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INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY IN CORRUPTION VOTING

How External Political Efficacy Shapes Electoral Responses to Corruption

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Abstract

Corruption poses a serious challenge to democratic accountability as electoral punishment of corrupt incumbents remains limited and varies considerably across contexts. Moreover, the empirical evidence indicates that widespread corruption leads citizens to 'exit' options, such as abstention from the electoral process. So far, the scarce literature investigating moderators of the relationship between corruption and turnout has been limited to macro-level contextual factors. Studies that examine how corruption perceptions affect party choice have also mainly concentrated on system-level moderators. This study introduces political efficacy as an individual-level factor shaping electoral responses to perceived corruption. I argue that political efficacy helps to overcome obstacles to corruption voting that have been previously identified in the literature. In my theoretical framework I specify mechanisms for these conditional corruption effects on a) turnout and b) party choice. Drawing on cross-national data of 64,256 individuals from 40 elections, I employ multilevel logistic regression models to test my hypotheses. In line with previous literature, I find that corruption perceptions have a negative effect on electoral participation. More importantly, my results suggest that political efficacy *does not mitigate these detrimental effects of corruption perceptions on turnout.* However, among voters, political *efficacy does increase the saliency of corruption evaluations on voting choices,* thereby strengthening accountability for corrupt activity.

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1. Introduction

Despite the detrimental effects of corruption on almost every indicator of human well-being (Rose-Ackermann 1999), surprisingly often voters tolerate corrupt incumbents (see, for instance, Bågenholm 2013; Bauhr and Charron 2018). In addition to that, corruption generates cynicism and alienation towards political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Subsequently, large segments of the electorate abstain from elections and refrain from their right to punish the corrupt incumbent (Kostadinova 2009; Pavão 2015). Given that both outcomes undermine democratic accountability, a growing body of research examines under which circumstances citizens are actually going to the polls to 'throw the rascals out'.

Studies investigating the effect of corruption on turnout have mostly found that corruption decreases turnout (Chong et al. 2015; Stockemer et al. 2011; Stockemer 2013; Sundström and Stockemer 2015). However, research examining which factors moderate this relationship is scarce. The few existing studies (i.e. Bauhr and Charron 2018; Dahlberg and Solevid 2016; Stockemer 2013) focus mostly on macro-level contextual variables and do not take characteristics of the individual into account. The (larger) literature examining the effect of corruption on actual party choice also mostly concentrates on macro-level moderators (see, for instance, Ferraz and Finan 2008; Kurnicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Manzetti and Wilson 2007). This study contributes to the literature by investigating external political efficacy as an individual-level factor shaping electoral responses to perceived corruption. In doing so, I deploy a theoretical framework that integrates the effects of corruption on turnout as well as on party choice.

My main research question is:

Does political efficacy shape electoral responses to corruption?

More specifically, I argue that political efficacy helps to overcome several obstacles to corruption voting. I suggest two complementary mechanisms. First, political efficacy mitigates the severity of collective actions problems. Second, it increases the relative weight of the 'corruption evaluation' when voters are faced with trade-offs regarding their party choice. Both mechanisms increase the expected benefits of a vote based on the 'corruption evaluation' and thereby strengthen the saliency of that evaluation for voting behaviour. Building on these considerations, I expect that high external political efficacy increases the likelihood that voters go to the polls and 'throw the rascals out' when they perceive widespread corruption.

In line with most previous studies (Chong et al. 2015; Stockemer 2013; Sundström and Stockemer 2015), my findings provide evidence that corruption perceptions do indeed decrease turnout. However, the negative relationship is not mitigated by high levels of political efficacy. Nonetheless, the findings reveal that those citizens who do go to the polls are indeed more likely to vote against corrupt incumbents when they have high levels of political efficacy. The results not only provide interesting insights how the electoral punishment of corruption works, but also allow for a more nuanced understanding of how corruption affects democratic accountability. Moreover, the results depict the importance of employing theoretical frameworks that integrate both dimensions – turnout and party choice – in the study of electoral responses to corruption.

This paper proceeds as follows. To begin with, I provide an overview of the existing literature on the effect of corruption on voting behaviour. This section is divided into four parts. In the first part, I provide an overview of previous studies which investigate the effect of corruption on actual party choice. In the second part, I introduce the smaller but growing literature investigating the effect of corruption on electoral participation. In the third part, I synthesize the existing literature and point out gaps and contradictions. In the final part, I introduce the concept of political efficacy and explain how it differs from moderators of corruption voting that have been analysed earlier. In the following section, I point out my theory. I present three complementary mechanisms about how political efficacy helps to overcome obstacles to corruption voting. Subsequently, I introduce my empirical framework. Furthermore, I provide information about the employed dataset, explain the operationalization of my theoretical concepts and introduce the methodological procedure. Next, I present the results of my analysis and discuss my hypotheses against the background of these results. Then, I discuss the results of my analysis. Finally, I summarize my findings and discuss their implications for further research.

2. Literature Review

So far, the empirical record has not provided unequivocal evidence that democracies are less corrupt than non-democracies (Treisman 2007; Fukuyama 2015; Keefer 2007, Montinola and Jackman 2002). Moreover, cross-national studies show that the degree to which electorates punish corrupt incumbents varies substantially across different democratic regimes (see, for instance, Bågenholm 2013; Basinger 2013).[1] Thus, the literature has investigated several

[1] See de Sousa and Moriconi (2013), de Vries and Solaz (2017) and Kurer (2010) for excellent overviews of the literature.

macro-level systemic/institutional factors to explain the evident variation (see, for instance, Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Kurnicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Tavits 2007). Moreover, some scholars have taken the availability of viable alternatives at the supply-side of politics into consideration to account for the variation in the punishment of corrupt incumbents (Charron and Bågenholm 2016; Cordero and Blais 2017). To a lesser extent the research has also taken characteristics of the individuals into account that explain the variation in corruption voting[2] – i.e. political sophistication (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2016), political awareness (Klašnja 2017) and partisanship (see, for instance, Anduiza et al. 2013; Ecker et al. 2015; Konstaninidis and Xezonakis 2013).

However, corruption also leads to cynicism and alienation towards to system (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bauhr and Grimes 2014) and thereby undermines accountability. Subsequently, voters might choose to abstain from voting (Bauhr and Charron 2018; Chong et al. 2015; Pavão 2015). On the contrary, some, albeit fewer, scholars have argued that corruption might lead to an ignition effect rushing citizens to the polls in order to express their dissatisfaction (Kostadinova 2009; Stockemer and Calca 2013; Praino et al. 2013). These effects of corruption on voting behaviour are not captured by the former strand of literature, since it exclusively focusses on the effect of corruption on party choice but not on abstention.[3] Despite the inconclusive empirical record, only few studies have examined factors which moderate the relationship between corruption and turnout. Moreover, studies aiming to account for individual heterogeneity are completely missing so far.

In the following section, I point out and synthesize the different types of explanations why voters often fail to punish corrupt incumbents and present the literature examining how corruption affects turnout. I will point towards gaps and contradictions of the existing body of literature. Subsequently, I introduce the concept of political efficacy.

[2] I deploy the definition of Xezonakis et al. (2016, 161) to define corruption voting. They define "[…] corruption voting as a product of the evaluation of the incumbent from the part of the voter (as regards corruption) and a corresponding choice come election day (punish or reward)". It is important to note, that in order to make use of their vote to punish corruption, citizens must go to the polls. Thus, abstention in response to corruption is considered as an obstacle to corruption voting, whereas mobilization (in order to 'throw the rascals out') is considered as conducive to voting.

[3] See Bauhr and Charron for further explanations.

2.1 Corruption and Party Choice: Why do voters fail to punish corrupt incumbents?

2.1.1. Contextual explanations

Most studies on corruption voting investigate how system level factors[4] influence corruption voting. Some authors point out that institutions affect corruption voting since they shape abilities and incentives of voters to effectively monitor and to punish corrupt activity of politicians accordingly (Kurnicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits 2016; Tavits 2007). Whereas some refer to the overall constitutional configuration (for instance Tavits 2007), some refer specifically to the effect(s) of electoral systems (Ceron and Mainenti 2018; Gerring et al. 2004; Gingerich 2009; Ledermann et al. 2005). To my knowledge, there is only one study testing the micro-level underpinnings of these institutional explanations. Xezonakis et al. (2016) examine two implicit assumptions shared by all studies that investigate institutional factors as moderators of corruption voting. First, voters do in fact consider perceived corruption when they evaluate parties with regard to their vote choice. Second, the importance of this 'corruption evaluation' for the individual voting decision varies as a function of the characteristics of an institutional configuration. They find strong evidence that perceived corruption is indeed a significant determinant of voting against the incumbent. However, they find only minor evidence that this relationship is moderated by institutions.

Moreover, some scholars have examined the effects of contextual factors other than institutions. According to the 'information hypothesis' voters do not punish corrupt politicians if they lack information about corrupt activity of a political candidate (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013, 418). Most studies tested this hypothesis with regard to the availability of credible information in a country, mostly measured by the freedom of press (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Kalenborn and Lessmann 2013). Drawing on data on the municipal level in Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2008) have analysed the effect of publicly released audit reports about corrupt practices on the incumbents' electoral performance. They show that a more informed electorate does indeed punish corrupt incumbents at the voting booth. The severity of this punishment was even stronger in municipalities with local radio stations. These findings, again, depict the important role of the media as a provider of credible information about corrupt practices of politicians.

Some authors have argued that voters tolerate corrupt incumbents if they benefit from corruption in the form of clientelistic exchanges. That is, voters tolerate corrupt incumbents not *despite* their corrupt activity but *because* of their corrupt activity (Chang and Kerr 2017;

[4] That is, factors that do not vary across individuals but vary across political systems.

Manzetti and Wilson 2007). Building on a similar logic, Bauhr and Charron (2018) argue that Grand Corruption is a moderator of punishment for corruption. They define Grand Corruption "as collusion among the highest levels of government that involves major public sector projects, procurement, and large financial benefits among high-level public and private elites" (Bauhr and Charron 2018, 416). In countries with high levels of Grand Corruption, more citizens themselves are involved in clientelistic networks. Hence, they have no incentives to punish their patrons. Thus, Grand Corruption reduces the likelihood that voters punish corruption.

According to the 'trade-off hypothesis', voters knowingly vote for corrupt politicians since they expect the benefits of voting for the corrupt candidate will still be higher than the costs associated with corruption (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013, 419). Several studies provide evidence that the state of the national economy moderates the corruption voting (Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Rosas and Manzetti 2015; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). Citizens forgive corrupt incumbents in exchange for a good economic performance. Other scholars have concentrated more specifically on incumbents' performances in effectively providing public goods. Drawing on data from the 2011 Spanish local elections, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016) show that voters only punished corrupt mayors if their corrupt activities were associated with negative welfare consequences for the municipality. However, some findings also contradict the expectations of the 'trade-off hypothesis'. Winter and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) conducted a survey experiment in Brazil and found that voters do not support corrupt politicians, even if they perform well in terms of the provision of public goods. Surprisingly, this pattern does not hold for individuals with a high socio-economic status. The electoral responses of these voters are in line with the expectations of the 'trade-off' hypothesis. Konstantinidis' and Xezonakis' (2013) findings from a survey experiment in Greece allow for a more nuanced investigation. Greek voters tolerate corrupt incumbents if they provide collective benefits such as cutting taxes. Yet they punish corrupt incumbents if they provide beneficial goods exclusively for a particular group of voters.

2.1.2. Availability of Choices/Alternatives

Another strand of literature argues that voters are more likely to punish corrupt incumbents if there are viable alternatives available. Focussing on the ideology of voters, Charron and Bågenholm (2016) argue that voters with more extreme ideological positions tend to vote in line with their ideology – even if they are aware of corrupt practices of their preferred party – since there are less parties located at the poles of the ideological spectrum. Drawing on survey data from Spain, Cordero and Blais (2017) provide evidence that people only opt to vote against

the incumbent if they think that the challenger parties are substantially less corrupt. More precisely, Cordero and Blais (2017) investigate how the 'corruption evaluation' of challenger parties moderates the punishment of corrupt incumbents at the voting booth. The smaller the differences regarding the 'corruption evaluations' between the incumbent and its challengers, the less likely voters punish the corrupt incumbent at the voting booth. If voters do not perceive the challenger parties as significantly less corrupt than the incumbent party, they do not punish the incumbent party.[5] In other words, the perceived difference between the incumbent and its challengers is what matters and not the 'absolute level' of corruption of the incumbent.

2.1.3. Individual Heterogeneity

Some scholars focus on characteristics of the individuals themselves in order to explain variations in corruption voting. Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2016) argue that political sophistication enhances the quality of monitoring and enables correct blame assignment. Indeed, their findings provide strong evidence that politically sophisticated voters are better in identifying credible information.[6] Thus, they conclude that political sophistication is a micro-level factor enhancing corruption voting. In a similar vein, Klašnja (2017) argues that voters with higher political awareness are more likely to punish corrupt incumbents. Although the data from U.S. congressional elections supports their argument, this relationship is mitigated by partisanship.

Some authors have particularly examined the influence of partisanship on the quality of monitoring and correct blame assignment (Anduiza et al. 2013; Cordero and Blais 2017; Ecker et al. 2015; Riera et al. 2013). These studies find that voters tend to overlook corrupt activity of politicians of their preferred party and exaggerate misbehaviour of the political opponent. However, in the context of post-crisis Greece, Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) find no support for a moderating impact of partisanship on corruption voting amongst Greek voters.[7]

Klašnja et al. (2014) adopt the nomenclature commonly used in the economic voting literature and differentiate between *pocketbook corruption voting* and *sociotropic corruption voting*. The former refers to personal experiences with corruption, whereas the latter refers to perceptions of the societal level. They expect that *sociotropic corruption voting* is contingent on saliency

[5] However, their research design and thus their inferences builds on a strong assumption. They use the perceived corruption in parliament as proxy for perceived corruption among other parties. This is not only a very strong assumption but might also lead to endogeneity problems.

[6] This is of great importance since political opponents could knowingly disseminate dishonest information about corrupt activity of other candidates because they anticipate that the accused candidate will be punished by the voters (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2016).

[7] However, as the authors themselves conclude, this finding is might due to the specific conditions of the post-crisis era in Greece, (Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013, 559).

which is, in turn, "a function of elite action that raises the salience of corruption as an important concern among the mass public […]" (Klašnja et al. 2014, 68). On the contrary, personal experience with corruption (*pocketbook corruption voting*) directly raises the saliency of corruption and thus enhances corruption voting.

2.2 Corruption and Turnout: Indignation or Resignation?

So far, the presented literature has been exclusively concerned with the impact of corruption on the vote shares of the incumbent. However, voters may perceive corruption as an endemic and systemic problem and thus attribute it to the overall system instead of (solely) blaming the incumbent (Bauhr and Charron 2018; Chong et al. 2015). This might lead to severe distrust, alienation and cynicism towards the political system in general (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006) which results, in turn, in lower turnout rates. Put differently, voters could abstain from elections instead of voting for the challenger parties, when perceiving high levels of corruption. If so, this undermines the capability of elections to effectively combat corruption. In other words, the accountability chain not only breaks down if voters continue voting for corrupt incumbents – which is the focus of the literature presented in the previous section –, but also breaks down if citizens choose to abstain from voting (Bauhr and Charron 2018; Chong et al. 2015; Lagunes 2012). However, it seems also plausible that corruption can be a mobilizing agent. Several scholars have argued that corruption enrages people and increases the demand for change within the electorate which should result in higher turnout rates (Inman and Andrews 2010; Kostadinova 2009; Stockemer and Calca 2013). Is corruption a mobilizing agent of turnout or does it drive resignation and abstention of voters? And what moderates this relationship?

The majority of studies find that corruption lowers turnout (Birch 2010; Caillier 2010; Chong et al. 2015; McCann and Dominguez 1998; Pavão 2015; Stockemer 2013; Stockemer et al. 2011; Sundström and Stockemer 2015). Using data from a field experiment in Mexico, Chong et al. (2015) provide evidence that information on corrupt activity of incumbents not only decreases the vote share of their party, but also depresses turnout and the support for challenger parties. The literature suggests several mechanisms that might drive this pattern. Most of these mechanisms assume that a certain level of trust of citizens towards their representatives is a prerequisite of participation. Corrupt activity of politicians lowers trust (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Caillier 2010). Subsequently, corruption lowers turnout. This view implicitly assumes that voters attribute corrupt practices and/or the failure to contain corruption effectively not to specific politicians or parties but to political elites and

the political system in general. More specifically, Stockemer (2013, 4) argues that "if politicians at various levels of government cannot be trusted, then citizens have no interest to interact with them; a feature which should further decrease individuals' motivation to vote for any of the existing corrupt parties or politicians". In a similar vein, Pavão (2015) finds that exposure to corruption leads to cynicism and alienation. Some scholars have highlighted the importance of citizens' expectations about the behaviour others (Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Persson et al. 2013). Building on the logic of collective action theory, the authors argue that in contexts with high systemic corruption it is simply irrational for an individual to actively engage against corruption. When citizens expect that most other citizens are involved in corruption – or are at least reluctant to join fight against corruption – they do not expect any success from punishing corruption. Instead, they develop cynicism and alienation towards the political system. Thus, corruption leads rather to abstention instead of increased support for challenger parties. The fieldwork of Persson et al. (2013) in Kenya and Uganda suggests that in contexts where corruption is perceived as a pervasive problem across society most citizens are inclined to "perpetrate rather than fight corrupt exchanges" (Persson et al. 2013, 7) instead of fighting corruption. This pattern is reflected in turnout rates as well (Bauhr and Charron 2018).

Some, albeit fewer, findings indicate that corruption perceptions mobilize citizens to go to the polls (Escaleras 2012; Inman and Andrews 2010; Karahan et al. 2006; Karahan et al. 2009; Kostadinova 2009; Stockemer and Calca 2013; Praino et al. 2013). Most of these studies argue that corruption is perceived as a grievance generating demand to change which, in turn, drives citizens to the polls (Kostadinova 2009; Stockemer and Calca 2013). Inman and Andrews (2010) point out that corruption enrages citizens. Their analysis is based on Afrobarometer data as well as data from an experiment conducted in Senegal. They demonstrate that the mobilizing effect of corruption perceptions goes beyond clientelestisc exchanges. Therefrom, they conclude that rage and the demand for change rushes voters to the polls to punish their corrupt representatives. In a similar vein, Ezrow and Xezonakis (2011) analyse the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and voter turnout in a temporal perspective.[8] Drawing on data from twelve democracies between 1976 and 2011, they show that satisfaction with democracy is in fact negatively related with turnout. This contradicts the findings of most previous cross-sectional studies that found a positive correlation. Ezrow and Xezonakis (2011) argue that dissatisfaction causes demand for change. Subsequently, people seek to express their dissatisfaction with (the status quo) of democracy through multiple channels. Going to the polls

[8] In doing so, they deploy a different approach than most previous research on this relationship. Previous studies have predominantly only analysed this relationship from a cross-national perspective.

is one such channel (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011, 4). Thus, their findings provide support for the rationale that corruption could actually lead to higher turnout rates since it increases dissatisfaction within the electorate causing demand for change which people seek to express at the voting booth. Focussing more broadly on misbehaviour of political elites, Praino et al. (2013) investigate the electoral consequences of incumbents' involvement in scandals.[9] Based on district-level data from U.S. congressional elections, they find that involvement in scandals has not only a negative effect on incumbents vote share in elections following this scandal, but also slightly increases turnout in these elections. This boost in turnout exclusively benefits the challenging candidate. From the perspective of parties, Bågenholm and Charron (2014) argue that challenger parties could pick up 'clean government' issues as a campaign strategy. In their analysis of European elections between 1981 and 2011 they demonstrate that parties do indeed pick up anti-corruption issues as a strategy to gain more votes. Furthermore, Bagenholm and Charron (2014) show that parties are in fact successful with this strategy. Even though they do not directly measure turnout but focus on the vote shares of the parties which emphasize 'clean government issues' in their campaigns, the rationale behind this pattern should also be reflected in increased turnout rates. Another strand of literature supporting the idea that corruption boosts turnout argues that corruption increases the value of office-holding since candidates expect to gain more benefits due to corruption. Hence, they put more effort on mobilizing voters (Escaleras 2012; Karahan et al. 2006; Karahan et al. 2009).

Despite the inconclusive empirical record, only very few studies have investigated the specific circumstances under which corruption actually leads to lower – or even higher – turnout. Assessing systemic corruption as a macro-level moderator, Dahlberg's and Solevid's (2016) findings indicate that the dampening effect of corruption perceptions on turnout is contingent on the level of systemic corruption. Employing a multi-level approach which includes individual-level as well as system-level variables, they provide evidence that perceiving corruption has a negative effect on turnout, but only in settings with low to medium levels of system corruption. In a similar vein, Bauhr and Charron (2018) also investigate the moderating effect of Grand Corruption. Their findings demonstrate that corruption perceptions in Grand Corruption-settings leads not only to more voters remaining loyal to the incumbent, but also to more citizens abstaining from elections than in settings with less systemic corruption. Stockemer (2013) conducted a macro-level analysis based on data from over 200 elections in more than 70 presidential systems between 1990 and 2011. He finds that the type of corruption

9 Even though they apply a rather broad definition of scandals, which also includes scandals not associated with corruption, it seems plausible that their findings are also meaningful in terms of corruption voting.

determines whether corruption increases or depresses turnout. Whereas political corruption dampens turnout, a broader definition of corruption (i.e. including societal and financial corruption) has no effect on turnout.[10]

Some studies have investigated the effect of corruption on citizens' engagement beyond voting. Even though they measure other, more indirect forms of political participation than voting, these studies might also provide fruitful insights for the purpose of this analysis. Bauhr (2017) finds that citizens' engagement in the fight against corruption is contingent on the form of corruption. She differentiates between two forms of corruption. First, this entails, need corruption – that is, corruption is needed to gain access to public goods they are actually entitled to. Second, greed corruption – that is, corrupt activity which is motivated by special illicit advantages. Using survey data, she shows that need corruption leads to stronger engagement in the fight against corruption, whereas greed corruption leads to less mobilization. In a more comprehensive study, Bauhr and Grimes (2014) analyse the impact of enhanced transparency on political involvement, political interest and institutional trust when corruption is "endemic and egregious" (Bauhr and Grimes 2014, 291). In line with their expectations derived from collective action theory, they find that voters increasingly resign and abstain from politics at all if they become more and more aware of high levels of corruption. This finding contradicts previous common knowledge which assumes that increased transparency enhances the fight against corruption since it improves the principal's (voters) abilities to effectively monitor the agent (politicians). Even though they do not specifically measure voting behaviour, it seems plausible that her results also apply to turnout. Reduced civic engagement, political involvement, political interest and institutional trust should also be reflected in lower turnout rates. Pfeiffer and Alvarez (2016) examine how perceptions of government effectiveness shape the relationship between corruption perceptions and the willingness to engage in anticorruption activities. Government effectiveness refers to the government's capacity to effectively deal with corruption. They find that "especially among those who perceive that corruption levels are high, when confidence in the government's efforts grows, so will willingness to fight corruption" (Pfeiffer and Alvarez 2016, 352). Furthermore, their findings indicate that corruption perceptions mobilize people to fight corruption in OECD-settings, whereas it mitigates efforts to combat corruption in non-OECD settings.

[10] However, he conducts his analysis with three different indicators for corruption (i.e. the International Country Risk Guide corruption indicator, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, and the World Bank Control of Corruption measure) and finds only a significant negative effect for one of the indicators - the International Country Risk Guide corruption indicator.

2.3 Beyond current research: Political efficacy and corruption accountability

As this summary of the literature shows, previous studies aiming to explain the evident variation in the electoral response to corruption have been mostly concerned with moderators on the macro-level. Studies examining individual heterogeneity in the response to corruption are rather scarce. The few studies investigating individual heterogeneity in party choice in response to corruption have mainly concentrated on factors influencing the quality of monitoring and correct blame assignment. Political sophistication (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2016) as well as political awareness (Klašnja 2017) enhance the quality of monitoring and correct blame attribution and thus enhance punishment of the incumbent. In contrast, partisan bias (Anduiza et al. 2013; Cordero and Blais 2017; Ecker et al. 2015; Riera et al. 2013) hampers corruption voting. I examine political efficacy as an individual-level moderator which might further enhance the understanding of individual heterogeneity in the response to corruption perceptions.

In contrast to the literature that investigates how corruption affects the incumbents' vote shares, the body of literature specifically focussing on turnout is smaller. Moreover, most studies are based on country-specific data (Escaleras 2012; Karahan et al. 2006; Karahan et al. 2009; Praino et al 2013;) and use aggregated measures of turnout (Kostadinova 2009; Stockemer 2013; Stockemer and Calca 2013). There is almost no literature under which circumstances corruption voting actually leads to lower – or even – higher turnout. To my knowledge, there are only three studies (Bauhr and Charron 2018; Dahlberg and Solevid 2016; Stockemer 2013) examining factors which moderate the relationship between corruption and turnout. However, the moderators they investigate are on the system level – i.e. systemic corruption and the form of corruption. So far, the literature has not taken individual characteristics shaping the relationship between corruption perceptions and turnout into account. Moreover, research on the effect of corruption on party choice also investigated only few moderators on the individual level (i.e. political awareness, political sophistication and partisanship). In order to fill this gap, I take a first step and introduce the concept of political efficacy as an individual moderator shaping the impact of corruption on voting behaviour. I argue that political efficacy helps to overcome obstacles to corruption voting which have been previously identified in the literature. It moderates the relationship between corruption perceptions and turnout and increases the relative weight of the 'corruption evaluation' as a determinant of party choice.

2.4 Political efficacy: Introducing the concept

One of the earliest scholars using political efficacy as a concept are Campbell et al. (1960) in their seminal study "The American Voter". They define it as the feeling that political action does have any impact on the political process, meaning that it is worthwhile to fulfil one's civic duties. Related to the psychological concept of self-efficacy – which reflects people's belief in their abilities to control over their own functioning and their environment to a certain degree (Bandura 1997) –, political science scholars commonly distinguish between two different, albeit closely related, concepts of efficacy – internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to the belief that one is able to understand and judge politics or certain issues and that one is able to express one's political choices accordingly (Craig et al. 1990). External political efficacy refers to one's beliefs regarding the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizens' demands (Hayes and Bean 1993). Put differently, internal efficacy concerns an individual's ability to convert his preference into action and external efficacy concerns the likelihood that this political action is eventually converted into political outcomes. Since external efficacy captures the likelihood that one's vote ultimately makes a difference, I concentrate on external efficacy in this study.[11]

So far, there is only little research explicitly connecting external political efficacy and the electoral response to corruption. Kostadinova (2009) models the effect of political efficacy on turnout in Eastern European countries. She hypothesizes two opposing effects. First, there is an indirect, negative effect of corruption on turnout. Perceiving high levels of corruption lowers external political efficacy which, in turn, depresses turnout. However, she hypothesizes also a second, direct effect of corruption on turnout. She argues that corruption generates demand for change which, in turn, mobilizes people. Using a recursive model and path analysis, she finds evidence for both effects but a slightly stronger effect size for the negative, indirect impact of corruption perceptions on turnout. However, it is important to note, that she conceives political efficacy as a mediator in her model leading to decreased turnout rates, whereas I expect a moderating effect of political efficacy on turnout.[12]

If external political efficacy is determined by corruption perceptions to an extensive degree, this would cause severe inferential problems for the interpretation of my analysis. In other

[11] In doing so, I do not neglect that internal political efficacy might have an impact as well. However, even though testing both concepts would certainly provide interesting insights, this is unfortunately not possible since there is no suitable question available in the CSES dataset.

[12] However, she deploys a slightly different operationalization of external political efficacy. Her measurement captures citizens' answers to which degree they think that who people vote for matters. I operationalize external political efficacy as the degree to which citizens' think that who is in power matters.

words, the moderating effect of external political efficacy could be (solely) due to corruption perceptions causing an endogeneity problem. However, some preliminary analyses provided clear and convincing evidence that political efficacy is surprisingly little associated with corruption perceptions. The correlation across all countries is very small (r=-0.0604). Although there are indeed considerable cross-national differences, the correlation coefficients are very small for every country (Great Britain has the highest coefficient with r=-.1808; see A1. in the Appendix). Moreover, I ran multilevel bivariate regression models with country-fixed effects and clustered standard errors in order to estimate the effect of corruption perceptions on external political efficacy. The estimated coefficient is significant but very small (β_1=-0.0903). Subsequently, the change in in corruption perceptions from the lowest value ('1 it hardly happens at all') to the highest value ('4 very widespread') is associated with a change in external political efficacy from 3.95 (=β_0) to 3.6 (see A2. Appendix) in a 5-point scale. This suggests that there is hardly a robust effect of corruption perceptions on external political efficacy.

3. Theory

I argue that *electoral responses to corruption are shaped by citizens' expectations to what degree government turnover makes a difference*. This expectation is captured by external political efficacy. The more voters expect that government turnover makes a difference, the more likely elections will be a channel through which they express their discontent and 'throw the rascals out'. On top of that, I expect that external political efficacy increases the weight voters attach to the 'corruption evaluation' in their party choice.[13]

To be more precise, I hypothesize that external political efficacy helps to overcome several obstacles to corruption voting which have been previously found in the literature. I mainly suggest two complementary mechanisms. First, external political efficacy reduces the severity of collective actions problems and thereby mitigates the demobilizing effect of corruption. Second, it determines the relative weight of the 'corruption evaluation' when voters are faced with trade-offs regarding their party choice. Both mechanisms assume that external political efficacy increases the expected benefits of a vote based on the 'corruption evaluation'. In short, I expect that high external political efficacy increases the likelihood that voters go to the polls and 'throw the rascals out' subsequently when they perceive widespread corruption.

[13] This argument implicitly assumes that, even if corruption does not have any impact on individuals' decision whether they go to the polls or not, it can still influence voters' party choice.

3.1 External political efficacy helps to mitigate collective action problems

Persson et al. (2013) argue that the more citizens expect that many other citizens are involved in corrupt exchanges, the less willing they are to engage in the fight against corruption. The same logic applies with regard to citizens' expectations about the willingness of others to fight corruption. The less citizens expect that others will join the fight against corruption, the less likely they are to engage in the fight against it themselves (Bauhr and Charron 2018; Bauhr and Grimes 2014). In contexts with high systemic corruption, it is simply irrational to actively engage against corruption since acting 'principled' "in a context in which corruption is the rule rather than the exception is related to […] small returns" (Persson et al. 2013, 460). The underlying rationale is that citizens who perceive widespread corruption in their country expect that fighting corruption is not likely to be successful when nobody else is willing to do so. Thus, the more citizens perceive widespread systemic corruption, the lower the expected benefits of combatting corruption.

However, expecting that government turnover matters could reduce this negative effect of collective action problems on corruption voting. If citizens expect that government turnover will ultimately bring change, the detrimental effects of collective action problems on corruption voting could be diminished. On top of that – and even more importantly –, I provide an argument that builds on a similar logic but applies it to citizens' expectations about the behaviour (i.e. responsiveness) of the system/politicians instead of expectations about the behaviour of other citizens. Expecting a difference from government turnover is perceived as a precondition for elections to be successful in the fight against corruption. Only if citizens think government turnover actually matters to politics and policy outcomes, they consider elections to be an effective to instrument to reduce corruption and thus use it as a channel to express their discontent. If citizens do not expect that who is in power matters, they do not conceive elections as an effective instrument to fight corruption. Building on these considerations, I hypothesize that external political efficacy will moderate the relationship between corruption evaluations and turnout. The stronger citizens' external political efficacy is, the more likely they will rush to the polls. In other words, external political efficacy mitigates the negative effect of collective action problems on turnout. Moreover, it seems plausible that this also results in an increased weight of the 'corruption evaluation' as a determinant of party choice.

In addition to that, I argue that external political efficacy enhances voters' confidence in attributing blame.[14] More precisely, I hypothesize that external political efficacy magnifies the importance of national elections to fight corruption. As with other forms of performance voting (see, for instance, Bingham Powell and Whitten 1993 on economic voting), the clarity of responsibility might not always be clear for voters (Tavits 2007). That is, voters are uncertain in who is to blame for a bad performance. Presumably, this is not only true with regard to the horizontal distribution of power across different actors within countries on the national level (Tavits 2007; Tsebelis 2002) but also with regard to the vertical distribution of power (multilevel governance) - i.e. the international level, the national level and the subnational level. In a globalized world, voters might hold governments less accountable for political outcomes since the outcomes are not unequivocally attributable to the national level. The same applies to the regional level. Given that there are indeed quite big regional differences in corruption levels across regions *within* countries (Sundström und Stockemer 2015), it seems plausible that voters might not necessarily (mainly) blame the incumbent for corruption. Moreover, it is more difficult and increases the information costs for voters to judge the performance of the national incumbent in the context of multilevel governance. Whereas the literature on economic voting has provided some evidence for a mitigating effect of multilevel on performance voting in national elections (Anderson 2006, 2008; Cutler 2001, 2004), there is no evidence with regard to corruption voting. Hence, I argue that external political efficacy increases the confidence that the national level is the right arena to attribute blame for corruption.

3.2 External political efficacy increases the saliency of the 'corruption evaluation' in party choice

Moreover, external political efficacy increases the saliency of the 'corruption evaluation' in party choice. I hypothesize that higher external political efficacy increases the relative importance of the 'corruption evaluation' as a determinant of party choice when voters are faced with trade-offs in their party choice.[15] I assume that voters strive for maximizing the utility of their vote when they choose a party to vote for (Downs 1957). They attach certain weights to different factors and finally choose the party with the highest utility for them. I argue that political efficacy influences this cost-benefit analysis and accordingly the weights voters attach

[14] Presumably, internal political efficacy also plays an important role with regard to this mechanism. However, - as mentioned earlier the CSES module 2 dataset does not include an appropriate question, making it impossible to test that assumption.

[15] This mechanism works independently from the mobilizing effect of corruption on voters with a strong external political efficacy who would have abstained otherwise Perception of widespread corruption could also convince voters to vote for a challenger party who would have voted for the incumbent otherwise. I expect that this 'converting' impact of corruption perceptions on party choice is, again, moderated by external political efficacy.

to different determinants of their vote choice. The more people expect that a government turnover makes a difference, the more they actually weigh their 'corruption evaluation' of the incumbent party against other non-performance-related factors (party identification, ethnicity, etc.). Put differently, the expected benefits of a party choice based on the 'corruption evaluation' are higher when citizens anticipate a greater effect of government turnover on actual policies and good governance. If citizens expect only a minor – or even no – effect, the expected benefits of choosing a party based on the 'corruption evaluation' are low. Hence, when faced with a trade-off (for instance, voting for a non-corrupt challenger *versus* voting for the incumbent who has the same ethnicity) the relative weight of other (non-performance related) considerations might be higher than the 'corruption evaluation' if political efficacy is low. Broadly speaking, when voters weigh different determinants of their party choice, the relative weight of the 'corruption evaluation' is reduced if external political efficacy is low. Thus, for instance, voters with low political efficacy could also be more likely to accept clientelistic offers of corrupt politicians instead of punishing them, since the expected loss of benefits by not 'throwing the rascals out' is low. Moreover, voters could just vote in accordance with their predispositions since the assumed actual impact of their vote on policies is small to non-existent.

3.3 Summary of mechanisms and hypotheses

In summary, I expect that political efficacy helps to overcome obstacles to corruption voting. First, I argue that external political efficacy mitigates the severity of collective action problems. I expect efficacious voters with increased sense of efficacy to be more likely to rush to the polls in order to punish corrupt incumbents at the voting booth. Second, I argue that the more people expect that government turnover matters, the higher the expected benefits from a party choice based on the 'corruption voting' when voters are faced with trade-offs.

Based on the previously mentioned mechanisms, I postulate two hypotheses on how corruption perceptions affect voting behaviour (see A3. and A4. for graphical illustrations of the hypotheses).

H1: The higher the external political efficacy of citizens, the more likely corruption perceptions rush them to the polls.

H2: The higher the external political efficacy of voters, the stronger the effect of the corruption perception on their party choice.

4. Data & Operationalization

Previous studies on individual heterogeneity in corruption voting often focussed on specific countries (Escaleras 2012; Karahan et al. 2006; Karahan et al. 2009; Klašnja 2017; Klašnja et al. 2014). Others have conducted survey experiments that vary the treatment (corruption) by confronting people with different hypothetical scenarios (Bauhr and Charron 2018; Cordero and Blais 2017; Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2016). These studies measure the hypothetical vote intention instead of the actual voting behaviour as the dependent variable. Furthermore, they tend to overestimate punishment due to "social desirability bias". Moreover, their findings lack external validity. Other studies that investigate moderators of corruption voting used aggregated data (Praino et al. 2013; Stockemer and Calca 2013; Sundström and Stockemer (2015). However, these studies are prone to the risk of running ecological fallacies when it comes to the causal interpretation of the mechanisms on the micro-level. In order to draw robust conclusions with high external validity – that is, findings that hold robust across elections and country-specific contexts and directly measure individual behaviour –, observational data of individuals nested within country-/election-specific contexts that measure actual voting behaviour is most suitable.[16] The second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset seems to be most appropriate for the purpose of this study. The dataset compiles the data of 64,256 respondents from 40 different post-election surveys in 38 countries. It includes data on democracies across different continents and with very diverse levels of corruption (See the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index in the Appendix A1.). Moreover, the dataset includes survey data from presidential, semi-presidential as well as parliamentary systems. On top of that, the countries used in my analysis have quite different electoral systems. This substantial variation in context variables secures that my findings are robust across very different democratic regimes.

4.1 Dependent Variables: Turnout and Incumbent voting

In order to estimate the effect of corruption perceptions on an individual's likelihood to go to the polls (Hypothesis 1), I created a variable which indicates whether a respondent cast a ballot ('1') or not ('0'). Those who are not eligible to vote in the respective country were removed from the analysis. Moreover, respondents that refused to give an answer, that provided

[16] Indeed, official data on voting behaviour instead of self-reported data in order to circumvent the issues of social desirability and/or recall bias. In some of the countries the data was cross-validated. However, for most countries, such data is unfortunately not available.

inconsistent responses[17] or reported that they 'don't know' were removed from the analysis as well.[18]

Moreover, I created a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent has voted for the incumbent or a challenger party in order to examine my second hypothesis (*'The higher the external political efficacy of voters, the stronger the effect of the corruption perception on their party choice*'). This variable includes only respondents who went to the polls. Those who did not vote are not considered in the respective models. I retrieved the information about the governing parties prior to the elections from the Seki Williams dataset on Government and Ministers dataset (Williams et al. 2016). If a respondent reports that he voted for the party of the head of government, the variable is coded as 1. If a respondent reports to that he voted for any other party, the variable is coded as 0. This coding implies strong assumptions with regard to coalition governments. This measurement is based on the assumption that voters clearly distinguish between the party of the head of government and other parties regarding their 'corruption evaluation' and subsequently only punish the party of the incumbent for corrupt activity but not the other coalition parties. In other words, I treat coalition partners of the incumbent and opposition parties the same. Admittedly, it seems plausible that voters do indeed differentiate more finely nuanced. On the other hand, treating all governing parties the same is similarly problematic, since in this case the assumption would be that voters do not differentiate between the party of the prime minister and the other governing parties. Hence, this coding implies an equally strong assumption. However, I ran my models with such a variable as well and the findings remain robust (See Appendix A5.). Like the models that estimate the effect of corruption perceptions on turnout. the incumbent voting models do also capture party choice in lower house elections. Wherever the national surveys did not collect data on voting behaviour in lower house elections, the variable refers to the vote choice in presidential elections or upper house elections (Japan). In countries with a mixed electoral formula (e.g. Germany, New Zealand) – that is, it is neither only proportional representation nor only majoritarian – the variable refers to the party choice in the proportional 'element' of the ballot.

Unfortunately, the data for four elections –Hong Kong 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2005, Russia 2004 and Switzerland 2003 – had to be excluded from the analysis since a reasonable coding of incumbent voting was not feasible. Russia was removed since the candidate who won the election – Vladimir Putin (who was also president before the election – ran as an independent

[17] That is, the respondent reported not casting a ballot but reported a vote choice
[18] This applies to all other variables included in my models as well.

and the Russian party system is generally extremely fluid and personalized (Sakwa 2005). For Switzerland a reasonable coding was not possible due to its complex political system. There is no single head of government, but a body called "Federal council" which consists of seven members of multiple parties. The President of the Swiss Confederation who is the head of this council changes every year and rotates automatically around the seven members (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). The elections 2005 in Kyrgyzstan would certainly be an interesting case since the so-called "Tulip Revolution" succeeded the elections and the incumbent was accused of being corrupt. However, the prime minister as well as the president (officially) ran as independents (Radnitz 2006). Moreover, a reasonable coding for the legislative elections in Hong Kong 2004 was not possible since the head of government is not elected by citizens but by an 'electoral committee' (HKSAR Government 2017).

4.2 Independent Variable: Corruption perceptions

In order to measure a citizen's perceived level of corruption, respondents were asked the following question:

How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking amongst politicians is in [country]: 1. it hardly happens at all, 2. Not very widespread, 3. quite widespread, 4. very widespread?

Since the question directly refers to political corruption,[19] this question is more appropriate for the purpose of this study than the measurements deploying a broader definition of corruption used in many other surveys/studies. Due to the fact that my theoretically postulated mechanisms are particularly strong for corruption on the level of political elites, a corruption measure that explicitly refers to political corruption is better suited than broader definitions of corruption.

4.3 Moderator Variable: External political efficacy

I argue that external political efficacy conditions corruption voting. Hence, the primary interest of this study is to examine the conditional effect of corruption perceptions on voting behaviour. The following question asked in the CSES model 2 is well-suited to measure the concept of external political efficacy:

Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a

[19] See Philp (2006) for an overview of conceptual issues, different aspects, measurements and definitions of corruption.

difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn't make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself?[20]

Admittedly, this question captures only a limited part of external political efficacy. Expecting that it makes a difference who is in power does not imply that citizens expect the system to be responsive to their demands. Even if citizens expect that different incumbent deliver different policy outputs and that who is in power matters, they might think that the incumbents' behaviour does not reflect citizens' demands. However, this measurement captures – broadly speaking – a prerequisite to this responsiveness. Only if they expect that government turnover can bring change – whatever the incumbent's motives and incentives for this change are – it makes sense to expect that the systems can actually be responsive to citizens' demands.

4.4 Controls

In order to rule out the possibility that the effect of X on Y is in fact driven by (hidden) third factors C_n that influence both – X and Y – these factors C_n have to be included in the regression models in order to control for the confounding effects of C_n (Morgan and Winship 2015, 82-83). The CSES module 2 data provides a quite comprehensive pool of suitable control variables that enable more robust conclusions on the effect of my independent variable and the interaction term on my dependent variables. In addition to the independent variable (perceived corruption) and the moderating variable (external political efficacy), I include five control variables in my main models that estimate the effect of corruption perceptions on an individual's likelihood to go to the polls.

In the these models, I control for respondents' evaluations of the democratic process in general ('*On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?*'). Furthermore, I control for gender, age and education of the respondents since they are important determinants of electoral participation as multiple studies have shown (see Smets and van Ham 2013 for a meta-analysis of studies on individual determinants of turnout). Gender is coded as dummy variable – '1' indicates that the respondent is male; '0' indicates that the respondent is female. Even though the empirical evidence suggests that gender-related differences with regard to turnout are gradually decreasing, there is still some evidence that men are more likely to vote due to their different role in society (Smets and van Ham 2013, 5). As one of the arguably strongest predictors of

[20] Notice that I reversed the response scale of this variable in order to enable a simpler interpretation of the interaction terms. That is, higher values indicate that people think that it makes a difference who is in power in the regression models.

turnout (Smets and van Ham 2013, 5), the educational attainment of respondents is coded on an ordinal scale. Higher values indicate a higher educational attainment of the respondents. It is expected to be positively associated with turnout. Moreover, I control for party identification by including a dummy that indicates whether the respondent feels close to a particular party ('1') or not ('0'). Partisans are expected to be more likely to go to the polls than non-partisans (Smets and van Ham 2013, 5).

Unfortunately, many respondents refused to report their household income (measured in quintiles of the country-specific distribution). On top of that, the refusal to this question is unequally distributed across countries and presumably more severe at the extremes of the income spectrum. Therefore, I decided not to include this control variable in my main models. Unfortunately, in the Danish survey respondents were not asked about employment status. Thus, I decided not to further reduce the sample of elections and removed these control variables from the analysis. However, my findings remain robust after running the models including income and employment status as control variables (see A6. in the Appendix).

In my models that estimate the effect of corruption perceptions on an individual's likelihood to vote for the incumbent, I include almost the same control variables. However, I use a slightly different measurement of respondents' party identifications. To be more precise, I split the dummy that captures whether voters have a party identification or not into two different dummies. One dummy indicates whether the respondent feels close to the incumbent party ('1') versus all others – i.e., respondents with either no party identification or who identify themselves with any challenger party ('0'). The other dummy indicates whether the respondent feels close any other party ('1') versus all others – i.e., respondents with either no party identification or who identify themselves with the incumbent ('0'). Moreover, I included a control variable that captures the ideological distance. I calculated the distance between the self-placement on the left-right scale and the perceived left-right position of the incumbent party. The closer the ideological distance of voters with the incumbent, the more they are expected to forgive him for corrupt activity (Bagenholm and Charron 2014). Unfortunately, in the Belgian survey respondents were not asked about their perceived left-right positions of parties. Thus, in my main models presented in the analysis I decided not to further reduce the sample of elections and removed these control variables from the analysis. Since the questions on political knowledge were also not asked in all national surveys, this variable was removed from the main models as well. However, running my regression models including employment

status, income, political knowledge and the ideological distance to the incumbent reveal the same results (see A7. in the Appendix).

5. Analysis

The unit of analysis in this study is the individual voter. One crucial assumption of regression analysis is that observations are independent from each other. However, since I use data from different elections the individuals are nested within contexts specific to elections – that is, the data is clustered. Therefore, the independence assumption is violated. In order to take the clustered structure of my data into account and to control for unobserved election-specific differences, I deploy multilevel models (Gelman and Hill 2007, 237).[21] Moreover, the dependent variable is categorical. That is, I have binary dependent variables. Thus, OLS would lead to nonsensical predictors. Therefore, I employ logistic regression models using MLE to estimate the coefficients. Since I am not interested in interpreting macro-level variables and given the characteristics of the data, I estimate logistic regression models with country-fixed effects and clustered standard errors accounting for unobserved heterogeneity between elections.

I conducted eight different models to estimate the effect of perceived corruption on voting behaviour. Model 1 – Model 4 refer to the examination of Hypothesis 1 ('*The higher the external political efficacy of citizens, the more likely corruption perceptions rush them to the polls*'). Model 5 – 8 refer to the investigation of Hypothesis 2 ('*The higher the external political efficacy of voters, the stronger the effect of the corruption perception on their party choice*'). The values in brackets below the coefficients display the (clustered) standard errors of the estimates. Moreover, the number of number of the Pseudo-R^2 is displayed in the bottom of Table 1 and Table 2. The values indicate the 'model fit' of the overall model – that is, the amount of variation in the dependent variables (turnout and party choice) that is explained by the included variables. Higher values in my independent variable indicate that respondents perceive more corruption. Higher values of the moderator variables ('*Who is in power makes a difference*'), indicate that citizens expect more differences. The standard errors are displayed in brackets below the coefficients.

[21] The level 2 in the models are elections. The dataset includes only two countries with more than one election – Taiwan 2001 & 2004 and Portugal 2002 & 2005.

5.1 Turnout models

Table 1: Multilevel logistic regressions models estimating the effect of perceived corruption turnout

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Perceived corruption	-0.0994***		-0.0944***	-0.0373
	(0.0261)		(0.0244)	(0.0605)
External Political Efficacy		0.174***	0.172***	0.226***
		(0.0184)	(0.0186)	(0.0529)
Corruption*External political efficacy				-0.0167
				(0.0168)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.190***	0.172***	0.165***	0.165***
	(0.0298)	(0.0286)	(0.0281)	(0.0281)
Male	0.0290	0.0400	0.0340	0.0338
	(0.0332)	(0.0342)	(0.0340)	(0.0340)
Age	0.0249***	0.0252***	0.0252***	0.0252***
	(0.00278)	(0.00280)	(0.00282)	(0.00282)
Education	0.159***	0.146***	0.148***	0.147***
	(0.0186)	(0.0185)	(0.0182)	(0.0183)
Party identification	0.839***	0.788***	0.773***	0.773***
	(0.0778)	(0.0705)	(0.0727)	(0.0728)
Constant	-0.357	-1.218***	-0.843***	-1.022***
	(0.189)	(0.201)	(0.198)	(0.219)
Obs (Individuals)	53598	55681	52694	52694
Obs (Elections)	40	40	40	40
Pseudo R^2	0.109	0.115	0.116	0.116

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Model 1 estimates the effect of the perceived level of corruption on the likelihood to go to the polls without taking external political efficacy into account. The coefficient for the corruption perception is strongly significant. The p-value is below 0.001. In other words, we can reject the Null Hypothesis – which assumes that there is no effect of corruption perceptions on the likelihood to go to the polls – with a probability of more than 99.9%. The sign of the coefficient is negative. Thus, we can conclude that voters who perceive more corruption in their country are less likely to go to the polls. This finding is in line with the majority of studies that indicate that corruption lowers turnout (e.g. Caillier 2010; Chong et al. 2015; McCann and Dominguez 1998; Stockemer 2013; Stockemer et al. 2011; Sundström and Stockemer 2015). All of the

control variables – except for gender – are significant in the expected direction.[22] Satisfaction with the way democracy works, age, higher educational attainment and feeling attached to a particular party raise the likelihood to go to the polls. [23] Being male does not increase the likelihood to go to the polls significantly. Model 2 examines the effect of external political efficacy on the likelihood to go to the polls without taking corruption perceptions into account. The effect is significant and in the expected direction. The more citizens expect that who is in power matters, the more likely they cast a ballot. Again, the coefficient is significant on the 99.9% level.

Model 3 includes corruption perception as well as external political efficacy. The model measures the effect that both variables have on the likelihood to go to the polls independently from each other. The coefficients remain almost the same as in Model 1 and Model 2. In addition to that, they remain both highly significant. Nonetheless, the results are thoroughly interesting. Corruption perceptions still have a negative significant effect (the coefficient is only marginally smaller than in Model 2) in Model 3. This indicates that the negative effect of corruption on turnout is not (fully) mediated by its negative effect on external political efficacy. This finding is in line with the previously presented evidence that corruption only slightly affects external political efficacy. Finally, Model 4 includes the interaction term. In doing so, it investigates whether external political efficacy shapes the relationship between perceiving corruption and going to the polls. Since the coefficient is clearly not significant, Hypothesis 1 ('*The higher the external political efficacy of citizens, the more likely corruption perceptions rush them to the polls*') is not confirmed. We cannot reject the Null Hypothesis that external political efficacy has no effect on the relationship between corruption perceptions and going to the polls. In other words, those who think that government turnover makes a difference are <u>not</u> more likely to be rushed to the polls by corruption perceptions than citizens with lower levels of external political efficacy. The graph presented in Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration (marginsplot) of the effect of the interaction term ('*Corruption*External Political Efficacy*') on the likelihood to go to the polls that allows for a more nuanced interpretation.[24]

[22] I am aware of the fact that the interpretation of control variables has to be done with caution, since the model specification follows the selection of the variables of interest (dependent variable, independent variable, moderating variable). Thus, I do not provide any further substantial interpretation of control variables' effects.
[23] The effects of the control variables remain the same in the following three models. Thus, they will not be further discussed in the interpretation of Models 2, 3 and 4. Moreover, I ran several model specifications (i.e. including different sets of control variables or no controls at all). Since they did not reveal any interesting findings (i.e. effects of the independent variable, the moderating variable and the interaction term have not changed), their results are not presented.
[24] Note that for the sake of a simpler interpretation external political efficacy has been treated as a continuous variable in the regression outputs although the variable is ordinally scaled.

Figure 3: Marginal effect of corruption perceptions on going to the polls over different levels of political efficacy



Figure 3 displays the effect of corruption on an individual's likelihood to go to the polls over different levels of external political efficacy holding the effects of all other variables at their mean. Contrary to my theoretical expectations formulated in Hypothesis 1, almost all coefficients are negative. However, only some of them are significant and there is no linear pattern. Therefore, we cannot draw certain conclusions about differences in the effects of corruption perceptions on the likelihood to go to the polls across different values of external political efficacy. In summary, the interpretation of the coefficients across different levels of external political efficacy does not allow for the identification of a clear-cut, unambiguous pattern. Therefore, this finding clearly contradicts my expectations formulated in Hypothesis 1. External political efficacy does not mitigate the negative effect of corruption perceptions on turnout.

5.2 Incumbent voting models

Table 2: Multilevel Logistic regressions estimating the effect of perceived corruption on individuals' likelihood to vote for the incumbent

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Perceived corruption	-0.134***		-0.132***	0.0907
	(0.0348)		(0.0350)	(0.0545)
External Political Efficacy		0.0402	0.0350	0.218***
		(0.0282)	(0.0287)	(0.0434)
Corruption*External Political Efficacy				-0.0607***
				(0.0132)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.383***	0.403***	0.378***	0.378***
	(0.0756)	(0.0781)	(0.0754)	(0.0753)
Male	-0.0468	-0.0390	-0.0554	-0.0556
	(0.0315)	(0.0294)	(0.0315)	(0.0315)
Age	0.00104	0.00119	0.000974	0.000941
	(0.00157)	(0.00151)	(0.00158)	(0.00159)
Education	-0.0348*	-0.0319	-0.0371*	-0.0382*
	(0.0171)	(0.0178)	(0.0176)	(0.0176)
Identification with incumbent	2.808***	2.806***	2.799***	2.795***
	(0.153)	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Identification with any opposition party	-1.407***	-1.401***	-1.422***	-1.423***
	(0.177)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.180)
Constant	-1.254***	-1.976***	-1.341***	-2.004***
	(0.192)	(0.229)	(0.207)	(0.282)
Obs (Individuals)	43161	44752	42544	42544
Obs (Elections)	36	36	36	36
Pseudo R^2	0.322	0.321	0.323	0.324

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In order to examine Hypothesis 2 ('*The higher the external political efficacy of voters, the stronger the effect of the corruption perception on their party choice'*), I estimated four models. In these models, only citizens who reported that they went to the polls are included. The dependent variable is the likelihood to vote for the party of the head of government in the legislative period preceding the respective election. Table 2 shows the results of the models.

Model 5 examines the unconditional effect of the independent variable – corruption perceptions – on incumbent voting. The strongly significant, negative effect reveals that voters do indeed punish corrupt incumbents when they perceive high levels of corruption. Put differently, voters who perceive more corruption are less likely to vote for the incumbent. Conversely, they are more likely to vote for any challenger party. Again, the control variables display effects in the expected directions. Satisfaction with democracy leads to more incumbent voting.[25] Gender and Age do both not display any significant effects. More educated voters tend to vote against the incumbent, whereas voters that feel close to the party of the incumbent head of government are significantly more likely to vote for the incumbent. Likewise, voters that feel attached to any other party are less likely to vote for the incumbent.[26] Model 6 tests the effect of external political efficacy on incumbent voting. The results reveal that voters with higher levels of external political efficacy are more likely to vote for the incumbent. Model 7 takes corruption perceptions as well as external political efficacy simultaneously into account in order to estimate the effects of external political efficacy and corruption perceptions independently of each other. The direction and significance levels of the coefficients remain the same as in Model 5 and Model 6. Also, the size of the size of the coefficients change only marginally. Again, this is in line with my assumption that corruption perceptions do only slightly determine external political efficacy.

Finally, Model 8 includes the interaction term ('*Corruption*External Political Efficacy*') in order to estimate the conditional effect of corruption perceptions on incumbent voting. The estimated effect confirms my expectation postulated in Hypothesis 1 ('*The higher the external political efficacy of voters, the stronger the effect of the corruption perception on their party choice*'). The negative significant coefficient of the interaction term indicates that the negative effect of corruption perceptions on incumbent voting increases as external political efficacy increases. The more people expect that who is in power matters, the higher the likelihood that perceiving corruption results in punishing the corruption by voting for a challenger. In doing so, external political efficacy does indeed enhance accountability. Again, I present a marginsplot in Figure 4 that visualizes the effects of corruption perceptions on incumbent voting across the different values of external political efficacy.

[25] Presumably, voters that are satisfied with democracy rather tend to wish to preserve the status quo. However, as mentioned in footnote 22 drawing conclusions from effects of control variables is prone to bias. Thus, this is only a tentative conclusion.

[26] Since the effects of the control variables only marginally change across the different models, I do not discuss their effects in the interpretation of Models 6-8.

Figure 4: Marginal effect of corruption perceptions on incumbent voting over different levels of political efficacy



The marginsplot reveals that there is an almost linear moderating effect of external political efficacy on corruption voting. The 95% confidence intervals of the first two values of values of external political efficacy (1='*who is in power doesn't make a difference*') do clearly overlap with zero.[27] Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This finding indicates that these voters do not have an increased likelihood to vote against the incumbent. This is perfectly in line with my theoretical expectations. The coefficient of the middle category 3 is already significant. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected and I conclude that for this group of voters there is a moderating impact of external political efficacy. The pattern becomes even more clear for voters who display higher levels of external political efficacy. The effect size becomes bigger and the confidence intervals smaller. Moreover, the confidence intervals of the lowest value of external political efficacy and the two highest values do not overlap. This further increases the validity of the findings. Based on these insights, the empirical analysis clearly verifies the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 2. The effect of corruption perceptions on voting against the incumbent increases as voters have higher levels of political efficacy. If voters do have low levels of political efficacy, there is no effect of corruption perceptions on party choice. In sum,

[27] That is, with a probability of 95% the true parameter is within this range

the analysis provides strong support that the effect of corruption perceptions on party choice is contingent on external political efficacy.

6. Discussion

To recapitulate, I suspected two mechanisms how external political efficacy enhances corruption voting. First, external political efficacy mitigates the detrimental effects of collective action problems on accountability. Second, when voters are faced with trade-offs external political efficacy increases the relative weight of the 'corruption evaluation' as a determinant of party choice increasing accountability. Both mechanisms assume that external political efficacy increases the saliency and the expected benefits from a vote based on the 'corruption evaluation'. The empirical analysis examining the effect of corruption perceptions on turnout does not provide support for my initial idea that external political efficacy enhances accountability in terms of translating ignition within the electorate into higher turnout rates. My results indicate that corruption decreases turnout – no matter how efficacious citizens are. This finding is arguably the most important finding of this study. However, the results of the models estimating the effect of external political efficacy on the relationship between corruption perceptions and incumbent voting lead to more optimistic conclusions with regard to external political efficacy's capability to enhance accountability. Among voters, high external political efficacy is indeed associated with a higher likelihood to punish the incumbent. These findings suggest that punishment of the incumbent does not necessarily imply mobilization. Although external political efficacy enhances the willingness among voters to vote against the incumbent when they perceive widespread corruption, it does not rush more citizens to the polls. In other words, my findings indicate that external political efficacy drives more voters to voice against corruption at the voting booth but does not lead to less 'exit' options in response to corruption. Thus, my findings contribute to the growing literature which argues that the effects of corruption on abstention and citizens' willingness to actually punish incumbents at the voting booth underly different mechanisms (Bauhr and Charron 2018, 420).

Admittedly, the operationalization of my independent variable – corruption perceptions – is based on a rather narrow definition of corruption. In contrast to many other studies, my operationalization refers specifically to political corruption and thereby captures only one dimension of corruption. This might limit the magnitude of my results. Stockemer's (2013) cross-national analysis of the effect of corruption on turnout also suggests that political corruption dampens turnout. However, he finds that a broader definition of corruption (i.e. including societal and financial corruption) has no effect on turnout. Hence, it seems plausible

that the effect of corruption perceptions on turnout varies across different forms of corruption. Whereas the voters' expectations about government responsiveness might not have an impact on how perceptions of political corruption shape turnout, it might shape the relationship between other forms of (perceived) corruption and turnout. The operationalization of external political efficacy also captures only a limited part of the concept. It does not explicitly refer to citizens' beliefs that the system is actually responsive to their demands but measures a precondition of such a responsiveness – i.e. citizens' beliefs that who is in power matters. Thus, I might underestimate the effect of external political efficacy on corruption voting. Furthermore, I am not entirely able to preclude endogeneity issues. Turnout is not only affected by external political efficacy, but the act of voting itself enhances external political efficacy (Finkel 1985). The same applies to corruption. Moreover, my analysis is based on a very limited number of elections. Increasing the number of elections would not only raise the robustness of my findings but also enhance their breadth and allow for incorporating and interpreting the influence of contextual factors – such as saliency or the overall level of corruption.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to investigate the role of external political efficacy in the electoral response to corruption. I developed a twofold theoretical argument how corruption affects voting behaviour and thereby enhances accountability. First, I hypothesized that external political efficacy mitigates the depressing effects of collective action problems on turnout. Second, I argued that external political efficacy increases the weight of the 'corruption evaluation' in voters' actual party choice and thereby decreases their likelihood to vote for the incumbent. Drawing on cross-national data of 64,256 individuals from 40 elections, I tested these assumptions on the individual level and found evidence for the latter effect but not for the former one. In line with most previous research, my results indicate that corruption perceptions decrease individuals' likelihood to go to the polls. More importantly, the detrimental effect of corruption on turnout is not mitigated by external political efficacy. Corruption perceptions decrease turnout of voters – no matter how efficacious they are. However, the findings regarding those citizens who actually go to the polls lead to more optimistic conclusions about external political efficacy's ability to enhance accountability. External political efficacy does indeed increase the likelihood that voters hold corrupt incumbents accountable.

One initial motivation of this study was to introduce an individual factor to account for heterogeneity in corruption voting. I took a first step by examining the role of external political efficacy. Whereas the economic voting literature has made considerable progress in explaining

individual differences in economic voting (see, for instance, de Vries and Giger 2014; Duch 2001, Duch et al. 2000; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2003, 2006), the corruption voting literature has investigated only very few individual moderators (i.e. political sophistication, political awareness, partisanship) so far. For example, the saliency individuals attach to the 'corruption evaluation' or the perceived severity of the corrupt activity might account for individual heterogeneity in corruption voting. This applies with regard to studies focussing on party choice as well as on studies focussing on turnout. However, the latter strand of literature almost completely neglected individual heterogeneity so far. Hence, I suggest that future research should put more emphasis on individual heterogeneity in the response to corruption. In doing so, it will improve our understanding of the electoral consequences across different segments of society.

Furthermore, incorporating both dimensions – turnout and party choice – leads to more nuanced insights how electoral punishment of corruption works. Previous studies have mostly missed to incorporate 'exit' options in their analysis (see Bauhr and Charron 2018; Chong et al. 2015; Praino et al. 2013 as some exceptions to this). Especially studies using observational data, face difficulties to identify the actual mechanisms causing the observed negative effects of corruption on incumbent voting. In fact, these effects could be due to a mobilization effect on voters that would not have voted otherwise or to 'conversion' effect on voters who would have voted for the incumbent otherwise. Moreover, voters who would have voted for the incumbent could abstain from voting. Like most other studies that investigate the effect of corruption on voting behaviour (see Bauhr and Charron 2018 as well as Praino et al. 2013 for attempts to disentangle the three effects), my research design is unfortunately not entirely capable to distinguish between the different effects of corruption on voting behaviour. Observational data does not allow for certain conclusions of the causal mechanisms underlying the punishment of corrupt activity of incumbents. Given these challenges to identify the actual causal mechanisms how corruption affects voting behaviour, I suggest that future research should complement the existing insights retrieved from large-N studies with qualitative studies (i.e. expert interviews and focus groups). Moreover, experimental studies increase the confidence in internal validity. This applies to contextual as well as to individual-level moderators of corruption voting. This study provided a first attempt to identify the actual mechanisms how external political efficacy enhances electoral punishment of corruption. In sum, the results contribute to a more nuanced understanding how corruption perceptions affect democratic accountability.

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9. Appendix

A1. Country Table

Election	System of Government	Lower House Election	Upper House Election	Presidential Election	Mean of external political efficacy	Mean of corruption perception	TI corruption index	Correlation of efficacy & corruption
Albania 2005	Parliamentary	✓			3.82	3.76	2.4	-.03
Australia 2004	Parliamentary	✓	✓		3.79	2.33	8.8	-.15
Belgium 2003	Parliamentary	✓	✓		3.25	3.17	7.6	-.11
Brazil 2002	Presidential	✓	✓	✓	4.06	3.32	4	-.04
Bulgaria 2001	Parliamentary	✓			3.75	3.48	3.9	-.0002
Canada 2004	Parliamentary	✓			3.34	2.78	8.5	-.14
Chile 2005	Presidential	✓		✓	3.79	2.87	7.3	-.08
Taiwan 2001	Semi-presidential	✓			3.49	3.07	5.9	-.014
Taiwan 2004	Semi-presidential			✓	3.35	3.11	5.6	.0001
Czech Republic 2002	Parliamentary	✓			3.54	3.55	3.7	-.13
Denmark 2001	Parliamentary	✓			3.66	1.97	9.5	-.05
Finland 2003	Parliamentary	✓			3.65	2.24	9.7	-.10
France 2002	Semi-presidential			✓	3.20	3.16	6.3	-.16
Germany 2002	Parliamentary	✓			3.23	3.21	7.3	-.12
Great Britain 2005	Parliamentary	✓			2.99	2.38	8.6	-.18
Hong Kong 2004	Other	✓			3.53	2.00	8.0	-.01
Hungary 2002	Parliamentary	✓			4.17	3.07	4.9	-.05
Iceland 2003	Parliamentary	✓			4.15	2.16	9.6	-.09
Ireland 2002	Parliamentary	✓			3.46	2.99	6.9	-.08

Election	System of Government	Lower House Election	Upper House Election	Presidential Election	Mean of external political efficacy	Mean of corruption perception	TI corruption index	Correlation of efficacy & corruption
Israel 2003	Parliamentary	✓			4.08	3.51	7.0	-.06
Italy 2006	Parliamentary	✓			3.67	3.33	5.5	.01
Japan 2004	Parliamentary		✓		3.39	3.19	6.9	-.01
South Korea 2004	Presidential	✓			3.60	3.35	4.5	-.03
Mexico 2003	Presidential	✓			3.41	3.65	3.6	-.05
Netherlands 2002	Parliamentary	✓			4.35	2.24	9	-.04
New Zealand 2002	Parliamentary	✓			3.61	2.12	3	-.14
Norway 2001	Parliamentary	✓			3.44	2.05	8.6	-.06
Peru 2006	Semi-presidential	✓		✓	3.35	3.72	3.3	.02
Philippines 2004	Presidential	✓		✓	3.10	3.48	2.6	-.04
Poland 2001	Parliamentary	✓	✓		3.68	3.48	4.1	-.05
Portugal 2002	Semi-presidential	✓			3.62	2.87	6.3	-.09
Portugal 2005	Semi-presidential	✓			3.68	3.16	6.5	.04
Romania 2004	Semi-presidential	✓	✓	✓	4.14	3.50	2.9	.07
Russia 2004	Semi-presidential			✓	4.30	3.18	2.8	-.12
Slovenia 2004	Parliamentary	✓			4.04	3.21	6	-.02
Spain 2004	Parliamentary	✓			4.10	2.6	7.1	.02
Sweden 2002	Parliamentary	✓			4.03	2.09	9.3	-.09
Switzerland 2003	Other	✓			3.75	2.39	8.8	-.04
United States of America 2004	Presidential	✓	✓	✓	3.95	2.75	7.5	-.05

A2. Multilevel OLS-regression model with country-fixed effects and clustered standard errors estimating the effect of perceived corruption on external political efficacy using

	(1) Who is in power makes a difference
Perceived corruption	-0.0903*
	(0.0363)
Constant	3.949***
	(0.110)
Observations	58077

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A3. Hypothesis 1 – The conditional effect of corruption perceptions on the likelihood to go to the polls[28]



A4. Hypothesis 2 – The conditional effect of corruption perceptions on the likelihood to vote for the incumbent party



[28] Note that for the sake of a simpler interpretation the moderator variable external political efficacy has been binary coded in Figure 1, whereas it is ordinally coded (1 to 5) in the actual analysis.

A5. Incumbent voting models: voting for any governing party is coded '1'

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Perceived corruption	-0.136***		-0.135***	0.0609
	(0.0309)		(0.0314)	(0.0541)
External Political Efficacy		0.0319	0.0267	0.188***
		(0.0272)	(0.0278)	(0.0535)
Corruption*External Political Efficacy				-0.0533***
				(0.0143)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.372***	0.394***	0.368***	0.368***
	(0.0684)	(0.0709)	(0.0682)	(0.0682)
Male	-0.0624	-0.0554	-0.0710	-0.0710
	(0.0418)	(0.0404)	(0.0422)	(0.0424)
Age	-0.00132	-0.00133	-0.00137	-0.00141
	(0.00195)	(0.00195)	(0.00195)	(0.00195)
Education	-0.0205	-0.0171	-0.0216	-0.0225
	(0.0181)	(0.0185)	(0.0189)	(0.0190)
Identification with incumbent	2.844***	2.844***	2.839***	2.835***
	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Identification with any opposition party	-1.003***	-1.008***	-1.014***	-1.015***
	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Constant	-1.281***	-1.975***	-1.347***	-1.929***
	(0.169)	(0.205)	(0.189)	(0.252)
Observations	43161	44752	42544	42544
Pseudo R^2	0.305	0.304	0.306	0.306

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A6. Turnout models including household income and employment status as control variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Perceived corruption	-0.0956***		-0.0919***	-0.00845
	(0.0257)		(0.0245)	(0.0618)
External Political Efficacy		0.160***	0.160***	0.238***
		(0.0187)	(0.0194)	(0.0550)
Corruption*External Political Efficacy				-0.0246
				(0.0169)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.159***	0.147***	0.137***	0.136***
	(0.0302)	(0.0299)	(0.0288)	(0.0288)
Male	-0.104*	-0.0940*	-0.0957*	-0.0960*
	(0.0421)	(0.0446)	(0.0427)	(0.0427)
Age	0.0248***	0.0251***	0.0254***	0.0254***
	(0.00249)	(0.00247)	(0.00249)	(0.00249)
Education	0.0874***	0.0778***	0.0819***	0.0816***
	(0.0167)	(0.0169)	(0.0162)	(0.0162)
Party identification	0.759***	0.709***	0.700***	0.700***
	(0.0852)	(0.0792)	(0.0813)	(0.0813)
Household income	0.0906***	0.0895***	0.0906***	0.0902***
	(0.0186)	(0.0188)	(0.0185)	(0.0186)
Employment status	-0.227**	-0.233**	-0.227**	-0.226**
	(0.0771)	(0.0728)	(0.0782)	(0.0781)
Constant	-0.500*	-1.297***	-0.970***	-1.231***
	(0.226)	(0.231)	(0.248)	(0.249)
Observations	38766	40188	38214	38214
Pseudo R^2	0.130	0.135	0.136	0.136

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A7. Incumbent voting models including household income, employment status, political knowledge and ideological distance to incumbent party as control variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Perceived corruption	-0.0891*		-0.0900*	0.173*
	(0.0411)		(0.0415)	(0.0695)
External political efficacy		0.0452	0.0451	0.258***
		(0.0294)	(0.0298)	(0.0592)
Corruption*External Political Efficacy				-0.0714***
				(0.0191)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.287***	0.300***	0.278***	0.279***
	(0.0681)	(0.0704)	(0.0670)	(0.0673)
Male	-0.0956*	-0.0900*	-0.102*	-0.103*
	(0.0459)	(0.0431)	(0.0449)	(0.0447)
Age	0.00118	0.00125	0.00112	0.00108
	(0.00164)	(0.00166)	(0.00168)	(0.00169)
Education	-0.0587**	-0.0522**	-0.0585**	-0.0586**
	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0189)	(0.0189)
Identification with incumbent	2.512***	2.522***	2.502***	2.498***
	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Identification with any opposition party	-1.215***	-1.196***	-1.226***	-1.226***
	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.167)
Household income	-0.00225	-0.00665	-0.00567	-0.00611
	(0.0190)	(0.0184)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)
Employment status	0.00260	0.00989	0.0100	0.0103
	(0.0864)	(0.0818)	(0.0862)	(0.0855)
Political knowledge	0.0380	0.0358	0.0328	0.0315
	(0.0287)	(0.0268)	(0.0275)	(0.0277)
Ideological distance with government party	-0.287***	-0.295***	-0.291***	-0.290***
	(0.0433)	(0.0423)	(0.0425)	(0.0423)
Constant	0.0999	-0.473	-0.00308	-0.780*
	(0.245)	(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.329)
Observations	22671	23369	22505	22505
Pseudo R^2	0.356	0.356	0.357	0.358

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$