economies. In the latter, the poor population is often viewed as an aggregate of politically disengaged and unorganized citizens (Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012; Scruggs and Hayes 2017; Gilens 2012; Bartels 2008). The low political efficacy of the poor can be contrasted with the relatively high efficacy of well-organized formal sector workers who can coordinate and effectuate their political demands through resource-rich unions (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001).

Others argue that labor in some situations support CCTs and other non-contributory programs even though they do not benefit (Garay 2016) or that CCTs constitute an additional, low-cost layer to extant welfare states that do not meet with resistance from non-beneficiaries (Holland and Schneider 2017). But in the advanced economies, means-tested social-assistance programs are argued to split the support of the poor and the working class, with the latter opposing social policy that bypasses them and only benefits the worst-off in society (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 1998).

It may be tempting to view CCTs in light of the third wave of democratization and later, the leftist turn or "pink tide" across the region that began in the 2000s. This is a common framing of CCTs not least by observers in the media (e.g. Caistor 2015). I argue that CCTs are, contrary to popular belief, not what you would expect in leftist toolboxes, nor are they the best for poor if the goal is to reduce poverty and inequality as much as possible. If CCTs were really adopted out of a concern for the poor, we would have expected to see the development of Nordic-style, universal welfare states with generous flat-rate benefits and basic tiers of social insurance distributed on a citizenship basis as well as high-quality public education, health

care, and child and elderly care. Previous research finds that universal welfare states are most effective in reducing poverty and inequality (Huber and Stephens 2001).

Consider the case of social policy reform in Brazil in the early 2000s. Why did the Workers' party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT) choose to redistribute in a manner characteristic of the liberal welfare states, i.e. with an emphasis on means-tested, cheap, and targeted transfers to a minority of the population? Huber and Stephens (2001; see also Esping-Andersen 1990) find strong evidence for an association between social democratic government and universal welfare states in the advanced capitalist economies. Similarly, Hicks and Swank (1992) point to social democratic parties and unions as instrumental in the development of highly redistributive welfare regimes. Despite being presented as a social democratic party with established union ties (Roberts 2002; Hunter 2010; Cleary 2006), the PT chose to adopt a targeted, means-tested social assistance-style benefit for its poor population, which is emblematic of a liberal rather than a universal welfare state.

Some might object that fiscal constraints or state capacity hinder expansive redistributive policies in the Nordic vein, and that the choice to concentrate on the BFP was driven by such limitations in opportunity rather than a lack of motivation. There may certainly be factors of capacity or opportunity that put the most redistributive policies out of reach for some governments. In the Brazilian case, however, it is noteworthy that the 2000s (during which the BFP was created) were a period of strong economic growth in Brazil due to the commodity price boom (Campello and Zucco 2015; Martins Neto 2017). The prosperity of the 2000s arguably allowed policymakers to choose a more expansive, universalistic social policy reform than the BFP. State capacity is neither an intuitive explanation for the choice of a means-tested policy rather than a universal, citizenship-based benefit. While the ways in which governments determine whether someone is poor enough to be a CCT beneficiary varies across the region (Levy and Schady 2013; Stampini and Tornarolli 2012), it appears more labor intensive and to require more bureaucratic expertise to assess the wealth of individual households than to simply distribute benefits to all citizens. Lacking state capacity or bureaucratic competence should favor universal citizenship-based benefits rather than targeted means-tested benefits that require case-to-case assessments of eligibility.

Finally, there are also arguments about the role of IFIs and international policy diffusion (Sugiyama 2011; Brooks 2015; Hall 2007). In a study of international CCT diffusion determinants in Latin America, Sugiyama (2011) argues that neighboring countries learned from each other while policy experts developed norms of appropriate ways of combating poverty. IFIs such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank promoted the adoption and expansion of CCTs through financing. Sugiyama (2011, 264) suggests that "financial support for CCTs at least reinforced domestic decision-making processes, and provided the necessary resources to carry them out." Brooks (2015) argues that there are international neighborhood effects that help explain "[s]triking spatial and temporal correlations" between CCTs in a given region (Brooks 2015, 551). According to Brooks (2015), IFIs helped spread the CCT model of social assistance across the world even though there were also domestic conditions that promoted CCT adoption, namely a "deep-

ening of democracy" (Brooks 2015, 561; see also Hall 2007), implying more responsiveness to the poor in similarity to previously discussed theories (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; De La O 2015; Garay 2016; Holland and Schneider 2017). These theories have ably shed light on how loan access and learning from regional neighbors appear to have lowered the threshold for adopting CCTs over time. They cannot, however, speak to the *motivation* for adopting CCTs. Motivation is arguably a necessary factor for explaining social policy adoption by sovereign governments. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, I find little evidence that IFIs convinced national governments to adopt CCTs although it is clear that IFIs provided financing opportunities that may have enabled more governments to pursue pro-poor redistribution in the shape of CCTs, or enabled more comprehensive CCTs.

Description of CCTs in Latin America and the Caribbean

In this section, I provide a description of CCTs in the Latin American and Caribbean region with the objective to give a broad overview of CCT adoptions and program characteristics. I use data on national-level CCTs since these are better known and more well-documented than smaller, municipal (or any other subnational unit) CCTs. Where data allows, I compare this to local CCTs in Brazilian municipalities.

Between 1996 and 2017, national governments in the LAC region adopted 46 CCTs. Brazil's 1996 *Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (the Child Labor Eradication Program, PETI) pioneered the CCT trend among national govenments. It was closely followed by the Mexican government's adoption of *Progresa* in 1997. Table 1 below lists national CCTs by year of adoption. CCTs in Brazilian municipalities, however, preceded both the PETI and *Progresa*. The first three CCTs in Brazil were adopted in 1995 in two cities in the state of São Paulo (Campinas and Ribeirão Preto) and in Brasília in the federal district (S. Soares and Sátyro 2010; Sanches Corrêa 2015). There is no data for how many municipal CCTs were adopted per year in Brazil after the more well-documented cases of these first three programs. By 1998, 26 municipalities are reported to have followed suit, including the country's largest city São Paolo (S. Soares and Sátyro 2010; Secretaria Municipal de Assistência e Desenvolvimento Social 2017).[2] 455 (eight percent) of Brazilian municipalities reported having a local CCT in 2013 (IBGE 2014).

By design, CCTs only benefit the part of the population that governments judge economically disadvantaged enough to be entitled to income assistance. On average, CCTs had a coverage rate in national populations of 13 percent (calculated as an

[2] The Worker's Party senator Eduardo Suplicy had already in 1991 — six years after the poor effectively gained the right to vote and two years following the first election after the military dictatorship — proposed a law to establish a right to a minimum income for the poorest (*Programa de Garantia de Renda Mínima*), which was approved by the Senate but was never voted on in the Chamber of Deputies (S. Soares and Sátyro 2010).

unweighted average across all program-years based on CEPAL (2019b) data[3] between 1997 and 2017. In absolute numbers, CCT beneficiaries rapidly grew from 38 million in 2001 to 129 million in 2010 (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012). The growth in beneficiary numbers is not only reflecting the start of new CCTs across the region. Programs within countries have also gradually expanded. The number of beneficiaries of the Colombian *Familias en Acción* grew from around four hundred thousand to 12 million in the time period 2001-2010 (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012). In Mexico, *Progresa* benefits *(*later renamed *Oportunidades* and, currently, *Prospera*) went to around three hundred thousand households in 1997 and reached five million households by 2009 (World Bank 2009). In 2014, *Prospera* encompassed 5.8 million households, or approximately one-quarter of the population (World Bank 2014a).

The beneficiary numbers of the *Bolsa Família* program have also gradually increased. *Bolsa Alimentação* (one of the CCTs that was consolidated into the BFP starting in late 2003), benefited 1.5 million families in 2003 while *Bolsa Escola* (similarly phased into BFP in 2003) benefited 4.8 million families in 2001 (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). In 2006, the BFP encompassed more than one-fifth of the population with over 40 million beneficiaries in eleven million families (Zucco 2013). In 2014, these transfers were estimated to reach more than one-quarter of the 200 million population (Nichter 2014).[4] In a review of CCT coverage in 2010, Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) found that the most extensive coverage (42 percent, estimated as the percentage of the population who lives in a household in which someone receives CCT benefits), was achieved by Ecuador's *Bono de Desarrollo Humano*.[5] CEPAL (2019b) reports a slightly lower coverage rate of the BDH in 2010 (38 percent). In absolute terms, Brazil's BFP and Mexico's *Prospera* are currently the largest CCTs in the region, with 56.3 and 31.2 million individuals in beneficiary households, respectively, representing a coverage rate of 26 percent in Brazil and 24 percent in Mexico (2018 enrollment numbers, see CEPAL 2019b).

In the case of local-level CCTs in Brazilian municipalities, the average (median) proportion of beneficiary households in the total municipal population was 3.7 percent (1.4 percent) in 2013. As a proportion of the number of households, the average beneficiary household proportion was 13.8 percent and the median 4.7 percent. The average (median) proportion of beneficiaries in the poor municipal population was 24.5 percent (7.9 percent).[6]

[3] Information on the construction of the CCT dataset is in Appendix 1.

[4] In 2015, the 13.7 million BFP beneficiary households represented around 20 percent of the total households in the population (IBGE 2016; Palácio do Planalto 2015b).

[5] Sometimes the Bolivian *Bono Juancito Pinto* program, reported to have a coverage of 57 percent in 2010 (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012), is understood as a CCT. The targeting criteria in my definition of CCTs, however, means excluding the *Bono Juancito Pinto* since it is not targeted to poor households or individuals but rather all public schoolchildren with at least a 80 percent attendance rate "regardless of the income level of the child's parents" (McGuire 2013, 1; CEPAL 2019b).

[6] Author's calculations based on data on the number of households (*unidades domésticas nos domicílios particulares*) is from the 2010 census (IBGE 2010). Data on the estimated population number in 2013 is from IBGE municipal social assistance survey (IBGE 2014). Data on the poor population are from the 2010 national census, collected from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil (2015).

CCTs are considered highly progressive forms of social spending (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004; Huber and Stephens 2012; Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006) that account for about one-quarter of the inequality reduction in Latin America in the 2000s (Levy and Schady 2013, 206). In the case of Brazil, CCTs reduced inequality by nearly one-fifth (18 percent) from 2001 to 2006. The largest CCT, the *Bolsa Família* program, has been credited with one-quarter of the reduction of extreme poverty in Brazil over the same period (Lindert and Vincensini 2010, 15). Other effects of CCTs include better health and nutrition, and improved school attainment (Molina-Millan et al. 2016). Studies have also found that CCTs are associated with reduced child labor (Cecchini and Atuesta 2017).[7] Long-term effects of CCTs, such as decent jobs for working-age adults who grew up in beneficiary households, are as of yet difficult to estimate since insufficient time has passed since CCT inception (Molina-Millan et al. 2016).

CCTs provide important income assistance for poor households. Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) find that benefits represent one-fifth to one-quarter of the income in beneficiary households in the majority of LAC countries. The benefit is even larger (on average 32 percent of income) (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012) if we only include households under the Latin American extreme poverty line of US$2.5 *per capita* daily household income (PPP) (Ferreira et al. 2013). In *Oportunidades*, benefits have been found to represent over 40 percent of pre-transfer income in the bottom quintile of the income distribution (Levy and Schady 2013, 208). Benefits that represent 20-30 percent of total household income should be especially consequential at the bottom of the income distribution where the marginal utility of income is higher than for wealthier households.

But it is also true that progressive CCT spending is small relative to largely regressive social insurance benefits and energy subsidies. In comparing CCTs to subsidies, Levy and Schady (2013, 210) note that "the residential electricity subsidy is larger than the budget of *Oportunidades*, yet 57 percent of the electricity subsidy goes to households in the top two income quintiles, compared with about 6 percent for the lowest one." A comparison of the generosity of social-assistance style benefits like CCTs to contributory benefits such as social security similarly reveals the relative ungenerosity of CCTs. In Brazil in 2012, the average size of the daily *per capita* CCT was US$ .9 (PPP) while average per capita daily contributory social insurance benefits was more than eight times larger (US$ 7.6) (World Bank 2015). The same picture emerges for the region taken as a whole during the time period 1998-2015 when the average size of the daily *per capita* CCT was US$.5 for CCTs and US$7.5 for social insurance (World Bank 2015). Given their relatively low value, it should come as no surprise that CCTs are cheap. In 2012, governments

[7] Beyond the effects on economic security and human capital, Cecchini and Atuesta (2017) note that some studies find that CCTs have strengthened the position of women in the household since benefits are typically paid to the mother. Soares and Silva (2010) find that women in BFP beneficiary households in Brazil had higher bargaining power than women in non-beneficiary households. But no difference was found on women's bargaining power between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the case of *Familias en Acción* in Colombia (F. V. Soares and Silva 2010). Others (e.g. Franzoni and Voorend 2011; Hanlon, Barrientos, and Hulme 2010; Tabbush 2009) point to how paying the mother might reinforce women's traditional role as the primary caregiver while obligating women to take on even more unpaid work to meet program obligations.

spent an average of .3 percent of the gross domestic product on these programs, ranging from .1 percent (Dominican Republic 2009-15, Chile 2013-14, El Salvador 2013) to one percent (Ecuador 2010) of GDP.[8]

[8] The sample consists of 11 countries with CCTs during the years 2009-2015 (but with missing data for some years (World Bank 2015).

Table 1. Adoption of CCTs 1996-2017

Year	Country (name of CCT)	No. of CCTs
1996	Brazil (*Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil, PETI*)	1
1997	Mexico (*Progresa*)	1
1998	Honduras (*PRAF/BID Fase II*);) Brazil (*Guaranteed Minimum Income Program*)	2
1999		0
2000	Nicaragua (*Red de Protección Social*); Costa Rica (*Superémonos*)	2
2001	Jamaica (PATH); Colombia (*Más Familias en Acción*); Brazil (*Bolsa Alimentação; Bolsa Escola*), Mexico (*Oportunidades*), Ecuador (*Beca Escolar*)	6
2002	Chile (*Solidário*)	1
2003	Ecuador (*Bono de Desarrollo Humano*); Brazil (*Bolsa Família; Cartão Alimentação*)	3
2004		0
2005	Dominican Republic (*Programa Solidaridad*); Trinidad and Tobago (TCCTP); El Salvador (*Red Solidaria*); Nicaragua (*Sistema de Atención a Crisis*); Panama (*Bonos Familiares para la Compra de Alimentos*); Peru (*Juntos*); Paraguay (*Abrazo; Tekoporâ*); Argentina (*Familias por la Inclusión Social*); Uruguay (*PANES*)	10
2006	Honduras (*PRAF/BID Fase III)*; Costa Rica (*Avancemos*); Panama (*Red de Oportunidades*)	3
2007	Colombia *(Red Juntos*)	1
2008	Guatemala (*Mi Familia Progresa*); Uruguay (*Asignaciones Familiares - Plan Equidad*)	2
2009	Bolivia *(Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy);* Argentina *(Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social*); El Salvador (*Comunidades Solidarias Rurales*)	3
2010	Honduras *(Bono 10.000 Educación, Salud y Nutrición*)	1
2011	Ecuador (*Desnutrición Cero*); Brazil (*Bolsa Verde*); Colombia (*Red Unidos)*	3
2012	Haiti (*Ti Manman Cheri*); Dominican Republic (*Progresando con Solidaridad*); Guatemala (*Mi Bono Seguro*); Chile (*Subsistema de Seguridades y Oportunidades*/*Ingreso Etico Familiar*)	4
2013		0
2014	Mexico (*Prospera*); Honduras (*Bono Vida Mejor*)	2
2015		0
2016	Guyana (Public Assistance Programme)	1
2017		0

Sources: Table compiled by author based on CEPAL's database of CCTs (CEPAL 2019b), Fiszbein and Schady (2009). Additional secondary and primary sources have been consulted. See Appendix 1 for more information about the construction of the CCT dataset.

CHAPTER 1

Research design

Motivation for studying the cases of CCTs in Latin America and the Caribbean

I examine CCT support and adoption in national as well as subnational contexts across the LAC region in the 1991-2017 period. The overarching motivation for focusing the empirical analyses on the LAC region originated with the observation that two highly clientelist countries (Brazil and Mexico) were also home to the first two national-level CCTs in the world: Brazil's 1996 PETI and Mexico's 1997 *Progresa*. This curious observation led to the formulation of the puzzle stated at the beginning of the chapter: why would politicians adopt a social policy that undermines their ability to continue to pursue clientelist strategies, that is, to secure the support of the poor with the delivery of benefits that are contingent on political support?

CCTs have been adopted in other regions of the world since the pioneering programs in Brazil and Mexico in the late 1990s. 64 national governments across the world had adopted CCTs by 2014 (Gentilini, Yemtsov, and Honorati 2015). But it was in the LAC region that CCTs were first adopted. A study that intends to explain the causes of social policy expansion in the form of CCT adoption should include the first observed cases of CCT adoption and not only policy replications. I choose to examine cases within the region, exclusively, to control for any unobserved regional-level factors. Constraining the spatial boundaries of cases to LAC region should in this way make cases more similar and more comparable.

There were also more pragmatic concerns of time and language proficiency that influenced the choice to restrict the cases to one region. Examining what social programs amounted to CCTs, finding their date of adoption, and estimating the coverage of programs in the population in several instances involved consulting laws and policy documents from national governments.[9] To code the cases of CCT adoption in a careful and considered manner took time and language skills, and it would have been resource-intensive to expand the dataset to additional regions of the world.

Chapters 4-5 examine a subset of cases in Brazil, both within the spatial boundaries of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Chapter 4 examines support for CCTs through a survey experiment that was fielded before the 2016 elections for mayor and the local assembly. Chapter 5 examines determinants of municipal CCT adoption and effects on mayoral support in the same city from 1992 to 2012.[10] The start year of the analysis in Chapter 5 is the year of the first mayoral election within the current electoral system. This is the system that was put into place after the re-installment of free elections after around two decades of military dictatorship. The end year was the first mayoral election-year following the adoption of a local CCT. In 2010, first-term mayor Eduardo Paes adopted the *Cartão Família Carioca* program (the Rio Family Card program). This places Rio among the small minority of municipalities with a local CCT. In 2013, 455 (eight percent) of Brazil's 5,569 municipalities reported

[9] This process is elaborated in Appendix 1.

[10] The empirical strategies of these chapters are described more closely in the last subsection.

having a local-level CCT independent of federal CCTs.[11] Paes was elected in 2008 as a member of the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, PMDB), which for decades controlled poor *carioca* voters at least partly through clientelist manipulation of social programs and urban improvement projects (e.g. Sarmento 2004; Perlman 1976; Gay 1994). The impoverished *carioca* population has traditionally resided in makeshift houses or shacks in the *favelas* that are perched on the hilltops of the South Zone and West Zone to provide easy access to the beachfront upscale homes in which the poor work as doormen, janitors, housekeepers, and nannies.[12] The squalor among the poor stands in sharp contrast to the standard of living among upscale *cariocas* who reside in luxury apartments in chic South zone neighborhoods like Ipanema or glitzy West zone neighborhoods like Barra da Tijuca.

Rio de Janeiro has a long history of clientelist uses of social programs (further detailed in Chapter 5). Contemporary elections appear to be characterized by extensive efforts to buy votes during campaigns for local elected office although it is notoriously difficult to estimate the prevalence of a secret and criminal act. I know of no survey with national coverage that provides municipal-level estimates of vote buying, either with or without techniques such as list experiments to alleviate concerns of social desirability bias (e.g. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). To compare Rio to other Brazilian cities in the absence of available data, I constructed an estimate of vote buying effort based on campaign spending. Spending on a campaign worker-category that is widely believed to fill the function as brokers is one indication of the effort candidates and parties make to buy votes in the lead-up to campaigns. The estimate is based on the proportion of campaign expenditures that goes to so-called *cabos eleitorais*. *Cabos eleitorais* may be used for legal campaigning activities but they are also known to function as local-level brokers (Nichter 2011). A proposal to ban the use of *cabos eleitorais* given their role in brokering vote buying deals was approved by the federal Senate in the fall of 2015 (one year before mayoral and local assembly elections would take place) but struck down in the Chamber of Deputies (Lei da minirreforma eleitoral PL 5735/13) (Câmara dos deputados 2015).[13] The objective is not to interpret the point estimate of individual municipalities but rather to cautiously use the estimates to get a sense for approximately where Rio is located in the distribution of vote buying efforts in Brazilian municipalities. The 2012 municipal-level estimate of vote buying effort, aggregated from each candidate's expenditure reports (reported by expenditure type), puts Rio above the median Brazilian municipality but below the average municipality (a few municipalities whose candidates reported very high relative spending on *cabos eleitorais* make the average higher than the median). The median estimate, then, suggests that candidates in

[11] Author's calculations based on data reported by municipal administrations in the 2013 municipal survey (*Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros: Assistência Social 2013*). The survey was designed and administered by the federal statistics agency *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE 2014).

[12] Decade-long efforts to evict poor squatters and raze favelas to the ground have also resulted in the residence of large poor populations in the North zone and the more remote parts of the West zone (Perlman 1976).

[13] The data source is the Supreme Electoral Court's candidate expenditure data for the 2012 municipal elections (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015), which candidates are required by law to submit. The construction of the vote buying effort estimate is described more closely in Appendix 2.

Rio de Janeiro in 2012 made greater efforts to buy votes than at least half of Brazil's 5,569 municipalities. Unfortunately, the candidate spending data is inappropriate to use for elections prior to 2012 since the reporting requirements were made more stringent for the 2012 elections (requiring candidates to report spending on *cabos eleitorais*). This means that it is difficult to tell how much vote buying occurred in local elections in Rio de Janeiro in the earlier years of the case study in Chapter 5.

The estimate is admittedly an imperfect measure of vote buying effort since it relies on self-reported spending. It is possible that candidates do not comply with the reporting requirements that were established by the Supreme Electoral Court. If noncompliance is not randomly distributed across municipalities, the estimate may be biased. One might hypothesize that candidates in places where vote buying carries a greater electoral cost are more likely to underreport broker spending. There are no studies or audits that examine this matter to the best of my knowledge. Given the paucity of prior efforts to systematically measure vote buying in local-level Brazil, I consider the vote buying effort estimate based on broker spending during campaigns for local office an improvement that may help us get a better sense for the distribution of vote buying in Brazilian municipalities.

In summary, Rio is a place with a long history of social programs that have been politically manipulated to attract the poor vote. This implies that concern with clientelism have been high among upscale *cariocas* for a long time. The CFC program appears to have escaped the same destiny of being used to elicit support of the poor population with the incumbent. What appears to be continued high levels of vote buying during the limited time frame of electoral campaigns implies, however, that concern with clientelism can be reactivated. This makes Rio a suitable place in which to field an experiment with a randomly assigned treatment intended to induce clientelism concern. Manipulating concern with clientelism in a place spared such exchanges would make little sense. To be considered a test that is well aligned with the theory, concern has to come from some observed practices of tying social assistance to political allegiance with the incumbent. It is therefore well motivated to experiment with clientelism concern, as I do in Chapter 4, in a real-world setting like Rio de Janeiro in which respondents can connect the treatment to lived experiences in their own city. In contrast to a sterile lab environment with participants who may never have had reason to worry about clientelism, a survey experiment in a city whose recent past presents very real reasons to be wary of clientelism can be considered a better test of the influence of clientelism concern on CCT support.

Some may draw the conclusion that the case of Rio de Janeiro should be viewed as a most likely case that provides no more than weak support for the theory in the longitudinal case study in Chapter 5 given a long history of clientelism and what appeared to be a relatively high effort to buy votes in the 2012 election. I am, however, hesitant to label it as such since I lack the data that would allow for systematic comparisons of levels of clientelism and vote buying in Rio compared to other cases across time and space. It is for that reasons difficult to conclusively tell what type of case Rio is among the population of Brazilian municipalities.

The theory is tested on a larger set of cases in Chapter 6: the full sample of national-level CCT adoption in the region. Chapter 6 provides analyses of the entire set

of national-level CCT adoptions in the LAC region from 1991 up to 2017 (with some exceptions due to data availability) as well as support for redistribution in one year (2014). The lower bound of the temporal restriction (1991) corresponds to the first year of national-level CCT adoption minus five years. This means that I begin the empirical analyses of national CCTs five years before the Brazilian government under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the center-right *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, PSDB) adopted the PETI. The upper bound corresponds to the last year with available data at the time of data collection. The analyses in Chapter 6 are intended as a test of the generalizability of the theory across time and space in the birth region of CCTs. It remains an empirical question to what extent tests on cases outside the LAC region would yield results similar to those presented in this dissertation. However, the hypotheses I derive from the theory contain no region-specific conditions. Theoretically, then, the expectations presented in Chapter 3 should be applicable regardless of region. Tests outside the LAC region could strengthen the theory if such tests gave results that were similar to those presented in Chapters 4-6. Contrasting results from tests on other cases may also help formulating more precise theoretical expectations of the effects of clientelism on preferences for CCTs and conditions under which a rich-poor preference convergence for cheap cash transfers is followed by CCT adoption. Results that differ substantially may help to specify boundaries and scope conditions of the theory.

Empirical strategy

The objective of the empirical chapters is to assess to what extent the theory and its hypotheses are supported when tested against the empirical record. Since different types of empirical strategies for theory testing come with their own specific advantages and disadvantages, I implement a research design that draws on a combination of different strategies for causal inference. Likewise, I use a variety of techniques to estimate effects. The tests rely on many different types of data, some of which have been originally collected for this project.

I use experiments in Chapter 4 to test to what extent upscale respondents are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern, and to what extent the difference between upscale and poor support for CCTs decrease when clientelism is a greater concern. Experiments have strong internal validity and can produce unbiased estimates of the effect of a randomly assigned independent variable on the outcome of interest (e.g. Green and Gerber 2003). The treatment in this instance consisted of information about extensive attempts of politicians to buy votes in the lead-up to elections. It was randomly assigned and designed to induce higher concern with clientelism. The control group received no treatment. Since the treatment was randomized, differences in support for CCTs can be attributed to the treatment through the hypothesized role of clientelism concern in raising support for CCTs among the upscale electorate.

As expected and in line with the theory, upscale respondents in the treatment group were more supportive of CCTs than their upscale peers in the control group. Higher clientelism concern leads to higher support for CCTs among upscale voters. A closely connected expectation was that the difference between poor and upscale voters decreases as clientelism concern grows. The results in Chapter 4 indicate support for this expectation, too.

An important drawback of experiments is the difficulty with which one can tell how generalizable the results are. It is an empirical question to what extent the results in Chapter 4 could be replicated in other contexts. There is, however, nothing case-specific about the theory or its hypotheses that should lead us to expectation that the treatment effect be isolated to the particular sample of respondents that participated in the survey experiment in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2016 in the lead-up to the local elections.

In Chapter 5, I conduct a longitudinal case study of the city of Rio de Janeiro. This means that I study the same place over time to hold any city-level factors constant (Gerring 2007). The objective of this study is to examine how well the theory is supported when we look closer at the electoral dynamics and redistributive reforms that occurred in Rio de Janeiro 1992-2012. The inferences in Chapter 5 rely on a different logic than the straightforward experimental logic in Chapter 4 of randomizing treatment of the hypothesized cause of CCT support and then comparing the treatment group with the control group in terms of average level of CCT support. In Chapter 5, I instead use a variety of observational data to see to what extent these together provided support for the hypotheses. In view of the exclusive use of observational data and its associated possibility of unobserved confounding factors that

may bias the results, I interpret the results as consistent with, rather than as providing a confirmation of, the hypotheses.

I draw on a combination of analyses of expressed support for different mayoral candidates from surveys (Datafolha 1996ab, 2000ab, and 2004) and election results (collected from the Supreme Electoral Court, TSE 2015). I examine the economic composition of households in neighborhoods in Rio based on census data from 2000 and 2010, and map these onto the election results (that are reported by electoral zone, which are different geographical areas than neighborhoods) to assess the success of mayoral candidates in electorates with varying level of aggregate income. The analysis begins in 1992, which is the year of the first mayoral election within the current electoral system that was put into place after the re-installment of free elections following the end in 1985 to two decades of military dictatorship. The analysis ends in 2012, which was the first mayoral election-year after the 2010 adoption of the *Cartão Família Carioca* program ("The Rio Family Card") by first-term mayor Eduardo Paes of the clientelism-marred *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB).

In summary, the evidence in Chapter 5 is consistent with the hypotheses that politicians who are considered clientelist are more likely to adopt CCTs than politicians who are not considered clientelist when there are incentives to attract poor and upscale voters, and that politicians who are considered clientelist attract more support from upscale voters after adopting a CCT.

In Chapter 6, finally, I assess how well the theory travels across the Latin American and Caribbean region during close to three decades (1991-2017). I analyze redistributive support on the basis of data from nationally representative surveys (Latin American Public Opinion Project 2019) and CCT adoption through large-*n* time-series cross-section analyses. I construct measures of clientelism concern that are based on the perceived use of vote buying and the pool of vote sellers. For the attitudinal analyses, this is based on the percentage of respondents in each country-survey (Latin American Public Opinion Project 2019) that reported knowing someone who had been approached with an offer of benefits in return for a vote. For the policy adoption analyses, the perceived use of vote buying is based on expert assessments of the latest national election from the Varieties of Democracy-project (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, et al. 2018).[14] In both instances, I interact perceived vote buying effort with the relative size of the poor population as an estimate of clientelism concern. This estimate is intended to come as close as possible to the experimental treatment in Chapter 4. The results in Chapter 6 are consistent with the expectations of the theory.

[14] Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v8". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Summary of research design

In summary, I selected subnational and national cases within the LAC region in order to include the first CCTs in the world in the analyses. The cases of CCT adoption in Brazil and Mexico were what inspired the puzzle at the heart of the dissertation: politicians in clientelist contexts who adopt hard-to-manipulate social policies that undermine their ability to buy the poor vote. The selection of the LAC region as the spatial boundary of the analyses was done to control for unobserved regional-level factors that may result in biased estimates. The research design of the dissertation utilizes the strengths (and acknowledges the weaknesses) of different strategies of causal inference. In combination, experimental analyses, a longitudinal case study, and broad time-series cross-section analyses of voter attitudes to redistribution and policy adoption enable sound, rigorous tests of the theory of a cross-class coalition of upscale and poor voters for CCTs in the shadow of clientelism.

A roadmap for the remainder of the dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. I critique extant explanations for CCTs in Chapter 2. I divide the critique by two broad types of current theories, described earlier in this chapter. First, there are theories that focus on bottom-up forces in the form of democratic responsiveness to the demands of the poor or the together with those at risk of poverty. Second, there are theories of CCT adoption that emphasize top-down pressure from IFIs and learning from policy experimentation in the regional neighborhood. In summary, I argue that the first type of theory does little to explain why so few of the poor benefit from CCTs. If the main objective of such programs were to win the poor vote, we should expect politicians to maximize their political and electoral utility by enrolling close to the entirety of the poor population. I present data in Chapter 2 that shows that CCTs coverage rates correspond to approximately the relative size of the extremely poor population, which is only a subset of the poor population. CCTs appear underutilized if their main function is to win the poor vote. Additionally, I argue that these theories provide few answers as to why poor voters in developing world democracies should be expected to possess such high electoral efficacy compared to their peers in the advanced economies, who are often viewed as a weak constituency in comparison to the politically mobilized working class and the upscale electorate (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001; Gilens 2012; Bartels 2008; Scruggs and Hayes 2017).

The second type of theory, emphasizing IFIs and regional diffusion, has contributed to our understanding of how CCTs could spread so quickly across the world by pointing to access to loans and knowledge of CCTs. It appears likely that both of these factors have over time lowered the threshold for adopting CCTs. The main weakness of these theories is that they provide little in the way of motives for CCT

adoption. Opportunity seems an insufficient explanation for the decision by sovereign governments to decide whether to reform social policy and by extension change the fabric of redistribution by including the poor in the welfare state.

I present the theory in Chapter 3. The electorate in the theory is tripartite with bottom, middle, and top groups of equal size along the income distribution: the poor, the vulnerable or struggler, and the upscale electorate. The upscale electorate by definition is the most economically privileged group. The upscale electorate prefers private schools and private health services. The private option to public services is less accessible for the vulnerable and poor population given their relatively low incomes.

The poor electorate is theorized to be the main target of clientelism and vote buying efforts due to their relatively high marginal utility of income (Calvo and Murillo 2013; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). I refer to clientelism as ongoing, iterative exchanges between voters and politicians that occur throughout the electoral cycle. Vote buying refers to the exchanges that take place during campaigns in the lead-up to elections. The poor, however, prefer CCTs to clientelism and vote buying since CCTs provides them with a reliable, predictable source of income. The poor are also expected to prefer targeted cash transfers (which could come in the shape of either CCTs or clientelist handouts) to investments in public services given their unsatisfied material needs (Epple and Romano 1996; Ansell 2006). The vulnerable group earns too much to benefit from social assistance and clientelism. Yet they lack the economic security of the upscale electorate that allows the latter to purchase private services. The vulnerable have a stronger preference for investments in public services than do the poor in relation to targeted cash transfers. The demand for instantaneous cheap cash transfers among the vulnerable is lower than that of the poor due to a diminishing marginal utility of income. Finally, the high incomes of upscale voters mean that they are overqualified for being on the receiving end of clientelism, social assistance, or public services. The main redistributive objective of the upscale electorate is to pay as little as possible in taxes without risking social unrest. The upscale prefer targeted cash transfers to the poor electorate since they are cheaper than the public services investments demanded by the vulnerable.

But the upscale also want a labor force that is reasonably educated and healthy, which clientelist handouts do little to accomplish since they simply require political allegiance with the incumbent. Additionally, there is uncertainty surrounding the volume of redistribution when pro-poor redistribution is clientelist and secret, which is unappetizing to the tax-averse upscale electorate. In summary, CCTs allow upscale voters together with the poor to defeat costly proposals for public services investment. CCTs also have the potential to end poor dependency on government handouts since CCTs raise the productivity of the low-skill labor force. CCTs, finally, turn hidden clientelist exchanges into observable social assistance transactions with public budgets.

I argue that there is a greater probability of CCT adoption in situations in which clientelism is a greater concern for two reasons. First, the presence of clientelism and vote buying indicates that politicians are making an effort to win the support of

the poor population. These contingent exchanges send a signal to the upscale electorate that the poor are important constituents. For that reason, it should be expected that some form of pro-poor redistribution will occur in an effort to use material benefits to attract poor support. In a situation in which the poor were not part of the collection of voters with which politicians intend to win elections, we should expect no more than residual attempts at buying the electoral support of those with the lowest marginal utility of income during campaigns. The upscale electorate sees an opportunity to influence the level of redistribution and the productivity of the poor labor force by supporting CCTs. The second reason clientelism and vote buying should increase the likelihood of CCT adoption is that CCTs substitute human capital investments for promises of supporting the incumbent, and public budgets for secret exchanges. The human capital demand-side incentive inherent to CCTs helps to explain why the outcome is CCTs, specifically, and not some other type of social assistance such as unconditional cash transfers, social housing, or food stamps that do not require the poor to take actions to climb out of poverty and welfare dependency in return for material benefits.

Chapter 3 also explains why CCT appear to be so hard to use for clientelist purposes although CCTs may co-exist with vote buying efforts to capture last-minute support during campaigns. In summary, CCTs have clear eligibility criteria that allow bureaucrats and politicians little discretion in the selection of beneficiaries. An additive strategy of "CCTs + clientelism" makes little theoretical sense since CCTs raise the reservation price of potential vote sellers and thereby undermines clientelism. A higher reservation price implies that politicians can afford to purchase the support of fewer votes. Under a hard budget constraint, it is impossible for the incumbent to maintain the former level of clientelism after the adoption of CCT, *ceteris paribus*. I argue that it is unlikely that the *ceteris paribus* condition should be relaxed since raising the tax rate or reallocating public funds both come with consequences that should be unwelcome to an incumbent who seeks the support of a poor-upscale coalition of voters.

Finally, I present a theoretical resolution of the tension in the literature between free-from-clientelism CCTs in Mexico and Brazil and the continued use of vote buying in the lead-up to elections (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; Sugiyama and Hunter 2013; Zucco 2013). The ability of the incumbent to pursue clientelism should be expected to be severely undercut in the presence of difficult-to-manipulate CCTs assuming a hard budget constraint. But candidates who are under intense electoral competition may still attempt to use vote buying to secure last-minute support in the limited time frame of campaigns. Theoretically, it should be expected that such last-minute efforts primarily target poor voters who are not CCT beneficiaries.

The hypotheses are tested in Chapters 4-6 as described in the research design section. In Chapter 4, I show on the basis of data from a survey experiment in the lead-up to the 2016 elections in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, that upscale voters express higher levels of support for CCTs after clientelism has become an increasingly concerning issue. In addition, the redistributive preferences of upscale and poor voters in relation to CCTs largely converge when clientelism is a greater con-

cern. The randomized assignment of a treatment designed to induce clientelism concern warrants the conclusion that differences in support for CCTs between upscale voters in treatment and control groups can be attributed to the role of clientelism, in line with the expectations of the theory, and not any unobserved factors.

In Chapter 5, I use a longitudinal case study of the city of Rio de Janeiro from 1992 to 2012 to examine when politicians adopt CCTs and what happens to support in the upscale electorate after a politician has adopted a CCT. Analyses of survey data on support from mayoral candidates and election results indicate that politicians with clientelist reputations adopt CCTs when they need a coalition of upscale and poor voters to win elections. Politicians with clientelist reputations make inroads into the upscale electorate after they adopt CCTs. Since the analyses in Chapter 5 exclusively draw on observational data, the causal claims may be weaker than those of Chapter 4 given the possibility of unmeasured confounders that bias the results. The results from analyses of a rich collection of survey data going back to the first elections after the reinstallment of democracy as well as election results, disaggregated to the lowest possible level and mapped onto neighborhoods differentiated by the average income of households calculated on the basis of census data, do, however, clearly illustrate the hypothesized causal sequence of the theory. Unlike studies that exclusively rely on lab environments or large-*n* regression analyses, a case study enriches our understanding of the causal sequence and provides a sense for how the theory plays out on the ground when politicians with a clientelist reputation need to attract a cross-class coalition of voters. Unlike quantitative studies that lack clear descriptions of the causal sequence in any of the cases included in the regression models, the case study in Chapter 5 also shows that at least one case of the outcomes of interest (CCT adoption and support for clientelist politicians after CCT adoption) can be explained by the theory in a coherent and consistent manner.

Finally, I draw on a larger set of cases in Chapter 6 in an effort to test the generalizability of the theory. I here combine tests of the association between clientelism concern and support for redistribution, on the one hand, with test of the association between clientelism concern and CCT adoption, on the other. The tests on expressed support for redistribution were done across all Latin American and Caribbean nations in a year (2014) for which the nationally representative surveys included questions on the perceived volume of vote buying as well as support to decrease income inequality between rich and poor citizens. The cases for the analysis of CCT adoption include all Latin American and Caribbean nations in the 1991-2017 period (there are some exceptions due to missing data). Survey analyses of support for redistribution as well as time-series cross-section analyses of determinants of policy adoption provide evidence that is consistent with the expectations of the theory.

In summary, the broad analyses of redistributive attitudes and policy adoption in Chapter 6 help us to see to what extent the theory on average can explain the dramatic changes in the Latin American and Caribbean welfare state that have allowed a space for poor citizens in the last two decades. The results of both sets of analyses are consistent with the theory, and indicate that the theory is general enough to predict redistributive support and policy adoption across the continent in the eventful

time period for social policy that started in the late 1990s and continues to the present day.

I summarize the theory and the results of the empirical tests in the final chapter of the dissertation (Chapter 7). Overall, I find that the tests provide support for the theory. There was evidence for its attitudinal as well as its policy adoption hypotheses. The research design combined the strengths of randomized assignment of treatments for making causal claims; the ability of rich, detailed case studies to examine to what extent the hypothesized causal sequence plays out as expected in real-world cases of CCT adoption and efforts by politicians with a clientelist reputation to make inroads into the upscale electorate; and the capacity to test claims of generalizability through large-*n* regression analyses on redistributive support across most countries in the region in one year and close to all cases of CCT adoption in the LAC region in the last three decades.

In Chapter 7, I also discuss the contributions of the dissertation to the literature and to policymakers, and suggest future lines of inquiry. I conclude that the dissertation has helped shed light on why the secret practices of clientelism and vote buying counterintuitively can lead to the deepened, higher-quality democracy that is a consequence of granting the poor access to the welfare state. Understanding the adoption of CCTs is important since it represents a break with a long-standing tradition of excluding the poor from benefits that would have helped them counter adverse market forces (e.g. unemployment, inflation) as well as life events like illness or separation that reduce household income. The theory developed and tested in the dissertation illuminates to what extent different types of pro-poor redistribution can attract support beyond the beneficiary base.

The theory draws on lessons from the literature on redistribution in the advanced economies and the literature on clientelism, which is largely developing world-focused. Unlike extant theories of CCT adoption, I take seriously the lessons from the "Paradox of Redistribution" (Korpi and Palme 1998) and theories in the influential power resources tradition (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001) that point to the inability of social assistance to attract support from groups in the middle of the income distribution. The middle group is squeezed between the poor (who benefit from social assistance, e.g. CCTs) and the upscale (who have the least to gain from redistribution and seek to keep tax rates low).

In Latin America, liberal welfare states such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and other similar cases; the hardship of the middle group is pronounced since the upscale electorate have to a high degree opted out from public services in education and health care, and have little interest to invest in the high-quality services that are demanded by the middle and that would enable middle-sectors to move upwards in the income distribution. This provides an opportunity of a preference convergence for cheap cash transfers between upscale and poor voters, leaving the middle behind in faltering public schools and crowded public hospitals. Yet extant theories assume that the middle group (which I refer to as the vulnerable but that is called labor or the working class in parts of the literature) is neutral or even supportive in the face of public spending on CCTs for which the middle is unentitled. This pays insufficient attention to the precarious situation of the vulnerable.

Too little theoretical weight is placed on the distinct redistributive demands of those who are wedged in-between a poor class of citizens who are mainly concerned with day-to-day survival and an upscale group that has left the public sphere and relies on the market for its education and health care needs.

When we do consider the weak likelihood of gaining support from the vulnerable for social assistance, we are left with the possibility of either a coalition between upscale and poor voters (the theory presented in this dissertation) or the sufficiency of demands from the poor for CCTs. The latter seems unlikely if poor people in developing world democracies are similar to poor people in the advanced economies. Theory as well as evidence suggests that those at the bottom of the income distribution face immense difficulties in organizing themselves into a politically efficacious electorate. The poor lack the unions and affiliated social democratic parties of the working class, on the one hand, and the money and connections of the upscale electorate, on the other. These disadvantages relative to those higher up in the income distribution have been put forth as explanations for weak responsiveness to the preferences of the poor in redistributive politics (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012; Gilens 2012; Bartels 2008; Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012; Scruggs and Hayes 2017).

An important topic for future research is to what extent the electoral constituency for CCTs and social assistance more broadly would change if the poor population rose from absolute poverty. In such a situation, the overwhelming need to focus on day-to-day survival would subside. This would be a context with relative rather than absolute poverty. Climbing out from absolute poverty should increase the weight the group at the bottom of the income distribution places on investments in public services. High-quality public services should over time enable greater upward economic mobility (Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer 2014; Ferreira et al. 2013). The redistributive preferences of the bottom electorate should be expected to change in response to a more economically secure situation and a lower marginal utility of income, and afford the relatively poor the luxury, as it were, to attach greater weight to the future than when they were in a situation of absolute poverty. Supporting cheap, targeted pro-poor transfers should lose some of its attractiveness in a situation of relative poverty, and increase the likelihood of a poor-vulnerable coalition for higher spending on public services.

2

Chapter 2. Theories of conditional cash transfer adoption

Current theories of CCT adoption can be divided into two groups, focusing either on bottom-up forces in the form of democratic responsiveness to the demands of the poor and/or those at risk of poverty or top-down pressure from domestic or international experts.

Responsiveness to the excluded poor

The first type of explanation takes as its departure the context of exclusionary or truncated welfare states, which was somewhat alleviated by the introduction of CCTs as well as non-contributory pensions to the bottom of the income distribution. Social policy before the expansion of social assistance programs had low coverage of the poor (Holland 2013; Pontusson 2005) and welfare transfers were characterized by weak progressivity or even regressivity (Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006), giving rise to assessments that the Latin American welfare state had "traditionally failed to benefit the poor" (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009, 36). It was a type of welfare state that tied benefits to occupational group and contributions, which is a type of redistribution that "tends to reproduce social inequalities, not reduce them" (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993, 740; Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Huber and Stephens 2012). Given its reliance on formal occupational status and contributions, social policy in Latin America effectively excluded the numerous individuals who lacked employment or worked in the informal sector and only protected the relatively privileged segment of the population in the formal sector (Carnes and Mares 2014; Mares and Carnes 2009; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; Ferranti et al. 2004; Garay 2016; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Holland 2013; Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006; Pribble 2013; Stampini and Tornarolli 2012).

I present descriptive statistics to show the extent of exclusion in the region before CCTs were adopted. The extent of welfare state exclusion (and indirectly labor informality) can be estimated through statistics on the share of the labor force that contributes to social security systems. I use harmonized 1990-1995 data from the Inter-American Development Bank (2019) on total active workers contributing to social security (as a percentage of the economically active population, 15-64 years of age). As illustrated in Figure 1 below, far fewer than all workers contributed to

social security in the time period. At the regional level there was some variation in the percentage of social security contributors across the period.[15] On average, 42.6 percent of the economically active population contributed to social security 1990-1995, ranging from 36 percent in 1991 to 46 percent in 1992.[16]

Figure 1. Workers contributing to social security (percentage of the economically active population), 1990-95



Source: IDB/SIMS (Inter-American Development Bank 2019) database. Variable "Formal sector (1): Total active workers contributing to social security (as a % of the economically active population)". The sample consists of 32 observations across nine countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay).

A similar picture emerges by examining the extent of access to contributory pensions 1990-95. Here, I use the IDB's variable on reported access to contributory pensions from nationally representative surveys (Inter-American Development Bank 2019). The yearly averages for the region as well as country-year averages are illustrated in Figure 2 below.[17] The average percentage who reported receiving contributory pensions for the five-year period preceding CCT adoptions was 44 percent.

[15] This is the unweighted average for 32 observations in the nine LAC countries for which there was available data (Inter-American Development Bank 2019).

[16] Of the country-year observations, the highest (lowest) percentage was 65.7 (6.4) percent and was observed in Costa Rica in 1993 (Uruguay in 1990).

[17] The sample consists of 47 country-year observations from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

Whether we use contribution rates or reported access to pensions, then, social security systems served less than half of the LAC labor force in the pre-CCT period.

Figure 2. Reported access to contributory pensions (percentage of the old-age population), 1990-95

Source: IDB/SIMS (Inter-American Development Bank 2019) database. Variable "Formal sector (1): Total active workers contributing to social security (as a % of the ec. Variable "Population aged 65 and over who declare receiving contributory pension benefits (%)"

It is against this backdrop of widespread informal sector exclusion and economic precariousness for those lacking access to the welfare state that scholars place their arguments about why countries in the region have adopted CCTs. My theory is consistent with those who point to the failure of earlier social policy in alleviating poverty and the demand among newly enfranchised poor voters for accessing the welfare state although I argue that CCTs do not only respond to the redistributive demands of the poor but also to those of upscale voters.

According to Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016), rising poverty rates in tandem with democratization compelled the Mexican government to expand and reform social assistance systems. Early efforts at reducing poverty through the transfer of funds to poor communities (*Programa Nacional de Solidaridad*, *Pronasol*, 1989-1994) in order to reduce poverty were marred by political manipulation in the allocation of benefits that were in "line with the electoral needs of the ruling party" rather than needs of the population, and led to uprisings such as the Zapatista rebellion in late 1994 (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, 4). The *Pronasol* was

adopted by president Carlos Salinas de Gortari of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) and abandoned at the end of his presidential term. In 1997, the first CCT was adopted in Mexico (second only in the region to the Brazilian PETI of the preceding year). Unlike the politically manipulated *Pronasol*, *Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación* (*Progresa*) effectively delivered cash transfers to poor households on the basis of need in exchange for investments in health and education and is "widely touted as one of the most successful poverty relief programs in the world" (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, 4).

In the argument of Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016), the adoption of *Progresa* (succeeded by *Oportunidades* in 2001 and *Prospera* in 2014) responded to demands from the poor for effective poverty reduction. The threat of growing "social unrest among the poor" paved the way for CCTs (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, 13). In other words, demands from the poor are framed as the reason for why CCTs were adopted in Mexico. The authors also find that CCTs appear to have successfully won the support of the poor, who "handsomely rewarded incumbents that were credited with establishing or expanding CCT programs" (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, 20; electoral rewards from the lower segments have also been found for Bolsa Família, see Zucco 2008, 2013; Hunter and Power 2007).

In summary, the poor became more important to politicians as Mexico began to transition from a dominant party system to a more competitive party system in the late 1980s (culminating with the loss of the long-hegemonic PRI in the 2000 presidential elections, see Greene (2007); Magaloni (2006)). According to Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016, 183), democratization resulted in increased responsiveness to the demands of the poor as manifest by "effective social policies" rather than intensified vote buying efforts. This argument is similar to that of De La O (2015). While the main outcome of interest is the stringency and potential for political manipulation of social policy rather than CCT adoption *per se*, De La O (2015, 62) argues that the decision to adopt "any type of CCT" is driven by economic crises that resulted in rising poverty rates and heightened attention to the insufficiency of *status quo* antipoverty strategies, which excluded the informal sector from the welfare state while targeting some poor voters with clientelist benefits. In similarity to Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016), De La O (2015) argues that the insufficiency of antipoverty efforts led to social tensions that "in many countries in the region" manifested themselves as protests, strikes, and even armed rebellion (De La O 2015, 46).

Weaknesses of arguments based on demands from the poor (1): the underutilization of CCTs

While the arguments reviewed above rightfully emphasize the precariousness of the poor (and the numerous other individuals who work in the informal sector) who were excluded from the welfare state, I argue that there are two weaknesses to theories based on responsiveness to redistributive demands from the poor. First, these theories cannot readily explain why so few of the poor benefit from CCTs if the

rationale of such programs is to win the poor vote. If the poor were the only constituency for CCTs, it should be expected that politicians maximize the electoral utility of these programs by including the entirety or at least close to the entirety of the poor population.

As I show in Figure 3 below, CCTs cannot benefit the entire poor population since its coverage rates are on average below the moderate and in the vast majority of cases also the extreme poverty rate when we consider aggregate, regional averages by year. These calculations are based on the household coverage data made available by CEPAL or through official government data, including 229 program-year observations. CCT coverage is calculated as the unweighted average coverage rate of households by CCT programs in a given year.[18] The country-level moderate and extreme poverty headcounts are provided by the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank 2019) on the basis of national surveys.[19]

[18] The available coverage data at the program-year level is listed in Appendix 4. When estimates of the percentage of the population who lives in a beneficiary household were unavailable, I used the number of beneficiary households as a percentage of the total number of households. Data is available for at least one year for 32 (70 percent) of the 46 CCTs. The CCTs for which there is missing household coverage information for the entire program period are: Brazil's Bolsa Verde and Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil. Ecuador's Beca Escolar. Honduras's PRAF III. Dominican Republic's Programa Solidaridad. Ecuador's Desnutrición Cero. Guatemala's Mi Familia Progresa. Guyana's Public Assistance Programme. Haiti's Ti Manman Cheri. Jamaica's Programme of Advancement Through Health and Education (PATH). Panama's Bonos Familiares para la Compra de Alimentos. Trinidad and Tobago's Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Program (TCCTP), and Uruguay's Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES).

[19] The data has been harmonized by the IDB to enable cross-country comparisons.

Figure 3. CCT coverage and the size of the poor population



Source: CCT coverage from CEPAL (2019b) and author's calculations based on the literature and official government data. Poverty headcounts based on IDB/SIMS (Inter-American Development Bank 2019).

As the dashed black line in Figure 3 indicates, moderate poverty ranged from 32.2 percent to 41.6 percent during the 1990-95 time period in the region (calculated as the unweighted average of country-level moderate poverty headcounts by year).[20] The average moderate poverty headcount in the five years preceding the first national CCT adoption was for the region 37.1 percent.[21] After 1995, when CCTs had started to spread across the region, moderate poverty at the aggregate regional level

[20] The sample size for the moderate poverty headcount is 358 observations from 20 countries during the 28-year period from 1990-2017. I exclude Ecuador due to seemingly extreme values, ranging from .13 percent to 1.3 percent in the IDB/SIMS database while the World Bank's PovcalNet (The Development Research Group of the World Bank 2019) reports a moderate poverty headcount of 59.17 percent in 1990. The moderate poverty threshold used by the IDB is slightly below the World Bank/PovcalNet poverty line at $5 per day (2011 PPP). When Ecuador is included, the 1990-95 average is 33.4 percent. The variable "Indicador de pobreza (USD 5, 2011PPP, en %)" measures the head-count index (or poverty rate) for a household per capita income poverty line of 5 USD per day at purchasing power parity (PPP) 2011 (Inter-American Development Bank 2019).

[21] According to regional-level estimates from PovcalNet (The Development Research Group of the World Bank 2019), the poor population below $5.5 per day (2011 PPP) made up close to half the LAC population in the first half of the 1990s (49.3 percent in 1990 and 49.1 percent in 1993). In the 1980s, poverty rates according to PovcalNet similarly hovered around half the population: 46.7 percent in 1981, 51.3 percent in 1984, and 47 percent in 1987 (The Development Research Group of the World Bank 2019). Since I am interested in country-level decisions to adopt CCTs, however, country-level estimates of poverty are more relevant than estimations based on the entire population in the region.

was on average 36.8 percent 1996-1999, 37.7 percent 2000-2009, and 30.7 percent 2011-2015. The extremely poor population in the 1990-95 period was on average 22.3 percent, ranging from 18.4 percent in 1994 to 26.8 percent in 1990.[22] As before, I calculate the average extreme poverty rate as the unweighted average of country-level extreme poverty headcounts by year since the quantity of interest is average country-level poverty and not poverty in the regional population.

The solid line in Figure 3 above indicates that average CCT coverage was in all years but one below the size of the extremely poor (and by extension the moderately poor) population. Only in 2013 does the average CCT coverage (15.4 percent) surpass the average size of the extremely poor population (15.1 percent). The main point illustrated in Figure 3 is that average CCT coverage rates are below the moderate as well as the extreme poverty rate. On average, CCTs had a coverage rate of 13 percent (calculated as the unweighted average across all program-years).[23] The average coverage rate by year is illustrated in Figure 4 below, as well as program-year observations.[24]

[22] There are 53 observations from 15 countries for the 1990-95 period.

[23] If we include Chile's Solidario 2013-2017, the average would be even lower. We do not include it since Subsistema de Seguridades y Oportunidades (o Ingreso Etico Familiar - IEF) started in 2012, after which Solidario's enrollment reduced from 10-13 percent 2009-12 to under 0.1-2 percent 2013-17 (CEPAL 2018).

[24] CCT coverage is also below 50 percent of the population+1 at the national level. In terms of observed program coverage, then, claims that "[m]eans-tested programs in the developing world are not tailored to the needs of minorities; on the contrary, they are tailored to majorities" (De La O 2015, 136) seem overstated. The CCT coverage that comes closest to encompassing more than half of the population is Ecuador's *Bono de Desarollo Humano* in 2009, when the coverage rate was 40.5 percent of the population (calculated as the percentage of the population who lives in a beneficiary household (CEPAL 2019b).

Figure 4. CCT coverage, 1997-2017



Source: CEPAL (2019b) and author's calculations based on national government data.

I also calculate the difference between CCT coverage and poverty rates by program and year. For the 187 program-year observations for which I have data on CCT coverage as well as poverty rates, CCT coverage was on average 20 percentage points smaller than the size of the moderately poor population. As an example, the BFP in Brazil had a coverage rate of 21 percent in 2005 while the moderately poor population represented 39 percent of the population. This coverage rate implies that nearly half of the poor population was left out of the new social policy and did not benefit directly from the *Bolsa Família*, which in 2003 had consolidated CCTs that were adopted under the center-right Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) government, and which was the flagship innovation of the center-left first-term Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) government. If the Lula government had intended to seek re-election with the poor as its core constituency, why was BFP coverage so low compared to the potential pool of beneficiaries and PT supporters?

The difference is of course smaller if we only consider the extremely poor population. The CCT shortfall here is on average six percentage points. An example of a CCT with a close-to-average shortfall in coverage is Argentina's *Familias por la Inclusión Social* in 2006 when the coverage rate was four percent and the extreme poverty rate was eight percent. In terms of the extremely poor population, then, CCT coverage is on average not very far from the target population. But this still leaves open the question of why such a small portion of the moderately poor were granted access to the welfare state through CCTs. If politicians were interested in making

inroads into the poor electorate who were excluded from the social security system, why did they focus their efforts on the small subpopulation of extremely poor voters rather than maximize the electoral gain from CCTs by scaling-up program coverage to include the moderately poor?

The low coverage rate that in most years do not even cover the extremely poor population is consistent with the notion that CCTs do not only seek to attract the support of the poor population. If the programs were truly catering *exclusively* to the demands of the poor, we should expect that CCTs cover most of the poor to maximize electoral gain in this constituency. If, however, CCTs *additionally* respond to the redistributive preferences of the upscale electorate, suppressed program coverage is consistent with upscale preferences for low redistribution. The upscale-poor coalition argument readily explains why CCT coverage is artificially low.

Weaknesses of arguments based on demands from the poor (2): the low political efficacy of the poor electorate

Second, CCT explanations that center on responsiveness to the demands of the poor need to contend with why the poor in Latin America appear to have relatively high efficacy compared to their peers in the advanced economies who are typically viewed as an aggregate of politically disengaged and unorganized citizens. Unlike well-organized formal sector workers who can coordinate and effectuate their political demands through resource-rich unions, the poor are viewed as "politically residual" (Esping-Andersen 1990, 33) and "typically the least politically engaged and efficacious segment of the citizenry" (Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012, 387; see also Scruggs and Hayes 2017; Gilens 2012; Bartels 2008). Notably, the bottom stratum of the population is not even included as an actor with influence over the emergence of distinct welfare states in Huber and Stephens (2001, 18) since they are not believed to possess the necessary "organization and power." Similarly, Rueda (2005, 62) argues that the informal outsider group "tends to be less politically active and electorally relevant […] than insiders".

While no theory from the literature on the advanced economies to the best of our knowledge directly concerns the determinants of liberal welfare states in which means-tested social assistance dominates; the absence of coalitions between the lower middle and working class segments appears to predict the formation of liberal welfare states rather than the more investigated highly redistributive universal welfare states with generous transfers on a citizenship basis as well as high-quality public services or the less redistributive conservative welfare state. The red-green coalition of urban workers and capital-intensive farmer households were crucial for the development of universal welfare states before World War II, after which rising incomes led to a new middle class that substituted for the farmers in the role as the decisive voter (Esping-Andersen 1990). Similarly, Huber and Stephens (2001) credit the universal welfare state in the Nordic countries to the power resources of the mobilized working class, whose demands were translated into policy by social democratic parties by way of allying with the farmers and, later, with the lower middle classes. The result, generally speaking, was a welfare state that combined "universalistic, flat-rate, tax-financed, and employment-based, income-related, contribution-

financed programs" while countries with Christian Democratic parties (relying on cross-class alliances within the party base) in power developed welfare states in which the latter type of policies dominated (Huber and Stephens 2001, 312). Where there were no such alliances between the working class and the middle class and the political landscape was characterized by "a laissez-faire-inspired bourgeoisie" (Esping-Andersen 1990, 110), the resulting welfare state was of the considerably less redistributive liberal variety as in the US, the UK, and Ireland (Huber and Stephens 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990).

This is suggestive of an ends-against-the-middle coalition of upscale and poor voters in liberal welfare states where the former face a smaller tax burden in exchange for marginal, relatively cheap social assistance programs for the most vulnerable. Even though the poor are more numerous in Latin America than in the advanced economies and may possess more political clout for this reason, it is easy to see that the incentives for tax-averse upscale voters to support a limited liberal welfare state are the same in Latin American as in the US or the UK. It may accordingly be expected that the poor in Latin America were not the only constituency for CCTs but were joined by the tax-averse upscale electorate. Nonetheless, it is clear that the LAC poor in terms of their relative size are far from residual actors, potentially outweighing the "disproportionate weight" (Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012, 404) of a more politically efficacious upscale electorate. But if sheer size were what made the Latin American poor so consequential for social policy after the third wave of democratization with support from no other groups in the electorate — in contrast to theories of redistributive outcome in the advanced economies — we would have expected the nations with the largest poor populations to be more likely to adopt CCTs.

When I examine the cases in which the poor made up a majority of the population, there is a lag of around ten years between the observation of a majority-poor population and CCT adoption. Using the IDB's (Inter-American Development Bank 2019) data on the at least moderately poor (using the moderate poverty line of course also means including the extremely poor) again, I find that the relative size of the moderately poor population in the first half of the 1990s ranged from 8.1 percent (Uruguay in 1992) to 80.2 percent (Honduras in 1990). The moderately poor made up a majority in nine cases (representing 17 percent of the 53 country-year observations 1990-95 for which we have data): Bolivia 1991-93, Colombia 1992, Honduras 1990, 1992, 1994-95, and Nicaragua in 1993. These countries eventually adopted CCTs. Honduras adopted the PRAF II in 1998; at least eight years after the moderately poor made up the majority. Since I only examine poverty from 1990, it is possible that the poor were a majority earlier, too, so the eight years estimate is if anything biased against the proposition that the poor by themselves demanded CCTs. Nicaragua adopted the *Red de Protección Social* in 2000; at least seven years after its population was majority-poor. In the Bolivian case, it was not until 2009 that the *Bono Madre Niña-Niño Juana Azurduy* CCT was adopted. Even I had counted the untargeted cash transfer *Bono Juancito Pinto* for all public school children (regardless of household income), adopted in 2006, 15 years passed between the observation of a majority-poor population and CCT adoption. Finally, Colombia adopted the

Más Familias en Acción program in 2001. Almost a decade passed between the point at which the poor made up a majority of the Colombian population and the point as which the government adopted a CCT for the poor.

By itself, a majority-poor population has no obvious relationship to whether the government will expand pro-poor redistribution through a CCT. This should be unsurprising since it is easy to see how the poor may at little cost use their electoral weight to simply vote in favor of CCTs when such issue proposals differentiate candidates. But before CCTs were part of party or candidate platforms, it would have taken immense effort on behalf of the poor to organize to influence parties or candidates to campaign on such an issue when the poor for so long had been a neglected and excluded part of the citizenry. The poor lack the capacities to influence parties held by the upscale who can use their money to make donations (Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012; Scruggs and Hayes 2017) as well as formal sector workers who can coordinate and deliver coherent, unified demands through their unions (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001).

The demands of the poor are politically neutral

Another line of inquiry is based on the support or neutrality of non-beneficiaries (Garay 2016; Holland and Schneider 2017). This is similar to the arguments based on responsiveness to the poor of Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) and De La O (2015) in that it takes as its departure the large excluded informal poor population whose importance grew to politicians as the region democratized. It is different in that formal labor is argued to in some situations support CCTs and other non-contributory programs even though they do not benefit (Garay 2016) or in that CCTs are argued to constitute an additional, low-cost layer to extant welfare states that do not meet with resistance from non-beneficiaries (Holland and Schneider 2017).

Garay (2016) argues that the rise of the "outsider" informal population that lacked access to contributory schemes can help to explain the expansion of non-contributory benefits and health care universality in the region. The implementation of CCTs, health care universality, and non-contributory pensions in the 1990s and 2000s occurred to win the votes of outsiders in presidential elections (Garay 2016, 18). Working-class insiders only oppose outsider benefits like CCTs when governments finance them by taking benefits from insiders. The absence of such direct substitutions enables governments to extend their welfare states downward to include the poor. According to Garay (2016), labor therefore either forms a coalition with the beneficiary group in support of CCTs — explaining cash transfer adoption in Argentina and Brazil in the early 2000s — or is neutral — explaining CCT adoption in Mexico and Chile in the same time period. Garay argues that her qualitative analysis of the labor union *Central de Trabajadores de Argentina* and social movements demonstrates an alliance beginning in 1998 between these groups. Part of the evidence in the case study, however, demonstrates labor resistance to an expansion

of pro-poor welfare programs. For example, labor and organizations of the unemployed protested a 2001 reform proposal that would have shifted benefits in an extant system of family allowances toward poor families. Garay (2016, 180) explains the diverging preferences of labor and the poor in this instance as the result of an *explicit* substitution of outsider for insider benefits. The assumption is then that non-beneficiaries see no opportunity cost to a new social program so long as CCTs are not explicitly financed by diverting resources from extant social policy.

Holland and Schneider (2017) similarly view CCTs and non-contributory insurance as complementary policies that allow for broad welfare coalitions beyond the base of beneficiaries. Democratization made it more important to attract the support of the poor. Non-beneficiaries of CCTs are neutral since CCTs according to Holland and Schneider (2017, 990) add "new social policies on top of the old" rather than constitute a reform of the welfare state. Viewed in this light, CCTs have no losers (since non-beneficiaries perceive no notable opportunity cost) but only winners (the poor population who were granted access to the welfare state after decades of exclusion). The factor that changed was in this argument not that parts of the non-poor electorate became more supportive of CCTs but rather that democratization made it more electorally important for politicians to listen to the redistributive demands of the poor. As long as they do not directly substitute for other social policy, the logic is that voters outside the beneficiary base are supportive or at least neutral in the face of CCT expansion (Garay 2016; Holland and Schneider 2017).

But in the advanced economies, means-tested social-assistance programs are thought to split the support of the poor and the working class, with the latter opposing social policy that bypasses them and only benefits the worst-off in society. CCT-like social assistance programs beause of their ungenerosity and narrow beneficiary groups rarely gain the support of organized labor (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). As Korpi and Palme (1998, 663; see also Korpi 1980) argue, "[b]ecause marginal types of social policy programs are directed primarily at those below the poverty line, there is no rational base for a coalition between those above and those below the poverty line. In effect, the poverty line splits the working class and tends to generate coalitions between better-off workers and the middle class against the lower sections of the working class, something which can result in tax revolts and backlash against the welfare state." Means-tested social assistance benefits are typically ungenerous with little redistributive power compared to flat-rate, proportional-tax financed universal benefits (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2001) and promote stratified societies, which made them "a chief target of labor-movement attacks" (Esping-Andersen 1990, 24). To the extent, then, that the experiences of the advanced economies — in which "means-tested poor relief […] has always been violently opposed by labor" (Esping-Andersen 1990, 126) — are applicable to Latin America, there may be reason to be skeptical of claims of a poor-working class alliance.

There are other influential scholarly works on social policy reforms in Latin America in the last few decades that I discuss below even though the outcome of interest is not CCT adoption *per se*. These theories are, however, similar to those of Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) and De La O (2015), as well as Garay

(2016) and Holland and Schneider (2017). Carnes and Mares (2014) argue that the implementation of non-contributory pensions in many Latin American countries beginning in the mid-1990s was a consequence of a reduction in the number of formal sector workers and rising job insecurity. The changing demands for social insurance in an increasingly informal, transient, and economically insecure labor force compelled governments to introduce non-contributory insurance schemes that were financed through the general revenue rather than employer or employee contributions (Carnes and Mares 2014). However, at least one of the cases in the analysis (the Brazilian pension *Benefício de Prestação Continuada*, regulated by the social assistance law (*Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social (LOAS*)) is intended for the poor among the informal old or disabled population whose family *per capita* income is less than one-quarter of a minimum wage (Tribunal de Contas da União 2009), which means that rising informality seems unable to explain this non-contributory program that only benefits the poor in the informal sector while informality runs throughout the entire income distribution in Latin America.

The cross-cutting character of informality can be illustrated using the same variable as before from the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank 2019) on the share of the labor force that contributes to social security systems but this time by labor income quintile in the pre-CCT period, 1990-95. As Figure 5 below illustrates, the largest relative size of social security contributors was found in the highest income quintile. At no point in the period do the lines by income quintile intersect, illustrating the close connection between income and social security contribution status. But the values, which all fall far below the 100 percent that would indicate full inclusion of the economically active population in social security systems, also show that insider-outsider status divided each income class 1990-95. The average in the time period for the top quintile is 53.1 percent. In descending order, the average for the remaining four quintiles is 47 percent, 40.8 percent, 35.5 percent, and 24.3 percent.

These data indicate that social security contributions were made by on average less than half of the economically active population in the region 1990-1995 (except for the highest income quintile) and that social security contributions increased with income.[25] While it is the case that a larger proportion of workers in the bottom quintile were excluded from contributory benefits than in any of the higher income quintiles, the truncation of the welfare state affects all income groups. CCTs, in contrast, only increase access to the welfare state for the poor. To the extent that non-contributory pensions are means-tested and intended for the most vulnerable in the informal sector, then, explanations based on rising informality rates and risk of falling into informality have to contend with the cross-cutting character of informality in the Latin American labor force.

[25] Plots of country-year observations by income quintile can be found in Appendix 3, Figure 23-Figure 25.

Figure 5. Social security contributors by labor income quintile (percentage of the economically active population)



Source: IDB/SIMS. Variable: "Formal sector (1): Total active workers contributing to social security (as a % of the economically active population)", disaggregated by labor income quintile. The sample consists of 32 observations per labor income quintile across nine countries 1990-95.

Top-down pressure and policy diffusion

Another line of reasoning concerns top-down pressure from IFIs and policy diffusion. These arguments are clearly different from the previously discussed domestic bottom-up arguments about demands from the poor in that the electoral utility is not considered a factor in the decision to adopt CCTs. In a study of international CCT diffusion determinants in Latin America, Sugiyama (2011) argues that neighboring countries learned from each other and policy experts developed norms of appropriate ways of combating poverty while IFIs such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank promoted the adoption and expansion of CCTs through financing. Sugiyama (2011, 264) suggests that "financial support for CCTs at least reinforced domestic decision-making processes, and provided the necessary resources to carry them out." Others who claim that IFIs rather than domestic politics drove CCT adoption include Nelson and Sandberg (2017, 26) who

state that "international organizations realized they had to address social problems in order to maintain their legitimacy and avoid social unrest" after the economic crises of the 1980s.

While Brooks (2015) partly points to domestic conditions that promote CCT adoption, namely a "deepening of democracy" (Brooks 2015, 561), implying more responsiveness to the poor in similarity to previously discussed theories (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; De La O 2015; Garay 2016; Holland and Schneider 2017), she also argues that there are international neighborhood effects that help explain "[s]triking spatial and temporal correlations" between CCTs in a given region (Brooks 2015, 551). According to Brooks (2015), IFIs helped spread the CCT model of social assistance across the world. Hall (2007), too, emphasizes that there are international as well as domestic conditions that made CCTs so prevalent. CCTs appeal to IFI lenders as well as country-borrower since they provide well-targeted benefits to the poor population while incentivizing investments in human capital, and "enable ruling parties to strengthen their political support at the ballot box" (Hall 2007, 159).

While IFI and diffusion arguments rightfully point to the learning process and availability of international institution financing that in time are likely to have lowered the threshold for adopting CCTs, it is sovereign governments that ultimately decide whether to reform social policy and by extension change the fabric of redistribution. International financing and diffusion arguments have provided important understanding of how thresholds for CCT adoption may have been lowered through IFI loan provision and lessons-learned mechanisms but they disregard the motivation of national governments to adopt CCTs in the first place. Since it is difficult to quantitatively test to what extent IFIs convinced governments to adopt CCTs, I undertook analyses of primary documents from the World Bank in the years surrounding the first CCTs in Brazil (the first in the region and to the best of our knowledge the first in the world) and statements from policymakers to search for evidence that CCTs were exogenous innovations.

Qualitative evidence provide little support for any foundational role of the World Bank in the early days of CCT adoption. The Brazilian researcher Ana Fonseca was a key architect of a CCT in the city of São Paolo (adopted in 2001) and later a minister in Lula's government at which point she helped to launch the *Bolsa Família* program in 2003. Fonseca has vigorously refuted the notion that the World Bank was behind the design or the decision to adopt the *Bolsa Família,* which unified several smaller CCTs in Brazil.[26] According to Fonseca (2014), the *Bolsa Família* was already being drafted during Lula's candidacy for president in 2002 and was inspired by the pioneering Brazilian CCTs. These were the municipal CCTs in Campinas and Ribeirão Preto in the state of São Paulo, the *Bolsa Escola* in the federal district of Brasília, the CCTs in the capital city of São Paolo and the state government of São Paolo, and the federal CCT *Bolsa Escola* under the Cardoso government (Fonseca 2014; Leite, Oliveira, and Mafra 2016). Likewise, Pero and Szer-

[26] In the words of Fonseca, "Participei do processo que deu origem ao programa Bolsa-Família e sempre me surpreende ler e ouvir referencia a pessoas e instituições que são apresentadas como protagonistas de um processo do qual não participaram." (Fonseca 2014)

man (2010) argue that far from being international products pushed upon sovereign nations; the Brazilian subnational as well as small federal CCTs adopted by the Cardoso administration opened the eyes of international experts in the World Bank to the value of CCTs in poverty fighting efforts. Stampini and Tornarolli (2012, 2) similarly stress that CCTs were "an endogenous Latin American innovation."

I also analyzed primary documents from the World Bank in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These similarly give little support to the notion that there was external pressure from international institutions and lenders to adopt CCTs. In fact, at this point in time, the Brazilian programs were not even referred to as CCTs but rather by reference to their names in Portuguese, specifically "the Bolsa Escola programs" and the *Bolsa Escola* in the federal district of Brasília, described as "a minimum income program focused on education" (World Bank 2001a, 80). A World Bank report later in 2001 similarly notes the recent wave of minimum income programs and school grant programs, again using their Portuguese names (the "rapidly expanding *Programa de Garantia de Renda Minima ('Bolsa Escola')*") (World Bank 2001a, 47). The report makes no reference to CCTs being in accordance with advice given by the Bank to adopt such programs but rather notes the deep endogenous roots of non-contributory social assistance: "since the early 1970's, minimum income programs have been proposed as a poverty alleviation tool in Brazil" (World Bank 2001b, 1). Nor does the World Bank seem fully convinced of the effectiveness of CCTs. Although the report states that "[t]hese programs have been assessed by the Bank and other organizations and found to provide effective incentives for school attendance and effectively reduce income poverty" (World Bank 2001a, 89), it is also noted that "[r]igorous evaluation results with respect to the educational impact of these programs, however, are still lacking" (World Bank 2001a, 47). The lack of references to prior Bank advice to adopt these programs, the use of their Portuguese name rather than the general term "conditional cash transfers", and the comment that evaluations of the educational impact are insufficient suggest that early CCTs in Brazil were exogenous to the World Bank even though loans later may have helped to expand the *Bolsa Família* program.

The involvement of the international institutions was more explicitly rejected in a World Bank report from 2000 (Sedlacek, Ilahi, and Gustafsson-Wright 2000, 10), stating that

> The existing programs are the outcome of a vibrant political and technical debate that took place in Mexico and Brazil during the 1990s. These programs count on the broad based political and technical support within the countries and are part of an emerging consensus in these countries on the need to prioritize support for poverty alleviation programs. As proof of this consensus all these programs have been financed entirely through local budget allocations (i.e. without foreign aid or donations) and the international financial institutions have been involved in only a supporting role.

In a World Bank report the following year, the authors present the Brazilian local CCTs as the precursors of the CCT wave that would be found across Latin America, including Mexico's *Progresa* that was described as "a variant of the Bolsa Escola Program" (World Bank 2001b, 7). Another lengthy quote serves to illustrate how explicitly the World Bank described these programs as innovations first adopted in

Brazil, and then adopted in other early adopters in the region, including Mexico's *Progresa*, Ecuador's *Beca Escolar*, and Honduras's PRAD-BID II.

> This program [the Campinas CCT] and subsequent ones in Brasilia, D. F. and other cities, as well as the Federal Program for the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) have become models for the rest of Latin America. Mexico replaced its untargeted tortilla subsidy with Progresa, a variant of the Bolsa Escola Program with the objective of providing poverty-targeted social assistance. Honduras has installed the Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF-BIDII). Similarly, Ecuador's Beca Escolar is considering programs closely modeled along the same lines and Nicaragua is on the verge of installing its own demand-side intervention in education, health, and nutrition (World Bank 2001b, 7).

Similarly, President Ernesto Zedillo (PRI) chose to not seek World Bank funding for *Progresa*, which has been interpreted as an effort to shield the program from accusations that it was a social policy mandaded by the World Bank rather than a "domestic initiative" (Sugiyama 2011, 254; Dion 2010). *Oportunidades*, which was the name of the re-vamped program created by the incoming center-right president Vicente Fox of the PAN after the PRI loss in the 2000 elections, however, appears to have received IDB loans for expanding the program (Teichman 2007). Loans from the World Bank and the IDB have similarly been used to bankroll expansions of the *Bolsa Família* program (Sugiyama 2011; Hall 2008) but not the adoption of the first iteration of *Bolsa Família*, which unified and expanded smaller CCTs in 2003 (Fonseca 2014). Teichman (2007, 568) similarly finds that World Bank involvement can explain little of the decision to adopt *Solidario* in Chile although she argues that the IFI later in the process threw its weight behind the program, which may have helped to consolidate the program. Similarly, UNICEF in 1996 awarded the *Bolsa Escola* in Brasília, adopted by PT governor Cristovam Buarque, with the "Children and Peace Prize." UNICEF and international agencies such as the UNESCO have also financed evaluations of the program, which spread information about the program outside of Brazil. Neither UNESCO nor the World Bank, however, financed the early *Bolsa Escola* programs (Sugiyama 2012, 91).

In some of the poorer countries in the region, IFIs appear to received financial and technical support from IFIs from the beginning. In Honduras, which in 2015 was the second poorest and most unequal LAC country, "[p]overty reduction programs have been continuously supported by the IDB" (Azuara Herrera, Maciel, and Tetreault 2015, 14). In Guatemala, in which over half of the population lives in poverty according to government data, the IDB supported the *Mi Familia Progresa* from its year of adoption in 2008 (Azuara Herrera, Maciel, and Tetreault 2015, 17). While only a systematic assessment of country characteristics, programs, and IFI support can tell to what extent IFIs have been involved in the decision to adopt CCTs rather than offer financial and technical support to countries that already had the motivation to reform its social policy, the reviewed evidence suggests that higher-income countries such as Mexico and Brazil independently launched CCTs that in time came to receive support from IFIs while more impoverished countries like Honduras and Guatemala had IDB support at earlier stages, too.

While there is little to suggest, then, that CCT adoption in the region resulted from IFI or international development community pressure with the possible exception for some of the more impoverished countries, it is possible, perhaps even likely given its role as a lender, that IFIs may later have tried to influence the evolution of these programs. For example, a 2001 World Bank report provides advice for improving the programs, suggesting for example that "A design-related issue that requires attention is the need to reach the 'non-covered' population" (World Bank 2001b, ii), i.e. to improve the take-up rate of benefits among the poor, eligible population. Advice from expert IFIs on improving poverty alleviation efforts is different from convincing a national government to adopt a specific form of social policy. While I do not deny the importance of loan access or learning from successful antipoverty strategies in the regional neighborhood (Sugiyama 2011; Brooks 2015), I maintain that the motivation for CCT adoption was found in domestic, electoral politics.

Finally, a word on ideology is in order since it is key in theories of redistribution in the power resources tradition in the advanced economies. But the specific case of CCT adoption appears to have little relationship to ideology in international studies of CCT adoption (De La O 2015; Brooks 2015; Sugiyama 2011). Brooks (2015, 553) suggest that we might expect politicians to the left and right alike to adopt CCTs because while these programs are " progressive and redistributive in nature and thus appeal to the partisan left", they also include behavioral contingencies that "appeal to conservative politicians who resist handing out cash to the poor without strings attached." The possible exception to the insignificance of ideology is Huber and Stephens (2012). While Huber and Stephens (2012) do not specifically examine determinants of CCT adoption, they find that cumulative, long-term left political strength and democracy (over 20 years) have been key for reducing poverty and inequality in Latin America.

Subnational analyses of Brazilian CCTs (Sugiyama 2012), however, find leftist executives to be more likely to adopt CCTs. Sugiyama's (2012) explanation for subnational CCT adoption in Brazil argues against electoral calculi and focuses instead on the value systems of leftist politicians and bureaucrats, and peer recognition among these actors. Sugiyama (2012, 157) finds that leftist incumbents are more likely to adopt CCTs since "[l]eftist ideology mattered not only to mayors, but also to technocrats and political appointees, such as secretaries of education and health." According to Sugiyama, "there was a surprising absence of electoral engineering between the program and political campaigning" in the cities that adopted a CCT similar to Brasília's *Bolsa Escola* (Sugiyama 2012, 101). Using an observation drawn from ten case studies across Brazilian cities and the federal district of Brasília, Sugiyama describes how Brasília's PT governor Cristovam Buarque is said to have "told beneficiaries of programs like Bolsa Escola that they did not owe him their votes and should feel free to vote for whomever they wished" (Sugiyama 2012, 103). Sugiyama (2012, 103–4) understands Buarque's efforts as an example of "nonstrategic decision making [that] confirm the hypothesis that some politicians are indeed driven by their own deeply held values and will make decisions that go against their own electoral self-interest." In other words, ideology and peer learning

rather than electoral considerations drove CCT adoption in Brazilian municipalities according to Sugiyama (2012).

Since it was Brazilian CCTs that started the CCT wave in Latin America, the reasons for their adoption should be expected to be same inside and outside of Brazil. While something analogous to peer learning have been identified in the international studies of international expert and neighborhood effects on CCT adoption discussed above, left-right placement has received little support and it is unclear to what extent Sugiyama's (2012) findings can be generalized to other cases.

Conclusion

This chapter has served to examine explanations for CCT adoption in the current literature. I have argued that these explanations have paid insufficient attention to the undercoverage of CCTs in relation to the poor population, which suggests that CCT are not *exclusively* tailored to the electoral demands of the poor. If they were, we should expect politicians to maximize their electoral utility by including most of the poor rather than just the extremely poor. Even if we accepted that undercoverage might result from lacking government capacity to enroll the entire poor population, extant theories tell us little about how such an unorganized and politically weak group as the poor were able to put the issue of CCTs on the political agenda, especially so since the poor and others in the informal sector had effectively been excluded from the welfare state for most of the 20th century.

Informality also appears as an insufficient explanation for social assistance expansion given that informality and welfare state exclusion characterized not only the poor population but also non-poor groups higher up in the income distribution. Suggestions of a poor-working class alliance in favor of CCTs ignore long-standing traditions in the advanced economies of labor resistance to means-tested social assistance, and do little to explain why Latin American workers above the poverty line should be more inclined than their peers in Europe to support the demands of the poor rather than ally with the middle class for investments in public services.

Finally, explanations centered on policy diffusion and IFIs have shed light on the role of peer learning in the region and access to IFI credit that appear to have lowered the threshold for CCT adoption. These explanations, however, appear unable to explain the first CCT adoptions in Brazil and Mexico. Analyses of primary documents from policymakers and the World Bank lead to the conclusion that IFIs played no more than possibly a marginal role in the early cases of CCT adoption even though they at a later stage contributed to the expansion of extant programs through loans.

In the next chapter, I present a theory of CCT adoption that can explain why the marginalized poor were granted access to the welfare state after decades of exclusion during which they instead had to rely on politically contingent exchanges with politicians to reduce their vulnerability to market forces and adverse life events. A coalition of upscale and poor voters explains both why CCTs are underutilized as an electoral resource and how pro-poor redistribution made it to the political agenda.

3

Chapter 3. A theory of a cross-class coalition for conditional cash transfer programs

Introduction

In this chapter, I present a theory of a cross-class coalition of upscale and poor voters in favor of conditional cash transfers (hereafter CCTs). I begin with defining key concepts: the three groups of voters that make up the theorized electorate, and the practices of clientelism and vote buying, which both tie material benefits to the promise of supporting a given politician or party. I then describe the different redistributive interests of the three voter groups, and the conditions under which upscale and poor voters can be expected to come together in a coalition for CCTs. The chapter ends with a discussion of why CCTs are hard to manipulate for clientelism but may nonetheless co-exist with vote buying.

Defining poor, vulnerable, and upscale voters

I conceptualize the electorate as tripartite with bottom, middle, and top groups of equal size along the income distribution. A tripartite electorate is also the basis for theorizing about redistributive preferences in Iversen and Soskice (2006), Persson and Tabellini (1999), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). The theoretical distribution is illustrated in Figure 6 below to clarify who the voters are and where they are located in the income distribution.

I refer to the bottom-third of the income distribution as the poor population (or poor people, poor voters, the poor electorate, etc.). The poor are by definition worse-off in terms of economic security than the groups in the middle and the top of the income distribution, which has implications for how they evaluate different redistributive policies (which I discuss later in the chapter). The middle one-third of the income distribution consists of the vulnerable or struggler population. I use these concepts interchangeably following Ferreira et al (2013) and Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer (2014), respectively. The vulnerable are above the poverty line but lack the economic security of the top one-third group. I refer to people in the top one-third group as upscale individuals in similarity with Rueda (2005). The upscale by

definition earn the highest incomes in society and enjoy the highest level of material well-being.[27]

Figure 6. Conceptualization of classes and their theoretical distribution



Defining clientelism and vote buying

Across developing world democracies, clientelism and vote buying have been used in an attempt to win the support of voters. I define these practices as the contingent exchange of benefits and services for political support between politicians (patrons) and voters, sometimes intermediated by political brokers hired by politicians. Voters sell their choice for whom to vote or otherwise politically support (and whether to turn out or abstain from voting for the competition, see Nichter 2008; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubín 2016; John Morgan and Várdy 2012) in return for benefits. These benefits can include a wide variety of goods and services (some examples include groceries, construction materials, and portable washing machines, Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; doors, cement, paint, Nichter and Peress 2017; food and medicine, Auyero 2000; social housing, Chubb 1981, 1982; access to subsidized health care schemes, Hicken and Simmons 2008; food, cash, and liquor, Stokes et al. 2013).

I distinguish between clientelism and vote buying. By clientelism, I mean ongoing, iterative exchanges between voters and politicians that occur throughout the electoral cycle. By vote buying, I mean the exchanges that take place during campaigns in the lead-up to elections. It is theoretically possible that the same party engages in both clientelism and vote buying. The literature is replete with evidence that clientelism is a labor-intensive undertaking that requires the hiring of brokers to target, monitor and enforce exchanges so that limited resources for vote buying are not wasted on voters who ultimately renege on the deal or who would not have needed clientelist benefits to vote for the patron. In Stokes's (2005, 315) account, "machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes." Stokes et al (2013) similarly emphasize the complex organization of machine-style politics that not only requires a long-term commitment to being present in local communities in order to build relationships with voters but that also entails inefficiencies in whom brokers target

[27] Rueda (2005, 62) uses a somewhat different definition of upscale groups in the advanced market economies as "employers, the upper middle-class, and the business and financial community".

(loyalists) in relation to the preferences of the politician (weakly opposed voters). The "ongoing relationship" between patrons, brokers, and voters in the model of clientelism in Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016, 10) similarly makes it possible to turn benefits into votes, albeit in this account to retain the support of loyalists. In Auyeros's (2000) account, brokers form part of the urban community as effective problem-solvers to whom poor voters in underprivileged neighborhoods have learned to turn in times of need.

The understanding of clientelism as long-term, iterative exchanges between deeply embedded patrons, brokers and supporters point to the costly character of clientelism. This is so because parties need to invest to establish themselves, sometimes through the use of brokers, as trusted and resourceful problem-solvers in politically advantageous districts. The importance of long-term ties is also emphasized in the early, mainly anthropological, literature on clientelism (Powell 1970; Scott 1969, 1972).[28] In the conceptualization of Nichter (2010), the absence of these relationships and targeting of benefits in-between elections means that clientelism is electoral rather than relational in character. To clarify, Nichter's concept of relational clientelism corresponds to what I simply call clientelism. Electoral clientelism (vote buying in my parlance) occurs during campaigns without a continuous exchange of benefits for political support throughout the electoral cycle (Nichter 2008, 2010; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014). The co-existance of PRI distribution of clientelist handouts during campaigns and clientelist-free CCTs in Mexico (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016) can be understood by these two different types of contingent exchanges, where the latter have substituted for relational clientelism while the former is frequently utilized by at least the PRI during campaigns. Similarly, vote buying before elections in Brazil continues although the *Bolsa Família* program is overall considered to be protected from clientelist manipulation. In the words of Zucco, "even where vote buying is rife, the BFP is not perceived by its beneficiaries to be another instrument of vote buying" (Zucco 2013, 820; in reference to the study by Sugiyama and Hunter 2013; see also Fried 2012).

It is the poor electorate that is theorized to be the main target of clientelism and vote buying efforts. The main reason that the poor are expected to be targets of clientelism and vote buying attempts is their higher marginal utility of income than more affluent voters (Calvo and Murillo 2013; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). The declining marginal utility of income implies that politicians would need to offer more valuable benefits to buy the vote of an upscale person and as consequence buy a smaller portion of the electorate than had they targeted poor voters. In the words of Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1143), politicians direct more benefits to the poor on the basis of "a cold calculation of votes—the poor voters switch more readily in response to economic benefits because the incremental dollar matters more to them." In addition, some theorize that the poor have short time-horizons and are risk averse, which make them more likely to support a politician

[28] Definitions of clientelism in the early literature (Powell 1970; Scott 1969, 1972) also tend to emphasize the asymmetry of power between patron and client, as well as the factors of proximity and reciprocity that are also present in contemporary theorizing on clientelism.

today by accepting a handout than to abstain from selling their votes today and placing their faith in public policy in the future (Scott 1969, 1976; Desposato 2006; Stokes 2007; Wantchekon 2003; Kitschelt 2000).

Ultimately, there is uncertainty surrounding how many voters are swayed by vote buying. Greene (2017) argues that campaigns may change pre-campaign swing voters to opposition or loyalist voters, which makes handouts based on broker identification of pre-campaign swing voters inefficient. Even if clientelism and vote buying entailed no inefficiencies in targeting and no reneging voters, the existence of targeting alone implies that not all of the poor sell their votes.[29] Clientelism and vote buying may accordingly be insufficient strategies for politicians who want to make the poor part of their core constituency. Inefficiencies in targeting, voters who renege from their commitment, and the relatively small proportion of the poor who sell their votes imply that politicians for whom the poor are a core constituency should increase their use publicly known and legal types of redistribution, which would limit the costs of clientelism. Social assistance programs such as CCTs are an intuitive way of attracting poor voters, especially so in contexts where such programs specifically designed for the impoverished population were lacking.[30] The electoral rewards of CCTs in contexts with a history of poor exclusion from the welfare state and clientelism are indicated by voting for the incumbent in the poor population after CCTs had been adopted or expanded (for the Mexican case, see Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016); for Brazil, see Zucco (2008, 2013); Hunter and Power (2007).

Preferences of poor, vulnerable, and upscale voters

It seems unwise to try compiling an exhaustive list of considerations for every member of each of the three groups. The aim here is rather to present the general assumptions that undergird the theory in terms of the motivations that guide the redistributive preferences of the upscale electorate, the vulnerable, and the poor. I begin with the poor, who constitute the theorized target group for clientelism and vote buying since poor voters given a diminishing marginal utility of income require the smallest handout to give up their political and electoral independence, respectively (e.g. Stokes et al. 2013). The poor are also the targets of means-tested social assistance policies such as CCTs. As elaborated in the literature, the poor are expected to prefer targeted cash transfers (which could come in the shape of either

[29] This is also indicates by empirics, such as Stokes (2005) analyses of Argentina. According to Stokes (2005, 315), "in the societies where clientelistic parties or machines are active, not all poor voters receive benefits. Limited resources force political machines to choose among poor voters."

[30] This is similar to the logic in Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003; see also Bueno de Mesquita and Root 2000), according to which politicians increase the distribution of public relative to private goods when there is an increase in the number of people that need to be rewarded in order to vote for the incumbent.

CCTs or clientelist handouts) to investments in public services given their unsatisfied material needs (Epple and Romano 1996; Ansell 2006). The expectation of a small demand for a public service like education relative to cash transfers among the poor comes from a diminishing marginal utility of income and educational services as a normal or superior good for which increased income results in increased demand (Epple and Romano 1996).

I theorize that the poor prefer CCTs to clientelism since CCTs are predictable sources of income that cannot be taken away at the whim of a politician. Similarly, CCTs unlike clientelism and vote buying are not likely to be affected by the anticipation of low levels of electoral competition. Finally, a poor voter who loses his or her CCT benefit can complain to the authorities. If, for example, a local-level politician tried to withhold CCT benefits from a non-supporter, that non-supporter could turn to the media to report that a politician violated the eligibility criteria of a CCT. If the CCT is federally managed, as in the case of the Brazilian *Bolsa Família* program, the non-supporter could also turn to federal authorities to report the local politician. These avenues of benefit restoration do not exist for clientelist pro-poor redistribution simply because clientelism is hidden, secret, and typically criminal. A poor voter with high levels of economic insecurity and a lack of savings to protect against income shortfalls arising either from market shocks (such as inflation) or life events (e.g. disease, separation from a breadwinner, pregnancy), or some combination of the two, should be expected to be very concerned with accessing predictable sources of income. CCTs are predictable. Clientelism is not.

The vulnerable group, located in the middle one-third of the income distribution, is too wealthy to benefit from social assistance and clientelism. Yet vulnerable voters lack the economic privilege of the upscale electorate that allows the latter to purchase private services. The vulnerable accordingly prefer investments in public services. Their demand for instantaneous cash transfers is lower than that of the poor. This is simply because the marginal utility of income is higher for the poor (at the bottom of the income distribution) than the vulnerable (in the middle of the income distribution). I theorize that clientelism is preferred to CCTs for vulnerable voters since CCTs incentivize poor households to increase their use of public services. If increased usage is not followed by increased supply-side investments in public services, vulnerable groups will have to compete with the poor for access to medical doctors and public teachers.

Finally, upscale voters have too high incomes to be dependent on clientelism, social assistance, or public services. Their main redistributive objective is to pay as little as possible in taxes. "As little as possible" means without risking social unrest and revolutions in response to ignoring redistributive demands. Upscale citizens also want a reasonably educated and healthy supply of labor to clean their homes, take care of their children, and work in their factories. The preferred level of redistribution should not be zero, in other words, given these theorized trade-offs between low taxation, on the one hand, and social unrest and unproductive labor, on the other. While upscale voters have no direct interest in either clientelism or social assistance since their high incomes make them unattractive as targets of clientelism and of course put them far above the income cut-off for social assistance eligibility, they

should be expected to prefer CCTs to clientelism. Previous research on the smaller prevalence of political manipulation of welfare programs in places with a larger non-poor population and higher political competition (Weitz-Shapiro 2012) suggests that politicians anticipate an electoral punishment to using clientelism when the number of voters beyond the possible client population grows. This indicates that non-poor voters dislike clientelism. Whereas the extant literature has little to say about why the non-poor dislike clientelism except perhaps for the increasing difficulty of finding a vote buyer as voters move up in the income distribution, I argue that there are two reasons for the upscale electorate to dislike clientelism.

The first reason has to do with the price poor voters pay to receive a clientelist handout and a CCT, respectively. When poor voters receive handouts via clientelist logic, they simply get a benefit without any reciprocal action that has direct value for the upscale electorate. Put slightly differently, the political or electoral services poor voters promise to undertake in return for a handout matter little to upscale voters. While clientelism might keep the poor from revolting, it does not turn them into the reasonably educated and healthy labor force that the upscale electorate desires. CCTs, on the other hand, might increase the human capital of the poor electorate sufficiently to provide labor for upscale citizens without the hefty price tag of high-quality public health care and education. CCTs provide a demand-side intervention for health and education investments rather than supply-side interventions to increase public services quality. By tying benefits for the poor population to school attendance and medical visits rather than support for a politician or a party, pro-poor redistribution via CCTs respond to upscale preferences for a somewhat educated and healthy pool of labor.

The second reason for upscale aversion to clientelism relates to the opacity of secret clientelist spending on the poor. The unknown level of redistribution that occurs in clientelism should be a concern for the upscale electorate given their preference for paying as little taxes as possible. Clientelist exchanges between the incumbent and the poor population make the size of redistribution unknowable since there is no such thing as an official and publicly available clientelism budget for upscale voters to use as information of the redistributive agenda. Upscale voters are accordingly left to do guesswork in order to estimate how much the government spends on poor citizens. Uncertainty of the size of redistribution should sit uneasily with the upscale population whose members have the most to lose from increasing the volume of redistribution. Some might object that it is private resources that fund clientelism and vote buying, such as party funds and donations, rather than public resources from taxation. Since the theory concerns determinants of welfare policy, the question only comes into play when a politician has won office. The question of relevance for my theory is therefore how clientelism is financed when the vote buyer is the incumbent. The tax burden of upscale voters will not be affected by how much challengers spend on clientelism but only by how much incumbents spend.

This specification of the microfoundations of the theory emanates in two hypotheses relating to upscale support for CCTs and the difference in upscale and poor support for CCTs, respectively. *Hypothesis 1* states that upscale voters are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern. *Hypothesis 2* states

that the difference between upscale and poor support for CCTs decrease when clientelism is a greater concern. In other words, clientelism induces support for CCTs among the upscale electorate for the reasons described above. In turn, the difference between upscale and poor support for CCTs should be expected to shrink. In order to test a key implication of the theory, I formulate the hypothesis that politicians who are considered clientelist will attract more support from upscale voters after adopting a CCT (*Hypothesis 3*).

When poor and upscale voters come together for CCTs

When, then, do the preferences of the upscale electorate lead to the adoption of CCTs? In situations in which clientelism is a greater concern, there is a greater probability of CCTs adoption. This is so because the presence of clientelism and vote buying indicates that politicians are making an effort to win the poor vote. Clientelism and vote buying send a signal to the upscale electorate that the poor are important constituents, and that some form of pro-poor redistribution is likely to occur in an effort to use material benefits to attract poor support. Since the upscale electorate infers from clientelism and vote buying practices that the poor are part of the intended collection of voters that ensure the electoral success of at least some politicians (similar to the concept of the winning coalition, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003); the upscale electorate sees an opportunity to influence the level of redistribution and the productivity of the poor labor force.

In sum, clientelism increases the likelihood of CCT adoption. The upscale electorate dislikes the opaqueness and meaninglessness of clientelist redistribution, and demand observable redistribution of known quantity that turns the poor into a more productive labor force. CCTs are functional responses to this demand since CCTs have public budgets and provide economic incentives for the poor population to invest in the human capital of their families. This is summarized in *Hypothesis 4: there is a higher likelihood of CCT adoption following increases in clientelism or vote buying*. As with the attitudinal hypotheses 1-3 specified above, I also derive a politician-level hypothesis to test whether the theory can explain decisions by politicians to adopt CCT: *Hypothesis 5*: *politicians who are considered clientelist will be more likely to adopt CCTs than politicians who are not considered clientelist*.

It may seem counterintuitive that the upscale electorate should ally with the poor and support social assistance-style benefits like CCTs. One-dimensional models of policy predict that the poor given their low incomes have the greatest redistributive appetite and the upscale electorate the smallest. But the dimensions of public services and targeted transfers in addition to the lump-sum transfers in standard models of redistribution (such as the Meltzer-Richard (MR) model (Meltzer and Richard 1981)) make it possible for the ends of the income distribution to come together to defeat costly proposals for public services investments from the middle of the in-

come distribution (Epple and Romano 1996; Ansell 2006). In the MR model of redistribution, redistribution is constrained to a flat-rate benefit for the entire populace. That is, benefit size is constant regardless of income and benefits are paid to everyone regardless of contribution. This type of redistribution is only characteristic of the solidaristic and highly redistributive universal welfare states of the Nordic countries (Huber and Stephens 2001; Esping-Andersen 1990).[31] Even in the universal welfare states, however, generous flat-rate benefits are used in combination with targeted benefits, including means-tested non-contributory benefits like cash transfers as well as contributory social insurance benefits for the unemployed or ill (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990). The less redistributive systems in liberal and conservative welfare states alike depend to a much greater extent on the use of targeted transfers for low-income groups (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi and Palme 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001).

In national as well as local instances of CCT adoption, the reliance on private services counterintuitively allow upscale groups and the poor to come together in a coalition for cheap cash transfers for the latter in exchange for a low tax burden for the former. Existing theory has explained why the bottom and the top in some situations share a preference for less public services spending than the middle. The claim is that poor and upscale individuals prefer less spending on public services than the vulnerable since the upscale prefer the private alternative and the poor because their relatively high marginal utility of income and short time horizons make them more likely to value a relatively cheap cash transfer today over relatively expensive investments in public services (health and education) than the vulnerable. First, to the extent that the children of the upscale electorate do not attend public schools, this group lacks direct interest in public education spending, which makes such spending "a pure instrument of redistribution" (Iversen and Goplerud 2018, 296; Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer 2014; Ansell 2006). The same logic applies to increased substitution in the upscale electorate of private health insurance for public. When the upscale electorate privately purchases these goods and services, they do not simply prefer less taxes and spending than users but none at all since they will derive no direct benefit but still pay more than its less affluent users given a proportional or even progressive tax system. When there are few private alternatives, on the other hand, the question is *how much* to spend, which is a one-dimensional issue (Iversen and Goplerud 2018).

The preference for targeted cash transfers over long-term supply-side interventions in services among the poor - a function of the high marginal utility of income at the bottom of the income distribution - means that upscale and poor groups have a shared preference for targeted cash transfers to public services. The vulnerable population in the middle of the income distribution, in contrast, can ill afford to purchase private services on the market. But unlike the poor, the vulnerable earn enough income to be able to forego cash transfers in favor of investments in the health and education of their family. The vulnerable have succeeded in earning enough income and gaining the economic security that allows them to not be part of

[31] As Huber and Stephens (2012, 5) note, a system that uses a proportional tax in combination with flat-rate benefits is "very redistributive" (and even more so when taxation is progressive).

the day-to-day struggle of poor households of having enough money to purchase food, pay for utilities, and provide their children with shoes and clothes as they grow. This indicates that the vulnerable are squeezed between the poor electorate - who unlike the vulnerable can benefit from either clientelism or CCTs - and the upscale electorate, whose members have little interest in costly spending on the high-quality public services that would allow more members of the vulnerable group to become part of the upscale electorate.

If it is the case that the upscale electorate can avoid the high taxation rates associated with high-quality public services by allying with the poor, what role does clientelism and vote buying play in the spread of CCTs? Should the upscale not always be expected to prefer a coalition with poor voters to avoid the costly preferences of the vulnerable group for high-quality public services capable of effectuating upward economic mobility that turn vulnerable citizens into economically privileged members of the upscale electorate? Is concern with clientelism a necessary factor for CCT adoption? The theorized causal sequence described above is summarized in Table 2 below. The three rows summarize the actions and preferences of politicians and parties, the upscale electorate, and the poor at different times. The vulnerable group is not included in the figure since this section specifies the conditions under which poor and upscale groups come together in a coalition for CCTs.

I argue that the role of clientelism and vote buying in the adoption of CCTs is to send a signal to the upscale electorate of the importance of the poor vote for winning elections. If the poor were not part of the intended winning coalition, it would make little sense to observe more than residual attempts at purchasing the support of those with the lowest marginal utility of income during campaigns. Clientelism and vote buying are first, then, key factors for enabling the upscale electorate to understand that the poor are part of the winning coalition. In the absence of clientelism and vote buying, upscale voters may not realize that there is an opportunity to come together with the poor to defeat costly demands from the middle. Clientelism and vote buying are, second, consequential for CCT adoption, specifically, since CCTs so clearly substitute human capital investments for political allegiance and public budgets for secret exchanges. This is unlike other types of social assistance one might imagine that simply give cash transfers, social housing, or food stamps with no requirement for the poor to take actions to climb out of poverty and welfare dependency. When politicians engage in more comprehensive attempts of using material benefits to gain political or electoral support, concern with clientelism grows among the upscale electorate who can only guess the extent to which their taxes fund clientelist or vote buying efforts that waste taxpayer money with no effect on the ability of the poor to escape their dependency on handouts. In sum, politicians need to shift the mode of redistribution from clientelism to an observable welfare program to attract the support of the tax-averse. In addition to the opacity of clientelism, the upscale electorate dislikes their taxes being used on the poor in exchange for an action that carries no value except for the vote seller and the vote buyer.

In anticipation of potential questions about whether clientelism is a necessary cause, I hold that claiming that a certain factor is a necessary cause of an outcome is a very strong claim that needs a specific type of theory. It would, amongst other

things, require a very precise specification of the level of clientelism or vote buying that is necessary for the adoption of CCTs. The aim of the theory is not to make case-specific predictions of CCT adoption based on the exact level of clientelism in a given situation but rather to elaborate on the coalitional logic that shapes redistributive preferences and guides policy outcomes in contexts with availability of private options to public services and targeted transfers than can exclude the median voter. It is largely an empirical question whether other factors can substitute for clientelism and vote buying in causing upscale support for CCTs and thus enabling an ends-against-the-middle-coalition of upscale and poor voters in favor of targeted pro-poor redistribution in the shape of CCTs.

One such situation might be if there are currently large expenditures on public services, which is indicative of a poor-vulnerable coalition. Upscale voters might then wish to institute targeted transfers to the poor if such transfers (to just the poor) are estimated to be cheaper than public services (which target poor and vulnerable groups alike). In other words, it is possible that there are other factors than clientelism that make upscale voters more supportive of CCTs or other types of pro-poor redistribution that should be cheaper than services since the latter target poor and vulnerable alike. It should be noted, however, that CCTs are demand-side interventions that incentivize poor parents to invest in health and education by making cash transfers contingent on behavioral changes: complying with pre- and post-natal schedules, health-check ups, school attendance. Depending on the skill profiles needed on the labor market, these types of demand-side interventions might at a cheaper price provide upscale groups with reasonably educated and healthy labor than would more expensive supply-side interventions such as improving teacher quality, investing in school infrastructure, and decreasing class sizes in public schools.

Table 2. Summary of causal sequence: convergence of upscale and poor preferences for CCTs

	Time t	t+1	t+2	t+3
Actor Politicians, parties	Redistribute to poor via clientelism, vote buying	Struggle to attract support in poor and upscale groups	Politicians who seek support of clientelism-averse upscale electorate and poor voters adopt CCTs	*Ceteris paribus*, win office through a coalition of upscale and poor voters
Upscale electorate		Experiences concern with clientelism		Gained responsiveness to demand for observable redistribution that improves productivity of low-skill labor force
Poor electorate		Prefers predictable sources of income		Gained responsiveness to demands for predictable sources of income

Why CCTs are hard to manipulate for clientelism but may yet co-exist with vote buying

In this last section of Chapter 3, I discuss why CCT appear to be hard to use for clientelist purposes although CCTs may co-exist with vote buying efforts to capture last-minute support during campaigns. First, the literature indicates an intended substitution effect of CCTs on clientelism. Holland and Schneider (2017, 14) view the adoption of CCTs and non-contributory pensions in Latin America as a move from discretionary strategies "of securing the poor's votes to redistributive ones in which bureaucracies established rule-based selection criteria. Politicians empowered bureaucrats and sacrificed discretion over the selection of beneficiaries in adopting means-tested programs to varying degrees across the region." In Brazil, known for its longstanding patterns of clientelist exchanges between poor voters and politicians (Gay 1999, 1994; Nunes Leal 1949; Perlman 1976; Hagopian 1996; Nichter 2014; Nichter and Peress 2017), CCTs were seen as "a public policy […] with the ability to contribute to changes in political practices and democracy through confronting clientelism and the electioneering that has characterized Brazilian social policy" (Silva, Yazbek, and di Giovanni 2014, 209). Frey (2018, 1) suggests that CCTs "make clientelism a less attractive strategy to incumbent mayors" since they reduce the economic insecurity of the poor voters.

Research indicates that benefits from the Brazilian flagship CCT *Bolsa Família* program are, generally speaking, distributed in accordance with program rules and without making the benefit contingent on the poor voter committing to supporting the incumbent (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013; Zucco 2013; Fried 2012). In Mexico, *blindaje electoral* regulations have been put in place to protect programs against political manipulation such that "officials are not allowed to go into the field or enroll new beneficiaries for six months prior to the elections" (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016, 16). There appears to be a scholarly consensus that benefits in Mexican CCTs (*Progresa*, followed by *Oportunidades* and *Prospera*) have not been distributed according to clientelist logic but largely followed program rules in sharp contrast to the clientelism and pork-barreling that previously characterized redistributive politics (De La O 2013; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; Haggard and Kaufman 2008).[32]

Theoretically, CCTs are not very amenable to clientelist manipulation given their clear eligibility criteria, which leave bureaucrats and politicians little room for discretion in the distribution of CCT benefits. CCT thus appear as hard-to-manipulate benefits that are not designed for clientelism. I expect that CCTs are on average not clientelist since they have publicly known eligibility criteria and conditionalities that make benefits contingent on health and educational investments rather than political support. But what about the possibility of parallel or additive strategies of CCTs plus clientelism? I argue that this makes little theoretical sense since CCTs raise the reservation price of potential vote sellers and thereby undermines clientelism. A higher reservation price means that politicians can buy fewer votes. It makes little theoretical sense for a politician to adopt a CCT if (s)he intends to use clientelism to attract the support of the poor population since a CCT makes clientelism more expensive.

Beyond motivation, it is impossible under a hard budget constraint for the incumbent to maintain the former level of clientelism after the adoption of CCT, *ceteris paribus*. Only if we relax the *ceteris paribus* condition is it possible for politicians to continue the same level of clientelism after the adoption of a CCTs. Politicians could increase taxation or cut down on other spending in favor of either CCTs or clientelism in order to finance both types of pro-poor redistribution. Raised taxes would, however, have implications for support among the vulnerable as well as the upscale electorate who do not directly benefit from either CCTs or clientelism but will have to pay the price for raised taxes, either directly (e.g. via a payroll tax, estate tax, or a value-added tax) or through its effects on the economy (e.g. higher unemployment, lower levels of consumption).

Alternatively, the incumbent could allocate resources differently under the same tax rate. For example, the incumbent could decrease spending on public services in order to make more funds available for an additive strategy of CCTs and clientelism.

[32] To make voters understand the different distributive logic of *PRONASOL* and *Progresa,* beneficiaries of the latter received the following message: "We remind you that your participation in Progresa and receipt of benefits are in no way subject to affiliation with any specific political party or to voting for any specific candidate running for public office. No candidate is authorized to grant or withhold benefits under the program. Eligible beneficiary families will receive support if they show up for their doctor's visits and health education talks, and if their children attend school regularly. Any person, organization, or public servant that makes undue use of program resources will be reported to the competent authority and prosecuted under applicable legislation" (De La O 2013, 3)

This might make sense under some conditions if the incumbent can cut down on extant spending without losing support. In a coalition of upscale and poor voters, cutting down on public education might work well since the poor value a cash transfer today higher than supply-side investments on education. To the extent that the upscale electorate does not use public education, these voters, too, should be expected to be in favor of lower education spending. But if cut-downs in education spending occur only to reallocate those funds to clientelism or CCTs, the upscale electorate has gained nothing since the tax rate remains the same. Only now upscale voters finance CCTs or clientelism instead of public education. This is unlikely since upscale voters are averse to clientelism and to paying taxes. Upscale voters neither get rid of clientelism, nor spending on public services, if the incumbent simply diverts public resources for education to finance an additive strategy of CCTs and clientelism.

But while CCTs and clientelist pro-poor redistribution by the incumbent should not co-exist, there are no theoretical reasons to believe that vote buying in the limited time frame of campaigns will disappear simply because poor voters can access CCTs throughout the electoral cycle. Even after the poor have gained access to benefits irrespective of their political allegiance, then, it is possible that vote buying attempts will continue to occur in the lead-up to elections. It is possible that candidates in contexts in which poor individuals have gained the right to social assistance in the form of CCTs independent of their political leanings will still try to use the allure of material benefits to secure a promise of voting for the candidate during campaigns. This co-existence of politically neutral CCTs that allow poor voters income assistance simply on the basis of being under the poverty line and complying with investments in human capital, on the one hand, and the explicit use of material benefits in attempts to gain additional votes at the last minute before elections, on the other, has been documented in at least Mexico (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016) and Brazil (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013) after the introduction of comprehensive CCTs that cover about one-quarter of the population. As stated above, I expect clientelism by the incumbent to be severely undercut in the presence of difficult-to-manipulate CCTs assuming a hard budget constraint. But candidates involved in fierce electoral contests may still attempt to use vote buying to secure last-minute support. These efforts should primarily target poor voters who are not yet enrolled in CCTs given their lower reservation price for selling their vote.

4

Chapter 4. Upscale attitudes toward CCTs and an upscale-poor preference convergence: the effect of clientelism

Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze to what extent a concern with clientelism and vote buying influence support among the upscale for CCTs. The objective is to test the first two hypotheses of the theory, relating to attitudes toward CCTs. First, I test what support there is for *Hypothesis 1*: upscale voters are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern. Second, I test the evidence for *Hypothesis 2*: the difference between upscale and poor support for CCTs decrease when clientelism is a greater concern.

The empirical strategy of the chapter relies on randomized assignment of a treatment that informs survey respondents of the high level of vote buying in their city of residence (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, described in more detail in the next section).[33] The treatment is designed to increase concern with clientelism among respondents. The intuition is that the vote buying that takes place during campaigns serves as a reminder of the possibility of clientelist use of tax-financed resources by the incumbent throughout the electoral cycle to attract the support of the poor population. As elaborated in Chapter 3, upscale voters are expected to want to end clientelism because it is of unknown scale and does little to raise productivity in the low-skill labor force. CCTs, in contrast, have public budgets, from which upscale voters can infer tax rates. CCTs, additionally, make benefits contingent on fulfillment of educational and health requirements that should improve the human capital of beneficiaries. In addition to testing Hypotheses 1-2, I test to what extent the data support the proposed causal mechanism: increased concern with clientelism.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the empirical strategy. I present the case of Rio de Janeiro during the 2016 campaigns for mayor and the local assembly. In summary, the city has a long history of clientelist uses of social programs (further detailed in Chapter 5). While it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of vote buying in contemporary election given the criminal

[33] Financial support from the Quality of Government Institute (University of Gothenburg), the Varieties of Democracy-project (University of Gothenburg and the University of Notre Dame), Adlerbertska stiftelsen, Rese- och donationsstipendier (University of Gothenburg), Helge Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse, and Stiftelsen Wilhelm och Martina Lundgrens Vetenskapsfond is gratefully acknowledged.

nature of vote buying, originally collected data on the use local brokers (*cabos eleitorais*) suggest that Rio saw more vote buying attempts in its 2012 election than most municipalities in Brazil. In contrast to the majority of municipalities, Rio has a local CCT since 2010. The federal *Bolsa Família* CCT also redistributes income to poor voters in the city. I then present information about the survey experiment, which was distributed face-to-face to poor, vulnerable, and upscale voters. The experiment exposed the treatment group to information about the relatively high use of brokers in the closest preceding local election (the 2012 elections for mayor and local assembly). I describe the data from the survey, including several alternative questions of support for CCTs in general, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and for the *Bolsa Família* program. The section ends with a description of the methods used to test the hypotheses.

I then present the results, divided into three subsections relating to evidence for Hypothesis 1 (Treatment effects within classes), Hypothesis 2 (Treatment-control difference in the between-class difference), and supporting evidence. The analyses of intuitive difference-of-means and difference-of-proportions tests between treatment and control groups as well as respondent class indicate support for both Hypothesis 1 and 2. The supporting evidence shows that upscale respondents in the treatment group were more concerned with vote buying than their peers in the control group. This offers support for the causal mechanism of the theory.

The last section of the chapter concludes that the analyses have provided support for Hypotheses 1-2. The supporting evidence bolsters the interpretation of the effects of the randomly assignment treatment as due to concern with clientelism.

Empirical strategy

The case of Rio de Janeiro

The experiment was carried out in the city of Rio de Janeiro in September 2016 during the local campaigns for mayor and the local assembly. The elections were held the following month in October 2016. The choice of the experimentation site is motivated by Brazil's history of informal distribution of material benefits to its economically disadvantaged citizens (McGuire 2014; Nichter 2014), which is one shared by other democracies with truncated welfare states (e.g. Argentina, see Auyero 2000; Mexico, see De La O 2015; Nicaragua, see Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). Brazil is also a highly unequal country with a national Gini coefficient of 0.6, which is the same as the local Gini in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The extremely poor and poor populations in Rio de Janeiro constitute 1 percent and 5 percent respectively, of the local population. In contrast, the extremely poor and poor in Brazilian municipalities on average represent 11 percent and 23 percent respectively, of the local

population. At the national level, the extremely poor represent 6.62 percent and the poor 15.2 percent of the population.[34]

Rio de Janeiro's for Brazil relatively small poor population implies that the scale of informal distribution is smaller than when the poor make up a greater proportion of the electorate, implying that it is harder to get upscale voters to attach enough weight to the vote buying problem to make them consider a CCT a better option. On the other hand, the small poor population implies that any CCT will be cheap, implying that it is easier to get support for CCTs. The vote buying information treatment utilizes the high dependence of candidates in Rio de Janeiro relative to the median municipality on activists (*cabos eleitorais*) who are frequently used as vote brokers in local elections (Nichter 2011). The higher reliance on activists implies that vote buying is a bigger issue than the size of the poor population would imply, potentially due to higher competition for the poor vote in the city of Rio de Janeiro.[35] As I described more fully in Chapter 2, I constructed an estimate of vote buying effort based on campaign spending on *cabos eleitorais* in order to compare Rio to other Brazilian cities. The 2012 municipal-level estimate of vote buying effort, aggregated from each candidate's expenditure reports places Rio above the median Brazilian municipality. Voters in Rio, in other words, have an interest in adopting CCTs because while the poor population is small relative to other Brazilian cities, there appears to be more competition for the poor vote through vote buying than the Brazilian average.[36]

Like many other middle to high-income democracies in Latin America, Brazil is characterized by a welfare state that with the exception of CCTs largely excludes a sizeable poor population.[37] The existence of a large CCT in Brazil – the federal *Bolsa Família* program, benefiting over 13.7 million families in 2015 (representing

[34] Data on the poor and extremely poor population as well as the Gini are from the 2010 national census, collected from *Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil* (2015).

[35] Overall levels of political competition in the city, on the other hand, appear quite representative of Brazilian municipalities. Using electoral data from the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015), I estimate that the average margin of victory (using results from the first round if there was no runoff, and runoff if one was held) for Rio de Janeiro in the three mayoral elections held in 2004, 2008, and 2012 was 0.22, which implies a little less competitiveness than the average municipality that had a 0.18 margin of victory.[35] Further, a larger opposition presence in the municipal assembly implies that the mayor's party faced a great deal of competition in the election. In the municipal assemblies elected in 2004, 2008, and 2012, the average seat share of the single largest opposition party (including parties in coalition with the mayor) was 0.27 in the average Brazilian municipality and 0.12 in the city of Rio de Janeiro, indicating lower competitiveness in the latter. However, the seat share of the total opposition (including coalition members) was 0.76 in the average municipality; just below the opposition seat share of 0.79 found in the city of Rio de Janeiro. I include coalition members in the opposition since it is arguably the case that the mayor on average prefers candidates from her own party in the assembly. The weak character of coalitions in Brazilian politics is indicated by the large number of parties in coalitions as well as the ease with which they are thrown aside when politically fortuitous as the disintegration of the former president Dilma Rousseff (PT) -vice-president and then president Michel Temer (PMDB) alliance demonstrates.

[36] The data source is the Supreme Electoral Court's candidate expenditure data for the 2012 municipal elections (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015), which candidates are required by law to submit. The construction of the vote buying effort estimate is described more closely in Appendix 2.

[37] In addition to CCTs, Brazilian federal welfare policies for low-income households include housing programs (the *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* program), electricity provision and subsidies (the *Luz para Todos* program and the *Tarifa Social de Energia Elétrica* program, respectively), and the educational/vocational program *Pronatec* (Governo Federal 2016; Palácio do Planalto 2015a; Ministério da Educação 2016).

around 50 million individuals or almost a quarter of the population) (Palácio do Planalto 2015b)[38] – implies that voters know about CCTs and have had exposure to the idea before being asked in the survey to state how they support it, which makes it more meaningful to examine attitudes toward CCTs after exposure to vote buying information.[39] There is also a local CCT (*Cartão Família Carioca*) at the experimentation site and the state-level *Renda Melhor Jovem*, which should be expected to increase the likelihood that respondents already have at least considered the value of these programs.[40]

Given the heightened salience of vote buying during campaigns when voters should be more likely to be exposed to vote buying, either directly through offers to sell their votes (poor voters) or indirectly by being told of vote buying attempts (poor and nonpoor voters), the treatment effect of the vote buying information (described in a following subsection) might be depressed compared to an experiment in the middle of the electoral cycle. As such, estimates may be considered lower bounds of the treatment effect.

Survey administration and sampling

The survey experiment was administered via face-to-face interviews. The enumerators used the offline version of the survey software Qualtrics on tablets.[41] The sampling strategy was two-fold given difficulties in accessing high-income respondents in their homes. First, low-income and lower-middle income respondents were sampled in two purposively chosen neighborhoods that served as strata. These were the

[38] *Bolsa Família* beneficiaries can have monthly per capita incomes of up to R$ 154 (US$ 44) (Caixa Econômica Federal 2016). As a reference, the average household income per capita in the first decile of the national income distribution in 2014 was R$ 133 while the average household income per capita in the second decile was R$ 276 (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 2015). BFP beneficiaries received an average monthly transfer of R$ 167.95 (ca US$ 43.50). Numbers are for the May 2015 payment (Palácio do Planalto 2015b).

[39] There are other federal CCTs that are smaller in scale. The *Benefício de Prestação Continuada* encompassed less than 3.8 million beneficiaries in 2012 and is a non-contributory old age and disability monthly benefit equivalent to a minimum salary for people with a household income per capita less than 25% of the minimum salary (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 2014a). The *Renda Mensal Vitalícia* (RMV), created in 1974 and for which the BPC has gradually substituted since 1996, encompassed around 200 000 beneficiaries in 2012 (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 2014b).

[40] The municipal *Cartão Família Carioca*, instituted in 2010 by then-mayor Eduardo Paes, serves as a local supplement to the BFP. The CFC program puts Rio de Janeiro among the 455 municipalities (the equivalent of eight percent of Brazil's 5,569 municipalities) that in 2013 reported having a local CCT. The CFC uses the same income cutoff as the BFP and encompassed around 145 000 families in 2013, representing 2.3 percent of the total number of individuals in the population and 37 percent of the poor population. As a proportion of the total number of households, the CFC covered 6.8 percent of the local population. Similar coverage rates are found for other local cash transfers. The average (median) proportion of beneficiary households in the total municipal population was 3.7 percent (1.4 percent). As a proportion of the number of households, the average beneficiary household proportion was 13.8 percent and the median 4.7 percent. The average (median) proportion of beneficiaries in the poor municipal population was 24.5 percent (7.9 percent). Data on the number of households (*unidades domésticas nos domicílios particulares*) is from the 2010 census (IBGE 2010). Data on the estimated population number in 2013 is from IBGE municipal social assistance survey (2014).

[41] The enumerators were undergraduate or graduate students or recent graduates and received thorough training in the survey software and the distribution of the questionnaire and the information treatment. There was a pilot study on August 22-23, 2016, to allow the enumerators to test the questionnaire and the administration out in the field. Enumerators who were unable to successfully implement the questionnaire and the associated treatment were released from the assignment.

North Zone neighborhoods of Magalhães Bastos and Cidade Nova. Census sectors served as the primary sampling units and were randomly drawn within the neighborhoods. The address lists published by the IBGE after the 2010 census were subsequently used to randomly draw households. There were a total of 14 census sectors, 6 of which in Magalhães Bastos and 8 of which in Cidade Nova. 100 households in Magalhães Bastos and 79 households in Cidade Nova were sampled. The number of households per sector ranged from 7 to 34 in Magalhães Bastos and from 6 to 14 in Cidade Nova. Magalhães Bastos is in the 31st percentile of the neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro in terms of average per capita income and in the 6th percentile in terms of median per capita income. Households in Cidade Nova have a per capita monthly average income that places it in the 54th percentile, and a median income that places it in the 57th percentile.

The high levels of insecurity and fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro made it impossible to access the upscale electorate as part of a representative, probabilistic sample. Instead, upscale voters participated in the survey experiment as part of a convenience sample collected in public spaces in upscale neighborhoods. While this means that I lack data on average support for redistribution among the upscale electorate outside the sample, the main purpose of the survey experiment was to estimate the treatment effect of clientelism concern on CCT support. The sites in the high-income purposive sample start at the 87th percentile (Catete) and continue up to the 99th percentile (Leblon). The purposive sample was taken in public places across upscale neighborhoods to access high-income residents. A total of 15 sampling sites were used, including beaches, parks, gardens, and metro stations in the neighborhoods of Barra da Tijuca in the West Zone, and Ipanema, Leblon, Botafogo, Flamengo, and Catete in the South Zone.

As I discuss in Chapter 1, a convenience rather than probabilistic sample limits the opportunity for representative results. The extent to which these results can be replicated in other contexts is an empirical question. There are, however, no theoretical reasons to expect that the results are limited to the case of Rio de Janeiro during the 2016 campaigns for mayor and local assembly.

The survey experiment and the data

The survey experiment exposed randomly selected respondents to information about how much candidates in local elections in their city of residence (Rio de Janeiro) rely on vote buying relative to the rest of the country.[42] The respondents who were randomly assigned to the treatment group were shown a card (illustrated in Figure 7 below) with the text "Did you know that the city of Rio de Janeiro has a very high level of vote buying?" and a bar graph showing the expenditures on activists in the 2012 municipal elections in Rio de Janeiro compared to the median Brazilian municipality. After reading the text on the sheet and explaining the bar graph, enumerators received a prompt through the questionnaire to read the following statement: "In other words, politicians in the city of Rio de Janeiro spend much more on activists

[42] The information treatment draws on the design of Corbacho et al's (2016) corruption information experiment in Costa Rica.

than politicians in at least half of Brazilian municipalities who spend nothing on activists. Activists are sometimes used for vote buying. By vote buying I mean the exchange of money, goods like food and cigarettes, or favors for votes."[43]

The randomly selected respondents in the control group received no treatment but otherwise identical questionnaires to the treatment group. The treatment was distributed at the beginning of the questionnaire after a few qualification questions to ensure that the respondent was at least 16 years old, a Brazilian citizen or permanent resident, and living on the address in question (for the representative sample) or living in the city of Rio de Janeiro (for the purposive sample). As Table 3 below shows, there were no significant differences across treatment and control for the pretreatment control variables (age and sex).

[43] "Em outras palavras, políticos na cidade do Rio de Janeiro gastam muito mais com cabos eleitorais do que políticos em pelo menos metade dos municípios brasileiros, que não gastam nada com cabos eleitorais. Às vezes, cabos eleitorais estão utilizados para compra de votos. Por compra de votos, quero dizer a troca de dinheiro, bens como comida e cigarros, ou favores por votos."

Figure 7. The vote buying information treatment



Note: the English translations have been added after the end of the survey experiment. The original card that was shown to respondents only included the Portuguese information.

Table 3. Pretreatment control variables

	Average (std. error)		Difference (*p*-value)
	(A) Control	(B) Treatment	(A–B)
Age	49.7	49.5	0.2
	(1.6)	(1.9)	(0.9)
Women (%)	60.3	59.6	0.7
	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.9)
n	121	109	

Respondents were asked three types of outcome questions to capture general support CCTs, support for a local CCT in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and support for the federal *Bolsa Família* program, respectively. First, respondents were asked to rate on a seven-point scale running from ”strongly disagree” to ”strongly agree” the degree to what extent they with the statement “I support cash transfer programs, in other words, government programs that give monthly cash benefits to [ALL] [SOME] families in poverty (half of the sample was asked about support of CCTs for all families in poverty and half about some families in poverty). Responses to the two varieties of the generalized CCT support question are pooled in the analyses.[44]

Second, respondents were asked about their support for the federal program *Bolsa Família*. The item followed the wording in the LAPOP survey (Latin American Public Opinion Project 2014) in which respondents are asked whether the program should be expanded, maintained, decreased, or ended. Third, respondents were asked to what extent they supported a local conditional cash transfer in the city of Rio de Janeiro using the same seven-point scale as before. Since the city already has a CCT in place (the *Cartão Família Carioca* program), asking about support for creating a local program might be confusing for those respondents who were aware of the CFC’s existence. The local CCT support question was therefore preceded by a question intended to identify respondents who knew about the CFC.[45] Those who accurately identified the CFC were subsequently asked to, on the same seven-point scale as before, rate the extent to which they wanted the CFC to continue.[46] Those who could not identify the CFC were instead asked to what extent they agreed that it would be a good idea to create a CCT for poor families in the city of Rio de Janeiro.[47] The outcome questions did not explicitly present CCTs as clientelism-free forms of redistribution, which implies that the treatment effect might be smaller than had we told respondents to evaluate CCTs as free from clientelism.

To identify upscale and poor respondents, I rely on reported household income and social assistance beneficiary status. Upscale respondents are identified as those in the sample highest income category (monthly household incomes of at least R$ 6,600), roughly corresponding to the income of the population top decile in which the vast majority opts out of public services. According to the 2010 census (IBGE 2011) (Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil 2015), the average monthly income per capita in the richest quintile in the city of Rio de Janeiro in 2010 was R$ 4,976, and the average income per capita in the richest decile was R$ 7,558. While the 2015 edition of the annual household survey *Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicilios Annual* (IBGE 2017) shows that only a minority of students from kindergarten through secondary education attend private schools - 17

[44] There is no significant difference within the control and treatment group, respectively, between supporting a CCT for all and some poor families (see results in Table 18 in Appendix 5).

[45] “O(a) sr.(a) poderia me dizer o que é o Cartão Família Carioca?” Enumerators were instructed to identify informed respondents as those who said income transfer/social program of the city/Rio/the mayor/the government.

[46] “No geral, eu quero que o programa Cartão Família Carioca continue. Até que ponto concorda ou discorda desta frase?”

[47] “Seria uma boa ideia criar um programa de transferência de renda para famílias cariocas em situação de pobreza. Até que ponto concorda ou discorda desta frase?”

percent of students in Brazil and 29 percent in the metropolitan area of Rio in 2015[48] - most families in the tenth decile enroll their children in private schools (IBGE 2017). In Brazil overall, for respondents whose households belonged to the 99th percentile of household per capita incomes, 94 percent attended private schools while the same was true for 86 percent in the 95th percentile and 77 percent in the 90th percentile.[49] In Rio, the opt-out rate from public education is even higher among high-income households than the national average (IBGE 2017). All students in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro whose households belonged to the 99th percentile attended private schools, while the same was true for 99 percent of students in the 95th percentile and 94 percent in the 95th percentile.[50] As a robustness check, I use having a college degree as an alternative way to identify upscale respondents.

Poor respondents are identified as those who said they or someone in their household currently receive social assistance. I include respondents who stated receiving cash or in-kind aid (excluding pensions and social insurance) or benefits from the BFP, the CFC, or the state-run CCT *Renda Melhor Jovem*. In accordance with the conceptualization in Chapter 3, then, the poor population is the beneficiary population of social assistance benefits. CCTs frequently have a lower coverage rate than the poverty rate. I therefore use questions in the survey about CCT benefits as well as other social assistance benefits. Alternatively, I operationalize poor respondents as those lacking a primary education.

The vulnerable, "struggler" respondents are identified as those who earn less income than the upscale electorate. The lower boundary of the vulnerable class is determined by self-reported access to social assistance benefits. The vulnerable do not include those who said they received social assistance beneficiaries. Alternatively, I operationalize the vulnerable as those with at least a completed primary education but less than a complete college degree.

Table 4 below summarizes the distribution of respondents across income and education. As the table clearly shows, the sample middle (vulnerable) group is the largest with a majority of respondents in both income and education operationalizations. The number of poor respondents is quite low, reflecting difficulties in safely accessing the more poverty-ridden neighborhoods of Rio. Upscale voters are by design overrepresented in the sample since the Hypothesis 1 specifically concerns treatment effects within the upscale group.

[48] I included education from kindergarten through secondary school in this measure, excluding tertiary education and literacy classes outside the regular educational system Included educational categories: *regular do ensino fundamental, regular do ensino médio, creche, maternal, jardim de infância, pré-vestibular*. Excluded educational categories: *educação de jovens e adultos ou supletivo do ensino fundamental, educação de jovens e adultos ou supletivo do ensino médio, superior de graduação, alfabetização de jovens e adultos, classe de alfabetização - CA, mestrado ou doutorado.*

[49] The same percentages were found using family per capita income instead of household per capita income (IBGE 2017).

[50] The same percentages were found using family per capita income instead of household per capita income (IBGE 2017).

Table 4. Distribution of respondents according to income and education operationalization

	Income	Education
Upscale	73 (30%)	81 (35%)
Vulnerable	145 (60%)	121 (52%)
Poor	22 (9%)	32 (14%)

Note: number of observations (percentage)

Methods, hypotheses, and predictions

If reminding upscale voters of how much politicians in their district buy the votes of poor citizens to win elections has no (or a negative) effect on their attitudes toward CCTs, the claim that politicians adopt these programs to attract vote-buying averse upscale voters is severely undermined. Observing an increase in upscale support of CCTs after exposure to such a reminder is, however, consistent with the argument. I test the hypothesis that upscale voters express higher support of CCTs when they are more concerned about vote buying in their district.

Empirically, I expect average support for CCTs (general as well as for a local CCT) to be significantly higher among respondents in the top income category who received the treatment than their peers in the control group who received no treatment.[51] I expect that a significantly higher proportion of upscale respondents in the treatment group express support for maintaining or increasing the beneficiary rolls of the BFP than their peers in the control group. I expect no treatment effect on the poor for any of the three dependent variables. While I expect that poor individuals on average prefer CCTs to clientelism since the former is a more reliable and predictable source of income than the latter, this expectation is unrelated to the treatment and should therefore be the same across treatment and control. The expectation for the vulnerable group is more ambiguous. While the vulnerable have a negative interest in a CCT given their inability to benefit from an antipoverty program and its opportunity cost for public services, I expect it to be largely unrelated to their concern with clientelism. If anything, I expect the treatment to have a negative effect on vulnerable support for CCTs if they substitute for clientelism, which unlike CCTs may gain vulnerable voters if they find a buyer for their votes.

Since the theory envisions a cross-class coalition of upscale and poor voters, it is also necessary to examine how the possibilities for such a coalition are affected by heightened concerns with vote buying. I predict that the difference in average support for CCTs in general and a local CCT in Rio (difference in proportion who support the BFP) between upscale and poor respondents will be smaller in the treatment than in the control group. I expect no statistically significant difference between upscale and poor support (average support for general and local; proportion for the

[51] The difference-of-means tests (two-tailed, adjusted Wald tests) cluster standard errors on the primary sampling units. Around 30 fieldwork sites in the city of Rio de Janeiro were used to distribute the experiment. High-income respondents were primarily interviewed in public places as part of a convenience sample. Around 15 interviews each in the control and treatment group were completed as part of a representative survey and took place inside households.

BFP) in the treatment group. I test the two parts of the second hypothesis by comparing differences-of-means (difference-of-proportions for BFP support) between upscale and poor respondents by treatment condition and the difference in the upscale-poor gap across treatment and control to see whether there is a statistically significant difference in the possibility of an upscale-poor coalition after the treatment.

Finally, I examine supplemental evidence to analyze what evidence there is for the causal mechanism of increased concern with clientelism. Three survey items are used for this purpose. I analyze to what extent respondents associated poverty with vote selling opportunities; viewed CCTs as yet another vote buying tool; and whether respondents thought beneficiaries in existing CCTs like the BFP fulfill program criteria. Exposure to the vote buying information treatment is expected to have no effect on any of these matters. The objective of analyses in the supportive evidence-section is to assess the plausibility of the claim that CCTs function as a credible commitment to non-clientelist redistribution. The main interest therefore lies in average values rather than differences across treatment and control.

Results

Treatment effects within classes: Hypothesis 1

I begin by estimating the treatment effect for upscale respondents in order to test the first hypothesis: upscale voters are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern. In line with the empirical prediction, I find that the upscale in the treatment group express significantly higher support for (1) CCTs in general and (2) a local CCT in Rio, in particular, while (3) a significantly larger proportion of the upscale in the treatment group supports the BFP than in the control group.

Results of difference-of-means tests for general support and support for a local CCT in the city of Rio de Janeiro are presented in the first row of Table 5 below, and results for difference-of-proportions tests for support of the BFP are presented in the first row of Table 6 further below. The coefficient in the case of general support amounts to 1.6 ($p < 0.01$) on the seven-point scale. The average value is 3.6 for the control group and 5.2 for the treatment group, implying that the reminder of Rio's extensive clientelism causes upscale respondents to go from mild disagreement to agreement with the general idea of a CCT for poor families.[52]

[52] The treatment reminded rather than provided respondents with new information about clientelism in Rio de Janeiro because, as I discuss in Chapter 5, clientelism has been a prominent characteristic of pro-poor redistribution in Rio for decades. Contemporary practices of *assistencialismo* and *clientelismo* are frequently reported on by newspapers, for example in connection to allegations of misconduct by a local assembly member who runs so-called social centers that assists supporters in their bailiwicks with anything from wheelchairs to emergency cash. The data supports this understanding of the treatment since there is no significant difference between the treatment and the control group when we asked respondents to tell us how much they agreed with the statement that vote buying in Rio is common. The difference is statistically insignificant (see results in Table 5). But as I discuss later in this chapter, there is a significantly higher concern with vote buying among upscale respondents in the treatment group than the control (Table 5), suggesting that the treatment primed voters to think about the problem of vote buying rather than supplied them with new information that changed their assessment of the extensiveness of *carioca* clientelism.

Table 5. Mean support for CCTs: differences across class and treatment condition

	General support			*Support for local CCT*		
	G. Treat-ment	H. Con-trol	**Diff G-H**	I. Treat-ment	J. Con-trol	**Diff I-J**
A. Upscale	5.182	3.595	1.587	4.767	3.595	1.172
	(0.390)	(0.281)	(0.001)	(0.360)	(0.395)	(0.038)
B. Vulner-able	4.238	4.507	-0.269	3.875	4.625	-.75
	(0.322)	(0.294)	(0.433)	(0.385)	(0.287)	(0.038)
C. Poor	6.667	6.444	0.222	5.167	6	-0.833
	(0.179)	(0.372)	(0.586)	(0.497)	(0.554)	(0.272)
			Diff-in-Diff G-H			**Diff-in-Diff I-J**
D. Diff A-B Upscale-vulnerable	0.944	-0.912	1.856	0.892	-1.030	1.922
	(0.083)	(0.052)	(0.001)	(0.106)	(0.098)	(0.002)
E. Diff A-C Upscale-poor	-1.485	-2.850	1.365	-0.4	-2.405	2.005
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.014)	(0.539)	(0.001)	(0.026)
F. Diff B-C Vulnerable-poor	-2.429	-1.938	-0.491	-1.292	-1.375	0.083
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.316)	(0.077)	(0.033)	(0.926)

Note: the table presents mean support in each group (standard errors) and differences in means (*p*).

Table 6. Proportion in support of the BFP: differences across class and treatment condition

	Support for the BFP		
	G. Treatment (st. error)	H. Control (st. error)	**Diff G-H** (*p*)
A. Upscale	0.656	0.412	0.244
	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.010)
B. Vulnerable	0.607	0.606	0.001
	(0.080)	(0.054)	(0.991)
C. Poor	0.833	0.778	0.056
	(0.108)	(0.145)	(0.738)
			Diff-in-Diff G-H
D. Diff A-B Upscale- vulnerable	0.050 (0.660)	-0.194 (0.004)	0.244 (0.056)
E. Diff A-C Upscale-poor	-0.177 (0.240)	-0.366 (0.019)	0.189 (0.312)
F. Diff B-C Vulnerable - poor	-0.227 (0.097)	-.172 (0.295)	-0.055 (0.796)

Note: the table presents the proportion of respondents who wanted to maintain or expand the BFP (rather than decrease beneficiary numbers of end the program altogether) and the difference-in-proportions (*p*).

The treatment effect on general CCT support among upscale respondents is illustrated by the range plot to the left on the left side of Figure 8 below. The range plot to the left on the right side of Figure 8 illustrates the treatment effect — a difference-in-means of 1.2 ($p < 0.05$) — on support for a local CCT. Upscale respondents in the control group were on average mildly in disagreement (3.6) over the idea of a local CCT in Rio while their peers in the treatment group were mildly in agreement (4.8).

Figure 8. Treatment effect by class: support for CCTs



There is, similarly, a significant, positive treatment effect ($p < 0.05$) among upscale respondents on support for the BFP, as illustrated in the left-most range plot in Figure 9 below. A higher percentage of upscale respondents in the treatment group than the control group (66 and 41 percent, respectively) agreed that the beneficiary numbers of the BFP should be maintained or increased. In summary, the difference-of-means tests on CCT support indicate support for the first hypothesis and the empirical prediction that upscale respondents in the treatment group who were reminded that local elections in Rio de Janeiro feature extensive vote buying expressed significantly higher levels of support for a cash transfer, whether we ask in a general way, about a local program in their city, or about the federal BFP than did their peers in the control group who were exposed to no treatment.

Figure 9. Treatment effect by class: support for the *Bolsa Família* program



In contrast to the consistently positive and significant treatment effect among upscale respondents, the vote buying information treatment did not make vulnerable or poor respondents more supportive of CCTs, illustrated above by the middle and right-most range plots in the two graphs in Figure 8 and the single graph in Figure 9. The effect is insignificant in all instances but vulnerable support for a local cash transfer program (right-hand side graph in Figure 8), in which case it is significantly *negative* ($p < 0.05$). I interpret the negative treatment effect for vulnerable respondents in the following way: vulnerable voters who were told about the extensiveness of vote buying were primed about the possibility of receiving private handouts in return for their votes. If local politicians start a CCT, I argue that they will substitute those benefits for clientelism, reducing the likelihood for vulnerable of receiving a clientelist handout while simultaneously diverting scarce resources from the general revenue for a program from which they are too wealthy to directly benefit.

The negative effect for support of a local CCT specifically is plausibly due to the fact that it is municipalities that are responsible for providing public services like health, education, and public transport. This makes the link between a tax-financed

social assistance program and public service quality more prominent than when we asked about cash transfer support in the abstract or for the federal BFP.[53] Municipalities can largely choose how to "allocate spending across policy areas" (Schiumerini 2017, 14) within the ramification of certain regulations, such as the constitutional requirement that "at least 25 percent of municipal revenues [be spent] on education and 15 percent on health" (Schiumerini 2017, 14, footnote 4).[54] In other words, voters should be expected to perceive of the tradeoff between local social assistance (that benefit few) and public services (on which most but the upscale rely). Vulnerable voters should be expected to be sensitive to any diversion from the general revenue given their financial inability to opt-out from public services, in contrast to upscale voters who purchase their health and education services in the marketplace. Vulnerable voters may also have low enough incomes to find a buyer for their votes.

Robustness checks of the within-class treatment effect, utilizing education as an alternative specification of class, largely give the same results as before with the exception of general support for CCTs. [55] When I use having a college degree instead of being in the top income category to identify upscale respondents, the higher support in the treatment than the control group is just above the conventional threshold of statistical significance (p: 0.058). In light of the results in Chapter 5 that indicate an effect of education independent of income on voting for Rio's 2008-2016 PMDB mayor Eduardo Paes, it is unsurprising that substituting education for income may change the treatment effect. The positive treatment effect is, however, still significant for college-educated respondents when it comes to their support for a local CCT and the BFP. The other notable change from substituting education for income is that there is a positive treatment effect on general support for CCTs among respondents with less than primary education. Given the small number of respondents in this group (14 in the treatment group and 17 in the control group), too much weight should not be placed on this effect. The effect is not repeated for either local CCT support or BFP support.

Treatment-control difference in the between-class difference: Hypothesis 2

I next estimate the treatment-control difference in the between-class difference. I then estimate the between-class difference in the treatment group. To clarify, the first step concerns examining to what extent the difference in average support for CCTs between upscale and poor respondents will be smaller in the treatment than in the control group. In the second step, I test whether there is a statistically significant

[53] Municipal provision of public services like health care, primary education, and public transportation in Brazil are to a great extent paid for by higher-level government. Schiumerini (2017) finds that transfers from the federal and state government on average represented 90 percent of municipal budgets from 2000 to 2016.

[54] Other studies similarly emphasize subnational discretion over how to spend federal transfers, for example 89 percent of federal transfers to subnational government in late 1990s Brazil was unconditional, i.e. not earmarked for a specific purpose by the federal government (Garman, Haggard, and Willis 2001, 220).

[55] The results are presented in Table 19 (general and local) and Table 20 (BFP) in the Appendix 5. I also plotted the treatment effects for each class (see Appendix 5 Figure 26 for general and local CCT support; Figure 27 for BFP support).

difference between upscale and poor CCT support in the treatment group. These two steps in the analysis serve to test the second hypothesis: the difference between upscale and poor support for CCTs decrease when clientelism is a greater concern.

The results are presented in Table 5 above (the third and sixth column for the treatment-control difference in the between-class difference and the three last rows for the between-class difference by treatment condition). For general CCT support, there is a positive and significant difference between the upscale-poor gap in the treatment and the control group, suggesting that the tension between upscale and poor CCT support is alleviated in the treatment condition. The reason is the previously demonstrated positive treatment effect among upscale respondents. It follows that the gap in support between upscale and poor should decrease. However, the poor remain significantly more supportive than the upscale in the treatment condition. In both treatment and control, the poor are significantly more supportive of CCTs in general than upscale respondents.

These results are illustrated in Figure 10 below. The panel to the left illustrates differences in means between classes (upscale-poor, upscale-vulnerable, and vulnerable-poor) by treatment condition. The panel to the right illustrates the difference in the between-class differences as we move from the control to the treatment condition.[56]

[56] In addition to the significantly smaller poor-upscale gap in the treatment than control condition, we note that the upscale-vulnerable gap, too, decreases significantly in the treatment condition ($p < 0.01$). The change in the upscale - vulnerable average support when we move from the control to the treatment amounts to 1.856 (on the seven-point response scale), going from -0.912 (indicating higher support among vulnerable than upscale respondents in the control condition) to 0.944 (indicating a reversal of positions relative to the control condition). In contrast, there is no significant treatment-control difference for vulnerable-poor difference in general support. This reflects that the general support of vulnerable and poor respondents, respectively, is unaffected by the treatment and maintain their distinctiveness. The vulnerable class is significantly less supportive of CCTs than the poor in both the control and the treatment condition ($p < 0.001$).

Figure 10. (Difference in) between-class differences: general support (95 percent confidence intervals)



The difference in the upscale-poor difference between control and treatment is significant for local CCT support, too. This is further evidence in favor of the proposition that the possibilities for an upscale-poor coalition for CCTs grow in the shadow of clientelism. In statistical terms, local CCT support among the intended beneficiaries (the poor) in the treatment group is indistinguishable from local CCT support among upscale respondents in the treatment group. Statistically speaking, then, local CCT preferences of the poor and the upscale converge in the treatment group. There is, in contrast, a significant local CCT support gap in the control group: upscale respondents in the control group are significantly less supportive of local CCTs than the poor in the control group. This is similar to the just discussed result for general CCT support. These results are illustrated in Figure 11 below. As before, the between-class difference by treatment condition is plotted on the left side and the difference in between-class difference on the right side.[57]

[57] The results also show that upscale respondents become more supportive of local CCTs relative to the vulnerable as we move from the control to the treatment group ($p < 0.01$). There is no significant difference in the vulnerable-poor difference across the treatment and control conditions.

Figure 11. (Difference in) between-class difference by treatment condition: support for a local CCT (95 percent confidence intervals)



Finally, I examine the second hypothesis with respect to BFP support. Results from difference-of-proportions tests are presented in Table 6 above (the third column for the treatment-control difference in the between-class difference and the three last rows for the between-class difference by treatment condition). As in the case of support for a local CCT, there is a significant difference between BFP support among upscale and poor respondents in the control but not the treatment condition. I interpret this as a convergence of upscale-poor preferences after respondents have been exposed to information about the extensive use of clientelism in local elections. The difference in the upscale-poor difference across treatment condition, however, fails to reach statistical significance. The results for BFP support are illustrated in Figure 12 below.[58]

[58] The results for the upscale respondents-vulnerable are similar to for the upscale-poor: the significantly lower support of the upscale disappears in the treatment condition. The difference in the upscale-vulnerable difference is borderline significant (p: 0.056). Finally, unlike general support and support for a local CCT (except for the treatment group, just missing the significance threshold), there is no discernable difference between the proportion of vulnerable and poor respondents who support the BFP. It is consistent with the theory that vulnerable respondents can afford to care less about government spending on a program from which they do not benefit when it is a federal program, since local governments are in charge of the lion's share of public services. Even though the federal government transfers the majority of local governments' resources, recent research suggests that voters in Brazilian municipalities largely fail to attribute funding shortfalls to factors outside the control of local governments and punish mayors for too little public goods spending (Schiumerini 2017). Other studies similarly find that voters in highly decentralized contexts find it challenging to accurately identify policies in higher-level government as causes of economic underperformance (Ander-

Figure 12. (Difference in) between-class difference by treatment condition: support for the BFP (95 percent confidence intervals)



Again, I use respondent education instead of income as a robustness check for the between-group differences and differences in between-group differences across the treatment and control. Results are presented in Table 19 (general and local) and Table 20 (BFP) in Appendix 5. For general support, there is no significant difference between college-educated respondents and respondents without a primary education in the control condition although the point estimate is as expected higher for the latter group. The difference in the between-class difference is neither significant, contrary to when we use income to identify the upscale.[59] For local CCTs, the same convergence of upscale-poor preferences in the treatment group can be observed when I use education instead of income to identify classes. The upscale-poor difference in the control group is smaller than when income is used. The difference is just

son 2006). This line of research supports the notion that voters rarely connect a local government's ability to provide public goods like health and education to federal policy.

barely insignificant (p 0.052). Expectedly, this turns the difference across treatment conditions insignificant.[60]

Finally, no changes are observed for BFP support of the upscale and the poor. A couple of changes occur in comparisons of support for the BFP when I substitute education for income for the other educational groups. First, the difference in the gap between respondents with college degrees and those with up to secondary education gains significance across treatment and control groups while it just surpassed the significance threshold in the income rendition. Second, the difference between respondents with up to secondary education and those with less than primary is significant in the treatment group (although there is no significant treatment effect for either educational group). As before, the point estimate for the latter is higher than the former, indicating that a larger proportion of the least educated than those with intermediary educational attainment support the BFP.

Supporting evidence and other explanations for the treatment effect among upscale respondents

What evidence is there that respondents view CCTs as an effective way to reduce vote buying and clientelism? To assess this, I analyze responses to three statements intended to probe to what extent respondents associated poverty with vote selling opportunities; viewed CCTs as yet another vote buying tool; and whether they thought beneficiaries in existing CCTs like the BFP fulfill program criteria. Exposure to the vote buying information treatment is expected to have no effect on any of these matters. The point in analyzing responses to these questions from the upscale respondents in the sample is to assess the plausibility of the claim that CCTs function as a credible commitment to non-clientelist redistribution. Therefore, I am mainly interested in average values rather than differences across treatment and control although I also report treatment effects, if any. These results, and the remainder discussed in section, are presented in Table 7 below.

The first question asked respondents to what extent they agreed that it is difficult to buy votes when people leave poverty. Upscale respondents expressed agreement with this statement (average of five on the seven-point scale, interpreted as mild agreement) and there were no statistically significant differences between treatment and control. Believing that reducing poverty is an impediment to vote buying is consistent with the claim that as the upscale become more concerned about clientelism, they turn to reforms like CCTs that have been proven to reduce poverty by

[60] The between-group difference in the control condition is significant for college-educated respondents (lower support) and those with up to secondary education (higher support). The ordering was the same when we used income (i.e. vulnerable respondents in the control group expressing lower support for a local CCT than the vulnerable) but then the difference did not achieve statistical significance. For local CCT support, there is neither a significant between-group difference in the control condition for respondents with up to secondary education and those with less than primary. The point estimates of the differences in mean support go from -1.4 when we use income to -0.5 when we use education, indicating a smaller gap between the groups when education is used to identify poor and vulnerable respondents.

supplementing the income of the poor in the short-term while raising investments in human capital through education and health care conditionalities over the medium to long term.[61] Upscale respondents were mildly skeptical or neutral in relation to the second statement that people who do not support the current government are at risk of losing CCT benefits. While falling short of a clear-cut rejection of the notion that benefits may be politically manipulated, the average values indicate that CCTs in the minds of upscale respondents are far from another resource through which politicians can purchase electoral support on an individual, contingent basis. There are no significant differences between treatment and control.

Table 7. Probing the mechanism: upscale respondents

Survey statements	A. Treatment (st. error)	B. Control (st. error)	A-B (*p*)
1. The government should reduce inequality in society	6.515 (0.179)	6.270 (0.145)	0.245 (0.347)
2. Reducing poverty in Rio among most important issues today	6.394 (0.184)	5.541 (0.279)	0.853 (0.006)
3. My life would be better with less poverty in society	6.091 (0.195)	6.306 (0.164)	-0.215 (0.264)
4. It is important to me that vote buying become more difficult	6.970 (0.029)	6.784 (0.061)	0.186 (0.002)
5. Left-right placement	4.893 (0.291)	5.655 (0.278)	-0.762 (0.057)
6. Partisanship (proportion with)	0.394 (0.080)	0.216 (0.071)	0.178 (0.012)
7. Vote buying is common (Rio)	6.774 (0.098)	6.588 (0.136)	0.186 (0.104)
8. Vote buying is common (Brazil)	6.594 (0.168)	6.694 (0.140)	-0.101 (0.651)
9. Difficult to buy votes when people stop being poor	4.697 (0.367)	4.595 (0.458)	0.102 (0.856)
10. People who do not support the current government risk losing CCT benefits	3.545 (0.351)	3.811 (0.339)	-.265 (0.578)
11. Government chooses beneficiaries of CCTs like the BFP according to the rules	2.879 (0.330)	2.333 (0.376)	0.545 (0.206)

Note: all responses given on a seven-point scale where 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree except items 5. Left-right placement (ten-point scale from left to right) and 6. Partisanship (dichotomous responses, table shows proportion with partisanship).

[61] In Brazil, 25 percent of the reduction of extreme poverty and 18 percent of the inequality reduction that took place from 2001 to 2006 have been attributed to the *Bolsa Família* program (Lindert and Vincensini 2010, 15) while overall in Latin America, CCTs have been found to be responsible for 25 percent of the reduction in inequality in Latin America in the last decade (Levy and Schady 2013, 206).

The third question asked respondents to tell to what extent they agreed with the statement that "by what I have heard, the government chooses beneficiaries of CCTs like the BFP according to program rules." The statement did not specify what rules so for the BFP, the source of error could range from a household per capita income that exceeded the cutoff or failure to comply with the health and educational requirements. It is important to note that the statement left it unsaid whether the government willfully awards benefits in tension with program rules or against their own intention to follow the rules due to, for example, difficulties in keeping beneficiary records updated as household members change their employment situation or children grow up and move out of the household. The average values suggest that upscale respondents in the sample largely disagreed that program rules for the BFP are honored. I interpret this to mean failure to comply with program rules beyond clientelist calculi, first, since average responses to the previous question indicated that the upscale in our sample disagree that CCTs are used in a clientelist manner to bolster support for the incumbent. Second, there were no significant differences across treatment and control. If it were the case that upscale voters on average associated CCTs like the BFP with rule-breaking for clientelist purposes, there should be a decrease in the extent to which the treatment group agreed with the statement since they had been reminded of the extensive vote buying that characterizes *carioca* elections.

The absence of a negative treatment effect (i.e. the absence of stronger rejection in treatment than control) suggests that respondents interpreted the question as one of BFP errors due to misrepresentation by the households or administrative failures in assessing who belongs to the beneficiary group. I summarize the findings so far as evidence in favor of a link between poverty and clientelism in the minds of the upscale; a rejection of the notion of CCTs as clientelist resources, and skepticism that BFP beneficiaries comply with the rules.

Next, I evaluate the alternative explanation that it is a concern with poverty *per se* rather than its implications for clientelism that fuels the treatment effect on CCT support. While the random assignment of the information treatment alleviates concerns of respondent characteristics that may affect attitudes toward cash transfers, perhaps something other than a desire to curb clientelism explains why upscale respondents in the treatment group were more supportive of cash transfers than their peers in the control group. It is possible that people in the treatment group were reminded of Rio's vast inequalities and numerous poverty-ridden communities when they were told about how much politicians in local elections rely on clientelism, causing them to express stronger support for CCTs as a measure to reduce inequality and poverty. There are three questions in the survey that allow us to test this hypothesis.[62] A simple examination of average agreement with these questions on a seven-point scale (where higher numbers indicate stronger agreement) shows that there is strong agreement among the upscale in the control as well as the treatment group that the government should reduce inequality in society, that reducing poverty in the city of Rio de Janeiro is among the most important issues today, and that the respondent's life would be better if there were less poverty in society.

[62] These questions were asked after the treatment and before the CCT support questions.

Were it the case that a concern with inequality and poverty drove the treatment effect on CCT support among upscale respondents, however, we should observe a treatment effect (i.e. stronger agreement) on the poverty and inequality measures, too, and not only strong average agreement across treatment condition. The results of difference-of-means tests show that there is only a significant treatment effect on the second of these statements: reducing local poverty in the city of Rio de Janeiro was more important for upscale respondents in the treatment than control group (*p*: 0.006).[63] In contrast, there was no significant difference between the groups in average agreement with the statements that the government should reduce inequality or that the respondent's life would be better if there were less poverty in society, respectively. The questions asked first and last did not mention the local context or Rio but asked about inequality and poverty, respectively, in society. In other words, the idea that a heightened concern with inequality or poverty *per se* in the treatment group explains higher support for CCTs finds little support in the data. Instead, the significant treatment effect on concern with *local* poverty appears to be connected to the information treatment about *local* clientelism in elections. Rather than a concern with poverty and inequality overall, the treatment effect occurred because respondents perceived of the link between a supply of cheap votes and clientelism in local elections. This would explain the heterogeneous treatment effect among upscale respondents on the three measures in the survey that tapped into respondent concern with poverty and inequality.

I also tested whether respondents in the treatment group placed themselves differently than the control on a ten-point left-right scale. A significant difference here could mean either support of the poverty and inequality mechanism or a stronger commitment against clientelism given the *carioca* left's positioning against clientelism and vote buying. Given the tendency of the left frontrunners in at least the three last mayoral elections in Rio (the Green party's Gabeira in 2008, The Socialism and Liberty Party's Freixo in 2012 and 2016) to run on post-materialist issues rather than redistributive platforms that I discuss in Chapter 5, I consider the latter interpretation more likely. The difference-of-means is just beyond conventional significance levels (*p*: 0.057) but the lower point estimate in the treatment group suggests a more leftist self-placement than the control group with the average value in the treatment group (4.9 on the ten-point scale) places them left-of-center.[64]

A strong indication in favor of the claim that concerns about clientelism drive the treatment effect on CCT support would be that upscale respondents in the treatment group considered clientelism a more salient issue than their peers in the control

[63] In addition to the positive treatment effect among upscale respondents, there is a borderline (*p* 0.045) significant negative effect among the vulnerable. As a result, the upscale surpass the vulnerable in terms of concern with reducing poverty in Rio in the treatment condition while the reverse is true in the control.

[64] A significantly higher proportion of upscale respondents in the treatment than the control group identified as partisans. The question asked whether the respondent currently sympathized with any party. 39 percent of people in the treatment group and 22 percent in the control group answered "Yes" (*p*: 0.012) Unfortunately, few respondents who said they identified with a party gave us the name of the party in the follow-up question (eight in the control group and thirteen in the treatment group), which asked the respondent with what party (s)he sympathized. Enumerators were instructed not to read party names so any responses were spontaneous. It is possible that a stimulated version of the question, in which respondents were read party names as response options, would have resulted in more responses.

group. To that end, respondents were asked to what extent they (dis)agreed that "It is important for me that vote buying becomes more difficult. By vote buying, I mean the exchange of cash, goods like food and cigarettes, or favors for votes."[65] A difference-of-means test shows that upscale respondents in the treatment group were significantly ($p < 0.01$) more in agreement than their peers in the control group with this statement. Both groups expressed strong support of the statement but the significant difference is consistent with the notion that the vote buying information treatment reminded respondents of the extensiveness of clientelism in Rio, which made respondents in the treatment group more eager to support solutions to end clientelism. Among vulnerable and poor respondents, there was no treatment effect on the extent to which they felt it important to make it more difficult to buy votes. This is consistent with the lack of a treatment effect on support for CCTs among these respondents. It is also additional evidence that there is a connection between an eagerness to reign in the use of vote buying and, by extension, clientelism, on the one hand, and CCT support, on the other.[66]

Conclusion

When upscale voters experience increasing concern over the clientelist ways of politicians in their district, they seek to reduce such practices by supporting policies and politicians that signal a turn to observable forms of pro-poor redistribution. The experimental evidence in this chapter is consistent with my argument that CCTs become increasingly attractive to upscale voters under the growing threat of clientelism. Upscale support for CCTs grew after exposure to the vote buying information treatment, and the positive treatment effect was consistent across support for CCTs in general, a local CCT in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and the federal *Bolsa Família* program. There is also evidence in favor of the causal mechanism I propose. The analyses indicate that upscale respondents on average consider CCTs to be free from clientelist manipulation while associating poverty with opportunities to buy votes. Upscale voters in the treatment group placed higher priority on reducing clientelism and local poverty in the city of Rio de Janeiro, respectively, than their peers in the control group.

In sum, the evidence in this chapter supports the claim that increasing concern with vote buying and clientelism should be expected to result in a upscale-poor redistributive preference convergence in favor of CCTs, explaining for instance the hitherto hard-to-explain adoption of the CFC program by Rio's first-term mayor Eduardo Paes in 2010. The CFC is the focus of the next chapter.

[65] Questions about vote buying were asked after the CCT questions such that the control group was not asked anything that resembled the vote buying treatment.

[66] Averages and treatment effects for vulnerable and the poor are presented in Table 21 in Appendix 5. Between-class differences upscale-vulnerable and upscale-poor by treatment condition are presented in Table 22 in Appendix 5.

5

Chapter 5. Why adopt a CCT? Attracting the upscale vote in clientelist contexts

The theory at play in local-level politics in Brazil

Most local governments in Brazil lack their own CCT. In 2013, no more than 435 or eight percent of 5,569 municipalities had a local CCT independent of higher-level CCTs. Higher-level CCTs include the federal *Bolsa Família* program (the Family Grant Program, BFP) (IBGE 2014). The *Cartão Família Carioca* program (the Rio Family Card, CFC), adopted in 2010, puts the city of Rio de Janeiro among the minority of local governments in Brazil to operate a CCT for its poor citizenry.[67] The CFC explicitly drew on the design of the BFP (a "Bolsa Família 2.0", see Neri 2010a). The CFC served as a supplement to the BFP benefits that poor *cariocas* already received (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2010a). It was President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) who adopted the BFP in 2003 in his first term of government. It has been found to be largely free from clientelist manipulation (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013; Zucco 2013) and an effective tool with which to reduce poverty and inequality (Lindert et al. 2007; Lindert, Skoufias, and Shapiro 2006).

The CFC is at first glance a counterintuitive policy choice in a place with such a long history of clientelism as Rio de Janeiro and, as we saw in the preceding chapter, contemporary levels of vote buying that appear higher than those in at least half of Brazilian municipalities. As I elaborate in Chapter 3, the CFC like CCTs in general should be expected to undercut clientelist redistribution. Why did first-term mayor Eduardo Paes adopt the CFC and tie material benefits to poor families in exchange for human capital-investments in the same way as the BFP? To what extent can the theory explain the rare decision to adopt a CCT in the case of local-level (referred interchangeably to as municipal or city) government in Brazil?

In this chapter, I examine the determinants of municipal CCT adoption and its effects on mayoral support. I test two hypotheses on the *carioca* case, that is, the case of the city of Rio de Janeiro. First, politicians who are considered clientelist will be more likely to adopt CCTs than politicians who are not considered clientelist (*Hypothesis 5*). Second, politicians who are considered clientelist will attract more

[67] Although it is rare with local CCTs in Brazil, it was local governments that pioneered the CCT trend. As noted in Chapter 1, the local governments of Campinas and Ribeirão Preto in the state of São Paolo and the government in the federal district of Brasília adopted CCTs in 1995. These local CCTs preceded Brazil's PETI (the Child Labor Eradication Program) by around one year and Mexico's lauded *Progresa* by two years (S. Soares and Sátyro 2010; Sanches Corrêa 2015).

support from upscale voters after adopting a CCT (*Hypothesis 3*). The longitudinal case study is geographically bounded by the city of Rio de Janeiro (the capital of the eponymous Southeastern state) and encompasses the time period from 1992 (the first year to employ majority, two-round voting in the larger cities and seven years after the re-institution of free elections) to 2012 (the first mayoral election-year after mayor Paes adopted the CFC in 2010).

To preview the results, I find that a greater need to attract the support of the upscale electorate made life difficult for politicians with a clientelist reputation. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, it was the rise of Evangelicalism as an electoral magnet for parts of the poor and the vulnerable electorates that made it hard to win elections without the backing of the upscale electorate. Analyses of survey data on support for mayoral candidates as well as election results indicate that Evangelical candidates over time attracted more voters in the popular classes (the poor and the vulnerable), which posed a problem for non-Evangelical candidates who had traditionally relied on voters in those strata to win elections. CCTs are functional policy responses to both clientelism-averse upscale voters and poor voters who demand redistribution. The 2008 candidate Paes, running under the banner of the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB), won with a very slim margin of victory in 2008. In 2010, two years before the next mayoral election, he announced the creation of the CFC. The PMDB in Rio has a reputation for clientelism and vote buying, going back at least to the military dictatorship. The CFC was an effort by Paes to cleanse himself from his party's reputation and make inroads into the upscale electorate in order to secure his bid for re-election in 2012. Analyses of survey data and election results indicate that Paes saw significant increases in support among high-income voters and in the wealthiest neighborhoods of the city. In 2008, electoral districts in the impoverished West Zone largely carried his victory while the wealthy South Zone overwhelmingly voted for his competitor Fernando Gabeira in the runoff. In 2012, Paes had much more support than in 2008 in the upscale South Zone.

As I describe in Chapter 4, there are indications that contemporary elections in Rio are characterized by relatively extensive attempts of buying the poor vote. The city of Rio de Janeiro also has a long history of clientelism, which I describe more fully in a later section of this chapter. Taken together, these indications might suggest that Rio should be understood as a most-likely case of CCT adoption. I note, however, that the unavailability of systematic data across time and space makes it difficult to assess how much more or less likely CCTs are in Rio throughout the examined time period in comparison to other cases. The case study strengthens the internal validity of the theory in addition to that provided by the experimental results presented in Chapter 4. It also complements the external validity of analyses of voter attitudes and CCT adoption across the region in Chapter 6.

Next, I describe the empirical strategy of the chapter. I then describe pro-poor redistribution in Rio across time. The subsequent section contains analyses of the voting bases of mayoral candidates from the 1992 to the 2008 election, suggesting that the winning candidates expect for Paes had won with a multiclass electoral base. In particular, winners before Paes (and his historically narrow margin of victory in 2008) had enjoyed the support of the upscale electorate. The following section

contains analyses of voting intentions through survey data as well as election results. These indicate significantly higher levels of support of Paes in the upscale electorate in 2012 than in 2008. The final section summarizes the results and its implications for the theory.

Empirical strategy

The case study in this chapter draws on a variety of methods and data sources to test the two hypotheses. I begin the empirical analysis by providing a description of clientelism in the city of Rio de Janeiro from the military dictatorship to 2012. The objective is to show the reader the ways in which politicians from some parties have manipulated social policy for political ends, and to provide a basis for my claim that clientelism concern could conceivably influence electoral support in upscale circles for a politician with a clientelist reputation. The qualitative analysis of clientelism in Rio is based on primary and secondary sources. The primary data encompasses newspaper articles that contained information about clientelism and electoral politics and statements by politicians collected either from newspapers or other sources (e.g. social media accounts of the politician in question).

I then use quantitative data and methods to compare the electoral bases of mayoral candidates in the city of Rio de Janeiro from the 1992 to the 2008 election. The objective is to compare the base of the very narrow victory of Paes in 2008 to previous victors in mayoral contests to see to what extent there was a difference. I rely on a mix of election results from the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE 2015) at the electoral zone-level where that is available (the 2000 and 2004 elections), secondary sources on the base of the winning candidate (mainly for older elections with lacking data availability), and survey data from the polling firm Datafolha (1996ab, 2000ab, and 2004).

I subsequently examine to what extent the winning coalition of Paes in 2012 included the upscale electorate to a greater extent than in 2008. In other words, I compare Paes 2008 to Paes 2012. Again, I analyze election results at the electoral zone-level from the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE 2015). To make inferences about the voter base of Paes, I use neighborhood-level income data based on 2010 census data (IBGE 2010/Instituto Pereira Passos 2016). Since electoral zones and neighborhoods boundaries are not the same, I create maps to examine their intersection. Alternatively, I use electoral zone-level data on the educational attainment of registered voters (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (2015). The voter registry has the advantage of excluding those individuals who do not vote since individuals who abstain from voting in three consecutive elections (including runoffs) are removed (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2015). Ignoring voting propensity risks making voter wealth estimations misleading.[68] The disadvantage is that education is only an indirect

[68] Although Brazil has a mandatory voting system, abstention in the first round of the 2012 mayoral elections amounted to 16 percent (Fleischer 2012), which indicates that turnout patterns should be taken seriously even in this context. In the 2016 runoff for mayor in Rio de Janeiro, 27 percent of the electorate (1.314.950 voters) abstained (UOL 2016). If

measure of wealth. Additionally, the self-reported educational variable might be misleading if voters do not update their information after the time of registration (i.e. not reflecting their current educational status). While individuals may neglect to update their educational status as they progress, it is unclear why the propensity to update voting records should be expected to vary systematically across electoral zones and bias the results. I use the percentage of registered voters with low education, measured as voters who reported being illiterate, having the ability to read and write, and having an incomplete primary education, as a proxy for the poor population.[69] As a proxy for the upscale population, I use the percentage of registered voters with a college degree.

Concerns of ecological fallacy are alleviated by analyses of vote intention surveys in the lead-up to each election. I fit logistic regression models on pooled cross-section data with respondent income and other possible explanations for vote choice as independent variables, and year-dummies to examine the hypothesized effect of income on vote intention for Paes in 2008 and 2012. The data come from Datafolha surveys with voting-age residents of Rio on the eve of the elections in 2008 and 2012. The dependent variable on vote intentions for Paes before the first round of voting is based on responses to the question "If the election for mayor of Rio de Janeiro were held today, for which of these candidates would you vote?[70] For the 2008 runoff, the dependent variable is constructed from responses to the question "The day after tomorrow/tomorrow there will be an election for mayor of Rio de Janeiro. If the runoff were held today, for what candidate would you vote?" (Datafolha 2008b).[71]

For both variables, I constructed dummy variables that are "1" if the respondent answered Paes and "0" if they intended to vote for another candidate (excluding blank votes and undecided respondents). For 2012, there are two dependent variables based on survey question in Datafolha's poll on the eve of the first round of voting (Datafolha 2012). First, respondents were asked "If the election for mayor of Rio de Janeiro were held today, for which of these candidates would you vote?"[72] and then presented with the names of the candidates. The dummy variable is "1" if the respondent answered Paes and "0" if (s)he gave any other candidate name (excluding blank votes, undecided respondents).

Second, I construct a dependent variable from responses to a question about vote intentions in a simulated runoff between Paes and leftist candidate Marcelo Freixo,[73] who was the runner-up to Paes in the polls. This simulated runoff scenario is the

abstention rates are not uniform across income, then *per capita* median income will not capture the wealth of the electorate.

[69] I coded voters as having an incomplete primary education if they responded "analfabeto", ensino fundamental incompleto" or "lê e escreve."

[70] Question P2 (Datafolha 2008a): " Se a eleição para prefeito do Rio de Janeiro fosse hoje, em qual desses candidatos você votaria? "

[71] Question P2 (Datafolha 2008b): "Depois de amanhã/ amanhã haverá eleição para prefeito do Rio de Janeiro. Se o segundo turno da eleição fosse hoje, em quem você votaria?"

[72] Question P2 (Datafolha 2012) "Se a eleição para prefeito do Rio de Janeiro fosse hoje, em qual desses candidatos você votaria?"

[73] Question item P4 in Datafolha (2012): "Se o segundo turno da eleição para prefeito do Rio de Janeiro fosse hoje e a disputa ficasse apenas entre Eduardo Paes e Marcelo Freixo em quem você votaria?"

most closely comparable situation to the eve of the 2008 runoff since Paes won re-election in the first round of voting in 2012. Even though the situations are different with respect to the number of candidates in the starting field and the runoff, respectively, the 2008 runoff and the 2012 first round of voting are similar in that they produced the winner. I constructed the dummy variable "Would vote for Paes," which takes on the value of "1" if the respondent answered Paes and "0" for respondents who answered that they would vote for Freixo (again excluding blank votes, undecided).

The independent variable of main interest is respondent family income, which is a categorical variable with seven categories. The logistic models include demographic and political variables to control for other possible explanations for vote intention. I control for the potential effect of education (independent of its correlation with income) through the categorical variable Education (encompassing eight categories from illiterate to graduate school). The models also include control variables for sex ("1" for women and "0" for men) and age (measured by a categorical variable of six categories). The potential effect of being a PMDB partisan (that is, stating a preference for the party of Paes) is controlled for through the dummy variable PMDB Partisan that is "1" if the respondent said PMDB was their preferred political party and "0" otherwise. The potential effect of having a preference for any party is controlled for through the dummy Partisan that is "1" if the respondent stated any partisanship other than PMDB and "0" otherwise.

Pro-poor redistribution in the city of Rio de Janeiro: from clientelism to CCTs

Clientelism has been a prominent and long-standing feature of *carioca* (referring to the city of Rio) as well as *fluminense* (referring to the state of Rio) politics. Clientelism is referred to as *clientelista* and *assistencialista* politics in Portuguese, and I use these terms interchangeably. As an indication of the common assessment of Rio as a clientelist context from the days of the military dictatorship to the 2000s, consider how the newspaper *Jornal do Brasil* presented the victor of the 2002 gubernatorial election Rosinha Garotinho (wife of former governor Anthony Garotinho): "the heiress of the *clientelista* and *assistencialista* tradition of Chagas Freitas (PMDB) in the 70s, of Leonel Brizola (PDT) in the 80s and 90s, and of her husband since 98" (*Jornal Do Brasil* 2002). As the quote suggests, clientelism in Rio has persisted through the military dictatorship installed via the 1964 *coup d'etat*, the democratic opening in the 1980s, and the re-installment of multiparty elections in 1985. During the military dictatorship in the MDB-dominated Chaguista era (becoming the *P[artido]MDB* in the democratic opening once parties were allowed to freely form), redistribution to the poor was "characterized by clientelism and the absence of comprehensive policies for the favelas" (Cavalcanti 2004, 81). Hagopian (1996, 16) classifies the MDB's efforts to gain the support of the poor during the Chaguista era as "a machine-based form of clientelism." The influence of the

"máquina chaguista" (Sarmento 2004) was maintained through a network of local leaders who brokered (much like the colonels in the interior in the Old Republic) deals with impoverished populations of access to basic goods like water (earning this style of politics its nickname *bica d'água* meaning water pipe, faucet) in exchange for political support (Fuiza de Melo and Cariello 2002).

After the end of the Chaguista era and the erosion of MDB hegemony over politics in Rio in the early 1980s, neighborhood associations took over the role as broker between the city and its poor residents since the Brizola government lacked a political machine. Secretaries in the Brizola government in the 1980s and early 1990s would broker deals with the leaders of neighborhood associations of votes in return for privileged access to government programs such as a highly valued spot in the underdimensioned public school system (Fuiza de Melo and Cariello 2002). Later, programs like the *Favela-Bairro* (Slum-Neighborhood), adopted in 1994 in the first term of mayor Cesar Maia (PMDB) with the objective to urbanize the favelas, appear to similarly have been politically manipulated to shore up electoral support in underprivileged communities (Fuiza de Melo and Cariello 2002). Observers have described access to the Favela-Bairro program as the result of a negotiated "political agreement" between favela leaders and the government under the guise of popular participatory democracy (Magalhães 2004, 81).

In more recent years, politicians have established bailiwicks in lower and working-class neighborhoods through so-called social centers, providing basic healthcare, access to wheelchairs, vocational training, and so, to their constituents. An ethnographic study conducted 2005-06 (Siqueira 2009) details the political function of such social centers. The study follows one local deputy in the impoverished West Zone of Rio who maintained three social centers in his bailiwick, financed according to the deputy by himself and a co-partisan federal deputy. These centers allowed the deputy to keep records of around 80,000 voters in his area, in turn allowing him to mail or otherwise contact them directly to ask for their votes and maintain contact in-between the visits (for example in the form of birthday cards to remind the voter of his or her benefactor). The deputy also held visiting hours in these centers once a month, during which constituents would come and ask for help with anything from money for medicines to a job (Siqueira 2009).

Seventh-term local deputy Rosa Fernandes (PMDB) stands out as an example of a politician of the *assistencialista* brand, reflecting the emphasis on providing social assistance-type benefits to poor, urban constituents.[74] Fernandes inherited several social centers from her father Pedro Fernandes, the 10-term state deputy who was derisively called a "deputado fisiológico because he sought [issues like] water supply, paving of the streets, public lighting, renovation of squares …" (Fernandes 2002, 217; Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro 2016; Scofield Jr. 2013).[75]

[74] A common way to distinguish between types of politicians is accordingly to say that they are *assistencialistas* or *fisiológicos* (named after its focus on material rather than ideational rewards), on the one hand, or *ideológicos*, on the other (Kuschnir 1999). Deputies in the *assistencialista* tradition frame their work in terms of assistance and portray themselves and benefactors and patrons, in sharp contrast to the ideological deputy who view their efforts as work and portray themselves as the instruments or spokespersons of poor voters (Kuschnir 1999, 43).

[75] Fernandes was the most voted deputy in 2000 (then affiliated with the Democratas, DEM) 2004 (*Partido da Frente Liberal*, PFL), and 2012 (PMDB) (*Folha de S.Paulo* 2008; *Folha de S.Paulo* 2004; *G1 RJ* 2012).

Assistencialista-leaning politicians frame their work as heroic contributions in a city that has long neglected its poor residents.[76] Kuschnir (2000) notes how deputies in this tradition often stress the long hours they put in, sacrificing their leisure for the community, as well as their personal financial contributions to help constituents.[77] But contrary to the self-sacrificing framing provided by politicians in this tradition, the literature understands the underprovision of services and downward income redistribution as instrumental to the ability of this brand of politicians to win elections. In Southern Italy, for example, the low performance of the economy, the hard-to-access bureaucracy, and the scarcity of employment opportunities except for government jobs were central mechanisms that maintained the Christian Democratic Party's hegemony (Chubb 1982). According to a newspaper interview with the political scientist Cesar Romero Jacob in connection to the 2008 elections in Rio, "local deputies are not interested in making public services work. They are interested in making sure the public service does not function such that their own social assistance centers will help create a client relationship" (Mathias 2008).

The underprovision of public services to low-income individuals has a long history in Rio. In her 1968-69 study of favelas in Rio, Perlman (1976, 141) finds that "The Bureau of Social Services, an amalgam of 12 former institutes, consistently treats favelados and the poor in general in such a 'slow, inefficient, punitive, brusque, and dehumanizing' manner that many favelados avoid using its facilities, and pay private institutions for the needed services." Although Perlman argues that the 1964 coup and the subsequent cancellation of popular elections meant that the poor "lost the major bargaining power they had" (Perlman 1976, 207), she challenged the prevailing wisdom at the time of the poor as a passive, politically disinterested group. Rather, Perlman found plenty of political organization within favelas (typically the Residents' Association), whose local leaders "serve the brokerage function between their members and outside contacts" (Perlman 1976, 163). While local leaders function as intermediaries in-between elections, the *cabo eleitoral* performed the role as broker in the lead-up to elections, delivering votes to the candidate in exchange for goods or services from the candidate. Perlman describes how *favelados* sold their votes for benefits that were sometimes collective in nature (club goods) such as "sewer pipes or cement steps" while at other times benefits were for individuals in the shape of "clothes, shoes, or food" (Perlman 1976, 170–71).

It is typically local deputies who are depicted in stories of *assistencialismo* and *clientelismo*. The domination apparent of deputies rather than mayors in clientelist exchanges can according to the theory I propose be explained by the fact that local

[76] Fernandes (2002), for example, motivates her and her father's bent toward *assistencialista* politics with City Hall's neglect of the outskirts of Rio such as her own electoral base in the North Zone neighborhood of Irajá while investing heavily in South Zone neighborhoods like Ipanema and Copacabana.

[77] In her ethnographic study 1995-97 of a lower-income neighborhood in the North Zone, Kuschnir (2000, see also 1999) details the locally embedded relationships between clientelist politicians in the city and state legislature (some elected as early as in the 1960s), respectively, and their voters. Kuschnir (2000) argues that the fate of politicians in Rio de Janeiro in the time period under study who went after the poor vote had little to do with their legislative actions and much with their everyday actions to help their constituents in their electoral strongholds with access to cash, health care, school enrollment, and so on.

deputies are elected with a relatively small number of votes and can concentrate their electoral base in a relatively small geographic and homogenous area. *Assistencialista* deputy Rosa Fernandes (currently MDB), for example, won her first seat in the local assembly with no more than 12,231 votes (Fernandes 2002). In contrast, the winner of the closest runoff in the history of Rio in the examined time period (since the installation of two-round voting in 1992), Eduardo Paes (PMDB) in 2008, needed 1,696,195 votes to take home the election (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015). In the same election, the least-voted candidate who won a place in the local assembly received 3,200 votes (*G1 Globo* 2008).

The heterogeneous effect of clientelism on voters across the income distribution (see Weitz-Shapiro 2012 on the political manipulation of social assistance beneficiary lists; and Holland 2015 on discretionary redistribution to groups of poor citizens) matters little for local deputies who can establish an electoral base in one large neighborhood or several smaller neighborhoods by privileging its residents in the distribution of public resources and access to overburdened health care and education services. Mayors appear primarily to be linked to *assistencialista* politics through coalitions with influential deputies. For example, Robert Gay's (1999) fieldwork in the favela Vila Brasil in the lead-up to the 1996 elections documents how the local assembly candidate Jorge Leite (PFL) delivered a variety of material benefits to the neighborhood association president in exchange for the president encouraging the community to vote for Leite. In addition to the president's endorsement, Leite was allowed to put up his campaign posters in the favela, which not only were advertisements for Leite but also for his co-partisan and mayoral candidate Luiz Paulo Conde (who ended up winning the election) whose name, party affiliation, and candidacy number appeared on the poster together with those of Leite. In one instance, Gay (1999, 61) is told by a community member that Leite had promised the construction of a medical center if he and Conde "received a significant number of votes in the favela."[78]

The *carioca* left has by and large served as a counterforce to clientelism and *políticas assistencialistas*, abstaining from using clientelist appeals to attract low-income voters even as leftist candidates have been more or less consistently unsuccessful in most of the impoverished and populous West and North Zone since the early 1990s. The last Leftist mayor was PDT's Marcello Alencar, elected in 1989. The left has in contrast resonated well with the minority upscale electorate, largely residing in the South Zone. Gay (1999, 59) was told by his informants that the PT was unsuccessful in poor neighborhoods at least partly because PT candidates only pursued the so-called conscientious vote (*voto conscientizado*) rather than votes by clientelist persuasion. In addition to its abstention from clientelism and the lack of anything resembling the organizational resources of the PMDB machine, observers attribute the failure of the left to its neglect of redistribution and material issues; instead focusing on broader, ideological themes and, more recently, post-materialist issues such as sexual rights and marijuana liberalization that have relatively little

[78] Gay (1999, 62) writes that when asked why they supported a candidate from a "party of business elites and authoritarian accomplishes," Vila Brasil residents responded "We are not supporting the PFL because of its ideas" […] "We want to see things done in this community and in other communities of the region."

traction in the underprivileged electorate (Gay 1994; Dutra 2016; Interview).[79] In 2004, the left's rejection of clientelism was manifest in the national "Citizen Vote" campaign, sponsored amongst others by then-PT federal deputy Chico Alencar who had been a fixture of the *carioca* left since the late 1980s when he was first elected to the local assembly. The "Citizen Vote" campaign aimed to raise awareness of the democratic costs of vote buying. Alencar said he hoped the campaign would get people to "vote in a more conscious way" (Agência Brasil 2004) and in effect "repel clientelism, this lowly way of doing politics" (Câmara dos Deputados 2004). The campaign slogan "Your vote does not have a price, it has consequences" (Câmara dos Deputados 2004) was the same as in the 1998 national campaign against vote buying, which in 1999 resulted in the first law by popular initiative, sharpening the legal consequences of engaging in vote buying (Nichter 2011) to "fight corruption, *fisiologismo*, and clientelism" (Câmara dos Deputados 2004).

In 2012, now affiliated with PSOL (*Partido Socialismo e Liberdade*, which was created in 2005 by PT defectors who thought the party had become too centrist after winning the presidency), Alencar campaigned together with co-partisan Marcelo Freixo in the latter's bid for mayor of Rio. Alencar encouraged voters in the lead-up to the election to reflect upon the candidates who tried to gain their votes through ideas, projects, and causes, rather than through "vote buying, promise of employment, school enrollment, hospital beds" (Alencar 2012). Freixo, who lost the 2012 runoff against the PMDB incumbent Paes, emphasized that he had run a "clean" campaign (Reis 2012).[80] Similarly, progressive *Partido Verde* mayoral candidate Fernando Gabeira said after losing the 2008 runoff against Paes (PMDB) that his opponent had run a "dirty campaign" with the help of the PMDB machine, allegedly using access to school meals to promote the Paes candidacy (Clark 2008).

The 1996-2008 elections: the upscale vote and the rise of Evangelicalism

Paes became the first PMDB mayor of Rio since Cesar Maia's victory in 1992. Paes also won with the slimmest margin of votes of any candidate since the start of majority elections in 1992. The vote share of Paes (50.8 percent) only gave him a difference against Gabeira amounting to 55,225 votes (TSE 2015). The victory of Paes was attributed to the support of low-income voters, primarily in the impoverished West zone, while the upscale vote in the South zone was largely won by Gabeira (e.g. *Estadão de S. Paulo* 2008; Tabak and Marqueiro 2008). In other words, Paes enjoyed a highly concentrated electoral base in the popular sectors: the poor and vulnerable (working-class) sectors that are primarily found in the West and North

[79] Interview with Rio-based journalist, Rio de Janeiro, October 20, 2017.

[80] This was very similar to what Freixo said upon losing the mayoral contest once again in 2016, that he was "the moral winner" (Dutra 2016).

zones of the city.[81] The failure of Gabeira to attract votes from the popular classes looks very similar to his losing strategy in the 1986 gubernatorial election, which focused on post-materialist values and issues of "racial, ecological, and sexual" character, rather than "traditional working-class demands" (Gay 1994, 175; Interview).[82] The weak showing of the Paes candidacy was in spite of the endorsement by governor Sérgio Cabral (PMDB) (de Moraes 2011) and, in the runoff, president Lula and the PT, too (Lopes 2016; *G1 RJ* 2008).[83] Paes also had the advantage of the PMDB machine and the resources of the state and federal government (Alves 2008; Interview)[84] as well as Pentecostal Evangelical Marcello Crivella and the candidate Jandir Feghali from the communist party (PCdoB) (Alves 2008).

Yet Paes had weak results in upscale neighborhoods. According to observers at time, "It should have been a much larger difference [between votes for Paes and Gabeira] given the number of endorsements that Paes had" (interview in newspaper *O Globo* with political scientist Ricardo Ismael, Alves 2008). The margin of victory would arguably have been even narrower had turnout in the South zone been higher. Abstention there, where Gabeira won 70.88 percent of votes, was 25 percent. In Paes's bastions in the West zone (with vote shares ranging from 57.26 to 42.74 percent), in contrast, abstention was 17 percent (*O Globo* 2008b). Upscale areas saw higher abstention, which some (including Gabeira) have credited to the decision by governor and Paes's co-partisan Cabral to declare a public holiday on the Tuesday following the election on Monday, leading some to use the extended weekend for travelling (*O Globo* 2008b, 20; Interview).[85] Overall, 927,250 voters, representing 20.25 percent of the population, abstained in the runoff (*O Globo* 2008b; *Terra* 2008).[86] This was the highest abstention rate since the 1996 runoff between Conde and Cabral when 21.42 percent abstained. Abstentions together with null and blank votes added up to 1.2 million votes. The margin of victory amounted to 55,225 votes (Tabak 2008).

It is unsurprising that Paes largely failed to attract the votes of the upscale electorate in 2008 given the long-standing tendency of the PMDB — from the Chaguista era through contemporary practices of *assistencialismo* in the social assistance centers of local deputies — to engage in clientelism to win votes. Further below, I present systematic ecological as well as survey analyses that indicate the weak standing of Paes among upscale voters in 2008 in comparison to 2012, as well as in relation to the winning mayoral candidates 1996-2004. For now, I note that survey data from the eve of the first round of voting (Datafolha 2008a) indicate that the majority (52

[81] Paes acknowledged the role of West zone residents in 2012, four months before his re-election: "Quem me elegeu prefeito dessa cidade, eu tenho que confessar, foi esse povo aqui da zona oeste. Foi essa gente que acreditou em mim e fez com que eu chegasse lá" (de Andrade 2012b).

[82] Interview with Rio-based journalist, Rio de Janeiro, October 20, 2017.

[83] The promise of an improved partnership between the city, the state, and the federal governments was a theme of the 2008 campaign. The incumbent Maia (DEM) had notably not maintained very good relations with either the state or the federal government (*Folha de S.Paulo* 2008; Tabak 2008; *O Globo* 2008a).

[84] Interview with Rio-based journalist, Rio de Janeiro, October 20, 2017.

[85] Interview with Rio-based journalist, Rio de Janeiro, October 20, 2017.

[86] This was more than in the first round of voting in which 17.91 percent abstained and 10.47 percent cast invalid votes (4.33 percent blank votes and 6.14 percent null). In sum, 28.38 percent of voters did not vote for a candidate in the first round (*UOL* 2008).

percent) of upscale respondents (the top-two of the seven income categories) intended to vote for Gabeira in the first round of voting. Paes only received 17 percent of the vote intentions in this group.[87] According to a survey on the eve of the runoff (Datafolha 2008b), 69 percent of the upscale planned to vote for Gabeira and 27 percent for Paes.[88] The voter base of the leftist candidates in the first round of voting in 2008 also had significantly higher incomes than that of Paes. Difference-of-means tests on the income category (seven categories, treated as a continuous variable) of respondents who said they would vote for [Paes] [Leftist candidate] show that the base of the PT candidate Molon had significantly higher incomes than that of Paes (p: 0.019), as did PSOL's Alencar and PV's Fernando Gabeira (both differences with p values < 0.001). The higher average income of the base of PDT's Paulo Ramos is not statistically significant.

In sum, Paes just barely beat the leftist candidate Gabeira in 2008, and his base was very narrowly concentrated among low-income voters. In contrast, winners of the 1996-2004 mayoral elections enjoyed relatively high levels of support among upscale voters.[89] In 1996, the literature indicates that the winner, Luiz Paulo Fernandez Conde (PFL), enjoyed cross-class support.[90] In the first round of voting, Conde had his electoral base in the upscale neighborhoods of Barra da Tijuca, Leblon, and Ipanema as well as among voters in the poor and vulnerable Ilha do Governador in the North Zone (Romero Jacob et al. 2012). In the runoff, Conde "significantly raised his electoral returns in these areas and nearby districts" (Romero Jacob et al. 2012, 11), granting him a victory against Sergio de Oliveira Cabral Santos Filho (PSDB).

Survey data, too, indicates that the 1996 winner was favored by the upscale in addition to the popular classes. I use vote intentions in the top and top-two income categories as proxies for the support of upscale respondents. On the eve of the first round of voting in the 1996 (Datafolha 1996a), Conde received the plurality (46 percent) of vote intentions in the top-two income categories.[91] Before the runoff, 75 percent of respondents in the same income category intended to vote for Conde (Datafolha 1996b).[92] The winner of the 2000 elections (Maia, then PTB) was only behind the incumbent Conde in the vote intentions of respondents in the top-two income categories: 24 percent of respondents in the top-two income categories[93] said they would vote for Maia while 39 percent would vote for Conde (PFL) (Datafolha 2000a). On the eve of the runoff, a slim majority (51 percent) of high-income respondents said Maia and 49 percent said Conde (Datafolha 2000a). Maia's posi-

[87] If we exclude respondents who were undecided or planned to cast blank votes, the percentage in favor of Gabeira is 55 percent and, in favor of Paes, 18 percent.

[88] The percentage in favor of Gabeira is 72 when excluding respondents who were undecided or planned to cast blank votes. Paes received 28 percent of the valid vote intentions in the upscale group.

[89] Survey data as well as well as disaggregated election results from the 1992 election is unavailable.

[90] In 1996, Maia (by now affiliated with PFL) was barred to run since the electoral law did not yet allow for mayoral re-election. Instead of running himself, he chose party colleague Luiz Paulo Fernandez Conde who had served as Secretary of Urban Affairs in the highly approved Maia administration as his intended successor (de Moraes 2011; Lopes 2016).

[91] 52 percent in top income category with 31 respondents.

[92] 76 percent in top income category with 25 respondents.

[93] There were only eleven and 20 respondents in the top income category before the 2000 first round of voting and runoff, respectively, so we add the next-to-highest income category to increase the number of observations.

tion among the upscale strengthened between the 2000 and 2004 election. On the eve of the 2004 election, now as a candidate for PFL, Maia was the beneficiary of the majority (66 percent) of upscale vote intentions (proxied as the top income category of a total of six).[94] The second most popular candidate among upscale respondents (PT candidate Jorge Bittar) received no more than eleven percent of vote intentions (Datafolha 2004).

I also use election results by electoral zone when available (2000-2004) (TSE 2015) to examine the voter base (proxied by the education profile of registered voters in each of the 97 electoral zones) of former winners in mayoral contests. A simple correlation matrix shows that there was a positive association between college education and vote shares for Maia in 2000 as well as 2004. Across the zones, the correlation between the proportion of voters with a college degree and the vote share for Maia was 0.625 (p-value < 0.000) in 2000, and 0.736 (p < 0.000) in 2004. These correlations are illustrated in Figure 28 in the appendix.

I also calculated the percentage of voters with at least a primary education but less than a college degree (as a proxy for vulnerable voters), and the percentage of voters with less than a primary education (poor voters). In 2000, the correlation coefficient for the former was 0.552 and -0.742 for the latter (p < 0.000 for both). In 2004, the correlation coefficient for the former is 0.506 and -0.810 for the latter (p < 0.000 for both). In other words, the ecological data show that increases in the size of the intermediate to highly educated electorate are associated with stronger support for Maia in 2000 as well as 2004, while increases in the electorate with low levels of education are associated with weaker support for Maia. While the data is at the electoral zone-level, one plausible interpretation of these correlations is that vulnerable and upscale voters were more supportive of Maia than were poor voters. The two graphs in Figure 29 in the appendix show the linear predicted fit from a simple ordinary least squares regression with reported education level of registered voters as the independent variable and Maia's vote share as the dependent variable, and scatterplots of the observations in 2000 and 2004.

The lack of an upscale voter base — a characteristic that put the 2008 Paes candidacy in stark contrast to the winners of at least the previous three elections for which there is data — was problematic since the rise of Evangelicalism as an electoral magnet for the lower strata[95] had put a splinter in PMDB's historic voter base among the poor and the vulnerable classes.[96] The Evangelicals only became a cohesive constituency after the end of the military dictatorship when Evangelical leaders began efforts to mobilize their congregations (Freston 1993). Before that, "Pente-

[94] Given the low number of observations in the top category (38), I also examine the distribution of vote intentions in the highest and next-to-highest income category. The majority (60 percent) in this expanded group, too, said they would vote for Maia. None of the other nine candidates received more than ten percent in this group.

[95] In 2000, the majority of Pentecostals had below-average incomes and education, and there were more black and *pardos* (mixed race) in the Pentecostal denominations than in the population overall (Mariano 2004).

[96] According to the 2000 census, 11.3 percent of the population in Rio were Pentecostal Evangelicals (Castro 2012). According to the 2010 census (Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil 2015), there were close to 1.5 million (1.477.021 or 23 percent) Evangelicals in Rio in 2010, of which 800 000 (794 006 or 13 percent) were of the Pentecostal denomination. The Pentecostals can further be divided into God's Assembly (432 138) and the Universal Church (116 906).

costals were known for an evangelism directed almost exclusively towards the poor and for self-exclusion from politics" (Freston 1993, 26).

Evangelicalism had presented itself as a new way of engaging the poor in the state of Rio, at least in part through clientelism, with the 1998 gubernatorial election of Anthony Garotinho (PDT) following the growth and political mobilization of Evangelicals that had been occurring since the 1980s.[97] Garotinho drew on religious associations (primarily Evangelical churches) to form linkages between the poor and politicians, in effect introducing the church-affiliated broker (Fuiza de Melo and Cariello 2002). For example, Garotinho started the *Cheque Cidadão* (Citizen Check) program in 1999 that gave families monthly food stamps in the value of R$100 (US$31) that they could use in select supermarkets, and was distributed to churches that in turn were responsible to grant the money to poor families on the condition that the children attended school and received vaccinations, *and* registered with the churches.[98] In addition to the flagrant privileging of the Evangelical base of Garotinho over other religious associations, the program was criticized for its clientelist use (Machado 2006).[99] Lavinas, Barbosa, and Tourinho (Lavinas, Barbosa, and Tourinho 2001, 4) describe *Cheque Cidadão* in the following way:

> the state government, contradicting secular principles of citizenship, transfers to Evangelical churches a so-called "citizen's check", serving as a kind of "food stamp": the "check" is worth R$100 (US$70) and can be redeemed for foodstuffs or other goods at shops registered with the government's authorized network of suppliers. Meanwhile, the Evangelical churches choose from among their followers those who are to benefit from this gift from the state, using religious, moral, and behavioural criteria, completely distorting a programme whose efficiency and efficacy have been proven as a way to combat poverty and reinvigorate Brazil's meagre social policy reserve.

[97] Evangelicalism has grown in strength at the national political stage in parallel to *carioca* and *fluminense* politics. Evangelicals represented seven percent of the population in 1980, nine percent in 1991, 15 percent in 2000, and 22 percent in 2010 (Polimédio 2018; IBGE 2012). The so-called Bancada Evangélica in Congress has increased gradually since the mid-1980s: "In 1985, the bloc had 17 members; by 2006, membership had grown to 57, or 12.5 percent of the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies. By 2014, 93 members or 15 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and five members of the Senate (a body with 81 members) belonged to the bloc" (Encarnación 2017).

[98] The program was characterized by detailed record keeping of beneficiaries, which enabled its manipulation for these electoral ends. Pastors in some cases would only agree to enroll families after having been shown the voter identification card of the family representative, in turn enabling the pastor-broker to monitor voting for the politician-patron in the polling place of the voter (electoral returns are reported down to the level of the electoral section, which determines the polling place of the voter), which in small municipalities (or small electoral zones) may collect only a small number of voters (Praça 2017). In the beginning, only Evangelical churches participated but after protests from the former governor Brizola (PDT) amongst others, Catholic and other churches, too, were included in the program (de Faria 2000). Yet the majority, 84 percent of the enrolled churches, were of the Evangelical label in May 2000 (Pereira dos Santos 2015).

[99] Garotinho later went on to the executive of the oil-rich municipality Campos dos Goytacazes in the north of the state of Rio de Janeiro (where his wife Rosinha, the former governor of Rio and the *clientelista* and *assistencialista* heiress according to the quote in the beginning of the section, now served as mayor) and was arrested in 2016 along with eight suspected vote sellers on the allegation that he had manipulated the beneficiary rolls of the municipal cash transfer program *Cheque Cidadão* (the same name as the state-level food stamp program during his governorship) that granted a monthly transfer of R$200 (around US$62) to the neediest families for electoral ends (Seabra 2016). 6 of the 25 local deputies in Campos were removed from office in 2017 for their involvement in the clientelist scheme (*G1 Globo* 2017).

The Evangelicals' strength in numbers and cohesiveness as a voting bloc implied that mayoral candidates needed to tailor their strategies to a realigned electorate.[100] In 1992, Evangelical PT candidate Benedita da Silva lost against Maia (PMDB at the time) but I lack disaggregated election results as well as surveys to analyze their respective bases. In 1996, there was no Evangelical candidate running for mayor. There is, however, survey data to examine the bases of the winner and the Evangelical candidate in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections (Datafolha 2000a, 2004, 2008a). Maia, winning in 2000 as well as 2004, had a voter base that had significantly higher incomes than the Evangelical candidate (da Silva in 2000 and Evangelical candidate and *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus* bishop Crivella (PRB)[101] in 2004). On the eve of the 2000 election, Maia (then PTB) and da Silva (PT) were tied runners-up (18 and 17 percent, respectively, of vote intentions when including all income groups). But they had distinctively different bases in terms of income. da Silva, both an Evangelical and a PT candidate, had a voter base that was significantly poorer than that of Maia ($p < 0.001$). In 2004, the incomes of supporters of Conde from the PMDB and Crivella were statistically indistinguishable, indicating that they were competing for same base.

The winner in 2004, Maia, did not, in contrast, share Crivella's base as indicated by the highly significant, higher mean in the group of voters who intended to vote for Maia than Crivella ($p < 0.001$). In 2008, Crivella captured 19 percent of the valid votes in the first round of voting (G1 2008), which was not enough to take him to the runoff.[102] In the first round of voting in 2008, there were significant differences between Paes and Crivella supporters according to the Datafolha survey on the eve of the election (Datafolha 2008a). Those voters who said they would vote for Paes had on average higher family incomes ($p < 0.01$) and more education ($p < 0.001$) than voters who intended to vote for Crivella.[103] According to responses to Datafolha's survey on the eve of the runoff (Datafolha 2008b), the base of Paes (those who said they intended to vote for him if the election were held today) became sig-

[100] The efficacy of the Evangelical church in delivering the poor vote led most recently to the victory of the Evangelical *Igreja Universal* bishop Marcelo Crivella (PRB) in the 2016 mayoral elections in Rio. In a pre-election survey fielded ten days before the 2016 mayoral elections, Crivella had most support among those with the least education (41 percent), low incomes (39 percent), and Evangelicals of the Pentecostal (50 percent) as well as the non-Pentecostal (51 percent) variety (Datafolha 2016). In a simulated runoff between Crivella against the five candidates in the first round of voting who polled best (including Paes's intended successor and PMDB co-partisan Pedro Paulo, Crivella in all five situations had his largest advantage against his competitors among the poorest, the least educated, and the Pentecostal and non-Pentecostal Evangelicals (Datafolha 2016).

[101] Together with *Assémbleia de Deus* and *Congregação Cristã no Brasil*, the Universal Church collected 74 percent of all Pentecostals in Brazil in 2000 (Mariano 2004). In 2000, the majority of Pentecostals had below-average incomes and education, and there were more black and *pardos* (mixed race) in the Pentecostal denominations than in the population overall (Mariano 2004).

[102] It is likely that Crivella would have made a stronger showing in 2008 if there had not been a split between the neo-Pentecostals of Crivella's Universal Church and the traditional Pentecostals of God's Assembly, the latter of which federal deputy Manoel Ferreira led and whose votes were encouraged by the same Ferreira in August to go to Paes. After Ferreira endorsed Paes, Crivella went from 26 to 19 percent of the vote intentions (Marques 2008).

[103] P2: Se a eleição para prefeito do Rio de Janeiro fosse hoje, em qual desses candidatos você votaria?" Excludes blank votes and undecided voters. Crivella supporters were also older than Crivella supporters (p: 0.010). Unsurprisingly, a larger proportion of Crivella supporters identified as Pentecostal Evangelicals, while Paes had a larger proportion of Catholics among his voters ($p < 0.001$).

nificantly poorer in the runoff ($p < 0.01$).[104] The Datafolha survey on the eve of the runoff did not ask about religiosity so it is impossible to directly compare the proportions of Catholics and Pentecostals among the base of Paes in the first round of voting and the runoff. The lower level of income and education, however, is compatible with the hypothesis that Crivella split the group that otherwise may have voted for Paes. This is an indication that the Evangelical candidate "took" votes from Paes that were to some extent "returned" when Crivella did not make it to the runoff. While Evangelicals had carved out a distinct following in the popular classes already in the 2000 and 2004 elections, Maia in contrast to the 2008 Paes also enjoyed the support of upscale voters.

The increasing difficulty after the rise of Evangelicalism for any one candidate of collecting enough popular class votes (i.e. the support of the poor and vulnerable) to win made it key to also receive votes from the upscale electorate. As it happened, no Evangelical candidate ran in the 2012 election, but the preceding elections (all elections but the one in 1996 since the installment of majority elections in 1992, see Castro 2012) had seen the Evangelical constituency develop into an increasingly cohesive voting bloc. Paes needed to find another constituency to shore up support for his re-election given the narrow margin of victory in 2008. As indicated by the survey data from earlier in this section, upscale voters in 2008 primarily concentrated their votes on leftist candidates, who in turn have taken strong stances against *clientelism* and *assistencialismo* in Rio and beyond. Additionally, the increasing strength of the Evangelicals, whose base in 2008 was significantly poorer than that of Paes, made efforts to appeal to poor voters prudent. As I argue in Chapter 3, CCTs in clientelist contexts simultaneously serve to satisfy the demand for redistribution among the poor and the demand for drastically reduced use of clientelism among upscale voters. I argue that this explains why Paes in late 2010 announced the creation of the citywide CCT *Cartão Família Carioca* (the Rio Family Card) that was designed to serve as a local supplement to the federal government's flagship social assistance program the *Bolsa Família*, which in 2015 had 13.7 million beneficiary households that represented around 20 percent of the total households in the population (IBGE 2016; Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2010a; Palácio do Planalto 2015b).

At the time of the launch, Paes said the CFC would benefit 100,000 families, in effect lifting 440,000 individuals out of poverty with benefits ranging from R$20 to around R$ 400 per family, with an average benefit of R$70 (approx. US$6, US$125, and US$22, respectively) (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2010b). Poorer families received larger benefits since the objective was to complement family income until it was no longer under the poverty line (Neri 2012). In its first year, the CFC benefited close to eight percent of the *carioca* population (PMDB 2011). 422,000 individuals benefited from the CFC with a monthly average of 85,000 beneficiary families in the program's first year. 80 percent of beneficiaries lived in the North or West Zone of Rio (Leta 2011).[105]

[104] Likewise, education levels dropped (p: 0.034) while age remained unchanged.

[105] 12 percent of the beneficiaries were from the favelas Complexo de Alemão or Penha, which in the preceding year had become "pacified communities" (meaning formerly crime-ridden favelas in which the state of Rio beginning in its

By the end of the CFC's first year of operation, Paes announced an expansion of the program. The city would aim to increase the take-up rate (that is, the beneficiary rate in the target group) as well as double the value of the benefits for people with disabilities and for adolescents in the pacified favelas (PMDB 2011; Leta 2011). In 2013, the CFC reached 146,875 families, representing 2.3 percent of the total number of individuals in the poor population and 37 percent of the poor population. As a proportion of the total number of households, the CFC covered 6.8 percent of the local population. Similar coverage rates are found for other local CCTs in Brazil (Secretaria Municipal da Casa Civil 2011; IBGE 2014).[106] The overall take-up rate (families in poverty or extreme poverty), was 0.78 according to a municipal evaluation in 2016, using the 2010 census as the basis for the size of the poor and extremely poor population (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2016).

The CFC was designed in partnership with the academic institution Fundação Getúlio Vargas under the leadership of the Princeton-educated economist Marcelo Neri and drew on the design of the BFP ("Bolsa Família 2.0", see Neri 2010a) (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2010b), which, surprisingly in light of Brazil's long history of clientelism, has been found to overall be free from the interference of politicians (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013). At the launch of the CFC, Paes was accompanied by the governor and PMDB co-partisan Cabral (who the following year adopted the state-level *Renda Melhor* program), president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the PT (who expanded the federal government's CCT efforts, consolidating several smaller programs into the *Bolsa Família*), and the director of the *Caixa Econômica Federal* (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2010b). Like the BFP and other social assistance benefits administered by the federal government, the CFC used the *Cadastro Único* as its beneficiary base (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2010a, 2; Vieira da Costa et al. 2010).[107] Also like the BFP, CFC benefit payment is done via *Caixa Economica Federal* (Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro 2010b), limiting the ability of local politicians to interfere with the payment of benefits.[108]

While there to the best of my knowledge exists no research on the extent to which CFC benefits are distributed according to the rules (or to what extent any

preparation for the 2014 World Cup had placed "Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora" to disrupt criminal organizations in the communities) (PMDB 2011).

[106] Information on the income cutoffs is not available for all municipal CCTs, which in 2013 totaled 435 or eight percent of Brazil's 5,569 municipalities. The IBGE municipal social assistance survey (2014) does, however, collect data on the number of beneficiary households and so it is possible to get a sense for the relative size of the direct beneficiary group. The average (median) proportion of beneficiary households in the total municipal population was 3.7 percent (1.4 percent). As a proportion of the number of households, the average beneficiary household proportion was 13.8 percent and the median 4.7 percent. The average (median) proportion of beneficiaries in the poor municipal population was 24.5 percent (7.9 percent). Data on the number of households is from the 2010 census (IBGE 2010). Data on the estimated population number in 2013 is from IBGE municipal social assistance survey (2014).

[107] The *Cadastro Único* was created in 2001 to keep records of families with income per capita under ½ minimum wage or total family income up to three minimum wages (Neri 2010b).

[108] Governor Cabral would the following year, in November 2011, launch the state-level CCT *Renda Melhor*, which like the CFC was linked to the BFP in its selection of beneficiaries but used a higher poverty line than the federal government in reflection of the higher costs of living in urban Rio than the national average (the line for the CFC (Renda Melhor) benefits was monthly family per capita income less than R$ 108 (R$ 100), in comparison to the R$ 70 of the federal government at the time) (Neves and Filho 2011; Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2011; PMDB 2011).

discrepancies can be understood as political manipulation for electoral ends), several of the program characteristics just discussed indicate that it was designed to break with the historic tendency toward clientelism in Rio, especially so the clientelist inclinations of the PMDB in the Chaguista era and beyond. First, it uses the *Cadastro Único* to decide who benefits. It is the municipalities that are responsible for registering poor families in the database but the federal government (primarily through the *Cadastro Único* subsection of the *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social*, MDS) is responsible for the selection of beneficiaries for the federal social assistance programs like the BFP. To that end, the MDS undertakes yearly controls of the veracity of the data that municipalities report. Decisions of BFP beneficiaries and control over BFP benefits rest with the federal level such that mayors cannot decide to include or withdraw benefits from citizens. Individuals who believe the local social assistance office has treated them unfairly in reporting their right to benefits can report such instances of abuse to the federal MDS (Interview).[109] Second, beneficiaries register with the city bureaucracy (*the Centros de Referência da Assistência Social*, CRAS) rather than through local leaders (as in the Chaguista era), neighborhood or favela leaders (as in the Brizola era) or religious leaders (during the Garotinho state government) to limit the possibilities for political manipulation.[110]

The 2012 re-election: strengthened support among the upscale electorate

Analysis of election results: voters in favor of Paes in 2012 compared to 2008

Paes ran for re-election in 2012, again under the PMDB banner, and won a majority of votes in the first round of voting against seven candidates. He received 2,097,733 votes, which translated into a vote share of 65 percent and a 36-percentage point difference in vote share to the runner-up Freixo (PSOL) (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015). Paes greatly increased his standing in the upscale electorate between the 2008 and 2012 elections. In a survey on the eve of the election (Datafolha 2012), he received 45 percent of the upscale vote intention (using the top-two of seven income categories as a proxy for the upscale electorate) against 41 percent of the leading Leftist candidate Freixo (PSOL).[111] Compare this to the time around the hotly contested 2008 runoff when Gabeira was heavily favored by the *carioca* elite and Paes,

[109] Interviews with two senior officers at Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social, Brasília, November 1, 2017.

[110] To the best of my knowledge, there have not been any allegations of CFC benefit manipulation for political ends. In 2014, however, allegations arose over a corruption scheme (the misuse of public resources for personal enrichment) in the social assistance secretariat (Haidar 2014; Prado 2014). The social assistance secretary in the first Paes administration was accused of embezzlement. Paes quickly rebuked his former secretary ("Quem pratica corrupção vai para a cadeia") and said there would be an investigation into the contracts that been under his responsibility (*O Dia* 2014). Furthermore, the contract with the NGO that had allegedly paid the social assistance secretary was ended already in 2012 after a municipal audit found irregularities in the accounts (*O Dia* 2014).

[111] Paes had 47 percent and Freixo 43 percent of the valid vote intentions (excluding blanks and the undecided).

in his own words in a 2016 interview with the *Piauí* magazine, "could not even walk the streets of [upscale neighborhood] Leblon" (Gaspar 2016).

Before analyzing the survey data further in the next subsection, I present results from ecological analyses of election results. The growth in Paes's vote share from 2008 to 2012 was on average 14 percentage points across the 97 electoral zones of the city of Rio de Janeiro, ranging from 5 to 29 percentage points. In 2008 minority districts (those in which Paes did not win a majority of votes in the 2008 runoff), growth from 2008 to 2012 was on average 19 percentage points (author's calculations based on TSE data, see Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015).

To get more traction on the question of the group of voters who started supporting Paes in 2012, I calculated the median and average income of each electoral zone that had an above-average growth in vote share for Paes between 2008 and 2012. Among minority districts with above-average (for minority districts) growth in vote shares for Paes between 2008 and 2012, the average income (calculated as the average of the neighborhood-level average monthly incomes of individuals 10 years and older in the neighborhoods that made up each electoral district) was R$3,521 and the median income (calculated as the median of the median income at the neighborhood level) was R$ 1,689. The median income in the city of Rio de Janeiro of all neighborhood-level medians was R$745 and the average income was R$1,332.[112] Among the places in which Paes attracted only weak support in 2008, the largest vote share increases for Paes between 2008 and 2012 occurred in areas whose voters were more than twice as wealthy as the average and median voter in the city.[113]

Since electoral districts sometimes encompass more than one neighborhood, I present maps of the geography of voting at the district level in the 2012 elections along with a map of the income distribution across *carioca* neighborhoods in the maps in Figure 13-Figure 15 below.[114] Average income per capita (individuals over 10 years of age) in the neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro is illustrated below in Figure 13, in which a darker shade indicates higher incomes. The map clearly reveals the highly unequal character of the city. Income is primarily concentrated in the seaside neighborhoods in the South Zone that constitutes a relatively small part of the city. The uneven distribution of income is unsurprising given Rio's Gini coefficient of 0.62 (Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil 2015) but nonetheless staggering. People in the neighborhood at the top of the income distribution (South Zone Lagoa) enjoy almost 84 times higher incomes than those who live in the neighborhood at the bottom of the income distribution (Gericinó in the Western Zone). The neighborhood-level average income per capita is R$6,160 (ca US$1,915) in Lagoa and R$74 (US$23) in Gericinó. On average across the city, income per

[112] Author's calculation of average and median income in the electoral districts. Information on the neighborhoods for each electoral zone come from (Romero Jacob et al. 2012). Data on neighbouhood-level median and average incomes of individuals 10 years and older come from *Instituto Pereira Passos* based on 2010 census data (IBGE/Instituto Pereira Passos 2016).

[113] Lapa (zona eleitoral 3) was not a neighborhood in 2010 (Paes 2012) and therefore lacks income data. Bairro Peixoto (zona eleitoral 206), Horto (zona eleitoral 212), and Muda (zona 7) were similarly not neighborhoods according to IBGE 2010 data.

[114] I thank Natalia Alvarado at the Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, for valuable assistance in creating these maps.

capita is R$1,492 (US$464) (Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil 2015). The average of the neighborhood-level average income is slightly lower (R$1,332 or US$414).

Figure 14-Figure 15 below illustrate where Paes increased his support most from the 2008 to the 2012 elections. The level of analysis is the electoral district. There were 97 electoral districts in the 2008 and 2012 elections. These maps together with the income distribution map in Figure 13 help to get an overview of where the largest increases for Paes in 2012 relative to 2008 took place. Both Figure 14 and Figure 15 (the latter in particular), show that the South Zone electorate swung toward Paes in 2012. The map in Figure 14 illustrates whether an electoral district had an above-average increase in support for Paes. The average difference is based on the electoral-district difference in vote share for Paes in 2008 and 2012. Districts with the darker shade are those that exhibit an increase that was above average, whereas those with the lighter shade saw below average-increases. The map in Figure 15 only illustrates districts in which Paes lost in 2008, i.e. those in which he received a minority of votes in the 2008 runoff against Gabeira. These minority districts, 37 in total, are shaded according to whether they exhibited above-average increases in support for Paes. As before, the average is calculated on the basis of the difference in vote share for Paes in 2008 and 2012 at the electoral-district level, but this time only including 2008 minority districts.

Figure 13. Income per capita in the neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro



Note: data on income from IBGE/Instituto Pereira Passos (2016).

Figure 14. Increases 2008-12 in the vote share of Paes in all districts



Note: data on electoral returns by electoral zone from TSE (2015).

Figure 15. Increases 2008-12 in the vote share of Paes in the districts in which he received a minority of the votes in 2008



Note: data on electoral returns by electoral zone from TSE (2015).

I also calculated the correlation between the percentage of college-educated voters in a district and Paes's vote share in a district based on voter registration data and election results from the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE 2015). In 2008, the correlation was negative with a coefficient of −0.9595 ($p < 0.000$). In a simple linear regression model, the relative size of the college-educated population is a highly significant, negative predictor of the vote share of Paes. The coefficient (−1.3) indicates that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of registered voters with a college degree is associated with a decrease of over one percentage points in the vote share of Paes in that district. In 2012, the association between college-education and vote share of Paes is still negative and highly significant but the associated decrease of a one-percentage point increase in the college-educated percentage in the registered voters in a district is now smaller (−0.8).

The correlation between district-level education and vote share in 2008 and 2012 is illustrated in the scatter plot below in Figure 16. The top slope (illustrating the regression coefficient in 2012) is flatter than the bottom slope (the regression coefficient in 2008). The negative association between a relatively large college-educated electorate and the vote share that went to Paes was, in other words, weaker in his re-election. One may speculate that the 2012 slope would have been even flatter relative to 2008 had the Evangelicals fielded their own candidate in 2012. An Evangelical candidate should be expected to have weakened the pull of Paes in districts with relatively little education (the Evangelical bastions in the West and North zones of the city).

Figure 16. Simple OLS: college-educated voters and voting for Paes



Note: percentage of college-educated voters (registered voters in 2006 and 2010, respectively) and vote share of Paes in 2008 and 2012.

I also divided the electorate according to educational status at the zone level, measuring the percentage of voters in a district with a college degree (as a measurement of the upscale), with less than a primary education (measuring the poor), and with at least a primary education but not a college degree (the vulnerable). Simple OLS with each of these measures in separate models shows that in 2008, a one percentage-point increase in the college-educated electorate is associated with a −1.3 decrease in the percentage vote share of Paes (significant at the 99 percent confidence level). Increasing the relative size of the electorate in the middle of the educational distribution is not significantly associated with the vote share of Paes.

The relative size of the electorate with the least education (less than primary) is however positively and highly significantly associated with the vote share of Paes. In 2012, a one-percentage point increase in the college-educated electorate was associated with close to a one-percentage drop in the vote share of Paes (−0.8). The relative size of the middle-educated group had no significant association to district-aggregate vote shares of Paes while increasingly large electorates with less than a primary education were associated with larger vote shares. Plots of these results with education as a proxy for upscale, vulnerable, and poor electorates can be found in Figure 30, Figure 31, and Figure 32 in Appendix 6.

Analyses of survey data: vote intention for Paes in 2008 and 2012

Logistic regression models with vote intention for Paes as the dependent variable, presented in Table 8 below, likewise indicate that support for Paes in the upscale electorate grew from 2008 to 2012. The data is from surveys on the eve of each election (round of voting) from Datafolha (2008ab, 2012). I fit three pooled, cross-section models with three different dependent variables. First, I use vote intentions for Paes in the runoff scenarios in each year (Model 1). The interaction term year-income is highly significant, indicating that higher income was associated with a higher probability of expressing support for Paes in the 2012 than the 2008 election. The constitutive term for income is likewise highly significant but negative, indicating that income in 2008 (the reference category) was negatively associated with the likelihood of supporting Paes on the eve of the runoff. All control variables are significant. Education is negatively associated with support for Paes, as is identifying with a party other than the PMDB. PMDB partisans, on the other hand, were unsurprisingly more likely to support Paes. Women were also more likely to support Paes.

Table 8. Logistic regression results: vote intention for Paes 2012-08 (pooled, cross-sectional data)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variables	*Runoffs*	*1st rounds*	*Runoff 08, 1st round 12*
Income	−0.307***	−0.030	−0.287***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Year (dummy)	0.155	1.814***	0.191
	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Year#Income	0.175***	−0.140**	0.158***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Education	−0.193***	−0.168***	−0.223***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Woman	0.215**	−0.025	0.183**
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Age	0.187***	0.119***	0.169***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)
PMDB Partisan	0.659***	0.694***	0.524**
	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.189)
Partisan (non-PMDB)	−0.425***	−0.416***	−0.403***
	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.077)
Constant	1.010***	−0.285	1.178***
	(0.162)	(0.169)	(0.163)
Observations	4,088	3,882	4,012

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

To better understand how the base of Paes changed between 2008 and 2012, I calculated the predicted probabilities for the seven different income groups used in the surveys in 2008 and 2012, respectively, while holding the control variables at their mean values. The predictions and the between-year and between-group differences are summarized in Table 9 below. Support for Paes overall (examining all income groups) increased in 2012 ($p < 0.01$ for all between-year differences) but mostly so in the higher income groups. The difference in predicted probability of expressing a vote intention for Paes in the 2012 and 2008 runoff for each of the seven income categories is illustrated in Figure 18 below. The between-year difference ranges from seven percentage points for the bottom income category to 31 percentage points in the top income category. The between-group difference for respondents in the top and bottom categories in 2012 was smaller than in 2008 (42 and 18 percentage points, respectively, as presented in Table 9). This was expected given the posi-

tive slope of the predicted between-year differences across the income categories plotted in of Figure 18.

Table 9. Differences in predicted probabilities: vote intentions before 2008 and 2012 runoffs by income group (Model 1)

	Income group								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Δ 7-1**	**Δ 6-1**
2008	.651	.579	.503	.426	.354	.287	.228	−.423	−.364
								(*.000*)	(*.000*)
2012	.722	.695	.666	.636	.605	.573	.541	−.181	−.149
								(*.000*)	(*.000*)
Δ 12-08 (*p*)	.071 (*.003*)	.116 (*.000*)	.163 (*.000*)	.210 (*.000*)	.252 (*.000*)	.286 (*.000*)	.312 (*.000*)		

Figure 17. 2012-08 differences in predicted probabilities for expressing vote intention for Paes across the income distribution. Runoffs.



Note: Control variables held at sample mean values. 95 percent confidence intervals. Data from Datafolha on vote intentions in the 2008 runoff and the 2012 runoff scenario of Paes and Freixo (Datafolha 2008b, 2012).

Figure 18. 2012-08 differences in predicted probabilities for expressing vote intention for Paes across the income distribution. First rounds of voting.



Note: Control variables held at sample mean values. 95 percent confidence intervals. Data on vote intentions in the first rounds of voting 2012-08 from Datafolha (Datafolha 2008a, 2012).

Figure 19. 2012-08 differences in predicted probabilities for expressing vote intention for Paes across the income distribution. First round 2012, runoff 2008.



Note: Control variables held at sample mean values. 95 percent confidence intervals. Data on vote intentions in the 2008 runoff and the first round of voting of 2012 from Datafolha (Datafolha 2008b, 2012).

Model 2 estimates determinants of vote intention in the first rounds of voting in 2008 and 2012. Results are presented in Table 8 above. In contrast to vote intentions on the eve of the runoffs (Model 1), the interaction term for year and respondent income is negative. The slope between supporting Paes and income was, in other words, steeper (more negative) in the first round of voting in 2012 than the first round of voting in 2008. The depressing effect of income on support for Paes was predicted to be greater in 2012 than 2008. The constitutive term for income is insignificant, indicating that there was no association between income and support for Paes in the first round of voting 2008.

Despite the steeper negative association between support for Paes and income in 2012, the predicted probability of voting for Paes in the first round of voting increased among respondents in the top income category from 29 percent in 2008 to 49 percent in 2012 ($p < 0.001$). The between-year differences for each income category are presented in the bottom row of Table 10 below and illustrated in Figure 18. The negative sign of the interaction term in Model 2 is explained by the fact that the predicted probabilities of supporting Paes among lower-income respondents increased *even more* than among higher-income respondents from 2008 to 2012. There was as a result a greater difference between the top and bottom income categories in 2012 than in 2008. In the first round of voting in 2008, the difference in

predicted probabilities between respondents in the highest and the lowest income category was estimated to four percentage points (statistically insignificant with a *p* value of 0.420). In 2012, in contrast, the difference was estimated to 20 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). The large increases in support among poor and vulnerable respondents may at least partly be explained by the absence of an Evangelical candidate in 2012 in contrast to 2008, when Evangelical candidate and bishop Crivella captured part of this electorate.

Table 10. Differences in predicted probabilities: vote intentions before the first rounds of voting in 2008 and 2012 by income group (Model 2)

	Income group								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Δ 7-1 (*p*)**	**Δ 6-1 (*p*)**
2008	.333	.326	.319	.313	.306	.300	.294	-.039 (*.420*)	-.033 (.423)
2012	.727	.692	.654	.614	.573	.531	.488	-.238 *(.000)*	-.196 *(.000)*
Δ 12-08 (*p*)	.394 *(.000)*	.365 *(.000)*	.334 *(.000)*	.301 *(.000)*	.267 *(.000)*	.231 *(.000)*	.195 *(.000)*		

Finally, Model 3 examines determinants of support for Paes on the eve of the 2008 runoff and the 2012 first round of voting, which both produced the winner. The results (presented in Table 8 above) are very similar to those of Model 1 with the same signs and confidence levels except for PMDB partisanship, which is now significant at a lower level ($p < 0.01$). In summary, higher income is associated with a higher probability of expressing support for Paes in the 2012 first round of voting than the 2008 runoff election. The predicted probabilities, presented in Table 11 below, are close to those calculated on the basis of Model 1. The difference between the top and bottom income category was 40 percentage points in 2008 and 18 percentage points in 2012 ($p < 0.001$ for both differences). The between-year increases range from eight percentage points in the bottom income category to 30 percentage points in the top income category ($p<=0.002$) (illustrated in Figure 19).

Table 11. Differences in predicted probabilities: vote intentions before the 2008 runoff and 2012 1st round by income group (Model 3)

	Income group								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	**Δ 7-1 (*p*)**	**Δ 6-1 (*p*)**
2008	.641	.573	.501	.430	.361	.298	.242	−.400 (*.000*)	−.343 (*.000*)
2012	.717	.690	.662	.632	.602	.571	.539	−.178 (*.000*)	−.146 (*.001*)
Δ 12-08 (*p*)	.076 *(.002)*	.117 (*.000*)	.160 (*.000*)	.202 (*.000*)	.241 (*.000*)	.273 (*.000*)	.297 (*.000*)		

The re-election campaign of Paes in 2012

To end this section, I briefly examine the characteristics of Paes's 2012 re-election campaign in which Paes continued to use appeals that were based on improving the lives of poor people much like he had done in the 2008 campaign and in his first term in office. For example, in June 2012 four months before the election, he said he had followed ex-president Lula's advice to "govern for everyone but especially for the poorest, the worker" ["governar para todos, mas especialmente para o povo mais pobre, trabalhador"] in his first term in office (*Veja* 2012). Lula was a vocal supporter of Paes in his bid for re-election in 2012 in contrast to the more muted endorsement in the 2008 election (which due to Paes's 2005-06 criticism of Lula in the *Mensalão* scandal when Paes was a PSDB deputy (*Veja* 2012; de Andrade 2012a)). As discussed earlier, the PT in Rio has historically won the votes of the intellectuals in the traditional neighborhoods in Zona Sul such as Laranjeiras, Flamengo and Botafogo. Lula's endorsement in 2012 may have contributed to the inroads into the upscale electorate to some extent.

The other notable endorsement came from the governor of Rio de Janeiro and PMDB colleague Cabral who in June 2016 (in the same public appearance as Lula) said that Paes was "the best mayor in the history of Rio. He made promises in 2008 and is honoring all of them" (*Veja* 2012). Cabral, who described earlier also supported Paes in 2008, said Paes had "undertaken a promise to the poorest when he ran for the mayorship" in 2008, in the West Zone and the hitherto neglected Northern zone as well as the run-down area in the Port of Rio in the city center (de Andrade 2012a). Cabral also suggested that Paes had made great strides in improving public safety in Rio through the installment of the pacification police units in favelas (de Andrade 2012a).

Given the absence of an Evangelical candidate running for mayor in 2012, Paes seized the opportunity to capture the Evangelical vote by crafting a coalition that included no fewer than 15 parties, including Crivella's PRB and the PSD, which

counted religiously influential figures like the state deputy Samuel Malafaia (brother of the powerful Silas Malafia of Assembleia de Deus, who also threw his support behind Paes (Ritto 2012)) as members (Castro 2012). RR Soares and Valdemiro Santiago also encouraged their congregations to vote for Paes (de Andrade 2012c). In addition to endorsements by these influential leaders, Paes spent valuable time of his television *horario politico* on an interview with the popular gospel singer Aline Barros (de Andrade 2012c).

The absence of an Evangelical candidate and the choice of religious leaders to support Paes can help explain the rise in electoral support among poor and vulnerable voters. But it does not explain why there was also increased support for Paes among the upscale in 2012 relative to 2008. It might appear surprising that Paes received such great increases in support among upscale individuals after clearly singling out the poor as the most important constituency. But the historical tendency, especially so of the PMDB in Rio, to redistribute to the poor in clientelist exchanges, made Paes's strategy of including the poor in the agenda of the city hall an effective one for attracting upscale voters who were fed up with decades of clientelist capture of the many favelas that are scattered across Rio.

Conclusion

Local CCTs are a rare occurrence among Brazilian municipalities. This chapter has applied the theory to an in-depth examination of the adoption of a CCT in the city of Rio de Janeiro and its effect on support among upscale voters. The allure of attracting the upscale and poor vote simultaneously can explain why a PMDB politician like Eduardo Paes would go against the historic tendency of his party to redistribute to low-income residents through clientelism by adopting the CFC in 2010, explicitly modeled on the successful, largely clientelist-free *Bolsa Família* program run by the federal government. I have argued that the decision to so closely tie the CFC to the BFP was intended to send a signal to the carioca electorate of a commitment to reduce clientelism, and the substitution of social assistance-style benefits like CCTs for the clientelist exchanges that have taken place between politicians and the popular sectors ever since the Chaguista era during the military dictatorship.

The literature contains examples of cross-class alliances that appear to have been driven by a different logic than an aversion among upscale voters to clientelism. For example, Peru under Alberto Fujimori and Argentina under Carlos Menem suggest that another way in which we may see the emergence of an upscale-poor coalition is during economic crises in which neoliberal economic forms are made possible when combined with social, sometimes politically manipulated, spending on the poor. In Peru, President Fujimori enjoyed support from business elites as well as the lower segments of the income distribution by reforming and opening the economy, on the one hand, and implementing antipoverty programs to accommodate those who were hurt most by fiscal austerity, on the other, while unions "largely opposed Fujimori's economic project" (Roberts and Moisés 1998, 240–41). Another example is Presi-

dent Menem of Argentina. The Peronists reached electoral success since they through locally based clientelist organizations could retain their lower class base while a programmatic shift to the right in terms of neoliberal reforms attracted the business elite and upper-middle class voters who were concerned with economic stagnation brought on by the economic model in place (Levitsky 2001). These examples suggest that clientelism is not always the overriding concern of the upscale electorate. Deep economic crises may take precedence as salient issues and make social spending on the poor, even if politically manipulated, palatable in the short run if it results in the acquiescence of the popular sectors in comprehensive economic reforms. It is, therefore, important to note that the argument presented here does not state that CCTs are the only way in which candidates can attract cross-class support but that it should be expected to be effective in contexts where clientelism is a concern.

In closing, it is worth reflecting on the development of city politics in Rio after the end of the case study in 2012. The victory of the Evangelical bishop Crivella in the 2016 mayoral elections led a writer for the newspaper *El País* (Dutra 2016) to declare that a political realignment had occurred in which the Left had lost its advantage among the lower classes to the Evangelicals given the Left's air of moral superiority and focus on post-materialist issues. Freixo, similarly to Gabeira in 2008, said upon losing that he was "the moral winner" of the race in apparent reference to his competitor's electoral corruption (Dutra 2016). But the Left in Rio has largely failed to attract poor voters and has not since the 1989 election of Marcello Alencar, PDT, produced a mayor. The realignment appears instead to concern the alliance between the Evangelical poor base, and the non-Evangelical popular sectors in the North and West Zones. In the 2016 election, the *assistencialista* politician Rosa Fernandes was re-elected to the local assembly for her seventh consecutive term and threw her support behind Crivella[115] rather than the leftist candidate Freixo after her co-partisan, the scandal-ridden PMDB candidate Pedro Paulo, did not make it to the runoff. *Assistencialista* and Evangelical politicians used to compete for partly overlapping electorates but now appear to have joined forces and excluded the left. This is in contrast to Paes who ruled with a vice-mayor from the PT in 2012. In effect, the upscale *carioca* population who lives in the South Zone has been left without representation.

[115] Fernandes told Crivella to "count on her" on encouraging her base in North Zone neighborhoods like Honório Gurgel, Coelho Neto, Rocha Miranda, Irajá, Colégio, Vista Alegre, and Cordovil to support him if acknowledged the needs of the *subúrbio* neighborhoods of Rio (Paiva 2016).

6

Chapter 6. Attitudes to pro-poor redistribution and CCT adoption in Latin America

Testing the theory beyond the Brazilian case

This chapter takes the empirical analyses beyond the Brazilian case of CCT support and CCT adoption to cases from the entire Latin American and Caribbean region in the time period in which CCTs were first invented and then rapidly spread. The objective of the chapter is to how well tests on a region-wide set of cases corroborate the theory. I assess attitudinal as well as policy adoptions expectations against the empirical record. Tests that are consistent with the theory indicate that the theory is generalizable beyond the Brazilian case to at least the LAC region.

The empirical strategy is twofold. I test, first, how clientelism affects the willingness of the upscale electorate in LAC countries to redistribute to the poor through analyses of survey data as well as a brief case study of the Dominican Republic. This serves as another test of *Hypothesis 1*: upscale voters are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern, which I tested and found support for in Chapter 4 on experimental data from Rio de Janeiro. In the second part of the chapter, I test how well the theory can predict the 46 cases of CCT adoption that took place between 1996 and 2017 in the region. More specifically, I test *Hypothesis 4*: there is a higher likelihood of CCT adoption following increases in clientelism or vote buying. I also provide data that indicate that a high proportion of upscale voters opt-out from public services in education. This is to support the idea that a cross-class coalition of poor and upscale voters is possible, in contrast to theories that predict that the median voter is decisive (Meltzer and Richard 1981).

Since I am relying on observational data in this chapter, causal inferences are weaker than in the case of randomized assignment of treatment. I do not make a causal claim exclusively on the basis of the observational data in this chapter. The theory is strengthened, however, if the results of the correlational analyses in this chapter are consistent with the theoretical expectations and the empirical results in Chapter 4 and 5.

The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the data and methods used to test upscale support for redistribution. I then present analyses of survey data. The results are consistent with *Hypothesis 1*. Upscale respondents in countries in which clientelism concern was relatively high expressed stronger support for redistributing income from rich to poor citizens. The case of the highly clientelist Dominican Republic is used to illustrate the theory. In

the following section, I present the data and methods used to analyze determinants of CCT adoption. The subsequent results section presents results from population-averaged regression analyses of CCT adoption that corroborate *Hypothesis 4*. The final section concludes that the analyses in the chapter have shown support for the theory in a broader set of cases. In sum, the results indicate that the theory has strong predictive power of upscale support for CCTs as well as CCT adoption in at least the Latin American and Caribbean region in the examined time period.

Empirical strategy (1): Attitudes toward pro-poor redistribution when clientelism is a concern

I test how clientelism affects the willingness of the upscale electorate to redistribute to the poor in a sample of respondents from across Latin America with data on clientelism and redistributive support from the LAPOP survey (Latin American Public Opinion Project 2019). I examine attitudes to redistribution to decrease income inequality between rich and poor since there to the best of my knowledge is no direct question about support for CCTs in cross-national surveys. The dependent variable is based on a question in the 2014 LAPOP surveys in which respondents were asked to state the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement (translated to English here) that "The [country] government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor."[116] The response scale had seven points, of which the endpoints were labeled such that a "1" meant "Strongly Disagree" and a "7" meant "Strongly Agree". Note that this is a specific form of redistribution that goes from the top to the bottom rather than from the top to the middle. It thus comes close to the outcome of interest here: targeted pro-poor redistribution that excludes the middle.

I use responses to a question in the same survey (LAPOP 2014) about whether the respondents knows someone who was offered to sell his or her vote in the previous election to estimate country-level clientelism: "Thinking of the last national elections/general election of [year], any candidate or political party offered a favor, gift, or other benefit to a person whom you know in exchange for that person's support or vote?"[117] I calculate the country-level average to get the proportion of respondents who answered "Yes" to this question. I include all respondents to construct the estimate, that is, upscale as well as other groups. This question provides an estimate of knowledge of vote buying attempts, which I use as an approximation of the extent of vote buying in a country. It may overestimate vote

[116] In the Spanish questionnaires applied to the Spanish-speaking population, the question was "El Estado [país] debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?"

[117] In the Spanish questionnaires, the original question was "Pensando en las últimas elecciones nacionales/generales de [año], ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció un favor, regalo u otro beneficio a alguna persona que usted conoce para que lo apoye o vote por él?"

buying to the extent that more than one respondent had knowledge of the same vote buying attempt. It should be expected, however, that this overestimation should be somewhat similar across cases. I chose to use this survey item rather than the alternative vote buying item that asks whether the respondent himself or herself had been been approched to sell his or her vote due to concerns of social desirability bias, which makes respondents less likely to answer truthfully (e.g. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Greene 2017).

Table 12 below reports the knowledge of vote buying-estimate in descending order. The percentage of respondents who said they knew someone who had been approched to sell their vote in the latest national election was 32 percent in Dominican Republic, 29 percent in Belize, 23 percent in Mexico, 22 percent in Haiti, 22 percent in Honduras, Brazil, and Paraguay, 14 percent in Colombia, Guatemala, and Jamaica, eleven percent in El Salvador, ten percent in Uruguay, nine percent in Nicaragua, Peru, and Panama, five percent in Guyana, and three percent in Costa Rica.

Table 12. Descriptive statistics: vote buying estimates (LAPOP 2014)

Country	*Dom. Rep.*	*Belize*	*Mexico*	*Haiti*	*Honduras*	*Brazil*
Knows someone (%)	32	29	23	22	22	22
Country	*Paraguay*	*Colombia*	*Guatemala*	*Jamaica*	*El Salvador*	*Uruguay*
Knows someone (%)	22	14	14	14	11	10
Country	*Nicaragua*	*Peru*	*Panama*	*Guyana*	*Costa Rica*	
Knows someone (%)	9	9	9	5	3	

Source: author's calculation based on data from LAPOP's 2014 survey.

Note that this is a measure of vote buying in the lead-up to elections and not clientelism that occurs throughout the electoral cycle. As I argue in Chapter 3, vote buying during campaigns may co-exist with social programs that are not clientelistically manipulated. Even in contemporary Mexico, where long-term clientelist manipulation of social programs was common until CCTs were adopted as a harder-to-manipulate form of pro-poor spending, Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) argue that the once-dominant party PRI continues to buy votes during campaigns. Vote buying in the lead-up to elections serves as a reminder of

the potential for clientelism throughout the electoral cycle in the absence of large pro-poor programs that are hard to manipulate. I use the case of the Dominican Republic to illustrate how a very high level of vote buying can co-exist with upscale support for CCTs.

To try to make the analysis as comparable as possible to the experimental findings in Chapter 4 on the effect of clientelism *concern* rather than *level* of vote buying, I add an interaction term between clientelism and the relative size of the poor population. The proportion of respondents who had knowledge of vote buying attempts is an estimate of the scale of vote buying in the latest preceding election while the size of the poor population is an upper-bound estimate of the potential scale of clientelism. While a survey item that directly asked about responent concern with vote buying in their country would clearly have been a closer replication of the experimental findings, the interaction between observed vote buying attempts and the potential pool of clients may serve as an estimate of how worrying clientelism is to the upscale electorate. Including estimates of the size of the poor population also serve as a control for the possibly confounding effect of poverty, which might drive up vote buying rates (Stokes et al. 2013).

I identify upscale respondents as those who said their household had two or more cars. Those with less than two cars are understood as below the upscale group on the income distribution, including the poor as well as the vulnerable. The interest here is in how clientelism affects the willingness of the upscale electorate to redistribute to the poor. 1,224 respondents had two or more cars, representing 4.9 percent of the respondents in the sample of 14 countries with data on redistributive support and vote buying.[118] This measurement of the upscale gives an estimate that is close to what other studies find is the size of the top-tier of the upscale electorate, suggesting that the two-cars-or-more estimate is conservative and identifies the most economically privileged among the upsale electorate. Ferreira et al (2013) use self-reported income in surveys and find that around two percent are (in their terminology) rich or elite citizens. Together with what Ferreira et al (2013) refer to as the middle class, the rich constitute around one-third of the electorate. This suggests that I am capturing a small proportion of the theorized upscale electorate, and likely the richest part of it. I use this conservative identification strategy of the upscale electorate since there is little risk that anyone below upscale status has two cars. The lower bound of the estimate should accordingly be well within the upscale electorate. The theory does not contain any expectations that location in the income distribution *within* the upscale electorate should matter for redistributive support. It is possible to test the expectations of higher upscale support for CCTs using only a subpopulation of upscale respondents for this reason.

The variable measures the percentage of the population below the moderate poverty line, collected from the IDB/SIMS database (Inter-American Development Bank 2019). The surveys were implemented in 2014 but since the vote buying item asked about the last national election, this year may have varied across the countries and the respondents nested within those countries. I measured the poor population

[118] Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, and Belize.

the same year as the election where possible. In cases where data on the poor population in the election year was unavailable, I used the preceding year such that any difference in measurement time between the IVs puts the possible confounder of poverty before the national election.[119]

To control for the effect of the ideological leaning of the respondent, I include responses to a survey item was measured on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 was labelled as "Left" and 10 as "Right.[120] Although the success of social democrats in redistributing has been associated with a mobilized working class rather than the poor (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001) and associated with responsiveness to insider rather than outsider demands (Rueda 2005), the literature frequently assumes a greater redistributive appetite among leftists than conservatives so we include ideology to alleviate any concerns of omitted variable bias in this regard.

I also include two variables intended to capture fear of crime (in separate models) since Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) have found that fear of crime is associated with more support for redistribution among upscale citizens. I use, first, a survey item about crime victimization in the last twelve months. The survey item asked respondents to answer "Yes" or "No" to the following question: "Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?"[121] As an alternative fear of crime-variable, I created a binary variable that had the value of "1" for respondents who stated that the most serious problem facing the country was crime and "0" for other responses (excluding non-responses and "don't know"-responses.[122]

I treat support for redistribution as an interval-scale variable even though the seven-point response scale is ordinal. I do this because linear regression is a more well-known and examined method of statistical inference than ordered logistic regression. Robust standard errors are calculated with the Taylor-linearized variance estimator. The clustering of the data and the stratification of the sampling process is taken into account through Stata's "SVY" program. Countries are re-weighted to accommodate different sample sizes in the different countries which might otherwise have biased the results since larger countries would contribute with more observations.

[119] Information on the year of the previous election and the year corresponding to the relative poverty size is included in Appendix 7.

[120] Survey item "l1" in the AmericasBarometer grand merged codebook: "Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número."

[121] Survey item "vic1ext"**:** ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses?"

[122] Survey item "a4": En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país?" Responses "Delincuencia, crimen" were coded as "1."

CHAPTER 6

Results (1): Survey evidence on support for pro-poor redistribution when clientelism is a concern

Support for redistribution from rich to poor

I first compare average levels of support for redistribution among upscale respondents, on the one hand, and vulnerable and poor respondents, on the other, respectively, in LAPOP's 2014 survey. To remind, I identify the upscale as those who reported having two or more cars and the rest as those who had less than two cars. Those below upscale status on average express higher support for pro-poor redistribution than upscale respondents. The average scores on the seven-point scale are 5.4 for those outside the upscale group and 5.2 for the respondents in the upscale group, which indicates that both groups are on average mildly supportive of redistribution. The difference of means (calculated through a two-tailed t-test) is highly significant (p 0.000).[123]

I use linear regression to test how well country-level vote buying predicts support among upscale voters for redistributing to the poor. Results from Models 1a-f are reported in Table 13 below. Among upscale respondents, more country-level vote buying is positively associated with higher support for redistribution (p 0.041) (Model 1a, including respondents from 17 countries). Substantively, an increase of one percentage point in the percentage of respondents in the national surveys who knew someone who had been approached for vote selling is associated with a score on the seven-point scale that is 0.015 higher in the upscale sample.

I next add the size of the moderately poor population in the year of the national election that most closely preceded the survey (1b). After controlling for moderate poverty, itself a statistically significant and negative factor for redistributive support in the upscale electorate, there is more uncertainty surrounding the point estimate of vote buying (resulting in a higher p value) associated with redistributive support among the upscale but the correlation remains positive as expected.[124]

[123] These estimates are based on 29,303 observations. Data have been re-weighted for the mean estimation to account for different population sizes such that all countries after the re-weighting have around 1,500 respondents.

[124] As a robustness check, I also create a binary variable for support for pro-poor redistribution and fit logistic regression models first with only clientelism and then also with the poverty control. I leave out mid-point responses since these indicate neutrality and code responses 1-3 as "0" and 5-7 as "1". While the signs of vote buying and poverty remain as before, there is no statistical significance at conventional thresholds.

Table 13. Linear regression results: attitudes among upscale respondents toward pro-poor redistribution

	1a	1b	1c	1d	1e	1f
C. Vote buying	.015**	.015*	-.026	-.032*	-.029*	-.034**
	(.007)	(.008)	(.016)	(.017)	(.017)	(.017)
C. Poor pop. (% under mod. pov. line)		-.010***	-.039***	-.038***	-.037***	-.040***
		(.004)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)	(.010)
C.Vote buying#poor pop.			.002***	.002***	.002***	.002***
			(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
I. Ideology (Left- right scale)				-.041*	-.043*	-.041
				(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
I. Victim of crime last year = No					-.088	
					(.127)	
I. Crime most important issue=Yes						-.133
						(.173)
Constant	5.073***	5.432***	6.100***	6.340***	6.390***	6.404***
	(.145)	(.208)	(.317)	(.366)	(.376)	(.370)
Observations (upscale subsample)	24,985 (1,224)	21,015 (1,009)	21,015 (1,009)	20,917 (911)	20,915 (909)	20,911 (905)
Countries	17	14	14	14	14	14
R-squared	.005	.011	.021	.020	.021	.023

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

Note: variables with "C" prefix are country-level variables. "I" denotes individual-variables.

Adding the relative size of the moderately poor population results in the loss of Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana from the sample since they lacked data in the latest election year. These countries were spread out across the distribution of vote buying. The average estimate of vote buying in the sample is 15.8 with a standard deviation of

8.1. This puts Haiti (22.4) just within the upper boundaries of the sample average plus one standard deviation (23.9). Jamaica (13.7) is close to the average. Guyana (5.2) is below the sample average minus one standard deviation (7.7). The loss of these three countries from the sample would have been more worrisome of they shared extreme values on the treatment variable. I also analyzed Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana in terms of their difference on the dependent side. The confidence intervals for average support for redistribution among the upscale overlap between the these three countries (analyzed separately) and the rest of the sample. In terms of redistributive support, then, these countries do not seem to have extreme values but fall rather closely to average support in the sample.

A linear regression model with vote buying and poverty in interaction (1c) shows a positive association between the interaction term and support for pro-poor redistribution in the upscale electorate. The poor population is indicative of the size of the pool of potential clients whereas the proportion of respondents who reported knowing someone who was offered something in return for their vote in the last national election estimates current perceptions of the prevalence of vote buying. When I include all respondents (Model 2c, reported in Table 14 below), the interaction is still significant and positive but with a coefficient that is half as large as in the subsample of upscale respondents. I interpret this as evidence consistent with the claim that observed vote buying and the size of the poor population serve as clues for the upscale of how worrying they should find vote buying, in turn influencing their support for pro-poor redistribution.

I add the ideology of the respondent in an alternative model (1d). Ideology has a negative sign (indicating lower support for redistribution among more conservative respondents) but is statistically insignificant. Likewise, neither of the fear-of crime-variables gain statistical significance when they are added in separate models (both with p values > .3, Models 1e-f). The vote buying and poverty terms remain unchanged with the addition of these additional variables. In the full sample, ideology is in contrast a highly significant predictor of pro-poor redistributive support (Models 2d-f, reported in Table 14). Respondents who identified as more to the right on the ten-point scale from left to right expressed higher support for reducing income inequality between rich and poor. Respondents who thought crime was the most important issue on average expressed significantly lower redistributive support (Model 2f).

Table 14. Linear regression results: attitudes in full sample toward pro-poor redistribution

	2a	2b	2c	2d	2e	2f
C. Vote buying	.013*** (.002)	.019*** (.002)	-.002 (.005)	-.003 (.005)	-.003 (.005)	-.004 (.005)
C. Poor pop. (% under mod. pov. line)		-.002* (.001)	-.014*** (.002)	-.013*** (.003)	-.013*** (.003)	-.014*** (.003)
C. Vote buying*poor pop.			.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)
I. Ideology (Left / Right)				.020*** (.006)	.019*** (.006)	.019*** (.006)
I. Victim of crime last year=No					-.035 (.034)	
I. Crime most important issue =Yes						-.075** (.033)
Constant	5.180*** (.040)	5.170*** (.060)	5.506*** (.096)	5.345*** (.103)	5.382*** (.106)	5.367*** (.105)
Observations	25,301	20,813	20,813	17,953	17,905	17,771
R-squared	.004	.008	.010	.013	.013	.013
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1						

Note: "C" prefix: country-level variables. "I" prefix: individual-level variables.

The case of the Dominican Republic: a long history of clientelism, high contemporary levels of vote buying, and upscale support for pro-poor redistribution and clientelism-free CCTs

To better understand the cases included in the regression model, I examine more closely the extreme on the vote buying scale: the Dominican Republic. This country has had a long history of clientelism, going back "at least since the lengthy period of authoritarianism under Rafael Trujillo (1930-61)" (Jana Morgan, Hartlyn, and Espinal 2011, 7; see also Keefer and Vlaicu 2007; Keefer 2002; Sánchez, Lozano, and

Breña 2012). The upscale electorate in the Dominican Republic were highly supportive of pro-poor redistribution in the 2014 LAPOP survey, with an average score of 6.0.[125] In the Dominican Republic, the population under the moderate poverty line made up 37.6 percent in the election year preceding the survey. The high support in the upscale electorate in the Dominican Republic for redistribution in the presence of a large poor electorate is difficult to explain with standard theories of unidimensional preferences since redistribution in this context risks "soaking" the rich. Given the commonality of vote buying in the Dominican Republic, however, upscale support for redistribution even in the presence of a large poor population is consistent with my claim that the upscale electorate prefers observable budgeted redistribution to secret, clientelist redistribution of potentially larger volumes.

The CCTs in the Dominican Republic have been well-received. Like Brazil's *Cadastro Único*, the Dominican Republic uses the demographic and socioeconomic data in the *Sistema Único de Beneficiarios* (Siuben, the Unified Beneficiary System) to register beneficiaries and help evaluate needs in the beneficiary population and to provide information for the program planning process (OECD 2017; World Bank 2014b). The Siuben was started in 2004 before the 2005 adoption of the *Programa Solidaridad* and organized as a subsidiary institution to the vice-president (OECD 2017; World Bank 2014b). The Siuben is the basis for the proxy-means testing through which *Solidaridad* beneficiaries are picked as well as for other targeted programs such as energy subsidies and subsidized health insurance (OECD 2017; World Bank 2014b).

Even though assessments have found deficiencies in the system, resulting in the non-coverage of "individuals with high rates of undernutrition living in areas with poverty levels not classified as moderate or extreme" (World Food Programme 2015, 6),[126] the *Solidaridad* program appears to have been relatively free from clientelist manipulation. According to the World Bank (2014b, 21), the objective proxy-means tests used to target CCTs in the DR were intended to "replace extended clientelism" in the social policy sphere.[127] A survey of *Solidaridad* beneficiaries in 2012 indicated high support for the program in the enrolled beneficiary population. Despite the continued high prevalence of vote buying in the lead-up to elections, as indicated by the 2014 LAPOP survey, a majority of *Solidaridad* beneficiaries in the 2012 beneficiary survey "showed they knew the requirements to enter the program (national ID, SIUBEN, be poor) and rejected other requirements such as a recommendation by a politician" (World Bank 2016, 73).

[125] To remind, the response scale for the statement that the government should reduce income inequality between rich and poor runs from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement).

[126] In addition to the demand side-intervention *Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar*, the *Solidaridad* program has a second component (*Comer es Primero*) to improve nutrition and food security among households in extreme poverty. *Comer es Primero* also aids poor households to access vaccines and health education and check-ups (World Food Programme 2015).

[127] The SIUBAN is described as "un mecanismo objetivo de focalización para reemplazar el clientelismo extendido" (World Bank 2014b, 21).

The Dominican Republic case appears similar to that of Mexico — in which the PRI continues to pursue electoral clientelism while CCTs are insulated from clientelist manipulation (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016) — and that of Brazil in which scholars have found that "even where vote buying is rife, the BFP is not perceived by its beneficiaries to be another instrument of vote buying" (Zucco 2013, 820; in reference to the study by Sugiyama and Hunter 2013; see also Fried 2012). Continued high levels of support for CCTs and pro-poor redistribution more generally among the upscale amid vote buying is consistent with the theory.

Research design (2): CCT adoption when clientelism is a higher concern

Hypothesis 4 states that there is a higher likelihood of CCT adoption following increases in clientelism or vote buying. I test how well CCT adoption is predicted by the theory on time-series cross-section data from countries in the region in the time period 1991-2017. There was variation across time in the region in the extent to which candidates made use of vote buying in national elections. This is illustrated in Figure 20 below. Similarly, there was variation between countries, as illustrated in Figure 21. Both plots are based on a variable ("v2elvotbuy") from the Varieties of Democracy-dataset (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, et al. 2018) on vote buying in national elections (including elections to the executive as well as to the legislature).[128] It is a relative scale variable. Is based on a question with ordinal scale responses. Expert responses were recorded and then transformed by a measurement model to a probability distribution on a standardized interval scale. The value of the variable is the median value of a given country-year. The relative scale variable is the recommended version for time-series models (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).[129] Experts were asked "In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?" (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, et al. 2018, 54–55). The ordinal response scale was 0-4.[130] Higher values

[128] Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Agnes Cornell, Sirianne Dahlum, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

[129] Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lind- berg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Mar- quardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtröm, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

[130] 0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates. 1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties. 2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded. 3: Almost none. There was limited use of

indicate less vote buying. I reverse the scale in the regression analyses for ease of interpretation. I replaced missing values (for years with no national election) with those for the closest preceding election. For example, Mexico in 2001 was given the vote buying score for the 2000 election, and in 2004 the vote buying score from the 2003 election.

The V-Dem data provides the opportunity for time-series cross-section analyses given its extensive coverage. One potential drawback of the data is that it is based on the perceptions of experts whose assessments of the level of vote buying may be different from the true extent of exchanges between politicians or brokers and voters of material benefits for electoral support. For the issue of interest here, however, perceptions are at the heart of why I expect comprehensive vote buying to raise the likelihood of CCT adoption; namely, the perceptions of the upscale electorate of the use of vote buying to win elections. For that reason, we may expect expert assessments of vote buying to be a reasonably good measure of how those at the top of the income distribution perceive vote buying in their country.

Figure 20 below illustrates the average level of vote buying in national elections in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1985 to 2016. The plot indicates that the region-year averages vary around the median value of 1.9, which means restricted use of vote buying.[131] The range is, however, quite wide. The bottom average of 1.1 in 2016 indicates that vote buying was rather common in the region this year. The top observation took place in 1992. The value of 2.8 suggests that there was almost no vote buying in 1992.

money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters. 4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

[131] The variable version of vote buying used here is the linearized original scale posterior prediction, which is the result of a linear translation of the point estimates from the measurement model to the ordinal response scale described above (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, et al. 2018).

Figure 20. Average level of vote buying in national elections in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1985-2016



Data source: V-Dem Country-Year dataset v.8 (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, et al. 2018).

Country-level estimates of vote buying are illustrated in Figure 21 below. The plots point to the variation across the region in the extent to which candidates make use of vote buying in national elections. In Uruguay, the vote buying score ranged from 3.8 to 3.9, which put the country closest to the assessment that there was no vote buying in national elections. In Honduras, on the other hand, the score ranged near the opposite end of the scale from .7 to 1.2, which indicates that vote buying was rather common throughout the period. It is also clear that vote buying remained stable in some countries while varying widely in others. Uruguay experienced the smallest variation in vote buying as captured by a standard deviation of .04. The largest standard deviation was observed for Costa Rica and amounted to .52.

Figure 21. Vote buying in national elections in Latin America and the Caribbean, country-year observations 1990-2016



Data source: V-Dem Country-Year dataset v.8 (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, et al. 2018).

As I discuss in Chapter 2, several theories of CCT adoption (and the expansion of non-contributory social assistance benefits more broadly) emphasize the key role played by demands from the poor for more effective antipoverty policies (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; De La O 2015; Holland and Schneider 2017; Garay 2016). I include a measure of the relative size of the moderately poor population (IDB 2017) to account for these explanations for CCT adoption. As stated earlier in this chapter, poverty may also drive up vote buying rates (e.g. Stokes et al. 2013). It is therefore important to control for the possibly confounding role of poverty.

I also include the relative size of the poor population in an interaction term with V-Dem's vote buying variable. I do this to make the analysis as comparable as possible to the experimental findings in Chapter 4 on the effect of clientelism *concern* rather than the *level* of vote buying in the latest election. This is analogous to the analyses in the previous section, which included an interaction between the proportion of respondents who had knowledge of vote buying attempts and the relative size of the poor population. As before, the interaction between expert assessments of vote buying attempts and the potential pool of clients (the poor) may

serve as an estimate of how worrying vote buying and, by extension, clientelism throughout the electoral cycle, is to upscale respondents.

I include covariates in the model to control for confounders and to control for factors found significant in extant theories of CCT adoption. Huber and Stephens (2012) find that long-term leftist rule and democracy are significant predictors of redistribution. Borges Sugiyama (2012, 157) find that leftist incumbents are more likely to adopt CCTs since "Leftist ideology mattered not only to mayors, but also to technocrats and political appointees, such as secretaries of education and health" in the case of Brazilian CCTs in the mold of Brasília's *Bolsa Escola* program. To include leftist executives as covariates, I use data on the ideology of the party occupying the executive (the president's party since all countries in the sample are presidential systems) according to the coding in the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2018b). I calculate cumulative left rule from 1975. Every year with a leftist executive is given a 1. Cumulative left rule is the sum of left executive years up to the current country-year observation. I also use an indicator variable for whether there was a leftist executive the year before using the DPI data.[132]

I use a minimal definition of democracy as effective multiparty competition and use the DPI's operationalization as democracy as country-year observation with "eiec" scores of at least six. Observations are given a six if "Multiple parties DID win seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats" and a seven if " Largest party got less than 75%" (Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2018a, 14). I count consecutive years with democracy. If a democratic spell is broken by an authoritarian year, the next time democracy is present the cumulative sum starts over from zero.

To control for population size, I include the logged value of the population. Data is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018). Finally, I use logged GDP per capita (purchasing power parity-adjusted) from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018) as a proxy for a country's economic capacity to adopt CCTs.

Since the interest is in explaining CCT adoption across the region rather than for any specific country, I use population-averaged models on the time-series cross-section data instead of a subject-specific model like the random intercept logistic model (Szmaragd, Clarke, and Steele 2013; Hubbard et al. 2010). I specify an exchangeable correlation structure within cluster over time, meaning that correlations between all pairs of residuals within panels are assumed to be equal irrespective of time passed (Szmaragd, Clarke, and Steele 2013). Robust standard errors are calculated by cluster. The use of robust standard errors result in unbiased estimates even if the correlation structure is incorrectly specified (StataCorp. 2018).

[132] One note on recoding is in order: I changed the DPI scoring of the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB) government under Fernando Henrique Cardoso from the original "Leftist" coding to "Centrist". The two PSDB governments under Cardoso (1995-2002) are coded as leftist in the DPI but Power and Zucco (2009, 230), on the basis of repeated surveys in Congress on the ideological placement of parties, consider the PSDB a centrist government (starting as a left-of-center position in the early 1990s and then taking "a sharp turn to the right" during the two Cardoso governments).

Finally, I present data that indicates that a high proportion of upscale voters opt-out from public services in education in the LAC region. This is to support the idea that a cross-class coalition of poor and upscale voters is possible. As I discuss in Chapter 3, the reliance on private services in the upscale electorate helps upscale and poor voters to come together in a coalition for cheap cash transfer to defeat costly demands for high-quality public services. I examine average opt-out rates from public education and the extent to which opt-out was concentrated in the upscale electorate through a mix of extant documentation in the literature and analyses of microdata from contemporary (2015) Brazil.

Results (2): CCT adoption when clientelism is a higher concern

Concern with clientelism and CCT adoption

The hypothesis to be tested is that increasing clientelism or vote buying raises the likelihood of CCT adoption. I regress CCT adoption in a given year on the V-Dem vote buying score in the last national election and the size of the population under the moderate poverty line. Vote buying and poverty are measured with a lag of one year. Results are reported in Table 15 below. Model 1a simply includes as covariates vote buying and moderate poverty. Model 1b adds an interaction term, which is positive as expected but statistically insignificant. Model 1c includes GDP *per capita* to control for economic capacity, and Model 1d also includes population size. After I include the economic and demographic controls, the interaction of vote buying and poverty reaches statistical significance (p 0.001). The positive sign is consistent with the hypothesis that increasing concern with clientelism makes CCT adoption more likely. Model 1e adds cumulative left, which turns out to be statistically insignificant. The interaction between vote buying and poverty remains positive and highly significant. Model 1f adds democratic history. It is statistically insignificant. The interaction between vote buying and poverty remains positive and and significant but now with a larger p value.

Finally, I remove the insignificant covariates so that Model 1g only keeps the variables that were significant in the most extensive model (1f). The interaction of increasing clientelism and poverty rates is as before positively associated with the likelihood of CCT adoption, which is also the case for population size.

Table 15. GEE logit models of CCT adoption, 1991-2017

	1a	1b	1c	1d	1e	1f	1g
Vote buying	.036	-.145	-.340*	-0.627***	-.575***	-.573***	-.667***
	(.128)	(.236)	(.202)	(.184)	(.198)	(.178)	(.207)
Moderate poverty	.012	.009	.039**	.019	.024	.023	.006
	(.009)	(.010)	(.016)	(.018)	(.016)	(.016)	(.008)
Vote buying*mod. pov.		.007	.012**	.021***	.018***	.019***	.022***
		(.009)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.007)	(.007)
ln(GDP cap) (PPP)			1.062***	.423	.521	.544	
			(.393)	(.507)	(.450)	(.435)	
ln(pop)				.259**	.230**	.226**	.342***
				(.120)	(.095)	(.089)	(.085)
Cum. left					-.013	-.010	
					(.024)	(.025)	
Dem. history						-.005	
						(.019)	
Constant	-2.750***	-2.728***	-13.570***	-11.381***	-11.856***	-11.895***	-8.449***
	(.319)	(.326)	(4.102)	(4.046)	(3.921)	(3.807)	(1.566)
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380	380
Countries	17	17	17	17	17	17	17

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

The interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 22 below. The black line illustrates the marginal effect of vote buying conditional on the size of the population below the moderate poverty line. The marginal effect is estimated at the sample average value of the poor population and at one and two standard deviations above and below the average. The figure shows that the predicted effect of increasing clientelism at below-average levels of poverty is negative, but that it becomes positive above the average poverty rate. At the sample mean, the predicted marginal effect of clientelism is positive but not statistically significant.

Figure 22. Clientelism concern and CCT adoption



Note: Marginal effects based on Model 1g. Population size held at mean value in estimation sample. 95 percent confidence intervals.

Conditions that enable coalitions that exclude the median voter

The data I present below indicate a high propensity of upscale citizens in the LAC region to opt out from public services in education in the examined time period. This is one way in which redistributive policy can exclude the median voter (Iversen and Goplerud 2018). Put differently, private schooling is one mechanism that provides the opportunity for a cross-class coalitions of upscale and poor voters that excluded the median voter, in contrast to predictions of influential theories of redistribution such as the Meltzer-Richard model (1981). As I argue in Chapter 3, the reliance on private education in the upscale electorate makes it possible for the upscale and the poor to converge on a preference for cheap cash transfer for the

latter in lieu of costly investments in public services, which are more in demand among the middle of the income distribution.

I lack the data to make systematic assessments throughout the period and region on the percentage of the upscale electorate that has opted-out from public education. Fortunately for the purpose here, the preference for private schooling among the Latin American upscale electorate is well documented in the literature. Available data indicate that across the region, parts of the upscale electorate have opted-out from public education since at least the early 1990s. Since my argument does not rest on changes in the preference for private education in the upscale electorate but rather that there on average in the region was a tendency toward opting out in the upper third of the population, the documentation in the literature of a long-standing problem of higher-income households choosing private (Birdsall 2012; Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer 2014; Ferreira et al. 2013) may suffice in the absence of time-series cross-section data.

In 2013, 18 percent of primary school students in the region were enrolled in private schools (Elacqua, Iribarren, and Santos 2018). The regional average has steadily increased since 1999 when around 14 percent of primary school students were enrolled in private schools. Rates for secondary schools have similarly increased slightly from around 17 percent in 1999 to a regional average of 18 percent in 2013 (Elacqua, Iribarren, and Santos 2018). But the probability of private schooling is much higher in the upscale electorate. Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer (2014, 141) found household income "to be the single most important household characteristic in accounting for private school attendance" in primary and secondary education in analyses across the region 2008-09. Similarly, Birdsall (2012, 18) find that there is a positive relationship between income and private schooling.

The vast majority of students from upscale households attend private schools according to the available data. Birdsall (2012, Table A.8) examines opt-out rates among students 13-18 years of age from upscale households (referred to as rich households with daily *per capita* income > $50). These data are summarized in Table 16 below. 77 percent of these were enrolled in private school in Mexico in 1992, growing to 86 percent in 1998 and falling to 71 percent in 2008. The corresponding figure for Chile in 1992 is 75 percent and 64 percent in 2009.[133] In 1999, 96 percent of rich students in Peru opted-out, decreasing slightly to 92 percent in 2009. In Honduras, the opt-out rate among the rich was 70 percent in 2009. The opt-out rate was 83 percent in the Dominican Republic in 2008, 85 percent in Colombia in 2006, and 85 percent in Brazil 2009. The lowest percentage identified by Birdsall (2012) is among the Costa Rican rich in 2009, among which 62 percent of students were enrolled in private education.

[133] Birdsall (2012, Table A.8) reports a very low 16 percent for Chile in 1998, compared to the 75 percent in 1992. In 2009, the opt-out rate among students from rich households is reported as 64 percent.

Table 16. Private schooling among upscale students (% who opt-out from public services

	1992	1998	2009
Brazil			85
Chile	75		64
Colombia			85
Costa Rica			62
Dominican Republic			83
Honduras			70
Mexico	77	86	71
Peru		96	92

Source: Table A.8 in Birdsall (2012). The data refers to students 13-18 years of age, household daily *per capita* income > $50. The year of measurement by country is noted in the next, and may differ slightly from year in table.

I analyzed Brazilian microdata to get a better understanding of the proportion who opt out of from public education at the upper end of the income distribution. The 2015 household survey *Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicilios Annual* by the national statistics agency (IBGE 2017) shows that only a minority of students from kindergarten through secondary education attend private schools (17 percent) while most families in the tenth decile enroll their children in private schools (IBGE 2017).[134] For respondents whose households belonged to the 99th percentile of household *per capita* incomes, 94 percent attended private schools while the same was true for 86 percent in the 95th percentile and 77 percent in the 90th percentile (IBGE 2017).[135] At the national extremes of the income distribution, 89 percent of respondents in the top household income category (representing three percent of population) are enrolled in private schools while two percent of respondents (representing nine percent of the population) in the first income category attend private schools.[136]

[134] I included education from kindergarten through secondary school in this measure, excluding tertiary education and literacy classes outside the regular educational system Included educational categories: *regular do ensino fundamental, regular do ensino médio, creche, maternal, jardim de infância, pré-vestibular.* Excluded educational categories: *educação de jovens e adultos ou supletivo do ensino fundamental, educação de jovens e adultos ou supletivo do ensino médio, superior de graduação, alfabetização de jovens e adultos, classe de alfabetização - CA, mestrado ou doutorado.*

[135] The same percentages were found using family per capita income instead of household per capita income (IBGE 2017).

[136] 10 percent of respondents in the lowest income category 0, i.e. those who reported no income, were enrolled in private schools. One may only speculate that this deviation from the positive relationship between income and private

In summary, this subsection has provided data in support of the idea that the upscale electorate to a relatively high degree choose private education and has no direct interest in public educational services. Upscale opt-out from public services is one way in which predictions from redistributive theories can deviate from the preferences of the median voter (Iversen and Goplerud 2018). These data in combination with the analyses before of CCT adoption support the expectation of an upscale-poor coalition that excludes the median voter, and corroborate the hypothesis that CCT adoption is more likely following increases in clientelism or vote buying.

Conclusion

This chapter has served as a test of the generalizability of the theory beyond the Brazilian case. The evidence from a large sample of respondents and countries across the Latin American and Caribbean region corroborated Hypotheses 1 and 4, relating to the attitudes among the upscale electorate toward pro-poor redistribution and the likelihood of national-level CCT adoption.

In relation to the former, analyses of survey data indicated that upscale voters in countries with a high prevalence of vote buying in interaction with a large poor population were more supportive of pro-poor redistribution. This is consistent with *Hypothesis 1*: upscale voters are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern. The results in this chapter conform to those of tests in Chapter 4 on experimental data from Rio de Janeiro in 2016. The causal claims in Chapter 4 rest on firmer ground than those in this chapter. This is because the evidence in Chapter 4 was based on the randomized assignment of the vote buying treatment, intended to induce higher concern with clientelism. The evidence in this chapter, in contrast, is more vulnerable to risks of unmeasured confounding factors that might have biased the results concerning upscale support for pro-poor redistribution. That the evidence in both chapters point in the same direction should, however, be considered support of the theory. Chapter 4 provided evidence of the causality. This chapter mainly provided evidence of the generalizability of the attitudinal expectations of upscale support for pro-poor redistribution in the theory.

I used a brief case study of the Dominican Republic in support of the theory. In this case, a long history of clientelism eventually gave way to a CCT that appears to be relatively free from clientelism. Yet vote buying during electoral campaigns persists. As I argue in Chapter 3, vote buying can co-exist with clientelist-free CCTs. Vote buying serves to remind upscale voters of the risk of the more encompassing practice of clientelism, which takes place throughout the electoral cycle. Vote buying can accordingly "reactivate" upscale support for CCTs. This appears to have happened in the case of the Dominican Republic.

In the second set of analyses in this chapter, I tested how well the theory can predict the 46 cases of CCT adoption that took place between 1996 and 2017 in the

schooling can be explained if a portion of households with no income received capital income such that they are wealthier than what their zero income indicates.

region. More specifically, I tested *Hypothesis 4*: there is a higher likelihood of CCT adoption following increases in clientelism or vote buying. The regression models controlled for several factors that previous theories have suggested as drivers of vote buying and CCT adoption, which should to some extent alleviate concerns of bias in the estimates. The tests provided support for *Hypothesis 4*. I also presented data that indicated that a high proportion of upscale voters opt-out from public education and instead enroll their children in private schools. This was to support the idea that a cross-class coalition of poor and upscale voters is possible, in contrast to theories that predict that the median voter is decisive (Meltzer and Richard 1981).

In sum, analyses of upscale support for pro-poor redistribution and CCT adoption on a large set of cases in this final chapter of the dissertation have provided support for the theory. It appears that the theory of a cross-class coalition of upscale and poor voters can predict CCT support and CCT adoption not only in the Brazilian case, as analyzed in-depth in Chapters 4-5, but also more broadly in cases across the Latin American and Caribbean region in the three decades from the 1990s to the present day.

7
Chapter 7. Conclusion

In this final chapter, I will summarize the theory and assess to what extent the results from the empirical analyses support the theory of a cross-class coalition of upscale and poor voters in favor of CCTs. I will also discuss how the dissertation contributes to the extant literature, what avenues of future research may be interesting, and the policy implications of the theory.

The theory in condensed format

In summary, the theory involved a tripartite electorate of poor, vulnerable, and upscale groups of voters of equal sizes. I argued that the poor, the one-third of the electorate that are located at the bottom of the income distribution, demanded redistribution since they by definition are the least economically privileged group. I defined pro-poor redistribution as redistribution of income that targets the poor and the poor alone, implying the exclusion of vulnerable voters in the middle of the income distribution. Pro-poor redistribution sometimes occurs outside the strictures of the welfare state through clientelism and vote buying. I distinguished between clientelism and vote buying although they are similar in that they both involve the conferral of benefits to those who pledge support to the politician in charge of the benefit. I defined the practice of clientelism as a form of pro-poor redistribution of unknown volume that lack, for the upscale electorate, valuable eligibility criteria. Clientelist redistribution allows poor voters throughout the electoral cycle to access material benefits in return for the promise of political allegiance. Vote buying similarly allows the poor to receive material benefits but only in the more limited time frame of campaigns. This conceptualization is similar to the distinction that has been made between relational and electoral clientelism (Nichter 2010), and the concept of embedded, iterative clientelist exchanges between voters and local brokers versus vote buying on the spot market (Magaloni 2014).

Voters who engage in these practices gain access to material benefits in return for a promise of supporting a politician or a party. This means that the conditionality or contingency of material benefits distributed through clientelism or vote buying is political in nature. Clientelism may stop the poor from revolting or in other ways contribute to social unrest. According to the theory, the upscale electorate wants to limit the risks of revolution and social unrest more broadly. In this way, clientelism may seem like a form of pro-poor redistribution that would appeal to the upscale electorate. But the upscale electorate also seeks to keep taxes low and demand a

reasonably educated and healthy labor force to work in their homes and in other low-skill jobs.

Clientelism denies the upscale electorate the opportunity to observe the volume of redistribution since clientelism is secret and hidden. Clientelism also does little to improve the human capital of recipients. I expect the upscale electorate to have an interest in reducing clientelism. To sum up, the two key characteristics of CCTs that make them preferable to clientelism for the upscale electorate are, first, that CCTs let voters observe the volume of redistribution and, consequently, taxation effort. Second, CCTs tie material benefits to behavioral changes that can be expected to lead to a more productive labor force. This is the function of the health and education conditions of CCTs that incentivize the poor to invest in their human capital. CCTs respond to the upscale electorate's demands for an observable and low volume of redistribution, and a productive labor force.

The different scopes of clientelism and vote buying, the latter limited by the short time-period of campaigns, indicate that the practices can co-exist. It is possible that vote buying attempts will continue to occur during campaigns even after the poor have gained access to social assistance benefits that are not dependent on their support of the incumbent. In particular, I expect that candidates under high electoral competition may still attempt vote buying to secure support shortly before the election. Beyond the lack of a theoretical reason for why vote buying should cease after CCTs have been introduced, the cases of Mexico and Brazil suggest that the two may co-exist. Some politicians still attempt to buy support of poor voters during campaigns. Nonetheless, *Progresa* (whose later iterations were renamed *Oportunidades* and *Prospera*, respectively) and *Bolsa Família* have been found to largely be free from clientelist manipulation (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016; Sugiyama and Hunter 2013).[137] It is consequently not a weakness of the theory that elections in for example Brazil and Mexico are still marred by vote buying attempts despite the introduction of the wide reaching, internationally lauded, and largely clientelist-free CCTs *Bolsa Família* and *Prospera* that have reduced poverty and inequality in the two decades since their inception (Lindert et al. 2007; Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Molina-Millan et al. 2016; Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016).

As I argued in Chapter 3, there is a greater probability of CCTs adoption in situations in which clientelism is a concern. According to the theory, this is so because the use of clientelism and vote buying indicates that politicians are making an effort to win the poor vote. This means that clientelism and vote buying send a signal to the upscale electorate of the importance of the poor to win elections. One way or another, politicians in these contexts will pursue pro-poor redistribution in an attempt to attract poor support. There is now an opportunity for the upscale electorate to influence both the level of pro-poor redistribution and the productivity of the

[137] In my definition, clientelism takes place throughout the electoral cycle. It can involve challengers as well as the incumbent. The point of interest for the theory, however, is the consequences of taxation to fund clientelist effort, which makes clientelism relevant for the redistributive preferences of the tax-averse upscale electorate when it occurs through the redistributive practices of the incumbent. This makes clientelism funded by party coffers from private donations fall outside the scope of the theory.

poor labor force by supporting CCTs. CCTs have public budgets and amount to a demand-side intervention in beneficiary use of health and education services. CCTs are difficult to manipulate for clientelist purposes, and it is unlikely that the incumbent will pursue an additive strategy of "CCTs + clientelism".

At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive that voters at the top of the income distribution (the upscale) should throw their support behind the poor and support CCTs, which are social assistance-style benefits. One-dimensional models of policy predict that the poor given their low incomes have the greatest redistributive appetite and the upscale electorate the smallest, making the prospect of an upscale-poor coalition unfeasible. But the dimensions of public services and targeted transfers in addition to the lump-sum transfers in standard models of redistribution (such as the Meltzer-Richard model (Meltzer and Richard 1981)) make it possible for the ends of the income distribution to come together to defeat costly proposals for public services investments from the middle of the income distribution (Epple and Romano 1996; Ansell 2006). This is so given the propensity of the upscale electorate to choose private provision of education and health care, which implies that upscale voters have no direct interest in public services to the extent that they already pay for private schools and medical doctors (e.g. Iversen and Goplerud 2018). As I detailed in Chapter 3, the preference for targeted cash transfers over long-term supply-side interventions in services among the poor is a function of the high marginal utility of income at the bottom of the income distribution. It means that upscale and poor groups have a shared preference for targeted cash transfers to public services. In this situation, the poor win by gaining access to cash that helps them in the short-run and the upscale escapes the high tax rates associated with high-quality public services.

In sharp contrast to the poor, the vulnerable population in the middle of the income distribution has enough economic security to be able to focus on the future and forego cash transfers today for access to higher-quality public services tomorrow. In sharp contrast to the upscale group, the vulnerable lacks the economic privilege to purchase private services on the market. The lacking quality of public education has been pointed out as an obstacle to improving upward economic mobility and allowing more people currently in the vulnerable group access to the lifestyles of the economically privileged segment of the population at the top of the income distribution (Ferreira et al. 2013; Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer 2014).

As I discussed in Chapter 3, the observation that there is an opportunity for the upscale electorate to avoid the high taxation rates associated with high-quality public services by allying with the poor may raise the question of the role of clientelism and vote buying in the decision to adopt a CCT? One might ask the question of whether the upscale should not always be expected to prefer a coalition with poor voters? A related question is whether concern with clientelism is a necessary factor for CCT adoption?

According to the theory, clientelism and vote buying increase the likelihood of CCT support and CCT adoption. These politically contingent practices send a signal to the upscale electorate that the poor electorate is key for winning elections. It should be expected that no more than weak attempts are made to purchase the sup-

port of the poor through clientelism or vote buying in a situation in which the poor are not included in the collection of voters needed to win an election (the winning coalition, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). This means that clientelism and vote buying help upscale voters understand that the poor are part of the winning coalition. Upscale voters may not in the absence of clientelism and vote buying recognize the opportunity to defeat costly demands from the middle if they throw their electoral weight behind poor demands for redistribution.

CCTs, specifically, are more likely in the shadow of clientelism and vote buying since CCTs substitute human capital investments for political allegiance and public budgets for secret exchanges. Other forms of social assistance, such as cash transfers, access to social housing, and food stamps, may come with no requirement for the poor to take actions to climb out of poverty by increasing their human capital. CCTs allow upscale voters access to a low-skill labor force whose productivity should be expected to be higher as a result of the demand-side intervention to increase use of education and health care inherent to CCTs. CCTs also allow upscale voters the ability observe the volume of pro-poor redistribution. The public budgets of CCTs allow upscale voters to punish any politician who spends too much on the poor, which is more difficult in the case of clientelism whose volume (and accompanying tax rate) is difficult to estimate.

In summary, clientelism and vote buying are key since they signal to the upscale an opportunity to defeat costly demands from the vulnerable population of spending for high-quality public services. The upscale want to defeat clientelism, too, since the upscale are tax-averse and require observable volumes of pro-poor redistribution. In addition to the opacity of clientelism, the upscale electorate dislikes their taxes being used on the poor in exchange for an action that carries no value except for the vote seller and the vote buyer. CCTs are functional responses to these demands of the upscale. For these reasons, clientelism and vote buying are expected to increase support for CCTs among the upscale and the likelihood of CCT adoption.

Claiming that a certain factor is a necessary cause of an outcome is a strong claim. It would, amongst other things, require a very precise specification of the level of clientelism or vote buying that is necessary for the adoption of CCTs. The theory developed in this dissertation is a novel contribution to the study of pro-poor redistribution and the first of its kind to the best of our knowledge to connect previous findings of a low prevalence of clientelism in large, non-poor electorates with a high degree of political competition (Weitz-Shapiro 2012) to the preferences of the upscale electorate, specifically, for low tax rates and creating a more productive labor force through tying human capital investments to social assistance benefits. The aim is not to make case-specific predictions of CCT adoption but rather to elaborate on the coalitional logic that shapes redistributive preferences and guides policy outcomes in contexts with availability of private options to public services and targeted transfers than can exclude the median voter. At the end of the day, it remains largely an empirical question whether other factors can replace clientelism and vote buying as factors that increase upscale support for CCTs and provide the opportunity for ends-against-the-middle-coalition of upscale and poor voters in favor of targeted pro-poor redistribution in the shape of CCTs.

The evidence for a theory of a cross-class coalition of upscale and poor voters for CCTs

The empirical evidence has combined original, experimental data with rich case knowledge of Brazilian subnational politics as well as broad analyses of attitudinal and social policy adoption patterns across the region in the eventful period from the 1990s to today. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the choice to select subnational and national cases within the LAC region was made in order to include the first CCTs in the world in the analyses, as well as to control for unobserved regional-level factors that may result in biased estimates. The first CCTs were adopted in Brazil and Mexico, which gave rise to the puzzling observation stated at the very beginning of the dissertation: politicians in clientelist contexts who adopt hard-to-manipulate social policies that undermine their ability to buy the poor vote.

The research design of the dissertation has combined different strategies of causal inference in light of the weaknesses and advantages of any one strategy. In combination, experimental analyses, a longitudinal case study, and broad time-series cross-section analyses of voter attitudes to redistribution and policy adoption have given the opportunity to conduct rigorous tests of the theory of a cross-class coalition of upscale and poor voters for CCTs in the shadow of clientelism.

To what extent has the evidence supported the theory? I began the empirical analyses in Chapter 4. The objective was to examine to what extent there was support for the expectation of increased CCT support among the upscale electorate followed increases in clientelism concern. I tested Hypotheses 1-2: upscale voters are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern, and the difference between upscale and poor support for CCTs decrease when clientelism is a greater concern, respectively. First, I tested if experimental data supported the hypothesis that upscale voters become more supportive of CCTs when there is growing concern with clientelism. Second, I tested if the experimental data supported the hypothesis that there materializes a redistributive convergence between upscale and poor preferences for CCTs in the shadow of clientelism. In both instances, I find that the results of simple, intuitive tests of difference-of-means offer support for the hypotheses.

The results of Chapter 4, which are based on original, experimental data from a face-to-face survey in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in the lead-up to the 2012 elections for mayor and the local assembly, are consistent with the theory. Upscale voters in the treatment group were exposed to information about the high effort of candidates in local elections in Rio de Janeiro to broker vote buying deals. Upscale voters in the control group received no information about vote buying efforts. Upscale voters in the treatment group were (a) more concerned about clientelism than their upscale peers in the control group, and (b) more supportive of CCTs than their upscale peers in the control group. This result clearly supports the hypothesis of a positive effect of clientelism concern on upscale support of CCTs for the poor population. The distance between upscale and poor support for CCT also decreased when

upscale respondents were more concerned with the clientelist practices of their local politicians. This is consistent with an upscale-poor redistributive preference convergence for CCTs in the shadow of clientelism. The alternative explanation that poverty concerns rather than clientelism concerns drove the difference in CCT support between upscale voters in the treatment and the control group found little support in the analyses.

In summary, the original, experimental data in Chapter 4 provided encouraging support for the attitudinal predictions of the theory. I consider these tests to have high internal validity, which is of course the main advantage of experiments. Not only were upscale respondents in the treatment group more supportive of CCTs than their peers in the control group but I also found support for the causal mechanism: higher concern with clientelism in the treatment group. The main disadvantage of experiments is their unknown external validity. The upscale respondents were sampled as part of a convenience sample such that they were not necessarily representative of the population of upscale voters in the city of Rio de Janeiro. As a consequence, the upscale respondents may be unrepresentative of upscale Brazilians, and it remains an empirical question to what extent the results can be replicated in other cases. Although it would have been valuable to possess representative data on the way upscale voters in Brazil view poverty, clientelism, and CCTs, the main point of the survey experiment was not to collect these types of representative survey data. The objective was rather to use an experiment to test the causal claims of the theory with a randomized treatment to induce clientelism concern. An alternative research design would have relied on correlational analyses of observational data, which can at best result in evidence that is consistent with the hypotheses while causality claims remain more humble than those based on experiments. The experimental evidence in Chapter 4 is a novel contribution to our understanding of the link between upscale concerns over clientelist redistribution and support for hard-to-manipulate, observable CCT benefits for poor families.

In Chapter 5, I analyzed the extent to which the case of CCT adoption in the city of Rio de Janeiro was consistent with hypotheses 4-5: that politicians who are considered clientelist are more likely to adopt CCTs than politicians who are not considered clientelist, and that politicians who are considered clientelist attract more support from upscale voters after adopting a CCT. The inferences drawn in this chapter relied on a different logic than the straightforward experimental logic in Chapter 4 of randomizing treatment of the hypothesized cause of CCT support and then comparing the treatment group with the control group in terms of average level of CCT support. In Chapter 5, I instead collected many different pieces of observational data to see to what extent these together provided support for the hypotheses. Since I exclusively used observational data in Chapter 5 and consequently have to acknowledge the possibility of unobserved confounding factors that may have biased the results, I cautiously interpreted the results as consistent with, rather than as providing a confirmation of, the hypotheses.

I drew on a combination of analyses of expressed support for different mayoral candidates from surveys (Datafolha 1996ab, 2000ab, and 2004) and election results (collected from the Supreme Electoral Court, TSE 2015) in Chapter 5. I examined

the economic composition of households in neighborhoods in Rio based on census data, and mapped these onto the election results (that are reported by electoral zone, which are different geographical areas than neighborhoods) to assess the success of mayoral candidates in electorates with varying level of aggregate income. The analysis began in 1992, which is the year of the first mayoral election within the current electoral system that was put into place after the re-installment of free elections following the end in 1985 to two decades of military dictatorship. The analysis ended in 2012, which was the first mayoral election-year after the 2010 adoption of the *Cartão Família Carioca* program ("The Rio Family Card") by first-term mayor Eduardo Paes of the clientelism-marred *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB).

To summarize the results of Chapter 5, I found through analyses of data on election results, documentation in secondary sources on the base of the winning mayoral candidate (mainly for older elections with lacking data availability), and survey data from Datafolha that winning mayoral candidates 1992-2004 enjoyed a multiclass voter base. However, Evangelicalism rose throughout this period as an electoral magnet for the lower strata of the electorate, including voters from the poor population as well as from the vulnerable population. While the poor had been a fairly cohesive voting bloc in favor of clientelist politicians from the PMDB, the increasing popularity of Evangelical candidates put a splinter in the poor bloc and changed the electoral calculus of clientelist politicians in Rio. The data is consistent with the explanation of a divided poor electorate, which implies that clientelist politicians needed to look elsewhere to bolster their support. Since the vulnerable group, too, were divided by the rise of Evangelicalism, non-Evangelical candidates were faced with a new scenario of limited prospects of capturing broad segments of the poor and the vulnerable population.

The upscale electorate now became more attractive but clientelist politicians like Paes struggled to win votes at the top of the income distribution. In his first election in 2008, he won by a very narrow margin only in the runoff with the support of poor and vulnerable electorates, as indicated by elections results. I argue that the 2010 adoption of the CFC was in anticipation of crafting a more diverse coalition of voters in the 2012 election, expanding his base from the poor to the upscale electorate. Elections results in 2012, mapped onto neighborhoods according to their economic status and, alternatively, voter education, indicate that Paes succeeded in winning support of the upscale electorate in addition to the poor population. To address concerns of ecological fallacy in the conclusions from election results analyses of support for Paes in 2008 (before CCT adoption) and 2012 (after CCT adoption), I also fit logistic regression models on pooled cross-section data with respondent income and other possible explanations for vote choice as independent variables, and year-dummies to examine the hypothesized effect of income on vote intention for Paes in 2008 and 2012. Election results as well as expressed support for Paes in surveys indicate that Paes made inroads into the upscale electorate in 2012 compared to 2008.

In summary, the evidence in Chapter 5 is consistent with the hypotheses that politicians who are considered clientelist are more likely to adopt CCTs than politi-

cians who are not considered clientelist when there are incentives to attract poor and upscale voters, and that politicians who are considered clientelist attract more support from upscale voters after adopting a CCT. The rich and complex character of case studies compared to the cleaner and more straightforward character of standard strategies of causal inference such as randomized assignment of treatment means that conclusions of the former are more subjective since they require more interpretation than a comparison of average values in treatment and control groups, respectively. Additionally, a close examination of a case such as that of Chapter 5 can give rise to observations that are case-specific and difficult to anticipate in a general theory of redistributive attitudes and policies. I consider the finding of Evangelicalism's role in the decision to adopt a local CCT one such particularity. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the rising popularity of Evangelical candidates among the lower strata (including poor as well as vulnerable voters) sharpened the incentive for a clientelist politician like Paes to establish support among upscale voters in addition to the traditional PMDB base among the poor.

Finally, I tested Hypotheses 1 and 4 in Chapter 6: upscale voters are more supportive of CCTs when clientelism is a greater concern, and there is a higher likelihood of CCT adoption following increases in clientelism or vote buying. Chapter 6 moved the empirical analyses beyond the Brazilian case of CCT support and CCT adoption to the entire region across the time period in which CCTs were first invented and then rapidly spread from one country to another. Chapter 6 helps to estimate the generalizability of the theory. I use nationally representative survey data from LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project 2019) on support for redistribution to reduce income differences between rich and poor as the dependent variable.

The results from linear regression models indicate that upscale respondents in countries with high levels of vote buying in the latest national election were more supportive of redistribution. In an effort to replicate the findings in Chapter 4 (although this time with the limitations of observational data), I constructed an interaction term of vote buying and size of the poor population as a proxy for concern with clientelism. The intuition behind this was that the size of the poor population is indicative of the upper boundary of vote buying and clientelist efforts, and represents the worst-case scenario of excessive use of electoral and political conditionalities in pro-poor redistribution. The analyses indicate that clientelism concern is a highly significant predictor of redistributive support among upscale respondents. The results, consistent with Hypothesis 1, are robust to the inclusion of individual-level control variables for respondent ideology (left-right scale), which had a negative association with redistributive support at a low level of statistical significance (with a p value around .1). This indicates that more conservative respondents were less supportive of redistribution. I also control for crime victimization and evaluation of crime as the most important issue (in separate models). Neither was statistically significant.

I used time-series cross-section data from 17 countries, 1991-2017, to test Hypothesis 4. I used population-averaged logistic regression models to test how well the theory can predict the 46 cases of CCT adoption that took place between 1996

and 2017 in the Latin American and Caribbean region. I measure vote buying in the latest national election with data from the Varieties of Democracy-project (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, et al. 2018). The interaction of increasing vote buying and poverty rates was positively associated with the likelihood of CCT adoption, controlling for GDP per capita, population size, cumulative left strength, and democratic history. Analogously with individual-level support for redistribution from rich to poor, then, a proxy for clientelism concern was associated with a higher probability of national-level CCT adoption.

In summary, the last empirical chapter of the dissertation provided evidence consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 4. The cases were drawn from the Latin American and Caribbean region in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. The evidence in Chapter 6 indicates that the theory can help explain redistributive attitudes and outcomes in a broad sample of case, which points to high generalizability and predictive power of the theory.

Contributions of the dissertation to the literature and future research

The coalitional dynamics of redistributive politics are at the heart of this dissertation. I have presented a theory of when a cross-class coalition of the top (the upscale electorate) and bottom (the poor population) of the income distribution against the middle (the vulnerable or struggler group) may emerge, and why the secret practices of clientelism and vote buying counterintuitively can lead to deepened, higher-quality democracy when the poor are granted access to the welfare state after longstanding exclusion from benefits that help them counter adverse market forces (e.g. unemployment, inflation) and life events that reduce household *per capita* income (including sickness, separation, the death of a breadwinner, and pregnancy). The issues examined in the dissertation can contribute to several strands in the academic literature as well as help guide policies to reduce poverty and inequality.

The long-standing exclusion of the poor from the Latin American welfare state despite high levels of inequality that should have predicted more redistribution according to standard theories of redistribution such as the Meltzer-Richard model (Meltzer and Richard 1981) is puzzling. How could welfare policies do so little to alleviate the plight of the poor in the Latin American and Caribbean region given persistently high levels of inequality since "at least the middle of the nineteenth century, if not before" (Levy and Schady 2013, 206; Ferranti et al. 2004)? Even after the adoption of CCTs, national governments in the region do relatively little to reduce inequality. The volume of redistribution remains quite limited compared to efforts of more comprehensive welfare states in Western Europe (e.g. Goñi, López, and Servén 2011). This is unsurprising since the social policy reforms that have swept the region in the last two or three decades have specifically targeted the poor

(Garay 2016; De La O 2015; Holland and Schneider 2017; Carnes and Mares 2014), which is a telltale sign of a liberal welfare state in the mold of the US, the UK, and Australia, just to mention a few examples of countries in other regions of the world that do very little to reduce inequality compared to more comprehensive universal welfare states in Scandinavia and even relative to the conservative welfare states in continental Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001, 2012).[138] In Latin America as well as other places in which redistribution comes close to the ideal type of liberal welfare states, the upscale electorate has escaped high taxation efforts in return for relatively cheap social assistance-style benefits like cash transfers and food stamps for the most economically insecure. Meanwhile, middle sectors have been too wealthy to qualify for social assistance and too poor to opt-out from underfunded public schools and public health care (to the extent that the latter exists for people above the poverty line) and purchase private services on the market like people in the upscale segment. The logic of an ends-against-the-middle coalition of upscale and poor voters has been elaborated elsewhere (Epple and Romano 1996; Ansell 2006) and appears applicable beyond the Latin American and Caribbean region, which has been the empirical focus of this dissertation.

The role of clientelism in effectuating the adoption of CCTs, specifically, is the more novel contribution of the dissertation. I have argued that clientelism and vote buying function as a signal to the upscale electorate of efforts to capture the poor vote. Upscale voters dislike this way of gaining the support of the poor since the taxation effort required to sustain clientelism is unknown as a consequence of the unknown volume of clientelist redistribution. Politicians who give benefits to poor people simply in return for a promise of political or electoral support do little to respond to upscale demands for a more productive labor force. While the upscale dislike being taxed, they do have a preference for a reasonable level of skill and health in the segment of the labor force that cleans, cooks, washes clothes, and takes care of their children. CCTs have publicly known budgets, are cheap relative to supply-side investments (such as improving teacher quality, reducing class sizes, and extending the curriculum). When clientelism and vote buying signal an effort to make the poor part of the winning coalition, the upscale electorate and poor voters converge on a preference for CCTs. Politicians can attract both these groups at the top and the bottom of the income distribution by adopting CCTs.

The theory sheds light on the ability for different types of pro-poor redistribution to attract support beyond the beneficiary base. It combines insights from the literature on redistribution in the advanced economies with the largely developing world-focused clientelism literature. It appears largely accepted among scholars of the advanced economies that the "Paradox of Redistribution" (Korpi and Palme 1998) means that it is hard to find support for targeted pro-poor social assistance programs beyond the beneficiary base, which results in less generous benefit levels than what would counterintuitively have been the case if benefits were distributed to broader segments of the population. Yet scholars have treated CCTs as policy innovations

[138] Another common social policy reform has been privatization of pensions (Brooks 2009), which should also decrease rather than increase redistribution since individuals are more vulnerable to market forces in a privatized system with individualized pensions compared to a public system in which benefits are pooled across the population.

that enjoy broad support even among vulnerable groups in the middle of the income distribution (Garay 2016; Holland and Schneider 2017) because they are cheap programs compared to social security programs such as pensions.

The theory of the dissertation, in contrast, resolves the tension between theories of the advanced economies that argue and empirically document long-standing animosity of middle-income groups to social assistance because it drives a wedge between the poor and the middle. The poor were long neglected in the welfare state in Latin America and beyond, and received benefits primarily in return for supporting their political patron. It should come as no surprise that the poor opt for cheap CCTs since they represent an improvement to being the targets of erratic, unpredictable, and unreliable clientelism and vote buying efforts. Nonetheless, politicians who seek to win elections and stay in office with the support of upscale and poor voters through social policy that is characterized by means-tested social assistance for the bottom of the income distribution in return for a low tax rate are dividing the redistributive interests of the poor from those of the vulnerable group. Opportunities for a coalition of poor and vulnerable groups diminish since the means-tested character of CCTs excludes the vulnerable from benefits even though they lack the economic security of the upscale electorate.

Topics for future research include how the coalition for CCTs would look, and to what extent it would be enough to win elections, if the bottom-group rose from absolute poverty. I have modeled a world with three equally sized groups of poor, vulnerable, and upscale voters. What would happen if the poor escaped material deprivation and difficulty of satisfying basic needs? While the poor group by design would still be poor in a relative sense, it is theoretically possible that the redistributive preferences of the bottom electorate would change in response to a more economically secure situation and lower marginal utility of income. If the relatively poor gained enough economic security to be able to leave their day-to-day struggle for survival and falling deeper into poverty behind, it is possible they could afford to place a higher weight on investments on public services even though such investments would do little for their economic status in the short-run. In a scenario in which absolute poverty is drastically decreased, voting for targeted pro-poor transfers would lose some of its attractiveness to their intended beneficiary base. It is quite conceivable that the relatively poor then could join the demands of those in the middle of the income distribution for higher quality services, which researchers have pointed to as a key factor for upward economic mobility (Ferranti et al. 2004; Birdsall, Lustig, and Meyer 2014; Birdsall 2012).

Beyond its contributions to academic debates about redistributive politics, attitudes to redistribution, and the determinants of social policy expansion; the dissertation may help to inform policy by elucidating what electoral support can be expected for different types of pro-poor redistribution. The dissertation can as a consequence help make sense of the political value of CCTs, and anticipate in what contexts CCTs may struggle to find fertile ground. The effects of CCTs have been widely studied by academics and policymakers in national as well as international fora (see, for example, Fiszbein and Schady 2009, for an overview) but less effort has been expended on understanding the political logic behind these programs.

CCTs are rather revolutionary in a region that for a long time was known for its puzzling exclusion of the poor amid staggering levels of inequality. Yet there has been a tendency in part of the literature to simply view CCTs as natural consequences of large poor populations and stubborn inequality, which ignores the long time-period in which there was in fact very little space for the poor in the welfare state. Understanding when governments help its least economically privileged citizens on the basis of need rather than political currency is an important topic with real-world consequences for poor people with little protection against market forces and adverse life events across the world.

Appendix 1. Construction of the CCT dataset

Which programs were counted as CCTs?

I relied on the CEPAL (2019b) database of CCTs and the literature (primarily Fiszbein and Schady 2009) to form the dependent variable. To be considered a CCT, programs needed to have conditionalities, target the poor, and transfer cash directly to households. Using this scoring rule meant excluding Ecuador's *Bono Solidario* program that was started in 1998. The BS was unconditional (World Bank 2005) until parts of the program were merged with the CCT *Bono de Desarollo Humano* (2003) (ILO 2017).[139] Similarly, Honduras's original *Programa de Asignación Familiar* (PRAF I) (1990) was unconditional[140] while its later iterations (PRAF II in 1998 and PRAF III in 2006) made cash conditional on fulfillment of health and educational requirements (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Azuara Herrera, Maciel, and Tetreault 2015).

The targeting criteria in the definition meant excluding Bolivia's *Bono Juancito Pinto* (2006), which is not targeted to poor households or individuals but rather all public schoolchildren with at least a 80 percent attendance rate "regardless of the income level of the child's parents" (McGuire 2013, 1). Similarly, I exclude Argentina's *Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados* (2002) since it was not targeting poor households but rather households in which the household head was unemployed with children or people with disabilities. In others words, "Jefes did not have an explicit poverty focus" (Galasso and Ravallion 2004, 370). I also exclude subnational CCTs since the objective of this chapter is to estimate determinants of national-level CCT adoption. This means I exclude subnational CCTs such as the *Programa de Ciudadanía Porteña* in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, the *Protección y Desarrollo de la Niñez y Adolescencia Trabajadora* in the city of Guatemala, and *Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar* (Bogotá, Colombia) (CEPAL 2019b).

Another question was whether CCTs that replaced existing CCTs should be understood as new programs and hence CCT adoptions. I chose to understand these as new programs on the basis that politicians who change names of CCTs do so with the knowledge that their actions may be noticed. Policymakers intend for the revamped program to be understood as a new or at least improved CCT. In that sense, I understand politicians who make alterations to an existing program as reaffirming their commitment to non-clientelist, observable, and human capital-improving pro-

[139] The BS was expressly instituted to compensate the poor for a price hike, "para compensar a las familias pobres por la supresión de los subsidios de gas y electricida" (Martínez et al. 2017, 5) (similarly to Brazil's *Auxilio Gás/Vale Gas* that "was intended to dampen the effects on poor families as cooking gas subsidies were phased out" (Fiszbein and Schady 2009, 35–36)).

[140] The original PRAF was implemented in 1990 "as an emergency programme delivering subsidies without conditionalities, funded by the Honduran government." (CEPAL 2019a) (Azuara Herrera, Maciel, and Tetreault 2015).

poor redistribution. I accordingly code Mexico as adopting CCTs when *Progresa* changed names to *Oportunidades* (2001) and *Prospera* (2014) although some researchers treat *Progresa* and *Oportunidades* as the same program.[141] Similarly, I code the pilot projects *Red Juntos* (2007) that preceded the Colombian government's adoption of *Red Unidos (*2011)[142] as its own program.

Some programs in the CEPAL database were strictly speaking not conditional *cash* transfers since the benefit came in the form of food stamps. This is the case for Panama's 2005 *Bonos Familiares para la Compra de Alimentos*, which bimonthly grants food vouchers to extremely poor families in rural areas, with priority given to indigenous populations (CEPAL 2019b). I included it on the basis that food stamps constitute additional income since the families need to spend less cash on food. It is targeted to poor families and entails health and education conditionalities just like a CCT. CEPAL includes *Tarjeta Uruguay Social* (adopted in 2006) in their database. This, however, is an unconditional cash transfer for food consumption (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2019). I exclude it from analysis.

According to the theory, the same political motives drive CCT adoption when none existed before and when CCT adoption occurs against a background of prior CCTs. As Table 1 in the main text shows, Brazil adopted no fewer than seven CCTs from 1995 to 2017. Since four of these were started in two years (*Bolsa Alimentação* and *Bolsa Escola* in 2001; *Bolsa Família* and *Cartão Alimentação* in 2003), however, I treat these as one adoption per year in the population-averaged logit regression models in Chapter 6.

Other decisions

I used the official end date of the program to calculate program coverage even if CCTs in some cases continued to make payments in the phase-out. For example, *Cartão Alimentação* in Brazil was adopted in 2003 but was merged with the *Bolsa Família* program that was adopted the same year. However, CEPAL data indicates payments continued until 2011 when 1,537 households received the benefit (CEPAL 2019b).

Ecuador's *Beca Escolar* (2001-02) was "a small cash transfer to families whose school-age children were enrolled and regularly attending school" (Fiszbein and Schady 2009, 259), which was phased-into the *Bono de Desarrollo Humano* (2003). It is not listed in CEPAL's database and we lack information on its coverage.

The Brazilian PGRM is neither in CEPAL's database. It was implemented in the late 1990s after the Brazilian Congress approved a law that made it possible for the federal government to grant resources to municipal cash transfer programs (Lei Federal nº 9.533/1997, Presidência da República 1997) (Veras Soares 2010). It was intended to cofinance local *Programas de Renda Mínima* and *Bolsa Escola* programs such that for "municipalities poorer than the respective state average, the federal government pays up to 50% of programs that provide a support payment (Bolsa Escola) to low-income families who maintain all their children in school"

[141] In Fiszbein and Schady (2009), for example, the then-current name *Oportunidades* is also used to refer to *Progresa*.
[142] The nation-wide implementation of *Red Unidos* took place in 2011 (CEPAL 2019b; Abramovsky et al. 2014).

(World Bank 2001a, 81). The municipal programs were targeting families whose *per capita* income was no more than one-half minimum wage with children and dependents under 14 years of age who were enrolled and frequently attended public schools (Licio 2002, 85). There is some uncertainty surrounding the effective start date of the PGRM program. The decree (Decreto 2.609) that regulated the co-financing program was passed in 1998 but it appears to have effectively started in early 1999. It ended in 2001 when the Cardoso government introduced the *Bolsa Escola* program instead (Licio 2002). I code it as 1998 since this is when the federal government, through Lei Federal nº 9.533/1997 and the regulating Decreto 2.609, had signaled its intention to start a CCT even though the effective start may have been one year later. By October 2000 (one and a half year after the effective program start), one million families (1,031,244) in a total of 1,624 municipalities had benefitted from the program, which was co-funded by the federal government (Licio 2002, 88 based on numbers from Comite Assessor de Gestao do PGRM and FNDE (2000)). If we calculate the coverage rate based on the total numbers of households in 2000 (48,262,786 families lived in *domicílios particulares* according to the 2000 census (IBGE 2000)) (although the data from Licio (2002) also includes beneficiary households in 1999), the PGRM reached 2.1 percent of households. In May 2001, no more than 46,000 households benefited from the PGRM (Pacheco Santos, Pasquim, and Chaves dos Santos 2011, 1829).

The federal *Bolsa Escola* program (started in 2001 by the Cardoso government) benefited ca. five million families by the end of its first year of operation, which it continued in 2002 and 2003. This represents a household coverage rate of around ten percent of households (based on the 2000 census) (Pacheco Santos, Pasquim, and Chaves dos Santos 2011, 1829; IBGE 2000). *Bolsa Alimentação* reached 1.67 milion families in September 2003, representing 3.5 percent of all households. (Pacheco Santos, Pasquim, and Chaves dos Santos 2011, 1829; IBGE 2000). The *Cartão Alimentação* program had 774,000 beneficiary families in September 2003, representing 1.6 percent of households (Pacheco Santos, Pasquim, and Chaves dos Santos 2011, 1829; IBGE 2000). The PETI reached around 35,000 children in 1997. By 2010, the number had grown to 820,000 (Sposati 2010).

624,184 households in the Dominican Republic benefited from the *Progresando con Solidaridad*'s largest conditional component "Comer es primeiro" in June 2013 (Dirección de planificación y seguimiento 2014). The two other conditional components "Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar" and "Bono Escolar Estudiando Progreso" benefited 268,758 and 45,800 households, respectively (Dirección de planificación y seguimiento 2014). It was unclear to what extent these households overlapped. If we assume these households are unique and simply sum the beneficiary households, *Progresando con Solidaridad* had a coverage rate of 33.7 percent in June 2013. If we assume that all of the beneficiary households of the largest component also benefit from the other two components, the coverage rate is 22.4 percent. We estimated the number of households (2,784,852) on the basis of a population size of 9,468,497 from the 2010 census (ONE 2010) and the 2013 average household size of 3.4 individuals (ONE 2014).

APPENDIX 1

According to Moore (2009), Nicaragua's *Red de Protección Social* from 2000 to 2002 covered around 10,000 households (representing 1.3 percent of households). There were 751,637 households (approximated by *viviendas particulares ocupadas*) in 1995 (INIDE 1995). The SAC in Nicaragua (2005) benefited 3,000 households (Moore 2009). There were 1,044,476 households (*hogares*) in 2005 (INIDE 2005).

Appendix 2. Construction of the vote buying effort estimate

To proxy the extent to which voters believe that vote buying is a prevalent practice, I draw on original, municipal-level estimates of the relative reliance of candidates on brokers in municipal election campaigns. The data source is the Supreme Electoral Court's candidate expenditure data for the 2012 municipal elections (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015), which candidates are required by law to submit.[143] For example, alderman candidate Benjamin Nogueira de Oliveira (PRTB, *Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro*) in the Amazonian municipality of Manaquiri (population of less than 23,000) reported employing voluntary *cabos eleitorais* for 15 days during the period September 3-October 6, valued at a total of R$ 1,244 (ca. US$ 323) in the expenditure category of personnel expenses.

The value of the variable "Broker" is the percentage of total campaign expenditures in each municipal election that went to brokers (*cabos eleitorais*).[144] According to the data, campaign spending on brokers was on average three percent of all campaign spending in Brazilian municipalities in the 2012 elections. While *cabos eleitorais* may be used for legal purposes (e.g. canvassing), they are known in the literature to function as "local-level political brokers" (Nichter 2011, 3). Examples from previous Brazilian elections likewise indicate that candidates hire these campaign activists to broker deals with vote sellers in the lead-up to elections. For example, the Regional Electoral Tribunal of the northern state of Tocantins issued upon request of the Regional Electoral Prosecutor an injunction against the use of *cabos eleitorais* by gubernatorial candidates in the 2010 elections. The one-day injunction was enforced by police forces as well as the army, and was motivated by the court as a way to curb vote buying (Simionato 2010). *Cabos eleitorais* have also been used in campaigns for national office. For example, the 2014 presidential cam-

[143] Unfortunately, the candidate spending data is difficult to use for elections previous to 2012 since the reporting requirements were made more stringent for the 2012 elections, rendering it mandatory to explicitly report spending on *cabos eleitorais*. Likewise, it is difficult to use candidate spending reports for the 2014 state (gubernatorial and state assembly) and federal (president and Congress) elections since they do not disclose the location of the campaign, making it challenging to use for intermunicipal vote buying comparisons.

[144] The reporting occurs at the expenditure level for each candidate. I summed all expenditure on brokers at the municipal level and created the variable "Brokers" to measure the proportion of all campaign expenditures that goes to *cabos eleitorais*. I used the "egenmore" package for Stata to construct the variable. I searched for expenditure descriptions containing the words "cabo eleitoral," "cabos eleitorais," "militante," and "militantes" and included all expenditures related to such personnel. In addition to salaries (estimated by the candidate in those cases where the candidate reported that the service was voluntary) and social charges, candidates report paying for food and beverages, sunscreen, clothing, transportation, etc., for the activists. The number of observations for the municipal-level variables equals the number of municipalities (5,567) but these are based on a far greater number of observations. Expenditure reports solely for the state of São Paulo, for example, result in more than one million observations. The reports contain among other things information about the office for which the candidate is running, the date of expenditure, the value of the expenditure, type of expenditure, and a short description of the expenditure.

paign of Aécio Neves paid R$ 2.5 million in August 2014 for activist activities and popular mobilization ("atividades de militância e mobilização de rua" (Bramatti and Venceslau 2014), garnering the PSDB more than 1,000 activists. Against this backdrop of the potentially illegal use of *cabos eleitorais* to facilitate vote buying in the lead-up to elections, a proposal to ban their use was approved by the Senate in the fall of 2015 (one year before the municipal elections of 2016) but struck down in the Chamber of Deputies (Lei da minirreforma eleitoral PL 5735/13) (Câmara dos deputados 2015).

In sum, the relative size of campaign expenditures for *cabos eleitorais* may serve as a proxy for the relative reliance on brokers and vote buying across municipalities given the historic use of such campaign staff to buy votes.

Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics (Chapter 2)

Figure 23. Social security contributors in the first and second labor income quintile, respectively (percentage of the economically active population)



Source: IDB/SIMS database (Inter-American Development Bank 2019). Variable: "Formal sector (1): Total active workers contributing to social security (as a % of the economically active population)", disaggregated by labor income quintile. The sample consists of 32 observations per labor income quintile across nine countries 1990-95.

APPENDIX 3

Figure 24. Social security contributors in third labor income quintile (percentage of the economically active population)



Source: IDB/SIMS database (Inter-American Development Bank 2019). Variable: "Formal sector (1): Total active workers contributing to social security (as a % of the economically active population)", disaggregated by labor income quintile. The sample consists of 32 observations per labor income quintile across nine countries 1990-95.

Figure 25. Social security contributors in the fourth and fifth labor income quintile, respectively (percentage of the economically active population)



Source: IDB/SIMS database (Inter-American Development Bank 2019). Variable: "Formal sector (1): Total active workers contributing to social security (as a % of the economically active population)", disaggregated by labor income quintile. The sample consists of 32 observations per labor income quintile across nine countries 1990-95.

Appendix 4. Coverage of CCTs (Chapter 2)

Table 17. CCT coverage (program-year)

Country	CCT abbr.	Year	Cov (%)	CCT abbr.	Year	Cov (%)
Argentina	AUH	2009	23.44	FPIS	2005	2.83
Argentina	AUH	2010	24.51	FPIS	2006	3.73
Argentina	AUH	2011	24.52	FPIS	2007	6.01
Argentina	AUH	2012	23.22	FPIS	2008	6.87
Argentina	AUH	2013	24.46	FPIS	2009	7.47
Argentina	AUH	2014	25.42	FPIS	2010	8.01
Argentina	AUH	2015	23.95			
Argentina	AUH	2016	24.67			
Argentina	AUH	2017	26.65			
Bolivia	BMN	2009	5.71	BMN	2014	5.35
Bolivia	BMN	2010	5.01	BMN	2015	4.64
Bolivia	BMN	2011	4.91	BMN	2016	5.16
Bolivia	BMN	2012	3.46	BMN	2017	5.91
Bolivia	BMN	2013	4.43			
Brazil	BA	2003	3.5	BFP	2010	28.36
Brazil	BE	2001	10.4	BFP	2011	28.9
Brazil	BE	2002	10.4	BFP	2012	29.31
Brazil	BE	2003	10.4	BFP	2013	28.95
Brazil	BFP	2003	8.87	BFP	2014	28.05
Brazil	BFP	2004	16	BFP	2015	27.71
Brazil	BFP	2005	20.93	BFP	2016	26.14
Brazil	BFP	2006	26.11	BFP	2017	26.43
Brazil	BFP	2007	26.03	CA	2003	1.6
Brazil	BFP	2008	24.66	PGRM	2000	2.1
Brazil	BFP	2009	28.17			
Chile	IEF	2012	3.67	SOL	2005	5.38
Chile	IEF	2013	2.38	SOL	2006	6.7
Chile	IEF	2014	1.56	SOL	2007	7.7
Chile	IEF	2015	1.78	SOL	2008	8.9
Chile	IEF	2016	4.68	SOL	2009	10.08
Chile	IEF	2017	4.44	SOL	2010	11.07

Chile	SOL	2002	1.14	SOL	2011	12.32
Chile	SOL	2003	2.54	SOL	2012	13.37
Chile	SOL	2004	3.93			
Colombia	MFA	2001	2.71	RJ	2008	3.33
Colombia	MFA	2002	3.97	RJ	2009	10.21
Colombia	MFA	2003	4.19	RJ	2010	13.28
Colombia	MFA	2004	4	RU	2011	14.09
Colombia	MFA	2005	5.61	RU	2012	12.89
Colombia	MFA	2006	7.38	RU	2013	13.23
Colombia	MFA	2007	16.95	RU	2014	12.92
Colombia	MFA	2008	17.41	RU	2015	8.77
Colombia	MFA	2009	25.79	RU	2016	3.3
Colombia	MFA	2010	24.09	RU	2017	5.38
Colombia	MFA	2011	22.04			
Colombia	MFA	2012	18.77			
Colombia	MFA	2013	23.53			
Colombia	MFA	2014	22.94			
Colombia	MFA	2015	21.66			
Colombia	MFA	2016	21.61			
Colombia	MFA	2017	21.5			
Costa Rica	AVA	2007	2.19	AVA	2015	10.15
Costa Rica	AVA	2010	12.16	AVA	2016	10.36
Costa Rica	AVA	2011	11.8	AVA	2017	10.91
Costa Rica	AVA	2012	11.47	SUP	2000	.93
Costa Rica	AVA	2013	10.69	SUP	2001	1.31
Costa Rica	AVA	2014	10.52	SUP	2002	.87
Dominican Rep.	PS	2013	33.7			
Ecuador	BDH	2003	39.36	BDH	2010	37.75
Ecuador	BDH	2004	31.62	BDH	2011	34.12
Ecuador	BDH	2005	33.22	BDH	2012	29.67
Ecuador	BDH	2006	34.85	BDH	2013	30.58
Ecuador	BDH	2007	34.5	BDH	2014	13.32
Ecuador	BDH	2008	34.13	BDH	2015	13.11
Ecuador	BDH	2009	40.45	BDH	2016	12.69
Ecuador				BDH	2017	11.91
El Salvador	RS	2005	1.19	RS	2011	8.22
El Salvador	RS	2006	2.13	RS	2012	7.7

El Salvador	RS	2007	4.4	RS	2013	7
El Salvador	RS	2008	7.67	RS	2014	6.69
El Salvador	RS	2009	9.66	RS	2015	6.13
El Salvador	RS	2010	8.93	RS	2016	5.97
Guatemala	MBS	2012	32.39	MBS	2015	13.22
Guatemala	MBS	2013	32.2	MBS	2016	23.58
Guatemala	MBS	2014	30.23	MBS	2017	5.94
Honduras	BVM	2014	19.72	PRAF II	2002	1.2
Honduras	BVM	2015	18.37	PRAF II	2003	1.6
Honduras	BVM	2016	16.39	PRAF II	2004	1.4
Honduras	BVM	2017	17.51	PRAF II	2005	1.8
Honduras	Bo-no100.00	2010	6.22			
Honduras	Bo-no100.00	2012	10.18			
Honduras	Bo-no100.00	2013	13.85			
Mexico	OPORT	2001	15.02	PROG	1997	1.53
Mexico	OPORT	2002	20.17	PROG	1998	8.01
Mexico	OPORT	2003	19.92	PROG	1999	11.42
Mexico	OPORT	2004	23.2	PROG	2000	12.09
Mexico	OPORT	2005	22.92	PROSP	2014	23.08
Mexico	OPORT	2006	22.63	PROSP	2015	23.57
Mexico	OPORT	2007	22.35	PROSP	2016	23.06
Mexico	OPORT	2008	22.29	PROSP	2017	25.11
Mexico	OPORT	2009	22.46			
Mexico	OPORT	2010	24.51			
Mexico	OPORT	2011	23.63			
Mexico	OPORT	2012	22.8			
Mexico	OPORT	2013	23.32			
Nicaragua	RPS	2000	1.3			
Nicaragua	SAC	2005	.3			
Panama	RO	2006	3.73	RO	2012	11.63
Panama	RO	2007	9.09	RO	2013	11.45
Panama	RO	2008	11.07	RO	2014	11.41
Panama	RO	2009	12.04	RO	2015	10.39
Panama	RO	2010	11.26	RO	2016	10.43

Panama	RO	2011	11.87	RO	2017	8.23
Paraguay	ABR	2005	.06	TEK	2005	.38
Paraguay	ABR	2006	.06	TEK	2006	.79
Paraguay	ABR	2007	.06	TEK	2007	1.2
Paraguay	ABR	2008	.04	TEK	2008	1.65
Paraguay	ABR	2009	.03	TEK	2009	6.34
Paraguay	ABR	2010	.04	TEK	2010	7.51
Paraguay	ABR	2011	.22	TEK	2011	7.36
Paraguay	ABR	2012	.2	TEK	2012	7.13
Paraguay	ABR	2013	.12	TEK	2013	6.45
Paraguay	ABR	2014	.14	TEK	2014	8.11
Paraguay	ABR	2015	.22	TEK	2015	10.33
Paraguay	ABR	2016	.23	TEK	2016	11.58
Paraguay				TEK	2017	10.82
Peru	JUNT	2005	.46	JUNT	2011	8.6
Peru	JUNT	2006	3.33	JUNT	2012	10.94
Peru	JUNT	2007	7.11	JUNT	2013	11.09
Peru	JUNT	2008	8.38	JUNT	2014	12.51
Peru	JUNT	2009	7.9	JUNT	2015	12.59
Peru	JUNT	2010	8.79	JUNT	2016	10.67
Peru				JUNT	2017	10.94
Uruguay	AF	2008	16.83	AF	2013	18.57
Uruguay	AF	2009	19.93	AF	2014	19.19
Uruguay	AF	2010	21.04	AF	2015	18.84
Uruguay	AF	2011	21.02	AF	2016	19.42
Uruguay	AF	2012	20.41	AF	2017	18.56

Source: CEPAL's CCT database (CEPAL 2019b) and author's calculations based on official government statistics on program coverage and households.

Appendix 5: Supplemental information (Chapter 4)

Table 18. Within-group difference of means tests

	Control (*n*=114)	Treatment (*n*=105)
(A) A CCT for all poor families	4.629 (0.294)	4.944 (0.298)
(B) A CCT for some poor families	4 (0.342)	4.648 (0.290)
(C) Difference of means (*p*-value) (B–A)	**–0.629 (0.100)**	**–0.296 (0.445)**
(D) CFC continue	4.889 (0.504)	5.2 (0.565)
(E) Start CCT Rio	4.32 (0.209)	4.058 (0.245)
(F) Difference of means (*p*-value) (E–D)	**–0.569 (0.251)**	**–1.142 (0.054)**
(G) Maintain BFP	0.5 (0.083)	0.382 (0.077)
(H) Expand BFP	0.5 (0.083)	0.618 (0.077)
(I) Difference of proportion (*p*-value) (H–G)	**0 (1.000)**	**–0.235 (0.136)**

Note: at conventional levels of statistical significance, there are no differences within the control and treatment group, respectively, between supporting a CCT for all and some poor families (row C); between supporting the continuance of the *Cartão Família Carioca* program and starting a CCT in the city of Rio de Janeiro (row F); or between supporting the maintenance or increase of the number of *Bolsa Família* beneficiaries (row I).

APPENDIX 5

Table 19. Robustness check: education and support for CCTs

	General support			*Support for local CCT*		
	G. Treatment	H. Control	**Diff G-H**	I. Treatment	J. Control	**Diff I-J**
A. College	4.794	3.795	0.999	4.516	3.614	0.902
	(0.341)	(0.317)	(0.058)	(0.327)	(0.268)	(0.025)
B. Secondary	4.4	4.741	-0.341	3.934	4.75	-0.816
	(0.272)	(0.379)	(0.390)	(0.320)	(0.350)	(0.118)
C. No primary	6.5	4.588	1.912	5.214	5.278	-0.063
	(0.398)	(0.534)	(0.003)	(0.494)	(0.751)	(0.948)
			Diff-in-Diff G-H			**Diff-in-Diff I-J**
D. Diff A-B College-secondary	0.394	-0.946	1.340	0.582	-1.136	1.718
	(0.371)	(0.080)	(0.034)	(0.100)	(0.041)	(0.005)
E. Diff A-C College-no primary	-1.706	-0.793	-0.913	-0.698	-1.664	0.966
	(0.003)	(0.226)	(0.269)	(0.249)	(0.052)	(0.374)
F. Diff B-C Secondary-no primary	-2.1	0.153	-2.253	-1.280	-0.528	-0.752
	(0.000)	(0.805)	(0.008)	(0.061)	(0.540)	(0.537)

Note: the table presents mean support for each group (standard errors) and differences in means (*p*).

Table 20. Robustness check: proportion in support of the BFP

	Support for the BFP		
	G. Treatment	H. Control	**Diff G-H**
A. College	0.4	0.656	0.256
	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.018)
B. Second-ary	0.593	0.632	-0.038
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.517)
C. No pri-mary	0.857	0.706	0.151
	(0.087)	(0.104)	(0.263)
			Diff-in-Diff G-H
D. Diff A-B College-secondary	0.063 (0.512)	-0.232	0.295
		(0.011)	(0.009)
E. Diff A-C College-no primary	-0.201 (0.108)	-0.306	0.105
		(0.015)	(0.539)
F. Diff B-C Secondary-no primary	-0.264 (0.021)	-0.074	-0.190
		(0.570)	(0.208)

Note: mean support for each group (std. errors) and differences in means (*p*).

APPENDIX 5

Figure 26. Robustness check: treatment effect on general and local CCT support by educational status



Figure 27. Robustness check: treatment effect on BFP support by educational status



Table 21. Probing the mechanism: vulnerable and poor respondents

	Vulnerable			Poor		
	A. Treat	B. Control	A-B (*p*)	C. Treat	D. Control	C-D (*p*)
The government should reduce inequality	6.161	6.351	-0.190	5.75	6.111	-.361
in society	(0.169)	(0.186)	(0.358)	(0.427)	(0.644)	(0.689)
Reducing poverty in Rio among most	5.859	6.365	-0.505	6.333	6	0.333
important issues	(0.171)	(0.147)	(0.045)	(0.291)	(0.357)	(0.510)
My life would be better with less poverty	6.156	6.356	-0.200	5.889	6.7	0.811
in society	(0.213)	(0.136)	(0.437)	(0.530)	(0.137)	(0.072)
Important to me that vote buying become	6.406	6.676	-0.269	6.917	5.444	1.472
more difficult	(0.256)	(0.129)	(0.274)	(0.068)	(0.853)	(0.108)
Left-right placement	5.361	5.097	0.264	1.725	5.4	-1.4
	(0.548)	(0.434)	(0.741)	(1.725)	(1.305)	(0.549)
Partisanship (proportion with)	0.141	0.176	-0.035	0.333	0.222	0.111
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.604)	(0.089)	(0.145)	(0.543)
Vote buying is common (Rio)	6.283	5.676	0.607	5.917	4.375	1.542
	(0.202)	(0.276)	(0.013)	(0.585)	(.0842)	(0.058)
Vote buying is common (Brazil)	6.207	5.972	0.235	5.917	5.333	0.583
	(0.274)	(0.285)	(0.415)	(0.643)	(0.857)	(0.415)
Difficult to buy votes when people stop	4.016	4.592	-0.576	3.455	4.111	-0.657
being poor	(0.439)	(0.322)	(0.344)	(0.783)	(0.932)	(0.613)
People who do not support the current	3.982	4.123	-0.141	4.625	3.556	1.069
government risk losing CCT benefits	(0.301)	(0.335)	(0.763)	(1.280)	(0.954)	(0.312)
Government chooses beneficiaries of	3.085	2.887	0.197	2.083	3.111	-1.028
CCTs like the BFP according to the rules	(0.411)	(0.185)	(0.617)	(0.570)	(0.682)	(0.264)

Note: all responses given on a seven-point scale where 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree except items 5. Left-right placement (ten-point scale from left to right) and 6. Partisanship (dichotomous responses, table shows proportion with partisanship).

APPENDIX 5

Table 22. Probing the mechanism: between-class differences by treatment condition

	Upscale-poor (*p*)		C. Upscale-vulnerable (*p*)	
	A. Treat	B. Control	C. Treat	D. Control
1. The government should reduce inequality in society	0.765 (0.099)	0.159 (0.811)	0.354 (0.167)	-0.081 (0.681)
2. Reducing poverty in Rio among most important issues	0.061 (0.859)	-0.459 (0.319)	0.535 (0.052)	-0.824 (0.009)
3. My life would be better with less poverty in society	-0.609 (0.014)	0.417 (0.455)	-0.065 (0.815)	-0.051 (0.838)
4. Important to me that vote buying become more difficult	0.053 (0.480)	1.339 (0.128)	0.563 (0.045)	0.108 (0.402)
5. Left-right placement	0.893 (0.629)	0.255 (0.851)	-0.468 (0.475)	0.558 (0.267)
6. Partisanship (proportion with)	0.061 (0.657)	-0.006 (0.968)	0.253 (0.007)	0.041 (0.563)
7.Vote buying is common (Rio)	0.858 (0.154)	2.213 (0.014)	0.491 (0.019)	0.912 (0.004)
8.Vote buying is common (Brazil)	0.677 (0.303)	1.361 (0.127)	0.387 (0.267)	0.722 (0.031)
9. Difficult to buy votes when people stop being poor	1.242 (0.178)	0.483 (0.652)	0.681 (0.222)	0.003 (0.996)
10. People who do not support the current government risk losing CCT benefits	-1.080 (0.418)	0.255 (0.807)	-0.437 (0.361)	-0.312 (0.530)
11. Government chooses beneficiaries of CCTs like the BFP according to program rules	0.795 (0.213)	-0.778 (0.350)	-0.206 (0.756)	-0.554 (0.169)

Table 22 presents between-class differences by treatment condition. Vulnerable respondents were significantly more supportive than upscale respondents in the control condition of the statement that reducing poverty in Rio was among the most important issues today. The situation was reversed in the treatment condition (borderline significance at *p* 0.052). Poor respondents expressed more agreement than the upscale in the treatment condition with the statement that their life would be

better with less poverty in society. It was significantly more important for the upscale than the vulnerable in the treatment group that vote buying became more difficult. A higher proportion of the upscale than vulnerable in the treatment group identified as partisans.

Upscale respondents thought that vote buying in Rio was more common than did vulnerable in control as well as treatment poor respondents in the control group. Upscale respondents in the control thought vote buying in Brazil was more common than vulnerable.

There were no significant between-class differences for the last three items in Table 22 in relation to the association between poverty and vote buying, the political manipulation of benefits, or the rule-boundedness of BFP benefits.

Appendix 6: Supplemental results (Chapter 5)

Figure 28. College-educated voters and voting for Maia (2000, 2004)



APPENDIX 6

Figure 29. Educational attainment in a district and voting for Maia (2000, 2004)



Note: educational level of registered voters is 2000 data for the model with 2000 election results as the dependent variable as voter records kept by the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015) in preceding years lack educational information in the city of Rio de Janeiro. For the 2004 election results, the educational data is from 2002 (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2015)

Table 23. District-level education and voting for Paes 2008-12

% of voters in district with	**Pearson's correlation (*p*-value) between educ. and vote share of Paes**	
	2008	*2012*
College degree	-0.961 (0.000)	-0.893 (0.000)
Primary/secondary	-0.181 (0.076)	-0.097 (0.345)
Less than primary	0.8529 (0.000)	0.832 (0.000)

		Vote share (%)			**Δ Vote share 12-08**
Voters w college (%)	*n*	*2008 mean (SD)*	*n*	*2012 mean (SD)*	
Median	*49*	59.974 (3.701)	*49*	70.681 (3.549)	**10.708**
Mean	*16*	50.934 (2.991)	*17*	64.237 (3.236)	**13.304**
Mean +1 SD	*13*	42.352 (3.836)	*13*	56.689 (3.171)	**14.337**
Upscale district: Mean +2 SDs	*12*	30.472 (2.873)	*11*	50.695 (2.911)	**20. 224**
Voters with prim/sec educ. (%)					
Mean	*43*	50.212 (15.141)	*45*	63.944 (10.446)	**13.732**
Median	*5*	56.882 (7.057)	*4*	59.053 (9.392)	**2.172**
Mean+1 SD	*32*	49.628 (12.233)	*33*	64.541 (7.146)	**14.914**
Mean+2 SDs	*15*	48.026 (6.543)	*13*	64.453 (5.5797)	**16.428**
Voters with less than prim educ. (%)					
Mean	*45*	23.912 (6.610)	*45*	57.680 (7.757)	**33.7677**
Median	*4*	35.340 (0.777)	*3*	60.031 (7.246)	**24.69113**
Mean+1 SD	*30*	40.371 (2.709)	*31*	68.793 (3.771)	**28.42191**
Poor district: Mean+2 SDs	*18*	50.425 (2.459)	*18*	71.999 (4.390)	**21.57384**

Note: In 2006, % of reg. voters with college degrees were 5 (median), 9 (mean), 18 (mean+1 SD), and 27 (mean + 2 SD). In 2012, 5 (median), 9 (mean), 19 (mean+1 SD), and 29 (mean+2 SD).

Figure 30. Simple OLS: 2012 vote shares for Paes in districts by proportion of college-educated (upscale) voters and voters with no primary education (poor)



Figure 31. Simple OLS: 2008 vote shares for Paes in districts by proportion of college-educated voters (upscale), primary or secondary education (vulnerable), and voters with no primary education (poor)



Figure 32. Simple OLS: 2012 vote shares for Paes in districts by proportion of college-educated voters (upscale), primary or secondary education (vulnerable), and voters with no primary education (poor)



APPENDIX 6

Table 24. Summary statistics

	2008 1st round	**2008 runoff**	**2012**
Paes vs. 1st round candidates	1: 32.58% 0: 67.42%		1: 65.74% 0: 34.26%
Paes vs. [Gabeira] [Freixo]		1: 50.97% 0: 49.03%	1: 66.63% 0: 33.37%
Family income (1-7)	2.845 (1.471)	2.817 (1.474)	2.653 (1.519)
Education (1-8)	4.504 (1.863)	4.517 (1.837)	4.517 (1.990)
Sex	M: 45.52% W: 54.48%	M: 45.30% W: 54.61%	M: 45.53% W: 54.47%
Age (1-6)	4.027 (1.594)	4.027 (1.595)	4.254 (1.360)
PMDB partisan	Y: 3.31% N: 96.69%	Y: 3.86% N: 96.14%	Y: 3.81% N: 96.19%
Non-PMDB partisan	Y: 27.57% N: 72.43%	Y: 25.98% N: 74.02%	Y: 25.99% N: 74.01%

Note: refers to valid votes (excluding undecided respondents and those who said they would cast blank votes or vote for no one).

Table 25. Logistic regression results: vote intention for Paes 2012-08 (spontaneous versions of vote intention question)

	2b	**3b**
	1st rounds	**Runoff 08, 1st round 12**
Income	-.046	-.291***
	(.046)	(.038)
2012 (dummy)	2.120***	.621***
	(.190)	(.173)
1.ano12#c.rendab	-.185***	.088
	(.056)	(.051)
Education	-.188***	-.227***
	(.028)	(.025)
Woman	.020	.184*
	(.085)	(.075)
Age	.190***	.223***
	(.029)	(.025)
PMDB Partisan	.947***	.668**
	(.229)	(.207)
Partisan (non-PMDB)	-.394***	-.396***
	(.092)	(.082)
Constant	-.426*	.990***
	(.203)	(.168)
Observations	2,885	3,599

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05

Figure 33. Predicted probability of support for Paes (spontaneous versions of vote intention question





Table 26. Differences in predicted probabilities: vote intentions before the first rounds of voting in 2008 and 2012 by income group (pooled cross-section model with year-income interaction) (Model 2b)

	Income group								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
	Spontaneous vote intention							**Δ 7-1 (*p*)**	**Δ 7-1 (*p*)**
08	.339	.329	.319	.309	.300	.290	.280	-.059 (*.305*)	-.049 (*.310*)
12	.780	.738	.691	.640	.585	.528	.471	-.309 *(.000)*	-.252 *(.000)*
Δ 12-08 (*p*)	.441 *(.000)*	.409 *(.000)*	.373 *(.000)*	.331 *(.000)*	.286 (.000)	.239 (.000)	.191 (.000)		

Table 27. Differences in predicted probabilities: vote intentions before the 2008 runoff and 2012 1st round by income group (pooled cross-section model, year-income interaction) (Model 3b)

	Income group								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
	Spontaneous							**Δ 7-1 (*p*)**	**Δ 6-1 (*p*)**
08	.639	.569	.497	.425	.356	.292	.236	-.403 (*.000*)	-.347 *(.000)*
12	.782	.746	.705	.661	.614	.565	.515	-.267 (*.000*)	-.217 (*.000*)
Δ 12-08 (*p*)	.143 (*.000*)	.176 (*.000*)	.208 (*.000*)	.236 (*.000*)	.259 (*.000*)	.273 (*.000*)	.279 (*.000*)		

Appendix 7: Year for moderate poverty data (Chapter 6)

I collected data on moderate poverty for countries in the following years: Argentina in 2011 (legislative elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were held in 2013), Dominican Republic 2012 (presidential elections in 2012), Belize held parliamentary elections in 2012 but data was available 2007, Mexico in 2012 (general elections in 2012), I find no data for Haiti in 2010 or 2011 (when presidential elections were held) or earlier from the IDB, Honduras in 2013 (general elections were held in 2013), Brazil in 2009 (elections were held 2010), Paraguay in 2013, Colombia in 2013 (elections were held in early 2014 overlapping with the 3024 LAPOP survey, Guatemala in 2011, I found no data for Jamaica 2011 or earlier from the IDB, El Salvador in 2013 (presidential elections were held in 2014 before the 2014 LAPOP survey), Uruguay in 2009, Nicaragua 2011, Panama 2009, Peru 2011, I found no data for Guyana 2011 from IADB, and Costa Rica in 2013 (elections were held in early 2014).

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