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THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT EMIGRANT

Explaining radical right party voting among
expatriate Swedes

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Abstract

What can explain the radical right party voting of citizens that have emigrated abroad? Results from the 2014 SOM survey of Swedish expatriates show that 7% of the expatriate population voted for the radical right party of Sweden – the Sweden Democrats. The research area of radical right party support is substantial, and there have been numerous studies presenting explanations to why individuals vote for radical right parties. But so far, there exists no previous investigations of whether these explanations hold for a group of citizens that live abroad. This thesis combines previous research on explanations to radical right support, with the theory of transnationalism, which argues that citizens emigrating from their home country develop identities that are either *transborder* (only connecting them to their home country) or *transnational* (connecting them to two or more countries). The hypotheses tested are 1) if previously ‘established’ explanations on radical right vote support also can explain expatriates voting for the Sweden Democrats 2) if expatriates differently developed national identities affect their vote support for the Sweden Democrats 3) if the presumed effect of explanations such as anti-immigrant attitudes leads to even higher likelihood of voting for the Sweden Democrats among expatriate voters with strong national identity. By conducting several logistic regressions, this thesis shows firstly, that Swedish expatriates with negative attitudes towards immigration and with low political trust are much more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Secondly, there is no effect of expatriates differently developed identities and voting for the Sweden Democrats. Finally, no interaction effect is found: having different types of national identities does not moderate the effect of attitudes to immigration on voting for the Sweden Democrats.

Keywords: radical right party voting; transnationalism; expatriate Swedes; Sweden Democrats

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1. Introduction

For thousands of years, people have migrated all over the world in search for happiness and a better life. Until recently, migration mostly concerned humans from low income countries moving to high-income countries. But as the world has become more globalized, people from both low-income countries and affluent countries take the opportunity to move across borders. In relation to this, an increased attention has been directed towards researching people migrating from developed countries (World Migration Report 2013:25). Emigrants from Sweden can be considered as a part of this development, as Sweden is an advanced industrial state with a highly progressed economy (Solevid 2016:9). Looking back at Swedish emigration history, the 1800s were the time when big waves of emigrants left Sweden in search for happiness in the West. Sweden have since then been considered to be an immigration country. But in 2011, statistics showed that the number of emigrants were bigger than during the top year of 1887 (SCB).¹ According to the theory of transnationalism, when citizens emigrate from their home country to a host country, and travel back and forth as a circular migrant, they develop identities that often connects them to two or more nation states. The theory of transnationalism further argues that the multiplicity of political and social involvements affects migrants' values, habits and the way they make decisions (Basch et.al 1994: 7). Studies have shown that these transnational experiences and the relationship with the home country also can affect the electoral behavior of migrants (Lafluer & Dominguez 2015).

Alongside with globalization, not least manifested in increased migration, radical right parties with strong anti-immigrant sentiments have emerged all through Europe. A great amount of research has been conducted to investigate the explanations behind individuals voting for radical right parties. Lubbers et.al (2002:348) argues that attitudinal positions are the most important factor to consider, specifically anti-immigration attitudes and political distrust. Other explanations are that immigrants are perceived as a cultural threat to Western values, but also as an economical threat to the welfare state and the labor market (Kriesi 2006). Scholars also argue that the anti-globalization message that radical right parties have attracted the so called 'losers' of globalization, that is voters that do not benefit from the current economic globalization who wishes to see stronger national boundaries and national identities

¹ There are, however, more people that immigrate into Sweden than people emigrating out of Sweden. Because of the refugee crisis that has been going on for the last three years, the immigration levels have reached a record amount, this according to SCB. <https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/in-och-utvandring/>

(Zaslove 2008: 169, Kreisi 2006). It is possible to consider expats, especially expats from Western societies, to be the opposite, that is the 'winners' of globalization, as they are people that enjoy more fluent borders, benefit from international competition and might have national identities that connect them to both their home country and their host country (Tsuda 2012: 642; Levitt and Schiller 2004: 1009). Focusing on the case of Sweden, research have shown that 7% of Swedish expats votes for the radical right winged party of Sweden Democrats, whose main success has grown from their anti-immigration and nationalistic policies (Oscarsson 2016; Rydgren & van der Maiden 2018). Hence, there is a plausible conundrum here, where people who are immigrants themselves and enjoy the freedoms of globalization, votes for a party that noticeably works with policies against globalization and immigration. Thus, these voters act in a way that challenges our previous notions of radical right support. The overall aim of this thesis it to investigate this specific occurrence, and look into what can explain Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. To reach the aim, the thesis draws and integrates on two strands of literature; firstly, research on motivators and explanations to radical right wing voting, secondly, research on transnationalism, a theory about how migrant experiences from two or more nation-states affects their actions, values and identities (Basch et al. 1994, Tsuda 2012). Together, they will be used to investigate the underlying explanations to why Swedish expatriates votes for the Sweden Democrats.

In a time with increased migration in general, the political behavior and influence of migrants towards their home country becomes more interesting to study. Not least as voters residing abroad have been described as playing a crucial role in different home country elections in recent years (Lafluer & Dominguez 2015: 156, Oscarsson 2016: 259). In the context of Sweden, Oscarsson (2016) showed in his study that expats voted quite differently than residential swedes, and that they were more right-winged in their voting behavior. This is an important finding, and something that needs to be developed, as there is not much research on how citizens who vote from abroad make decisions in favor of one political party over another. Additionally, this thesis also contributes to radical right research. Previous research has mainly drawn conclusions on explanations to radical right support on residential citizens. Migrants that vote from abroad are a new group of people in the context of radical right electoral support, and therefore a group that needs to be studied to be able to expand this field of research.

1.1 Aim

By drawing from research on both radical right voting and the theory of transnationalism, this thesis aims to investigate the explanations behind Swedish expats voting support for the Sweden Democrats. To be more specific, this thesis aims firstly to examine whether ‘established’ explanations on radical right electoral support, such as anti-immigration attitudes, distrust to politicians and distrust to other people in general, also are valid explanations to why expatriates from Sweden vote for the Sweden Democrats. Secondly, as transnational experiences such as relations to home and host country have proven to affect expats political behavior in combination with that previous research has showed that national identity affect support for radical right parties, this thesis aims to examine whether transnational experiences, and mainly the developed national identities from those experiences, affects Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Thirdly, the aim is also to investigate whether the presumed effect of explanations such as anti-immigrant attitudes leads to even higher likelihood of voting for the Sweden Democrats among expatriate voters with strong national identity.

2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, the theoretical framework will be conceptualized and developed. It will lay the foundation for the investigation that will follow to peruse the aim of this thesis. The thesis will mainly be based on previous research on radical right voters as well as the theory of transnationalism. This chapter will first present both of these concepts individually, to later be able to present both of them together as a basis for this thesis.

2.1 Definition and explanations to radical right voting

2.1.1 Definition of radical right parties

Since the middle of the 1980s, Western Europe has experienced an increase of parties within the radical right party family. Even though scholars have labeled them differently (‘extreme right’, ‘right-wing populist’, ‘anti-immigration’) most of them agree upon what characterizes the basics of this party family (Rydgren 2007, Mudde 2007, Jungar & Jupkås 2014, Van der Brug 2000). Mudde (2007:19) argues that ‘nativism’ constitutes the very core of the ideology of the larger radical right party family, and that it is a combination of xenophobia and nationalism. Nativism as an ideology holds that states exclusively should be inhabited by native groups, and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening

to the homogeneous nation-state. Furthermore, as radical right parties are exclusionary in their politics, it implies very strict assimilation and anti-immigration policies and a large criticism towards multi-culturalism (Jungar & Jupskås 2014: 218).

In their party program, the Sweden Democrats describes themselves as a social conservative party with a nationalistic foundation. They claim that their goal is to form a political movement that will guard the common national identity of Sweden, which can only be achieved if there are high degrees of ethnical and cultural likeness among the population. The party strongly opposes multiculturalism, which they claim leads to disharmony and conflict (Widfeldt 2008; Rydgren & van der Maiden 2018; Principprogram, Sverigedemokraterna 2003, 2011). Widfeldt (2008:272) argues that the Sweden Democrats emphasis on common ethnic and cultural identity can be seen as an expression of ethno-pluralism, sometimes called culturalism, which is interpreted as all ethnic groups being equal, but that they should be kept separate. Further, Mulinari & Neergard (2014:49) argues that the Sweden Democrats focuses on creating a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and uses it as a right to exclude others. The people considered as ‘them’ are not only different, but problematically different – as they differ from what is considered normal. Thus, by drawing from previous research on radical right parties, but also on research specifically about the Sweden Democrats, it is possible to define them as a radical right party with a nationalistic agenda. That is, a party with strong anti-immigration policies and an extensive criticism towards multiculturalism, with an idea of Sweden mainly being inhabited by native groups.

2.1.2 ‘Winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization

Research on radical right parties show that they have long campaigned against the forces of globalization and denationalization. Radical right parties argue that the financial and political elites together with the growing influence of the European Union destroys the natural fabric of civil society (Zaslove 2008: 169). Generally, the effects of political and economic globalization mainly manifest themselves at the national level. National politics are challenged both from above- through new forms of international cooperation- and from below, at the regional and local level (Kriesi et.al 2008:3). Over the past decades, effects of globalization have created a division between so called “winners” and “losers” in Western Europe, and these categories are articulated by political parties. The winners in this situation are citizens who are high skilled workers, with a higher educational degree, who work in a sector that benefit from international competition and are open to all kinds of cosmopolitan

citizens. The expected losers are the ones with lower education, unqualified jobs and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community (Kriesi 2006: 922). Time and time again, research has shown that lower educated, low-skilled workers are more prone to show electoral support for radical right parties (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002, Givens 2004). Theories of economic interest (Lipset 1960) have proposed that being unemployed or a manual worker with a lower level of education puts you in a similar social category as immigrants. Scholars argue that being in the same social category makes you more likely to perceive them (immigrants) as an economic threat, and will therefore make you more likely to vote for a radical right party (Lubbers et.al 2002: 348). It can also affect how individuals view the labor market competition, and see immigrants as the reason for themselves being unemployed. Furthermore, it can add to a belief that immigrants drain on the welfare system that may eventually leave these individuals less well-off (O'Rourke & Sinnott 2005: 843). Moreover, globalization poses a potential cultural threat as well. But this threat is not experienced in the same way by all members of the national community, and the individual level of education plays an important role. Kriesi et.al (2008:7) argues that education has a 'liberalizing' effect that introduces a shift in political values towards cultural liberalism and universalism. It contributes to openness and cultural tolerance towards immigrants and foreigners. Hjern (2001:56) also argues that education has an effect on nationalistic pride and xenophobic values, where higher education levels is associated with decreased levels of national pride and xenophobic values. Additionally, education contributes to professional success as well. Highly educated individuals are marketable inside and across the national borders, thus increasing one's *exit options*. Thus, on the one hand, there are those who have the mobility and convertible resources that allows them to exit if needed, on the other hand, there are those who remain locked in because of the lack of resources (Kriesi et.al 2008:5).

These economic and cultural threats have created a political space for the new populist radical right parties to take place. The radical right parties use a strategy of thriving on the fears and worries of the 'losers' about economical transformations and cultural diversity. Ethnically different populations become symbols of potential threats to the collective identity of the native population. Individuals that support nationalism and who possess a strong identification with their national community, will perceive globalization weakening their status. Conversely, citizens with universalist norms and identity perceives this as something positive.

2.1.3 Previous research on what explains radical right voting

While globalization theory is more of a theoretical perspective in the frame of radical right voting behavior, there is also an empirical perspective, with previous research on explanations behind radical right voting. Previous research shows that attitudinal positions are an important explanation behind radical right voting, with anti-immigration attitudes being the most important one (Lubbers et.al 2002). Research show that individuals who perceive immigrants negatively and hold them accountable when state's economy and welfare plunges have a larger incentive to vote for radical right parties (Zhirkov 2014, Lubbers et.al 2002). Likewise, individuals who view immigrants as a cultural threat and feel like they are diminishing Western values and social cohesion have shown to be more likely to vote for the radical right (Lubbers et.al 2002:349). These anti-immigrant attitudes largely originate from a nationalist sentiment and pride, where patriotism and chauvinism generally have a large positive effect on anti-immigrant emotion (O'Rourke & Sinnott: 2005:851, Hjerm 2001). The results concerning anti-immigrant attitudes are in line with the theory of winners/losers of globalization, showing that feelings of economic, cultural and national identity threats are common traits for individuals that vote for radical right parties. In addition to anti-immigrant attitudes, scholars also press on the importance to consider political trust and political dissatisfaction as factors for radical right voting (Lubbers & Scheepers 2000; Zhirkov 2014, Kehrberg 2014, Sannerstedt 2015). Voters with low political trust who are discontent with the current system respond well to rhetoric about protecting the interests of the 'common people'. They can be characterized by political cynicism and low trust towards the current politicians and the established parties. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the current political system and general disappointment in politics are also very important characteristics in radical right voters, especially in West European countries. People who are politically dissatisfied are likely to cast a protest vote, and because radical right winged-parties position themselves against the current system, these parties are an attractive alternative (Lubbers et.al 2002:349). Consequently, people that are satisfied with the current system and with the current politicians are less likely to oppose the current political system and not vote for the radical right party. Another aspect of trust that has been examined is social and generalized trust. Rydgren (2009:140) means that earlier research only has focused on political trust, whereas his research, drawing from theories about social isolation, shows that lower generalized and social trust makes individuals more likely to support radical right parties.²

² Paragraph taken from course paper in SF2321 Applied Statistical Analysis – Muleta (2018) *Swedish expats support for radical right parties- and the explanations behind it.*

To summarize, the globalization theory together with previous research on radical right voting derive the conclusion that economic, cultural, political and attitudinal positions are important for explaining not only the radical right electoral success, but also why some people are more likely to support them more than others. The scientific interest for the radical right and their voters has of course increased in line with their success, and endless of research have been conducted, mainly in Western Europe (Zhirkov, O'Rourke & Sinnott, Lubbers et.al, Mudde 2007, Givens 2004, Rydgren 2008, Kehrberg 2014). What this thesis aims to contribute with is to test these explanations on a new group of individuals that stand out from our previous notion of the radical right voter. Additionally, by adding a second strand of literature, transnationalism, this thesis will contribute with a new perspective to the current radical right research.

2.2 Transnationalism – an overview

The term transnationalism can be traced back to early 1900s, when it was first used by Randolph Bourne in his paper “Trans-National America”. He described how immigrants in America could contribute with a great mix of cultures and people, something that we today would call “multiculturalism” (Bourne 1916). However, in the research field of migration, it was first used in the 1990s and has gotten increasingly more attention by scholars since then. One of the first formulations of transnationalism as a theory was released in 1994, by Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc. They emphasized that the essential element of transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that immigrants have in both their country of origin and their country of settlement. By partaking in these involvements, immigrants build social fields that cross geographic, political and cultural borders. Immigrants developing and maintaining multiple relationships – economic, social, political or organizational- are called transmigrants. Further, Basch et.al (1994:7) emphasizes that the actions taken, decisions made and identities developed by transmigrants can be embedded in networks simultaneously connecting them to two or more nation-states. This definition of transnationalism allows us to analyze the fluid experiences of these transmigrants, who act in ways that challenge our previous notions of geographical space and social identity. More specifically, it allows us to see how they are affected by their transnational experiences and practices.

However, if we look back in history, bi-national, political and social involvements were investigated and researched well before it was called ‘transnationalism’. Immigration historians have documented nearly all American immigrant groups and their enduring participation in both host and home countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Joppke and Morawska (2003:21) argues that the view that these new transnational spaces has created a - supposedly non-existent in the past - political sphere is improper. In the turn of the twentieth century, sending states in eastern and southern Europe clearly involved immigrant communities abroad in their own nation-building processes. Despite this critique directed against the foundations of transnationalism, contemporary transnationalism is of course not a replica of the old, but shaped by a different set of circumstances. For example, the development of technology, both in communication and transportation, have made present day transnational connections more dense and intense than in the past. Further, the connection is much more spread and varied in content because contemporary immigrants are much more diverse in socioeconomic background, racial identification, regional origin and gender. Lastly, the judicial systems of both the sending and receiving country are today more accepting of diversity than in the past. More specifically, immigrants are not as much subject to demands from home and host countries concerning their national commitments as they were in the past (Joppke & Morawska 2003:22).

The breath of transnationalism – everything from social movements to economic relations to migrant ties to their homeland- is difficult to research and comprehend, let alone analyze (Mahler 1998:66). Consequently, this thesis will try to delimitate the theory to a more manageable size of framework- by focusing on political transnationalism, homeland politics and the possibility of differently developed identities. This will be apparent in the next section of this chapter, where the definition and effects of political transnationalism will be discussed.

2.3 Political transnationalism and developed identities

The concept of political transnationalism can be defined as various forms of cross-border political participation, such as citizens being engaged in political associations in two different countries, voting from abroad or political campaigning running across borders (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003: 762). Thus, it concerns both the political involvement of migrants in their country of origin, as well as the indirect participation via the political institutions in the host country (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003:762, Martinello & Lefluer 2008: 645). Levitt and Jaworsky (2003: 136) mention that cross-border political participation can take shape in three ways;

immigrants' politics, translocal politics and homeland politics. Immigrant politics refers to political activities undertaken by immigrants who want to improve their social status in the host country, whilst translocal politics includes activities migrants take on to support localities in the home country. But what this thesis mainly will focus on is the domains of homeland politics. Homeland politics can be defined as migrant political activism in the host country, concerning issues of their home country. Homeland politics can be viewed as ordinary political activities in which citizens can participate; only that it is performed in another country. This mainly includes expatriate voting, but also electoral campaigning and running for political office.

Bauböck (2003:700) argues that political transnationalism not only is about a set of activities that migrants become engaged in the both the sending and receiving society. It is also about how these activities affect transmigrants collective identities and conceptions of citizenship. Tsuda (2012) develops this further by emphasizing that identity is often mentioned as a byproduct of political transnational activity in this field of literature. The multiple engagement is understood to produce *transnational* identification, in which transnational identities are multiple, flexible and based on simultaneous affiliation to two or more nation-states. The simultaneous engagement can make migrants utilize and construct flexible national and personal identities that are not traditionally 'localised' in one community (Tsuda 2012:642, Yeoh et.al 2003: 213). But these transnational identities do not naturally get produced just because immigrants partake in transnational social practices. Immigrants can also simply have *transborder* (long-distance) nationalist identification, which mean that they are not transnational, but only identify to their home country. Tsuda (2012: 642-643) reasons that highly skilled professional immigrants, mainly because of their high socio-economic status and language skills, often have positive experiences in the host country. Those immigrants who have more positive experiences and are more socially integrated in the host society will identify to the host country in a larger extent while maintaining their transborder affiliations to their country of origin. Consequently, immigrants who due to social alienation, marginalization and distance have negative experiences will not feel at home in the host country and have a strengthen transborder affiliation towards their home country (Tsuda 2012: 642). Furthermore, Berg (2007:29) agrees with the idea that individuals simultaneously can be attached to several territorial levels, and depending on where they feel at home, it can affect their attitudes and behaviors differently. By labeling it 'territorial attachment' as a proxy for national identity, Berg (2007:26, 38) demonstrates that individuals can have

different sets of attachments. Individuals can be attached to no country, have an *exclusive* attachment to only one country, which can be associated with what transnationalism literature labels as having a transborder identity, or have *multiple* attachments to two or more countries, which can be associated with having a transnational identity. I argue that expatriates' national identity can be associated with radical right parties' emphasis on nationalism, who amongst their electoral support have many individuals that feel nationalistic towards their home country. Thus, the distinction between expatriates having transborder/exclusive nationalist identities or having transnational/multiple identities is important to consider, as radical right parties mainly draw on voters who strongly identify with their home country. Consequently, this thesis will argue that Swedish expats with experiences that has developed transborder identities are more likely to identify to Sweden and thus more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats.

Apart from theory, previous research within the area of political transnationalism has shown that transnational experiences and connections have an impact on expats electoral participation and behavior (Lefluer and Dominguez 2014). Bauböck (2003) argues that the element of citizenship affects expatriates' chances to get involved in politics. Having a double citizenship enables expatriates to have political rights in both home and host country, which increases the possibility for transnational activities. Furthermore, a study on Bolivian expatriates have shown that connections to home country, where you feel at home and educational level had an effect on Bolivian expatriates party choice. Besides that, the study also shows that socio-economic and demographic characteristics are strong predictors of expatriates' political behavior (Lafluer & Dominguez 2014: 175).

2.4 Transnationalism and radical right voting- a theoretical framework

As the rise of the radical right in Western societies have increased in the last three decades, research on radical right electoral support are constantly developed by scholars. Further, with the increasing flow of migrants, the electoral behavior of migrants is of great relevance to investigate not only because of their political behavior having influence on home elections, but also for studies on assimilation and migration. There have been few studies on expats party choice, and the explanations behind their electoral behavior. Further, in the context of radical right voting, there has only been a small amount of research that has investigated the group of citizens that live and vote from abroad, and what explains their electoral support for these parties. Thus, this thesis is not only testing the 'established' explanations on radical

right electoral support, but also developing the explanations to radical right voting by adding theories of transnationalism, and more specifically why expatriates' identity with home and host country should affect their propensity to vote for the Sweden democrats. By intertwining these theories, this thesis is able to investigate a rather understudied group of migrants, and will hopefully be able to find the reasons behind Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Before presenting the hypotheses, it is important to consider that most studies on transnationalism and political transnationalism is focused on migrants from developing areas, such as South America, Eastern Europe and Africa (Ahmadov & Sasse 2016, Lefluer & Dominguez 2014, Escobar et.al 2015), and not the reverse flow of relatively privileged migrants. As mentioned before, Swedish expats are representative of migrants from a developed country, which makes them an under-analyzed element of transnational studies. Many of these migrants are affluent, well-educated and have a higher political status and involvement in home country (Solevid 2016). Therefore, this thesis will have to consider that not only is there a scarce amount of research on migrants' political behavior, but in addition, the existing literature on migrants' political behavior is mainly adjusted to migrants from developing countries.

To be able to establish the explanations behind Swedish expats support for the Sweden Democrats, this thesis first needs to investigate whether some (amongst several) of the well-researched explanations behind radical right voting also can explain expatriates' vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Research has shown that attitudinal positions, such as being negative towards immigration have a positive effect on voting for radical right parties. Individuals that perceive immigration negatively holds them accountable for economic and welfare plunges and also views them as a cultural threat because immigrants might diminish their Western values (Lubbers & Scheepers 2000, Zhirkov 2014, Kehrberg 2014). Further, distrusting politicians and the political system have also been proved to have an effect on voting for radical right parties. Voters who are characterized by political cynicism and who are discontent with the current politicians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, as these parties usually criticizes the conventional parties and current political system (Zhirkov 2014, Lubbers & Scheepers 2000). Additionally, social trust i.e. if people can be trusted, have been proven to have an association to voting for radical right parties. Voters who have a lower social trust, and who believe that people will try to take advantage of you, are more likely to support the radical right (Rydgren 2009: 136,140). Thus, this thesis expects that similar attitudinal positions of expats can explain their electoral support for the Swedish Democrats.

Hypotheses 1a (H1a): Swedish expats with a negative attitude towards immigration have a higher probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats compared to expats with a positive attitude to immigration

Hypotheses 1b (H1b): Swedish expats with lower levels of trust towards Swedish politicians and institutions have a higher probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats compared to expats with a higher level of political trust

Hypotheses 1c (H1c): Swedish expats with lower social trust have a higher probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats compared to expats with higher social trust.³

Based on the theory of transnationalism and political transnationalism, multiple engagements in both host and home-country, enables migrants to build social fields that cross geographic, political and cultural borders. From the multiplicity of involvements, Tsuda (2012) argues that migrants' identities evolve to either *transnational* identities or stay as *transborder* (long-distance) national identities. The development of these identities can depend on whether an expat have positive or negative experiences in the country of settlement, positive experiences leading to transnational identities and negative experiences leading to transborder identities. Furthermore, having a stronger affiliation towards home country/host country can also depend on where the expatriates feel most at home. The Swedish expats with transborder identities can be assumed to have stronger affiliation to Sweden, and identify themselves more as Swedes than anything else. This can be combined with the notion that radical right research has shown that individuals with strong affiliation to their country and a strong national identity are more likely to support the radical right. Thus, I argue that expatriates with *transborder* national identities would be more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats and conversely, that Swedish expats with *transnational* identities would be less likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats.

Hypotheses 2 (H2): Swedish expats with transborder nationalist identities have a higher probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats compare to expats with a transnational identity


³ Other variables such as 'Political satisfaction' and 'Dissatisfaction with democracy' could also have been included in the analysis, as they are also established predictors to voting for radical right parties (Zhirkov 2014, Lubbers et.al 2002). But I argue that the three hypotheses included capture the most important ones from the array of explanations that have been established. Furthermore, to avoid hypotheses that would be too similar to each other, I, for example, chose to include only one hypothesis concerning the support for Swedish politicians and institutions, rather than two similar hypotheses concerning both trust towards politicians and dissatisfaction with politicians.

Turning back to the role of attitudinal positions, this thesis further hypothesizes that the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on voting for the Sweden Democrats should be higher also adding the aspect of expatriates *transborder* identity. Previous research states that anti-immigration attitudes are one of the most established motivators to why individuals vote for radical right parties. Several scholars point out that the anti-immigration issue is a core message amongst radical right parties, and that people who perceive immigrants negatively and hold them accountable for economic and cultural threats support these parties. Additionally, previous research further shows that individuals that support nationalism, and who have a strong national identification to their national community are more likely to vote for radical right parties. O'Rourke & Sinnott (2005:851) argues that anti-immigrant attitudes largely derive from national identities and that having a strong nationalist identity makes individuals view immigrants as a potential threat to the collective identity of the native population. Thus, this makes them more likely to support a party that wants to preserve the cultural cohesion that exists. Since research show that anti-immigrant attitudes largely originate from nationalist identity, it is not far-fetched to assume that voting for the Sweden Democrats would be even higher among expatriates both having nationalist (*transborder*) identity and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Hypotheses 3 (H3) The probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats is higher amongst *transborder* expats with a negative attitude to immigration, compared to *transnational* expats with a negative attitude to immigration.

In figure 1 below, the hypotheses are visualized in an elaboration model. H1a, H1b and H1c represents the effect that attitudinal positions - anti-immigration attitude, level of trust to Swedish politicians and institutions and level of social trust- have on expats probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats. H2 represent the effect of *transborder* and *transnational* identification on expats probability of voting for the Sweden Democrats. Finally, H3 represents if attitudes to immigration affect expatriates voting for the Sweden Democrats differently depending on different types of national identity

Figure 1: Elaboration model



3. Methodology

This chapter will discuss and describe the chosen data for this thesis. It will also give an overview of the selected group of study: Swedish expats. Additionally, this chapter will also present and motivate the operationalization of the variables that will be included in the analysis. Lastly, the chosen statistical method for this thesis will be discussed.

3.1 Data

The dataset used in this thesis is the SOM survey on Swedish expats, collected by the SOM-institute at the University of Gothenburg. This dataset provides insight to many aspects of the lives of Swedish expats, such as demographics, socioeconomics, political opinion and participation etc. This dataset is a first of its kind, as there has been no Swedish research institute that has collected data on Swedish citizens living abroad. The survey was conducted and retrieved between September 2014 to February 2015.

The survey was based on a stratified probability sample of 10 000 Swedish citizens age 18-75 registered as living abroad by the Swedish Tax Authority. The sample is disproportionally stratified in six geographically and/or culturally connected regions; The Nordic countries (n=2000), Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand (n=4000), Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries (1000), Africa and the Middle East (n=1000), Asia (n=1000) and Latin America (n=1000) (Vernsdotter 2016: 287). A disproportional stratified sample implies that every strata - or in this case region - proportionally represent the population in the region, but the sample in a whole has a skewed geographical distribution in

relationship to the reality. This because the regions of The Nordic countries and Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand are the regions heavily populated with Swedish expats, compared to the other regions, thus a straightforward proportional sample would have yielded very few expat Swedes in other regions of the world. This is also why those two regions are represented by 2000 and 4000 respondents in the sample, respectively. The reasoning behind this sampling method was to ensure that the regions wasn't represented by too few people and was big enough to be a foundation for statistical analyses (Vernsdotter 2016: 290). Since the SOM data has the aim to represent the whole population of Swedish expats, this analysis will use a weight variable to be able to compensate for the skewness created by the disproportional stratification.

The survey invitation was sent out via regular mail to all the selected respondents that were registered at the Swedish Tax Authority, and instructed the respondents to answer the survey online. The survey comprised 75 questions on issues such as democracy, politics, socioeconomic status, interests and values. The survey got a response rate of 27%, which means that from the sample of 10 000, 2668 people answered the survey (Vernsdotter 2016:291). The Swedish citizens living in Asia had the highest response rate of 32% together with Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, with 31% response rate. Swedish citizens living in Africa and in the Middle East have the lowest response rate, and were also the region with the highest amounts of countries that gave no answers at all.

The advantage of this dataset is that it is first of its kind, providing a unique foundation for expanding research in migration, political participation, political behavior, news consumption, religion, identity etc. The variety in the questions in the survey also allows for comparison, between both individuals and contexts. The dataset fits this thesis not only because it is data on Swedish expats, but also because it contains some question specifically about party choice, attitudinal positions and transnational activities.

However, there are also disadvantages with this dataset. There is a problem around the fact that expatriates do not inform the Swedish Tax Agency about their move abroad. This makes the sample drawn from the agency problematic, creating a skewed sample of the population since it misses all those expatriates that don't report their move abroad, or moves shorter than one year. Furthermore, there is also a risk that many of the addresses to the expatriates are wrong or not updated, since it is not an obligation for expatriates to report if they move.

Because of this, it is hard to know how many of the Swedish expats that never got the letter from the SOM institute. This is very problematic, not only for the SOM institute, but also for the Swedish Tax Agency, the Election Authority and other authorities.

Moreover, the response rate of 27% is also a possible shortcoming, since it will be hard to draw general conclusions about this specific group of people. Since the response rate is low, there will be an uncertainty to how well the data fits the population. The expats that answered the survey might have been representing a specific group of expatriate Swedes, which means that there can be other groups of expats not represented in this data. Concerning the obvious issue of validity, there is a current debate around the presumption that lower response rate automatically equates to lower study validity. But several recent studies have shown that there is no direct correlation between response rate and validity (Morton et.al 2012, Visser et. al 1996). Holbrook et.al (2007) demonstrated in his study that lower response rates were only marginally less accurate than with those with much higher response rates. Hence, lower response rates do not automatically mean low validity; it simply implies a potentially greater risk of it.

3.2 Expatriate Swedes

The group of Swedes that live and work abroad are different in many aspects from the residential swedes. By comparing the SOM survey with expatriate swedes to the respondents in the national SOM survey, Solevid (2016) finds that the biggest difference between residential swedes and expatriate swedes are the levels of education. A staggering 58% of the Swedish expats are highly educated, compared to 26% of the residential swedes. Highly educated in this context means that they have a degree from university or post graduate studies. Additionally, higher education also affects which socioeconomic group the Swedish expats consider themselves to be in. Compared to residential swedes, expatriate swedes are to a greater extent officials with an executive function in the workplace. There is also a slightly higher proportion of expatriate swedes that consider themselves to manage very good on the current income compared to people living in Sweden. Furthermore, the factor of age is not distributed evenly when it comes to Swedish expats. Almost half of the expats who answered the survey is between 30-49 years old, which means that the respondents in this survey are to a lower degree younger and older compared to the respondents in the national SOM survey. The findings of education and age - the fact that Swedish expatriates in general have a higher education and are in the age between 30-49 - is in line with SCB: s data on Swedish expats,

which is based on the Swedish national registration (SCB 2014). Furthermore, when comparing Swedish expats view on immigration with the national SOM survey, the data shows that expatriate Swedes only have a marginally more negative attitude to immigration with 44% compared to residential Swedes with 43% (Demker 2015: 264, SOM survey 2014). In addition, when it comes to Swedish expatriates' experiences and identities, my own analysis of the data show that Swedish expatriates are in a larger extent transnational in the way they partake in activities and develop experiences from both home and host country (SOM-survey 2014). Therefore, the variation between expatriates' transnational identities and transborder identities is not as high as one wished for, but it is still enough to use in an analysis. To summarize, the fact that expats have higher education, higher working positions and manage very well on their income, Swedish expats are to be considered a well-established group (Solevid 2016: 17).

3.3 Dependent variable

The dependent variable- voted for the Sweden Democrats- is measured by Q27 "*Which party did you vote for in the Swedish national election 2014?*". There are 9 answering options for the 8 parties in the Swedish parliament and Feminist Initiative, but as this thesis interest lies in if the expats voted for the Sweden Democrats or not, the variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable. The respondents' answers are now divided in 1=voted for SD and 0=did not vote for SD. Additionally, this survey has a total of 2668 respondents, but as nearly 30% of the respondents answered that they did not vote in the election at all, only 1222 of the respondents will be included in this survey.

3.4 Independent variables

As the theoretical framework consist of two strands of literature, previous research on radical right voting and transnationalism, the independent variables will be categorized into two sets of variables: variables related to attitudinal positions and variables related to transnational/transborder identities. Additionally, a variable concerning the relationship between negative attitudes to immigration and different kinds of national identification will be added as an interaction term.

3.4.1 Attitudinal related independent variables

In line with previous research on radical right voters, the attitudinal positioning towards immigration will be added as a variable. This thesis expects that Swedish expatriates with a

more negative attitude to immigration will have a higher probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats. To be able to measure the respondents' attitudes to immigration, this thesis will use two questions: Q15 "*What is your opinion about: accepting fewer refugees?*" and Q45 "*In what amount do you agree with the following; Immigration enriches the Swedish culture*" and create an index. The index was reliability tested with a Cronbach Alpha, and showed a value of 0.74. These two questions are the most suited questions from the data set to measure attitudes to immigration. However, an additional question surrounding opinions about accepting immigrants and not necessarily *refugees* would have been preferable, as people can view them differently (O'Rourke et.al 2006: 845) The index will be coded so that a low number will represent a positive attitude to immigration and a high number represent a negative attitude to immigration.⁴

The following independent variable in this analysis will be political trust. Since this thesis focuses on Swedish expats voting in Swedish elections, the factor of political trust will only concern Swedish politicians and institutions, and not the political arena in the host country. Therefore, Q14 "*How much confidence do you have for the way the Swedish Parliament manage their work?*" and Q17 "*How much confidence do you have for the politicians in Sweden?*" will be combined into an index that will measure the level of political trust. The Cronbach alpha showed a value of 0.75. Similar to the index above, this index will also be coded with a low number representing a high trust towards politicians and a high number representing low levels of trust.⁵

The last independent variable within this category concerns the aspect of general and social trust. In line with previous research (Rydgren 2009), this thesis will operationalize social trust with three questions from the SOM-survey. In the SOM-survey, the respondent where asked three questions about trust in different aspects; Q38 "*In your opinion, to what extent can you rely on people in general?*", Q39 "*Do you think most people would try to make use of you if they got the chance or would they try to be honest and fair?*" and Q40 "*Would you say that people mostly try to be helpful or that they are looking for themselves?*". These three questions were then combined into an index to be able to measure a bigger spectrum of social and generalized trust. The index showed a Cronbach alpha of 0.87. Yet again, this index is

⁴ For details on exact coding procedure, see Appendix A

⁵ For details on exact coding procedure, see Appendix A

also coded as low numbers representing high social trust and high numbers representing low social trust.⁶

3.4.2 Transnational /transborder related independent variables

To measure someone's national identity and sentiment can be a difficult task, but this thesis will use two indicators to be able to measure if the respondents strongly affiliate either to Sweden, to their host country or both of them. People that have a strong national identity who have a fear of their national identity being threatened by outsiders are more likely to support the radical right (Rydgren 2008, 2009). Therefore, it is important that this analysis includes variables that can, in the best way possible, measure the Swedish expats national identity. This thesis includes two different aspects of national identity to be able to create good proxies and ensure the *content validity* of the independent variable.⁷ Previously mentioned in the theoretical framework, Berg (2007) argues that individuals can have *no attachment*, *exclusive* or *multiple* territorial attachments. In this paper, the exclusive attachment can be connected to expatriates *transborder* identification, as they only affiliate with one country. Consequently, the multiple attachments can be connected to expatriates' *transnational* identification, as they affiliate to two or more countries. In her research, Berg (2007) uses a question concerning where the respondents feel at home. Similarly, this thesis will use Q43 *How well do you feel at home in; Sweden* and in *Host country* and create a 'territorial attachment' variable, that will divide the expatriates into 4 different groups; 1= *Weak attachment to both Sweden and Host country*, 2= *Strong attachment to Sweden (weak to Host country)*, 3= *Strong attachment to Host country (weak to Sweden)* and 4= *Strong attachment to both Sweden and Host country*. The second group can be seen as the expatriates with a transborder identification, and the fourth group can be seen as the expatriates with a transnational identification. The variable was then recoded into 4 dummy variables that will be used in the analysis, where *Weak attachment to both Sweden and Host country* will be left as a reference variable.

In addition, Hjerm (2001) argues that the related concept of national pride is a good proxy for national identity. This can be understood as a form of national sentiment and national

⁶ For details on exact coding procedure, see Appendix A

⁷ Even though this thesis includes two aspect that measure national identity, it is of course difficult to operationalize it so that it covers the whole multidimensional spectrum that is national identity. Therefore, this thesis is aware of its *content validity* being challenged by the difficulty to construct a national identity variable. This might affect the results and conclusions that can be drawn. However, this thesis tries to account for this problem by drawing from previous research and including two different proxies for national identity. The chosen variables show a correlation 0.29 and thus do not correlate highly. Thus, they measure different aspects of national identity. For correlation matrix, see Appendix B

belonging, based on both political and ethno-cultural aspects (Hjerm 2001: 47). The focus lies on the attitudes of nationalism that people have towards their nation or national belonging (Hjerm 2001:46). Therefore, this thesis will create an index that will measure the ‘National pride’ towards Sweden. In Q44 *To what extent do the following claims apply to your relationship with Sweden?* there are five different statements about expats feelings towards Sweden that will be used in order to operationalize the national pride; 1) *It is important for me to celebrate Swedish holidays*, 2) *I am proud to be Swedish*, 3) *I often miss Sweden*, 4) *I always root for Sweden in international competitions*, 5) *Sweden as a country is a good role model*. An index was created using these five statements, which showed a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.70. In this index, high numbers translate to having strong nationalist pride towards Sweden, and low numbers translates to not having strong nationalist pride towards Sweden.⁸

3.5 Control variables

Based on previous research, three control variables will be added to my analysis; gender, age and education. Good control variables in a logistic regression should be correlated to both the explanatory variables and the outcome variable (Aneshensel 2013:250). Research show that age, gender and education matters when looking at attitudinal positions and national identity. O’Rourke (et.al 2006) demonstrates that people with better socioeconomic characteristics are less opposed immigration and Luedtke (2005) shows in his research that low-skilled individuals with a lower education can have a stronger national identity. These socio-economic characteristics have also been shown to be important when identifying who votes for radical right parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000, Givens 2004, Kreisi 2006, Zhirkov 2014). Research show that lower educated people are compared to highly educated people more likely to vote for radical right parties (Zhirkov 2014, Kitschelt 2007). A higher education has a liberalizing effect that introduces a shift towards cultural liberalism and universalism. Education levels have been coded into three different dummy variables. ‘Low education’ equals an education level of completed primary school and attendance to high

⁸ ‘Years abroad’ and ‘Double or Swedish citizenship’ were potential variables that I considered to add in the analysis. Scholars argue that the time spent abroad increase socialization in host country and can further lead to disengagement from home country, and can in this case been seen as an indicator of de-integration from Sweden (Ahmadov & Sasse 2016: 83, Guarnizo, Portes & Haller 2003: 1215). Furthermore, scholars also argue that citizenship is important to consider political rights that an expat has depending on single/double citizenship. Dual nationality can be seen as enabling the possibility for transnational activities (Bauböck 2003). Even though both of these variables have some significance to research about political participation, they do not have enough empirical evidence of being an indicator of how expatriate choose one party over another. When added in the analysis, none of the variables showed any significance. Furthermore, it was in this thesis interest to have few joint variables that could operationalize national identity and affiliation, rather than many variables that all measured similar things.

school. 'Middle education' includes graduation from high school and studies at university. 'High education' equals graduation from university and/or graduate school. In this analysis, 'Low Education' will be used as a reference group. There are also some differences between men and women; men tend to be overrepresented in the electorate of radical right parties (Givens 2004). Therefore, the variable of gender is coded as Male=1, as I expect males to have a higher likelihood to vote for SD. When it comes to age differences, research has shown that young people are more likely to vote for radical right parties, as they are more responsive to the radical right rhetoric (Arzheimer 2009). But recent studies, specifically in Sweden, have shown some evidence towards a reverse in the age gap, with people over the age of 50 now having strongest support for the Sweden Democrats (Sannerstedt 2016: 167). The age variable is coded into four different dummy variables; 18-29, 30-49, 50-64 and 65-75. The age 18-29 will be used as a reference group. As mentioned above, the respondents of the SOM-survey of Swedish expats have, compared to residential Swedes, a higher level of education and are largely in the age range of 30-49, which might affect the outcome of the analysis (Vernsdotter 2016: 295). Table 1 below summarizes the descriptive statistics for the different variables that will be used in the statistical analysis.

Table 1. Descriptive table

Variable	Mean	Std.Dev	Min	Max	N
Voted for SD	.066	.248	0	1	1222
Attitudes to immigration	4.83	2.30	2	10	1222
Political trust	4.31	1.16	2	8	1222
Social trust	8.26	5.20	0	30	1222
Weak attachment to SE & host country (ref)	0.21	0.41	0	1	1222
Strong attachment SE (weak host)	0.25	0.47	0	1	1222
Strong attachment to Host country (weak to SE)	0.14	0.35	0	1	1222
Strong attachment to SE and Host country	0.38	0.48	0	1	1222
National pride SE	15.43	2.77	5	20	1222
Gender (1=Male)	0.46	0.49	0	1	1222
Low Education (ref)	0.04	0.21	0	1	1222
Middle Education	0.31	0.46	0	1	1222
High Education	0.65	0.48	0	1	1222
Age 18-29 (ref)	0.12	0.32	0	1	1222
Age 30-49	0.49	0.50	0	1	1222
Age 50-64	0.23	0.42	0	1	1222
Age 65-75	0.15	0.35	0	1	1222

3.6 Statistical method

As my outcome variable is dichotomous, I have chosen to conduct a logistic regression for this research paper. When conducting a logistic regression, the elaboration model is analyzed in a different way from when doing an OLS regression. When performing an OLS regression, there is an assumption that the relationships between the variables are linear. This assumption is violated when it comes to using an outcome variable that is categorical. A way around this problem is by transforming the data by using the logarithmic transformation. Instead of predicting the value of the outcome variable from one or several predictor variables, we predict the *probability* of the outcome variable occurring given the known values of the independent variables (Field 2013: 762). Further, rather than looking at the value of b-coefficient when analyzing the outcome of a logistic regression, one should only focus on the sign of the coefficient (negative or positive). Moreover, in a logistic regression it is possible to calculate the *odds ratio* to illustrate the effects size. The odds ratio is calculated by using the exponential value of the b-coefficient, and indicates the change in the odds resulting from a unit change in the predictor. The odds ratio can be interpreted in terms of the change in the

odds: if the value of the odds ratio is bigger than 1, it indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring increases. When the value is less than 1, it indicates that as the predictor increases, the odds of the outcome occurring decreases (Field 2012:767).

Additionally, when using logistic regression, it is important to investigate how well the chosen models fit the data. In a logistic regression, Nagelkerke's R^2 value can be used when comparing models. Nagelkerke's R^2 is a pseudo R-square and can be seen as equivalent to R-squares in OLS regressions, as they measure the substantive significance of a model and can be used as a measure of explained variation (Field 2013:764-766).

In this analysis, 8 different regression models will be performed. Model 1a and 1b analyzes the first focal relationship concerning attitudinal positions and levels of trust and their effect on voting for the Sweden Democrats, model 1a without control variables and model 1b with control variables. Model 2a and 2b analyzes the second focal relationship concerning transnational/transborder identities and their effect on voting for the Sweden Democrats. Model 3a and 3b analyzes the two focal relationships together. Lastly, model 4a and 4b analyzes the two focal relationships with control variables together with the two interaction terms. In line with the codebook, to account for the disproportional stratified selection, the data is weighted with a weight variable.

4. Results

In this chapter, the empirical results will be presented. Table 2 shows the findings of attitudinal related variables and transnational/transborder identities on voting for the Sweden Democrats, separately. Table 3 present the full model where two focal relationships are tested together. Each outcome from every model will be presented, but most emphasis will be put on the full model 3b and the variables with significant impact, where some variables will be further illustrated with graphs of predicted probabilities. Table 4 includes the full model together with the interaction terms. All interactions will be plotted in graphs to better understand the relationships between the variables.

Table 2. Logistic regression analysis. The effects of attitudinal related variables and transborder/transnational related variables respectively on voting for the Sweden Democrats


	Model 1a		Model 1b		Model 2a		Model 2b	
	B-coeff	Odds ratio	B-coeff	Odds ratio	B-coeff	Odds ratio	B-coeff	Odds ratio
Attitudes to immigration (2-10, 10=very negative)	.844*** (.093)	2.325	.838*** (.095)	2.312				
Political Trust (2-8, 8=low political trust)	-.605*** (.111)	1.832	.602*** (.114)	1.825				
Social Trust (0-30, 30=low social trust)	-.007 (.027)	.943	-.013 (.028)	.987				
Weak attachment to SE & host country (ref)								
Strong attachment SE (weak host)					-.019 (.347)	.981	-.157 (.357)	.857
Strong attachment to Host country (weak to SE)					.228 (.349)	1.257	-.024 (.360)	1.024
Strong attachment to SE & Host country					-.151 (.316)	.860	-.204 (.328)	.815
National Pride SE (5-20, 20=High national pride)					-.096* (.041)	.908	-.092* (.044)	.912
Gender (1=Male)			.540* (.316)	1.717			.879*** (.253)	2.409
Education Low (ref)								
Education Middle			-.751 (.522)	.472			-1.019* (.422)	.361
Education High			-.801 (.502)	.449			-1.509*** (.411)	.221
Age 18-29 (ref)								
Age 30-49			-.465 (.481)	.628			-.265 (.373)	.767
Age 50-64			-.657 (.521)	.518			-.390 (.417)	.677
Age 65-75			-.290 (.537)	.748			-.165 (.429)	.847
Constant	-11.261 (.891)		-10.337 (1.084)		-1.180 (.625)		-.190 (.900)	
Nagelkerke r2	.501		.513		.019		.075	
-2 Log Likelihood	337.843		330.632		595.134		567.872	
N	1222		1222		1222		1222	

Comment: Dependent variable: Vote for Swedish Democrats. Models estimated using logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable. Significance levels: *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Values express B-coefficients and Odds ratio, standard error in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. Source: SOM-survey of Swedish expats 2014. Weighted data.

Model 1a tests the effects of attitudes toward immigration, political trust and social trust on voting for the Sweden democrats. There is a significant positive relationship between both attitudes to immigration, political trust and voting for the Sweden democrats. There is no significant relationship between social trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats. In model 1b, the control variables are added and the relationship between attitudes to immigration, political trust and voting for Sweden Democrats remains positive and significant, thus indicating no spuriousness in the relationships. Model 2a tests the effects of territorial attachment and national pride on voting for the Sweden democrats. Having strong attachment to Sweden, the host country or to both countries show no significant effect on voting on SD

compared to respondents with weak attachment to both countries. However, the variable of ‘national pride SE’ show an, albeit weak, significant negative effect, indicating that Swedish expats with a higher/stronger national pride towards Sweden have a *lower* likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats, which is not in line with H2. Adding the control variables in model 2b doesn’t alter the interpretations. To visualize the relationship between ‘National pride SE’ and voting for the Sweden Democrats in model 2b, the predicted probabilities have been plotted below. Here we can see that the stronger national pride expatriates have towards Sweden, the less likely they are to vote for the Sweden Democrats, which is the exact opposite of what was expected in H2.

Figure 2 Predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats under different levels national pride towards Sweden



Comment: predicted probability based on model 2b in Table 2

Table 3. Logistic regression analysis. Effect of attitudinal related variables and transborder/transnational related variables together on voting for the Sweden Democrats

	Model 3a		Model 3b	
	B-coeff	Odds ratio	B-coeff	Odds ratio
Attitudes to immigration (2-10, 10=very negative)	.853*** (.094)	2.345	.848*** (.097)	2.354
Political Trust (2-8, 8=low political trust)	.627*** (.119)	1.872	-.635*** (.123)	1.886
Social Trust (0-30, 30=low social trust)	-.007 (.027)	.993	-.014 (.028)	.988
Weak attachment to SE & host country (ref)				
Strong attachment to SE (weak to host)	.292 (.442)	1.339	.175 (.454)	1.191
Strong attachment to Host country (weak to SE)	-.091 (.464)	.913	-.171 (.478)	.843
Strong attachment to SE & host country	.245 (.408)	1.278	-.304 (.431)	1.355
National Pride SE (5-20, 20=High national pride)	.003 (.059)	1.003	.012 (.063)	1.013
Interaction term				
Gender (1=Male)			.610* (.335)	1.819
Education Low (ref)				
Education Middle			-.787 (.534)	.455
Education High			-.798 (.516)	.450
Age 18-29 (ref)				
Age 30-49			-.364 (.493)	.695
Age 50-64			-.581 (.538)	.569
Age 65-75			-.245 (.543)	.783
Constant	-11.575 (1.425)		-11.219 (1.801)	
Nagelkerke r2	.503		.516	
-2 Log Likelihood	337.099		329.555	
N	1222		1222	


Comment: Dependent variable: Vote for Swedish Democrats. Models estimated using logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable. Significance levels: *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Values express B-coefficients and Odds ratio, standard error in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. Source: SOM-survey of Swedish expats 2014. Weighted data

In model 3a, the two focal relationships are tested together. The b-coefficient of ‘Attitudes to immigration’ still shows a significant positive value, indicating that expats with a more negative attitude to immigration have a higher estimated likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. The same goes for ‘Political trust’, as it shows a positive significant relationship, meaning that expats with a lower level of political trust have a higher estimated likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. The variable of ‘Social trust’ still shows no significant relationship. Having strong attachment to Sweden, the host country or to both countries show

no significant effect on voting on SD compared to respondents with weak attachment to both countries. Likewise, the variable of ‘national pride SE’ also shows no significant effect on voting for the Sweden Democrats.

In model 3b, the two focal relationships together with control variables were tested. The association between ‘Attitude to immigration’ and voting for the Sweden Democrats keeps show a positive significance. The odds ratio is 2.354, which can be interpreted as the odds for expatriates with a more negative attitude to immigration to vote for the Sweden Democrats is estimated to be more than twice as great compared to expatriate with a positive attitude to immigration, which is in line with H1a. Furthermore, to visualize the results, the predicted probabilities are shown in figure 3. Here we can see voting for the Swedish Democrats is much more likely among expats with a more negative attitude to immigration compared to expats with a more positive attitude to immigration. Swedish expats with a more negative attitude to immigration have a predicted probability of 59% to vote for the Swedish Democrats, after adjusting for other variables. This compared to the expats with a positive attitude to immigration that on average has a predicted probability of 0.07% to vote for the Swedish Democrats, after adjusting for all other variables.


Figure 3 Predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats under different levels of attitudes to immigration



Comment: predicted probability based on full model 3b in Table 3

Furthermore, the variable concerning expats trust to Swedish politicians and institutions keeps showing a positive significant relationship. The odds ratio is 1.886, which means that the odds for expatriates with a lower political trust to vote for the Sweden Democrats is estimated to be almost than twice as great compared to expatriates with a higher level of political trust, which is in line with H1b. In figure 3, the predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats under different levels of political trust are shown. Swedish expats with a low level of political trust have a predicted probability of 55 % to vote for the Swedish Democrats, after adjusting for other variables. This compared to the expats with a high level of political trust that on average has a predicted probability of 0.3% to vote for the Sweden Democrats, after adjusting for all other variables.

Figure 4 Predicted probabilities to vote for the Sweden Democrats under different levels of political trust



Comment: predicted probability based on full model 3b in Table 3

Furthermore, in both model 3a and 3b, the associations between ‘Strong attachment to Sweden’, ‘National pride SE’ and voting or the Sweden Democrats becomes positive, but are not statistically significant. The same goes for ‘Strong attachment to Host country’ and ‘Strong attachment to SE & host country’, which both show a negative association with voting for the Sweden Democrats, but are not statistically significant. This indicates that there is no association between territorial attachment, national pride and voting for the Sweden

Democrats. Thus, no support for H2 is found. The only control variable showing significance is 'Gender'. As expected, expatriate males have a higher estimated likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats, compared to women. In terms of odds ratio, the odds of voting for the Sweden Democrats for men is estimated to almost twice as great compared to expatriate women.

Worth noticing is the difference in Nagelkerke r^2 between model 1b with the established explanations of radical right support, showing a value of .513 and model 2b with the transnational explanations, showing a value of .075. This indicates that the variance in the dependent variable 'voted for Sweden Democrats' can be much better explained by previously established explanations to radical right research than transnational or transborder identification. This can further be confirmed by the last full model 3b, that shows a value of .516, which is almost fully in line with model 1b.

Table 4. Logistic regression analysis with full models together with interaction terms on voting for the Sweden Democrats


	Model 4a		Model 4b	
	B-coeff	Odds ratio	B-coeff	Odds ratio
Attitudes to immigration (2-10, 10=very negative)	.970*** (.232)	2.652	1.072* (.527)	2.902
Political Trust (2-8, 8=low political trust)	.657*** (.129)	1.499	.633*** (.123)	1.882
Social Trust (0-30, 30=low social trust)	-.017 (.030)	.984	-.014 (.029)	.986
Weak attachment to SE & host country (ref)				
Strong attachment to SE (weak to host)	-2.153 (2.909)	.116	.169 (.455)	1.184
Strong attachment to Host country (weak to SE)	-2.117 (3.462)	.113	-.178 (.482)	.837
Strong attachment to SE & host country	3.554 (2.131)	34.598	.310 (.432)	1.363
National Pride SE (5-20, 20=High national pride)	.024 (.065)	1.025	.128 (.275)	1.137
Attitudes to immigration*Strong attachement SE	.295 (.351)	1.334		
Attitudes to immigration*Strong attachement Host	.233 (.404)	1.263		
Attitudes to immigration*Strong attachement SE & Host	-.425 (.263)	.654		
Attitudes to immigration*National pride SE			-.015 (.034)	.985
Gender (1=Male)	.561 (.340)	1.753	.615 (.335)	1.849
Education Low (ref)				
Education Middle	-.688 (.546)	.503	-.787 (.532)	.455
Education High	-.732 (.531)	.481	-.806 (.515)	.447
Age 18-29 (ref)				
Age 30-49	-.388 (.507)	.678	-.354 (.493)	.702
Age 50-64	-.638 (.546)	.529	-.571 (.528)	.565
Age 65-75	-.207 (.553)	.801	-.231 (.544)	.794
Constant	-12.268 (2.477)		-12.060 (4.482)	
Nagelkerke r2	.532		.516	
-2 Log Likelihood	319.564		328.584	
N	1222		1222	

Comment: Dependent variable: Vote for Swedish Democrats. Models estimated using logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable. Significance levels: *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Values express B-coefficients and Odds ratio, standard error in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. Source: SOM-survey of Swedish expats 2014. Weighted data

In model 4a and 4b, the full model is tested together with the two interaction terms between attitudes to immigration and national identity, in order to test hypotheses 3: if attitudes to immigration affects expatriates' probability to vote for the Sweden Democrats differently between types of national identity. The first interaction term test the interaction between attitudes to immigration*territorial attachment. Model 4a shows that attitudes to immigration*Strong attachment SE has a positive relationship. In graph A, we can see that

expats with strong attachment to SE (transborder) with a more negative attitude to immigration show a slightly *higher* likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats than expats with other types of territorial attachment. The same goes for attitudes to immigration*Strong attachment Host country, which also show a positive interaction effect. In graph B, we can see that expats with attachment to Host country with a more negative attitude to immigration show a marginally higher likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. The interaction effect of attitudes to immigration*Strong attachment SE & host country (transnational) show a negative effect, which means that have a *lower* likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats, compared to expatriates with other types of territorial attachment. This is visible in graph C. However, none of these interactions are significant, indicating that territorial attachment does not modify the effect of attitudes to immigration on voting for the Sweden Democrats. In model 4b, we can see the negative effect of the last interaction term attitude to immigration*national pride SE. Figure D visualizes that the interaction term goes the opposite way than expected, that expatriates with low national pride towards Sweden are more likely to vote for the Sweden democrats. However, this interaction effect also showed no significance, which in the end means that national pride towards Sweden does not modify the effect of attitudes to immigration and voting for the Sweden democrats. Thus, there is no support for Hypotheses 3.

Interaction plots



To summarize, there is a strong significant relationship between attitudes to immigration, political trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats. Expatriates with a more negative attitude to immigration are more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Expatriates with a low political trust are more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Thus, this is supporting H1a and H1b. However, H1c is not supported, as there is no significant relationship between social trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats. Contrary to what hypotheses 2 expected, the analysis shows no significant relationship between different kinds of national identity (transborder and transnational) and voting for the Sweden Democrats. All variables added concerning national identity were not statistically significant, meaning that there is no support for hypotheses 2. Lastly, no support is found for hypotheses 3, different kinds of national

identity do not moderate the impact of attitudes to immigration on voting for the Sweden Democrats. Taken together, the results show that there is no significant association between national identity and voting for Sweden Democrats, or a statistically significant interaction effect.

5. Concluding discussion

This thesis started out with the observation of an increasing number of Swedes emigrating abroad. As a part of the current globalization, migration does no longer only concern people from low-income countries, but also people migrating from affluent countries. The theory of transnationalism argues that when emigrants move from their home country to a host country, the multiplicity of political and social involvements affects migrants' values, identities and the way they make decisions. Alongside with the increased migration and globalization, radical right parties have emerged all through Europe. Found in the 2014 SOM survey of Swedish expats, 7% of the expatriates voted for the radical right party of Sweden- the Sweden Democrats. Swedish expats are a group of people characterized by a higher socio-economic status, higher education levels and higher positions in the job market. Drawing from Kriesi's (2006) theory of winners and losers of globalization, Swedish expats can arguably be viewed as the prominent 'winners' of globalization, as they are high skilled workers, with a higher educational degree that benefit from more fluent borders. This formed a conundrum of why the winners of globalization would vote for a radical right party, who mainly attracts the 'losers' of globalization. Thus, the overall aim of this thesis was to investigate this specific occurrence, and look into what can explain Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. By combing two strands of literature, transnationalism and radical right research, this thesis aimed to contribute to research by first testing three hypotheses concerning attitudinal factors; if attitudes to immigration, political trust and social trust had any effect on Swedish expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Secondly, this thesis also aimed to investigate whether differently developed national identities (transborder and transnational) had any effect on expatriates vote support for the Sweden Democrats. Lastly, this thesis also aimed to test if the presumed effect of anti-immigration attitudes leads to an even higher likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats among expatriates with strong national identity.

Regarding the attitudinal factors, this thesis found a strong significant association between expatriates' attitudes to immigration and voting for the Sweden Democrats. A more negative

attitude to immigration leads to increased likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. There was a significantly large difference in the predicted probabilities, where expats with a negative attitude to immigration had a predicted probability of 59% to vote for the Sweden Democrats, whilst expats with a positive attitude to immigration had a predicted probability of 0.07% to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Thus, hypotheses 1a is supported. The factor of political trust also showed a significant association to voting for the Sweden Democrats. The results demonstrate that expatriates with lower levels of political trust have an increased likelihood to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Again, there was a large difference in the predicted probabilities, where expats with low levels of political trust had a predicted probability of 55% to vote for the Sweden Democrats, whilst expats with a high level of political trust has a predicted probability of 0.3% to vote for the Sweden Democrats. Therefore, hypotheses 1b is supported as well. However, the results show no significant association between expatriates' social trust and voting for the Sweden Democrats, thus hypotheses 1c is refuted.

Turning to the factors of transborder and transnational identification, the results showed no significant relationship between different kinds of national identity (transborder and transnational) and voting for the Sweden Democrats. There is no evidence that expatriates territorial attachment, or national pride have an effect on voting for the Sweden Democrats. Hypotheses 2 is thus not supported. Finally, no interaction effect is found: different kinds of national identity do not moderate the impact of attitudes to immigration on voting for the Sweden Democrats. Consequently, no support for hypotheses 3 is found.

The significant results demonstrating that expatriates with a negative attitude to immigration and low political trust are more likely to vote for the Sweden Democrats is in line with previous research. But as previous research mainly is based on residential citizens, this thesis has added a new context to radical right research and has made an empirical contribution, by testing and confirming previously stated explanations on migrants that vote from abroad. Another empirical contribution is the test of the relationship between transnational/transborder national identities and voting for a radical right party, which rarely has been done before. Theoretically, this thesis further elaborated the national identity argument and its effect of radical right voting, that is put forward by previous scholars. This thesis intertwined the factor of national identity and nationalism from radical right research, together with the possibly developed national identities from political transnational

experiences. Further, the national identity mechanism was also tested in the new context of migrants that vote from abroad. However, contrary to previous research, the empirical analysis conclusively shows that there is no association between expatriate's national identity and voting for the Sweden Democrats.

It is clear from this analysis that the anti-immigrant and political trust explanations gets strong support, and that the national identity explanations get no support at all. A potential explanation to why national identity has no effect on expats vote support for the Sweden Democrats could be that national identity- feelings of home and pride towards Sweden- mean something else for expatriate Swedes compared to residential Swedes. It is possible to imagine that when people live abroad, it might become more important to celebrate Swedish holidays or root for Sweden in competitions, which also is visible empirically in the SOM survey on expatriate Swedes. The data also shows that many expatriates are proud of Sweden and see it as a role model. When living abroad, it might be more accepted to be proud of your home country and its cultural values, without it meaning that you would be critical to immigration and support a radical right party. This would be interesting to investigate further in future research, as the abstract concept of national identity could have different meaning for expatriates and residents.

Furthermore, another possible shortcoming with this study that could explain the non-significant impact of the national identity variables and the socioeconomic variables is the relative skewness of the data. Only a small part of the respondents is found in the groups with lower education and lower age and with transborder identification. When it comes to Swedish expats experiences and identities, the data showed that Swedish expatriates in a larger extent are transnational in the way they partake in activities and develop experiences from both home and host country. Because of this skewness, hypotheses 2 and hypotheses 3 were challenging to test, as the main group that were to be tested were expatriates with a transborder identification.

This thesis has demonstrated that among these winners, individuals who are strongly opposed to immigration to a great extent votes for the Sweden Democrats. Future research could be directed towards this finding, and towards investigating what it is that shapes these anti-immigrant attitudes about the state of a country in which they no longer live in. Furthermore, future research of the context of settlement in which the expatriates find themselves could be

interesting to look into. Previous research shows that it might have an effect on their political behavior and preference, and could add an interesting perspective in future analysis. Moreover, additional research can be directed towards other groups of migrants, from countries other than Sweden that show support for radical right parties. An analysis where several country samples would be included could give a wider understanding and maybe present other explanations to expatriates radical right support. In the context of migrant research, this thesis focused on a group of migrants from a developed country, which is relatively rarely found compared to research about developing countries. Therefore, this thesis further calls for a research perspective recognizing this inchoate field.

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Appendix A

Voted for the Sweden Democrats

(Q27) *Which party did you vote for in the Swedish national election 2014?* 1) Left Party 2) The Social Democrats 3) The Center Party 4) The Liberals 5) The Moderate Party 6) The Christian Democrats 7) The Green Party 8) The Sweden Democrats 9) Feminist Initiative 10) Other Party 11) Blank Vote. The original coding was replaced by 1) Voted for the Sweden Democrats 0) Did not vote for the Sweden Democrats (voted for any other party).

Attitudes to immigration

(Q15): *“What is your opinion about: receiving a smaller number of refugees?”* A 5-scale option that went from 1=‘Very good suggestion’ to 5=‘Very bad suggestion’. (Q45): *“In what amount do you agree with the following; Immigration enriches the Swedish culture”* 7-scale option that went from 1=Do not agree at all to 7=Fully agree. (Q45) was recoded to a 5-scale option, so that an index could be created. The scale showed a Cronbach Alpha of 0.749.

Political trust

(Q13): *“How much confidence do you have for the way the Swedish Parliament manage their work?”* 5-scale option that went from 1=‘Very large confidence’ to 5=‘Very little confidence’. It was recoded into 4-scale option. (Q17): *“How much confidence do you have for Politicians in: Sweden?”* 4-scale option that went from 1=‘Very large confidence’ to 4=‘Very little confidence’. These questions were combined into an index with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.737.

Social trust

(Q38): *“In your opinion, to what extent can you rely on people in general?”* 10-scale option that went from 1=You cannot trust people in general to 10=You can trust people in general. (Q39): *Do you think most people would try to make use of you if they got the chance or would they try to be honest and fair?”* 10-scale options that went from 1=Most people would try to use me to 10=Most people would try to be honest. (Q40): *“Would you say that people mostly try to be helpful or that they are looking for themselves?”* 10-scale option that went from 1=People only look after themselves to 10=Most people try to be helpful. The three questions were combined into an index with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.868.

Territorial attachment

(Q43C) *How well do you feel at home in Host country?* A 7-scale option that went from 1=Do not feel at home at all to 7=Feel completely at home. (Q43D) *How well do you feel at home in Sweden?* A 7-scale option that went from 1=Do not feel at home at all to 7=Feel completely at home. By using both of these questions, ‘Territorial attachment’ was created with 4 options; 1) Weak attachment to both countries, 2) Strong attachment SE, weak host country, 3) Strong attachment Host country, weak to SE, 4) Strong attachment to SE and Host country. The line between weak and strong attachment is drawn by value 5 because of it being a skewed variable. In option 1) included answering option 1-5 from Q43C and 1-5 in Q43D. Option 2) included answering option 1-5 from Q43C and answering option 6-7 from Q43D. Option 3) included answering option 6-7 from Q43C and 1-5 from Q43D. Option 4) included answering options 6-7 from Q43C and 6-7 from Q43D. Before being out in the regression analysis, the variable was recoded in to four dummy variables, where ‘Weak attachment to both countries’ were used as a reference category.

National pride Sweden

(Q44) *To what extent does the following claims apply to your relationship to Sweden?*

(Q44A) *It is important for me to celebrate Swedish holidays*, (Q44B) *I am proud to be Swedish*, (Q44D) *I often miss Sweden*, (Q44E) *I always root for Sweden in international competitions*, and (Q44H) *Sweden as a country is a good role model*. The answering options went from 1=Completely agree to 4= Completely disagree. The five different question were combined into an index with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.700.

Gender

(Q51) *Are you: 1) Male, 2) Female, 3) Other*. The variable was recoded so that 1) Male and 0) Female, and other responses excluded from the data.

Education

(Q74) *Education level* contained 7 different levels of education, and was recoded into three different categories 1) Low 2) Middle 3) High. The categories represent Low= Primary school and attendance to high school; Middle= graduation from high school and studies at university; High= graduation from university and/or graduate school. The three categories were coded as dummies where 0=No and 1=Yes, and the category of Low education was used as a reference category.

Age

(Q62) *Which years where you born?* This variable was divided into 4 different age groups; 1) 18-29, 2) 30-49, 3) 50-64 and 4) 65-75. The four categories were coded as dummies with 0=No and 1= Yes. The age 18-29 were used as a reference category.

Appendix B

Correlation matrix- correlations between the four dummy variables ‘territorial attachment’ and ‘national pride SE’

	National Pride Se	Weak attachment SE& Host country	Strong attachment SE (weak to host)	Strong attachment Host (weak to SE)	Strong attachment SE & host
National Pride SE	1				
Weak attachment SE& Host country	-.108**	1			
Strong attachment SE (weak to host)	.218**	-.249**	1		
Strong attachment Host (weak to SE)	-.299**	-.247**	-.243**	1	
Strong attachment SE & host	.152**	-.416**	-.410**	-.407**	1