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“WE WILL BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE”

A study on Swedish prison officers' views on violent extremists and radicalised persons

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Abstract

The aim with this study is to find out how prison officers in Gothenburg are identifying violent extremism and radicalisation. The method used to find information regarding this was interviews performed with thirteen prison officers who have recently finished the basic training programme. The interviews lasted approximately 30 to 40 minutes each, and were performed during two different periods when the basic training programme educated the prison officers in radicalisation and violent extremism. The theoretical framework used to extract information is made by Moscovici, and involves categorisation and social representation. The interviews have been analysed through discursive analysis, which helped the study to gain depth and an interesting angle of approach. The findings on the first research question show approximately half of the prison officers felt they did not learn anything from the lecture, and the other half are positive towards the content of the lecture. The findings on the second research question show eleven prison officers cannot identify a violent extremist person from looks and appearance, meanwhile two prison officers mean they are able to identify them. This gives the education and the lecture about violent extremism and radicalisation credibility and should mean positive response.

Key words: Gothenburg, radicalisation, violent extremism, social representation, categorisation, interviews, discourse analysis, prison and probation services, prison officers, education.

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1. Introduction

The city of Gothenburg has become a base for young people who leave Sweden to take part in violence in war-torn countries (Smith 2016). This has been the case since the start of the Syrian war in 2012, and while the travels still occur, there seems to be a decline in the amount of people taking these decisions (Smederöd 2016). Some parts of Gothenburg have been reported to have a higher amount of people connected to violent extremism than others, which often is blamed on poor integration and economic or social exclusion. There have occurred travels from segregated areas and areas of low socio-economic statuses, but violent extremism and radicalisation is not connected to poverty, according to some researchers (Ranstorp, Gustafsson & Hyllengren 2015). The problem is neither arising from the poorest countries in the world, nor from the poorest people in Sweden. “The connection between poverty and terrorism is very weak” (Ibid 2015:16), even if there are contradictory reports (UNDP 2017).

Violent extremism and terrorism are serious problems in the global world today, and governments are forced to increase their knowledge about and resources for working against terror. The increased focus on violent extremism and radicalisation is relevant in a European perspective due to the spread both in Europe, but also globally.

“Prisons are considered to be high risk environments where violent extremism is growing rapidly” (Kriminalvården 2015:3), therefore the Swedish prison and probation services have received a mission by the Swedish government (Kriminalvården 2016) to develop their work against violent extremism. The mission includes educating prison officers and thereby restricting the number of radicalisations happening in Swedish prisons to a low level. To be successful with the mission, the Swedish prison and probation services are requested by the Swedish government to educate their prison officers in the matter.

The authority judge factors like e.g. an increased amount of swedes affiliated with foreign terror groups, stricter criminal law regulations, and an increased movement in the right- and left wing extremist environments raise the probability of higher amounts of clients with connections to violent extremism...

...To achieve this, the Swedish prison and probation services stress the necessity of authority staff acquiring additional knowledge and understanding of violent extremism.

The Swedish prison and probation services therefore raise the need of developing and implementing educational efforts for the staff as an urgent measure. (Kriminalvården (2016:2, own translation).

The Swedish prison and probation service offer a basic training programme for their staff, which after completion gives the staff a position as prison officer. The basic training programme is an education consisting of all knowledge possible when working with clients, and means 100 percent full time studying. The basic training programme stretches over 20 weeks and excludes participants from work during the ongoing education, but includes workplace practice. The basic training programme includes preparation for different situations possible to occur when in contact with clients, and gives the prison officers a broad spectrum of knowledge to handle potential settings. One aspect of the education is violent extremism and radicalisation, and in Gothenburg this particular regard is given a 90 minutes long lecture.

This study and thesis is based on an investigation of how prison officers perceive and talk about the lecture on violent extremism and radicalisation, which the author also participated in. The lecture is a fairly new aspect of the basic training programme, and the first group of prison officers were introduced to the lecture in Gothenburg in March 2017. Since the lecture had only been part of the basic training programme for a couple of months when this study was finished, there is a clear research gap regarding what the prison officers brought from the education.

This study is focused on finding out what the prison officers, who have finished the basic training programme, learned from the lecture about violent extremism, but also to learn more of what their understanding of this subject is overall. There could after all be a large difference between what is taught and what is learned. This study is relevant to society because it can show if prison officers use stereotypes and preconceived notions to identify violent extremists and radicalised persons. This would be a problem because the motto of the Swedish prison and probation service is “we will break the vicious circle”, suggesting stopping vicious behaviour leading back to imprisonment, and this means that prison officers need an open mind and give judge free support. The increasing media coverage of extremist crimes and the fact that according to estimates (Kriminalvården 2015), violent extremists and

people in the risk of becoming radicalised in prisons as well as out in the society are likely to increase, this study has a high social relevance.

A newly appointed position created in 2014, The National Coordinator to Saveguard Democracy against Violent Extremism (furthermore referred to as the Coordinator), is part of a governmental united front to fight violent extremism in Sweden. The Coordinator works to develop a strategy to diminish violent extremism in different dimensions; promotion and prevention. The Coordinator has informed 'front line staff', which often is municipal managers, about violent extremism and radicalised persons (The National Coordinator to Saveguard Democracy against Violent Extremism 2016). The Coordinator includes the strategy of educating prison officers, but the plan on how to educate them has not been found. The Coordinator has made about 200 educational visits to different front line staff, around Sweden. This was thereby motivated by the mission to educate front line staff so that they, in turn, can spread their knowledge on to their colleagues (Statens offentliga utredningar 2016: 26).

1.1 Aim

This thesis focuses on the prison and probation services' commitment to the Swedish government to educate prison officers in how to handle and prevent radicalisation and violent extremism in prisons. The aim of this study is to find out how prison officers experience the education regarding violent extremism, and how they identify violent extremists and radicalised persons. To find information regarding how prison officers are perceiving persons who are violent extremists or radicalised, thirteen interviews have been made and recorded. The prison officers have been questioned about their views of violent extremists and radicalised people, and the interviews have been analysed and theoretical frameworks have been applied.

1.2 Research questions

These are the research questions used to find the answer to the aim:

1. What did the prison officers know before and what did they learn about radicalisation and violent extremism when participating in the education?
2. How do prison officers identify violent extremist and radicalised persons?

The first question focuses on answering the level of knowledge that the prison officers had before the education, and to explore what they consider they have learned. Question number two can demonstrate if prison officers have any preconceived notions about violent extremists and radicalised persons, and focuses on finding what those stereotypes and preconditions might be. This is interesting because it can show how prison officers are categorising and stereotyping violent extremists and radicalised persons. Preconceived notions are something that most people are carrying, but because of the sensitivity of this profession it is important not to let it affect the way clients are treated.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

This thesis will continue as follows. The first chapter after this introduction is the background where a presentation of the problem will be given, followed by a discussion about terminology, relevance and delimitations continue through to the next chapter. Chapter number three focuses on previous research where the most important studies in the field of violent extremism and radicalisation are presented. The previous research chapter also include some studies on how prison officers have been educated and informed in different aspects before. Next chapter following is the theoretical framework where theories of stereotypes and categorisation are explained for and discussed about. Chapter number five is research design, methodology and concepts, including a detailed presentation of how the interviews have been performed, what the interesting material consist of and how the methodology of discursive analysis has been applied. The same chapter also include a part of validity and reliability, and one part discussing the ethics regarding the problematics of performing interviews. Chapter number six is a comprehensive chapter of the analysis and results, which is where the study is presented and where the theoretical framework and methodology is used. Finally, chapter seven presents the conclusions made and a discussion regarding what was found, but also what there should be made further studies on. Ending this thesis is a reference list and an appendix of the interview questions given to the interviewees.

2. Background

This chapter provides a presentation of the problem of violent extremism and continues with clarifications of the frequently used terms and concepts in this research field. Thereafter follows a section of relevance where it is stated why this study is important to European studies, and then a discussion on delimitations, and where the limits of this study have landed.

2.1 Presentation of the problem

Since the terrorist group Al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center in New York in 2001, the discussion regarding Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism entered the global scene (Furubrant & Norman 2009). The European Union saw the attack as a cause of the Palestinian conflict, the slow progressions in the developing world, and the inhibition of the Middle East, and did not believe it would involve Europe in a larger extent. This followed by the British ‘shoe-bomber’ and a killing of a nationalist populist politician in the Netherlands, but even though the European Union had assigned for a programme for counterterrorism cooperation after the World Trade Centre attack, not much happened at European Union level (Bossong 2014). It did not take long before there was an attack in Europe which the terrorist group Al-Qaeda took responsibility for. In 2004 the first large terror attack coupled with radicalised Islam took place in Europe, this time in Madrid’s commuting system, killing almost 200 people (History.com 2010). This was a new type of attack where civilians were the main target, which the European Council recognised and therefore a new political channel of the European Union counterterrorism policy was introduced. The European Commission published an extensive communication on the European Union counterterrorism policy in 2004, listing a range of areas where increased empathy needed to be placed. The term ‘violent radicalisation’ was coined in the communication, which made an important statement that ‘radicalisation’ without the word ‘violent’ in it does not necessarily mean terrorism (Bossong 2014).

Following the attacks in Madrid, the bombings in London occurred in 2005, causing international terrorism to become a global threat and an issue for every national authority to deal with (Furubrant & Norman 2009). Globally, the amount of prisoners of all kinds is increasing (Goulding, Hall & Steels 2008) meanwhile there is also an increasing development

of people becoming radicalised (Noori 2016). Prison and probation services in Europe have discovered a number of people who are becoming radicalised during their time in prison. This occurs when they get in contact with people who already are or currently developing into becoming radicalised, but the Swedish prison and probation services do not see this as a big issue (Kriminalvården 2016). Nevertheless, prisons in Sweden are still seen as “high-risk-environment” for people to develop into radicalisation and violent extremism (Kriminalvården 2015). These two factors are contradicting to each other but are coming from the same source, namely the Swedish prison and probation services.

A number of people who have been part of the performance of the latest terrorist attacks have been radicalised during their time spent in prison, among them the people performing the Paris attacks 2015 and also the people responsible for the Brussels murders in 2014 (Hellmuth 2015: 989-990). The French prison officers have been educated and trained on how to discover radicalisation among their prisoners, but not how to deal with it (Hellmuth 2015: 990). One solution has been to isolate radicalised prisoners from the others completely, having all activities and time isolated from the rest of the prisoners, even though this demands the radicalisation to be discovered in time before it is spread onward (Hellmuth 2015: 989). In Germany there are similar problems with radicalisation during time spent in prison (Hellmuth 2016: 42). Also Italy is reporting about the issues of having prisoners becoming radicalised during their time spent in prison, and how difficult it is to discover (Björkman 2010: 240).

The Swedish prison and probation services has received a mission by the Swedish government to firstly, map out what the current situation looks like regarding violent extremism and radicalisation, and secondly, to create an assessment of how the mission is developing. This first part of the mission was to develop work procedures, to educate the prison officers in a secure and accurate way, and the second part of the mission was to fulfil those requirements in order to fight the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism in prisons. The mission was initially in place by the government in 2015, to cover radicalisation towards violent extremism of clients in the prisons in Sweden. The mission also covers clients that are already affiliated, or has any kind of connection to groups of violent extremism, and it includes right-, left- and Islamic extremism (Kriminalvården 2015). The statement points out the crucial situation and the seriousness of it, and the importance of a collective effort both

nationally but also in Europe to be able to stop the radicalisation from growing in prisons. The Swedish prison and probation services are mirroring the society in general, events in the surrounding world affect the work that is being done with the clients, and the clients are also being affected. A risk with having violent extremists in prisons is that they are meeting each other, and therefore can create a stronger belief in their mission to spread radicalisation to other clients (Kriminalvården 2015).

The first group of prison officers in Sweden trained to discover and find clues that could connect clients to radicalisation or violent extremism, started their education in March 2017 in Gothenburg. The lecture of the subject was 90 minutes long and the dynamic and current material that they are covering includes terminology, indicators, possible background factors, what the governmental decisions mean, and what the circumstances are for the prison officers. The target group that the prison officers learn to be more attentive to when looking for signs of violent extremism and radicalisation is listed in the statements below.

Persons who are considered being close, or being included in Islamic violent extremist environments, including those considered vulnerable receivers have an average age of 36 years. Approximately 75 percent of those have done sentences before. Clients who are associated with the political extremist environment have an average age of nearly 30 years. Everyone who is considered being connected to the right-wing extremist environment has previous sentences compared to approximately half of the persons connected to the left-wing extremist environment. (Kriminalvården 2015:7, own translation).

The amount of women involved in violent extremism is fractional, but is expected to rise due to the increased amount of women traveling to align with terror organisations, hence more women are returning to Sweden (Kriminalvården 2015). Science is showing that risk factors like overpopulation, assaults of prisoners, abuse of power by prison officers, and threats and violence among prisoners are the biggest reasons for the increasing radicalisation of prisons today, which is why “prisons are occasionally described as high risk environments where violent extremism is growing fast” (Kriminalvården 2015:3).

The goals that have been installed for the Swedish prison and probation services (Kriminalvården 2015:3) by the government in the area of radicalisation and violent extremism are:

- Prevent and avert clients to become radicalised.
- Contribute to lower the threat of terror and protect the society from harmful events.
- Through the spread of knowledge and education of prison officers and policy makers find an increased understanding for, and knowledge about, violent extremist environments.
- Work with adequate relapse prevention for the target group, where treatment efforts are based on scientific research.
- Work by a distinct structure for the authority's external collaboration regarding the target group, in relation with other authorities, communes and country councils, as well as civilian actors and organisations.
- Document and follow up the authority's work against violent extremism.

2.2 Terminology

Extremism, radicalisation, radicalised persons and violent extremism are all terms with complicated associations. Explanations of how the terms are used in this paper follow below.

Extremism as a concept is, according to Carlsson, used by researchers to identify groups of people that are considered to be on extreme sides of political or religious spectrums (2016:12). The Swedish security police is using the concept extremism as an assembling of movements, ideologies or people whom does not accept democracy in society, which sometimes is acted out through violence, in order to influence the society in the wanted direction (Säkerhetspolisen 2010:27).

Violent extremism is a concept that is frequently discussed, but difficult to define. The concept is defined by Carlsson (2016:12), namely that a person is more or less supporting, requesting or participating in violent action based on ideological beliefs:

It is also a question of what is considered as violence. The concept is rarely specified neither in the science field in Swedish nor foreign studies, but it is significant to hold a short discussion about it. Sociologically violence often means an action of aggression where a person or group intentionally add, or tries to achieve someone or something damage. (Carlsson 2016:13, own translation).

It is the supporting, requesting and participating parts that are the problematic factors seen from a societal point of view, not the extreme opinions alone. In fact, the extreme opinions often form the society in positive directions, if they are expressed but not taken into action. The definition of violent extremism is including many different groups with shifting agendas, and a variety of violence (2016:13). Violence can imply a range of different actions and is categorised by the context where it happens. The concept violent extremism occurs when the society chooses to define groups of actions as supporting of, requesting, or participating in violence or other problematical actions (2016:13).

The actions of supporting, requesting, and participating in violent extremism have two separate meanings according to the Swedish security police. The first meaning is an action which can be seen as threatening to security, as supporting or participating in violence which is according to the radicalised reinforced by ideology, religion or political views. The second meaning is actions that are not supporting, requesting, or participating in violent extremism, but are problematic in other ways (Säkerhetspolisen 2010: 26). Naturally, only the first meaning will be considered here since the second meaning does not involve the criteria for the concept used in this study. The concept of supporting, requesting, or participating in violence could take form either in material of some sort, like a film or a speech, or it can take the form of a person's behaviour. A person is according to the Swedish security police considered supporting, requesting, or participating in violence when he or she repeatedly is showing support or partaking in violence in the name of ideology (Säkerhetspolisen 2010: 27). Violent extremism can also be defined as individuals or groups who are supporting or taking part of violent actions to achieve certain political changes (Herz 2016).

Radicalisation can be described as a “development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict” (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011:4). Another way to

describe the term is “the process by which individuals (or groups) change their beliefs, adopt and extremist viewpoint and advocate (or practice) violence to achieve their goals” (Porter & Kebbell 2011:213). There are authors suggesting that there is no such thing as radicalisation, that it is just a phenomenon that can be compared to a virus that is spreading online (Neumann 2013). Most researchers agree on the assumption that radicalisation is a process leading towards becoming violent extremist, and that being radicalised is a converting step that transforms the person into the end goal of extremism. However, the *concept* of radicalisation divides researchers; it can illustrate political ideas which are not accepted by the general society, due to norms and principles. This can be portrayed in Western European societies as religion, ideologies which deny human rights, or racial supremacy. Radicalisation can also be depicted as the process when the radicalised person seek to gain political or religious power by diminishing other people’s human rights and freedoms (Neumann 2013). Radicalisation has mostly been connected to Islamic violent extremism, and this is according to Kundnani (2014) because people and mainly scientists, need an explanation to why radicalisation only occurs to people who have an extremist view of what Islam means. Kundnani means that without discovering the real roots of violent extremism it is easy to blame other things that could have caused the problem, but did not. To blame radicalisation is an ‘easy way out’ instead of taking responsibility and deal with the core issues, which Kundnani means are the infinite losses of families and friends due to the irresponsible way the United States of America answered the Al-Qaeda attacks in 2001. What becomes obvious from reading about the definition of radicalisation is that there is no clear answer to what it stands for, only that the radicalised person is undergoing a process of becoming more convinced in the cause of extremism.

A radicalised person can be defined as someone who is influenced by a ‘radicaliser’, who is a manipulative and charismatic person who actively tries to affect targeted and vulnerable persons. This process of radicalisation is mostly performed individually, and occasionally in small groups (Khosrokhavar 2013). A radicalised person has been going through a recruitment process introduced by a radicaliser (Carlsson 2016).

2.3 Relevance

Radicalisation and violent extremism is constantly rising, and it seems as there are frequently news regarding terrorist attacks and racist acts all over the European Union and Europe. Gothenburg is one of the many cities in Europe where people are collectively deciding to perform or support terrorist attacks, both in Europe and globally. This creates fear and suspicion among people in societies affected by the attacks. In this thesis there are two different types of extremism, namely political and religious. Political extremism is in this study portrayed as left and right wing extremism, and the two groups have many similarities at its core. Anti-democratic ideas is one of the most important thoughts that illustrates the political extremism (Korsell 2009), and that is also one of the most important reasons why it needs to be contained. Religious extremism includes Islamic extremism, which is the type that has received most attention in media during the latest years. To be able to contain the spread of political and religious extremism inside prisons, one important step is to maintain the democratic process which is unwanted for the existence of extremism.

This study is relevant to the field of European studies due to the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism through Europe, and because it is affecting everyone living on the European continent. The field of violent extremism is growing larger in Sweden and Europe and the subject of keeping citizens safe is often problematized in relation to the current terror threats and violent extremism. The issue has turned into a favourite topic for politicians who either are playing on people's fear of terror, or begging people to be more open minded. How to contain violent extremism has become a huge field where it is of great importance to expand the research and to engage as many factors as possible, where the prison and probation services plays an important role. An easy way would be to lock violent extremists up for life, but it is important to be critical to these fast solutions because they are only solving the current issue. It is a difficult and important problem to solve.

To hinder the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism it is important to ensure that the prison and probation services are doing what they can to minimise a growing support for extremist movements. Fear creates anger and it can build walls between people, which are the least needed in the society of Gothenburg today. If the prison and probation services can offer their prison officers a sufficient knowledge regarding the appearance and spread of

radicalisation and violent extremism, it could mean that the spread can be hindered and maybe even stopped. The urgency of stopping the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism cannot be clearer.

2.4 Delimitations

This study does not engage in what extent there is people in prisons available to radicalisation, neither the cause of violent extremism and radicalisation. The prison officers have all chosen to remain anonymous throughout the interviews, which make the probability to lie during the interviews rather small, because firstly, no one else knows they participated, and secondly, there is no incentives to lie since the questions regards the basic training programme and are therefore not personal. The prison officers have all been selected to participate in the basic training programme financed by the state, and after finishing the basic training programme they will be able to work as a prison officer with permanent employment.

3. Background and previous research

Prison officers is an occupation with a long history, and in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the need for staff took a turn from only needing to be big and strong, to be more enlightened about the lives that prisoners have lead. The training for the staff at that time was taken seriously in England where a report has been performed by Johnston (2008) regarding the training of prison officers. The prison officers were exhorted to be a ‘moral influence’ over the prisoners by practicing their tasks accurately but without being harsh. An act of responsiveness and morally correct behaviour by the prison officers were thought to guide the prisoners to adjust to a more respected and honest lifestyle. The prison officers were supposed to be acknowledging this when dealing with prisoners, and behaving representable around the prisoners – that they are always an object of moral example (Johnston 2008: 300). General training schools for prison officers opened up in England in the late 1800s and in a report performed by Gladstone committee they wanted the lectures in the training schools to be performed by experts in the area of criminal anthropology. The committee agreed on that the training should contain ‘firmness, intelligence, and probity’. The prison officers should be informed about their obligations and have knowledge about what they are implied to do in situations that occur in prisons (Ibid: 304). The prison officers also had to study in their spare time, and pass the written exams that were held in order to test their knowledge, and to confirm the training gave results (Ibid: 306). One major that participated in the training reported to the committee that he acknowledged the ‘human and personal’ side of the work as prison officer during his time at the training school, and that it brought him ‘the curious and unexpected problems’ that occur daily in a prison (Ibid: 307). At this time there was no training in finding violent extremism or any kind of care for the prisoners, only to keep them locked in and busy, and to influence them with morality and honesty.

One of the complicated parts of studying the subject of radicalisation and violent extremism has been to find the fact-based previous research on an issue that is always current. The research that has been used here is mainly studies that have shown up when searching in library catalogues e.g. GUNDA and LIBRIS for Gothenburg university- and national studies, but also studies that have appeared when searching in Google Scholar to have international studies interlocked as well. The search phrases used are ‘radicalisation education’ and ‘training prison officers’ and similar wordings.

Research in the field of radicalisation and violent extremism has mainly been focusing on what the causes of it could be and what contributes to a larger likelihood for a person to emphasise with these radical thoughts. There are much emphasis on the beginning of terrorism and how it has spread all over the world today, and few studies are enlightening the work being done to prevent the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism in prisons. Since the phenomenon is relatively new (as in how it is portrayed today) there have been few studies on the work to prevent prisons from being breeding grounds for radicalisation and violent extremism.

Comparative research performed on prison and probation services in Denmark and Sweden show that there are many similarities between the countries. In Denmark there have been educational courses for all newly employed prison officers to prevent radicalisation and extremism where the employees are trained to identify signs. There are also suggestions that there should be additional training for the prison officers, since it seems to be a particular problem within prisons, and they are now hiring prison officers from a larger range of cultures and social backgrounds to make the understanding for other people's situations wider, and increase the competence within the prison and probation services in Denmark (Christiansen 2017: 31). In Swedish prison and probation services there is a claim of lack of knowledge on how to educate prison officers on radicalisation most efficiently. It seems like Swedish prison and probation services cannot make up their mind on how to educate their prison officers in this matter, since there are a couple of different programmes and alternatives on instruments that can be used. The problem for the Swedish side seems to be the requirement of knowledge and experience to attempt to find radicalisation signs (Christiansen 2017: 32). Unfortunately there is not much research on this topic in Sweden, since the prison and probation services are a difficult place to collect information from, and both the prisoners and the prison officers are often quite moderate about critique. This is an ethical problem because the authority of prison and probation services in Sweden "serves as both a gatekeeper and primary sponsor for the research" which means the authority can steer what is published (Christiansen 2017: 38).

Britain also has a Prevent programme, focusing on "education and community engagement-based policy approach to terrorism prevention" which has affected other countries in Europe.

Prevent was produced as an effect of the bombings in London 2005, where terrorists attacked the public transport system of London during rush hour. The programme contains sections where several authorities and institutions acquire different types of activities, e.g. the prisoners received direct educational programmes. The police received the most extensive activity, with more than 300 police posts between 2008 and 2011 dedicated on the prevent programme, split between different levels of police posts. There are different voices being heard claiming the programme a failure due to the focus being put on population of Muslim beliefs. This has raised walls between the Muslim community and the police's desire to supervise and control the moves of these communities' actions. (Thomas 2015: 171-172).

To educate and train prison officers to discover and report any suspicion of radicalisation is crucial in order to stop the radicalisation happening in prisons. In an extensive study performed by Useem and Clayton (2009), prisons in the United States of America motivate their prison officers to 'listen for and observe signs of radicalization', and they are told to report to their superiors any suspicious actions that are observed. Most of the staff interviewed were aware of the issue of radicalisation, but could not express the signs that they are looking for and listening after (Useem & Clayton 2009: 580). Prison officers in the United States of American prisons are told to be attentive of deviant and unusual behaviour, but what is defined as 'deviant behaviour' is not clear which adds more responsibility to identifying behaviours and analysing them. In the end, the prison officers are exhorted to report behaviour rather than wait for the process to proceed (Useem & Clayton 2009: 567).

Other researchers (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora 2012) in the United States of America have studied the lacking knowledge on how to treat Muslim prisoners. The study investigates the prison officers' ability to adjust and understand the needs of Muslim prisoners, as well as being educated about different religions (but with a direct focus on Islam). The prison officers in United States of America are trained on how to identify signs of radicalisation, but also the religions requirements that most Muslims hold, in order to make the prison officers more sensitive to special demands. Even though this kind of effort to train prison officers is supported by the Bureau of Prisons most states do not have programmes of this sort to educate their prison officers (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora 2012: 450). The training is mostly regarding finding the signs of radicalisation, rather than understanding the religion, which is

directly opposing to what the Office of Inspector General was warning about; more knowledge of Islam enables to possibilities to discover messages of radicalisation. It is important for the country to develop a coordinated strategy to train and support prison officers to view the imprisoned Muslims as individuals rather than as an isolated and troubled group, otherwise the prison experience will be more likely to enhance rather than oppress radicalisation and extremism (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora 2012: 451).

Khosrokhavar (2013) has done studies on French prisoners and their potential connection to radicalisation. He performed interviews with both prisoners and prison officers, which makes his study of great importance in the area of violent extremism and radicalisation. Unfortunately there were no training for the majority of the prison officers (at least not at that time), but there were a low number of prison officers who were assigned to monitor and handle the spread of radicalisation in prisons in France. Those who were assigned this task were sometimes also doing other duties, which decreased the chances of detecting radicalisation even more (Khosrokhavar 2013). The prison officers were sometimes given a two-week introduction course where they were accompanied by experienced prison officers showing them the basic knowledge about the work, but this often did not make the new prison officers certain of the job, which in turn created uncertainty among the prison officers. This uncertainty may have led to a build-up of misunderstandings and preconceptions regarding radicalisation, hence more prejudices are created among the prison officers (Khosrokhavar 2013).

A study made by Jones highlights the importance for prison officers to be educated in areas like violent extremism and radicalisation, in order to be less suspicious towards clients. The study shows that Muslim clients have been poorly treated both by other clients but also by prison officers, and little attention is given to differentiate between Muslim clients and Islamic extremists. Instead, all Muslim clients have been treated with suspicion by prison officers in the study (2014:96). This proves that more education is needed and the subject must be treated seriously, meanwhile less emphasis is needed on detecting radicalised persons since the number of detected cases so far is low. This may seem contradictory since information regarding prisons being great breeding grounds for extremism is constant, and

also true. The discussion regarding “prisons being schools for terrorism” is one-sided according to Jones (2014:75).

To summarise the findings of previous research, there need to be more research in this area because currently it is difficult to find relevant research connected to the issue. The previous research started out with a comparative study between Sweden and Denmark, and how the two countries are trying to solve the issue of radicalisation in prisons. Denmark seems to have won that fight since Sweden unfortunately has not gotten a concrete solution to the educational problem yet, according to Christiansen (2017). Another study is performed by Johnston (2008) and he describes the evolution of prison officers through time, but more importantly the importance of being able to see the individual in prisoners as a prison officer today, since it can be easy to create preconceptions and judge by group belonging instead. Thomas (2015) has created research on how the desire to supervise can create wedges between people and destroy relations between communities. Useem and Clayton (2009) have done research on what prison officers learned from a lecture about radicalisation and violent extremism and it displayed that they are taught to constantly look for signs, but this created a miscommunication between the different groups of people. Rappaport, Veldhuis and Guiora (2015) have done a study on how prison officers are trained to reduce the radicalisation in prisons. The findings were that prison officers were taught to look for signs of radicalisation, which could be anything that according to the prison officer seems strange. The study showed that they all needed more education on what different religions means, which could reduce the suspicion between groups and increase the understanding between one and other. Khosrokhavar (2013) has made a study where some of the prison officers were educated in the issue and some were not, and a couple of the prison officers were assigned to monitor and handle the spread of radicalisation. This seemed to be a poor model because there were few prison officers with knowledge of how to handle the situations emerging. Meanwhile, prison officers were also often assigned other side-missions as well, which means they might have been unfocused whilst stationed to analyse the place. Last was Jones (2014) who made a study that showed Muslim clients are being poorly treated in prisons, because of prison officers’ suspicion. As the previous research is telling us; more research is needed in educating and evaluating what is taught about radicalisation and violent extremism.

4. Theoretical framework

Following there will be a statement about the theoretical framework and how it has been used to match the study of educating staff about radicalisation and violent extremism.

4.1 Categorisation & social representation

Categorisation is often used to help understand how to relate and behave, and it occurs subconsciously for most people. People use categorisation of other people when they need either to make a connection or to distance themselves from a person or a group, but it is also utilised when positioning a person or a group in relation to ourselves. Categorisation can also be used to form an opinion regarding a person or a group (Mäkitalo 2012) e.g. “he is a motorcycle type” or “they behave like high school girls”, which creates preconceptions about persons or groups before meeting them. Accordingly, we can create a categorisation of ourselves e.g. by wearing a certain style of clothes or represent a sports team etc. Moscovici (2010) writes that categorisation is built on memories created by ourselves or by someone else, and connections created with either positive or negative emotions. Ragazzi discusses the negative sides of categorisation (2017), and means that concepts of different sort justify signs which indicate e.g. radicalisation. Categorisation in this perspective can, therefore, be a hinder because it may cut off persons of interest, meanwhile include those who fit the category instead of being a guide toward finding those on the verge to radicalisation. Mäkitalo (2012) suggest that categories given by an institution or authority may be of more importance, or as in this case, be of more concern because they influence more people. This is another reason why it is important to educate the prison officers on the topic of violent extremism and radicalisation; because the Swedish prison and probation services has a responsibility towards society to develop an environment for the clients to all be treated equally without exceptions.

Social representation is, according to its founder Moscovici; “a system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function: first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.” (1976: xiii). Any small

task performed in the society would become a problem without the references of representations and could be perceived as walking around without the means to communicate with the surrounding society, according to Moscovici. He continues to explain the meaning and importance of representations; the world would be apprehended as if there was a new language, culture and social codes everyday which would make the environment for anyone unbearable (Moscovici 2000).

Johansson and Lalander (2010) describe representations as a way to make the world familiar, which is performed through anchoring. Anchoring means to identify something and then categorise it according to what is most appropriate. Social representations are created in relation to others, and as Moscovici express it: “Representations, obviously, are not created by individuals in isolation” (2000:27). Once they have been created they emerge into living and changing phenomena, evolving in contact with other people’s experiences and discoveries.

Representations are always influenced by previously learned experiences, and are also affected by our culture and language (Moscovici 2000). This means that we are always subconsciously comparing people we meet with our preconceived knowledge gained by previous encounters, acknowledging the tiniest sign of a familiar notion to be able to put people into categories and establish an approach to them. To recognise and identify a shirt of your favourite hockey team on a stranger makes you categorise differently compared to if that same stranger would wear a team shirt of the greatest rival team. Moscovici further claims social representation to be both intellectual and figurative (2011), explained as having a thought of a person or group and apply it on to reality creating the featuring attributes immediate. The group itself is not considered to be moulded by the environment, but rather the group is shaped from within by the expectations and preconditions applied on it. The social representation of different groups and people within these groups are shaped by a society that classifies its members after class, categories, ethnicity, sex etc. Meanwhile society divides its members by majorities and minorities, and people’s beliefs of either religious or political are also categorised by society. As a result these representations of groups are synonymous for the individuals within them even if none of the attributes are true for the individual (Moscovici 2011).

Moscovici summarises the meaning of representation in one sentence: “the purpose of all representations is to make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar” (2000:37). This is replicated in Johansson and Lalander where they draw the conclusion that nightmares are classified as ‘dream’ as soon as we awake from one to be able to process it and separate from reality (2010:79).

The concepts of categorisation and representation are interesting to use in this thesis due to the importance of not being judgemental as prison officer. In the role of prison officer, it is particularly important to not judge clients and their past and history does not matter in the role of recovery. Some of the interview questions are focused on how the interviewees identify violent extremists and radicalised persons, which, depending on what the prison officers’ answer, could suggest that preconceived notions and stereotypes shines through.

5. Research design, methodology and concepts

In this chapter the methods used for finding answers for this study is explained and discussed. For this study the method used has been interviews, and for analysing the answers given discursive analysis has been used. There is also a part where the material (interviews) are explained and discussed for. Lastly, there is a part where the validity and reliability for the study are reasoned for.

5.1 Interviews as method

The method for this study is qualitative interviews due to the ability to get the most expressive answers to the questions that will be asked (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 47). The interviews performed have the character of respondent interviews since the interviewees are the study objects in this research. By conducting respondent interviews will be an accurate way to let me explain the questions fully and ask for clarification when needed. To make respondent interviews mean that the interesting parts is not the facts, but how the interviewee perceive the reality and the different situations (Ibid: 47). The answers for the questions asked to respondent interviews say little about the reality, but much about how the reality is perceived. The interviews were organised in a semi-structured way, meaning that there are some fixed questions but also some degree of flexibility. When conducting interviews, it is important to realise that there are different kinds of interviewees, some need more questions and some need fewer, which is why semi-structured interviews are a great way to work around the possible issue of not getting enough material. The adaptability of semi-structured interviews also brings the possibility to change orders of questions, or even excluding some questions according to the meeting and feel of the conversation with the interviewee. Semi-structured interviews also make it possible to add questions and ask follow-up questions to some interviewee's answers. The interviews have been brought out in the manner of one-to-one interviews, meaning interviewees can feel fully relaxed and open with their perspective on the answers. The interviews were performed individually because of the possibility to be more open with reflections during the interview, compared to if the interview would have been performed as a panel or group interview (Morgan et al. 2013). Another positive point with individual interviews is that more control lies with the person who is performing the

interview, whom easily can navigate the conversation after the questions. In a group- or panel interview the interviewer may have more problems focusing the questions and answers.

According to Kvale & Brinkmann there are seven ethical issues at different research phases that need to be taken into consideration during the interview. Firstly, there is the question whether the aim of the interview will bring something to the humanity making it a better place, not only the fact that it might be valuable to the research field (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 99). Secondly, there is the issue of keeping the interviewee positive toward the situation and maintaining confidentiality (Ibid). Thirdly, there is a need to calculate the consequences for the interviewee, which could be stress and a changing self-concept (Ibid). Fourthly, the importance of keeping the final text as close to the spoken words as possible in order to maintain confidentiality (Ibid). Fifthly, there is the issue of how deeply the interviews should be analysed, and whether the interviewee could have any influence of how their statements could be analysed (Ibid). Sixthly, verifying the knowledge that is presented during the interview in order to have the possibility to ask critical follow-up questions (Ibid: 100). Lastly, there is the issue of reporting and publishing the results from the interviews, and what could be the consequences for the people interviewed, but also the people that they are representing (Ibid). Other ethical issues include the basic ones occurring when interviews are conducted; to inform the interviewee about the possibility of being anonymous which often leads to a more open interview (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 109-110), to inform about the overall ambition of the interview to create trust (Ibid 107-108), inform what the results of the interview will entail which gives the interview a meaning (Ibid 110-111), and inform the interviewee about the role of the scientist and interviewer to ensure morality and professionalism (Ibid 111-112). A reoccurring issue when conducting interviews and qualitative research in general is the difficulty of conducting an identical study later, and the interviewees are affected by the interviewer's personality (Bryman & Bell 2013).

The issue of objectiveness is important when it comes to conducting and analysing interviews, and according to Kvale and Brinkmann (2014: 291) it is a question whether it is possible or not. There are accordingly different sets of objectiveness. Objectivity as in freedom from bias is based on reliable research and knowledge that is carefully controlled to limit prejudgements to a rather low level (Ibid: 292). Another type of objectiveness is reflexive objectivity which

is when researchers reflect about their own contribution to the research area, and aim to be objective in relation to the subjectivity. This means that one can only be objective in the sense that one always carries preconceptions from previous experiences according to the hermeneutical language. To have knowledge of those preconceptions is the key to create reliable material and to strive for sensibility when dealing with preconceptions (Ibid: 292). Objectivity, as in being adequate to the researched object, means to depict the object in its most natural way. One can imagine humans as numbers which will only be told in quantitative ways, but one can choose to imagine humans as literate and cultivated creatures making the meeting with one feel privileged and informative (Ibid: 293). Objectivity can also mean to allowing the object to object which in social science implies to search for the unusual and extreme objects, and allowing them to object to the researchers when they feel they are not depicted correctly. This creates an environment where the interviewer makes the object form the answer (Ibid: 294), as violent extremism has made people react on the actions taken to prevent radicalisation occurring. It is important to separate the different concepts of objectivity and intersubjectivity, because it is not the same. When something is intersubjective it is a shared view of a certain group of people or society, but it is not necessarily a shared view with the surrounding people (Ibid: 292-293).

The interviews has been covering questions about their overall point of view of the lecture and what could be improved, what they learned from the lecture, and how they are viewing a person who is radicalised. The interviewees who are participating in this study have been educated in two different groups which means that their main impression of the lecture could vary depending on the different circumstances regarding the lecture and group of people etc.. The length of every interview was between 30 and 40 minutes and executed either at the education centre or in the building of the gaol. The interviews were executed from right after the lecture, to up to three weeks after the lecture took place, which means that the prison officers could possibly remember the lecture differently. The information that is given at the lecture is supposed to be remembered much longer than a couple of weeks so the fact that some of the prison officers cannot remember what was being taught at the lecture can be an indication of that the structure of the lecture should be changed. Some of the interviewees expressed the need for more lecture opportunities, which could be one idea to increase the amount of information staying longer. Another idea could be to create a whole day dedicated

only to radicalisation and violent extremism, or even a week. There could be people coming to be guest lecturer with different experiences from either meeting radical/extremist people or actually being one. Another idea is to have a test after the lecture/s to increase the need of attention given, and one idea is to move the lecture from the last week before finishing the basic training programme, to increase the sense of importance and decrease the feeling of 'last minute solution'. There may be other ways to teach about this issue even, maybe the prison officers should be given a written material to read and then be heard about later, or do presentations about it, or write a short essay.

5.2 Material and selection

The amount of people who are in the range of being of interest to this study is currently very limited. Interesting for the study is to interview about the thoughts and opinions regarding a certain part of the training program for prison officers who have gone through the basic training. All prison officers have not gone through the basic training but it is more or less a condition to accommodate a permanent position. The basic training programme ranges over five months, and the certain part that is of most interest for the study is currently covering 90 minutes. This certain part is of most interest to the study because it is covering violent extremism and radicalisation. The program that this part contains is handling the different types of violent extremism; right wing-, left wing-, and Islamic extremism. The amount of people who fulfilled the criteria for being a part of the study are few, and the amount of people of those who fulfilled the criteria and wanted to participate are even fewer, which made it difficult to gather enough interviews for the study.

The amount of interviews held was thirteen, and they lasted about thirty to forty minutes each. All interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed, and since all interviews were held in Swedish the interviews were translated into English. The interviews started off with basic questions regarding their background and current situation in the prison and probation services. All interviewees have gone through the six months basic training and as a part of it was the lecture about radicalisation and violent extremism. The lecture was held the last week of the basic training programme, and after all of the different tests that they have gone through to complete the basic training programme. This means that the lecture did not play

into the end-result of passing or failing the basic training programme. The interviewees all have different backgrounds; some has worked within the prison and probation services for years, and some has never had contact with the authority before. The ages range from early 20's to mid-50's, and therefore the participants vary a lot in experience. The interviewees were adopted to the basic training programme nationally, but most of them live in Gothenburg.

The lecture is put together on behalf of suiting everyone participating, which means being informative yet educational to a broad spectrum of people of different levels of knowledge and interest. Some of the interviewees have lived largest parts of their lives outside Sweden, which sometimes made the language a difficulty. Parts of the interviewees had troubles remembering what was being said during the lecture. The interview opportunities ranged from right after the lecture to up to three weeks after, which means the interviewees can only try to recall in their memory what kind of knowledge they possessed before the education, and not know for certain. This caused some of the interviewees to, according to themselves, forget details regarding the lecture.

5.3 Discursive analysis

The methodology used in this study is discursive analysis, which is applied in order to analyse the results of the interviews. Discursive analysis puts empathy on the language used and how people choose to express themselves. The intention is to apply discursive analysis on the results of the interviews, to distinguish what is being said in the interviews and what it means (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 272-276).

In discursive analysis, the focus is put on how knowledge and truths are moulded in different power situations (Ibid:196). Performing a discursive analysis means to investigate how people and groups of people are using expressions and language to create situations and happenings (Ibid:197). Things are experienced differently depending on who you ask and what baggage that person is already carrying on, which is both the positive and the negative sides of discursive analysis (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 274). Positive because it brings understanding to a person when able to project the thoughts from the interviewee to the reader, and negative

because it is not always possible to understand and project thoughts. Discursive analysis implies that there are different views to a problem or issue, and the answer will differ depending on who is asked. This creates a dilemma for the interviewer to ask enough questions to ensure the interviewed gets her/his thoughts through, but without asking too many questions which could confuse the interviewee and make him/her rethink the answer.

There are different branches within discursive analysis but the one that will be used for this study is the one most often associated with Foucault (1998), and he is still one of the most known names connected to discursive analysis. Foucault (1998) suggests that power is used when a discourse starts, and is nothing that one can possess. Power is not exercised by or towards a subject, but rather developed within relations between people, and means limitations to some, and possibilities to others (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 311). Foucault (1998) has used discursive analysis to portray the different relations within a prison, and in the book *Discipline and punish*, he shows how the prison staff can be controlled into doing what the one in power tells them to do. Foucault (1998) uses positive and negative power functions. The positive power function is distinguished by the will to control, mould, monitor and normalise, meanwhile the negative power function is distinguished by punishments and restrictions (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 330).

Foucault (1998) addresses discursive truth effects, which can be interpreted as discourses can show what is true meanwhile setting the limitations to what is conceivable. According to Foucault (1998) there are different procedures that can both disconnect and engage a conversation; who is allowed to speak and on what terms? More general in terms of making discursive analysis more applicable is to see it as boundaries on what is conceivable (Börjesson & Palmblad 2007).

Discourse analysis can be used on different texts in order to find out how a point of view is changing over time and what kind of preconditions there are, and how they are changing. The approach can also be used to find structures in discourses, who they benefit and why. Discourse analysis can be used to identify structure of power and disadvantages in relations, and also why groups of people are being seen as advantaged and some as disadvantaged. This approach can be used to see power relations and how they are being acted upon. When using

this approach, it is of importance to always justify the choices made in the process of analysing (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 356-357).

Discourse analysis was chosen for this study because of the ability to analyse what is being said as well as what is not being said. Interviewees can sometimes feel like they are not able to express opinions and thoughts because they may not feel comfortable enough for different reasons. That is one reason to why discourse analysis can be a reliable tool to use when analysing e.g. texts from interviews, because it is possible to evaluate situation, not only the spoken words. When analysing the interviews, moments of silence, hesitation and confusion can be taken into the analyse process. Since some of the questions asked are of delicate kind, much can be analysed through for example body language and facial expressions. According to what Bergström and Boréus (2011:358) are suggesting, the interviews have been closely read multiple times. The interviewees' general and precise mood and the character and feeling in the room throughout the interview had been noticed during the interview which has been helpful when writing the analysis. After reading the interviews closely they have been divided into different categories, adding similar answers together to get a more broad perspective of how the general views differ from each other. After pairing the answers together, the furthestmost opinions work as comparison to the most delicate answer on the opposite side of opinions. This demonstrates the different answers meanwhile highlighting the sometimes unexpected differences of the answers in the analysis.

The answers given on the questions have been closely read and scrutinised several times, according to how Bergström and Boréus (2011) and Kvale and Brinkmann (2014) would suggest using discursive analysis. The interviews have been carefully evaluated when choosing the most accurate translation, a later analysed again and trying to hear what the interviewees are telling.

Here is how the discursive analysis has proceeded: Firstly, a thorough briefing of the current situation regarding the basic training programme and the violent extremism and radicalisation lecture, and the author also went to two of the lectures to get a better overview of the learning material and to be more prepared of the outcome. Secondly, the interview guideline was created based on the material gotten from the lecture. Thirdly, the thirteen interviews were

held and recorded, which took several months. The interviews were later transcribed into written text, and the quotes used for the thesis were translated carefully. Fourthly, the texts were prepared to be analysed, by marking important words used and coded into similar answers, important points, word groups and the atmosphere during the interview. Fifthly, the information was interpreted and analysed, taking all of the above steps into consideration. Lastly, the results are presented in the chapter ‘Analysis and results’.

5.4 Validity & Reliability

Validity is described as “the method of measuring is valid if it is measuring what it is meaning to measure” (Rosing 1996: 100). In other words; good validity is when you are measuring what you intend to measure. Good validity does not necessary mean good research (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 35), but it is a necessary mean to reach good research. High reliability is when the measure is trustworthy. When using both validity and reliability, the goal is to achieve as high validity and reliability as possible. The two measures do not assure each other; high reliability does not guarantee high validity, but high validity presumes high reliability. One way to ensure high reliability for the study is to document the steps taken in the analysis, in order for the reader to be able to redo to study in another time if wanted (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 352-353).

In order to make sure that this study is measuring accordingly to the research questions that are asked, research about the current issue of radicalisation and violent extremism has been thoroughly studied, and information regarding the institutions of prison and probation services has been closely studied. The latter information was gathered mostly by having a position at the prison and probation services in Gothenburg, and being able to search through their intranet for information.

5.5 Ethics

All of the interviewees were told about the possibility to be anonymous, which could make them more open regarding their opinions about the lecture and basic training programme, and they all agreed to participate in the interviews if they could be anonymous.

According to Vetenskapsrådet there are a couple of points that are important when conducting research generally. Conducting research with humans, research misconduct is an important factor and includes honest results and misconduct of any kind. Honest results because it is never allowed to scramble, make false, mislead or plagiarise results of any kind. Dishonest results are considered research misconduct and could lead to unnecessary risks. This is why all research should be translucent and open about how the research has been conducted, to make possible for other researchers to control and repeat the research. Not until the research is redone with similar results is the research scientifically accepted (vr.se 2017).

6. Analysis and results

This chapter contains the findings of the study. The analysis has been structured into different sections according to each research question. The first research question focuses on how much the prison officers knew before entering the lecture provided by the prison and probation services, and what they know afterwards. The second question asks how the prison officers identify people in the radicalisation process and those who are violent extremists. The third research question will ask how the prison officers imagine violent extremists and radicalised persons looks, behaviour, age, gender and what target group they belong to, etc. The answers are chosen due to what they answered, but all interviewees' answers are represented at least once.

In order for the Swedish prison and probation services to be able to deliver what they have undertaken by the government, the lecture that is provided to the prison officers elected for the basic training programme must be effective and offer the prison officers what they need to know about radicalisation and violent extremism as Kriminalvården (2015) and Kriminalvården (2016) are suggesting.

6.1 Knowledge in the area

News and media are constantly providing information about threats of terror, and remembering terrorism by year has become huge and numerous documentaries have been made. It has become impossible not to know something about the radicalisation and violent extremist wave that hit Europe the last years. Having this information in regards, the interviewees' were all asked what they knew about the subject before coming to the lecture. The question asked to the interviewees was: *What did you as prison officer know before and what did you learn from the lecture about violent extremism and radicalisation?*

Interviewee #1: I learned that it exists both on the left and right sides of politics, but also religious groups and other groups. It is not only tied to Islam which media often makes it seem like. Of course I knew that before, but it is easy to forget when it is only Islamic extremism that is shown in media all the time. So that is what I learned from the lecture. And also the signs that the lecturer showed at the lecture were new to me, I had not seen the left wing signs

before.. The ones with the arrow and AFA I had heard of but I did not know what they stood for.

Interviewee number one talks about the fact that radicalisation exists both politically and religiously, something that the interviewee is fast to point out was already to his/her knowledge. This is important to mention because media always focus on the religious and Islamic extremism, and rarely mention political radicalisation. This can be seen as a way that Islamic extremism has been stereotyped into being the only extremism, according to how this interviewee experiences the media reports. As Ragazzi (2017) discusses, categorisation of a type of extremism can lead to missing out other signs about extremism that might come from clients that are not the 'right fit' according to that category. The lecture has, therefore, been a positive experience for this interviewee, since it has opened the presumptions of what a violent extremist can be and might have contributed to a less categorised view of violent extremists. Meanwhile the interviewee categorises less, he/she also learned that there are signs that the different extremist groups are using, which are totally opposing consequences of the education and therefore it is difficult to interpret what the aftermath is for this interviewee.

Interviewee number nine explained that he/she got information from research and experts. These experts he/she talked about have to some extent also been a source for this study.

Interviewee #9: It was nothing new to me. I do find it peculiar that such little focus is being put on the subject, because there is always the right wing-extremism with bombs and all, and now ISIS is very current. One of the colleagues in the programme speaks Arabic, and while she was visiting a detention here in Gothenburg she observed recruitment to ISIS going on openly in Arabic. The other prison officers had no idea about this, but she heard it in the way they talked to each other. They searched the living space and sure enough they found material that supported ISIS. Open recruitment to fighting units in a Swedish detention!

Interviewee number nine is interested in the area of radicalisation and violent extremism, which is why he/she goes to the lengths of reading research about it, and the lecture gave nothing new, because of that. When people are taught things that they already know or have heard of before, it creates distrust to the authority or company, as shown in the study made by Useem and Clayton (2009). The students need to feel like they are gaining some sort of

information, in order to make the lecture interesting. On the contrary, Mäkitalo (2012) writes about the importance of information and education from authorities who in turn would mean that regardless of what the prison officers have heard before, the education provided from the prison and probation service is more important than previously given information. As noted in the interview; it is much appreciated to have different language skills when working in the prison and probation services. Interviewee number nine learned that recruitment to terror organisations can take place in different ways which underlines the importance of Jones (2014) research about prisons being “schools of terror”.

In contrast to interviewee number nine is number five and eleven, both uncertain on what they knew before and what was being taught during the lecture. Especially interviewee number eleven cannot remember anything that was being told during the lecture, but still is certain he/she knew it all from before.

Interviewee #5: I do not remember what we talked about... During the basic training programme there was so much information constantly. I know that we talked about political and religious extremism and radicalisation, but I cannot remember more than that. I know only what is being said on the news since I am not familiar with it at all. It was a condensed lecture of some 60 or 90 minutes, I believe we touched upon religious extremism but I cannot say more than that.

Interviewee #11: He talked about things that I already knew about. It is a lot in the news and media so I did not get affected because I already knew the things that he talked about. It was interesting, and he seems to know what he is talking about. But since I knew it all from earlier I cannot say what I learned from the lecture. I do not remember what we talked about unfortunately. It was about symbols and such, flags and signs. Do not know what it stands for.

Interviewees five and eleven are both very insecure of what they learned. They do not remember what the lecturer talked about and seem both quite uninterested to find out. To compare this kind of sloppiness to the research made by Johnston (2008) is interesting since he noticed a change when he put more pressure on the prison officers. The prison officers were supposed to stay updated about news within the criminal gangs and study on their spare time, to stay on top of what is going on at the prison you are working at. When questioning

interviewees number five and eleven (and some of the others too) they answer the questions half-heartedly and with lack of interest. If it spread to clients that some of the prison officers do not know how to handle certain situations they could choose to take advantage of that. A knowledge test after the lecture about radicalisation and violent extremism should be considered to make the prison officers more attentive and according to Johnston (2008) some pressure could be helpful when it comes to remembering important information.

Interviewee number six is next, and he/she answers very differently compared to the previous answers. This interviewee seems to have learned a lot from the lecture, and is very positive about the experience meanwhile aware of the difficulties of detecting something hidden.

Interviewee #6: I learned how the prison and probation services in Sweden looks at radicalisation, how we are supposed to act, but I am still not sure. It is positive that we are starting to think about this and how we can prevent it from happening. It is very positive. I work at a class-two prison facility, and what I learned about radicalisation and the symptoms of it is when someone speaks openly about supporting those kinds of organisations. We were shown flags, letters and books that can be encrypted, mostly you can ask for help from a colleague to translate it for you. But I think it is easy to hide it if you want to, meanwhile some people show openly that they are extremists.

Interviewee number six is encouraged to engage in the relations with the prisoners, which can be supported and strengthened by Johnston (2008). There are influences coming from the prison officers that are invaluable because often the prison officers are the only influences at all that some of the prisoners get from the outside world. The life within the walls of the prison can seem lonely and it is easy to find “bad” kind of influences from other prisoners, which is why it is important that the prison officers believe they can and should make a difference for the prisoners that they meet. As Jones remarks the quality of the education given to the prison officers are of importance, because it is easy for clients to find influences which can be discovered if they are trained properly (2014).

The interviewees have in general a distinct opinion about their previous knowledge in the area to be at approximately the same level before as after the lecture. It seems to be predominantly news and media that is being held as the source of information for most parts. To have prison

officers informed and interested to that degree is not common, but seven out of the thirteen interviewees answered that they had the same information before as after the lecture. Many of the interviewees also had troubles remembering what was being talked about on the lecture. The interviewee who is interested in the subject is also indifferent to the outcome of the lecture, due to the large amount of knowledge that was already gathered about the issue. When summarising the information gathered by analysing the first research question, the prison officers remarks they have learned that there are different types of extremism, and “not only Islamic extremism”, which is a stereotype that many prison officers had previously to the lecture. Moscovici (2000) continually points out the importance of not getting stuck in stereotypes and categories, which is another point in why education in this subject is well needed for prison officers. Being more open minded about who can be in the radicalisation process, would mean that fewer clients would be subject to stereotyping and hopefully make the time clients spend imprisoned more valuable.

Seven out of thirteen interviewees either have trouble remembering what they were taught or they claim they did not learn much, more than half of the group interviewed either did not learn anything about violent extremism or they do not remember anything from the lecture. Many of the interviewees who say they do not remember what they were taught suggested more and longer sessions on this subject. More time spend on the subject would, according to the prison officers, naturally give them a better remembrance of the lecture and they would be more likely to detect signs of violent extremism or radicalisation. Another recurrent issue is that some of the interviewees already had knowledge regarding what was being taught. When these people are asked what they knew from before the lecture they often answer that they did not know much, but simultaneously did not learn anything either. By using Moscovici on both of the groups mentioned, it is obvious that the education is of high importance. Moscovici (2000) mean that you cannot learn anything about representations from spending time alone, and these stereotypes can only be broken when challenging them. The interviewees mention media as their main source of information, meanwhile many of the interviewees say they only knew about Islamic violent extremism, and not about the left- and right wing violent extremism, assumingly media is portraying Islamic violent extremism and not the others, which shows that a wider perspective on the possible perpetrator is needed. By giving the prison officers more information about the different kinds of violent extremism, the

representations and stereotypes can be questioned. It could be argued with help from Mäkitalo (2012) that education in this area is important only based on the fact that it comes from an authority. In this case, the education gives prison officers a base to start from when suspicion arises regarding a possible radicalised or violent extremist person.

6.2 Stereotyping the radicalisation process

This question was certainly interesting to ask the interviewees, because they all paused and seemed to contemplate how to answer this question. Due to the much attention given lately to radicalisation and terrorist attacks all over the world, this topic is certainly sensitive and easy to misunderstand. The question asked was: *How do you as a prison officer, identify “radicalised” and violent extremist persons?*

A common answer to this question is reflected in the answers by interviewee number four and twelve. Media is easily contributing to the depiction of violent extremists.

Interviewee #4: Well yes you do get affected by media, which makes you think of an Arab with a big beard running around with dynamite under his jacket. That is what I think of when I hear about terrorist attacks.

Interviewee #12: It depends on what group you mean... My first thought is that I exclude the left wing extremists since I do not know anything about them. The right wing extremists have become more present lately but to my knowledge they are working more in the shadows, it is hard to grasp them. So I am going for the Islamic extremist group.. I am thinking of a young guy, up to thirty years old, whom lacks a meaning in life, he also lacks both an education and a job, and he has been unemployed for a while. He might be a Muslim. He appears open about his views in his circle, but hides them from the rest of the society. I think they shake it off, the circle. He is tired of life, feels left outside the society, cannot afford to buy an apartment, the line for a rental apartment is like 10 years, what should he do... He is probably pretty innocent otherwise. I am visioning him in the suburbs where he cannot find any role models. The people in the mosque became his idols and he gets manipulated to want a change. It is hard to find them to make it better.

Interviewees number four and twelve are acting out what is portrayed in media and news constantly, without questioning the reality or facts of it. Another interpretation is that the interviewees are answering the way that others would answer if there were no audio-recording devices, which are only pure speculations though. They are both answering quite uncensored compared to the other interviewees, which could be interpreted as they both forgot about the audio-recording and wandered astray with their thoughts. They are both answering some other questions with the same kind of certainty, which makes their credibility lower because they make the complex questions sound easy and unproblematic. The research made by Thomas (2015) showed that the walls between the clients and the prison officers would surprisingly increase after an educational or resource focus. This means that education can increase the differences and creates what is unwanted, namely division between parties. Thomas (2015) claims that the desire for supervision by authorities creates wedges between them and the other part, which is what could have happened between these two interviewees and Muslim clients. This is a classical way stereotyping and social constructions (Moscovici 2000) are creating bigger differences appear than what exist. Social construction work as a magnet board where the memory tries to connect different features with actions, which in this case for interviewees four and twelve couples religion or heritage with social distress and violence, and even terror.

Interviewee number eight seems to be aware of stereotypes, but still applicate them on to reality.

Interviewee #8: Something that I was told during the lecture and programme is that the radicalised people are often strict about how they appear. And they are together a very strong coherent group and they stand up and support each other to 100%. They are often extreme in their behaviour overall. And all we can do when we acknowledge someone who is acting like this is to note it down, it is tricky. There is no mould that shows how a radicalised person will act or look like, but I think they act extreme regardless if it is politically or religiously. I have heard that there in some prisons are men who do not shake women's hands, do not eat certain things, cannot sit next to many people, and in those cases you can tell they are extreme.

Interviewee number eight tries to wrap the answer in a soft blanket by saying there are ways to find out if someone is extreme or not by observe them and see if they are acting in a way

considered extreme in any way. The interviewee is asking for a mould or a description of how an extremist looks and acts like, which is exactly the point that Christiansen (2017) put forward with the research on the differences between Swedish and Danish prison and probation services. Christiansen (2017) found that there is more action in terms of educational material and action plans on the south side of the Öresund since the Swedish prison and probation service seem to be having problems with deciding what action plan to follow. The 'mould' that the interviewee is asking for would possibly be a way to undermine stereotypes and create more wedges between people that are unfamiliar to us. Research made by Rappaport, Veldhuis and Guiora (2012) says that the attention should be shifted from searching for signs of radicalisation, to educating the prison officers in religious values. According to the study (Rappaport, Veldhuis and Guiora 2012) it is important to see prisoners as individuals rather than a part of a large group if the goal is to keep the level of violent extremism down. The more attention given to the individual the more likely it is that individual will be encouraged to change course of life. This interviewee is using a classical way to categorise (Mäkitalo 2012) radicalised persons, because the prison officer has never met a radicalised person, but still has opinions and knowledge about these people.

Interviewee number two is next, and he/she thinks long and hard before answering the questions, and appears careful with the words chosen.

Interviewee #2: That is a very hard question! To me, it is a person who chooses to execute.. I do not know how to explain it, but in terms of tattoos and symbols. But I cannot look at a person and tell him or her: you are like this! I cannot assign someone as a certain type of person or group. I could guess but I would not know. --- I do not see people like that. I know that society judge people after their appearance, for example a middle east person with a lot of beard are perceived in one way, and a very Swedish looking person in another way.. I think the society often judge after appearance. But since I have met so many people in my previous job with the forensic psychiatry, I know that it is impossible to predict a person's beliefs and what he or she sympathises with based on that persons looks. I have never judged a person by its cover. No.

This interviewee is very particular in letting us know that there are no groups of people that can be treated the same way, only individuals that need special treatment separately. This

interviewee prefers to view people on an individual level, meaning that the categorisation and representation probably looks different from the group of people that otherwise are categorised as violent extremists and terrorists. This prison officer analyse violent extremists and radicalised persons individually, and claims society to judge them according to appearance, which is exactly what Moscovici (1976) also means. Moscovici says that all people connect certain behaviour and appearance with social representations, depending on what the individuals have experienced and been told through life.

Next is interviewee number thirteen, using 'correct' language and expressions, and he/she make clear to the interviewer that there is no 'type' of violent extremist, but instead it can be anyone.

Interviewee #13: It is hard. I think it comes back to preconceived notions. If you take for instance Islamic extremism almost everyone has the preconceived notion about it which also can be interpreted as racist, in other words it is a foreign man between 20 to 25 years old, big beard, pretty dark-skinned, and I think that is the basic presumption that for any Swede but that is really wrong because he do not necessarily look like that. It is the same with right wing extremists, peoples preconceived notion is that they are the same age but with as skinhead, bomber jacket and leather boots. But it can be a 45 year old dad whom lives the world's best life in a detached area, but really he has swastikas tattooed on his legs. It is more to people than what meets the eye. So my answer to the question is that it is really hard to say since it can be anyone.

Person number thirteen is in the same way as number two very delicate when choosing words while expressing his thoughts. This interviewee is aware of the stereotypes that people have regarding violent extremists. In the same way as interviewee number two, interviewee number thirteen also believe society judges people after their appearance, but does not do it him/herself. Interviewee number thirteen says that even when the appearance of a person tells you how he or she will behave, this is when stereotypes should be ignored. Referring to previous experience, interviewee number thirteen tells about great people supporting violent extremism, and people that are thought of being violent extremists being innocent of that kind of support. This means that categorisation can go both ways, as Ragazzi also points out (2017). It is easy to find characteristic traits when you know where to look for them. This can

be more strongly reinforced by examine the way they use the words, and superlatives are frequently used which can be analysed as assurance in the extreme which implies the opposite. In this answer, the prison officer automatically knows that there are wrong answers, and carefully tries to find a way to answer correctly. This interviewee prefers to view people as individuals who all have different stories and fates constructing their life.

Interviewee number three answers this question trying to show no signs of preconceptions, but do show hints of hidden preconceived notions.

Interviewee #3: That is a hard question... What we have gone through has been some religious ways of expression or properties, but strictly superficial I do not find a huge difference between how the religious expressions would be without radicalisation. Possibly it would be taken a notch further, be more direct. Meanwhile, when thinking of the political expressions, one can look for tattoos and graffiti, and of course greetings and gestures.

Using categories, this prison officer believe that e.g. tattoos should be present on political extremists, who can both include people who wear tattoos but does not sympathise with those opinions, meanwhile it can exclude people who does not wear tattoos but agree with the opinions (Ragazzi 2017). This is problematic because it strengthens stereotypes and could mean that people in the radicalisation process are not detected due to an improper, according to the prison officer, identity of the radicalised person. This is a way to categorise violent extremists as a part of society where most people have little insight. To give the unfamiliar and, as it is portrayed, dangerous part of society certain attributes create an illusion of a relation, which makes it easier to categorise and separate from (Moscovici 2000).

Next interviewee puts more emphasis on the behaviour of the client rather than looks, and has preconceptions about the age of violent extremists. The stereotype about age is, according to Swedish prison and probation services, correct in the case of political violent extremists, but Islamic violent extremists are often older than expected (Kriminalvården 2015:7).

Interviewee #7: I think a lot about behaviour, expressions that change quickly, maybe copy others opinions which make the client unrecognisable anymore. I believe younger clients can

be more receptive and predisposed to radicalisation, vulnerable persons who lack a sense of belonging maybe. It is very hard to say.

Interviewee number seven imagines the behaviour to be shifting from one way to another. That might be a way of viewing violent extremism and radicalised persons a bit too soft. That these people would be “younger clients” is not totally correct according to the mission given to the Swedish prison and probation service (Kriminalvården 2015) by the government. This prison officer is using a way of categorising, as Moscovici would say. By believing radicalisation and violent extremism mostly occur to young clients whom are “vulnerable persons who lack a sense of belonging” is a way for the prison officer to make this problem more tangible and less obscure. This interviewee is 35+ years old and is actually around the same age as most violent extremists are when getting in contact with prison and probation services in this matter. This means that this interviewee has created a misleading fact about violent extremists, to create a barrier between ‘them and us’.

Interviewee number ten is sceptical about identifying a person who is violent extremist or in the radicalisation process, and doubt it would be possible to discover signs if they are hidden. This is a realistic view of the problem, but not an excuse not to work towards finding more ways to identify some of these people.

Interviewee #10: I do not know... It depends on how they behave, and move. I do not know how to... It is hard to say in my profession, it all depends on how much you get to meet the person. I am working at the transportation unit, which means I only meet a client for maximum four hours at the time, and sometimes they do not even want to talk. And I am never inside a prison room. I do not think it is possible to tell from appearance. There are so many different kinds of people. It is really hard to say. It could be if they have very extreme opinions, but I doubt they want to share those thoughts with anyone. It is hard to know in my position, if I am not participating in the courtroom, but that is only after something has happened.

For interviewee number ten it is hard to say what causes these opinions, and also what behaviours it might occur. Extreme opinions are not problematic until they are taken into action (Porter & Kebell 2011), but in this case the prison officer might not be open to detect

signs of violent extremism and radicalisation. It is important to remember what Kundnani (2014) discusses, that the problematizing of violent extremism can both solve and hurt the process of ending it, but that does not include ignoring signs that are obvious.

Next interviewee is interested in the subject of violent extremism, and therefore has more knowledge than most people, which is of importance to acknowledge when reading the following answer.

Interviewee #9: I would pay attention to the small details. There are probably very many different types of radicalisation. There have been some Nazis who were extremely hidden, who would never wear symbols or express thoughts openly. There was a diffusive Nazi group within the police in Stockholm during the 1980's who performed horrible deeds, but never expressed it openly. It is different with people who openly express his/her opinion; it is very easy to identify them. The few Islamic violent extremists that I have met have been very strict with the diet, they have been absolutist... The ones that I have met have also been very well-read; I have looked everything up after the meetings and it all have been correct. Sometimes it is claimed that they are incompetent, but that has not been the case for me. Nazis that I have conversed with are often not that knowledgeable. That is very different. It is a too complex question. I would not hesitate to report a so called hidden extremist if I suspect it. The ones who are really spiteful are not very expressive about their opinions. The ones that I know who have travelled to Syria have not been extreme before they leave either, they have just suddenly left without anyone having suspicions about it. The dangerous extremists are not noticed before they leave. I worked with a schmuck a while back during a hearing whom had SS tattooed over half his face and a swastika on his chest, and also he was a poly-drug abuser, he was not dangerous in that way since his sympathies are clear. Of course it is extreme to tattoo SS in the face, but I think that tells more about that person's intellectual status than anything else.

Interviewee number nine stresses the importance of being aware of the different types of violent extremism. This interviewee draws stories and conclusions from own experiences when meeting extremists as a prison officer, and it is noticeable that he/she has been analysing this topic before. Even with the knowledge and experience from many clients of different extremist backgrounds, this interviewee still categorises right-wing extremists as

'not that knowledgeable' and Islamic extremists as 'well-read' in the subject that they represent. This means that according to interviewee number nine, the extremist encounters that he/she has had, mostly have been presented as the categorisation of right-wing extremists as 'schmucks' with low intellectual status, and Islamic extremists as 'absolutists' who are competent in the subject. This connects well with Mäkitalo (2012) where she discusses that we identify someone we have once met with a category of people, and that category is stuck until we meet someone new who fits into that category, hence the category is transforming over time, slowly. Moscovici (2000) also means that we need to create categories for people in order for us to know how to interact with them, in this case interviewee number nine acts and talks in different ways depending on what the previous experiences have been with the same category of people.

Interviewee number six uses categorisation like previous interviewees, but the difference is that this interviewee uses television and media as references, instead of personal encounters.

Interviewee #6: It... Often when we see on telly or movies they have big beards, and belong to a church or religion. But I really believe that there are many individuals who are completely normal, but might have those thoughts, hidden from the eye. If I meet a person with a big beard and darker skin and looks like a typical terrorist as they show on telly, it does not mean that person is like that. It is a hard question.

It is problematic that interviewee number six refers to media as a reference point for this stereotype, even though he/she informs the interviewer about it being inappropriate. This can be portrayed as figurative social representation according to Moscovici (2011). It means that the group which is stereotyped is shaped by what society expects from the class, ethnicity, gender and ultimately categorises are expecting from that specific representation. The individuals within these representations become equal to the group they are representing, no matter how little in common the individual has with the group in general. This creates a wedge between the minorities (in this case violent extremists inside prisons) and the prison officers, and is the opposite of what is wanted.

This research question was interesting to investigate. Many of the interviewees had ideas of identifying violent extremism and radicalisation through observing the clients' behaviours.

Changing territorial areas, new groups of people, attitudinal changes, growing a beard and becoming more religious and extreme in their food habits were some of the recurring actions to observe, according to the prison officers. Many of the interviewees were surprised by the question 'how can a violent extremist person be identified', and needed some time before answering it. This can be analysed in different ways, but most of the times it happened the situation and words spoken was interpreted as a way of reflection and carefully choosing 'right' words for those thoughts. Not as a way to hide a certain opinion but making sure the words said would not be misinterpreted.

Eleven of the interviewees were certain that it is impossible to tell just by looking at a person if he/she is a violent extremist person, but two of the prison officers were certain on looks and identities of extremist persons. These two interviewees answered the question without hesitation, saying things including: they have a big beard, wear bombs under their jacket, have darker skin, very religious and picky with their food, and all of these attributes fit the stereotype for 'Islamic violent extremist'. This is problematic meanwhile it is small part of the interviewees who portrayed violent extremists like this. Applying Moscovici on this implies the social representation and categorisation of violent extremism to be crooked and showing only one type of person, when the representation should be much larger. Both of these interviewees were relatively calm and straight forward with their answers, and did not spend much time thinking about the answers. The positive side is that the largest part of the interviewees did not have any doubt there was no way to tell by looks if someone is a violent extremist. This shows that the education has given the prison officers knowledge regarding the different types of violent extremists, and showed the possibility of a broad variety of types of clients which all could be exposed to radicalisation. Using discursive analysis on the text in the steps explained in chapter 5.3, gave the interviews more depth and increased the possibility to understand how the interviewees meant to express themselves, and developed the analysis.

7. Conclusion and discussion

The article (Kriminalvården 2017) written about the project of educating and preventing radicalisation in Swedish prison and probation services tells: “The work is going well”. This is an article posted on the intranet of Swedish prison and probation services, without an author, saying that the work of being equipped to follow the directives from the government is going well.

This thesis is evaluating thirteen interviews of prison officers on the topic of violent extremism and radicalisation. The interviews has been audio-recorded and transcribed, and then used to answer the research questions. Then the answers have been translated from Swedish to English, and then analysed using discursive analysis.

The aim of this study is to find out how prison officers experience the education regarding violent extremism, and how they identify violent extremists and radicalised persons. Two research questions have been used in order to find answers to the aim:

1. What did the prison officers know before and what did they learn about radicalisation and violent extremism when participating in the education?
2. How do prison officers identify violent extremist and radicalised persons?

Question number one include background information about what the prison officers knew before they entered the lecture about violent extremism and radicalisation, and what they learned from the lecture and basic training programme together. Some prison officers answered that they knew everything that was being talked about already, and wanted the next round of basic training programme to include more and longer sessions, which would result in better remembrance from the lecture, also make the prison officers appear more competent to the prisoners, according to the prison officers. By comparing the answers on the first question, the results show that more than half of the interviewees say they did not learn much or anything at all from the lecture. This is bothersome, but since the question was given after the lecture took place, it is possible they thought they knew things that they actually did not. Most of the interviewees were happy they got information regarding the three different types of

violent extremism, because a majority of them said during the interview they mainly thought about Islamic extremism, forgetting about the political extremism.

Question number two tells a lot about if prison officers' use preconceptions in their work, and how they identify violent extremists and radicalised persons according to it. Eleven of the thirteen interviewees said it is impossible to tell by appearance whether or not a person is a violent extremist, which is positive for the future of prison and probations in Sweden. This means that either the education has taught them the different types of violent extremism and therefore the variety of people being possible violent extremist and radicalised persons, or they knew this before the education. Either way, it is positive the amount of stereotyping, categorising and social representation among prison officers is keeping a low number. The theoretical framework of categorising and representation worked to find the different ways prison officers might use stereotypes in order to identify violent extremists and radicalised persons. Moscovici theory helped the analysis to find the problems of categorising and representation, and concluded it was used by two of the thirteen interviewees.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that this is a complex issue that needs to be dealt with in order for it to stop. Much of the previous research show that the education of prison officers is of big importance for the clients and their environment inside prisons. The fact that prisoners become radicalised during their visit to prisons, make the issue of large importance to the Swedish prison and probation services. In Gothenburg this issue is dealt with by having a 90 minute lecture for the new prison officers. Considering the lecture of violent extremism and radicalisation to be fairly new in Gothenburg, the results should be seen as positive, especially the answers on research question number two, where the considerable majority answered satisfactory.

Problems that have occurred during the process of this study have first and foremost been to find prison officers who are qualified and willing to participate in an interview. It has been quite difficult. Other problems have been to find previous research that matches with the topic of educating prison officers, which is why chapter on previous research might be a little shorter than usual.

The generality of the findings are a little insecure since there were only thirteen prison officers that were interviewed. Meanwhile there have not been more than a total of 40 prison officers finishing the basic training programme under the time frame from when the mission was taken on from the Swedish government. This means that thirteen are quite many from a small group of 40, and the generality is adequate. The interviews have been performed in Gothenburg and not considered any other of the educational locations as Stockholm, Malmö, Örebro and Norrköping, which might affect the generality as well.

The research gap that was talked about in the introduction has partly been filled. There should be much more research in the area before the gap is filled. It would be of interest to perform this study again after a potential change is made. Depending on what change is performed the result of the prison officers knowledge about radicalisation and their preconceptions about who becomes radicalised, it would be very interesting to see the possible change. If there are still people who forgets and appears uninterested to the issue of radicalisation and violent extremism there must be further change in the lecture structure.

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9. Appendix

Interview guideline

1. What is your background? Have you done any studying or work previously?
2. What is your age?
3. For how long have you been in the prison and probation services?
4. Have you gone through any kind of education within the prison and probation services (apart from the basic training programme)?
5. Did any part of the basic training programme stand out from the rest?
6. Have you been affected by the lecture? How?
7. What is your general impression from the lecture?
8. What concepts were you informed of on the lecture?
9. What did you know about radicalisation and violent extremism before the lecture?
10. What did you learn about radicalisation and violent extremism?
11. Have you been working towards radicalisation and violent extremism at work?
12. Do you have knowledge about what to search for in regards to finding signs of radicalisation before and after the lecture?
13. Do you know what to search for regarding radicalisation processes?
14. What have you learned to be attentive to?
15. How have you learned to identify radicalisation?
16. Have the lecture affected your everyday work life in any way?
17. How have the lecture affected your understanding of radicalisation?
18. How are you working with the issues radicalisation and violent extremism today?
19. How do you identify a person who is in the radicalisation process? How do you imagine the looks, behaviour, age, gender, target group?
20. How do you think the lecture has affected your opinion regarding the previous question?
21. What is the most important thing you learned from the lecture?
22. What is the most important thing you learned from the basic training programme?
23. Have the terror attack in Stockholm, with the truck, affected you in any way? (This question was added after the attack occurred, because one of the interviewees mentioned it and it felt appropriate to add to the interview guideline).