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The retreat of multiculturalism – an exaggerated and misleading narrative?

Examining the policy development of immigrant integration in
Sweden and Germany between 2006 and 2012

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Abstract

In recent years, issues regarding immigration, integration and multiculturalism have been widely discussed where a common denominator has been to describe immigrant integration, and particularly multiculturalism as a policy solution in this aspect, as a failure. This has given rise to a narrative about a phenomenon that has got the name “the retreat of multiculturalism”. How this phenomenon should be understood, however, there are disagreements on. Generally, previous research is represented by two perspectives, where the first one argues for a retreat of multiculturalism that reflects a seismic shift among European countries, and where the other one argues that this narrative is exaggerated and misleading, arguing for a more complex picture where even multicultural policies have been strengthened in recent years. For instance, it may be useful to separate policy practice from policy rhetoric to gain a better understanding of this phenomenon. By studying the cases of Sweden and Germany, this thesis examines the policy development of immigrant integration in these countries between 2006 and 2012, where both policy practice and rhetoric are taken into consideration. A qualitative method is applied where also a theoretical framework on how to understand policy development and change is used. By doing this, this thesis aims to give a plausible answer to how a narrative about a multicultural retreat should be understood in these countries. The main findings are that the picture in both Sweden and Germany is complex, with both a strengthening and weakening of multiculturalism as a policy solution for immigrant integration.

Keywords: Immigrant integration, multiculturalism, policy development, policy practice and rhetoric, Sweden, Germany

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Contents

1. INTRODUCTION	4
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH	7
2.1 A MULTICULTURALISM BACKLASH – RETURN OF ASSIMILATION?	7
2.2 THE RETREAT OF MULTICULTURALISM – AN EXAGGERATED AND MISLEADING NARRATIVE?	8
2.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION	10
2.4 IMMIGRATION POLICY, IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM IN GERMANY	10
2.5 IMMIGRATION POLICY, IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM IN SWEDEN	12
2.6 SUMMARY AND REFLECTIONS	14
3. RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS	15
3.1 AIM	15
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	15
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	16
4.1 NEW INSTITUTIONALISM	16
4.2 POLICY RHETORIC IN RELATION TO POLICY PRACTICE	19
4.3 DEFINING MULTICULTURALISM	20
5. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES	21
5.1 WHY GERMANY AND SWEDEN?	21
5.2 POLICY ANALYSIS	22
5.3 MATERIAL	24
6. THE POLICY PRACTICE AND RHETORIC OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN SWEDEN, 2006-2012	26
6.1 ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY	26
6.2 EDUCATION	28
6.3 ACTIVE SUPPORT AND FUNDING OF ETHNIC AND IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS	30
7. THE POLICY PRACTICE AND RHETORIC OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN GERMANY, 2006-2012	33
7.1 ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY	33
7.2 EDUCATION	35
7.3 ACTIVE FUNDING AND SUPPORT OF ETHNIC AND IMMIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS	37

8. DISCUSSION – HOW TO CHARACTERIZE AND DETERMINE THE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS BY APPLYING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK?	40
8.1 SWEDEN	40
8.2 GERMANY	41
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS	44
10. REFERENCES	45
11. APPENDICES	50

1. Introduction

Swedish integration policy has failed. Too many people are left outside the society and the labor market. The teaching of Swedish for newly arrived immigrants is showing bad results, and many do not participate in the education. The gaps are widening socially and economically. (...) The best ways to integration are through work and language knowledge. Therefore, integration into the labor market and the language education must be improved, discrimination be resisted and evaluation of competences be facilitated (Fredrik Reinfeldt, 2006).¹

We are a country, which at the beginning of the 1960s, actually brought guest workers to Germany. Now they live with us and we lied to ourselves for a while, saying that they won't stay and that they will disappear again one day. That's not the reality. This multicultural approach, saying that we simply live side by side and are happy about each other, this approach has failed, utterly failed (Angela Merkel, 2010).²

The two quotes above by the Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel are illustrative examples of an ongoing political and public debate, but also an academic debate regarding immigrant integration in Europe. In recent years, issues regarding immigration, integration and multiculturalism have been widely discussed where a common denominator has been to describe immigrant integration, and especially multiculturalism as a policy solution in this aspect, as a failure – and this despite the fact that European countries seem to be more *de facto* multicultural. As a result, there has been a shift in the debate from an earlier focus on what rights immigrants shall enjoy to a focus on what duties immigrants have and what requirements one can place on them.³ A rise and convergence of arguments condemning multiculturalism has emerged, where the major argument is that the multicultural ideology has failed to deliver integration and equality for immigrants⁴. To some extent, this critique against multiculturalism is also a phenomenon within academic research. However, both within academic and political debate it is quite common to criticize multiculturalism without giving a clear definition of what it means.⁵

This thesis seeks to problematize this phenomenon, trying to determine what is referred to when talking about a retreat of multiculturalism as a policy solution for immigrant integration. Is it concrete policy programs – i.e. the policy practice – that mainly have been criticized and reformed? Or is the criticism more at the rhetorical level, i.e. is it the rhetoric and objectives of the policy that mainly have been criticized and reformed?

Indeed, it can be argued that a narrative about the retreat and failure of multiculturalism has exerted influence over debates about immigrant integration, implying that we have to see how perceptions of an unsuccessful multiculturalism fed back to influence the narrative framing of integration issues. There are of course significant variations over time and between EU member states

¹ Riksdagsprotokoll 2006/07:6, *Quote from Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt's first inaugural speech*

² Quote by Angela Merkel at a meeting of young members of the CDU party (2010)

³ Boswell, Christina & Geddes, Andrew (2011), *Migration and mobility in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 202, Borevi, Karin (2008), *Mångkulturalismen på reträtt*, in Gustavsson, Sverker, Hermansson, Jörgen & Holmström, Barry (red.) (2008), *Statsvetare ifrågasätter: Uppsalamiljön vid tiden för professorsskiftet den 31 mars 2008*, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, p. 408

⁴ Vertovec, Steven & Wessendorf, Susanne (2010), *The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*, Routledge, London, p. 1

⁵ Borevi (2008), pp. 408-409

in narratives about immigrant integration, but the perceived failure of immigrant integration – caused by the influence of a multicultural ideology – tends to be a salient policy concern. Particularly, it is the failure to successfully integrate certain targeted immigrant groups that is seen as emblematic.⁶ However, this narrative is not undisputed. The critique leveled against the narrative about the retreat and failure of multiculturalism emphasizes, among other things, that there is a mischaracterization of the nature of the experiments in multiculturalism that has been undertaken over the last 40 years. Therefore, it is also argued that “the retreat of multiculturalism” is an exaggerated and misleading narrative, even if there is a consensus on a backlash against multiculturalism policies relating to postwar migrants in several Western democracies.⁷

Generally, the ongoing debate about multiculturalism and whether it has failed or not as a policy solution for immigrant integration is mainly characterized by these two perspectives, both within the public and political debate, but also within academic research. But as mentioned earlier, it is often a bit unclear what is exactly referred to when the rise and fall of multiculturalism, and its success or failure, are discussed. Sweeping generalizations are made without specifying in what ways multiculturalism as a policy solution for immigrant integration has been unsuccessful or successful. Therefore, an ambiguity regarding how the narrative about the retreat and failure of multiculturalism should be understood emerges. The overall intention with this thesis is to bring a bit clarification on this aspect.

To do this, it is necessary to distinguish between rhetoric and practice of policies regarding immigrant integration, and also between countries’ immigrant integration policies. Policy solutions on issues regarding immigrant integration across Europe differ from one country to another. Two countries that differ from each other in this aspect are Germany and Sweden, as Germany, for instance, in recent years has adopted an immigrant integration policy with mandatory integration courses and citizenship tests as instruments.⁸ On the contrary this is absent in Sweden. But as illustrated by the two quotes by Reinfeldt and Merkel, they both describe their countries’ immigrant integration policies as failures, thus indicating a similarity in the policy rhetoric, despite the different types of policy practice as regards policies for immigrant integration.

With this in mind, the phenomenon called “the retreat from multiculturalism” appears to be more complex than how it is usually described. First, an apparent discrepancy that exists between rhetoric and practice does not seem to be sufficiently taken into consideration when discussing it – both within the political and scholarly debate. Second, this is also the situation when it comes to differences between countries. By describing the retreat of multiculturalism as a convergent and widespread phenomenon among European countries, there is a risk of missing national peculiarities regarding both policy rhetoric and policy practice.

⁶ Boswell & Geddes (2011), pp. 205-207

⁷ Kymlicka, Will (2010), *The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies*, in Vertovec & Wessendorf (2010), pp. 33, 37-41

⁸ Jacobs, Dirk & Rea, Andrea (2007), *The end of national models? Integration courses and citizenship trajectories in Europe*, *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, Vol. 9, No.2, p. 268

However, there is previous research that has emphasized this complexity⁹ but what seems to be lacking is a profound study that takes both rhetoric and practice into consideration when studying the development of immigrant integration policies in Europe in recent years, both regarding convergence and discrepancy between rhetoric and practice, and how it differs between countries. By making a study of the cases of Sweden and Germany, this thesis aims to fill this gap and by that add to the scholarly debate about the phenomenon called the retreat from multiculturalism.

⁹ Banting, Keith & Kymlicka, Will (2012), *Is there really a backlash against multiculturalism policies? New evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index*, Gritim Working Paper Series, No.14

2. Previous research

2.1 A multiculturalism backlash – return of assimilation?

One of the first scholars that argued for a retreat of multiculturalism policies and a return of assimilation was Rogers Brubaker¹⁰. He means that the Western world during the 1980s and the 1990s experienced an unprecedented efflorescence of a multiculturalist discourse, with multiculturalist integration in all Western countries of immigration, but that this development at the end of 1990s took another direction since it showed signs of having exhausted itself.¹¹ Brubaker argues that it has been shift from an overwhelming focus on persisting difference to a broader focus that encompasses emerging commonalities, where the automatic valorization of cultural differences, normatively, has been replaced with a renewed concern with civic integration.¹²

Another renowned representative of this view is Christian Joppke, who has written several articles and books about the topic. In a book written together with Ewa Morawska, it is argued that the prevalence of multiculturalism policies in liberal states is exaggerated. Instead, in the few cases where such policies were put in place, they have come under pressure and there has been a move away from them.¹³ However, a distinction is made between *de facto* multiculturalism, which is required by the logic of liberal states, and official multiculturalism, where the state, with targeted policies, explicitly recognize and protect immigrants as distinct ethnic groups.¹⁴

This is discussed further in an article, in which Joppke argues for multiculturalism's retreat both at the level of theory and policy. He mentions a number causes responsible for this development, where their relative weight, for certain, is differing across cases but where the general trend is a replacement of official multiculturalism policies by centrist policies of civic integration with respect to immigrants. First, there is a lack of public support for multiculturalism policies. Second, these policies have inherent shortcomings and failures, especially with respect to socio-economic marginalization and self-segregation of migrants. Also, there is a new assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its dissenters. According to Joppke, the second and third factors have been foremost present in a wholesale retreat from multiculturalism in Europe.¹⁵ It is concluded that the turn from multiculturalism to civic integration reflects a seismic shift in European societies, implying that this is a Europe-wide phenomenon, as it everywhere is the same tendency to take multiculturalism as the description of a diverse society rather than as a prescription for state policy.¹⁶

Thus, Joppke means that the retreat of multiculturalism is a Europe-wide phenomenon that reflects a convergence of immigrant integration policies in Western Europe. For example one

¹⁰ Brubaker, Rogers (2001), *The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24:3

¹¹ Brubaker (2001), pp. 532-533

¹² Brubaker (2001), p. 542

¹³ Joppke, Christian & Morawska, Ewa (ed.) (2003), *Toward assimilation and citizenship: immigrants in liberal nation-states*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 1-2

¹⁴ Joppke & Morawska (2003), p. 8

¹⁵ Joppke, Christian (2004), *The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy*, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 55, Issue 2, pp. 243-244

¹⁶ Joppke (2004), pp. 249, 253

convergent trend is the introduction of obligatory civic integration courses and tests for newcomers, he argues. However, this development is problematized, as Joppke means that the obligatory character of these civic integration policies implies that liberal goals are pursued with illiberal means, making it an instance for repressive liberalism.¹⁷

But why have we seen an introduction of civic integration courses and tests at this particular point in time in several EU member states? Sue Wright discusses this in an article and highlights several causes. Among other things, she mentions an emerging concern for security that maybe has provoked the introduction of these tests, where links between immigration and terrorism are constructed and then the populist reaction becomes to introduce such tests because of fear of the newcomer. Also, the complex cosmopolitanism of cities of Western Europe due to changed migration flows can be an explanatory factor, since it can provoke reaction and resurgence of national sentiment. Here, the tests can be seen as a return to a muscular nation-building. Moreover, Wright argues that the timing of the tests' introduction indicates that they may have a gatekeeping mechanism, designed with the purpose to make it harder for immigrants to join the nation and become citizens.¹⁸

2.2 The retreat of multiculturalism – an exaggerated and misleading narrative?

As mentioned, the perspective represented by Joppke is not a unanimous description shared among researchers. The most renowned representative of the view that the master narrative about multiculturalism's failures and shortcomings is exaggerated and misleading is Will Kymlicka, who has written numerous books and articles about this specific issue. In a book written together with Keith Banting, it is argued that multiculturalism as a concept is often not given a clear definition, where a concern about multicultural policies' effects on economic and political integration of immigrants, national security and the welfare state is lumped together with the concern about the impact of ethnic and racial diversity as such on social solidarity and on the welfare state. And therefore, it is important to make a distinction between these two concerns, i.e. it is important to specify what you are criticizing – multicultural policies or racial and ethnic diversity.¹⁹

Making this distinction, Banting and Kymlicka argue that the narrative about multiculturalism's retreat is exaggerated. In reality, there is a general trend of accommodation of ethnocultural diversity in the West, as multiculturalism has become deeply embedded in the legislation, jurisprudence and institutions of many Western countries, as well as embedded in their very self-image. For instance, there has been a clear trend towards greater recognition of non-immigrant substate national groups, often with a strengthening of these groups' regional autonomy and official language. However, regarding immigration they admit that there has been a retreat from multiculturalism. But in contrast to e.g. Brubaker and Joppke, they reject the explanation that this retreat reflects a return to the traditional

¹⁷ Joppke, Christian (2007), *Beyond national models: Civic integration for immigrants in Western Europe*, West European Politics, 30:1

¹⁸ Wright, Sue (2008), *Citizenship tests in Europe – editorial introduction*, International Journal on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 10, No.1, pp. 1-2

¹⁹ Banting, Keith & Kymlicka, Will (ed.) (2006), *Multiculturalism and the welfare state: recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

liberal belief that ethnicity belongs in the private sphere, a belief where the public sphere should be neutral and citizenship should be undifferentiated. If so, the retreat reflects a rejection of the whole idea of a liberal-democratic conception of multiculturalism. And since there is a trend of recognition of non-immigrant substate national groups and their claims, this cannot be the explanation. Also, there are different types of ethnocultural diversity in different countries that have their own multicultural claims and their own trajectories of resistance, backlash and acceptance, which means that there is no single story of ‘advance’ or ‘retreat’ of multiculturalism.²⁰

Thus, Banting and Kymlicka mean that it is difficult to argue for a wholesale retreat from multiculturalism if we use their interpretation of it. And even if they admit that there has been a serious retreat from multiculturalism regarding immigration, we cannot see this retreat as a universal phenomenon, since it has affected some countries more than others.

In another book, Kymlicka levels criticism against the characterization of multiculturalism as a feel-good celebration of ethnocultural diversity that encourages citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music and cuisine that exist in a multi-ethnic society. Kymlicka calls this a caricature of multiculturalism, used by critics to criticize multiculturalism as a policy solution that ignores economic and political inequality, encourages a conception of groups as hermetically sealed and static, and reinforces power inequalities and cultural restrictions also within minority groups. And if multiculturalism really was about celebrating cultural difference, the critique against it would be justified. But instead, Kymlicka means that multiculturalism should be seen as a part of a larger “human rights revolution” in relation to ethnic and racial diversity, where a foundational ideology of the equality of races and peoples that challenges legacies of earlier ethnic and racial hierarchies is present. In a historical context multiculturalism can therefore be seen to have contributed to a process of democratic “citizenization”, where the earlier catalogue of hierarchical relations have been turned into relationships of liberal-democratic citizenship. In this sense, multiculturalism is first and foremost about developing new models of democratic citizenship, according to Kymlicka.²¹

The critique of the master narrative about multiculturalism’s failure is further developed in a recent article. Here, they present an index that show the strength of multicultural policies for European countries and several traditional countries of immigration at three different points in time (1980, 2000 and 2010). The results presented paint a different picture of contemporary experience in Europe, indicating that, in much of Europe, multicultural policies are not in general retreat. Instead, Banting and Kymlicka mean that the turn to civic integration is often layered on top of existing multiculturalism policies, implying that more liberal forms of civic integration can be combined with multiculturalism.

Using eight indicators that are intended to capture a policy dimension where liberal-democratic states face a choice whether or not to take a multicultural turn, Kymlicka and Banting mean that a large number of European countries have adopted some level of multiculturalism over the past three decades, and that no general retreat from multiculturalism can be distinguished since 2000. However,

²⁰ Banting & Kymlicka (2006), pp. 6-9

²¹ Kymlicka (2010), pp. 33-37

the proliferation of civic integration policies alongside the persistence of multiculturalism policies implies that these two can somehow co-exist.²²

In contrast to Joppke, it is also argued that there is no evidence for convergence either on multiculturalism policies or on civic integration policies in Europe. This means that the compatibility of multiculturalism policies and civic integration varies immensely from one country to another. In conclusion, there is nothing inherently incompatible between multiculturalism and civic integration, but there are limits to it if more coercive and illiberal versions of civic integration will be introduced. The balance between different conceptions of civic integration will, therefore, clearly be important for the future development of cultural diversity in Europe.²³

2.3 Summary and discussion

Summarizing the research presented above, it is evident how two perspectives are conflicting with each other, interpreting the development of multiculturalism in Europe in different ways. Joppke speaks, mainly, about a retreat of multiculturalism that reflects a Europe-wide phenomenon with a convergence of immigrant integration policies in Western Europe. Challenging this view, Banting and Kymlicka emphasize an immense variation as regards immigrant integration policies among European countries and thus reject the idea of a single-story about a retreat of multiculturalism. Instead, they mean that evidence showing a strengthening of multicultural policies can be found, and that a turn to civic integration – with e.g. introduction of civic integration tests – can be combined with a maintenance of multicultural policies.

However, both perspectives, particularly the one represented by Joppke, seem to have an absence of a profound discussion of the relation between policy rhetoric and policy practice regarding the retreat of multiculturalism – even if Banting and Kymlicka to some extent have emphasized this. In conformity with the two last-mentioned, this thesis will challenge the view that claims that the retreat of multiculturalism is a convergent phenomenon in Europe. Inspired by the argument of Banting and Kymlicka, this study will examine the development of both policy rhetoric and policy practice regarding immigrant integration and multiculturalism in Sweden and Germany in recent years. An elaboration of previous research regarding this is therefore necessary, which will follow next.

2.4 Immigration policy, immigrant integration and multiculturalism in Germany

In the book, *The politics of exclusion: institutions and immigration policy in contemporary Germany*, Simon Green gives a good description of Germany's immigration policy during post-war period from the 1950s to the beginning of the 2000s. Green argues that the very central aspect in the understanding of Germany's immigration policy is to be aware of the longstanding official government position that Germany was not a country of immigration, a position that Germany maintained until the late 1990s,

²² Banting & Kymlicka (2012), pp. 10-12

²³ Banting & Kymlicka (2012), pp. 15-19

despite substantial immigration over a period of several decades.²⁴ Moreover, Green pictures immigration policy in Germany as a quite sensitive issue that at some particular points in time has become heavily politicized.

The guest-worker model adopted in the 1950s established Germany as a country of non-immigration, since it was expected that guest workers and their families should return to their countries of origin. As a result, these people were not seen as German citizens but as guests in Germany that were not supposed to become German citizens. However, this position became problematic after 1973 when the recruitment of guest workers was stopped and this group became transformed into a permanent immigrant minority.²⁵ Also, there were changed migration flows during the 1980s and 1990s, with an increased level of asylum and dependant migration, which raised concerns about a need for a new immigration law. At this moment, immigration policy became more politicized, where particularly the CDU still were consistent with the notion that Germany was not a country of immigration. The political party that resisted this notion the most was the Greens, but to some extent it was also questioned by the SPD.²⁶

Indeed, the longstanding notion of Germany as a non-immigration country has played a crucial role for the understanding of German citizenship and immigration policy, and also for the German approach to multiculturalism. Regarding multiculturalism in Germany, it is discussed by Kraus and Schönwälder. They mean that multiculturalism in Germany has so far mainly existed at the level of discourse and not at the level of policy, even if elements of multiculturalism policies do exist. Despite this, the concept of multiculturalism is very present in the German context, mainly due to a growing concern with the overall integration of an increasingly heterogeneous society.²⁷ But obviously, any explicit and comprehensive multiculturalism policies have been unlikely to be introduced, foremost because of the official insistence of Germany as a non-immigration country. However, this has not prevented elements of multiculturalism policies to exist, but not in a way where there is a commitment to minority rights and public support for the maintenance and expressions of distinct identities.²⁸

Thus, the term multiculturalism is frequently used in present day Germany. But due to growing concerns for an increasingly heterogeneous society, it has become a derogatory term, often negatively used to describe cultural diversity and integration of immigrants as inconsistent with each other. This is further discussed by Schönwälder. In the past she means that commitment or opposition to multiculturalism divided those who welcomed or resisted Germany's transformation into an immigration country, which today has largely disappeared because of the CDU's slow movement towards an acceptance of immigration, an acceptance that, as described earlier, can be seen as a part of a slow policy change process spanning over decades. However, this seems not be accompanied by a generally positive approach to cultural diversity. It is accepted that the German population is composed of people with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, but Germany's new notion of

²⁴ Green, Simon (2004), *The politics of exclusion: institutions and immigration policy in contemporary Germany*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 5-6

²⁵ Green (2004), pp. 35-37, 47

²⁶ Green (2004), pp. 81-82

²⁷ Kraus, Peter A. & Schönwälder, Karen (2006), *Multiculturalism in Germany: Rhetoric scattered experiments, and future chances*, in Banting & Kymlicka (2006), pp. 202-203

²⁸ Kraus & Schönwälder (2006), pp. 211, 220

itself as country of immigration seems to be existing in a climate unfavorable to an active promotion of minority rights and identities.²⁹ There are requirements on immigrants who desire to stay in Germany permanently, like learning the German language and accepting constitutional values and German culture. A slogan of “challenge and support” is frequently used to describe the core principle of the official integration policy, and this slogan legitimizes a focus on the individual, who is offered help but in turn the individual has to prove willingness to co-operate and integrate. But if this “co-operation” does not achieve the expected results there is a tendency to blame the immigrants, claiming that immigrants are retreating into secluded communities and that multiculturalism is the concept that legitimized this retreat. However, Schönwälder means that attacks on multiculturalism are often rhetorical and not necessarily accompanied by a consequent move to abolish any pluralist intervention.³⁰

Acceding to the notion of Germany as a country where multiculturalism is often described as the cause of current failures in immigrants’ integration, Miera also describes this as counterfactual since multiculturalism policies have never been systematically implemented in Germany. Moreover, Miera discusses the introduction of language and citizenship tests as a requirement in order to acquire citizenship. Discussing this, Miera means that, on the one hand, these approaches can provide an infrastructure for migrants to learn about the conditions of the host society. But on the other hand, it implies an understanding of the aim for migrants to learn the language of the host society as an obligation rather than a desirable goal. In this sense, citizenship tests reflect a suspicion that migrants, according to Miera especially Muslims, do not understand or respect the norms and values of the host society.³¹ However, another important element of the immigrant integration policy in Germany is also the involvement of immigrants in the debate on integration issues, which symbolizes a sort of acknowledgement of immigrants as a part of society.³²

2.5 Immigration policy, immigrant integration and multiculturalism in Sweden

Looking at Sweden there are crucial differences in comparison to Germany as regards immigration policy. In her doctoral dissertation, Karin Borevi gives a good description of the development of Swedish immigration policy. First and foremost, Sweden did not established a guestworker model as a policy strategy, as it already in the 1950s was realized that some immigrants had the intention to permanently reside in Sweden and that the state should have strong reasons to force those immigrants to leave Sweden. Therefore, the official government position was to see Sweden as a country of immigration, which made that Sweden already in the 1960s started to formulate a clear immigration policy.³³

²⁹ Schönwälder, Karen (2010), *Germany: Integration policy and pluralism in self-conscious country of immigration*, in Vertovec & Wessendorf (2010), pp. 152-153

³⁰ Schönwälder (2010), pp. 154-155, 162

³¹ Miera (2012), p. 200

³² Miera (2012), pp. 203-204

³³ Borevi, Karin (2002), *Välfärdsstaten i det mångkulturella samhället*, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala, pp. 80-83

In Sweden, immigrants were early included into the integrative logics and goals of the welfare state. The position adopted by the Swedish government was influenced by the principle of equality between immigrants and native Swedes. Issues regarding immigrants' adaptation to the Swedish society were mentioned, such as how immigrants should acquire knowledge in the Swedish language and culture. However, the state's relationship to immigrants' different ethnic and cultural affiliations was also highlighted. This resulted in an immigration survey that suggested the state to undertake a responsibility for giving immigrants access to both the culture associated with the majority and the "own" minority culture. Additionally, a goal that emphasized freedom of choice was highlighted, with the meaning that immigrants should be able to choose to which degree they wanted to keep and develop their culture of origin, and to which degree they wanted to adapt to a Swedish cultural identity. As a consequence of this, Borevi means that Sweden adopted a clear multicultural approach in its immigration policy, about which there also was a consensus in the parliament.³⁴

The multicultural approach was taken in the middle of the 1970s but became questioned during the 1980s, mainly due to changed migration flows with an increased level of refugee and dependant immigration. According to Borevi, a tension between - what she calls - ethnos and demos, i.e. a national identity based on ethnic community and/or political community, clearly emerged. As a consequence, it was asked to what extent immigrants in the long-term could maintain coherent minority cultures and at the same time adapt to the Swedish society. Rhetorically, the Swedish government now emphasized the necessity for every citizen – both immigrants and native Swedes – to assimilate and adhere to a citizenship defined as a civic community. This clearly indicated a step away from the multicultural approach adopted in the 1970s.³⁵ But this rhetorical reorientation did not caused any political disagreements among the political parties in the parliament.

Discussing this rhetorical reorientation, Borevi means that Sweden pioneered this already in the mid-1980s, which a decade later became the common trend in Europe. And in recent years, the current trend towards civic integration has been strengthened also in Sweden. According to Borevi, the trend of civic integration is characterized by a "rights vs. duties discourse", where there is a development towards a stronger focus on citizens' duties and responsibilities, promoting a more 'active citizenship'. Thus, the fulfillment of certain duties is defined as a condition for achieving rights, i.e. duties come before rights.³⁶

This, Borevi means, makes it quite unclear how we should characterize Sweden's position today. Historically, Sweden has often been described as "the flagship of multiculturalism", but how relevant is that description nowadays? According to Borevi, this depends on what aspects of the current trend, which has got the name "the retreat from multiculturalism", we focus on. Regarding the general movement away from an active promotion of ethnic diversity, it can be argued that Sweden is a representative, even a pioneering, case among European countries. But regarding the introduction of

³⁴ Borevi (2002), pp. 85-90, 95-97

³⁵ Borevi (2002), pp. 100-107, 113

³⁶ Borevi, Karin (2010), *Dimensions of citizenship: European integration policies from a Scandinavian perspective*, Paper presented at the Swedish Political Science Association conference in Göteborg 2010, pp. 9-10

integration courses and tests as conditions for obtaining a residence permit or acquiring citizenship, Sweden may represent something of an exception, since such proposals have been rejected.³⁷

Regarding the latter Wiesbrock also discusses this and means that Swedish integration policies differ considerably from integration policies applied in other EU countries. Discussing this, Wiesbrock points out a paradoxical aspect in Swedish integration policies, where those policies in an overall ranking made by the Migration Policy Group were ranked number one, but when looking at data and statistics from OECD and Eurostat it indicates more unfavorable integration outcomes – at least in terms of labor market participation. Particularly, the gap in employment rates between the native and foreign-born population is larger in Sweden than in several EU countries, among them Germany.³⁸

2.6 Summary and reflections

Indeed, Germany and Sweden have different histories regarding immigration, immigrant integration and multiculturalism. The resistance of seeing Germany as an immigration country made it difficult to introduce an official policy of multiculturalism. But despite this, critique against multiculturalism has emerged, and then primarily on the rhetorical level. Schönwälder writes about a tendency of blaming immigrants if expected results of the immigrant integration policy are not achieved where multiculturalism is seen as the concept that caused this failure, but that this phenomenon does not necessarily have to be accompanied by a consequent move to abolish any pluralist intervention

In many regards, the case of Sweden differs in comparison to Germany. During the 1980s the multicultural approach taken in 1970s became questioned, which resulted in a step away from this approach where a rhetorical reorientation that emphasized the necessity for every citizen – both immigrants and native Swedes – to assimilate and adhere into a citizenship defined as a civic community, occurred. According to Borevi, Sweden was a pioneering country in this sense, i.e. regarding a rhetorical reorientation away from a promotion of a multicultural immigration policy, which a decade later became the common trend in Europe and also Germany. However, similar to Germany this has not necessarily been accompanied by an extensive abolishment of the actual policy practice regarding immigration and integration, which is even more evident in Sweden than Germany.

Thus, considering results of previous research there seems to be a kind of discrepancy between rhetoric and practice in both Germany and Sweden, which is of great interest for this thesis. Apparently, the policy development in Germany and Sweden reveals a complexity of how the retreat of multiculturalism should be understood in these countries, where there are intentions of a multicultural retreat that may be more complete at the rhetorical level than the practical. But more in detail, how does this actually look like if one studies the development between 2006 and 2012? This is what this thesis aims to give an answer to. The focus will hence be on policy reformation and change, for which I now will elaborate a theoretical point of departure.

³⁷ Borevi, Karin (2012), *Sweden: The flagship of multiculturalism*, in Brochmann, Grete & Hagelund, Anniken (2012), *Immigration policy and the Scandinavian welfare state 1945-2010*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke pp. 89-90

³⁸ Wiesbrock, Anja (2011), *The integration of immigrants in Sweden: a model for the European Union?*, International Migration, Vol. 49 (4), p. 48

3. Research aim and questions

3.1 Aim

As seen in previous research, there are disagreements among researchers how to interpret the phenomenon called the retreat from multiculturalism. Is it a convergent, single-story of retreat that can be observed? Or is the picture more complex? By taking the practice and rhetoric of immigrant integration policies into consideration, this thesis means that the latter seems to be the most proper question to ask. The aim with this thesis is, thus, to examine the policy development of immigrant integration in Sweden and Germany between 2006 and 2012, both regarding practice and rhetoric. By doing this, I will try to give a plausible answer to how a narrative about a retreat from multiculturalism can be understood in these countries.

3.2 Research questions

To this aim, the overall question formulation of the thesis will be:

- **Is it mainly a rhetorical retreat or a practical retreat from multiculturalism as a policy solution for immigrant integration that can be observed during 2006-2012 in Sweden and Germany?**

This question will be answered by asking the following sub-questions to the empirical material:

- *How should the policy development of immigrant integration in Sweden and Germany between 2006 and 2012 be described and characterized?*
- *To what extent is there a discrepancy or a convergence between policy rhetoric and practice?*
- *Can policies that have a multicultural character be combined with policies that have a civic assimilation character?*

To answer these questions, a theoretical framework on how to understand policy development and change will be used. The policy development will be studied by focusing on three different aspects of immigrant integration, namely (1) access to citizenship (2) education and (3) active funding and support. How this will be done will be described in detail in the method chapter.

4. Theoretical framework

4.1 New institutionalism

As just stated, this thesis aims to examine the policy development regarding immigrant integration and multiculturalism in Germany and Sweden. Thus, it is the evolution both in rhetoric and practice of such policies in recent years – more exactly between 2006 and 2012 – that this study has its focus on. What will be studied are, hence, changes and reformations of policies. In this sense, literature on new institutionalism can offer considerable potential in the understanding of this evolution. New institutionalism has contributed to growing understanding of the nature of institutions and change, i.e. what role institutions – and policies as well – have in a specific context and also how and why institutions or policies change within this context. Roughly, it can be claimed that new institutionalism conceives two different theories of institutional change, which can be applicable to the earlier presented previous research.³⁹ Thus, a neo-institutionalist perspective on how and why institutions and policies change would also be applicable in this thesis. In what ways, I will describe in detail now.

Two broad theories

First, one interpretation identifies a process of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, where a policy development of long continuity suddenly gives way to a sharp burst of radical change and enters a new trajectory that persists for a long time. To a great extent, Brubaker’s and Joppke’s interpretations of the shift in Europe from multiculturalism to civic integration have this feature, i.e. after a period of growing multiculturalism, Europe is undergoing a radical transition to a new different trajectory. Second, another interpretation sees more evolutionary processes, in which it is assumed that policies and institutions are the subject of ongoing political contestation and evolve through steady incremental adaptation. In this aspect changes can, for instance, take place through processes of conversion and layering. Conversion occurs when existing policies are redirected to new purposes, and layering occurs when new governments simply work around existing programs and lay new policies on top of old ones, adding new institutions to old ones.⁴⁰

New institutionalism and institutional change have been elaborated upon by March and Olsen. They mean that the mix of rules, routines, norms, and identities that describe institutions change over time in response to historical experience, more exactly that these are both instruments of stability and arenas of change. And the key to understand the dynamics of change is a clarification of the role of institutions within standard processes of change.⁴¹ Regarding the earlier mentioned model of punctuated equilibrium, March and Olsen claim that it assumes discontinuous change where long periods of institutional continuity are assumed to be interrupted only at critical junctures of radical

³⁹ Williams, Helen Marie (2011), *Examining the nature of policy change: a new institutionalist explanation of citizenship and naturalization policy in the UK and Germany*, The University of Birmingham, Birmingham pp. 48-49

⁴⁰ Banting & Kymlicka (2012), p. 8

⁴¹ March James G. & Olsen Johan P. (2008), *Elaborating the new institutionalism*, in Rhodes, R.A.W., Binder Sarah A. & Rockmann, Bert A. (red.) (2008), *The Oxford handbook of political institutions*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 11

change. Also, massive failure is an important condition for change.⁴² Thus, the model of punctuated equilibrium fits well into the master narrative of multiculturalism’s retreat and failure.

However, March and Olsen argue that this model underestimates both intra- and inter-institutional dynamics and sources of change and by that it ignores how incremental steps can produce transformative results. Political orders are never perfectly integrated, since they routinely face institutional imbalances and collisions. Therefore, it is useful to have a focus on how the dynamics of change can be understood in terms of the organization, interaction, and collisions among competing institutional structures, norms, rules, identities and practices.⁴³

The model of punctuated equilibrium is also to some extent questioned by Streeck and Thelen. One argument they put forward is that *equating incremental with adaptive and reproductive minor change, and major change with mostly exogenous, disruption of continuity, makes excessively high demands on ‘real change’ to be recognized as such and tends to reduce most or all observable changes to adjustment for the purpose of stability.* In this sense, they suggest that it is necessary to distinguish between processes of change, which may be incremental or abrupt, and results of change, which may amount to continuity or discontinuity.⁴⁴ Streeck and Thelen have elaborated this in the following figure/model:

		Results of change	
		Continuity	Discontinuity
Process of change	Incremental	Reproduction by adaption	Gradual transformation
	Abrupt	Survival and return	Breakdown and replacement

Source: Streeck and Thelen (2005)

When describing institutional change from the perspective of a punctuated equilibrium model, a change that results in discontinuity often takes place through an abrupt institutional breakdown and replacement (the cell on the lower right). But from this perspective, incremental processes of change can also be recognized and are then often conceived to result in reproduction by adaption as it serves to protect institutional continuity (the upper left cell). However, in spite of historical break points marking an institutional change there is often considerable continuity, which tentatively can be referred to as survival and return (the lower left cell). Lastly, institutional change can also result in

⁴² March & Olsen (2008), p. 12
⁴³ March & Olsen (2008), pp.12, 14
⁴⁴ Streeck, Wolfgang & Thelen, Kathleen Ann (2005), *Beyond continuity: institutional change in advanced political economies*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 8

discontinuity through an incremental process, where the main characteristic can be said to be a dramatic institutional reconfiguration beneath a surface of apparent stability. It can also be called gradual transformation and is mainly a result of an accumulation over longer periods of time of subtle incremental changes (the upper right cell).⁴⁵

Streeck and Thelen mean that this model can be suitable to use when analyzing policy change, but it depends on the character of the policy in question. In this aspect, they mean that policies can be considered as institutions if policies can constitute rules for actors other than for the policymakers themselves. More exactly rules that can and need to be implemented and that, if necessary, can be enforced by agents acting on behalf of the society as a whole.⁴⁶ Thus, immigrant integration policies in Germany and Sweden, which are the units of analysis in this study, can be said to fall within the scope of those conditions.

Two modes of policy change

When they elaborate an alternative to the model of punctuated equilibrium, Streeck and Thelen focus more on how significant change can emanate from inherent ambiguities that exist by design or emerge over time between formal institutions and their actual implementation or enforcement. Briefly, they describe five broad modes of gradual but nevertheless transformative change. Two of them have been mentioned before: *conversion*, and *layering*. The other three are *drift*, *displacement* and *exhaustion*. However, the modes of relevance for this study will be conversion and layering.

The first one, *conversion*, is characterized by redirection to new goals, functions and purposes, i.e. old institutions and policies remain but the goals and purposes of them change. Often, conversion occurs as a result of new environmental challenges (policymakers deploy existing institutional resources to new ends), changes in power relations, where existing institutions are adapted to serve new goals or fit the interest of new actors, and also through political contestation over what functions and purposes an existing institution should serve.⁴⁷

The second one, *layering*, is characterized by involvement of active sponsorship of amendments, additions or revisions to an existing set of institutions. As mentioned before, new institutions or policies are layered on top of old ones, and according to Streeck and Thelen the question that then appears is to what extent the fringe and the core of institutions and policies peacefully can coexist.⁴⁸ This question can thus be said to be in line with how Banting and Kymlicka try to understand the tension between multiculturalism policies and civic integration policies.

Considering these two different modes of gradual incremental policy change, it is evident that institutional and policy change can occur in different ways. When conducting the analysis later on, it will be made in relation to these modes where I will try to characterize changes in both policy rhetoric and practice based on these modes.

⁴⁵ Streeck & Thelen (2005), pp. 8-9

⁴⁶ Streeck & Thelen (2005), p. 12

⁴⁷ Streeck & Thelen (2005), p. 26

⁴⁸ Streeck & Thelen (2005), p. 24

4.2 Policy rhetoric in relation to policy practice

Another crucial issue when an institution is established or changed is legitimacy. Here, Streeck and Thelen mean that an institution as a regime is legitimate in the sense and to the extent that the expectations it represents are enforced by the society in which it is embedded. An institutional regime involves rule makers and rule takers, where relations and interactions between these two are important for the content and evolution of the regime as such. In this two-way process both rule makers and takers are evaluated and legitimized by supportive third parties. This illustrates the fact that there always is some kind of gap between the ideal pattern of a rule and the real pattern of life under it.⁴⁹

This is further discussed by Dahlström. He means that if a policy area is to survive in the long run, the objectives of the policy need to have legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Otherwise, there must in some way be policy changes. Foremost, an institution can gain legitimacy by defending core values and carrying out its operations efficiently. To evaluate legitimacy, it is therefore useful to ask two questions, according to Dahlström. The first question is: Is the institution doing the right thing? The second question is: Is it working? And if the answers to these questions conflict with each other, the first question takes precedence. However, this does not have to lead to adjustments of the institution's performance, as the conflict can be avoided by decoupling moral (first question) and efficiency (second question) evaluations from one another.⁵⁰ In other words, there can be discrepancy and tensions between policy rhetoric and practice, where e.g. the objectives of the policy are questioned but how these objectives are carried out is not.

In this aspect, Dahlström means that there are two levels existing at the same time and that these two levels have different functions, where one answers to moral values and the other to efficiency expectations. They may be called the "rhetorical" and "practical" levels. At the rhetorical level, evaluation of institutions is made in political debate and typical asked questions are often of a moral character, for instance, if policy objectives are compatible with values like liberty and justice. While at the practical level, evaluation of institutions is made through the government's audit system, where the questions asked deal more with whether policy objectives have been reached efficiently and satisfactorily. For instance, has language training for immigrants led to a sufficient number of degrees being awarded? If yes, the institution is seen as efficient; if no, it is seen as inefficient. In this sense, the different questions asked on the two levels imply different kinds of reform agendas, where institutions at the rhetorical level adapt to dominant moral values and at the practical level it is more about changing e.g. coordination and competence to facilitate more efficient policy solutions.⁵¹ Thus, another important factor when analyzing institutional and policy change is legitimacy, particularly regarding the relationship between rhetoric and practice. Here, the decoupling of rhetoric and practice suggested by Dahlström contributes to an even clearer understanding of how policy changes can be understood.

⁴⁹ Streeck & Thelen (2005), pp. 13-14

⁵⁰ Dahlström, Carl (2004), *Rhetoric, practice and the dynamics of institutional change: Immigrant policy in Sweden, 1964-2000*, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 290

⁵¹ Dahlström (2004), p. 292

By uniting the model elaborated by Streeck and Thelen, the two modes of policy change and Dahlström's elaboration on policy rhetoric and practice, a theoretical framework can be established that will serve as guidance when analyzing whether it is concrete multicultural policy programs that have mainly been criticized or reformed, or if it is the rhetoric and objectives of the same policies that have been criticized and reformed. In this sense, three different characterizations of the evolution regarding immigrant integration and multiculturalism in Germany and Sweden can hopefully be crystallized. First, if the evolution and changes of the policies occurred as a result of an abrupt or incremental change. Second, what mode of change it can be said to be, i.e. if the change has occurred through conversion or layering or even both, and third how the changes – both rhetorical and practical changes – relate to each other. More exactly, to what extent it is a discrepancy or a convergence between these two. Exactly how this will be operationalized will be discussed when I describe the methodological approach.

4.3 Defining multiculturalism

However, before I do this it is necessary to elaborate a short working definition of multiculturalism that will be valid for this study. Taking previous research into consideration, this study will use a definition of multiculturalism that can be said to be similar to how Banting and Kymlicka define multiculturalism. Concretely, it means that multiculturalism will be defined as a policy solution aiming to reflect, represent and maintain distinct cultural identities, which means that immigrant and ethnic minority groups should be seen as legitimate social and political actors, worthy to be incorporated, consulted and supported by the state. Thus, multiculturalism can be considered as a policy solution that has an intention to develop new models of democratic citizenship, where different cultural identities have an intrinsic value that also is seen as a vehicle for promotion of immigrant integration.

The results and analysis will be made in relation to this definition, i.e. it will be examined how distinct cultural identities are reflected, represented and maintained within these three earlier mentioned aspects in Sweden and Germany, as well as how immigrant and ethnic minority groups are seen as legitimate social and political actors. Using this definition will also help to clarify to what extent immigrants are expected to assimilate into culture of the majority.

In sum, the definition of multiculturalism in this study is very much about recognition and support of minority groups, in this sense about recognition and support that go beyond basic civil and political rights of all individuals in a liberal-democratic state.

5. Methodological approaches

5.1 Why Germany and Sweden?

First of all, the main reason why Germany and Sweden, i.e. these countries' immigrant integration policies, have been chosen as study objects is because of their apparent different historical policy development in this regard, which alone makes it interesting to compare Germany's and Sweden's policy developments in recent years. The main reason why the time period between 2006 and 2012 has been chosen is that around 2006 formative moments in both Sweden and Germany occurred, where new governments took office in 2005 in Germany, and 2006 in Sweden. These government coalitions are still in office. Also, this time period is a couple of years after "the retreat of multiculturalism" has been argued to start, which makes it interesting to examine what relevance this narrative has, if studying the policy development in recent years.

To motivate the choice of Germany and Sweden further, I will present two different indexes that in different ways measure immigrant integration policies in several countries, among them Germany and Sweden. Moreover, it is also on the basis of these indexes I will motivate and choose the three earlier mentioned aspects related to immigrant integration. In this sense, it will be even more clarified what is meant with multiculturalism policies in this thesis, what delimitations that have been made and the strengths and weaknesses that come with this.

The Multiculturalism Policy Index (The MCP Index) and MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index)

The MCP Index, which was described short in the previous research section, is an index that provides information about multiculturalism policies across Western democracies and how those policies have evolved over time. The index has been elaborated by Banting and Kymlicka with the main goal to aid comparative research and to contribute to the understanding of state-minority relations. The index covers three types of minorities: immigrant groups, historic national minorities, and indigenous peoples.⁵²

The MCP Index measures the presence or absence of a range of MCPs at three different points in time, 1980, 2000, and 2010. Regarding immigrant groups, which is what this study focuses on, eight policy indicators are listed⁵³, where the presence or absence of each policy gives a score between 0 and 1. On each indicator, countries are scored 0 (no such policy), 0.5 (partial) or 1 (clear policy). By this, the intention is to track the evolution over the past three decades. Thus, the maximum score one country can get is 8. Looking at this index, two slightly different pictures as regards multiculturalism policies for immigrant minorities in Germany and Sweden can be distinguished. Unsurprisingly, Germany has lower scores than Sweden, starting with a total score of 0 in 1980, to a total score of 2 in 2000 and 2,5 in 2010. However, despite the absence of an official policy or leading paradigm of multiculturalism, Germany has introduced elements of MCP during the last decades. Among other

⁵² Website of the MCP Index, *The MCP Index Project*

⁵³ These indicators can be found in an appendix after the reference list

things a funding and support of ethnic group organizations has been established. Taking this index into consideration, it can be argued that the policy development in Germany, to some extent, indicates a strengthening of MCPs, at least in practice. By contrast, Sweden's scores are among the highest of the 21 countries that comprise the index. Starting with the total score of 3 in 1980, the total score was 5 in 2000 and 7 in 2010, which also clearly indicates a strengthening of MCPs during the last decades when looking at the policy practice. The only indicator Sweden does not have is affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

The MIPEX Index an index that measures integration policies in all EU Member States plus Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the USA.⁵⁴ The index consists of seven different policy areas⁵⁵. Also in this index, Germany and Sweden have different scores, where Sweden anew is top-ranked (actually number one in this index) with a total score of 83 out of 100. Germany is ranked as number twelve with a total score of 57. Similar to the MCP Index, MIPEX measures the practice of integration policies in the seven policy areas above, more exactly how policies are structured and designed to create the legal environment in which immigrants can contribute to a country's well-being, where they have equal access to employment and education, are protected against discrimination and become active citizens. And looking at the cases of Germany and Sweden, the overall findings in the MIPEX index show that Sweden performs better than Germany. However, as highlighted by Wiesbrock, a favorable structure or design of policies does not automatically mean that the outcomes of the same policies have to be favorable.

In sum, when looking at these indexes two slightly different pictures appear, which makes it interesting to study the cases of Sweden and Germany, as they score so differently in these indexes. Because, what the indexes measure is exclusively the practice of multiculturalism and immigrant integration. If we, for example, look at the MCP Index it could be argued that it has been a strengthening of multiculturalism policies, particularly in Sweden but also in Germany. Indeed, quite interesting results. Therefore, it would be useful to use the indexes as a point of departure and elaborate different analytical aspects from them, which then can be used to analyze the policy practice as well as the policy rhetoric more profoundly and see how applicable and correct the MCP Index is. In this sense, it will also be possible to capture broad cross-national differences and similarities between Germany and Sweden, as well as make it clear what is meant with multiculturalism policies in this study. The different analytical aspects will now be presented more in detail.

5.2 Policy analysis

The research method in this thesis will be a qualitative policy analysis, where both policy rhetoric and practice of the three aspects: (1) access to citizenship, (2) education and (3) active funding and support of ethnic groups will be examined and analyzed. Considering the two indexes presented above, immigrant integration and multiculturalism policies cover a wide range of policy domains. This is highlighted by Freeman, who means that immigrants are mostly managed via institutions created for

⁵⁴ MIPEX Index, *Migrant Integration Policy Index*

⁵⁵ Also these policy areas can be found in an appendix

other purposes.⁵⁶ In other words, integration of immigrants is strongly interlinked to other policy areas, such as labor market policy, housing policy, education policy etc. Therefore, it is important to be clear on what you exactly mean when you study immigrant integration and multiculturalism policies. In this study this will be taken into consideration by focusing on aspects that can be clearly related to policies of integration and diversity. Certainly, it would have been interesting to include e.g. labor market policies or social policies, which also represents parts of a larger incorporation regime, but that would have been a too large thesis. Nevertheless, having a specific focus on policies of integration and diversity – where I in this thesis will focus on the three aspects mentioned above – implies an interesting approach as it, if considering previous research, indicates that there is a complexity as regards rhetoric and practice of immigrant integration policies of Sweden and Germany.

Moreover, these three aspects have also been chosen on the basis that they go beyond the protection of the basic civil and political rights guaranteed to all individuals in a liberal-democratic state. To some extent, all these aspects deal with issues and questions that concern public recognition and support for immigrant minorities to express their distinct identities and practices. Additionally, the aspects have a concrete dimension that makes it favorable using them in an analysis between policy rhetoric and practice as well as between countries like Sweden and Germany.

As mentioned, I will use a qualitative method in this thesis as policy practice and rhetoric of the three aspects regarding immigrant integration will be studied, which more concretely means that I will qualitatively analyze different texts relevant to the three aspects. The study is both descriptive and exploratory, since it has the intention to identify salient themes and patterns of immigrant integration policies in recent years in Sweden and Germany, as well as documenting and describing beliefs, opinions and ideas regarding integration of immigrants and multiculturalism that are expressed in the texts meant to be analyzed. In this sense, it is not an explanatory study where I aim to explain why the policy development of the three aspects regarding immigrant integration in Sweden and Germany has resulted in the specific outcomes I describe and explore.⁵⁷ Also, I would emphasize that it is solely government decisions and positions in official policy documents, legislation acts and parliamentary debates that will be presented and analyzed in this thesis. This will be discussed and motivated further when I present the empirical material.

Analytical framework - operationalization

The analysis of the empirical material will be made on the basis of the three earlier mentioned aspects. Regarding the first aspect, **access to citizenship and nationality**, it is primarily requirements for acquisition of citizenship and naturalization that will be examined and analyzed. Also, the attitudes towards dual citizenship will also be considered. In this sense, the relation between practice and rhetoric as well as between a multicultural and a civic assimilation approach towards this particular policy aspect could be identified and analyzed. When studying the second aspect, **education**, it is primarily policies on language training in Swedish and German and civic orientation that will be

⁵⁶ Freeman, Gary (2004), *Immigrant incorporation in Western democracies*, International Migration Review, Vol. 38, No.3, pp. 948

⁵⁷ Marshall, Catherine & Rossman, Gretchen B (2011), *Designing qualitative research*, 5. ed., Sage, Los Angeles, pp. 68-69

studied, which also will capture the relation between practice and rhetoric and multiculturalism and civic assimilation. Lastly, in the third aspect, **active funding and support**, it is policy initiatives having the aim to support ethnic and immigrant organizations that will be considered.

Thereafter, when the findings of this examination have been presented and discussed, they will be related to the theoretical framework, which then will be used to more precisely characterize and determine the policy development of these three aspects. First, I will determine what kind of policy change it has been, i.e. an incremental or abrupt process of change. Second, I will determine what type of mode/s of change it can be. Third, it will also be determined how the policy changes – both in practice and rhetoric – relate to each other. More exactly, to what extent it is a discrepancy or a convergence between them. In this sense, these determinations will serve as a kind of criteria for how I make my conclusions of the findings. The results and conclusions of the thesis will also be summarized in an analytical template, which will give a good overview and also emphasize the most relevant findings of the study. This template can be found as an appendix after the reference list.

Having this methodological approach will then enable me to answer the sub-questions asked directly to the empirical material, and satisfying answers to these questions will then enable me to answer the overall question formulation of the thesis.

5.3 Material

As mentioned, this thesis will use a qualitative method where immigrant integration policies of Sweden and Germany regarding three different aspects will be analyzed. The material gathered has thus been such that is relevant to these three aspects. Also, since the analysis of these three aspects is divided into two parts, where both the policy practice and rhetoric of them will be analyzed, a variety of sources have been gathered. First and foremost, the primary source has been official policy documents, such as government bills and other government documents relevant to the aspects. In those documents, both practice and rhetoric will be presented and analyzed. However, to look beyond the rhetoric in such documents other types of sources have been gathered. Here, rhetoric from parliamentary debates has been taken into consideration as well as rhetoric in mass media, like newspaper articles and websites. By doing this, i.e. by using a variety of sources, it will ensure that a broad perspective is taken where different types of rhetoric are considered, thus capturing a larger spectrum in the analysis of the policy rhetoric. Moreover, as regards the policy practice and the aspects, access to citizenship and education, legislation documents on citizenship laws, residence laws and integration courses have also been gathered. This will ensure that a broad perspective of the material regarding the policy practice is taken as well.

It is, however, a quite large amount of different documents that will be used in the analysis. For example, studying long parliamentary debates on immigrant integration will require a focus to find relevant material that can be used and to sort out things that are irrelevant for the thesis. To achieve this, my delimitation to three aspects will be facilitating, as well as the choice to solely focus on official government decisions and positions and not on opposition parties or other actors with an

interest in immigrant integration. Though, this approach has disadvantages, as not all actors will be considered when it comes to the rhetoric of immigrant integration. However, it is primarily government decisions and positions that are of interest for this thesis, since it is these that first and foremost create practical policy programs. Therefore, it is solely the policy rhetoric of the Swedish and German governments between 2006 and 2012 regarding practical policy programs of immigrant integration that is interesting for this thesis.

6. The policy practice and rhetoric of immigrant integration in Sweden, 2006-2012

6.1 Access to citizenship and nationality

The policy practice

Regulations on acquisition of Swedish citizenship are regulated in current the Swedish citizenship law, which came into force in July 2001. In this law, a principle allowing dual citizenship was introduced for the first time. This principle has also been in force since then and indicates, therefore, that a Swedish citizenship to a lesser extent than before is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, i.e. that the right to citizenship or nationality is decided upon a person's origin. The principle of *jus sanguinis* is though still the general principle in Sweden.⁵⁸ However, the introduction of dual citizenship signals a development in a multicultural direction.

Looking more specifically at the situation for immigrants over 18 years old, citizenship can be acquired by an application, where an immigrant becomes naturalized through a special decision. For a person over 18 years old, its identity must be proved and he/she needs to have a permanent residence permit. The person has to reside in Sweden (since two years regarding citizens in another Nordic country, four years regarding a stateless person or if the person can be considered as a refugee, and five years regarding other foreigners). Also, the person should have had and be expected to have "a decent way of living".⁵⁹ Thus, there are no requirements on language knowledge or on participation in integration programmes to become naturalized and thereby acquire citizenship.

The main motivation behind this has been that an introduction of an official language requirement for citizenship could, to different degrees, exclude certain people from becoming Swedish citizens. In this sense, Swedish citizenship is seen more as a part of the integration process of immigrants rather than a reward for a successful integration.⁶⁰

To summarize, the development in policy practice regarding access to citizenship and nationality for immigrants between 2006 and 2012 has been very stable. No actual changes of the citizenship law adopted in 2001 have been made. But very recently a government official report about Swedish citizenship came with proposals to change some parts of the existing citizenship law.

The policy rhetoric

The development in policy practice regarding access to citizenship and nationality has been stable, and seems not to have been subjected to any larger political disputes or controversies at all between 2006 and 2012. But how is it in relation to development regarding the policy rhetoric during the same period? Before discussing this, it needs to be mentioned that during the Swedish election campaign 2002 the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) proposed an introduction of a language test for immigrants who

⁵⁸ SOU 2006:2, p. 64

⁵⁹ SOU 2006:2, pp. 67-68

⁶⁰ Borevi (2012), p. 81

suggested by the Liberal Party several times after that, often at the time before a parliamentary election.⁶¹ The most recent example is a debate article published in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter 2012, written by three cabinet ministers from the Liberal Party, among them the party leader, Jan Björklund, and the Minister of Integration, Erik Ullenhag. In this article, these ministers stressed that it was of utmost importance for immigrants to quickly learn the Swedish language and to quickly enter the labor market. The Swedish language is one of the keys to enter the Swedish society, and therefore, the Liberal Party wants to have an introduction of a language requirement for obtaining Swedish citizenship.⁶²

But in other respects, the issue regarding immigrants' access to citizenship and nationality seems to be quite depoliticized between 2006 and 2012. Neither in government bills nor in parliament debates has this issue seemed to be a debated one. However, the issues on language requirements and citizenship were brought up in a background report⁶³ published in 2008 and addressed to a "globalization council", appointed by the Swedish Government in 2006. The conclusions of the report are that a language requirement likely could work as an instrument to increase knowledge in Swedish among citizenship applicants, but that there are risks associated with it. Increased demands for obtaining citizenship can lead to a decrease in the number of citizenship applications. Also, the degree of knowledge in Swedish varies individually, where education level and country of origin affect the ability in learning Swedish. A Swedish citizenship can therefore be harder to obtain for people that belong to some social categories and that descend from some countries. However, the report presents a possible model that could keep the current regulations, where a citizenship always can be acquired after five years of residence. But for individuals that gain good knowledge in Swedish earlier than that, the application process for citizenship could be accelerated.⁶⁴

In the earlier mentioned government official report, which was published very recently, this idea is reflected⁶⁵. With the aim to stronger link language knowledge to citizenship, the proposition presented in the report suggests that a citizenship applicant who has demonstrated a certain level of knowledge in the Swedish language should have, as main principle, the possibility to become a citizen by naturalization one year earlier than otherwise would have been required, i.e. after four years of residence instead as the current five years. The proposition is called "language bonus" and has the aim to serve as an incentive for immigrants, who want to become citizens in Sweden, to learn Swedish as quickly as possible.⁶⁶ Moreover, the report suggests a loosening of the main principle of *jus sanguinis* in the citizenship legislation, where it is suggested that children who are born in Sweden and who can be expected to grow up in the country should become citizens in Sweden at birth, this regardless if the parents are Swedish citizens. Instead it should be enough if one of the parents is nationally registered in Sweden since five years and has a permanent residence permit.⁶⁷

⁶¹ Svenska Dagbladet (2012), *Statsvetare om FP-förslag: "Språkravet en symbolfråga"*

⁶² Dagens Nyheter (2012), *"Kunskaper i svenska krav för medborgarskap"*

⁶³ Underlagsrapport nr.14 till Regeringens globaliseringsråd (2008), *Språk, krav och medborgarskap*, Globaliseringsrådet

⁶⁴ Globaliseringsrådet (2008), pp. 50-51

⁶⁵ SOU 2013:29

⁶⁶ SOU 2013:29, p. 22

⁶⁷ SOU 2013:29, pp.19-20

6.2 Education

The policy practice

Since the 1970s, language training in Swedish for new arrivals, mother-tongue instruction and an affirmation of multiculturalism in school curriculums has been central features in Sweden's immigrant integration policy. Language training in Swedish, called 'Swedish for immigrants' (SFI), was in fact initiated already in the middle of the 1960s and has also been clearly connected to the mother-tongue instruction initiated in the 1970s. Looking at the development of the policy practice on this between 2006 and 2012, no major changes have occurred but rather minor changes. For example, proposed changes of SFI were made already by the Social Democratic Government in a government bill presented in 2006, a couple of months before the centre-right government took office. In this bill the government had the intention to task/assign The Swedish National Agency for Education to elaborate a new syllabus, where the emphasis should be on an individualized language training both regarding goals and content.⁶⁸

Following this path, the centre-right government reformed the syllabus of SFI at the end of 2006 and introduced those suggestions.⁶⁹ However, the syllabus of SFI was reformed once again in 2009 when even bigger emphasis was placed on SFI as a qualified language education for immigrants.⁷⁰ Probably as a reflection of this development, the government presented a government bill in March 2009, in which a new law about experimental work with performance-based incentive compensation within SFI was proposed. The purpose with the experimental work was to examine the extent to which economic incentives for participants in SFI could contribute to a faster learning of Swedish.⁷¹ The proposition got the name "SFI-bonus" and came into force in October 2009. Since it was an experimental work, the bonus was introduced in 13 chosen municipalities in Sweden. Around one year later, the bonus was introduced all over Sweden after a new government bill that suggested the bonus to become permanent.⁷²

As can be seen, the development of policy practice regarding language training and learning has gone in a direction where these issues have been emphasized as very important. Despite this, no extensive integration courses or mandatory language tests have been introduced. However, simultaneously with the reformation of the SFI a new law on "introduction activities" for some newly arrived immigrants was adopted. This law contains regulations on responsibility and activities that have the purpose to facilitate and accelerate some new arrivals' introduction into working and social life.⁷³ Much emphasis is placed on new arrivals' entrance on the labor market, where the Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) is given the main responsibility of the introduction plans every new arrival shall have right to. But also, the new arrival has a duty to follow his/her introduction plan since the economic compensation he/she has right to by participating in introduction activities is conditioned. Considering this as an incentive, new arrivals, who do not have an acceptable

⁶⁸ Proposition 2005/06:148, pp. 29-30

⁶⁹ SKOLFS 2006:28

⁷⁰ SKOLFS 2009:2

⁷¹ Proposition 2008/09:156

⁷² Proposition 2009/10:188

⁷³ Proposition 2009/10:60, p. 1

absence in the activities of their introduction plan, can lose their right to compensation partially or altogether.⁷⁴

In line with this policy development the government presented another government bill in December 2012, in which a new law on “offering information about Swedish society “ for some newly arrived immigrants was proposed. The meaning of the law is that municipalities shall have a responsibility to offer information on Swedish society for some newly arrived immigrants who are not comprised in the earlier mentioned law on introduction activities.⁷⁵

The policy rhetoric

Looking at the development of the policy practice in the aspect of education during 2006-2012 it happened quite much. Even if there were not any major changes, the government was active. In this sense, the policy practice converged to some extent with the policy rhetoric, as all the presented government bills were adopted and became legislation.

Studying the rhetoric regarding immigrants’ introduction and integration into Swedish society between 2006 and 2012, where language training and introduction activities were seen as very important issues, it is evident how this was given serious attention by the centre-right government already after they took office in 2006. As stated in the introduction, Prime Minister Reinfeldt declared Sweden’s integration policy as a failure in his first inaugural speech. Such notions are also found in a parliamentary debate held in April 2007, in which several representatives from the government coalition claim the same thing. The main message in the debate is that the previous social democratic integration policy has created “exclusion” and excluded many immigrants from a social affinity.⁷⁶ This is also reflected in the government bills about SFI and introduction activities. As regards SFI, it is argued that incentives may need to be strengthened on several levels. New arrivals need to learn Swedish faster, which will make it easier to find a job. This is a recurring argument. The SFI is seen as a failure since the entrance in the labor market for too many immigrants takes too long, something that the government claims is a result of the poor outcomes of SFI.⁷⁷ Regarding the government bill about introduction activities, it was preceded by a government official report. In this report, the previous integration policy was criticized of having too much of a “caring attitude”, which caused problems both for new arrivals and society. The key to a successful integration is to have a “working line” and countries that have had that are the ones who have been most successful, it is argued. Therefore, it is seen as very important that Sweden newly has introduced a working line as well.⁷⁸ Moreover, the main responsibility for the future of the new arrival should be placed on the new arrival himself/herself, which in turn means that the new arrival has to take the consequences of not being active; something that is taken for granted in other countries and which should be the case in Sweden as well.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Proposition 2009/10:60, pp. 47-48, 105-112

⁷⁵ Proposition 2012:13:63

⁷⁶ Riksdagsprotokoll 2006/07:99

⁷⁷ Proposition 2008/09:156, p. 7

⁷⁸ SOU 2008:58, p. 62

⁷⁹ SOU 2008:58, p. 102

This report resulted, as known, in the government bill about introduction activities. Just before this bill was adopted in December 2010, Erik Ullenhag published a debate article in Dagens Nyheter where he called it “the biggest reform of Swedish integration policy in 25 years”. Describing the previous the integration policy as problematic, he means that Sweden has big challenges regarding integration, arguing that more emphasis must be placed on the need of the individual, but also that the individual has his/her own responsibility. New arrivals need professional assistance to become established in Sweden and not “a pat on the head”, Ullenhag argues.⁸⁰ A similar reasoning can also be found in a parliamentary debate held in December 2011 by a party colleague to Ullenhag, who argues that Sweden for many years had a policy that focused on a caretaking of persons who made their way to Sweden or to feel sorry for them. And as a result of this, Sweden has been poor at taking advantage of the new arrivals’ skills.⁸¹

6.3 Active support and funding of ethnic and immigrant organizations

The policy practice

Similar to the aspect regarding education, an active support and funding of immigrant and ethnic minority organizations has been a feature in the Swedish immigrant integration policy for a long time. Initiatives in this aspect were taken in the late 1960s and became more institutionalized when Sweden adopted a multicultural approach in 1975. Since then, this policy practice has been a feature in the Swedish immigrant integration policy.

In a government official report from 2007, in which it is among other things dealt with the state funding of non-profit organizations, information about the level and extent of the funding of ethnic communities and immigrants organizations can be found. In 2004, 58 immigrant organizations on state level received around 24 million Swedish crowns in government grants and the cooperation group for ethnic associations in Sweden, SIOS, receives on a yearly basis 500 000 crowns. The overall aim with this funding is to facilitate and support actors who work with and further integration. Some conditions for receiving financial support are, for example, to have at least 1000 paying members and to have a nationwide organization with a satisfying geographical spread in relation to the organization’s number of members.⁸² Thus, Sweden has a clear policy regarding state support and funding of ethnic communities and immigrant groups that establishes both aims and conditions with it. And as regards the period between 2006 and 2012, no major changes or reformations have been made of these particular regulations.

However, new initiatives were taken in other respects. For example, the government took initiatives during this period that had the purpose to establish a dialogue between the government and non-profit ethnic and immigrant organizations that work with newly arrived immigrants’ introduction. In January 2009, this resulted in an invitation to a dialogue on how relations between the government

⁸⁰ Dagens Nyheter (2010), “Nyanlända behöver mer än en klapp på huvudet”

⁸¹ Riksdagsprotokoll 2011/12:43

⁸² SOU 2007:66, p. 226 -227

and such organizations within the field of integration could be developed in the future.⁸³ Subsequently, in April 2010 an agreement between the government, non-profit organizations in the field of integration and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting) was adopted, where the purpose was to clarify the relation between these actors as well as developing forms and methods for the incorporation of non-profit organizations into the work with integration and introduction of newly arrived immigrants into Swedish society.⁸⁴ Furthermore, during 2011 four regional conferences were arranged as a part of efforts to make this agreement known and to start discussions about how the intentions with the agreement could be realized. As project leader for this the earlier mentioned organization SIOS was appointed.⁸⁵

The policy rhetoric

As described, regarding the policy practice in this aspect it has for a long time been a feature in Sweden's policy for immigrant integration. There are clear regulations regarding state support and funding of ethnic communities and immigrant groups, and none of these regulations have been changed or reformed to a greater extent between 2006 and 2012. But during this period, the government initiated a dialogue forum between the government and non-profit ethnic and immigrant organizations that had the main purpose to incorporate such organizations into the work with integrations of immigrants into Swedish society, which later on resulted in an agreement that had the purpose to clarify the relations between these actors.

So when looking at the rhetoric surrounding this, it is highlighted that there, to some extent, is an absence of these organizations in the dialogue as well as in the work with integration of immigrants, even if it is stated that many non-profit ethnic and immigrant organizations have participated in the dialogue. However, it is emphasized that there is a need to clarify purposes with and points of departure for an active participation in the integration process of these organizations.⁸⁶ Ethnic and immigrant organizations contribute already to the work in achieving the overall strategic goals with the government's integration policy but they could do even more in this aspect, it is argued. Therefore, the Swedish government wants to take advantage of the energy existing within these organizations, stressing that this is an opportunity to increase the diversity regarding the work with the introduction of newly arrived immigrants.⁸⁷ To do this, it requires a strong will to acknowledge and consent the work that these organizations do, where they should be treated equally with other actors within this area.⁸⁸

So in general, the policy rhetoric regarding the active support and funding of ethnic and immigrant organizations in Sweden between 2006 and 2012 has been much about how to incorporate such organizations into the work with introduction of new arrivals. This is not only reflected in the

⁸³ Proposition 2009/10:55, p. 123

⁸⁴ Website of the Government (2009), *Överenskommelsen inom integrationsområdet*

⁸⁵ Överenskommelsen om integrationsområdet, *Sammanfattande rapport från fyra konferenser*, p. 4

⁸⁶ IJ2009/2235/UF, *Överenskommelse mellan regeringen, idéburna organisationer inom integrationsområdet och Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting*, p. 3

⁸⁷ IJ2009/2235/UF, p. 1, Riksdagsprotokoll 2009/10:42

⁸⁸ IJ2009/2235/UF, pp. 19-20

agreement in the field of integration, which was agreed upon in April 2010, but also in the conditions for receiving financial support. First and foremost, the financial support is given to facilitate integration, where the receiving organizations must have worked with furthering of integration during two years and formulated a plan of this work for the next three years.⁸⁹

Hence, the active support and funding from the government is not mainly about supporting specific ethnic activities of such organizations, but rather to support the organizations' work with integration and their provision of advice to the government. This is clearly reflected in documents regarding the agreement in the field of integration and the conditions for receiving financial support.

⁸⁹ SOU 2007:66, p. 227

7. The policy practice and rhetoric of immigrant integration in Germany, 2006-2012

7.1 Access to citizenship and nationality

The policy practice

As in Sweden, regulations on acquisition of German citizenship and nationality are regulated in a citizenship law. And even if the conditions for acquisition are more restrictive than in Sweden, major changes were made when the law was reformed in 2000. As discussed earlier in the previous research section, the principle of *jus sanguinis* was dominant for a long time in Germany, but with the reformation of the citizenship law in 2000 some regulations based on the territorial principle (*jus soli*) were introduced. Among other things dual citizenship was – after strong political disputes – introduced temporarily and the acquisition of German citizenship for children was simplified, as they at birth acquire Germany citizenship if one parent had an 8 years' residence permit.⁹⁰ However, when the child has reached the age of legal majority the child must choose between German citizenship or the citizenship of his/her parents. This is called the “optionsmodel” and has been criticized, which will be discussed later. To become a German citizen a foreigner therefore has to renounce his/her previous citizenship. But, foreigners that hold citizenship in another member state of the European Union or Switzerland are generally exempt from having to renounce their previous citizenship.⁹¹

Looking at the specific conditions for acquisition of citizenship, a foreigner must have been legally ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years to be entitled to naturalization. Moreover, the foreigner must confirm his/her commitment to the free democratic constitutional system of Germany, give up his/her previous citizenship, and possess an adequate knowledge of German and knowledge of the legal system, society and living conditions in Germany. Also, the foreigner should not have been sentenced for an unlawful act or be subject to any court order. Additionally, a foreigner that can confirm a successful attendance of an integration course by presenting a specific certificate can have his/her qualifying period for acquisition reduced to seven years, in some cases even to six years if the foreigner has made outstanding efforts, especially when it comes to knowledge of German.⁹²

Furthermore, the requirements on knowledge of German and knowledge of the legal system, society and living conditions in Germany became even more stringent when the earlier mentioned citizenship tests, including a passing of a standardized naturalization test, were introduced in 2008.⁹³ Also, a foreigner is also obliged to attend an integration course if he or she is unable to communicate at least at a basic level in German and if he or she enjoys social benefits.⁹⁴ These regulations have been in force ever since, and until today no major changes of this have been made.

⁹⁰ Green (2004), p. 100

⁹¹ Federal Ministry of Interior (2011), *Migration and Integration – Residence law and policy on migration and integration in Germany*, p. 132, German Nationality Act, p. 8

⁹² German Nationality Act, pp. 5-6

⁹³ Federal Ministry of Interior (2011), p. 135

⁹⁴ German Residence Act, p. 37

The policy rhetoric

Not surprisingly, much in this development has also converged with the policy rhetoric. Generally, the importance of learning German is strongly emphasized, which can be seen by just making a short glimpse on the website of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the overall description of the German integration policy. Here, it is simply stated that people who come to Germany and have intention to stay **must** learn the German language and acquire basic knowledge of German history and the legal system.⁹⁵

In contrast to Sweden the issue regarding immigrants' access to citizenship and nationality has also been quite politicized. As mentioned before, when the citizenship law was reformed in 2000 it was done after strong political disputes, particularly over the dual citizenship. This was also the case in 2006, when a heated debate on the introduction of citizenship tests arose. The then relatively new chancellor, Angela Merkel, proclaimed her support of a citizenship test and meant that an introduction of such a test was not too much to ask of foreigners who wanted to become citizens in Germany. Anyone wishing become citizen in Germany must put a conscious commitment to Germany, she declared on a CDU-rally in March 2006.⁹⁶ This kind of reasoning can also be found in the foreword of the National Integration Plan from 2007, where Merkel claims that whoever wants to permanently reside in Germany cannot fail to master the German language sufficiently.⁹⁷

Similar ideas are expressed in a parliamentary debate held in June 2006, in which representatives from the then government parties CDU and SPD emphasize the necessity of language knowledge and an acknowledgement to free democratic values as prerequisites for acquiring citizenship.⁹⁸ This is even more emphasized in another parliamentary debate held in November 2008, when a CDU-representative polemicizes against a proposal from the opposition on an abolition of citizenship tests, arguing that a long time of residence in Germany not automatically will mean sufficient language knowledge, and that naturalization should represent a final reward of a successful integration.⁹⁹ In a debate held in October 2010 it is also argued that many immigrants who want to become German citizens consider citizenship tests as something good, since they consider it as an advantage to be familiar of what rights and duties one has as a citizen.¹⁰⁰

Moreover, in November 2011 in a parliamentary debate on a proposal from the opposition about abolishing the "optionsmodel" and introducing the possibility for immigrants to have dual citizenships caused a heated political debate, where the government strongly rejected it. Allowing dual citizenship may lead to conflicts of loyalty, i.e. which nation state are you loyal to? And in this sense, the function of citizenship is to form a unified state, which is difficult to achieve with an introduction of dual

⁹⁵ Website of the Federal Ministry of Interior (2013), *Integration*

⁹⁶ Spiegel Online (2006), *Einbürgerungstest: Merkel fordert "bewusstes Bekenntnis zu diesem Land"*

⁹⁷ The Federal Government (2007), *Der Nationale Integrationsplan: Neue Wege – Neue Chancen*, p. 7

⁹⁸ Plenarprotokoll 16/43 (2006), pp. 4166-4168

⁹⁹ Plenarprotokoll 16/187 (2008), p. 20221

¹⁰⁰ Plenarprotokoll 17/65 (2010), p. 6794

citizenship, it is argued. Therefore, the government coalition between CDU and FDP has made “impressive decisions” to move away from the red-red-green multicultural ideology.¹⁰¹

In sum, the policy rhetoric regarding access to citizenship and nationality is clearly characterized by a rhetoric that stresses the importance of language knowledge and knowledge of German culture and the social order. Thus, the policy rhetoric on access to citizenship and nationality argues clearly for a kind of civic assimilation, rather than multiculturalism, as a policy solution.

7.2 Education

The policy practice

Historically, Germany’s position in the aspect of education has been very influenced by the notion of Germany as country of non-immigration. In comparison to Sweden, any extensive language education in German and civic orientation courses were not introduced until the adoption of the Immigration Act in 2005. Though, there was an exception regarding would-be ethnic German migrants in Eastern Europe and Russia, who since the 1990s have been offered language instruction and civic orientation courses. But with the introduction of the integration course in 2005, non-EU and non-ethnic migrants were also offered what had been in place already for ethnic Germans.¹⁰²

With this as a background, the development of the policy practice between 2006 and 2012 has been characterized by a strengthening of the integration course – including language instruction and civic orientation – introduced in 2005. However, any major changes since the introduction have not been made. The structure and content of the integration course is regulated in the *Integrationskursverordnung*. Altogether, the integration course comprises 660 hours of instruction where the language course comprises 600 hours and the civic orientation course 60 hours. The course has also obligatory features, as a foreigner is obliged to attend a course if his/her knowledge in German is not sufficient and to pay EUR 1,20 for every lesson of the integration course. And to finish the course a final language test as well as a civic orientation test must be passed.¹⁰³

In recent years, there have also been amendments and some minor changes. For instance, before a residence permit is renewed, it is necessary to determine whether the foreigner has complied with any requirement to take an integration course. If so, the residence permit is to be renewed for a period of no more than one year until the foreigner successfully completes the course or demonstrates successful social integration by other means. Moreover, a campaign called “Deutsch lernen - Deutschland kennen lernen” (Learn German and get to know Germany) was updated and revised in 2009 with the purpose to motivate more members of the target group to take integration courses designed for parents. The intention with these courses is to teach German and also provide information about the educational system in Germany and about their children’s language acquisition.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Plenarprotokoll 17/139 (2011), pp. 16479-16470, 16474

¹⁰² Joppke (2007), p. 12

¹⁰³ Integrationskursverordnung, pp.5-7

¹⁰⁴ Federal Ministry of Interior (2011), p. 79

Thus, the development of the policy practice regarding education is characterized by a maintaining as well as a strengthening of the integration course introduced in 2005, where it clearly shines through how important the government considers this feature of their immigrant integration policy to be. This is even more evident when it comes to the policy rhetoric.

The policy rhetoric

Similar to the rhetoric on access to citizenship and nationality – and maybe even more here – knowledge of the German language is emphasized as very important, considered as the key to a successful integration into German society. In short, the integration courses are described as the most important federal measure of the integration policy.¹⁰⁵ This is also clearly reflected in policy documents, official parliamentary records and media articles.

As an effect of the introduction of the new Immigration Act in 2005, the German government established 11 different dialogue forums where federal, state and local governments as well as representatives of civil society and immigrants have been represented, which in turn lead to the earlier mentioned National Integration Plan in 2007. In this plan it is also stated that the integration courses are the corner stone of the efforts that have the aim to further integration, where the overall aim of the course is to make immigrants acquainted with living conditions in Germany so that they can act independently in all matters of daily life without any help from third parties.¹⁰⁶

Looking at parliamentary debates, it is evident that representatives from the government parties are proud of the integration courses, which often are referred to as a success story and seen as the most important instrument in language acquisition where the government, particularly, will continue to work with the accuracy and efficiency of the language course.¹⁰⁷ In short, the government wants to make sure that the integration courses continue to be a success story, with the main goal to make immigrants citizens of Germany, citizens who feel responsible and participate in the shaping of Germany.¹⁰⁸ This is also stressed by Angela Merkel, as she means that learning the German language enables immigrants to participate in society as well as access to education and work. And in this regard, the integration courses are a real success story, she claims, since over one million people during her time as chancellor have participated in the language course.¹⁰⁹

In sum, learning German and accepting and becoming acquainted with German history and the legal system are considered as very important. Or as it is stated in a policy document: *“The aim of integration should not be merely to organize the co-existence of people from different cultures. A society cannot long endure an internal divide based on cultural differences. Speaking the same language and accepting basic values of the receiving society are basic requirements for maintaining*

¹⁰⁵ Website of the Federal Ministry of Interior (2013), *Integrationskurse*

¹⁰⁶ The Federal Government (2007), p. 37

¹⁰⁷ Plenarprotokoll 17/65 (2010), pp. 6797, 6807, 6809

¹⁰⁸ Plenarprotokoll 17/149 (2011), p. 17943

¹⁰⁹ Website of the Government (2013), *Die Kanzlerin im Gespräch*

societal cohesion".¹¹⁰ Thus, also regarding this aspect the rhetoric argues for a civic assimilation rather multiculturalism as a policy solution.

7.3 Active funding and support of ethnic and immigrant organizations

The policy practice

Looking at the MCP Index regarding this case, it is stated that Germany has a clear policy for an active funding and support of ethnic communities and immigrant groups. Though, such communities and groups receive funding on a very limited scale, where there also are variations on the federal, regional and local level. For instance, the regional state North-Rhine Westphalia was a predecessor in this case as the state already in 1997, to some extent, began to financially support immigrant organizations and projects by ethnic group organizations. However, a national and comprehensive overview of funding for ethnic communities and immigrant groups does not exist.¹¹¹

More specifically regarding the period 2006-2012, initial steps were taken in 2006 with the launch of the first National Integration Summit, which had the overall purpose to initiate a dialogue among all levels of government – federal, regional and local – and representatives of civil society and immigrants.¹¹² As known, this resulted in the adoption of a National Integration Plan in 2007, in which among other things the role and participation of immigrant organizations in the integration process was brought up. Establishing common measures for the federal, regional and local level, the National Action Plan on Integration emphasizes that on all those levels there is a responsibility to support the process of intercultural opening in traditional societies, associations, religious communities and migrant organizations, where it is highlighted that migrant organizations should be financially supported.¹¹³ In conformity with this initiative, an Islam conference was launched in September 2006 that had the overall intention to create a forum for long-term dialogue between the German state and Muslims in Germany. This conference has ever since been a recurring event.¹¹⁴

Evidentially, around 2006-2007 the government took initiatives that had the aim to support ethnic and immigrant organizations, particularly to incorporate those into the development of future policies for immigrant integration. Thus, these initiatives are very similar to those that were taken in Sweden a few years later. Like the Islam conference, the National Integration Summit has also been a recurring event, which in 2012 resulted in a development of National Integration Plan from 2007, which now got the name National Action Plan on Integration.

In this plan, the importance of civic commitment of immigrants is even more emphasized, where this commitment is seen as an engine as well as an indicator of integration. Among other things, the government provides support to non-governmental players, like immigrant organizations, in their efforts to increase the share of immigrants in voluntary services. Moreover, a strengthening and

¹¹⁰ Federal Ministry of Interior (2011), p. 54

¹¹¹ Schönwälder (2010), pp. 160-161

¹¹² Federal Ministry of Interior (2011), p. 82

¹¹³ The Federal Government (2007), pp. 173-175

¹¹⁴ Federal Ministry of Interior (2011), pp. 84-85

support of research projects in the field of civic commitment of immigrants that have the aim to increase knowledge about the interconnectedness of ethnic diversity and civic commitment has been undertaken.¹¹⁵ Thus, in similarity with Sweden, the hallmark of these dialogues, conferences and measures is that they all aim to incorporate immigrants and immigrant organizations into the work with integration rather than to support specific ethnic activities.

The policy rhetoric

Studying the rhetoric in documents (for example the two national integration plans), parliamentary debates and newspaper articles, it is evident how the German government stresses – what they understand as very important – the involvement of immigrants and immigrant groups in the work with integration. In the national integration plan from 2007 several goals are established, where among other things a need of an intercultural opening of organizations and a public responsibility sharing through networking German associations and migrant organizations on the basis of mutual respect, mutual recognition and acceptance are highlighted.¹¹⁶ In the plan from 2012 this kind of rhetoric is even sharper. Regarding intercultural opening it is argued that the cooperation between immigrant organizations and traditional organizations of civic engagement is a necessary element, where the heterogeneity of the society must be reflected. An important measure in this sense is to financially support immigrant organizations, making it possible for those to participate on an equal footing. In short, the government is convinced that the engagement of immigrants and immigrant groups is something that enriches the work with integration of immigrants.¹¹⁷

These opinions are also reflected in a question time in the parliament held in December 2011 where the Minister of State in the German Chancellery, Maria Böhmer, who also is the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, answers question regarding the National Action Plan on Integration. On a question regarding engagement of immigrant organizations, she highlights that these organizations may be in need of support, also financially, to become equal partners with organizations that have bigger resources.¹¹⁸ Moreover, in an interview Angela Merkel speaks about civic commitment as something essential in a democracy, where she among other things mentions integration of immigrants and how engagement of immigrants in this aspect is important. In addition, Merkel claims that the government has to encourage more support in this sense, also for those who are already involved.¹¹⁹

In summary, the policy rhetoric regarding active funding and support of ethnic and immigrant groups in Germany is characterized by recognition and support. Actually, the policy practice and rhetoric can be said to correspond with each other to a great extent in this aspect, as it is evident how it within both rhetoric and practice is emphasized that there is a need to incorporate immigrants and immigrants into the work with integration. Thus, which is the case in Sweden too, the policy

¹¹⁵ The Federal Government (2012), *National Action Plan on Integration – Abridged press version*, pp. 12-13

¹¹⁶ The Federal Government (2007), p. 172

¹¹⁷ The Federal Government (2012), *Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration*, pp. 288-289

¹¹⁸ Plenarprotokoll 17/148 (2011), p. 17677

¹¹⁹ Bundesnetzwerk Bürgerschaftliches Engagement (2013), *Interview with Angela Merkel*

development in this aspect can be said to be characterized by a clear promotion of diversity, highlighting e.g. intercultural opening and how it enriches the work with integration.

8. Discussion – how to characterize and determine the policy developments by applying the theoretical framework?

8.1 Sweden

Considering the three aspects discussed above, how should then the policy development in Sweden between 2006 and 2012 be characterized? Applying the theoretical framework of this study, the following three different characterizations of the policy evolution can be crystallized regarding the first aspect, **access to citizenship and nationality**: First, the observed policy changes, in this case the policy rhetoric, can be said to be a result of an **incremental process** as it hardly can be a question of an abrupt process. The changes of the policy rhetoric are rather modest, since e.g. the argument about language requirement – that indicates a change – has come from only one party of the government coalition, who also has used this argument several times during the 2000s. Likewise, the suggestions in the government official report are also quite modest. Second, the most applicable mode of change has to be **conversion**, as the old policy has remained but changes in the rhetoric have suggested that the policy should have new goals and purposes, namely to see the acquisition of citizenship as a reward of a successful integration, where immigrants by learning the Swedish language as quickly as possible can be more deserved to become Swedish citizens. Third, evidentially there is to some extent a **discrepancy** between the policy practice and rhetoric, where the policy practice is almost unchanged but the rhetoric has changed character slightly. Thus, this indicates that the efficiency of the policy has not been criticized, but rather the objectives of it. But overall, no radical changes have occurred regarding this aspect between 2006 and 2012.

Regarding the second aspect, **education**, it differs a bit from the first aspect, as changes in both practice and rhetoric can be clearly distinguished. Applying the theoretical framework on this aspect, it can also be argued that the observed policy changes occurred as a result of an **incremental process**, despite some big rhetorical catchphrases. Changes occurred within both practice and rhetoric, but they were rather minor changes where some could be distinguished even before the centre-right government took office in 2006. However, the adoption of the new law on introduction activities was a new initiative, but nowise something that was a result of an abrupt process that totally replaced an old malfunctioning policy. Regarding the mode of change, the most applicable one seems to be the one called **layering**, but some support for **conversion** could also be found. The adoption of the new law on introduction activities should be seen as an amendment to an existing policy, where a new policy was layered on top of an old one. Introduction activities for new arrivals existed before the adoption of this law, but what mainly changed was the responsibility distribution, where the Swedish Public Employment Service was given a main responsibility, and the introduction of new regulations regarding economic compensation. This applies mainly to the policy practice.

As regards the policy rhetoric, a conversion can be found when it comes to the minor reformations of SFI, where goals and purposes of SFI were redirected towards more individualized language training. Therefore, the relation between practice and rhetoric is not characterized by a discrepancy, but rather by a convergence, even if the rhetoric more strongly stresses the need to strengthen incentives on several levels. Both within practice and rhetoric, it could therefore be argued

that the policy development regarding education has moved in a direction that promotes incentives and individual responsibility as keys to a successful integration into Swedish society, where particularly knowledge in Swedish is highly prioritized. Thus, a move towards a civic assimilation as a policy solution can be distinguished, but not a distinct move, rather a slightly modest one.

If the aspect of education is characterized by a policy development modestly moving towards civic assimilation, the third aspect, **active funding and support of ethnic and immigrant organizations**, can be said to be characterized by a somewhat opposite direction of the policy development. Particularly, the agreement between the government, non-profit organizations within the field of integration and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, which first of all had the purpose to incorporate non-profit organizations within the field of integration into the work with integration and introduction of new arrivals, can be said to have a multicultural character.

Also within this aspect, the observed policy changes have not been a result of an abrupt process of change but rather an **incremental process**, as the changes within both rhetoric and practice are modest and by no means groundbreaking at all. Once again, the most applicable mode of change would be **layering**, where the initiated dialogue and agreement between the government, ethnic and immigrant organization and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions has been added to a policy that already had a clear policy regarding support and funding of ethnic and immigrant organizations. And the developments of the practice and rhetoric are very similar to each other during the period 2006-2012, as almost **no discrepancy** at all can be found. Thus, the policy practice and rhetoric within the aspect of active funding and support of ethnic and immigrant organizations have been in conformity, where actually a strengthening of multiculturalism as policy solution can be distinguished. However, the funding and support has almost solely been about increase participation of ethnic and immigrant organization in the integration, and not specifically to support ethnic activities.

8.2 Germany

Regarding the first aspect, **access to citizenship and nationality**, there are crucial differences between Germany and Sweden, with e.g. stricter conditions for acquisition and an absence of the possibility to have dual citizenship for non-EU citizens in Germany. The regulations for acquisition became even stricter when a passing of a standardized naturalization test was introduced in 2008. As regards the policy rhetoric, this is even more evident. The necessity of language knowledge for citizenship acquisition is emphasized in several parliamentary debates during 2006-2012, and an introduction of dual citizenship is considered as problematic, since it can lead to conflicts of loyalty. It is even stated that the government coalition between CDU and FDP has made impressive decisions to move away from the red-red-green multicultural ideology.

But despite the high tone of voice in the debate and the practical changes that have occurred, the process of change has been **incremental**, as the policy development has gone in a direction that rather has strengthened a civic assimilation character of this policy aspect that already existed. Thus, there has not been a move away from an official multicultural ideology, despite the rhetoric, because such an ideology has never existed, which also has been highlighted in previous research. The changes of

the policy practice are therefore not to be seen as an abrupt or radical break with the policy regime, but rather as a gradual change. Trying to determine the mode of change, the most applicable one has to be **layering**, as e.g. the adoption of a standardized naturalization test in 2008 meant that the existing policy on access to citizenship and nationality became amended with new regulations on acquisition for citizenship. Regarding the relation between practice and rhetoric, it is evident that there is a **convergence** between them rather than a discrepancy. The changes of the policy practice have been characterized by an aim to strengthen the link between language knowledge and citizenship, which also is clearly reflected in the policy rhetoric. However, in contrast to Sweden, there has been a high tone of voice in the political debate, where representatives from the government coalition of CDU and FDP have clearly denounced multiculturalism as a policy solution. This has not maybe been fully reflected in the policy practice, but overall it is difficult to argue for a clear discrepancy between rhetoric and practice in this aspect.

Similar to the aspect regarding access to citizenship and nationality, the rhetoric has been quite strong as e.g. the introduction of the integration courses is considered as a success story. Despite this, however, this introduction cannot be seen as radical change of the policy regime. Language instruction and civic orientation courses have actually been offered since 1990s, but then exclusively to ethnic German migrants from Eastern Europe and Russia. So when the new integration courses were introduced in 2005 and advanced in the years after, this must be considered as an extension of or an addition to an existing policy. Therefore, the reformation of the policy practice in this aspect cannot be seen as a result of an abrupt process where a completely new policy was adopted. Instead, it is rather an **incremental** process of change. The most applicable mode of change is hence **layering**, but also to some extent **conversion**. The evidence for layering is for short that the adoption and strengthening of the integration courses is to be considered as an extension or addition to an already existing policy. However, with this introduction the goals and purposes of the policy changed, as the completion of the integration course was interlinked to the regulations on acquisition of citizenship.

For short, a successfully completed integration course is not only about learning the German language or becoming acquainted with the German social order or the legal system, but also about educating immigrants to become “worthy” citizens deserved to be naturalized. So here, the policy got a new goal and purpose. In this sense, a combination of layering and conversion can be distinguished. Regarding the relation between practice and rhetoric, it is **rather a convergence than a discrepancy** that can be observed. Though, the rhetoric is somewhat “turgid”, as the integration courses are called a success story and the corner stone of the integration policy, which also indicates a pride of having adopted these courses. This is not fully reflected in the policy practice, but despite that, the development of the policy practice can be said having converged with the policy rhetoric.

In contrast to the other aspects, the third aspect, **active funding and support of ethnic and immigrant organizations**, has had a policy development between 2006 and 2012 where the direction actually has gone into a direction that can be said to have a multicultural character. However, to characterize what type of policy change it can be said to be in this case is quite difficult. The initiation of the National Integration Summit in 2006 was actually something completely new in the German immigrant integration policy when it was introduced. However, it was not a result of an abrupt process

of change that radically broke with a previous policy. Instead, the introduction and the advance of the National Integration Summit should/could be seen as an **incremental process**, as it can be seen as a gradual step of a policy development towards more recognition and support of immigrant minorities that started when Germany abandoned the notion of itself as country of non-immigration in the beginning of the 2000s. Regarding the mode of change, the most applicable one seems to be **layering**, where a new policy initiative was added to the immigrant integration policy. Thus, a policy initiative with a multicultural character, indicating that civic assimilation policies – as the ones regarding access to citizenship and education – and multiculturalism policies can peacefully coexist. In similarity with Sweden, in the relation between practice and rhetoric no evidence of a discrepancy can be found, but, to great extent, rather **convergence**. For an overview of the findings see the analytical framework in the appendix.

9. Concluding remarks

In this study, I have applied the cases of Sweden and Germany to the phenomenon called the retreat of multiculturalism, with the intention to gain an understanding of how such a phenomenon should be understood in these countries if studying the policy development of immigrant integration between 2006 and 2012. With point of departure in a theoretical framework on how policy changes can be understood, and a division between policy practice and rhetoric, I have found that, in accordance with Banting and Kymlicka, the narrative about a retreat of multiculturalism is more complex than how it uses to be narrated.

First, the division between practice and rhetoric has been advantageous for the study, as it has contributed to study the policy development from two different perspectives. Somewhat surprising, however, in contrast to my expectations I found that a discrepancy between practice and rhetoric did not was that evident. Clear evidence for a discrepancy between practice and rhetoric was actually only found in one of the three examined aspects, namely access to citizenship and nationality, and then in Sweden only. It surprised me. On the other hand, there were, however, interesting differences between practice and rhetoric, Sweden and Germany and the different aspects, which indicated that the retreat of multiculturalism is a complex phenomenon and not a 'single-story retreat'.

Second, if I would try to make an overall generalization about a retreat of multiculturalism in Sweden and Germany, I would argue that a multicultural retreat is more evident at the rhetorical level, something that also has been argued by some researchers. But even if a multicultural retreat within certain aspects – with very different degrees of variation – has occurred, I have also found evidence of introduction and advance of multicultural policies within other aspects. This was, as known, the case regarding active funding and support of ethnic and immigrant groups in both Sweden and Germany. Hence, this indicates that policies of multicultural character can be combined with policies of civic assimilation character. Thus, multicultural policies and civic assimilation policies do not need to be mutually exclusive, which also is something in accordance with Banting's and Kymlicka's research. So to answer the question in the title of this thesis, the answer has to be: Yes. The narrative about the retreat of multiculturalism is to some extent exaggerated and misleading, as the policy practice and rhetoric, as well as differences between countries and between different aspects within immigrant integration need to be taken into consideration before making sweeping generalizations about a retreat of multiculturalism that is a Europe-wide phenomenon. Also, the processes of change have in every examined aspect been of an incremental character, which does not indicate a retreat of multiculturalism that reflects a seismic shift or radical transition to a new policy trajectory.

Lastly, regarding further research it would be interesting to do a study like this one with other European countries as cases, where the policy practice is divided from the rhetoric. This would even more problematize the policy development of immigrant integration, thus bringing clarification on how this relation looks in other countries. Another perspective that could be interesting to examine is the influence of the EU in immigrant integration. Here, a Europeanization as regards anti-discrimination has occurred, where progressive anti-discrimination legislation that was more advanced than legislation in several EU member states has been adopted. Thus, exploring if something similar has occurred in other fields of immigrant integration would be interesting.

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11. Appendices

THE ANALYTICAL TEMPLATE

ASPECTS	POLICY PRACTICE	POLICY RHETORIC
Access to citizenship and nationality		
Education		
Active support and funding		

POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN SWEDEN, 2006-2012

ASPECTS	POLICY PRACTICE	POLICY RHETORIC
Access to citizenship and nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very stable development - Actually, no changes at all - Regulations adopted in 2001 have remained unchanged 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Changes can be observed. Arguments arguing for a clearer linkage between citizenship and language knowledge - A discrepancy between practice and rhetoric - Conversion of goals and purposes, i.e. citizenship should be seen as a reward - But overall, results of an incremental process
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minor changes, reformation of SFI and an adoption of a new law on introduction activities - The new law was amended to an existing policy, i.e. layering of a new policy on top of an old one - An incremental process of change, where a modest move towards civic assimilation can be distinguished 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Changes of the policy practice corresponded to the policy rhetoric, i.e. no clear discrepancy - But, the rhetoric stressed more strongly the need of incentives, the old (social democratic) integration policy was called a failure - Conversion of goals and purposes of SFI
Active support and funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One minor change, an initiation of a dialogue and an agreement within the field of integration - Also this new policy was layered on top of an existing policy - Therefore, an incremental change that can be said to be multicultural 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No discrepancy between practice and rhetoric has been found - Promotion of diversity and equality, illustrated by a talk about incorporation of ethnic and immigrant groups - However, almost solely about increase participation in the work with integration, no specifically about support ethnic activities

POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN GERMANY, 2006-2012

ASPECTS	POLICY PRACTICE	POLICY RHETORIC
Access to citizenship and nationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stricter conditions for acquisition introduced in 2008. Layering of a new policy on top of an old one - Clear linkage between language knowledge and citizenship - Strengthening of civic assimilation, but an incremental change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High tone of voice, dual citizenship seen as a problematic feature of a multicultural ideology - Clear emphasis on language knowledge and civic orientation which to great extent is reflected in the policy practice - Therefore, no evidence of a clear discrepancy, even if the sometimes inflate debate tone indicates elements it.
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - An advance of the integration courses introduced in 2005. - Results of an incremental process - The introduction and advance of the integration courses should be seen as an extension or addition to an already existing policy, i.e. layering - Also, a conversion as the completion of the integration course became interlinked to the regulations for acquisition of citizenship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sometimes a somewhat “turgid” debate tone, where e.g. the integration course is called a success story. - The rhetoric argues more in favor of civic assimilation as a policy solution, as an “internal divide based on cultural differences” is not desirable. - But despite this, no clear evidence of discrepancy.
Active support and funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opposite to other aspects, the policy development has gone in a multicultural direction - A brand new initiation of a dialogue between the government and immigrant organizations, which has been advanced during 2006-2013 - However, a result of an incremental process. The new initiative was layered to the immigrant integration policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The policy practice clearly reflected in the rhetoric - Engagement of immigrants enriches the work with integration. Immigrant organizations need to become equal partners - A clear convergence between practice and rhetoric. No discrepancy.

MCP Index – policy eight indicators

1. Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism;
2. The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum;
3. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing;
4. Exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc;
5. Allowing dual citizenship;
6. The funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities;
7. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction;
8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

MIPEX Index – seven policy areas

1. Labor market mobility
2. Family reunion
3. Education
4. Political participation
5. Long term residence
6. Access to nationality
7. Anti-discrimination