

**Masteruppsats i offentlig förvaltning [VT13]**

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# Where did all the women go?

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A study of the composition of, and assignments to, the Standing  
Committees of the European Parliament

## **ABSTRACT**

Although most of the legislative tasks of the European Parliament (EP) are performed in its committees, it is still not clear how representative they are to the overall plenary. Feminist theories of legislative organizations suggest that: (1) women parliamentarians are concentrated in committees that are concerned with issues related to what can be classified as typical “female” policy areas, (2) while men parliamentarians are concentrated in committees that are concerned with issues related to what can be classified as typical “male” policy areas. These propositions are examined via representative samples of EP committees using an original dataset of MEPs’ profiles in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> EP, and a secondary dataset of MEPs’ profiles in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP. The results show that: women are overrepresented in EP committees concerned with social welfare policies and underrepresented in EP committees concerned with policies connected to the basic functions of the EU, and economic and technic; and that sex has an impact on individual MEPs assignments to EP committees concerned with social welfare policies and the basic functions of the EU policies. However, although the results show that women are underrepresented in EP committees concerned with economic or technic policies, sex appears to have no effect on assignments to EP committees concerned with those policies. The study’s findings suggest that feminist theory of legislative organization can bring important insights into the study of women’s descriptive representation in the EP. Although the theory needs to be revised and further developed at the supranational level.

**Keywords:** women’s descriptive representation, composition of committees, committee assignments, the European Parliament.

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# 1 Introduction

The European Parliament (EP) has undergone a rapid transformation since the late 1970s. Having begun life as a consultative assembly, its involvements in legislation, budgetary politics and oversight within the European Union (EU) has grown swiftly since the first direct elections in 1979 and the Single European Act (SEA) in July 1987 (Whitaker 2011:1). Subsequently, the power of the EP has grown with each treaty, most recently the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, which placed the EP on equal footing with the Council of Ministers (which represents state interest) under the co-decision procedure, in most policy domains.<sup>1</sup> Today, the EP is, arguably, more powerful than most of its national counterparts (Yordanova 2011:597; Yoshinaka et al. 2010:457). Being the only direct elected institution of the EU, it owes its empowerment to the hopes of solving the EU's "democratic deficit" problem. The Parliament is presumed to increase the openness and transparency of the EU decision-making process, and decrease the distance between the EU and its citizens by translating their preferences and interests into EU legislation (Yordanova 2011:597).

The ability of the EP to fulfill these goals is largely shaped by its internal organization, by its faculty to exploit its resources and institutional powers effectively and thus exert influence in the EU framework (Bowler and Farrell 1995:220f). Like most national legislatures, the EP has a committee system that forms its "legislative backbone" (Whitaker 2011:1f). It is in the standing committees where the most of the EP's legislative work is carried out, where parliamentary inquiries are executed and where individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can exercise power. Previous research on the EP's part in EU policy-making has shown that the EP committees "play a vital role in EU legislation" (Neuhold 2001:21), and that the EP's positions are negotiated and in most case already decided at the committee stage of the parliamentary legislative process (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003:348; Yordanova 2009:254).

Owning their increasing importance, the EP committees have recently attracted scholarly attention, including studies on the composition and assignments of the EP committees (Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Whitaker 2011; Yordanova 2009). However,

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<sup>1</sup> Initially, the EP had a *consultation procedure* under which it was allowed to give a non-binding opinion to the Council of Ministers. The SEA introduced a *co-operation procedure* which gave the EP the right to a second reading in certain laws and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) created a *co-decision procedure* under which the EP was given the right to a third reading, efficiently given it equal authority with the Council of Ministers. With the Treaty of Lisbon, this became the *ordinary legislative procedure*, which is now the standard approach to law-making in the EU.

although the EP committee membership can largely affect the type of legislation the EP adopts, it is still not clear how representative it is to the overall plenary (Yordanova 2009:254). Thus, even if a key question in committee studies is whether committees are representative of the legislative they serve (McElroy 2006:6), and despite an increased awareness of the important role played by the EP committees. One research area that to date has been largely neglected is women's representation in the EP committees.

However, although women's representation in the EP committees is a research area in which the knowledge remains limited, feminist theories of legislative organization is an established scholarly. Previous studies on women's representation in national parliamentary committees have found that women, once they have been elected to Parliaments, often are found to be concentrated in certain types of committees. More specific, in committees that are concerned with issues related to what can be classified as typical "female"<sup>2</sup>. Additionally, it has also been found that women parliamentarians are significantly more likely to be assigned to health care and welfare committees than men, and less likely than men to be assigned to committees dealing with business and private economic concerns. (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999) Thus, feminist theories of legislative organization focus on the numbers of women in Parliaments and highlights two questions in relation to women's representation: first, where are women represented and, second, where are women not represented? By addressing these two questions feminist theories of legislative organization gives indications of the way the power is distributed between women and men in Parliaments (Kantola 2009:380). Hence, women's representation in the EP committees is consequently linked to indications of the distribution of power between women and men within the EP. But, nonetheless, a systematic examination of the composition of women and men in the EP committees, and the effect of sex<sup>3</sup> on assignments to the EP committees have yet to be undertaken.

In this thesis, the composition of and assignments to, the EP committees will be examined in all direct elected EPs (seven in total). This study aims to test feminist theories of legislative organization on the EP committees, with the broader aim to increase the knowledge of women's representation in the EP committees. The research questions are thus:

- *Are women MEPs more or less commonly found in certain types of EP Committees?*
- *Does sex have an impact on the assignment of individual MEPs to EP committees?*

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<sup>2</sup> The concepts female and male refers here to gender roles, see Chapter 3 for a further discussion.

<sup>3</sup> The concept sex refers here to the legal sex, which in this thesis is restricted to only two sexes, woman and man.

## 1.1 Disposition

The thesis proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2, women's political representation will be thoroughly theorized and discussed. The chapter will begin with a presentation and discussion of feminist theories of women's political representation, followed by an outlining of the development of women's representation in the EP. A review of the relevant literature on women's descriptive representation will thereafter end the chapter. In Chapter 3, the EP committees will be considered from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. The chapter will begin with an overview of the expansion of the EP committees, which will be followed by a presentation of the formal EP committee assignment system. Thereafter, a review of the relevant literature on EP committee assignments and a presentation and discussion of the feminist theories of legislative organization, precede a new proposed classification of the EP committees. A presentation of the derived hypotheses and a discussion of the control variables included in this study will thereafter end the chapter. In Chapter 4, the methodology of the empirical analysis of the study will be outlined, and subsequently, in Chapter 5, the results will be presented and analyzed. Lastly, in Chapter 6, a discussion of the results and conclusions will close the study.

## 2 Women's political representation

In the following chapter, women's political representation will be thoroughly theorized and discussed. The first part of the chapter will focus on feminist theories of women's political representation and establish why this thesis's focus on the women MEPs in the EP committees should matter. In the second part, the policies adopted by the EU to promote a balanced representation of women and men in the political decision-making process will be presented and discussed. It will be shown that the effectiveness of EU's policies can be questioned. Thereafter, in the third part of the chapter, the development of women's representation in the EP will be mapped out, followed by a review of the relevant literature on women's descriptive representation. The review will show that women's representation in the EP committees is a research area that, even by feminist researchers, has been largely neglected.

### 2.1 Theorizing women's political representation

For a long time, feminist scholars have debated the question: does it matter if women are represented in Parliaments or not? Phillips (1998) famously identified four arguments in support of women's political representation: 1) the importance of symbolic representation, as women politicians act as *role models* for future candidates; 2) numerically equal representation between women and men in Parliaments is a sign of *justice*; 3) women are positioned to represent women's *interests* better than men; and 4) women's political representation *renews democracy*. Dovi (2007) later built upon this, and put forward two additional arguments: 5) the *trust* argument, which implies that women's political representation is crucial for women's confidence in political institutions; and 6) the *legitimacy* argument, which implies that the presence of women politicians strengthens the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Women's political representation can thus be justified in its own term: it is normatively desirable that Parliaments reflect the composition of women and men in society and include representatives from both sexes (Kantola 2009:380). On the other hand, it is also possible to stress the benefits that women's political representation produces, by way of improving the deliberative process, increasing democratic legitimacy and reducing distrust (Mansbridge 1999:654).

The point of departure for these arguments originates from the theory of politics of preference (Phillips 1995) which suggests that individuals' interests are connected to experiences, which in turn are linked to sex. And is built upon the assumption that women and men have different

experiences in their everyday life, and that women politicians, at least to some extent, share the experiences of other women, and therefore are better equipped to represent the “interests of women” (Wängnerud 2009:52). In other words, the arguments predict a link between descriptive and substantive representation<sup>4</sup>, that is, a belief that women politicians will have a substantive impact on the political decision-making process. That women politicians’ represents the “interests of women” and therefore will affect public policy in favor for women. However, the expectation that an increasing number of women in legislatures will result in more and better public policies for women, are not without problems.

First, the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is hard to capture. (Wängnerud 2009:59). In the feminist literature today, there is both a lack of agreement on what to expect when the number of women in Parliaments increases, and competing views on which share of the seats in Parliaments women need to occupy, for the impact of women’s presence will become apparent.

Second, women are by no means a coherent group. Women parliamentarians have different experiences affecting their interests, e.g. ethnicity, class, age and sexual orientation, and it is not desirable, or even possible, to group the diversity of women’s experiences into one single category of “women’s interests” (Kantola 2009:381). However, in research on descriptive representation, far-reaching definitions of women’s interests are not necessary (Wängnerud 2009:53). The focus is instead directed towards *where* women are represented and *where not*, and by addressing this issue, research on descriptive representation gives indications of the way that power is distributed between women and men in the political decision-making process (Kantola 2009:380).

This thesis does not attempt to make claims about substantive representation of women or about constitution of gender in the political representation process. Rather, the thesis’s focus on women’s representation in the EP committees is pertinent as it may give some indications of the way that power is distributed between women and men in the EP. Women’s political representation in the EP committees is thus an important research area and its importance is also stressed by the fact the EU, over the two past decades, has adopted measures to improve women’s political representation in both the member states’ parliaments and in the EU’s institutions. In the following section, the policies adopted by the EU to promote a balanced

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<sup>4</sup> In research on women in parliaments, there is a widely used distinction between substantive and descriptive representation. The distinction roughly corresponds with whether the focus is on the effects of women’s presence in parliament or on the number of women in parliament. (Wängnerud 2009:52)



representation of women and men in the political decision-making process will be presented and discussed.

## 2.2 Improving women's representation in Europe

The EU has encompassed the agenda of balanced representation of women and men in the political decision-making process since the 1990s. Initially, the EU's first steps to advance equality between women and men were taken in the Treaties of Rome (1957) Article 119, in which it was stipulated that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. This initial step was though taken in an all-man environment and it was not until the preparation of the Equal Treatment Directive in 1976, that the first feminist actors were included in working groups (Hoskyns 1996:101f).<sup>5</sup>

Although, since then, the EU's view on women's participation in the political decision-making process has altered dramatically. For example, the EP now states in one of its key documents in this issue, that equal participation of men and women in decision-making "strengthen democracy, by taking account of the interests of the whole of society, and promote its proper functioning" and as a result leads to more "efficient use of human resources" (European Parliament 2000:16). The EU has both been influenced by international developments, such as the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, and has itself been an important actor in pushing for balanced representation of women and men in political decision-making internationally (Kantola 2009:383).

The EU's first action on women's representation in political decision-making was taken with the adoption of the Third Action Programme on Equal Opportunities (1991-1995), in which the importance of the participation of women in political decision-making for equal opportunities policies was recognized for the first time.<sup>6</sup> This was later followed by the Council Resolution in 1995 on balanced participation of women and men in decision-making, and the Council Recommendation in 1996 on the promotion of positive action for achieving a balanced participation of women and men in the decision-making process (Council of the European Union 1996). Three years after the adopting of the Council Recommendation, nine indicators were established by the Council for measuring women's participation in power

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<sup>5</sup> During the formulation of Article 119, the Commission established a special "Article 119" group, however, even if the documentation does not reveal who the members of this group were, Hoskyns (1996) argue that "it seems highly likely that they were almost entirely men." due to the fact that, even ten years later, few women were involved in working groups (Hoskyns 1996:62).

<sup>6</sup> In the first two Action Programmes, the emphasis was on equal opportunities at work.

structures. The indicators showed that participation was far from being sufficient both at national and EU level. (European Parliament 2000:13)

Further, in 2000 the Commission published a report on the implementation of the Council Recommendation (European Commission 2000a). The Commission gave a new definition of balanced representation and set 40 percent as the minimum level of participation of women or men in committees and expert groups. The Commission noted that there was a variation in the perception of balanced representation in member states with the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom proposing 50 percent participation whereas the majority of countries considered a participation rate of at least 30 percent to represent a balance. (European Commission 2000b) The Commission's definition was thus a result of an increased frustration on the lack of implementation and due the fact that the Council Recommendation mentioned the need for "balanced representation" without defining in figures the term "balanced".

Increasing the number of women in the political decision-making process was again brought up as one of the priorities in the Commission's Roadmap to equality between women and men (2006-2010), and in the current Commission's Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015), equality in the decision-making process is one of five priority areas.<sup>7</sup> One of the key actions in the Commission's Strategy is to promote greater participation by women in EP elections, including as candidates, and particular in the 2014 EP election.

As shown above, the EU has paid attention to the representation of women in the member states' parliaments and in the EU's institutions and demanded measures to increase it. However, the effectiveness of these strategies can be questioned. For instance, the implementation of the Council Recommendation and the Council Resolution in the member states have been poor and the impact of these strategies limited (Kantola 2009:385). In many cases it has been a matter of interpretation and definition whether balanced representation of women and men has been achieved. The question is thus how women's political representation looks like in the EP. In the following section the development of women's representation in the EP will be mapped out, followed by a review of the relevant literature on women's descriptive representation, which will show the knowledge of women's representation in the EP committees remains limited.


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<sup>7</sup> In December 2010, the Council adopted Conclusions in support for the implementation of the European Commission's Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015).

### 2.3 Women in the EP

Since 1979 when the EP was directly elected for the first time more and more women have gradually entered the Parliament. At the outset, the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952-1958) included one woman out of 78 representatives (1.3 percent). This increased marginally to 3 percent in the Parliament of Six (1958-1972) and to 5.5 percent in 1978. (Norris and Franklin 1997:188) These MEPs were nominated by national legislatures and the responsibility for the low representation of women rested with the national parliamentary parties. In this context, the 1979 elections represented a breakthrough, resulting in an increase of the number of women to 16 percent. The percentage of women MEPs has since then been increasing steadily to 35 percent in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP, nonetheless still lower than the Commission's definition of balanced representation of women and men (40 percent). Diagram X displays the development of women's representation in the EP from the 1<sup>st</sup> EP to the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP.

**Diagram 1: The development of women's representation in the EP**



Source: The official website of the European Commission.

Although the number of women MEPs has increased over the years, the number of women MEPs elected in the member states varies substantially. For example, in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP, 62 percent of the Finnish and 50 percent of the Estonian MEPs are women, compared to 18 percent of the Czech Republic and 17 percent of the Italian MEPs. Notably is also that Malta has not yet had any women MEPs (The official website of the European Commission). Further, even if women today constitute 35 percent of the representatives in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP, it is still at a higher level than in most of the member states' national parliaments. The average

percentage of women parliamentarians in the current EU-27 is 26 percent, although in Hungary and Malta, for example, women only constitute 9 percent of the members of the Parliaments, compared to Sweden, where women constitute 44 percent (The official website of the European Commission).<sup>8</sup>

### **2.3.1 Literature on women's descriptive representation**

There is a large body of literature that has focused on the numbers of women in national Parliaments and developed explanations for cross-nation variations. Traditionally, feminist scholars have distinguished between supply-side and demand-side factors, where the former relating to the availability of women parliamentarians and the latter to their usage (Kantola 2009:387). For example, women's resources including time, money and the levels of education and gainful employment among women may result in women being less able than men to contribute to campaigns, take on poorly paid positions in local or regional governments or finance their own campaign. However, the focus of scholarly research in Europe has gradually shifted, from women's lack of resources or lack of will to participate in politics, towards institutional and cultural explanations.

It has been established that women do better in electoral system based on proportional representation and multi-member constituencies, than majority system and single member constituencies. Further, political parties have also been found to be important, as the variations in proportion between women and men are even greater across parties than across nations (Wängnerud 2009:54ff). Here, political ideology and party organization have found to play the leading roles, as parties on the left tend to send more women to Parliament and centralized organizations with ties to organizations outside the party are favorable for women, due to the fact that they provide more points of access. Other more cultural explanations emphasize on socio-economic and socio-cultural factors such as economic development, secularization and the level of gender-equality, for the number of women elected.

Thus, the EP is a very suitable object for studies on women's representation since there is a considerable heterogeneity in culture, economic conditions and political institutional set-up among the member states, which all has found to have an impact on the number of women elected to Parliaments. Owing up to its intriguingly, the EP has in recent years attracted feminist scholarly attention, which seeks to explain why there are more women in the EP as opposed to many of the member states' national Parliaments, including studies on factors

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<sup>8</sup> Single or Lower House of Parliament in the current EU-27.

related to institutional circumstances (Footitt 1998; Vallance and Davis 1986) and women's policy network's activism (Krook 2002; Lombardo and Meier 2007). However, although feminist scholars have developed explanatory factors for both the number of women's representatives in national Parliaments and in the EP, little or even no attention has been paid to the women inside the EP (Galligan and Clavero 2008:5). Thus, no questions have been asked in relation to what happens when women actually are in place in the EP, and to date, no study has so far sought to explain the internal organization of the EP from a feminist perspective. Galligan and Clavero (2008:6f) suggest that the lack of research addressing this issue may derive from the difficulty of applying models that have been developed at the national level to a supranational context. An added difficulty is that the EU is quite unique in many respects, since it has no other supranational comparator. As a result, women's representation in the EP committees is not a well-researched area and the knowledge remains limited. But, as showed above, women's representation in the EP committees is linked to indications of the distribution of power between women and men within the EP, and it is therefore essential that the knowledge of women's representation in the EP committees increases.

In summary, the EU has embraced the agenda of balanced representation of women and men in the political decision-making process since the 1990s, although the effectiveness of the policies adopted by the EU has been questioned (Kantola 2009:385). For instance, even if women MEPs occupy a higher percentage of the seats in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP than the average percentage of the seats in the national Parliaments in the current EU-27 (35 percent compared to 26 percent), the percentage of women MEPs in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP is nonetheless still lower than the Commission's definition of balanced representation of women and men (40 percent).

Further, feminist scholars have for a long time focused on the numbers of women in national Parliaments and developed explanations for cross-nation variations. In recent years, feminist scholars have also directed their attention to the numbers of women elected to the EP in comparison the national Parliaments, and developed explanatory factors for variations. However, little or no attention has been paid to what happens when women actually are in place in the EP, thus research on women's representation in the EP committees has, even by feminist researches, been largely neglected. But, the importance of research, and increased knowledge, in this area, is underlined by the fact that women's representation in the EP committees is linked to indications of the distribution of power between women and men within the EP.

### **3 The EP committees from an empirical to a theoretical perspective**

In this chapter, the EP committees will be considered from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. The first part of the chapter will show the expansion of the EP committees and a presentation of the formal EP assignment system. It will be shown that there is no formal rule that require that the composition of women and men in the EP committees should reflect the composition of women and men in the overall plenary. Thereafter, in the second part, the relevant literature on EP committee assignment will be reviewed. The review will show that no study on EP committee assignments so far, has fully explored the impact of sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP committees. In the third part of the chapter, feminist theories of legislative organization will be applied on the EP. First, a discussion regarding how this thesis relates to the concepts of “female” policy areas and “male” policy areas precedes the presentation of feminist theories of legislative organization. Thereafter, the classification of the EP committees and the derived hypotheses are presented. A discussion on the control variables included in this study ends the chapter.

#### **3.1 Overview of the EP committees**

Committees have played a central role in the EP since the institution was first established as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The Common Assembly recognized that committees would help facilitate the problems inbuilt in coordinating work in an assembly that only was scheduled to meet in plenary a handful of times a year. For this purpose, it created seven committees to conduct Assembly business. (McElroy 2006:8; Whitaker 2011:26). However, it was not until the immediate aftermath of the first direct elections in 1979 that the committee system was significantly expanded and developed (McElroy 2006:8). Thereafter, the range of committees expanded gradually, from 17 committees in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP to 20 committees in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP. Although, following the 1999 June elections, the number of committees was reduced from 20 to 17 as a part of streamlining of the EP’s committee system (Whitaker 2011:29). This alternation was though reversed in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP, when the number of committees again increased to 20.<sup>9</sup> Table 1 shows the expansion of the EP committees from the 1<sup>st</sup> EP to the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP (see Appendix 1 for a detailed

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<sup>9</sup> For a more detailed overview of the development of the EP’s committee system, see e.g. Whitaker (2011).

overview of the EP committees), and the enlargement of the EU from 10 member states in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP to 27 member states in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP

**Table 1: Committee expansion of the EP from 1979 to 2009**

	1 <sup>st</sup> EP (1979-1984)	2 <sup>nd</sup> EP (1984-1989)	3 <sup>rd</sup> EP (1989-1994)	4 <sup>th</sup> EP (1994-1999)	5 <sup>th</sup> EP (1999-2004)	6 <sup>th</sup> EP (2004-2009)	7 <sup>th</sup> EP (2009- )
No. of committees	17	18	19	20	17	20	20
No. of MEPs	434	518	518	626	788	732	754
Total no. of committee seats	523	599	651	768	876	861	848
Average committee size	31	33	34	38	52	43	42
No. of Member states	10	12	12	15	25	25	27

Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009).

Table 1 also displays that the size of the EP committees has increased over the time. Average committee size rose from 31 members in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP to 52 members in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP. However, in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP, the average committee size decreased to 43 members and in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP, the average committee size is 42 members. Although average committee size has varied over time, sizes vary even more significantly across committees within the same parliamentary term. For example, in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP the Legal Affairs committee and Fisheries committee is composed of mere 25 members whereas the Foreign Affairs committee has 75 members.

The importance of the committee system is underlined by a survey of MEPs in 2010. When asked to choose their first preference from among the EP posts of Group President, National Delegation Leader, President of the EP or Committee Chair, more respondents opted for a EP committee chair rather than any of the other alternatives (Farrell et al. 2011).<sup>10</sup> Thus, MEPs clearly value committee posts and consider that the EP committees are important arenas of power that matters to the legislate process within the EP (McElroy 2006:8).

### 3.1.1 The committee assignment system of the EP

The majority of MEPs serve on one committee as full members and on another as substitutes. However, multiple memberships are possible since the number of available committee seats always exceeds the number of parliamentarians (see Table 1) and not all MEPs are members in a committee. Officially, committee seats are assigned in a plenary vote every two and a half years. However, in practice, they are distributed before the plenary stage (Bowler and Farrell

<sup>10</sup> Of the respondents, 33% opted for committee chair as their first preference, compared with 29% opting for what would apparently seem to be the most prestigious parliamentary post, the presidency of the Parliament. Only 21% opted for leadership of their political group or leading their national delegation. (Farrell et al. 2011)

1995:226; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003:338). The only reference in the EP Rules of Procedure states that:

Members of committees and committees of inquiry shall be elected after nominations have been submitted by the political groups and the non-attached Members. The Conference of Presidents shall submit proposals to Parliament. The composition of the committees shall, as far as possible, reflect the composition of Parliament. (Rule 186; EP, 2013)

The leaders of the EP party groups, together with the President of the EP, constitute the Conference of Presidents, which for each committee propose the number of seats and the allocation of seats between the EP party groups according to the political composition of the plenary, using the D'Hondt method. Thus, seats are allocated to the EP party groups proportionally to their size in the plenary. Thereafter, it is the EP party groups that internally decide on individual assignments, taking into consideration the sizes and wishes of their constituent national party delegation (Yordanova 2009:257)

The EP party groups do not apply any formal rules in the selection process, and past research on the 6<sup>th</sup> EP has revealed some differences in the procedure in the different groups. For example, in the big groups (Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats, and Group of the Party of European Socialists), seats are first distributed among the national party delegations and thereafter, individual seats are allocated within respective delegation. In the Liberal group (Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), the procedure is instead that each national delegation shall be allowed one committee seat, and then if there are any seats left, delegations can have another. Subsequently, once members have expressed their preferences for committee membership, the distribution of seats is done by the Bureau of the group. In the Green group (Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance) it is instead almost solely the members' individual interests that decide the assignment of seats in the committees. (Yordanova 2009:257)

To summaries, the above overview of the EP committee system shows that the range of the EP committees has expanded gradually since the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. Moreover, the majority of the MEPs are full members in one committee, and although the EP committees are important areas in which MEPs can exercise power within the EP, there are no formal rules that require that the composition of women and men in the EP committees should reflect the composition of women and men in the overall plenary. After the Conference of Presidents has allocated seats to the EP party groups according to the political composition of the plenary, the informal rules



of the EP party groups determine individual committee assignments. As displayed above, these rules have shown to differ in different EP party groups. The question is thus what lays besides the formal and informal rules, hence, which factors that affect individual EP committee assignments. In the following section the relevant literature on EP committee assignments will be reviewed. It will be shown that although past studies on EP committee assignments have puzzled out some of the factors affecting individual committee assignments, no study has so far fully explored the impact of sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP committees.

### **3.2 Literature on the EP committee assignments**

Due to the similarities between the EP and the United State (US) Congress<sup>11</sup>, a strong committee system twinned with relatively undisciplined parties in a legislature with no government resting on a vote of no confidence (Yoshinaka et al. 2010:458), previous research on EP committee assignments has to a large extent relied on the theoretical literature on the US legislature (Yordanova 2011:599f). In line with this literature, the majority of previous studies have asked question in relation to the predictions of either distribution, informational or partisan theory. Thus examined if MEPs join EP committees in order to: exercise distortional influence over the policy area they serve, enhance the EPs efficiency by serving the informational needs of the plenary, or if the control over committee assignments lays in hands of the EP party group leaders.

Bowler and Farrell (1995) found from their groundbreaking study on the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP (1989-1994), evidence that identified occupational and interests group attachments as “the only consistently significant determinants driving committee membership.” (Bowler and Farrell 1995:234) Similarly, McElroy (2006) showed that policy expertise played a role in the assignment of members to the committees on Legal Affairs, Environment and Public Health and Industry in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP (1999-2004), suggesting that MEPs with relevant policy expertise or links to relevant interests groups are more likely than others to obtain an assignment in, at least, those committees. Further, Yordanova (2009) also found, in her study on the 6<sup>th</sup> EP (2004-2009), support for the importance of relevant expertise and interests for assignments to a wide range of committees. Yordanova showed that MEPs with relevant expertise were more likely to join committees that require technical knowledge, and that MEPs with special interests were more likely to join a committee whose area of operation addressed their

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<sup>11</sup> For a deeper discussion on the similarities between the EP and the US Congress, see McElroy (2007).

interests. Additionally, Bowler and Farrell, McElroy and Yordanova all concluded in their studies that the composition of the EP committees, with minor expectations, were largely proportional to the partisan and national composition of the plenary.

To summarize, much of the previous research on committee assignments in the EP suggests that MEPs' expertise and personal interests may be good predictors of committee assignments. As the 2010 survey of MEPs in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP (2009- ) has shown, the most important factor affecting MEPs' committee assignments are: the importance of the issues that a committee covers (47.5%) and their professional expertise (45.5%), followed by their personal interests (38.4%) (Farrell et al. 2011).<sup>12</sup> However, although past studies have largely deepened and increased our knowledge about the organizational principles of the EP committees and provided some answers to the question of which factors that affect individual EP committee assignments, the whole rationale behind, is still not clear. As Chapter 2 showed, research on women's representation in the EP committees has to date, even by feminist explorations, been largely neglected. Consequently, no study has so far fully explored the impact of sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP committees.

There are at least two explanations for this. First, the theoretical literature on the US legislature does not treat sex as an important and prominent factor of individual committee assignments. Second, the EP is at the supranational level, while the feminist models of legislative organizational have been developed at the national level, an added difficulty in applying models on the national level to the EP, is that the EP has no other supranational comparator. Thus, when applying models developed at the national level to the EP, a series of methodological problems arises, for example, the EP operates, in difference to national parliaments, in a multi-nation, multi-party EP setting with MEPs with strong electoral dependence on their national parties (Yordanova 2009:261). But in order to develop the knowledge of women's representation in the EP committees and fully examine the impact of sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP committees, feminist theories of legislative organization needs to be tested on the EP committees.

Furthermore, although the feminists theories are developed at the national level, the adaptability of the feminist theories to the EP can still be very fruitful, since the feminist theories solely suggest that the composition of, and assignments to, parliamentary committees

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<sup>12</sup> Of the respondents, 47.5% opted for the importance of the issues that the committee covers as extremely important for committee choice, 45.5% opted for their professional expertise, 38.4% opted for their personal interests, 34.5% opted for the importance to their voters, 12.5% opted for previous membership in the last EP, 7.4% opted for being asked by their national party and 6.9% opted for being asked by their EP party group (Farrell et al. 2011).

can be explain by gender-roles, hence, of what can be expected being “female” or “male” policy areas (Wängnerud 1999).<sup>13</sup> Thus, the differences can therefore serve as a basis for discussion of the explanatory power and adaptability of the feminist theories to the supranational context. Another factor which enable the adaptability the feminist theories to the EP is that all direct elected EPs are included in this thesis, thus by including all direct elected EPs, it is possible to compare the different EPs with each other and see if any patterns emerges in the data that can be generalized on future EPs.

In the following section, the feminist theories of legislative organization will be presented, followed by a classification of the EP committees and the derived hypotheses. However, first, it needs to be discussed how this thesis relates to the concepts of “female” and “male” policy areas, a discussion which we now turn to.

### **3.3 Application of feminist theories of legislative organization to the EP**

Feminist theories of legislative organization suggest that policy areas are linked to gender-roles. That some policy areas are linked to what can be seen as “female” while other policy areas are linked to what can be seen as “male”. Thus, suggesting that is exist a gendered division between different policy areas, hence a division between “female” policy areas and “male” policy areas.

However, the usage of the labels “female” and “male” in relation to different policy areas are not without problems. ”Female” and “male” are vague concepts and every attempt to categorize policy areas on the basis of them, runs the risk to reproduce preconceptions about the different sexes. Hence, the aim here is not to define which policy areas that is ”female” or “male”, through some, for example, ide about sameness or difference between the sexes. The categorization that is made is merely to test feminist research of legislative organization on the EP committees, and not to comment about ”female” or “male” *per se*.

The following parts of this section will be presented as followed. First, previous research on women´s representation in parliamentary committees will be presented. Thereafter, a new classification of the EP committees based on the concept pair *reproduction/production* will be proposed, followed by the derived hypotheses and a discussion on the control variables included in this study.

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<sup>13</sup> For a different view see Heath et al. (2005).

### 3.3.1 Female and male policy areas

Previous empirical studies on women's representation in parliamentary committees have shown that women, once they have been elected to Parliaments, often are found to be concentrated in certain types of committees. More specific, in committees that are concerned with issues related to what can be classified as typical "female" policy areas.

Some of the first researchers that drew attention to this phenomenon were the authors to the book *Unfinished Democracy – Women in Nordic Politics*, in which the authors, among other things, studied the composition of women and men in the Nordic countries<sup>14</sup> parliamentary committees, from the 1960s to the 1980s. The authors found that women parliamentarians often were seated in social affairs and education committees and held up a significant lower number of seats in finance and economy committees. Hence, the author concluded that women were allocated seats to committees dealing with issues connected with the traditional women's role and that men were assigned to committees focusing on issues that have traditionally fallen within the men's sphere. (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985)

The same pattern was later found by other feminist researchers. Thomas (1994), which is a pioneer of empirical research on sex and committee assignments, showed, in her study on the U.S state-level where she followed the development overtime, that women were significantly overrepresented in social political committees, traditionally "female-oriented" committees and underrepresented in committees that were concerned with business and private economy, traditionally "male-oriented" committees. Thomas showed that women representatives, in the 1970s, were concentrated in a narrow set of committee assignments, usually education committees. However, in 1988 this situation had changed, and women were found in all of the committees, although the proportion of women and men were not equal in all types of committees. Thomas found that women were significantly more likely to sit on health care and welfare committees than men, and less likely than men, to sit on committees dealing with business and private economic concerns. Further, the pattern was similar when Thomas broke down the aggregated data by state. In eleven out of twelve states, women were found more often than men on health care and welfare committees. In contrast, in nine of twelve states, women were less often than men found in business committees. (Thomas 1994:65f)

Similarly, Wängnerud (1999) found, in her study of the Swedish Parliament from 1971 to 1996, where she focused on committee assignments to the standing committees that women parliamentarians were overrepresented and underrepresented in different types of committees.

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<sup>14</sup> Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

In her study, Wängnerud classified the committees based on the concept pair *reproduction/production*, on what can be expected being female and male, creating four groups in which the committees were placed in: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic Technic. Wängnerud found that women more often were assigned to committees in the Social welfare and Culture/Law group, than men. In contrast, men were more often than women assigned to committees in the Basic functions and Economic/Technic group. However, Social welfare and Economic/Technic were the two most sex characterized groups, where in the former women were most overrepresented and in the latter most underrepresented. Wängnerud concluded that there existed a clear sex-pattern, and suggested that the differences in the compositions of women and men in the different groups were dependent on which policy areas the committees was concerned with, that is, typical “female-oriented” policy areas or typical “male-oriented” policy areas. However, Wängnerud also concluded that the pattern was decreasing over time and that it in the 1994 election was broken. In a later study of the Swedish Parliament, Wängnerud (2009) confirmed this conclusion, when she found that women only were underrepresented, occupying less than 40 percent of the seats, in one of the standing committees, namely the committee on social insurance, a formerly heavily “female” dominated policy area (Wängnerud 2009:61).

To summarize, previous research has shown that women parliamentarians more often than men parliamentarians, are seated in committees concerned with issues connected to typical “female-oriented” policy areas. The other side of the coin is that men parliamentarians more often than women parliamentarians are seated in committees that are concerned with issues focusing on typical “male-oriented” policy areas. The question is thus if the same pattern can be found in the EP committees.

### **3.3.2 Classification of the EP Committees**

In order to make visible which of the EP committees that is expected to be concerned with typical “female-oriented” or typical “male-oriented” policy areas, the EP committees need to be classified. Here, the classification scheme of Wängnerud (1999) will be used and the following categorization of the EP committees will thus depart from the concept pair *reproduction/production*.

#### **A continuum between reproduction and production**

Reproduction and production represents two extreme values on a continuum between of what can be expected being “female” and “male”, and are commonly used concepts when women’s

and men's different positions in the society are analyzed (Rhode 1992:157; Wängnerud 1999:62). Reproduction refers to what in a broad sense can be said being caring tasks in the society: care of children and old, care of sick people etc. Traditionally, reproduction has been a "female" responsibility area and it has also been an area that to a great extent has been connected to the family and the private sphere. Production, on the other hand, refers to what in a broad sense can be said being the society's production of goods, and has in another way been connected to the public sphere. It has also, traditionally, been a "male" responsibility area.

The EP committees have been divided into the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic. The Social welfare and Economic/Technic groups represented the two extremities (see Wängnerud 1999:62f). The EP committees that are expected to be concerned with typical "female-oriented" policy areas have been placed in the Social welfare group, while the EP committees that are expected to be concerned with typical "male-oriented" policy areas have been placed in the Economic/Technic group. The EP committees placed in the two groups in the middle, Culture/Law and Basic functions are expected to be concerned with less gender characterized policy areas.

Thus, the EP committees that have been placed in the Social welfare group are concerned with social welfare policies, such as employment and social affairs policies etc., policies which are seen as typical "female", while the EP committees that have been placed in the Economic/Technic group are concerned with economic and technic policies, such as international trade and budgets policies etc., policies which are seen as typical "male". The EP committees placed in the Culture/Law group are concerned with culture and law policies, such as civil liberties, justice and home affairs policies etc., policies that are seen as more "female" than "male", but not as gendered as the social welfare policies. Finally, the EP committees placed in the Basic function group are concerned with policies connected to the basic functions of the EU, such as regional development policies etc., policies that are seen as more "male" than "female", but not as gendered as the economic and technic policies.

The dimension between reproduction and production is illustrated in Table 2. Table 2 also shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees have been placed in. However, the classification offered in Table 2, only show the classification of the EP in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> EP, for the classification of the EP committees in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> EP see Appendix 2.

In Table 2, there is also a description of the different EP committees' responsibilities. The description is to enable a critical assessment of the classification that has been made.

Although the following classification of the EP committees was the one who was found to be most justified, one must still be aware that the classification probably will affect the study’s results.

**Table 2: Classification of the EP committees based on a continuum between reproduction and production and a description of the EP committees responsibilities**

Reproduction		Production	
←-----→			
Social welfare	Culture/Law	Basic functions	Economic/Technic
<p><i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development</li> <li>▪ Employment and Social Affairs</li> <li>▪ Environment, Public Health and Food Safety</li> <li>▪ Internal Market and Consumer Protection</li> <li>▪ Women’s Rights and Gender Equality</li> </ul>	<p><i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs</li> <li>▪ Constitutional Affairs</li> <li>▪ Culture and Education</li> <li>▪ Legal Affairs</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> </ul>	<p><i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture and Rural Development</li> <li>▪ Fisheries</li> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Regional Development</li> <li>▪ Transport and Tourism</li> </ul>	<p><i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary Control</li> <li>▪ Economic and Monetary Affairs</li> <li>▪ Industry, Research and Energy</li> <li>▪ International Trade</li> </ul>

**Social welfare:** Employment and Social Affairs committee is responsible for employment policy and all aspects of social policy; Environment, Public Health and Food Safety committee is responsible for environmental policy and public health and food safety issues; Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee is responsible for coordination at Community level of national legislation and protection of the economic interests of consumers; Development committee is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the EU; Women’s Rights and Gender Equality committee is responsible for the definition, promotion and protection of women's rights in the EU and related Community measures.

**Culture/Law:** Culture and Education committee is responsible for the cultural aspects of the EU and the EU's education policy; Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs committee is responsible for the protection within the territory of the EU of citizens' rights, human rights and fundamental rights, including the protection of minorities; Legal Affairs committee is responsible for the interpretation and application of European law, compliance of EU acts with primary law; Constitutional Affairs committee is responsible for the institutional aspects of the European integration process; Petitions committee is responsible for petitions and relations with the European Ombudsman.

**Basic functions:** Transport and Tourism committee is responsible for matters relating to the development of a common policy for inter alia rail, road, and air transport and tourism; Agriculture and Rural Development committee is responsible for the operation and development of the common agricultural policy and rural development; Fisheries committee is responsible for the operation and development of the common fisheries policy and the conservation of fishery resources; Regional Development committee is responsible for regional and cohesion policy; Foreign Affairs committee is responsible for the common foreign and security policy and the European security and defense policy.

**Economic/Technic:** International Trade committee is responsible for matters relating to the implementation of the Union's common commercial policy and its external economic relations; Economic and Monetary Affairs committee is responsible for the economic and monetary policies of the EU; Budgets committee is responsible for the multiannual financial framework of the EU revenue and expenditure; Industry, Research and Energy committee is responsible for the EU's industrial policy and the application of new technologies; Budgetary Control committee is responsible for the control of the implementation of the budget of the EU and of the European Development Fund.

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Source: The official EP website.

### 3.3.3 Hypotheses

In the outset of this thesis, the two broad research questions to be answered were stipulated: *are women MEPs more or less commonly found in certain types of EP committees?*; and *does sex have an impact on the assignment of individual members to EP committees?* Derived from the feminist theory of legislative organization, the following set of hypotheses will more precisely be employed in the analysis trying to answer the research questions. The first set of hypotheses (H1a and H2b) will be employed in an answering the first research question and the second set of hypotheses (H2a, H2b, H2c and H2d) will be employed in answering the second research question.

#### **From overrepresented to underrepresented**

Linking the feminist research on legislative organization to the classification of the EP committees offered in Table 2, it is tested whether the two extremities groups, Social welfare and Economic/Technic, are more sex characterized than the two groups in the middle, Culture/Law and Basic functions. This leads to the following hypotheses:

**H1a:** Women MEPs are more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than in EP committees in the Culture/Law group.

**H1b:** Women MEPs are more underrepresented in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group than in EP committees in the Basic functions group.

#### **EP committee assignments on the individual level**

Although women MEPs may be more or less overrepresented or underrepresented in the different groups, it is still needed to be tested if sex has an impact on the individual assignments to the EP committees. This leads to the following hypotheses:

**H2a:** The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is increased by being a woman.

**H2b:** The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group is neither increased nor decreased by being a woman.



**H2c:** The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions groups is neither decreased nor increased by being a woman.

**H2d:** The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is decreased by being a woman.

### **3.3.4 Control variables**

The above hypotheses examine a bivariate relationship between sex and EP committee assignments, and although a bivariate relationship in an uncontrolled setting is suboptimal, it is not useless. By examine the relationship between two variables, an independent variable and a dependent variable, it is possible to establish if it exists an association, and if it does, the strengthen and direction of the association between the two variables can be determined (Bryman 2008:325f) Consequently, having a model with only sex as a predictor of EP committee assignments will enable to establish if it exists an association, and if so, the strengthen and direction of the association can be determined. Thus, this study's intention is not to establish the whole rationale behind EP committee assignments by puzzling out all the factors affecting it. Instead, the intention is merely to examine the relationship between sex and individual assignments to EP committees, in order to establish if sex has, or has not, an impact.

However, it is also true that having a model with some control variables is better, as it allows an association to be controlled for spurious correlation, and specifies different conditions under which the original bivariate relationship might hold (Bryman 2008:330f). In the review of the literature on women's descriptive representation in Chapter 2, it was shown that political parties have found to be an important factor in explaining the number of women parliamentarians, as parties on the left tend to send more women to Parliament (Wängnerud 2009:54ff), although previous research on EP committee assignments have thus found that the composition of the EP committees, with minor expectations, were largely proportional to the partisan composition of the plenary. However, the EP party groups are still important factors in the assignment process to EP committees and therefore, EP party group will be included in this study as a control variable. Additionally, by including EP party group as a control variable, it will also be able to see if previous researchers' observation that the compositions of the EP committees, with minor expectations are largely proportional to the partisan composition of the plenary holds, in this thesis new classification of the EP committees.

Furthermore, in the review, it was also shown that other factors, such as the electoral system, economic development, secularization and the level of gender-equality, all have found to have an impact on the number of women elected to Parliament. By including nationality as a control variable in this study, all of these factors above will thus be controlled for, due to the fact that variable nationality includes all the above factors. Although it will not in this study be evident which of the above factors that might have an effect on the dependent variables since the factors are not examined separately. Additionally, including nationality as a control variable will also enable to see if previous researchers' observation that the compositions of the EP committees, with minor expectations are largely proportional to the national composition of the plenary holds, in this thesis new classification of the EP committees. A more detailed discussion of the usage of the control variables will be provided in the following Methodology chapter (Chapter 4).

## 4 Methodology

In this chapter, the collection and usage of the data employed in this study will be presented. In the first part, a review of the data collection process precedes a presentation of the coding of the variables. Thereafter, in the second part, the statistical tools which will be employed to test the derived hypotheses will be presented and argued for. First, the statistical tool cross tabulation, which will be used to test the 1<sup>st</sup> set of hypotheses will be presented. Thereafter, the statistical tool logistic regression, which will be used to test the 2<sup>nd</sup> set of hypotheses, will be presented and the construction of the models will be explained.

### 4.1 Data and measures

The data for this thesis consists of both an original and a secondary dataset. The original dataset contains of data on the MEPs in the second term of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> EP and the secondary data set contains of data on the MEPs in the first term of the 6<sup>th</sup> EP. The data is on the individual level.

The original dataset were collected from the official EP website. All MEPs have been coded manually by going through the lists of MEPs in the different EPs. The data on the MEPs in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP were collected in August 2012 and the data on the MEPs in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> EP were collected from February to April 2013. The secondary dataset consist of Yordanova's (2009) replication data. The dataset was used by Yordanova in an article published in *European Union Politics* journal and the replication data is available online. However, as the data collection for the original dataset has been carried out manually, it is possible that occasional coding errors occur in the original dataset.

Together, the original and secondary data sets include data on the individual level of the MEPs in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> EP. The codebook is provided in Appendix 4.

#### 4.1.1 The dependent variables

The dependent variables are actual EP committee membership. More specific, membership in an EP committee in a named group, that is, in the Social welfare group, Culture/Law group, Basic functions group or Economic/Technic group, coded as 1 for being member in an EP committee in a named group and 0 otherwise. The dependent variables are thus coded in four separate binary variables.

An alternative way to code EP committee membership in a named group, could have been to code it in one nominal variable (e.g. Social welfare = 1, Culture/Law = 2, Basic functions =3, Economic/Technic = 4). However, coding membership that way require that the MEPs solely are members in a EP committee in one of the groups, and as some MEPs are members in a EP committee in two or more groups, coding EP committee membership in a named group in one dependent variable is thus not possible.

#### **4.1.2 The independent variable**

The independent variable is the MEPs sex. With sex refers here to the legal sex, which in this thesis is restricted to only two sexes, woman and man. Women MEPs are coded as 0 and men MEPs are coded as 1.

#### **4.1.3 The control variables**

The control variable nationality is coded in a series of dummy variables, coded as 1 for being from a named member state and 0 otherwise. For example, MEPs from Sweden are coded as 1, while MEPs from another member state are coded as 0, MEPs from Spain are coded as 1, while MEPs from another member state are coded as 0, and so on for all member states. The United Kingdom will be used as reference group in the logistic regressions.

The control variable EP party group is also coded in a series of dummy variables. However, since many of the EP party groups change their name over the examined time span, and some smaller EP party groups only exists under one or two parliamentary terms, the EP party groups has been classified into five categories, depending on their ideological affiliation. The classification scheme of Hix et al. (2009) has been used to classify the different EP party groups.

The EP party groups have been classified into the five categories: Radical left, where the EP party groups with radical left ideological affiliations been placed; Socialists, where the EP party groups with socialist ideological affiliations been placed; Liberals, where the EP party groups with liberal ideological affiliations been placed; Conservatives, where the EP party groups with conservative ideological affiliations been placed; and Others, where the smaller EP party groups and none-attached members been placed. The coding of the EP party group variable is the same as for the control variable nationality. The group Others will be used as reference group in the logistic regressions. See Appendix 3 for the classification of the EP party groups.

## 4.2 Statistical tools

To test the hypotheses derived from the feminist theory of legislative organization, the statistical tools cross tabulation and logistic regression will be used. The tests will be run in SPSS.

### 4.2.1 Cross tabulation

The statistical tool employed to test Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b is cross tabulation of the independent variable sex with the dependent variables, membership in an EP committee in a named group. The cross tabulations will provide an comparisons of the observed percentage of women MEPs in the different groups and it is therefore reasonable to use the average percentage of women in all EP committees as reference point.<sup>15</sup> An *underrepresentation* of women will thus mean that the percentage of women MEPs in a certain group is lower than the average percentage of women in all EP committees. The other way around, an *overrepresentation* of women will occur when the percentage of women in a certain group is higher than the average percentage of women in all EP committees.

### 4.2.2 Logistic regression

Due to the fact that the dependent variables are binary, the statistical tool logistic regression will be used to test Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d.

There are two main uses of logistic regression: 1) prediction of group membership, since logistic regression calculates the probability that an event will occur; and 2) examine the relationship and strengths among variables, e.g. being a woman MEP puts you at a higher probability to be assigned to an EP committee in a named group, than being a man MEP. (Menard 2010:14ff) However, due to the fact that logistic regression calculates the changes in the log odds of the dependent variable, and not changes in the value of the dependent variable as ordinary least square (OLS) regression does, the b coefficients in logistic regression are reported as log odds, which are not as easy too interpreted as the b coefficients in OLS regression. But not to make the interpretation of the b coefficients too complicated, all the reader needs to be concerned with is if the b coefficients have a positive or a negative value. A more detailed review of how the b coefficients should be interpreted will be presented in the following Results chapter (Chapter 5).

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<sup>15</sup> Compare the design used by Wängnerud (1999) and Thomas (1994).

## **Construction of models**

To fully examine the relationship between the sex and the dependent variables, four separate models will be constructed.

In Model 1 the relationship between sex and the dependent variables will be examined. In other words, the bivariate relationship between sex and the dependent variables will be examined in Model 1, which will enable to establish if it exists an association, and if it does, the strength and direction of the association will thereafter be determined. In Model 2 the relationship between sex, the dependent variables and the control variables will be examined. Hence, if an association is found in Model 1, the association will, in Model 2, be controlled for spurious correlation, and it will also be specified under which conditions which the original bivariate relationship holds.

Further, the control variables nationality and EP party group can both have a direct effect on the dependent variables, which is controlled for in Model 2, and a simultaneous effect depending whether an MEP are a woman or a man. That is, the effect of the control variables might differ depending on the value of the independent variable. For example, being a woman MEP from a certain member state or being a woman MEP from a certain EP party group might higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in a certain group. Hence, the control variables might interact with the independent variable, and these variables are known as interaction variables.

In Model 3, the relationship between sex, nationality and the interaction variables of these on the dependent variables will be examined. Hence, it will be examined if being a woman MEP from a certain member state higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in a certain group. In Model 4, the relationship between sex, EP party group and the interaction variables of these on the dependent variables will be examined. Here, it will instead be examined if being a woman MEP from a certain EP party group higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in a certain group.

Model 3 and Model 4 are thus not constructed on the basis of testing Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d, since they are not derived from the feminist theories of legislative organization. As shown in Chapter 3, the feminist theories of legislative organization are developed on the national level, which means that they do not include nationality or EP party groups as prominent factors affecting committee assignments. However, previous studies on women's descriptive representation have shown that political parties are important factors when explaining the number of women parliamentarians, as parties on the left tend to send more women to parliament. Hence, it is therefore interesting to

examine if the impact of sex on the dependent variables differ depending on which EP party group an MEP is member in. Further, other factors which also have been outlined as prominent on the number of women elected to parliament are the electoral system, economic development, secularization and the level of gender-equality in a nation, and it is therefore interesting to examine if the effect of sex on the dependent variables differ depending on which member state an MEP are from. Model 3 and Model 4 are thus constructed on the basis to see if there might be any interesting inductive findings in the data, which can be used to further develop the feminist theories of organization to the supranational level.

## 5 Results

In this chapter the results of the statistical tests will be presented and analyzed. In the first part, the results from the cross tabulations will be reported and it will be made clear if the different hypotheses in the 1<sup>st</sup> set of hypotheses are accepted or rejected. Thereafter, in the second part, the results from the logistic regressions will be reported and it will be cleared if the different hypotheses in the 2<sup>nd</sup> set of hypotheses are accepted or rejected.

### 5.1 Where are the women?

In Table 3 the cross tabulations of sex and the dependent variables are presented. Table 3 displays the percentage of women within each of the Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic groups, and a measure that compare the percentage of women within each group, with the average percentage of women in all the EP committees (comparison measure). A plus sign means an overrepresentation of women and a minus sign means an underrepresentation of women.

**Table 3: Cross tabulations of sex and membership in an EP Committee in a named group**

EP	Social welfare		Culture/Law		Basic functions		Economic/Technic		Average
	%	Cf.	%	Cf.	%	Cf.	%	Cf.	%
1 <sup>st</sup> (1979-1984)	29	+12	12	-5	13	-4	13	-4	17
2 <sup>nd</sup> (1984-1989)	38	+21	15	-2	9	-8	11	-6	17
3 <sup>rd</sup> (1989-1994)	46	+24	20	-2	12	-10	16	-6	22
4 <sup>th</sup> (1994-1999)	42	+16	30	+4	18	-8	25	-1	26
5 <sup>th</sup> (1999-2004)	50	+22	29	+1	20	-8	25	-3	28
6 <sup>th</sup> (2004-2009)	46	+16	34	+4	22	-8	28	-2	30
7 <sup>th</sup> (2009- )	49	+14	37	+2	27	-8	31	-4	35

Note: The comparison measure compare the average percentage of women in respective group with the average percentage of women in all the EP committees. (+)-signs means that women been overrepresented in relation to the average percentage, (-)-signs means that women been underrepresented in relation to the average percentage. Sources: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009).

The results of the cross tabulations displayed in Table 3 show that the composition of women and men varies in the different groups. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, women have been more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than in EP committees in



the Culture/Law group. Hence, women have been overrepresented with 12 percentage points of as lowest (in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP) and 24 percentage points as highest (in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP) in the Social welfare group, whilst women been overrepresented with 4 percentage points as highest (in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> EP) in the Culture/Law group. The finding thus confirm previous observations of Wängnerud (1999) of a more significant overrepresentation of women parliamentarians in committees the Social welfare group than in the Culture/Law group.

A somewhat unexpected finding is, however, that women in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> EP were not overrepresented but underrepresented in the Culture/Law group. In the first three EPs, the results in Table 3 show a pattern of an underrepresentation of women in the Culture/Law group. Although, in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP, the pattern was inversely, and since then, there is instead a pattern of an overrepresentation of women in the Culture/Law group. This finding is, to some extent, divergent to the observations of Wängnerud (1999) of a clear pattern of an overrepresentation of women parliamentarians in the Culture/Law group.

Leaving Hypothesis 1a and instead turning our attention to Hypothesis 1b. The results in Table 3 show that women have been more underrepresented in EP committees in the Basic functions group than in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group, thus contradicting Hypothesis 1b. In the 1<sup>st</sup> EP, women were underrepresented with the same percentage points (-4 percentage points) in the Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group. But since the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP, women have been more underrepresented in the Basic functions group than in the Economic/Technic group. Hence, women MEPs have been underrepresented with 8 percentage points as lowest (in the 2<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> EP) and 10 percentage points as highest (in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP) in the Basic functions group. In the Economic/Technic group, women have been underrepresented with 7 percentage points as highest (in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP). Hence, the results in Table 3 show that there is a pattern of an underrepresentation of women in both the Economic/Technic group and in the Basic functions group in all EPs. Although the underrepresentation of women has been greatest in the Basic functions group, except in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. This finding is thus divergent to Wängnerud's (1999), observation that women parliamentarians are more underrepresented in the Economic/Technic group than in the Basic functions group.

However, one methodological problem that the coding of the depended variables induces in the above results is that an MEP only can be counted once in the different groups. Thus, in the results in Table 3, it has not been taken into consideration that a MEP can occupy more than one seat in EP committees in a named group, and as a result, the results in Table 3 does not display the actual percentage of seats occupied by women within each of the Social

welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic groups, or the actual average percentage of seats occupied by women in all EP committees. The results in Table 3 have therefore been controlled for the actual number of seats occupied by women in the different groups. Table 4 displays the percentage of seats occupied by women within each of the Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic groups, and a measure that compare the percentage of seats occupied by women within each group with the average percentage of seats occupied by women in all EP committees (comparison measure). A plus sign means an overrepresentation of women and a minus sign means an underrepresentation of women.

**Table 4: Cross tabulations of sex and number of seats in an EP committee in a named group**

EP	Social welfare		Culture/Law		Basic functions		Economic/Technic		Average
	%	Cf.	%	Cf.	%	Cf.	%	Cf.	%
1 <sup>st</sup> (1979-1984)	29	+12	11	-6	13	-4	13	-4	17
2 <sup>nd</sup> (1984-1989)	45	+28	17	0	9	-8	10	-7	17
3 <sup>rd</sup> (1989-1994)	49	+27	18	-4	12	-10	17	-5	22
4 <sup>th</sup> (1994-1999)	44	+18	29	+3	18	-8	25	-1	26
5 <sup>th</sup> (1999-2004)	51	+23	28	0	20	-8	25	-3	28
6 <sup>th</sup> (2004-2009)	48	+18	34	+4	22	-8	27	-3	30
7 <sup>th</sup> (2009- )	51	+16	39	+4	27	-8	30	-5	35

Note: The comparison measure compare the average percentage of seats occupied by women in respective group with the average percentage of seats occupied women in all the EP committees. (+)-signs means that women been overrepresented in relation to the average percentage, (-)-signs means that women been underrepresented in relation to the average percentage. Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009).

The results in Table 4 more or less coincides the results displayed in Table 3.<sup>16</sup> One thing worth noting though is that the composition of women and men in the Culture/Law group is even more less sex characterized in Table 4. Hence, the results in Table 4 show no pattern of an underrepresentation or an overrepresentation of women. Again this finding is, to some extent, divergent to Wängnerud's (1999) observation of a clear pattern an overrepresentation of women parliamentarians in the Culture/Law group.

<sup>16</sup> Since the number seats in the EP committees vary between the different EPs and hence even greater within the same EP (see Chapter 3). The results displayed in Table 4 have been controlled for the number of seats in the different groups, by an examination of the difference between the observed and the expected number of seats per woman MEP based on the average percentage of seats occupied by women MEPs in all the EP committees. The results from the examination coincided with the results displayed in table 4 (See appendix 5).

### 5.1.1 Summary

The main result of the analysis is that: women have been more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than in EP committees in the Culture/Law group, in all EPs; and that women been more underrepresented in EP committees in the Basic functions group than in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group, in all EPs except for the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. The finding thus implies that Hypothesis 1a is accepted and that Hypothesis 2a is rejected. A summary of the 1<sup>st</sup> set of hypotheses is displayed in Table 5.

The two groups that thus appear to be most sex characterized are the Social welfare group and the Basic functions group, which is, to some extent, divergent from Wängnerud's (1999) observation that women are most overrepresented in the Social welfare group and most underrepresented in the Economic/Technic group. But before a deeper discussion regarding which conclusions that can be drawn from these findings, Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c, and Hypothesis 2d will be tested and the results from the logistic regressions will be presented and analyzed.

**Table 5: Summary of the 1<sup>st</sup> set of Hypotheses**

	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Decision</b>
<b>H1a:</b>	Women MEPs are more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than in EP committees in the Culture/Law group.	Accepted
<b>H1b:</b>	Women MEPs are more underrepresented in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group than in EP committees in the Basic functions group.	Rejected

## 5.2 Does sex matter?

In the following section, the bivariate relationship between sex and membership in an EP committee in a named group will be further examined. By running a series of logistic regressions, it will be established if it exist an association between the sex and the dependent variables, and if it does, the strength and the direction of the association will be determined.

For each of the four dependent variables, in each EP, four models will be reported. (Revisit Chapter 4 for a thorough review of the variables and models). In Model 1, the relationship between sex and the dependent variables will be reported. A negative value for a b coefficient signifies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for a positive value. Further, since the b coefficients do not allow the sizes of these effects to be estimated, the predicted probabilities of membership in EP committees in a named group for women and men will be reported in Table 13.

In Model 2, the relationship between sex, the dependent variables and the control variables will be reported. A negative value for the variable sex's  $\beta$  coefficients signifies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for a positive value. For the control variables'  $\beta$  coefficients, positive values signify a positive effect on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for negative values.

In Model 3, the relationship between sex, nationality and the interaction variable of these on the dependent variables will be reported. A negative value for the variable sex's  $\beta$  coefficients signifies a positive effect for women MEPs from the United Kingdom on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for a positive value. However, it is not possible to foretell if the interaction variables'  $\beta$  coefficients values signify a positive or a negative effect for women from respectively member state on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group by just observing them, they need to be recalculated first. How this is done will be made clear in the in the text.

In Model 4 the relationship between sex, EP party group and the interaction variable of these on the dependent variables will be reported. A negative value for the variable sex's  $\beta$  coefficient signifies a positive effect for women MEPs from the Others EP party group on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for negative values. However, likewise as above, it is not possible to foretell if the interaction variables'  $\beta$  coefficients values signify a positive or a negative effect for women from respectively EP party group on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group by just observing them, they need to be recalculated first. How this is done will be made clear in the in the text.

The results from the logistic regressions in the different EPs will be reported and analyzed separately, starting with the 1<sup>st</sup> EP and end with the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP. In the last part of this section, the summary section, the main results of the analysis of the logistic regressions in all EPs will be presented and it will be made clear if the different hypotheses are accepted or rejected. However, it is now time to turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP.

### **5.2.1 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP**

The results of the logistic regressions in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP are displayed in Table 6. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group

only is significant in the Social welfare group. In the other groups, the effect of sex is not significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is ( $b=-.96$ ), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group. Hence, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 34.8%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 17.0%. That women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group ( $34.8\% > 17.0\%$ ) are well in line with other researchers' observations of committee assignments in national Parliaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). However, as mentioned above, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. Comparing the results in Table 6 with the results in Table 3 and Table 4, this finding is not very surprisingly. Although, it is divergent to other researchers' observations that women parliamentarians are significantly less likely than men parliamentarians, to sit on committees concerned with business and private economic policies (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). Further, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group or in the Basic functions group.

The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is unaffected ( $b=-.96$ ), when controlling for nationality and EP party group. Moreover, the results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP, which is consistent with previous researchers' observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009).

So far, the results from Model 1 and Model 2 have been analyzed. The main result of the analysis is that: sex only is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group, and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group, in the Basic functions group or in the Economic Technic group, in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. Thus, we have now come a long way in the analysis process of the results in Table 6, but still, the results in Model 3 and Model 4 have not yet been analyzed. Therefore, we now turn to Model 3 and Model 4, to see if any of the interaction variables are significant.

The results from Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are significant. The results thus implies that being a women MEP from a certain member state, or being a women MEP from certain EP party group does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP.

With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the results in Table 6 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP.

### **5.2.2 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP**

The results of the logistic regressions in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP are displayed in Table 7. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the Social welfare group, in the Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group. In the Culture/Law group, the effect of sex is not significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is ( $b=-1.77$ ), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 58.5%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 19.4%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group ( $58.5% > 19.4%$ ). Again, the result is in line with previous observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). An interesting remark is though, that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is higher for both women ( $34.8% < 58.5%$ ) and men ( $17.0% < 19.4%$ ) in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP, than in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is greater in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP than in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP ( $b=-1.77 > b=-0.96$ ).

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is ( $b=.89$ ), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 18.3%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 35.4%. That women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group ( $18.3% < 35.4%$ ) are divergent to the expected result, but comparing the results in Table 7 with the results in Table 3 and Table 4, this result is not all to surprisingly.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is ( $b=-.68$ ), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women will be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is 20.7%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is 34.1%. That women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic are in line with other researchers' observations of committee assignments in national Parliaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999) which hold that women parliamentarians are significantly less likely than men parliamentarians, to sit on committees concerned with business and private economic policies (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). However, an interesting remark is though that the main effect of sex is greater in the Basic functions group than in the Economic/Technic group ( $b=.89 > b=-.68$ ). Further, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group.

The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group, in the Basic functions group and in the Economic Technic group remains significant and that there are no changes in the b coefficients' directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party group. An interesting observation in the results in Model 2 is though that the main effect of Greece on membership in an EP committee in the Basic function group is significant ( $b=1.14$ ). Thus, the result implies that MEPs from Greece have a higher likelihood than MEPs from the United Kingdom to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group. In the other groups, neither nationality nor EP party group has any effect. Hence, it is difficult to draw any interesting remarks of the finding and an additional factor which enhances it is that although the EP were enlarged with two member states in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP (10 member states in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP and 12 member states in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP), both Greece and the United Kingdom were members in the EU in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. Thus further analysis of the results in the following EPs will expose if this finding is relevant or not. However, since only the main effect of Greece is significant<sup>17</sup>, the results in Model 2 implies that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP, which is consistent with previous researchers' observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009).

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<sup>17</sup> The only control variable which is significant.

In summary, the main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group, in the Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP. Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP.

However, before we turn to the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP, the results from Model 3 and Model 4 needs to be analyzed. The results from Model 3 and Model 4 show, as in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP, that none of the interaction variables are significant. Thus, being a women MEP from a certain member state, or being a women MEP with a certain partisan affiliation, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP.

With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the results in Table 7 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP.

### **5.2.3 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP**

The results of the logistic regressions in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP are displayed in Table 8. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law group and in the Economic Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (b=-1.82), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 60.2%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 19.7%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group (60.2%>19.7%), and again, the finding is in line with previous researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is higher for both women (58.5%<60.2%) and men (19.4%<19.7) in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP, than in the 2<sup>nd</sup>



EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is greater in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP than in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> EP ( $b = -1.82 > b = -1.77 > b = -0.96$ ).

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is ( $b = .92$ ), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic function group is 18.5%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 36.3%. Hence, women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group ( $18.5\% < 36.3\%$ ). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. An interesting remark is though that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is higher in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP than in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP, for both women ( $18.3\% < 18.5\%$ ) and men ( $35.4\% < 36.3\%$ ), and the overall effect of sex is also greater in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP than in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP ( $b = .92 > b = .89$ ).

Further, in contrast to the finding in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP but consistent with the finding the 1<sup>st</sup> EP, sex do not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. Hence, as mentioned before, this finding is divergent to other researchers' observations that women parliamentarians are significantly less likely than men parliamentarians, to sit on committees dealing with business and private economic concerns (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group.

The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in the b coefficients' directions, when controlling for nationality and EP Party group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP, which is consistent with previous researchers' observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Wängnerud 1999; Yordanova 2009).

The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP.

Additional, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP.

We now leave the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead turn our attention to the results in Model 3 and Model 4. The results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are significant. Hence, as in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> EP, being a women MEP from a certain member state, or being a women with a certain partisan affiliation, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP.

With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the results in Table 8 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP.

#### **5.2.4 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP**

The results of the logistic regressions in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP are displayed in Table 9. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is ( $b=-1.01$ ), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 40.9%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 20.2%. Hence, women are more likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group ( $40.9%>20.2%$ ). Again, the finding is in line with previous researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). An interesting remark is though that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is lower for women ( $60.2%>40.9%$ ) but higher men ( $19.7%<20.2%$ ) in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP, than in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP, and that the overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP than in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP ( $b=-1.01<b=-1.82$ ).

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is ( $b=.65$ ), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 23.9%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is

37.5%. Hence, women are less likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group (23.9% < 37.4%). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is higher for both women (18.5% < 23.9%) and men (36.3% < 37.5%) in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP, than in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is lower in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP than in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP ( $b=.65 < b=.92$ ). Additionally, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP, and divergent to other researchers' observations (cf. Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group.

The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in the b coefficients' directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party group. An interesting observation in the results in Model 2 is though that the main effect of Conservatives on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is significant ( $b=.59$ ). Thus, the result implies that MEPs from the Conservative EP party group have a higher likelihood than MEPs from the Others EP party group to be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. In the other groups, neither nationality nor EP party group has any effect. Hence, it is difficult to draw any interesting remarks of the finding and an additional factor which enhances it is that the classification of the control variable EP party group induces that the Others EP party group consists of MEPs from the smaller EP party groups and the non-attached members in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP. Thus further analysis of the results in the following EPs will expose if this finding is relevant or not. However, since only main effect of Conservatives is significant<sup>18</sup>, the results in Model 2 implies that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP, which is consistent with previous researchers' observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009).

The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood, than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP.

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<sup>18</sup> The only control variable which is significant.

Additional, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP.

We now have come a long way in the analysis process of the results in Table 9, but before we turn to the 5<sup>th</sup> EP, the results from Model 3 and Model 4 needs to be analyzed. The results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that one interaction variable is significant in Model 3, more precisely, the results show that the interaction variable for sex\*Belgium on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is significant.

The interaction variable for sex\*Belgium on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group is (b=2.78). To be able to see the size of the effect we simply add the main effect of gender (b=-.47) with the interaction term (b=2.78) and get the value 2.31<sup>19</sup>, which we EXP(2.31) and get the value 10.07, which in percentage term means that men MEPs from Belgium are 907.0%<sup>20</sup> more likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group than women MEPs from Belgium. Hence, women MEPs from Belgium have thus a lower likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law, than men MEPs from Belgium. Putting it at another way, being a woman from Belgium, compared to being from any other member state, lowers the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP. However, since no other interaction variables or neither the main effect of sex are significant, it is hard to draw any interesting remarks of this finding, thus further analysis of the results in the following EPs are therefore needed to be able to determine if this finding is relevant or not.

Further, the results in Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are significant. Hence, the results implies, as in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> EP, that being a women from a certain EP party group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP.

With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the results in Table 9 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP.

### **5.2.5 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP**

The results of the logistic regressions in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP are displayed in Table 10. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is

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<sup>19</sup>  $-.47+2.78 = 2.31$

<sup>20</sup>  $(10.07-1)*100 = 907.0\%$

significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is ( $b=-1.35$ ), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 46.3%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 18.4%. Hence, women are more likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group ( $46.3\%>18.4\%$ ). Again, the result is in line with previous researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). An interesting remark is though that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare, group is higher for women ( $40.9\%<46.3\%$ ) but lower men ( $20.2\%>18.4\%$ ) in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP, than in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP . Further, the overall effect of sex is also greater in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP ( $b=-1.35>b=-1.01$ ).

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is ( $b=.61$ ), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 20.6%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 32.4%. Hence, women are less likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group ( $20.6\%<32.4\%$ ). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. Additionally, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is lower for both women ( $23.9\%>20.6\%$ ) and men ( $37.5\%>32.4$ ) in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP, than in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP, and the overall effect of sex is also lower in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP than in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP ( $b=.61<b=.65$ ).

Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> EP, and divergent to other researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group.

The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in the b coefficients' directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an

effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups, which is consistent with previous observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Wängnerud 1999; Yordanova 2009).

The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP. Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group, in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP.

Turning our attention instead to the results in Model 3 and Model 4, the results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that the main effect of sex and one of the interaction variables is significant in Model 3, more precisely, the results show that the main effect of sex and the interaction variable for sex\*Portugal on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (-1.18). To be able to see the size of the effect we simply  $\text{EXP}(-1.18)$  and get the value 0.31, which in percentage term mean that men MEPs from the United Kingdom are 69%<sup>21</sup> less likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs from the United Kingdom. Hence, women MEPs from the United Kingdom have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs from the United Kingdom.

The interaction variable for sex\*Portugal on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (b=-3.45). To be able to see the size of the effect we do the same procedure as in the section above. Thus adding the main effect of gender (b=-1.18) with the interaction variable (b=-3.45), which gives the value -4.63<sup>22</sup>, which we  $\text{EXP}(-4.63)$ , and get the value 0.01, which in percentage term mean that men MEPs from Portugal are 99.0%<sup>23</sup> less likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs from Portugal. Hence, women MEPs from Portugal have thus a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs Portugal.

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<sup>21</sup>  $(0.31-1)*100 = -69\%$

<sup>22</sup>  $-1.18+-3.45 = -4.63$

<sup>23</sup>  $(0.01-1)*100 = -99\%$

Thus, the results implies that being a woman from the United Kingdom or from Portugal, compared to being from any other member state, higher the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP. Additionally, the results also show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is greater for MEPs from Portugal than for MEPs from the United Kingdom (-4.63>-1.18). The results thus furthermore implies that being a woman from Portugal compared to being a women from The United Kingdom higher the likelihood even more of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP.

However, since no other interaction variables are significant it is hard to draw any interesting remarks of this finding. An added difficulty is that comparing this finding with the finding in Table 9, that being a woman from Belgium, compared to being from any other member state lowers the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group, does not seems to be fruitfully. Thus, further analysis of the results in the following EPs are therefore needed to be able to determine if this finding in Table 10 is relevant or not.

Further, the results in Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are significant. Hence, the results implies, as in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> EP, that being a women from a certain EP party group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP.

With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the results in Table 10 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP.

### **5.2.6 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP**

The results of the logistic regressions in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP are displayed in Table 11. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (b=-.98), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 43.6%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 22.6%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the

Social welfare group (43.6%>22.6%). Again, the result is in line with previous researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). The probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is lower for women (46.3%>43.6%) but higher for men (18.4%<22.6%) in the 6<sup>th</sup>, than in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP. The overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP, than in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP ( $b=-.98 < b=-1.35$ ).

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is ( $b=.63$ ), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 23.2%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic function group is 36.2%. Hence, women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group (23.2%>36.2%). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is higher for both women (20.6%<23.2) and men (32.4<36.2) in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP, than in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP. The overall effect of sex is also higher in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP than in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP ( $b=.63 > b=.61$ ).

Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> EP, and divergent to other researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group.

The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in the b coefficients' directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups, which is consistent with previous researchers' observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Wängnerud 1999; Yordanova 2009).

The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood, than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP. Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group or in the Economic/Technic group in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP.



We now leave the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead turn our attention to the results in Model 3 and Model 4. The results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are significant. Hence the results implies, as in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> EP, that being a women MEP from a certain member state does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP. Further, the results also implies, as in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and the 5<sup>th</sup> EP, that being a women from a certain EP party group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP.

With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the results in Table 11 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP.

### **5.2.7 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP**

The results of the logistic regressions in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP are displayed in Table 12. The results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is ( $b=-.82$ ), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 38.0%, whilst the predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 21.9%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group ( $38.0\% > 21.9\%$ ). Again, the result is in line with previous researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). The probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is lower for both women ( $43.6\% > 38.0$ ) and for men ( $22.6\% > 21.9\%$ ) in the 7<sup>th</sup>, than in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP. The overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP, than in both the 6<sup>th</sup> and the 5<sup>th</sup> EP ( $b-.82 < b=-.98 < b=-1.35$ ).

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is ( $b=.54$ ), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 25.1%, whilst the predicted

probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 36.0%. Hence, women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group ( $25.1\% < 36.0\%$ ). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is lower for women ( $23.2\% > 25.1\%$ ) but higher men ( $36.2\% < 36.0\%$ ) in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP, than in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP. The overall effect of sex is though lower in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP than in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP ( $b = -.54 < b = .63$ ).

Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> EP, and divergent to other researchers' observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group.

The results from Model 2 show that the effect on sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there are no changes in the b coefficients' directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party group. The results in Model 2, also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups, which is consistent with previous observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Wängnerud 1999; Yordanova 2009).

The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood, than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP. Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP.

Leaving the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead turning our attention to the results in Model 3 and Model 4. The results in Model 4 show that the main effect of sex and one of the interaction variables is significant, more precisely, the results show that the main effect of sex and the interaction variable for sex\*Liberals on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is significant.

The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (-0.88). To be able to see the size of the effect we simply  $\text{EXP}(-0.88)$  and get the value 0.42,

which in percentage term mean that men MEPs from the Others EP party group are 58%<sup>24</sup> less likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs from the Others EP party group. Hence, women from the Others EP party group have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs from the Others EP party group.

The interaction term for sex\*Liberals on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (b=1.37). To be able to see the size of the effect we do the same procedure as before. Thus adding the main effect of sex (b=-.88) with the interaction variable (b=1.37), which gives the value 0.49<sup>25</sup>, which we EXP(0.49), and get the value 1.63, which in percentage term mean that men MEPs from the Liberals EP party group are 63%<sup>26</sup> more likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs from the Liberals EP party group. Hence, women MEPs from the Liberals EP party group have a lower likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs from the Liberals EP party group. Thus, the results implies that being a woman from the Others EP Party group, compared to being from another EP Party group, higher the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, while being a women from the Liberals EP party group, compared to being from any another EP Party groups, lower the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP. However, since no other interaction variables are significant it is hard to draw any interesting remarks of this finding. An added difficulty is, as mentioned before, that the classification of the control variable EP party group induces that the Others EP party group consists of MEPs from the smaller EP party groups and the non-attached members in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP.

### 5.2.8 Summary

The result from the analysis shows that women have a higher likelihood than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, in all EPs. This finding is well in line with other researchers' observations of committee assignments in national Parliaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999) and consistent with Hypothesis 2a, which implicates that Hypothesis 2a is accepted. However, there are no evidence in the data of a pattern that the effect of sex have been decreasing over time, which

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<sup>24</sup>  $(0.42-1)*100 = -58\%$

<sup>25</sup>  $-.88+1.37 = 0.49$

<sup>26</sup>  $(1.63-1)*100 = 63\%$

is contrary to the findings of Wängnerud (199) who found that the effect of sex on committee assignments to the Social welfare group in the Swedish Parliament decreased over time, and that the effect of sex no longer was significant after the 1994 election.

Further, the result from the analysis also shows, consistent with Hypothesis 2b, that sex does not have an effect on assignments to EP committees in the Culture/Law group in any of the EPs. The finding thus implicates that Hypothesis 2a is accepted.

However, contrary to Hypothesis 2c, the result from the analysis show that women have a lower likelihood than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in all EPs, except for in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP. Hence, the finding implies that Hypothesis 2c is rejected. Additional, as in the Social welfare group, there is no evidence in the data of a pattern that the effect of sex has been decreasing over time.

The result from the analysis furthermore show, contrary to Hypothesis 2c, that sex only had an effect on assignments to EP committees in the Economic group in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP. In the other EPs, sex did not have an effect. Hence, the finding thus implies that Hypothesis 2c is rejected. Further, the finding is also divergent to other researchers' observations of committee assignments in national Parliaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). A summary of the 2<sup>nd</sup> set of hypothesis is not displayed in Table 14. Additionally, except for minor expectations in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> EP, the results from the analysis show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups. These findings are thus consistent with previous researchers' observations (Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009) that the composition of the EP committees is largely proportional to the national and partisan composition of the plenary.

Moreover, the results showed that the control variable nationality interacted with sex in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> EP. In the 4<sup>th</sup> EP, being a woman from Belgium compared to being from any other member state decreased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. While in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP, being a woman from the United Kingdom or from Portugal, compared to being from any other member state, increased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, and that being a woman from Portugal compared to being a women from The United Kingdom increased the likelihood even more. It is difficulty to draw any interesting remarks of these inductive findings since comparing the finding in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP with the finding in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP does not seem to give any fruitful insights. Further, since no other interaction variables in the different EPs were significant the result of the analysis thus implies that being a woman from a certain member

state do not increase or decrease the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups.

In the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP, the result showed that the control variable EP party group interacted with sex. Hence, being a woman from the Others EP Party group, compared to being from another EP Party group, increased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, while being a women from the Liberals EP party group, compared to being from another EP Party group, decreased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP. However, as mentioned before, the classification of the control variable EP party group induces that the Others EP party group consists of MEPs from the smaller EP party groups and the non-attached members in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP. Thus, the result may be a product of a methodological choice in the classification process of the EP party groups. Further, since no other interaction variables in the different EPs were significant, the result of the analysis implies that being a woman from a certain EP party group do not increase or decrease the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups.

**Table 14: Summary of the 2<sup>nd</sup> set of Hypotheses**

	<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Decision</b>
H2a:	The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is increased by being a woman.	Accepted
H2b:	The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group is neither increased nor decreased by being a woman.	Accepted
H2c:	The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions groups is neither decreased nor increased by being a woman.	Rejected
H2d:	The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is decreased by being a woman.	Rejected

**Table 6: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP (1979-1984)**

	Social welfare				Culture/Law				Basic functions				Economic/Technic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sex	<b>-0.96**</b> (.29)	<b>-0.96**</b> (.30)	.02 (.84)	-1.10 (.86)	.48 (.34)	.48 (.35)	.30 (.84)	20.38 (14210.04)	.45 (.30)	.42 (.31)	-.92 (.66)	-.44 (.82)	.46 (.28)	.45 (.29)	1.35 (.82)	.99 (.88)
<i>Nationality</i>																
Belgium		.46 (.56)	1.91 (1.20)			.23 (.56)	-19.70 (17974.84)			-.26 (.52)	-21.39 (17974.84)			-.01 (.49)	1.91 (1.20)	
Denmark		-1.45 (1.12)	.41 (1.39)			.10 (.75)	-19.70 (20096.48)			.74 (.62)	-.18 (1.17)			-.30 (.64)	.41 (1.39)	
France		-.11 (.47)	-.11 (1.01)			.15 (.44)	-.11 (1.01)			-.33 (.40)	-1.14 (.80)			-.11 (.38)	1.28 (.91)	
Germany		.02 (.42)	1.50 (.97)			.00 (.39)	-19.70 (11602.71)			-.12 (.35)	-1.28 (.90)			.21 (.33)	.41 (1.03)	
Greece		-.92 (.81)	1.50 (1.62)			.64 (.53)	-19.70 (28420.72)			.22 (.49)	-21.39 (28420.73)			-.39 (.50)	1.50 (1.62)	
Ireland		.49 (.68)	22.71 (40192.98)			-19.97 (10363.61)	-19.70 (40192.97)			.79 (.59)	-21.39 (40192.98)			-.20 (.59)	-19.70 (40192.98)	
Italy		-.19 (.47)	1.10 (1.01)			.49 (.41)	.66 (1.04)			.00 (.37)	-21.39 (12710.14)			-.35 (.37)	.66 (1.04)	
Luxembourg		.99 (.98)	22.71 (40192.97)			-.06 (1.16)	-19.70 (40192.97)			-20.61 (17917.67)	-21.39 (40192.97)			-.07 (.95)	-19.70 (40192.97)	
Netherlands		.67 (.54)	1.10 (1.20)			1.00 (.51)	<b>2.89*</b> (1.36)			-.27 (.52)	-.59 (1.10)			-.77 (.54)	-19.70 (17974.85)	
<i>EP party group</i>																
Radical left		.08 (.57)		-.34 (1.00)		-.66 (.55)		19.01 (14210.04)		.45 (.48)		-1.69 (1.28)		-.26 (.45)		1.10 (1.03)
Socialists		-.11 (.47)		-.08 (.83)		-.09 (.44)		20.10 (14210.04)		.40 (.41)		-.59 (.85)		-.39 (.38)		.00 (.93)
Liberals		.18 (.56)		-.18 (1.13)		-.30 (.55)		19.59 (14210.04)		.40 (.50)		-.18 (1.13)		-.21 (.47)		.41 (1.19)
Conservatives		-.20 (.48)		-.10 (.89)		-.01 (0.44)		19.66 (14210.04)		.33 (.41)		-.36 (.90)		-.26 (.38)		.22 (.97)
<i>Interaction</i>																
<i>Sex*Nationality</i>																
Sex*Belgium			-1.75 (1.37)				20.13 (17974.84)				21.59 (17974.84)				-2.29 (1.32)	
Sex*Denmark			-20.12 (12710.13)				20.06 (20096.48)				.92 (1.36)				-.66 (1.56)	
Sex*France			.35 (1.10)				.07 (1.09)				.91 (.89)				-1.62 (.99)	
Sex*Germany			-1.86 (1.08)				19.84 (11602.71)				1.39 (.97)				-.25 (1.09)	
Sex*Greece			-3.06 (1.94)				20.34 (28420.72)				21.94 (28420.73)				-2.11 (1.70)	
Sex*Ireland			-22.52 (40192.98)				-.30 (41603.68)				22.41 (40192.98)				19.57 (40192.98)	

Sex*Italy			-1.44 (1.12)				-0.41 (1.12)				21.78 (12710.14)				-1.10 (1.10)	
Sex*Luxembourg			-22.32 (40192.97)				19.80 (40192.97)				.92 (44937.11)				19.85 (40192.97)	
Sex*Netherlands			-.39 (1.34)				-2.46 (1.48)				.30 (1.24)				19.08 (17974.85)	
<i>Interaction</i>																
<i>Sex*EP party group</i>																
Sex*Radical left			.37 (1.19)				-19.57 (14210.04)				2.35 (1.38)				-1.77 (1.14)	
Sex*Socialists			.04 (.98)				-20.45 (14210.04)				1.04 (.95)				-0.30 (1.01)	
Sex*Liberals			.60 (1.29)				-19.96 (14210.04)				.44 (1.25)				-0.70 (1.29)	
Sex*Conservatives			.06 (1.02)				-19.83 (14210.04)				.71 (.99)				-0.41 (1.04)	
Constant	<b>-0.63*</b> (0.25)	-0.53 (.57)	<b>-1.50*</b> (0.78)	-0.51 (0.73)	<b>-1.56***</b> (.32)	-1.64 (.58)	-1.50 (.78)	-21.20 (14210.04)	<b>-1.04***</b> (.27)	<b>-1.30*</b> (.52)	.18 (.61)	-.51 (.73)	<b>-.83**</b> (.26)	-.43 (.49)	-1.50 (.78)	-1.10 (.82)
Observations	411	411	411	411	4114	411	411	411	411	411	411	411	411	411	411	411
-2LL	400.54	390.86	376.68	399.49	451.66	434.75	420.79	445.66	524.84	513.35	496.10	520.42	547.61	541.34	531.92	543.24
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.04	0.01	0.07	0.12	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.02
Percentage Classified	80.0%	80.0%	80.8%	80.0%	75.9%	75.9%	76.6%	75.9%	65.9%	66.4%	66.7%	65.9%	60.8%	61.3%	61.1%	60.8%

Comment: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.001, \*\*\*p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.

**Table 7: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 2nd EP (1984-1989)**

	Social welfare				Culture/Law				Basic functions				Economic/Technic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sex	<b>-1.77***</b> (0.26)	<b>-1.83***</b> (.27)	<b>-1.37*</b> (.66)	<b>-1.68*</b> (.69)	.11 (.30)	.03 (.31)	1.03 (1.09)	-.14 (.73)	<b>.89**</b> (.30)	<b>.91**</b> (.31)	.31 (.72)	1.74 (1.08)	<b>.68*</b> (.29)	<b>.77*</b> (.30)	.59 (.71)	1.41 (1.08)
<i>Nationality</i>																
Belgium		.15 (.57)	.41 (1.08)			.76 (.54)	1.01 (1.53)			.20 (.52)	-.29 (1.30)			-.22 (.53)	.69 (1.13)	
Denmark		-.60 (.72)	-.92 (1.02)			-.39 (.83)	1.48 (1.34)			.39 (.63)	-.69 (1.27)			.23 (.63)	.81 (1.01)	
France		.28 (.42)	.69 (.80)			.24 (.44)	.53 (1.29)			-.15 (.40)	-.29 (.93)			-.03 (.38)	-.29 (.93)	
Germany		-.07 (.40)	.69 (.80)			.11 (.41)	1.01 (1.23)			-.09 (.36)	-.29 (.93)			.26 (.34)	-.29 (.93)	
Greece		-.65 (.71)	21.20 (28420.72)			.95 (.54)	-18.80 (28420.73)			<b>1.14*</b> (.51)	-20.10 (28420.73)			-.90 (.61)	-20.10 (28420.72)	
Ireland		.40 (.67)	.00 (1.53)			-.48 (.84)	2.40 (1.76)			.12 (.63)	-20.10 (28420.72)			-.27 (.65)	-20.10 (28420.72)	
Italy		.05 (.43)	.51 (.93)			.51 (.42)	1.89 (1.27)			.00 (.38)	-.85 (1.26)			-.24 (.38)	-.85 (1.26)	
Luxembourg		-.22 (1.28)	21.20 (40192.97)			1.51 (1.04)	-18.80 (40192.97)			-.20 (1.19)	-20.10 (40192.97)			.67 (1.04)	22.30 (40192.97)	
Netherland		.10 (.56)	.29 (.96)			-.24 (.63)	.61 (1.50)			.48 (.49)	.18 (1.07)			-.32 (.52)	-.69 (1.27)	
Portugal		.77 (.57)	.00 (1.53)			-.09 (.65)	-18.80 (28420.72)			-.11 (.55)	1.10 (1.56)			-.18 (.53)	-20.10 (28420.72)	
Spain		-.28 (.45)	.00 (1.00)			.21 (.44)	2.40 (1.33)			.27 (.38)	-20.10 (16408.71)			-.31 (.38)	-20.10 (16408.71)	
<i>EP party group</i>																
Radical left		-.31 (.48)		-.34 (.92)		-.49 (.49)		-.27 (1.05)		.17 (.43)		.22 (1.49)		.05 (.46)		1.61 (1.26)
Socialists		-.26 (.35)		-.32 (.72)		-.17 (.35)		-.37 (.80)		-.03 (.32)		.95 (1.13)		.37 (.33)		.76 (1.14)
Liberals		-.58 (.50)		-.56 (1.18)		-.19 (.48)		-20.22 (20096.48)		-.09 (.44)		2.30 (1.45)		.47 (.43)		1.20 (1.56)
Conservatives		-.23 (.35)		-.05 (.76)		-.21 (.35)		-.35 (.84)		-.01 (.32)		.69 (1.18)		.35 (.33)		1.20 (1.15)
<i>Interaction</i>																
<i>Sex*Nationality</i>																
Sex*Belgium			-.36 (1.26)				-.18 (1.63)				.54 (1.41)				-1.21 (1.27)	
Sex*Denmark			1.18 (1.34)				-21.32 (14210.36)				1.48 (1.48)				-1.40 (1.33)	
Sex*France			-.49 (.91)				-.24 (1.36)				.17 (1.01)				.13 (1.00)	
Sex*Germany			-1.01 (.92)				-1.01 (1.30)				.21 (1.00)				.61 (1.00)	



Sex*Greece			-22.78 (28420.72)			19.77 (28420.73)				21.51 (28420.73)				19.23 (28420.72)		
Sex*Ireland			.56 (1.67)			-3.52 (2.07)				20.42 (28420.72)				19.80 (28420.72)		
Sex*Italy			-.60 (1.03)			-1.64 (1.34)				1.01 (1.31)				.53 (1.31)		
Sex*Luxembourg			-41.04 (46410.84)			20.87 (40192.97)				20.20 (40192.97)				-22.48 (40192.97)		
Sex*Netherland			-.24 (1.15)			-.91 (1.66)				.29 (1.20)				.43 (1.39)		
Sex*Portugal			.60 (1.62)			18.67 (28420.72)				-1.29 (1.66)				20.06 (28420.72)		
Sex*Spain			-.36 (1.12)			-2.49 (1.41)				20.55 (16408.71)				19.86 (16408.71)		
<i>Interaction</i>																
<i>Sex*EP party group</i>																
Sex*Radical left			.03 (1.05)			-.03 (1.16)				.01 (1.55)				-1.97 (1.35)		
Sex*Socialists			-.03 (.80)			.27 (.87)				-1.01 (1.17)				-.38 (1.19)		
Sex*Liberals			.19 (1.28)			20.17 (20096.48)				-2.64 (1.51)				-.85 (1.62)		
Sex*Conservatives			-.37 (.83)			.19 (.87)				-.73 (1.22)				-.88 (1.19)		
Constant	.34 (22)	.59 (.48)	.00 (.58)	.56 (.63)	<b>-1.34***</b> (.27)	-1.33 (.51)	<b>-2.40*</b> (1.04)	-.98 (.68)	<b>-1.50***</b> (.29)	<b>-1.60**</b> (.48)	-1.10 (.67)	<b>-2.30*</b> (1.05)	<b>-1.34***</b> (.27)	<b>-1.60**</b> (.48)	-1.10 (.67)	<b>-2.30*</b> (1.05)
Observations	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495	495
-2LL	517.29	509.23	500.05	515.29	524.28	513.76	499.20	521.69	614.60	604.84	595.53	609.94	613.96	603.74	594.61	607.39
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.14	.16	.18	.14	.00	.03	.08	.01	.03	.05	.08	.04	.02	.05	.07	.04
Percentage Classified	77.0%	72.2%	77.6%	77.0%	77.8%	78.0%	78.0%	77.8%	67.5%	68.7%	68.7%	67.5%	68.1%	67.9%	68.3%	68.1%

Comment: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.001, \*\*\*p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.

**Table 8: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP (1989-1994)**

	Social Welfare				Culture/Law				Basic functions				Economic/Technic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sex	<b>-1.82***</b> (.23)	<b>-1.84***</b> (.25)	<b>-2.50**</b> (.74)	<b>-1.49**</b> (.51)	.11 (.24)	-.03 (.25)	-.21 (.67)	.47 (.57)	<b>.92**</b> (.27)	<b>.84**</b> (.28)	1.84 (1.08)	1.10 (.60)	.48 (.26)	.58 (.27)	1.70 (1.08)	.28 (.57)
<i>Nationality</i>																
Belgium		.11 (.54)	-1.39 (1.01)			.76 (.48)	.41 (.98)				-.59 (.57)	.61 (1.50)		.18 (.51)	2.11 (1.29)	
Denmark		.02 (.66)	.51 (1.28)			-20.37 (10375.46)	-20.51 (16408.71)				-.55 (.72)	.79 (1.51)		.93 (.60)	.79 (1.51)	
France		-.54 (.42)	-1.22 (.82)			.03 (.37)	-.18 (.81)				-.15 (.38)	1.52 (1.17)		.12 (.38)	.86 (1.22)	
Germany		-.22 (.39)	-.81 (.77)			-.17 (.36)	-.05 (.73)				-.08 (.36)	.61 (1.18)		.22 (.36)	1.10 (1.14)	
Greece		.12 (.55)	.31 (.56)			.71 (.49)	.74 (.49)				.13 (.50)	.05 (.49)		-.29 (.54)	-.41 (.54)	
Ireland		-.53 (.75)	-22.30 (28420.72)			.13 (.62)	.69 (1.54)				.78 (.60)	-18.80 (28420.72)		-.48 (.71)	2.40 (1.76)	
Italy		-.13 (.40)	-1.10 (.88)			.14 (.36)	.00 (.87)				.08 (.36)	1.30 (1.24)		-.09 (.37)	1.30 (1.24)	
Luxembourg		1.20 (.99)	20.10 (23205.42)			-.79 (1.13)	-20.51 (23205.42)				-.60 (1.14)	-18.80 (23205.42)		-.60 (1.13)	1.70 (1.61)	
Netherland		.11 (.53)	-.18 (1.07)			-.32 (.54)	-.22 (1.04)				.26 (.50)	.61 (1.50)		-.25 (.54)	1.48 (1.34)	
Portugal		-.11 (.59)	20.10 (23205.42)			-.03 (.54)	.00 (1.37)				.78 (.51)	-18.80 (23205.42)		-.82 (.63)	-18.80 (23205.42)	
Spain		-.36 (.43)	-.54 (.92)			.11 (.38)	-.81 (.99)				.16 (.37)	1.84 (1.22)		-.09 (.39)	.89 (1.30)	
<i>EP party group</i>																
Radical left		.12 (.71)		-.88 (1.30)		-.17 (.67)		.53 (1.33)		-.37 (.69)		.81 (1.34)		.05 (.73)		.53 (1.33)
Socialists		-.21 (.32)		.22 (.53)		-.09 (.29)		.32 (.61)		-.21 (.29)		-.37 (.71)		.14 (.30)		-.16 (.63)
Liberals		-.23 (.46)		1.20 (.90)		.06 (.41)		.38 (.86)		-.23 (.41)		-.69 (1.19)		.39 (.41)		-.16 (.94)
Conservatives		-.05 (.33)		.25 (.58)		.04 (.30)		.48 (.65)		-.16 (.30)		.59 (.69)		.22 (.31)		-.08 (.69)
<i>Interaction</i>																
<i>Sex*Nationality</i>																
Sex*Belgium			2.10 (1.17)				.50 (1.12)				-1.30 (1.63)				-2.37 (1.42)	
Sex*Denmark			-1.18 (1.69)				.21 (21183.56)				-1.48 (1.73)				.60 (1.69)	
Sex*France			.97 (.95)				.27 (.90)				-1.86 (1.23)				-.83 (1.28)	
Sex*Germany			.81 (.90)				-.22 (.85)				-.65 (1.24)				-.93 (1.21)	
Sex*Greece																

Sex*Ireland	22.50															
	(28420.72)															
Sex*Italy	1.26															
	(.99)															
Sex*Luxembourg	-19.39															
	(23205.42)															
Sex*Netherland	.33															
	(1.25)															
Sex*Portugal	-20.49															
	(23205.42)															
Sex*Spain	.18															
	(1.05)															
<i>Interaction</i>																
<i>Sex*EP party group</i>																
Sex*Radical left	1.33															
	(1.50)															
Sex*Socialists	-.43															
	(.63)															
Sex*Liberals	-1.95															
	(1.08)															
Sex*Conservatives	-.21															
	(.68)															
Constant	.41*	.70	1.10	.18	<b>-.91***</b>	-.81	-.69	<b>-1.22*</b>	<b>-1.48***</b>	<b>-1.30**</b>	<b>-2.40*</b>	<b>-1.50**</b>	<b>-1.31***</b>	<b>-1.54***</b>	<b>.240*</b>	<b>-1.22*</b>
	(.20)	(.44)	(.67)	(.43)	(.21)	(.42)	(.61)	(.51)	(.25)	(.43)	(1.04)	(.55)	(.24)	(.44)	(1.04)	(.51)
Observations	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499	499
-2LL	533.17	526.60	512.35	527.07	613.29	594.24	590.45	612.44	615.88	606.15	595.95	611.20	592.40	583.59	573.11	590.94
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.17	.19	.22	.19	.00	.05	.06	.00	.04	.06	.09	.05	.01	.04	.06	.01
Percentage Classified	76.0%	76.0%	76.8	76.2%	69.5%	69.7%	69.5%	69.5%	67.5%	68.9%	68.7%	67.5	71.5%	71.5%	72.1%	71.5%

Comment: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.001, \*\*\*p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient reported for Sex\*Greece since no women MEPs in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP were from Greece. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.

**Table 9: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP (1994-1999)**

	Social welfare				Culture/Law				Basic functions				Economic/Technic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sex	<b>-1.01***</b> (.20)	<b>-1.03***</b> (.21)	-.85 (.58)	-.33 (.45)	-.25 (.20)	-.33 (.21)	-.47 (.61)	-.25 (.01)	<b>.65**</b> (.21)	<b>.61**</b> (.22)	.36 (.63)	.14 (.42)	.10 (.21)	.15 (.22)	-.23 (.61)	.56 (.54)
<i>Nationality</i>																
Austria		-.38 (.59)	-.04 (.92)			.79 (.52)	.50 (.94)			-.41 (.58)	.81 (.96)			-.12 (.58)		-20.41 (15191.52)
Belgium		-.07 (.54)	-.26 (.89)			.78 (.50)	-1.16 (1.20)			-.14 (.52)	.00 (1.00)			.04 (.52)		.28 (.91)
Denmark		.22 (.65)	.94 (1.00)			-.95 (.84)	-20.41 (16408.71)			-.02 (.66)	-20.10 (16408.71)			.09 (.66)		.10 (1.02)
Finland		-.97 (.83)	-1.13 (1.23)			-.90 (.83)	.38 (1.06)			.63 (.61)	.69 (1.08)			.67 (.61)		.38 (1.06)
France		-.38 (.39)	-.90 (.69)			.12 (.38)	.38 (.68)			-.06 (.37)	.15 (.73)			.32 (.38)		-.87 (.77)
Germany		-.57 (.37)	-.30 (.63)			-.08 (.36)	-.22 (.68)			-.04 (.33)	-.29 (.74)			.23 (.34)		.10 (.66)
Greece		-.25 (.54)	-.15 (1.04)			.20 (.52)	.38 (1.06)			.89 (.48)	1.50 (1.08)			-.17 (.54)		-20.41 (17974.84)
Ireland		.53 (.62)	1.35 (1.26)			.01 (.66)	.79 (1.14)			.52 (.60)	.00 (1.29)			.13 (.66)		-.31 (1.27)
Italy		-.11 (.37)	-.09 (.77)			.63 (.36)	.79 (.79)			.16 (.34)	.00 (.88)			-.49 (.38)		-1.61 (1.18)
Luxembourg		-.81 (1.15)	.25 (1.50)			1.75 (.91)	.79 (1.51)			-.79 (1.13)	-20.10 (28420.72)			.98 (.86)		.79 (1.51)
Netherlands		.28 (.49)	.94 (.87)			-.17 (.53)	-.46 (.97)			.34 (.47)	-.98 (1.21)			-.19 (.52)		.10 (.89)
Portugal		-.15 (.55)	.25 (1.12)			.06 (.54)	.79 (1.14)			.26 (.49)	-20.10 (20096.48)			.11 (.52)		-.31 (1.27)
Spain		-.37 (.41)	-.26 (.72)			.17 (.40)	.00 (.76)			.34 (.37)	.00 (.82)			-.07 (.39)		.28 (.75)
Sweden		.33 (.53)	.25 (.81)			-.55 (.62)	-.60 (.96)			-.06 (.55)	-.29 (.98)			-.17 (.58)		-.60 (.96)
<i>EP party group</i>																
Radical left		.12 (.47)		.61 (.77)		.12 (.44)		.34 (.76)		-.45 (.44)			-1.52 (1.12)	.08 (.50)		-.36 (1.17)
Socialists		.09 (.29)		.77 (.45)		-.20 (.27)		-.27 (.45)		-.37 (.26)			-.75 (.47)	.36 (.29)		.82 (.56)
Liberals		-.30 (.48)		.27 (.73)		.33 (.44)		-.42 (.77)		-.40 (.43)			-1.74 (1.11)	.54 (.45)		<b>1.54*</b> (.78)
Conservatives		-.04 (.29)		.32 (.50)		-.31 (.27)		-.29 (.50)		-.30 (.26)			-.54 (.51)	<b>.59*</b> (.29)		.75 (.60)
<i>Interaction</i>																
<i>Sex*Nationality</i>																
Sex*Austria			-.66 (1.22)				.47 (1.12)							-1.87 (1.25)		20.85 (15191.52)



**Table 10: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP (1999-2004)**

	Social Welfare				Culture/Law				Basic functions				Economic/Technic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sex	<b>-1.35***</b> (.17)	<b>-1.46***</b> (.19)	<b>-1.18*</b> (.53)	-.78 (.44)	-.05 (.18)	-.08 (.19)	.22 (.58)	-.53 (.42)	<b>.61**</b> (.19)	<b>.65**</b> (.20)	.35 (.63)	.26 (.44)	.23 (.19)	.28 (.20)	-.25 (.54)	.61 (.54)
<i>Nationality</i>																
Austria		-.52 (.60)	-.42 (.85)			.71 (.51)	.65 (.89)			-.22 (.62)	.35 (.99)			-.20 (.57)	-1.25 (1.16)	
Belgium		-.16 (.55)	.32 (.80)			.27 (.50)	.47 (.87)			.08 (.55)	.19 (.98)			-.38 (.56)	-1.39 (1.16)	
Cyprus		.32 (.96)	21.30 (40192.97)			-.57 (1.13)	-20.04 (40192.97)			1.16 (.87)	-19.76 (40192.97)			-20.40 (16397.71)	-20.51 (40192.97)	
Czech Republic		-.24 (.59)	.79 (1.30)			-.24 (.57)	.47 (1.33)			.34 (.53)	-19.76 (23205.42)			-.22 (.54)	-20.51 (23205.42)	
Denmark		.29 (.62)	.79 (.97)			-.50 (.70)	-.45 (1.21)			-.80 (.81)	-19.76 (16408.71)			.39 (.58)	.00 (.98)	
Estonia		-.48 (1.15)	-21.11 (40192.97)			-.64 (1.13)	22.37 (40192.97)			.36 (.91)	-19.76 (40192.97)			.16 (.90)	-20.51 (40192.98)	
Finland		-.47 (.66)	.38 (.88)			-.51 (.69)	.88 (.92)			.73 (.59)	-19.76 (15191.52)			.12 (.60)	-.22 (.96)	
France		-.60 (.38)	-.40 (.55)			.25 (.35)	.43 (.62)			.34 (.37)	.16 (.68)			-.35 (.37)	-.76 (.62)	
Germany		-.62 (.37)	-.76 (.57)			-.12 (.34)	.43 (.62)			.45 (.35)	-.01 (.70)			-.07 (.33)	-.17 (.59)	
Greece		-.53 (.59)	.50 (1.01)			-.10 (.54)	-20.04 (17974.84)			.83 (.50)	.06 (1.25)			-.33 (.54)	-.69 (1.21)	
Hungary		.45 (.52)	.79 (1.30)			.31 (.50)	-20.04 (23205.42)			-.20 (.57)	2.14 (1.34)			-.78 (.60)	-20.51 (23205.43)	
Ireland		-.18 (.68)	-.31 (1.01)			.41 (.62)	-.22 (1.23)			.89 (.62)	1.04 (1.07)			-.31 (.71)	-.69 (1.21)	
Italy		-.08 (.37)	-.31 (.78)			.48 (.33)	.76 (.82)			.10 (.36)	1.45 (.84)			-.42 (.36)	-1.50 (1.15)	
Latvia		-1.24 (1.15)	-.60 (1.30)			.09 (.88)	.47 (1.33)			1.03 (.82)	.75 (1.34)			-.86 (1.11)	-20.51 (23205.42)	
Lithuania		-.39 (.83)	-21.11 (40192.97)			-.64 (.82)	-20.04 (40192.97)			.72 (.65)	-19.76 (40192.96)			-.30 (.71)	21.90 (40192.97)	
Luxembourg		.15 (.94)	21.30 (28420.72)			-20.23 (16399.36)	-20.04 (28420.72)			.53 (.91)	-19.76 (28420.72)			1.61 (.90)	21.90 (28420.72)	
Malta		.22 (1.19)	.17 (1.19)			-.07 (1.18)	-.16 (1.19)			.01 (1.19)	.00 (1.19)			-.30 (1.18)	-.16 (1.19)	
Netherland		.64 (.46)	1.35 (.91)			-.08 (.48)	.94 (.84)			.40 (.47)	-19.76 (13397.66)			-.34 (.50)	-.56 (.93)	
Poland		-.37 (.44)	-.60 (.83)			-.02 (.40)	.47 (.87)			.02 (.42)	.19 (.98)			.14 (.38)	-1.39 (1.16)	
Portugal		-.15 (.54)	1.89 (1.17)			.07 (.51)	-.63 (1.20)			.69 (.50)	-19.76 (15191.51)			-.78 (.60)	-1.10 (1.18)	
Slovakia		.06 (.67)	21.30 (23205.42)			.10 (.64)	-20.04 (23205.42)			-.17 (.71)	-19.76 (23205.42)			-.42 (.70)	-20.51 (23205.42)	

Slovenia	.30 (.90)	-21.11 (40192.97)								
Spain	-.56 (.41)	-.19 (.62)								
Sweden	.97 (.52)	.32 (.80)								
<i>EP party group</i>										
Radical left	.29 (.39)	1.17 (.62)								
Socialists	.08 (.28)	.61 (.42)								
Liberals	-.31 (.40)	.66 (.58)								
Conservatives	-.04 (.27)	.10 (.44)								
<i>Interaction</i>										
<i>Sex*Nationality</i>										
Sex*Austria		-.02 (1.19)			.13 (1.09)					1.38 (1.34)
Sex*Belgium		-.92 (1.14)			-.22 (1.07)					1.31 (1.33)
Sex*Cyprus		-21.41 (40192.97)			19.59 (40192.97)					.25 (44029.19)
Sex*Czech Republic		-1.25 (1.47)			-.92 (1.47)					20.60 (23205.42)
Sex*Denmark		-.90 (1.29)			.00 (1.47)					.53 (16408.71)
Sex*Estonia		20.99 (40192.97)			-42.63 (44029.19)					21.04 (40192.98)
Sex*Finland		-20.31 (13397.66)			-21.14 (13397.66)					.47 (1.22)
Sex*France		-.09 (.75)			-.28 (.75)					.49 (.77)
Sex*Germany		.52 (.72)			-.90 (.75)					.07 (.71)
Sex*Greece		-1.43 (1.29)			20.13 (17974.84)					.53 (1.34)
Sex*Hungary		-.43 (1.42)			20.49 (23205.42)					20.00 (23205.43)
Sex*Ireland		.33 (1.33)			.94 (1.43)					-.38 (1.48)
Sex*Italy		.24 (.88)			-.38 (.90)					1.26 (1.21)
Sex*Latvia		-19.33 (20096.49)			-.63 (1.78)					20.35 (23205.42)
Sex*Lithuania		20.88 (40192.97)			19.47 (40192.97)					-22.46 (40192.97)
Sex*Luxembourg		-41.23 (34808.13)			-.22 (34808.13)					-20.96 (28420.72)
Sex*Malta										

Sex*Netherland																	
Sex*Poland																	
Sex*Portugal																	
Sex*Slovakia																	
Sex*Slovenia																	
Sex*Spain																	
Sex*Sweden																	
<i>Interaction</i>																	
<i>Sex*EP party group</i>																	
Sex*Radical left																	
Sex*Socialists																	
Sex*Liberals																	
Sex*Conservatives																	
Constant																	
Observations																	
-2LL																	
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>																	
Percentage Classified																	

Comment: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.001, \*\*\*p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient reported for Sex\*Malta since no women MEPs in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP were from Malta. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.



**Table 11: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP (2004-2009)**

	Social welfare				Culture/Law				Basic functions				Economic/Technic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sex	<b>-0.98***</b> (.17)	<b>-0.96***</b> (.18)	-.78 (.56)	-.74 (.44)	-.19 (.19)	-.24 (.20)	.48 (.70)	-.31 (.46)	<b>.63**</b> (-1.20)	<b>-0.60**</b> (.19)	.73 (.63)	.75 (.46)	.16 (.18)	.21 (.19)	.49 (.63)	.71 (.54)
<i>Nationality</i>																
Austria		-.56 (.64)	-.60 (.96)			.58 (.58)	1.39 (.99)			.10 (.57)	1.03 (.95)			-.27 (.63)	-19.88 (15191.51)	
Belgium		.18 (.52)	1.23 (.96)			-.65 (.68)	-19.53 (15191.51)			.09 (.51)	.41 (1.01)			-.39 (.47)	-19.88 (15191.52)	
Cyprus		.37 (.92)	.41 (.92)			-.18 (1.14)	-.41 (1.14)			.67 (.86)	.59 (.86)			-20.27 (16391.63)	-20.37 (16408.71)	
Czech Republic		.14 (.52)	.72 (1.02)			-.25 (.63)	.29 (1.28)			-.15 (.53)	-.06 (1.25)			.09 (.53)	-.06 (1.25)	
Denmark		.23 (.63)	-1.07 (1.21)			-.50 (.82)	-19.53 (17974.84)			.25 (.62)	.92 (1.07)			.69 (.60)	1.73 (1.07)	
Estonia		.13 (.93)	.32 (1.49)			-.27 (1.14)	1.67 (1.55)			.18 (.91)	-19.88 (28420.72)			-.68 (1.13)	-19.88 (28420.72)	
Finland		.53 (.62)	21.52 (17974.84)			.39 (.66)	.29 (1.28)			-.43 (.70)	-19.88 (17974.84)			.37 (.62)	-.06 (1.25)	
France		-.15 (.37)	-.06 (.59)			-.22 (.41)	.58 (.75)			-.07 (.36)	-.62 (.78)			.25 (.36)	.81 (.67)	
Germany		-.12 (.35)	-.11 (.59)			-.19 (.39)	.17 (.77)			-.01 (.34)	.01 (.71)			.05 (.34)	.63 (.67)	
Greece		-.37 (.55)	.61 (.89)			.48 (.54)	.76 (1.05)			.47 (.49)	1.03 (.95)			-.36 (.57)	.41 (1.01)	
Hungary		.05 (.52)	.32 (.85)			.24 (.55)	2.18 (.96)			-.05 (.52)	.22 (.99)			.05 (.52)	-19.88 (14210.36)	
Ireland		.63 (.63)	.72 (1.02)			.03 (.72)	.29 (1.28)			.31 (.63)	.92 (1.07)			-.70 (.81)	-19.88 (17974.84)	
Italy		-.12 (.37)	-.37 (.72)			.47 (.38)	.98 (.83)			-.27 (.36)	-.55 (.95)			-.09 (.37)	.92 (.77)	
Latvia		.29 (.77)	-20.88 (28420.72)			-.04 (.86)	1.67 (1.55)			-.61 (.85)	1.32 (1.52)			-.28 (.85)	-19.88 (28420.72)	
Lithuania		-.90 (.83)	-.09 (1.02)			.06 (.73)	.29 (1.28)			.43 (.64)	-19.88 (17974.84)			.14 (.66)	1.73 (1.07)	
Luxembourg		-.06 (.93)	-.37 (1.31)			-.37 (1.13)	.98 (1.38)			-.73 (.113)	.63 (1.35)			.99 (.86)	.63 (1.35)	
Malta		-20.12 (17974.63)	-20.10 (17974.84)			-19.76 (17969.66)	-20.01 (17974.84)			-.74 (1.15)	-.80 (1.15)			22.08 (17974.72)	22.03 (17974.84)	
Netherlands		.17 (.49)	-.02 (.75)			-.49 (.61)	.58 (.92)			.50 (.47)	.22 (.87)			-.48 (.56)	.22 (.87)	
Poland		-.30 (.43)	-.09 (1.02)			-.19 (.46)	1.27 (1.11)			.30 (.38)	-.06 (1.25)			-.43 (.43)	-19.88 (17974.85)	
Portugal		-.57 (.58)	-.37 (.98)			.30 (.56)	.06 (1.26)			.45 (.49)	.63 (1.03)			-.66 (.61)	-.29 (1.23)	
Slovakia		.16 (.63)	1.70 (1.21)			-.52 (.82)	.29 (1.28)			-.13 (.65)	-.06 (1.25)			.05 (.65)	-19.88 (17974.84)	

Slovenia	-1.14 (1.13)	-.37 (1.31)	1.00 (.82)	.98 (1.38)	.01 (.88)	-19.88 (23205.42)	.03 (.88)	.63 (1.35)
Spain	-.41 (.42)	-.13 (.67)	.50 (.42)	.06 (.89)	.25 (.39)	.87 (.74)	.11 (.40)	.37 (.77)
Sweden	.47 (.54)	.14 (.76)	-.43 (.69)	.69 (.92)	-.75 (.69)	.34 (.88)	.01 (.59)	-.98 (1.19)
<i>EP party group</i>								
Radical left	.33 (.42)	.85 (.69)	-.34 (.47)	-.67 (.87)	-.26 (.41)	.00 (.78)	-.10 (.45)	-.71 (1.15)
Socialists	.19 (.27)	.33 (.43)	-.29 (.29)	-.28 (.48)	-.25 (.26)	-.20 (.49)	.11 (.27)	.67 (.55)
Liberals	-.06 (.34)	-.32 (.53)	-.15 (.35)	-.20 (.67)	-.38 (.32)	-.04 (.58)	.16 (.33)	.99 (.61)
Conservatives	.21 (.26)	.45 (.44)	-.17 (.27)	-.16 (.49)	-.24 (.24)	-.09 (.50)	.13 (.26)	.67 (.56)
<i>Interaction</i>								
<i>Sex*Nationality</i>								
Sex*Austria		.19 (1.27)		-1.17 (1.24)		-1.43 (1.20)		20.15 (15191.51)
Sex*Belgium		-1.68 (1.19)		19.18 (15191.51)		-.42 (1.16)		19.84 (15191.52)
Sex*Cyprus								
Sex*Czech Republic		-.65 (1.19)		-.77 (1.46)		-.12 (1.37)		.12 (1.38)
Sex*Denmark		1.94 (1.42)		19.47 (17974.84)		-1.02 (1.31)		-1.59 (1.32)
Sex*Estonia		-.32 (1.91)		-21.68 (20096.49)		20.47 (28420.72)		19.61 (28420.72)
Sex*Finland		-22.50 (17974.84)		.22 (1.50)		19.78 (17974.84)		.67 (1.45)
Sex*France		-.09 (.75)		-1.25 (.92)		.81 (.88)		-.88 (.80)
Sex*Germany		.09 (.72)		-.46 (.90)		-.02 (.80)		-.84 (.79)
Sex*Greece		-1.52 (1.21)		-.44 (1.22)		-.80 (1.10)		-1.12 (1.23)
Sex*Hungary		-.32 (1.07)		-3.70 (1.45)		-.42 (1.16)		20.46 (14210.36)
Sex*Ireland		-.14 (1.30)		-.19 (1.55)		-.84 (1.33)		19.61 (17974.84)
Sex*Italy		.33 (.84)		-.68 (.94)		.32 (1.02)		-1.32 (.88)
Sex*Latvia		21.70 (28420.72)		-2.27 (1.91)		-2.53 (1.89)		19.80 (28420.72)
Sex*Lithuania		-20.02 (14210.36)		-.19 (1.55)		20.98 (17974.84)		-2.84 (1.54)
Sex*Luxembourg		.78 (1.82)		-20.99 (23205.42)		-21.24 (23205.42)		.89 (1.84)
Sex*Malta								

Sex*Netherland		.42 (.98)		-2.02 (1.42)		.50 (1.05)		-1.26 (1.19)									
Sex*Poland		-.31 (1.13)		-1.71 (1.22)		.45 (1.31)		19.47 (17974.85)									
Sex *Portugal		-.14 (1.21)		.18 (1.40)		-.26 (1.17)		-.49 (1.41)									
Sex*Slovakia		-2.69 (1.64)		-1.17 (1.69)		-.04 (1.46)		20.49 (17974.84)									
Sex*Slovenia		-19.73 (20096.49)		.22 (1.73)		20.47 (23205.42)		-.90 (1.80)									
Sex*Spain		-.34 (.86)		.61 (1.01)		-.93 (.87)		-.32 (.90)									
Sex*Sweden		.96 (1.09)		-20.70 (14210.36)		-20.96 (14210.36)		1.81 (1.41)									
<i>Interaction</i>																	
<i>Sex*EP party group</i>																	
Sex*Radical left		-.74 (.85)		.58 (1.01)		-.29 (.90)		.73 (1.25)									
Sex*Socialists		-.40 (.54)		.11 (.58)		.01 (.57)		-.57 (.63)									
Sex*Liberals		.53 (.66)		.09 (.70)		-.48 (.68)		-1.06 (.72)									
Sex*Conservatives		-.43 (.53)		.09 (.57)		-.17 (.56)		-.61 (.63)									
Constant		-.26 (.14)	-.31 (.35)	-.32 (.46)	-.51 (.37)	<b>-1.15***</b> (.16)	<b>-.96*</b> (.37)	<b>-1.67**</b> (.63)	<b>-.94*</b> (.39)	<b>-1.20***</b> (.16)	<b>-1.00**</b> (.34)	<b>-1.32*</b> (.56)	<b>-1.10**</b> (.41)	<b>-1.10***</b> (.16)	<b>-1.20**</b> (.36)	<b>-1.32*</b> (.56)	<b>-1.69**</b> (.49)
Observations		725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725
-2LL		840.83	824.72	796.87	835.55	759.24	740.38	711.09	758.17	899.57	885.40	858.80	897.01	847.44	817.78	778.00	841.95
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>		.06	.09	.14	.07	.00	.04	.10	.00	.02	.05	.10	.03	.00	.06	.13	.01
Percentage Classified		71.0%	72.8%	73.0%	71.3%	78.2%	78.2%	78.5%	78.2%	67.7%	68.0%	68.1%	67.7%	72.8%	73.5%	73.9%	72.8%

Comment: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.001, \*\*\*p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient s reported for Sex\*Cyprus and Sex\*Malta since no women MEPs in the 6<sup>th</sup> EP were from Cyprus or Malta. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: Yordanova (2009).

**Table 12: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 7<sup>th</sup> EP (2009- )**

	Social Welfare				Culture/Law				Basic functions				Economic/Technic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sex	<b>-0.82***</b> (.17)	<b>-0.81***</b> (.18)	-.29 (.54)	<b>-0.88*</b> (.37)	-.11 (.18)	-.15 (.19)	-.07 (.58)	.04 (.42)	<b>.51**</b> (.17)	<b>.54**</b> (.18)	.93 (.63)	.48 (.38)	.27 (.18)	.27 (.18)	-.17 (.58)	.18 (.40)
<i>Nationality</i>																
Austria		-.31 (.60)	-.13 (.97)			-.58 (.69)	-.63 (1.20)			.48 (.56)	1.50 (.99)			.12 (.60)	-.63 (1.20)	
Belgium		-.35 (.56)	.05 (.85)			-.84 (.68)	-20.22 (14210.36)			-.05 (.55)	.41 (.99)			.51 (.53)	.47 (.87)	
Bulgaria		-1.00 (.70)	-.13 (.97)			.32 (.58)	.29 (.99)			.29 (.29)	1.50 (.99)			.33 (.58)	.29 (.99)	
Cyprus		-.99 (1.16)	.56 (1.48)			.15 (.94)	.98 (1.49)			1.05 (.89)	-19.70 (28420.72)			-20.22 (16371.51)	-20.22 (28420.72)	
Czech Republic		.07 (.54)	.56 (1.09)			-2.10 (1.07)	-20.22 (20096.49)			-.15 (.56)	.41 (1.28)			.66 (.52)	.98 (1.11)	
Denmark		.46 (.63)	1.25 (.97)			.15 (.67)	-.63 (1.20)			-20.23 (11089.30)	-19.70 (16408.71)			.62 (.64)	.29 (.99)	
Estonia		-1.07 (1.14)	-.13 (1.30)			-.64 (1.14)	-20.22 (23205.42)			1.04 (.87)	2.20 (1.34)			-.54 (1.14)	-20.22 (23205.42)	
Finland		-.02 (.65)	.56 (.83)			-1.52 (1.08)	-20.22 (14210.36)			.96 (.63)	1.50 (.90)			-.10 (.72)	-20.22 (14210.36)	
France		-.09 (.38)	.25 (.57)			-.61 (.43)	.15 (.61)			.16 (.39)	.00 (.71)			-.05 (.41)	-.74 (.68)	
Germany		-.26 (.37)	.15 (.56)			-.55 (.41)	-.24 (.63)			.06 (.37)	.29 (.68)			.12 (.38)	-.41 (.64)	
Greece		-.54 (.60)	-.36 (.95)			-.50 (.64)	-.81 (1.18)			.90 (.53)	.59 (1.00)			.54 (.54)	.69 (.90)	
Hungary		-.62 (.60)	-.54 (.93)			.53 (.54)	1.49 (.87)			.34 (.55)	-.44 (1.20)			.13 (.57)	-.12 (.95)	
Ireland		.26 (.67)	1.95 (1.20)			-20.26 (11584.11)	-20.22 (17974.84)			.72 (.66)	.12 (1.25)			-.59 (.84)	-20.22 (17974.84)	
Italy		-.49 (.40)	.05 (.68)			.08 (.40)	.19 (.72)			.11 (.38)	-.44 (.94)			-.10 (.41)	.19 (.72)	
Latvia		-.60 (.86)	-.13 (1.30)			-1.14 (1.10)	.29 (1.13)			.77 (.73)	.81 (1.34)			-.23 (.86)	-20.22 (23205.42)	
Lithuania		-.40 (.73)	1.25 (1.30)			-.07 (.73)	-20.22 (23205.42)			.21 (.68)	-19.70 (23205.42)			-.07 (.73)	.29 (1.31)	
Luxembourg		.08 (.93)	21.76 (40192.97)			-.57 (1.14)	-20.22 (40192.97)			-.72 (1.14)	-19.70 (40192.97)			.99 (.87)	22.18 (40192.97)	
Malta		.14 (.92)	.15 (.92)			-.51 (1.15)	-.56 (1.14)			-.79 (1.14)	-1.03 (1.13)			.26 (.93)	.46 (.93)	
Netherland		.35 (.49)	.38 (.75)			.14 (.51)	.80 (.77)			-.04 (.52)	.00 (.96)			-.36 (.57)	-.52 (.92)	
Poland		-.56 (.45)	.74 (.75)			-.23 (.45)	-.52 (.92)			.69 (.40)	.00 (.96)			-.14 (.45)	-.52 (.92)	
Portugal		-.96 (.64)	-.13 (.83)			-.60 (.65)	-20.22 (13397.66)			.30 (.55)	.25 (.97)			.26 (.56)	.76 (.82)	

Romania	-.75 (.52)	-.13 (.76)	.32 (.48)	.29 (.78)	.45 (.46)	.81 (.82)	-.11 (.51)	-.12 (.82)
Slovakia	-1.20 (.83)	.15 (1.01)	.21 (.68)	1.39 (1.03)	.56 (.64)	.12 (1.25)	-.16 (.73)	-20.22 (17974.84)
Slovenia	-.66 (.89)	-.54 (1.24)	-.11 (.88)	-.12 (1.25)	.60 (.79)	.41 (1.28)	-.90 (1.11)	-.12 (1.25)
Spain	-.76 (.45)	-.66 (.67)	.05 (.44)	-.86 (.78)	.35 (.41)	1.32 (.70)	.18 (.43)	.42 (.65)
Sweden	-.06 (.55)	-.69 (.92)	-.76 (.69)	-.27 (.93)	-.38 (.63)	.81 (.90)	.45 (.55)	-.27 (.93)
<i>EP party group</i>								
Radical left	-.17 (.49)	-.12 (.79)	.53 (.50)	.21 (.89)	-.28 (.45)	-.98 (1.12)	.23 (.45)	.09 (.89)
Socialists	.26 (.26)	-.19 (.38)	-.05 (.29)	.31 (.44)	-.15 (.25)	-.17 (.42)	.08 (.26)	-.02 (.44)
Liberals	.02 (.32)	-.83 (.50)	.06 (.34)	.39 (.52)	-.16 (.31)	.44 (.48)	.16 (.32)	-.39 (.57)
Conservatives	.22 (.25)	.28 (.36)	.02 (.27)	-.09 (.44)	-.32 (.24)	-.37 (.42)	.16 (.25)	.21 (.42)
<i>Interaction</i>								
<i>Sex*Nationality</i>								
Sex*Austria		-.12 (1.22)		.07 (1.46)		-1.62 (1.20)		1.09 (1.38)
Sex*Belgium		-.50 (1.12)		19.97 (14210.36)		-.75 (1.19)		.09 (1.09)
Sex *Bulgaria		-1.42 (1.46)		.07 (1.21)		-2.03 (1.23)		.17 (1.21)
Sex*Cyprus		-20.92 (20096.49)		-1.03 (1.91)		21.37 (28420.72)		.17 (34808.13)
Sex*Czech Republic		-.67 (1.25)		18.43 (20096.49)		-.79 (1.42)		-.28 (1.25)
Sex*Denmark		-1.32 (1.32)		1.39 (1.45)		-.93 (22361.30)		.58 (1.29)
Sex*Estonia		-20.22 (23205.42)		20.57 (23205.42)		-2.32 (1.84)		20.68 (23205.42)
Sex*Finland		-1.10 (1.43)		19.88 (14210.36)		-1.33 (1.31)		21.78 (14210.36)
Sex*France		-.36 (.74)		-1.94 (1.00)		.12 (.84)		1.20 (.84)
Sex*Germany		-.47 (.71)		-.43 (.79)		-.54 (.80)		.89 (.77)
Sex*Greece		-.10 (1.19)		.56 (1.39)		.28 (1.18)		-.13 (1.11)
Sex*Hungary		.18 (1.18)		-1.65 (1.14)		.86 (1.36)		.46 (1.17)
Sex*Ireland		-2.89 (1.65)		.07 (23534.59)		.75 (1.49)		20.46 (17974.84)
Sex*Italy		-.61 (.82)		-.15 (.85)		.43 (1.02)		-.24 (.85)
Sex*Latvia		-.63 (1.73)		-20.44 (16408.71)		-.24 (1.60)		20.68 (23205.42)

Sex*Lithuania																	
Sex*Luxembourg																	
Sex*Malta																	
Sex*Netherland																	
Sex*Poland																	
Sex*Portugal																	
Sex*Romania																	
Sex*Slovakia																	
Sex*Slovenia																	
Sex*Spain																	
Sex*Sweden																	
<i>Interaction</i>																	
<i>Sex*EP party group</i>																	
Sex*Radical left																	
Sex*Socialists																	
Sex*Liberals																	
Sex*Conservatives																	
Constant	<b>-1.45***</b>																
	(.13)																
Observations	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738
-2LL	850.22	832.11	809.87	835.85	784.02	752.19	713.74	780.08	917.30	889.76	863.35	910.65	863.89	847.66	820.16	860.93	
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.05	.08	.12	.07	.00	.07	.14	.01	.02	.07	.11	.03	.00	.04	.09	.01	
Percentage Classified	72.1%	72.5%	73.2%	72.1%	77.6%	77.6%	78.0%	77.6%	67.9%	68.6%	68.8%	67.9%	72.6%	72.4%	72.9%	72.6%	

Comment: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.001, \*\*\*p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient variable reported for Sex\*Malta since no women MEPs in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP is from Malta. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.

**Table 13: Predicted probabilities of EP committee assignments**

EP	Social welfare		Basic functions		Economic/Technic	
	Woman (%)	Man (%)	Woman (%)	Man (%)	Woman (%)	Man (%)
1 <sup>st</sup> (1974-1984)	34.8	17.0				
2 <sup>nd</sup> (1984-1989)	58.5	19.4	18.3	35.4	20.7	34.1
3 <sup>rd</sup> (1989-1994)	60.2	19.7	18.5	36.3		
4 <sup>th</sup> (1994-1999)	40.9	20.2	23.9	37.5		
5 <sup>th</sup> (1999-2004)	46.3	18.4	20.6	32.4		
6 <sup>th</sup> (2004-2009)	43.6	22.6	23.2	36.2		
7 <sup>th</sup> (2009- )	38.0	21.9	25.1	36.0		

Comment: Only predicted probabilities for the significant b coefficients in Model 1 is reported. Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009).

## 6 Conclusions

Examining the EP committee compositions and assignments in all direct elected EPs, this study shows that: women are more commonly found in EP committees concerned with social welfare policies, but less commonly found in EP committees concerned with the basic functions of the EU policies, and economic and technical policies; and that sex has an impact on individual MEPs' assignments to EP committees concerned with social welfare policies and the basic functions of the EU policies.

However, to be able to fully conclude that sex has an impact on individual MEPs' assignments, more data of MEPs' profiles are needed for further examinations under which conditions the association holds. This implies a need for studies that explore the causal mechanisms behind assignments, e.g. how MEPs' preferences, interests and expertise affect EP committee assignments (see Yordanova 2009) as previous findings relying on qualitative interviews suggest that "... most members are able to self-select their committee positions and many do so primarily on the basis of their own policy preferences..." (Whitaker 2001:82). Hence, it is conceivable that women have greater preferences, interests and expertise in social welfare policies, than men and therefore to a great extent choose to join EP committees that are concerned with that type of policies. Conversely, this pattern of thoughts also implies that women have lower preferences, interests and expertise in the basic functions of the EU policies and therefore to a great extent choose not to join EP committees that are concerned with that type of policies. However, on the other hand, it is also possible that women and men are excluded from certain areas in politics (Wängnerud 1999:49). If this is the case, if exclusions exist, it can be interesting for further studies to problematize which impact this might have on the type of policies the EU adopts, and what this might mean on the hopes that the EP will solve the EU's "democratic deficit" problem. Nevertheless, the findings of this study indicate that a division exists of how the power is distributed between women and men in the EP. Although, it is not possible, from this study, to draw any conclusions on what this division implicates. The finding of this study still goes in line with previous studies' questioning of the effectiveness of EU's actions for balanced representation of women and men in the political decision-making process.

Further, this study's findings also suggest that feminist theory of legislative organization can bring important insights into the study of women's descriptive representation in the EP. Although the theory needs to be revised and further developed at the supranational level. Thus



the findings in this study show evidence in support for a gendered division between different policy areas in the EP. But the finding indicates that the two most gendered policy areas are social welfare and the basic functions of the EU, and not social welfare and economic and technic which the feminist theory suggests. Furthermore, the inductive finding in this study suggests that neither nationality nor EP party group has an effect on women's committee assignments. Consequently, the factors explaining why social welfare and the basic functions of the EU are the most gendered and sex characterized policy areas in the EP needs to be found in other theories, than the feminist theory that has been presented in this thesis. One approach for further studies can be to examine the EP's internal organization from an institutional perspective.

Further studies can examine the effect of the development of the legislative powers of the EP on the composition and assignments of the EP committees. Whereas the legislative powers in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> EP were limited to serving as a consultative body, with the introduction of the co-decision procedure in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP (Maastricht Treaty, 1992) the EP was given equal authority with the Council of Ministers, and subsequently the EP has steadily increased its application to most policy areas (culminating in the Lisbon Treaty, 2009). In other words, further studies can examine if the effect of sex on committee assignments differ depending on how the legislative powers of the EP in different policy areas have developed. Additionally, the effect of the differences in the EP committees' power on the composition and assignments of the EP committees can also be addressed by future studies. Hence, the EP committees' powers differ depending how much they can influence the EU budget and legislation, and further studies can examine if the effect of sex on committee assignments differ depending how power full the EP committees are.

Lastly, women's representation in the EP is an important research area, and it is essential that further studies increases the knowledge in order to better understand *how* the power between women and men is distribution within the EP, and *why* a division exists.

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## The expansion of the EP committee system

Table 1 shows the expansion of the EP committees from the 1<sup>st</sup> EP to the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP, and the enlargement of the EU from 10 member states in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP to 27 member states in the current 7<sup>th</sup> EP.

**Table 1: Committee expansion of the EP from 1979 to 2009**

1 <sup>st</sup> (1979-1984)	2 <sup>nd</sup> (1984-1989)	3 <sup>rd</sup> (1989-1994)	4 <sup>th</sup> (1994-1999)	5 <sup>th</sup> (1999-2004)	6 <sup>th</sup> (2004-2009)	7 <sup>th</sup> (2009- )
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political Affairs</li> <li>▪ Agriculture, fisheries and food</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political Affairs</li> <li>▪ Agriculture, fisheries and food</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Agriculture, fisheries and food</li> <li>▪ Civil liberties and internal affairs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Agriculture and rural development</li> <li>▪ Fisheries</li> <li>▪ Civil liberties and internal affairs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Agriculture and rural development</li> <li>▪ Fisheries</li> <li>▪ Citizen's freedoms and rights, justice and home affairs</li> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Agriculture and rural development</li> <li>▪ Fisheries</li> <li>▪ Civil liberties, justice and home affairs</li> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs</li> <li>▪ Industry, research and energy</li> <li>▪ International trade</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs</li> <li>▪ Internal market and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Employment and social affairs</li> <li>▪ Regional development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Agriculture and rural development</li> <li>▪ Fisheries</li> <li>▪ Civil liberties, justice and home affairs</li> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs</li> <li>▪ Industry, research and energy</li> <li>▪ International trade</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs</li> <li>▪ Internal market and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Employment and social affairs</li> <li>▪ Regional development</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li> <li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li> <li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li> <li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li> <li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Industry, external trade, research and energy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Industry, research and energy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Industry, research and energy</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ External economic relations</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ External economic relations</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ External economic relations</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ External economic relations</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Legal affairs and the internal market</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Legal affairs</li> <li>▪ Internal market and consumer protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Legal affairs</li> <li>▪ Internal market and consumer protection</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social affairs and employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social affairs and employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social affairs, employment and the working environment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Social affairs, employment and the working environment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Employment and social affairs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Employment and social affairs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Employment and social affairs</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional policy and regional planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional policy and regional planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional policy, regional planning and relations with regional and local authorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional policy, regional planning and relations with regional and local authorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional policy, transport and tourism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Regional development</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Youth, culture, education, information and sport</li> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Youth, culture, education, information and sport</li> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport and tourism</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Culture, youth, education and the media</li> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport and tourism</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Culture, youth, education and the media</li> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer policy</li> <li>▪ Culture, youth, education, the media and sport</li> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport and tourism</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and food safety</li> <li>▪ Culture and education</li> <li>▪ Development</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Transport and tourism</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and food safety</li> <li>▪ Culture and education</li> <li>▪ Development</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Verification of credentials</li> <li>▪ Rules of procedure and petitions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rules of procedure, the verification of credentials and immunities</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Institutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Women's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rules of procedure, the verification of credentials and immunities</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Institutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Women's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rules of procedure, the verification of credentials and immunities</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Institutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Women's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Constitutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Women's rights and equal opportunities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Constitutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Women's rights and equal opportunities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Constitutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Women's rights and gender equality</li> </ul>
<b>Number of committees:</b>						
17	18	19	20	17	20	20
<b>Number of MEPs:</b>						
434	518	518	626	788	732	754
<b>Total number of committee seats:</b>						
523	599	651	768	876	861	848
<b>Average committee size:</b>						
31	33	34	38	52	43	42
<b>Number of Member states:</b>						
10	12	12	15	25	25	27

Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009).

## Appendix 2

### Classification of the EP committees

Table 1 show in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP been placed in.

**Table 1: Classification of the EP committees in the 5<sup>th</sup> EP based on a continuum between reproduction**

Reproduction				Production
←				→
<b>Social welfare Committee:</b>	<b>Culture/Law Committee:</b>	<b>Basic functions Committee:</b>	<b>Economic/Technic Committee:</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Employment and social affairs</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer policy</li> <li>▪ Women's rights and equal opportunities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Citizen's freedoms and rights, justice and home affairs</li> <li>▪ Constitutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Culture, youth, education, the media and sport</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and the internal market</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture and rural development</li> <li>▪ Fisheries</li> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Regional policy, transport and tourism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs</li> <li>▪ Industry, external trade, research and energy</li> </ul>	

Source: The official EP website

Table 2 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP been placed in.

**Table 2: Classification of the EP committees in the 4<sup>th</sup> EP based on a continuum between reproduction**

Reproduction				Production
←				→
<b>Social welfare Committee:</b>	<b>Culture/Law Committee:</b>	<b>Basic functions Committee:</b>	<b>Economic/Technic Committee:</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Social affairs, employment and the working environment</li> <li>▪ Women's rights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Civil liberties and internal affairs</li> <li>▪ Culture, youth, education and the media</li> <li>▪ Institutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen's rights</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Rules of procedure, the verification of credentials and immunities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture and rural development</li> <li>▪ Fisheries</li> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Regional policy, regional planning and relations with regional and local authorities</li> <li>▪ Transport and tourism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li> <li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li> <li>▪ External economic relations</li> </ul>	

Source: The official EP website.



Table 3 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP been placed in.

**Table 3: Classification of the EP committees in the 3<sup>rd</sup> EP based on a continuum between reproduction**

Reproduction ←		→ Production	
<p><b>Social welfare</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Social affairs, employment and the working environment</li> <li>▪ Women's rights</li> </ul>	<p><b>Culture/Law</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Civil liberties and internal affairs</li> <li>▪ Culture, youth, education and the media</li> <li>▪ Institutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen's rights</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Rules of procedure, the verification of credentials and immunities</li> </ul>	<p><b>Basic functions</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture, fisheries and food</li> <li>▪ Foreign Affairs</li> <li>▪ Regional policy, regional planning and relations with regional and local authorities</li> <li>▪ Transport and tourism</li> </ul>	<p><b>Economic/Technic</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li> <li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li> <li>▪ External economic relations</li> </ul>

Source: The official EP website.

Table 4 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP been placed in.

**Table 4: Classification of the EP committees in the 2<sup>nd</sup> EP based on a continuum between reproduction**


Reproduction ←		→ Production	
<p><b>Social welfare</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development and cooperation</li> <li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li> <li>▪ Social affairs and employment</li> <li>▪ Women's rights</li> </ul>	<p><b>Culture/Law</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Institutional affairs</li> <li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen's rights</li> <li>▪ Petitions</li> <li>▪ Rules of procedure, the verification of credentials and immunities</li> <li>▪ Youth, culture, education, information and sport</li> </ul>	<p><b>Basic functions</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Agriculture, fisheries and food</li> <li>▪ Political Affairs</li> <li>▪ Regional policy and regional planning</li> <li>▪ Transport</li> </ul>	<p><b>Economic/Technic</b> <i>Committee:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Budgetary control</li> <li>▪ Budgets</li> <li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li> <li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li> <li>▪ External economic relations</li> </ul>

Source: The official EP website.

Table 5 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP been placed in

**Table 5: Classification of the EP committees in the 1<sup>st</sup> EP based on a continuum between reproduction**

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Reproduction		Production	
			
<b>Social welfare</b> <i>Committee:</i>	<b>Culture/Law</b> <i>Committee:</i>	<b>Basic functions</b> <i>Committee:</i>	<b>Economic/Technic</b> <i>Committee:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Development and cooperation</li><li>▪ Environment, public health and consumer protection</li><li>▪ Social affairs and employment</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Institutional affairs</li><li>▪ Legal affairs and citizen’s rights</li><li>▪ Rules of procedure and petitions</li><li>▪ Verification of credentials</li><li>▪ Youth, culture, education, information and sport</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Agriculture, fisheries and food</li><li>▪ Political Affairs</li><li>▪ Regional policy and regional planning</li><li>▪ Transport</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Budgetary control</li><li>▪ Budgets</li><li>▪ Economic and monetary affairs and industrial policy</li><li>▪ Energy, research and technology</li><li>▪ External economic relations</li></ul>

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Source: The official EP website.

## Classification of the EP party groups

Table 1 show the classification of the EP party groups based on the classification scheme of Hix et al. (2009).

**Table 1: Classification of the EP party groups**

EP	1 <sup>st</sup> (1979-1984)	2 <sup>nd</sup> (1984-1989)	3 <sup>rd</sup> (1989-1994)	4 <sup>th</sup> (1994-1999)	5 <sup>th</sup> (1999-2004)	6 <sup>th</sup> (2004-2009)	7 <sup>th</sup> (2009- )
<i>EP Party Group</i>							
Radical left	▪ Communist and Allies Group	▪ Communist and Allies Group	▪ Left Unity	▪ Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left	▪ Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left	▪ Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left	▪ Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
Socialists	▪ Socialist Group	▪ Group of the Party of European Socialists	▪ Group of the Party of European Socialists	▪ Group of the Party of European Socialists	▪ Group of the Party of European Socialists	▪ Group of the Party of European Socialists	▪ Group of the Party of European Socialists
Liberals	▪ Liberal and Democratic Group	▪ Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group	▪ Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group	▪ Group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party	▪ Group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party	▪ Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	▪ Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

Conservatives	▪ Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic Group)	▪ Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic Group)	▪ Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats	▪ Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats	▪ Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats	▪ Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats	▪ Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats
	▪ European Democratic Group	▪ European Democratic Group					
Others	▪ Group for the Technical Coordination and Defense of Independent Groups and Members	▪ Rainbow Group: Federation of the Green Alternative European Links, Agelev-Ecolo, the Danish People's Movement against Membership of the European Community and the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament	▪ The Green Group in the European Parliament	▪ The Green Group in the European Parliament	▪ Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	▪ Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	▪ Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
	▪ Group of European Progressive Democrats	▪ Movement against Membership of the European Community and the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament	▪ Rainbow Group: Federation of the Green Alternative European Links, Agelev-Ecolo, the Danish People's Movement against Membership of the European Community and the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament	▪ Group of the European Radical Alliance	▪ Union for Europe of the Nations Group	▪ Union for Europe of the Nations Group	▪ European Conservatives and Reformists Group
	▪ Non-attached	▪ Group of the European Democratic Alliance,	▪ Group of the European Right	▪ Group of Independents for a Europe of Nations	▪ Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities	▪ Independence/Democracy Group	▪ European Conservatives and Reformists Group
		▪ Non-attached	▪ Group of the European Right	▪ Non-attached	▪ Non-attached	▪ Non-attached	▪ Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group
		▪ Non-attached				▪ Non-attached	

Comment: The classification scheme of Hix et al. (2009) has been used to classify the EP Party groups. Source: The official EP website

## Appendix 4

### Codebook of the datasets

VARIABLES	CODING
<b><i>Dependent variables:</i></b>	
Membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group	1 = yes, 0 = no
Membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group	1 = yes, 0 = no
Membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group	1 = yes, 0 = no
Membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group	1 = yes, 0 = no
<b><i>Independent variable:</i></b>	
Sex	1 = man, 0 = woman
<b><i>Control variable Nationality:</i></b>	
Belgium	1 = yes, 0 = no
Bulgaria	1 = yes, 0 = no
Cyprus	1 = yes, 0 = no
Czech Republic	1 = yes, 0 = no
Denmark	1 = yes, 0 = no
Estonia	1 = yes, 0 = no
Finland	1 = yes, 0 = no
France	1 = yes, 0 = no
Germany	1 = yes, 0 = no
Greece	1 = yes, 0 = no
Hungary	1 = yes, 0 = no
Ireland	1 = yes, 0 = no
Italy	1 = yes, 0 = no
Latvia	1 = yes, 0 = no
Lithuania	1 = yes, 0 = no
Luxembourg	1 = yes, 0 = no
Malta	1 = yes, 0 = no
Netherlands	1 = yes, 0 = no
Poland	1 = yes, 0 = no
Portugal	1 = yes, 0 = no
Romania	1 = yes, 0 = no
Slovakia	1 = yes, 0 = no
Slovenia	1 = yes, 0 = no
Spain	1 = yes, 0 = no
Sweden	1 = yes, 0 = no
The United Kingdom	1 = yes, 0 = no
<b><i>Control variable EP Party group:</i></b>	
Radical left	1 = yes, 0 = no
Socialists	1 = yes, 0 = no
Liberals	1 = yes, 0 = no
Conservatives	1 = yes, 0 = no
Others	1 = yes, 0 = no

## Appendix 5

### Control of the number of seats in the different groups

Table 1 displays the difference between the observed and the expected number of seats occupied by women based on the average percentage of seats occupied by women in all the EP committees.

**Table 1: Difference between the observed and the expected number of EP committee seats per woman based on the average percentage of women in all the EP committees (rounded to whole numbers)**

	<b>Social welfare</b>	<b>Culture/Law</b>	<b>Basic functions</b>	<b>Economic/Technic</b>
<b>EP</b>	<b>Women MEPs</b>	<b>Women MEPs</b>	<b>Women MEPs</b>	<b>Women MEPs</b>
<b>1<sup>st</sup></b> <b>(1979-1984)</b>	+11	-7	-5	-7
<b>2<sup>nd</sup></b> <b>(1984-1989)</b>	+42	0	-12	-10
<b>3<sup>rd</sup></b> <b>(1989-1994)</b>	+43	-7	-16	-7
<b>4<sup>th</sup></b> <b>(1994-1999)</b>	+31	+5	-19	-3
<b>5<sup>th</sup></b> <b>(1999-2004)</b>	+49	0	-21	-7
<b>6<sup>th</sup></b> <b>(2004-2009)</b>	+40	+5	-21	-6
<b>7<sup>th</sup></b> <b>(2009- )</b>	+34	+6	-19	-10

Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009).