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# Competition and its outcomes:

*Does a more competitive electoral system elect  
more well-educated politicians?*

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## **Abstract**

**Title:** Competition and its outcomes: *Does a more competitive electoral system elect more well-educated politicians?*

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Recent studies have reemphasized the importance of competition in democracy. An idea originating from Weber: that democratic competition leads to more qualified leaders, has been resurrected. Research shows that democracies are more likely to elect leaders with a high level of education, and within democratic states stronger competition correlates with elected politicians with higher education, more political experience and higher previous income.

This study researches whether the correlation between greater competition and elected candidates with higher “Curriculum vitae-qualities” holds between electoral systems. Does a more competitive electoral system elect candidates that score higher on such measures? Using education as a proxy for these qualities the study traces different outcomes on education in a mixed electoral system, comparing the majoritarian (more competitive) part of the electoral system with the proportional (less competitive) part. It finds that there is no clear correlation and discovers hints that this may be because a proportional systems elects candidates with high levels of education for other reasons.

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## 1.1. Introduction – Electoral reform

In 2005 Italy reformed its electoral system, in 2008 Lithuania made changes in its electoral system. Also Norway, Greece, Estonia, Belgium and many more European countries has changed or even reformed their electoral system in the early 2000s. In the last ten years Europe has experienced a great intensity of electoral reform, and it is far from just the former Soviet states that undergo reform. Several stable, old, democracies make changes to their electoral systems!<sup>1</sup> This stands in stark contrast to the old notion that “Familiarity breeds stability” and that electoral systems generally stay the same. The trend is often considered a “forth wave” of electoral reform, and it is going on right now.<sup>2</sup>

As is shown by the debate on the British electoral system, one does not simply “wing” an electoral system anymore. Crafting an electoral system is a process of debates on both the “fairness” of the system and its outcomes.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2. The purpose

This study aims to contribute to the research on how and whether democratic systems favor candidates with a high level of education (a proxy related to other “Curriculum vitae-qualities”) and what outcomes different electoral systems favor. The theoretical background is mainly influenced by research showing a correlation between the competitive components of democracy and “higher valence”-candidates being elected. “Higher valence” was used to summarize a higher level of education, former income and political experience.<sup>4</sup> The contribution to this research will be to trace whether the correlation can be shown when comparing different electoral systems, with different degrees of electoral competition. If this is the case it will provide some clues to the different outcomes of the different electoral systems, if it’s not the case there is cause to question how important electoral competition really is, or at least *when* electoral competition matters and when not. After dealing with the theoretical background the study’s purpose will be translated into a research-question and a hypothesis.

This study focuses on data from a mixed electoral system, the German. The results and the conclusions can however be generalized beyond the German case. The German data is used

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<sup>1</sup> Renwick (2011) p. 466

<sup>2</sup> Farrell (2001) p. 179

<sup>3</sup> Jeffery (1998)

<sup>4</sup> Galasso and Nannicini (2011) p. 79

for a strategic selection (instead of a wider cross-European dataset including many countries) avoiding disturbance caused by different political climate, cultural differences and other institutional differences that may blur the results.<sup>5</sup> After all, what is interesting is not which countries Members of Parliament (MP:s) has the highest level of education but whether changes in an electoral system can produce a different outcome on education (and related properties) in future elections.

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<sup>5</sup> The homepage of the German Bundestag provides a great deal of statistical data on its members of parliament and is well worth a visit.  
<http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/abgeordnete17/listeBundesland/index.html>

## 2.1. The theory and the casual mechanism – competition matters

The theoretical foundation dates back to Max Weber, and his notion that democracy helps producing better leaders.<sup>6</sup> This notion was recently rekindled by a paper of Timothy Besley and Martha Reynal-Querol who, with a vast dataset ranging over about 150 years, 197 countries and 1468 political leaders, showed that democracies indeed are more likely to produce more leaders with a high level of education (in their study level of education serves as an approximation of good leadership). According to them:

*“[...] democratic systems are around 20% more likely to select highly educated leaders.”<sup>7</sup>*

These results cannot easily be dismissed, they hold when controlled for both economical factors as well as country-specific trends of education levels.<sup>8</sup> One way of looking at their results is by stating that democracies elect different candidates. Among other things democracies elects less military professionals (with a generally lesser level of education) and more scientists than dictatorships. Interestingly when Besley and Reynal-Querol controls for previous occupation there is still an independent effect contributed to democracy.<sup>9</sup>

So what mechanism in democracy is it that favors selection of educated politicians? One interesting insight is provided by Vincenzo Galasso and Tommaso Nannicini. They claim to find a correlation between stronger electoral competition and higher “valence” of elected candidates.

*“In other words, the harsher is political competition, the higher is the probability that political parties rely on high-valence candidates. These are defined as politicians with higher educational attainments or private income—both proxies for market skills—or politicians who proved their political ability in subsequent rounds of local elections [...]”<sup>10</sup>*

Galasso and Nannicini have conducted their research on candidates in Italian elections. They show that within the rather isolated majoritarian part of Italy’s electoral system (75% of seats were elected with a majoritarian system between 1994 and 2006), constituencies where competition between the candidates and parties is strong tend to elect candidates with higher

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<sup>6</sup> Held (2001) p. 215

<sup>7</sup> Besley & Reynal-Querol (2011) p. 552

<sup>8</sup> A.a. p. 555f

<sup>9</sup> A.a. p. 558f

<sup>10</sup> Galasso and Nannicini (2011) p 89

education, income and/or more previous experience. Since the study focused on the majoritarian electoral system competition was measured by:

*“two different indicators: (i) the margin of victory in the previous political election and (ii) the district-specific ratio of the number of swing voters to the difference between the ideological voters of the two main coalitions.”<sup>11</sup>*

This measure for competition can unfortunately not be borrowed when comparing different electoral systems, below a cruder method is used to differ between electoral systems with more or less competition.

## **2.2. Trying the Casual mechanism on electoral systems.**

If indeed stronger competition correlates with politicians of higher valence this mechanism should be possible to measure not only within an electoral system, as was done in Italy, but also between electoral systems. That is, a system that encourages more political competition should also produce more high-valence politicians, all other things equal.

Instead of the concept of “valence” used by Galasso and Nannicini focus will be put on “education” (much like Besley and Reynal-Querol) for three important reasons:

1. Collecting data for all aspects of “valence” used by Galasso and Nannicini would take considerably more time than this study has at disposal.
2. Education tends to correlate to both the income-factor and civic engagement, and hence suffice as a proxy not only for “valence”.<sup>12</sup>
3. The notion of education as a measure of valence and competence is supported in Besley and Reynal-Querols work (there as a proxy for “good governance”).<sup>13</sup>

A core assumption is that a majoritarian electoral system encourages more competition than a proportional system, when there can be only one winner the prestige of winning ought to be greater. This assumption is fueled by a model for measuring electoral competition *within* a party that should apply also to competition between parties. Competition is greater where the ratio of people competing for elected seats is higher (more people per seat equals stronger competition), in a district with only one seat to be won and several parties or candidates

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<sup>11</sup> Galasso and Nannicini (2011) p. 79f

<sup>12</sup> Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) p. 552

<sup>13</sup> A.a. s. 553

competing over it competition ought to be strong (however there is a risk that if only a few parties stand a real chance to win others may simply avoid competing in it). In list-systems (especially closed list-systems where there is no way to advance on your party-list in the electoral competition) where only a number of top names on the lists can be considered to have a chance in the competition and the rest serve mainly to increase the competitiveness of the list itself, the ratio of people per seat ought to be lower (to equal the competitiveness of a two-party majoritarian system there has to be twice the number of people who has a decent chance to win a seat as there are available seats, and Germany has more than two parties).<sup>14</sup>

Another way of arguing that majoritarian systems tend to be more competitive is by looking at the candidate selection, something that has been done in much research on how electoral systems benefits female representation in parliament. In local constituencies the top candidate carries the party; therefore the local party also tends to select a candidate that will maximize their chances of winning (when considering gender this means a man is generally selected candidate since men are considered more competitive as single candidates).<sup>15</sup> To the local party the election is often an “all or nothing at all” situation, even when the party in the region can win seats on an additional list. Such a situation can in itself be considered highly competitive. Also the competitive situation is “different” between majoritarian and proportional system – in majoritarian systems the candidate competes, in proportional the list also competes (a list is more than the number of its candidates, how the candidates are balanced matters).<sup>16</sup> Here the stronger competition in the majoritarian system may also be indicated. In the majoritarian system the candidate competes for his/her success, failure may mean being denied a seat. On a list the candidate can be “pulled” by the list, and the other candidates, especially when the list is “closed” as in Germany.

Testing whether electoral competition has the same effect of promoting high levels of education on candidates between electoral systems is somewhat more difficult than proving it within a system (at least a majoritarian). There are many ways in which culture or other national traits could affect the valence of candidates and make a comparison between countries unreliable to draw conclusions from. Here an attempt to overcome such difficulties is made by eliminating as many cultural differences as possible. By focusing on a country with a mixed electoral system there is a hope of keeping other relevant factors constant, a

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<sup>14</sup> Hazan (2010) p. 126ff

<sup>15</sup> Norris (2006) p. 205

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*



most similar systems design.<sup>17</sup> However, as soon will be explained, there is also a risk that the two systems are too similar...

### 2.3. The German case

The German electoral system is suitable for this study for several reasons: it has a mixed electoral system where every citizen has two votes, one to cast for a candidate in a single-member constituency and a second to cast for a closed party-list that encompasses the entire region (Land) which is the electoral district.<sup>18</sup> The last election in 2009 was fairly representative for German elections, the same parties have been elected since the unification of Germany and only one thing stood out about the 2009 election: the smaller parties have gained slightly more seats than they have used to in the elections between 1990 and 2002. They have done so mainly at the cost of the Social Democratic party (SDP).<sup>19</sup> Working from the thesis that a majoritarian system elects more highly educated candidates than a proportional it should be easy to compare the candidates elected with the two systems to confirm it, and this is what is attempted here. However there are no perfect cases, reality rarely shows that much respect for researchers. The parts of the German electoral system interact, creating a few kinks which are explained below.

The total number of seats a party has in the Bundestag is determined by their success in the party-list vote. That is: each party is awarded about the same percentage of the seats in the Bundestag as they win from the party-list votes. Candidates from the party-lists are added to the candidates elected with the majoritarian system until they fill up the total number of seats the party has won. The winner simply doesn't take it all.<sup>20</sup> This may somewhat contribute to lessen the difference in competition between the two systems; it is very important to gain seats with the party list. However this effect is in turn somewhat reduced since there are so called "überhangmandate". If the number of candidates elected with the majoritarian system in a region exceeds the total number of seats their party has won in the region they nevertheless gain seats in the bundestag (causing the size of the bundestag to differ somewhat between elections), winning an election with the majoritarian system is a sure way to gain a seat.<sup>21</sup> The fact that the proportional system, the list system, is very important does not mean

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<sup>17</sup>Metodpraktikan (2007) p. 112

<sup>18</sup> Jeffery (1998) p. 245

<sup>19</sup>Data for previous elections to the German parliament:

[http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/fruehere\\_bundestagswahlen/btw2002.html](http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/fruehere_bundestagswahlen/btw2002.html)

<sup>20</sup> Farrell (2001) p. 104f

<sup>21</sup> Farrell (2001) p. 105

that the competition is stronger in it. In order to guarantee a seat the candidate still has to win in his or her single-member constituency and provided that voters does not split their votes to a very high degree the party needs to compete in the majoritarian election in order to succeed in the proportional election.

However there is a risk that the differences when comparing the outcomes of the systems may not be so large as they would be if the two systems were used separately under otherwise similar conditions.

It is important to notice that this study is concerned with the German bundestag (the elected parliament) and not the “Bundesrat” (the regions representatives in the German legislative) since they are not subjected to the same electoral process as the candidates to the bundestag.<sup>22</sup>

#### **2.4. A precise question**

Since this study deals with whether there is a correlation between higher degrees of electoral competition and politicians with a higher level of education being elected, since it assumes that a majoritarian system is more competitive than a proportional and since it focuses on the German case the question will simply be:

- **“Does the majoritarian part of the German electoral system elect members of parliament with a higher level of education than the proportional part of the electoral system”**

#### **2.5. Hypothesis**

Based on Galasso and Nannicini there should be a direct correlation between stronger electoral competition and candidates with a higher level of education being elected (they have controlled for regional effects and “time fixed effects”).<sup>23</sup> Based on this it is possible to expect that the majoritarian part of the German electoral system will indeed elect candidates with a higher level of education than the proportional part.

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<sup>22</sup> The Bundesrat: [http://www.bundesrat.de/cln\\_152/nn\\_10940/EN/funktionen-en/funktionen-en-node.html?\\_nnn=true](http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_152/nn_10940/EN/funktionen-en/funktionen-en-node.html?_nnn=true)

<sup>23</sup> Galasso and Nannicini (2011) p. 89

## 2.6. Direct correlations and intermediate variables

Since Galasso and Nannicini find a correlation that is direct (considering to the factors they have been able to control for) it is probably safe to assume that if the effects of competition on level of education holds between electoral systems they should shine through on a empirical material consisting of over 600 cases. One should notice that this study does not have the capacity to control whether any correlations found are direct or indirect (that would take a more extensive empirical material than that available).

One interesting factor is very similar to the competition; it is the matter of “list-pullers”. In order to attract voters to the party-list parties tend to put their most attractive candidates first on the list.<sup>24</sup> It is possible that within the German system of closed lists the candidates for the majoritarian elections are selected to function as “list-pullers” (at least within their single-member constituency) and that the candidates with high levels of education are selected to be list pullers.

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<sup>24</sup> Hague and Harrop (2007) p. 191

### **3.1. The dataset**

In order to carry out this study a dataset have been crafted for comparative analysis. The dataset is but a meek reproduction of an already existing dataset used in producing the data available at the Bundestags website. However the request to access the already existing dataset(s) was denied. This, sadly, means that data for previous elections and members of parliament is unavailable. Therefore this case-study cannot be extended into the past (which would otherwise have strengthened whatever conclusions that will be drawn).

The dataset deals with members of the German parliament elected in the 2009 years election. It is on them the hypothesis is tested, and although access to data over time would reduce the risk of results influenced by randomness or external factors it is likely that if the predicted correlation exists it would nevertheless show as a pattern. The data in this dataset is fetched from two types of sources: First there is the biographical information available on each Member of Parliament (and on those who have been replaced during the term) at the website of the German parliament.<sup>25</sup> Further this information has been filled out and completed with data from the Members of Parliaments personal websites (surprisingly almost all Members of Parliament has a personal website), whenever this complementary information has been used it will be noted together with the dataset in the appendix.

Since the dataset has been crafted by a single student, (who isn't even German), instead of employed officials at the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), it is somewhat simplified and only includes the age, gender, electoral system and level of education of the Members of Parliament. Under the next paragraph some of the potential errors that may arise in the crafting of the dataset will be highlighted and discussed.

### **3.2. Systematic and unsystematic errors**

A number of errors may arise when gathering and coding the information. Some of them will be discussed here. Since the information is available only in a foreign language with which the conductor of this study is not entirely fluent there is a risk of misinterpretation, this risk is heightened since the information is biographical and not always very specific or well formulated. A few times there has been little choice but to consider answers "missing" because the information was too unclear. Many of the potential misunderstandings are likely unsystematic: there is little reason to believe that what system the candidates were elected by

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/abgeordnete17/biografien/index.html>

will correlate much with their ability to formulate such simple information (actually several of the more hard-to-read biographies belong to people with a high level of education). For the unsystematic errors one can assume that they are about equally spread over the systems and hence will not cause much disturbance to the results of the study.

Worse are the potential systematic errors. One of them is the risk of subconsciously giving higher scores to one system than another (in favor of whatever expectations there are on the results) when there is space to allow such behavior. Besides being aware of this risk, another measure has been taken to avoid it: the level of education has been classified and coded before finding out by which system each candidate was elected.

Besides this there are some educations that has been hard to classify, this will be further dwelled upon in when dealing with the German education system. By combining some categories there is a possibility to handle the educations that lies “between” categories and make the dataset more valid.

### **3.3. The German system of education**

How the German school system (and further education) works will be swiftly explained here. The system is arranged in several steps, the first and second (primary and secondary education) steps are the foundation. The primary school is only attended for a few years (4-6), after that students are recommended to continue their secondary education in Hauptschule, Realschule or Gymnasium (the schools are hierarchically ordered with Hauptschule oriented for manual labour, Gymnasium oriented for further studies at tertiary level and Realschule being somewhere in between).<sup>26</sup>

People who have finished the Gymnasium (Abitur) can access higher education at universities. Universities along with “Hochschule” comprise the bulk of higher education, but there is also the “Fachhochschule” that allows entry not only through the “Abitur” and provides higher practical-oriented education and applied scientific training that may still result in a grade with similar qualifications to a grade from a university.<sup>27</sup>

There are also a number of intermediate schools providing further education after the secondary education, but not at the same level as the universities or “fachhochschulen”.<sup>28</sup>


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<sup>26</sup> Glasser & Cooper (2011) p. 571

<sup>27</sup> Gellert (1996) p. 312

<sup>28</sup> Letter from Bundestagsverwaltung (See appendix)

The German education system, and its complexity is illustrated in this picture fetched from Wikipedia:



Germany has conformed to the Bologna-process, but most of the elected candidates had their education well before that happened. Therefore the old grades for higher education must be mentioned. Basically there is the “Diploma”, a grade indicating completed university (or “fachhochschule”) studies.<sup>30</sup> The grade does not entirely match the bachelor- or master-grades, in some fields a “Diploma” may equal a bachelor, in others a master.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore there are a number of “Staatsexam”-grades that are not entirely similar to the “Diplom”.<sup>32</sup>

### 3.4. The coding of education

For each elected candidate the highest level of education is coded.

In the dataset the measure of education is no direct copy of any previous model, however it is closely inspired by some, and only altered when necessary. The first inspiration is the “ISCED”-measure that gives different levels of education different codes, ranging from 0 to 6. 0 equals “pre-primary education” (and is irrelevant since none of the candidates has so little education), 1 equals primary education, 2 lower secondary (second step of basic education), 3 (upper) secondary education, 4 post-secondary but non-tertiary education), 5 equals first stage of tertiary education encompassing almost all tertiary education not leading to “advanced research qualification” and 6 is the stage of tertiary education that leads to advanced research qualifications.<sup>33</sup> Since most elected candidates has a level of education containing some tertiary education at a university or “fachhochschule” the ISCED-measure is not detailed

<sup>29</sup> Wikipedia 2011/11/22 [http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:Deutsches\\_Bildungssystem-quer.svg&filetimestamp=20100717114028](http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:Deutsches_Bildungssystem-quer.svg&filetimestamp=20100717114028)

<sup>30</sup> Kehm, Michelsen & Vabö (2010) p. 228f

<sup>31</sup> A.a. p. 235

<sup>32</sup> A.a. p. 228

<sup>33</sup> UNESCO, explaining ISCED: [http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced\\_1997.htm](http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm)

enough. Therefore (inspired by a paper by Fredrik Willert at “Högskolan på Gotland”) the code 5 of ISCED was divided into three parts: Academic studies not resulting in a final grade, basic academic grade (bachelor) and higher academic grade (master).<sup>34</sup> Besides the ISCED 0 and 1 was deleted, since they fit no candidate (everyone had higher levels of education). Also a temporary misunderstanding of the German education-system caused the ISCED 4 to be divided into two parts, causing some annoyance in the original dataset but nothing that couldn't be easily fixed.

This gives the categories and “codes” of the original dataset (forwarded in the appendix):

- 1 = ISCED 2 - Lower secondary education
- 2 = ISCED 3 – higher secondary education
- 3 = ISCED 4 – Lower post-secondary education
- 4 = ISCED 4 – Higher post-secondary education
- 5 = Academic studies not resulting in a grade
- 6 = ISCED 5 – Academic studies resulting in a basic academic grade
- 7 = ISCED 5 – Academic studies resulting in a higher academic grade
- 8 = ISCED 6 – Education leading to advanced research qualifications (including people working with research at an university and so called “wissenschaftliche mitarbeiter/angestellte”, meaning “scientific coworker/employee”)

As noticed earlier this great number of categories was not fruitful, sometimes it was hard with the inexact information several candidates gave to fit them perfectly into a category. Some categories contains very few candidates and finally it is not possible to fit the German grades “Diplom” or “Staatsexam” perfectly into “basic”- or “higher academic grade”. In the analysis some categories will therefore be combined resulting in the following codes/categories:

- 1 = Secondary education (ISCED 2 and 3)
- 2 = Post-secondary, non-teritary, education (ISCED 4)
- 3 = Academic studies not resulting in a grade (somewhere between ISCED 4 and 5)
- 4 = Academic studies resulting in a grade (ISCED 5)
- 5 = Education leading to advanced research qualifications (including people working with research at an university and so called “wissenschaftliche mitarbeiter/angestellte”) (ISCED 6)

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<sup>34</sup> Willert P. 15 (Utbildningsnivå i riksdagen)

### **3.5. Some important facts about the coding**

When assigning a code for level of education to the elected candidates the general rule has been to code the highest education mentioned in their biography or at their website (which actually gives slightly more information than in the data available at the “Bundestags” website, since some candidates fill out more information at their websites than in their “biographies”). Three things are still very worth mentioning:

1. Elected candidates who have studied but haven’t mentioned any grade are coded as 5 (3), even though their line of work implies that they may have higher education.
2. A number of people have typed their work, but not the education qualifying them, even so it is the level of education that is coded.
3. Some have “education to [whatever they work with]”, if there are several educations of different levels that may lead to that job, they are coded as “missing” (99).

### **3.6. The rest of the data**

Besides list and education, data on gender, age and party has been collected on all elected candidates. Coding age was simply done by what year the candidates were born (broken down into what decade the candidates were born when used for analysis), gender where also simply coded with men given the number (1) and women (2). The majoritarian electoral system was coded as number (1) and the proportional system as (2). The parties are coded from left to right (on a classic left-right scale) as follows:

- 1 = Die Linke (The Left Party)
- 2 = SPD (The Social Democrats)
- 3 = Die Grüne/Bündnis 90 (The Greens)
- 4 = FDP (Liberals)
- 5 = CDU/CSU (Christian democrats)

Sometimes the parties will be combined into two categories: Major parties (1) and minor parties (2) to enable means of analysis generally used on ordinal scales. With this information on the coding and the original dataset provided in the appendix it should be possible to duplicate this study with exact precision.



#### 4.1. Significance with a total selection

Since the study uses a total selection of the elected candidates to the Bundestag statistical significance is of less importance than when using a random sample of a population. However it may still function as a safeguard against some coding-errors and a result that could be the effect of uncontrollable and hidden factors rather than patterns.<sup>35</sup> Also, if considering the selection a part of a greater number of parliaments in Europe, significance may say something about how far the results can be generalized (although the selections is strategic rather than random, meaning that significance still won't be as useful as with a full random sample from a greater population)

#### 4.2. The pattern between electoral system and level of education

First and foremost the correlation between electoral system and level of education is tested and presented in the table below.

**Table 1: Level of education in the different electoral systems**

Level of education	System	
	Majoritarian	Proportional
Secondary education	14 5%	10 3%
Post-secondary, non-tertiary, education	25 9%	23 7%
Academic studies not resulting in a grade	26 9%	59 18%
Academic studies resulting in a grade	133 48%	151 47%
Education leading to advanced research qualifications	82 29%	77 24%
Total	280 100%	320 99%

Comments: Dataset forwarded in appendix. Number of valid cases: 600 (94% of total), number of missing cases 38 (6% of total). Percentage is rounded, however all SPSS calculations are done with exact decimals.

This table shows a few interesting things. First a vast majority of the elected candidates have attended some higher education at either universities or “fachhochschule” (slightly more

<sup>35</sup> Öhberg (2011) p. 52

according to this dataset than in the data published on the Bundestags webpage, since this dataset also uses the personal website-data of the elected candidates).

If we look at how level of education is spread over the different systems we see that the majoritarian indeed has elected a few more candidates with higher education than the proportional (here it is important to look at the percentage, since the proportional system has elected a greater number of the candidates). However the majoritarian system has also elected a larger share of the candidates with low levels of education. The proportional system on the other hand has elected a much greater percentage of the candidates with “academic studies not resulting in a grade”. Only at two levels of education is the difference between the systems greater than 5 percent. The proportional system elected a percentage 9,1 higher than the majoritarian of “academic studies not resulting in a grade”. The majoritarian system struck 5,2 higher on the “Education leading to advanced research qualifications”-category.

### 4.3. Patterns and directions

The hypothesis is that there shall be a relationship where the majoritarian category has a higher score on the education-scale than the proportional category. Due to the coding the majoritarian systems is “lower” than the proportional (code 1 compared to code 2). The expected relationship is therefore a low code on the system-scale and a high code on the education-scale. This means that any linear relationship is expected to be negative.

A negative linear relationship indicates that there is a pattern and that is compatible with the hypothesis (however if the relationship is too weak it may be of none importance).

The dataset includes an ordinal-scale on education and a two-values ordinal-scale on electoral systems. Hence, any measure of correlation (symmetric measures) for ordinal-scales will do. The tests used will be Gamma and Kendall’s-tau<sub>c</sub>, both tests gives information on directions and strength of the correlations, specifically: how much better one can predict an outcome on the dependent variable with knowledge about the independent variable. One should be aware that Gamma tends to exaggerate the correlations somewhat.<sup>36</sup>

**Table 1.2: symmetric measures for the correlation between electoral system and level of education**

Test	Value	Significance
Kendall's tau-c	-,062	0,159
Gamma	-,092	0,159

<sup>36</sup> De Vaus (2002) p.257ff

The tests show the expected negative relationship. Therefore the hypothesis cannot simply be rejected. Whether it is confirmed will be further dealt with.

#### **4.4. Strength and significance**

Both measures range from 0 to 1 (or 0 to -1) and the further from zero the stronger the correlation. Both measures can be used for PRE-interpretations, meaning that the value indicates how useful the one variable will be for predicting outcome on the other (a value of 1 or -1 indicates a 100% usefulness of the variable for predicting the outcome).<sup>37</sup> The values given by the Gamma and Kendall's tests are -0.092 and -0.062 meaning 9.2 and 6.2 percent. Interpreting whether this is a strong or weak relationship is somewhat problematic. Here the guidance from De Vaus book "Surveys in social research" is used. Generally a relationship of 0.09 (9 percent or less) is considered very weak/small, practically zero. There is however a tendency in social science to provide lower levels of strength than physical sciences. Relationships should not be expected to be incredibly strong.<sup>38</sup>

That said one must consider that the result of the Gamma-test is probably slightly exaggerated, and considered together with the result of the Kendall's test the true value can hardly be above 0.09 (9%). Practically zero that is...

The symmetric measures (Gamma and Kendall's indicates a significance of 0.159, had this been a random sample that would have been bad, very bad. Significance levels should be below 0.05 (or sometimes 0.1). Here it gives further reason to question whether there is a real pattern in the dataset, or just a stroke of chance.

#### **4.5. Analysis**

Testing the empirical material did not give cause to deny the hypothesis (that there is a correlation between the majoritarian system and elected candidates with a higher level of education) or answer the question negatively. Now the big issue is whether the tests gave reason to accept the hypothesis, or whether it can be rejected for different reasons. Is the pattern displayed by the tests powerful enough to stand through the criticism concerning how either randomness or other factors could have influenced and caused a similar result? As stated in 2.7. there is a risk that the candidates in the majoritarian system also serve a purpose as the proportional lists "list-pullers" and therefore are selected for their high-valence. This would of course also hint competition as a major factor (the high-valence candidates would be

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<sup>37</sup> De Vaus (2002) p. 257

<sup>38</sup> A.a. p. 258f

selected because they improve the lists competitive abilities), but it is not the competition between systems that is attempted to study here.

In opposite direction there is the risk noted in 2.4. that the systems in the German electoral systems are too entwined making the pattern weaker than it would be when comparing two separate systems (under extremely similar cultural conditions). Much like the “list-puller” influence there is no way for this study to measure how much the studied mechanisms are distorted by this kind of influence. Hopefully the influences pretty much equal each other so that the effect measured mainly is caused by competition.

#### **4.6. Is the pattern strong enough?**

The phrase “Practically zero” is important. Even if the discussion above had resulted in the conclusion that a weak relationship should be strengthened a little it would perhaps not have been enough to assume a correlation stronger than 0.09 (9%). The correlation is therefore to be considered very weak, practically zero. This means more than just that there is a weak relationship, it also indicates that the relationship may not at all be what the study is concerned with and looking for. Since all the correlation really proves is that the majoritarian system has (in this case) elected a slightly higher proportion of highly educated candidates, and although such a large sample as this eliminates many of the risks of chance or randomness it could still influence the results. More important is however the risk that other, unknown, factors have affected the results. One indication of the weakness of the pattern is that the majoritarian system not only elected a lower proportion of high-educated candidates, but also a larger proportion of low-educated candidates. If the pattern was caused by competition and competition tends to lead to more high-educated candidates, then there are few reasons to assume that the majoritarian systems should also elect more low-educated candidates. Here the significance-measure is somewhat useful. A significance of 0.159 does hint that the data is too weak to give a perfectly reliable result. Since it is a total selection whatever patterns discovered are obviously there, but they are not very stable.

#### **4.7. Controlling for gender**

The correlation between the majoritarian electoral system and more educated elected candidates is lacking, but why is that? Is the German electoral system too entwined? Are there properties to proportional and majoritarian systems that cause more or less educated candidate

to be elected? Or is it that the majoritarian system simply is not more competitive than the proportional, or that the competition works differently?

When working with electoral systems one of the first things that comes to mind (at least if one has read enough Pippa Norris) is women. Different electoral systems favors very different outcomes on how many women are elected, the proportional system generally elects a larger proportion of women than the majoritarian.<sup>39</sup> Therefore it is quite natural to control the results for gender and when doing so a very interesting result shows up. As is shown in the table below:

**Table 2: Level of education in different electoral system, men and women.**

Level of education	System Men		System Women	
	Majoritarian	Proportional	Majoritarian	Proportional
Secondary education	12 6%	6 3%	2 3%	4 3%
Post-secondary, non-tertiary, education	18 8%	14 8%	7 12%	9 7%
Academic studies not resulting in a grade	17 8%	34 19%	9 15%	25 18%
Academic studies resulting in a grade	103 47%	82 45%	30 50%	69 51%
Education leading to advanced research qualifications	70 32%	48 26%	12 20%	29 21%
<b>Total</b>	220 101%	184 101%	60 100%	136 100%

Comments: The same table as in 1.2.(level of education in the different electoral systems) but splitting men and women, 600 valid cases. Percentage is rounded, however all SPSS calculations are done with exact decimals. Dataset forwarded in appendix.

First of all, the well known fact that proportional systems are better at electing women than majoritarian systems is proven again. The proportional system elects more than twice as many women as the majoritarian while the majoritarian system actually elects more men than the

<sup>39</sup> Norris (2006) p. 201

proportional, even though the proportional system elects more candidates altogether. Furthermore: for men the U-shaped patterns remains where a greater proportion of the men with both very low and very high level of education are elected by the majoritarian system, for women this does not hold; the majoritarian system elects a greater proportion of women with a low level of education, and a lesser proportion of women with a high level of education than the proportional system. When controlling for patterns, with the symmetric measures Kendall's tau-c and Gamma this is made obvious.

**Table 2.1: symmetric measures for the correlation between electoral system and level of education, men and women.**

Test	Men		Women	
	Value	Significance	Value	Significance
Kendall's tau-c	-,081	0.131	,032	0.653
Gamma	-,118	0.131	,057	0.653

For men what little correlation could be found between electoral system and level of education is strengthened, the tests end up on either side of -0.09. What is more interesting is the pattern for women, it is extremely weak but it is also reversed. The proportional system is slightly better at electing educated women than the majoritarian. This is interesting in relation to Galassos and Nannicinis study since Italy had 8.9% women in the senate and 15.1% in the chamber of deputies 1994, 8.0% in the senate and 11.1% in the chamber of deputies 2000 (election 1996) and 8.1% in the senate and 11.5% in the chamber of deputies 2005 (election in 2001).<sup>40</sup> This is low compared to the German proportion with 32.8% women in 2010 (election 2009).<sup>41</sup> What this may say about the results of Galassos and Nannicinis study is further dwelled upon in 5.9.

It is known that proportional systems tends to elect more women,<sup>42</sup> but it does not explain why the women in this case elected by the proportional system are also more educated than the ones elected by the majoritarian system. However this gives cause to wonder whether there are any other properties of the proportional system that may cause it to elect candidates

<sup>40</sup> Women in parliaments 1945-1995, Women in politics: 2000 ([http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap00\\_en.pdf](http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap00_en.pdf)), Women in politics 2005 ([http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap05\\_en.pdf](http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap05_en.pdf))

<sup>41</sup> Women in politics 2010 ([http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap10\\_en.pdf](http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap10_en.pdf))

<sup>42</sup> Norris (2006) p 197

with such a similar level of education as the majoritarian. The most famous tendency in a proportional system compared to a majoritarian is that it elects more, and smaller, parties.<sup>43</sup>

#### 4.8. A difference between parties

Since proportional systems generally elects many more, smaller parties it may be well worth to control if this holds for Germany, and whether it may affect the original correlation.

Germany has two major parties, the Social Democrats (SDP) and the conservative “Christian democrats” (CDU/CSU), together they have more than 50% of the seats in the Bundestag.

Totally the bundestag consists of five parties.<sup>44</sup>

Out of 291 candidates elected by the majoritarian system, (since education is not included in this comparison the missing cases are included giving a total population of 620 instead of 600) 274 comes from the two major parties and 17 from the smaller parties. Another interesting thing is that the smaller parties elect a greater proportion of high educated candidates than the two major parties does. As is shown below:

**Table 3: Level of education in major and minor parties.**

Education	Party	
	Major parties	Minor parties
Secondary education	17	7
	5%	3%
Post-secondary, non-tertiary, education	38	10
	10%	4%
Academic studies not resulting in a grade	51	38
	13%	16%
Academic studies resulting in a grade	174	118
	46%	50%
Education leading to advanced research qualifications	100	65
	26%	27%
Total	380	238
	100%	100%

Comments: Total number of cases includes candidates who have left the Bundestag since the election. Percentage is rounded, however all SPSS calculations are done with exact decimals. Dataset forwarded in appendix.

The table shows that the minor parties indeed have a slightly larger proportion of high educated elected candidates than the major parties. The Symmetric measures are on a very

<sup>43</sup> Lijphart (1999) p. 167f

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/fraktionen/index.html>

low level (Kendall's tau-c 0.052, Gamma 0.081, significance 0.210), but it does affect the correlation between electoral system and education level in Table 1.

#### 4.9. The combined effect

We have seen two factors contributing to the proportional system almost matching the majoritarian on level of education. What would happen if we split gender and exclude small parties from our table on the relation between electoral system and education level (the minor parties elects so few candidates with the majoritarian system that it is pointless to compare men and women from them)?

**Table 4: Level of education in different electoral systems for men and women from major parties**

Level of education	System Men		System Women	
	Majoritarian	Proportional	Majoritarian	Proportional
Secondary education	12 6%	3 5%	2 4%	0 0%
Post-secondary, non-tertiary, education	17 8%	10 17%	7 13%	4 9%
Academic studies not resulting in a grade	17 8%	12 20%	9 17%	11 24%
Academic studies resulting in a grade	98 46%	24 41%	28 52%	19 42%
Education leading to advanced research qualifications	67 32%	10 17%	8 15%	11 24%
<b>Total</b>	211 100%	59 100%	54 101%	45 99%

Comment: Level of education per system for men in the two major parties (SDP and CDU/CSU), cases who have left the Bundestag are excluded. Percentage is rounded, however all SPSS calculations are done with exact decimals. Dataset forwarded in appendix.

Two things should be noticed before mentioning the strength of the correlation here. First the large parties elect a lot of their male candidates with the majoritarian system. Second the U-shape from Table 1 is not so clear, actually we got more of a “J”-shape. With the systems almost equal on the lowest levels of education (in proportion to how many they elect in total, that is, the percentage rather than the number of respondents) and the proportional system electing a larger proportion of candidates with post-secondary education and academic studies not resulting in a grade. Thereafter the majoritarian system elects more, and its proportion



increases as the level of education does. The symmetric measures below show that the correlation between electoral system and level of education is quite noticeable for men from major parties.

**Table 4.1: Symmetric measures, level of education in different electoral systems for men from major parties**

Test	Value	Significance
Kendall's tau-c	-,164	0,002
Gamma	-,332	0,002

If the same operation is carried out on women in major parties the symmetric measures are a great deal different. Out of 99 women elected from the major parties 54 are elected by the majoritarian system and 45 by the proportional, and here the reversed correlation that the proportional system elects a larger proportion of women with a high level of education than the majoritarian is even clearer:

**Table 5.1: Symmetric measures, Level of education in different electoral systems for women from the two major parties**

Test	Value	Significance
Kendall's tau-c	,093	0,391
Gamma	,135	0,391

Considering that (as mentioned in 5.7.) Italy had elected a much lower percentage of women when Galasso and Nannicinis study was carried out than the German system has. The effect of women should be dwelled upon a little further. If it is the case the effect of competition is much stronger for men than women (as is indicated here), than perhaps the fact that they have seen a much clearer correlation between electoral competition and level of education etc. is somewhat connected to the lesser proportion of women in the Italian parliament. If that is the case, this study actually gives some support to their conclusions. Stronger competition correlates with higher level of education.

Within the group of men from the two major parties (the ones who are mostly elected by the majoritarian part of the electoral system) the correlation between electoral system and level of education is noticeable. It appears that the way women are elected and the fact that small parties has a slightly higher level of education while being elected by the proportional system contributes to making the proportional system catch up with the majoritarian on level of education.

## 5.1. Conclusions

Given the weakness and significance-level of the discovered pattern the hypothesis has to be rejected. The answer to our question (“**Does the majoritarian part of the German electoral system elect members of parliament with a higher level of education than the proportional part of the electoral system**”) is simply: No.

This study does not disprove previous studies indication that competition matters within the same electoral system. At most it weakens the extent to which competition can be expected to have a real impact on said electoral outcome. Since the study hints that previous conclusions on the outcomes of greater competition may not carry across/between electoral system, but is not able to disprove the effects of competition within a system; a fair conclusion would perhaps be that there are other elements to electoral systems that negate the effect of one system being more competitive than another.

As shown in 5.7. the majoritarian system actually has an extremely weak tendency to elect a smaller proportion of women with a high level of education than the proportional. This correlation is far too weak to generalize, but whether proportional systems not only elect more women but also women with a higher level of education is an interesting area for further studies.

A famous trait of majoritarian electoral systems is their tendency to elect a few (two or three) large parties while excluding smaller parties. At the same time in this study the smaller parties has a higher proportion of candidates with a high level of education. Whether this is a general trait of small parties or just something that shows up in the German case this study cannot tell. However it may be another interesting subject for further studies. In this study the fact that the smaller parties are mainly elected by the proportional system and the fact that they have a larger proportion of candidates with a high level of education has contributed to weakening the correlation between electoral system and level of education. As soon as small parties are excluded the correlation between electoral system and level of education becomes stronger. How far this effect can be generalized is unclear, as stated further studies and more material is needed. Even if it is true that smaller parties have a higher proportion of highly educated candidates this may not hold for pure majoritarian electoral systems where the small parties are marginalized and if it does not then there is no room for generalization at all.

Altogether it is still clear that the way women and small parties are elected by the different systems has had an impact on the overall results. They have reduced the very noticeable correlation between electoral system and level of education that exists for men from the major parties to the weak, practically zero, correlation between electoral system and level of education that was shown in 5.2. and 5.3.

## 5.2 Generalizations

If we assume that smaller parties overall has more educated candidates and that proportional systems not only elects more women but also more educated women, the conclusion of no differences between electoral systems can be drawn quite far. Then we could probably claim that choosing a majoritarian electoral system will not result in elected candidates with a higher level of education.

However we cannot make these assumptions safely, more research is needed, and would be exciting. In a system where the small parties are marginalized it is very possible that the educated candidates who have shown up in the small parties here would simply stick to the major parties instead. Whether majoritarian systems overall not only elects less women but also women with a lesser level of education is nothing a single study like this can draw any conclusions on.

The results and conclusions of this study nevertheless hint one thing: The expected outcome on level of education that follows from greater electoral competition does not seem to carry over between electoral systems. Even if it is neither the small parties nor the women that causes it; the expected correlation between electoral system and level of education was not there. Choosing a majoritarian electoral system will probably not give more educated elected candidates than a proportional system. This study does not have the capacity to disprove the study made by Galasso and Nannicini, since this study tests the effect of competition over different electoral system, while theirs focuses on changes *within* a system. From this study one can however support the hypothesis that choosing a majoritarian or proportional electoral system will probably not affect the level of education of the elected candidates, but increasing competition within the system probably will. A hypothesis that could be used for further studies with a dataset that ranges over time and across several countries.

What if the results are instead a consequence of one of the core assumptions being wrong? What if the majoritarian part of the German electoral system is not really more competitive than the proportional? The arguments for the assumption can be read in 3.3. and 3.4. as well as some arguments against it. It should be noted that competition is hard to measure. Within a purely majoritarian system there is at least a difference between safe and contested seats to be made. In this study it would be irresponsible to not at least be open to the risk that the competition in the systems is not weaker or stronger, but simply different.

### **5.3. Reforming an electoral system**

In 2005 Italy reformed its electoral system, in 2008 Lithuania made changes in its electoral system. Also Norway, Greece, Estonia, Belgium and many more European countries has changed or even reformed their electoral system in the early 2000s. In the last ten years Europe has experienced a great intensity of electoral reform, and it is far from just the former Soviet states that undergo reform. Several stable, old, democracies make changes to their electoral systems! This stands in stark contrast to the old notion that “Familiarity breeds stability” and that electoral systems generally stay the same. The trend is often considered a “fourth wave” of electoral reform, and it is going on right now.

What can these states learn from this study? Perhaps their main concern is not whether the elected candidates are slightly more or slightly less educated. As significant education may be as a proxy for good governance there are still many other, probably more desirable outcomes of an electoral system such as fairness, proportionality, stability, equality and much more. This study pretty much indicates that they can go on with business as usual. If the ambition is to produce more educated elected candidates whatever expectation Weberian ideas or Galasso and Nannicini's study may have kindled should be put out, or at least put aside for now. As far as this study can tell, a more competitive electoral system will not result in politicians with a higher level of education.

## 6.1. Summarization

This study tests whether some of the positive effects attributed to democratic electoral competition, namely causing candidates with a higher level of education to be elected, are more commonly present in a more competitive electoral system. Education is interesting since it serves as a proxy for “good governance”. This test is carried out on two parts in the German mixed electoral system, assuming that the majoritarian part is more competitive than the proportional part. The two parts of the system are compared on how high level of formal education the candidates elected to the German parliament (Bundestag) by each part of the system has.

The study uses a dataset encompassing level of education, part of the electoral system, sex, age and party. When comparing the parts of the electoral system there is no clear tendency for the majoritarian part to elect candidates with a higher level of education. However when only looking at male candidates from the major parties (the groups most typically elected in a majoritarian system), the majoritarian system definitely elects candidates with a higher level of education.

Two explanations for why this correlation between electoral system and level of education are not found in the overall results are detected: Small parties in Germany have candidates with a slightly higher level of education than the large parties; these parties are mainly elected by the proportional part. Among women the correlation between the majoritarian system and high level of education is reversed, meaning that the majoritarian system elects women with a lower level of education than the proportional. It is unclear whether these explanations can be generalized beyond the German system. If they can this study hints not only that a majoritarian system will not elect candidates with a higher level of education than a proportional, but also that this is because the proportional system has properties that makes it elect an about equal proportion of candidates with a high level of education.

## 6.2. Sammanfattning

I denna studie undersöks huruvida vissa av de positiva konsekvenserna av demokratisk konkurrens, närmare bestämt att högre grad av konkurrens tenderar att följas av valda politiker med högre utbildningsnivå, är mer förekommande i ett valsystem med högre grad av konkurrens. Utbildning är intressant i och med dess förmåga att fungera som en approximation på gott eller lämpligt styre. Undersökningen utförs på de två delarna av det Tyska blandade valsystemet och det förutsätts att den majoritära delen av systemet är mer konkurrensutsatt än den proportionella delen. De två delarna av valsystemet jämförs med avseende på hur nivån av formell utbildning hos kandidaterna som valts in i det Tyska parlamentet (Bundestag), med de två delarna av systemet.

Undersökningen använder ett datamaterial som omfattar utbildningsnivå, del av valsystemet, kön, ålder och parti. Vid jämförelsen av de två delarna av valsystemet så har den majoritära delen ej uppvisat större tendens att välja kandidater med högre utbildningsnivå, men om man bara tittar på manliga kandidater från de större partierna (de grupper som huvudsakligen väljs i majoritära system) så väljs definitivt kandidater med högre utbildningsnivå med det majoritära systemet.

Två förklaringar till varför sambandet mellan valsystem och utbildningsnivå uteblir framgår: För det första har de små partierna i Tyskland kandidater med något högre utbildning än de stora partierna; dessa partier väljs oftare med den proportionella delen. För det andra är sambandet mellan valsystem och utbildning bakvänt när det kommer till kvinnor. Det majoritära systemet väljer kvinnor med lägre utbildningsnivå än det proportionella gör. Det är oklart om dessa förklaringar kan generaliseras bortom det Tyska systemet. Om de kan så antyder denna undersökning inte bara att majoritära system knappast väljer kandidater med högre utbildningsnivå än proportionella system, utan också att detta beror på att proportionella system har andra egenskaper som gör att de väljer en motsvarande mängde kandidater med hög utbildningsnivå.

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## 7.2. Online sources

Specific links can be found in the references.

German Federal Returning Office (Bundeswahlleiter): <http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/>

German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag): <http://www.bundestag.de/>

German upper legislative chamber (Bundesrat): <http://www.bundesrat.de/>

Inter-Parliamentary Union: <http://www.ipu.org>

UNESCO: <http://www.unesco.org>

Wikipedia: <http://www.wikipedia.org/>

## 7.3. Other Sources

Bibliographical information on the members of the German parliament is coded and forwarded in the appendix. Generally information is fetched from the German parliament's webpage (<http://www.bundestag.de/>), when extra information is fetched from the members of parliament's personal webpages information and links are forwarded in the end of the appendix.



## Appendix

Name and party	Birth	Sex	System	Education	Party
Ackermann, Jens, FDP	1975	1	2	6	4
Ahrendt, Christian, FDP	1963	1	2	5	4
Aigner, Ilse, CDU/CSU	1964	2	1	4	5
Aken, Jan van, DIE LINKE.	1961	1	2	8	1
Alpers, Agnes, DIE LINKE.	1961	2	2	6	1
Altmaier, Peter, CDU/CSU	1958	1	1	8	5
Andrae, Kerstin, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1968	2	2	6	3
Arndt-Brauer, Ingrid, SPD	1961	2	2	6	2
Arnold, Rainer, SPD	1950	1	2	5	2
Aschenberg-Dugnus, Christine, FDP	1959	2	2	7	4
Aumer, Peter, CDU/CSU	1976	1	1	7	5
Bahr (Münster), Daniel, FDP	1976	1	2	7	4
Bär, Dorothee, CDU/CSU	1978	2	1	6	5
Barchmann, Heinz-Joachim, SPD	1950	1	2	5	2
Bareiß, Thomas, CDU/CSU	1975	1	1	6	5
Barnett, Doris, SPD	1953	2	2	7	2
Bartels, Dr. Hans-Peter, SPD	1961	1	1	8	2
Barthel, Klaus, SPD	1955	1	2	7	2
Barthle, Norbert, CDU/CSU	1952	1	1	7	5
Bartol, Sören, SPD	1974	1	1	6	2
Bartsch, Dr. Dietmar, DIE LINKE.	1976	1	2	8	1
Bas, Bärbel, SPD	1968	2	1	4	2
Bätzing-Lichtenthäler, Sabine, SPD	1975	2	2	6	2
Baumann, Günter, CDU/CSU	1947	1	1	6	5
Beck (Reutlingen), Ernst-Reinhard, CDU/CSU	1945	1	1	7	5
Beck (Bremen), Marieluise, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1952	2	2	5	3
Beck (Köln), Volker, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1960	1	2	5	3
Becker, Dirk, SPD	1966	1	1	6	2
Beckmeyer, Uwe, SPD	1949	1	1	7	2
Behm, Cornelia, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1951	2	2	6	3
Behrens, Herbert, DIE LINKE.	1954	1	2	5	1
Behrens, Manfred, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	3	5
Bellmann, Veronika, CDU/CSU	1960	2	1	5	5
Bender, Birgitt, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1956	2	2	7	3
Bergner, Dr. Christoph, CDU/CSU	1948	1	2	8	5
Bernschneider, Florian, FDP	1986	1	2	6	4
Beyer, Peter, CDU/CSU	1970	1	1	7	5
Bilger, Steffen, CDU/CSU	1979	1	1	7	5
Binder, Karin, DIE LINKE	1957	2	2	4	1
Binding (Heidelberg), Lothar, SPD	1950	1	2	6	2
Binnering, Clemens, CDU/CSU	1962	1	1	5	5
Birkwald, Matthias W., DIE LINKE.	1961	1	2	6	1
Bleser, Peter, CDU/CSU	1952	1	1	4	5
Blum, Heidrun, DIE LINKE.	1958	2	2	6	1

Blumenthal, Sebastian, FDP	1974	1	2	6	4
Bockhahn, Steffen, DIE LINKE.	1978	1	1	8	1
Bögel, Claudia, FDP	1961	2	2	5	4
Böhmer, Dr. Maria, CDU/CSU	1950	2	1	8	5
Bollmann, Gerd, SPD	1947	1	1	5	2
Bonde, Alexander, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN *)	1975	1	99	5	3
Börnsen (Bönstrup), Wolfgang, CDU/CSU	1942	1	1	5	5
Bosbach, Wolfgang, CDU/CSU	1952	1	1	7	5
Bracht-Bendt, Nicole, FDP	1959	2	2	99	4
Brackmann, Norbert, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	7	5
Brähmig, Klaus, CDU/CSU	1957	1	1	4	5
Brand, Michael, CDU/CSU	1973	1	1	7	5
Brandl, Dr. Reinhard, CDU/CSU	1977	1	1	8	5
Brandner, Klaus, SPD	1949	1	2	4	2
Brandt, Helmut, CDU/CSU	1950	1	1	7	5
Brase, Willi, SPD	1951	1	2	5	2
Brauksiepe, Dr. Ralf, CDU/CSU	1967	1	2	8	5
Braun, Dr. Helge, CDU/CSU	1972	1	1	8	5
Brehmer, Heike, CDU/CSU	1962	2	1	6	5
Breil, Klaus, FDP	1945	1	2	4	4
Brinkhaus, Ralph, CDU/CSU	1968	1	1	6	5
Brinkmann (Hildesheim), Bernhard, SPD	1952	1	1	2	2
Brüderle, Rainer, FDP	1945	1	2	6	4
Brunkhorst, Angelika, FDP	1955	2	2	6	4
Buchholz, Christine, DIE LINKE.	1971	2	2	8	1
Bulling-Schröter, Eva, DIE LINKE.	1956	2	2	3	1
Bulmahn, Edelgard, SPD	1951	2	1	5	2
Bülow, Marco, SPD	1971	1	1	5	2
Bunge, Dr. Martina, DIE LINKE.	1951	2	2	8	1
Burchardt, Ulla, SPD	1954	2	1	6	2
Burgbacher, Ernst, FDP	1949	1	2	6	4
Burkert, Martin, SPD	1964	1	2	3	2
Buschmann, Marco, FDP	1977	1	2	7	4
Caesar, Cajus, CDU/CSU	1951	1	2	6	5
Canel, Sylvia, FDP	1978	2	2	7	4
Claus, Roland, DIE LINKE.	1954	1	2	6	1
Connemann, Gitta, CDU/CSU	1964	2	1	7	5
Cramon-Taubadel, Viola von, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1975	2	2	6	3
Crone, Petra, SPD	1950	2	2	5	2
Danckert, Prof. Dr. Peter, SPD	1940	1	1	8	2
Daub, Helga, FDP	1942	2	2	3	4
Dautzenberg, Leo, CDU/CSU *)	1950	1	99	6	5
Dağdelen, Sevim, The Left Party	1975	2	2	5	1
Dehm, Dr. Diether, The Left Party	1950	1	2	8	1
Deligöz, Ekin, Alliance 90/The Greens	1971	2	2	5	3
Deutschmann, Reiner, FDP	1953	1	2	6	4

Dittrich, Heidrun, The Left Party	1958	2	2	6	1
Djir-Sarai, Dr. B. Jan, FDP	1976	1	2	8	4
D. Brindt, Alexander, CDU/CSU	1970	1	1	6	5
Dörflinger, Thomas, CDU/CSU	1965	1	1	7	5
Döring, Patrick, FDP	1973	1	2	6	4
Dörmann, Martin, SPD	1962	1	1	8	2
Dörner, Katja, Alliance 90/The Greens	1976	2	2	8	3
Dött, Marie-Luise, CDU/CSU	1953	2	2	4	5
Dreibus, Werner, The Left Party	1947	1	2	5	1
Drobinski-Weiß, Elvira, SPD	1951	2	2	7	2
Duin, Garrelt, SPD	1968	1	1	8	2
Dyckmans, Mechthild, FDP	1950	2	2	7	4
Ebner, Harald, Alliance 90/The Greens	1964	1	2	6	3
Edathy, Sebastian, SPD	1969	1	1	7	2
Egloff, Ingo, SPD	1956	1	2	7	2
Ehrmann, Siegmund, SPD	1952	1	1	6	2
Enkelmann, Dr. Dagmar, The Left Party	1956	2	1	8	1
Erdel, Rainer, FDP	1955	1	2	4	4
Erler, Dr. h.c. Gernot, SPD	1944	1	1	8	2
Ernst, Klaus, The Left Party	1954	1	2	6	1
Ernstberger, Petra, SPD	1955	2	2	8	2
Essen, Jörg van, FDP	1947	1	2	7	4
Evers-Meyer, Karin, SPD	1949	2	1	5	2
Feist, Dr. Thomas, CDU/CSU	1965	1	1	8	5
Fell, Hans-Josef, Alliance 90/The Greens	1952	1	2	5	3
Ferlemann, Enak, CDU/CSU	1963	1	1	5	5
Ferner, Elke, SPD	1958	2	2	4	2
Fischbach, Ingrid, CDU/CSU	1957	2	2	7	5
Fischer (Karlsruhe-Land), Axel E., CDU/CSU	1966	1	1	8	5
Fischer (Hamburg), Dirk, CDU/CSU	1943	1	1	7	5
Fischer (Göttingen), Hartwig, CDU/CSU	1948	1	2	2	5
Flach, Ulrike, FDP	1951	2	2	6	4
Flachsbarth, Dr. Maria, CDU/CSU	1963	2	2	8	5
Flosbach, Klaus-Peter, CDU/CSU	1952	1	1	6	5
Fograscher, Gabriele, SPD	1957	2	2	7	2
Franke, Dr. Edgar, SPD	1960	1	1	8	2
Frankenhauser, Herbert, CDU/CSU	1945	1	1	99	5
Freitag, Dagmar, SPD	1953	2	1	6	2
Fricke, Otto, FDP	1965	1	2	7	4
Friedhoff, Paul K., FDP	1943	1	2	6	4
Friedrich (Hof), Dr. Hans-Peter, CDU/CSU	1957	1	1	8	5
Friedrich, Peter, SPD *)	1972	1	99	8	2
Frieser, Michael, CDU/CSU	1964	1	1	7	5
Fritz, Erich G., CDU/CSU	1946	1	2	7	5
Fuchs, Dr. Michael, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	8	5
Fuchtel, Hans-Joachim, CDU/CSU	1952	1	1	7	5

Funk, Alexander, CDU/CSU	1974	1	1	6	5
Gabriel, Sigmar, SPD	1959	1	1	7	2
Gädechens, Ingo, CDU/CSU	1960	1	1	3	5
Gambke, Dr. Thomas, Alliance 90/The Greens	1949	1	2	8	3
Gauweiler, Dr. Peter, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	8	5
Gebhart, Dr. Thomas, CDU/CSU	1971	1	1	8	5
Gehrcke, Wolfgang, The Left Party	1943	1	2	2	1
Gehring, Kai, Alliance 90/The Greens	1977	1	2	6	3
Geis, Norbert, CDU/CSU	1939	1	1	7	5
Geisen, Dr. Edmund Peter, FDP	1949	1	2	8	4
Gerdes, Michael, SPD	1960	1	1	99	2
Gerhardt, Dr. Wolfgang, FDP	1943	1	2	8	4
Gerig, Alois, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	4	5
Gerster, Martin, SPD	1971	1	2	7	2
Gienger, Eberhard, CDU/CSU	1951	1	1	6	5
Glicke, Iris, SPD	1964	2	2	4	2
Glos, Michael, CDU/CSU	1944	1	1	3	5
Gloser, Günter, SPD	1950	1	2	7	2
Gohlke, Nicole, The Left Party	1975	2	2	7	1
Goldmann, Hans-Michael, FDP	1946	1	2	6	4
Golombeck, Heinz, FDP	1948	1	2	3	4
Golze, Diana, The Left Party	1975	2	2	6	1
Göppel, Josef, CDU/CSU	1950	1	1	6	5
Göring-Eckardt, Katrin, Alliance 90/The Greens	1966	2	2	5	3
Gottschalck, Ulrike, SPD	1955	2	1	2	2
Götz, Peter, CDU/CSU	1947	1	1	6	5
Götzer, Dr. Wolfgang, CDU/CSU	1955	1	1	8	5
Graf (Rosenheim), Angelika, SPD	1947	2	2	5	2
Granold, Ute, CDU/CSU	1955	2	1	7	5
Griese, Kerstin, SPD	1966	2	2	8	2
Grindel, Reinhard, CDU/CSU	1961	1	1	6	5
Gröhe, Hermann, CDU/CSU	1961	1	1	7	5
Groschek, Michael, SPD	1956	1	1	6	2
Groß, Michael Peter, SPD	1956	1	1	6	2
Grosse-Brömer, Michael, CDU/CSU	1960	1	1	7	5
Grotelüschen, Astrid, CDU/CSU *)	1964	2	99	6	5
Groth, Annette, The Left Party	1954	2	2	8	1
Grübel, Markus, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	99	5
Grund, Manfred, CDU/CSU	1955	1	1	6	5
Gruß, Miriam, FDP	1975	2	2	8	4
Grütters, Monika, CDU/CSU	1962	2	2	8	5
Gunkel, Wolfgang, SPD	1947	1	2	6	2
Günther (Plauen), Joachim, FDP	1948	1	2	6	4
Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu, CDU/CSU *)	1971	1	99	5	5
Gutting, Olav, CDU/CSU	1970	1	1	7	5
Gysi, Dr. Gregor, The Left Party	1948	1	1	8	1

Hacker, Hans-Joachim, SPD	1949	1	2	6	2
Hagedorn, Bettina, SPD	1955	2	2	5	2
Hagemann, Klaus, SPD	1947	1	1	5	2
Hahn, Florian, CDU/CSU	1974	1	1	5	5
Haibach, Holger, CDU/CSU *)	1971	1	99	6	5
Hänsel, Heike, The Left Party	1966	2	2	6	1
Happach-Kasan, Dr. Christel, FDP	1950	1	2	8	4
Harbarth, Dr. Stephan, CDU/CSU	1971	1	1	8	5
Hardt, Jürgen, CDU/CSU	1963	1	1	6	5
Hartmann (Wackernheim), Michael, SPD	1963	1	2	5	2
Hasselfeldt, Gerda, CDU/CSU	1950	2	1	6	5
Haßelmann, Britta, Alliance 90/The Greens	1961	2	2	6	3
Haustein, Heinz-Peter, FDP	1954	1	2	5	4
Heider, Dr. Matthias, CDU/CSU	1966	1	1	8	5
Heiderich, Helmut, CDU/CSU	1949	1	2	6	5
Heil (Peine), Hubertus, SPD	1972	1	1	5	2
Heil, Mechthild, CDU/CSU	1961	2	1	6	5
Hein, Dr. Rosemarie, The Left Party	1953	2	1	8	1
Heinen-Esser, Ursula, CDU/CSU	1965	2	2	6	5
Heinrich, Frank, CDU/CSU	1964	1	1	5	5
Hempelmann, Rolf, SPD	1948	1	1	7	2
Hendricks, Dr. Barbara, SPD	1952	2	2	8	2
Henke, Rudolf, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	7	5
Hennrich, Michael, CDU/CSU	1965	1	1	8	5
Herlitzius, Bettina, Alliance 90/The Greens	1960	2	2	6	3
Hermann, Winfried, Alliance 90/The Greens *)	1952	1	99	6	3
Herrmann, Jürgen, CDU/CSU	1962	1	1	6	5
Herzog, Gustav, SPD	1958	1	1	2	2
Heveling, Ansgar, CDU/CSU	1972	1	1	7	5
Hiller-Ohm, Gabriele, SPD	1953	2	1	5	2
Hinsken, Ernst, CDU/CSU	1943	1	1	3	5
Hintze, Peter, CDU/CSU	1950	1	2	5	5
Hinz (Essen), Petra, SPD	1962	2	1	7	2
Hinz (Herborn), Priska, Alliance 90/The Greens	1959	2	2	4	3
Hirte, Christian, CDU/CSU	1976	1	1	6	5
Hochbaum, Robert, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	6	5
Höferlin, Manuel, FDP	1973	1	2	5	4
Hoff, Elke, FDP	1957	2	2	5	4
Höfken, Ulrike, Alliance 90/The Greens *)	1955	2	99	8	3
Hofmann (Volkach), Frank, SPD	1949	1	2	6	2
Hofreiter, Dr. Anton, Alliance 90/The Greens	1970	1	2	8	3
Höger, Inge, The Left Party	1950	2	2	6	1
Högl, Dr. Eva, SPD	1969	2	1	8	2
Höhn, Bärbel, Alliance 90/The Greens	1952	2	2	8	3
Höll, Dr. Barbara, The Left Party	1957	2	2	8	1
Holmeier, Karl, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	2	5

Holzenkamp, Franz-Josef, CDU/CSU	1960	1	1	4	5
Homburger, Birgit, FDP	1965	2	2	6	4
Hönlinger, Ingrid, Alliance 90/The Greens	1964	2	2	7	3
Hoppe, Thilo, Alliance 90/The Greens	1958	1	2	5	3
Hörster, Joachim, CDU/CSU	1972	1	1	5	5
Hoyer, Dr. Werner, FDP	1951	1	2	8	4
Hübinger, Anette, CDU/CSU	1955	2	1	7	5
Humme, Christel, SPD	1949	2	1	6	2
Hunko, Andrej, The Left Party	99	1	2	99	1
Jarzombek, Thomas, CDU/CSU	1973	1	1	99	5
Jasper, Dieter, CDU/CSU	1962	1	1	5	5
Jelpke, Ulla, DIE LINKE.	1951	2	2	6	1
Jochimsen, Dr. Lukrezia, DIE LINKE.	1936	2	2	8	1
Jung (Konstanz), Andreas, CDU/CSU	1975	1	1	7	5
Jung, Dr. Franz Josef, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	8	5
Juratovic, Josip, SPD	1959	1	2	3	2
Jüttner, Dr. Egon, CDU/CSU	1942	1	1	8	5
Kaczmarek, Oliver, SPD	1970	1	1	7	2
Kahrs, Johannes, SPD	1963	1	1	99	2
Kalb, Bartholomäus, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	2	5
Kammer, Hans-Werner, CDU/CSU	1948	1	2	99	5
Kamp, Heiner, FDP	1964	1	2	6	4
Kampeter, Steffen, CDU/CSU	1963	1	1	8	5
Karl, Alois, CDU/CSU	1950	1	1	7	5
Kaster, Bernhard, CDU/CSU	1957	1	1	6	5
Kastner, Dr. h. c. Susanne, SPD	1946	2	2	5	2
Kauch, Michael, FDP	1967	1	2	6	4
Kauder (Villingen-Schwenningen), Siegfried, CDU/CSU	1950	1	1	7	5
Kauder, Volker, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	7	5
Kaufmann, Dr. Stefan, CDU/CSU	1969	1	1	8	5
Kekeritz, Uwe, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1953	1	2	6	3
Kelber, Ulrich, SPD	1968	1	1	8	2
Keul, Katja, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1969	2	2	7	3
Kiesewetter, Roderich, CDU/CSU	1963	1	1	6	5
Kilic, Memet, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1967	1	2	7	3
Kindler, Sven-Christian, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1985	1	2	6	3
Kipping, Katja, DIE LINKE.	1978	2	2	7	1
Klaeden, Eckart von, CDU/CSU	1965	1	2	5	5
Klamt, Ewa, CDU/CSU	1950	2	2	5	5
Klein, Volkmar, CDU/CSU	1960	1	1	6	5
Klein-Schmeink, Maria, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1958	2	2	7	3
Klimke, Jürgen, CDU/CSU	1948	1	1	5	5
Klingbeil, Lars, SPD	1978	1	2	8	2
Klöckner, Julia, CDU/CSU *)	1972	2	99	7	5
Klose, Hans-Ulrich, SPD	1937	1	1	7	2
Knoerig, Axel, CDU/CSU	1967	1	1	7	5

Knopek, Dr. Lutz, FDP	1958	1	2	8	4
Kober, Pascal, FDP	1971	1	2	6	4
Koch, Harald, DIE LINKE.	1954	1	1	6	1
Koczy, Ute, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1961	2	2	5	3
Koenigs, Tom, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1944	1	2	5	3
Koeppen, Jens, CDU/CSU	1962	1	2	4	5
Kofler, Dr. Bärbel, SPD	1967	2	2	8	2
Kolb, Dr. Heinrich Leonhard, FDP	1956	1	2	8	4
Kolbe, Daniela, SPD	1980	2	1	6	2
Kolbe, Manfred, CDU/CSU	1953	1	2	7	5
Königshaus, Hellmut, FDP *)	1950	1	99	7	4
Kopp, Gudrun, FDP	1950	2	2	99	4
Koppelin, Dr. h.c. Jürgen, FDP	1945	1	2	2	4
Körber, Sebastian, FDP	1980	1	2	6	4
Körper, Fritz Rudolf, SPD	1954	1	2	5	2
Korte, Jan, DIE LINKE.	1977	1	1	7	1
Koschorrek, Dr. Rolf, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	8	5
Koschyk, Hartmut, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	8	5
Kossendey, Thomas, CDU/CSU	1948	1	1	7	5
Kotting-Uhl, Sylvia, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1952	2	2	8	3
Kramme, Anette, SPD	1967	2	2	7	2
Krellmann, Jutta, DIE LINKE.	1956	2	2	2	1
Kressl, Nicolette, SPD	1958	2	2	7	2
Krestel, Holger, FDP	1955	1	2	6	4
Kretschmer, Michael, CDU/CSU	1975	1	1	6	5
Krichbaum, Gunther, CDU/CSU	1964	1	1	7	5
Krings, Dr. Günter, CDU/CSU	1969	1	1	8	5
Krischer, Oliver, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1969	1	2	8	3
Krogmann, Dr. Martina, CDU/CSU *)	1964	2	99	8	5
Krüger-Leißner, Angelika, SPD	1951	2	1	6	2
Krumwiède, Agnes, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1977	2	2	6	3
Kruse, Rüdiger, CDU/CSU	1961	1	1	5	5
Kudla, Bettina, CDU/CSU	1962	2	1	5	5
Kues, Dr. Hermann, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	8	5
Kuhn, Fritz, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1955	1	2	7	3
Kühn, Stephan, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1979	1	2	6	3
Kumpf, Ute, SPD	1947	2	2	8	2
Künast, Renate, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1955	2	2	7	3
Kunert, Katrin, DIE LINKE.	1964	2	1	6	1
Kurth, Markus, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1966	1	2	8	3
Kurth, Patrick, FDP	1976	1	2	7	4
Kurth (Quedlinburg), Undine, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1951	2	2	6	3
Lach, Günter, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	99	5
Lafontaine, Oskar, DIE LINKE. *)	1943	1	99	6	1
Lambrecht, Christine, SPD	1965	2	2	7	2
Lamers (Heidelberg), Dr. Karl A., CDU/CSU	1951	1	1	7	5

Lämmel, Andreas G., CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	6	5
Lammert, Prof. Dr. Norbert, CDU/CSU	1948	1	2	8	5
Landgraf, Katharina, CDU/CSU	1954	2	1	6	5
Lanfermann, Heinz, FDP	1950	1	2	6	4
Lange (Backnang), Christian, SPD	1964	1	2	7	2
Lange, Ulrich, CDU/CSU	1969	1	1	7	5
Laurischk, Sibylle, FDP	1954	2	2	7	4
Lauterbach, Dr. Karl, SPD	1963	1	1	8	2
Lay, Caren, DIE LINKE.	1972	2	2	8	1
Lazar, Monika, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1967	2	2	5	3
Lehmer, Dr. Max, CDU/CSU	1946	1	1	8	5
Lehrieder, Paul, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	7	5
Leibrecht, Harald, FDP	1961	1	2	7	4
Leidig, Sabine, DIE LINKE.	1961	2	2	2	1
Lemme, Steffen-Claudio, SPD	1965	1	2	6	2
Lenkert, Ralph, DIE LINKE.	1967	1	1	3	1
Leutert, Michael, DIE LINKE.	1974	1	2	6	1
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Sabine, FDP	1951	2	2	7	4
Leyen, Dr. Ursula von der, CDU/CSU	1958	2	2	8	5
Liebich, Stefan, DIE LINKE.	1972	1	1	6	1
Liebing, Ingbert, CDU/CSU	1963	1	1	7	5
Lietz, Matthias, CDU/CSU	1953	1	1	6	5
Lindemann, Lars, FDP	1971	1	2	7	4
Lindner, Christian, FDP	1979	1	2	7	4
Lindner, Dr. Martin, FDP	1964	1	2	8	4
Lindner, Dr. Tobias, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1982	1	2	8	3
Link (Heilbronn), Michael, FDP	1963	1	2	8	4
Linnemann, Dr. Carsten, CDU/CSU	1977	1	1	8	5
Lips, Patricia, CDU/CSU	1963	2	1	4	5
Lischka, Burkhard, SPD	1965	1	2	7	2
Lösekrug-Möller, Gabriele, SPD	1951	2	1	6	2
Lotter, Dr. Erwin, FDP	1951	1	2	6	4
Lötzer, Ulla, DIE LINKE.	1950	2	2	5	1
Lötzsch, Dr. Gesine, DIE LINKE.	1961	2	1	8	1
Luczak, Dr. Jan-Marco, CDU/CSU	1975	1	1	8	5
Ludwig, Daniela, CDU/CSU	1975	2	1	6	5
Lühmann, Kirsten, SPD	1964	2	2	6	2
Luksic, Oliver, FDP	1979	1	2	7	4
Luther, Dr. Michael, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	8	5
Lutze, Thomas, DIE LINKE.	1969	1	2	5	1
Maag, Karin, CDU/CSU	1962	2	1	7	5
Maisch, Nicole, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1981	2	2	7	3
Maizière, Dr. Thomas de, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	8	5
Malczak, Agnes, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1985	2	2	5	3
Marks, Caren, SPD	1963	2	1	8	2
Marwitz, Hans-Georg von der, CDU/CSU	1961	1	2	4	5



Mast, Katja, SPD	1971	2	2	5	2
Mattfeldt, Andreas, CDU/CSU	1969	1	1	3	5
Mattheis, Hilde, SPD	1954	2	2	99	2
Maurer, Ulrich, DIE LINKE.	1948	1	2	7	1
Mayer (Altötting), Stephan, CDU/CSU	1973	1	1	7	5
Meierhofer, Horst, FDP	1972	1	2	6	4
Meinhardt, Patrick, FDP	1966	1	2	5	4
Meister, Dr. Michael, CDU/CSU	1961	1	1	8	5
Menzner, Dorothée, DIE LINKE.	1965	2	2	6	1
Merkel, Dr. Angela, CDU/CSU	1954	2	1	8	5
Merkel (Berlin), Petra, SPD	1947	2	1	2	2
Meißner, Ullrich, SPD	1954	1	1	2	2
Michalk, Maria, CDU/CSU	1949	2	1	5	5
Michelbach, Dr. h. c. Hans, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	4	5
Middelberg, Dr. Mathias, CDU/CSU	1964	1	1	8	5
Miersch, Dr. Matthias, SPD	1968	1	1	8	2
Mißfelder, Philipp, CDU/CSU	1979	1	2	7	5
Möhring, Cornelia, DIE LINKE.	1960	2	2	6	1
Molitor, Gabriele, FDP	1962	2	2	7	4
Möller, Kornelia, DIE LINKE.	1961	2	2	6	1
Monstadt, Dietrich, CDU/CSU	1957	1	1	7	5
Montag, Jerzy, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1947	1	2	7	3
Mortler, Marlene, CDU/CSU	1955	2	1	4	5
Movassat, Niema, DIE LINKE.	1984	1	2	6	1
Mücke, Jan, FDP	1973	1	2	5	4
Müller, Dr. Gerd, CDU/CSU	1955	1	1	8	5
Müller (Köln), Kerstin, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1963	2	2	7	3
Müller, Petra, FDP	1960	2	2	6	4
Müller (Erlangen), Stefan, CDU/CSU	1975	1	1	3	5
Müller-Gemmeke, Beate, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1960	2	2	6	3
Müller-Sönksen, Burkhardt, FDP	1959	1	2	7	4
Müntefering, Franz, SPD	1940	1	2	1	2
Murmann, Dr. Philipp, CDU/CSU	1964	1	1	8	5
Mützenich, Dr. Rolf, SPD	1959	1	1	8	2
Nahles, Andrea, SPD	1970	2	2	7	2
Nestle, Ingrid, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1977	2	2	8	3
Neumann (Bremen), Bernd, CDU/CSU	1942	1	2	5	5
Neumann, Dr. Martin, FDP	1956	1	2	8	4
Nešković, Wolfgang, DIE LINKE.	1948	1	1	8	1
Niebel, Dirk, FDP	1963	1	2	6	4
Nietan, Dietmar, SPD	1964	1	2	5	2
Nink, Manfred, SPD	1950	1	2	4	2
Noll, Michaela, CDU/CSU	1959	2	1	7	5
Nord, Thomas, DIE LINKE.	1957	1	1	99	1
Notz, Dr. Konstantin von, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1971	1	2	8	3
Nouripour, Omid, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1975	1	2	5	3

Nüßlein, Dr. Georg, CD /CSU	1969	1	1	8	5
Obermeier, Franz, CDU/CSU	1946	1	1	6	5
Oppermann, Thomas, SPD	1954	1	1	7	2
Ortel, Holger, SPD	1951	1	2	3	2
Ostendorff, Friedrich, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1953	1	2	4	3
Oswald, Eduard, CDU/CSU	1947	1	1	6	5
Ott, Dr. Hermann E., BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1961	1	2	8	3
Otte, Henning, CDU/CSU	1968	1	1	5	5
Otto (Frankfurt), Hans-Joachim, FDP	1952	1	2	8	4
Özoğuz, Aydan, SPD	1967	2	2	8	2
Pau, Petra, DIE LINKE.	1963	2	1	6	1
Paul, Dr. Michael, CDU/CSU	1964	1	1	8	5
Paula, Heinz, SPD	1951	1	2	5	2
Paus, Lisa, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1968	2	2	8	3
Pawelski, Rita, CDU/CSU	1948	2	2	3	5
Petermann, Jens, DIE LINKE.	1963	1	1	6	1
Petzold, Ulrich, CDU/CSU	1951	1	1	6	5
Pfeiffer, Dr. Joachim, CDU/CSU	1967	1	1	8	5
Pfeiffer, Sibylle, C U/CSU	1951	2	1	3	5
Pflug, Johannes, SPD	1946	1	1	6	2
Philipp, Beatrix, CDU/CSU	1945	2	1	7	5
Pieper, Cornelia, FDP	1956	2	2	6	4
Piltz, Gisela, FDP	1964	2	2	7	4
Pitterle, Richard, DIE LINKE.	1959	1	2	5	1
Ploetz, Yvonne, DIE LINKE.	1984	2	2	5	1
Pofalla, Ronald, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	7	5
Poland, Christoph, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	5	5
Polenz, Ruprecht, CDU/CSU	1946	1	1	8	5
Pols, Eckhard, CDU/CSU	1962	1	1	3	5
Poß, Joachim, SPD	1948	1	1	1	2
Pothmer, Brigitte, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1955	2	2	6	3
Priesmeier, Dr. Wilhelm, SPD	1954	1	1	8	2
Pronold, Florian, SPD	1972	1	2	7	2
Puttrich, Lucia, CDU/CSU *)	1961	2	99	6	5
Raabe, Dr. Sascha, SPD	1968	1	2	8	2
Rachel, Thomas, CDU/CSU	1962	1	1	7	5
Ramsauer, Dr. Peter, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	8	5
Ratjen-Damerau, Dr. Christiane, FDP	1954	2	2	8	4
Rawert, Mechthild, SPD	1957	2	2	6	2
Rebmann, Stefan, SPD	1962	1	2	3	2
Rehberg, Eckhardt, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	6	5
Reiche (Potsdam), Katherina, CDU/CSU	1973	2	2	8	5
Reichenbach, Gerold, SPD	1953	1	2	7	2
Reimann, Dr. Carola, SPD	1967	2	1	8	2
Reinemund, Dr. Birgit, FDP	1959	2	2	8	4
Remmers, Ingrid Lieselotte, DIE LINKE.	1965	2	2	6	1

Riebsamen, Lothar, CDU/CSU	1957	1	1	6	5
Rief, Josef, CDU/CSU	1960	1	1	4	5
Riegert, Klaus, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	6	5
Riesenhuber, Dr. Heinz, CDU/CSU	1935	1	1	8	5
Rix, Sönke, SPD	1975	1	2	4	2
Röhlinger, Dr. Peter, FDP	1939	1	2	8	4
Röring, Johannes, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	4	5
Röspel, René, SPD	1964	1	1	8	2
Rossmann, Dr. Ernst Dieter, SPD	1951	1	2	8	2
Rößner, Tabea, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1966	2	2	7	3
Roth (Augsburg), Claudia, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1955	2	2	2	3
Roth (Esslingen), Karin, SPD	1949	2	2	5	2
Roth (Heringen), Michael, SPD	1970	1	1	6	2
Röttgen, Dr. Norbert, CDU/CSU	1965	1	1	8	5
Ruck, Dr. Christian, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	8	5
Rüddel, Erwin, CDU/CSU	1955	1	1	6	5
Ruppert, Dr. Stefan, FDP	1971	1	2	8	4
Rupprecht (Weiden), Albert, CDU/CSU	1968	1	1	6	5
Rupprecht (Tuchenbach), Marlene, SPD	1947	2	2	99	2
Sager, Krista, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1953	2	2	6	3
Sänger, Björn, FDP	1975	1	2	6	4
Sarrazin, Manuel, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1982	1	2	5	3
Schaaf, Anton, SPD	1962	1	1	2	2
Schäfer (Saalstadt), Anita, CDU/CSU	1951	2	1	99	5
Schäfer (Bochum), Axel, SPD	1952	1	1	5	2
Schäfer (Köln), Paul, DIE LINKE.	1949	1	2	6	1
Schäffler, Frank, FDP	1968	1	2	6	4
Scharfenberg, Elisabeth, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1963	2	2	6	3
Schäuble, Dr. Wolfgang, CDU/CSU	1942	1	1	8	5
Schavan, Prof. Dr. Annette, CDU/CSU	1955	2	1	8	5
Scheel, Christine, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1956	2	2	7	3
Scheelen, Bernd, SPD	1948	1	2	5	2
Scheer, Dr. Hermann, SPD +)	1944	1	99	8	2
Scheuer, Dr. Andreas, CDU/CSU	1974	1	1	8	5
Schick, Dr. Gerhard, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1972	1	2	8	3
Schieder, Marianne, SPD	1962	2	2	7	2
Schieder, Werner, SPD	1948	1	2	6	2
Schiewerling, Karl, CDU/CSU	1951	1	1	3	5
Schindler, Norbert, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	4	5
Schipanski, Tankred, CDU/CSU	1976	1	1	8	5
Schirmbeck, Georg, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	2	5
Schlecht, Michael, DIE LINKE.	1966	1	2	5	1
Schmidt (Fürth), Christian, CDU/CSU	1958	1	1	7	5
Schmidt, Dr. Frithjof, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1953	1	2	8	3
Schmidt (Eisleben), Silvia, SPD	1954	2	2	6	2
Schmidt (Aachen), Ulla, SPD	1949	2	2	5	2

Schneider (Erfurt), Carsten, SPD	1976	1	2	3	2
Schnieder, Patrick, CDU/CSU	1968	1	1	6	5
Schnurr, Christoph, FDP	1984	1	2	5	4
Schockenhoff, Dr. Andreas, CDU/CSU	1957	1	1	8	5
Scholz, Olaf, SPD *)	1958	1	99	5	2
Schön, Nadine, CDU/CSU	1983	2	1	6	5
Schreiner, Ottmar, SPD	1946	1	2	99	2
Schröder (Wiesbaden), Dr. Kristina, CDU/CSU	1977	2	1	8	5
Schröder, Dr. Ole, CDU/CSU	1971	1	1	8	5
Schui, Dr. Herbert, DIE LINKE. *)	1940	1	99	8	1
Schulte-Drüggelte, Bernhard, CDU/CSU	1951	1	1	6	5
Schulz, Jimmy, FDP	1968	1	2	5	4
Schulz (Spandau), Swen, SPD	1968	1	2	8	2
Schummer, Uwe, CDU/CSU	1957	1	1	2	5
Schurer, Ewald, SPD	1954	1	2	6	2
Schuster, Armin, CDU/CSU	1961	1	1	5	5
Schuster, Marina, FDP	1975	2	2	6	4
Schwabe, Frank, SPD	1970	1	1	8	2
Schwall-Düren, Dr. Angelica, SPD *)	1948	2	99	8	2
Schwanholz, Dr. Martin, SPD	1960	1	2	8	2
Schwanitz, Rolf, SPD	1959	1	2	8	2
Schwartz, Stefan, SPD	1974	1	1	2	2
Schwarzlühr-Sutter, Rita, SPD	1962	2	2	6	2
Schweickert, Dr. Erik, FDP	99	1	2	8	4
Seif, Detlef, CDU/CSU	1962	1	1	7	5
Seifert, Dr. Ilja, DIE LINKE.	1951	1	2	8	1
Seiler, Till, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1981	1	2	6	3
Selle, Johannes, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	6	5
Sendker, Reinhold, CDU/CSU	1952	1	1	6	5
Senger-Schäfer, Kathrin, DIE LINKE.	1962	2	2	8	1
Sensburg, Dr. Patrick, CDU/CSU	1971	1	1	8	5
Sharma, Raju, DIE LINKE.	1964	1	2	7	1
Siebert, Bernd, CDU/CSU	1949	1	2	5	5
Sieling, Dr. Carsten, SPD	1959	1	1	8	2
Silberhorn, Thomas, CDU/CSU	1968	1	1	8	5
Simmling, Werner, FDP	1944	1	2	6	4
Singhammer, Johannes, CDU/CSU	1953	1	1	99	5
Sitte, Dr. Petra, DIE LINKE.	1960	2	1	8	1
Skudelny, Judith, FDP	99	2	2	99	4
Solms, Dr. Hermann Otto, FDP	1940	1	2	8	4
Spahn, Jens, CDU/CSU	1980	1	1	6	5
Spatz, Joachim, FDP	1964	1	2	8	4
Stadler, Dr. Max, FDP	1949	1	2	8	4
Staffeldt, Torsten, FDP	1963	1	2	5	4
Stauche, Carola, CDU/CSU	1952	2	1	3	5
Steffel, Dr. Frank, CDU/CSU	1966	1	1	8	5

Steffen, Sonja Amalie, SPD	1963	2	2	7	2
Steinbach, Erika, CDU/CSU	1943	2	1	6	5
Steinbrück, Peer, SPD	1947	1	2	6	2
Steiner, Dorothea, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1948	2	2	7	3
Steinke, Kersten, DIE LINKE.	1958	2	2	5	1
Steinmeier, Dr. Frank-Walter, SPD	1956	1	1	8	2
Stetten, Christian Freiherr von, CDU/CSU	1970	1	1	6	5
Stier, Dieter, CDU/CSU	1964	1	1	6	5
Stinner, Dr. Rainer, FDP	1947	1	2	8	4
Storjohann, Gero, CDU/CSU	1958	1	1	6	5
Stracke, Stephan, CDU/CSU	1974	1	1	7	5
Strässer, Christoph, SPD	1949	1	2	99	2
Straubinger, Max, CDU/CSU	1954	1	1	4	5
Strengmann-Kuhn, Dr. Wolfgang, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1939	1	2	8	3
Strenz, Karin, CDU/CSU	1967	2	1	6	5
Ströbele, Hans-Christian, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1939	1	1	7	3
Strobl (Heilbronn), Thomas, CDU/CSU	1960	1	1	8	5
Strothmann, Lena, CDU/CSU	1952	2	1	3	5
Stüber, Sabine Ursula, DIE LINKE.	1953	2	1	99	1
Stübgen, Michael, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	7	5
Süßmair, Alexander, DIE LINKE.	1977	1	2	5	1
Tack, Kerstin, SPD	1968	2	1	6	2
Tackmann, Dr. Kirsten, DIE LINKE.	1960	2	2	8	1
Tauber, Dr. Peter, CDU/CSU	1974	1	1	8	5
Tempel, Frank, DIE LINKE.	1969	1	2	6	1
Terpe, Dr. Harald, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1954	1	2	8	3
Thiele, Carl-Ludwig, FDP *)	1953	1	99	5	4
Thierse, Dr. h. c. Wolfgang, SPD	1943	1	2	8	2
Thomae, Stephan, FDP	1968	1	2	7	4
Thönnnes, Franz, SPD	1954	1	2	2	2
Tiefensee, Wolfgang, SPD	1955	1	2	6	2
Tillmann, Antje, CDU/CSU	1964	2	1	6	5
Toncar, Florian, FDP	1979	1	2	7	4
Tören, Serkan, FDP	1972	1	2	7	4
Tressel, Markus, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1977	1	2	5	3
Trittin, Jürgen, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1954	1	2	8	3
Troost, Dr. Axel, DIE LINKE.	1954	1	2	8	1
Uhl, Dr. Hans-Peter, CDU/CSU	1944	1	1	8	5
Ulrich, Alexander, DIE LINKE.	1971	1	2	2	1
Vaatz, Arnold, CDU/CSU	1955	1	1	6	5
Veit, Rüdiger, SPD	1949	1	2	7	2
Vogel, Johannes, FDP	1982	1	2	7	4
Vogel, Volkmar, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	6	5
Vogelsang, Stefanie, CDU/CSU	1966	2	1	5	5
Vogler, Kathrin, DIE LINKE.	1963	2	2	5	1
Vogt, Ute, SPD	1964	2	2	7	2

Volk, Dr. Daniel, FDP	1970	1	2	8	4
Volkmer, Dr. Marlies, SPD	1947	2	2	8	2
Voß, Johanna, DIE LINKE.	1957	2	2	6	1
Voßhoff, Andrea Astrid, CDU/CSU	1958	2	2	7	5
Wadephul, Dr. Johann, CDU/CSU	1963	1	1	8	5
Wagenknecht, Sahra, DIE LINKE.	1969	2	2	6	1
Wagner, Daniela, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1957	2	2	5	3
Wanderwitz, Marco, CDU/CSU	1975	1	1	7	5
Wawzyniak, Halina, DIE LINKE.	1973	2	2	7	1
Wegner, Kai, CDU/CSU	1972	1	1	2	5
Weinberg, Harald, DIE LINKE.	1957	1	2	5	1
Weinberg, Marcus, CDU/CSU	1967	1	2	7	5
Weiß (Emmendingen), Peter, CDU/CSU	1956	1	1	99	5
Weiss, Sabine, CDU/CSU	1958	2	1	5	5
Wellenreuther, Ingo, CDU/CSU	1959	1	1	7	5
Wellmann, Karl-Georg, CDU/CSU	1952	1	1	7	5
Werner, Katrin, DIE LINKE.	1973	2	2	2	1
Westerwelle, Dr. Guido, FDP	1961	1	2	8	4
Wichtel, Heinz Peter, CDU/CSU	1949	1	1	2	5
Wicklein, Andrea, SPD	1958	2	1	6	2
Widmann-Mauz, Annette, CDU/CSU	1966	2	1	5	5
Wieczorek-Zeul, Heidemarie, SPD	1942	2	2	5	2
Wiefelspütz, Dr. Dieter, SPD	1946	1	1	8	2
Wieland, Wolfgang, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1948	1	2	7	3
Willsch, Klaus-Peter, CDU/CSU	1961	1	1	6	5
Wilms, Dr. Valerie, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1954	2	2	8	3
Winkelmeier-Becker, Elisabeth, CDU/CSU	1962	2	1	7	5
Winkler, Josef Philip, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN	1974	1	2	6	3
Winterstein, Dr. Claudia, FDP	1950	2	2	8	4
Wissing, Dr. Volker, FDP	1970	1	2	8	4
Wöhrl, Dagmar G., CDU/CSU	1954	2	1	7	5
Wolff (Rems-Murr), Hartfrid, FDP	1971	1	2	7	4
Wolff (Wolmirstedt), Waltraud, SPD	1956	2	2	5	2
Wunderlich, Jörn, DIE LINKE.	1960	1	2	7	1
Zapf, Uta, SPD	1941	2	2	5	2
Ziegler, Dagmar, SPD	1960	2	1	6	2
Zimmer, Dr. Matthias, CDU/CSU	1961	1	1	8	5
Zimmermann, Sabine, DIE LINKE.	1960	2	2	4	1
Zöllner, Wolfgang, CDU/CSU	1942	1	1	6	5
Zöllmer, Manfred Helmut, SPD	1950	1	1	7	2
Zylajew, Willi, CDU/CSU	1950	1	1	6	5
Zypries, Brigitte, SPD	1953	2	1	8	2

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Sharma Raju Nr 536 [http://www.raju-sharma.de/mein\\_team\\_ich/die\\_mannschaft\\_in\\_den\\_wahlkreisbueros\\_und\\_in\\_berlin/mein\\_lebenslauf/](http://www.raju-sharma.de/mein_team_ich/die_mannschaft_in_den_wahlkreisbueros_und_in_berlin/mein_lebenslauf/)

Carsten Sieling Nr 538 <http://www.carsten-sieling.de/persoendlich/lebenslauf.html>

Kersten Steinke Nr 555 <http://www.kersten-steinke.de/standard/biografie.html>

Christian von Stetten Nr 556 <http://www.kandidat-stetten.de/>

Karin Strenz Nr 565 <http://www.strenz.de/ueber-mich.html>

Hans-Christian Störbele Nr 566 <http://www.stroebele-online.de/person/929.html>

Carl-Ludwig Thiele 577 [http://www.carl-ludwig-thiele.de/wcsite.php?wc\\_b=2580&wc\\_lkm=760](http://www.carl-ludwig-thiele.de/wcsite.php?wc_b=2580&wc_lkm=760)

Johann Wadephul Nr 601 [http://www.abgeordnete.sh/wadephul/data/ueber\\_mich/ueber\\_mich.php?navid=3](http://www.abgeordnete.sh/wadephul/data/ueber_mich/ueber_mich.php?navid=3)

Halina Wawzyniak Nr 605 <http://www.wawzyniak.de/persoendlich/lebenslauf/>

Candidates who aren't coded correctly: nr 49, nr 180



E-mail from "Bundestagsverwaltung":

Sehr geehrter Herr Eriksson,

der Unterschied in den "-schulen" ist

1. die Voraussetzungen, die die Studenten mitbringen.
2. die Art der Ausbildung.

1. Eingangsvoraussetzung für eine Fachschule muss nicht das Abitur (matura) sein (früher 13 Jahre inzwischen vielfach auch nur noch 12 Jahre).

Bei Universität ist das Abitur erforderlich.

Eine Fachhochschule können Sie auch besuchen, wenn Sie nur die 11. Klasse mit Erfolg besucht haben.

2: Eine Fachschule kann durchaus eine private Institution sein, die Diplome ausgibt. So zum Beispiel eine "Fachschule für Design". Diese Schulen haben meist nur ein enges Lehrangebot. Diese Schule hat nicht den Charakter einer Universität oder staatlichen Fachhochschule.

Die Fachhochschule war in den letzten Jahrzehnten immer eine alternative zur Universität. Die Fachschule war und ist in der Regel praxisbezogen und hat eine kürzere Ausbildungszeit. Sie bekommen dann ein Fachhochschuldiplom

Die Universitäten bilden länger und gründlicher aus, bieten weniger Praxis an, dafür aber mehr Theorie (und Lehre).

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Michael F. Feldkamp

