

THE USE OF HOPE

Biopolitics of security during the Obama presidency

Claes Tängh Wrangel

SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

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Abstract

Through a compilation of four research articles, this PhD thesis investigates 'hope' as a biopolitical technology. It interrogates the use of hope by the United States security apparatus, on the one hand, to pre-empt processes of radicalisation and, on the other hand, to prepare the subject of security to cope with permanent insecurity. The dissertation analyses the security discourse of the Obama Administrations 2009 – 2016, paying particular attention to strategic narratives of hope across three principal domains of US security: diplomacy, development and military. The thesis thereby renders visible a set of ambiguous relations between hope and insecurity in US foreign policy during the Obama period: between hate and hope in the domain of (public) diplomacy; between despair and hope in the domain of development; and between fear and hope in the military domain. To analyse the respective strategic narratives, the thesis employs a theoretical framework drawn from Giorgio Agamben's theory of biopolitics, through which hope appears as a means of governing the future, a technology employed to regulate processes of subjectification. The dissertation's theoretical ambition is to question a central assumption undergirding important critique of the post-9/11 biopolitical condition: namely that practices of security are inherently at odds with hope, operating through discourses and practices of fear and suffering to reduce the capacity to hope within the global populace. By analysing the appropriation of hope by US security discourse, the thesis explores how practices of security works *through* hope to achieve security. US security discourse achieves this by means of constituting a particular form of hopeful life: an individualised and resilient form of neoliberal life who is called to embody an indistinction between fear, despair, hate *and* hope.

Keywords: hope, biopolitics, Agamben, Obama, security, development, public diplomacy, resilience, radicalisation, counterterrorism, strategic narratives, neoliberalism, discourse analysis.

Contents

List of articles

i. Wrangel, Claes (2013) “Reading the War on Terror through Fear and Hope: Affective Warfare and the Question of the Future”, *Political Perspectives* 7(2): 85-105.

ii. Tängh Wrangel, Claes (forthcoming) “The Unknowing Subject of Radicalisation: US Counterterrorism Communications and the Biopolitics of Hope”

iii. Tängh Wrangel, Claes (2017) “Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and the Promise of Despair”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 35(5): 875-892.

iv. Wrangel, Claes (2014) “Hope in a Time of Catastrophe? Resilience and the Future *in* Bare Life”, *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 2(3): 183-194.

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THE USE OF HOPE

Foreword

All that Shepherd Fairey's iconic Obama poster says is "Hope". Aside from the face of Obama – "looking towards the future, his gaze serious yet confident" (White, 2010) – it details no hopeful subject, and no distinct future to hope for, only an imperative: Hope. In contrast to other seminal Presidential slogans, such as Donald Trump's "Make America great again" and George W. Bush's promise of "enduring freedom" to the Iraqi people, Fairey's poster issued no distinct promise. It did not promise that the future will be free of struggle, nor that the future will be certain. Hope was its only promise, an assurance that despite the fear and division of our present day, hope was still possible.

During the past years, I have studied the biopolitical appropriation of hope by the US security apparatus. During this time, I have come to be haunted by the imperative to hope and the desire for hope, which by no means is exclusive to Obama. On the contrary, the desire for hope undergirds much of contemporary critique directed at the post 9/11 state of security. In this critique, a radical potential has been invested in hope, finding in hope, on the one hand, an openness to an unknown future, to the stranger and to the different (Bloch, 1986; Rorty, 1999; Derrida, 2006: 212; Solnit, 2016), and, on the other hand, a radical capacity to imagine another future, and in this process a potential to transform the present (Hardt and Negri, quoted in Brown et. al., 2002; Ahmed, 2004: 185; Anderson, 2006a; 2006b; Burke, 2011; Reid, 2012, Evans and Reid, 2014; Pedwell, 2012).

The thesis that follows is my attempt to question this imperative and the political capacity that so often associated with it. Through a compilation of four research articles, the thesis examines hope as a biopolitical technology,

interrogating its use by the United States security apparatus to pre-empt processes of radicalisation. The empirical material consists of the security discourse of the Obama administrations 2009 – 2016. Particular attention is paid to strategic narratives of hope across three principal domains of US security: diplomacy, development and military. Rendered visible by this analysis is a series of ambiguous relationships between hope and in/security in US foreign policy of the Obama period: between hate and hope in the domain of diplomacy; between despair and hope in the domain of development; and between fear and hope in the domain of military affairs. Through this reading, the thesis explores how the discourse of hope is used to constitute a particular form of life: a depoliticised and allegedly nonviolent neoliberal way of being.

Outline of the kappa

This introductory *kappa* attempts to synthesise and present the research conducted in the four supporting articles, rendering explicit the methodological choices and analytical tools employed within the articles. It also brings the theoretical discussions and empirical analyses performed within the articles together, in order to allow a concluding discussion on how hope is used biopolitically by US security discourse. It is my ambition that the kappa should be able to stand on its own, demanding no familiarity with the supporting articles.

Chapter 1 presents the research problematic that informs the thesis, the study's aims as well as the research questions employed. It briefly introduces how hope has been enlisted by politics of security as a tool to pre-empt processes of radicalisation to what in US security discourse is referred to as 'violent extremism'. The chapter also presents the choice of empirical material and some of the limitations involved with this choice, as well as with the choice of an Agambenian theoretical framework.

Chapter 2 aims to establish a theoretical framework to study hope as a biopolitical technology. It also reviews the relationship between hope and security as it has been perceived by critical analyses of modern and postmodern forms of biopolitics of security. The chapter highlights the centrality afforded to hope within studies critical of the post 9/11 state of security. Drawn from this discussion is a conceptual toolkit that is heavily indebted to Agamben, focusing on the possible conceptual relation between hope and Agamben's concepts of exclusion, suspension and potentiality – crucial as Agamben deems them to be for the workings of both sovereign power and biopolitics.

Chapter 3 elaborates on the methodological rationale that informs the analysis of the Obama administration's security discourse. The chapter quali-

fies the choice of discourse as the thesis' level of analysis and the selection of grand narrative as its primary object of study. The chapter further details the methodological limitations and possibilities entailed in the concept of the example, discussing the relation between the case of official foreign policy discourse and its use of strategic narratives and the wider security dispositif this discourse is a part of. Also discussed are the analytical concepts employed to identify the conceptual network of relations and the narrative structure that give form and meaning to the use of hope in US security discourse.

Chapter 4 synthesises the empirical investigations performed in the separate articles. The aim of the chapter is to discuss and make visible the relationship between hope and security as it is articulated and actualised in the respective strategic narratives that comprise US security discourse. The analyses are presented through a series of thresholds (a key analytical concept in the Agambenian lexicon): between hate and hope, despair and hope and lastly between fear and hope.

Chapter 5 concludes this *kappa*. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how hope conditions political agency today. The chapter begins with a summary of the empirical analysis performed in chapter 4 in light of the study's research questions. These findings are then discussed in relation to key concepts of Agambenian biopolitics, namely the state of exception and bare life, probing these concepts' relation to hope. The chapter ends with a short afterword that seeks to discuss the relationship between hope and biopolitics beyond US security discourse. Following this short excursion is a discussion of the contribution to research that this thesis offers as well as a short comment of future avenues of research provoked or made possible by the thesis.

Introduction

According to Terry Eagleton, hope is a "key signifier" (2015: 54) of modernity, a signal of "the transition from the tradition-bound to the future-oriented, from timeless metaphysical truths to the historically open-ended" (2015: 54). As a key signifier of modern life, hope appears to be everywhere. If one begins to search for hope in one's everyday surroundings, as I have done since 2011 when work on this thesis began, it can seem as if the world is obsessed by hope. From billboards to television commercials we are constantly urged to commit to hope – to play 'Football for Hope' (FIFA, 2010), to do 'Yoga for Hope' (City of Hope, 2016) and to 'Run for Hope' (Hope Association, 2016). We are also asked to give money for hope. In the UK alone, 1050 listed charities include the word hope in their name (UK Charity Commission, 2018).

In politics, hope seems to belong simultaneously to no one and to everyone. From the political left to the political right, hope is embedded in language as diverse as Marxist slogans of a coming revolution (Bloch, 1986; Harvey, 2000; Chomsky, 2010) to capitalist and liberal mottos of inevitable progress (Schlesinger, 2007; Ridley, 2011). According to Ben Anderson, "all political campaigns express and offer more or less specific hopes, albeit in a range of different tones" (2017). As argued by Anderson, this includes those discourses that often are claimed to be antithetical to the indeterminateness and inclusiveness that often is associated with hope, such as current US President Donald Trump's campaign discourse of "hate" (Giroux, 2016; Shaull, 2017), "fear" (Robin, 2016; Fallows, 2017) and "despair" (Aronson, 2017; Solnit, 2016).

In contemporary politics of global security, hope holds an equally central place. In 2009, when announcing the nomination of US President Barack

Obama as laureate of the Nobel Peace Price, the Nobel Committee recognised hope as a key concept of liberal peace (Nobel Media, 2009). Others hold hope to be central to the legitimation of humanitarian intervention (Anderson, 2006a: 749). The US 1992-93 *Operation Restore Hope* in Somalia and the 1999 US *Operation Shining Hope* in Kosovo serve as clear examples of this practice.

In the post 9/11 understanding of global insecurity, the proclaimed lack of hope within the global South has served – and continues to serve – as a convincing explanation to the continual threat of terrorism. Exemplary of this logic is former US President George W. Bush's identification of hopelessness as a root cause for terrorism: "the stability we thought we saw in the Middle East was a mirage. For decades, millions of men and women in the region have been trapped in oppression and *hopelessness*. And these conditions left a generation disillusioned, and made this region a breeding ground for extremism" (2006, emphasis added). As President, Barack Obama often repeated Bush's logic, arguing that it is "when people – especially young people – *feel* entirely trapped in impoverished communities [that] those communities [become] ripe for extremist recruitment" (Obama, 2015a, emphasis added). According to Obama, the capacity to hope is defined as one of the principal targets of terrorist acts, the intention of which Obama describes as to "foment fear and division" (2016a). Trump has recently offered a similar perspective: "The true toll of ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and so many others, must be counted not only in the number of dead. It must also be counted in generations of vanished dreams" (2017).

In contemporary US Presidential counterterrorism discourse, the production of hope is often presented as a key strategy for the pacification of what is perceived to be potentially dangerous populations. In this discourse, hope appears as a use object, the deployment of which ostensibly furthers the aims of security. According to Bush, "hope is an answer to terror" (2002), for Obama, hope is "the most powerful weapon in our arsenal" (2009a). In the wake of the 2016 attacks in Brussels, Obama described the social character of this weapon, moving from one body to another: "It is not a static hope [but] a living and breathing hope. It's not a gift we simply receive, but one we must give to others, a gift to carry forth" (2016a). In his celebrated Nobel lecture, Obama defined hope as holding the capacity to bridge seemingly fixed lines of division, to reject what may appear as static particular identities and thus to pave the way for a common humanity (2009b).

Prompted by such narratives, this thesis interrogates the instrumentalisation of hope by the US security apparatus under the Obama administrations 2009 – 2016. If hope is that which will combat and defeat terror, operating on

terror's alleged conditions of possibilities, then this thesis analyses how this weapon is used. By observing hope's social and political character – how hope is envisioned to move between bodies, to assemble bodies into formation – the thesis analyses how discourses of hope are meant to regulate the capacity of certain risk populations to become violent. The thesis questions what hope is, how it is practiced and how it acts on the lives it targets. Provoked by the empirical investigations that supports this thesis are questions of larger ethical and political weight that are addressed in the concluding chapter of this *kappa*: If hope is an embrace of insecurity (Rorty, 1999), what happens to hope when it is rendered into a technology of security? If hope expresses the promise of an open and unknown future (Derrida, 2006; Solnit, 2016), then what remains of this promise, when it is used to govern the future's coming into presence? If hope is a capacity to envision another more just world (Bloch, 1986; Burke, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014; Aronson, 2017), what happens to this capacity when it is used to secure *this* world, when hope becomes both a necessity and a use of force?[1]

While hope currently appears to have a conventional meaning – defined according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as something like desire plus expectation (Bloeser and Stahl, 2017) – it is difficult from a philosophical viewpoint to argue that hope has a fixed meaning. On the contrary, as made clear by Eagleton's exposé of hope's conceptual history (2015), hope is an essentially contested concept. Peter Burke maintains that there is no "Hope, with a capital H, in the singular", but rather "varieties of hope, […] hopes in the plural" (2012: 207). Susan McManus describes the meaning of hope as inherently "ambivalent" (2011). Throughout hope's conceptual history, it has been referred to inter alia as a feeling or affect (Bloch, 1986; Massumi, 2002a; Anderson, 2006a), a disposition or ethos of life (Anderson, 2006a; Eagleton, 2015: 57-59; Aristotle, 2016: 49), a falsifiable rational estimation of the future (Descartes, 2015: 221; Eagleton, 2015: 3), and curiously both as pleasure (Bauman, 2008: 15; Ahmed, 2010: 181) and as pain (Nietzsche, 1996: 45).

In contemporary critiques of liberal forms of linear and modernist governance, hope seems to hold a particular appeal. In this literature, hope is commonly referred to as a revolutionary experience of excess (Massumi, 2002a; Spivak, 2002; Anderson, 2006a), as an embrace of contingency and of social diversity (Rorty, 1999; Derrida, 2006; Solnit, 2016; Robin, 2016; Ar-

[1] As shown by Steven DeCaroli, the etymological roots of the concept of necessity stem from the Greek word *ananke*, which was perceived by the Greeks to be closely related to both violence and security: "the proximity of necessity and violence arises, of course, in the context of biological survival where, in accordance with natural law (*ius naturale*), the use of force to secure basic necessities is justified" (2016: 208, original emphasis).

onson, 2017) and/or as a transformative and subversive capacity that is intrinsic to, if not defining of, life (Negri, 1999; Zournazi, 2002; Burke, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014). Susan McManus has dubbed this appeal the "hope project" (2011), calling attention to how hope has come to capture the imaginary of the academic left in its attempt to articulate resistance towards the post 9/11 security apparatus.

Given hope's ambiguous and polysemic nature, this thesis does not seek to define hope. On the contrary, it analyses the instrumentalisation of hope within the Obama administration's security discourse as performative of hope. Following Ghassan Hage, who has argued that "we need to look at what kind of hope a society encourages rather than simply whether it gives people hope or not" (2002: 152), the thesis sees hope as a concept whose meaning is established through practices that change over time and space. Following a long tradition within poststructural and/or discourse-analytical thought (Foucault, 1972; Hansen, 2006; Cholouriaki, 2008; Derrida, 2009: 170; Agamben, 2009a; 2011), the thesis reads the use of hope within US security discourse as produced by, and as being productive of, social realities and the lives that inhabit them. As such, the thesis probes how the Obama administrations' politics of security aimed to be formative both of a particular form of hope and of the life meant to experience and embody it. The primary objective of this thesis is not to analyse how the Obama administration's security discourse played on people's hopes – as if hope had a given meaning, as if all humans by default shared a general predisposition to experience a particular kind of hope – but rather how it rendered the capacity to hope into a political problem, a deficiency that needed to be externally corrected.[2]

In other words, the thesis treats the use of hope by and in US security discourse as what Giorgio Agamben refers to as a biopolitical technology or apparatus (2011). According to Agamben, the aim of biopolitics is, on the one hand, to form, model, valuate and define what is considered safe, non-violent human life and, on the other hand, to identify, exclude and/or to regulate those lives that are considered dangerous and threatening (Agamben, 1999a: 147, 1998: 137, see also Reid, 2011). This dual objective makes biopolitics – the power to make life – inseparable from sovereign power – the power to let life die (Agamben, 1999a: 147; 1998:6).[3] As Judith Butler re-

[2] As noted for instance by Murray Li (2007: 7) and by De Larrinaga and Doucet, problematisation is a key facet of biopolitics. It is a "discursive strategy [that] de-legitimates local politics and gives the green light for the disciplinary and rationalising intervention of outside forces" (De Larrinaga and Doucet, 2014: 58).

[3] In contrast to Foucault, Agamben perceives no difference between biopolitics and sovereign power. According to Agamben "*the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power*" (1998: 6, original emphasis). For a discussion on the differences between

minds, the question of what life is, of life's ontology, is never posed "outside of operations of power" (2009: 1). It is a question of exclusion, the result of historical and political struggles, of "social crafting and form" (Ibid.). As such, every definition of life – every claim to establish the fact of life, such as Obama's recognition of hope as foundational for the establishment of a "common humanity" (2009b) – is part of what Agamben refers to as a "relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses" (2011: 14),[4] between the substance of life and the "historical element" (Ibid.: 6) through which living beings are captured: "the set of institutions, of processes of subjectification and of rules in which power relations become concrete" (Ibid.). It is the result of this fight that Agamben calls *the subject* (Ibid.).

To study hope's role in this process, the thesis analyses security discourse – a key discourse in the biopolitical apparatus governing contemporary life. As mentioned above, this study is limited to the security discourse of the Obama administration. The reasons are twofold, and although they will be expanded upon in the methodological section of this *kappa*, they are worth introducing here. *Firstly*, few presidencies have been so intimately tied to hope as Obama's (Nobel Media AB, 2009; Pedwell, 2012; CBS, 2017). Moreover, as argued for instance by Hirokazu Miyazaki (2008), the hope that Obama embodied was to a large extent self-referential. In contrast to traditional accounts of US exceptionalism articulated by his predecessors (Patman, 2006; Burke, 2007; Rojecki, 2008), Obama promised not to realise a given future, but hope for the future. As such, the election of Obama was presented as a radical break from the past, one that seemingly freed hope from its attachment not only to US exceptionalism and manifest destiny, but also from the global power relations supported by such notions (Stephanson, 2009; Pedwell, 2012; Golbush, 2016). In contrast to the discourse of the war on terror, Obama's conceptualisation of hope was presented not as an imperialistic assertion of an already defined vision of utopic perfection, but as an empathic recognition of the impossibility of such visions (Rossi Keen, 2008: 5; Hirsh, 2011; Kloppenberg, 2011; Berlant, quoted in Pedwell, 2012). According to Scott Atran, this promise made Obama key to fighting radicalisation, a "ray of hope" that in 2008 "already [was] making it harder for Al

Agamben and Foucault's definition of biopolitics, see Ojakangas, 2005; Genel, 2006; Coleman and Grove, 2009; Snoek, 2010; Heron, 2011.

[4] Agamben defines an apparatus as "literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and – why not – language itself" (2011: 14).

Qaeda and associates to promote the demonization of America which drives their viral movement" (2008).

Secondly, Obama's particular version of hope remains relevant in global security discourse. Not only does it still reverberate in the US security apparatus at large (Gerson, 2016), it also surfaces periodically in the Trump administration's security discourse – think for instance of Trump's asserted commitment to tolerance, respect of cultural and ethnic difference as well as to the right of every human to hope issued in Saudia Arabia (2017). One may also consider whether not the seemingly grand contrast between Obama and Trump has not secured for Obama's version of hope an even stronger grip on the political liberal imagination and beyond. Following Trump's election, the political debate in the academic left was to a large extent centered on a desire for hope (Anderson 2017; Tängh Wrangel, 2017b).[5] Polls taken shortly after Trumps' election further suggested that Obama's popularity increased during Trump's presidency (Tesfamichael, 2017).

To study the use of hope within the Obama administration's security discourse, this thesis analyses three different, yet interrelated, strategic narratives tasked to generate hope within what implicitly or explicitly is referred to in US security discourse as risk populations (Jackson, 2007; von Hippel, 2008; Kundnani, 2012; Eroukmanhoff, 2015). These narratives are key within the Obama administrations' counter terrorism communications, engaging – by the means of (public) diplomacy, development and military –[6] three different processes of purported radicalisation. By looking at how hope is articulated in these respective narratives, the thesis analyses how hope is meant to regulate violence by tackling, firstly, the assumed relation between ideology, hate and violence (diplomacy), secondly, the relation between poverty, despair and violence (development), and, thirdly, the relation between insecurity, fear and violence (military), as detailed in the US *National Security Strategy* (White House, 2010a; 2015).

Following Agamben's methodological conceptualisation of the example as a performative operator (2009a; 2009b), the primary empirical material that is taken to exemplify and make visible these narratives consists of political speeches, described by Obama as a key tool to inspire the public, an opportunity to 'send a message', to 'commit to hope' (2015b). As exemplary moments of hope, speeches signify for Obama more than "just words" (2008a; 2015c), they represent the possibility to inspire and ignite political action and participation (2008a). Just like hope, Obama describes words as a

[5] For a critical reflection of this desire, see Tängh Wrangel, 2017b.

[6] In the US *National Security Strategy* of 2015 these 'pillars' of security are defined as the three "principal means of U.S. engagement abroad" (White House, 2015: 4).

"living" entity, as a "call to action, a roadmap" (2015c) that not only the public is urged to follow, but also the US security apparatus as a whole (Obama, 2014a). As such, while political speeches may not represent the standard use of hope within the US security apparatus, if such a standard exist at all, they nonetheless hold normative power over this use. As the most authoritative level of political communication, presidential speeches represent the words which the 2010 US *National Framework of Strategic Communication* urges the US security apparatus to be "synchronised" and "aligned" with (White House, 2010b: 1). Agamben calls such discourses *exemplary* or paradigmatic (2009a: 9-32).

The analysis of these narratives is highly indebted to Agamben's political philosophy, in particular to his conceptualisation of potentiality (1999b). If hope traditionally has been perceived as a radical capacity or potentiality to imagine another world or future, an embrace of contingency that by default would be opposite to or external to the reductive logics both of security and biopolitics, Agamben grants no such privilege to hope. For Agamben, there is no outside of power, no particular political agency invested in the experience that there is something beyond our present world. Potentiality functions for Agamben rather as "the ontological underpinning […] of sovereignty" (Atell, 2011: 162). Agamben perceives power not as a containment or reduction of potentiality, but the "organization of potentiality" (1995: 71). As such, he defines potentiality as a "principle" (1998: 47) that runs through every attempt to give form to life. Given the close proximity identified by Obama between hope and potentiality (2008b; 2009c; 2009d; 2015b; 2016a), it is the identification of this 'principle' within US security discourse that Agamben's theoretical framework makes possible, and hence also its role in the constitution of what this thesis will refer to as *hopeful life*. In other words, by directing attention to the role of hope-as-potentiality in the maintenance of the biopolitical present, the framework offered by Agamben makes it possible to analyse hope as a principle of sovereign power, a technique of security. It places not only Obama's discourse of hope under critical scrutiny, but in extension also the diagnoses and prescriptions offered by the contemporary desire for hope within the political and academic left (McManus, 2011; Duggan and Muñoz, 2009: 275).

Aims

The primary aim of this thesis is to understand and make visible how hope is employed as a biopolitical technology within US security discourse under the Obama administration. It seeks to shine light on what the purposes of this use

are, how its ideal practice is envisioned and executed by US security discourse. It also aims to render visible how hope acts on the life it targets and what relationship between hope and security the use of hope presupposes and (re)produces. As an effect of this investigation, this thesis aims to make possible a discussion on the relationship between hope and the present biopolitical condition.

On a theoretical level, the thesis aims to contribute to a range of literatures in which the concept of hope holds a central place. To studies of the politics of hope – and of the adjacent concepts of desire (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Stavrakakis, 1999)[7] and optimism (e.g. Berlant, 2011) – this thesis adds a biopolitical dimension. Both Lauren Berlant and Sara Ahmed (2010: 181) treat the use of hope as a subdiscipline to the political manipulation of desire, as an "attachment" (Berlant, 2011: 23), or a "wish orientation" (Ahmed, 2010: 181) towards a politically communicated vision of the future, a final end-state. In contrast to these studies, which have analysed the relationship between neoliberalism and hope, I am primarily interested in hope's relationship to security.[8] I am further more interested in how the subject is constituted as hopeful, rather than in studying which future that is projected towards the subject. To general studies of biopolitics, the thesis conceptualises hope as a biopolitical technique, discussing how hope can be studied as form of governance. To studies of Agambenian biopolitics, the thesis seeks to discuss how hope regulates the relationship between politically qualified life, *bios*, and bare life, *zoē*, questioning a common description of bare life as a life without hope (Agamben, 1998: 7; Edkins and Pin Fat, 2005; Burke, 2011; Bourke, 2014). The thesis further seeks to contribute conceptually to critical literatures on development, radicalisation, resilience and affect theory, by systematically situating hope in these respective forms of governance.

Empirically, the thesis aims to make three contributions. First, it seeks to remedy a bias in critical security studies towards studying the affect and logic of fear within critical studies of security (Hardt and Negri, quoted in Brown 2002; Ahmed, 2004; Robin, 2004; 2016; Debrix, 2005; Massumi, 2005; 2007; Bleiker and Hutchinson, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Loseke, 2009; Royal, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014). Secondly, the thesis also seeks to widen the range of empirical cases to which Agamben's framework is traditionally applied, beyond its typical discursive case: explicitly excluding discourses,

[7] For a conceptual discussion on the difference between hope and desire, see Eagleton, 2015: 47-54.

[8] Following Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Anna Stobbe, neoliberalism is for me a result, not a starting point. According to Lobo-Guerrero and Stobbe, different forms of governance should "not to be assumed as preconceived, for example, of a neoliberal sort. It must be taken instead as undetermined until the power relations that give rise to it are explored" (2016: 431).

often exemplified by the rhetoric of Presidents Bush and Trump (Bly, 2016). Third, to studies on Obama's grand strategy, the thesis questions common descriptions of Obama's hope as "general" (Miyazaki, 2008: 8), "imaginative" (Kloppenberg, 2011: 84), "empathic" (Berlant, quoted in Pedwell, 2012) and "pragmatic" (Rossi-Keen, 2008) as well as readings of Obama's security strategy as historically opposed to US imperialism (Stephanson, 2009).

Methodologically, the thesis aims to contribute to attempts to operationalise Agamben's dense political philosophy, in terms of both methodology and method. As for methodology, the thesis discusses the use of discourse as a way of studying the employment of biopolitical technologies, such as hope. It also discusses the relationship between a single case study and the general dispsitif, or apparatus of power, of which the case is but a part. In terms of method, the thesis attempts to deduce from Agamben's philosophy a set of principles, such as the example (1998: 21-22; 2009a; 2009b: 9-11) and the signature (2009a) through which to both delimit a given discourse and to select empirical material. Through a discussion on Agamben's conceptualisation of the relationship between the example and the exception (1998: 21-22) as well as his concept's of repetition and movement (2004a), the thesis also seeks to tease out an analytical practice through which to read the text and narrative structure of a given discourse.

Politically, the thesis seeks to problematize the assumed progressiveness that various strands of the biopolitical theoretical canon afford to hope. By questioning the juxtaposition between hope and bare life that is often assumed in this literature (McSorley, 2016; Burke, 2011; Agamben, 2000: 31; Bourke, 2014), the thesis aims not only to provide an alternative reading of the biopolitical present, but also to question the political potency of the contemporary desire for hope within the academic and political left.

Research questions

In order to study hope as a biopolitical technique, as a tool of discursive power that is appropriated by apparatuses of security, the thesis is guided by the following central research question:

How is hope designed to be used biopolitically in US security discourse under the Obama administrations?

To answer this question, the thesis pursues four subsidiary research questions, each targeting different aspects of biopolitical use, as defined by

Agamben: namely, *instrumentality*, *ontology*, *temporality* and *subjectification*. The discussion below will discuss Agamben's definition in relation to the four subsidiary research questions, listed below:

In US security discourse under President Obama:

1) *how can we understand the narrative means and ends of the **instrumental** use of hope?*
2) *how do particular **conceptual relations** give meaning to hope?*
3) *how is the **temporal experience** of hope articulated and actualised?*
4) *how are different **forms of life** constituted in relation to hope and to one another?*

As stated above, the reasoning behind these research questions is based on Agamben's definition of the concept of use (2015), the exploration of which concludes the *Homo Sacer* book series. Starting with instrumentality and ending with biopolitics, the ensuing discussion will review Agamben's fourfold conceptualisation.

The formulation of research question 1 – *how can we understand the narrative means and ends of the **instrumental** use of hope?* – is based on Agamben's etymological discussion on the concept of 'use', in particular its relation to technology. According to Agamben, in its most direct articulation, use refers to an instrumental activity, one whose genealogy Michel Foucault has traced to the Greek notion of *techne* as "a practical rationality governed by a conscious aim" (1984: 255-256). Agamben finds this definition resurfaced across the conceptual history of use, actualised for instance in Martin Heidegger's description of technology as "nothing other than human action directed at a goal" (quoted in Agamben, 2015: 68). With that in mind, the first research question directs attention to the instrumentalisation of hope that is a central part of US security discourse in general and in its adoption of strategic narratives in particular (Obama, 2008a; 2009a). Through what narrative means are hope explicitly meant to be produced by these different narratives, and to what ends? How do these narratives make use of hope to replace the hopelessness that is perceived to condition radicalisation? And what kind of 'security' does this use promise to achieve?

The second research question – *how do particular **conceptual relations** give meaning to hope?* – directs attention to how the use of hope gives meaning to hope. According to Agamben, to be used is not only a question of instrumentality, as if the object of use had a given and fixed meaning, an

original and static function, generative of only one possible effect. On the contrary, use refers to a performative process that is constitutive of the object in use, in this case hope. Historically, Agamben traces the performative dimension of use to the Greek category of work, *ergon*, meaning production. In ancient Greece, work designated a process of rendering actual, allowing a not-yet fully formed object to "come into presence" (2015: 48). For Agamben, to bring something forth includes a linguistic process[9] – a practice of naming and constituting the object of use by inscribing it "within a given sphere" (2007a: 85).[10] To be used is to be placed in relation – to be inserted in a sphere consisting of other concepts, subjects and objects, and, crucially, to affect and be affected by these relations (Agamben, 2014: 69; 2015: 29). Based on this logic, the thesis analyses the conceptual relations through which hope is articulated in the Obama administrations' security discourse: between hope and fear in the sphere of military; between hope and despair in the sphere of development; and between hope and hate in the sphere of (public) diplomacy. Through these three analyses, the thesis interrogates the general relationship between hope and security.

The third empirically oriented research question – *how is the **temporal experience** of hope articulated and actualised?* – refers to the historical and contingent dimension that Agamben claims to belong to the practice of use, described by Agamben, on the one hand, in terms of movement, and, on the other hand, in terms of becoming. Firstly, as per the above, Agamben refers to the practice of use as a process, an activity that moves the object of use, "inscrib[ing]" (2007: 85) it in a given sphere, thereby *changing* its meaning. So described, the activity of use is inherently temporal, a sense of movement that dislodges a signifier from past usages and makes it available for use in new ways. Secondly, Agamben describes use as an activity that brings presence to that which is not-yet fully actualised (2015: 48). It is in this sense that one can say that usage organises processes of becoming. According to Agamben, this is a central aim of every biopolitical technology (2011: 11), one that is performed inter alia through the organisation of time. In *Infancy and History*, Agamben argues that "every culture is first and foremost a par-

[9] For Agamben, what is fundamental to life is the constitutive function of relation: "relation ceases to be one category among others and acquires a special ontological rank" (2015: 270). Nothing can escape being-in-relation, not even language. Indeed, according to Agamben, "the fundamental relation – the onto-logical relation – runs between beings and language, Being and its being said or named. *Logos* is this relation, in which beings and their being said are both identified and differentiated, distant and indistinguishable" (Ibid.: 271).

[10] Agamben thus follows a long tradition within post-structural thought to substitute meaning for use, or rather, to attribute meaning to use. As argued by Derrida: "the idealization of an objective and theoretical ideality of meaning, or a 'free' ideality, as Husserl would say […], cannot be what gives the rule for the use" (2009: 170).

ticular experience of time and that no new culture is possible without an alteration in this experience" (2007b: 99). Based on this logic, the thesis investigates the experience of time that is articulated and actualised in and by US security discourse' use of hope. If hope is issued through 'a new beginning' – the key theme of the strategic narrative on diplomacy, or in a 'new moment of promise' – the leitmotif of the strategic narrative on development – then how are these moments meant to be experienced temporally? What past do they promise to displace, what present do they actualise, and what future do they visualise?

The fourth empirically oriented research question – *how are different* ***forms of life*** *constituted in relation to hope and to one another?* – attends to the explicit biopolitical dimension that Agamben identifies as inherent in the activity of use. According to Agamben, a biopolitical technology, or apparatus, takes as its object the constitution of life. As discussed above, apparatuses aims to "capture" (2011: 14) what Agamben refers to as a non-fixed "substance of life", to mould it into a given subject. As Agamben's discussion of the concept of use indicates, the activity of biopolitical use presupposes a series of relations: between the using subject and the object of use, between the object of use and the subject that is the projected outcome of that use, and finally between the using subject and the produced subject. According to Agamben, these relations are performative of each position, including, the using subject. Agamben explains: "Every use is first of all use of the self: to enter into a relation of use with something, I must be affected by it, constitute myself as one who makes use of it […] in the using of something, it is the very being of the one using that is first of all at stake" (2015: 30). What Agamben terms "subjectification" (2011: 6) is thus intrinsic in the concept of use., which is fundamentally distinguished from both utility and instrumentality, seeing as the latter two presuppose an independent and autonomous agent.[11] With the ambition to analyse how the use of hope governs processes of subjectification – what subjects the use of hope is productive of, the thesis investigates how the activity of use both separates and places in relation different forms of life on the basis of hope. Analysed through this question are multiple topics of concern: Which forms of life are deemed in need of

[11] Historically, Agamben finds this ontological formulation expressed in the Stoic tradition, in which use of the self was opposed to the notion of essence and substance. For the Stoics, use was taken to "precede being […referring to] a primary *energeia* without being'" (2015: 56, original emphasis). While the Self was seen as a contingent entity, amenable to change, the capacity to use was not. As Agamben writes: "it is necessary that the self first be constituted in use outside any substantiality in order that something like a subject – a hypostasis – can say: I am, I can, I cannot, I must…" (Ibid.: 55).

hope? Which forms of life are perceived to be capable of using hope? What relationship between these forms of life does the use of hope establish? And, lastly, what subject does the use of hope by US security discourse aim to produce, what form of hopeful life does it deem deem safe, without risk of becoming violent?

To summarise this discussion, my empirical exploration of the discursive use of hope analyses the instrumentalisation of hope by the Obama administrations' security discourse. It questions what this instrumentalisation does to hope, to time and to life respectively. As such, the thesis focuses on the four elements identified by Agamben as belonging to every technology: *instrumentality*, *ontology*, *temporality* and *subjectification*. In the next section, I will probe a series of limitations actualised by these research questions and by the discourse-oriented framework employed.

Delimitations

The choice to focus on discourse comes with a series of limitations that render the thesis unable to speak on a range of issues of urgent political and academic importance.

First of all, despite the explicit attention to use, the focus on discourse entails a blind spot to aspects of implementation that fall outside the use of strategic communication, in particular to how the use of hope is operationalised across the departments, sectors and shifting levels of the US security apparatus.[12] As is well known, the focus on discourse associated with the 'linguistic turn' within critical studies of security has been widely critiqued in recent years precisely for its inattention to this level of implementation. Didier Bigo, for one, has questioned whether discourse hold any explanatory value at all, directing attention rather to the embodiment of mundane, bureaucratised practices among the professional security work force (2014). Similarly, Jef Huysmans has called for the study not of the traditional exceptional speech act, but of everyday practices that in contrast appear as "little security nothings" (2011). The thesis' attention to discourse further renders it blind to hope's material implementation – not only how it is effectuated by actual policies, such as the 2010 US *Global Development Policy* but also how these policies are expressed for instance in the built environment, through infrastructure initiatives such as *Power Africa* and *Feed the Future*. The aesthetic dimension of strategic communication – its dissemination through

[12] For a discussion on how exceptional claims to sovereignty are related to and dispersed across a "complex and forcible domain of power", see Butler and Spivak, 2007: 10-11.

"images, slogans, memes, and stereotypes", as testified by former coordinator of the *Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications* Albert Fernandez (2013), also falls outside the purview of this thesis.

The reason for these limitations is that my primary interest is to make visible the exclusions and power actualised by hope on the most authoritative level within the US security apparatus. Because it is at this level that the use of hope most effectively affects our political imagination. I do not claim that this is the only way hope is used in the US security apparatus. Quite the contrary, as I argue in the methodological chapter of this *kappa*, I see the respective strategic narratives neither as dictating the actions of the US security apparatus, nor necessarily as representative of its use of hope, but as an exemplary use – a code of conduct, a point of reference that cannot be avoided.

Importantly, the question of how the irreducible multiplicity of contemporary global life has come to embody, respond, contest, appropriate and resist the respective strategic narratives' attempts of subjectification also falls outside the scope of inquiry. Following Mitchell Dean, I wish to conclude this section by emphasising that "regimes of government do not determine forms of subjectivity" (2010: 43). Needless to say, the use of hope analysed in this thesis does not affect every hope, every experience of time, and every life, only the particular hope, time and life actualised in and by the Obama administrations' security discourse. The hopeful life that is addressed in this thesis should therefore "not be confused with a real subject, subjectivity or subject position, i.e. with a subject that is the endpoint or terminal of these practices and constituted through them" (Ibid.).

Supporting Articles

Supporting the analysis summarised in this *kappa* are four separate research articles. *Article 1* situates the thesis in the current academic debate. It reads the meaning afforded to hope politically and analytically in critical studies of the post 9/11 US security apparatus. The article ends with a call to treat hope not as an analytical concept, but as a biopolitical technology, one which is central to practices and discourses of security. Articles 2-4 attempt to answer this call, offering a biopolitical analysis of the use of hope in US security discourse of the Obama administration. The analyses performed in the respective articles, have enabled this *kappa* to discuss this use in relation to three central facets of Agambenian biopolitics: the suspension of language and political voice (*article 2*), the suspension of time and of political agency (*article 3*) and the suspension of political belonging and permanent exposure to death (*article 4*).

Article 1, "Reading the War on Terror Through Fear and Hope? Affective Warfare and the Question of the Future",[13] analyses how hope and fear has been employed in critical analyses of contemporary practices of security, represented in the article by critical strands of affect theory as well as of Derridean deconstruction. It concludes that the analytical distinction between hope and fear that these accounts offer reproduces both the temporal structure of promise enacted by authoritative discourses of the War on Terror as well as the political terminology and distinctions informing such discourses.

Article 2, "The Unknowing Subject of Radicalisation: US Counterterrorism Communications and the Biopolitics of Hope",[14] analyses the biopolitical use of hope by US counterterrorism communications to combat the 'hate' that US security discourse claims to be disseminated by the 'ideology of violent extremism'. Tracing the definition of hope that informs these practices, the article makes visible a paradoxical form of hope that while held as open to an unknown future, functions to govern the future's coming into presence. The article argues that the use of hope by US counterterrorism communications is constitutive of a postmodern subject, whose ability to articulate concrete utopian visions of the future is actively and continuously disrupted. Such visions are associated by US counterterrorism communications only with violence and exclusion. It is further argued that while the use of hope aims to create an unknowing and hopeful subject open to the future, the form of governance that informs these practices is more akin to Agamben's theory of the state of exception. What characterises this form of politics is not hope, as it is commonly conceived, but an indistinction between hope, fear and hate. The article engages literature of radicalisation, strategic communication as well as poststructural theories of hope.

Article 3, "Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and the Promise of Despair",[15] traces the distinction between hope and despair that is central in the Obama administration's development discourse. It analyses hope's proclaimed ability to render despair – and poverty – a condition less threatening to neoliberal life. Emerging from this reading is the identification of hope's temporal structure as it is actualised in this discourse: an amnesiac hope that works to revise the past rather than to build the future. This temporal structure is explicitly discussed in relation to Agamben's definition of both the state of exception and of potentiality. The form of life that the use of

[13] Published 2013 in *Political Perspectives* 7(2): 85-105. Special issue: Unfolding the Political: Voices of aesthetics and emotions, guest edited by Emmy Eklundh and Rachel Massey.

[14] This article has been invited to be part of a special issue on "Hope as a Technology of Development", guest edited by Marjo Lindroth and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen. Tentative journal: *International Political Sociology*.

[15] Published 2017 in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 35(5): 875-892.

hope aims to produce is identified as similar to the idealised figure of the neoliberal subject, whom is encouraged to not perceive despair as the opposite of hope, but as its condition of possibility. The article engages literature within the fields of critical development studies and post-development.

Article 4, "Hope in a Time of Catastrophe? Resilience and the Future *in* Bare Life",[16] takes a broader look, focusing not only on the distinction between fear and hope in US security discourse, but also on the overarching relation between security and hope that this discourse is productive of. By analysing Obama's Nobel lecture, it argues that through hope, life becomes both permanently vulnerable and dangerous. The distinction between fear and hope, as well as that between war and peace that initially appears to support the use of hope within US security discourse is thus dissolved. The article analyses the production of hopeful life through Agamben's notion of the sovereign ban, explicitly probing the relation between hopeful life and the figure of the *homo sacer*, a bare life able to be killed, yet not sacrificed (1998: 85). The article interrogates critical literature on resilience.

[16] Published 2014 in *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 2(3): 183-184.

Theorising the use of hope

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework from which we can study and understand the use of hope not only as an instrumental conscious activity performed by a pre-defined agent, but as a biopolitical practice, a "weapon used in the biopolitical struggle for Being, in which a decision is made each time on the human and the inhuman on 'making live' or 'letting die'" (1999a: 147). This framework is based on Agamben's conceptualisation of potentiality not as a "logical or epistemological categor[y]", but as an "ontological operator" (Ibid.) employed to form the human subject. According to Agamben, it is precisely through potentiality that the subject is produced: "'the subject […] is a field of forces always already traversed by the incandescent and *historically determined* currents of potentiality and impotentiality" (Ibid.: 147-48, emphasis added). The framework is chosen for multiple reasons, one of which is because it engenders critical examination of the relationship between hope and potentiality that Obama repeatedly articulates (2006; 2008b; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2010a; 2013; 2015b; 2015d; 2016a). By defining hope as a use object, the framework also directs attention to the biopolitical ramifications entailed in the concept of use – an activity that is operative on the levels of *ontology*, *temporality* and *subjectification*. As such, the framework garners attention, firstly, to hope as constituted through discursive practices. Secondly, to hope as a temporal experience of movement that governs the future's coming into presence, and thirdly, to how the subject of hope is formed through exclusion.

While this framework borrows heavily from general post-structural insights, such as the attention to discourse and to relations of power and exclusions, it nonetheless problematizes a certain way that post-structuralist critique of the post 9/11 state of security speaks about hope. Within this cri-

tique, hope is often referred to as a capacity or an experience of excess which cannot be contained (Rorty, 1999; Negri, 1999; Massumi, 2002a; Derrida, 2006; Anderson, 2006a; Skrimshere, 2008; Burke, 2011; Bourke, 2014). Hope is also commonly taken to signify an embrace of contingency and radical potentiality, a practice that opens the present towards the possibility of a radically different future (Ahmed, 2004; Evans and Reid, 2014; Eagleton, 2015; Solnit, 2016;). In respect to politics of security, hope is often held as an act of resistance, a refusal to accept fear and division as a fixed reality (Hardt and Negri, quoted in Brown et. al., 2002; Atran, 2008; Skrimshire, 2008; Bourke, 2014; McSorley, 2016; Robin, 2017).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Susan McManus has referred to this manner of speaking as the "hope project" (2011).[17] While McManus speaks of a 'project', the way of speaking that I will address in this chapter is not as coherent, as instrumental nor as well-defined as the notion of a project implies. The 'hope project' is not a unified or pre-defined research agenda. Although working in a post-structural spirit, those included in the 'hope project' do not fully share epistemological and ontological foundations. Some advocates for hope, such as Brian Massumi (2002a), Anderson (2006a; 2006b) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (quoted in Brown et. al, 2002), base their research on the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, others employ a Derridean perspective (Skrimshere, 2008). Others still depart from Foucauldian biopolitics (Duffield, 2007; Chandler, 2013; Evans and Reid, 2014) or from Levinasian ethics (Burke, 2011). Despite these differences, however, they all contribute to an idea of and a desire for radical hope, one that, I would argue, is not all that different from the narrative of hope offered by Obama.[18]

The chapter departs with a literature review that focuses on the relationship between hope and global biopolitics of security. This review details the use of hope by both modernist frameworks of liberal progress and by what David Chandler has referred to as "postmodern" (2014: 62) forms of human-centred approaches to global security. Following this exposé, I review how these forms of governance have been critiqued from the vantage point of critical theory, in particular critical studies of security broadly defined (c.a.s.e collective, 2006; DeLarrinaga and Salter, 2014). The reason that this critique is presented is twofold. On the one hand, the review aims to tease out the

[17] Duggan & Muñoz (2009: 275) has similarly observed the privilege afforded to hope in contemporary critique.

[18] Of course, not all post-strutural theory shares the desire for hope, yet it is common. Rorty includes in his vision of hope, "anti-platoni[c]" theorists as disperse as Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer, Derrida and Foucault, but also James, Dewey, Kuhn, Quine, Putnam and Davidson (Rorty, 1999: xix).

ideas of radical hope that this literature is productive of, and, on the other hand, to problematise how this narrative has rendered invisible the identification of hope as a biopolitical technology. Throughout this review, the discussions will focus on how hope's *instrumentality*, *ontology*, *temporality* and *subjectification* has been conceived or assumed in and by biopolitics of security as well as by its critiques.

In order to move beyond the exteriority between hope and security that is often articulated within critical studies of security, the chapter ends with a discussion on the relationship between potentiality and biopolitics as conceptualised by Agamben. To be sure, Agamben grants no privilege to hope, nor to potentiality, in the attempt to overcome biopolitics of security. According to Agamben, devotion to the future "is not a question of thinking a better or more authentic form of life, a superior principle or an elsewhere" (2014: 74). For Agamben, the experience of a radical excessive potentiality that often is emphasised by critical studies of security is not outside of biopolitics, but complexly imbricated with the workings of both biopolitics and sovereign power. Indeed, Agamben has argued that "a principle of potentiality is inherent in every definition of sovereignty" and that "the sovereign state is founded on an 'ideology of potentiality'" (1998: 47). Emerging from this discussion is a theoretical framework to study how the use of hope attempts to organise potentiality. Like post-structural theory at large, it does this by focusing on the performative use of language, on the constitutive role of exclusions and on the regulation of time – but without privileging hope as an uncontainable affect or capacity.

The use of hope in biopolitics of security

As stated above, this section offers a literature review over the use of hope in modern and postmodern forms of biopolitics of security. It begins with a discussion on the liberal subject of modernity, and the linear hope attached to the attempt to universalise this subject's moral progression. Following this discussion is an exploration of the attempts by postmodern forms of security governance to produce a non-linear and localised hope. Throughout this review, the biopolitical ambitions and ramifications of these projects will be highlighted, with a particular focus on the *instrumentality*, *ontology*, *temporality* and processes of *subjectification* that these forms of governance relate to hope.

As is well known, the liberal viewpoint holds the individual to be the primary actor of politics (Hegre, 2004: 31; Vernon, 2011). In its ideal form, liberal representative democracy presents itself as a reflection of the individ-

ual citizens that make up a given state. While hope is central to this subject, liberal theory subsumes hope's *ontology* to the general notion of interests. As such, hope is described in non-emotive terms, embodied in a bounded and rational individual who pursuits its hopes instrumentally and calculable, with no explicit regard for the common good. Ronald Aronson has referred to this subject as formed through a "privatisation of hope" (2016). According to James Vernon, what defines the liberal individual is not the contents of his or her interests – but the way in which these interests are pursued. What characterises the liberal subject is "a way of being in the world. The subjects of liberal politics [are] expected to think for themselves and act as individuals, not as representatives or members of a wider collectivity or community" (2011: 304).

In order to ensure that this individual does not express its hopes through violent means, modernist forms of liberal theory encourage the careful regulation of the economic incentives and institutional settings surrounding the individual. To that end, liberal democracy combines promises of meritocracy (Wallerstein), with the establishments of legal rights and structures to handle discontent (Hegre, 2004: 34). Proponents of the democratic peace theory hold that such institutional forms make liberal democracies averse to war, both between and within states. Immanuel Kant, chief ideological architect of the democratic peace paradigm, has famously argued that liberalism makes war non-profitable (1795/1991). It is further commonly assumed within liberal theory that the everyday practices of democracy foster moral norms of tolerance, pluralism and compromise, norms that according to Håvard Hegre "strictly inhibit the complete removal from political life of the loser in political contest — defeat does not mean elimination of a chance to try again" (2004: 42).

Through the latter explanation's emphasis on norms in the cultivation of democratic ideals, the liberal subject appears less as a universal and ahistoric description of human nature, but as a politically formed entity, the moral progression of whom was the object of Kant's philosophical project (Behnke, 2012; Jabri, 2010). For this subject, conflictual self-interest had been transformed into enlightened self-interest, rendering the difference between the individual and the common good obsolete (Behnke, 2012: 254). According to Vernon, however, the liberal project was never complete, because the idealised liberal subject did not exist. Human life "was not always an individual" (2011: 306). On the contrary, the liberal project demaned that the individual was continuously produced, "for liberalism was never able to entirely extricate its subjects from the social" (Ibid.). So defined, liberalism concerns a radical and continuous transformation of the subject that it claims to be pre-

existent and natural, a paradox that historically has generated immeasurable violence (Jabri, 2006; Reid-Henry, 2015; Evans, 2016). According to Agamben, who calls the result of this paradox "an incessant civil war" (2000: 32), the liberal subject "is what already is, as well as what has yet to be realized" (Ibid.: 31).

As we shall see, the use of hope has been central to liberalism's transformative promise. From above reading, we can contend that a linear *temporality* is embedded in the liberal canon, a promise of the imminent arrival of what has been likened to the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 2006), i.e. the establishment of perpetual peace through the universalisation of the liberal subject. According to Agamben, this linear hope is exemplary of modernist forms of biopolitics, defined by a wish to purify itself, to become whole. "Our age", he writes, "is nothing but the implacable and methodical attempt to overcome the division dividing the people, to eliminate radically the people that is excluded" (1998: 179). As have been observed repeatedly, the liberal promise includes a perception that "illiberal life" embodies a series of character defining lacks (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2014: 58; Murray Li, 2007: 7), one of which is its perceived inability to practice a politically oriented hope. Hegre's claim that poor people lack the economic and cultural capacity to "be politically active" (2004: 57) and to "use democratic institutions" (Ibid.: 63) is illustrative of this position. According to Maja Zehfuss, such claims deny illiberal life the capacity for voice, perceiving them as "unable to make a contribution to visions of the future" (2012: 869).

Central to the liberal promise is thus a geography and economy of hope; "a division between the hopeful and the hopeless that ties the hopeless into a network of obligation" (Anderson, 2006a: 749).[19] Through the lens of the liberal promise, hope appears as a gift to those that are perceived to be "absen[t] of aspiration" (Galbraith, 1979: 61–62, quoted in Pupavac, 2005: 165), a promise to realise life's full potential (Alt, 2016: 119). Installed by such practices is a "trusteeship" (Murray Li, 2007: 5) or a "contractual relationship" (Duffield, 2005: 154) towards illiberal life. Hope is instrumental for this relationship, seeing as it allows liberal geopolitical practices to be perceived as humanitarian or developmental (Anderson, 2006a: 749). Jennifer Fluri has observed that the precondition of this project is a reduction of illiberal life to a "site of potentiality" (2011: 12) – a blank slate onto whom the liberal project can sovereignly act. It thus seems that the liberal project constantly reproduces that which it claims to erase, sedimenting an image of

[19] See also Richey (2015) for a discussion on how celebratory humanitarianism is productive of a "geopolitics of hope that foreground[s] sentimental rather than political concern" (2015: 14). See also Goodman (2013) for a similar discussion.

global poor as "the object of aid and protection" (Agamben, 1998: 133). The objectification of life that Agamben here addresses is of course addressed in the concept of bare life (1998) that he so often is associated with – described repeatedly as a life without future and hope (Agamben, 1998: 177; Negri, quoted in Nielsson, 2004: 68; Edkins and Pin Fat, 2005; Burke, 2011; Bourke, 2014).

Through this reading, we can perceive the liberal project of modernisation as a biopolitical project to produce hopeful life: to *instrumentally* produce a subject for whom there is no difference between self-interest and the general interest. It is precisely this universal project that Obama claims to deny, issuing a promise to recognise the global poor as inherently hopeful and potential (2009c). Indeed, the strategic narrative on development explicitly promises to do away with the linear promise of modernity, recognising that no nation can ever be perfect (2015b).

In that sense, the Obama administrations' security discourse echoes what has been observed as increasing tendency in and by contemporary governance to reject the modernist framework. According to David Chandler, what characterises this form of governance, which he refers to as "an adaptation of a postmodern ontology" (2014: 62), is an abandonment of modernity's linear hope, a recognition "that linear or teleological understandings of human progress are no longer deemed possible" (Chandler, 2013: 3, see also Duffield, 2005: 132; Reid, 2010: 392).

Following developments in the life sciences that question the "'naturalness' of the universal rational subject" (Chandler, 2013: 5, see also Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009), the subject centring this emerging form of governance is perceived to be social, relational and affective, engaged in continuous non-linear processes of adaptation and emergence. Michael Dillon has referred to the figure of life that such practices seek to produce as "Being as Becoming", defined as a potential life that is "radically contingent because it is ontologically emergent" (2007b: 14). If the modernist promise sought to foreclose contingency, postmodern forms of security governance have been claimed to govern *through* contingency (Dillon, 2007b), attempting to regulate the continual processes of becoming that is central to their definition of life (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 44). Based on this definition of life, the modernist desire for a stable identity is held to no longer be presented as an object of aspiration for the Western subject of security (Dillon, 2007a: 17; O'Malley, 2010; Chandler, 2012: 217).

One of the ways through which the postmodern life of potentiality is claimed to be governed is through emotions, including hope (Grove, 2014: 248; Kaufmann, 2016: 105). In the literature on affect, hope's ontology is

perceived to be based not in reason, but in emotions, in the body's sensory and affective capacities (Connolly, 2002; Massumi, 2002b; Ahmed, 2004; 2010; Anderson, 2006a; 2006b; Holmer Nadesan, 2008; Berlant, 2011). Rather than giving hope to the hopeless, Mark Duffield argues that postmodern practices of security and development now seek to "contain" (2005: 152) what is perceived as illiberal life's inherent potentiality. In contrast to modern forms of security governance, Duffield argues that postmodern practices of security offer illiberal life a "portfolio of sustainable aspirations, feasible hopes and affordable dreams" (Duffield, 2005: 155, see also Pupavac, 2005: 167) – seemingly a stark contrast to Obama's promise to release their potentiality from the constraints of modernist ideals, offering the global poor a "new moment of promise" (2009c).

It has also been claimed that postmodern forms of governance have reformulated the liberal definition of the relationship between poverty and violence. In this framework, it is not poverty that is dangerous, but the idea that poverty can be eliminated: the inevitable risks associated with "rising expectations backfiring" (Pupavac, 2005: 167). Aspirations to eradicate poverty have thus been replaced by attempts to govern the poor, to create a resilient subject that is able to cope with the vulnerabilities associated with poverty (Best, 2013: 123; Aradau, 2014: 81; Chandler, 2015: 13; Pupavac, 2005: 173). If contained, hope's non-linear and anticipatory character is deemed central to this capacity (Evans and Reid, 2014: 47; Grove, 2014; Kaufmann, 2015), as is hope's assumed relation to creativity and optimism, two central aspects of resilience (Bourbeau, 2013).

In general, however, the resilient subject is often depicted as without hope. According to Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper, the framework of resilience is productive of a "culture of preparedness" (2011: 152), one which always is in anticipation of the crisis. Evans and Reid hold the resilient subject to be exhausted by a "biopolitical aesthetic" of human suffering, "projecting and anesthetizing a fear for the immanent and total destruction of human life" (2014: 178). Together with Dillon, Reid has argued that fear has become a "generative principle of formation" (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 86), a feeling Brian Massumi hold to have become ingrained into the very fabric of post 9/11 life (2005: 31). It has often been claimed that the representations of this feeling is now heard and seen everywhere, "in real time, all the time" (Der Derian, 2005: 23). The same goes for the representation of catastrophe, as argued by Henry A. Giroux: "Catastrophes have not only been normalized, they have been reduced to the spectacle of titillating TV" (2012).

In summation, we find within (post)modern forms of security governance, two versions of hope employed to govern and form life's becoming. In modernist accounts, the instrumental use of hope appears to be the creation of the liberal subject. Ontologically, the liberal project assumes that hope belongs to reason, the natural prerogative of the liberal subject. The temporal structure that organises the modernist hope is a linear conception of history, promising the universalisation of the liberal subject. In postmodern forms of governance, we see an inverse method. Rather than giving hope, it is claimed that such practices actively contain hope. Central to this form of governance is a perception of the human subject as an inherently potential and affective being, formed through constant adaptation to its habitat. The ontology of hope that occupies these forms of governance is defined as an anticipatory and affective capacity, one that is in need of continuous containment and regulation.

The next section will rehearse important theoretical critiques against these two forms of security governance, highlighting the pivotal role afforded to hope in this body of literature. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, what this review makes visible is a desire to position hope as external to biopolitics. The section is structured as follows: I first discuss a common tendency to argue that what modern and postmodern forms of biopolitics use is not really hope at all, but a reduced or distorted form of hope that is claimed to be parasitic of the inherent radical nature of hope. I then proceed by presenting different descriptions of the presumed subversive and political role that defines this radical hope. The section ends with a discussion on the proximity between this critique and the use of hope in US security discourse under president Obama. The ambition of this discussion is to question the radicality of this way of speaking as well as its usefulness when studying hope as a biopolitical technology.

The affirmative use of hope in critical theory

Based on above discussions, it would be easy to assume that hope has a central place within biopolitics of security, functioning either as a promise to realise liberalism's linear hope or as an attempt to contain and regulate the non-linear hopes of illiberal life. However, critical literatures of these forms of governance often describes such practices as antagonistic to and reductive of hope. This section will present this critique in greater detail, teasing out the various ideas of hope and the general desire for hope that is embedded in it. Like the section above, the presentation will focus on the *ontology* of hope, the *temporal experience* of hope and the process of *subjectification* that hope

is taken to be formative of. It will also discuss the *instrumental* relation to hope that often is presented in this literature: the articulated need to describe hope as a deficiency in need of constant cultivation if a radical political subject is to emerge. The section ends with an attempt to problematize this desire, questioning its portrayal of hope as a subversive act of resistance, rather than as a biopolitical technique.

While a Marxist perspective would describe the liberal promise of moral progress as false hope,[20] a common stance from a post-structural perspective is to describe the liberal hope as a drastic limit to our political imagination. According to Anthony Burke, the liberal promise of security has "written us – [it has] shaped and limited our possibility, the possibilities for ourselves, our relationships, and our available images of political, social and economic order" (2007: 31). The confidence with which the liberal promise has been pronounced – the promise of "enlightened knowledge" effectively being, as Claudia Aradau explains, a "voice of authority and certainty" (2014: 86) – has additionally been taken as an attempt to foreclose the contingency that is commonly claimed to be hope's condition of possibility. According to Eagleton, devotion to linearity is a "fatalist" position, one that radically reduces the "indeterminacy of the future" (2015: 26). Jacques Derrida has poetically described this fatalism as the death of hope: "if one could count on what is coming, *hope would be but the calculation of a program*. One would have the prospect but one would no longer wait for anything or anyone. […] To see coming. Some, and I do not exclude myself, will find this despairing 'messianism' has a curious taste, a taste of death" (2006: 212, emphasis added).

While the rationale behind postmodern forms of security governance emphasise time to be non-linear and the future to be essentially unknown (Massumi, 2007; Anderson, 2010; Aradau and van Munster, 2010; Martin, 2014), the life produced by such practices has nonetheless been claimed to be anchored to the actuality of *one* time, to be obsessed by a future only comprehensible in catastrophic terms. Aradau speaks of these practices as enacted by a will to 'tame' the unknown (2017: 329). Dillon speaks of them as organised by a "*katechontic*" (2011: 784, original emphasis) temporal structure, centred on a catastrophic imaginary, obsessed by the desire to withhold the end of

[20] From a (post)Marxist perspective, it is not the poor that is dangerous, but inequality. According to Lauren Berlant, the promise of social mobility orients affection to that which causes the hurt, namely the structure of capitalism. True hope, from a Marxist perspective, is rather of the revolution, in the social collective form of political mobilisation (Bloch, 1986). Ronald Aronson has argued that it is precisely the lack of this social and political hope that creates conditions for violence in liberal democracies: The promise of individual betterment turns collective, social hopes into individual ones (2017). The lack of social hope has further been claimed to create loneliness, lack of trust and empathy (Harvey, 2000).

days.[21] Embedded in this temporal order, he argues, is not true contingency, but the knowledge of contingency: "contingency is not arbitrary chance. It represents a complex discourse – set of truth-telling practices – about the knowledge of uncertainty" (2007b: 45).

Despite their professed commitment to contingency, it has thus been argued that postmodern forms of governance seek to stabilise the present, urging life to cope with rather than to transform the conditions in which it lives (Reid, 2012; Evans and Reid, 2014). Evans and Reid hold the postmodern subject of resilience to be a nihilistic and reactive life without imaginative power, unable to conceive of a world beyond the demands of insecurity (2014: 125; 196; see also Chandler, 2013: 163). According to Aradau, such forms of governance issues a "non-promise" (2014), through which the political subject is taught to be "agential, but within the coordinates of the system" (2014: 74). The potentiality that this framework incessantly emphasises is thus not held to really be potentiality, but a particular potentiality "suborned to the actual", to the "insistence that this world, as it is supposedly known, is the only world that can be" (Evans and Reid, 2014: 195). According to Thomas Martin, such practices offer nothing but "a radical constriction of the possibilities of the present" (Martin, 2014: 63).

Through above description, we can already begin to trace a way of speaking about hope that I hold as central to contemporary critique. Characteristic of this way of speaking is a dual claim: that hope, on the one hand, is under threat, at risk of being foreclosed by practices and discourses of security, and, on the other hand, is ontologically uncontainable by biopolitics, a disruptive force that forever exceeds the actuality of the present. According to this way of speaking, the *temporality* and *ontology* of hope is non-reducible to *one* time and to *one* meaning. Hope is rather presented as that which upsets every attempt to fix or define the present. Below, I will present four common ways of speaking about hope that I seek to both problematize and avoid.

Firstly, the *temporality* of hope is often with the future. Derrida, for instance, locates what he terms "messianic hope" in an unpredictable future that is paradoxically both forever to-come, yet always already present. According to Derrida, the future is not a temporal stage succeeding the present, but an experience of contingency that takes place *within* the present, in the most immediate immediacy. Derrida describes this moment as a "singular event of engagement", a messianic moment in the "here and now" (1996: 83) that is present "without presence" (Ibid.). Elsewhere, Derrida has referred to this future as an actualisation of an irreducible potentiality: "'It *can* come'

[21] See also Prozorov, 2012; Debrix, 2015; Heron, 2016 and Agamben, 2017 for a discussion on the relation between katechontic time and sovereignty.

('ça peut venir'). There is the future" (Ibid., emphasis added). In his response to the attacks on 9/11, it was this experience of hope and future that he feared was at stake, because, as he warned, the *discourse* of terror "*open onto no future and, in my view, have no future* […] there is *nothing good* to be hoped for from that quarter" (Derrida, 2003: 113, original emphasis)

Others have equally found both hope and the future in the experience that there is something beyond our current world. For Eagleton, hope is "conceivable" because of the "unfinished nature of the actual" (2015: 52), because there "strictly speaking is no present – because every present is radically in excess of itself" (Ibid.). According to Reid, who in many ways equate the imaginary with hope, the imaginary is "not only the promise of a world beyond […], but the *actual existence* of the beyond in the psychic life of the subject. It is *the enactment of the beyond now*" (2011: 161, emphasis added). In Massumi's terminology, hope is equalled to an affective intensity (2002a: 212),[22] i.e. to an "expectant suspension" (2002b: 27), a "temporal sink, a hole in time, as we conceive it and narrativize it" (2002b: 26). For Massumi, this hole in time is not a pause, but a "superlinear" experience, in which the distinction between present and future becomes blurred. It is the "*perception of one's own vitality*, one's sense of aliveness, of changeability" (Massumi, 2002b: 36, original emphasis).

Secondly, the *ontology* of hope is often placed beyond language, defined in opposition to fear and despair. Massumi's definition of hope as an affective intensity is a case in point. As an affective intensity, Massumi perceives hope to be an experience in excess of language, unable to be fully contained, without "particular content or end point" (2002a: 242). As the very definition of an affective intensity, hope refers to that which is present but not represented; it is located beyond the "sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience" (2002b: 28). Derrida too perceives the ontology of messianic hope as located "*beyond* language" (2003: 87, original emphasis), conditioned upon an openness for the "freedom of play, [an] opening of indetermination and indecidability" (2005: 25). For Derrida, hope is possible because of language's failure to fully constitute the world, hope is rather that force which deconstructs every such discursive attempt.[23]

[22] In a more recent article, Massumi has questioned hope's progressive role, describing hope rather as a politics of waiting (2015).

[23] For descirptions of Derridean deconstruction as a practice of hope, see Stavrakakis, 1999: 110-12; Matustik, 2004; Horner, 2010. For a fuller discussion on Derrida and Massumi's respective definitions of the relationship between hope, language and linear time, see *article 1* (Wrangel, 2013: 89-95). In this article I also place Derrida's dichotomy between hope and language in relation to liberal politics of security.

Antonio Negri similarly describes "full hope" (1999: 108) not as a constituted power, but as a form of constituent power: "the punctual determination that opens a horizon, the radical enacting of something that did not exist before" (1992: 31, quoted in Agamben, 1998: 43). Negri speaks of constituent power as a "principle and hope" drawn "toward the production of a new wealth and a new humanity" (1999: 231). The experience of hope, defined as essentially "boundless" in its expressions (Ibid.: 3), is thus juxtaposed the stabilisation of language which Negri claims to belong to constituted power (Ibid.: 3; 51; 211).

As a form of constituent power, Negri further holds hope to be the ontological opposite of fear (Ibid.: 324), which, according to Negri, functions to repress hope. In *Empire*, Negri together with Michael Hardt describe hope as "an antidote to the fear that surrounds us" (quoted in Brown et. al., 2002). As I have argued in *article 1* – "Reading the War on Terror through Fear and Hope: Affective Warfare and the Question of the Future" – Negri's distinction between hope and fear is commonplace within critical studies of security. Ahmed's distinction between fear and hope is another illustrative example of this tendency. In contrast to hope, which Ahmed describes inter alia as a sense of "opening up the world (2004: 184), fear is described as an experience that "shrink[s] the body" (2004: 69), that restricts "its mobility precisely insofar as it seems to prepare the body for fight" (Ibid.). As such, Ahmed defines fear as central to politics of security, a means "to secure the relationships between [...] bodies" (2004: 63), an attempt to preserve the subject in its present identity. Massumi's description of fear as a paralyzing sensation (2005: 36) modulated for the purposes of security also mimics this dichotomy.[24]

Such definitions not only ontologises hope, they also give hope a normative character, which brings me to my third point: hope is often equalled to the creation of a radical and inclusive *subject*. For Aronson, hope is "an experience of coming together" (2017), one that unsettles lines of division once perceived to be fixed and antagonistic. For Ahmed, hope is an act of "gathering together" (2004: 184). According to Negri and Hardt, hope is a force of resistance, one that "ultimately resides in comraderie, the possibility of the creation of a fraternal society of equals" (quoted in Brown et. al., 2002: 200). Burke's vision of a "humanity after biopolitics" (2011) offers a similar narrative. In this article, which arguably provides the theoretical and philosophical assumptions undergirding Burke's recent attempts to establish a form of "security cosmopolitanism" (2013), Burke finds in what he perceives as a

[24] For a systematic analysis of fear's relation to sovereign power and to US politics of security, see Robin, 2004.

"groundless" human nature an inextinguishable "hopeful creativity", untameable by biopolitics. Like Hardt and Negri's hopeful society, Burke argues that this groundlessness must be recognised and acted upon if it is to be realised. The hopeful life he envisions is both an "empirical fact and [a] moral imperative" (2011: 109). It is both an effect of politics, addressing a "moral future that is yet to take wing" (Ibid.: 108) and perceived to be prior to politics, referred to by Burke as "a supremely valuable core of human being normatively prior to the claims of politics, culture and subjectivity" (Ibid.: 109).

According to such definitions, hope is held to be both intrinsic to life – an inextinguishable and uncontainable human force of creativity that forever transcends totalitarian attempts of sovereign power (Burke, 2011: 108) – and to be formative of a particular transcendent form of life, as exemplified by Hardt and Negri's claim above. This brings me to my fourth and final point: hope is often presented as an end in itself, the instrumental task of what Richard Rorty has called an affirmative form of "biopower" (1999: 64). For Rorty, to foster hope means to foster a subject capable of setting "aside religious and ethnic identities in favour of an image of themselves as part of a great human adventure" (Ibid.: 238-9). Rorty thus sees in hope not only an abandonment of "the desire for stability, security and order" (Ibid.: 88), but also a commitment to contingency, to the "romance of unpredictable change" (Ibid.).

To be sure, Rorty is not alone to speak in this manner. In critical studies of security, we find numerous examples of this line of critique, calling for the cultivation of hope. For example, Evans and Reid argue, in the spirit of Derrida, that "one must love the future" (2014: 191). To implement this love, they advocate for practising a "critical pedagogy" (2014: 195) to the "globally oppressed" (Ibid.: 192) that would "release a potential which was *already there in the making*" (2014: 192, emphasis added). Other examples of this line of reasoning include Bloch's and Sarah Amsler's respective insistence that political agency is a "question of learning hope" (1986: 3; 2015: 12), Giroux's notion of a "critical pedagogy of educated hope" (2003), Anderson's call to develop an affirmative "ethos of hope" (2006a: 740) and Eagleton's identification of hope as a "question of merit", that can be "cultivated by practice and self-discipline" (2015: 58). Within this line of critique, we also find Chandler's appeal to replace the postmodern subject of governance with a "transformative subject" aspiring to "remake the world" (2013: 139) as well as Duffield's promotion of an "international citizenship" representative of the "magic of life itself", namely, the "possibilities for new encounters, mutual recognition, reciprocity and hope" (2007: 232).

Summarising this discussion, we hence see within critical studies of both modernist and postmodern forms of biopolitics of security a way of speaking about hope that collects diverse definitions and epistemologies of hope into a collective desire, one which presents hope as that which will counter and subvert the present state of security. Symptomatic of this desire is a description of hope as a temporal experience of radical contingency, one that is both co-disruptive of the present and formative of a new future and of a new inclusive subject. Hope is further presented as simultaneously present and absent, as both embodied in life and as fundamentally lacking contemporary life. Below, I will discuss the limits posed by this description for my study of hope as a biopolitical technology.

Firstly, if hope is perceived as an ontological capacity or experience, a constituent force that upsets the actuality of language, then this means that articulations of hope within political discourse are perceived by default not as constitutive of hope, but as reductive of it. As such, the conceptual relations through which hope is most commonly discussed, such as those between fear and despair, are taken as ontological, rather than as constitutive. Hardt and Negri's juxtaposition between fear and hope is particularly illustrative of this position. Secondly, the descriptions of hope as external to the demands of security, arguably contributes to why hope is understudied as a biopolitical technology in a systematic fashion.[25] As presented for instance by Burke, hope is not a biopolitical technology, but a substance of life, whose excessive character biopolitics of security aim to contain. While this way of speaking articulates a radical critique of the liberal and neoliberal subject – shining light on the historical and political context upon which this form of life is conditioned as well as on the exclusions belonging to its constitution – it nonetheless remains blind to the use of hope within its constitution. One central component in the "drama" that is playing on "theatre of our humanity" (Evans and Reid, 2014: 176) is thus left invisible – withheld as the prerogative of an affirmative form of subversion.

Because of this omission, this line of critique moreover leaves unscrutinised the historical and political conditions that undergird the contemporary critical desire for hope: its proximity with the narrative of hope offered by the Obama administrations' security discourse. For instance, as I explore in the supporting articles of this thesis, the conceptualisation of hope that is articu-

[25] See for example Anderson, 2006a; 749; 2010b; Berlant, 2011; Pedwell, 2012; Goodman, 2013; Grove, 2014: 248; Richey, 2015: 14; Kaufmann, 2016: 105. Anderson's discussion of morale in a total state of war (20101b) is arguably the most systematic of these studies.

lated by Obama is quite similar to the descriptions of hope presented above. Obama too positions hope to be an inclusive concept, defined in opposition to fear and division. Obama too describes hope as an embrace of contingency, a call to cherish the "ambiguities of history" (2009b), and a recognition that "history is on the move" (2009c). In varying circumstances, Obama has claimed that this contingency is actualised through a combination of some of the techniques recommended by critical literature: for instance through the rejection of the liberal promise of perfection (Obama, 2009c) and through recognising the capacity to remake the world from the "bottom-up" (2006; 2009c; 2015b).

Additionally, Obama too perceives hope to be both present and absent in contemporary life. Like the poststructural descriptions of hope discussed above, Obama depicts hope as both an inextinguishable force of human nature (2008; 2009b) and a capability that demands continuous external activation. According to Obama, hope can be both "built" (2010a), "supported" (2014) or "given" (2016a). While Obama continuously recognises the capacity to hope as universal (2009b; 2009; 2009c; 2015b; 2016a), it is nonetheless treated as a biopolitical problem, a capability or experience that both the subject of security and that of radicalisation is presumed to be in constant need of (Ibid., 2016a).

In order to move beyond the desire for hope, as well as the externality between hope and security, the next section will seek to establish a theoretical framework for studying hope as a biopolitical technology. To that end, it will discuss Agamben's conceptualisation of potentiality in relation to his definition of biopolitical use, paying particular attention to processes of *ontology*, *temporality* and *subjectification*. The discussion will explicate the pivotal role afforded by Agamben to potentiality in biopolitics of security, which Agamben defines not as an uncontainable excess of biopolitics, but as a state of suspension, the "ontological root of every political power" (1998: 48).

Theorising the biopolitical use of hope

In contrast to the literature discussed above, Agamben finds no political potency in hope, nor in a radical imaginary. Recalling the quote offered in the introduction to this chapter, Agamben perceives resistance against the biopolitical present to not be "a question of thinking a better or more authentic form of life, a superior principle or an elsewhere" (2014: 74). For Agamben, resistance is rather a question of decreating the present, to render the world "inoperative" (Ibid.: 69). In explicit contrast to Negri's constituent power (Agamben, 1998: 43; 2015: 266), as well as to Derrida's dedication to the to-

come (Ibid., 1999b: 172-74; Doussan, 2013; Atell, 2015), Agamben defines his political project as an attempt to make way for what he calls, following Walter Benjamin, a destituent power (2015: 266; 2014: 70). According to Agamben, to destitute sovereign power is not a matter of replacing it, or of exceeding it, but rather to render it inoperative: to expose the suspension of time, language and life that Agamben claims characterises our present biopoliticised state. To that end, the examples offered by Agamben of subversive forms of agency is characterised not by hope, but by what could be called a nihilistic acceptance of the biopolitical present beyond the limits of will and desire (1999b: 254). The most famous of the examples offered by Agamben is Herman Melville's Bartleby, a laconic figure that according to Agamben embodies the potential to negate the potentiality manifested in sovereign power, to turn the suspended state of modern life against itself (1998: 48; 1999b 243-71; 2009b: 35-8). The phrase that, for Agamben, encapsulates destituent power is "I prefer not to" (1998; 1999b)

The reason for Agamben's scepticism of hope is found in his radical redefinition of the concept of potentiality and its relationship to biopolitics. If we recall the brief introduction offered to potentiality in the introduction to this chapter, Agamben assigns no particular ontology or epistemology to potentiality. Potentiality is rather described as an "ontological operator" (Ibid.), a "weapon used in the biopolitical struggle for Being" (1999a: 147). If biopolitics is the politics that takes as its object the governing of life processes, of life's becoming (Ibid., 2011: 6), then it does this, according to Agamben, by regulating and organising the relation between actuality and potentiality through which different forms of life is brought into presence. For Agamben, this process does not necessarily refer to a reduction of life's potentiality to actuality, but to the "organization of potentiality" (1995: 71).

As a biopolitical technology, a use object, Agamben holds potentiality to be historically determined (1999b: 148). He speaks interchangeably of a particular "ideology of potentiality" as foundational of the sovereign state (1998: 47) and of particular "principle[s] of potentiality [as] inherent in every definition of sovereignty" (Ibid.). The "paradigmatic ontology" (Agamben, 2009: 5) that characterises Agamben's theoretical framework is here extended to his notion of potentiality. As such, Agamben underlines that potentiality cannot be studied as an ahistoric ontology. Like other paradigmatic concepts in the Agambenian framework, such as the *homo sacer* (1998: 139), inoperativity (2014: 72) and the state of exception (Lee, Najeeb and Wainwright, 2014: 652). Agamben claims that potentiality is only accessible through "the form in which [it] is captured in power" (2014: 72).

Importantly however, to adopt an Agambenian perspective of potentiality is not to strip à priori from potentiality its political potency, finding in it only the violent exclusions and operations of sovereign power. On the contrary, Agamben treats the political function of potentiality, and in extension of hope, as open. As observed by Rad Borislalov, Agamben speaks interchangeably of potentiality in positive and in negative terms (2005: 181), finding in potentiality both the workings of sovereign power and the means for its suspension.[26] Whether or not potentiality is emancipatory and progressive is hence an empirical question, one which is always phrased in relation to the structure of potentiality that we are caught in today.

The discussion below will rehearse Agamben's conceptualisation of potentiality in relation to the four aspects of biopolitical use: *instrumentality*, *ontology*, *temporality* and *subjectification*, with a particular focus devoted to the latter three.

In implicit contrast to Derrida (Atell, 2011), who if we recall defines potentiality as a pure presence beyond the actuality of language, Agamben conceives of the relationship between actuality and potentiality not as a mutually exclusive dichotomy, the one being parasitic of the other, but as a complex, if not paradoxical, indistinction. According to Agamben, the *ontology* of what he calls "pure potentiality" (1999b: 245) is absence, not presence. Based on Aristotle's notion of im-potentiality, Agamben takes potentiality to signify the presence of an absence, a presence that Agamben claims is able to "condition and render possible what is actual" (Heller Roazen, 1999: 15)

The philosophical question that ultimately concerns Agamben is how one is to understand the experience of potentiality *as* potentiality, i.e. how potentiality can be realised in, not reduced by actuality. For Agamben, this process demands a negation of the traditional idea of potentiality as the "potential to do or be something" (1999b: 250), seeing as such a definition would subsume potentiality to actuality: "we would never experience [potentiality] as such; it would only exist in the actuality in which it is realised" (Ibid.). If taken as a separate ontology, Agamben maintains that potentiality would refer not only to the capability to be or to act, but more importantly to the capacity to *not-be*. Following Aristotle's notion of im-potentiality, Agamben argues that "all potentiality is, at the same time, potentiality for the opposite [...] He who walks has the potential not to walk, and he who does not walk has the poten-

[26] In his many elaborations of the radical emancipatory potential of Bartleby, Agamben speaks of im-potentiality as a break from sovereign power (1998: 48; 1999b 243-71; 2009b: 35-8). In *Homo Sacer* (1998: 47-48) and in *The Idea of Prose*, he speaks of potentiality as the ontology of power (1975: 71).

tial to walk" (Ibid.: 262), otherwise the activity would not be referred to as a potentiality. If a potentiality is to be actualised as a potentiality, it thus demands that the potential not-to, the im-potential, is "not effaced in the passage into actuality" (Heller Roazen, 1999: 17), but realised in it. According to Daniel Heller Roazen, Agamben thus manages to conceive of "the passage to actuality […] not as a destruction or elimination of potentiality but, rather, as the very conservation of potentiality as such" (Ibid.: 17).

This matters to us because it means that we can conceptualise the use of hope and potentiality within US security discourse as a performative, rather than as a reductive exercise. It also means that hope is actualised, if not constituted, through language, not beyond it. Hope thus appears as an effect of performative distinctions in language – between what is taken as potential and that which is taken actual, between what is not yet, and what is. This means that the distinctions that Burke, Hardt and Negri and others employ to describe hope, such as those between fear and hope, and those between despair and hope, appear from an Agambenian perspective not as ontological, but as a performative discursive separation. From an Agambenian perspective, these distinctions do not mark the limit of language. Fear is not predefined as a stabilisation of actual language, nor is hope perceived by default as the actual's subversion. Such distinctions are rather perceived as taking place *in* language.

Indeed, while the ontology of potentiality may be absent, this does not mean that Agamben positions potentiality outside of language. Quite the contrary, Daniel Paul McLoughlin has observed that Agamben takes "the limit of language [to] fall within language" (2009: 174). As such, Agamben has argued that "Everything that is presupposed for there to be language (in the forms of something non-linguistic, something ineffable etc.) is nothing other than a presupposition of language that is maintained as such in relation to language precisely insofar as it is excluded from language" (1998: 50). So defined, Agamben perceives the absence that potentaility signifies as a suspension of language that takes place *in* and *through* language: "only the word puts us in contact with mute things" (Agamben, 1975: 113). Indeed, the principle method employed by Agamben in his study of potentiality is language. The question of potentiality thus becomes a question "concerning the *meaning of words*, an attempt to understand the meaning of the verb 'can' [potere]. What do I mean when I say: 'I can, I cannot'?" (1999b: 177, emphasis added).

One way that this paradoxical linguistic suspension of language is exemplified by Agamben is through the state of exception (2005a), which he describes as being "in force without signification" (1998: 51). What character-

ises the state of exception is the suspension of the law, a state in which the law is present in its absence, "appl[ied] in no longer applying" (1998: 28). In the state of exception, the law is actualised in its performative absence, in its capacity to *not-be*. The law is "entirely emptied of content" (Humphreys, 2006: 681), it is in force (hence actual), but without signification (hence absent and potential). Elsewhere, Agamben has described this form of suspension as a "destruction of communicable experience" (2007b: 6). To be abandoned to the state of exception has thus been likened to being stripped of one's capacity for voice, of one's "capacity to give meaning" (de Koning, 2015), unable to bear witness to the violence inflicted upon oneself (Agamben, 1999b: 33). This state of being, this "closedness and muteness" (Ibid., 2004b: 81) is, however, not without relation to language. As argued above, Agamben conceives of the outside of language as a product of language. He thus emphasises that the power to install the state of exception is a performative activity that, on the one hand, takes place in language, and, on the other hand is constitutive of the sovereign (Ibid., 1998: 7), who comes into being by announcing the law's suspension (Ibid.: 27): "language is the sovereign who, in a permanent state of exception, declares that there is nothing outside language and that language is always beyond itself" (Ibid.: 21).

Agamben further describes the state of exception as a temporal suspension, capable of "maintain[ing] itself indefinitely, without ever passing over into actuality" (1998: 47). In *The Idea of Prose*, Agamben describes the potential state as a temporal "duration" (Ibid.), the "organisation" of which he perceives as one of the principle aims of politics (Ibid.). In contrast to for instance Derrida, Agamben holds the actualisation of potentiality *as* potentiality – i.e. an actualisation of the im-potential, of the potential not-to – not to signify the future's rupture into the present, but as one of the principle means through which the future is postponed. While the experience of potentiality *as* potentiality may be dislocating – William Robert describes it as a 'rupture of temporality', a suspension of "normal spatiotemporality" (2006: 41) – Agamben takes its effect to be a suspension of time. Agamben thus defines time's relation to the enduring as paradoxical: a temporal experience of time's suspension. According to Sergei Prozorov, to live in this ruptured state is to be imprisoned in the present, in a time in which "nothing at all would be able to happen" (2010: 1067).

In other words, what the life of the state of exception is closed off to is not only language, but the ability to act in time. According to Agamben, the figure of bare life that he claims inhabits the state of exception is formed through a "deactivation of single, specific, factical possibilities" (2004b: 67). Bare life is defined as unable to "truly act" (Ibid.: 52), as "captivated" in its

present form (Ibid). In the state of exception, the potential to act – to become actual – is included only through its exclusion, a suspension that Agamben previously has referred to as the "*very origin of potentiality*" (Ibid., emphasis in the original). Through this reading, one can thus define the state of exception not as a "tyranny of actuality" (Prozorov, 2010: 1067) as per traditional interpretations of Agamben's conceptualisation of the state of exception, but as an im-potential state. This matters to us, because it means that the *temporality* of potentiality – and consequently of hope – is not predefined as an experience of the future, but presents itself rather as a means through which the present is organised. By defining hope as a biopolitical technology, the temporality of hope becomes rather an experience of the present, one that takes part in organising the future's coming into presence.

In terms of *subjectification*, hope – and potentiality – is often held, to be formative of an inclusive subject, as discussed in the previous section. However, according to Agamben, every subject constitution is formed through exclusion. Agamben describes exclusion as a performative act, one that establishes the limits of political belonging: In "Western politics", Agamben writes, the exclusion of "bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men" (1998: 7). As is well known, Agamben finds the historical roots of this exclusion in the Greek distinction between *zoē* and *bios*, between bare natural life and the good life deemed politically qualified. Of course, many have taken this distinction to imply a separation between a life caught in actuality, "a life that just is" (Beckman, 2016: 1) and a potential life capable of voice and agency that is worthy of legal protection (Ibid.). However, as Agamben has repeatedly underlined, the concept of bare life does not signify a purely actualised life, a natural existence, but rather a dehumanised or animalised life that continues to be caught in relation to political life (1998: 88; 2004b: 77; 2014: 66). If we recall Agamben's definition of potentiality above, in which the opposite of the potential to act is not actuality, but im-potentiality, then bare life appears not as an actual life but as an im-potential life, a "being-in-potentiality" (1998: 35). We should thus not be surprised that Agamben quotes Hannah Arendt's description of the Nazi concentration camps, which Agamben holds as the paradigmatic spatial site of the state of exception, as a place where "everything is possible" (quoted in Agamben, 1998: 170).

The im-potential life of the state of exception is not simply without the capacity for life, it is suspended from it, kept in relation to it. Geraldine Pratt argues that "abandonment is an active, relational process" (2005: 1054), in which one remains "in relation with sovereign power, included through exclusion" (Ibid.). The location of that this form of life occupies is not outside

the political order, but the *threshold* to it: it is a figure that represents the limit of the body politic. It is this relational character that transforms bare life into the figure of the *homo sacer*: the life that "may be killed but not sacrificed" (1998: 83). According to Agamben, it is not possible to sacrifice the life of the *homo sacer* because it has no value, or rather, its value lies in its exclusion, in the denial of its right to live politically, protected by the law. It is through this exclusion, which Agamben names the "sovereign ban" (1998: 28), that political life is able to performatively experience itself as qualified and potential.[27] In contrast to Foucault, who has argued that biopolitics render death into a private affair, Agamben thus holds the exposure to death as a key activity of biopolitics, one that has to be iterated continuously (1998: 32; 139; 153). This, according to Agamben, is the central paradox conditioning life biopolitically. To produce life, life has to be excluded, even exposed to death (at least potentially), thus making biopolitics, the politics of life, into its opposite: thanatopolitics, the politics of death (1998: 153).

This matters to us because Agamben's attention to the subject's relational status shines light on the exclusions that are a constitutive part of every process of subjectification – it directs attention to how life is assigned value, how it is differentiated from other forms life (Agamben, 1998: 137). From an Agambenian perspective, the embodied capacities of hope – and potentiality – thus appears as an effect of biopolitics rather than as an uncontainable excess. In summation, we can thus argue that an Agambenian framework makes it possible to understand potentiality as a performative activity, one that gives form to life.

Given the close proximity often assumed between hope and potentiality, Agamben's insistence on the performative nature of potentiality thus opens the possibility to identify hope as a biopolitical technology, a use object, rather than simply as being the target of such technologies. It makes it possible to understand the instrumental use of hope in the Obama administrations' security discourse as performative of hope, not as reductive of it. In short, Agamben allows us to see 1) the *ontology of hope* as constituted through language 2) the *temporality of hope* as an experience of the present that governs the future and 3) The *subject of hope* as a historical product, a biopolitical form of life, whose constitution is achieved through exclusion, by assigning value and non-value to life. The next chapter will seek to provide an answer as to how to research the actualisations of these limits in the biopolitical present in which we live.

[27] For a similar discussion on the performative role of exclusion, see Agamben, 2004b: 26.

Researching the use of hope

As stipulated in the opening to this *kappa*, this thesis aims to understand how hope is used biopolitically in the official US security discourse under the Obama administrations, 2009-2016. Following Sandra Harding's distinction between methodology – "a theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed" – and method – "a technique for (or way of proceeding in) gathering evidence" (1987, 2-3, quoted in Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006: 20), this chapter presents the methodological choices and considerations that inform this analysis as well as the concrete methods of analysis employed. The chapter departs with a discussion on the concept of discourse, as defined by Foucault and subsequently by Agamben. This discussion attempts to answer what discourse is, its relationship to materiality, and most importantly how to identify a given discourse as a distinct object of study. The key concepts that guide this discussion are the *example* and the *signature*, which Agamben holds as central to the formation of a particular discourse. I then proceed to discuss how these concepts are operationalised in terms of identifying and delimiting the thesis' study object. This discussion explicates my choice of the Obama administrations' security discourse as a paradigmatic study object, the selection of strategic narratives (which in turn is represented primarily by high-level speeches) as my primary empirical material, as well as the method employed to select and study these speeches. The empirical material has been selected by tracing the complex relational network that binds a series of statements to one another into a particular discourse. The primary method through which these statements have been analysed consisted of mapping the conceptual relations that according to Agamben (2009a: 40; 2013: 66) give content to a specific concept, such as hope, within that discourse. This method was complimented with a narrative analysis, which

attempts to make visible the temporal order established by the respective strategic narratives. In the final section, these methods are related to the research questions posed in *chapter 1*.

Conceptualising discourse

In order to query the use of hope as a biopolitical technology, the thesis focuses on how hope is articulated in US security discourse – a central, if not paradigmatic, discourse within the biopolitical apparatus governing and securing contemporary life. According to Foucault, discourse is only one element of a larger, more complex and heterogeneous structure of governance that Foucault has referred to as a dispositif – or apparatus, as Foucault's concept is often, yet perhaps wrongly, translated as,.[28] In an interview from 1977, Foucault defines the dispositif as consisting inter alia of social institutions, material forces and of discourses:

> "What I am trying to single out with this term is, first and foremost, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements" (Foucault, 1980: 194)

From Foucault's definition we learn that discourse is only one part of biopolitics of security. While Foucault defines language's role as central to the formation of regimes of knowledge, such regimes are in other words seen as only one part of the "much more heterogeneous" (Ibid.: 197) dispositif. Foucault's definition also details the relational character of the dispositif. A dispositif is not reducible to a particular element, be it a given discourse, an institution or a material composition, but constitutes rather the network that "exist between these heterogeneous elements" (Ibid.).

To study these relations, Agamben argues that Foucault nonetheless employed a single case methodology (2009a: 17), examining in great detail one example of the more general dispositif: "The great confinement, the confession, the investigation, the examination, the care of the self: these are all singular historical phenomena that Foucault treats as paradigms" (Ibid.). As such, Foucault's method aimed not to showcase the dispositif in its entirety, but rather to render visible "its ideal form" (1977: 221), what he also referred to as a "diagram" (Ibid.) of its operations. In Agamben's reading, Foucault

[28] For a discussion and problematisation of this translation, see Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & Thaning, 2014.

treats the diagram as an "epistemological figure" (Agamben, 2009a: 17) that organises the relations that make up a given dispositif. Agamben observes that the diagram is for Foucault not the standard or typical element of the dispositif – it is rather a hegemonic model, a paradigmatic example.

According to Agamben, the function of the paradigmatic example is not to represent, but to constitute the general. The example collects together what would otherwise be a disperse group of articulations. It allows "statements and discursive practices to be gathered into a new intelligible ensemble and in a new problematic context" (Ibid.: 18). The example performs this function by substituting itself for the general, describing the general through its own particularity: "it is the exhibition alone of the paradigmatic case that constitutes [the general]" (Agamben, 2009b: 21). It is in this way we should read the example: not as a single case, nor as a typical case – but as a "model", a "canon" (Ibid.), or in Foucault's words, an "ideal" (1977: 221), that is employed both to describe and to form the general. In other words, while one cannot, from a strictly methodological perspective, easily generalise from the example (it is after all but one case), this generalizability nonetheless appears to be the example's paradigmatic function: to "establish a broader problematic context that [the example] both constitute and make intelligible" (2009a: 17).

Agamben's conceptualisation of the example informs my choice of a single case methodology. As mentioned above, and as will be argued in greater detail below, I see US security discourse as a paradigmatic expression of biopolitics of hope, a single case whose explicit purpose is to become general, to organise the operations of the more general dispositif of which it is a part.

Agamben's identification of discourse as a privileged site, central to the formation of political belonging, and for the constitution of political community further informs my choice to study the US security apparatus through discourse. According to Agamben, language is "perhaps the most ancient of all apparatuses" (Agambem, 2009a: 14). In contrast to the late Foucault, Agamben perceives language not simply as one of many other elements within a given dispositif, but as an "onto-logical relation [that] runs between beings and language, between Being and its being said or named" (2015: 271). For Agamben, there is no example that is not somehow related to language. In *The Coming Community*, Agamben refers to the example as a "purely linguistic being" (2009b: 10). He explains: "Exemplary is what is defined not by property, except by being-called. Not being-red, but being-*called*-red; not being-Jakob, but being-*called*-Jakob defines the example" (Ibid., original emphasis). In other words, language is not one example of a dispositif, but

central to the very paradigmatic form through which a dispositif is studied – even of studies of material elements or techniques.

According to Agamben, a discourse is not a pre-existing list or group of statements. What collects certain statements into a group is not necessarily their shared content, but their relation either to a paradigmatic case, as argued above, or to what Agamben refers to as a signature: the authorial mark that aims to exhibit the creator of a given statement or object. Like the example, Agamben claims that the function of the signature is to make a given dispositif or discourse manifest. However, in contrast to conventional social constructivism – which has been critiqued for producing a distinction between those who are capable of writing discourse and those who are governed by discourse (Weber, 2014: 67-90; Shepherd, 2015) – Agamben conceives of the signatory not as an author of discourse, but as a product of the apparatus of the signature; of the contemporary demand for an author, for an individual addressee (Agamben, 2009a: 40). Read as an apparatus, Agamben argues that the purpose of the signature is not to change the object it signs, but rather how the object is interpreted. According to Agamben, the signature moves the object or statement that it signs, it "position[s] it in a new network of pragmatic and hermeneutic relations" (Ibid.). As such, the signature changes "our relation to the object [or statement] as well as its function in society" (Ibid.: 40). It is from this perspective one should understand my dedication to Obama. I perceive Obama not as an author of discourse, but as a paradigmatic figure whose signature is and has been employed to organise the relations between statements and signifiers belonging to US security discourse.

In sum, this thesis takes from Agamben two central concepts of methodology: the example and the signature. It employs the example in order to make visible a discourse or dispositif's model form and the signature to identify the connectivity between statements, their belonging to a given discursive formation. In the next section, I will operationalise these concepts, discussing how I have utilised them to identify my object of study: The Obama administration's strategic narrative. The discussion is organised as follows: I first identify Obama as a paradigmatic figure, exemplary of a form of postmodern and cosmopolitan hope. As paradigmatic, the signature of Obama has been used to delimit US security discourse in time as well as to identify which particular statements that belongs to it. I then discuss how I have chosen to represent as well as to narrow down the countless number of statements that bears the signature of Obama. As will be detailed below, the statements analysed have been selected because they attempt to be exemplary moments of hope.

Operationalising discourse

Which case that becomes paradigmatic is of course "never already given" (Agamben, 2009a: 23), but an effect of a historical and political contest. In this section I will argue that the signature of Obama, being one of the most circulated and exhibited figures of modern politics, has become exemplary of a cosmopolitan, if not postmodern, form of empathic hope.

That the signature of Obama is paradigmatic of hope – a signifier that has become indistinguishable from his persona (Shaull, 2017; CBS, 2017) – is hardly a novel claim. As the Nobel Committee declared in their Peace Prize nomination: "Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future" (Nobel Media AB, 2009). According to Mark Ferrara, Obama represented a form of universal hope, freed from it particular content, an "ideal form of global citizenship" (2013: 144), a "multicultural world" (Ibid.: 145). As such, Obama came to represent an escape from both the imperialist history of US exceptionalism (Stephanson, 2009) and from the occupying logic of the War on Terror, a label that Obama did not use (Luce and Dombay, 2009). According to Matthew Golbush, Obama's grand strategy was characterised by what he refers to as "moral multilateralism" (2016: 24), defined as a check on power, on the idea that might is right. Quoting Obama, Golbush concludes that multilateralism "regulates hubris", serving as a guarantee of a global balance of power. Others have described Obama's grand strategy as a professed willingness to listen (Lindsay, 2011: 765), to cooperate (Ibid.) and to see the world through the perspective of others (Pedwell, 2012).

While conservatives critiqued Obama for lacking a grand strategy, for not offering a vision of a global future (Henderson, 2010), progressives claimed that it was precisely this lack of vision that was Obama's vision. In Michael Hirsh's words: "the real Obama doctrine is to have no doctrine at all" (2011). So conceived, this 'grand strategy' to a large extent corresponded to what has been perceived as Obama's general conceptualisation of hope as an empty category. According to Hirokazu Miyazaki, Obama's hope is not particular, but general. The "most distinctive component" of Obama's hope, Miyazaki argues, is "its lack of specificity" (2008: 5), an emptiness he claims "invites us all to replicate it as our own personal and specific hope" (Ibid.: 8). In a similar manner, Daniel E. Rossi Keen has argued that: "there is [...] no singular or specific telos for Obama's audacious call for hope. That telos, rather, is itself an infinite collection of *teloi*" (2008: 210, original emphasis). Lauren Berlant has succinctly summarised the empathic promise issued by Obama's

hope: an assuring proclamation that "I feel your hope" (quoted in Pedwell, 2012: 290).[29]

It is the emptiness of Obama's hope – that it seemingly does not refer to anything other than itself, that is does not promise anything but hope – that informs the choice of the Obama presidency as the object through which the biopolitical use of hope is studied and exemplified. To study this use, I have analysed the administrations' security discourse, represented in this thesis by its strategic narratives in the respective 'pillars' of national security: (public) diplomacy, development and military.

The reason I focus on narrative is that narratives, in contrast to other more general forms of discourse, offer a temporal organisation of past, present and future (Miskimmon et. al., 2013: 7). Narratives attempt to sequence events in time, orchestrating a "rhythmic unfolding of words and representation" (Agamben, 2004a: 317). Following Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin and Laura Roselle, I understand strategic narratives as "a communicative tool through which political actors – usually elites – attempt to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives" (2013: 5). Based on Kenneth Burke, they define narratives as "frameworks that allow humans to connect apparently unconnected phenomena around some causal transformation" (Ibid.: 5). In other words, narratives are not a static description of the present, but an articulation of change, and of the available means of change. In visualising the future, narratives give meaning to the past and the present. One should however be careful to assume that narratives are ordered according to a pre-defined temporal sequence, such as linear chronological time. Sofie Hellberg notes that "there are no given rules for how people organise their stories temporally" (2015: 77). How a given narrative organises time is in other words rather a matter of empirical investigation.

From an Agambenian perspective, the methodological reasons for studying strategic narratives are plural. Not only do they have a clear signature, they also represent the most authoritative level of communication within the US security apparatus. As such, they are designed to be exemplary. Strategic narratives articulate the words and values that the actions of the larger US security apparatus are supposed to be 'synchronised' with (White House, 2010b: 2). Strategic narratives also have an explicit biopolitical agenda, attempting to "shape behaviour [by] chang[ing] the discursive environment" (Miskimmon et. al. 2013: 2). According to Agamben, narratives enchant their audience (2000: 71), they steer processes of subjectification. In the 2010 US

[29] See Pedwell, 2012, for a critical analysis of the relation between Obama's empathic hope and neoliberalism.

National Framework of Strategic Communication this objective is formulated as an attempt to influence the perception of the US among foreign publics, to "articulate a positive vision", (White House, 2010b: 6), fostering the belief that the US is a "constructive" and "respectful partner" with whom one shares "mutual interest[s]" (Ibid.).

In sum, the paradigmatic methodology that this thesis employs points to the study of political speeches at the presidential level as well as to the narrative form of these speeches: the organisation of past, present and future presented by them. The methodology presented above further leads me to treat these speeches as a biopolitical technique, as an attempt to regulate and modulate processes of subjectification. In the next section, I will detail the method used to select which speeches to analyse, as well as the discourse analytical method utilised to analyse these speeches.

Sampling US security discourse

Given that I am interested both in official discourse as well as in how the US uses hope, the empirical material has been selected based on how the administrations have chosen to present its discourse of hope to the general public. To that end, the material has been collected based on how a given speech has been communicated, 'sold' and 'advertised'. In particular I have used www.whitehouse.gov as well as the administrations' various social media channels.[30] Aside from providing an indexed database over statements, speeches, reports, policies and executive orders, www.whitehouse.gov is in many ways organised as a campaign site. It accentuates certain stories, speeches or policies in order to raise awareness or influence public opinion on different topics. It is, in other words, not a neutral research database, but a tool of public diplomacy, one that showcases the administrations' ideal image of a given policy or issue.

If every discourse consists of a complex network of statements, a "system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences", as per Foucault's definition (1972: 23), then www.whitehouse.gov offers a snapshot of how the Obama administrations perceive this network to be ideally assembled. The website represents an attempt to place certain speeches and reports in what

[30] There were several social media channels through which official US foreign policy was communicated during the Obama period: Barack Obama's personal Twitter, Instagram and Facebook profiles, the official @potus accounts on the same platforms, the State Department's and the White House's channels, as well as those that were specifically designed with a public diplomacy purpose, such as the Global Engaement Center's twitter account, and other campaign specific accounts such as the White House's campaign Muslim and American.

Lene Hansen calls "a prominent intertextual location" (2006: 13), rendering them into what Foucault has called a "node within a network" (1972: 23) and what Agamben refers to as an example (2009a: 18). As such, the presentation of certain issues on whitehouse.gov has provided a possibility to reassemble the network that forms US security discourse during the Obama period.

While the presentation of this network on whitehouse.gov changes over time, a certain consistency remains. Some speeches seem to never become old, but are referenced time and again either by policy documents and/or by new speeches. Some quotes or statements are used as reminders of old promises kept, others become headings employed to give an emotional and poetic aura to particular policies. The *National Security Strategy* of 2010's quote from Obama's speech at the UN General Assembly – "what happens to the hope of a single child – anywhere – can enrich our world, or impoverish it" (White House, 2010a: 7) – is exemplary of this method.

By observing this presentation, three paradigmatic moments of hope within Obama's strategic narratives were quickly identified, each corresponding to the three separate domains of national security presented above. A narrative of "A New Beginning" between the US and the Muslim world, as told by Obama in Cairo (2009d);[31] of a "New Moment of Promise" for the global poor as communicated by Obama to the Ghanaian parliament (2009c), and a vision of "Just and Lasting Peace" as detailed at the Nobel Peace Prize reception in Norway (2009b).

These moments were supplemented with a wider reading of each respective strategic narrative, analysing additional speeches that were listed or referred to as prominent by the two consecutive administrations. In order to anchor the speeches in their larger discursive setting, I also read a series of reports such as the *National Security Strategy* of 2010 and 2015 (White House, 2010a; 2015), the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (US Department of Stare, 2015), the *Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development* (White House, 2010c) and the *National Framework for Strategic Communication* (Ibid.: 2010b). Not all of the material read is referenced in the articles or in this *kappa*. In these reports I have particularly searched

[31] According to Hallams, Obama's Cairo speech was "a classic example of how the administration is using social media technologies to promote its message and construct an alternative narrative to that offered by groups like Al-Qaeda. The speech was instantaneously wired around the world, via social networking sites, podcasts, and a live Webcast on the White House's Web site. Updates via text message reached 20,000 non-US citizens in over 200 countries around the world, with the texts being available in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and eight other languages. In addition, translated versions of the speech were available to download on YouTube, Facebook, and MySpace, and the South Asian social networking site Orkut. The White House used Facebook to conduct an international discussion on the event, while responses to the speech submitted via text messages were compiled and later posted on America.gov" (2011: 13)

for articulations of hope (or of adjacent concepts such as belief, faith, passion, aspiration, but also of opposite concepts such as fear, despair, hate) to find evidence of how hope has been used and understood in its wider security context. This method was utilised not only to contextualise Obama's speeches, but also to find contrasting articulations of hope than those that appear in the strategic narratives. For example, while the strategic narrative on global development continuously refers to hope as *not* a gift to the hopeless, but as an inherent capacity in need of recognition, the *Policy Directive on Global Development* defines hope solely as a gift. In part, it was this contrast that allowed the act of recognition to be identified as a gift of hope in *article 3*, "Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and the Promise of Despair" (Tängh Wrangel, 2017a).

To analyse the strategic narrative employed in the sphere of (public) diplomacy, addressed in *article 2* – "The Unknowing Subject of Radicalisation: US Counterterrorism Communications and the Biopolitics of Hope" (Tängh Wrangel, forthcoming) – Obama's Cairo speech was supplemented by high-level speeches in which hope was articulated as a primary means to counter the ideology of violent extremism, in particular Obama's address at the White House initiated *Summit on Countering Violent Extremism* (2015a) and his 2014 speech at the UN General Assembly (2014b). In order to gain access to how the strategic narrative was implemented on a daily basis, beneath the presidential level, the empirical material analysed in this pillar include statements from the administrators of public diplomacy. Although situated on another level within the relational network that make up US security discourse, this material is equally narrative, strategic and exemplary as the presidential addresses.

The empirical material analysed in *article 3* on the strategic narrative in the sphere of development, engages the entirety of Obama's public discourse on development and global poverty. Particular focus was paid to three exemplary moments of hope: 1) Obama's 2009 speech in Ghana (2009c), a landmark public diplomacy event (Cull, 2013: 133), during which Obama addressed the promise of global development for the first time. 2) Obama's 2010 speech at the UN General Assembly (2010a), during which Obama both presented the 2010 US *Global Development Policy* and urged the international aid community to cast aside its colonial lens. 3) Obama's pledge of commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals at the UN General Assembly in 2015, during which Obama reiterated his promise to recognise the global poor as inherently hopeful and potential (2015b).

The discussion of the use of hope in the practice of war, analysed in *article 4* – "Hope in a Time of Catastrophe? Resilience and the Future *in* Bare

Life" (Wrangel, 2014) – is based on a close reading of Obama's Nobel lecture, in which hope's relation to human nature, to violence and to fear was explicitly conceptualised. To this day, the Nobel lecture remains the primary articulation of Obama's definition of hope within the context of security. To support this reading, references were further made to passages from Obama's 2006 book *The Audacity of Hope*, which offers a key conceptualisation of hope within Obama's oeuvre, as well as to statements made by Obama on the promise of military intervention in Afghanistan (2009e). The empirical discussion in this *kappa* employs a wider selection of empirical material than that analysed in *article 4*, complementing the analysis with a reading of other key speeches in which hope is articulated. These include Obama's address at West Point Military Academy (2014a), in which Obama encouraged the US military to embody an ethos of hope as well as several speeches held in response to terror attacks claimed to be orchestrated or influenced by Islamic terror organisations on Western soil. These speeches include Obama's addresses on the 2013 attacks in Boston (2013), the 2015 attacks in San Bernardino (2015e), the 2016 attacks in Orlando (2016b) as well as his statements on the 2015 attacks in Paris (2015f) and the 2016 attacks in Brussels (2016a).

Reading US security discourse

To analyse Obama's speeches, the thesis has made use of a discourse analytical method adopted from Agamben's methodological vocabulary. While Agamben does not offer a systematised analytical method, his brief discussions on method point to his use of what may be called an exercise of mapping or tracing the network of conceptual relations that surround a given object or concept. In *The Highest Poverty,* Agamben briefly argues that "it is not possible to understand the meaning of [a] term if one ignores its relations with its linguistic context as a whole" (2013: 66). His discussions of both the signature (which, if we recall, highlight the constitutive role of a "network of pragmatic and hermeneutic relations" (2009a: 40)) and of use (which define use as being placed in relation, of affecting and being affected by that relation (2015: 29)) also directs attention to this exercise.

In *Homo Sacer*, Agamben identifies two "correlative" (1998: 22) types of relations as central to the formation of any concept, object or subject, namely the exception and the example, which he describes as "the two modes by which a set tries to found and maintain its own coherence" (Ibid.: 21). According to Agamben, the subject is caught at the *threshold* between the example and the exception. The performative interplay between the two

"come[s] into play every time the very sense of belonging and commonality of individuals is to be defined" (Ibid.). For Agamben, what is between the exception and the example is both nothing and everything. Every time that something is defined or addressed, every time that someone is either excluded from or articulated as a member of a political community, this particular subject is made either into an example or an exception. It is moved from its original unspecified location and placed at the limit, what Agamben defines as the threshold. As such, the threshold is not simply inside or outside the political community, it manifests rather "the experience of the limit itself" (2009b: 66), what makes a given subject, object or concept identifiable. Because of this constitutive role, the first step of my analytical method consisted of identifying these two types of relations in each subordinate domain of US security discourse. Alex Murray defines this method as a dialectical method, which is employed to bring "dialectically opposed forces to a standstill" (2010: 33).

Agamben describes the exception as an "*inclusive exclusion*" (1998: 21), original emphasis), as something that is "included in the normal case precisely because it does not belong to it" (Ibid.) In many ways, the exception can be likened to the relation of abandonment discussed in this *kappa's* theoretical chapter, which, if we recall, is defined as "an active, relational process" (Pratt, 2005: 1054) through which that which is abandoned remains caught in relation to that which excludes it. As such, the concept of the exception appears to hold a similar function as Henry Staten's "constitutive outside" (1984: 24) that has been so central to post structural theory in general, and perhaps especially to the discourse analytical method operationalised by Laclau and Mouffe (1985).[32]

[32] Despite these similarities however, I have attempted to avoid Laclau and Mouffe's terminology. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe bases their analytical method on a modernist subject of desire, one that is assumed to be driven by the desire for satisfaction. According to Laclau and Mouffe, all political articulations promise to fix meaning, to secure and realise a stable identity (1985: 127; see also Zizek, 1990: 252). Laclau calls this logic of articulation a promise to fill the "empty signifier" (1996: 44) – the nodal point in the chain of signifiers, that according to Laclau and Mouffe defines a given discursive formation (1985: 105) – with a particular content, creating what he calls an "ontological society" (1996: 69). As such, this logic of articulation appears to be at odds with Obama's notion of hope, which if seen as an empty signifier would cancel out the desire for both *satisfaction, finality* and *security*. Indeed, for Obama, hope is to be never satisfied, merely actualised. The ideal society which he depicts is not an 'ontological society', in which hopes are satisfied, but a society where "aspirations of individual human beings matter, where hopes and not just fear governs" (2014a) – this is, according to Obama "the world as it *should* be" (Ibid., emphasis added). Obama further defines hope not as the opposite of insecurity or contingency, but as made possible by them. In US security discourse, this is articulated, on the one hand, as a call to embrace the "ambiguities of history" (Obama, 2009b) as well as an imperative to recognise insecurity as a "permanent condition of life" (Homeland Security Council, 2007: 25)

The example constitutes for Agamben the exception's symmetrical opposite. If we recall, Agamben refers to the example as a concept of substitution, one that constitutes the general by taking its place. However, this is not the only way that Agamben discusses the performative role of the example. In *The Highest Poverty* (2013), Agamben discusses how the example conditions becoming, on the one hand, through desire, and, on the other hand, as a form of life. As we shall see, the two are deeply interrelated. The monastic orders that Agamben in this book analyses governed the conduct of its monks through a particular definition of the example as a form of life (Ibid.: 14). The monks were called to form themselves not only in the image of Christ, but to become themselves a form, to "be a form of living for all, be an example" (Ibid.: 95). Through this definition, the concept of '*form* of life' that Agamben so often invokes appears to refer not simply to different ways of living, but to an exemplary form of living, a model life. The concept signifies an object of aspiration, an ideal. Agamben thus observes that the monks were governed not by explicit rules, not by "substance or content" (Ibid.: 53), but by "their own desires" (Ibid.: 12) to become exemplary. Agamben explains: "The form is not a norm imposed on life, but a living that in following the life of Christ gives itself and makes itself a form." (Ibid.: 105). As an object of desire, the example is both absent and present, or rather, it is present in its absence, what Agamben refers to as an "*exclusive inclusion*" (1998: 21, original emphasis).

In order to answer research question 2 – *how do particular* ***conceptual relations*** *give meaning to hope?* – I sought to identify the conceptual network that gives form to hope in US security discourse. To that end, I identified which signifiers were articulated as the principal exceptions to hope and which signifiers that were held as exemplary of hope. Across the different narratives, the signifier that held the position of the exception varied. The strategic narrative in the diplomatic domain distinguished hope primarily

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Secondly, Laclau and Mouffe's notion of antagonism (1985: 122) assumes that the fixed meaning or identity that the subject is assumed to desire is denied realisation by the very existence of the antagonist. The desiring subject which they presume is in that sense withheld satisfaction by the presence of the antagonist, which they define as a "symbol of my non-being" (1985: 125). In Obama's discourse of hope, this relationship appears to be reversed, as below analyses will attempt to show in greater detail. According to Obama, hope is not withheld by the encounter with an antagonistic Other – the terrorist – but actualised by it. If hope is an empty signifier that we desire to realise, then what realises this signifier is not the overcoming of the antagonist, but its presence. Indeed, as I will argue below, Obama perceives moments of threat and fear *as* moments of hope: it is "the darkest of moments, that gives us hope" (2016b), they offer, in Obama's words, a "test of the sturdiest of souls" (2013), a "chance to see and highlight and appreciate that [hopeful] spirit" (Ibid.). It is this 'spirit' that Obama previously has called the "audacity of hope" (2006).

from hate, the strategic narrative in the domain of development distinguished hope primarily from despair and the strategic narrative in the military domain distinguished hope primarily from fear. Within the different articles analysing these respective narratives, I traced the signifiers that were associated with these exceptions in each narrative, analysing, on the one hand, how they were placed in relation to one another and, on the other hand, how they were placed in relation to hope on various levels of intimacy. I also traced which concepts were placed in an exemplary relation to hope in each respective narrative. These relations changed somewhat in the different narratives. For instance, the narrative in the ideological sphere placed a stronger emphasis on "pluralism" (Obama, 2015f), and "freedom" (Ibid., 2009d; 2015a; 2016b), than the narrative on development, which emphasised 'entrepreneurial spirit' (2009c) and "opportunity" (Ibid.).

This method also made visible the temporalities that the respective narratives placed in opposition to hope, hence allowing me to answer part of research question 3 – *how is the* ***temporal experience*** *of hope articulated and actualised?* To analyse how the respective narratives articulated the experience of hope, I looked at how hope was temporally described. As emphasised in the strategic narrative on development, despair was associated both with a form of cyclical repetition and with a sense of impossible linear hope towards perfection. Examples of this discursive practice includes Obama's continual reference to the cycles of "dependence" (2010a; 2015b), "poverty" (2015b) and "resentment" (2015a). In the domain of diplomacy, hate was likewise associated with two seemingly contradictory temporalities. Hate was both presented as a backwards motion, a force of destruction, but also as made possible by the same linear hope that was critiqued in the narrative on development. In the military domain, fear was described both as a state of paralysis as well as an attempt to cling to the past, to remain fixed in "particular identities" (Obama, 2009b). This paralysis was further associated with a 'naïve' linear hope, which was claimed to make the subject of security unprepared to act in the face of insecurity. In contrast to these different temporalities, hope was presented as a "moment" (2009c), a "break" (2010a; 2015c), as "move[ment]" (2009c), but also as a "timeless creed" (2008b) that will never falter or be extinguished, as expressed by Obama: "while we breathe, we hope" (Ibid.).

In order to address research question 4 – *how are different* ***forms of life*** *constituted in relation to hope and to one another?* – I also traced how these concepts were placed in relation to different forms of life, deemed by US security discourse to be in lack of hope. Through this method I was also able to analyse both which forms of life that were targeted by the use of hope and

what the characteristics of these forms of life were perceived to be. As discussed in this *kappa's* introductory chapter, the different narratives were directed not only towards different affective states, but also towards different populations of risk. Targeted by these narratives were not only the global Muslim population and the global poor, but also the Western subject of security, whose actions and response to terror were perceived as affecting the populations of risk and their disposition for violence.

A similar procedure was conducted to identify the concepts that surround and give form to the exemplary form of hopeful life that Obama referred to in each strategic narrative. By tracing which concepts that give content to the exemplary form of life, I analysed how this form of life was presented and which characteristics it was taken to embody. As a dual concept, the example being both a concept of substitution and of desire, I analysed both how US security discourse substitutes the hopeful life for the general and how it renders it an exemplary object of desire. Obama's articulation of the hopeful life as both a universal figure of human nature and as an exemplary form of life that is perceived to be absent from the potential subjects of radicalisation is a clear testament to this dual role.

To answer research question 1 – *how can we understand the narrative means and ends of the* ***instrumental*** *use of hope?* – as well as the second part of research question 3, on how the temporal experience of hope is *actualised*, a narrative analysis was employed. This analysis allowed me to study the temporal sense of movement that is implied both in the narrative style that characterises strategic communication as well as in Agamben's definition of the activity of use (2015). As we have seen in the theoretical chapter of this *kappa*, the experience of temporal movement is also often held as a defining trait of hope (e.g. Derrida, 2006; Negri, 1999; Hardt and Negri, quoted in Brown et. al., 2002; Massumi, 2002a). It is also central to Obama's conceptualisation of hope. Below, I will briefly rehearse the theoretical underpinnings of this narrative analysis.

In a brief analysis of Guy Debord's cinematic strategies, Agamben explains what he means by narrative movement. According to Agamben, the first act of movement is stoppage, which Agamben defines not as a "chronological pause, but rather a power of stoppage that works on the image itself, that pulls it away from the narrative power to exhibit it as such" (2004a: 317). In other words, narrative movement requires disruption, to halt the network of relations that make up a narrative – discussed in Agamben's short text as a "montage" that organises time (Ibid.: 315) – to "pull it out of the flux of meaning, to exhibit it as such" (Ibid.: 317). Agamben asserts that it is this stoppage that is the condition of possibility of movement: "at the heart of

every creative act there is an act of decreation" (Ibid.: 318). If the example and the exception are the *relations* through which a concept is brought to presence, it thus seems that stop and move are the *process* through which it is brought to actuality. Indeed, Agamben presents the process of stop and move as a temporal mirror to the relationship of 'exclusive inclusion' that is characteristic of the exception, through which that which is stopped is included in a given narrative solely to allow the experience of movement.

To analyse how this process is actualised in the Obama administrations'' security discourse, I studied how the narratives order time: which past the use of hope stops and which future it heralds. In other words, the method employed to study this process is also partly conceptual. Its purpose is, on the one hand, to identify which past – and which forms of life, and which relations between lives – that is explicitly decreated in order to be able to define the present as a moment of hope, as a moment when, as Obama explains, "history is on the move" (2009c). Its purpose is also to identify through which narrative means a given stoppage is achieved, and what sense of movement that is associated with it; which future the stoppage heralds. In the respective narratives, a series of various narrative means were employed to stop time. In the ideological sphere, the practice of truth-telling was readily employed, allegedly confronting the "lies" (Obama, 2009d) peddled by violent extremist ideology. In the sphere of development as well as in the military domain, the practice of recognition was used as a means of stoppage, purportedly claiming to "break" (Ibid.: 2010a; 2015c) time free from path-dependency.

To problematize Obama's description of hope as a one-time event – a new beginning, a moment of historical movement – I was also interested in how these attempts were repeated across time. Indeed, Agamben defines repetition as central to the formation of life, in itself a never finalised process. In his study of the monastic form of life, he argues that the monks were moulded through the ceaseless repetition of the 'holy art', "without interruption" (2013: 23). Agamben refers to this form of governance as "a total mobilization of existence through time" (Ibid.). The role of repetition is also central both in US security discourse as a whole – which since the attacks of 9/11 has emphasised that security can never be truly achieved, but must be continuously pre-empted (Massumi, 2007; Anderson, 2010) – and in Obama's conceptualisation of hope – which is defined as a living and fragile experience in constant need of support (2016a). In his discussion of Debord's narrative style, Agamben further defines repetition as a central component of narration. Together with stoppage, he describes repetition as the "two transcendental conditions of montage" (2004a: 315).

To ascertain the role of repetition in each strategic narrative, I therefore looked at if, and if so, how, the respective narratives changed over time. Reading the narratives, I sought to identify both recurrent patterns of stoppage and movement and changes in the meaning given to the past and to future respectively. I was also interested in to what frequency the respective narrative was articulated. Through this method I was able to problematize the dichotomy between cyclical repetition and instantaneous rupture that the Obama administrations' security discourse articulated. In contrast, the temporal experience actualised in the respective narratives – addressed by the second part of research question 2 – appears as a paradoxical union of the instant and the eternal, an instant caught in repeat.

To summarise the above, the method of analysis that I have employed in this thesis is twofold. The primary analysis has focussed on studying the conceptual network that gives meaning both to the life of hope and to the time of hope. This network has been organised based on Agamben's definition of the example and the exception as the two primary relations that give form to a given discourse. In tandem with this method I have studied how the respective narratives organise time and how they are repeated over time.

By these methods I have been able to study how hope has been used as a biopolitical technology, utilized by the US security apparatus to regulate processes of subjectification. I have also been able to analyse how hope has been used to value and separate between forms of life, another key aspect of Agambenian biopolitics (1998: 137). The next chapter will present my analysis of the conceptual network that constitutes US security discourse – the conceptualisation of hope, of time, and of life that it is productive of – in order to make possible a concluding discussion on its relation to the current state of security in which Agamben and others claim that we live (2001).

Analysing the use of hope

Given the form of this thesis – a compilation of articles – the empirical analyses offered in the three empirically focussed articles are presented at times without reference to the methodological vocabulary discussed in the previous chapter, aligning rather to different literatures and concepts within critical security studies and biopolitics. In the interest of clarity, the empirical findings are therefore presented in a terminologically more concentrated form below.

If we recall Agamben's definition of the subject as caught at the threshold between the example and the exception, this analytical chapter is broken down into a series of *thresholds*: between hope and hate; hope and despair as well as between hope and fear. These sections rehearse the strategic narratives in each sphere. They also analyse the different conceptual relations which give form and content to hope in the Obama administrations' security discourse and which forms of life that the use of hope is productive of. In general, these thresholds coincide with the different pillars claimed to support US security. The sphere of public diplomacy actualises the threshold between hope and hate; the sphere of development actualises the threshold between hope and despair; and the threshold between hope and fear is actualised in the sphere of military. To a large extent, the different thresholds correspond to the respective articles and the empirical discussions performed therein, yet not exclusively so. Far from being clear-cut, the distinctions between the respective spheres are intimately related, blurring into one another. For instance, despair and hate are in many ways articulated as conditioned upon one another. I will attempt to make visible this intimacy below, rectifying to some extent a separation made necessary by the choice of writing a compilation thesis.

The discussion in this chapter is overarching, unable at times to offer the same level of detail, both theoretical and empirical, as the respective articles. The narratives are presented as a snapshot in time. What this chapter offers is not an historical analysis of the use of hope, but an attempt to understand and make visible its paradigmatic use. It should be noted, however, that hope is articulated across the strategic narratives with remarkable consistency. But this consistency should by no means be taken to imply that hope holds an unambiguous meaning in the Obama administrations' security discourse. As we will see below, this is far from the case. In the following concluding chapter, I will discuss these findings in relation to the research questions stipulated in the introductory chapter as well as to key concepts of Agambenian biopolitics, such as bare life and the state of exception.

Threshold: hope – hate

In the domain of public diplomacy, hope is summoned to confront what is most commonly described as a "hateful ideology" (Obama, 2009d; 2014b; 2015a; 2015g; 2016c) that seeks to "divide the world into adherents and infidels" (2014b). The ideological sphere constitutes in the Obama administrations' security discourse the principal threshold on which 'violent extremism' is to be combatted: war's "most fundamental source", namely "the corruption of young minds by violent ideology" (Ibid.). According to Obama, this war is not won on "the battlefield", but "by better ideas – a more attractive and compelling vision" (2015a). As we shall see below, hope is of course defined as critical, if not synonymous, to this task.

While Obama is careful not to mention words like "radical Islam" (2016d), it remains evident that the target of these practices are the global Muslim population at large. As such, the logic that informs the use of hope within US counterterrorism communications is far from hopeful, at least if hope is conceived as formative of a solidaristic and inclusive subject, as per the previously discussed 'hope narrative'. Quite the contrary, what these operations actualise appear strangely similar to what Massumi has defined as a politics of fear, in which the object of politics are not situations of danger, identifiable and known, but a pre-emption of an always present, yet unknown and indeterminate threat, "formless and contentless" (2005: 35).

Like Massumi's politics of fear, the use of hope within US counterterrorism communications aims to "not only reach those that may be on the fence, but to disseminate messaging that will prevent young people from ever getting to the fence" (Hussein, 2015). The place that these 'young people' inhabit, i.e. social media, is likewise referred to in US security discourse as a prob-

lem in its own right, an "ungoverned space" (Fernandez, 2013), that is claimed to produce "echo chamber effects, accelerating and widening the process of radicalization" (Fernandez, 2013).[33]

The distinctions that give form to hope in this particular strategic narrative initially appear to be clearly defined. While the US is held to represent "pluralism" (Obama, 2015g), "opportunity" (Ibid., 2009d; 2015a; 2015f), "freedom" (Ibid., 2009d; 2015a; 2015g), "communication and trust" (Ibid., 2015g) "truth" (Ibid., 2009d; 2014b; 2015g) and "hope" (Ibid., 2009d; 2015a; 2016a; 2016c), the ideology of 'violent extremism' is described as a "nightmarish vision" (Ibid., 2014b), that Obama claims to represent a "twisted interpretation of religion" (2015a). Elsewhere this ideology is described as a form of "cancer" (Ibid., 2014b), a "barbarism" (Ibid., 2016c) communicated by "depraved terrorists" (Ibid., 2016c) who "cannot build or create anything, and therefore peddle only fanaticism and hate" (2014b). According to Obama, this ideology offers only "misery and death" (2015a) and its sole aim is "to spread panic" (2016c). The *Global Engagement Center* (GEC), which is tasked to counter this ideology (succeeding the *Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications* (CSCC) and the *Digital Outreach Team* (DOT)) describes this ideology as a "nihilistic vision" (US Department of State, 2016) that centre on two ideas: that the West and Islam are essentially incompatible and that US imperialism is the cause of the majority of grievances facing the global Muslim population.

A closer reading however, reveals above distinctions to be less certain. Indeed, what makes the ideology of violent extremism so dangerous, according to Obama, is not its nihilism, but the 'inspiration' it offers, its 'attractiveness' (2015a). From former CSCC Coordinator Rashad Hussein, we learn that what makes this ideology desirable is its promise of "empowerment, adventure, and religious obligation and reward" (Hussein, 2015). Such statements take as their condition of possibility a recognition that the battle of hearts and minds is not waged between hope and a nihilistic form of hate, but *between* hopes. In other words, the terrorist ideologue is not perceived to be devoid of hope, on the contrary, the 'ideology of violent extremism' is described as even more hopeful than the "positive vision" (White House, 2010b: 6) allegedly disseminated by the US' strategic narrative. Accordingly, the US need not invert this ideology, but mimic it: "Like extremist messaging, counter-content could draw in youth with emotional images and themes. It would foster a sense of purpose, belonging, and obligation" (Hussein, 2015). In other words, what according to US security discourse separates the

[33] See also von Behr et al, 2013; Elkjer Nissen, 2015 for an analysis of social media as a key location of contemporary conflict.

respective narratives from one another is not their commitment to hope, but what kind of hope they profess commitment to.

Presented as the perhaps most important distinction separating these forms of hope is their respective relationship to the truth. While the hope offered by the proponents of 'violent extremism' is claimed to be ideological, the hope represented by the US is not once referred to in such terms. The 'positive vision' that the strategic narrative is tasked to implement is not an ideology but an objective reality. This is a stark contrast to the discourse of President Bush, who during the War on Terror repeatedly claimed allegiance to an "*ideology* of hope" (2010: 1576; 1632; 1747; 1890; 1901; 2039; 2154, emphasis added).

Within the Obama administration's security discourse, the signifier of 'truth' is heavily invested with hope. In this narrative, 'truth' functions as the *narrative means* through which hope is supposed to be generated. According to Obama, commitment to truth holds the potential to move humanity towards the future – enabling the "new beginning" that is the key theme of this particular narrative (2009d). If "terrorists traffic in lies and stereotypes" (Ibid.), the 'truth' is claimed to represent a foundation upon which humanity can 'build' and 'bolster' "bridges of communication and trust" (Obama, 2015g). In Cairo, Obama thus defined the practice of truth-telling as the real objective of his speech: "That is what I will try to do – to speak the truth as best I can" (2009d). If "division" and "hate" is associated with signifiers like "fate" and "doom", the truth of hope – that the future is not fixed – is held to free human action from having been "bound to the past" (Obama, 2009d).

Outside of presidential discourse, reference to the truth remains equally common. For instance, one senior official has described the activities of the CSCC as "repeatedly and aggressively presenting *the reality* of what is going on the ground" (Fernandez, 2013, emphasis added). The truth is referred to in this body of communication not as an end, but as a means to "deconstruct the radical frame" (Olidort, 2015). As such, the purpose of this practice appears to be the generation of an emotional impact: "What we try to do is not to affirm the positive about ourselves but to emphasize the negative about the adversary. It is about offense and not defence […] to unnerve the adversary, *to get in their heads*" (Fernandez, 2013, emphasis added). The devotion to truth that this discourse makes manifest thus appears to be based not on the objective to replace the "lies and stereotypes" (2009d) peddled by 'violent extremism' with a hopeful and positive truth, but rather to unsettle the certainty given by the extremist representation of truth. As such, the despairing contents of the ideal message – delivered not by the US State Department but by "empowered" (US Department of State, 2016) partner messengers with

"credibility […] and sway in the Muslim world and the Arab world" (Stengel, 2016)[34] – should come as no surprise: "No you're not going to go to heaven, no you're going to be treated appallingly when you're there, no you're not likely to fight, but you're likely to be cleaning toilets, no you're not going to be able to communicate with your family, and by the way, how are you even going to tell your family that you've done this" (Ibid.).

Established through such statements is a paradoxical relationship between truth and certainty, through which devotion to the truth is meant to unsettle certainty rather than to produce it, to give choice – and doubt – to the subject of radicalisation. In contrast to the 'truth', US security discourse associates certainty with a reduction of human potentiality, exemplified through signifiers such as "division", "fate", and 'inevitability' (2009d). Obama's description of the 'propaganda' of 'violent extremism' as having "*coerced* young people to travel abroad to fight their wars and turned students – young people *full of potential* – into suicide bombers" (Obama, 2014b, emphasis added) is a clear example of this logic.

Through this logic, the form of life that the Obama administrations' security discourse excludes appears not to be conceived as the traditional non-communicative figure of bare life, the speechless barbarian,[35] but the all-too communicative terrorist ideologue: the *one* who speaks, and allows, only *one* language. The *one* whose 'nightmarish vision' is but too defined, binding aspiration to only *one* future. So conceived, this figure embodies a curious conflation of the traditional dichotomy supporting modernist forms of biopolitics: it combines the violence associated with bare life, *zoē*, and the linear hope of perfection associated with politically qualified life, *bios*.

What separates this figure from the Western subject of security is hence not the use of hope, it is rather how hope is used: either by positive content, promising the creation of a specific future as per the alleged workings of the terrorist demagogue, or by disrupting hope's relation to an articulated object or future. According to US counterterrorism communications, the disruption of linear hopes is not a nihilistic and destructive enterprise, but rather a commitment to the contingency, doubt and uncertainty that this security discourse associates with hope. Obama's popular distinction, his wartime slogan: "the future belongs to those that build – not those who destroy" (2014b), is thus

[34] In this sense, the GEC can be seen as a direct implementation of Obama's proclamation at the 2015 *Counter-terrorism Summit* that deradicalization and resistance from recruitment will not be performed primarily by the US state, but by "empower[ing] communities", "former extremists" and "families" to speak out against the ideology of violent extremism (2015a).

[35] For observations and critique of the pervasiveness of this figure within the War on Terror, see Douzinas (2007) and Zehfuss (2012).

paradoxically inverted. The future – experienced as possibility – belongs to the moment of destruction, to the decreation of words and meaning.

If the past which Obama's truth aims to disrupt belonged to a linear hope and to ideas of a clash of civilisations (Obama, 2009d; 2014d; 2015a), the future is claimed to belong to a subject presented as the antithesis to such collective ideas of perfection: the struggling multi-cultural individual. Not only is this exemplary figure of life continuously summoned by Obama (2009d; 2015a; 2015g), its constant dissemination constitutes one of the key tasks of the CSCC and of the GEC: to collect and distribute "examples of young people around the world who are addressing challenges they face through productive means" (Hussein, 2015). Other examples of this dissemination include the White House's recent *Muslim and American* campaign (White House, 2016). To be sure, the world which this individual – who, according to Obama, is universal: "all of us share common aspirations" (2009d) – inhabits is a neoliberal world, a world where opportunity may not come true but nonetheless always exists – as promise if not as reality, as articulated by Obama in Cairo.[36] In Cairo, Obama thus accentuated the successes of Muslim American businesses, and the *Muslim and American* campaign all show individuals *at work*. Obama is of course the embodiment of this figure, as he was sure to tell the audience in Cairo: "I am a Christian, but my father came from a Kenyan family that includes generations of Muslims. As a boy, I spent several years in Indonesia and heard the call of the azaan at the break of dawn and the fall of dusk. As a young man, I worked in Chicago communities where many found dignity and peace in their Muslim faith" (2009d).

Although presented as the opposite of hate, the hopeful and productive individual discussed above is not free of hate. On the contrary, as testified by Obama's frequent use of dehumanizing language referred to in the introduction to this section, the hate this subject is supposed to hold is directed towards the idea of perfection, towards a linear utopic hope that in this narrative is associated solely with violence and exclusion. According to the Obama administrations' security discourse, it is further held as imperative that the global Muslim community continually expresses this hate. They are charged with a special responsibility to both "explicitly, forcefully, and consistently" (Obama, 2014b) distance itself from the dehumanized figure of terror, and to actively circulate the counter-image defined by US counterterrorism communications (Ibid.). As such, the condition of possibility of this hate is the continually presupposed link between Islam and terror, an associa-

[36] "The dream of opportunity for all people has not come true for everyone in America, but its promise exists for all who come to our shores" (Obama, 2009d).

tion that must be continuously summoned only to be banished if the subject of radicalisation is to become the hopeful, empowered messenger that US security discourse aims to produce. For the global Muslim population, it thus seems that one cannot be anything other than a struggling, potentially successful individual in a capitalist society or a violent hateful barbarian.

To summarise the strategic narrative in the sphere of (public) diplomacy, this narrative operates through a clear structure of stop-move-repeat. By the means of truth-telling, the ideology of 'violent extremism' is meant to be continuously stopped in order to effectuate a sense of movement. This is arguably not actual movement, in which the subject of radicalisation is moved to another future – that of pluralism, tolerance and freedom that this narrative allegedly promises – but rather an experience of movement achieved through the act of stoppage, by the continuously demanded disassociation from the 'barbaric' linear hope offered by 'violent extremism'. Nothing is offered the subject of radicalisation, except the disruption of its dreams. Through this act of stoppage, the subject of radicalisation is placed at the threshold between two different forms of life, between what this narrative presents as a collective form of violent life and a multicultural individual, exemplified through the figure of Obama. At this particular threshold, the subject of radicalisation is torn not between hope and hate, but between a particular form of hateful hope and a particular form of hopeful hate: between a form of hope that hates articulated dreams of utopia and a form of hate that hopes to realise its particular version of utopia through violent means; between a collective hate for an explicit Other and an individualised hate that is neither tolerant or pluralistic, but rather urged to constantly fear and exclude the global Muslim population.

Threshold: hope – despair

If ideology represents for Obama the principal level of radicalisation, poverty is defined as violence' second root cause. However, what the use of hope targets, according to the Obama administrations' security discourse, is not poverty, but a particular relationship between hope and poverty: "when people – especially young people – *feel* entirely trapped in impoverished communities" (Ibid., emphasis added), making them "ripe for extremist recruitment" (2015a). According to Obama, poverty is a necessary but not sufficient cause for radicalisation: "poverty alone does not cause a person to become a terrorist" (2015a). The *Presidential Policy Directive* (PPD-6) detailing the 2010 US *Global Development Policy* (GDP) echoes this association between violence, poverty and hope: "We cannot defeat the ideologies of violent ex-

tremism when hundreds of millions of young people face a future with no jobs, *no hope* and no meaningful opportunities" (White House, 2010c, emphasis added). This is an important distinction in the strategic narrative, as it allows the global poor to be addressed as a specific risk community, without the explicit use of excluding and deterministic language.

Just like the Muslim subject of radicalisation, this narrative describes the global poor as inherently hopeful and potential, deemed by Obama as capable of changing the world from the "bottom up" (2009c). Obama holds this capacity as a defining characteristic of human life, described elsewhere as a "timeless creed" (2008b), an inextinguishable "audacity" (2006). In Ghana, the capacity for hope was articulated as the foundation for a "common humanity" (2009c). We here see how hope is held as exemplary in the dual sense that Agamben attributes to the term. As an experience, hope is described as an object of desire, one that is denied significant parts of the global poor. As a capacity, however, hope is described as universal, in form if not in content. As we shall see, recognition of this universality plays a central role in the strategic narrative, functioning as a narrative means to generate the experience of hope that the Obama administrations' security discourse claims that the global poor are lacking.

The narrative infuses the act of recognition with a promise to release the previously contained potentiality that it claims belongs to the global poor. The articulation of this promise is based on a description of the history of development as being imprisoned by a modernist linear promise of perfection, addressed by Obama as "the old model in which we are a donor and they are simply a recipient" (Obama, 2013b). According to Obama, the moral positioning undergirding this division – "a world that sees only tragedy and the need for charity" (2009c) – has reduced the inherently potential life of poverty to a state that remind us of the traditional figure of bare life; excluded from, yet continuously made dependent of the international development community. However, Obama repeatedly underlines that this figure is not hopeless, without relation to hope (2009c; 2015b), as per traditional depictions of bare life (Agamben, 2000: 31; Negri, quoted in Nielson, 2004: 68; Edkins and Pin Fat, 2005; Burke, 2011; Bourke, 2014). On the contrary, Obama underlines that the global poor are withheld from hope, forced to live in the shadow of hope. While hopeless, they are in other words not defined as absent or incapable of hope, but rather as once hopeful – as hopeful subjects whose hopes have turned into "cynicism, even despair" (2009c), as Obama observed in Ghana, when describing the unrealised promise of African liberation movements.

It is this experience of reduced or diminished hope that the act of recognition promises to remedy, ostensibly "break[ing]" (2010a; 2015b; 2015c) life free from "cycle[s] of poverty" (Obama, 2015b), "dependence" (2010a; 2015b), "conflict and violence" (2010b) and of "fear and resentment" (2015a). As I have shown in *article 3* – "Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and the Promise of Despair" – the act of recognition is a recurrent theme in the strategic narrative on global development, one that is repeated continuously throughout Obama's presidency, iterated in every public appearance made by Obama on the topic of development. In 2010, speaking to young African leaders, Obama made clear to the attending individuals that they "represent the Africa that *so often is overlooked* – the great progress that many Africans have achieved and the *unlimited potential* that you've got going forward into the 21st century" (2010b, my emphasis). At the UN General Assembly in 2015, Obama reiterated this point: "development is threatened if we do not recognize the incredible dynamism and opportunity of today's Africa. [...] I visited Africa recently, and what I saw *gave me hope* and I know should *give you hope*" (2015b, emphasis added).

Although presented as a new moment in time, the theme of recognition is but the latest expression of a long standing tradition within global development discourse to emphasise local capacity and agency. Examples of this tradition includes both the paradigm of human development's focus on capabilities, local ownership and partnerships (Crawford 2003; Abrahamsen, 2004; Murray Li, 2007; Shani, 2012; Chandler, 2013; Alt, 2015; Hansson, 2015) as well as the practice of indirect rule as applied by colonial administration (Cooke, 2003; Duffield, 2005; Murray Li, 2007: 267).

As such, the promise to abandon the subjectivities and relations that according to Obama belongs to traditional practices of development – the respective figures of developed and underdeveloped life, (or in Agamben's terms *bios* and *zoē* (1998: 7)) – is not an abandonment in the traditional sense, dissolving the constitutive relationship these figures of life have in the formation of hopeful life. On the contrary, the continuously iterated exclusion of these categories appears to be a performative exercise. As such, it does not confine these categories to history, but continually engenders the promise of their abandonment – thereby infusing the potentially hopeful yet despairing life of underdevelopment with hope. What the act of recognition offers is a sense of narrative movement, achieved by the articulated disruption of the past: "at this moment, history is on the move" (Obama, 2009c). For the actualisation of this moment, and the hope experienced in it, despair is not an enemy, but a condition of possibility. One that has to be constantly summoned if only to be banished time and again. The temporality that is per-

formative of hope thus appears as a paradoxical union of cyclical time and instantaneous time: an experience of rupture caught in repeat. This temporality offers a striking resemblance to what Agamben has identified as the structure of narration, which was discussed in the previous chapter: stop, move, repeat (2004a).

Similar to the use of hope by US counterterrorism communications, this narrative employs hope to regulate the form of life through which poverty is experienced and acted upon. The act of recognition, and the moment of rupture produced by it, is crucial in this regard, establishing a series of temporal dichotomies, through which both the past and future are instilled with meaning. Firstly, if the narrative presents dependence to belong to the cyclical structure of development, the future belongs to the mutually beneficial structure of economy (Obama, 2009c). According to Obama, this future has continuously been withheld the life of underdevelopment: "Africans – especially young Africans – tell me they don't just want aid, they want trade" (2015b).

Secondly, if the past belonged to collective identities – exemplified by Obama by "identities of tribe and ethnicity; of religion and nationality" (2009c), the popular "liberation struggles" (Ibid.) of the decolonial movements as well as by the passive figure of underdevelopment – then the future is claimed to belong to the potential and responsible individual. Emerging in this discourse is a form of hope which can be likened to what Aronson has called the "privatisation of hope", claimed to replace solidarity and collective political action with the consumerism and precariousness characteristic of neoliberalism (2014). In the strategic narrative, this objective is made explicit, articulated as a necessity to "invest in" (2015b), to "encourage" (2010a; 2014c), to "empower" (2014c) and to "build" (2010a) "the next generation of entrepreneurs" (2010a; 2014c). As articulated in the strategic narrative in the sphere of (public) diplomacy, the figure of Obama is hailed as exemplary of this form of life: a figure born in despair and risen beyond imagination. Through the exhibition of this exemplary figure the American dream is effectively transposed into a global fantasy: "And in my country, African Americans – including so many recent immigrants – have thrived in every sector of society. We've done so despite a difficult past, and we've drawn strength from our African heritage" (2009c).

Echoing the conceptualisation of poverty claimed to emerge within the framework of resilience, which highlight the need to cope with poverty rather than to strive to eradicate it (Best, 2010: 123; Aradau, 2014: 81; Chandler, 2015: 13; Pupavac, 2005: 173), this narrative does not promise to end despair, but aims rather to produce an individual able to thrive in despair, that accepts "suffering and setbacks" (Obama, 2009c), in order to use such expe-

riences for the betterment of itself. This appears to be this narrative's objective: to produce a form of life capable of emerging from despair, of succeeding "*despite great odds*" (Obama, 2015c, emphasis added). For this form of life, despair is supportive of hopeful neoliberal life, rather than its threat. Unlike the potentially dangerous hope that Obama identifies as embodying both 'violent extremism' and the popular decolonial movements of the past (2009c), there is no promised telos that this hopeful form of life can be withheld from, nor any identifiable antagonist that stands in its way. As recognised, the subject of development is already free: "Freedom is your inheritance. Now, it is your responsibility to build upon freedom's foundation" (Ibid.)

In summation, it appears as if the strategic narrative in the sphere of development, like the strategic narrative in the (public) diplomatic sphere, operates through a narrative structure of stop-move-repeat. In this narrative, recognition of human potentiality is meant to generate the sense of movement that Obama associates with hope, ostensibly removing the life of underdevelopment from the categories of linear modernity. Like the 'hateful' subject of radicalisation, the 'despairing' subject of development is placed at the threshold, torn not between between hope and despair, but between two forms of hope: a linear hope that is claimed to produce despair and a resilient non-linear hope that is allegedly capable of *using* despair. To this non-linear hope, despair is not an enemy or opposite, but a condition of possibility, one that must be continuously summoned in order to actualise a sense of continuous movement. The subject that is called to embody this hope is likewise caught at the threshold between two forms of life: between collective forms of political struggle – that Obama describes as capable only of frustration, despair and misguided antagonism – or the individual entrepreneur. As such, nothing is promised this individual, except the reformulation of poverty as a site of opportunity.

Threshold: hope – fear

It would be easy to assume that the military sphere is not engaged in the attempt to pre-empt radicalisation, devoted as it is primarily to the traditional battlefield. But this is not the case. Not only is the US military tasked with implementing hope through the means of strategic communication and development – this they do, as both Caroline Holmqvist (2010) and Jan Bach-

mann (2013) respectively have observed[37] – how terrorist attacks are defended against and responded to are also perceived as a central target for the use of hope. As the strategic narrative in the military sphere details, how terror is confronted matters in the long run, affecting the exclusions that US security discourse defines as central to radicalisation: the spread of "fear and division" (2016a) that Obama holds to be the "intent of the terrorists" (Ibid.).

As in the previous narratives, the distinctions that give meaning to hope and fear in this narrative initially appears to be clearly defined. Obama associates hope with "possibility" (2009b), "grit" (2013a), "ambiguity" (2009b), "love" (2009b; 2016a), "empathy" (Ibid.), "individual choice" (2008; 2009b), "moral compass" (2009b), "faith" (2009b; 2016a), "peace" (2009) and "humanity" (2009; 2015f). Indeed, in his Nobel lecture, Obama defines hope as that which is "best about humanity" (2009b). These signifiers are opposed to fear, which in turn is placed in relation to "division" (2009b; 2014a; 2016a), "religious dogma" (2009b), the "loss of particular identities" (Ibid.), "violence" (Ibid.) and "war" (Ibid.). Obama warns that fear can "tempt us to cast out the stranger, strike out against those who don't look like us, or pray exactly as we do" (2016a). Fear can also "lead us to turn our backs on those who are most in need of help and refuge" (Ibid.). Importantly, Obama defines faith, which is associated with hope, as different from religion, which is associated with fear. While faith is described as a belief in the unknown (2009b; 2016a), religion is referred to as a dogma, a commanding law that turns the respect of difference that Obama holds as central to faith into hatred and exclusion (Ibid.).

While Obama describes the Western subject of security, the "we" that this particular narrative primarily addresses, as "people of hope not fear" (2016a), a closer reading reveals this dichotomy to be anything but certain. The relationship between hope and fear that is articulated in this narrative is not mutually exclusive, but rather complexly intimate. Despite the differences listed above, the narrative does not depict fear and hope to be ontologically juxtaposed. They are rather mutually placed within what is articulated as a contingent and potential "human nature" (2009b), described by Obama as a constant state of "human imperfection" (Ibid.). According to Obama, hope can never truly overcome fear, because everybody is by nature *both* fearful *and* hopeful – in potentiality, if not in actuality.

[37] According to Caroline Holmqvist, strategic communication has garnered increasing attention within the US military at large (2013). The 2010 *National Framework for Strategic Communication* lists strategic communication as a core responsibility of the US security apparatus at large, including the military. As an effect of the security-development nexus, Jan Bachmann (2010) has further noticed that the US military is engaged in a series of operations traditionally deemed to be of civilian nature, including development.

The battle between violence and peace, that Obama depicts as the "choice" between hope and fear (2009f; 2014b), is hence dissociated from its modernist history. It is no longer described as a battle over human nature, a fight between the violent and fearful figure of bare life, *zoē*, in the name of qualified life, *bios*, as per traditional modernist accounts of humanitarian war referenced in this *kappa's* theoretical chapter. On the contrary, the battle between hope and fear is articulated as a forever ongoing battle *in* life, between the potentialities of life, "the core struggle of human nature" (Obama, 2009b). Through descriptions like these, the subjectivities undergirding modernist forms of humanitarian war dissolves, locating the potential for violence not only in the generalised figures of the Muslim and the Poor, but in everybody: "we are fallible. We make mistakes, and fall victim to the temptations of pride, and power, and sometimes evil. Even those of us with the best of intentions will at times fail to right the wrongs before us" (Ibid.).

Importantly, Obama maintains that acknowledgement of this 'fact' of life should not be interpreted as cynicism, but as a matter of urgent security; a "recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason" (Ibid.). Repeating the logic of recognition discussed in the previous section on the use of hope in the domain of development, the act of recognition is heavily invested with hope. The reason is twofold: firstly, idealistic beliefs in the possibility of a peaceful human nature renders human life insecure, unprepared for the necessity of security and at odds with the resilience that Obama defines as a central capacity of life (2009b; 2013b; 2015e; 2016b). At the Nobel reception, Obama thus argued that he "cannot be guided by the examples of [advocates of non-violence such as Ghandi and King] alone" (Ibid.), because, he emphasised, security needs to be continuously underwritten if peace is to be promoted.

Addressing the dangers of "homegrown" (2016b) terrorist attacks after the 2013 attacks in San Bernardino and the 2016 Orlando attacks, Obama continued this line of reasoning, emphasising that "we will not be able to stop every tragedy" and that "We can't anticipate or catch every single deranged person that may wish to do harm to his neighbors, or his friends, or his coworkers, or strangers. But we can do something about the amount of damage that they do" (2016b). Ultimately, this is why hope is important, according to this narrative, not because it is equated with peace, but because it is linked with resilience, with an "audacious" (2006) capacity to act "compassion[ately]" (2013b) in the face of uncertainty and fear. In contrast to the linear hope manifested in modernist practices and discourses of security, Obama describes hope as a "grit" (2013b), a "spirit" (Ibid.), the precondition

for which is precisely the recognition that the linear promise of peace is unattainable.

Secondly, similar to the logic articulated in the previously discussed narratives, this narrative describes the idea of perfection as separating different forms of life from one another. Although the recognition of human imperfection portrays war and fear as facts of life, the Obama administrations' security discourse is hence not without commitment to universalism nor to a common humanity. Indeed, Obama's recognition that "we are all sinners" (2016a) is heavily invested with notions of empathy and redemption. Just as the division between developed and developing life is claimed to undergird global poverty, the idea of perfection – exemplified in the military domain with religious dogma – is held to dehumanise the one deemed different, to turn conflict into hate, and violence into annihilation. In Obama's words: "then there is no need for restraint – no need to spare the pregnant mother, or the medic, or the Red Cross worker, or even a person of one's own faith" (2009b).

So defined, the common humanity that Obama envisions – the promise of just and lasting peace that is the key theme of this particular strategic narrative – appears not to be the liberal notion of perpetual peace. It is not a state where hope has won out over fear – such a state is, as we have learned above, identified as both impossible and undesirable – it is rather a place where hope and fear coexist: "where hopes *and* not just fears govern" (2014a, emphasis added), where "the aspirations of individual human beings really matter" (Ibid.). What this recognition stops in order to grant the appearance of movement is hence not fear, but the modernist idea of perfection. This idea is not associated with peace, but with exclusion and violence, with a desire to remain in "particular identities" (2009b). It is also associated with a foreclosure of that which Obama defines as the real condition of possibility of hope, and consequently also of "moral progress" (2009b), namely the "ambiguities of history" (Ibid.) and the "imperfections of man" (Ibid.).

We here see how hope takes the place of peace as the object of global desire. In other remarks, Obama has continued this line of reasoning. In 2009, when drawing up the contours of a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama promised neither peace nor freedom to the Afghan people. He did promise, however, opportunity and hope. He promised not that their hopes would be *realised*, but rather a continuous experience of hope, a "lasting opportunity" (2009e). This, we were told, is what the people of Afghanistan cherish the most, this is what they seek: not a better future per se, but "the *promise* of a better future" (Ibid., emphasis added). Hope in this schema

should not be read in opposition to violence and fear – Afghanistan has of course seen the end of neither – but in their indistinction.

Instead of avoiding fear, or being consumed by fear, Obama thus urges humanity to see fear and insecurity as a source of hope, a moment in which hope is actualised and experienced in its purest form. Obama describes the event of terror as a "test of the sturdiest of souls" (2013a), one that shows the "best of humanity" (2016b). Importantly, it is not only that hope is needed in such moments, on the contrary, such moments are transposed into hope. For Obama, it is "the darkest of moments, that gives us hope" (2016b). They offer the "chance to see and highlight and appreciate that [hopeful] spirit" (2013a). This logic was repeated in response to the attacks in Boston, San Bernardino, Orlando, Paris and Brussels.

If hope is a choice, as this narrative articulates, it thus appears not to be an existential one, through which a life of hope replaces a life of fear, but a confirmation of the indistinction between hope and fear. The life of hope signifies a subject continuously placed at the threshold – at the moment of choice – between hope and fear. With this subject in mind, it is not surprising to find that the exemplary figure of life that is presented in this narrative is neither the face of non-violence, nor the neoliberal individual, as in the previous narratives discussed above, but their radical inversion. For the Western subject of security, a figure of permanent struggle and suffering is presented as exemplary – in Obama's Nobel lecture this figure is illustrated through the impoverished mother, the desperate soldier and a young protestor withheld from political rights (2009b). According to Obama, these figures do not represent destitution or hopelessness, but hope in its purest incarnation: an inextinguishable will to carry on in the face of insurmountable odds. They represent a life reduced to nothing but hope, a life that is defined not by what it is has or what it is, but solely by what is absent from it, by what it is subjected to. For this life, hope is reduced to a spirit of self-preservation, a capacity for survival, as argued by Obama: "Let us live by their example" (Obama, 2009b).

To summarise the strategic narrative in the military sphere, hope appears to be generated by recognising that the modernist dream of peace is impossible and that the potential for violence is an ever present potentiality, an emergent property of human nature. Repeating the logic of the two previously discussed narratives, the hopeful subject of imperfection is placed not on the threshold between hope and fear, but between what is presented as an excluding form of modernist hope, which according to the Obama administrations' security discourse renders fear dangerous, and an allegedly inclusive form of resilient hope that regulates and pacifies fear. Like in the previous narratives,

this hope does not move the subject towards a future free from violence, on the contrary, the hope that this subject is called to embody is actualised in moments of fear and insecurity, moments that Obama reformulates as manifestations of hope, as the condition of possibility of that which Obama holds to be the "best of humanity" (2009b).

In the next section, which concludes this *kappa*, I will discuss these analyses in light of the research questions posed in the introductory chapter. The discussion will both summarise and consolidate above analyses in order to make visible the general use of hope in US security discourse under President Obama. By doing so, it will place this use in relation to, on the one hand, the radical potential that often is placed in hope by critical studies of security, and, on the other hand, in relation to what Agamben claims is the primary operation of biopolitics, namely the production of bare life.

Conclusion

As explicated in this *kappa's* introductory chapter, the analyses performed in the four separate research articles were guided by one overarching research question, namely:

> *How is hope designed to be used biopolitically in US security discourse under the Obama administrations?*

In order to answer this question, this concluding section will discuss the analyses performed in the previous section in relation to Agamben's distinction between instrumental use – a conscious activity directed at an explicit goal (Agamben, 2015: 68) – and biopolitical use – which operates to regulate the *ontology*, *temporality* and the *subjectification* of the object and subjects engaged by the use of hope in US security discourse. As the introductory chapter of this *kappa* details, these different levels of use provide the rationale for the four empirically oriented research questions that guides this thesis, repeated below in the interest of clarity. The objective of this discussion is to render possible a discussion on the overall biopolitical use of hope within US security discourse and beyond. The chapter also discusses how this use relates to traditional conceptualisations of contemporary biopolitics and to the privilege often afforded to hope as a practice of resistance. The ambition is not to provide an answer to how the use of hope can be suspended or subverted, but rather to engender a discussion about hope's role in the contemporary biopolitical imaginary. The four empirically oriented research questions are formulated as follows:

In US security discourse under President Obama:

1) *how can we understand the narrative means and ends of the **instrumental** use of hope?*
2) *how do particular **conceptual relations** give meaning to hope?*
3) *how is the **temporal experience of hope** articulated and actualised?*
4) *how are **different forms of life** constituted in relation to hope and to one another?*

The first research question concerns the explicit version of the respective strategic narratives analysed in this thesis: How the means of public diplomacy is tasked to engage the ideological roots of 'violent extremism' by attempting to replace an ideology of hate and exclusion with a positive vision of trust and inclusion; how the promise of development is employed to replace a state of despairing poverty with economic opportunities; and lastly how a narrative of military protection and intervention promises to replace insecurity and fear with peace and human possibility. In order to trace through what *narrative means* the Obama administrations' security discourse aims to generate hope in each respective narrative, the discussion below will answer the question of instrumental use in tandem with question 2, concerning the conceptual relations which give meaning to hope. The simple reason is that in order to retell the respective narrative means, we need to know which concepts that the narratives include. In what follows, I will recapitulate these conceptual relations within each sphere. Through this recapitulation, I will discuss the means through which hope is meant to be generated in each narrative as well as the ends hope promises to achieve.

As the analysis of the threshold between hope and hate made visible, the Obama administrations' security discourse associates hope with a series of signifiers in the sphere of (public) diplomacy. In this strategic narrative hope is placed in relation not only with 'trust and communication', but also with 'pluralism', 'opportunity', 'choice' and perhaps most notably with 'truth'. Within this narrative, the practice of truth-telling serves as the narrative means through which US counterterrorism communications aims to produce hope. Through the practice of truth-telling, "a new beginning" (Obama, 2009d) is ostensibly made possible – the key theme of this strategic narrative. The practice of truth-telling is meant to unsettle the certainty and linearity that the 'ideology of violent extremism' is claimed to express. Curiously, this narrative establishes a conceptual dichotomy between certainty and truth. In contrast to truth, 'certainty' is associated with 'lies', 'stereotypes' and 'prop-

aganda'. In that sense, certainty is depicted as a precondition of 'hate', which in turn is associated with words like 'nightmare', 'cancer', 'barbarism', 'destruction' and 'division'.

In this narrative, the practice of truth-telling operates on an affective level, rather than on an epistemological level. The use of 'truth' aims to "unnerve" the subjects of radicalisation, to "get into their heads" (Fernandez, 2013), to create a sense of disruption from linear certainty. Two forms of truth-telling is practiced in this narrative. On the one hand, the moment of truth is articulated as a call to recognise that the US is not the "crude caricature" (Obama, 2009d) that it is so often presented as, that the US is not the cause of all the problems suffered in the Muslim world and most importantly, that the US and Islam are not inherently at odds with one another. A series of positive examples of Muslims thriving in America is disseminated to that end. On the other hand, the Obama administrations' security discourse paradoxically utilizes the moment of truth to disrupt the hopes disseminated by the 'ideology of violent extremism': in particular its claim that success is near, that adventure and martyrdom awaits the subject of radicalisation. We will have cause to return to this paradoxical relation between hopelessness and hope in the discussions below.

As made clear by the analysis of the threshold between hope and despair, the strategic narrative on global development associates hope with 'potentiality', 'promise', 'entrepreneurial spirit', 'opportunity', 'empowerment' and 'choice'. In contrast, 'despair' is associated with 'poverty', 'tragedy', 'conflict and violence' and of 'fear and resentment', but also with 'colonialism', 'patronage', 'exploitation', 'development', 'charity' and 'dependence'. Already from this brief list, we can see that the strategic narrative in the developmental sphere enlists empathy as a means to generate hope. While the strategic narrative in the (public) diplomatic sphere directs its primary attention to the antagonist, the strategic narrative on development ostensibly shifts the focus inwards, towards the global development community.

The narrative is structured around two promises of recognition, which functions as the narrative means through which hope is meant to be generated. Firstly, the narrative promises to recognise the structural conditions that have allowed despair to foster and turn violent. Secondly, a promise is issued to see the global poor as responsible agents of change, rather than as passive objects of aid and suffering (Obama, 2009c; 2010a; 2013b; 2015b). Taken together, these two acts of recognition promise to "break" underdeveloped life free from the exclusions inherent in what Obama depicts as the "old model" (2013b) of development, thereby offering the subject of development

a "new moment of promise" (2009c) – the key theme of the strategic narrative in this particular sphere.

The conceptual network articulated in the military sphere, which gives form to the threshold between hope and fear, places hope in relation to signifiers such as 'possibility', 'ambiguity', 'faith, 'love', 'empathy', 'individual choice', 'moral compass' and 'humanity'. These signifiers are opposed to fear, which in turn is placed in relation to 'religious dogma', the 'loss of particular identities', 'violence", terror' and 'war'. Importantly, both fear and hope are associated with a notion of 'human imperfection' that is conditioned upon what is articulated as a contingent and potential "human nature" (Obama, 2009b). Within the strategic narrative in the military sphere, recognition of the ambiguous relation between fear and hope functions as a narrative means to generate hope, finding within it the possibility for a "common humanity" and for a "just and lasting peace" (Ibid.) – the key theme of the strategic narrative in this sphere. For Obama, to recognise that one is imperfect is to recognise one's humanity, to see that every human is caught in a continual process of being made. So described, the act of recognition is articulated in opposition to ideas that essentialise social difference. It is in this sense that the act of recognition is invested with hope, it functions as a promise to disrupt lines of division previously perceived to be of divine or natural design.

From above discussion, we can now answer research question 1: *how can we understand the narrative means and ends of the* ***instrumental*** *use of hope?* In different ways, each narrative paints a picture of a hopeful society free from violent and collective conflict and characterised by freedom, plurality, tolerance of difference, universal access to economic opportunities and individual choice. This is a hopeful society in which individual hopes are supported, not supressed. The means through which this society is created are held to be equally hopeful, namely the disruption of ideas and perceptions claimed to be deterministic, divisive and excluding.

In the Obama administrations' security discourse, this society is made synonymous with hope. It would thus be easy to assume that this society holds no place for neither hate, despair or fear. Yet a closer reading of the *conceptual relations* that inform the use of hope reveals that this is not the case. As the analyses performed in the previous chapter have made clear, US security discourse utilises hope not to replace hate, despair and fear, but to reorganise their relationship with violence. The potentially dangerous subjects of radicalisation, be it the figure of the Muslim or of the Poor, are perceived not to be in lack of hope, but to possess a dangerous form of linear and collective hope. Obama equates this linear hope both to a promise of

realisation and to dreams of perfection. As such, it is perceived both to be in constant risk of being frustrated and as being violently opposed to the virtues of empathy and tolerance. The intervention hope makes necessary is thus not the modernist gift of hope – one which projects optimism, that promises a better future without fear, hate and despair – but rather a postmodern form of non-linear hope. This form of non-linear hope offers not a well-defined trajectory towards a given future, but a momentary experience of rupture – presented as a release of human potentiality.

The particularity that informs this hope is its paradoxical claim that it does not have any particular content that can be realised. Allegedly, there is no future that this hope can be withheld from, no antagonist that stands in the way of perfection. The devotion to a common humanity that is equated with this form of hope is not based on a given idea of what humanity is, or what it will become. Its condition of possibility is rather the recognition that humanity is not yet, and never will be, perfected. A closer reading of the Obama administrations' security discourse further reveals that the future that this hope is made synonymous with is no future at all, but rather an effective redescription of the present. The future that these narratives promise does not have to be realised, it does not have to establish itself as a positive order. Its realisation is based neither on the eradication of poverty, nor on the exclusions facing the global Muslim population. It is also not based on the achievement of security or peace, it operates rather through the disruption of the present.

Recalling the analysis presented in the previous chapter, the strategic narratives achieves this through a drastic redirection of desires: the despairing subject of underdevelopment is urged to use *despair* in order to reformulate poverty as a state of opportunity. The hateful subject of radicalisation is urged to redirect its *hate* towards ideas of perfection, and the fearful subject of insecurity is urged to perceive *fear* as an opportunity for moral progression. As such, while the non-linear hope promoted by US security discourse may not be indistinguishable from hate, despair or fear (indeed, it is continuously disassociated from particular forms of hate, despair and fear), it remains caught in relation to them, intimately entangled with a form of individualised hate, fear and despair. In the Obama administrations' security discourse, hope is thus not simply opposed to hate, despair and fear, but rather, in Agamben's terminology, made indistinct from them.

From this reading, we can now fully answer research question 2: *how do particular conceptual relations give meaning to hope?* In US security discourse what structures this network is not the traditional Agambenian relation of inclusive exclusion (1998: 21), but rather a network of indistinctions.

What is excluded is not simply fear, hate nor despair, but rather the notion that these concepts can be excluded, that they can be replaced and overcome by hope. What is removed from politics is not only the desire to realise a perfect state without indistinctions, excluded in and by the Obama administrations' security discourse are also the very idea of a utopic imaginary: the idea that hope can be realised, that hope can end, that hope refers to anything but itself.

Based on this reading of the conceptual relations, we can also begin to answer research question 3: *how is the temporal experience of hope articulated and actualised?* If the Obama adminsitrations' security discourse holds the linear dream of perfection to be deterministic, then it presents the temporality of hope as a moment of contingency, a non-linear "break" (Obama, 2010a; 2015b; 2015c) from the past. According to Obama, this break is experienced when "history is on the move" (2009c). It is articulated as both eternal and instantaneous, as an instant of contingency that is forever present *as possibility*.

However, despite hope's eternal presence, the experience of hope is perceived to be in need of continuous activation, lest it risk turning violent. To that end, the narrative means through which this discourse generates hope are continuously repeated in and by each respective narrative. In the narrative on (public) diplomacy, we find a constant dissemination of the moment of truth. In the sphere of development, we find an endlessly iterated promise of recognition, and in the sphere of military, we find a continuous activation of the moment when hope can be chosen. The reason for this repetition is that these moments are designed to offer a constant experience of rupture, an extended moment of potentiality, a continual experience of hope: an *eternal instant*. Caught in this instant is not a life released, but a disrupted life, one that is suspended in the moment of suspense, in anticipation rather than realisation, in potentiality rather than actuality.

The 'break' hope offers is thus not a new moment in time, constitutive of a new future, but a structure of repetition that keeps the future from coming into presence. In this repeated moment, life is arrested in relation to a past that it is promised to be replaced, a past that must be continuously summoned only to be banished time and again.The narrative on development thus repeatedly summons the passive recipient of development that it promises to abandon, the narrative on diplomacy continuously articulates the idea of a violent Islam that it claims to expunge and the military narrative on resilience remains dependent on the modernist figure of perfection. If there is hope in this repetition, it is arguably a passive and amnesiac hope whose target is not the creation of the future but the erasure and revision of the past – of the

cycle which it repeats – a stark reminder of Bloch's conceptualisation of hope as the temporal opposite not of "fear, but memory" (1986: 12). This is the temporal experience of hope actualised by the Obama administrations' security discourse. Separated from the future, this hope appears curiously similar to Agamben's conceptualisation of potentiality as that which is "never enacted, what never achieves its end. It is, in a word, pain" (1995: 71). In this "duration" (1995: 71), hope is achieved through continuously decreating the present. As such, the structure that this temporal experience installs reminds us of Agamben's conceptualisation of the state of exception as a ruptured state that is able to "maintain itself indefinitely, without ever passing over into actuality" (1998: 47).

The ambition of the use of hope is however not only to govern the future, but also to govern life, an ambition captured by research question 4: *how are different* ***forms of life*** *constituted in relation to hope and to one another?* As indicated in the previous chapter, the Obama administrations' security discourse does this not only by reorienting the desires of the potential subjects of radicalisation towards hope, rather than towards perfection, but also by modifying the form of the desiring subject, attempting to create what I have referred to in this thesis as *hopeful life*.

Despite the focus on choice and capability in this discourse, its concern, as will be argued below, is not the governance of action but of life.[38] To that end, a temporal dichotomy emerges in what the respective narratives articulate as moments of hope, through which both the past and future are instilled with meaning. If the past, according to Obama, belonged to collective identities, then the future belongs to the potential and responsible individual. Importantly, this individual does not equal the individual human as such, but rather a particular entrepreneurial and opportunistic individual – similar in form to what has been described as the neoliberal subject: an individualised form of life that embraces and experiences uncertainty, risk and poverty as opportunity (Miller and Rose, 1990; Pedwell 2012; O'Malley, 2010; Shamir, 2008). In the Obama adminstrations' security discourse, this individual is exemplified through Muslim Americans at work and by successful African Americans. As the respective narratives underline, the person of Obama is exemplary of both these figures.

This form of life is presented as an imperfect life that embodies life's indistinctions, as this discourse defines them. This form of life is not without fear, hate and/or despair, but exemplifies rather the possibility of their productive use. While the examples disseminated by the respective narratives

[38] For a historical analysis of the shift in governance from action to life, see Agamben, 2013: 61.

may be successful, the crucial point that is articulated is that they are all struggling, that they have all known, and will continue to know suffering and exclusion. If hope is actualised, given meaning, at the threshold between fear, hate and despair respectively, then the hopeful life is not called to overcome the threshold, but to inhabit it, to *live at the threshold* where fear, hate, despair and hope merge into one.

At the threshold, we find all the traits characteristic of Agambenian biopolitics. Firstly, we find an excluding separation between different forms of lives. Despite the repeated promises to not single out particular risk populations as well as to abandon the separation of lives on the basis of hope, the analyses presented in this thesis shows that the Obama administrations' security discourse identifies the global Muslim population and the global poor as particularly vulnerable to radicalisation. According to this discourse, it is not simply despair and hate that make these populations vulnerable to radicalisation, but rather the combination of collective forms of life and utopian linear hope that they are perceived to represent. If hope is an individual choice, then it is precisely the individuality of this choice that is denied the respective subjects of radicalisation. The Muslim Other is thus described as "coerced" by violent propaganda (Obama, 2014b) and the Poor Other as made "dependent" by development (Ibid.: 2010a). Identified in US security discourse under Obama is not a subject incapable of hope, as per traditional depictions of bare life, but a subject denied the choice of hope. In contrast to the neoliberal form of hopeful life, these figures have to be continuously brought to the threshold, they have to be presented to the moment of choice: either 'released' from the 'cycles of poverty' or 'disrupted' from an ideology of 'hate' and 'lies'. As such, it appears as if the promised abandonment of the biopolitical division between lives does not dispense with the hierarchies and exclusions characteristic of Agambenian biopolitics, but remains committed to them.

According to Rens van Munster, such a politics finds its condition of possibility in the normalisation of the Agambenian state of exception; a state of living in which the global Muslim population and the global poor are excluded from the body politic simply by reference to being alive. As argued by van Munster: "Through the inclusion of risk classes in a system of control, the life of legal subjects is not *reduced* to that of *homo sacer*. Rather, the reverse is happening: the figure of *homo sacer* dwells in everybody in the sense that all life is bare life until class credentials prove otherwise – the elevation from *homo sacer* to an autonomous subject is only a secondary move (2004: 151-152, original emphasis).

At the threshold, we also find the suspension of political agency that Agamben claims characterises bare life (2004b: 67). In particular, the Obama

administrations' security discourse denies the hopeful life the capacity to create another world. Despite the frequent claims within this discourse that hope is a performative force operating on an ontological level, capable, as Obama assures the respective subjects of radicalisation, to form the world according to one's desire, to make "change from the bottom up" (2009c), the neoliberal world remains out of hope's reach. Neoliberalism is not articulated as one possibility out of many that the hopeful life is deemed capable of choosing. In this discourse, neoliberalism is not referred to as a choice, but as that which gives choice, it is what inserts a particular benevolent uncertainty to life. In the strategic narrative on development, Obama refers to this world as an "environment in which young people can succeed *despite great odds*" (Obama, 2015c, my emphasis). The object of this hope is thus not to transform the world, but to naturalise it, to produce a subject blind to the exclusions engendered by it. As such, Obama's hope is not liberating, but depoliticising: the call to change the world effectively transposed into a continuous individual struggle to change one's place in the world.

In other words, what is denied the hopeful life is the capacity to suspend the state or world in which it lives, to transcend the threshold that it is called to occupy. Just like Agamben's definition of bare life as a state of im-potentiality, we can now conceptualise this hope as formed through the "de-activation of single, specific, factical possibilities (Agamben, 2004b: 67). What this form of life lacks is consequently not hope, but sovereignty – the ability to command hope, to step out of and suspend the moment and world of hope in which it is hailed. If Agamben defines sovereign life as in command of its im-potentiality, as being "*capable* of the act in not realizing it" (1998: 45, original emphasis), the hopeful life that Obama addresses appears as its inversion. Rather than in command of its im-potentiality, it is subjected to and captivated by im-potentiality. For this life, sovereign decision is reduced to an experience of individual choice.[39]

What the Obama administrations' security discourse actualises is not the capacity to hope and *not to* hope, but an inherently fragile experience of hope, that is perceived to be in demand of continuous reactivation and support if it is not to turn violent. So conceived, the "principle of potentiality" (Agamben, 1998: 47) that is actualised in this discourse could be summarised as an infinite repetition of a captivating state of im-potentiality. Characteristic of this principle, is an indistinction between actuality and potentiality, ac-

[39] For an analysis of how discourses of human development entails a similar reduction of decision to choice, see Alt, 2015.

cording to which that which is potential does not realise itself into actuality, but takes the place of actuality – a suspension of the potential to act, in which the reference to this capacity is included only to be excluded.

At the threshold, we also find the denial of voice that characterises Agamben's notion of bare life (1998: 7). As this thesis has shown, US security discourse under President Obama continuously distinguishes hope from concrete articulations of a utopic future, which this discourse associates only with violence, exclusions, frustration, and particularity. Used to exemplify this violent and despairing utopia is *both* the figure of the hateful terrorist storyteller *and* the modern promise of perfection, whose exclusion from hope is based on their perceived attempt to bind aspiration to but *one* future. What is articulated as real hope is in contrast actualised by disrupting such utopic articulations, 'breaking' their hold on our political imaginary. As such, what characterises the moment of hope that this discourse actualises is what Agamben has called a 'destruction of communicable experience' (2007b: 6) – a suspension of meaning that paradoxically is produced through language, actualised by the strategic narratives analysed in this thesis. Like the state of exception, this discourse thus appears to be in "force without significance" (1998: 51).

Similar to Agamben's figure of bare life, the Obama administrations' security discourse denies the hopeful life the capacity to give testament. Not only are the people hailed in this extended moment of rupture formed by the destruction of language, they are also deemed unable to represent themselves. In fact, they are urged and responsibilised to conform to the respective strategic narratives disseminated by the US security apparatus. While the identified risk populations that US security discourse identifies are recognised as having a voice, they are thus disqualified from speaking its *own* voice. What is denied these people is the possibility of *not* conforming to the neoliberal form of life addressed by US security discourse, not without being perceived as complicit in the ideological diffusion of violent extremism. As such, those perceived as vulnerable to radicalisation become unable to bear witness to, on the one hand, the irreducible multiplicity that undoubtedly characterises the *actually existing hopes* of both the global poor and the global Muslim population, and on the other hand, to the global power relations that continue to constitute the conditions in which we all live. This is of course a special form of exclusion, in form similar to Edward Said's diagram of orientalism, quoted from Marx: "They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented" (1979).

At the threshold, we also find the permanent exposure to death that Agamben claims characterises the *homo sacer*. Like the *homo sacer*, a life

without political value that can be killed, but not sacrificed (1998: 85). The hopeful life is called to acknowledge the permanence of war and insecurity. According to the Obama administrations' security discourse, this permanence is embedded in a notion of human imperfection, in the idea that violence is an internal and inevitable characteristic of human life. While this discourse singles out the global poor and the global Muslim population as particular risk populations, the potential for becoming violent in effect applies to us all. The idealised life of neoliberalism included, deemed by US security discourse to be equally imperfect, albeit without the collective form and the utopic aspirations that Obama holds so threatening. Throughout his presidency, Obama has continuously emphasised this fact, finding both hope, empathy *and* fear in the recognition of human imperfection, in the 'fact' that we "are all sinners" (2016a), "all fallible" (2009b). Through such statements, human nature is transposed into the ultimate site of the state of exception, one that must be continuously policed.

For the formation of this life, an indistinction between bare and hopeful life is made into a global exemplar, an effective limit to our political imagination. What defines the bare and hopeful life in the Obama administrations' security discourse, is a permanent struggle, an "audacious" (2006: 421) will to reject what may seem given. Like the life of resilience (Evans and Reid, 2014), Obama urges this life to draw strength from the perpetual vulnerability installed upon it. If we recall Obama's identification of the event of terror as a moment of hope, as a "chance to see and highlight and appreciate that [hopeful] spirit" (2013a), US security discourse transposes the insecurities of war into a global promise, one that is both infinitely deferred and continuously actualised. Paradoxically, Obama thus manages to describe the necessity of war not as cause for hopelessness, but as a celebration of the possible, a testament to hope's inextinguishable force. Formed to perceive war as an opportunity for moral progression, the hope that this form of life is urged to embody is not reduced or sacrificed by exposure to death, but actualised by it. In the end, it is insecurity that allows the hopeful life to forever experience its indistinctions, it is war that serves as one of hope's primary conditions of possibility. If hope is that which we shall become, it thus seems that death truly is the "originary political relation" (Agamben, 1998: 85).

In sum, it could thus be argued that within the continual experience of hope that US security discourse under Obama aims to achieve, we find all the traits that Agamben defines as characteristic of the state of exception as well as of bare life: a separation between lives, voicelessness, passivity, and an indefinite exposure to death. But in contrast to traditional characterisations of bare life, the life governed and produced by US security discourse is not

without hope, nor is it "tyrannised by actuality" (2010: 1067). Quite the contrary, it appears as formed *through* hope and to be captivated by potentiality. As such, the biopolitical ambitions that this discourse expresses appears as a radical break from the history of modern liberal biopolitics, which, as shown in the theoretical chapter of this *kappa*, has been claimed to define hope as a prerogative of politically qualified life. It is also distinguished from postmodern forms of biopolitics claimed to "contain" (Duffield, 2005; 2007) hope. Obama's discourse of hope seeks neither to contain or realise peoples hopes, but to realise life *as* hopeful: to regulate life by releasing hope, by inserting life in a permanent moment of hope. As such, it appears that US security discourse under President Obama exemplifies a form of biopolitics that takes as its object the indistinction between bare and hopeful life.

This is the biopolitical use of hope in US security discourse – as asked by this thesis *overarching research question*: the production of a bare *and* hopeful life. For this life, which appears as a postmodern incarnation of the *homo sacer*, hope is not the prerogative of political life, but signifies rather the exclusion from it. For this bare and hopeful life, hope appears not as a "refusal to accept the imposed conditions of bare life" (McSorley, 2016),[40] but the very thing that produces and sediments its bareness. In contrast to traditional depictions of hope in critical studies of security and beyond, this form of biopoliticised hope appears not as a subversion of the exclusions generated by contemporary biopolitics of security, but as productive of them. This biopoliticised hope acts not to issue forth a new future, or a new human subject , but to sediment life and time in its present form. If we could name the state of living produced by this hope, it would perhaps not be bare life, but rather a *bareness-full-of-life* – a minimum condition of life, in which the audacious force of life – which Obama defines as hope – is experienced in its purest form: a state of necessity, a will to survive.

Afterword

Given the prevalent desire for hope in our present society, I choose not to end this thesis hopefully. On the contrary, I wish to underline that we cannot take hope for granted as a progressive force. As this thesis has shown, there is harm being done in the name of hope and by the use of hope everyday. In our present lives, hope functions, inter alia, as a tool for political legitimation, as a variable through which different lives are valued differently and as a rationale for constant policing and surveillance. People die for the sake of hope.

[40] For a similar description of the relation between hope and bare life, see Bourke, 2014.

Hope also functions as an effective limit to our political imagination. Indeed, the two should not be assumed to be the same. As this thesis has shown, hope cannot be pre-defined as opposite to the apocalyptic imaginary in which we currently live, where cinema and headlines daily warn of irretrievable climate change, of impeding financial crisis and of the next terror attack (Bendle, 2005; Wallis and Newport, 2009; Aradau and van Munster, 2011; Zizek, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014). On the contrary, Erdogan Sima argues that the "normalization of hope" (forthcoming) coexists with the catastrophic imaginary of our present lives. In this imaginary, hope has been transposed into a tool for survival, a celebration of that which Obama and others claim define us as human: our resilience, our creativity, our imagination, our resolve, our will to be alive.

Given the current conflation of insecurity, catastrophe and hope, we should not be surprised that traditional spaces or conditions of hopelessness are today immersed in a language of hope. For instance, UNHCR ceaselessly describes the paradigmatic site of today's camp – the refugee camp – as a site of hope (2017a). In their human interest stories and press releases alike, the refugee is presented as a forever striving subject, an embodiment of human agency and resilience that "never gives up hope" (UNHCR, 2017b). While those inhabiting the refugee camp may very well be without future – according to UNHCR, approximately two thirds of the global refugee population live in or at risk of facing a protracted refugee situation (Refugee Studies Center, 2011: 3) – the refugee is, it seems, never without hope.

The same situation seems to apply to today's increasingly precarious labour force. While the dominant affect of precarity has been claimed to be anxiety (Institute for Precarious Consciousness, 2014), a sense of not having a future (Standing, 2011: 12), of being expendable, unable to foster social relations (Ibid.: 8), hopefulness is nonetheless continuously demanded of the precarious worker. Kathleen Kuehn and Thomas F. Corrigan describe the institutionalisation of this practice as "hope labour" (2013), directing attention to how the neoliberal economy encourages the precarious worker to trade security in the present for the hope of employment in the future. In our present economy, hope is individualised and responsibilised. According to Franco "Bifo" Berardi, "capitalism has swallowed the exchange-value machine not only for the different forms of life, but also for thought, imagination, and hope" (2009: 131). We should thus not be surprised that the ultimate space of this form of labour, the factories in the tax-exempted Free Trade Zones in the global South are advertised as "zones of hope" (Tornhill, 2010: 63). In these zones, the modernist promise, "Arbeit macht frei", work

gives freedom, is replaced by the postmodern promise of neoliberalism: work gives hope.

But perhaps we should not be surprised by this conflation of despair, insecurity and hope? To be sure, hope's conceptual history is a history of violence and suffering. Although maintaining a desire for hope, Bloch identifies the location of hope as "the place of death" (1995: 112), Derrida associates hope with "fear and trembling" (1992: 5) and Eagleton claims that there is no "authentic hope" without tragedy (2015: 115). Hesiod's narration of the legend of Pandora (2006), which remains the first historical record of hope that has survived to our days, written approximately 700 BC, is another example of hope's ambiguous relation to human suffering. According to the legend, hope is placed *within* the box of miseries that Pandora is ordered by Zeus to release onto mankind. In the final instance, however, Pandora closes the box and keeps hope, personified in the goddess *Elpis*, alone left within. The positioning of hope within the box of miseries – both belonging to the category of suffering and, in the final instance, being separated from it – have puzzled interpreters of Hesiod's poem. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, Hesiod's poem is evidence that hope "is in truth the worst of all evils, because it protracts the torment of men" (1996: 45). Others have taken the fact that hope "is caught by the lid [of Pandora's box] to symbolize that hope always desires to be realized but never is" (Verdenius, 1985: 68). However, such interpretations reduce neither the ambiguity of Hesiod's poem nor of hope, which remains intimately related to human suffering. Indeed, if we are to believe Hesiod's tale, human suffering is hope's original location. No wonder that Agamben has spoken of "the courage of hopelessness" (quoted in Cerf, 2012).

Contribution to the field

In order to address the primary aim of this thesis – to make visible how hope can and has been used as a biopolitical technology in US security discourse – this thesis has demonstrated how hope is used by the US security apparatus under President Obama as a biopolitical technology to pre-empt processes of radicalisation in perceived risk populations. It has shown how the US security apparatus employs strategic narratives to work on the desires of particular lives, to give form to an individualised and resilient form of hopeful life as well as to govern the future, issuing a state of prolonged suspension.

Theoretically, the thesis has added critical discussion to a series of literatures. The most important contribution, in my mind, has been a problematisation of the conceptual opposition between hope and bare life – central as this

opposition has been to discussions and applications of Agamben's theoretical framework (Agamben, 2000: 31; Negri, quoted in Nielson, 2004; Bartolini, 2008; Burke, 2011; Cerf, 2012; Snoek, 2012: 12-15; Bourke, 2014). As such, the thesis has also problematized the often presumed relationship between hope and contemporary forms of biopolitics of security, according to which hope functions as a motor for a radical political imaginary, an act of resistance that politics of security seeks to tame or deny (e.g. Hardt and Negri, quoted in Brown et. al. 2002; Burke, 2011). By systematically situating hope within biopolitics of security and development, the thesis has contributed to critical literatures on development (e.g. Duffield, 2007), pre-emptive counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism practices (e.g. Massumi, 2007; Holmqvist, 2013; Martin, 2014), resilience (e.g. Evans and Reid, 2014) as well as to studies on security through the lens affect theory (e.g. Bleiker and Hutchinson, 2008). It has shown that hope is complexly related to a series of affects or concepts that hope traditionally is taken to oppose, namely fear, hate, despair and violence. To critical literatures on hope, optimism and desire (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Ahmed, 2004; 2010; Berlant, 2011), the thesis has investigated and theorised the relation between security and hope. The thesis has further added a biopolitical dimension, probing into how hope can be used to separate between forms of life, as well as to regulate processes of subjectification.

Empirically, the thesis has employed an Agambenian analysis outside of its traditional settings, namely the camp and the law. Agamben's framework has also been applied to an atypical discursive case, namely a discourse of inclusion and hope, rather than strict discourses of fear and exclusion (Bly, 2017). If the traditional empirical material within critical security studies are discourses or aesthetics of fear, then this thesis has broadened the scope of empirical inquiry within this field, analysing the articulations of hope that necessarily exists in every security discourse. To studies on Obama's grand narrative, the thesis has questioned common characterisations of Obama's hope as progressive, as general, as empathic and as being without particularity.

Methodologically, the thesis has contributed to discussions on how to operationalise Agamben's dense political philosophy. To that end, the thesis has teased out a set of principles through which to select empirical material (i.e. the example and the signature). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly given Agamben's silence on the subject, the thesis has operationalised an analytical method that allows a discourse and/or narrative to be read in a systematic fashion. The key concepts that informs this discourse analytical method are, in relation to a conceptual analysis, the example, the exception

and the threshold. In terms of a narrative analysis the key concepts have been identified as stoppage, movement and repetition.

Politically, the thesis has contributed to discussions of what limits our present political imaginary. By analysing the appropriation of hope by biopolitics of security, it has questioned one of the most cherished tools of radical political agency. As such, the thesis has engendered, but not conducted, a discussion on how to decreate the hopeful state of exception in which we live.

Future research

This thesis has provoked several potential avenues for future research, in particular further analysis of hope as a biopolitical technology, within the US security apparatus and beyond. Within the US security apparatus, it would be pertinent to further analyse several aspects of the use of hope that this thesis has been blind to. These include the material, aesthetic and administrative implementation of hope briefly discussed in the section on delimitations. To be sure, hope is by no means the exclusive object of strategic communication or the task of Presidential discourse. On the contrary, within the US security apparatus hope is implemented in and through practices as diverse as trade policies, development programmes, US military conduct and communication, as well as in a range of external activities orchestrated by the US state department. One should also not forget the use of US media outlets in the Arab world, such the Alhurra television channel launched 2004 to counter anti-Americanism.

It would also be interesting to study hope as a biopolitical technique outside the sphere of security and outside the US context. Of particular interest would be to study articulations of hope in respect to the precarious labour as well as in neoliberalism at large. The hold on the imaginary that the promise of never-ending growth has occupied in our present capitalist societies comes to mind, as do hope's relation to the politics of dis/satisfaction that is embedded in our consumerist behaviour (McGowan, 2004). Of further interest would be to problematize the relation between hope and what has been called our contemporary "post-political condition" (Mouffe, 2005). While post-politics is often called a hopeless form of politics devoid of ideology and vision, surrendered to technocracy and administration, it is arguably not without hope. For instance, the party manifesto of the Swedish Social Democrats – a typical case of post-politics – professes commitment to a society in which everyone should have the ability to hope (Socialdemokraterna, 2012: 1).

Another field of interests is of course how the lives that US security discourse targets with the use of hope, responds, appropriates, negotiates and/or resist this discourse. Such research would be especially valuable, seeing as it holds the potential to show exactly how reductive Obama's use of hope actually was, denying – despite its promise of empathy and recognition – the existence and irreducible plurality of actually existing hopes in both the global South and North.

The latter point is of course an empirical question, but it also has a theoretical dimension: how to suspend and resist a form of power that is so elusive, formless and unarticulated as hope? How to suspend the state of suspension actualised by Obama's version of hope? Crucial for such a line of research would be to probe the relationship between hope and several of Agamben's more ethical and political concepts, namely inoperativity (2014; 2015), destituent power (Ibid.), profanity (2007a), messianic time (2005b) as well as his notion of free use (2014; 2015). Given the urgency of this task, this thesis has but scratched the surface of the relationship between hope and politics.

Svensk sammanfattning

Denna avhandling undersöker hur Obamaadministrationens säkerhetsdiskurs använder och skapar hopp för att motverka radikalisering till våldsbejakande extremism. Studiens primära frågeställning är: hur används hopp biopolitiskt av amerikansk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs?

Hopp har en lång historia i säkerhetsdiskurs. Sedan attackerna i New York 11 september 2001 har amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs varit närmast besatt av hopp. George W. Bush definierade tidigt hopplöshet som en grundorsak till terror (2006), en praxis som Obama till stora delar följt. Enligt Obama lever vi nu i en värld där ”vad som händer med ett enskilt barns hopp – varhelst på jorden – kan berika vår värld, eller göra den fattigare” (2009a, egen översättning). Särskilt är det ”när människor – särskilt unga människor – *känner* sig fängslade i fattiga samhällen” (2015, egen översättning, egen betoning) som risker för radikalisering antas uppstå. Hopp fungerar i amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs som motsatsen till terror. Avsaknaden av hopp är inte bara förutsättningen för radikalisering till terror, det är även definierat som ”terroristernas sanna intention” (Obama, 2016a, egen översättning). Det är vidare genom hopp som vi mäter terrorns effekter, en idé som även Donald Trump nyligen givit uttryck för: ”den sanna effekten av ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hizbollah, Hamas med flera inte bara räknas i antalet döda, det måste också räknas i antalet förlorade drömmar” (2017).

Givet detta påstådda motsatsförhållande har skapandet och givandet av hopp definierats som en nyckelstrategi för att motverka radikalisering och därmed ’vinna’ kriget mot terrorismen. Enligt Bush är ”hopp ett svar på terror” (2002), enligt Obama är hopp ” det viktigaste vapnet i vår arsenal” (2009a). I efterdyningarna av attackerna i Bryssel 2016 pratade Obama om hopp som en social känsla eller kapacitet, med möjlighet att förflytta sig

mellan olika människor. Han syftade då ”inte på ett icke-statiskt hopp, utan ett levande hopp. Hopp är inte enbart en gåva vi får utan en något som vi måste ge till andra, en gåva att sprida vidare” (2016a). I hans hyllade Nobeltal talade Obama om att hopp innehade möjligheten att överbrygga tillsynes låsta och fasta identiteter, och därmed bereda väg för en gemensam mänsklighet.

Denna avhandling är inspirerad av sådana utsagor. Den undersöker hur hopp används som ett vapen i krig, ett medel för att skapa säkerhet. Utifrån det syftet analyserar avhandlingen hur hopp antas verka på terrorns grundorsaker, på dess påstådda ideologiska och affektiva förutsättningar. I amerikansk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs är hopp inte bara en känsla, de är ett verktyg som verkar på individer, på deras begär och drömmar, på deras identiteter och på deras handlingsutrymme. Avhandlingen betraktar därför hopp som en social och politisk företeelse, vad Giorgio Agamben kallar för en biopolitisk teknologi (Agamben, 2011).

Avhandlingens teoretiska ambition är att ifrågasätta och problematisera en tendens inom kritiska säkerhetsstudier och inom den akademiska vänstern att positionera hopp som diametralt motsatt den rädsla som ofta anses ligga bakom begäret efter säkerhet och kontroll. I denna litteratur presenteras hopp som byggt på ett öppet förhållningssätt mot det okända, som möjliggörande av en annan framtid bortom dagens säkerhetssamhälle och som subversivt av de främlingsfientliga och exkluderande praktiker som detta samhälle har underbyggt.

Avhandlingens primära studieobjekt är Obamaadministrationens strategiska narrativ i vad amerikansk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs definierar som säkerhetens tre primära domäner: (allmän) diplomati, utveckling och militär. Som denna avhandling visar så aktualiserar dessa domäner hopp på olika vis. Diplomatiska medel används för att motverka spridande av extremistisk ideologi, genom att, hävdas det, ersätta hat och propaganda med hopp och sanning. Utveckling och bistånd påstås förebygga den förtvivlan som denna diskurs associerar med fattigdom. Slutligen används militära medel för att motverka rädsla – dels genom att ge löfte om beskydd, men även genom att verka som en symbol för en bättre framtid. De olika strategiska narrativen i dessa domäner aktualiserar med andra ord tre olika centrala distinktioner som ger hopp mening och betydelse: mellan hopp och hat, mellan hopp och förtvivlan och slutligen mellan hopp och rädsla. Genom att analysera hur dessa relationer hanteras inom varje narrativ undersöker denna avhandling den övergripande relationen mellan våld och hopp som underbygger amerikansk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs under president Obama.

Avhandlingen bygger på fyra stycken separata forskningsartiklar. *Artikel 1*[41] – "Att läsa kriget mot terrorn genom hopp och rädsla: Affektiv krigsföring och frågan om framtiden" – placerar avhandlingen i samtida akademisk debatt. I motsats till att se hopp som en analytisk kategori för att studera och kritisera säkerhetsdiskurs under kriget mot terrorn, argumenterar artikeln för att hopp ska betraktas som en (bio)politisk kategori. Artikeln introducerar avhandlingens teoretiska ramverk, ett ramverk som systematiserats i denna *kappa*.

Artikel 2[42] – "Det ovetande radikaliseringssubjektet: Amerikansk kontraterrorismkommunikation och hoppets biopolitik" – undersöker det strategiska narrativet inom den diplomatiska sfären. Artikeln analyserar hur hopp används för att motverka spridandet av vad som framställs som en 'hatets ideologi', vilken inom amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs presenteras som den primära grundorsaken till radikalisering. Obama kallar denna process för "korruptionen av unga medvetanden" (2014b). Artikeln visar vidare att även om denna ideologi presenteras i motsatsförhållande till hopp och framtid, så ses den trots allt som fylld av hopp. Det är de facto detta hopp – dess löfte om martyrskap, om broderskap och om mening – som anses göra den så farlig, så attraktiv för den globala muslimska populationen. Särskilt farligt anses den framtid som är kopplat till detta hopp vara: dess löfte att hoppet ska infrias, att en värld fri från amerikansk ockupation är möjlig.

Hopp är med andra ord inget entydigt positivt i amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs, det kan tvärtom vara extremt farligt. Givet denna tvetydighet visar artikeln hur amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs försöker att reglera hoppets relation till våld, detta genom att bryta ner det hopp som anses erbjudas av 'hatets ideologi'. Artikeln (tillsammans med den bredare analysen av detta narrativ som erbjuds i denna *kappa*) visar att målet med denna aktion inte är att skapa hopp, utan att skapa ett viss form av hoppfullt liv, vilket anses mindre våldsam än det radikaliserade subjektet – potentiellt hela den globala muslimska befolkningen. Målet verkar vara att individualisera hoppet, att skapa en människa som inte drömmer om en specifik framtid, som inte kanaliserar sitt hopp mot någon annan, utan använder sitt hopp för att hantera sin vardagssituation – en strävande mångkulturell individ i ett neoliberalt samhälle.

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[41] Wrangel, Claes (2013) "Reading the War on Terror through Fear and Hope: Affective Warfare and the Question of the Future", in *Political Perspectives* 7(2): 85-105. Special issue: Unfolding the Political: Voices of aesthetics and emotions, guest edited by Emmy Eklundh and Rachel Massey.

[42] Denna artikel har blivit inbjudan att medverka i ett specialnummer om "Hope as a Technology of Development" föreslagen till tidskriften *International Political Sociology*. Redaktörer: Marjo Lindroth and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen.

Artikel 3[43] – "Att erkänna och se hopp: Amerikansk utvecklingsdiskurs och förtvivlans löfte" – undersöker det strategiska narrativet inom utvecklingspolitikens domän. Artikeln analyserar hoppets relation till förtvivlan, såsom det artikuleras i och av detta narrativ. Förtvivlan ses i amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs som starkt relaterat till fattigdom. Det är en kombination av förtvivlan och fattigdom som anses utgöra en av de primära grundförutsättningarna för att hatets ideologi ska kunna få spridning. I likhet med hoppets relation till hat diskuterat i *artikel 1* är hoppets relation till förtvivlan inte entydigt i detta narrativ. Om det som Obama beskriver som traditionell utvecklingsdiskurs säkerhetiserade världens fattiga på grund av deras förtvivlan, så betecknas världens fattiga som potentiellt farliga av Obama på grund av deras hopp. Artikeln visar att detta hopp kontinuerligt presenteras i amerikanska säkerhetsdiskurs i singularära termer, vad som definierar världens fattiga är *ett* hopp, de ses och bemöts som *ett* subjekt.

Vad som gör detta hopp farligt är den politiska och sociala karaktären det har tagit: viljan att bryta sig själv fri från omvärldens exploatering och kolonialism. Att erkänna och se världens fattiga som hoppfulla, vilket Obama vid upprepade tillfällen lovar världens fattiga, är med andra ord inte en entydig handling. Som hoppfulla subjekt krävs att deras hopp noggrant regleras och upprätthålls – så att den förtvivlan som enligt Obama är oseparerbar från hopp inte ges våldsamma uttryck. Likt *artikel 1* visar artikeln att vad som kännetecknar Obamas hopp är en omskrivning av hoppets relation till framtiden. Istället för att beteckna ett begär efter en annan värld, så associeras hopp till en strävan att hantera ens nuvarande situation i ett neoliberalt samhälle. Världens fattiga uppmuntras med andra ord att inte bli frustrerat av sin fattigdom utan att finna hopp i sin fattigdom, att ständigt söka förbättra sin individuella position i ett i grunden ojämlikt samhälle. Målet att skapa hopp framstår därmed som djupt motstridigt löftet om verklig ekonomisk utveckling.

Artikel 4[44] – "Hopp i katastrofens tid? Resiliens och framtiden *i* det 'bara livet'" – undersöker det strategiska narrativet i den militära domänen, med fokus på hoppets relation till rädsla. Detta narrativ skiljer sig till viss del från de övriga två, eftersom det hanterar hur ett direkt hot ska bemötas, snarare än hotets grundförutsättningar. Indirekt är dock detta narrativ även det förebyggande: hur vi hanterar terror har, enligt Obama, betydelse för framtiden. Om terror möts med rädsla så antas detta skapa diskriminering och främlingsfientlighet vilket påstås gynna terroristerna. Narrativet försöker således skapa

[43] Tängh Wrangel, Claes (2017a) "Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and the Promise of Despair", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 35(5): 875-892.

[44] Wrangel, Claes (2014) "Hope in a Time of Catastrophe? Resilience and the Future *in* Bare Life", in *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 2(3): 183-194.

både resiliens för framtida terrorattacker samt förebygga sådana attacker från att uppstå. Platsen för detta narrativ är den direkta konfrontationen med terror, antingen på hemmafronten i efterdyningarna av en attack eller i kriget mot terrorns traditionella slagfält, i synnerhet Afghanistan, Irak och Syrien.

Liksom i de tidigare presenterade narrativen artikuleras i detta narrativ en ambivalent relation mellan hopp och rädsla. Enligt Obama kan inte hopp övervinna rädsla, snarare är hopp starkt beroende av rädsla och osäkerhet. Hopp är enligt Obama det som låter mänskligheten hantera osäkerhet, vilket i detta narrativ betecknas som ett givet, statiskt tillstånd. Artikeln visar att Obamas definition av den mänskliga naturen som hoppfull inkluderar en syn på människan som potentiellt farlig, som ett ofärdigt projekt som noggrant måste regleras så att den inte får våldsamma uttryck – hela mänskligheten förvandlas därmed till ett potentiellt säkerhetshot. Genom att erkänna detta ”faktum” – att osäkerhet alltid kommer att finnas, att alla människor kan bli farliga – menar Obama paradoxalt nog att säkerhet kan uppnås. I detta erkännande finns nyckeln till att låta hopp bli en garant för resiliens, en inneboende kraft att hantera osäkerhet, vilken Obama presenterar som ’mänskligheten bästa sida’.

Sammanfattningsvis har dessa artiklar visat att hopp inte är motstridigt osäkerhet, utan starkt förknippat med det. I amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs under Obama har hopp bidragit till att naturalisera den permanenta säkerhetsapparaten och paranoian som kännetecknat västvärlden sedan attackerna i New York den 11 september 2001. Om skapandet av hopp är politikens mål, så innebär det med andra ord en radikal förskjutning av ideal som fred, säkerhet och välstånd, vilka har organiserat global diskurs historiskt. Denna avhandling har snarare visat att hopp som politiskt ideal inom amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs tvärtom bygger på en naturaliseing av osäkerhet, ojämlikhet och exkludering. I amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs ses hopp både som lösning till osäkerhet och det som gör världen permanent osäker. Detta hopp bygger på en identifiering av hela den muslimska populationen och på alla världens fattiga som särskilda riskpopulationer, som några vars hopp kräver ständig reglering. I förlängningen ses hela mänskligheten som potentiella terrorister. Utifrån denna artikulation skapar hopp ingen framtid, utan förstärker de maktrelationer och strukturer som kännetecknar vår nutida värld. Det hopp som antas agera pacificerande bygger vidare på en radikal separation mellan hopp och framtid. Inbyggt i detta hopp är de facto ett erkännande av att det inte finns en framtid, att osäkerhet är ständigt närvarande. Utifrån analyserna som underbygger denna avhandling framstår detta som den biopolitiska ambitionen för användandet av hopp i amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs under

Obama: att reducera hopp till en individuell hanteringsmekanism i ett tillstånd av permanent osäkerhet.

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