

# **The Past of Present Livelihoods**

Historical perspectives on modernisation, rural policy regimes  
and smallholder poverty – a case from Eastern Zambia

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## ABSTRACT

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This study is an enquiry into the processes shaping rural livelihoods in peripheral areas. The study is situated in the field of livelihood research and departs in the persistent crisis within African smallholder agriculture and in rural policy debates during the post-independence era. The research takes a critical stance to the way that people-centred and actor-oriented approaches have dominated livelihood research, thereby over-shadowing structural and macro-oriented features.

The aim of this study is to, through a historical perspective on rural livelihoods and policy regimes, uncover the political and economic processes, with their discursive foundations, that shape contemporary rural livelihoods in peripheral areas. The analytical framework emphasises four key factors: ideas of development and modernity; the terms of incorporation into the global economy; rural policy regimes; smallholders' ways of making a living. Inspiration is gained from critical political geography, world-systems analysis and different perspectives on rural livelihoods and development.

The empirical study is based on fieldwork in Chipata District in Eastern Zambia, investigations at the National Archives of Zambia, the British National Archives and library research. The findings are presented in three parts. The first part looks into contemporary policies and the situation among smallholders in Chipata District. The second part examines the history of the area up to independence in 1964. The third part examines the post-independence period which links colonial experience to the contemporary situation.

The findings suggest that smallholders' livelihoods are shaped by long-term political-economic-discursive processes, rooted in the terms of the study area's integration into the world-economy in the colonial period. Colonial policies peripheralised the area through tax, labour, and market policies and the creation of native reserves, all of which have led to contemporary problems of food insecurity, soil depletion and a marginal role in agricultural markets. Since the inception of colonial rule, semi-proletarianisation has been a dominant process in the area. Current diversified livelihoods are more a contemporary expression of this semi-proletarianisation than a consequence of post-colonial policies. The households in the study area show preference for a farming way of life. However, the development goal of modernity has since long led to an 'othering' of smallholders, labelling them backwards and resistant to change. In the early twenty-first century this 'othering' has been played out through a development programme aimed at changing attitudes and mindsets among the farmers in line with individualistic and entrepreneurial behaviour. The 'othering' discourses of contemporary and colonial policymakers display striking similarities in this case.

**Keywords:** Rural livelihoods; Smallholders; rural policy regime; development; modernisation; Zambia

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Appendix I: Interview Guide Smallholder farmers

Appendix II: Interview Guide Extension Officers

Appendix III: Food Availability Calendars

Appendix IV: Lists of respondents

## LIST OF ACRONYMS:

ASP	Agricultural Support Programme
BSAC	British South African Company
CO	Colonial Office
CDFA	Chipata District Farmers Association
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DfID	UK Department for International Development
EO	Extension Officer
EOFU	Extension Officer follow-up
EP	Eastern Province
EPCMA	Eastern Province Co-operative Marketing Association
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FNDP	First National Development Plan
FRA	Food Reserve Agency
FSP	Fertiliser Support Program
IDZ	Intensive Development Zones
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRDP	Integrated Rural Development Programme
KV	Kasauka village
MACO	Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives
MAG	Ministry of Agriculture
ML	Ministry of lands
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MRD	Ministry of Rural Development
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia
NERP	New Economic Recovery Program
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OF	Older farmer
OFG	Older Farmers Group
PRO	Public Record Office

PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RoZ	Republic of Zambia
SADEV	Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SCAFE	Soil Conservation Agroforestry Extension Programme
SEC	Secretariat
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNDP	Second National Development Plan
UNIP	United National Independence Party
USAID	United States Agency for Internatioanl Development
YV	Yelesani village
ZP	Zambian Papers

# **1. Introduction: problem and research agenda**

## **1.1 Farming as a business and rural livelihoods in Eastern Zambia**

The donor-sponsored slogan for rural development in Zambian smallholder areas in the early twenty-first century is ‘farming as a business’. Project team leaders, district personnel and extension staff are today all involved in a discussion about farmers’ lack of business orientation and the way that smallholders’ conservative mindsets prevent development. There is need, it is argued, both for improved entrepreneurial skills and for an attitudinal change among small-scale farmers in Zambia in order to raise rural incomes and increase food security among the rural poor. Within the Swedish Sida-funded Agricultural Support Programme, ASP, farming as a business is discussed in contrast to ‘farming as a way of life’, which is claimed to be the common attitude towards farming among smallholders in Zambia. Farming as a way of life is defined by a lack of planning, willingness and ability to treat farming as a commercial activity, where the goal is profit, not subsistence. It is farming ‘only for the sake of farming itself’, done partly as a tribute to forefathers’ lifestyles. The values that nurture such an outlook on life can, according to the team leader of the ASP, largely explain poverty and the lack of modern development in countries like Zambia.

Africa does not need more money or resources, which everyone talks about. It has nothing to do with that. It is about attitudes, and these attitudes are present throughout the societies. It is the mindset, which results in bad management on all levels of society. And that is the reason why Africa does not develop, not because of lack of resources, because resources are there. (ASP Team Leader, Swedish Broadcast P1, 16th August, 2005. Author’s translation)

The farming as a business approach is within the ASP programme referred to as something profoundly new and is frequently contrasted with earlier policy regimes of regulation and state-support to small-scale farmers. The approach gives a reason for, and a solution to, rural poverty, by focusing on the attitudes of the farmers themselves. In a condensed form the argument is that if the mindset and the attitudes of the farmers change, if smallholders develop

entrepreneurial skills and visions and start to plan their activities more carefully, poverty will decrease and development follow.

Entering the rural parts of Chipata District, Eastern Zambia in May 2006, the farming as a business approach took me by some surprise. Eight years earlier, in 1998, I had conducted research into the everyday lives and livelihoods of farmers in a smallholder village south of Chipata town. At that time, the men and women told me of a situation where soils were poor and degrading, food often scarce, money always short, markets too far away and chemical fertilisers desperately sought after. In my report (Amberntsson 1999) I made no references to a reactionary peasantry when analysing the factors behind the farmers' hardships. Rather I explained their situation in terms of the rapid changes in the overall development strategy of the country that took place in the early 1990s. These changes involved a shift from a regulated, socialist inspired regime to a liberalised strategy in accordance with the Structural Adjustment Programme, SAP, promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, IMF (see e.g. Rakner 2003). In 1998, this had meant that earlier state-initiated markets were gone, as well as most subsidies for farming inputs like chemical fertilisers. Fees for education and healthcare had been introduced at the same time as credit policies had become restrictive. From the smallholders' point of view the liberal policy regime was seen as deeply problematic, in that it abruptly took away the support needed for them to establish secure livelihoods. In general, the farmers' wish was a return to the earlier regime of state regulation and support.

My initial interest when entering the smallholder areas in 2006, concerned changes in the livelihood situations of smallholders compared to eight years earlier. The broader literature on rural livelihoods in the Global South focused on local change and people's strategies under different circumstances. A multitude of studies have outlined and discussed how people all over the rural South are adjusting and transforming their ways of making a living. They shift from agriculture into other activities with far-reaching consequences for how they can best be supported and how they should be identified in terms of occupation and social and cultural belonging. While there was some evidence of the sorts of changes that are cited in the broader literature, the most striking finding in 2006 was not how things had changed, but rather how much they had remained the same. The smallholders' livelihood situations were centred on the same type of problems as in 1998 and they were still in favour of state regulation of the agricultural sector. On the other hand, the personnel within the ASP project, saw the previous regime of state control as part of the problem, since it had made the farmers more demanding and unwilling to adopt a more modern business approach towards agriculture.

The farming as a business approach left me with several rather fundamental questions regarding rural livelihoods, poverty and policy. Its almost total lack of correspondence with the farmers' views of what constitutes both the explanation and the solution to their insecure livelihoods left me wondering what policies such as 'farming as business' are informed by. Furthermore, how have policy regimes of different times analysed rural poverty and how can we best explain the problematic livelihood situations faced by many rural smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa. And last but not least, why do we see policies targeted at people's attitudes and behaviour arriving at the front of development practice in the twenty-first century?

## **1.2 Livelihood research**

This study takes as its point of departure an interest in the contemporary crisis within the African small-scale agricultural sector (including high poverty rates, food insecurity and declining per capita production) (Djurfeldt et al. 2005; IFAD 2010), ideas for development and the rather long-standing debate on the outcomes of rural policies in post-independent Africa (c.f. Berry 1984; Bernstein et al 1992; Djurfeldt et al. 2005; Havnevik et al. 2007). The study is situated in the field of livelihood research and analysis, which has grown substantially over the last 15 years. This field of research evolved partly out of a dissatisfaction with the grand theory that had dominated development thinking until the early 1980s. The critique of grand theory was that local people were largely seen as pawns in a game constituted by a rather linear development process, dominated by overarching political and economic decisions or structures. This underplayed their role as active subjects who took initiatives and played a role in the formation of society (Schuurman 1993:16-20). The concept of livelihood strategies became widely used within academia in the 1990s, following a rather long tradition of local and people-centred approaches within different disciplines of the social sciences (Scoones 2009:173-174). Earlier household studies had often resulted in a rather pessimistic view of poor households' possibilities to play an active role in shaping their own lives or making decisions not constrained by rather narrow structural features (Rakodi 2002:4-8; de Haan & Zoomers 2003; 2005:28-29).<sup>1</sup>

The change that took place in the 1990s implied a more optimistic view of poor people's possibilities. There was an increased focus on households' assets

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<sup>1</sup> The deprivation trap of Robert Chambers (1983:111-114) is illustrative of this point, describing poor households as trapped in a vicious circle of poverty, isolation, powerlessness, physical weakness and vulnerability.


and creative ability to sustain their livelihoods and strengthen their livelihood resources, often framed as different forms of capital. The livelihood approach was also a response to earlier failures in establishing policies for poverty reduction in different settings (de Haan & Zoomers 2005:28-32). Hence, the research on livelihoods and the developing of an analytical framework progressed in close relation to the aid community, with the Institute of Development Studies, IDS, and British Department of International Development, DfID, as two important institutions. Social scientists from various disciplines embarked on a collection of empirical studies on household livelihoods and livelihood strategies, departing in different settings and sectors. These have covered urban (Espling 1999; Rakodi 2002; Mandel 2004) and rural (Bryceson 1996; Ellis 2000; Francis 2000; Ellis & Freeman 2005) settings, as well as addressing the links between rural and urban (Rigg 1998; 2007), and addressing specific issues such as the work of development agencies (Bebbington 2005), to mention just a handful of studies.

A key aspect of livelihood research has been to highlight the reality on the ground and to build on peoples' experiences. Livelihood analysis has been of great importance for the understanding of how people make a living in diverse local settings. We have learnt more about how people adapt and respond to various forms of crisis and about poor people's creativity in drawing on various tangible and intangible resources when forming a livelihood (Scoones 2009). Furthermore, we now know that a rural livelihood is not the same as a farming livelihood. Sometimes farming contributes little or nothing of rural household incomes. Instead other activities are becoming more important, including trade, retail, local manufacturing, transport, temporary migration and receipt of remittances (e.g. Bryceson 2000b; Rigg 2006; 2007). Key discussions have concerned processes of deagrarianisation and livelihood diversification and the increased mobility of people in the rural South. Of particular influence has been the deagrarianisation thesis, which has claimed that rural people (and rural poverty) have become de-linked from the land and that rural dwellers are changing as a social and cultural group away from an identity as peasants or farmers. Policy-wise it is postulated that the focus on agriculture as the main rural activity diverts attention away from the poorest and towards the less poor (Bebbington 2005; Rigg 2006).

Accordingly, rural dwellers across the Global South have been framed as building their lives around the different types of capitals (social, human, financial, physical, natural) in the asset pentagon found at the core of the livelihood framework outlined in Figure 1-1 below. The livelihood approach is commonly described as a holistic approach since it is not trapped in a certain sector when identifying livelihood resources, activities and outcomes. Attention



to the complexity of poor people’s livelihoods has included an awareness of household fragmentation, with individual strategies often in tension with household strategies based on collective interest (de Haan & Zoomers 2003:354). Researchers and practitioners have become more sensitive to the importance of internal household relations, which for example has provided new insights into gendered aspects of livelihoods in different contexts (e.g. Porter 1995; Mandel 2004; Nyberg 2004). Hence, we have learnt more about the mosaic character of both rural and urban livelihoods, which has fed policy discussions on how to best support poor people in different settings (Scoones 2009; see also Rigg 2006). The critics of the “one model fits all” solution to poverty and development have gained momentum once more.



**Figure 1-1: The sustainable livelihood framework**

Source: Rigg 2007:31

Many of the above-mentioned issues will deserve further discussion and debate, since they are perhaps not as straightforward as sometimes claimed. Processes of diversification, deagrarianisation and increased mobility are often described as rather recent phenomena that could be explained by recent changes in the political, economic and social context. However, similar processes have been observed for quite some time although processed through a rather different conceptual frame, addressing issues of ‘rural slums’ and ‘semi-proletarianisation’ rather than ‘deagrarianisation’ and increasing ‘off-farm incomes’ (Berry 1984; Bernstein 1992; Taylor 1993; Akram-Lodhi & Kay 2010). Francis (2000:4) reminds us that “many of the supposedly new processes coming out of rural Africa today (...) look less novel when viewed historically”: a warning note that resonates throughout this thesis (see also Carswell 2002).

The livelihood framework is designed to assist analysis of the livelihoods of poor people. The framework also aims at identifying important areas for policy intervention. The core of the framework is the different type of livelihood

capitals but since the take-off of livelihood research there has been an outspoken ambition to relate the micro-level realities of households to the broader economic, political and institutional reality of society. This has been stressed every now and then in IDS working papers and other academic publications (Scoones 1998; 2009; Bebbington 1999; Shankland 2000; Bebbington & Batterbury 2001; de Haan & Zoomers 2005; de Haan 2007).

However, these initiatives to link local livelihood issues closely to broader economic and political features have remained at the margins, as several of the authors attempting to make these links have noted.<sup>2</sup> This has had two consequences. Firstly, there is high emphasis on peoples' agency and activities, regardless of, and with little debate about, the actual significance of their agency in relation to other actors and structures (on different levels or scales) influencing peoples' livelihoods (see also de Haan & Zoomers 2005). Secondly, structural factors and macro features have been relegated to the status of 'context' that does not need to be researched on its own in close relation to peoples' livelihoods.

Here we find perhaps the most important line of critique towards this field of research. Livelihood research has tended to focus on the asset pentagon consisting of the different types of capitals making up the livelihood strategies of rural households. Studies of households' livelihood strategies have mushroomed, but often with rather vague connections to the different dimensions of the wider political and economic context and issues of ideological and discursive power. Scoones rhetorically asks, "what happens when contexts are the most important factor, over-riding the micro-negotiations around access to assets and the finely-tuned strategies of different actors?" (Scoones 2009:181). If long-term historical processes, contemporary global macro-economic features, or western-style perceptions of development and modernity are what dominate a household's livelihood situation and room for manoeuvre, should we not focus more on those, both empirically and theoretically? This is partly, of course, a re-working of the actor-structure debate. Surprisingly often, however, the actor-structure debate seems to be about a 'choice' of emphasis or theoretical frame that researchers need to make. I would argue, however, that the question of

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<sup>2</sup> The work of Bryceson (e.g. 1999; 2000b; 2009), later referred to in the theoretical framework should be acknowledged here. Bryceson brings in policies and partly historical perspectives into her discussion on changing livelihoods in rural Africa. She is making a general case for changing rural livelihoods built on different studies, which is open to local perspectives. Also Rigg (2006; 2007) have contributed in his attempts to make a general case for the rural South in terms of trends in rural dwellers ways of making a living. Furthermore, the study of raspberry farmers in Chile by Challies & Murray (2011) constitutes a recent example of livelihood research, which incorporates research into global value chains (see Scoones 2009 for further discussion).

‘structure’ versus ‘agency’ should be approached less as one of theoretical preference and more as a researchable empirical question.

It is problematic that a field of research that largely aims to feed policy on the base of peoples’ experiences deals rather hesitantly with issues of power, politics and ideology. This involves a risk of an all too harmonious perspective on issues of empowering poor people and reducing poverty that does not necessarily correspond with reality. Empowerment and poverty reduction are likely to be about more than finding the right policies and implementing them. Any attempt to realise ‘empowerment’ or ‘poverty reduction’ will attract both supporters and opponents and will be firmly embedded in the real conflicts that exist at all levels of society. As O’Laughlin (2004:387) states, it is not clear how livelihood research assists us in “identifying the relations of inequality that underlie poverty, most of which extend far beyond the boundaries of local communities and livelihood groups”. It follows from this that the existing structural features are often given and accepted in livelihood research, and hence out of focus in the research process. The focus of interest is instead the variety of livelihoods in the South, how they are pieced together in a complex manner rather than “the contradictory structural processes from which poverty arises” (O’Laughlin 2002:527).

### **1.3 Rethinking livelihood research**

There are, however, studies on structural and macro-oriented matters that could assist research that still departs in the very local of households’ livelihood situations. The fields of, for example, political geography, political economy and political ecology deal with different extra-local aspects of, for example, rural development. There is research on policy regimes in relation to rural poverty, smallholders’ livelihoods and the crises within African agriculture of both the colonial and the post-colonial era that could inspire us here, even if the periods are typically treated separately. For the colonial period, there are several studies dealing with the impact of colonial rule for rural communities across sub-Saharan Africa, such as the effects of tax and labour policies, land expropriation and settler farming and discriminatory agricultural policies (e.g. Parsons & Palmer 1977b; Vail 1977; Mackenzie 1998; Elkins 2005; see also Berry 1984:73-82 for a review). Research on the early policy regimes of the post-independence era largely focused their analysis on the state-machinery and the urban bias that led to a decline of the African agricultural sector, especially affecting small-scale farmers in a negative way (e.g. Bates 2005; 1981 in original; Lipton 1982).

The more contemporary literature on rural development often puts the structural adjustment policies at the centre when explaining many processes in rural Africa. The lack of markets and inputs, farmers' declining terms of trade and food insecurity are often seen in light of neoliberal economic policies and the deregulation of former state initiatives in the agricultural sector (Havnevik et al. 2006b; 2007; Curtis 2007; de Vylder 2007). Also processes of income diversification and deagrarianisation are, at least partly, seen as results of the difficulties of making a living out of agriculture under this policy regime (Bryceson 2000b; Rigg 2006). These three policy periods (colonial, pre-SAP and during/post-SAP), are, however, seldom interlinked in contemporary livelihood research. The views on the different periods are not necessarily contradictory, and most would agree that an urban bias was a reality of many regimes during the 1960s and 1970s. The troubling issue is rather that three distinct policy regimes are described largely as failures in terms of the situation of small-scale farmers.

This multiple policy failure demands our attention and highlights the need for further research on both the formulation of policy and its effects on peoples' livelihoods over time. But in this process we need to look upon policy in a less straightforward way. Policy formulation is not just a matter of identifying problems and suggesting measures to overcome these problems. Policies are formulated according to beliefs and within an ideological as well as a political and economic context (Peet 2007). There are several ways to interpret concrete issues of poverty and development. 'Urban bias theory', the critique of structural adjustment and the 'farming as business' approach are clear examples of that. Policies hence say something about how rural areas and rural people's lives are, and have been, perceived in terms of their past, present and their future. In the context of this study it will therefore be relevant to uncover the discursive elements that are embedded in policies having concrete effects on rural peoples' livelihoods. Discourse is here understood as an ideologically grounded system of rules, framing what is considered as valuable knowledge as well as relevant questions when policies are formulated and implemented (see e.g. Sharp 2009:19). Hence, when studying policies in relation to peoples' livelihoods, there is a need to unveil the different layers that are involved, such as the discursive foundation of policies, their aims and objectives, and what local economic and social processes policies actually encourage when put in place, or how discourses "spill out into the real world" as Sharp (2009:147) phrases it. Only then can we grasp the more comprehensive meaning of policies in relation to rural livelihoods.

## **1.4 Aim, research questions and scope**

In the land-locked state of Zambia in Southern Africa, rural dwellers and small-scale farmers have lived under different policy regimes from the colonial era to present times. The former British colony gained its independence in 1964 and has since then gone through being a socialist-oriented one-party state during the 1970s and much of the 1980s, into parliamentary democracy and structural adjustment in the 1990s and the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy in the twenty-first century (Haantuba & Wamulume 2004). This has been mirrored in the governments' policies towards smallholders. These have gone from colonial policies of discrimination and European settlement, a post-independence period of strong state regulations of the agricultural sector, to deregulation and a free-market approach to small-scale agriculture, which of late have been complemented by approaches pointing at attitudinal change and a strengthening of entrepreneurial skills as a key for poverty reduction and development. Through research into these different periods we can better explain how both people and places have been politically, economically and socially integrated into the world-economy. Such research will also enable a better understanding of the policies that are put in place at different times, in terms of their ideological foundations, their (possible) interconnectedness and the likelihood of their being effective.

The aim of this study is to, through a historical perspective on rural livelihoods and policy regimes, uncover the political and economic processes, with their discursive foundations, that shape contemporary rural livelihoods in peripheral areas. This aim is addressed through a case study of the rural areas of Chipata District in Eastern Zambia, viewed in the context of sub-Saharan Africa with focus on former British colonies in the Southern and Eastern part. Two interlinked research questions are being asked:

1. What factors have shaped the livelihood situations of smallholder farmers in peripheral areas over time?
2. How have rural policy regimes changed over time in terms of their practical implementation, their impact and their ideological/discursive foundations?

Contemporary livelihood situations provide the point of departure for this study. These were accessed through a process of field research, which was designed to enable small-scale farmers to describe their own situation. These descriptions will be complemented by interview data from extension officers and secondary sources relevant for the study area.

Geographically, the focus is on a part of Chipata District (former Fort Jameson District). It has, however, been difficult to maintain a well-defined geographical area throughout the research process. An obvious problem is the various entities referred to in the literature and the archival sources, such as the Eastern Province, North Charterland Concession Area, Fort Jameson District, South Ngoni Area, Chief Sayiri or the modern division of the area into agricultural blocks, camps or wards. The focus for my rural fieldwork, as well as in the archives, *is the southern portion of the old Main Ngoni Reserve, today constituting the Eastern Agricultural Block, roughly containing the chiefdoms of Sayiri, Maguya and Mpezeni in the southern part of Chipata District*. Since there is focus on the study areas integration into the modern world-economy, the study deals foremost with the period after the inception of colonial rule in the late nineteenth century up to 2008, although the pre-colonial period is discussed as well.

### **1.5 Overview of the research approach and research process**

This study is intensive by design, largely inspired by Sayer (1992:241-251). By intensive design is meant that focus is on “processes, activities, relations and episodes of events rather than statistics on particular characteristics” (ibid:242). An intensive design is concerned with outlining relations and events in detail, with a further purpose of explaining them. An intensive design is therefore often associated with qualitative methods, since the focus is on understanding processes and events rather than attempting aggregation and representation. This research project departs in a contemporary case study, which lead to historical research into the societal processes that can assist to understand and explain different features of the case. An intensive design does not need to result in solely a local focus. Instead the intention here is to bring in aspects deriving from different scales of society when understanding the local. In line with what Sayer argues, the local case is seen as distinctive, at the same time as there are good reasons for arguing that the more abstract knowledge that is created is of a general relevance. By this is meant that processes, power-relations and structures that are identified in relation to people’s livelihood situations in one particular case are valuable for understanding and explaining local development and rural livelihoods in other settings.

Explaining the social world is a core task of social science. But explanations within social science are hard to achieve. The system we work in is an open system, and could perhaps be described as a “structured mess” (ibid:234), where outcomes, reactions and the activation of casual powers (for example peoples’ or organisations’ actions of various kind) can never be fully

predicted. Causal powers change, social behaviour is complex, and can hardly be reduced to a list of possible options (ibid:232-241 for further discussion). Neither is there any general procedure nor course of action to bring about a good explanation in social science. A key tenet of critical realism is, however, that there is cause and effect in society, although the relationship between the two is complex. Events, processes, situations (such as rural poverty for example) involve causality, and even when working in an open system, it should be an essential ambition to strive to describe and explain this causality. At the same time causality and causal powers are embedded in societal structures that are often stable and hard to influence, due to existing power relations and the historical rootedness of political, economic and social relations.

In line with Sayer, I also argue that an intensive design is the most appropriate when approaching explanations in social science. But to discuss its broader relevance the case study needs to be linked to both theoretical and empirical research, in this case theoretical and empirical aspects of rural livelihood issues in Southern and Eastern Africa. This does not mean that the results of the empirical study can be generalised, but it does enable a more general discussion of the outcomes of certain processes and the circumstances under which different events and situations might occur.

Fieldwork has been conducted in several phases for this thesis. The first phase was during May and June 2006, which focused on rural fieldwork including semi-structured interviews and food availability calendars with small-scale farmers. This focused chiefly on the smallholders' contemporary livelihood situations. The second phase of the fieldwork was during nine weeks of February, March and April in 2007 in Zambia and during most of October 2007 in London. In Zambia half of the time was devoted to archival studies and half of the time to rural fieldwork including semi-structured interviews with small-scale farmers, group-interviews and individual interviews with elderly farmers and extension officers. The time in London was spent at the National Archives in Kew and at the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies. This phase focused chiefly on the historical part of the study and on policy issues related to the smallholders' livelihoods. The last phase of the fieldwork was carried out during most of October 2008 and a 10 days stay in May 2010. This was foremost a follow-up and feedback session, 2008 in the rural part and in 2010 in the National Archives of Zambia.

The study design implicates both theoretical and empirical contributions. A major part of the contribution lies in the approach as such, which deliver a comprehensive picture of rural livelihoods in relation to long-term processes of social change on micro as well as macro levels. This is something rarely done in livelihood research. This also involves a contribution to the discussion on how to

better link development features on local level to broader ideas on development, poverty and inequality, which partly could be referred to as grand theory.

Empirically, the study also contributes in putting different periods (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) together in relation to a specific area. Although there are earlier studies in Eastern Zambia related to aspects of rural livelihoods for all periods, this study contributes in its specificity of place, while for example earlier research on historical features have been broader in its geographical approach, although often narrower in its theme, focusing for example solely on the effects of land alienation or resettlement in Eastern Zambia. This has meant that unique empirical material has been constructed for all periods, through rural fieldwork, archival research and studying of government documents.

## **1.6 Outline of the thesis**

The thesis is divided into nine chapters. **Chapter Two** is a theoretical chapter outlining the study design, the analytical frame and relevant theoretical perspectives. **Chapter Three** outlines the context through looking into rural development, rural livelihoods and policies in sub-Saharan Africa from both a contemporary and historical perspective. **Chapter Four** describes and discusses the methods used during the empirical research process and **Chapter Five** introduces the study area and the rural livelihoods of smallholder farmers. The empirical study is outlined in chapter six to eight. **Chapter Six** further describes the present livelihood situation of the rural households in two villages in Chipata District, in the context of available written sources about rural livelihoods and rural development in the study area during the last 10-15 years. The chapter also includes an account of the development of the present policies towards small-scale farming and rural development in the area, related to the livelihood situations of the rural households. **Chapter Seven** is a presentation of the historical development of the study area, with an account of the political and economic development during the pre-colonial period, with focus on colonial rule and its impact on rural livelihoods in the study area. **Chapter Eight** provides an account and interpretation of the post-independence development in the area of study and its relation to rural policies of the time. **Chapter Nine** discusses the conclusions and the final interpretations of the material in relation to the aim, the research questions, the analytical framework and the theoretical and contextual background.



## **2. The research framework**

### **- Research approach and theoretical perspectives on rural livelihoods**

This chapter presents the analytical framework, research approach and the theoretical perspectives informing the study. The first part of the chapter discusses methodological issues relating to livelihood research and develops an analytical framework for the study. Different perspectives on how to look upon local development and peoples' experiences are discussed in order to formulate a standpoint on how to go about in the field of livelihood research. The second part of the chapter deals with the different theoretical perspectives needed to make use of the analytical framework. This incorporates discussions of development and modernisation, the world-economic integration of rural Africa, post-independence policy regimes and rural livelihoods, all in relation to smallholders, sometimes referred to as small-scale farmers or peasants.

### **2.1 Developing the research approach**

#### **2.1.1 Livelihood research – a method in search of a theory?**

Chapter One discussed the achievements of livelihood research during the last 15 years. Although livelihood research has contributed greatly to our understanding of the complexities of local development, a general critique towards the approach is that it has been less successful in generating research that link peoples' livelihoods more closely to broader societal processes. However, actor-oriented research in the wider context of development studies, has been debated for quite some time. Booth (1993) concluded, for example, that despite the ambition to study the interdependence between structure and action, actor-oriented studies remained micro and chiefly focused on locality, agency and peoples' experience. Booth in fact raised several of the issues that have been repeated by those elaborating on the livelihood approach in development research:

Most practitioners of actor-oriented research acknowledge in principle the interdependence of action and structure. It is, however, one thing to recognise what is the case in principle and another to build it effectively

into the design of one's research. A specific problem of this sort arises from the fact that most actor-oriented studies are not only 'micro' in the sense of being concerned with face-to-face processes, but also highly localised spatially. It is legitimate to ask how we are to ensure that the findings of local-action studies reflect not only local realities and room-for-manoeuvre, but also the constraints upon action that may only emerge at the regional or national level (or over longer time-periods). (ibid:60)

Similar issues have been discussed by Mohan & Stokke (2000) as well as Schuurman (2003), who in his critical article on the contemporary focus on social capital concluded that we live in an era "where structuralist approaches to understanding reality are increasingly traded for more actor-oriented approaches" (ibid:1000).

The debate on localised approaches in actor-oriented research in general, and livelihood studies in particular, has therefore generated a long-term discussion on how to do people-centred research that is not confined to local studies of face-to-face processes. The different iterations of the livelihood framework have in many respects turned into all-inclusive-models, saying that everything is important when trying to understand peoples' livelihoods (see e.g. Scoones 1998:4). As more and more aspects and factors are successively included in the framework, it becomes increasingly difficult to grasp how this kind of holistic livelihood research could be done in practice. O'Laughlin (2004:387) has argued that livelihood research "presents itself as a method without a theory". Seemingly this has led to an almost uncontrolled expansion of the method, placing an exorbitant burden on any researcher aiming at fulfilling the task of the framework. Most likely this has contributed to a further blackboxing of structural features in livelihood research.

Harvey (2009) has criticised human geography research for tending to be particularistic and lacking in theoretical depth. He therefore urges us to theoretically frame our research more distinctively through putting different people-centred studies together when developing theoretical standpoints. He further argues that people-centred studies need to be integrated into general theories of (unequal) development and that case studies and theories should be better linked and developed in relation to each other (ibid:77-78). However, Booth seemed to warn us that what can be said in principle will be difficult in practice. So how then can we develop an approach to rural livelihoods that includes structural features and long-term processes of social change, while still departing in people's livelihoods and ways of making a living? This issue will be approached by drawing inspiration from critical political geography and the world-systems analysis, perspectives that more or less contest the fundamental

tenet of actor-orientation, namely that different actors are important, and that they through action can form and transform structures in a meaningful way.

### 2.1.2 The world-system and the level of experience

In critical political geography and world-systems analysis, rural livelihoods are viewed more or less as products of structural constraints. Taylor (1993)<sup>3</sup> has developed what he calls a world-systems political geography. Quite contrary to the people-centred livelihood approach he argues that there is one scale – the global scale - that ‘matters’. This “is the basic social entity within which [social] change should be studied” (Taylor 2008:50) because events taking place in different locations cannot be properly understood within any other frame. According to this approach, actors are not agents in terms of changing the system, rather they are products of it, and they use their power to reproduce the modern world-system. Taylor (1993:42-47) divides society into three scales, the local level of experience, the national level of ideology and the global level of reality (Figure 2-1).




**Figure 2-1: Three-tier structure of separation and control - division by scale**

Source: Taylor 1993:44

<sup>3</sup> These thoughts are developed by Taylor in the book *World-economy, National state and Locality* published the first time 1985. From the 2000 edition Colin Flint appears as a co-author. The parts referred to here are, however, not changed in editions after 1993.

The local level of ‘experience’ is where we all live our daily lives, where we work, socialise, reproduce and, according to the livelihood approach, develop our individual- and household-based livelihood strategies. However, according to Taylor, the relevant processes that shape our lives occur at the global scale of ‘reality’, filtered through the national level of ‘ideology’. What happens in different settings at local level can then more or less be seen as reflections or productions of the system as a whole. This world-system consists of a core, a periphery and semi-periphery in line with Wallerstein’s original world-system approach (Figure 2-2) (ibid:44; Wallerstein 1979). Crucial for Wallerstein and Taylor is that society, the capitalist world-system they describe, has evolved over a period of 500 years. The dynamics of the system should be understood within this long history of the capitalist world-economy, which also explains the problematic issue of altering it (Taylor 1991:392-393).



**Figure 2-2: Three-tier structure of separation and control - division by area**

Source: Taylor 1993:44

The stability of the world-system is, in this tradition, further understood by Wallerstein’s horizontal division of areas/countries into core, semi-periphery and periphery. The long history of world capitalism has not integrated different parts of the world as equal partners but as exploiters (for example colonial

powers) and exploited (colonies), which has moulded their positions within the world-system, and the livelihoods of people in its different locations. In Wallerstein's model areas are not clearly defined as periphery or core. Rather, there are areas that are moulded either by core processes, such as high wages, advanced technology, a diversified production and proletarianisation, or periphery processes, such as low wages, rudimentary technology, an undiversified production and semi-proletarianisation. By semi-proletarianisation, a key periphery process, is meant a condition where a combination of wage labour and primary activities, such as farming, are necessary to sustain households. This process implies both low wages and low returns for agricultural products and is an important part of the exploitation of peripheral areas. In this way, the proponents of the world-systems analysis build their analysis around long-term exploitative processes, while the actors at different times are of less interest, or rather taken for granted.

The semi-periphery is, however, a special category since there are no semi-peripheral processes (Wallerstein 2005:55). Rather this is a category of countries moulded by both core processes and periphery processes. These countries strive to become part of the core, they exploit the peripheral areas and therefore work as a buffer zone or "middle category to separate conflicting interests" releasing tension between core zones and peripheral zones (Taylor 1993:44). This parallels the way that the national scale of ideology works as mediator, "diverting political protest away from the key processes at the scale of reality [the global scale] by ensuring that they stop short at the scale of ideology – the nation state" (ibid:45).

At the centre of world-systems analysis is a long-term process of capitalist development that gradually has incorporated the whole world. This process is producing poverty and inequality locally, regionally, nationally and globally. Our studies on rural livelihoods in different parts of the world can then be seen as illustrative examples, reflecting the contemporary place-specific outcomes of a historical system. According to this perspective, government policy for poverty reduction is not likely to bring any substantial change. And it definitely will not bring change to the system, it will not change the world divided into zones of core, semi-periphery and periphery, a system based on inequality as one of its founding pillars. According to Wallerstein (1985), the proportion of people dwelling in each zone has also been rather constant over time. What governments can do, according to Taylor and Wallerstein, is to distort the effects of this historical process and under certain circumstances move from periphery to semi-periphery and in a few cases become core, which requires a profitable exploitation of other peripheral areas. In similar ways nations will travel in the

opposite direction (Taylor 1988; 2008). These perspectives are in stark contrast to actor-oriented livelihood researchers who discuss such concepts as responsible wellbeing (Chambers 2005) or socially sustainable livelihoods (Chambers & Conway 1992; Scoones 1998), which represent livelihoods that do not risk the environment or the livelihoods of other people. These ideas are based on a rather harmonious worldview not shared by those developing the world-systems political geography. In Wallerstein and Taylor's terms, responsible wellbeing would be seen as, at best, a contradiction within the historical system of world capitalism, which is based on exploitation, conflict and inequality.

### **2.1.3 Doing livelihood research in a historically shaped world**

So we have two rather distinct positions, one stressing the importance of locality and actors' agency and interactions when exploring (and explaining) rural livelihoods, and another claiming that local features only can be understood within the frame of the modern capitalist world-system. To bridge this gap we need to come back to Harvey's (2009) discussion of how to better integrate people-centred studies with general theories. A similar request is made by Gellert & Shefner (2009), who, however, take their departure in a critique of world-systems analysis. The demand to link micro with macro and actor with structure is thereby placed in both ends of the debate. Gellert & Shefner criticise world-systems analysis for lacking empirical depth in terms of studies into peoples' realities. Their standpoint is that world-systems analysis needs to incorporate more case study data and what they call "structural fieldwork" (ibid:196).

By structural fieldwork they mean fieldwork that is driven by structural or macro-oriented theories, for example world-systems analysis. It aims at paying "careful attention to local histories and dynamics" but the particulars of the case "must be joined to an analysis focused on seeing wider links – discourses, events etc. that embody global roots" (ibid:203-204). Structural fieldwork is therefore not solely engaged with what is happening in different locations of a globalised world but with "the basic nature of social realities" (Friedman quoted in ibid:196). This approach points at an ambition to view structures as situated in people's lives. By departing in theories, and by continuously revisiting these theories and comparing cases it is possible to cultivate and sophisticate existing development theory and "understand what are generalizable cases, and what are more unique" (ibid:205). Perhaps this should be a matter of course, but, as Harvey notes, it is not often done in relation to case studies. Such an approach

will also reveal the discursive elements of policy regimes and economic processes, which contribute to the constitution of peoples' livelihoods. Through theoretically informed fieldwork, where concepts such as modernisation and development form key parts, it will be possible to leave the position of the "armchair", and the analysis of texts and images, as expressed by Sharp (2009:144-148). Instead we will be able to ground post-colonial theory in peoples' realities, as well as in the political and economic framework impacting these realities, and do the "decolonised geographies of African development" that Mercer et al. (2003:432) among others recommend (see also Sylvester 1999).

#### **2.1.4 Analytical framework**

World-systems analysis provides us with an idea of how to empirically do research on livelihoods without neglecting the historically shaped world. Geographers have something to contribute here, as Taylor (1988) argues in his search for a new regional geography within the frame of a world-systems analysis. His regional concept insists on a rather large geographical entity, which is not always applicable in livelihood research. But the basic idea to "understand the places that make up the world-system" (Taylor 1988:259) or the places that are made up by the world-system, and that "space and time are central to examining the nature of social change" (Taylor 1991:389) could be better utilised within livelihood studies. This is to be done empirically, through looking into how people and places historically have been integrated and shaped by broader political and economic processes.


In this study the rural households and their contemporary livelihood situations are at the centre. Inspiration is gained partly from the livelihood framework in outlining the important aspects of households' livelihoods. Dimensions are added in order to achieve a basic understanding of how the farmers perceive different parts of their livelihoods, how they look upon farming compared to other activities etcetera. Importantly, this includes attention to obstacles and opportunities with respect to improved wellbeing, and what improved wellbeing would consist of.

When studying the impact of rural policy regimes, the state of Zambia and Northern Rhodesia are seen as key institutions, which however are heavily influenced by discursive and material processes and actors of both external and internal origin. The concept of policy regime is divided into five layers, *goals*, *problem description*, *instruments*, *processes* and *discourse*. Firstly we have the overall goals or purposes of policies, which might be such things as national

food security, environmental protection, access to cheap labour or establishing a functioning agricultural market economy. Then there is the problem description which describes the current state of affairs at each particular point in time, and which provides the rationale or justification for policy intervention. Problem descriptions might include issues such as poverty, inequality, lack of market economy or wrong type of agricultural methods. Thirdly are the instruments or tools to achieve the goals and amend the problems outlined in the problem description. Instruments can be anything from concrete tax or price policies, privatisation of marketing boards, to soil conservation methods. Fourthly are the processes, the socio-economic change, that take place and that can be linked to the instruments. This could be increased export production, labour migration, but also processes such as increased equality or social differentiation. The fifth layer is the discourse, meaning the more fundamental ideas about modernisation and development that the goals, problem descriptions, processes and instruments rely on. This five-layer division of the policy concept has gained inspiration from a few sources within the field of policy research, foremost Hall (1993) and Howlett and Cashore (2009). These authors divide the policy concept into different orders, with discussions of goals, instruments and problem description as for this analytical framework. They do, however, lack the components of discourse and processes, which are seen as crucial in fulfilling the aim of this study.

In conclusion then, a number of concerns form the analytical frame for this study of rural livelihoods in Chipata District in Eastern Zambia. Rural people's ways of life and their choices and actions, the policies towards rural smallholders, ideologies of modernity and development and place-specific economic integration into the world-economy are all important aspects for our understanding of the shaping of smallholders' livelihoods. In Figure 2-3 smallholders' livelihoods (or livelihood situations) are therefore outlined as originating in smallholders place-based ways of making a living in relation to the effects of rural policies over time, the historical integration into the world-economy and ideologies of modernity and development. The outer ellipses can be seen as factors or forces that, through interacting with each other, shape the livelihoods of rural smallholders. Smallholders' actions are still an important part of the framework, but must be viewed in intimate relation to the three other factors.





**Figure 2-3: Analytical framework**

This framework generates livelihood research dealing with the study area's integration into the world-economy (or world-system), and how this integration has been played out in terms of concrete and place-specific policies, with their discursive foundations and associated economic and political processes over time. The framework therefore enables a livelihood study that takes place, people and their voices and actions seriously without neglecting structural dynamics and the power of discourse in shaping concrete livelihood situations. The approach also brings forth the actors that uphold both material and discursive structures at different periods of time, at the same time as the actors can be viewed in relation to the historical processes shaping them, their agency and room for manoeuvre. Hence, by outlining the policies and actions of colonial and post-independence administrations, donors, international financial institutions, IFIs, like the World Bank and the IMF, as well as of smallholders and extension officers, we enable a more concrete discussion of how structures are located in peoples lives as well as what instances of resistance towards dominant structures there might be.

The content in the outer ellipses in Figure 2-3 will be further theoretically and contextually dealt with in the following sections of Chapter Two and

Chapter Three. Some parts, like ideologies of modernity and development will correspond well to a certain section, while theoretical and contextual aspects of rural policy regimes by necessity will run through several sections of both Chapter Two and Chapter Three.

## **2.2 Ideologies of modernity and development**

By coincidence I participated, in October 2008, in a meeting between small-scale farmers and a cooperative organisation working with local entrepreneurship and fertiliser support in Chipata District. I joined the meeting halfway, and sat down among the participants to listen. The leader at the meeting talked about the importance of having a vision in life and of planning carefully in accordance with that vision. He brought one of the farmers up on the floor and pointed at me while addressing the group. He explained rather straightforwardly that if the farmer and I received 1 million dollars each, I would do something productive with it, while the man brought up on the floor would most likely just waste the money. He turned to me and said; “You see, we differ, you and us”.

Policies on different levels of society are embedded in fundamental ideas of development and modernity, which are produced and reproduced over time (Preston 1996; Peet 2007). These ideas are important for shaping the Western view of Africa and African development. At the time of the Enlightenment and capitalist development in Europe, Africa was often described as a continent in a state of nature, moulded by innocence and undistorted by modernity (Preston 1996:36). This idea, often associated with Rousseau (1712-1778) was, however, gradually complemented and replaced by a more fateful vocabulary. The noble savage became the uncivilised savage, the exotic became the beastly, the untouched the backwards and so on.

As Sharp (2009:12-16) notes, the early images of the other, outside Europe, were at the beginning not necessarily based on empirical observations. Rather they were based on tales and myths of monstrous people with their main characteristic as being different from Europeans in body, mind, needs and social practices. As Sharp also notes, one could assume that these images would be corrected as observations were made and explorers travelled through the areas meeting and interacting with different people and societies. Even if the most absurd images eventually became less convincing to most people, many of the images remained essentially intact resulting in only slightly more sophisticated ideas about the others. In Africa this process was related to European countries' increased economic self-interest in exploiting the continent, but was justified in

terms of Christianisation, civilisation, economic, political and social development (Preston 1996:137-144). Explorers such as Richard Burton, Henry Morton Stanley and Samuel Baker had an important function in spreading the image of Africans as helpless children without an own history and in need of help to get on the right track towards civilisation. It was concluded that without a cultural and political past there could be no development, and Africans were often described as living in a complete vacuum in terms of history and experience (Davidson 1972:16-19).

These images of Africans were not, however, created in a vacuum. Postcolonial theories in particular refer to the construction of a European identity in relation to these images and suggest that ideas of development, modernisation and the 'modern man' must be seen in relation to these representations of otherness (Loomba 2006:117-119; Sharp 2009; see also Blaut 1993). A hierarchical binary logic was created that came to be central to European Enlightenment thought and to ideas of what constituted 'modern man' and modern society. There are many variations, but some examples central to this binary logic are rational-emotional, active-passive, adult-child, white-black, mind-body, man-woman, impersonal-personal, abstract thought-concrete thought, and intellect-instinct. On a societal level the set of binaries were aggregated to things like urban-rural, industry-craft, civilised-primitive, progress-stagnation, science-sorcery and inventiveness-imitativeness.

Also the early sociological tradition was to a large extent occupied with these dichotomies or what has subsequently been labelled ideas of global difference (Connell 1997). Canonised texts by Marx (1971; 1846 in origin), Weber (1930; 1904 in origin), Durkheim (1933; 1902 in origin) and Simmel (1981; 1908 in origin) all discuss similar issues of what constitutes a modern person and a modern society in contrast to primitiveness and traditional societies. With partly different focus and interpretations they describe modern urban society with its goal-rationality, anonymous bureaucracy, individualisation and individual consciousness and its cohesion through division of labour, where we are free as individuals at the same time as we are all interdependent. This is in opposition to primitive, 'lower societies' constituted by little division in labour, held together by conformism, social control and a collectiveness in ideas and values (see foremost Durkheim 1933).

Most of these ideas came into use within the field of development thinking, in modernisation as well as dependency theory. Development came to constitute the process from the primitive and traditional society to the modern and advanced society. The focus was on the level of society while the implications for the individual became less elaborated on in twentieth century

development theory. However, the modern person described in the classical sociological texts was in many aspects a rather tragic figure. It is not only Marx's (1978; 1844 in origin) discussion of alienation that is constitutive here. Durkheim (1933), Simmel (1981) and Weber (1930) also elaborated on the effects that modern, urban society with its increased specialisation and division of labour had on the individual human being. What they described is by and large a modern person, whose mentality is dominated by rational thinking to the extent that he has lost his ability to respond emotionally to the world around him. He (the modern person was a 'he' in these texts) lacks a larger meaning in life and is constantly going through a process of spiritual and emotional underdevelopment. Individual freedom is larger in a modern urban society compared to a traditional one, but this freedom has nothing to do with our wellbeing (Simmel 1981). Instead we wither away as whole human beings as we no longer cultivate our full potential, instead becoming more and more specialised and individualistic in what we do. Eventually we turn into incomplete and defective persons, trapped in an "iron cage" as Weber (1930:181) put it. This defectiveness can also explain our high thoughts of our own societal model and ourselves. We are on a march into "the polar night of icy darkness and hardness" (Weber 1977:95; 1919 in origin) and Weber's only council seems to be seclusion. Weber is particularly pessimistic, describing the future modern person more or less as a heartless, smug nobody "embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance" (Weber 1930:182) while rotting in his iron cage. He concludes that "for of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved" (ibid:182).

During the second half of the twentieth century, when liberals, structuralists and dependency scholars debated poverty, inequality and development, they were all promoters of modernity, fundamentally in the shape of the early sociologists' description (Preston 1996; Rist 2008:118-122). Division of labour, specialisation, individualisation, goal-rationality, economic growth and an effective and anonymous administration and bureaucracy became constitutive of a good modern society. Rationality, reason and intellect became constitutive of a modern and civilised human being, with little reference to any negative implications of the European model of society. According to Durkheim (1933:42-43), we view the division of labour and specialisation as a code of conduct in our society, looking with suspicion on those not adjusting to this code. We show contempt for those striving to develop different parts of themselves, not willing to sacrifice any domain in life. To not take part in

specialisation and division of labour is then to be irresolute an “anti-social” (ibid:42). Those who show tendencies of that kind of lifestyle are often seen as treacherous, according to Durkheim, since they dissociate themselves from the productive and effective order that our society is founded upon.

Looking at the colonisation process in Africa many of the ideas discussed above, together with racism and social Darwinism, were important in forming arguments supporting and defending the colonial endeavour. Western society was the role model. Through science, Europe had formed the knowledge needed to understand other societies and what ought to be done (see Sharp 2009:34-38). Blaut (1993) discusses a super theory of Eurocentric diffusionism where Europe historically has controlled the knowledge production about itself and the outside world in such a way that it became an empirical fact that Europe was progressive, inventive and historical while the rest of the world lacked these characteristics. These ideas, together with the discourse of modernisation and development were spread so convincingly throughout the world that most people came to take them for truth and for natural. This also goes for the colonial subjects, who internalised many of these ideas (Sharp 2009:4-5). The leader at the cooperative meeting, referred to above, can be seen as a contemporary example of that. The diffusion of the European model, our values and innovations was similar to “air [that] flows into a vacuum” (Blaut 1993:16). There was nothing to destroy or violate in terms of political systems, property rights, culture, intellectual values or creativity. Europe had to bring these things in, and if raw material and labour was extracted and exploited to the benefit of the colonial power it was still the case that “colonialism gives more than it receives” (ibid:16).

The ideas of European superiority generated a circular reasoning where the different types of local responses to colonisation could be taken as a manifestation of this superiority. If there was no local protest towards conquest this was due to the lack of societal structure, political system and cohesion needed for such protest that also motivated and defended the invasion as such. But the fact was that protest and rebellion against the establishment of colonial domination was the rule rather than an exception. However, this could also be rationalised as providing evidence that Africans were just as backward, brutal and uncivilised, as they had been portrayed (see e.g. Davidson 2001; Elkins 2005).

Sharp (2009:82-105) argues that many early images of Africa and Africans have been reproduced in contemporary society through images and representations of otherness in for example tourism, art, literature and advertising. In a similar vein, Blaut (1993) identifies a continuous striving for

spreading the Western societal model, and a repeated disavowal of things we do not perceive as originating in the Western hemisphere. More concretely, and in close relation to this study, Scoones (2009:184) talks of a “livelihood discourse”. He identifies normative assumptions of what constitute “a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ livelihood”, based on a rather linear perception of development, where it is an objective goal to move from subsistence farming to entrepreneurship and commercialisation. Finally, Harvey (2009) discusses universal principles and conceptions of rights that today put the individual and the individuals’ liberal rights at the very centre of all debates about society and development.

These include individual responsibility and liability, independence from state interference, equality of opportunity in the market and before the law, rewards for initiative and entrepreneurial endeavors, care for oneself and one’s own, and an open market place that allows for wide-ranging freedoms of choice of both contract and exchange. (ibid:56)

What has made this regime of rights so appealing (including to oppositional elements in society), is its inclusion of “rights of private property in one’s own body” and “the right to freedom of thought, of expression and of speech” (ibid:56). However, according to Harvey, to accept this regime of rights is to accept;

a regime of endless capital accumulation and economic growth no matter what the social, ecological or political consequences. Reciprocally, endless capital accumulation implies that the neo-liberal regime of rights must be geographically expanded across the globe. (ibid:56)

Much criticism has no doubt been directed towards the modernisation project and theories that are aligned with it. It has been criticised for being ahistorical, ethnocentric, gender-insensitive, environment-insensitive and top-down and for obscuring the exploitation and pauperisation of various peoples and societies which have enabled the rise of the modern society and the ‘modern man’ (see e.g. Hartman 1986; Shiva 1989; Braidotti et al. 1994; Parpart 2002; Rist 2008). This has inspired several researchers to more or less completely repudiate ‘development’ and to search for something else (Escobar 1995; Rist 2008:256-261).

The discussion of ‘another development’ or an alternative to development is a broad one, which has centred on concepts such as territorialism, reciprocity, local knowledge, self-reliance, egalitarianism, sustainability, participatory and cultural pluralism (Hettne 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 2010:90-102). The key idea or principle of territorialism is associated with local development with respect

paid to cultural and ecological specificity, where localities have their own development logic, instead of being viewed as functions of a broader development agenda of national or international origin. Proponents of the more radical post-development bluntly refute the basic ideas of both modernity and development. What they suggest is that the different means and goals of modernity such as economic growth, large-scale development and high consumption are fundamental problems and not only insufficient measurement of peoples' and societies' wellbeing (Rist 2008).

## **2.3 World-economic integration and colonialism in rural Africa**

### **2.3.1 Interpreting the integration of rural Africa**

There is certainly not one single way to interpret the history of rural Africa. Early modernisation theories, for example, look upon the colonial period, if not as a positive, at least as a necessary process in introducing a capitalist mode of production and an institutional framework necessary for development and modernisation (Rostow 1960). Although modernisation theories have not been primarily occupied with interpretations of this historical period, it is quite clear that the modes of production of pre-colonial Africa were seen as incompatible with steady economic growth and modernisation. The peasantry and rural life were seen as backwards and the agrarian structure consisting of small-scale producers needed to be transformed into a modern agricultural sector, based on larger units with improved technology and new farming practices. The large masses of peasants should be converted into urban workers in the emerging industries (Singh 1999). An important obstacle to development according to this tradition is the co-existence of pre-capitalist modes of production in rural areas, which is a major point of departure also in Hydén's idea of a 'peasant mode of production' and an 'economy of affection' (Blomström & Hettne 1981:199-206; Samoff 1981).

Several Marxist thinkers have been inclined to agree with the proposition that a fundamental problem is that African societies are not yet sufficiently penetrated by capitalism. However, according to world-systems theorists and radical political geographers, Africa is well penetrated and the widespread rural poverty visible today is deeply rooted in the historical process of world capitalism. One of Wallerstein's key tenets is that the modern world-system evolves through repeated responses to crises of capital accumulation, leading to an increased rivalry between the major economic powers in search of cheap natural resources and cheap labour to produce a new upswing in the global economy (Wallerstein 1976). Through these crises, or rather the responses to

these crises, new areas have been integrated into the world-economy. One such process was the Atlantic slave trade that meant that coastal areas of Africa were integrated into the world-economy and peripheralised, while large parts of the inland continued to exist as an external arena. A new crisis in the world-economy in the second half of the nineteenth century led to increased rivalry between European countries and to the scramble for Africa where most of the continent was formally colonised and integrated into the world-economy.

### **2.3.2 Semi-proletarianisation and primitive accumulation**

Two concepts by which rural Africa's integration into the world-economy can be understood are *semi-proletarianisation* and *primitive accumulation*. What they explain is both the rationale behind, and the effects of, the colonial exploitation in Africa. Africa was attractive due to its rich mineral deposits, its vast areas of fertile and productive land and as a source of cheap labour. In this context rural areas were used foremost as a) a source of labour, b) a source of land for European settlers and their production of cash crops, and c) a source of land for African farmers producing cash crops or food for the market or for subsistence. On an overall level the colonisation of Africa created a system of three zones a) islands of modern development, which produced for the world market (settler areas, plantations, mining areas), b) rather small food production zones for the labour in the first zone (often adjacent to the first zone), and c) vast labour reserve zones characterised by semi-proletarianised households (Wallerstein 1976).

In the labour reserve zones people survived on subsistence agriculture, and supplied migrant labour to the first zone at the same time as they took care of the costs of reproduction. Labour was extracted through the introduction of taxes on rural households, often in combination with agricultural regulations prohibiting African farmers from earning a livelihood through marketing their agricultural produce. Wages were kept at a level barely sufficient to sustain the worker much less sustain and reproduce the worker's family. It was these people, forced by colonial tax policies to depend on both waged labour and subsistence agriculture, that formed the great class of semi-proletarians on the African countryside. Taylor describes the third zone (the labour reserve zone) as "the periphery of the periphery" (Taylor 1993:125-126), a supplier of cheap labour for the world-economy, a supplier who, however must take care of itself and gets almost nothing in return. Taylor's argument is that, although this is largely a description of colonial societies, it has not fundamentally changed in the post-colonial world. The formal imperialism under colonialism was replaced



by an informal or hidden imperialism. This ‘new’ imperialism is moulded by uneven exchange between core countries and the periphery constituted largely by a continuous semi-proletarianisation of the population. This should be seen in contrast to the process of proletarianisation, which took place in the core countries, where initially the male and today often both the male and the female are breadwinners and earn incomes, which, in general, cover the household’s full subsistence, and often beyond that. In many African households, wages have always constituted only a small part of the households’ income, while other sources have been just as important. Since the households in the African countryside (and in the cities) still sustain (and have to sustain) their livelihoods largely through different types of subsistence activities, extremely low wages can be maintained. In addition to this all the reproductive work, such as caring for children and elderly is taken care of within the rural society, predominantly by girls and women. Costs of reproduction and subsistence do not have to be included either in the wages or in the prices for the commodities that go for export, which further explains the continuing unequal exchange between (for example) Africa and Europe.

The same kind of process has been described by Meillassoux (1973) and Cliffe (1976) and later by authors such as Forstater (2003) using the concept of primitive accumulation in their writing on development in rural Africa. In this context primitive accumulation refers to a process where the capitalist world-economy feeds on the co-existence of pre-capitalist modes of production. In peripheral areas, where a semi-proletariat sustain themselves through subsistence farming and especially women take care of reproductive tasks, a kind of superexploitation is possible where extraordinary profits can be made due to the existence of pre-capitalist modes of production. Cliffe (1976) takes the position that African farmers, especially in the former labour reserve areas, are involved in world capitalism but not engaged in a capitalist mode of production. Production in these areas is largely pre-capitalist, and continues to be so since it is “profitable to certain interests” and since it promotes the “dynamics to the capitalist system as a whole” (ibid:113). This is possible due to the existence of a subsistence economy, which effectively subsidises the cost of labour. Primitive accumulation therefore provides a “transfer of wealth from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist sector” (Meillassoux 1973:89).

According to Cliffe (1976), it is by adopting this perspective that we will be able to understand the more complex reasons why, during colonial rule, African agriculture was held back and arrested to the limit where it could survive on a subsistence level and care for the reproduction of the labour force but not develop into a “productive alternative to labour migration” (ibid:115).

Clearly this does not mean that the pre-colonial institutions were left intact in rural Africa. The involvement in the world-economy affected rural Africa in profound ways, also its modes of production, but vast areas never became capitalist in themselves, but kept crucial elements of pre-capitalist modes of production.

### **2.3.3 The peasant mode of production and the economy of affection**

The processes of semi-proletarianisation and primitive accumulation are partly parallel in thought to Hydén's development of the concepts of a peasant mode of production and an economy of affection, although they do differ on some major points. Hydén is not easily labelled as belonging to either a liberal or a Marxist tradition. He takes history seriously, but ends up with a rather different conclusion to, for example, Taylor and Wallerstein. In various publications Hydén (1980; 1983; 2006) argues that the root to underdevelopment in Africa is not about colonial exploitation or unequal exchange on the international market.<sup>4</sup> Instead, an important cause to both rural poverty and lack of national development is to be found in the rural areas and in the existence of a peasant mode of production, and in an economy of affection that dominate African societies and block a capitalist development. The peasant mode of production is characterised by producers who are independent of other peasant producers as well as of other classes in society. There is no mutually dependent relation with other farmers except in a time of crisis, based on the belief that everyone has the right to survive. The structural independence of each household has, according to Hydén, resulted in low technological development and almost no surplus production. It also implies low levels of specialisation and division of labour, just as discussed by Durkheim in a previous section.

The peasant mode of production means also that the peasants are rather independent of the state. They do not need the state, which suggests that the state is largely separated from the rural society. Rural areas are then characterised by local, spontaneous and flexible social networks that serve the purpose of supporting the rural community in times of crisis, to supply social help and to support development efforts at times (Hydén 1983:11-16). The main point of the concept economy of affection is to describe a rationality that differs greatly from modern capitalist societies and hence from the objectives of governments in terms of national development and economic growth.

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<sup>4</sup> However, Hydén nowadays agrees that the high subsidies to agriculture in OECD countries have a negative impact on agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa (Hydén 2006:149).

The broader issue at stake is that this informal institution - the economy of affection – dominates both political and economic life in African countries and thereby hinders a development route, where capital accumulation is an end in itself and push the society ‘forwards’. The working of rural communities are, however, of crucial importance, since they hold the key to the necessary transformation of the agricultural sector, from labour intensive subsistence production to intensification, commercialisation and surplus production (Hydén 2006). In rural areas, the focus on the needs of the members of the local community hampers local investment in activities, which are of interest for the nation as a whole. The large extended family can be seen as one of the economy of affection’s major institutions, although the size of this network varies greatly depending on the magnitude of a particular crisis. According to Hydén (1983:17-22), the economy of affection has a detrimental impact on national development since it hinders changes in social behaviour and the evolving of societal institutions necessary for achieving development and sustained economic growth on a national scale.

On the one hand Hydén demonstrates his disagreement with ideas of dumb or lazy peasants (Hydén 1980:41-42). On the other he states that “the African personality is full and wholesome in a sense that does not tally with the demands of systemic rationality” (Hydén 1983:150). However, the African peasants *are* rational according to Hydén, but not in agreement with the needs of modern development. Their rationality is focused on reproduction not production, they rely on the law of subsistence (for everyone) and wealth is of subordinate importance. Modernisation, capitalism and nation building are threats to their local patriotism, independence and domestically oriented way of life and therefore African peasant societies are very resistant to change.

By arguing for dissolution of the peasant mode of production, Hydén complies with Durkheim’s description of specialisation and division of labour as a code of conduct. In Hydén’s view, African farmers are somehow disloyal citizens when they strive for a domestically oriented life instead of fulfilling functions in a national strategy towards development and modernisation.<sup>5</sup> Hydén

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<sup>5</sup> At a seminar (2009-12-02, Gothenburg) Hydén jokingly regretted that he from some camps had been labelled Stalinist after his publication of *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania* in 1980. Such a label must be considered unfair, Hydén is first and foremost a hardcore modernist. It might, however, have something to do with his theme that coercion and force is required in the necessary process of “capturing” the peasantry, destroy their mode of production and install a new set of values, attitudes and habits into the peasants. His critique and dismissal of liberals as well as naïve “Marxists who assume that the individual liberties can be combined with socialism”, and his clarity when it comes to the capturing of the peasantry as a “necessary evil of modernization” (Hydén 1980:225) might have added to such conceptions.

therefore represents a functionalist approach to development, pointing at instances of territorialism as obstacles in the development process.

Hydén concludes that most analysts have overemphasized the impact of colonialism and capitalism in Africa (Hydén 1980:20). In his analysis of the colonial era he depicts attempts to transform the African agricultural sector, to capture the peasantry and replace their mode of production. The local resistance towards this process was fierce, according to Hydén, and whatever progress was made it was crushed by the newly independent states (Hydén 1983:29).<sup>6</sup> Especially he points at the independent governments' abandonment of the head and hut taxes, introduced during colonial rule, as a measure that de-linked the local people from the state, leading to an independent peasantry (Hydén 2006:143-144).

Hydén disagrees with Cliffe that there is a built-in interest of the international capitalist system to keep these alternative modes as a source of primitive accumulation; capitalism "does not by design seek the impoverishment of Africa" (Hydén 1980:22). Instead, capitalism develops and thrives when its mode of production becomes more inclusive. Cliffe (1976) and Hydén (1980) do however agree on one major point; the peasant mode of production must be destroyed. According to Hydén because it causes underdevelopment and has infected the entire society with the economy of affection, producing corruption, nepotism and societal fragmentation; according to Cliffe (1976) because it is "counterrevolutionary" (ibid:126) and since it permits primitive accumulation and exploitation by the international capitalist system. Taylor (1993) and Wallerstein (2005) do not, however, reason in a similar vein. Their focus on primitive accumulation and semi-proletarianisation as central themes in the world-economic system does not lead them to discussions of a necessary reform process of local communities. Their search for cause and change is instead the system as a whole, wherein African households continuously face the consequences of a historically grounded process of exploitation.

## **2.4 Perspectives on post-independence policy regimes**

Colonial societies were illustrative examples of policy regimes holding an urban bias, where small-scale farmers and rural development were neglected and

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<sup>6</sup> Hydén has developed the ideas on a peasant mode of production and the economy of affection better and more thoroughly than anyone else I would say. Still there is, as indicated, a wider literature on the need for changing behaviour and attitudes and adopting economic rationality in rural areas in line with what is believed to be necessary for modernisation (e.g. Rostow 1960; Johnston & Kilby 1982; see also Williams 1982 and Handy 2009 for overviews).

discriminated against in the development process. The idea of an urban bias has also played a key role in the post-independence development debate in Africa. Given the historical context and the debate surrounding the colonial period, this section brings up some key ideas on rural development, policy and livelihoods in a post-independence perspective. The ‘urban bias theory’, associated with Michael Lipton (1982), will here be treated in relation to different models or policy-options, which will bring the discussion up to present times.

During the 1970s the idea of an urban bias in development was put forth by Michael Lipton and in a more specifically African context by Robert Bates (2005). The original argument was that the distribution of resources, development efforts and policies for a long time had worked to the benefit of urban areas and the industrial sector at the expense of agriculture and the majority of the rural population. Small-scale farmers had been particularly neglected in this process. This was manifested in declining terms of trade for rural producers, price policies prioritising cheap food for urban consumers, and a comparable neglect of rural areas when it came to budget allocations and the development of physical and social infrastructure (Lipton 1982; Brohman 1996).

Urban bias has often been accompanied by a bimodal approach towards rural development. A bimodal approach indicates a policy regime aimed at differentiation of the rural population, often in favour of the already resource rich farmers (Johnston & Kilby 1982; Lipton 1982). The colonies in sub-Saharan Africa contained much of this open discrimination and differentiation within rural areas. However, in many societies the bimodal approach has proved very difficult to alter after independence and the dual structure of the agricultural sector and of rural areas has endured post-independence.

In explaining urban bias, Lipton argued that the distribution of resources in developing countries were controlled by a small urban elite “comprising mainly businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, trade-union leaders and a supporting staff of professionals, academics and intellectuals” (Lipton 1982:66). These groups gained their power due to their key roles during the struggle for independence, which gave them a dominant role in the newly formed nations. Many of them shared similar interests, which inevitably led to the favouring of urban areas. According to ‘urban bias theory’, political power is based on good relations with relatively well-organised urban classes. Private as well as state companies and institutions had a shared interest in keeping food prices low in urban areas in order to keep wages at low levels (Jones & Corbridge 2010). By contrast rural populations are “more dispersed, poor, inarticulate and unorganized” (Lipton 1982:66) and therefore face greater difficulties in drawing attention to their needs and demands.

The continuous differentiation between the poor and less poor/non-poor within rural areas is explained by an alliance between the urban elite and the rural elite. This alliance implies that resources invested in rural development are diverted to richer segments of the rural population, in line with the bimodal approach. In a short-term perspective the urban elite gain from this type of resource distribution. This is because the rural elite will respond to support by producing a surplus to be sold in urban areas, and their increased incomes are more likely to be invested and spent in urban areas. Support to poor and small-scale farmers will not result in the same surplus, instead it is likely to be consumed within the rural communities, since it is often becomes a necessary contribution in smallholders' struggle to make a living (ibid; see also Johnstone & Kilby 1982; Brohman 1996).

Lipton and several others have from a structuralist perspective argued for an interventionist (active, strong state), redistributive and unimodal approach towards rural development. The unimodal approach aims at encouraging increased production in the entire rural sector at the same time as the wealth of the entire rural population increases.<sup>7</sup> This is usually done through redistributive measures such as land reform and an expansion of the physical, economic and social infrastructure to the entire sector of small-scale farmers. This is combined with efforts in extension work and supplies in technology believed to be appropriate for a labour-intensive small-scale agriculture sector. The unimodal approach to rural development requires a strong interventionist state that takes active part in the development process. Bates (2005) advocated for a much more economically liberal model, with deregulation and lower taxes as key instruments for increasing farmers' producer prices and their production of food crops, which would in the long run lead to low food prices.

'Urban bias theory' has been widely discussed and debated as will be seen in the treatment of rural African livelihoods in Chapter Three. Who and what is rural/urban is always a matter for debate. Neither is urban bias always seen as something bad by definition. It may be seen as an expression of rather rational economic policies (see e.g. Jones & Corbridge 2010). However, the discussion on urban bias illuminates and illustrates several issues of inequality and rural poverty in Africa and puts rural and agricultural development in relation to other sectors, both domestically and internationally.

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<sup>7</sup> An important part of the argument calls attention to the history of developed countries in both Europe and parts of Asia, where agricultural transformation and growth preceded industrialisation and that extensive state support in various aspects of agricultural and rural development has been integrated parts of this process (Bezemer & Heady 2008). This also points out the inefficiency of an urban bias in the development process, since it is argued that "agricultural growth is a precondition to broader growth" (ibid:1345).

From the early 1980s a non-interventionist model for rural development took form, following dominating intellectual and political trends mainly in the USA and Great Britain, which set the course of the global mainstream for the following three decades (Peet 2007). In that context it was claimed that the best way to even out the rural/urban divide and to support the rural producers was to deregulate the agricultural sector and to “get the prices right”. This would increase farmers’ producer prices, encourage production and promote small-scale capitalist farming. The policy regime towards rural development and smallholders rested now in neo-classical economics and a neoliberal modernisation theory. A free market environment without price-regulation, subsidies and state-initiated market arrangements is in this theoretical tradition the best option in terms of supporting small-scale farmers or peasants. In that kind of environment the farmers could maximise profits, leading to higher productivity (Bryceson 2000a:24-28). This pure neoliberal model was rather soon complemented with an institutionalist perspective where the state gained a role in creating an enabling environment for the private sector. The issue of good governance was emphasised in relation to market development and the need for the state to uphold policies as well as “a rule of law that could imbue private actors and stake-holders with incentives to invest and expand economic activities” (Havnevik et al. 2006a:14).

A few things are constitutive of the neoliberal-institutionalist approach. First, an urban bias is a result of market regulations and state-involvement working against smallholders and the rural poor, which also imply an inefficient and at times corrupt bureaucracy (Bates 2005). Therefore these things need to be removed. Secondly, market liberalisation will lead to capitalist development within smallholder communities (or peasantries) since they follow laws of economic rationality, including being prone to financial risk-taking and adoption of profit maximation as a goal in farming. In an African context, these policies towards rural development and livelihoods became known as part of structural adjustment policies, focusing on the liberalisation of the African national economies. In terms of small rural producers, export-orientation and increased integration into the world-economy and global agriculture commodity flows became important, through activities such as contract farming, where external demands would increasingly guide smallholder production (Akram-Lodhi & Kay 2010).

In this neoliberal policy regime, a change from communal, traditional and state-controlled types of tenure towards private ownership of land is another important aspect in making small-scale agriculture more efficient and economically viable. Pre-capitalist tenure systems were seen as obstacles to

economic development. Tenure reform and private land titling would promote increased investments as well as a sustainable use of natural resources since the future economic value of land becomes clearer and titles can be used as collateral (Chileshe 2005). Inevitably this will establish a land market, which – according to this line of theory - will allocate land to the most efficient producers and amalgamate land to its most efficient size (see e.g. Heltberg 2002; Chileshe 2005).

People becoming landless as a consequence of an effective land market, will seek other “pathways out of rural poverty” (World Bank 2007a:73) in the form of non-farm labour and migration. Small-scale farmers should focus on diversifying their production into cash crops, export crops or industrial crops. According to the World Bank, smallholder entrepreneurship is the way to fight rural poverty, or “the ideal to strive for” as in Scoones’ (2009:184) more discursive interpretation of the present policy regime. Households without possibilities to become commercialised in their farming activities are more likely to move into non-agricultural activities such as small-scale trade and businesses. Finally, migration is an option that will strengthen both the people migrating and the rural households left behind through remittances.

## **2.5 Making a living in contemporary rural Africa**

Processes of deagrarianisation and income diversification are, in livelihoods-oriented work, seen as products of the neoliberal economic policies of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (Bryceson 2000b; 2004; 2009). Bryceson (together with many others) identifies an increase in the importance of non-agricultural incomes. It is estimated that between 60 and 80 percent of the incomes of rural households comes from activities other than farming, which constitute a considerable increase compared to earlier figures (Bryceson 2004). Bryceson further argues that structural adjustment led to many of the problems that today can be said to be at the centre of the crises within smallholder agriculture. Due to market failures and smallholders’ lack of inputs, markets and credits, rural households have turned increasingly to non-agricultural activities to sustain their livelihoods. Within the livelihood framework, this has led to an increased focus on different types of capitals (or resources) when analysing peoples livelihoods and livelihood strategies.

Jonathan Rigg (2006; 2007) deals with most of the processes outlined in livelihood studies, such as diversification, deagrarianisation, increased migration/mobility, changing gender roles etcetera, but interprets them differently to Bryceson. Rigg sees neoliberal economic policy as only one



among many forces behind the current processes of deagrarianisation, income diversification and increased migration. Rigg (2006) outlines what he calls, “propelling forces” (ibid:188), which generate change in the rural South. He divides the discussion into first level propelling and second level propelling forces. The first level forces are those of direct influence in the rural South, such as environmental degradation, land shortages, cultural/social change, new income and job opportunities in the non-agricultural sector and a general decrease in economic returns from agriculture. The second level forces are those that produce the first level forces. These forces are everything from national policies holding an urban bias, foreign direct investments leading to new type of jobs, improved infrastructure, over-cropping/non-sustainable agricultural practices, population growth, concentration of land resources, education and “media-led consumerism” (ibid:189).

Rigg does not really discuss the relative importance of these different forces, saying no more than that they might vary between places, countries and continents. This is, however, problematic since one group of second level propelling forces contradict one of his prerequisites. Rigg argues generally that everyone from government officials, IFIs, academic scholars to development practitioners is inclined toward the erroneous conception that poverty is best fought through concentrating efforts in rural areas and the sector of agriculture. This has already been tried out and failed, according to Rigg. However, at the same time, he agrees that policies have long had an urban/industrial bias and have led to declining terms of trade for agriculture. Rigg claims that scholars as well as practitioners and policy-makers have a “moral preference for village life” and that they normatively think that “rural people *should* remain in the countryside and in farming” (ibid:187, emphasis in original). But the people concerned do not share this preference, Rigg argues. Instead rural dwellers show a desire to move away from agriculture. Poor households’ new preferences are influenced by education, newspapers, radio and television, and are especially well-pronounced in their aspirations and struggles for their children’s futures.

Rigg wants to see policies and development interventions that support people’s efforts to leave farming and perhaps rural areas, through re-skilling the poor and “permitting amalgamation of land holdings” (ibid:197), pointing at redistributing land reform as particularly meaningless in the long run. Whether Rigg is correct or not, his argument that policy-makers and academics are continuously in favour of small-scale agriculture is not very consistent with his acknowledgement of an urban bias in development policy. Rigg’s idea of a cultural change and his suggestion on re-skilling the rural poor is further problematic in an African context since the neoliberal economic policies have

produced a parallel process of deindustrialisation in parts of Southern and Eastern Africa and loss of formal job opportunities (e.g. Ferguson 1999). Furthermore urban agriculture is growing in Africa, and urban agriculturalists are expanding their fields leading to what could be described as an agrarianisation (and perhaps increased semi-proletarianisation) of urban areas (Zezze & Tasciotti 2010; see also Hampwaye et al. 2007; Espling 2009).

Bryceson claims on the contrary that rural dwellers often have a profound preference for farming and that much non-agricultural work is of an experimental character, but that farming is valued as very important (Bryceson 2000b; 2009; Larsson 2001). Bryceson does not see substantial evidence of a positive transformation of the African countryside due to increased engagement in non-agricultural activities. The livelihoods of rural dwellers in Africa are as uncertain as ever, despite a process of more than 20 years of relative increase in non-agricultural incomes (Bryceson 2009). She supports initiatives to re-skill the poor, but at the same time she argues that smallholder agriculture has an important role to play in development for several reasons. Economically smallholdings are preferred to large-scale agriculture since they are less energy-intensive and environmentally harmful in their practices. She also argues that support to the smallholder sector is vital for human welfare and national stability. Small-scale farming is an important part of national identities and people's continuing displacement from rural areas is likely to have a destabilising impact, according to Bryceson.

Rigg's differing viewpoint might be an effect of his empirical experience from South East Asia, although he aims at making a general case for the global South. It might also be an indication of the theoretical underpinning of much contemporary livelihood research. The tendency in livelihood research to frame everything in people's lives as resources or different types of capital, often leads to a modernist view of peoples' ways of life, which focuses on the material well-being of the individual, or the individual household. Social relations, even family-bonds, are described as social capital used in forming and improving livelihoods that can be transformed into other types of capital. Land, which is often the major form of 'natural capital' in rural communities, is treated rather one-dimensionally in the livelihood approach, as a resource among others to be used as efficiently as possible, or to be traded for other resources or capitals. To farmers, however, the land and the work associated with it often have a meaning beyond its economic value (e.g. Larsson 2001:440-441; Stringer & Reed 2007). Bebbington (1999) has argued that people's assets or capitals are "not only means through which they make a living; they also give meaning to the person's

world” (ibid:2022). This is a perspective in need of attention within the field of livelihood research, not least the more policy-oriented part of it.

## **2.6 A note on policy failure. Who is to blame?**

More or less all policies towards the sector of smallholders in Africa have been described in unfavourable terms. The impact of colonial policies on small-scale farmers in Southern and Eastern Africa is generally interpreted critically. Policy regimes of the 1960s and 1970s were criticised for being urban biased, in favour of large-scale farmers and for inhabiting a heavy, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy (e.g. Bates 2005). Structural adjustment and deregulation of the agricultural sector, were then accused of abandoning smallholders and deepening rural people’s deprivation through the withdrawal of support-structures and the introduction of cost sharing in the sectors of education and health (Bryceson 2000b; Havnevik et al 2007).

The question is then how to explain rural poverty and develop policies in an era in which both socialist-oriented and liberal-oriented strategies have proved inadequate. In Eastern Zambia today there is a focus on attitudinal change within projects such as ASP, where conservative cultures and mindsets are seen as obstacles to development and responsible for arresting rural dwellers in a state of poverty. According to Handy (2009), there is in the Western society a long tradition of ‘blaming the peasant’ with smallholders depicted ”as backward, ignorant, rude, and lawless, a threat to the economy, society and stability of the nation” (ibid:326). Williams (1982) has argued in a similar vein that both capitalist and socialist countries tend to describe peasants as a problematic and conservative group of people. He explained this through arguing that their communities always have been looked upon from a perspective where progress and rationality is strictly defined from a Western and modernist point of view. In arguments, which partly paralleled Hydén’s idea of the relative independence of the peasantry, Williams suggested that smallholders are neither backwards, ignorant nor rational according to ‘economic man’ nor any other Western concept of rationality. Instead they have a clear vision of what type of life they want to live. If they resist change it is because this way of life is threatened:

Peasants resist outsiders’ plans to change the countryside not out of an obtuse conservatism, but because of a clear and comprehensible preference for a way of life which allows them the freedom to manage their own resources. They will not welcome schemes for co-operation

without clear evidence that the schemes will bring material benefit and improve their way of life, rather than destroy it. (ibid:389)

And furthermore;

Peasants lack any clear evidence that a transformation of their way of life along capitalist or socialist lines will ensure their security, improve their wellbeing, and extend their independence – and they find considerable evidence to the contrary. (ibid:394)

Handy (2009:337-441) brings up well-known modernisation theorists, their linear views of development and their calls for a change in values and worldviews among inhabitants of traditional societies. Although his references are mainly from before 1980 he claims that blaming the peasants is still the paradigm. While issues of semi-proletarianisation and primitive accumulation are more or less absent in policy-discussions today there are some discussions on “prevailing cultural attitudes” (World Bank 2007b:43) among farmers in Africa and statements like “a large number of smallholders see farming as a life-style, and not as a business activity” (ibid). These things are identified as cultural (sometimes religious) obstacles or as part of a conservative mindset that “restrict them from exploring new opportunities” (Eenhoorn & Becx 2009:6).

These discussions link back to more fundamental ideas about modernity and development and to early modernisation theories pointing at binaries of rational-irrational, civilised-primitive, progress-stagnation and intellect-instinct when understanding and explaining issues of rural poverty. How explicit and widespread these ideas are at present and to what extent they have transformed into policies in more concrete terms is an empirical question, which will be further dealt with in relation to Eastern Zambia. First, however, it is necessary to further explore concrete aspects of rural livelihoods and rural development in the context of sub-Saharan Africa.

### **3. Rural livelihoods and rural development - the sub-Saharan African context**

In order to illustrate its wider relevance it is necessary to set this case study in Eastern Zambia in the context of earlier research on rural development and livelihoods in Africa. This chapter therefore presents a contextual frame, with references to literature on rural livelihoods, rural development and rural development policies in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents a discussion of rural poverty and contemporary research on rural livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa today. It also includes a section discussing literature that has used a historical perspective to analyse different aspects of rural development. The second section presents a historical contextualisation of issues related to rural livelihoods. In focus here is the integration of rural areas into the world-economy, rural policy development from the colonial period until present time and effects of these policies on rural development and livelihoods. The chapter is written in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, but with focus on countries in Eastern and Southern Africa of former British rule.

#### **3.1 Rural poverty and livelihoods in a contemporary perspective**

##### **3.1.1 Rural poverty in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa**

The modernisation project has been a disappointing experience for the rural population in Africa. Liberal as well as socialist and structuralist inspired models for development have generally failed to bring any substantial change in terms of reduced rural poverty in African countries. Around 75 percent of the people living in extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa are situated in rural contexts (IFAD 2010:233). Rural poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is often labelled chronic, showing little of the signs of change and reduced poverty seen in many Asian countries during the last 30 years (Kydd et al. 2004; IFAD 2010). Between 1988 and 2008 the number of extreme rural poor (living on less than 1,25US\$/day) in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 172 million to 306 million. In percentage terms the extreme poverty increased from 52 percent to 62 percent of the rural population during the same period. The share of the rural population living in

poverty (on less than 2 US\$/day) is today 87 percent, which is an increase on both 1988 and 1998 figures (IFAD 2010:233; see also World Bank 2007a).

Agricultural development has shown limited progress during most of the post-independence era in terms of both overall production and productivity (Dorward et al. 2004; Djurfeldt et al. 2006). There have for a long time existed widening urban-rural gaps in terms of income and levels of poverty, with the proportion of poor people in rural areas higher than that in urban areas (Dorward et al. 2004; IFAD 2010). A crucial aspect of rural poverty is the widespread food insecurity. In absolute terms undernourishment has increased since the early 1990s on a global scale, but this development has been particularly pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa (FAO 2009a:8-9). Food imports have increased gradually since the 1980s and the least developed countries, mostly found in sub-Saharan Africa, have from the early 1990s used between 50 and 80 percent of their export earnings to import food (de Vylder 2007:235).

The picture of the declining African food security situation becomes even more distinctive when compared to many Asian countries. In Asia the situation changed largely through the green revolution, which has caused some debate regarding why Africa seems to face so many difficulties in taking advantage of the technology and reform package, that in terms of aggregate food production showed to be quite successful in large parts of Asia (see e.g. Djurfeldt et al. 2006). The yield gap (tons per hectare) between sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the world increased from 1960 until at least 2005 (World Bank 2007a:15)<sup>8</sup>

Rural poverty in sub-Saharan Africa today is often related to a certain set of problems widespread over the subcontinent. In general the physical, social and economic infrastructure is underdeveloped. Included here are roads, transport systems, irrigation systems, schools, health clinics, and availability of credits, markets for sale of agricultural produce and for the purchasing of inputs. Compared with Asia, rural Africa is poorly provided with most of these factors (Djurfeldt et al. 2006:93-97). Other important issues concern a history of low producer prices during most of the post-independence period as well as high costs for inputs, especially chemical fertiliser. The increase in output prices since 2007 has in most cases been accompanied by an increase in input prices, notably the costs for fertiliser and transport. FAO also reports that while output

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<sup>8</sup> The success of the green revolution is, however, debated and disputed. The critique of the green revolution deals with environmental problems such as shrinking ground water levels, genetic impoverishment and social problems such as loss of local knowledge, increased social inequality and exclusion of women in the access to the new technology or higher workload for women (Chapman 2002; Potter et al. 2008:475-479). Djurfeldt et al. (2006) state that the critique levelled against the green revolution are in many cases incorrect and exaggerated (see also Holmén 2006).

prices are slowly and not fully transmitted to local producers “increases in the prices of inputs, especially where these are imported, are passed on fully and quickly” (FAO 2009b:35). Other characteristics of rural poverty in sub-Saharan Africa include a lack of arable land among rural poor as well as a wide range of environmental problems differing over space. The issues of land reform and access to agricultural land have for a long time been delicate issues in countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa, that historically developed extremely uneven land distribution systems (Lahiff 2003).

More broadly, the security of rural dwellers’ land holdings is widely discussed. Formal land titling and privatisation of land is underway in many African countries, although progressing slowly in many cases. Although widely believed to be an effective way to promote agricultural development, its efficiency and pro-poor benefits are also questioned (e.g. Jacoby & Minten 2007). An additional aspect contributing to food insecurity and rural poverty situation in many African countries is the high prevalence of HIV & AIDS. Among other things, HIV & AIDS have led to labour shortages, loss of knowledge and increased costs for care in rural and agricultural systems (Havnevik et al. 2006a:11-12). The elderly population in rural areas have been heavily burdened with responsibilities for both sick adults and the orphans left behind (Ssengozi 2009). Research also shows particularly negative aspects for the youth in Southern Africa, who are taken out of school in order to support their households in terms of income and subsistence in cases of long-term sickness in the family (van Blerk et al. 2008).

All these aspects of rural poverty exhibit gender dimensions. Women’s access to land is much more insecure than men’s and women have often been by-passed under both traditional and more modern tenure regimes. Female-headed households are often among the poorest and find it harder to obtain credits, formal jobs and varying types of support. At the same time women are normally responsible for most of the reproductive work and for sustaining the households subsistence. In many instances women are less mobile, and therefore find it harder to reach markets and access inputs (IFAD 2010:60-68; FAO 2010:3-6).

### **3.1.2 Rural livelihood research in sub-Saharan Africa**

Livelihoods research in sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into two broad categories. There are ‘specific interest’ livelihood studies, which examine the role of particular circumstances, issues or problems in people’s livelihoods, and then there are ‘general interest’ livelihood studies, which study overall trends in

livelihoods in relation to broader changes in livelihood contexts. Amongst recent 'specific interest' livelihood literature are studies on HIV & AIDS and its effects on rural livelihoods (van Blerk et al. 2008), the effects of climate change in Mozambique (Osbaahr et al. 2008), livelihood strategies in relation to land degradation in Tanzania (Assmo 1999) effects of population pressure on rural livelihoods in Ethiopia (Malmberg & Tegenu 2007) and rural livelihoods and access to water in Rwanda (Dushimumuremyi 2009). There is also research focusing on the different sectors of rural livelihoods, such as fisheries in Zambia (Wold 2007), policies on livestock in Uganda (Ashley & Nanyeenya 2005) farming in Uganda (McDonagh 2005) or non-farming livelihoods in South Africa (Hajdu 2006). There is also a number of research projects specifically aimed at forming ground for policy intervention (e.g. Ellis 2000).

Amongst the 'general interest' literature in sub-Saharan Africa the main concern has been describing and explaining livelihoods in terms of trends towards diversification and deagrarianisation, discussed in the previous chapter (see e.g. Ellis 2000; Bryceson 2000b; 2009; Barrett et al. 2001; Ellis & Freeman 2005). This could indicate that there is also something of a general explanation or story behind these processes. But there is need for caution on this issue. On a generalised level these processes referred to above tell us very little about the outcome for the people involved in these processes. Reading the literature it is also clear that issues of for example income diversification and migration are interpreted differently from case to case, and in reality mean very different things. Rigg (2006; 2007) looks at several of these processes from a rather positive point of view. He sees winners and losers in these processes but he identifies a pro-active element in the increased engagement in non-agricultural activities. Migration is seen as possible rather than as compulsory and rural dwellers are described as in favour of, and striving for, a modern and urban way of life. Hajdu (2006) points at changing identities and motivations when searching the causes to changing rural livelihoods in Transkei, South Africa. According to other researchers, income diversification and migration is foremost re-active where casual work, migration, petty trade and the sale of household assets are combined with reduced food consumption. In such cases it is hard to depict the process in any positive manner, although it is still described as income diversification (e.g. Osbaahr et al. 2008).

The 'specific interest' studies within contemporary livelihoods literature in Zambia have addressed a wide range of issues. Wiegers et al. (2006) in their study from the Northern Province show the negative impact of HIV & AIDS on food production, area cultivated and use of agricultural inputs. They also point at loss of social capital and decreased participation in different types of supporting



networks and organisations. They further point to the gender dimensions of these effects and the particular vulnerability of female-headed households. Davis (2000) draw attention to the impact of transport constraints on rural livelihoods in the Northern Province compared to the Copperbelt. They put this in relation to the need of markets and inputs and frame it within the liberalisation process and the withdrawal of state-initiated markets in rural areas during the 1990s. Eriksen (2007) looks at land use management policies in relation to rural livelihoods, specifically the fire policies in relation to extensive farming practices. She shows both the importance of these indigenous practices and the way that farmers' ability to adapt and develop their agricultural techniques in tune with sound environmental practices have been misunderstood by officials since the colonial era.

Chileshe's (2005) thesis looks into the relationship between land tenure reform and rural livelihoods in locations of the Northern and Copperbelt provinces. In looking into the consequences of the conversion of customary tenure into private land holdings, Chileshe questions the present regime of privatisation, viewing it as detrimental to the rural poor, since it tends to divert landholdings away from poor households, concentrating them into richer hands. He concludes by arguing for strategies to strengthen poor people's land rights through developing the customary tenure system. Kajoba (2002) deals more specifically with women's access to land, their insecure land rights and their tendency to diversify their livelihoods as a way of coping with a lack of access to land.

Amongst the 'general interest' livelihoods literature in Zambia Keller-Herzog & Munachonga (1997), Francis et al. (1997), Long (1998), Milimo et al. (2002) and White et al. (2005) are all to a varying degree concerned with the effects of structural adjustment policies on rural livelihoods in different parts of rural Zambia. This literature describes how farmers perceive the impacts of liberalisation as negative due to its effects on market and input access, the non-availability of credits as well as transport problems. In general these studies tell a story where small-scale farmers look back upon the Kaunda regime (1964-1991) as a time of relative prosperity. In the Lundazi and Chama districts in the Eastern Province, for example, small-scale farmers suggest a restoration of the old state controlled marketing system and the establishment of floor prices (Francis et al. 1997:27). In terms of livelihood diversification and deagrarianisation these studies show rather weak trends, with off-farm incomes still dominated by casual labour, petty trade, crafts and the like. These studies also show how female-headed households have experienced these changes as particularly difficult. Curtis (2007), and especially Karttunen (2009) have

conducted livelihoods research in Eastern Zambia, and their contributions will be discussed in the empirical chapters.

### **3.1.3 Historical perspectives – examples from contemporary research**

Although historical perspectives have not generally been prominent in contemporary livelihood research, there are examples of both recent and earlier research on rural development that apply long-term historical perspectives. This literature shows many of the advantages of such a perspective. One point is that history always needs to be reassessed in the light of new methods and new empirical evidence. An example is Elkins' (2005) work on the detention of the Kikuyu population as a consequence of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. Through careful archival studies and oral sources she manages to expose the nature of the British assault on the Mau Mau and the subsequent detention of more or less the whole Kikuyu population, which the British authorities had done their best to cover up. Fairhead & Leach (1996) in their study of savannah forest in Guinea in West Africa questioned a quite different established truth, namely the assumption that patches of savannah forest in Guinea were remnants of a forest landscape that had been severely degraded and deforested as a result of human settlement. This was an explanation that had underpinned the discourse of African farmers as destructive towards their own environment, which had long informed environmental policy in Africa. Through analysing satellite images over time, oral sources, as well as archival material and travellers' reports they found that the forest cover has been rather stable over time, and in some places it increased rather than decreased. They further relate the forest patches to human settlements and conclude that people have encouraged and contributed to increased forest cover rather than the opposite.

Fairhead & Leach also dwell on the policy implications of a misreading of the landscape. This and other examples are further put in the context of a broader tradition of misinterpreting the interaction of humans and the environment in Africa, and used to demonstrate how easily societal processes and history are misunderstood when doing research "on the basis of a 'snapshot' view (...) or on data gathered over a few years" (Leach & Mearns 1996:5). Kinlund (1996) also questions established truths in relation to land degradation. He further exemplifies how colonial attitudes towards African farmers have been reproduced in contemporary discussions. This includes the continued misrepresentation of African farmers' practices as a major hindrance to agricultural development and as thoroughly destructive to the environment (ibid:110-111).

The value of research into the pre-colonial period in relation to later development is demonstrated by Börjeson's (2004) study of agricultural intensification in the Mbulu highlands of Tanzania. The conventional explanation of pre-colonial agricultural intensification is one of population pressure caused by constraints on expansion, in this case due to hostility of surrounding people. Börjeson draws the conclusion that African agriculture is normally viewed as able to intensify and change mainly as an "extraordinary measure" undertaken when put under "coercive pressure" (ibid:160). He relates this to the more fundamental conception of Africans as "inherently resistant to change and development" and lacking a capacity to intensify and develop their production systems on their own (ibid:159). Through historical studies (oral sources, satellite images, travellers' reports) he shows that the agricultural intensification in Mbulu highlands is a process with its own driving forces. Börjeson describes a gradual intensification process that is parallel to the extension of field areas, which is in conflict with earlier explanations. Instead other factors are important including the division of labour between pastoralists and agriculturalists, local and regional trade and exchange of agricultural products (outside the main trading routes), which encouraged surplus production and a gradual intensification. He further points out how people saw advantages with close and clustered settlements, and their willingness to minimize risk and secure their access to food.

To point at cause and effect in agricultural intensification is, however, difficult according to Börjeson. The process is instead seen as "incremental". African agriculture and its potential for change is further discussed by Adams (2004) who states that, although African agricultural society has long been looked upon as bearing an inherent resistance to change, research on the pre-colonial era is gradually changing these perceptions.

The work of Moore & Vaughan (1987; 1994) further illustrates the value of a historical perspective. In their work covering most of the twentieth century they dwell on issues of nutrition and food security and how these issues have been interpreted by policymakers from the colonial era onwards. Taking the case of Northern Province, Zambia they show how the close identification of the Bemba with citimene agriculture (a type of shifting cultivation) has led officials (and researchers) at different times to relate food insecurity and malnutrition to the absence of adult males due to the high rates of labour migration. This interpretation stems from the fact that men are responsible for clearing new fields for the citimene cultivation of millet. However, through archival and oral sources Moore & Vaughan show that the importance of citimene is misunderstood and that it constitutes only one element in their livelihood, and its

relative importance varies over time in relation to other activities both on- and off-farm. They further show that there is little correlation between the absence of male labour and households' food security and nutrition rates, and question whether poverty created during colonial days can be explained by migration of adult males. Instead they illustrate how women at different times have adjusted their strategies to cope with changes and manage their different tasks. The results from their case study show that women manage to uphold a rather viable farming system despite extensive labour migration. The study further shows that labour migration was not as one-dimensionally male dominated as is often claimed. The work of Moore & Vaughan has the character of a historical livelihood study, with focus on households' livelihood strategies and how these have been adopted to different circumstances, such as labour migration and introduction of new crops.

Another study that put rural development in a historical perspective is Gould's (1989) work in the Luapula Province, Zambia. This regional study puts the developments of the 1980s concerning issues like migration, economic activities, agricultural development and post-independence development efforts in the context of colonial rule, where a long period of almost total neglect was replaced by certain development efforts after the World War II. Gould's study points both at the dependent development of the Luapula Province and how difficult it was to break this trend after independence, not least in light of the fact that most rural development projects in outlying provinces were financed from abroad. Kokwe's (1997) study in the Luapula Province, Zambia also contributes in a field of research where policies are looked upon from a historical perspective and form the framework for looking into rural development and farmers' livelihoods. Her main argument is that policies are not suited to local communities, and that agricultural policies are founded in colonial ideas on commercialisation, cooperatives and top-down approaches formed in the 1940s. Her historical perspective makes it possible for her to put the SAP policies and their effects in a perspective where they are just one phase in a series of policies, that have been poorly-adjusted to varying local needs and communities (ibid:168-175). Both the work of Gould (1989) and Kokwe (1997) are examples of work showing the value of grounding contemporary rural development issues in regional histories and in relation to policies over time. They both point at issues of continuity and the historical roots of contemporary policies.

Despite these and other studies with a historical perspective that have been referred to earlier, this long-term perspective is largely absent in contemporary research on current livelihood issues in rural Africa. In the same way that historical perspectives have shed new light on old processes in studies

of rural and agricultural development in Africa, these perspectives should also be utilised in contemporary, people-centred livelihoods research.

## **3.2 Rural sub-Saharan Africa in world history**

### **3.2.1 A pre-colonial perspective**

The integration of rural sub-Saharan Africa into the world economy was a gradual process that was fully and rapidly concluded by the European colonisation of the sub-continent. To enable an understanding of this process and its effects on rural development and livelihoods it is necessary to view rural Africa from a pre-colonial perspective. The research on pre-colonial Africa has today moved beyond both the romantic and negative stereotypes of absolute equality as well as pictures of stagnant societies and production systems. Over time the continent has hosted a complex and changing array of states, communities, small chiefdoms and large kingdoms. There have been times of famine and conflict, societies have been inhabited by rich and poor, oppressors and oppressed (Parsons & Palmer 1977b; Griffith 1995; Hillbom & Green 2010). Modes of production have varied from nomadic hunter and gathering, pastoralism to sedentary agricultural systems and a range of mixes between these classifications. In terms of social structures, pre-colonial Africa from 1000 AD to the mid-nineteenth century also varied greatly across the sub-continent (Hillbom & Green 2010:50). There were segmented social systems, characterised by decentralised political power into relatively independent separate settlements, where access to natural resources and means of production were relatively free and unregulated. There was also great variation within the segmented systems, those where the segments in themselves were very loosely held together, while there were other segments with a strong local political power.

Apart from varying types of segmented states there were also centrally ruled kingdoms or tribute societies where the central powers were relatively important. Here central political and economic authorities played an important role in the allocation of the means of production. Tribute from outlying areas was paid to an elite, normally settled in an urban area. The centrally ruled kingdoms were characterised by at least some division of labour and they were often involved in trade with slaves, gold, ivory and ostrich feathers within Africa as well as beyond the continent. There were also central states without hierarchal social, systems seemingly not involved in the trade of luxury goods, and with social systems characterised by social equality, reciprocity and cooperation (ibid:52-58).

In terms of rural development it is possible to point at a few features of the pre-colonial period, both in terms of issues of poverty and agricultural development, that can contextualise the impact of the colonial take over and the increased world economic integration that came as a consequence. Focusing on Eastern and Southern Africa, the pre-colonial era demonstrates great variations in agricultural development, which differ from earlier simplified views of shifting cultivation as dominating pre-colonial Africa. A wide range of cultivation practices were present and continuously developing. Intercropping, manuring, ridging, irrigation and terracing were present in Eastern and Southern Africa long before the European colonisation. Intensive agricultural systems were common as well as a great variety of more extensive farming practices. The driving forces behind intensification did not easily fit into models of increased population pressure, market opportunities, hierarchical political structures or environmental pressure (Widgren 2004). To say anything at a general level about food security or broader issues of wealth and poverty within pre-colonial agriculturally based societies is perhaps not very valid. Assessments tend to differ substantially with the same society being described as producing great surpluses by some sources, but by others as being more or less constantly famine ridden (see Börjeson 2004:51-53).

One event with widespread impact on rural communities in Africa was the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic slave trade developed due to an unmet demand for labour on the American continent where European countries such as England, France, Spain and Portugal exploited their colonies predominantly through vast plantation enterprises for shipment of sugar, coffee and cotton to Europe. Slaves therefore became the most important export commodity on the African continent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and between 12 and 15 million Africans were sold as slaves in the Atlantic trade (Hillbom & Green 2010:74).

For many rural communities this trade had a devastating impact, where the most viable part of the population were captured and sold by slave raiders, while a smaller group of adults had to take on the responsibility for supporting children and the elderly. Many rural societies disintegrated completely. Others changed from an agricultural mode of production to a 'slave mode', where societies sustained themselves through engaging in the slave trade, with negative effects on agricultural development and production (ibid:72-82). Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century African agricultural development showed some positive trends. New crops, such as maize, rice and groundnuts with a high nutrition value had spread over the continent. There are also many examples of technical changes within the agricultural sector leading to increased production

as well as supporting a rapidly increasing population on the continent. As a consequence, export production of agricultural products increased during the nineteenth century when the slave trade decreased, not least in West Africa (ibid:86-92).

Although many pre-colonial societies were clearly viable agricultural economies, well suited to sustain a large population as well as to produce surpluses, it is also clear that many 'livelihood systems' were both complex and fragile during the pre-colonial period. Beach (1977) writes about the history of the Shona economy in contemporary Zimbabwe and describes it as a farming based economy, which to varying extents, and especially in times of crisis fell back on livestock and to a lesser degree on hunting and gathering. Livestock was continuously held, but came into use only when livelihoods came under threat as a result of crop failure (for example because of pests or drought). van Horn (1977) in her study of the agricultural history in Barotseland in present-day Zambia, describes a viable agricultural system. For much of the nineteenth century the agriculturally based Barotseland economy was healthy and able to produce food surpluses through a labour intensive and labour demanding agricultural system, involving several characters of a more intensive cultivation system. Börjeson's (2004) study in the Mbulu highlands of Tanzania, referred to earlier, provides yet another example of a viable agricultural system, able to produce a surplus beyond food security.

Examples like these are not to be seen as an argument for any kind of position in the debate regarding poverty levels during the pre-colonial period. However, taken together, they show a diversity of internal practices and systems that had developed to cope with environmental characteristics as well as responses to outside influences. Some of these systems were viable, others were surely under strong pressure, while others were secure but fragile. Many of the above mentioned studies are also studies of societies that were far from isolated from the world economy during the pre-colonial era. However, the colonial take over often meant a rapid and full integration on very uneven terms when compared to earlier times. For the Shona example, colonial rule meant that a fragile system was disrupted when the Shona people's movement was restricted and the colonial authorities started to demand tax in the form of cattle, and labour in the form of able-bodied males (Beach 1977). In Barotseland colonisation meant a gradual disruption of the system, not least due to extraction of male labour, rendering agricultural practices unsustainable and diminishing food production. From being a place of surplus production the area became famine ridden and from the 1940s onwards it became largely dependent on food imports (van Horn 1977; see also Blaikie & Brookfield 1987:109-110).

### **3.2.2 Colonialism and rural development in sub-Saharan Africa**

From a Wallersteinian perspective, colonialism in Africa, in its different guises, was the product of a capitalist world-system developing through alternate processes of growth and contraction. The Atlantic slave trade that peaked during the eighteenth century emerged as a response to a long-term contraction that the world economy had suffered from since the early seventeenth century. This trade peripheralised certain coastal areas, which then became important exporters of slaves and importers of consumption goods, while large parts of Africa became an external arena that was not involved in the capitalist world economy, except through a leakage of people into the Atlantic slave trade. This meant that slaves were drawn from outside the world economy, which also was a prerequisite for the high profitability of the slave trade (Wallerstein 1976).

Hillbom & Green (2010:118-119) view the colonisation of Africa in the light of the world economic depression in the late nineteenth century, but see it as both an economic and political process. The power struggle of newly industrialised and potent European nations, such as England, France, Italy and Germany led to protectionist national policies where these countries started to become anxious to secure their access to natural resources for their continued industrial development. With the world economic recession from 1873 this anxiety intensified as did protectionist trade policies, and the idea of building empires to secure internal markets became increasingly attractive. Apart from this there were a number of separate financial, political and religious interests that supported and lobbied for colonisation. These interests were also an integrated part of the colonial enterprise, where the effective control and initial colonisation of vast areas was contracted out to companies such as Cecil Rhodes' British South African Company, BSAC.

When Africa was formally colonised by the European powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century it led to a thorough integration of its rural areas into the world economy. The colonial powers gradually took control of vast areas, pacified the populations through military campaigns and started their exploitation of minerals, land and people. African rural areas were used as a source of labour, for agricultural production and agricultural land for settlers and for mineral extraction. In West Africa coerced peasant commodity production for export was a common feature (Klein 1980a:19; Bernstein 2005). Although peasant production for internal markets was a feature of British colonies in Eastern and Southern Africa, the use of rural areas as labour reserve zones and for settler agriculture and plantation agriculture was more common. In Northern and Southern Rhodesia as well as in Kenya, European settlers occupied large estates of fertile land during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.



Africans were removed into marginal areas, often labelled as native reserves, where they were expected to sustain themselves partly through subsistence agriculture and migrant labour (Berry 2002; Bernstein 2005; Bagchi 2009).

Perhaps the most important purpose for which rural Africa was used during the colonial era was as a source of labour. The settlers needed cheap labour on their farms and plantations and the emerging mining industry of Southern Africa was in great need of manpower. Labour was further needed for a range of activities such as construction of roads, railways, harbours, port facilities, for service in the military (especially during the World Wars), the police force and as messengers (Cohen 1976:156-159). Amongst the African population there was often very little interest in participating in the waged labour market as communities were often able to sustain themselves quite well through farming and to get cash through marketing part of their produce. The securing of a labour force by the colonial powers was therefore achieved through a combination of policies. Firstly, different forms of forced labour were used in most colonies, especially during the early colonial period. Secondly, taxes of various kinds were introduced in order to force people to earn an income beyond subsistence. The most popular types were hut tax (paid for each household) or taxes to be paid by every adult male (*ibid*). Thirdly, agricultural regulations were introduced, often preventing Africans from earning cash through selling agricultural produce or at least limiting this possibility (Cliffe 1976). This policy was especially important in settler areas where the European farmers normally lobbied for regulations to protect them against competition from African farmers, but was also present in many other areas as well. Transport systems and limited access to market depots also worked against the interests of African farmers (Smale & Jayne 2003:12-16). Fourthly, the creation of native reserves worked as a way to “crowd them out”, to force Africans to look for wage labour due to the size of the reserves and the quality of the resources therein (Mair 1936:28-31; Arrighi 1970).

Colonial policies produced certain ‘development’ features in rural areas. One prominent feature was a massive migration of adult males from rural African communities to urban centres, mining areas, plantations and large-scale farms (Rodney et al. 1983; Adepoju 1995; Gugler & Ludwar-Ene 1995). Although a general feature, labour migration was especially heavy from the native reserve areas, which tended to become overcrowded at the same time as they suffered from the absence of the most viable people. From a situation where Africans were able to compete with Europeans in agricultural markets, African farming in the reserves went into despair often with problems of land degradation and soil erosion (e.g. Cohen 1976; Blaike & Brookfield 1987). In

Southern Rhodesia, where white settlers held more than half of the arable land and the most fertile portions, African smallholders were forcibly moved into marginal areas, where they faced increased difficulties in sustaining themselves (Floyd 1972; Prescott 1972). In Kenya, settlers occupied what became the 'white highlands', while the Kikuyu population was moved to reserve areas, and the grazing land of the pastoralist Masai people was severely reduced (Morgan 1972; Elkins 2005).

A dual structure emerged, with a class of white, large-scale commercial farmers, producing cash crops largely for export. Focus here was on primary production with little or no refinement. The rest of the rural sector consisted of African smallholders producing for subsistence. Separate land tenure systems were established where settler land was privately held, while land in the reserve areas was under a 'customary' regime (Berry 2002:641-642). The British colonies in Southern and Eastern Africa were usually subject to heavy regulations and state involvement in the agricultural sector. At the same time policies were urban biased. Investments were heavily targeted towards development and modernisation of 'islands of development', while African rural areas were neglected throughout the colonial period. The dual agricultural structure was particularly prominent in the major settler colonies, where a small class of large-scale settlers dominated production and markets. Labour migration was extensive in the whole region but Northern Rhodesia and South Africa, including Swaziland and Lesotho, stand out as leading examples, where African rural communities sometimes lost all of their adult males to work on large-scale farms or in mining areas (see Legassick 1977; Parsons & Palmer 1977a; Murray 1980).

During the late 1940s and 1950s some significant changes took place in the policies towards rural areas and African farmers. The background to these changes was an increased political tension, an increased need for food production for urban areas and to a varying degree the social and environmental crisis within the African rural communities, that were acknowledged within parts of the colonial administrations, within the political left and among liberals in the metropolitan countries. There was a broadly acknowledged need to reduce rural to urban migration and to address urban unemployment, because it was seen as a breeding ground for both civil unrest and recruitment to nationalist movements (see e.g. Gould 1989; Davidson 2001). According to Blaikie (1985:53-60), the colonial approach was that social and environmental degradation should be seen as an environmental issue, evolving out of African peasants' mismanagement, primitive methods of farming, ignorance, high levels of reproduction and lack of market involvement (see also Kinlund 1996:109-

111). Aspects such as price regulation, distribution of resources and access to land, forest and water resources and to markets were put in the background.

It is likely that soil degradation at times has been exaggerated as a part of the colonial discourse to repudiate African farming practices and as a strategy to legitimizing European settlement and control. The response to environmental as well as social problems in African areas became different types of soil conservation programmes. Methods advocated included contour ridging, terrace construction, prevention of tree cutting, prohibition of cultivation near streams, de-stocking to hold back over-grazing. Many of these techniques were forced upon the farmers, which in general made them very unpopular, not least due to their often negative effect on livelihood possibilities, and due to the fact that these techniques were often poorly-adjusted to local environments and needs (Stocking 1985; Blaikie & Brookfield 1987; Berry 2002; Huijzenveld 2008:409). The implementation of European farm practices often had negative effects on a vulnerable environment. Cash cropping, monocultures of maize, tobacco, cotton and groundnuts, and the abandonment of intercropping led to a loss of nutrients as well as to soil erosion in many places (Blaikie & Brookfield 1987:107-108). The great focus on maize as a food as well as a cash crop in Eastern and Southern Africa was initiated during colonial rule. Research, extension and marketing support were directed towards maize production, foremost in settler areas and to a lesser degree, but increasingly so during the late colonial rule, in African smallholder areas (Smale & Jayne 2003).

Soil conservation was a major theme in rural Africa during the late colonial period, but measures also, to some part, included resettlement schemes and the encouragement of 'progressive' or potentially capitalist African farmers. The different policies were normally interconnected. Resettlement schemes aimed at reducing overcrowding but were often directed towards emergent African farmers, who were offered plots of land and different types of support. Projects to encourage a new class of African capitalist farmers producing food crops and cash crops took place in many areas, however, in Northern Rhodesia these were called 'Peasant Farming Schemes' (e.g. Kay 1965; Gould 1989:136) and in Nyasaland 'Master Farmers' Schemes' (see Owen 1993). In the wake of these policies an increased social differentiation took place in many rural communities between what the colonial regime labelled as 'progressive' and 'traditional' African farmers (see Berry 2002:647; Bernstein 2005:74-75).

### **3.2.3 Post-independence policies and the era of state intervention**

The newly independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa inherited a social (and often environmental) crisis in rural areas, where African smallholders had been neglected both in relation to settler farmers as well as to urban areas. African countries also inherited an economic structure, based on primary production of one or a few agricultural or mining products, which was an effect of the colonial focus on extraction of raw materials and cheap labour, where increased manufacturing and local consumption were of low priority. The former colonies in Eastern and Southern Africa and elsewhere developed their policies for rural development in the light of this colonial heritage.

Several countries, such as Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Ghana in West Africa saw a need for strong state interventions in order to support the rural population and reverse the urban bias. The governments of these countries therefore developed policies along socialist lines and took a unimodal approach to rural development. More capitalist oriented countries, such as Nigeria and Kenya, also kept a large degree of state involvement in the agricultural sector, for example in terms of controlling and supplying marketing channels (Bates 1981). Investments were made in both social (schools, clinics) and physical infrastructure (roads, electric power supplies). Credit policies were developed and in socialist countries arrangements were made to supply African farmers with subsidised inputs and output markets on a pan-territorial basis through state-controlled marketing boards and parastatal corporations (ibid; Berry 2002; Bernstein 2005). A commercialisation of the sector of small-scale farmers was a common goal, through encouraging production of both domestic food and export crops. Often this meant an attempt to extend colonial support systems to African farmers (see e.g. Smale & Jayne 2003:18). In terms of land tenure the independent countries often tended to continue colonial policies. In countries where land titling and freehold were developed during the late colonial rule like in Kenya, this continued after independence, while in countries such as Zambia which had large areas of land under customary tenure, there was little impetus for land reform after independence (Bernstein 2005).

Newly independent countries also formulated their national development strategies against a critique of the Western development model, one example being African socialism, associated largely with Tanzania's first president Julius Nyerere (Kenneth Kaunda's Humanism will be discussed in Chapter Six). Nyerere built his idea of African socialism on the concept of *Ujamaa* and the African extended family, which was seen as an asset in building a prosperous society characterised by strong solidarity. The solidarity of the extended family was in this conception to be seen as a model (however, in need of some

adjustments) for the society as a whole (Nyerere 1969:138-142; Lönneborg 1999:213-225).

Socialist regimes were in general those focusing most (at least rhetorically) on rural development and the importance of closing the gap between urban and rural areas, as well as combating regional inequalities that had been established during colonial rule. Ironically, the urban bias theory has largely been a critique of these regimes. Lipton (1982), but also de Wilde (1980), Bates (1981), Osei-Hwedie (1985) (and Watts 1989 for an overview), were often critical towards price policies and agricultural regulations in African countries during the 1960s and 1970s, which were held to have had very negative consequences for small-scale farmers. When discussing subsidies and other support directed towards rural areas, these were generally claimed to have by-passed smallholders and been concentrated in the hands of large-scale commercial farmers, following the dual agricultural structure created during colonial days. These post-independence policies have largely been held responsible for the crisis within African agriculture, its declining terms of trade and meagre productivity, which were some of the major issues discussed in relation to agriculture and rural development during this time.

In time, the ideal of modernisation also came to dominate over more traditional values, and countries like Zambia and Tanzania developed rather authoritarian regimes. When Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, for example, did not receive the expected response to his villagisation project of *Ujamaa*, he accused peasants who opposed his development of being “stupid”, “ignorant” or “stubborn” (Nyerere cited in Havnevik 1993:47). The voluntary movement into *Ujamaa* villages, which was the cornerstone in Nyerere’s African socialism, was finally forced upon the farmers who were regrouped into large villages, sometimes by rather brutal methods (Scott 1998).

Urban bias during the post-independence era is, however, a rather complex matter. Chapter Two raised some forces behind this development, foremost in terms of the strong position of both urban and rural elites and the disincentives for the political elite to redistribute resources from urban to rural areas. There have, however, been other structural factors working against a levelling-out of the rural-urban divide. First of all, the newly independent countries of Africa aimed at diversifying their economies, since they relied heavily on incomes from a few primary commodities. This process demanded a lot of investment in the urban and industrial sectors, which were therefore competing for investment resources with rural areas. Modernisation was certainly prioritised, but investments were made also in rural areas to the benefit of smallholder farmers.

However, such a strategy, which included a commitment to rural development, became expensive, since resources were added rather than redistributed. This policy worked fairly well during the 1960s and early 1970s when African economies grew and the prices of their primary export products were relatively high. However, in the mid-1970s most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (for example Zambia and Tanzania) went into a severe economic crisis largely due to external causes. Increased oil prices and deteriorating terms of trade made it increasingly difficult for African governments to finance their ambitious development strategies. Apart from relying more and more on multilateral loans and development aid, this also tended to make it necessary to make priority choices between urban and rural areas which worked to the further disadvantage of rural areas. Another issue then, which might further emphasize the strength of the urban bias is that solutions to rural poverty were looked for in the rural sector itself, while broader strategies that included structural change in relations between rural and urban areas very seldom materialised (Brohman 1996:214-215).

### **3.2.4 The era of adjustment and non-intervention**

In Southern and Eastern Africa, the final response to the urban bias became a neoliberal one in line with structural adjustment policies. A deregulation of the agricultural sector took place during the 1980s justified partly by criticisms of the urban bias of earlier policies. Price regulations, input subsidies and food subsidies were pinpointed as ill-conceived policies, which African governments needed to do away with. Key actors in promoting these policies were the World Bank, the IMF and the bulk of western donors, who often tied their credits and grants to the implementation of structural adjustment (Havnevik et al. 2007). The reforms were expected to increase farmers' producer prices and encourage production. However, the adjustment policies did not manage to reverse the trend and the issue of an urban bias is still stressed and discussed well into the twenty-first century (Bezemer & Heady 2008; Jones & Corbridge 2010). It is claimed that while price twists have been reduced there remain other areas such as public spending where the urban bias critique is still valid (Jones & Corbridge 2010:3).

There are numerous examples to show how the rural poor have paid a high price for deregulation and for the decreased distribution of resources to rural development in the sectors of health and education. When it comes to the urban-rural divide, Bryceson (1996), however, concluded that the gap decreased as a consequence of structural adjustment, but only because the situation in

urban areas declined faster than in rural parts. After the early criticism of structural adjustment there have been some changes in the approach. The World Bank and the IMF have embraced some modification of neoliberal policies, in the form of selected investments in key poverty reduction sectors such as free primary education in both urban and rural areas. The World Bank and other international donors have partly shifted to an increased focus on the working of institutions and “enabling environments” (quotation from Havnevik et al. 2006a:13) for the private sector. This has meant an increased focus on infrastructure, credits to entrepreneurs, land tenure reforms and focus on good governance and a transparent bureaucracy (Havnevik et al. 2006a).

The non-interventionist approach dominating policymaking for rural development during the last 25 years has received considerable criticism. Akram-Lodhi (2008) directs his criticism at the lack of power-analysis and lack of understanding of how agricultural commodity value chains work today, with their monopolised character, dominance by TNCs ruling and “forcing the choices of emerging capitalist farmers” in an exploitative manner (ibid:1160). Emergent small-scale farmers are in a subordinate position and institutions, such as the World Bank, fail to see that or to account for it in their policy recommendations.

A major problem is that the private sector did not respond to the deregulation of output- and input-markets and the withdrawal of the state from credit services as anticipated by policymakers (de Vylder 2007:234; Havnevik et al. 2007). The persistence of an urban bias and the lack of interest in smallholders’ production is something that must be viewed in a broader context and cannot be held to be a product of domestic policies in developing countries, of either the colonial or post-colonial period. Development aid towards rural and agricultural development in the Least Developed Countries, LDC, has decreased over the years. In 2002 it had decreased by two-thirds compared to 1980, and its share of total aid has also fallen heavily (Bezemer & Heady 2008:1351; FAO 2009a). Furthermore, there are great inequalities in support to farmers on a global scale, deriving from a bias in favour of the agricultural sector in developed countries, particularly in the OECD. Ninety-five percent of the economic support to agricultural development goes to the five percent of the worlds’ farmers who are located in the rich part of the world (de Vylder 2007:236). While sub-Saharan Africa has gone through a process of deregulation and cuts in subsidies to rural producers, the agricultural subsidies in OECD countries have doubled between the early 1990s and 2003 (Bezemer & Heady 2008:1350). Support to OECD farmers has rendered smallholders in African countries uncompetitive in their own local markets, due to cheap

imports (and food aid) of highly subsidised foodstuffs (Oxfam 2005; Bezemer & Heady 2008). The attempt to achieve a liberal market for agricultural products in African countries is therefore highly contradicted by agricultural policies in Europe and North America (see also Bryceson 2009).

The period since the introduction of structural adjustment can be described as one of market failures. A defence for the neoliberal approach towards rural smallholders has, however, been that adjustment policies and the deregulation of agricultural markets were not implemented in a consistent manner. Regulations were kept and reintroduced, which prevented the entrance of market actors (Pletcher 2000; Jayne et al. 2002; Birner & Resnick 2010). However, just as it is true that adjustment policies were not fully implemented in some countries, and have been reversed in some, substantial liberalisation and deregulation have taken place, with meagre results on for example price development for smallholders' produce (Birner & Resnick 2010). There are today several ongoing rural development projects in sub-Saharan Africa highlighting the importance of promoting farming as a business instead of 'as a way of life' (e.g. Bonaglia 2008; Kilimo Trust 2009; Collett & Gale 2009). These projects and the research that they are based on have identified a lack of business skills and business attitudes towards farming in rural Africa, which are seen as decisive if smallholder farming is to have a future. These programmes therefore partly aim at educating farmers in entrepreneurial skills to prepare them to act within a market economy.



## **4. The empirical research process**

This chapter gives an overview of the research process, considering issues of site and sample selection, fieldwork methods and analysis. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section gives an overview of the field techniques used and presents a short discussion on the selection of study area, village-sites and respondents, considering issues of representativeness. The process of analysis of the empirical material is also discussed here. The second section discusses the fieldwork techniques, with focus on interviewing as a key method. The third section deals with the use of archival sources, secondary sources and other types of written material and the use of aerial photos. Major methodological concerns are brought up and discussed in relation to the different methods.

### **4.1 Selection, field methods and interpretation**

#### **4.1.1 Study area and respondents**

Much of the information for understanding the smallholders' contemporary livelihood situation was gathered in direct contact with small-scale farmers in Yelesani and Kasauka village in Chief Sayiri, in Eastern Block within Chipata District (Figure 4-1). The selection of Kasauka village goes back to the 1998 study. It was purposive (see Bernard 2002:182-184), based on the need of information from rural villagers at considerable distance from urban centres.

The selection of Yelesani village took place in 2006 and was purposive. Yelesani village was selected with Kasauka village as a reference point and the ambition was to approach a smallholder village within the same chiefdom that differed in distance to infrastructure such as schools, healthcare, transport to markets and extension services. In all these areas (especially primary education and extension services) Kasauka village has a favoured position compared to Yelesani and also to many other villages in the area. The point was hence partly to see if anything could be said about the implications or non-implications of these differences, although the objective to broaden the study was just as

important. Kasauka village is larger, consisting of 27 households, compared to 16 households in Yelesani village. Within these villages at least one member of each household were interviewed. Despite this I became much more acquainted with Kasauka village, for a number of reasons. I was there already in 1998, interviewing most of the households at that time. I also stayed closer to Kasauka village and had more informal conversations there, not least because it was easier to find someone to assist with translation.



**Figure 4-1: Eastern Province (left corner), Chipata district (main map), Eastern Block (right corner)**

What then are the major implications of this selection process? What does it mean that the study has been made in these particular places? What about the representativeness? Or in Chambers' phrasing (1983:13-16), in what way is this study spatially biased? On a general level the study area typifies major elements of the broader rural context of Eastern and Southern Africa as it is outlined in Chapter Three. It is a smallholder area focusing on maize production, that on a general level encounters many of the typical problems faced in most smallholder areas in Southern and Eastern Africa. As a former part of the British Empire, the district used to be a European settler area and has a history of large-scale

farming and the creation of native reserves. The study area lies within one of the former reserve areas, which has influenced policies at different times as well as the livelihoods of the people living there. Furthermore the area of study is located 600 km from the capital Lusaka. It is far from the ‘line of rail’<sup>9</sup>, the Copperbelt and the major areas of European agricultural settlement. The area is therefore remote from the major domestic markets for agricultural products and off-farm employment. Chipata town, which is approximately 35 km north of Kasauka village is the provincial capital, lodging markets and provincial ministries of various kind, for example the Provincial Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. The area is also close to Malawi and relatively close to the capital Lilongwe, which is a two and a half hour bus ride away. In terms of physical resources, Chipata District is a fairly well equipped area in Zambia. The district, however, presents big internal differences, for example in terms of soil quality. Chief Sayiri<sup>10</sup>, which is part of the old Main Ngoni Reserve has generally sandy, leached soils of rather low fertility, while the Northern part of the district and the former settler areas are more favoured in this respect (Hedlund 1980; Kaonga 2009).

What about the villages in focus for this study, which lie within Chief Sayiri and the Eastern Block? Would a selection of two other villages in the same area have led to different results, based on rather different issues? My strategy to approach this issue has been to consult a broad range of secondary material about the larger study area. Although documents on livelihood issues in the study area are rare, there are a variety of studies touching upon these issues from different angles, not least the research done on improved fallow (e.g. Phiri et al. 2004; Kuntashula et al. 2005). When reading about the study area a broad approach has been used, taking in most documents with the hope to at least extract something of relevance for my understanding of the broader study area. Another way to approach the issue of representativeness of Kasauka and Yelesani villages is of course informant interviews, but more importantly, interviews with extension staff at the different camps in Eastern Block (Figure 4-1). Many of the extension officers had work experience also from other parts of Chipata District. These interviews have given good insight into similarities as well as differences between Kasauka and Yelesani villages and the broader area of Eastern Block and Chipata District.

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<sup>9</sup> ‘Line of rail’ is the area stretching from Livingstone in the South, through Lusaka to the Cooperbelt in the north, where all major cities are located as well as the major part of commercial farms, industries and other types of infrastructures.

<sup>10</sup> A chiefdom South in Eastern Agricultural Block in the southern part of the Chipata District

### 4.1.2 Overview of the field methods

The empirical research process is illustrated in three boxes (see Figure 4-2), corresponding to the three different time periods approached in this study, the contemporary period, the colonial period and the post-independence period.

<b>Box 1</b>	<b>Box 2</b>	<b>Box 3</b>
<b>Contemporary perspective (Chap 6)</b>	<b>Colonial perspective (Chap 7)</b>	<b>Post-independent perspective (Chap 8)</b>
<u>Research interest</u> - Smallholders' livelihood situation - Policy 1991-2009 - Changes over time (policies, livelihoods)	<u>Research interest</u> - Colonial policies towards smallholders - Smallholders' experience of colonialism - Development within the smallholder society - Changes over time (policies, livelihoods)	<u>Research interest</u> - Policy change 1964-1991 - Development within the smallholder society - Changes over time (policies, livelihoods)
<u>Main-methods</u> - Interviews with smallholders/extension personnel - Secondary sources - Food-available calendars - Group-discussions - Observation - Informal conversation	<u>Main-methods</u> - Archival research - Interviews with older in group and individually - Secondary sources - Informal conversation	<u>Main-methods</u> - Interviews with smallholders/elderly/extension personnel - Secondary sources - Informal conversation - Archival research - Aerial photo analysis

**Figure 4-2: Research interest and main-methods**

These three boxes also correspond quite well with the structure of the empirical chapters six to eight in the thesis. Among the field techniques are semi-structured interviews, group interviews, observations, informal interviews, food availability calendars, analysis of aerial photos, archival and library research. The main reason for using these, often rather time consuming, techniques has been, as Willis states (2006:146), to gather information that has been hard to construct by any other means. To, for example, realise information about the contemporary livelihood situation in the study area it has been natural to use interviews, and to use a type of interview that has been less structured, since I wanted to create a space for local identification of some of the main-topics. Several of these methods are inspired by the participatory approach, aiming at involving the people to a higher degree in the research process (Beazley & Ennew 2006). Another example of a time consuming method is archival research that has been seen as necessary in order to construct knowledge about colonial

policies and perceptions, and the implications and outcomes of these policies in the study area.

### **4.1.3 Analysis and interpretation**

Analysis and interpretation of the empirical material has been an ongoing and somewhat iterative process. Recurring field visits have been an advantage because they have enabled follow-ups and for the further focusing and deepening of the research into topics that emerged early in the project. The theoretical framework (Chapter Two) and the broader context of rural development in Southern and Eastern Africa (Chapter Three) have been of assistance when categorising and coding the material and to view certain issues in a broader light, but also in the discursive analysis of rural policies towards small-scale farmers. The analysis and interpretation of the interviews have gone through a three-phase process. The first phase included a reading of the transcribed interviews, where themes and categories were identified and listed. Phase two involved systematically coding of the material into the different themes identified in phase one. The third phase included analysing the different parts together and trying to see relations between different themes and categories as well as identifying deviant opinions and statements. The analysis of interviews has also included some quantification of certain issues, for example standpoints or specific issues highlighted by the respondents.

The aim and research questions presented in Chapter One make a special demand in terms of analysis and interpretation. One part of the study includes outlining discursive elements that are embedded in policies towards African small-scale farmers. To attend to this task in relation to both interviews and written material, not least archival sources, I have drawn inspiration from the field of discourse analysis (Neumann 2003). Discourse in this study is understood as a system of rules, guiding (for example) policies towards smallholder farmers. These rules are visible in descriptions, reports and statements and represent a certain way to perceive the world which is ideologically grounded. The analysis of for example archival texts, policy documents or interviews with extension officers, has therefore been conducted partly with the aim of illuminating their perspectives on such things as (rural) development (and under- or non-development) and modernity (and non-modernity). The ambition has been to analyse documents or interviews and the various expressions of rural policies in the frame of more fundamental ideas about societal development. The different perspectives on development, modernisation, rural development, the modern man and the African peasant,

outlined in Chapter Two, have provided the frame for analysing different representations and how perspectives have changed, or not, over time.

## 4.2 Methods during the rural fieldwork

### 4.2.1 Interviewing - an overview

Field work consisted of an almost continual stream of both formal and informal interviews. The formal interviews will be discussed first, while informal interviewing or rather informal conversations will be treated together with observations discussed below, since these two techniques are highly interlinked. Seven types of formal interviews were made: 1) interviews with small-scale farmers, 2) follow-up group interviews with small-scale farmers, 3) individual interviews with older farmers, 4) group interviews with older farmers, 5) interviews with extension officers, 6) follow-up interviews with extension officers, and 7) informant interviews. In Table 4-1 below the number of interviews of each category are listed.

**Table 4-1: Type of interviews made**

<i>Type of interview</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>Total</i>
Small-scale farmers	48	10		58
Follow-up small-scale (group)	1		4	5
Older farmers		4	7	11
Older farmers (group)		3	1	4
Extension Officer		8	3	11
Ext off. Follow-up			2	2
Informant interviews	1	2	5	8
<i>Total</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>99</i>

The 1998 study is not included in the tables in this chapter. For the 1998 study 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with small-scale farmers in Kasauka village. These interviews were made individually, except three of them that were carried out with husband and wife together, and two group interviews. Twenty-one of the respondents were women, 22 were men. Apart from interviewing people in the village during the 1998 study, interviews were made with 16 small-scale traders at a market in Chipata town. The 1998 study serves an important purpose because it gives a picture of how the farmers apprehended their livelihood situation in 1998, and importantly it also included a retrospective

discussion on the situation during the 1980s, which cannot be neglected considering the purpose of this study.

#### **4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews with small-scale farmers**

Semi-structured interviews have been included in this study to reach an understanding of the livelihood situation of small-scale farmers. Semi-structured interviews aims at combining some of the control of the structured interview with the open-ended questions and loose character of unstructured interviews (Fife 2005:93-94; Willis 2006:145). It also aims at creating space to “tailor the questions to the particular individual” (Willis 2006:146) in order to get the most out of every respondent. However, in trying to combine the positive dimensions of both structured and unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews also risk sharing the weaknesses of both of them. Compared to unstructured interviews there is a risk of leaving out important topics. On the other hand, semi-structured interviews will never be as easily-coded or compared as structured interviews and will most likely be more time-consuming both in terms of execution and analysis.

My semi-structured interviews with small-scale farmers were based on a written interview guide (see Appendix 1), which is the key instrument of this method (Bernard 2002:205). The guide used for the initial interviews in 2006 consisted of 8 sections; 1) introduction of the research project/the researcher/interviewee/interview 2) background information about the respondent, 3) livelihood situation, resources and activities 4) questions on poverty and wealth, 5) comparison over time, 6) the future, 7) questions, comments from the respondents, 8) concluding.<sup>11</sup> This structure was no more than a guide, and deviation from the course of this guide was rule rather than exception. Interviews were between 40 minutes and 1,5 hours in length (not including the introductory and concluding sections). The semi-structured interviews with smallholders were mainly carried out in Kasauka and Yelesani villages as described in Table 4-2, with the majority being conducted in 2006.

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<sup>11</sup> This guide was generally also used when doing informant interviews, but always modified to suit the particular informant and situation. For comparable reasons it was important to discuss the same topics and ask similar questions also when interviewing for example extension officers.

**Table 4-2: Semi-structured interviews with small-scale farmers**

	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Kasauka village</i>			
Male	19	1	20
Female	18		18
<i>Yelesani village</i>			
Male	6	2	8
Female	3	6	9
<i>Other villages</i>			
Male	2	1	3
Female			
<i>Total</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>58</i>

In both villages the aim was to interview at least one respondent in each household, and in several households two respondents were interviewed, not least for the purpose of achieving a higher participation by women. Even if the focus of the interviews was on contemporary issues, the interviews in both 1998 and 2006 had a retrospective dimension to understand important events in their livelihood situation during the last 20 years.

Finally, during the last visit in October 2008 four group-interviews were organised with the aim of eliciting feedback on some issues and of clarifying any results that had proved difficult to interpret. This also became a way to brief some of the respondents on key-aspects of my results from the rural part of the research. There were three participants in each group and in each village there was one group of women and one group of men. These follow-up interviews were normally about two hours long.

#### **4.2.3 Group interviews and individual interviews with older people**

For the purpose of getting first hand information about the colonial era and the post-independence era up to approximately 1980, individual as well as group interviews with older people were conducted. This added what Tosh (2002:301, 309) labels a “human face” to the perspective of the colonial and post-independence administration. For these interviews fifteen people of the age of 70 or above were identified. Fifteen interviews were made with older farmers in 2007 and 2008. Four of them were group interviews and the rest individual interviews.

Altogether 21 older farmers were interviewed, 11 of them women and ten of them men. The sampling process has been purposive in the sense that the



respondents were selected based on my need for a certain type of information, and from the motto that “you take what you can get” (Bernard 2002:182). There was a need to broaden the selection base from Kasauka and Yelesani villages. Older farmers from six villages participated in this part of the research, including Kasauka village, Yelesani village, Kawasa village, Chisawa village, Masi village and Kalunga village (see Figure 5-1). They are all located within Chief Sayiri. Largely it was a snowball process where I together with my counterpart asked around for older people in the area. The intention from the beginning was to gather older people from different villages in groups and to only do group interviews. This, however, proved to be difficult. The respondents were not particularly keen on moving to another village for an interview and the question of who would go to who’s village became an issue. Together with my counterpart I therefore decided to do the interviews in the older villagers’ home villages. The group interviews had between two and five participants each.

The interviews with farmers over 70 years dealt with their experience of colonialism. An obvious problem here is the reliability of retrospection. This problem increases with distance in time and Francis (2000:187-189) gives examples of situations where it can be difficult to separate even the 1920s from the 1940s. I have had similar experiences and used inspiration from, for example, Francis when structuring the interviews on the experience of colonialism around certain well-known events. These interviews were mainly concerned with the period from the early 1940s up to independence 1964. The categories used were the time periods of: 1) before and after World War II (which people from the area participated in), 2) during the war, 3) before or during the movement to Chipangali<sup>12</sup>, which started in the early 1950s, and 4) the independence in 1964 as signposts for these discussions. Apart from these periods in time, time references that showed appropriate for the particular respondent were added during separate interviews, for example a village break-up or a longer absence from the village. When discussing the post-independence era, the event of independence was normally a starting point for a discussion where we worked our way through the 1960s and 1970s. The interviews with older people focused on a set of issues mainly; 1) general livelihood situation, 2) food security, 3) market and input access, 4) employment, tax payment and migration, 5) land issues and environmental change, and 6) access to extension.

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<sup>12</sup> Chipangali is a resettlement area north of Chipata whereto people from the Main Ngoni Reserve moved or were forcibly move during the 1950s (see Chapter Seven).

#### **4.2.4 Interviewing extension officers and informants**

Interviews with extension officers were a primary source of information about the livelihood situations of smallholders and the present rural policy regime. This served to go beyond the written documents and to understand how and in what form national policies arrived at the local level. Another reason for interviewing extension officers was to broaden the picture from the villages where I interviewed the smallholders.

Thirteen interviews were conducted with a total of 11 extension officers at 9 agricultural camps. Eleven of these were conducted within the Eastern Block in Chipata District, the other two in two camps in the Central Block in the same district (see Figure 4-1). The Eastern Block covers parts of Chief Sayiri, Chief Maguya and Chief Mpezeni in the Southern part of Chipata District or the old Main Ngoni Reserve. These camps constitute smallholder areas that differ from each other in terms of access to input and output markets, services such as Food Reserve Agency buying spots, education facilities, health-stations as well as soil quality. Most extension officers had also worked in different blocks and camps within the district.

The interviews with extension officers were also semi-structured (see Appendix 2). The guide consisted of nine themes: 1) introduction of the research project, 2) personal history in extension, 3) livelihood situation of small-scale farmers over time, 4) differences between different camps/places, 5) the present approach in extension, support and work with the farmers, 6) changes over time in approach, 7) outcomes and responses from farmers, 8) the work situation as an extension officer, 9) conclusion, comments, questions. These interviews lasted between one and two hours not including introductions and conclusions.

#### **4.2.5 Interviewing – methodological concerns**

A number of problems and concerns were encountered while interviewing. Although several of the issues discussed are relevant for all the different types of interviews, they are divided into three parts, based on the type of respondent. That means that several of the issues discussed under the first subheading are very much relevant also for the interviews done with older farmers, as well as the other way around.

##### *Reflections from the interviews with small-scale farmers*

In all but a few cases the interviews with small-scale farmers and older farmers took place in the villages, usually just outside the respondent's house. This can be compared to the 1998 study when about half of the interviews were

conducted in the fields. On the few occasions in 2006 that interviews were attempted in the agricultural fields interviewees made it clear that they did not like being disturbed while working during the heavy harvesting period. The visiting of fields has therefore largely been a separate activity during this study. Before starting interviewing in the separate villages I visited the headman to discuss the purpose of my research and to obtain his permission to contact the households on my own.<sup>13</sup>

A tape-recorder was used during all but a few interviews. Permission for this was always obtained from the respondent. The main advantage of using a tape-recorder is that it allows a more complete concentration on the interview and the interviewee, and renders possible a more reliable transcription of the interview compared to what happens when only written notes are taken. The drawback of tape-recording is that it might affect the respondent in a negative way. Respondents might feel uncomfortable and hesitate to give out certain information, information that would be possible to obtain if using a record technique, that makes it more difficult to trace the information back to the respondent (Willis 2006:149-150; see also Bernard 2002:220-224). I did my best to avoid this by explaining that no one else would be allowed to listen to the tape, and by granting them anonymity in the report. When I still felt hesitation from the respondent's side I chose to put the tape-recorder aside and took written notes instead.

Since my skills in the local language Chinyanja are limited I depended on informants and an interpreter during the rural studies.<sup>14</sup> The interpretation during the interviews meant that information was lost even though we continuously tried to limit this loss. This problem is likely to have gradually decreased due to improved communication with the interpreter and the fact that my somewhat improved language skills enabled me to identify occasions when information was lost. Especially in the beginning of the fieldwork information was left out, that the interpreter found irrelevant or "wrong", a common problem also described by Bujra (2006:176). Importantly, interpretation works as a filter, which makes it dubious to use the transcriptions as direct citation. Neither myself nor the interpreter are native English speakers, which is another reason that the citations from the field used in this report cannot be regarded as fully

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<sup>13</sup> The headman in Kasauka village did also alert me on the problem of interviewing people in the field, which meant that most interviews were made in the early mornings, often before or during the dawn, and in the late afternoon, when the respondents were coming back from the fields.

<sup>14</sup> I can, however, only agree with Bernard (2002:339-342), that learning the language is the best way to lay the ground for understanding another culture and also to be understood yourself and taken seriously. During the rural fieldwork in 2006 and 2007 I went for private language lessons in one of the households of Kasauka village on more or less a daily basis, which improved my language skills gradually during the research process.

representative of the original speech by the respondent (see also Bujra 2006:173-174).

Despite the problems relating to the need for translation we should, as indicated by for example Lindberg (2005:112), not neglect the positive sides of working with a field assistant. A local interpreter and counterpart often tend to be much more than a translator of language (Bujra 2006:174, 177). This has definitely been the case for this project. Since the person I worked with was a smallholder himself, living in the area, knowing the people and their general situation, he eventually became a great informant and counterpart during the rural part of the research process. We also had constantly ongoing discussions about the interview situation and how to best approach different issues. There is always a risk with a high dependency on the interpreter as the main informant, since it is easy to get trapped within a single person's perspective as discussed by Bujra (2006:174). This risk was limited in this study by my extensive observations, informal interviewing (without an interpreter) and also interviews with, for example the extension officers, which were also conducted without the participation of my interpreter.

Conducting research in a culture less known to the researcher always implies some validity problems. Do people understand my question? Are they answering the questions asked, or something else? Does the interpreter understand the questions? Espling (1999:101-104) describes interviews using interpreter as an indirect four-way communication, where both questions and answers are interpreted by three different people with different backgrounds, possibly both socially and culturally. That the interviewer and the interpreter communicate in a language that is not their mother tongue further adds to the risk of misunderstandings. In some cases this is obvious and more easily corrected but other cases are more difficult. Asking a smallholder in the study area what kind of animals he/she possesses might seem straightforward, but this question sometimes gave grounds for confusion. The answer might be based on access as well as ownership, and the boundary between these two categories is not necessarily clear-cut. In addition, it should be mentioned that it is not certain that everyone openly gives out information about the numbers of animals they possess to a visitor. This kind of validity problem can to a large degree be managed through developing control questions, and triangulating with other interviews and observations. Such techniques greatly reduced the risks of misunderstanding and misinformation but could not, of course, completely eliminate them.

An issue when doing fieldwork based on a method such as semi-structured interviews is boredom and tiredness. Asking the same (or at least

similar) questions over and over again and receiving answers that are also often very similar, is not always intellectually stimulating. As van Donge (2006:181) states these kind of feelings can be a sign of understanding and saturation, but Bernard (2002:218-219) is also right when he points at the pace, or rather organisation of the fieldwork, as a crucial factor. He gives examples of studies where the first interview each day is longer than the second and that the length of interviews also decreases from day to day. This can of course be explained by many factors, but some caution is necessary. The experience in this study is that it is not advisable to do more than two interviews of the same kind in one day. I did occasionally, especially at the beginning of the research conduct more than two semi-structured interviews a day (in a few cases four interviews/day), but increasingly I tried to adopt a strategy of mixing different techniques during the days in the field.

One issue in the fieldwork for this study and especially in the process of interviewing was the expectations of the respondents. I have learned from textbooks, supervisors and lectures on methods in development studies how important it is to make clear what the study is about and the expected outcome of the same. My own experience tells me that it is rather naïve to assume that this type of openness and honesty solves the problem of expectations or biased answers from the respondents. Neither does it solve any other ethical problem involved in development research. The discussion on the outcome of my research was continuously brought to the fore during the fieldwork process, despite rather urgent and repetitive declarations of the objective and non-objectives of my visit. The fact that time and money was being spent on a research project for a reason no more specific than generating knowledge (and disseminate it) and compiling a book seemed absurd to several of the respondents. The comment from one older man, “how is it possible that after you have learnt about the problems here, there will be no assistance” recurred in different versions during the fieldwork. It was obvious that the message of a probable non-outcome tended to create confusion and, on a few occasions, understandable discontent. Probably the best way to handle it is to do as described above, but maybe there is a need to devote more time and energy to this kind of discussions in field, even though it might be a dead-end.<sup>15</sup> Due to the

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<sup>15</sup> During the 1998 study I thought I was very clear on these issues. In 2006 I was, however, confronted by several questions regarding the fact that my earlier study had not resulted in any practical assistance. At the end of the 2006 visit I invited the villagers to a meeting to again discuss this topic, and other questions related to my research project. I am not sure at all that I was successful in explaining my objectives, but an elderly woman finally summed up the discussion by comparing me to David Livingstone and his ‘discovery’ of Victoria Falls, a very unpleasant comparison I found surprisingly hard to escape.

unequal relationship between myself as a researcher and the respondents, unrealistic expectations were not completely avoided through an obligatory account of my intentions at the beginning of every interview.

### *Reflections from the interviews with older people*

The reason for doing group interviews with older people was to achieve a more dynamic environment when trying to make people remember events that happened a long time ago. Although this worked quite well, there was always a risk that individuals would dominate the discussion at the expense of other group members. This was especially a problem in one group where male and female participants were mixed and an older man tended to totally dominate the discussion, despite the efforts to involve the other participants. In this and other instances it demands a lot of the moderator to encourage the full participation of all members (e.g. Morgan 1997; Wibeck 2000).

Furthermore, by gathering people of an age of 70 years or older, there has most likely been a bias towards the 'better off' in the area, since they are more likely to live longer lives compared to members of the poorer households. Bujra (2006:175) also points out the particular problem of translation during group interviews. There was no perfect solution to this problem. To continuously interrupt and disrupt the discussion in the group for translation was likely to stifle debate and destroy the possibility of a free discussion in the groups. In case of the large group (five participants) the interpreter and I therefore sat down afterwards and listened to the tape together while transcribing it. Another problem arising when doing interviews based on retrospection is that people are likely to look upon past times in a rather romantic light, since they most likely were both younger and stronger. There is no easy way around this, except cross-checking through informant interviews and secondary sources. In terms of questions regarding the 1980s these have also been included in interviews with relatively younger farmers.

Two of the older farmers were also used as key informants. By key informant in this context means a person knowing a lot about the history of the area. A few of the older farmers had that kind of knowledge that had been handed down to them. Especially one respondent had a few written notes on village movements from the early twentieth century, which was of value for me. I therefore approached the source of *oral tradition*, in some contrast to *oral history* (which in general is defined as own experience). Oral tradition can be defined as "knowledge that has been transmitted over several generations and is the collective property of the members of a given society" (Tosh 2002:311). To interpret information that has been passed on from one generation to another

involves even greater reliability problems than the type of interviews with older people discussed above. Widgren (2003) illustrates this when trying to map out land use and settlement patterns around 1900 in a part of South-Eastern Botswana through the use of oral sources. He describes the conflicting answers and how stories differed depending on the place where the interview was conducted and how he increasingly mistrusted his ability to say anything reliable about earlier land use and earlier settlement patterns. Widgren eventually found his way out, but concludes that these kinds of sources are “continuously shaped and reshaped in different social and historical contexts” (ibid:95). The approach in this study has been to as far as possible check the information against other sources (other interviews, information from the Headmen, archival documents) and scrutinise the information’s reasonableness in relation to the overall picture.

#### *Reflections on interviews with extension officers and informants*

The extension officers were interviewed at their camps, often in their homes. During these interviews, as during informant interviews, notes were taken instead of using a tape-recorder, except in one case. This was decided after a discussion with my field assistant. These interviews were all made in English. Normally the interpreter was not present, but in a few cases there was need for some assistance with translation. Apart from interviewing extension officers I had more or less daily contact and daily discussions with three extension officers at one of the camps. This gave me an understanding of their daily work and their approach towards the farmers, which would have been difficult to obtain otherwise. For example, it took quite some time before the extension officers started to openly air criticism towards some aspects of the approach most of them worked with, although they were in general open-minded to discuss political issues in relation to the agricultural sector. It also made it possible to observe the interaction between extension officers and smallholders through participating in meetings and workshops. On the other hand it was important to show some distance from the extension officers during my interviews with smallholders. On a general level I was surprised by the smallholders’ openness and rather frank and harsh criticism of the government’s policies. It is, however, likely that my rather close contact with extension officers impacted on the farmers’ willingness to criticise the extension work, especially on a personal level. Extension officers on the other hand, often complained about their own situation and that they did not get the support from the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives that they were entitled to. However, they became more reserved when I tried to get their views on the reasons for the absence of such support. To me it was clear that when I approached issues of corruption within

the Ministry, the officers did not feel comfortable talking about it in a formal interview setting, although it was sometimes possible under more informal circumstances.

#### 4.2.6 Food availability calendars

One technique used in field, which is inspired by the participatory approach, is *food availability calendars* (see e.g. Milimo et al. 2002:12). Food availability calendars were done to create a better understanding of the food security situation in the households and how it changes over a year. This was done with eight households in Kasauka and four households in Yelesani village, who were selected on the basis of the interviews in order to get a stratified sample. The sample was foremost based on aspects of material wealth such as access to land, animals, type of house, education level, how the respondents identified themselves and on my general impression about the wealth of the household. I have however diverted largely from this selection due to time constraints, and it is therefore important to acknowledge the different types of households that were selected in analysing this information. One food availability calendar took approximately one and a half to two hours to fill in. Below is an example of the food availability in one female headed household in Kasauka village (Table 4-3).

**Table 4-3: Food availability calendar**

Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Dry maize	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Sweetpotatoe	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cassava	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rice	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beans	0	0	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	0	0
Groundnuts	1	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Cowpeas	0	0	0	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Green maize	0	1	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pumpkin leafs	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	0	1
Cowpeas leafs	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	1
Mango	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
Bananas	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Guavas	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
Masuko	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3
Milk	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Egg	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
Meat	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1*
Fish	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Meals per day	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

3= A lot, plenty, for everyday consumption

2= Just enough. For staple, it indicates 2-3 meals per day, and for fish, meat and chicken it indicates 2-3 times a month.

1= A little. For staples as dry maize it implicates at least one meal per day, while for fish, meat, chicken it indicates one meal per month



#### **4.2.7 Observations and informal conversations**

Observations and informal conversations have been a continuous and important aspect of the fieldwork. The observations have largely been unstructured in a sense that they have taken place every day at most times (ibid:197; Fife 2005:77). Dealing with smallholders' livelihood situation, observations have helped in illuminating the research questions. I have observed discussions of market issues (such as farmers' anxiety about the prices offered for the cotton in out grower schemes), fertiliser prices, gender issues, traditional practices, witchcraft, democracy, Indian wholesalers in Chipata. Often it has been combined with informal conversations when visiting the villages, the fields, and the gardens, when participating in funerals, church functions, or group meetings, while eating or just spending time. This was often done without my local interpreter but usually there was someone who could assist me with some basic translation during these conversations.

Since two villages have been in focus, informal conversations and observations also helped to broaden the perspective beyond these two places. While walking around the area, visiting villages in the vicinity, the depth of certain problems highlighted during the interviews became clearer. I was often reminded of the cry for fertiliser, the poor soils, and the way the villagers experienced exploitation when it came to market issues. Observations of individual incidents did not on their own significantly change the course of the research, but taken together with the information collected through more structured techniques, my observations deepened my understanding of the magnitude of certain problems, as well as strategies developed by the farmers, their life preferences and thoughts of the future. I also benefited from these techniques when, for example, trying to understand the social stratification of the village. A tricky question is how to use information collected through these types of methods. Beazly & Ennew (2006:197) state that observations tend to be more useful if they are properly checked. I did my best to work in a manner where information collected was cross-checked through observations and informal interviewing during interviews with the smallholders, the extension officers and during daily discussions with my counterpart.

### **4.3 Archives, secondary sources and aerial photos**

#### **4.3.1 Historical research in archives**

Jennings (2006:241) describes archives as a neglected source of information about development processes, practices and policies. The value of archives is that they can supply us with the long-term context for an area or a project that is

indispensable when trying to understand the present. An archive is generally defined as a record of the past, containing documents of different kinds, which are no longer in use. Usually the material in archives is labelled as 'closed'. It is first hand information such as "personal letters, internal memoranda, minutes of meeting, policy documents, drafts and final versions of statements, [and] speeches" (ibid:243). Film, photographs, objects or videos might also be included in an archive. The documents in archives provide indications of the worldview of the author or an organisation at the time when these documents were produced. There is always a need to ask why a specific document was produced, what kind of document it is, under what conditions the information was collected and when it was produced in relation to the event it describes (ibid:244; Bernard 2002:426).<sup>16</sup>

The fieldwork in archives was conducted in 2007 in two locations, the National Archives of Zambia in Lusaka and the British National Archives in London. Altogether, I spent seven weeks at these two archives. The focus was on sources related to the area of study, the Fort Jameson District and the Native reserves that were created after WW I. Key documents are the District Notebooks of Fort Jameson District, the district commissioner's annual reports of Fort Jameson District, annual reports on agriculture as well as on native or African affairs. The annual reports were explored at least with an interval of five years. Several of the annual reports were, however, hard to locate. Of importance have of course been the reports on the development in the native reserves, especially the Main Ngoni Reserve. These reports were irregularly produced throughout the colonial era. Apart from that, minutes of meetings between the colonial administration and the local Chiefs have been used and key documents on marketing policies from the government side. Correspondence, for example between the district administration in Fort Jameson and the administration in Lusaka, and between one of these parts and the Colonial Office in London has been explored to a lesser extent.

Many archival documents embody the extreme top-down perspective of a male dominated colonial administration and the language often reveals extremely paternalistic attitudes, and in some parts documents are openly racist. The perspectives and attitudes in these documents (as in other official sources) are for this project seen as important aspects of the policy making process at different periods of time.

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<sup>16</sup> Points which are, of course, equally valid for all research using secondary materials.

### **4.3.2 Documents and secondary sources**

Regular secondary sources such as literature and articles have also been valuable for the historical part of the study. These sources have been treated as most secondary sources, although there are reasons to be particularly careful and critical here. Many of the secondary sources came into being during the colonial era, or on the brink of or just after independence. Some of the earlier texts are probably most valuable as representations of a colonial discourse, but might also include valuable information regarding the history of the study area. My strategy has been to crosscheck these sources as far as possible when it came to data and information cited in this research project. Apart from secondary sources available at libraries in the Nordic countries, sources available at the School for Oriental and African Studies in London and the library at the University of Zambia have been used. The reason for mentioning this is that several of the books and journals collected at these locations are not easily accessible elsewhere.

Secondary sources more generally form an important part of the material for this study. These include books, academic articles, government policy documents, statistics and NGO reports. These sources contributed in all sections of the study and particularly in the initial phase of the research when I was formulating the research problem and theoretical standpoints. Secondary information about the contemporary situation of small-scale farmers in the study area has been limited. There was, however, a rather rich material on issues related to soil conservation in the area, which gave deeper insights into some important aspects of smallholders' livelihood situations. Reports and statistics from the district and provincial offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, as well as NGOs working in the area have also provided important information. Official government documents that describe the development strategy in Zambia in general and the development for agriculture and the smallholder sector in particular have been relatively accessible for the different periods investigated. Literature and articles also form the base for understanding trends in smallholders' livelihood situation in the broader perspective of Southern and Eastern Africa.

The review of secondary sources can be described as what Unwin labels "development research at 'home'" (Unwin 2006:104). How to approach different sources of secondary material is, however, often an absent discussion in much of the methodological literature dealing with development research. My general standpoint towards social science is that the knowledge we produce is 'theory laden' to use the vocabulary of the critical realist school (see Sayer 1992; Danermark et al 2003). The secondary material used for this study is

believed to be influenced by theory and ideological standpoints and is treated as such. In many instances it can be valid to ask similar questions as when digging in the archives; when was the material prepared/produced, why was it produced and how was it produced (Jennings 2006:244). Some documents are relatively easy to critically evaluate in this respect, while in other cases, these issues are subtler.

Meth & Williams (2006:214-215) list a few questions that have been kept in mind during the literature research for this project. These questions concern the key focus and the argument of a document, whether the hypothetical audience have affected the argument and how the theoretical frame might have “shaped the author’s argument” (ibid:215). Furthermore we need to consider whether the methods used are appropriate, whether the conclusions and claims are backed up with the data produced, and what perspectives or aspects, such as gender, history, cultural, might have been overlooked. It has also been valuable to contrast the treatment of the same issues by different sources, as with, for example how land reform or soil degradation have been discussed over time, or how different authors have reviewed the impacts of structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa. My task is, as far as it is possible, to take account of the material as well as of the ideological base for the arguments presented, and of course, through using different methods, triangulate and present my own analysis, being as open as I can about my own theoretical and ideological baggage.

### **4.3.3 Aerial photos**

To further understand changes over time in respect to livelihood activities (and issues of deagrarianisation, population pressure, effects of resettlement), aerial photos have been analysed to map changes in land use patterns for the years 1965, 1988 and 2003. The land uses have been categorised and digitalised in Arcmap and show a small portion of the Chief Sayiri area, including the villages Kasauka, Kawasa, Kalunga, Chisawa and Mnukwa. The areas that have been categorised are active agricultural land and gardens. By active agricultural land is meant fields that have been cultivated during the last years. Fallow land where bush and small trees have started to take over have not been categorised as active land. Since the aerial photos are of variable quality there is uncertainty attached to the categorisation of gardens. Gardens have been especially difficult to identify on the 1988 photo but also on the 1965 photo. It is therefore likely that the area under garden cultivation is bigger for the years 1965 and 1988, compared to what is displayed on the maps.

## **5. Introducing the study area and rural livelihoods**


To enable a close study of smallholders' livelihoods in relation to both contemporary and historical processes of economic and political change this chapter presents an introduction to Eastern Province and Chipata District in terms of overall social and economic development. The more specific study area of Eastern Agricultural Block and Kasauka and Yelesani villages are then presented in more detail to prepare for a close discussion on smallholders livelihood situations in Chapter Six.

### **5.1 Situating the empirical study**

#### **5.1.1 Eastern Province and Chipata District – a farming based region**

Eastern Province, one out of nine provinces in Zambia, is a genuinely rural province in a country that is relatively urbanized compared with most parts of Southern and Eastern Africa. According to the census conducted in 2000 (Central Statistical Office, CSO/RoZ 2004a:22), 91 percent of the inhabitants of Eastern Province resided in rural areas. compared to 65 percent for the country as a whole in 2000 (CSO/RoZ 2004b:10) and 61 percent in 2010 (CSO/RoZ 2011:1). The total population of Eastern Province in 2010 was 1,7 million, which constituted 13 percent of Zambia's population (CSO/RoZ 2011:2).

The province is a major agricultural region in Zambia, and contains some of the best agricultural land in the country, together with the plateaus of the Central and Southern provinces (see Figure 5-1). The province can be divided into two rather distinct parts, the Eastern Plateau and the Luangwa Valley. The valley contains some good and fertile soils but rainfall is unpredictable and erratic. It is a tsetse fly infested area, which complicates livestock raising and the use of cattle for draught power. Luangwa Valley is in general suitable for drought resistant crops such as sorghum, millet, sesame and tobacco. On the plateau, however, the rainfall is more regular, normally between 800 and 1000 millimetres per year. This makes the Eastern Plateau better equipped for agriculture than most parts of Zambia, which typically suffer from semi-arid soils and erratic rainfall (Kumar 1994).



**Figure 5-1: Map of agro-ecological zones in Zambia**

Source: Based on Kumar 1994:33

On the plateau the soils vary from sandy to clay loamy. Smallholders, typically with farms of around two hectares, dominate the Eastern Province as well as rural Zambia as a whole (Curtis 2007; Ajayi et al 2005). Eastern Province is Zambia's main maize growing area (CSO/RoZ 2001:19-21; CSO/RoZ 2006:5-6). Other important crops are groundnuts, soybeans, sunflower, cotton and tobacco. Livestock farming is widespread in the smallholder sector. The most common animals are cattle, pigs, goats and chickens (CSO/RoZ 2004a:2).

Field preparations start in September/October. Some dry planting of maize occurs in October, while the rain usually starts in November followed by the planting of the major crops. The planting of maize is, however, usually staggered in order to spread the peaks of weeding and harvesting (Scheffee Peterson 1999). The rain normally stops in April. From May to early June is the major harvesting period. The system of agriculture varies from semi-permanent bush fallows to rather short fallows (1-3 years) on the plateau where population density has led to an increased pressure on the land (Jha & Hojjati 1993:18; Scheffee Peterson 1999:18; Kwesiga et al. 2005:6).

In terms of social development, Eastern Province is in several aspects similar to the rest of Zambia. The age-sex composition is such that around 46

percent of both males and females were below 15 years of age in 2000. Around 20 percent of the households were at this time female-headed, which corresponds well to Zambia as a whole. Female-headed households are generally poorer than male-headed ones (CSO/RoZ 2004a:26-29). In terms of education and literacy rates, Eastern Province lags behind considerably compared to the national average. In 2000, 70 percent of the national population between the ages of 15 and 24 were literate (CSO/RoZ 2004b:17). For Eastern Province the figure was 50 percent and has been declining since 1990. Female literacy was lower than male literacy and literacy rates were considerably higher in the urban parts compared to the rural parts of the province (CSO/RoZ 2004a:43).

Poverty levels for the province correspond rather well with those on national level. Fifty-seven percent of the population in the province were considered extremely poor in 2000, 13 percent moderately poor and 30 percent non-poor (CSO/RoZ 2005a:113). More recent figures, however, indicate decreasing rural poverty on a national scale (see Jayne et al. 2007). It is not yet clear whether this trend is mirrored in Eastern Province. HIV & AIDS prevalence in the Eastern Province was in 2000 close to 14 percent, which was slightly below the national average (CSO/RoZ 2004a:3). Infant mortality was 129 in year 2000, higher than the national average and practically the same as it had been in 1980, although it was an improvement on 1990 when it had risen to compared 149. The under-five mortality rate shows the same kind of trend, suggesting a deterioration in social welfare between 1980 and 1990 followed by a recovery in the following decade. Life expectancy similarly declined from 46 to 42 years between 1980 and 1990 and then increased to 48 years by 2000 (ibid:92-104). In terms of employment, the agricultural sector dominates with 90 percent of the labour force active in this sector. There are no statistical signs of any change between 1990 and 2000. If anything, the data available indicates that the percentage of workers in many occupations outside agriculture decreased between 1990 and 2000, for example in the manufacturing sector (ibid:70-73).

There are currently eight districts in the Eastern Province and Chipata is by far the largest in terms of population, despite being among the smallest in physical size (see Figure 4-2). In 2010 the Chipata District population stood at 452,428, constituting 26,5 percent of the population in Eastern Province (CSO/RoZ 2011:13). In 2000, approximately 70 percent of the district population lived in rural areas and around 20 percent of the households were at that time female-headed (Kasali 2007:3). Chipata town is the provincial headquarter, hosting the provincial offices of several sectoral ministries.

The district borders with Malawi and the Malawian capital Lilongwe is no more than 110 km away from Chipata town. There is a lot of trade, not least on a


daily small-scale basis between both urban and rural parts of Chipata District and Malawi. There are also great similarities between the two in both language and culture (Kasali 2007:2).

About 15 percent of all children in Chipata District were orphans in 2000, a burden not least for the elderly in the rural areas. Stunted growth among children is widespread in the district and stood at 66 percent in 2004 compared to the national average of 50 percent. This stunting is mainly due to low protein intake. The literacy rate for the district was 55 percent in 2000 (ibid:10-11). Enrolment rates were low for the same year, with rates around 55 percent for primary school and less than 15 percent for secondary school. There are also indications that drop-out levels are high already from grade 4 (Environmental Council of Zambia, ECZ, 2008:29). Twenty-eight percent of the district's population had no access to safe drinking water between 2002 and 2004. In Khova ward (one out of 20 administrative wards in the district), where both Yelesani and Kasauka village are located, the figure stood at 33 percent (Kasali 2007:10-11).

The dominant ethnic groups in the district are Chewa and Ngoni, although there are minorities of several other ethnic groups present in the district. There is a small but economically significant Asian community of Indian origin in Chipata town, owning restaurants and hotels. This group is also important wholesalers of various types of goods and several of them are involved in the agricultural marketing and act as important buyers of smallholders' maize and groundnuts. Indian in-migration to Chipata District dates back to 1904 when the first Indians settled in the area, and almost immediately became important in trade and commerce. Some of the larger estates of land in the district are also owned by families of Indian origin that took over the farms from Europeans who left the country during and after independence (Phiri 2000).

Most of the district lies between 900 and 1,200 metres above sea level and is part of the plateau area. There are a variety of soil types and the level of soil fertility on the plateau varies greatly. In general, the agricultural potential is good but many soils are fragile and shallow and require careful management if erosion and depletion are to be prevented (Kasali 2007:3). The best soils are located around Chipata town, where the European settlers started to occupy land during the early twentieth century. In many other areas the soils range from clay loamy to loamy sand or sandy soils prone to erosion and sensitive to intensive cultivation. Declining soil fertility is a major problem in many parts of the district.





**Figure 5-2: State land in Chipata District (private/leasehold farms, forest/game reserves, squatter areas)**

Source: Based on map received from Chipata District office October 2008

The agricultural land in Chipata District is predominantly under customary tenure, although there are considerable amounts ‘state land’, including private commercial farms (see Figure 5-2). The customary areas are regulated by traditional law under the authority of chieftaincies. This means that the land is invested in the chiefs and that there is no recognised land market where agricultural land can be traded. Farmers do not have any formal title deeds, but inherit their land and pass it on to the next generation.

There are ten Ngoni chiefdoms and six Chewa chiefdoms in Chipata District. The Ngoni chiefs are under the supervision of the paramount chief *Inkosi Yama Nkosi Mpezeni* and the Chewa chiefs are subordinate to the paramount chief *Gawa Undi*. The two groups nowadays share the same

language, Chinyanja, but differ in other significant respects, the Ngoni are, for example, patrilineal while the Chewa are matrilineal (ECZ 2008:14, 38). However, since intermarriages have been common for a long time, the cultural distinctions are not always clear (Sylwander & Egnell 1990:26). The Chinyanja language is also spoken in other parts of Zambia, especially in the central provinces and the capital Lusaka, largely due to labour migration from the Eastern Province.

In 2007/08 there were 77,994 farming households in Chipata District. Ninety-six percent of these were considered to be small-scale farmers, while the rest were medium-scale apart from 16 large-scale farmers.<sup>17</sup> Similar to many other areas in Southern and Eastern Africa, maize is the dominant crop, and for the small-scale farmers it represented around half of the cultivated area in 2005 (CSO/RoZ 2005b). Other cash crops among the small-scale farmers in the district are groundnuts, cotton, tobacco, sunflower and soybeans (ECZ 2008:40). The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, MACO, divides the district into eight agricultural blocks, which in turn are divided into 57 agricultural camps. The blocks and the camps are important facilities for extension work, farming training programmes, demonstration sites and the implementation of development projects. The block and camp headquarters also serve as centres for relief aid and for programmes to distribute agricultural inputs such as fertiliser.

Each camp has a camp committee, which is a representative organ for the farmers. These camp committees communicate with the block and camp officers on behalf of the farmers and also provide some extension services on a voluntary basis. There is normally one extension officer at each camp and one officer responsible for the whole block, although it is common that camps are without staff for long periods of time. Twenty-two out of 57 camps in the district were un-staffed in 2007 (RoZ 2007:30). This means that extension work in these camps is limited consisting only of extension initiatives taken by the farmers themselves through their camp committees. There are two Farming Training Centres, FTC, in Chipata District, one of which is located at Kalunga Camp close to my case study village, Kasauka. The farming training centres have a concrete building to enable larger meetings and the FTC occasionally organise agricultural shows and demonstrations. Apart from camp and block extension officers there is also a Senior Agricultural Officer at the Chipata office, who is responsible for all the extension work in the district.

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<sup>17</sup> Information gathered at the District office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in October 2008. The figures of the number of large-scale farmers varies between sources, from 13 (Kasali 2007:12) to 25 (ECZ 2008:39).


### 5.1.2 Southern Chipata, Eastern Block, Kasauka and Yelesani village

The study area is located within the Eastern Agricultural Block (from now on Eastern Block). Eastern Block is divided into eight agricultural camps as seen in Table 5-1 and Figure 5-3. Kasauka and Yelesani villages are both located within the Kalunga Camp in Eastern Block. Between 2006 and 2008 there were extension officers present in all but one camp, Mtowe Camp, which was without an extension officer from at least early 2007 up to the end of 2008.

**Table 5-1: Camps, villages, households and extension officers in Eastern Block, 2007/2008**

Extension camp	Villages	Households	Ext. staff
Kalunga	26	1,098	3
Sayiri	10	785	1
Makwe	30	1,214	1
Mtowe	15	1,060	0
Kaphinde	28	1,343	1
Jerusalem	38	1,632	1
Feni	19	1,350	1
Katambo	26	895	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>192</i>	<i>9,377</i>	<i>9</i>

Source: Block supervisor, Eastern Block; own field notes.




**Figure 5-3: Blocks in Chipata District and camps in Eastern Block**

Source. Based on map collected at MACO, Chipata District Office 2008.

The camps in the Eastern Block share many characteristics although there are some differences in crop production, soil fertility and water access. The soils vary from sandy soils in Kalunga to clay loamy in Katambo, which is an area facing fewer problems with soil depletion and erosion. Kasauka village is located only a kilometre away from Kalunga Camp. During the study period there were 27 households in the village, six of them were female headed. The village had 157 inhabitants in 2006/2007. The number of household members ranged from one to 13, with an average of almost six members per household.

Kasauka village is an offshoot from the neighbouring Kawasa village (see Figure 5-4). According to the headman in Kasauka, the village was formed in 1949, while two other sources, independently of each other, identify 1954 as the year when three additional villages were created out of Kawasa village. At that time, Kasauka village, Chisawa village and Mnu kwa village broke away and formed their own villages in the vicinity of Kawasa, which is still considered a senior village. Kawasa village was originally located in Chief Mpezeni but moved (or was moved) to its current location in Chief Sayiri sometime between 1910 and 1920. The villages are based on kinship and new villages are normally established by one or two families breaking away to form their own village. Kasauka village was established by two families from Kawasa village.



**Figure 5-4: The location of Kasauka and Yelesani village in Chief Sayiri**

Source: Field data and Google Earth.

Yelesani village was established as a farm in 1952 under the supervision of Masi village (see Figure 5-4). Officially Yelesani is still under Masi village but has now an acting headman and is on its way to being officially recognised as a separate village. The circumstances around the break up from Masi village are unclear. According to one source, the land now cultivated in Yelesani village was given by the headman of Masi village while other sources indicate that the farm was created by the colonial government. It may have been part of a Peasant Farming Scheme during the colonial era to encourage commercial farming among smallholders, but this cannot be confirmed. Yelesani is located approximately 8 km north of Kasauka village. During the study period Yelesani village consisted of 16 households of which three were female-headed. The village had 106 inhabitants. The number of household members ranged from two to 12, with an average of 6,6 persons per household. Kasauka and Yelesani villages are introduced in Table 5-2 below.

**Table 5-2: Introduction to Kasauka and Yelesani villages**

<b>Kasauka village</b>	<b>Yelesani village</b>
Patrilineal descent	Patrilineal descent
Ngoni	Ngoni
No polygamy present	Polygamy present in few cases
157 inhabitants	106 inhabitants
27 households	16 households
1-13 members/household	2-12 members/household
Established 1954 (1949)	Established 1952 (as a farm)
Customary tenure	Customary tenure
Sandy soil	Sandy soil/sandy loam
Chief Sayiri	Chief Sayiri

Source: Field data

Kasauka and Yelesani villages are located in Chief Sayiri, bordering Chief Maguya (see Figure 5-4). The larger parts of Chief Sayiri, Chief Maguya and Chief Mpezeni make up the Eastern Block. Both villages are based on kinship, with the households being related to each other within the frame of an extended family. The system is patrilineal, a female who gets married usually moves to her husband's village. The land in both Kasauka and Yelesani is under customary tenure and is passed on from a father to his sons. Although there are disputes at times, tenure is regarded as secure (see also Scheffée Petersen 1999:97). There is hardly any local wish or public opinion advocating for a tenure reform. A private land market is seen as a threat to people's livelihoods in

the area, not least for future generations. There is, however, need to strengthen female farmers' user rights. Female farmers are usually dependent on the benevolence of their parents, brothers or other relatives to get their own land and women who divorce often face uncertainties in access to agricultural land. There are also discussions regarding whether it might be necessary to issue some kind of land certificate for land under customary tenure, without transforming it into private property (Informant interview 5: Chipata District Farmers Association).

The Ngoni have a history of both farming and cattle herding. Cattle have always been of great importance for the Ngoni in the area, in cultural terms, as a sign of status and as a key resource for a secure livelihood. Although undergoing change there is still a clear division in labour between male and female. Men are responsible for ploughing and for construction work, such as building houses, kraals and storage bins. Women are responsible for the daily maintenance of the homestead, cooking, cleaning, daily care of children. Much of the work in the field is done jointly, although women are primarily responsible for weeding the field, while the men are commonly more active in garden work. Harvesting is done together.

## **5.2 Rural livelihoods in Kasauka and Yelesani villages**

### **5.2.1 Livelihood activities in Kasauka and Yelesani villages**

In terms of livelihood activities and resources, there are differences between the villages, as well as within the villages. At the same time, the villages share most characteristics in terms of livelihood activities. The households in both villages rely on agriculture as their main activity for making a living, at the same time as off-farm activities are present in both villages. Farming is dominated by maize cultivation and there are a range of animals present in both villages. Some important aspects of the household livelihoods are summarised on village level in Table 5-3.

**Table 5-3: Introducing livelihoods in Kasauka and Yelesani villages**

	Kasauka 27 HH		Yelesani 16 HH	
Average area under crop cult.	2,2ha (0,25-7ha)		1,1ha (0,4-2,2ha)	
HH with no fallow	11%		44%	
HH with plough	37%		19%	
HH using only hand hoe cult.	30%		25%	
HH without cattle	40%		50%	
HH with no animals	15%		13%	
Outgrower HH in 2006/2007	11%		19%	
HH cultivating garden	70%		88%	
Average adult education level	Male.7 years	Fem. 5 years	Male 4,2 years	Fem. 2,6 years
HH with bicycle	59%		88%	
HH with oxcart	15%		13%	
HH with electricity	4%		-	
Distance to camp office	1 km		9 km	
HH with tractor	0%		0%	
HH with motorised vehicle	0%		0%	
Functioning boreholes	2		0	

In terms of access to land, Kasauka village has larger plots of land, both under crop cultivation and under fallow. Close to half of the households in Yelesani have no fallow. Between 25-30 percent of the households in both villages use only hand hoe cultivation. In Kasauka these households cultivate on average 1,7 hectares, in Yelesani they cultivate on average 1,25 hectare. In Kasauka village, households not owning a plough sometimes borrow one from relatives or hire someone to plough for them, paying approximately 40 000 kwacha (10 US dollar) per hectare. In Yelesani, there were no households who hired someone for ploughing. In terms of animals Kasauka is slightly better positioned than Yelesani. Twelve out of 27 households in Kasauka own more than two head of cattle, while there are eleven households with no cattle at all. Goats are present in a few households, while 21 households own between 2 and 8 chickens. Other animals present in a few households are ducks, guinea fowl and pigeons. No households own pigs in Kasauka, partly because pork is proscribed as unclean food by the Seventh Adventist church to which many of the villagers belong.

The ownership of animals show big variation between the households in Kasauka village, ranging from 4 households owning no animals at all to households owning 10 oxen, several goats, about 10 chickens as well as some guinea fowls. In Yelesani village, there is one household with five head of cattle, three households with three heads of cattle each, and one household with one head of cattle. In addition to this there are four households who share access to four head of cattle and a plough inherited from their parents. Other animals

present are goats, chickens and pigs. Seven households have goats, eight have chickens and nine households have pigs. There are two households with no animals at all.

The major crop grown in both villages is maize, of which both hybrid and local varieties are cultivated. All households grow maize and in Kasauka maize is rotated with groundnuts by all households except one. In Yelesani, there are four households that do not practice crop rotation between maize and groundnuts, mainly due to lack of land. A majority of the households also grow sunflower, which is processed into cooking oil. Other important crops are soybeans and sweet potatoes, while the few out-growers in the villages are contracted by Clark cotton to grow cotton.

There are no major differences between the villages in terms of the types of crops cultivated. As can be seen in Table 5-3, most households in Kasauka as well as Yelesani cultivate a garden. The gardens are in general less than a hectare in size (although one of the better off households in Kasauka has a garden of four hectares). Most gardens are located near to a stream, such as Khova stream close to Kasauka and Chikando stream close to Yelesani (see Figure 5-4). Gardens are manually irrigated through carrying buckets of water from the stream. Important crops in the garden are maize, fruit (bananas, guava, oranges), beans, rape, sugarcane, onion, cabbage, tomato, cassava and Irish potato.

The major input, apart from seed, is chemical fertiliser, but households also apply animal manure, in case they have access to cattle. A few farmers in Kasauka state that they buy manure to apply in their fields. In Yelesani all households market parts of their produce, while all but three households in Kasauka market part of their agricultural produce. About half of the households in Kasauka report an off-farm<sup>18</sup> income and more than a third of the households receive remittances from relatives working elsewhere in Zambia. In Yelesani 7 out of 16 households report an off-farm income, while the majority have no additional income except doing casual work in other farmers' fields, which often is paid in maize meal. Only two households in Yelesani state that they receive remittances.

The education level is substantially higher in Kasauka village as seen in Table 5-3. In Kasauka village a few male farmers have completed secondary education, while no one in Yelesani had attended more than eight years of

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<sup>18</sup> By off-farm incomes are meant incomes that is not drawn from own agricultural produce (including crop/animal sales) or agricultural casual labour, what the respondents normally refer to as 'piecework'. Examples of off-farm activities are beer brewing, knitting, carpentering, practice of traditional medicine, construction of storage bins for sale and bricklaying. Remittances are also treated separately (see section 6.2.8).



school. This can partly be explained by the fact that Kasauka village is located only one kilometre from a basic school, providing education up to grade eight. For complete secondary education there is a boarding school in Chadiza, 35 kilometres away from Kasauka. In Yelesani the closest school is more than one hour's walk away. The nearest health station was 5 kilometres away from Kasauka village and 10 kilometres away from Yelesani.

Finally, as already indicated, Yelesani village is the poorer village of the two. The households in Yelesani are in general in possession of lesser land, they are more food insecure and in possession of fewer animals. In terms of access to water Kasauka, has two boreholes and villagers are generally also able to draw water from boreholes at the Kalunga Farmers Training Centre if the village wells dry up. In Yelesani there is no proper borehole. The villagers have dug some shallow wells, but do not have access to safe drinking water.

### 5.2.2 Social stratification in Kasauka and Yelesani

Both Kasauka and Yelesani villages are socially stratified, although this is more visible in Kasauka village. To look into social stratification, we need to know something of what is important to the villagers in terms of wealth. What is it to live a good or a poor life according to the respondents in Kasauka and Yelesani villages? The division seen in Table 5-4 is based on the respondents' views of what constitutes a good or a poor life, combined with data from the interviews and my own observations. A lot of different aspects were brought up for discussion, but a ranking of the top six most commonly discussed aspects of a good and a poor life looks like this.

**Table 5-4: A good or poor life**

<b>Good Life</b>	<b>Poor Life</b>
1. Producing enough food for the hh.	1. Food insecurity, lack of food
2. Enough money and income	2. Lack of fertiliser, no fertiliser
3. Owning cattle and other animals	3.No or few animals
4. Being able to buy enough fertiliser	4. Depending on casual work to get food
5. Owning farming implements, i.e. plough	5. Having no one to assist you
6. Having a brick house with iron sheets	6. Poor clothing

There are also many other aspects mentioned as characteristics for a good and a poor life respectively. Several respondents pointed out the ability to cultivate and work hard as part of a good life. Other things are to dress well, to own an oxcart, having additional businesses apart from agriculture and access to a vehicle. Characteristics of a poor life include a constant lack of money, having no source of income except agriculture, needing to beg and not having your own plough. The number one key issue is, however, food security and the ability to produce enough food for the whole household, which is brought up by almost all respondents. Owning cattle and other animals are also very central to a good life, not least as a security in times of crisis. Furthermore the ability to buy fertiliser is strongly associated with a good life as well as the access to financial resources. On the contrary, a key issue when discussing a poor life is that you depend on others to get enough food and that you cannot send your children to school. Dependency on casual work to survive and to get food is a very important indicator of a household living a poor life.

**Table 5-5: Social stratification of households in Kasauka and Yelesani villages**

Wealth Group	Kasauka	Yelesani
The better off	4	0
The less poor	4	3
The poor	11	6
The very poor	8	7
<i>Total</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>16</i>

The above categorisation in Table 5-5 is based mainly on material well-being in accordance with the respondents’ notion of what characterise a good respectively a poor life. The **better off** households are households that never (or almost never) experience food shortage, that cultivate more than 5 hectares of land and have, in all but one case, a substantial fallow. The better off also have at least 10 heads of cattle and usually also other animals such as a couple of goats and some chickens. Furthermore they have their own plough, oxcart, bicycle and they cultivate a garden. One of them has access to electricity through a solar panel. The better off manage to send their children at least through primary school, and some children are likely to complete secondary education. Finally, they normally have sufficient financial resources to meet their requirements in terms of fertiliser and basic commodities, even if there might be constraints, especially during pre-harvest months. The **less poor** have a few head of cattle and usually additional animals, like chickens. They rarely experience

food shortages, although it happens in times of drought. They cultivate at least two hectares, they have a garden, and often access off-farm incomes, either through off-farm work or remittances. They have access to some transport, although not both an oxcart and a bicycle. Although not owning their own plough they do plough most of their land and in some cases they have roofs of iron sheets.

The third category, **the poor**, face food shortages during pre-harvest months, although not every year. Some of them manage to temporarily solve the situation through selling an animal, others do casual labour in exchange for food, while there are also those who reduce the number of meals per day during pre-harvest months. Several of them have no cattle. Some of them have a garden, but not all and the same goes for bicycles. None of them have an oxcart. The **very poor** households have no animals at all or just a small number of chickens. They often experience food shortage, sometimes for longer periods of time, and it is common that they have to reduce the number of meals per day. Many of them depend on casual labour to get food. They face problems sending their children to primary school, especially those caring for several orphans. Many of them cultivate around one hectare or less and have no, or very little, land under fallow. Generally they do not receive remittances and have little off-farm income. In some of these households there are also members weakened by severe sickness.

It would be possible to add the category of the **destitute**, including those suffering from severe sickness, drug addicts and households facing an acute situation of intense poverty (including starvation) with seemingly no prospect for improvement in living conditions. In some cases they are not so different from the very poor except that the very poor in general are cared for within the existing networks of the extended family, at least to some extent. During the 1998 study there was one household that could be considered as destitute in Kasauka village, which was no longer there in 2006. In 2006 there was one household in Yelesani village that could be considered as very close to destitute.

The above analysis of social strata provides an important insight into the uneven nature of village society. However, this analysis based as it is on classification of individual household circumstances needs to be set in the context of complex relationships between the households. All households in places like Kasauka and Yelesani villages are related to each other and are part of the same extended family, a network that in general also goes far beyond the own village. Some of the very poor households, in for example Kasauka village, have close relatives among the group of better off and are supported by these relatives, just as the group of less poor and poor also benefit from the same kind

of support. It might be support in terms of access to a plough and animal draught power, it might be assistance with transport to the market through the use of an oxcart, it might even be support in terms of a bag of fertiliser or expenses in relation to sending children to school. This support cannot be taken for granted, it is not for all at all times and there are also indications of changes in these relations. Poor families do, therefore, derive important benefits from the social welfare provided by extended family networks in and beyond the village. However, there are limits to the social security implied by this, and the lower strata remains in conditions of poverty and extreme vulnerability.

## **6. A contemporary perspective on rural livelihoods**

To uncover the political and economic processes, with their discursive foundations, that have shaped rural livelihoods in peripheral areas, there is a need to look closer into rural livelihoods in relation to how policies arrive at local level. This will be done in the context of Kasauka and Yelesani villages, Eastern Block and Chipata District, which were introduced in the previous chapter. The chapter begins with a brief outline of the contemporary rural policy regime in order to frame the rest of the chapter, in which smallholders' livelihoods are discussed in relation to key policy measures and also related to the broader context of sub-Saharan Africa.

### **6.1 National policies for rural development**

Since the early 1990s liberalisation, deregulation and a commercialisation of small-scale farming have been guiding principles for rural policies in Zambia, just as for large parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In 1991, Zambia's new government under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, MMD, led by president Fredrick Chiluba rather enthusiastically embarked on a structural adjustment programme to encourage economic growth, private sector development and poverty reduction.

MMD believes that economic prosperity for all can best be created by free men and women through free enterprise, by economic and social justice involving all the productive resources – human material and financial, by liberalising industry, trade and commerce, with the government only creating and enabling environment whereby economic growth must follow as it has done in all the world's successful countries. (MMDs Campaign Manifesto cited in Gould 1997:23)

Based on neo-classical economics and a belief in modernisation the programme was developed in close relation to external actors, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The implementation of the adjustment programme was a condition for Zambia to receive loans and grants from several multilateral and bilateral donors. The switch from a more state-regulated to a neoliberal policy regime

was closely related to the debt crisis that hit Zambia hard during the late 1970s and the 1980s. In desperate need for financial support, the Zambian government had very limited room for manoeuvre and had to follow the external advice and policy suggestions given to them by IFIs and major donors (Saasa 2002; Rakner 2003).

Hence, the earlier regime of state-control was abandoned and labelled urban biased and inefficient in promoting economic and social development in both rural and urban areas. Prices, trade and exchange rates were liberalised, state companies privatised and markets deregulated. For the rural and agricultural sector this meant that the state withdrew as a major actor in supplying small-scale farmers with markets and inputs. Fixed producer prices on staples such as maize were lifted, and subsidies on inputs were cut down at the same time as cost sharing was introduced in the sectors of primary health care and education (Wendle 1995; Saasa 2002). Contract farming was encouraged and free market agents were expected to move in and replace the state as the major supplier of output as well as input markets. The first steps towards land tenure reform were taken with the ambition of facilitating a transition from customary tenure to private property. Overarching goals were still poverty reduction and food security at household and national levels, but also increased production of export crops (RoZ 2006). Agricultural producer prices and agricultural production were expected to increase as a consequence of the policy reforms. The 1990s were, however, a disappointment in this regard, since agricultural production actually fell during large parts of the first decade of structural adjustment (Jayne et al. 2007:6). Rural poverty levels did not decrease and according to some sources, rural poverty increased and food security decreased (see Seshamani 1998; RoZ/CSO 2005a:117-118).

During the first decade of the new millennium some changes have taken place in terms of policies towards rural and agricultural development. Cost-sharing for primary education has been abolished and several measures to support small-scale farmers have been implemented. Since 2002 a major part of public spending on agriculture has been devoted to subsidies on chemical fertilisers (and maize seed) under the Fertiliser Support Programme, FSP. This programme has supplied farmers (through cooperatives) with 50-80 percent subsidies on fertilisers up to 2009, although it is meant to be a temporary programme to enable “a well-managed transition to full market liberalization” (RoZ quoted in World Bank 2010:1). Similar programmes to subsidise agricultural inputs have been introduced in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the early twenty-first century (Minot & Benson 2009).

Not all farmers have accessed these subsidies but between 125,000 and 210,000 small-scale farmers<sup>19</sup> each year have benefited from the programme between 2002 and 2008 (World Bank 2010:2). Apart from the FSP, the parastatal Food Reserve Agency, FRA, has greatly increased its role in Zambia, especially since 2005. Over 600 buying points have been established in the country to buy maize from farmers at pan-territorial prices. The FRA now dominates the maize market and is involved also in the marketing of cassava, wheat and groundnuts. The FSP and the FRA are today the two dominating institutions in the national agricultural policies of Zambia. During the years since 2002, FRA and FSP have swallowed more (some years substantially more) than 50 percent of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives', MACO's, budget (SADEV 2010). The agricultural sector's share of national budget shows a positive trend during the last decade, increasing from 7,4 percent to 12,5 percent between 2000 and 2008 (World Bank 2010:16). The major donors, both multilateral and bilateral, are critical towards the heavy spending on fertiliser subsidies and FRA activities, which are held to undermine private sector development (SADEV 2010).

The strategy to further commercialise the small-scale farming sector remains, however, the guiding principle also for the Zambian government (see RoZ 2004). There are several major donor sponsored projects aimed at an increased commercialisation among small-scale farmers. One of these is the Agricultural Support Programme, ASP, which promotes activities in the study area. Within these programmes, there is often a specific focus on contract farming and out-grower schemes as a way to facilitate the commercialisation process. This strategy also implies a focus on wealthier small-scale farmers who are viewed as having the potential to develop entrepreneurial skills in relation to their farming activities (Curtis 2007; Bonaglia 2008:19-27). The FSP has also been criticised for focusing on the better off small-scale farmers (World Bank 2010).

Around a third of Zambia's small-scale farmers were in the mid-2000s reported to be involved in contract farming, most of them cultivating cotton (Curtis 2007:52). Usually the company supplies the farmer with seed and inputs and then buys the produce from the farmer after harvest. There is, however, critique directed towards the functioning of contract farming in Zambia. This critique is focused on unfair conditions in terms of input and output prices and the consequent negative impact on many households' food security (ibid).

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<sup>19</sup> According to the 2010 census (CSO/RoZ 2010) there is 1,6 million rural households in Zambia. Not all of those are farming households, but it is a clear indication that the FSP reach a minor part of the Zambian smallholder farmers.

## 6.2 Key issues in smallholders' livelihood situations

### 6.2.1 Introduction

The smallholders in Kasauka and Yelesani villages identify a number of obstacles to making a living in the southern part of Chipata District. One major issue is food insecurity, but this problem is to varying degrees attached to a number of other issues that need closer attention. During the interviews in Kasauka and Yelesani, but also during visits to other villages and agricultural camps in the area, discussions were centred on food, fertilisers, soil fertility/depletion, money and access to output and input markets. The poor soils make it more or less impossible to cultivate enough food without chemical fertilisers, including both basal and top-dressing. At the same time the farmers face problems reaching markets for buying fertilisers and selling produce to raise money to buy fertilisers and pay for other expenditures, such as basic commodities and the costs of children's schooling.

### 6.2.2 A food insecure smallholder community

Enough food or lack of food is a key indicator of a good respectively a poor life among the respondents in Kasauka and Yelesani villages. Respondents from 32 households out of 43 stated that they face food shortage some years, during pre-harvest months from December-March. In some cases there are several months of food shortage, while in others it might be a month or less. Figure 6-1 is an example of 6 households in Kasauka and Yelesani villages, which shows the vulnerable situation of especially the poor and very poor when it comes to food availability (see Appendix 3 for the whole sample of twelve households).




Figure 6-1: Meals per day in six households in Yelesani and Kasauka villages



The problematic months in terms of food are December to April. December and January can be seen as particularly difficult in this respect. Importantly, the lack of food coincides with the most laborious period for the farming households, which usually is the period between November and March. This means that households who need to go for casual work<sup>20</sup> have to cut down on the work on their own fields, with negative effects on the important work of weeding. There are a number of ways for the households to react to food shortage. Those with more animals often sell a goat or a head of cattle to be able to buy food. Some of the younger and newly-formed households are assisted by close relatives. Other households manage to buy food through earning money from off-farm activities, take for example one household that owned a small shop outside Kawasa village and rarely faced food shortages:

R: There is usually no food shortage, unless when there is a drought.

Q: How do you manage when there is a drought?

R: I buy maize.

Q: Do you have money for that?

R: Yes, there is money.

(KV16, younger middle-aged man, less poor, four children)

Others with off-farm incomes face food shortages more often but manage at least partly to solve it with money raised from these supplementary incomes. Remittances also play an important role during periods of food shortage, as does assistance from members of the extended family. There are households which at times benefit from national programmes, such as the Programme Against Malnutrition, PAM, and other types of food relief which are active in the area, especially during years of drought. There are also a few instances of stealing and in 2005 there was one household that was forced from one of the study villages after being caught stealing maize from fellow farmers. Several households depend on temporary migration, where one household member goes for work elsewhere in the district part of the year. This is more common during the dry season, when there is a seasonal break in the work on the farm, especially for those without gardens.

Q: Why did you go to town?

R: I had economic difficulties.

Q: What kind of economic difficulties?

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<sup>20</sup> The local term that is used is 'piecwork'. In all but a few cases 'casual work' or 'piecwork' is agriculture-based. The totally dominating type of casual work or piecwork in Kasauka and Yelesani village is to day labour on other farmers' land. Since this is a type of work normally done during the rain season and the hungry months, it often consists of weeding.

R: I did not have enough money to buy inputs (fertiliser) for farming?

(...)

R: I would have liked to stay in the village all along, but then I am not able to raise enough money to support the family, send my children to school and to buy fertiliser so when I go to town I raise money to care for the family.

(...)

Q: Do you have enough food in your household?

R: No that is why I am going to town.

(YV10, young man, married, very poor, four children, one dependant)

Twenty-two households state that they have to reduce the number of meals per day or go for casual labour to get food,<sup>21</sup> and in many households both methods are employed. At least 18 households have during the last couple of years done casual labour in times of food shortage, while at least 12 households have had to reduce the number of meals per day.

Especially during the rainy season, most households eat only once a day. Only supper. (...) Because I have many children around, and for them to eat enough food the whole year we have to reduce the number of meals per day.

(KV12, older woman, married, very poor, 11 dependant grandchildren)

The need to cut down on food intake or to do casual work is a widespread phenomenon in Kasauka and Yelesani villages as well as in the broader study area. The households in Yelesani usually go outside the village for casual work, stating that there is seldom anyone in Yelesani supplying that kind of work. In Kasauka village, it is more common that households facing food shortage make their casual labour within the village, although many also work for farmers in other villages. A very common type of casual work during the period of food shortage is weeding in another farmers' field. It is most commonly women who go for casual work, especially when the labouring consists of weeding others' land. In Kasauka village there is some consensus that the food situation has improved slightly since 1998, while it is harder to depict any similar trend in Yelesani.

There are, as seen in Figure 6-1, big differences between different households. Some households are more or less food secure and act rather as suppliers or employers for members of other households who need to have their food intake covered. Many households occasionally buy food items such as rice, milk, eggs, meat or fish to vary their food and get access to a more protein-rich

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<sup>21</sup> The casual labour is in generally paid in mealie meal and depending on the size of the household 2-3 days work covers one to two weeks consumption of *nzima*, the staple dish in the area.

diet. Here there are big differences between the better off and poorer households. While there are households eating fish, beef, pork or chicken twice a month for most of the year there are also households that do not eat any meat or fish for at least five months a year. The food availability calendars (all presented in Appendix 3) indicate a few important points. Many households cut down on the number of meals per day during the pre-harvest months and during this period the food intake becomes increasingly monotonous and protein deficient, which is clearly visible in the food availability calendars, for poorer households, but also for the relatively better off. The access to food decreases in most households from November to April but it affects the poor households more severely in terms of forcing them to reduce the food intake. This is to be understood in combination with a lower intake of protein throughout the year, compared to better off households.

There is also an important difference between women and men in their answers to questions about household livelihoods. In general female respondents describe their livelihood situations as more problematic compared to the male respondents. This is most notable in relation to food security. Women explain that this is because they are the ones responsible for preparing food and taking care of domestic duties, and therefore face the daily problem of food insecurity. The villages around Kasauka and Yelesani and throughout Eastern Block face similar problems with food insecurity, which is verified in interviews with camp extension officers and informal conversations in nearby villages. There are, however, some differences within the Eastern Block, where Katambo Camp with its relatively fertile soils is more food secure, especially since maize cultivation is possible without heavy application of chemical fertilisers. The same goes for the Central Block, closer to Chipata (EO3, 6, 10, 11, extension officers). For the wider area of Chipata District it is also clear that food insecurity is a real problem in many parts of the district (Curtis 2007:49-53; Karttunen 2009:75). Karttunen's study further indicates the high prevalence of casual labour among poorer farmers confirms that most income generated from these activities is spent on food items (Karttunen 2009:120-121).

### **6.2.3 A cry for chemical fertilisers**

From the respondents' point of view food insecurity is caused largely by insufficient supplies of chemical fertilisers on soils that are depleted and eroded mainly due to intensive cultivation and extensive use of chemical fertilisers, sometimes applied in the wrong amounts and of the wrong type, and in combination with mono-cropping. The respondents' relationship to fertiliser is

therefore ambivalent. They cry for the input at the same time seeing it as a curse that will finally ruin them and preclude their way of life. It is a rather common view that the use of chemical fertilisers has had a negative impact on the soil fertility in the area (see also Scheffee Peterson 1999). During an interview in 1998, one young woman stated that the “use of chemical fertiliser must be abandoned”.

It is, however, a much more widespread opinion that the fertiliser prices need to be reduced through increased government subsidies. According to one respondent “we need to be encouraged to buy fertiliser”, while another young farmer said that the “government must give out free fertiliser loans”, which is a rather common wish among the respondents. When asked about the effect for the next generation of that kind of policy the farmer responded, with perhaps a not totally sombre expression, that “the government need to figure out something else for them”. The tacit understanding here is that it is governments (present and previous) that made the mess in the first place. When confronted with the idea that the fertilisers are contributing to the depletion of the soil, the response was often rather dejected:

Q: So what will happen if you just continue [applying fertiliser]?

R: Since the soil fertility has depleted there is no solution except applying more and more fertiliser.

Q: For how long do you think that will be possible?

R: I think for as long as we are alive.

(KV16, younger middle aged man, married, less poor, four children)

To describe and illustrate the cry for chemical fertilisers among the farmers participating in this study is not an easy task. The broader literature on sub-Saharan Africa talks of a lack of inputs as a general problem in the region (de Vylder 2007:234; Havnevik et al. 2007). However, the extent to which this issue dominates the farmers’ understanding of their livelihoods in the area of this study seems to be extreme. During my stays in the area for both this study and my earlier 1998 research it has always been the premier topic of discussion. Everyone brings it up at all times no matter the setting or context. During the formal interviews the subject was often brought up before the interview had started. It is referred to as the major problem when trying to establish a more secure and sustainable livelihood. In terms of food security it is seen as of decisive importance. In general it is depicted as impossible or meaningless to cultivate without applying chemical fertilisers:

Q: Did you apply [fertiliser] on all your land?

R: No, not on all the land, I have not managed to apply on the whole maize.

Q: So the area where you did not apply fertiliser. How did the crop perform?

R: I did not get anything.

Q: But you were still planting?

R: My plan was to buy more bags of fertiliser, but I failed due to other problems I had.

(KV19, middle-aged man, married, poor, 6 children)

“You cannot cultivate without fertiliser” is a well-established truth in the area of study. When I asked why a household was not cultivating a larger portion of the land (in cases where they had a substantial fallow), the reply was instant “we do not have enough fertiliser” (KV3 female farmer, poor). Questions regarding the possibility of maize cultivation without chemical fertilisers were met by incredulous looks and to bring up the topic was seemingly regarded as somewhat silly. In my informal discussions and during times when I walked round the area, this was the number one issue that sooner or later was brought up. While walking in the bush I found people not previously met shouting at me from a distance asking about my presence and whether I had brought with me any fertiliser or not. Even if such cases had a playful undertone there were also clear expectations that my presence might lead to fertiliser distributions, and also disappointment among some respondents in relation to this subject. Some of those interviewed in 1998 expressed their dissatisfaction with the lack of outcome of those first interviews and one middle-aged female said directly “I expected fertiliser” (KV30, female farmer, better off) when explaining her lack of interest in participating in a further interview in 2006.

Farmers view their need for fertiliser as a dependency and in general it is reported as the largest household expense, and something they devote a lot of time and energy to raise money for. Those with animals sell of some off them to buy a couple of bags and remittances or incomes from off-farm activities are often invested directly in this item. During discussions and interviews farmers returned to the statement that the government should do more in terms of supplying them with fertiliser. During the study in 1998 the lack of fertiliser was identified as the major problem by the farmers in Kasauka and also as one of the most important reasons for migration into town. In 1998 former rural dwellers that had moved into Chipata town from different parts of the district were interviewed. Amongst this group the lack of fertiliser in rural areas was the main topic to be discussed and it was the most common reason given for migrating into town (Amberntsson 1999).

That rural to urban migrants from different parts of the district emphasized the lack of fertiliser is a clear indication of the relevance of this matter beyond the Kasauka and Yelesani villages. This situation is confirmed by the extension officers in Eastern Block, as well as by secondary sources focusing on Chipata District (Kwesiga et al. 2005; Curtis 2007). However, just as for food security, there are areas where smallholders are less dependent on chemical fertilisers, such as Katambo Camp and large parts of Central Block, mainly due to substantially more fertile land (Scheffee Peterson 1999; EO3, 6, 10, 11, extension officers).

#### **6.2.4 Buying subsidised fertilisers**

Chemical fertilisers are predominantly used on land where maize is cultivated, but is also applied in gardens for various types of fruits and vegetables, often in combination with pesticides. The households in this area use two types of chemical fertilisers, basal dressing (D compound) and top dressing (Urea). The recommended application is four bags of basal and four bags of top dressing per hectare, which makes eight 50 kg bags of fertiliser for a hectare planted with maize. Basal dressing is applied rather soon after the first rains, normally some time in November, while top dressing is applied after several weeks of rains in late December or early January. The farmers in Kasauka and Yelesani purchase their fertilisers from a few different sources. Some of the households are members of cooperatives buying subsidised fertilisers and seed, brought to Kalunga Camp, or to Masi village, which is the closest cooperative society to Yelesani village. Some farmers buy fertilisers from the cooperative members, and in that way they may benefit at least indirectly from these subsidies. Fertilisers are also bought in Chipata town as well as from across the border in Malawi, where prices are lower.

Fertilisers have been subject to government subsidies since 2002. For the season 2005/06 the farmers in the area of study could buy fertilisers that were subsidised by 50 percent, at 67,000 kwacha per bag, which is approximately 20 US dollar per bag. From 2006 up to 2009 global fertiliser prices have increased almost doubling from 40 to 70 US dollar on the free market. The government has meanwhile gradually increased the subsidies, which reached more than 80 percent during the 2008/09 season (World Bank 2010:10). To access the subsidised fertiliser a farmer needs to be member of a cooperative within an agricultural camp. Membership requires a joining-up fee and a yearly membership fee, which varies between cooperatives, but the national average was 87,000 kwacha (23 US dollar) in 2007/08 (ibid:32). The farmers themselves

form the cooperatives, often with some facilitation support from an extension officer. Each farmer is then allowed to buy eight bags of fertilisers to the subsidised price. Fifteen households stated that they are members of a cooperative and in that way benefit from the subsidies. Eighteen households reported being non-members, while six households reported buying subsidised fertiliser from those who are members, although this number is likely to be higher. The respondents buy between one and eight bags of fertiliser (except one household buying 12 bags). A large majority of the farmers reported not having enough fertiliser for their fields. Most farmers reported accessing between one and four bags of fertiliser.

Although not all farmers benefit from the subsidised fertiliser it is reasonable to estimate that a majority do so, irrespective of their status as cooperative members or not. However, one might ask why not all farmers are members of the cooperatives since the subsidies on the input are so heavy. Two major reasons are identified; lack of financial resources and dissatisfaction with the functioning of the cooperatives. Several non-members state that they have no money to pay for membership or supply the money in time to book fertiliser through the cooperatives for buying a full package of eight bags which is normally required. The most common reason for not signing on for membership in the cooperative is, however, the allegation that the cooperatives are not working well, that the fertiliser delivered through them arrives late and more importantly that money is being misused within the cooperatives. Several members and non-members mention this problem but as many as six households claim to have been subject to fraud and misuse of money in the cooperatives, which means that they have not got the amount of fertiliser they have paid for.

Q: Do you know how many bags of fertiliser you bought for this season?

R: We paid for 2 bags but we got only 1 bag.

Q: Did you get the money back?

R: No.

Q: Was that in the cooperatives?

R: Yes.

Q: So what do you think about the cooperatives?

R: It is not good.

(...)

Q: So is there something you can do to get your money back?

R: We just leave it as it is. Because there are others also who were not given their 2 bags. So it is alright as it is.

Q: So will you continue to buy fertiliser from the cooperatives?

R: No, not in this household. It is better we buy on our own.

(KV36, female, married, very poor, 2 children)

Despite all this, many farmers view the subsidies positively and believe they constitute an improvement compared to the situation in 1998. The FSP is also generally well regarded by the extension officers in Eastern Block, although they find the programme problematic due to corruption and late deliveries. The leaders of the cooperatives are particularly accused of misusing the farmers' investments. The issue of mismanagement and fraud within the Fertiliser Support Programme is a problem throughout most of the district. The officers working in Central Block confirmed that there are problems with late deliveries and that there are farmers who have suffered due to the misuse of their money by the cooperative leaders. The Chipata District Farmers Association, CDFA, monitored the FSP during 2007/2008 within all the eight agricultural blocks in Chipata District (CDFA 2008).<sup>22</sup> The conclusion in their report is that, although the programme is popular among farmers, it is burdened with several problems and "bribery and corruption was common in all phases of input distribution" (CDFA 2008:3). One major problem is the lack of information and late announcement of prices of inputs. Another is that the programme fails to reach the poorest farmers since they cannot afford a full pack of eight bags of fertiliser. This has meant that some farmers sell subsidised bags to fellow farmers, as confirmed by my interviews with the farmers. At the same time that poorer farmers have struggled to participate it is clear that there are farmers, especially among the cooperative leaders and richer farmers that have accessed much more than the permitted eight bags. A lot of cooperatives have also started up in urban Chipata and have actually managed to acquire more fertiliser than those in the rural areas.

There are also allegations that block supervisors and camp extension officers involved in the distribution process have asked farmers for bribes. The report also suggests that extension officers are major receivers of subsidised fertilisers, alongside other employees within the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, MACO at Chipata District level (CDFA 2008). These problems prompted the Provincial Agricultural Coordinator, PACO, to circulate a minute reminding all staff of the MACO that "inputs distributed under the Fertiliser Support Programme (FSP) are not supposed to be accessed by any person who is in formal employment" and "that any officer found getting, or facilitating ineligible persons in this regard shall be punished accordingly"<sup>23</sup>. This policy

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<sup>22</sup> CDFA is a district branch of the nationwide organisation *Zambian National Farmers Union*, which is the major union organising farmers in Zambia.

<sup>23</sup> Minute issued by the Provincial Agricultural Coordinator during fall 2008 under the heading "Ineligibility of all persons in formal employment to FSP farming inputs". *Date of issue missing*.



has later been changed and civil servants are now allowed to be members of cooperatives and buy subsidised fertilisers.<sup>24</sup>

### **6.2.5 Soil depletion and soil conservation**

The depletion of soil fertility, especially through nitrogen depletion, is a well-known problem in the area of study. A number of studies have been conducted that identify nitrogen deficiency as the major limiting factor for sustained and increased maize productivity in the area (e.g. Phiri et al. 2004; Kuntashula 2005). The land around Kasauka village suffers from both sandy soils and low nitrogen content in comparison with other places within the district (Kaonga & Bayliss-Smith 2009:38). The camps of Sayiri, Mtowe and, Makwe and Jerusalem share similar type of problems, while Katambo Camp is better off in this regard. Although nitrogen deficiency is a widespread phenomenon in many parts of Chipata District, there is also land, especially closer to Chipata town, which is much more fertile, less sandy and less erosion prone (Scheffee Peterson 1999; EO1-11, extension officers).

When it comes to explaining the soil depletion there are differing opinions. Some farmers state that the fertiliser has contributed to the depletion of the soil, while others explain that the soil has been cultivated intensively for a long period of time and that they need to fallow their land for longer periods. Others denounce the argument that the fertiliser is in any way responsible for the diminished soil fertility. A milder variation of this argument comes from farmers who say that the use of fertiliser today is more sustainable than before:

The soil fertility was destroyed because we used too much fertiliser, which was too strong. We used X compound and urea that destroyed the soil. The combination of these types of fertilisers contributed to the depletion of the soil.

(KV6, middle-aged male, married, better off, five children, two dependants)

Whether or not the fertiliser is to be blamed for soil depletion it did make a more intensive cultivation possible when it was introduced on a larger scale after 1970 (Kwesiga et al. 2005:6). An elderly man in Kasauka village gave the following answer while discussing the issue of the soil fertility.

R: The only way to improve the soils is to apply kraal manure and fertiliser.

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<sup>24</sup> E-mail correspondence with the coordinator of Chipata District Farmers Association 10/7 2010.

(...)

Q: How was the soil before you started to apply fertiliser. Was it possible to cultivate that time?

R: The yields were not very good before we started to use fertiliser.

(KV21, older man, married, better off, three dependant grandchildren)

This quote underlines the importance of time perspective when discussing soil fertility and soil depletion in the area of study. How recent or how ancient are the problems involved? Was the soil substantially more fertile before? And if that is the case, how long back do we need to go to find that people managed to sustain their food security without a heavy use of chemical inputs? These questions will be further explored in Chapter Seven and Eight.

The causes of soil depletion and more specifically nitrogen deficiency are several and complex, but are not thoroughly discussed in research on soil depletion in the area. The point of departure in this literature is rather that the problem became obvious when farmers reduced their use of chemical fertilisers after the reduction of subsidies in the early 1990s and that the fallow periods have decreased. This has been problematic because fallowing used to be the method to replenish the soil fertility in the area, before chemical fertilisers became extensively used (Kwesiga et al. 2005; Ajayi et al. 2005). The households in Kasauka and Yelesani fallow their land three years or less, which corresponds well to the wider area of study (Franzel 1999; Phiri et al. 2004). During the fallow the land is normally used for grazing. In both Kasauka and Yelesani there is also a period of free ranging of animals after harvesting, which means that cattle are left to graze on the field, eating most of the residues left after harvest. This is occasioned by the lack of grazing land, but risks depleting the soil further if it decreases the amount of organic matter that is returned to the soil.

The use of urea top dressing has an acidifying effect on the soil in itself, which is aggravated if the residues are not ploughed in and recycled into the soil. Studies on the use of urea in Zambia on similar alfisols as in Kalunga Camp have demonstrated an increased acidification of continuous use of urea and declining maize yields that cannot be restored through continuous application of fertilisers (Lungu 2008).

Are there any alternatives to fertiliser application today? Between 2006 and 2009 the price of fertiliser has doubled on the free market and the farmers' dependency on subsidies is increasing. So what about alternative practices and soil conservation methods in order to improve the soil fertility and decrease the use of expensive imported inputs in small-scale farming? In order to replenish the soil fertility in Yelesani and Kasauka a range of different measures are

advocated by extension officers and various NGOs. Crop rotation is now widely practiced in the villages, except in a few households with very small land areas. A majority of the households apply kraal manure on at least a small part of their land. Manure from goats and pigs is also used in some cases. Contour ridges (to prevent erosion) are used in some places. There is also a general push from the extension side to diversify the crops, in order to get away from the heavy focus on maize cultivation.

R: I have tried to apply kraal manure, crop rotate and use improved fallow. That's why I am developing a bit. When I plant maize one year, I plant groundnuts next year. Others do not do that because they have limited fields.

Q: Do you see any improvement in the soil quality?

R: Just a bit, not very much.

(KV19, middle-aged male, married, poor, 6 children)

A great problem is of course the lack of manure, which means that only small portions of the fields can be covered with organic fertiliser. Several farmers also have problems transporting manure to the fields.

Farmers in Eastern Block have for over ten years been subject to projects with the aim of implementing improved fallow through planting nitrogen fixing trees in their fields in order to reduce the dependency on expensive chemical inputs. A lot of research has been done on the matter and there are at least a dozen academic and semi-academic publications dealing with the issue of improved fallow in Chipata District, some referring to Kasauka village and the area around Kalunga Farming Training Centre. In these articles improved fallow is described as of high potential in the area, due to its positive effects on the soil fertility. It is seen as gender-neutral (according to some sources wealth-neutral (Franzel et al 2003)) and appreciated among the households who often show good adoption rates (see e.g. Phiri et al 2004; Ajayi et al. 2005; Keil et al. 2005; Kwesiga et al. 2005).

In Kasauka and Yelesani villages there are three types of trees (*Sesbania sesban*, *Gresidia sepium* and *Tephrosia*) that have been planted and they are all nitrogen fixing varieties. The purpose of tree planting is to reduce the use of fertiliser, and if possible to limit the application to only top dressing. During the 1998 study the impression was that farmers had adopted the improved tree fallow. Also during interviews in 2006 the apprehension was at first that the technique was widely adopted, until I gradually understood that farmers stating that they practice improved fallow, actually referred to the fact that they once did. Soon it became clear that almost everyone had stopped, and very few farmers in Kasauka village continued to practice improved fallow. In Yelesani

no farmer planted the trees between 2006 and 2008, while a majority had planted trees around 2000/2001. How does this picture fit in with the reports of increased maize yields and a great interest among the farmers for the new technique?

The extension officers describe the projects with improved fallow largely as failures, where a lot of money has been invested with very little outcome. No extension officer describes the improved fallow as a success and many of them refer to the technique as hardly being used at all among the farmers. The Senior Agricultural Officer for Chipata District responds in a similar vein. They all confirm the view that few in the area of study have adopted the technique other than temporarily.

We have for example tried to implement improved fallow. We have had a lot of education and training on this, but the adoption rate is almost zero. For example World Vision pumped in a lot of resources, they wasted a lot of money, and almost nothing is seen today in terms of improved fallow.  
(EO2, extension officer)

The extension officers have some difficulties explaining the reason why the farmers do not adopt the technique. Several extension officers acknowledge that it might be difficult to implement for farmers with limited land, which actually tend to exclude the poorest and those who are likely to be in most need of soil improvement (see also Kwesiga et al 2005:34-36). Some of the extension officers also agree that the activities are rather labour-intensive. Generally, though, their explanations are in terms of the attitudes and behaviours of the farmers.

But the farmers that have got enough land, I see no reason why they shouldn't practice that. And in some other cases we have these shorter species that improve the soil in short time, like sun hemp, velvet beans all those... but you find that they all have abandoned. They do not even want to listen. So to me I feel it is just resistance to change. It is really difficult...[laughter]... it is difficult to change a farmer. That is why... (...) When it comes to improved fallow the government and NGOs have spent a lot of money, and we have educated them, we have demonstrated, we have exposed them. And themselves, they have done it, proving to say that this works. But you find that up to now they have not accepted the technology to be used in their own field. What they want is fertiliser.  
(EO1, Extension officer)

Several extension officers also state that the farmers are used to handouts since the Kaunda regime and that this attitude has been encouraged by NGOs and in

government sponsored programmes even after the liberalisation started in the early 1990s. They therefore adopt new techniques temporarily, only as long as they get something in return.

They did the conservation farming because they got fertiliser. They do things as long as they are given some kind of material, but minus material they do not do it.

(EO2, Extension Officer)

In terms of supplying fertiliser and other materials to implementers of improved fallow it seems to differ between the different projects, but it is confirmed by some of the articles (Kwesiga et al. 2005). One might respond that it would anyway be sensible for a farmer to continue to plant trees without handouts if the outcome was a real improvement of the soil. Nevertheless, the extension officers are convinced by the benefits of improved fallow and look in other directions when explaining the low adoption rates. The District Organisation Coordinator at the Chipata District Farmers Association, CDFA, bluntly states that “farmers are babies, they never grow up” (Informant interview 7, Coordinator, CDFA). The neglect of improved fallow is further explained by reference to farmers lacking of larger perspective and lacking the ability to plan for the future. The following answers from extension officers illustrate:

Q: Why is it that tree fallow has failed?

R: The technology is not fully understood. I do not know, the response from the farmers is just not positive.

Q: But why is it not positive?

R: The farmers here wants to see the profit within a year to be really interested. But it takes longer, maybe 3 years before they see any benefit. People here do not have that time perspective.

(EO10, Extension Officer)

Or slightly differently:

(...) immediately the programme is phased out, the farmers also phase out. It is very rare that they continue on their own. They pull out very easily. I think it is lack of focus and vision, they do not have the vision, they do not see the good with it, they do not think about the future. For them, the important thing is what they have today.

(EO11, Extension Officer)

On occasion, the farmers' responses to questions on why they did not continue to implement improved fallow seemed unsatisfactory. I was frustrated by laconic

phrases such as “there is no reason” (YV12, female farmer, very poor) or “it looks like we did not continue” (YV13, female farmer, poor), or farmers saying that the seed for the trees is not available (which seems to be untrue) when asking why they had stopped planting the trees. It is of course possible that some farmers have stopped engaging themselves in improved fallow for “no reason”. But my findings suggest that there are rather rational causes behind the lack of success for the projects with improved fallow. An obvious question is to what extent the farmers experience any improvement in soil fertility when planting the trees? The interviews for this study reveal a mixed picture, but many farmers actually doubt the positive effects of the trees.

Q: Do you plant any soil conservation trees?

R: I planted those trees long time ago.

Q: About how long time ago?

R: About in 2001.

Q: And when did you stop?

R: 2003.

Q: And why did you plant the trees?

R: Because we were told that the trees will improve the soil fertility.

Q: Did the trees improve the soil fertility?

R: We did not see any good results.

(YV17, young woman, married, poor, two children)

Other farmers state that planting the trees does have some positive effects on the soil fertility, but not to the extent that it can by any means replace chemical fertilisers. Some respondents suggested that the tree species only work on certain types of soil:

R: The trees improve the soil depending on what type of soil you are planting on. On some soils the trees works well, but in some cases people have planted the trees and the soil has not improved.

Q: Can you give an example, what kind of soil is problematic?

R: Like for sandy soil, trees are not good.

Q: So it has to be a bit clay?

R: Yes, a bit loamy. Some of the trees do not grow well here.

(KVFU2, follow-up interview, three middle-aged males)

The soil around Kasauka village is of a sandy type, compared to for example around Msekera research station north of Chipata where many of the experiments with improved fallow have been undertaken (Kaonga & Bayliss-Smith 2009:38). The fact that improved fallow is less efficient on sandy soils is also mentioned, although not elaborated, in the literature (Keil et al. 2005). In Yelesani, where the clay content is slightly higher, lack of land is the main

reason given by the farmers for not planting the trees. This is logical since they have smaller land areas and that the trees actually demand some land although one of the species is possible to intercrop with maize. Another reason given is that it is rather laborious work to cultivate the trees, to weed them, to raise them in a nursery and transplant them into the field. This work also coincides with the most laborious period in terms of planting and weeding food crops (Franzel 1999:311).

Since the trees are to be grown for at least three years the farmers also find it problematic to protect them from being eaten by animals during the period of free range. In order to reduce deforestation the farmers are not allowed, by a decision from the Chief Sayiri, to build fences around their fields for protection. Other problems are the strong roots of *Gresidia sepium*, which otherwise is suitable to intercrop with maize, but makes ploughing almost impossible.<sup>25</sup> The extension officers often state with some frustration that the farmers “only want fertiliser”, and that seems to be true to some extent. However, nothing that is offered to the farmers can compete with chemical fertilisers in their struggle for food security or increased sales. In a context where people at times are limiting their children’s and their own food consumption in order to survive it is inevitable that short term solutions are preferred to long term ones, especially long term ones that have less certain outcomes.

In conclusion, the farmers in general seem to have a positive attitude towards several of the soil conservation methods, especially those where the response in terms of increased yields are instant and which do not involve a lot of extra labour or demand the cultivation of larger lands. Crop rotation is done, and application of kraal manure is highly valued, although the limited number of animals (and grazing land) prohibits an extensive use. A few farmers in Kasauka have also tried to plant cassava in their fields as an alternative to maize, but that had stopped in 2006. The practice of unrestricted grazing after the main harvest meant that farmers could not protect their crops from being eaten by cattle. Cassava is therefore cultivated mainly in the gardens, where the cattle are not free to graze.

The view of the extension officers, that farmers’ lukewarm interest in improved fallow is due to their lack of vision or an inherent resistance to change is

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<sup>25</sup> Several of these problems came up during interviews with the respondents. Much is also results from field visits with my counterpart, who also had personal experience from improved fallow. From his point of view, the trees had a positive effect on the soil fertility, but the management and the work involved did not come near to matching the effort and work a farmer needed to invest to make a tree fallow successful. He himself stopped growing *sesbania sesban* after doing so for three years.

less valid. It is, nevertheless, striking how much it is emphasised by the extension officers when explaining the failure of improved fallow. As will be shown under subsequent headings the focus on the farmers' behaviour is a major issue today when discussing different aspects of the farmers' livelihoods.

### **6.2.6 The lack of markets**

The economic doctrine in Zambia has since the early 1990s prescribed liberalisation of agricultural markets with the aim of increasing the commercialisation of the smallholder sector. This has been the strategy to both improve farmer livelihoods and achieve national goals of increased agricultural production. However, after more than 15 years of market liberalisation, the lack of markets and good prices, is still a burning issue in Kasauka and Yelesani villages, just as is the case in large parts of Southern and Eastern Africa as discussed in Chapter Three (e.g. de Vylder 2007:234; Havnevik et al. 2007). Most farmers in Kasauka and Yelesani villages sell at least small parts of their crops in order to raise cash for agricultural inputs, schooling, healthcare and basic commodities. For many households this is also the only way to raise income. In terms of the amounts of money the farmers raise per year through marketing field and garden produce it varies a lot between different households. They can earn amounts equalling 15 to 25 US dollar, while many make 70 to 120 US dollar. At the top-end there are a couple of households earning between 240-360 US dollar from field and garden produce.<sup>26</sup> The general standpoint among the respondents in Kasauka and Yelesani is that they lack access to a reliable, predictable and nearby market that offers decent prices. There is not one single dominant market option, there are instead several different options used by the farmers in Yelesani and Kasauka villages:

- Carrying produce by bicycle to Chipata and selling to the wholesalers (often members of the Asian community), market traders or directly to consumers at a town market. Maize, groundnuts, soybeans are sold to wholesale shops, while various food crops, mealie meal and vegetables are sold at local markets.
- To sell produce (maize, groundnuts, soybeans) to the Food Reserve Agency, FRA at Jerusalem. The produce is normally taken there by an oxcart or less commonly by bicycle.

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<sup>26</sup> These figures are relatively unreliable, although they serve as an indication, also in terms of differences between different households. It is likely that several households earn more than is stated here.



- To sell to briefcase buyers, travelling in and out of the area. This applies to crops such as maize, groundnuts and soybeans.
- Selling small amounts of produce in the villages around, often vegetables or mealie meal.
- Participate in an outgrower scheme – for crops like cotton, tobacco and paprika.
- The barter system, to exchange, for example, mealie meal for clothes or other items.
- To give food in exchange for agricultural casual labour.

All these options have their advantages and disadvantages according to the respondents. To sell to the FRA is seen as a good option and the best in terms of prices, which are considerably higher and often more predictable than those offered by for example briefcase buyers and private buyers in Chipata. FRA is also considered reliable in terms of the general conditions surrounding the sale. The prices are decent according to the farmers, they are announced before the marketing season begins, the arrangements are transparent and buying points are fairly close compared to other marketing options. All in all, the presence of the FRA is perceived as large improvement compared to the situation in 1998. But the FRA provides only five buying spots within Chipata District (with changing locations from year to year), the nearest to Kasauka village was in 2006 around 8 kilometres away and to Yelesani village around 15 kilometres away. Another problem is that the FRA market is temporary, it sometimes opens late and the smallholders lack proper information on if, when and where the FRA market is supposed to take place from year to year. There are also several complaints over late payments (sometimes with several months delay), although this aspect is reported to have improved since 2008.

R: Now we experience problems with late payments. Last year it was so late I was not able to buy fertiliser.

Q: What about this year?

R: The problem is there also this year.

Q: Where do you receive late payment?

R: At the FRA.

(OF13, older male farmer)

Taking produce to Chipata is reported as time-consuming and not very profitable. It is not an option for large quantities of maize, but for small portions of produce from the garden, groundnuts or perhaps one bag of maize. Briefcase buyers are unreliable and in terms of the purchase price is the least favourable option. The condition of the road to Chipata town is bad, which serves as a

further disincentive for private buyers to go to the area. Both in relation to briefcase buyers and wholesalers in Chipata the farmers state that “these buyers have very bad scales” (KV40 male farmer, less poor) and that their “scales are not properly adjusted” (FUYV2 male farmers group), while “FRA is better, and the way they weigh the bags... their scales are very good” (YV10 male farmer, very poor). This is an accusation directed towards private buyers, not only for exploiting the farmers, but also for deliberately cheating them. The wholesalers in Chipata that are subject to these allegations were not keen on answering any questions regarding their business as buyers of smallholders’ produce. One interview was completed with a wholesaler, who, according to some of the farmers, has weighing scales that are “better than other buyers” (FUYV2, male farmers group).

Q: Farmers around in the rural areas sometimes say that the scales are not good here at the ‘downshops’ [wholesaler are in Chipata town]. What do you think they mean by that?

R: I do not know, the first thing is that I do not know. [He shows the certificates on his scales and gives a rather long speech about Allah, and that he will “face the almighty”. However, he rounds up by saying] there are others... others are stealing and cheating.

Q: Who are they?

R: That I cannot tell you. But they are not even 100 metres away from you now.

(Informant Interview 3, wholesaler)

The farmers report that there is no negotiation over prices, that the buyer sets the price and that they have to accept it. The farmers also report that if they try to negotiate they are told to go somewhere else. The private wholesaler most commonly used by farmers from Yelesani and Kasauka confirms this.

Q: How do you normally agree on the price of the produce? How does the negotiation work?

R: There is no negotiation. I decide, this is my price. If you do not like it, just go somewhere else.

(...)

Q: Do the farmers often complain about the price?

R: They do complain.

Q: Does it happen that you raise the price then?

R: No, but if it is a very old woman I just give something extra.

(Informant Interview 3, wholesaler)

Table 6-1 below shows the difference between the prices offered by private wholesalers in Chipata in comparison with the FRA. Although it differs from

year to year there is a substantial difference between the prices offered on the two markets.

**Table 6-1: Comparison of maize prices. FRA and private market in Chipata 2005-8 (Kwacha/kg)**

<i>Maize</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>
FRA	720	700	760	1100
Private	450	350	500-700	900

Source: Information gathered from FRA Chipata office, private wholesalers in Chipata, farmers and field assistant.

A majority of the households in Kasauka and Yelesani villages sell or have sold to the FRA at least one year between 2005 and 2008. Only six households claim to sell to briefcase buyers coming to the area, and they are all in Kasauka village, since no briefcase buyers come close enough to Yelesani. Twenty-nine households report that they cycle to Chipata with their produce and sell it there. In 2007 farmers in Yelesani started to take produce to Chipata town for selling to the wholesalers more frequently. The reason for this was the long distance to the FRA and the problems of congestion, lack of information and late payments.

There were a total of six out-growers in Yelesani and Kasauka villages between the years 2005 and 2008 and all cultivated cotton. In 1998 there had been 11 out-growers in Kasauka village. The out-grower schemes have the advantage that the companies involved offer credits for inputs and seeds, which are paid back at the time when the company buys the produce from the farmer. The price situation is, however, unreliable since the prices on inputs are set at the time of the initial agreement, but the price for the produce is set by the company at the time of buying. Crops subject to this kind of scheme are cash crops, often for export, such as paprika, tobacco and cotton. By 2006 however the price of cotton had almost halved from 1,800 kwacha per kg in 2005 to between 850 and 1,000 kwacha per kg in 2006, due to a general decline in the world market price for Zambian cotton (Pedersen 2009:122-125). By 2008 there were no out-growers left in either Kasauka or Yelesani and the cotton production across Eastern Province more than halved between 2006 and 2007 (USAID 2007:7). Cotton production in Chipata District as well as elsewhere in Africa is one of the agricultural sectors that face most fierce competition from subsidised cotton production in the EU, USA and China (Pedersen 2009:60-67).

The negative experience with out-grower schemes is similar in large parts of Chipata District. Generally, farmers feel exploited and they have no means to negotiate (Curtis 2007). Karttunen's (2009) study, however, reveals that out-growing was widespread in 2003 within the district, even though it was

criticised and disliked for the low returns. The out-grower schemes were at this time seen as a supplement for the lack of a market for maize. There were high gender disparities. In 2003 44 percent of the male headed households grew cotton as out-growers, while only 12 percent of female headed households did so (Karttunen 2009:121). The extension officers, who view out-grower schemes positively, acknowledge that there are problems attached.

R: We have to encourage them to involve in out-growing. Because they need to diversify. But the agreement between the farmers and the companies must improve.

Q: In what way does it have to improve?

R: The price on the produce is not set at the time of agreement. The price for the inputs is decided, but the prices for the produce are decided by the companies at the time of selling. And there is usually no negotiation. Actually the company refused to negotiate.

Q: Did the farmers try to negotiate?

R: Yes, but without any success.

(EO6, extension officer)

The difficulties in reaching markets and the farmers' weak role in negotiations are discussed by extension officers throughout Eastern Block. There are few briefcase buyers in the block, while the extension officers report that taking produce by bicycle to Chipata is the most common market option used by the farmers in the camps. Selling to FRA in Jerusalem worked well in some camps as long as the market was there, while in other camps, such as in Kaphinde and Katambo, the distance is seen as too far. The two extension officers interviewed in Central Block, however, clearly state that marketing is less of a problem for smallholders close to Chipata, since even town markets are rather accessible by bicycle (EO10, 11, extension officers).

Basically all households state that they sell their produce at the earliest possible occasion, normally sometime between June and August. The farmers know that this time of selling is not good in terms of price negotiation and that it would be better to wait until the rainy season, but;

It is the only time we are able to find money, because we usually have no money. So when these buyers come anytime, we will sell. If they come in July, we will sell in July, if they come in August we will sell in August. Because we usually have children to send to school.

(KV2, middle-aged male, married, better off, ten children)

Also the search for fertilisers makes it impossible for farmers to wait very long before selling their produce. There are however some differences. The better off households have better possibilities to sell to the FRA since this market often

opens a little later, and the payments are not always instant, but at least a matter of a week or two. A farmer selling to the FRA also needs access to transport to bring a rather large quantity of produce to the buying spot at the same time, which means that those with access to an oxcart and oxen are advantaged. The interviews in both 2006 and 2007 were done just before the marketing season and it is likely that the interview answers partly reflect an ambition to sell to the FRA, an ambition that was not necessarily always realised. Briefcase buyers are reported to enter into the rural areas directly after harvesting or even during harvesting and this is a more common option for the poorest households since their need for money is more urgent and their access to transport lower.

At the same time as the farmers claim that the lack of markets is a major problem it is also clear that they have, and make use of, many different market options as discussed above. The issue is therefore not that the farmers cannot find any outlet for their goods at all, rather that none of these options are viewed as proper or decent in relation to their ideal of a well functioning market. Hence it is not only about physical access to markets, but also about what happens at the market. Farmers frequently argued that the state and the government as institutions should care more for the smallholder farmers in terms of supplying inputs and buying their produce. Apart from this there are many who state that the FRA is an improvement and that the Mwanawasa government has made efforts to support the farmers, compared to the Chiluba government of the 1990s.

The market liberalisation has been of limited success in the study area, just as for much of Eastern and Southern Africa. Instead of a vibrant private market, the farmers of Kasauka and Yelesani face a situation where they experience exploitation and seek short-term and small-scale solutions to their lack of a proper market for agricultural produce. The increased state involvement in output and input markets is at the same time a temporary measure to strengthen the “capacities of both the private sector and smallholders producers” (RoZ quoted in World Bank 2010:1), while preparing them for full-scale market liberalisation. According to critics, however, this state involvement effectively puts progress towards market liberalisation in mothballs and is therefore counter-productive.

### **6.2.7 Promoting farming as a business in the southern Chipata District**

The increased state involvement during the early twenty-first century is complemented, or contrasted, by another type of programme. The extension officers in the Eastern Block work according to an approach with the main

slogan ‘promoting farming as a business’. This is the slogan of the Sida-funded project Agriculture Support Programme, ASP, which is implemented in four provinces, 22 districts and 242 camps involving 44,000 small-scale farmers across the Zambian country-side (Ramboll 2008:4-5).

The project, as it was implemented during the period of research for this thesis, focused on “entrepreneurship and business development” with the objective of creating a “critical mass of self confident and emerging entrepreneurs (...) who identify and sustainably exploit business opportunities mainly on their farm, with adequate women-headed household representation” (ibid:26; see also SADEV 2010:20-21). The project was managed by a group of consultancy companies but under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in Zambia. Projects with focus on entrepreneurship and business development among farmers are an ongoing feature in different countries of Eastern and Southern Africa, although they are likely to differ in the specifics of their design (see Bonaglia 2008; Kilimo Trust 2009; Collett & Gale 2009). The slogan ‘farming as a business’ is, however, widely adopted as part of the contemporary vocabulary of the development industry working in the region.

The aim of the ASP has been to support sustainable livelihoods among small-scale farmers through increased food security and enhanced productivity in order to increase farmers’ incomes from their sale of agricultural products. The extension officers have received extensive training focused on how to promote farming as a business and to teach and facilitate the farmers in the process of becoming “successful enterprising households” which is the final stage to be reached by the households participating in the project (Ramboll 2008:26-27). The extension officers have done this through group-meetings and individual follow-ups. The meetings dealt with problem identification and how households can develop a vision to be achieved in a foreseeable future through following an action plan. Farmers have been taught to do market research, been trained in budgeting and to keep records of their activities, revenues, profits or losses. Farmers’ cooperation within the programme has been encouraged through a focus on group formation. Hence, a lot of credit groups, saving groups and out-grower groups have been formed under the ASP, with the aim of strengthening the farmers’ financial situation and their position on the agricultural market (Ramboll 2008).

All extension officers reported positively on the project, although they also reported various problems in promoting farming as a business. They point at issues such as illiteracy and lack of start-up capital, but they emphasise that people in the area are conservative and that they do not want to change their

attitudes towards farming. This was, however, not an unexpected problem according to the lead consultant Ramboll Natura AB:

Realizing the fact that ‘old habits die hard’, the programme identified the concept of “farming as a business” as a means to effectively deal with deep rooted business unfriendly like mental attitudes among farming households. ASP employed the facilitation cycle approach to inculcate the right business knowledge, attitude, practices, culture, risk and sustainable consciousness among the ASP targeted hhs [households]. (ibid:26)

According to the extension officers, ASP is about changing the attitudes among the farmers, through dealing with traditions and ways of living that have a restraining effect on business development. In the Eastern Block, six officers were assigned to work with ASP, although all camps were advised to work with the approach in their regular extension activities. However, not all camps were ASP camps and did not get funding from the project, which basically meant that they had almost zero resources to carry out any effective extension work at all.<sup>27</sup>

One immediate question is, of course, if people do not treat their farm as a business, how do they treat their farm? Furthermore, what do these “deep rooted business unfriendly like mental attitudes” that Ramboll identifies consist of? According to the extension officers, people treat ‘farming as a way of life’, which is the opposite of farming as a business. It is characterised by a lack of planning, and an unwillingness and inability to treat farming as a commercial activity, where the goal is profit, not subsistence. Farming as a way of life is “cultivation just for the sake of cultivation” (EO8, extension officer) or to “just keep animals for the sake of keeping animals” (EO7, extension officer). It is an inherited and anachronistic lifestyle, which is taken for granted and carried out without any further purpose except continuation of work and life as it has always been done, by parents, grandparents and grand grandparents.

Now the farmer often wake up and do whatever is there to do, without any plan. (...) It is tradition. They have always kept their plans in their head. So they wake up in the morning and do whatever is there to do. There is need for more training in this field to improve the adoption. They still work at random, there is no proper order. They just go to the field or to the garden or the field in whatever order.  
(EO7, extension officer)

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<sup>27</sup> Extension in Chipata District is heavily dependent on external funding for carrying out any effective work. Without external funding or in between donor sponsored projects towards rural and agricultural work, extension is mainly lingering.

Up to now, our farmers have only taken farming as a way of life. Now we try to make them see farming as having a shop, just like Shoprite<sup>28</sup>. You need a business plan and to look closely into incomes and expenditures. They need to have a business plan, they should look for profit, not small profit but big, big profit.  
(EO2, Extension Officer)

The Swedish Team Leader of the ASP developed these thoughts further in an interview in August 2005 on Swedish radio. He was clear about the need to change the attitudes and mindset among Zambian farmers. He partly blamed the socialist regime under Kaunda for creating a ‘dependency syndrome’ as one reason why farmers face so many difficulties in adjusting to a free market system. He pointed at climate factors and argued that people in Zambia had not needed to work as hard as in Northern Europe for their survival, and that labour is therefore not a virtue in the Zambian countryside as it has been in Sweden for example. He furthermore dwelt on the issue that people in Africa have lived in small communities where they have cared for each other instead of having a well-organised state that cares for its citizens through insurances and social security systems. In this respect he pointed at the extended family as a major issue to be tackled. Since people are expected to help each other in rather far-reaching communities, capital that has been generated in a business is consumed by the extended family, which always need assistance for things like funerals, healthcare, school fees as well as food and inputs for agriculture.

There is no wall between your private economy and your business economy [in rural Zambia] and obviously that is a recipe for no success in business. Here is the secret on how to bring development or not. To find a balance in this. Because there are also a lot of nice things in this type of culture.  
(ASP Team Leader, Swedish Broadcast P1, 16th August, 2005. Author’s translation)

The ‘secret’ of development exposed here is very much in line with Hydén’s (1980; 1983; 2006) ideas on the ‘economy of affection’ as a major obstacle towards modern development. In ASP, the problem is seen foremost from the perspective of the individual, while Hydén’s focus is on nations. In ASP the discussion is embedded in discussions on household food security and poverty reduction, while Hydén is more explicit in his functionalism. The basic idea is, nevertheless, the same; that the working of local rural communities is detrimental to economic growth and development. The extended family is hence

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<sup>28</sup> Shoprite is a supermarket chain with headquarters in Cape Town, South Africa.



seen as a problematic institution when promoting farming as a business in Zambia. This institution tends to seize any surplus that instead could be profitably invested in an enterprise. When discussing this with the extension officers they say that it is not openly worked with within the frame of ASP in Chipata District. But it was discussed when the programme was initiated and during their training for the approach:

R: Yes, we were given an opportunity to talk about that. But we did not want to do away with the extended family. So we have not worked hard with the separation of the business economy and the household economy. The extended family... it is really hard to talk about for any African. From our forefathers the extended family has played a very important role. It has been really helpful. In Zambia we say that 'you never know what tomorrow brings. Today, he might be poor but tomorrow he might be the one ruling the nation.' The extended family is basically too important here in the village.

Q: But you mean that it was somehow suggested from the beginning to do something on this issue?

R: Yes, the people from Lusaka brought it up. But since we are the ones who know what is going on in the field, we said, let us instead use the approach 'lets work together', let us all be productive, also the orphans and so on, to involve the extended family in the business approach.

(EOFU4, extension officer, follow-up )

However, during the last period of fieldwork in 2008, one of the better off households in Kasauka village, on which several farmers in and around Kasauka village depended upon for different types of support, took some action in this direction. Normally the better off farmer assisted his relatives in making ridges in the fields but for the 2007/2008 season he declared to his fellow farmers that he would not provide this service any longer. This, then, was one example of someone at the peak of the village community separating himself from part of the duties in relation to the extended family, or the 'economy of affection' in Hydén's phrasing.

According to the extension officers, the farming as a business approach is appreciated by some farmers but not by all. There are constant references to late adopters and conservative attitudes and an unwillingness to take up the business way of thinking.

There are two types of people. There are those who are comfortable by the way they are, by the way they manage their life. They are really a problem. To tell them, is like telling someone that he or she has a problem when they do not think so themselves. With these farmers, the mindset is a problem.

(EOFU1, extension officer, follow-up)

Also during field days, extension officers held speeches before crowds of farmers explaining to them their lack of vision and dullness in being seemingly satisfied by the way they manage their lives. However, the belief that there are two types of farmers was an important point of departure for the ASP, which focuses on farmers “with the interest and potential to become ‘entrepreneurs’ or business oriented farmers within the programme period” (Ramboll 2008:4). Those who were interested in the approach were supposed to sign on and take part in the training. Extension officers also had a role in identifying the potential farmers. But somewhere in the selection process things went wrong according to several of the officers. The farmers “were expectant of ASP. They thought that they would get some inputs from the programme” (EO8, extension officer), and they “thought; if I do not register I might lose something” (EO3, extension officer). Several officers report that farmers joined ASP in search for handouts, even though it had been explained that there would be no such handouts. When the handouts never showed up, they first complained and then lost interest in the programme.

R: We were supposed to focus on people which at least could find means to access inputs, farmers who are viable let me say so.

Q: Has ASP been successful do you think?

R: Partly, let me say so. It has been successful for those who had the courage to follow our guidelines, those who now treat farming as a business. This could even be a farmer who couldn't read or write, but still they could develop a business plan in their head and follow it. But for those who just wanted handouts – it has been a failure. They even started to run away when we followed them to see if they had done the things like action plans, record keeping, et cetera. They did not want to see us. They wanted to avoid questions from us.

(...)

R: I have two, three farmers who have really appreciated the programme who have made plans and followed the plans and been very successful.

Q: And that is out of how many?

R: Out of 100.

Q: And for how many has it been a failure?

R: Let me say 60 are really failures.

(EOFU4, extension officer follow-up)

Although the extension officers point at the mindset and attitudes of the farmers, many also, state that the major problem actually is the lack of resources. Education and changing attitudes are important but extension officers also discussed problems in relation to the fact that ASP lacked a credit component to enable the households to implement their business plans.

Actually, what we have found is that it is not so much about mindset. It is about resources. They are not so much lacking in attitudes as they are lacking in resources.

(EOFU1, extension officer follow-up)

Farmers also point at the lack of credit and often asked how they were supposed to implement their ideas without any start-up capital. “ASP do not support us, they only give education” was not uncommon to hear from the farmers. When talking with one officer I shared with him the impression that the farmers actually felt blamed for their own problems, since they are continuously told that they can improve their life if they just formulate a vision and an action-plan to be implemented accordingly. “Yes, it is true”, he said. “They feel blamed to some extent, they even say things like that. But of course they should not be blamed” (EO8, extension officer). During the visit in 2008 I got increasingly puzzled by the fact that the ASP was appreciated by the extension officers, when the response from the farmers had been rather weak. A lot of economic activity was observed among the extension officers. Many of them had several side businesses as a way to make money and my impression was that there was an increase in these activities between 2006 and 2008. I discussed this with one of the officers during a follow-up.

Q: Sometimes I get the impression that the extension officers have appreciated and benefited more from the programme than the farmers, that you have been able to better implement the business approach in your personal lives. Is that correct?

R: [Laughter]... it is 100 percent correct.... we have benefited much more from ASP compared to the farmers. But we also have to be in front of the households, implementing what we are taught to teach the farmers.

(EOFU1, extension officer follow-up)

This view is shared by other extension officer as well as by employees at the MACO District Office. It is also supported by an evaluation of Swedish aid to Zambia that concludes in relation to ASP that “almost all extension workers met had set up their own farming enterprise using the “Farming as Business” methodology they have learnt through ASP” (SADEV 2010:21).

### **6.2.8 The question of cooperation**

The ASP project and the extension services in the area have tried to facilitate an increased cooperation among the farmers, not least in terms of selling together to strengthen their role in price negotiations. However, this is not a new issue to the farmers in the area. When interviewing the smallholders in 1998 many of them

discussed possible ways to ease the lack of transport and achieve a better position on the market through greater cooperation. At all different stages of the research process the smallholders have discussed the issue of selling in bulk in order to approach buyers as a stronger unit in price negotiations. There have at different stages also been plans and discussions about saving money and undertaking different types of businesses together, not least of a non-agrarian form.

When discussing different types of cooperation during the interviews between 2006 and 2008 the farmers were in general very positive towards the matter. Most claim that cooperation through marketing produce and saving money together are good things that could improve their livelihoods. There are also ideas about buying fertiliser in bulk in order to get better prices and to cultivate joint fields in order to reduce food insecurity among the poorer households. However, when they are asked what has actually happened with regard to implementing these different ideas on cooperation the response from the farmers is unanimous; there is little or no cooperation between households. Although they discuss the matter, they never sell in bulk, there is hardly any activity in saving money together, and there is a general complaint that people lack interest in cooperating.

There is no cooperation. When you call the farmers for a meeting, they usually do not come, or they come in very small numbers.  
(KV5, younger middle-aged woman, very poor, not married, 3 children, one dependant.)

Some attempts to sell produce together have been made but in general they have not been successful. The most common explanation for this is that due to their vulnerable situation the households need money to solve acute problems at different times, which makes it difficult to cooperate in terms of earning or saving money together. How should they, for example, decide on when to sell the produce? The poorest households feel the strongest need to sell immediately after or even during the harvest while the slightly better off (also often in possession of transport such as oxen and oxcarts that could bring a larger amount of produce to a selling point) have incentives to hold their produce for a while to identify the best time and place to go to market. Lack of time to devote to cooperation and lack of trust between the households are other explanations given by the respondents. The lack of trust and the fact that money had been misused during earlier attempts to cooperate is brought up during several interviews:

R: It can't happen, because we do not trust each other.  
 Q: Why do not you trust each other?  
 R: Many of the leaders have misused the money.  
 Q: Have you experienced that?  
 R: Yes, I have.  
 Q: Can you tell me about it?  
 R: Last year we were asked to put produce together but after we did it we do not know where the produce went.  
 Q: Here in the village?  
 R: Here in the village and in other villages.  
 Q: Was it many farmers in this village that participated?  
 R: No.  
 Q: And you never saw any money?  
 R: No.  
 (KV33, young man, married, poor, 1 child)

A problem here is also that several of the respondents do not feel that they have the status or authority to take an initiative to gather a group of farmers in order to sell jointly. The extension officers also talk about the lack of cooperation among the farmers, foremost in relation to establishing linkages to the market, in selling jointly, generating income and approaching lending institutions (EO2, 4, 7, extension officers).

There is, however, a lot of cooperation in both Yelesani and Kasauka village. In both villages there are clubs (organised with government assistance) that are active in various ways including organising meetings, discussing different issues, cultivating joint fields, providing adult education to reduce illiteracy, and keeping a piggery. All kinds of problems are solved together in times of crisis and in general no one is left to starve as long as there is enough food within the greater extended family, which also tends to care for schooling outside the nuclear family, as well as for orphans and the elderly. Functions such as funerals are also examples of solidarity where the villagers get together both to emotionally support the mourning family, and also to assist with necessary arrangements such as getting material for, and building a coffin. But still, in terms of selling together or saving money together it seems to be more difficult, or, as one female respondent put it with a certain degree of cheerfulness; "we trust each other, but when it comes to money it is really a problem" (KV5, female farmer, very poor).

But again, if we were to look at the issue of cooperation in a more inclusive manner, it is a fundament of the life in both Yelesani and Kasauka village. People do assist each other in financial matters, in ploughing, transporting produce and in order to access inputs. However, within programmes such as ASP, only a certain type of cooperation is asked for. The smallholders are

encouraged to cooperate in business development, in saving money for investments and in marketing their produce. At the same time cooperation within the extended family is at times seen as an obstacle to development, as an institution that consumes resources that could be profitably invested in businesses.

### **6.2.9 Dependency syndrome, resistance and the conservative Ngoni**

While the farmers ask for more state regulation and a more active role of the government in supplying markets, inputs, credits and transport, the farming as a business approach advocates the opposite. Poverty reduction, food security and development is within the context of ASP a matter of attitudes and to be all about doing “away with the ‘dependency syndrome’, which had characterized small scale farming in Zambia” (Ramboll 2008:42). It is today possible to discern four interlinked themes that are constantly recurring during the interviews with extension officers in Chipata District, tallying well with the outline of the ASP. According to extension officers, the small-scale farmers a) suffer from a ‘dependency syndrome’, b) are generally resistant to change, c) refuse to see farming as a business activity, and d) the Ngoni people in particular are beset by these things, compared to other ethnic groups in the area, such as the Chewa.

The dependency syndrome implies that the farmers, through previous government policies and NGO work in the area, have become dependent on handouts and assistance, which is not compatible with a free market. Furthermore it has made them indifferent to ideas and projects that do not involve this type of assistance and therefore hinders them from learning things and developing on their own. One extension officer states that three quarters of the farmers have no interest in participating in extension meetings because handouts are not supplied. Another officer claims that:

People go where there are handouts. They do not go for knowledge, they go for money and are used to that. They only implement what the organisation says as long as the organisation is here. When the NGO phase out, the farmers also leave the activities. And they stop using improved fallow, organic fertilisers and conservation farming is not used.

(EO4, extension officer)

When discussing the reason for that, the extension officers often blame NGOs and even themselves who have participated in projects that involve a lot of free things for the farmers. Major blame is placed on the policies of the Kaunda government who arranged markets all over rural Zambia and who supplied the farmers with inputs and generous credit facilities, with undoubtedly low levels

of reimbursement. In the analysis of the extension workers, the farmers' resistance to change and their lack of interest in farming as a business are highly interrelated. It is a general problem that the farmers do not adopt new things, whether it is new types of seed, improved fallow or keeping written records of their produce, sales, incomes and expenditures. Sometimes it is explained by the dependency syndrome while sometimes it is "just resistance to change" depending on tradition and culture.

There are some who have the courage to implement and move on, these are easy to work with, but the others... those who only do farming just because their father did it and do not want to do it as a business, they are problematic. (EO4, extension officer)

Finally, the extension officers state that the Ngoni people are exceptionally problematic to work with, they are particularly resistant to change and conservative in their views. The Ngoni people are portrayed as particularly unwilling to implement conservation techniques and to treat their agriculture in a more commercialised manner. They are described as "most controversial" (EO5, extension officer) and "usually very stubborn, while Chewas, for example, are much more disciplined, hardworking and self-controlled" (EO2, extension officer). Furthermore "they [the Ngoni people] do not accept new things" (EO5 extension officer) and according to one officer "when it comes to Ngoni I need to take them individually" (EO7, extension officer).

Chewas are always easy to work with and they adopt very easily, they change easily. But the Ngonis do not. They refer to their forefathers, that 'those used to do this and that and who am I to change it'. Chewas want to experiment with new ideas, but not the Ngonis. (...) Another problem is that Ngonis do not worry about tomorrow, that is the problem. But Chewas have that sense to think about the future. (EOFU1, extension officer, follow-up)

There seems to be a rather strong belief that the Ngoni people are quite different in their attitudes towards crucial aspects of their life and their main livelihood activities. When trying to explain this, extension officers often refer to Ngoni people as a former 'warrior people' who entered the area as raiders for food and cattle and that defeated and absorbed other ethnic groups in the area during the second half of the nineteenth century.

Q: Why is it like that?

R: It is something with the background.

Q: What background?

R: Because they consider themselves to be strong so they do not really want someone to tell them what to do and to change their minds.  
(EO10, extension officer)

Eight out of eleven extension officers are clear about this specific attitude among the Ngoni people. Two officers oppose it and state that there is no difference between the Ngoni and the Chewa people, basically saying that they are all late adopters and to some degree resistant to change. One officer within the Eastern Block, however, disagrees rather strongly with the concept that farmers are dependent, resistant to change and that they do not want to take up the knowledge they are given. He instead blames the extension service.

R: People may change if an officer is serious about what he is doing. But if the officer is not serious the farmer will not change.

Q: Do you mean that officers here are not serious?

R: That is the conclusion. Some of them drink a lot and when an officer shows that kind of behaviour the farmers lose interest in that officer. And they just get out of him.

(EO9, extension officer)

This last point is confirmed by more informal discussions with officers in the area of study. In general there is quite a lot of self-criticism among the extension officers for having failed to get through to the farmers. A major problem brought up by the extension officers is the lack of formal education and illiteracy in the area. This is seen as a major obstacle when trying to implement many programmes. It seems that education and literacy are viewed as the keys to enable an improved livelihood among the small-scale farmers in the area. If educated they are believed to have better possibilities to benefit from the training, to formulate goals, visions and plans and to keep record of their activities, incomes and expenditures, in line with the farming as a business approach. However several officers also claim that this is not always the case. Several of them report working with illiterate farmers who were better at adopting new ways of farming and who were better at planning their activities in line with the extension advice.

#### **6.2.10 Life preferences, new ways of making a living and future plans**

The depictions of smallholder farmers in the study area as dependent, conservative and resistant to change and development raises questions about what type of life the respondents themselves aim for. How do they themselves look upon their life and their future, and how do they cope with the problems



they face as smallholder farmers? The broader livelihood literature discusses processes of increased income diversification and deagrarianisation (Bryceson 2000; 2009). There is also a contemporary discussion concerning social and cultural change in the rural South (e.g. Hajdu 2006; Rigg 2006; 2007; see also Larsson 2001:163-166). Recent literature suggests that rural dwellers to a lesser degree identify themselves as farmers or peasants. Terms like deagrarianisation and depeasantisation suggest that rural dwellers are not only diversifying but also substantially changing as a social/cultural category.

In the case of Yelesani and Kasauka villages it is, however, doubtful if income diversification, to the extent that it occurs, is an indication of a move away from a farming way of life. It can rather be interpreted as a means by which to continue this kind of life. In this study it is clear that people still identify themselves as farmers or peasants, not only because they cultivate a field but also because this is the kind of life they want to live and which they are proud of. Time-wise the farm-related work dominates heavily in all but a few households. In general they highly value village life and the social cohesion it is built on. Ideas on migration or a possible urban life are commented on with scepticism.

Q: Are you thinking yourself of going to town?

R: No.

Q: Why not?

R: I live a very free life in the village. I cultivate and I do not have to buy food. (KV5, younger middle-aged woman, female headed household, very poor, 3 children, one dependant)

Farming is still viewed as a 'free' and independent way of living and when discussing what a 'good life' might be the respondents include many aspects related to farming (see Table 5-4). To produce your own food is highly valued among the respondents, even for those households having money enough to cover up for shortages. The fact that urban dwellers buy their mealie meal on a daily basis is sniffed at and joked about and seemingly viewed as an unworthy way of living. Off-farm incomes are important and often seen as a necessary contribution to the household economy. But it is not at all clear that these activities are part of a strategy to move away from agriculture and a farming way of life (even if this eventually might be the consequence). Rather, the off-farm activities are part of a strategy to make farming continuously possible.

The off-farm activities in Kasauka and Yelesani and the villages around vary from brewing beer or wine, doing migrant work as bricklayer/construction worker, making clay pots, carpentering, blacksmithing, traditional healing,

burning charcoal, repairing buckets, knitting, hiring out their bicycle or oxcart, constructing storage bins, selling second hand clothes, trading or owning a small shop. My findings indicate that in Kasauka village, these activities have increased since the late 1990s, while in Yelesani by contrast, they have decreased or are about the same. According to the extension officers in Eastern Block, there is no real increase in off-farm activities. Karttunen (2009) looking into issues of livelihood diversification in Chipata District and Eastern Province more broadly also concluded that livelihoods are primarily agricultural. Diversification is taking place, but it is at an initial state. Seventy percent of the households' incomes were derived from the farm in 2003 (Karttunen 2009:75). Thirty percent came from off-farm activities, but this included agricultural piecework (casual work), processing of agricultural products and collection of forest products (Karttunen 2009:75:16). Karttunen found no correlation between wealth and degree of income diversification, but a big difference in what type of activities that are undertaken. The poor devoted themselves to casual labour and other less rewarding activities, while the better off farmers were more into business activities, which need some investment but also produced better rewards (Karttunen 2009:115-119). She found that food was usually bought for the money earned from off-farm activities, rather than farm inputs (Karttunen 2009:120).

In and around Kasauka village, however, it is rather clear that some off-farm activities have increased since 1998, especially different types of trading and grocery businesses. Table 6-2 below shows the degree of off-farm incomes, remittances and casual labour in Kasauka and Yelesani villages and indicates that there are very few households only depending on farming.<sup>29</sup>

**Table 6-2: Households stating incomes except from own farming produce**

Village	Off-farm income (OFI)	Remittances (R)	Casual Work (CW)
Kasauka village	13	9 (OFI+R=19) <sup>30</sup>	17 (OFI+R+CW=26) <sup>31</sup>
Yelesani village	7	2 (OFI+R=9)	7 (OFI+R+CW=13)
<i>Total</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>11 (OFI+R=28)</i>	<i>24 (OFI+R+CW=39)</i>

<sup>29</sup> It is also likely that the number of households doing casual work and receiving remittances is slightly higher. It was observed on a few occasions that farmers received remittances and did casual work, which was, however, not stated during the interview.

<sup>30</sup> Indicating the number of households with income from off-farm activities, remittances or both.

<sup>31</sup> Indicating the number of households with income from off-farm activities, remittances, casual work or two or more of these.

In terms of access to money these sources are important for several households. One of the better-off households earned 1,700,000 kwacha (above 400 US dollar) in off-farm income for one year, constituting around 50 percent of that household's cash income. A female headed household belonging to the group of poor earned between 40,000 and 100,000 kwacha per month brewing and selling beer. Another woman earned approximately 45,000 kwacha per week (10 US dollar) from knitting, on the weeks that she had time to do it. But there are also other households with no other income except selling farm produce or in some cases animals. In other villages in the study area young men in particular are involved in trading over the Malawi border. These activities are sometimes very rewarding in terms of income, but also very laborious, time-consuming and risky, since if they are caught by the customs officers they are usually deprived of their goods.

There are many reasons for undertaking these different kinds of off-farm activities. In general it is related to an increased need for money and as a way to reduce poverty and dependency on income from crop sales when paying for different expenses. There are also references to the fact that some farmers have been trained in undertaking business. Off-farm activities are a very important way to raise money for fertiliser, while casual work is done mainly to get food in time of shortages. When discussing with those that are more involved in off-farm activities they often give a definite answer that their aim is to invest the money in the farm and in animals to enable a farming way of life in the village. The deagrarianisation process is therefore far from straightforward. For the households for which comparisons have been possible there is no clear tendency that they cultivate less land area in 2006-2008 compared to 1998. Some households do cultivate less land, many cultivate the same area, while a few have increased their hectares slightly. Furthermore, there are signs that the cultivation of gardens has increased during the last 10-15 years. For the households that have decreased their cultivated area, there is no tendency to rely more on other types of incomes.

What can be said, however, is that the households that were formed in Kasauka village between 1998 and 2006 in general cultivate less land and have less fallow land compared to the households that have been established for longer. The six households that were formed in Kasauka village between 1998 and 2006 cultivate on average 0,8 hectare to be compared to the village average of 2,2 hectare. Some, but not all, of the young households are highly involved in off-farm activities and raise substantial incomes from these activities. It might therefore be possible to identify a generational aspect in the process of deagrarianisation, which is a common theme in the literature on rural livelihoods

(e.g. Bryceson 1999; Rigg 2006). In a few of the younger households in Yelesani, the adult men are involved in temporary migration to Chipata for construction work. Compared to 1998 there is also one household in Kasauka where the adult male is away for most of the time within Eastern Province working as a bricklayer, who in 1998 was staying in the village all the year around. However, these do not appear to be new trends. In Kasauka village there are older members from at least seven households with a history of migration to Chipata, Lusaka or the Copperbelt during the 1970s and 1980s, who are now settled in the village and have been so for at least 15 years.

There are many aspects of the possible process of deagrarianisation. Younger households commonly start off with a rather small piece of land, while it might be possible for them to increase their land area through getting more land from parents and relatives or taking over land after parents pass away. In 2006 there were several young men in Kasauka, Yelesani and villages around engaging in trading, spending much time on bicycles travelling long distances to buy and sell commodities demanded in different parts of the district's rural areas. In these households the adult females were still engaged in farming and taking care of the children and other household duties during the absence of the male. The two young men in Kasauka who were particularly involved in these activities asserted in 2006 that they invested (or planned to invest) the money earned from trading in their farming activities, such as buying a plough, cattle or other animals. In 2008 they had both cut down on trading and one of them stated very clearly that a farming way of life is preferred before business.

R: It would be better to stop business and only do farming.

Q: Why?

R: There is a lot of risk in business. (...) You can lose a lot.

Q: But if there was no risk in business, if it was safe to do it, what would you chose?

R: I would chose farming anyway even if there was no risk.

Q: Why?

R: Because in business you really need to manage your income. It is easy to lose. Farming is not like that. You do not lose everything in farming.

(KVFU3, young man, married, poor, 2 children, three dependants)

A farming way of life is clearly preferred both in Yelesani and in Kasauka village. At the same time many state that they need off-farm incomes to make ends meet, which is a rather clear type of semi-proletarianisation even though few are in formal employment. Different types of off-farm activities will continue and they might increase, but people will not give up farming. If they were to choose freely between doing business, farming or both, doing only

farming is the preference. Off-farm incomes are viewed as necessary to make farming continuously possible. But a good life outside farming is not seen as possible for those without at least 12 years of education.

Discussions on the future and respondents' future plans verified that farming is the priority in both Kasauka and Yelesani. Most plans and dreams for the future, among old as well as among newly established households, dealt with progress within the household farm. Common ambitions are to increase the number of animals, to produce and sell more agricultural products, increase the hectares under cultivation and find methods to raise money to buy more fertiliser. Important is of course to produce more food, buying implements like an oxcart and enable application of kraal manure. Those engaging in off-farm activities also talk about developing these, and some talk about starting up different types of off-farm activities, such as trading, baking bread and brewing beer. But ideas on how to improve in farming are put forth by almost everyone. Nevertheless, when discussing their children's future, most respondents turn away from farming. The view of the children's future (for those who had children in school-going age) is clear; they must be educated and then they must get employed. The reasons for this are multiple. One important aspect is that farming is seen as heavy and difficult and as a profession with a rather poor future in the area. But other things are also important.

Q: What do you think about your children's future. Will they be farmers here, or will they do something else?

R: I want them to start learning, to go to school.

Q: For how long shall they go to school?

R: I do not know, but I want them to complete education. I want them to get employed.

Q: What kind of employment?

R: They can chose any kind of employment, a teacher, driver as long as it is good. But it is up to the child to chose employment.

Q: Do you think that it is better that they get employed than that they become farmers?

R: Yes, it is better that they get employed.

Q: Why is that?

R: They will be able to support the family, their mother, and they can employ casual workers in the field while he or she work in town.

(YV16, young woman, very poor, two children)

Even when discussing the children's future, it was in terms that their children might pursue a future outside agriculture which would be sufficient to continue to support their rural and farming way of life. In general the parents aim for completed secondary schooling of 12 years for their children. Very few,

however, have succeeded in keeping their children in school through secondary level. Several state that they at least hope that one or two children would manage, while the rest are likely to drop out earlier. For those who drop out earlier than grade 12 there seems to be little prospect for employment and in general it is stated that they will have to be farmers, since there are no good employment opportunities for those who are not educated.

R: I plan to educate my children, so they can assist me when they grow up.

Q: What do you think that your children should do when they grow up?

R: They must live a good life.

Q: What kind of life is that? Shall they be employed or be farmers?

R: They must be employed.

Q: What about farming?

R: No.

Q: Why not?

R: If they will not be educated they have to do farming. Farming is for those who are not educated.

(KV16, younger middle-aged man, less poor, four children)

“Farming is for those who are not educated” is a rather common opinion among the respondents. At the same time it is preferred to most off-farm activities present in the area. The alternative is to get education and get employed, but to move out of farming into a sector of self-employment or hard unskilled work is not highly valued by the interviewees. Employment worth striving for includes jobs like teacher, nurse, extension officer or driver. Farming is furthermore seen as something important for everyone to return to later in life, even for those who manage to get a decent job. There is little evidence of a re-identification away from farming and a rural based life as discussed in parts of the literature.

### **6.3 Is farming as a business answering the question?**

The Senior Agricultural Officer supervising the extension workers in Chipata District states that they need to be “change agents”. If farmers are seemingly comfortable with the lifestyle that they pursue it must be the extension officers’ plight to alert the farmers and tell them that this is their problem. There is, however, nothing in the interviews with the farmers for this study that suggest that they look upon their life as cleared of worries. Instead they report a lot of problems with food insecurity, access to agricultural inputs, lack of markets and problems of paying fees for schooling<sup>32</sup>, healthcare and basic commodities.

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<sup>32</sup> Although primary schooling is free of charge, it in practice involves fees for the rural households, both in Kasauka and Yelesani villages.

All these aspects of life, including better housing and safer water are areas where they work for and wish for improvement. What they seem to have, however, is a strong will to live a certain kind of life, which might not be considered optimal in relation to models of economic growth. It still includes a large degree of independence, where a free life is felt to be associated with a low division of labour, subsistence production, local social cohesion and reciprocity rather than specialisation, profit-making and individual social progress. Food security, safe water, schooling, decent housing and clothing combined with a farming life within a rural community seem to be what is aimed for. That is, however, not a reality today, and it is hardly seen as achievable in the future by the households in Kasauka and Yelesani villages, who therefore turn away from farming when discussing the future of coming generations.

While the farmers in Kasauka and Yelesani villages are described as backwards and resistant to change, the reality is that they are rational and adaptable in the face of harsh circumstances. They do not specialise their production, they leave out-grower schemes, but they do so because they find no evidence that engagement in these activities can improve their wellbeing, just as Williams (1982) once argued. What the farmers in this study basically state is that they cannot establish a secure and good livelihood under the present regime of liberalisation.

The Swedish Team Leader of ASP is critical towards the re-introduction of subsidies on fertilisers and the increased state-involvement in marketing, and says it has a destructive impact on the development of a functioning free market for agricultural products (Informant interview 1, ASP teamleader). The support to FSP and FRA has also become a major issue in the relationship between the major donors, among them Sweden, the USA, the World Bank and the Zambian government. The donors continuously pressure the Zambian government on the issue and the dialogue between MACO and the major donors is of recent described as “constrained and minimal” (SADEV 2010:26). From the Swedish side, there has been no continuation of the support to small-scale farmers after the ASP was phased out in 2008 (ibid:24).

Is then the Zambian style of the farming as a business approach spreading in Africa today? Is this the model that is going to make a difference for peripheral smallholder communities in the twenty-first century? Or is the ASP unique in framing local attitudes as conservative and reactionary and therefore key obstacles to poverty reduction and development? There is no answer to this question yet, although there are projects with similar slogans around the region. What can be said for certain is that the causes of rural poverty in Chipata District are multi-faceted. To hold that rural poverty in Eastern Zambia is mainly a

matter of the wrong mindset among the farmers cannot be regarded as a serious analysis. It is a meagre and effort-free answer to a difficult and complex question. It immediately dismisses the significance of power relations and the terms of farmers' incorporation into existing economic and political structures. In the ASP documentation there are no references to, for example, global trade agreements, the competitive and volatile situation on the international market of agricultural products (which for this study could be exemplified by cotton) or the tough competition faced by cheap imports from farmers receiving subsidies far above what a *Zambian* household can acquire. There is little reference to history except to a dependency syndrome created during an earlier period of state-control. Apart from that it seems like the farmers in *Yelesani* and *Kasauka* villages have been plunged down into the present, apparently unaffected by their historical and contemporary relations to the outside world, and mysteriously endowed with a 'culture' that is unchanging and resistant to change.



## **7. The historical roots of smallholders' livelihoods**

How then have smallholder livelihoods in Kasauka and Yelesani villages been influenced by history and by the way the Chipata area was integrated into the world-economy? What material and discursive processes were initiated as a consequence of this integration and what kind of transformation of the area took place in relation to pre-colonial features? We know the broad terms of this integration from Chapter Three, but to elaborate its concrete impact on peoples' contemporary livelihoods we need to study this integration more closely. This chapter will first describe colonialism in rural Northern Rhodesia. It will then look more specifically at the case study area, looking firstly at pre-colonial conditions and then at colonial rule and policies and their impact on rural livelihoods.


### **7.1 Colonialism in rural Northern Rhodesia**

The British initially hoped that Northern Rhodesia would produce large amounts of minerals for export. However, few mineral deposits were initially found and the British South African Company, BSAC, started rather early to invite European settlers to buy land in the area. There was an early ambition to develop Northern Rhodesia as a 'white man's country' similar to Southern Rhodesia and Kenya but it never took off in a similar way (Lukanty & Wood 1990). The initial prospect for the settlers was to produce food for people working the mines of Katanga, Belgian Congo and for the future mining areas within Northern Rhodesia (Wood & Vokes 1990:458-460). The European population grew and the colonial administration under BSAC alienated land for settler agriculture in different parts of the colony. In 1924 the administration of Northern Rhodesia was transferred from BSAC to the Colonial Office in London. This meant that a colony was established in its true sense, with a local government and a governor.

While settler agriculture developed from the early twentieth century the mining industry expanded after 1926, when the large copper deposits adjacent to Katanga were exploited on a larger scale. From then the economy of Northern Rhodesia was centred on this one product. Northern Rhodesia became the fourth

greatest exporter of copper in the world during the 1950s and 60 percent of the colony's incomes came from the copper industry (Bhagavan 1978:8). At independence in 1964 the copper industry represented around 45 percent of GNP and about 95 percent of export incomes (Simson 1986:30). During colonial rule the copper mines employed great numbers of adult males migrating from rural areas to the industrial centres.

The European population grew from 1,500 in 1911 to at least 3,500 in 1921 (Roberts 1976:182), at which time there were about 700 European farms in the territory (Lukanty & Wood 1990:6). To the Europeans in becoming large-scale commercial farmers, the colonial administration pin-pointed three major areas for settlement, a) the area around the 'line of rail', b) the Abercorn area in the northeast, and c) the Fort Jameson area in the east. To facilitate the occupation of these areas, African smallholders were removed into native reserves (Pim 1938; Davies 1971:48-49). The rest of the colony became the property of the Crown, partly for the purpose of future European settlement (see Figure 7-1).



**Figure 7-1: Colonial land rights in Northern Rhodesia**

Source: Based on Davies 1971:49

The colonial government started to develop a series of policies to encourage and support European settlers in their agricultural activities. The focus of these policies was the 'line of rail' area where land was alienated on both sides of the railway, constituting some of the most fertile land in the colony. As a consequence, around 60,000 Africans were forcibly removed (Lukanty & Wood 1990:6-8). Rather few European farmers settled in Northern Rhodesia, and those who arrived were concentrated around the 'line of rail'. The alienated land, however, continued to be in European possession. In 1951 less than five percent of the European farmland was under cultivation. More than half of this land was cultivated by maize, while the major cash crop was tobacco, cultivated chiefly in the Eastern Province (PRO CO 1015/11 1951).

The areas outside the European farmland, and especially the native reserves, were seen mainly as labour reserve areas. A tax was introduced in the early twentieth century to finance the colonial administration and to push the male population into wage employment. Extensive migration took place all over Northern Rhodesia as a consequence of tax policies and the limited availability of land within the native reserves. Only in the far west, in parts of the Barotse Protectorate, and in a few areas close to the line of rail, was the out-migration of adult males less than 40 percent. In some areas, such as Fort Jameson and parts of the Northern Province, over 70 percent of taxable males were absent in the years shortly prior to independence (Davies 1971:46-47).

Colonial policies were heavily urban biased. Investments in all kind of infrastructure were focused to central provinces around the line of rail, creating regional imbalances in terms of economic and social development (Burdette 1988). An important purpose of the agricultural policies in Northern Rhodesia was to supply the urban areas, such as the Copperbelt, with cheap foodstuffs. This became increasingly important when the copper industry started to develop in the late 1920s. Already at an early stage it was, however, obvious that the European settlers were not particularly successful farmers. Their yields were meagre and they faced fierce competition from African farmers, who initially started to market their production as a way to raise money for paying tax. A situation arose where the European farmers faced increasing difficulties in finding markets for their maize and this finally led to the establishment of the Maize Control Board in 1935 to regulate the maize market. The effect of this was that maize was launched as the major staple in the colony, to be produced by both European and African farmers. Through different types of marketing arrangement the cultivation of maize was encouraged at the expense of other crops, such as sorghum, millet and cassava, and monocultures were established. The market was divided between European farmers and Africans. European

farmers gained access to  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the internal market and prices were differentiated in favour of the settlers (Vickery 1985).

Apart from this the settlers gained substantial support from the government throughout the colonial period in terms of implements, input subsidies, extension services and credit arrangements. These benefits were not shared by African smallholders, apart from a small group at the end of the colonial rule (Lukanty & Wood 1990). From the 1940s onwards the colonial government heavily subsidised the consumer prices of maize in urban areas and the marketing board started operating at a loss in order to uphold price incentives especially for large-scale farmers, but also for some African farmers. This was the situation until independence: in some years the consumer prices were in fact below producer prices (Vickery 1985:232; Lukanty & Wood 1990:18). The increased focus on cheap food for urban consumers and on increased maize production among African farmers from the 1940s was also part of a strategy to tackle the rising nationalism among Africans (Wood & Vokes 1990:458-459).


The colonial policies towards African smallholders underwent some changes in the late 1940s and 1950s. Extensive soil conservation programmes were introduced to tackle environmental problems in smallholder areas. The increased need for food imports in supplying the growing urban population led to policies that anticipated a greater role for African farmers. Policies developed that encouraged African farmers close to the 'line of rail' to increase their maize production (ibid:459-460). In addition, the agricultural department started to support a segment of African farmers with the "aim of transforming a small number of 'progressive' African farmers into modern market-oriented producers" (ibid:16-17). This strategy included less than two percent of the African farmers in Northern Rhodesia.

In summary, colonial rule promoted the emergence of a dualistic structure in the countryside of Northern Rhodesia. On the one hand, there were some 1,200 European farmers, with large estates of land, dominating the market for both food and export crops, on the other hand, there were hundreds of thousands of African subsistence producers (Lukanty & Wood 1990:17). In addition a small class of African commercial producers were encouraged in the late colonial period. In line with this dualistic structure African smallholders were excluded and removed from the most fertile land and from areas close to markets and urban centres.

## 7.2 The pre-colonial period in Eastern Zambia

### 7.2.1 Before the arrival of the Ngoni

The first agriculturalists in what is today Chipata district settled there during the sixteenth century, and possibly before in rather smaller numbers.<sup>33</sup> The Chewa settled at the expense of hunting and gathering people referred to as Akafula, Abatwa and Amwambonela, of whom there have been no signs of existence in the area since around 1830-1850 (Clark 1950:82-83). The Chewa and Nsenga people settled permanently in Eastern Zambia and a Chewa kingdom under the chief Undi was established. The kingdom spread out and reached its peak during the middle of the eighteenth century (see Figure 7-2). It covered a substantial part of Eastern Zambia, including the area around present day Chipata (Phillipson 1976:10-11).



**Figure 7-2: Undi's kingdom at its greatest extent**

Source: Based on Phillipson 1976:11.

<sup>33</sup> Eastern Zambia is believed to have been populated for at least 40,000 years by hunting and gathering people. None of these were, however, agriculturalists in the sense that Chewa and Nsenga became during the sixteenth century.

The Chewa people under paramount chief Undi entered the area from present day Malawi and established a decentralised kingdom, without a centralised bureaucracy or military power, but of considerable wealth.<sup>34</sup> Under chief Undi were sub-chiefs and tributary chiefs, not all of Chewa origin, but still loyal to the paramount chief (Langworthy 1971; Phillipson 1976). The area was much favoured in terms of fertile soils, fish rich rivers, wild animals, metals such as iron and copper and trading goods like ivory and gold (Langworthy 1972:28-29; Kalusa 2010:7). Trade took place in commodities such as ivory, iron works, gold, copper, cloth and dried fish, and later slaves. This trade was initially with various local groups and later on with Swahili traders and the Portuguese who gradually increased their presence in the area. Importantly, this trade was controlled and monopolised by Undi and wealth was in this way concentrated to the paramount chief (Langworthy 1971; Phillipson 1976). However, this trade made increased wealth possible among different people of the kingdom. An important part of Undi's ruling principle to keep sub-chiefs and tributary chief loyal to him was the distribution of imported goods within the empire. In return for this they showed him allegiance and supplied him with iron, gold, ivory and slaves delivered into the Atlantic trade system (Langworthy 1972:31).

However, this trade finally became a "double-edged sword" (Kalusa 2010:9) as the paramount chief faced increased difficulties controlling the trade. In the nineteenth century the Portuguese had started to sell goods, even guns, directly to sub-chiefs in exchange for slaves (*ibid*). The Swahili traders followed a similar behaviour in their trade in the area (Langworthy 1971). Sub-chiefs and headmen then started to claim their independence through trading ivory, slaves and copper, and building considerable fortunes on their own. Disruption grew, and the increased wealth caused further conflicts in how possessions were to be distributed within the kingdom. Furthermore, the slave trade and the raiding of slaves created distrust and fear leading to further disintegration. Ultimately, this precluded the cooperation and cohesion necessary to answer the threat of the Ngoni who had started to settle and raid the area for cattle and food in the second half of the nineteenth century (*ibid*; Phillipson 1976; see also Marks 2004). To sum up, the arrival of the Ngoni under Chief Mpezeni is often held responsible for the final destruction of the Undi kingdom. It should, however, be clear that the kingdom had started to disintegrate already during the late

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<sup>34</sup> The origin of the Chewa under Undi is traced back to the Luba Kingdom in the Democratic Republic of Kongo. More recently, however, it is an off-spring of the Maravi Kalonga kingdom in present-day Malawi, from where Undi separated from Kalonga most likely during the sixteenth century to move westward into present-day Zambia.

eighteenth century, largely as a consequence of the increased interaction with the Portuguese and the Swahili traders.


The few sources available that present any evidence of the livelihood situation in the area before the arrival of the Ngoni describe (as already indicated) a rather wealthy area with large areas of fertile agricultural land, cattle in a tsetse free area with vast pastures (Gamitto 1960:141-145; Rau 1974:74). There is no evidence of famine or any other type of severe crisis in the area during pre-colonial times and Gamitto, travelling the area in the early 1830s expressively wrote in his diary that people in the area produced enough food for subsistence as well as “to sell in abundance” (Gamitto 1960:142). The population is, however, believed to have been rather dense and Rau (1974:74, 85) writes about excessive deforestation on hills long before the Ngoni entered the area. Also Gamitto (1960) noticed the lack of larger forests in the area, and described the area as relatively densely populated.

### **7.2.2 The arrival of the Ngoni**

The major event just prior to colonisation affecting the livelihoods of people in the area was the arrival of the Ngoni people under Chief Mpezeni. The Ngoni had been on the move since around 1820 when they left Kwazulu-Natal after being defeated by Shaka Zulu as part of the Zulu wars in present day South Africa.<sup>35</sup> The Ngoni under chief Zwangendaba fled north and crossed the river Zambezi in 1835, passed through Eastern Zambia but finally ended up as far north as the eastern shores of Lake Tanganyika in 1842 (Figure 7-3). Here chief Zwangendaba died and the Ngoni people split up into several parties (Barnes 1967). One of these parties under the leadership of Mpezeni moved south and crossed the Luangwa river and entered the Nsenga area in 1862 where they settled while gradually moving towards the area of Fort Jameson and present day Chipata (Spear 1972). The Ngoni knew the area rather well from their earlier visit on the way north, which is one of the reasons why they decided to stay more permanently. The environment around Fort Jameson suited them well. It was a tsetse free area with large grazing land for their cattle and the sandy soils appeared to be well suited to their type of shifting cultivation. This together with the high altitude, good rainfalls and a rather low mean temperature made the plateau area attractive to the Ngoni people not least because it was rather similar to their former home areas of Natal in present-day South Africa (ibid).

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<sup>35</sup> For further description on the Ngoni migration from Kwazulu-Natal to present Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia see Barnes 1967 & Rau 1974.



**Figure 7-3: Mpezeni's migration to Fort Jameson area**  
 Source: Spear 1972:17

With a hierarchical structure and an effective military machinery the Ngoni disrupted the Chewa empire, and Ngoni came to dominate the area around present-day Chipata from 1870. The Chewa lost almost 40 percent of their habitable land (Allan 1949:72). However, the Ngoni communities assimilated a lot of people of Chewa and Nsenga origin, just as they used to assimilate people along their long march from the South. They settled and lived in large clustered villages, sometimes containing several thousands inhabitants. These large settlements were designed not only to maintain political cohesion, but also to protect themselves from slave hunters (Rennie 1966; Vail 1977:132). Although the Ngoni dominated the area politically and militarily, the culture that developed is best described as a merger of cultures of different groups of people. This is illustrated by the fact that the Ngoni language had almost ceased to exist by around 1900. The Chewa and Nsenga often outnumbered the Ngoni population even in the villages defined as Ngoni (Spear 1972).



The agricultural practices in the Mpezeni area became based on close and clustered settlements, intensive farming, extensive fallows, and a gradual movement into new areas following the decreased fertility that followed after a few years of intensive cultivation (Priestly & Greening 1956:1-3). In 1896 the gold prospector Crawford Angus travelled the area and left the following description of his impressions of Mpezeni's Ngoniland:

Never before in any of my African wanderings had I seen such an extent of land under cultivation; the cornfields seemed unending, and the size and number of the villages fairly astonished me; and it was not until then that I realized what a powerful and prosperous people were those whose acquaintance I was about to make. (Angus 1899:78)

An important part of their subsistence also came from raiding other people in the area as well as Arab slave caravans and traders passing in the area. According to Barnes (1967:102-105), the Ngoni system of making a living was partly unsustainable from an environmental point of view and relied on a gradual movement into new areas, since the land needed a bush fallow of at least 25 years after being cultivated for a few years. When the British penetrated the area in the 1890s the Ngoni state therefore needed to spread out. This might have worked, and according to Barnes there was at the time an internal pressure for this in Ngoni society. The larger villages were about to split up into more scattered settlements over a larger area and it is also believed that Mpezeni planned to move further east into the plateau of present Malawi (Spear 1972).

### **7.2.3 Colonial interest and the formation of a concession**


As already described, Barnes (1967) pointed at weaknesses within the Ngoni way of making a living and elements of unsustainability in their clustered settlements. Clothier (SEC1/54 1936) disagreed and concluded that the area was not overpopulated before colonisation and that people were rather well off. Vail (1977) and Priestly & Greening (1956) also described the area as wealthy and able to support a large population, not least because of good rainfall and good conditions for a productive agriculture. The German concession hunter Carl Wiese, who travelled the area between 1888 and 1891 in search of treaties also painted a rather positive picture, with fertile soils and abundant grazing land (Wiese 1983). Crawford Angus on his part was both impressed and positive when referring to life in Ngoniland. However, several of these sources tended to describe the area from a more problematic point of view when looking at the period after the intrusion of the Ngoni people. No doubt, the population pressure

increased and the land available for separate groups decreased considerably. It is important to note that the Ngoni dominance in the area was rather short-lived, a period of approximately 30 years, which makes it difficult to evaluate, especially when considering the radical changes that took place in the area directly upon their defeat.

The colonial interest in the country controlled by Mpezeni was part of the greater struggle for control over mineral deposits, land and people in southern Africa outlined in Chapter Three. At the time of the scramble for Africa, Britain and Portugal were the main colonial powers interested in Eastern Zambia. Portugal had been present and active in slave and ivory trade for centuries, while for Britain the area was a part of the British South African Company's sphere of interest. Initially the area was part of Portugal's ambitions to create a coast-to-coast empire, while Britain and BSAC saw Eastern Zambia and Malawi as being of crucial importance as a corridor to the north to support their ambition of building an African empire stretching from Cape to Cairo. The whole of Northern Rhodesia was also of interest to both nations due to its alleged possessions of great mineral deposits of different kinds (Gelfand 1961:117-122; Barnes 1967; Wesseling 2006:306-317).

What is now Chipata district was in many ways a typical area of great colonial interest. It was a plateau area with a dry climate, large pastures, good soils and a wealthy population. All this seemed promising from a colonial perspective, not least when nurturing settler ambitions. But what lured the Portuguese and British interest the most was the hope of finding gold in the area. Gold had been found south of the Ngoniland and there were expectations of further discoveries in Mpezeni's country (Barnes 1967:66-68). Rumours circulated of great deposits and Mpezeni's considerable wealth was believed to be built on gold and other ore deposits. These different factors came to mould how the colonisation went on in the area.

A key person for political control over Mpezeni's country was Carl Wiese, the German concession hunter, who had been travelling and living in Ngoniland since 1885. Wiese is also believed to be responsible for the not so well founded reports of major deposits of gold in the area (Roberts 1976:168). He became acquainted with Chief Mpezeni and managed to establish a series of treaties, which allowed him leasehold to an area of approximately 26,000 square kilometres (Rennie 1966:324-326). Britain and Portugal scrambled for these treaties and finally the BSAC managed to obtain them.



**Figure 7-4: The North Charterland Concession Area**

Source: Based on Kay 1965:4

The 26,000 square kilometres obtained by Wiese made up the North Charterland Concession area (see Figure 7-4) under the North Charterland Exploration Company (NCEC), which gained control over the area in 1895 (Lane Poole 1963; Rennie 1966).<sup>36</sup> This company was in turn controlled by the BSAC (Rennie 1966:327). The NCEC immediately began a search for gold and minerals and some initial discoveries proved promising (Lane Poole 1963:227). The Ngonis rebelled against the British rule in late 1897 but were defeated in a matter of days.<sup>37</sup> A local administration was established, finally at Fort Jameson,

<sup>36</sup> Many of the treaties in this area, as well as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, came into being under very doubtful circumstances (Van Oss 1932:404; NAZ SEC2/176 1938; see also Wesseling 2005). In this particular area it can be seriously questioned if the treaties included control of land as such, or only rights to explore probable mineral assets (PRO DO35/443/6 1932). Furthermore Mpezeni demanded percentage shares of any profits made from mineral exploitation and a yearly fee to be paid by those in possession of the treaties (Barnes 1967:73-78). Additionally, Mpezeni was far from in effective control of all the land he made available to Wiese (Priestly & Greening 1956:1). Large parts of it were under control of the Chewas, who were never involved in the signing or selling of the concessions (NAZ SEC2/176 1938).

<sup>37</sup> The common interpretation is that the Ngoni chief Nsingu, the eldest son of Chief Mpezeni, started to threaten the British headquarter at Fort Young, where it was first placed. This led the British to call for troops, arriving from Blantyre in Malawi (Wills 1985:184-188). An alternative interpretation (Phiri 2000:9) claims that the British misunderstood the Ngoni's preparation for their Nwala ceremony and mistook it for war preparation. Chief Nsingu was, however, provoked by the gathering of troops at Fort Young and started preparations for war. Although the rebellion by Nsingu was not sanctioned by Mpezeni, Chief Mpezeni had during 1897 contacted the Ngoni paramount chief Mbelwa in present-day Malawi concerning a united attack on the British. During the rebellion, Nsingu was captured and later killed by British troops.

at the heart of the Ngoni Kingdom (Barnes 1950:17; Kay 1965:3-5). As a consequence of their rebellion the Ngoni people were plundered of around 14,000 head of cattle, many of which were sent to Southern Rhodesia, others were sold and some were later returned to the Ngoni people (Lane Poole 1963:231-232). This together with rinderpest undermined the economic base of the Ngoni society at the time, rendering them very vulnerable to the events that followed (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol I; see also Kanduza 1992b:49). In 1900, around 1,200 head of cattle remained in Ngoni possession, while before the rebellion they possessed between 15,000 and 24,000 head of cattle (Priestly & Greening 1956:24).

While clustered living had served the Ngoni people well during pre-colonial days, it became their greatest weakness after their submission to the British. When defeated, the Ngoni and other ethnic groups, were quickly forced into a system of sedentary cultivation on land they earlier had considered only as temporary living sites. The need for long fallow periods for their agricultural land and the necessary movement into new areas of land was now effectively hindered by the British administration and the coming of settlers who started to occupy large estates of land and gradually forced African farmers into native reserves (Spear 1972; Vail 1977).

## **7.3 The experience of colonialism in the Fort Jameson area**

### **7.3.1 The absent mineral deposits**

The North Charterland Concession area, and especially the land within what became Fort Jameson District, was expected to contain great deposits of gold and other valuable minerals. These alleged deposits were initially also the major interest of the NCEC, which directly after acquiring control in 1895 started to prospect the area (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook 1). The company offered great rewards for those finding profitable goldfields. However, the mining industry in the North Charterland Concession area was a disappointment (Gelfand 1961). Basically few deposits were found and the expectations of a concession area rich in gold were dashed. Mines were opened, but most of them were closed within a few years, often running at a loss (Kay 1965:5). Ultimately there was hardly any success in this industry, although hopes continued to be there all the way up to independence.

Consequently, employment in the mining industry was meagre. In 1935 there is a note of one active gold mine employing 35 persons (NAZ SEC2/85 1935). In 1937, the annual report for Fort Jameson District bluntly concludes, "there is no mining in the district" (NAZ SEC2/85 1937). The most long-lived

mine was Sasare some 80 kilometres west of the Main Ngoni Reserve (see Figure 7-5). This goldmine was operated on an irregular basis by the NCEC from 1893 onwards. The mine faced a lot of operational problems, including many human casualties, and was finally brought to an end in 1942 largely due to lack of profitability (Priestly 1978). The area was, however, attractive also for its agricultural potential and parallel to the mining adventure the NCEC started to lease out large tracts of land and established Fort Jameson District as a settler area. The settlers developed a cattle industry, established rubber plantations and soon also turned to cotton cultivation and finally tobacco growing, which came to dominate the European agriculture from about 1916 (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. II). Most of these crops were produced for export, mainly to Britain and to a lesser extent South Africa.

### **7.3.2 European settlers and the creation of native reserves**

The total number of settlers in Fort Jameson never exceeded 1,000 people at one time, but their impact on African lives and livelihoods was felt in a large part of Eastern Province, and especially around Fort Jameson. In 1906 there were 22 European families in Fort Jameson District and the majority of them were farmers of one sort or another. Most of them owned more than one farm and the normal land area was above 10,000 acres (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. I). One European farm could easily contain 10-20 villages, and already in 1903 there were 159 smallholder villages and 3,153 African households on European farms around Fort Jameson (NAZ KDG8/6/1 1903). The movement of Africans into reserves started directly upon the inception of colonial rule but was relatively slow the first 10-15 years. The early settlers were foremost engaged in cattle ranching and during the first decade they were slightly positive towards letting Africans stay on the farms (Pim 1938:57-60). Gradually, however, they became eager to remove African smallholders from their land. They complained that Africans continued to burn the grass (although prohibited), that they did not stay on the land allocated to them by the owners and that they were reluctant to supply labour when the settlers demanded it (NAZ KDG8/6/1 1903; NAZ ZP1/1/1 1925).

The first Ngoni Reserve (a part of what later became the Main Ngoni Reserve, see Figure 7-5) was established in 1906/07 for the Chief Mpezeni (Kanduza 1992b:50). It was, however, not until 1913-14 that a complete programme for resettlement of the African population into native reserves was presented. By this time the settlers had abandoned the cattle industry and turned increasingly to crop production. They started off with cotton but went on to

tobacco where they became relatively successful as producers for export (Priestly & Greening 1956:2; Vail 1977:142). The movement of Africans from European farmland increased after 1910. Although it has not been firmly established, it is likely that some of the villages in the centre of this research project were directly affected through being subject to removal due to the land alienation. Kawasa village (the mother village of Kasauka) was, under unclear circumstances, moved from alienated land close to Fort Jameson around 1910 and was after that gradually moved to its present location, where the village has been located since the 1940s.<sup>38</sup> The idea of creating special reserves was mentioned to the African chiefs during a meeting in 1906 but was more formally communicated to the Africans during a meeting between officials of the local administration and the Native Chiefs within the Fort Jameson area in 1913:

We think many Europeans may soon come to the country and will wish to settle here. The Administrator thinks it will be best to give the people – the Angoni, the Achewa, the Wakunda some reserves – small countries with boundaries where they may live undisturbed. No white men will be allowed to settle inside the boundaries of these reserves. (...) Those who wish to live on the [European] farms may do so, but only if the farmer [the European] agrees – remember that we shall set aside in the reserves sufficient land for all of you. (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. II:488-489)

The Chiefs<sup>39</sup> did not protest initially, but instead they stressed the importance of clear borders with the European farmers in order to avoid conflicts (ibid). A comprehensive reserve scheme was presented in 1913 but due to World War I the reserve system was not fully implemented until after the War and the presentation of a new scheme in 1925 (NAZ ZP1/1/1 1925). By that time, the

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
<sup>38</sup> This information is gained through formal and informal interviews with older farmers and has not been verified by any written sources.

<sup>39</sup> As in many British colonies the political system was based on indirect rule, and the colonial project would in many instances not have been realisable without a certain degree of consent (see e.g. Loomba 2006:48). Northern Rhodesia differed from other settler colonies in that indirect rule was applied to a greater extent compared to for example in Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (see Mair 1936). In the Fort Jameson District (as in Northern Rhodesia in general) the colonial administration ruled through Chiefs and “District messengers” (who received payment for their services (Lane Poole 1963:226)) and the administration was hence dependent on their cooperation. These were obliged to report to the colonial authorities about important changes in their territory, to assist in tax collection, recruitment for war service, resettlement and forced labour. They were often responsible for administering physical punishment. The district administration kept records of the Chiefs and messengers on duty in Fort Jameson District. They were graded on a scale from 1-4 and labelled with words such as “watch!”, “promising”, “of little use” or “good man for any unpleasant job” in order to describe their character (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook, Vol. I).

movement into the Main Ngoni Reserve had taken place to a large extent and a high population density was already observed to be causing environmental damage (NAZ KDG8/1/3 1921). Nonetheless, the administration continued to persuade Africans to continue the movement into the designated areas (Pim 1938:58). In 1927 the Secretary of Native Affairs in Fort Jameson even used the fact that the reserves were overpopulated as an argument to convince the Chiefs and the Headmen to speed up the process:

The land inside the Reserve is limited, and so I advise you to move quickly, for those who delay will not be able to find any good land left.  
(NAZ KDG4/2, Indaba 1927)

A year later, in 1928, Africans were by law forced to leave their land for the native reserves and were given five years to complete the process (PRO CO795/16/5 1927). Accordingly, the final alienation of land resulted in the *Northern Rhodesia Crown lands and Native Reserves Order*, which divided the land into three categories (see Figure 7-5), that remained until after World War II; (1) Land alienated to Europeans, (2) Native Reserves, (3) Unoccupied and unalienated land (Kay 1965:15-16).



**Figure 7-5: Land distribution in the North Charterland area in 1928**

Source: Based on Kay 1965:16.

Four reserves were formed within Fort Jameson District, Msandili, Ngoni (Main Ngoni Reserve), Chewa and Zumwanda reserves (see Figure 7-5).<sup>40</sup> The Main Ngoni Reserve and the Chewa Reserve were of a similar size, while Msandili and Zumwanda were considerably smaller. In the early 1930s the compulsory movement into reserves was completed and the areas outside the reserves were largely emptied of African people, except those working for European settlers or in other kind of employment in the area (NAZ SEC1/54 1936; Kay 1965:15-16). Those smallholders who at that time happened to remain outside the reserves stayed at their own risk and were left to the benevolence of the North Charterland Exploration Company, which claimed the area “cleared of native rights” (PRO CO795/16/5 1927).

The alienation of land for settlers was based on an expected influx of Europeans, and within the North Charterland Concession Area, approximately 17,000 square kilometres were assigned to 80 settler families and their potential followers, while 150,000 Africans were left to share a little more than half of that area, usually on more marginal and less fertile land (Vail 1977:144). In the Main Ngoni Reserve as in several other reserves, only parts of the area were suitable for agriculture, and many of the soils needed long fallow periods to regenerate their capacity. For the two major ethnic groups, the Chewa and the Ngoni, access to land had decreased tremendously. The Chewa, who had already experienced a great decline in habitable land after the Ngoni had entered the area, again saw the land under their control decrease by over 60 percent, while the land controlled by the Ngoni decreased by almost 50 percent (Allen 1949:72). Table 7-1 present changes in habitable land areas controlled by different groups within Fort Jameson District.

**Table 7-1: Habitable land among different groups in Fort Jameson District**

Time period	Chewa	Ngoni	European settlers
Before the Ngoni arrival (1860)	9,272 km <sup>2</sup>		
After Ngoni arrival (1885)	5,905 km <sup>2</sup>	3,367 km <sup>2</sup>	
After creation of native reserves (1928)	2,302 km <sup>2</sup>	1,748 km <sup>2</sup>	5,222 km <sup>2</sup>

Source: Chidumayo 1985:32

<sup>40</sup> In neighbouring Petauke District five reserves were established (Nsenga, Lusandwa, Petauke, Wambo, and Chilinga).



When it comes to the number of people displaced into the reserves there are only fragments of information that hardly tell the full story.<sup>41</sup> Calculations that can be made from the district notebooks of Fort Jameson indicate that the population in the Fort Jameson reserve areas increased from approximately 70,000 in 1908 to 108,000 in 1918, which represents a 54 percent increase in 10 years. The 1925 Land Commission estimated that approximately 32,000 Africans needed to be moved into the reserves in the North Charterland Concession area (Pim 1938:59). In 1922 it was said that around 10,000 Ngonis needed to be moved into the Main Ngoni Reserve (NAZ KDG8/7/1 1922). Finally in 1929 there were some 8,000 Africans that “were under obligation to move into the [four] reserves” of Fort Jameson District (NAZ KDG8/1/4 1929). But since the movement into the reserve areas had been ongoing since the turn of the century, it is hard to estimate any exact number over the years. It is, however, clear that the population in the Main Ngoni Reserve grew steadily from its establishment as a result of both continued in-migration and natural increase. Between 1924 and 1942 the population in this reserve increased from 42,961 to 63,561. The population increase was high in all the reserves but the Zumwanda was the most extreme, almost doubling its population between 1924 and 1942 (Kay 1965:21).

It is however, likely that much, if not most, of the movement of Africans into reserves took place before 1924. In 1942, the Land Commission estimated that there was a surplus population of 90,000 in the four Fort Jameson reserves, which at the time had a total population of approximately 150,000 (Priestly & Greening 1956:4; Kay 1965:21). The 1924 Reserve Commission estimated that each African needed 6 hectares for cultivation, cattle grazing and wood collection, but this proved to be far too little to support people’s livelihoods in these areas (Vail 1977:143-144). Large parts of the reserves were in fact uninhabited due to lack of water, tsetse infestation and inferior soils, which was not well considered by the 1924 Commission, responsible for the final division of land in the Concession area (NAZ SEC2/176 1938; Priestly & Greening 1956:2-3;).

The colonial administration initially denied that the amount of land allocated to Africans was insufficient. Instead it was argued that the agricultural methods used by Africans caused soil erosion (NAZ KDG4/2 1933; NAZ SEC2/85 1935; NAZ SEC1/54 1936; Priestly & Greening 1956:4). The colonial

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<sup>41</sup> There seems to be a definite lack of data regarding how many moved into the reserves during the different years, as well as of a more aggregated character, which has also been pointed out by Phiri (1982). The annual reports for Fort Jameson District from 1912/13 to 1929 talk of a continuing movement of Africans into the reserves. But there is also data of movement of African smallholders into native reserves as early as 1906, and it is likely that it occurred also before that (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook 1).

authorities therefore suggested improved agricultural techniques in the reserves and the “hastening (of) less extravagant methods of agriculture” (NAZ SEC2/85 1935). The smallholders’ practices of intercropping and mound cultivation were pin-pointed as major evils that caused erosion and depletion, especially when used on slope land.<sup>42</sup> It was further concluded in relation to the improved agricultural techniques that:

It is manifest that changes will not be achieved merely by telling natives what to do. The Native Authorities must make the necessary orders, with penalties for failure to observe them. (NAZ SEC2/85 1935:10)

The approach to African farmers and agriculture was common among both colonial personnel and settlers in many parts of rural Africa and was by no means typical for this area (see e.g. Beinart 1984; Elkins 2005:125-127). The lack of response to the deteriorating situation in the reserves in Fort Jameson must be viewed in the light of the policies to protect the settlers, who despite their limited numbers were a strong pressure group. The tobacco industry was still seen as of great importance, and according to the District Agricultural Officer, the development within the reserves was to be adjusted in agreement with that ambition.

The district should advance as a European agricultural community (...) Hence we must control and develop the native agriculturalist in such a manner that the present Reserves may be permanently cultivated without acceleration of the natural denudation of the soils. (NAZ SEC1/54 1936:1)

This policy made it possible for the District Agricultural Officer to conclude that Mpezeni chiefdom was extensively over-populated but that the area could maintain its population if the farmers adopted the right agricultural technology. Chief Sayiri was thought to be able to increase its population under the same circumstances. In terms of Chief Maguya, however, Clothier concluded that the area is “decidedly over-populated” (NAZ SEC1/54 1936) and that the area needed to decrease its population by half. In general Clothier suggested that people should move northwards from the southern parts of the Main Ngoni Reserve. He acknowledged the problem of tsetse infestation north of Sayiri,

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<sup>42</sup> Mound cultivation meant in brief that the soil was gathered in heap where crops residues and weed were buried in the heap to conserve the soil. The mounds were then intercropped with for example groundnuts, pumpkins and beans. The following year the procedure was repeated but then with maize as the main crop instead of groundnuts (Priestly & Greening 1956; OF7, older male farmer).

Maguya and Mpezeni, but suggested people leave their cattle behind for the time being (ibid).

The colonial government hesitated to say that there was not enough land in the reserves. This would have meant that land needed to be taken from present or future European land occupations, which the administration wanted to avoid, although it was clear already in the early 1930s that the huge inflow of settlers was not to happen. In 1934 the European population of the Eastern Province stood at 354 persons and seemed to have peaked in 1951 at 980 (Kay 1965:8). Large areas therefore laid idle next to crowded reserves (Vail 1977:144-145). Bradley & Fraser (NAZ SEC2/176 1938) wrote about a situation where seemingly over half of the European farm areas were unoccupied and large parts of the occupied farms were far from fully tilled. Vail (1977:143-144) suggested that the North Charterland Company actually welcomed a situation where Africans would not be able to sustain their lives in the reserves. The reserve policies should hence be a way to 'crowd them out', a theme also in the broader literature on native reserve policies in Southern and Eastern Africa (Mair 1936:28-31; Arrighi 1970; Palmer & Parsons 1977a). Without access to enough land, the people living in the reserves would be forced to look for employment elsewhere, which was in the interest of both the mining industry and local settlers who also needed cheap available labour.

### **7.3.3 Tax and labour policies**

Colonial tax in Fort Jameson was introduced in 1901 initially in the form of a hut tax, but from 1914 it became obligatory to every adult male (NAZ ZP1/1/1 1925).<sup>43</sup> The tax changed over time but normally it was the equivalent of two months' labour at a settler farm in Fort Jameson District (NAZ SEC2/85 1935). The tax had two main purposes, a) to finance the local administration and b) to force Africans to look for employment in order to free labour<sup>44</sup> for European farmers and the mining industry in Northern Rhodesia and other parts of Southern Africa (Kay 1965:11). It was however the combination of the tax and the establishment of native reserves that made the outflow of males extreme in this area, even compared to other parts of Northern Rhodesia.

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<sup>43</sup> Methods to decide who was an adult male were an arbitrary process and the age varied largely. Important signs were hair in the armpit, beard that needed to be shaved and/or if the subject could pass the hand over the head and touch the shoulder (OF1, older male farmer; OFG2, older male farmers group; OFG3, older female farmers group; OF7, older male farmer).


<sup>44</sup> Regular forced labour continued when it came to road and bridge constructions and carriers in war (NAZ SEC2/85). During both the World War I and II the recruitment of male persons was extensive within the district (NAZ KDG8/1/3 1918/19; NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. II; Vail 1977:142-143).

According to Zgambo (1992:77), most people in the area initially managed to meet their increased expenditures by “surpluses produced in their traditional economies”. Available data also indicate that the labour migration before World War I was limited (NAZ KDG5/1 District notebook Vol. II). Also Poole (NAZ KDG8/7/1 1922) described the period 1900-1915 as relatively good for African smallholders in that they were able to produce agricultural products both for themselves and for the local market. However, it is also clear that the colonial army demanded a lot of male labour from Fort Jameson District during World War I. Over twelve thousand Africans from the Eastern Province were in the army the year 1919. At least half of them came from Fort Jameson District (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. II).

The creation of native reserves was in itself an argument to facilitate the collection of tax (Vail 1977:136). African settlements in the late nineteenth century were increasingly scattered all over Eastern Zambia and a more concentrated settlement was preferred both in terms of tax collection and political control through indirect rule. The villages in the reserves were located to facilitate the collection of tax (for example along roads) and scattered settlements were prevented through an ordinance stating that that each village had to contain at least 40 huts (Phiri 1982:128; NAZ KDG5/1 District notebook II). Due to lack of local employment, and the less attractive work at European farms, Africans from the reserves went to the mines in Southern Rhodesia and the Copperbelt. Although the conditions in the mines of Southern Africa were harsh, it was generally perceived as a better option than working on a settler farm in Eastern Northern Rhodesia, both in terms of salaries, working conditions and accommodation (Priestly & Greening 1956:46-47; Zgambo 1992:78).

This work migration led to a constant absence of 50-70 percent of the adult males in the reserve areas of East Luangwa for at least 50 years (Vail 1977:137-138). In 1929 over 60 percent of the adult males in Fort Jameson District were living and working away from their villages. Of these, 70 percent had gone outside the district, most commonly to the mines of Southern Rhodesia (NAZ KDG8/1/4 1929). In the Main Ngoni Reserve, 71 percent of the men were absent from their villages, most of them working outside Fort Jameson District (NAZ SEC1/54 1936). In 1950, the out-migration of adult males stood at around 60 percent for the whole Eastern Province. This situation continued at least until the early 1960s (see Davies 1971:46-47; Zgambo 1992:86). In Chief Sayiri, the absence of adult males was 65 percent throughout most of the 1950s and in Chief Maguya, where the livelihood situation in general has been described as more severe, the absence of adult males was 70 percent in 1953/54 (NAZ SEC2/87 Annual report 1947; NAZ SEC2/88 Annual report 1954-1957). An

illustration of labour migration is shown from three Chiefdoms in the Main Ngoni Reserve for the years 1953/54 (see Figure 7-6 and Table 7-2).



**Figure 7-6: Main Ngoni Reserve and European settler areas**

Source: Based on Barnes 1967:120

**Table 7-2: Male labour migration in Chief Sayiri, Maguya and Mpezeni 1953/54**

Location of taxable males	Chief Sayiri	Chief Maguya	Chief Mpezeni
Living at Home	(36%) 431	(30%) 314	(39%) 1,090
At work in Eastern Province	241	357	546
At work elsewhere in NR	174	166	351
At work in Southern Rhodesia	284	148	622
At work in Nyasaland	9	14	40
At work in South Africa	11	1	13
Missing	64	37	96
<i>Total taxable males</i>	<i>1,214</i>	<i>1,037</i>	<i>2,758</i>

Source: NAZ SEC2/88 1954-1957

The chiefs in the area soon started to complain about the tax and the exodus of adult males that left women and elderly behind in the villages. They also alerted the officials on the matter of treatment and salaries when working for settlers within the district:

Our boys when they come to work are not paid good wages and are not treated properly and so do not earn the tax money. (...) On all farms they are beaten by the white man. (NAZ KDG4/2, Indaba 1923)<sup>45</sup>

The officials for their part criticised the Africans for going to Southern Rhodesia instead of working for the Europeans on their farms (NAZ KDG4/2 Indaba 1923 & 1930). The chiefs responded that the low salaries within the district forced people to travel to the mines (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. II; NAZ KDG4/2 Indaba 1924). On earlier occasions the administrators had, however, explicitly told the chiefs to go and tell their “(...) men to go for work in Southern Rhodesia to raise money for taxes” (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. I). A recurring theme in the administrators communication with the local chiefs in the District during the first 35 years of colonial rule was the low morals among Africans taxpayers (ibid; NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. II):

I am disappointed in the way this [the tax] is being paid. You natives are getting too much behind in paying, and put it till last minute. It is due in July and after the end of December this year, the N.C. [Native Commissioner] will be summoning tax-defaulters. (NAZ KDG4/2, Indaba 1923)

To not pay the tax was evidently associated with big risks, such as confiscation of the households’ hut, recruitment for forced labour<sup>46</sup>, recruitment for the British Army during the World Wars or arrest and punishment of various kinds. This continued until the time of independence. During interviews with older people I listened to numerous stories about what could happen if someone failed to pay their tax. Normally it led to forced labour and physical punishment of some kind, but many tax defaulters chose to run away to hide and sleep in the bush if alerted that the tax collectors were approaching (OF1, older male farmer; OFG2, older male farmers group).

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<sup>45</sup> The older people interviewed also witnessed the bad treatment. Violence against African labourers seems to have been common practice on settler farms during the 1950s. Also when Indians started to take up agriculture there was deep concern among the native authorities regarding how the African labour was treated and paid on these farms (Phiri 2000:41).

<sup>46</sup> It was called Native Tax Relief Scheme (NAZ SEC2/85 Annual report 1935).

The absence of up to 70 percent of the adult male population naturally led to social disintegration of the households in rural villages and it also meant a huge loss of labour for the households. The agricultural work was left to women, children and the elderly, while the salaries for male workers were kept at a level that did not allow much investment in farming activities in the home villages (Zgambo 1992:90). However, as District Commissioner Bradley and Agricultural Officer Fraser (NAZ SEC2/176 1938) claimed (and also warned), the situation would most likely have become even worse if the men had returned to the limited and deteriorating pieces of land left at home. Looking at the female-male ratio in the Ngoni reserve, the picture becomes slightly different. Available sources indicate that there were around 150 women per 100 men in the Main Ngoni Reserve in the early 1920s (NAZ KDG8/7/1 1922). In Chief Sayiri there were around 67 men per 100 women during the 1930s (NAZ KDG 5/1 District Notebook Vol. I). This indicates that there was also a rather large degree of female migration, especially towards the later colonial period, something that is also stressed by Moore and Vaughan (1997) in their study of Northern Province. This is also confirmed by the interviews with older farmers in the study. Several of the older women interviewed had also joined their husbands during their period of migrant labour in Northern or Southern Rhodesia. The female migration was, however, more temporary. Often they joined their husbands after a few years and normally returned to the village long before the husband (OF1, older male farmer; OFG2, older male farmers group; OF5, older female farmer; OF6, older female farmer)

### **7.3.4 Trade and market policies**

Colonial agricultural market and trade policies in the Fort Jameson area were oriented towards supporting the European settler farmers. In this policy regime, the role of African smallholders was subsumed to that ambition. When the settlers in the early colonial days were occupied with beef production, the administration tried to convince Africans to grow cotton for sale. But as soon as the settlers turned to cotton cultivation, Africans were requested to work on their estates.

When the settlers around Fort Jameson started to cultivate tobacco in 1914/15, Africans were prohibited to grow the crop, a regulation that remained in force until 1938. At the same time, the settlers gained substantial state support (Kanduza 1983:202; NAZ SEC1/32 1943). According to Phiri (2000:39-40), African farmers were prohibited to grow tobacco until the late 1940s. Throughout the colonial era African farmers in the native reserves faced a lack

of access to commercial agricultural markets. On occasions, however, they were forced to market their produce in order to assist with the feeding of workers or prisoners in the district. The price was then set by the government, and at times, such as in 1919 it was in the form of a levy (Mtisi 1976:46). At other times when the smallholders in the reserves managed to produce substantial surpluses there was hardly any market available (NAZ SEC2/85 1935).

Agricultural regulations in Northern Rhodesia were often adjusted for different purposes in different areas. Marketing boards focused on the produce of settlers and discriminated against the African producers in different ways. In terms of maize, the colonial government guaranteed the settlers higher prices compared to Africans and also the lion's share of the internal market (Vickery 1985). The higher price paid to European farmers was motivated by their higher production costs (PRO CO852/1/3 1935; PRO CO852/191/13 1939).<sup>47</sup> It was further declared that the difference between the settler price and the African price was invested in an improvement fund for the development of African agriculture. In line with this policy it was argued that the division of the internal maize market was a mode to protect Africans from cultivating their land too heavily and causing environmental degradation. These policies were criticised even within the administration for being discriminatory against African smallholders (PRO CO852/1/3 1935).

The unsuitability of marketing Africans' produce is pointed out on several occasions in colonial records. In 1938, Bradley (District Commissioner) and Fraser (District Agricultural Officer) suggested that grain trade should be forbidden in the native reserves in Fort Jameson (NAZ SEC2/176 1938). In 1947 it was concluded that there was hardly any trading of maize produced in the native reserves and that it would be "most unwise for the position to be otherwise" (NAZ SEC2/87 1947). The main official argument behind this approach was again that market production within the reserves would put further pressure on the land and the environment.

Both the interviewees and archival sources indicate that there was no other place than Fort Jameson for smallholders to market their produce, at least not until the early 1960s (NAZ MAG2/6/40a 1962). The available option for smallholders was therefore to bring small quantities by themselves up to Fort Jameson for sale at the local market, seemingly rather similar to the contemporary market situation (NAZ EP1/1/23 1962; OF1, older male farmer; OFG2, older male farmers group; OFG3, older female farmers group). Later, when Peasant Farming Schemes were introduced in the 1950s the colonial

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<sup>47</sup> A similar argument was launched when European traders (who for some time monopolized all trade in the area) tried to prevent Indians from undertaking business in the area (2000:11).



government started to put African smallholders in competition against each other in terms of for example prices on produce and access to credits. This was a part of the thinking behind the cooperative societies created by the administration from the early 1950s (Banda 1992:101-102).

Finally, it can be concluded in relation to trade and market policies in the reserve areas of Fort Jameson that there was less need for enforcement of market regulations there compared to other parts of Zambia. The native reserves in themselves worked against any market involvement by African smallholders. The size and quality of the landholdings made it difficult to produce beyond subsistence so there was rarely any surplus to trade.

### **7.3.5 The troublesome Ngoni**

The relationship between the colonial administration in Fort Jameson District and the Ngoni people was deeply problematic. The view of Ngoni people as somewhat different compared to other ethnic groups in the area seems to be further rooted in descriptions of pre-colonial societies. In these sources they are labelled as belonging to a warrior tribe, characterised by aggression and a conquering mentality. One of the first British officers meeting with Chief Mpeseni in 1896 expressed the following opinion about the paramount chief:

Mpeseni is an absolute savage. He thinks no more of killing a man than killing an ox, perhaps not so much. (Colonel Warton cited in Lane Poole 1949:13)

Also when describing the Ngoni history of migration they labelled the Ngoni as an extraordinary malicious people with “a tribal history of arrogance and cruelty” (NAZ EP4/20/19 1951; see also Fraser 1945:45).

Throughout the colonial documentation the Ngoni are portrayed as particularly hard work. They were stubborn and conservative, they never followed orders, they did not grow the crops they were told to, nor did they decrease their livestock when advised to. Importantly, the colonial attitude towards African smallholders in general was patronising and paternalistic. All Africans in the area were seen as immature and unfit for the modern society. There are a lot of comments such as the “innate conservatism of the village African” and the like in the colonial documentation (NAZ SEC2/88 1957). However, there is a qualitative difference when it comes to how the Ngoni people were described. They were destructive and devastating to other people in the area, while other groups sometimes were credited descriptions such as the “peace-loving agricultural Chewa” or the “timid” Chewa (Lane Poole 1949:11,

31). Already in 1922 the Native Commissioner in Fort Jameson declared the Ngoni people to be a “rapidly declining race” (NAZ KDG8/7/1 1922:8).

However, as long as the Africans in the reserves were largely left to care for themselves the psyche of the Ngoni people attracted less attention. The Ngoni mentality, however, was a recurring theme during late colonial rule, from the 1940s and onwards. It coincided largely with the increased focus on African agriculture, with soil conservation work and the resettlement policies taking place after the World War II, further described under subsequent headings. By this time the administration started to work more actively in the reserve areas and colonial officials were clearly disturbed by the attitude among Ngoni people. From then on there are numerous references to the “reactionary Mpezeni area” (NAZ SEC 2/88 1954:15) and the “the usual Ngoni conservatism against progress” (NAZ EP4/2/9 1958:16) when, for example, new agricultural techniques were introduced. Agricultural officers were continuously frustrated by the Ngoni’s resistant attitude, which they saw as puzzling and without cause. However, the District Officer Priestly and Agricultural Officer Greening (1956) attempted an explanation after travelling in the South Ngoni Area of the Main Ngoni Reserve. Making a land use survey of the area they were astonished by how far the soil deterioration had gone and by the poor livelihoods of the people in the area.

Many of the Ngoni, even the more recalcitrant ones, fully realise the poverty of their land and they recognise soil erosion when they see it. They may even admit that the new ideas of conservation are sound, but they still refuse to do anything about it. This is due to traditional hostility to Europeans, reaction, apathy, laziness, and in some cases a definite spirit of independence. To agree would be to capitulate, to co-operate a public betrayal. (ibid:24)

This was a definite case of blaming the Ngoni for the deteriorating environment in the Main Ngoni Reserve (NAZ MAG2/9/12 1957). It was their lack of understanding for the European agricultural methods and their “mentality which does not relate cause and effect” that constrained any effective soil conservation in the area (Hellen 1962:200). They were compared with the Chewa who were “far ahead of the Ngoni agriculturally because they have understood what the Agricultural Officers were talking about” (NAZ MAG2/9/12 1957). The Chewa were further described as a people that want to practice new methods, while the Ngoni attitude was to refuse any kind of suggestion or order (NAZ SEC2/88 1956). It was stated to be a fundamental problem among the Ngoni that they did not think about the time to come, since they considered it “a bad thing to think

of the future” (NAZ MAG2/9/12 1957:12). This was held to hinder them from taking any kind of action to improve the status of their land and livelihood.

A lot of blame was placed on the Ngoni chiefs. With a few exceptions they were depicted as “reactionary and conservative in their ideas” (NAZ MAG2/9/12 1956), again in comparison with the chiefs of other groups in the area. The Ngoni resistance and the Ngoni’s suspicious attitudes towards European agricultural methods and basically to any kind of measures to improve their livelihoods and the situation in the reserves were said to be sanctioned from the highest level of the paramount Chief Mpezeni, also indicated in this letter from the Provincial Commissioner of the Eastern Province:

The Ngoni have been unco-operative in Government projects and the policy of firm handling that was adopted in recent years had not altered the outlook of the chiefs. The Paramount Chief Mpezeni in particular seemed apathetic and discouraged in all his contacts with Europeans. (NAZ EP4/20/19 1950)

Perhaps the view of the Ngoni during colonial times is best summarised by the following reflection by Priestly & Greening in their report in 1956 on land utilisation in the South Ngoni Area:

The Ngoni have been a ‘problem’ for years, in all probability ever since 1900, first to the British South Africa Company and then to the Northern Rhodesia Government. No doubt they were a ‘problem’, although of a different type, to the other tribes of North-Eastern Rhodesia ever since they crossed the Zambezi in 1835. (Priestly & Greening 1956:50)

In the years just before independence there was some evidence, however, that government officials changed their writing about the Ngoni. They now saw signs of change in the Ngoni’s behaviour and attitude. In the early 1960s there are numerous reports about an increased adoption rate of soil conservation methods in the Main Ngoni Reserve. The Paramount Chief Mpezeni was becoming cooperative in his attitude and his almost “dictatorial power” was seen as contributing “beneficially” to the conservation and forest protection work done in the area. This was not least so since most of Mpezeni’s sub-chiefs still, “conservative as they are” were “solidly against them” (NAZ EP1/1/42 1960:6). In 1962, referring to the Priestly & Greening report and their description of the Ngoni characteristics, government officials wrote that:

These words still undoubtedly apply to many (...) [although there are] indications that there is such a thing as a wind of change even in

Ngoniland. Here in lie our hope for the future. (NAZ MAG 2/6/40 1962a:15)

Considering the extension officers' contemporary descriptions of the Ngoni, this "hope for the future" has from an official point of view no doubt been dashed.

### **7.3.6 The crisis in the native reserves**

The policies towards smallholders in the area created a close to desperate situation in many areas of the native reserves. Policies were implemented that complicated the smallholders' livelihood possibilities in almost every aspect of their lives. Their lands shrank considerably at the same time as they were forced to earn money for tax. Important additional livelihood activities such as game hunting became forbidden and in all reserves in the Fort Jameson District people were obliged to live in clustered villages in order to ease political control and tax collection (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. II). Furthermore, the administration introduced pass laws to control the movement of Africans into Fort Jameson town (NAZ KDG5/1 District Notebook Vol. I).

It was at an early stage clear that a deep crisis in the reserve areas was inevitable. The War years from 1916-1919 were the first to become severely difficult for the African smallholders. Lack of labour due to war service, and a drought, left the Fort Jameson reserves in a state "very near a famine" (NAZ KDG8/7/1 1922). During the years immediately after the war the emigration of able-bodied males took place on a wide scale from Fort Jameson District. This was due both to the worsening conditions in the reserves and a heavy increase in tax (ibid). When men migrated from the reserve areas they left women, elderly people and children to carry out their duties within the household. This was work like building huts, kraals and other kind of construction work apart from their normal responsibilities. Constructions fell into disrepair. New land, in cases where it existed, could not be cleared, which inevitably led to over-cultivation of already open fields. The cohesion in villages was weakened and divorces became common (Zgambo 1992:90-91). In 1921, both Mpezeni and Maguya faced severe food insecurity and starvation threatened as long as no assistance was provided (NAZ KDG8/1/3 1921-22). The first area to draw specific attention of the officials of the administration was the Mpezeni chiefdom, which in the early years constituted a reserve of its own, entirely surrounded by European farm areas. As early as 1922 a report discussed the critical situation in this area:

(...) but no additional allowance was made to meet the needs of an increasing population or to compensate for the inferior soil and the mountainous nature of the country [Chief Mpezeni reserve]. The result is seen today when the soil is completely exhausted, the timber entirely felled, and the people upon the verge of starvation. In the main Angoni reserve a like tendency is discernible. (NAZ KDG8/7/1 1922:23)

Even if the situation in the Mpezeni area led to its integration into the Main Ngoni Reserve and an addition of land to enable the two reserves to unite, it is striking that several official reports up to the 1940s addressed the land problem in the reserves without any real consideration from the administration's side. The Main Ngoni Reserve was described as "rapidly becoming deforested" already in 1921 (NAZ KDG8/1/3:7 1921). In 1936 (NAZ SEC1/54), 1938 (NAZ SEC2/176) and 1943 (Trapnell 1943) reports were written that clearly stated that the reserves in Fort Jameson District were simply too small to accommodate the number of people living there.

Rather, severe food insecurity was a common theme during the colonial era. The reserve commission in 1925 wrote about a recurring lack of food for three months a year in the reserve areas (NAZ ZP1/1/1 1925). Phiri (1982:130-131) wrote about periodic famine among Africans in Fort Jameson District. Bradley & Fraser (NAZ SEC2/176 1938) described the situation as alarming, and in some areas on the brink of famine, and declared with certainty that improved agricultural methods and administrative control had no scope on their own to rectify the situation. According to the same source, famine relief was necessary in the Mpezeni area in 1938. However, the information on food security in the native reserves is limited and the annual reports often come with vague statements like "crops were adequate except for areas which were effected by land shortage and overcrowding" (NAZ SEC2/85 1937). In general, the problems were stated to be particularly urgent in the Main Ngoni Reserve. According to Bradley & Fraser (NAZ SEC2/176 1938), more land was needed not least for the purpose of avoiding political unrest.

At the same time, the tobacco industry showed not to be all that promising and there was in fact an outflow of settlers from the Eastern part to the 'line of rail' area. Many of them left their farms in Fort Jameson District (Vail 1977:144-145). One of the consequences of the reserve system and the decision to demarcate vast areas for future European settlement was that large areas within the Charterland Concession area had reverted into bush (Kay 1965:16). This together with the forced amalgamation of villages (foremost to ease tax collection) and the ban on game hunting by Africans led to a great increase in tsetse infestation in large parts of the reserves. This increased infestation

undoubtedly had a negative impact on the cattle owning Ngoni people (NAZ SEC1/54 1936; Vail 1977). Large parts of the Main Ngoni Reserve were tsetse infested, although the South Ngoni Area, including Sayiri, Maguya and Mpezeni were free of the fly (NAZ SEC1/54 1936).

While large parts of the European land became underutilised, the people in the reserves started to cultivate hillsides and other marginal areas in search for a living. Cultivated areas became exhausted, while soil erosion and deforestation became widespread (Kay 1965:20-24; Vail 1977:149). Fallow periods shortened and land that used to be fallowed for twenty years was cultivated more or less permanently (Priestly & Greening 1956:8-9). This development can hardly be said to have come as a surprise to the administration. Rather it seems to have been the opposite. The deforestation had for a long time been used as an argument for keeping Africans in reserves, since that would limit their “reckless cutting of timber” (PRO CO795/16/5 1927:3) in other parts of the North Charterland Concession Area. It was at an early stage well understood that the destruction within the reserves would continue (and probably increase) but this was to be dealt with at a later stage (PRO CO795/16/5 1927).


Despite the alarming reports about the situation in the Main Ngoni Reserve, very little happened until the end of 1940s. The Africans’ ‘failure’ to make a living out of their limited resources was still to be solved through harder work and the replacement of their allegedly primitive and outdated methods of agriculture. According to the Assistant Director of Agriculture in Northern Rhodesia, William Allan (1949), land use practices in the native reserves of Northern Rhodesia:

tended to degenerate rather than to improve, partly owing to increasing pressure on the land and partly because of migration of the men to the centres of employment. (Allan 1949:73)

In 1950, the southern part of the Main Ngoni Reserve was labelled the Ngoni Devastated area. Today this area includes Chief Sayiri, Chief Maguya and Chief Mpezeni (see Figure 7-6 and Figure 7-7). Priestly & Greening (1956) entered this area for an investigation into its condition with the purpose of advising on measures to ease population pressure and reverse the deteriorating conditions. In their report they began by stating that regarding earlier opinions and judgement of the situation of the area, it was actually much worse than anyone could have imagined. They also concluded that the southern portion of the Main Ngoni Reserve probably held a population four times higher than it could sustain.

### 7.3.7 Rethinking the reserves – resettlement and conservation farming

The livelihood crisis in the Main Ngoni Reserve and the three other reserves in the Fort Jameson District eventually led to a two-pronged approach from the government side. The starting point that African farmers needed to make better use of the land persisted and came to mould the policies up to independence, but it was also acknowledged that this alone was not the answer. During the 1940s and the 1950s, a number of resettlement schemes were undertaken. The resettlement of African farmers focused on unalienated land, which was in fair condition in terms of access to water and fertile soil. The white settlers protested, claiming to be expecting another influx of new settlers to the area. In consequence, the government agreed on setting aside areas for future European settlement. However, most of NCEC area was bought by the colonial government in 1941 (Priestly & Greening 1956:4). The unalienated land was renamed *Native Trust Land* for the future use and benefit of Africans (Kay 1965:25-35). Parts of this land became subject to resettlement, for example in Chipangali in the north-east of the concession area (see Figure 7-7).



**Figure 7-7: North Charterland Concession Area after the resettlement**

Source: Based on Kay 1965:34.

Figure 7-7 shows the major areas of resettlement between 1940 and the declaration of independence in 1963. Much of the resettlement during the 1940s however was illegal occupations that were transformed to legal occupations and therefore did not involve any real resettlement for the southern part of the Main Ngoni Reserve, which remained the most overcrowded part (Priestly & Greening 1956:4-5; Kay 1965:34). A few unoccupied settler farms in Fort Jameson District were bought in the early 1940s, but these had already been illegally occupied by the Ngoni (some of them since the 1920s) and can hardly be said to have been of any relief (Priestly & Greening 1956:57). The Africans living in what was in 1950 labelled the “Ngoni Devastated Area” (see Figure 7-7) were encouraged to resettle in Chipangali in the northeast during the 1950s, with the colonial administration making investments in the area to establish the necessary infrastructure. The people were, however, reluctant to move, partly because the Chipangali area was infested by tsetse fly (Hellen 1962:202). Despite the official approach that movement to the new area needed to be voluntary (NAZ EP4/2/9 1958), several of the older people interviewed reported that displacement had been forced:

People did not want to go there [to Chipangali] because of the tsetse fly. So the D.C. [District Commissioner] talked to the Chiefs who agreed upon sending people and those who did not want to go there were beaten by the messengers. The first people who moved there were forced, absolutely, but after some time people started to move voluntarily. (OF7, older male farmer)

There were other reasons for smallholders to resent the move to Chipangali. Earlier movement at the command of the administration had left them impoverished. Now, to move 60 kilometres away to Chipangali could easily be interpreted as a divide and rule strategy (Nkhata 1992:117-118). Often it was interpreted as part of a new land alienation involving their present belongings (Priestly & Greening 1956:58). The selection process was in general left to the chiefs and they were accused of using their power to evict people they preferred to get rid of for various reasons (Nkhata 1992:120).<sup>48</sup>

In general, the resettlement schemes from the 1940s and onwards are described as of some relief, although the problems of overcrowding in South Ngoni Area were by no means solved (NAZ EP1/1/23 1962; Kay 1965:35). The changes in agricultural practices and conservation farming continued to be the major measures to improve the situation in the overcrowded areas. The methods

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<sup>48</sup> That Chief Sayiri used the resettlement in Chipangali in order to get rid of certain people was something much talked about during the interviews with older farmers.



suggested by the colonial government involved earlier rules of prohibiting cultivation and cutting of trees on steep slopes and along watercourses. Contour ridges were introduced and there was a ban on cultivation on mounds in favour of conventional ridge cultivation. Many of these measures were suggested to decrease soil erosion, but some of them meant that the land available for cultivation decreased. The older farmers have differing opinions of mound cultivation. Some state that the practice caused soil erosion, while there are those claiming that it in fact had a preserving effect at the same time as it promoted crop diversification and intercropping.

We couldn't intercrop in ridges in the same way as in the mounds, it was difficult. But the cultivation in mounds did not lead to soil erosion, since each mound was surrounded by a small moat that prevented the water to run off with the soil. (OF7, older male farmer)

In the late 1930s and early 1940s it was explicit that "fact and firmness should enable the changes to be effected" (NAZ EP4/2/8 1943) and that there was a need to make "necessary orders, with penalties for failure to observe them" when new practices and rules were to be implemented (NAZ SEC2/85 1935). During the late 1940s and 1950s the rhetoric changed but older farmers report that there was continued violence and punishment in the enforcement of conservation farming (OF1, older male farmer; OFG2, older male farmers group; OF7, older male farmer):

When it came to implementing contour ridges we, the Ngonis, did not know what to do and we did not know the advantage and disadvantage of contour ridges. (...) So others were arrested for not implementing the technology, others were beaten once they were taken to Chipata, others were imprisoned for not implementing the contour ridges. (OF1, older male farmer)

The focus on soil conservation was a trend in the whole of Southern Africa at the time. It fitted the argument that the methods of agriculture were the cause of most problems faced in rural areas inhabited by Africans. For example, Carswell (2006) writes about similar policies in Kenya and Tanzania during the colonial time. Coercion and different types of punishment seemed to have been common practice also in these colonies (see also Elkins 2005). The resistance towards soil conservation was, as in many other places of Eastern and Southern Africa, of a political character. After World War II, national awareness was on the rise and collaboration with the colonial power was often seen as a betrayal of African interests (Vail 1977:152). This is likely to have been yet another reason for the

reluctant attitude towards resettlement in for example Chipangali. Nkhata (1992:117-118) also argues that reducing political tension was actually one of the most important motives for moving people to Chipangali.

The failure to implement many of the measures was also due to the lack of manpower in many of the households. High levels of labour migration persisted throughout the colonial era and it was often impracticable for the remaining household members to adopt new labour intensive conservation methods (Vail 1977:150-151; see also Carswell 2006:414). An extremely vulnerable situation, with lack of labour and resources as its most prominent features, is not the best starting point to adopt new unknown practices.<sup>49</sup> A colonial District Officer summarised his impressions from the Fort Jameson Reserves in 1947:

It is inevitable that the absence of 60 per cent of the able bodied males - and that the cream of them - should slow up development. So often the actual (...) population of a village is found to be a horde of women supported by a handful of elderly men and weaklings. Indeed, it is a matter of some surprise that so much can be done in the way of subsistence production and improved agricultural methods when the material is so weak and scanty. On the other hand it would certainly cause most acute embarrassment, to say the least of it, in some of the over-populated Reserves of the District if all the labourers came home together. (NAZ SEC2/87 1947:17)

The quotation above includes a degree of astonishment from the officer's point of view, that the situation in the reserves was not even worse. It also indicates a lack of understanding of the farmers' potential to make a living out of rather limited resources. When discussing the late colonial era with older farmers within Chief Sayiri, they partly divert from the close to doomsday-like depictions of large parts of the colonial documentation. The older farmers indicate that soil depletion was a problem during the late colonial era, but not to the same extent as today. They confirm that they faced food shortages and that they had difficulties cultivating enough to sustain themselves. At the same time they state that the dependency on fertiliser was not as high as today, although the lack of access to inputs is perceived to have been a big problem during the late colonial rule.

The soil fertility at independence was not as bad as today, it required less fertiliser. And there were other places where you could cultivate without fertiliser. (OFG3, older female farmers group)

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<sup>49</sup> Apart from that, some of the conservation methods such as the abandonment of intercropping (Hellen 1962:201) can be highly questioned.

Older farmers also confirm that land pressure was a problem in the area and that the movement of people to Chipangali was of some relief. The fact that squatting on European land was an increasingly common feature during the late colonial rule also confirms that the pressure on the land was high in the reserve.

During the 1950s the administration tried to encourage a commercial class within the African agriculture through Peasant Farming Schemes and Improved Farming Schemes. These schemes included support like inputs (chemical fertilisers), credits and farming equipment, and bonuses to people perceived as progressive farmers. The arrangement was an integrated part of the focus on maize production and to supply urban consumers with cheap staple food, which was an increasingly important objective of the colonial government. The programme for peasant farmers was in general described as a great success by the colonial administration (NAZ SEC2/85 1954-1957; PRO CO1015/11 1951). However, the programme included very few Africans, it focused on the already better off, who were supported by means that were not available to the rest of the African smallholders (PRO CO1015/646 1953; Phiri 1982:132-133). Farmer participating in these schemes in Fort Jameson were, for example, paid a 20 percent higher price for their maize compared to other African farmers (Nkhata 1992:115).

Political motivations also lay behind the implementation of this scheme (PRO CO1015/646 1953) and Kanduzi (1992a:9-10) concluded that “prosperous rural producers would strengthen indirect rule institutions and also act as a collaborating group for the colonial administration”. Resettlement areas were focus areas for the Peasant Farming Schemes (Kay 1965:38-51). In the middle of the 1950s there were around 50 peasant farmers or improved farmers in Fort Jameson, while the total population of the district stood at over 200,000. In 1958, the coverage of the programme had expanded and approximately two percent of the farmers in Eastern Province participated in Peasant Farming Schemes (NAZ SEC2/85 1954-1957).

### **7.3.8 Approaching independence**

It seems that rural livelihoods improved slightly in the area from the mid-1950s to independence. This was largely due to the fact that at least a thousand people moved from the South Ngoni Area to Chipangali up to 1962, leaving land that was taken up for cultivation by the remaining population (NAZ EP2/1/7 1962). Reports of the early 1960s also paint a slightly more positive picture of development in the reserve areas, with in general increased food security and

some surplus production (NAZ EP1/1/42 1960).<sup>50</sup> Until the mid-1950s the people in South Ngoni Area were obviously severely food insecure at the same time as there was no free land available (NAZ MAG2/9/12 1958). Famine relief was frequently required in the area up to 1955 (NAZ MAG2/6/40a 1962). Reports of famine relief are, however, absent during the 1960s.

However, the improvement in the South Ngoni Area was still described as limited. The problem was still that the land did not get time to rest, that there was a continuing loss of organic matter and plant nutrients. Sheet erosion was described as rampant. A lot of blame was put on the excessive cultivation of maize, which was perceived as soil exhausting, and the lack of use of manure and chemical fertilisers. The area around present day Kasauka village was estimated to have a 40 percent surplus population in 1962 (ibid). Visiting the South Ngoni Area in 1959 the former Agricultural Officer in Fort Jameson, William Allan, still described the area as:

(...) a typical rural slum, a 'nursery and old folks home' whose inhabitants had come to depend largely on wages of labour, remittances from migrant workers, and petty trade, to eke out totally inadequate crop yields from the degraded soil. (Allen 1965:454-455)

This last quote points at a high degree of diversification and semi-proletarianisation in the area, with farmers piecing together their livelihoods through a variety of activities. Market facilities for African smallholders improved during the early 1960s. The government-controlled Eastern Province Co-operative and Marketing Union started to collect smallholders' maize produce at purchasing points in the reserve areas, normally between June and September (NAZ MAG2/6/40a 1962). According to the interviews with older people in Kasauka, there was such a market just outside Kasauka village from the early 1960s. In line with the peasant farming schemes, the policy was now a more thorough commercialisation of the African smallholders. Despite the problematic situation this was seen as the only way for the future when presenting the development plan for the South Ngoni Area:

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<sup>50</sup> At the same time it is important to observe that the style of writing in official documents seemingly changed in the later 1950s and 1960s. Circumstances that earlier had been treated as natural or matters of course were increasingly viewed as controversial. When Priestly & Greenings report (1956) was to be published they were advised to remove sentences stating that the most fertile land were taken from the Ngoni people since it "may not be desirable to say so, even if it is true" (NAZ EP1/1/23 1956). The writing of an improved situation in the reserves should therefore be treated with some care.

The line of development recommended for this plan is the development of commercial farming in the area, which must be the ultimate aim as the traditional subsistence cultivator is doomed. There is hardly any future for purely subsistence cultivators in our fast developing world.  
(NAZ MAG2/6/40b 1962)

Consequently it was stated to be a need for preparing the area “for the emergence of landless people which must happen eventually if there is to be any future at all for Ngoniland” (NAZ MAG2/9/12 1958). Needs for rural industries and alternative incomes were also identified.

## 7.4 The past of present livelihoods

The colonial rule implied a number of key policies that had far-reaching impact on the livelihoods of African smallholders around the Fort Jameson District. The whole study area was re-arranged as a consequence of colonialism. Major policy measures towards smallholder farmers are summarised in the Table 7-3.

**Table 7-3: Major features of the rural colonial policies in Fort Jameson District**

1890-1910	1910-1940	1945-1964
Conquest/conflict	Amalgamation of villages	Conservation farming by force
Pacification	Taxation	Taxation
Tax introduction	Land alienation	Rewards for ‘good farming’
European settlement	Establishment of reserves	Peasant farming schemes
Removal of Africans	Restriction of agr. practices	Resettlement
Agriculture regulations	Market discrimination	Market opportunities (from 1962)
Market discrimination	Discrimination in support	Differentiation among Africans
Pass laws		
Restricted game-hunting		

The world-economic integration of African households in present day Chipata was ruled by a colonial interest in land for export production and a need for cheap labour in large-scale farming and mining enterprises controlled by European settlers and the colonial government. As a consequence African smallholders in the Chipata area were forced to adopt a sedentary type of cultivation that was alien to, for example, the Ngoni people. Excluded from agricultural markets, taxed, and with limited access to natural resources due to reserve policies, smallholders diversified their livelihoods. Households of a semi-proletarianised character emerged, incapable of making a living from either wage labour or agriculture alone. Furthermore, reserve and labour policies most

likely led to an over-exploitation of existing resources, creating environmental degradation, declining soil fertility and recurrent food insecurity.

The colonial policies were furthermore founded in ideas of spreading the ideals of the 'modern man' and society. The colonial administration gradually aimed at identifying viable and 'progressive' African smallholders, who showed willingness and ability to modernise their agriculture and way of life. Increasing poverty and natural degradation in native reserves were chiefly ascribed to African smallholders' way of living and to their agricultural techniques, although there was an increasing awareness of the negative effects of the native reserve policies. In the South Ngoni Area, where rural livelihoods were degrading faster than in other places, the Ngoni people were accused of nurturing particularly primitive and traditional ideas, also compared to other ethnic groups in the area. This attitude towards the Ngoni people seems to have survived into present times. And although the language might differ between the late colonial era and the present time, the discussions on both diversification and the planning for commercialised smallholder farming is strikingly similar to contemporary discussions about development in the area. The modernisation message to smallholder farmers is furthermore identical for the two periods, if you do not commercialise you are doomed to a life in acute poverty.

## **8. A post-independent perspective on rural livelihoods**

When Zambia gained her independence in 1964, the government with the United National Independence Party, UNIP, and president Kenneth Kaunda in the forefront faced major challenges in terms of smallholder areas in general, and former reserve areas, such as those in Chipata District in particular. Food insecurity, land pressure, squatting on land left behind by former European settlers and a longstanding neglect of the reserve areas in terms of all sorts of physical, economic and social infrastructure were all pressing issues. On a national level, the government had to deal with a dualistic agricultural structure, where large commercial farmers dominated market production while the smallholders in the reserves produced foremost for subsistence. The pressure on people's livelihoods threatened to create a situation of further food insecurity at a time when smallholders needed to take on a greater role as producers, both for the domestic and the international market. How was the new government to handle the policies developed during the colonial era that it had inherited? How should the UNIP government and president Kenneth Kaunda approach colonial policies and ideas, and to what extent did they have the possibility and willingness to alter them? And how did smallholders' livelihoods in the study area change after independence? This chapter starts by outlining the national policy framework with focus on rural policy regimes and rural development. In the second part focus will be on Eastern Zambia and Chipata District, and finally on the farmers' views of the post-independence period.

### **8.1 Humanism and the development strategy of independent Zambia**

Policies within different sectors of the Zambian society were from independence formulated within the frame of the Humanism ideology, founded largely in president Kenneth Kaunda's own political thinking. Kaunda presented it officially the first time in 1967. Simply stated, 'Humanism' as advocated by Kaunda is based on a mix of ideas founded in African traditions and culture, and more classically oriented socialism. Kaunda's Humanism is not essentially different from the African socialism developed by Julius Nyerere in Tanzania

during the 1960s (Nyerere 1969; Lönneborg 1999). By declaring Humanism the national ideology in Zambia, Kaunda rejected both capitalism and traditional socialism as well as communism. He denounced the idea of multi-party democracy (as well as the dictatorship of the proletariat) and advocated for a participatory democracy within the frame of a one-party state (Kaunda 1972). Multi-party democracy was criticised for causing conflicts and disintegration between separate groups and their separate interests, which was described as incompatible with African culture and tradition. Instead inspiration was taken from ideas on consensus, village cohesion and the extended family when developing the Zambian democratic model (Simson 1986). Humanism in itself is largely to be understood as a system of ethics, where a society's economic and social development is closely integrated with its people's moral and spiritual development. Kaunda criticised western civilisation for separating these parts, thereby marginalising man as the centre of all development and enabling exploitation and oppression of people for the cause of economic growth (Ranganathan 1985; Simson 1986). A part of this was a critique of the process of individualisation in western societies, where competition is highly valued and where human beings are judged in relation to their personal successes or misfortunes. The traditional extended family, with a deep sense of values relating to reciprocity and mutual responsibility, was seen as fundamentals in a humanist society. The extended family and village cohesion were highly regarded in themselves and in the way they embodied human relations (Kaunda 1968). In a humanistic society people are therefore not appreciated according to their individual achievements but in accordance with their presence.

The success-failure complex seems to be the disease of the age of individualism—the result of a society conditioned by the diploma, the examination and the selection procedure. In the best tribal society people were valued not for what they could achieve but because they were there. (ibid:6)

Kaunda's Humanism showed a clear preference for a rural way of life. Colonial policies had been urban biased and there were great regional imbalances where resources and public investments had been focused on the 'line of rail' and other settler locations. Farming was now to be upgraded as an activity and an occupation. Urbanised youth were encouraged to take up farming and village life through campaigns like 'Back to the land' (RoZ 1977). The ruling UNIP party, was to represent all members of the Zambian society in a collective stance. High demands were placed on leaders within the party, the bureaucracy and trade unions. Codes of conduct were developed that prevented leaders from earning



more than one income and from owning foreign property. Every person in a leading position was obliged to cultivate at least one hectare of land and to be a member of a cooperative society (Dubell 1980). The goal of the humanistic ideology was a class-less, egalitarian society free from oppression of people. In practice Kaunda and the UNIP party advocated a high degree of state control and collective ownership of the economy. Ideas of structuralist and dependency theorists had a deep impact upon Kaunda and the ruling party's way of describing the challenges for the country. Increased self-reliance was an important economic as well as political goal, and import substitution the favoured strategy for many economic sectors. Colonialism was labelled exploitative, leading to oppression and inequality between people, as well as between different parts of the country.

Practical aims included achieving full coverage of social services, such as primary education and healthcare, physical infrastructure expansion, national food security and a diversified economy through both agricultural and industrial development. The copper industry was to be key in financing the development strategy in Zambia, including rural and agricultural development. Nationalised in 1970, the copper industry had been dominating the Zambian economy since the 1930s (Simson 1985:36-39). During the first 25 years of independence the copper industry's share of Zambia's export earnings was between 80-95 percent and at independence the industry represented more than 40 percent of the country's GNP. These export incomes together with foreign aid and loans financed much of the government's spending commitments in various sectors (Bhagavan 1978; SASDA 1994:110-112).

Major parts of the economy were nationalised after independence and the state controlled large parts of manufacturing industry sector, a sector which grew in accordance with the import substitution policies (Simson 1985). Formal employment rates grew rapidly by 24% in seven years, with 90,000 jobs created by 1970 (Katona 1982:18-25). Social services coverage was extended over large parts of the country. Much of this was also part of a 'Zambianisation' process, where the economy was to be controlled by Zambians, and where Zambians were to take up jobs in the public sector earlier held by expatriates (see Bhagavan 1978; Nkomo 1986).

In terms of democratic development in Zambia, there was a considerable gap between the ideas of Humanism and the authoritarian rule that characterised the political development in Zambia after independence. A lot of power was vested in the president and there was little democracy within the UNIP party itself. Opposition activities were in general cracked down upon and alternative

parliamentary candidates or critical voices within the trade unions were often out-manoeuvred or imprisoned (Phiri 2006).

## **8.2 The rural policy regime after independence**

### **8.2.1 Commercialisation, food security and equality**

The national objectives guiding rural policies after independence were equality, regional balance, poverty reduction and raising rural incomes (Wood 1990). National food security and self-sufficiency also became articulated goals, which were to be reached through a continuing focus on maize production. A further commercialisation of the whole agricultural sector was seen as necessary. Subsistence farmers were to be encouraged to orient their production to markets and focus on maize production regardless of their geographical location or resource base. A decrease in the economic and social imbalances between the country's different regions was seen as an important principle when developing agricultural and rural policies. For this purpose the government expanded extension services, introduced credit facilities, settlement schemes, market facilities and subsidies on inputs and seeds on a national scale. In line with the Humanism ideology the government introduced socialist forms of production through parastatal companies, state farms and cooperatives. However, more capitalist- or individualist-oriented production forms continued to dominate in Zambia even during the post-independence era, through commercialised large- and medium-scale farmers as well as small-scale producers (Wood 1990:23).

In terms of marketing the government introduced fixed prices on agricultural produce on a pan-territorial and pan-seasonal basis. Markets were established through cooperatives with the objective to cover all rural provinces in the country (Wood 1990). State marketing boards holding a monopoly position handled the marketing of agricultural produce. Four major boards developed during the 1960s, the National Agricultural Marketing Board, Namboard, the Tobacco Board of Zambia, the Dairy Produce Board, and the Cold Storage Board. Apart from these there were also cooperative societies marketing agricultural produce in certain areas of the country (such as Eastern Province), often in cooperation with the marketing boards. The most important organisation was Namboard dealing with maize, groundnuts, cotton, sunflower, sorghum and a range of vegetables and other crops (Lombard & Tweedie 1972). Namboard operated through over 1,000 buying centres (and several smaller village markets) spread over the nine provinces in Zambia. These buying centres were connected through 52 major depots (Shawa & Johnson 1990:373). In

addition there were cooperative unions in several provinces handling much of the marketing for small-scale farmers (Dodge 1977:88-92).

The colonial focus on maize production continued after independence and was strengthened through the implementation of high subsidies on fertilisers and generous credit policies for the purchase of seeds and fertilisers (Dixon 1977:11-14). The input supply was also handled by Namboard, which had a monopoly on the distribution of fertilisers at its many distribution points in the rural areas (Shawa & Johnson 1990). Sales of fertilisers increased from less than 50,000 metric tonnes in 1967 to around 250,000 metric tonnes in the mid-1980s (McPhillips & Wood 1990:92-96).

State-run extension services to smallholder farmers expanded after independence. Extension camps were established all over the country and increased from 320 in 1964 to 660 in 1974 and 1,100 in 1984. The extension staff increased over the same time period from 336 in 1964 to around 1,500 in 1984 (Lof & Mulele 1990:346). Farming training centres were also built for all rural districts. Initially the extension continued to focus on emergent and better off farmers but from 1975 a broader approach was adopted to include all rural dwellers irrespective of their degree of commercialisation. Focus was on timely (early) planting, use of correct seed, improved spacing and better weeding and storage practices (Lof & Mulele 1990). There was a strong focus on maize cultivation and increased fertiliser usage in training given by extension officers (Dixon 1977:23). The implementation of soil conservation was to be based on participation, motivation and increased understanding of the importance of conservation work rather than on legislation and coercion, which had been the colonial doctrine (Chidumayo et al. 1990:116-118). Other important policies included a land tenure reform and settlement projects. Freehold on commercial farms was changed to leasehold when land was nationalised in 1975 (Priestly 1978). In practice over 90 percent of the land in Zambia continued to be under customary law, largely controlled by the chiefs.

### **8.2.2 Key problems in rural policy implementation to the early 1980s**

The literature<sup>51</sup> on rural and agricultural development in Zambia identifies several problems attached to the policy measures described above. In terms of

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<sup>51</sup> Section 8.2.1-8.2.5 are based on secondary sources. There is no direct reason to question the rather coherent picture that this literature display in terms of the effects of the rural policy regime of the Humanism era. However, the dependency on secondary literature needs to be stated in relation to the data that is presented from the case study area. The dissonance between this literature and the data presented in section 8.3 and 8.4 will be further discussed at the end of the chapter.

marketing and price policies there were difficulties reaching the most outlying areas, huge transport problems, too few depots to offer good services to all small-scale farmers, delayed payments and prices set at a level that hardly encouraged surplus production (Klepper 1979). Price policies encouraged maize production at the expense of other crops (Wood 1990). In addition the communication of prices to farmers was ill-functioning and prices were often announced late (Wood 1990:26).

In terms of credits and fertiliser loans there were extensive problems with low repayment rates and corruption within the parastatal organisations and the cooperatives. Credits were used as bribes or rewards by the ruling UNIP party, especially during election campaigns (Dixon 1977:12). Recurring problems with late delivery of fertilisers of the wrong type and wrong amount is a rather common theme in the literature (Shawa & Johnson 1990). Namboard was an expensive apparatus, often considered inefficient and increasingly economically unsustainable considering the increasing pressure on the national economy from the mid-1970s. Namboard, established in 1969, underwent a series of reorganisations up until the late 1980s. These reorganisations meant that Namboard gradually focused its activities on inter-provincial and international maize marketing and the importation and distribution of fertilisers, while provincial cooperatives handled much of the marketing of small-scale farmers produce (Shawa & Johnson 1990; Wood 1990:49-50). An overarching problem was the transport and infrastructure situation that hampered both input and output marketing, as well as extension services, especially in the more remote areas (Dixon 1977).

An increasingly important problem in the implementation of rural and agricultural policies directed at supporting smallholders was the national economic situation in Zambia from the mid-1970s. The oil crisis in 1973 hit Zambia badly and the international recession meant decreased demand for Zambian copper. The country's terms of trade declined and the national copper industry went into a deep crisis with decreasing production and diminishing incomes to finance the country's ambitious development strategy (Simson 1986; SASDA 1994).

The Zambian government turned to the donor community for support to uphold its commitments towards rural areas. While the major donors showed an increasingly hesitant attitude towards the Zambian development strategy, the overall economic situation led to problems in implementation of all different types of policy measures. During the 1970s extension work in Zambia started to face problems due to lack of funds. More and more resources went to salaries to pay the extension staff, while there was little left for operational activities. In

1974 the ratio between salaries and operational costs in extension were 74:26 and in 1984 it was 94:6. The relationship between extension camps and extension staff showed a negative trend and in 1984, 300-400 (out of 1,100) extension camps were unstaffed (Lof & Mulele 1990:346-348). Agricultural training activities therefore decreased rapidly during the 1970s. Soil conservation, the flagship of late colonial rule, was to a large extent removed from the portfolio of extension work activities. It was hesitantly treated in the first national development plan and increasingly so by politicians and officials due to its controversial character during the colonial rule and its politicisation during the struggle for independence (RoZ 1966; Chidumayo et al. 1990:118-119). The focus on maize cultivation in all parts of the country had led to unsustainable agricultural practices in areas not suitable for the crop. The encouragement to grow maize instead of alternative staple crops led to monocropping and a further decrease in crop rotation (Wood 1990).

There is much to discuss in terms of the outcomes of government policies towards rural development and smallholder farmers in Zambia after independence. However, two points of discussion concerning rural policies in Zambia during the first 20 years of independence are of extra importance; the issue of social differentiation versus equality and the question of an urban bias in the rural policies.

### **8.2.3 Social differentiation versus equality**

In reality, looking at practical policies and resource allocation it can be questioned how governing the principles of Humanism were. Out of 1,200 large-scale farmers present in Zambia at independence, Zambia lost 500 of them within the first two years of independence. Still they produced two thirds of the marketed maize, and the dependency was high on these farmers for achieving national food security (RoZ 1966:21; Dixon 1977:16). Rather than lifting the whole rural population, agricultural policies encouraged the large-scale farmers to uphold their production at the same time as segments of small- and medium-scale farmers were encouraged to expand and further commercialise their production. Zambia was forced to import food in 1970 and both from a governmental and donor point of view it became increasingly important to focus on farmers already commercialised, or perceived to have the potential to be so in a short period of time (Mbulo 1985:131-132). Despite the government's ambition to redistribute resources to the rural poor, large-scale farmers continued to swallow the bulk of public support to the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the concentration of resources and extension services to certain

groups of small- and medium-scale farmers provoked a further differentiation of the sector (Wood & Vokes 1990; Lof & Mulele 1990).

Large-scale farmers continued to hold a rather dominant position in Zambia and the new government largely avoided the question of settlers' land rights and land redistribution (Dixon 1977:30; Wood & Vokes 1990). Settlers were encouraged to stay and Europeans were encouraged to settle and start farming in Zambia. Abandoned farms went into the hands of private companies and parastatals. Some African farmers also got access to these lands but not in a manner that land was redistributed to those in most need of land. The colonial focus on settlement schemes and land redistribution directed towards better off farmers continued when these schemes were resumed from 1970 and onwards (Mbulo 1985; Wood & Vokes 1990).

Similarly, several of the projects primarily financed by external donors had a focus on the better-off farmers and the more resource rich areas. In the early 1970s there was a general idea within the Zambian government that resources to rural development had been spread too evenly and thinly to have any real impact on production and economic development. Therefore the government launched the idea of Intensive Development Zones, IDZ, also heavily promoted by donors from the mid-1960s (Lühring 1975:35). In Eastern Zambia and Chipata District, Swedish Sida financed the IDZ programme. The purpose was to focus resources in areas with favourable conditions (fairly good soils, availability of water, energy and roads) for more rapid economic development, which hopefully would lead to spread effects in the surrounding areas. In the 1980s these programmes were replaced by Integrated Rural Development Programmes, IRDP, aiming at spreading resources over a larger area, however, still not based on a general welfare principle (Pudsey et al. 1990). No doubt, projects like IDZ relied more on trickle down and classical modernisation theory than structuralist theories and ideas on dependency.

#### **8.2.4 Continuing regional imbalance and urban bias**

The objective after independence to reduce the gap between rural and urban areas and between different provinces in Zambia does not correspond with practical policies during the 1960s and 1970s. In reality the need for cheap food for urban areas continued to guide rural and agricultural policies, just as had been the case during the colonial era. High rural to urban migration rates were a fact during the first years after independence and supplying the increasing urban population with food at reasonable prices became a top priority that impacted on the policies towards rural smallholders (Wood & Vokes 1990).

The urban bias inherited from the colonial era was visible in budget allocations, and small-scale farmers in most parts of the country were neglected compared to the urban population (see e.g. Katona 1982; Osei-Hwedie 1985; Wood 1990). In terms of government investment in the agricultural sector it continued to be spatially focused on the 'line of rail' provinces. Central and Southern provinces, were allocated close to 50 percent of the government agricultural investment budget for the First National Development Plan period between 1966 and 1970 (Dixon 1977:5-6). In reality the 'line of rail' provinces received even more, while the rural provinces received only 79 percent of the planned allocations for these provinces (Lühring 1975:30). Regarding national budget allocations as a whole, the three 'line of rail' provinces received over 80 percent of the government's capital investments between 1966-1970. The public investments in Central Province were for example over 12 times higher per capita compared to investments in the more peripheral Luapula Province (Katona 1982:22).

The focus on manufacturing and copper mining, as well as on urban food subsidies showed a clear priority towards modernisation in the central provinces of the country. This was also mirrored in the development within the social sectors of health and education (Katona 1982). Income disparities between rural and urban areas increased during the 1960s and 1970s (Zeijlon 1987; Wood 1990:41). The Kaunda government therefore never seriously attacked the dual structure within the Zambian agricultural sector or the regional imbalances of the country.

### **8.2.5 Policy reform and changes during the 1980s**

From independence and onwards there was a debate between right wing and left wing camps within the UNIP party concerning agricultural and rural policies in Zambia. Apart from that, the donor community had their views, which gained increased momentum when the economic situation hardened in Zambia from the mid-1970s. In the late 1970s the ruling party saw a need for reform within the agricultural sector. Nineteen percent of the state revenue went to agricultural subsidies in 1980, of which about a third was consumer subsidies and 40 percent handling costs of Namboard and cooperatives (Wood 1990:40). At the same time the national food self-sufficiency decreased and forced Zambia to import maize during 1979.

The Zambian government turned to the donor community and the IMF for support. The IMF demanded cuts in subsidies. From 1979 to 1987 Zambia took considerable steps towards a more liberalised agricultural market. The government undertook a crop pricing reform and producer prices increased

considerably. Taxes on farm incomes were reduced and large-scale farmers were paid in foreign currency (Wood 1990). These reforms were again directed foremost towards larger and more commercialised farmers, who were believed to be able to rapidly respond with increased production.

Right wing forces within UNIP supported these reforms while the leftists looked upon them with considerable scepticism. Parallel to these reforms the government therefore launched new initiatives on socialist forms of production, like two state farms of 20,000 hectares in each province of the country funded largely by foreign aid (ibid:47-49). The government also introduced the Lima programme, which included support in terms of maize seeds, fertilisers and extension for the cultivation of one quarter of a hectare for the market and hence directed towards small-scale producers (ibid:50-51).

However, the IMF, supported by the donor community, wanted to move further in the direction of economic liberalisation within the agricultural sector. The 1980s therefore had a character of ambivalence in terms of agricultural policies. Zambia was several times declared off-track by the IMF, leading to the cancellation of disbursements from both multilateral and bilateral donors, notably in 1984, 1987 and 1990/1991 (Zeijlon 1990; EIU 1996). However, price controls were soon removed for non-basic consumer goods. In 1982 fixed producer prices were abolished and replaced by floor prices on all farm produce except maize and wheat. The monopolies of the marketing boards were lifted to invite private actors to take part in the agricultural marketing sector. Between 1984 and 1987 subsidies on maize were cut to further encourage the participation of private agents. Regional pricing on fertilisers was introduced to cover for transportation costs. The response from private actors was weak and the policy of keeping urban food prices low continued up to the mid-1980s (Wood 1990).

However, the increased producer prices became costly, and in 1985 and 1986 this was compensated for by a rapid increase (50 percent in 1985 and 100 percent increase in 1986) in prices on maize meal (ibid:54). This sparked an intense discontent among urban dwellers and food riots soon occurred in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. Finally, Kaunda broke with the IMF and the World Bank in May 1987 by declaring:

We are witnessing a situation where our social fabric is slowly disintegrating thereby sowing seeds of unrest and undermining the peace and unity of the nation. This situation cannot and will not be allowed to continue. (...) Comrades, what I am saying is that we shall determine our own destiny. (Kaunda 1987:4)



The UNIP government launched The New Economic Recovery Programme, NERP, with the slogan 'Growth from our own resources'. In practice it meant a return to the policies of high consumer subsidies, as well as fertiliser subsidies and fixed producer prices. There were some differences compared to the policies of the 1960s and 1970s including stressing regional comparative advantages in terms of crop productions, but on an overall level it was a return to a situation where the state played the key role in terms of agricultural input and output marketing, credit provision and price-policies (Wood 1990).

Despite the criticism towards the policies for rural and agricultural development in Zambia, small-scale farmers supplied 60 percent of the marketed maize in Zambia by 1979 (Fenichel & Smith 1992:1314) and the country reached a relatively high level of national food self-sufficiency compared to the post-liberalisation era (Seshamani 1998). In terms of maize, Zambia became self-sufficient in many, but not all, years. The focus on maize cultivation also led to an increase in imports of other types of food during the 1970s, notably wheat, rice and meat. In terms of national budget allocations the pre-liberalisation period is often criticised for neglecting the agricultural sector compared to other sectors of society. However, the allocations to agriculture as a share of the national budget were far higher during this period than during the years after 1993 (Scott 1990). Also in real value, government spending on agriculture was higher during each separate year of the 1980s than at any time during the 1990s (Govereh et al 2006:4).

## **8.3 Policies and rural livelihoods in Chipata District**


### **8.3.1 Introduction**

The remaining part of this chapter will narrow the geographical focus to rural livelihoods and rural development in Chipata District and its southern part. The section will be structured thematically. Before looking closer into rural livelihoods A brief account is given of relevant developments concerning the land question. The livelihood analysis will include reference to food security, input access, market access, soil conservation, extension and income diversification in the study area. Major development projects specific to the study area will also be reflected in this section. The chapter will then end up with a brief discussion on changes in rural livelihoods in relation to the major policy shift of the early 1990s.

### 8.3.2 The land question after independence

The land question in Chipata District and its surroundings is not well documented after independence, but this section is an attempt to sketch the major developments in terms of land ownership, settlement and resettlement after independence. Already before independence there was considerable squatting on privately held land both northeast and southwest of the South Ngoni Area. Most squatting took place on apparently abandoned farms but conflicts arose when owners or their relatives turned up and claimed access to their land. Orders were issued that squatters' houses were to be destroyed and on occasions African farmers were forced to move back onto the reserve areas. There were also Africans willing to buy and take over abandoned farms, but this rarely happened and in 1964 the government decided to stop all selling or transfer of land in Eastern Province until further decisions on future land use and settlement were made (NAZ EP1/1/52 1964). Squatting, however, continued at least until the early 1980s (NAZ EP4/2/127 1966; Priestly 1978; RoZ 1982). The policy towards squatting gradually changed, however, and was increasingly one of tolerance although it was still regarded as illegal (RoZ 1982).

Priestly (1978) presents the only thorough review of what happened to the large areas of former European farmland in the area until 1976. The major parts consist of the Katete Block (81,794 hectares) southwest of the Main Ngoni Reserve and the Chipata Block (65,321 hectares) northeast of the Main Ngoni Reserve (see Figure 8-1).



**Figure 8-1: State land after independence in Eastern Zambia**

Source: Based on Priestly 1978:49


In Katete Block most of the European large-scale farmers had left the area already before independence and by 1966 most of the land was acquired by the state. Only a few farms continued to be privately held. Immigration into the Katete Block started directly after independence by Chewa from the overcrowded Chewa Reserve south of the block. The immigration was spontaneous and unorganised and of a squatting character. The pressure on the land in the Katete Block increased further in 1969/70 when at least 2,000 people fled the Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) border area after being bombed by the Portuguese (ibid:52-53).

The major part (75 percent) of the Katete Block (Figure 8-2a) was acquired for the Zemba Tobacco Scheme run by the parastatal body the Tobacco Board of Zambia, and the Katete Ranch, owned by the parastatal Zambia Farm Development. The Katete cattle ranch was a major failure and was integrated into the Zemba Tobacco Scheme in 1975. The purpose of the Zemba Tobacco Scheme was to support tobacco production for export by small-scale commercial farmers, assigned to grow tobacco on areas of farmland averaging 10 hectares<sup>52</sup> per smallholder. In 1975 there were 720 small-scale farmers growing 433 hectares of tobacco. A considerable problem from the start of the scheme was to convince the immigrants from the overcrowded Chewa Reserve to take up commercial tobacco cultivation (ibid:52-55).


There is little information about the further development of the scheme. In 2005 there were 3,000 farming households within the scheme, of which eight percent were female headed. By 2005 a private company was put in charge of the programme and was providing inputs and markets for the farmers' tobacco production on a contract basis. The households act as tenants and there are great problems with tenure insecurity, and despite many attempts to facilitate this, farmers still face problems obtaining title deeds (RoZ 2005).

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<sup>52</sup> According to a later source, the average farm size within the Zemba settlement scheme today is 50 hectare (RoZ 2005:39-40). According to Nkhata (1992:122) it was 12 hectares. If 50 hectares is correct, the scheme must have expanded further in size.



**Figure 8-2a: State land – Katete Block**  
Source: Based on Priestly 1978:51



**Figure 8-2b: State land – Chipata Block**  
Source: Based on Priestly 1978:52

The Chipata Block (Figure 8-2b), bordering the South Ngoni Area to the northeast developed slightly differently. As for Katete a tobacco scheme was initiated, the Kapara Tobacco Scheme under the Tobacco Board of Zambia. The Chinjara Cattle Ranch turned out to be a failure just like the cattle ranch in Katete. Apart from these there were also three settlement schemes within the block, around 30 large commercial farms still belonging to Europeans, most of them absentee, some squatter areas, as well as farms that had been returned for village settlement and incorporated into the chief areas of the South Ngoni Area back in the 1940s.

Apart from the Kapara Tobacco Scheme, which allocated plots of 3,5 hectares of land, the land within the Chipata Block was directed towards commercial farming on a larger scale. When the Chinjara Cattle Ranch was closed down in 1972, the area was subdivided into 40 hectare plots on leasehold basis for small- or medium-scale commercial farming (Priestly 1978:55). The Jimoli Settlement was developed in a similar fashion with plots of 22-64 hectares of land (Nkhata 1992). Considerable parts of the Chipata Block continued to be operated as large private leaseholds. Europeans, including some newcomers, continued to own rather large properties, while wealthier members of both the Asian and the African communities also got access to commercial farmland. With the exception of the Kapara Tobacco Scheme and squatter areas, large parts of state land continued to be uncultivated after independence.

Sometimes less than 10 percent of the land, both on state and private farms, were cultivated (Priestly 1978:55).

The Chipangali area was the major resettlement area for farmers in the South Ngoni Area after independence (see Figure 7-7, Chapter Seven). The resettlement to Chipangali was slow and did not meet the expected level of 7,000 inhabitants before 1965 (Kay 1965). The resettlement, however, continued after independence and between 1961 and 1969 the population of Chipangali and bordering Rukuzye increased from 1,300 to 3,814 inhabitants. In 1980, the resettlement area was inhabited by 4,741 people, an increase that was mostly attributable to natural causes (Chidumayo 1985). From 1989 the Chipangali area was to be used for the resettlement of unemployed youth and as retirement plots (RoZ 2005:40)

In sum, we can conclude that the character of land owning had changed from a small number of large-scale farmers to several smaller holdings. Between 1964 and 1975 the state land in the Eastern Province changed from 230 original farms to 1,334 individual plots, with a total area of over 200,000 hectares. However, it is also clear that the major strategy was to promote small- and medium-scale commercial farmers, often producing tobacco for export, rather than allocating plots to those in most need of fertile land (MRD1/2/6 1973; Nkhata 1992). In the Chipata Block, the Kapara scheme consisted of small plots of 3,5 hectares of land, but elsewhere the government allocated large plots of 80-100 hectares (Nkhata 1992). The colonial approach of identifying emergent and 'progressive' farmers and offering them land continued.

### **8.3.3 Rural livelihoods and development in Chipata District**

How then did the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in the broader study area develop during the post-independence period? Discussions here will mainly be in relation to issues brought up in Chapter Five and concern the issues of food security, access to inputs, markets and discussions concerning soil conservation and soil depletion. Other issues will also be discussed such as income diversification and the importance of non-farm incomes.

#### *Food security*

In the few studies made in the South Ngoni Area (Eastern Block) and the Chipata District there is very little direct focus on food security and problems with lack of food. In many studies the issue is not brought up when discussing the post-independence era. Instead they tend to highlight other issues, such as agricultural productivity, access to services like extension or the importance of

certain off-farm activities (see Harvey 1973; Tuthill 1975; Hedlund 1979).<sup>53</sup> Data for the broader area of Chipata and the Eastern Province establish a picture of an area fairly food secure. Annual reports for the Chipata District and Eastern Province from 1966 up to the middle of the 1970s normally refer to good yields, especially concerning maize (EP4/2/127 1966; MRD1/2/6 1972-1974; EP4/2/167 1973; RoZ 1971a; RoZ 1976). For 1972 it is reported that relief food was necessary in the Luangwa valley area (MRD1/2/6 1972) but apart from that there have been no reported instances of need of relief food within the Chipata District or Eastern Province. Instead there are reports of bumper harvests and record crops and export of surplus production to the 'line of rail'. However, it is also clear that agricultural policies promoted maize production at the expense of other crops, which should have impacted on the nutritious composition of the diet. According to a 1990 study in Chipata District, people perceived their nutritional status to have declined due to less variety in diet (Sylwander & Egnell 1990:29). There were also reports of lack of basic commodities, such as soap, salt and cooking oil (EP4/2/167 1973).

This overall description might tell us that, on provincial or district level, the production was sufficient. It does not help us much though, to further judge on issues of local food security in an area that is socially stratified. A few studies bring food security up for discussion, although rather briefly. One study (Cowie 1979) in the Kanyanja area in Chipata District, which lies immediately north of Eastern Block and South Ngoni Area, discusses the different types of assistance given to the separate income groups in 1975. Nowhere is food mentioned in this discussion although cash support, finger millet for beer brewing and other types of material and immaterial support are exchanged between the households. This suggests a rather high degree of food security.

This should, however, not be taken as a justification for judging the South Ngoni Area, or any other place, as food secure. The Kanyanja area is former settler land (even though there were no settlers occupying it during the colonial period), with fertile soils and better access to both physical and economic infrastructure. A village study in 1977 by Skjønsberg (1981) in Kalichero area, west of Chipata and a bit further north of the South Ngoni Area on the other hand refers to "the hunger months of January and February when granaries are being emptied" (ibid:15), implying that food shortage during the pre-harvest months was a common feature during the late 1970s. Hedlund studied the Chief Sayiri in the South Ngoni Area in 1973-1974. Food security is not a main theme

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<sup>53</sup> To take this as an argument that food insecurity was not a problem is to jump to conclusions. Taken together with information from the respondents and other sources indicating a relatively secure food situation in the area, it seems at least logic.

of the study but he also refers to January and February as “difficult months for a number of households, for they may face severe shortage of maize or relish” (Hedlund 1980:14). Hedlund further states that it “is mainly the poorer households with limited resources that face this problem” (ibid:14). The study concludes that food shortages occur both as a consequence of insufficient production, but also due to “excessive sales earlier in the season to official depots” (ibid:42). Hedlund discusses the social system, within which food shortages in the villages were tackled, for example through ‘beer working parties’, communal work and eating.

However, on this matter, considerable change has taken place, that can help to explain the contemporary situation. Both the late colonial and post-independence era involved an increased commercialisation of parts of the smallholder communities. This commercialisation has resulted in a differentiation of the smallholder society, with deep impact on local cooperative and reciprocity structures (Hedlund & Lundahl 1983; Fenichel & Smith 1992). With the spread of cash crop production and increased input intensity, communal work and communal eating vanished as a phenomenon in the study area. As Fenichel & Smith noted:

[it] was not possible to maintain a communal approach when, with the spread of cash crop production, the product of communal labor came to be privately appropriated. (Fenichel & Smith 1992:1316)

Communal work and assistance through the extended family to survive and access food in times of stress has therefore increasingly been replaced by a system where people were “forced to exchange their labor for food” (Fenichel & Smith 1992:1316; see also Hedlund & Lundahl 1983:63-73). In the early twenty-first century the extended family still plays an important role in the study area, but it is also likely that casual work has increased since the early 1970s (Hedlund 1980:47pp). The older people interviewed in Chief Sayiri also point at the lack of cooperation among the farmers. This seems to be a gradual change, which has impacted on such things as food security, since it is not necessarily a natural thing anymore to assist those without enough food (OF8, older female farmer).

Q: And why do you think it [the cooperation] is reduced? What is the reason for that?

R: There was a lot of cooperation when we were together, because most households were on the same level and all experienced hardships. So this time some are better off than others. Some have bicycles and some have not. And those who do not have transport are looked down upon. I have a

bicycle and if someone in my family falls sick I will transport that person on my own without asking for assistance from anyone in the village. When I have got means I do not ask for assistance. But those who do not have transport have to ask for assistance from others, which is not easy to get. Those are not assisted quickly.  
(EFG2, older male farmers group)

The study by Karttunen (2009:123) contains a comparison between 1985/86 and 2002/2003. She concludes that household incomes have decreased since the mid-1980s, mainly as a result of decreased incomes from crop produce, which possibly indicates that food security was higher during the 1980s. In the 1998 study (Amberntsson 1999) the respondents also referred to decreased crop production and food availability when comparing the late 1990s with the 1980s. The articles on improved fallow in Chipata District, referring to reduced soil fertility, and food security after the cut in subsidies in the 1990s further support this (Ajayi & Kwesiga 2003; e.g. Kwesiga et al. 2005). Taken together, these different sources indicate that although there was a higher degree of food security during the 1970s and 1980s than today, that it is also clear that food insecurity during the pre-harvest months has been a problem throughout most of the post-independence era.

#### *Distribution and access to fertiliser*

Access to and use of fertiliser increased heavily in Chipata District generally and the study villages in particular after independence. Depots for fertiliser distribution and sale were established and according to one source there were 24 depots in Chipata District in 1976, among them Kalunga, Jerusalem, Sayiri, Feni and Kaphinde Camp in Eastern Block (EP4/15/17 1979). This means that there was a fertiliser depot very close to Kasauka village and within reasonable distance from Yelesani village. A study conducted in the southern part of the Chipata District in 1985 finds that the average distance to a fertiliser depot was 2.3 km (Jha & Hojjati 1993:49). After independence the government, through Namboard and associated cooperatives, supplied these depots with both basal and top dressing. The issue of fertiliser delivery was therefore a recurrent theme in the annual reports of the provincial Ministry of Rural Development. By the early 1970s there seems to have been quite some improvement on this matter.

Great achievements have been obtained as for the first time the fertiliser has really reached the most remote areas of the province. (RoZ 1971a)

In 1974 Namboard reports that farmers received sufficient fertilisers throughout the province and that there are large stocks of fertilisers in all districts



(EP4/15/17 1979). Furthermore, the report for the year 1975/76 is positive regarding the functioning of fertiliser and seed distribution (RoZ 1976). There is less information of the use of fertilisers among the smallholders but in 1986 it was reported that 90 percent of the farmers in the Kalunga area (which roughly corresponds to the borders of Chief Sayiri) used chemical fertilisers on their fields. The figure for the Feni area (in Eastern Block) was 83 percent (Fenichel & Smith 1992:1315). Fertiliser is also reported to have been the smallholders' major expenditure item, swallowing about half of their incomes, in the late 1980s (Sylwander & Egnell 1990:40). Maize production, and especially hybrid maize production, depends on much higher inputs of fertiliser than other crops grown in the area. Tracking the expansion of maize production provides an indication of both the extent and the cause of increased chemical fertiliser use. By the mid-1980s it is estimated that 80 percent of the cultivated area on the plateau in Eastern Province was planted with maize (Jha & Hojjati 1993:9). Groundnuts, considered as the second most important crop, was in 1983/84 cultivated on less than eight percent of the area cultivated with maize, a situation which seems to have persisted throughout most of the 1980s (RoZ 1988; RoZ 1992).<sup>54</sup>

A general problem during the 1970s and 1980s was that the necessary fertilisers were not made available at all of the different depots in Chipata District. Namboard's lack of vehicles was always a problem (MRD1/2/6 1972; EP4/15/17 1979). Often basal was in stock and in adequate supply, but there was frequently a lack of top dressing available when it was needed later in the planting season (RoZ 1982; RoZ 1987a; RoZ 1990). It seems therefore to be the case that fertilisers were available but not always on time, and not always of the required sort. At the same time it can be noted that the amount of top dressing used in the southern part of the Chipata District was equal to that of basal dressing (see Jha & Hojjati 1993:45), which might imply that the problem of late delivery of top dressing was not as severe as it is sometimes reported.

In the late 1980s the difficulties accessing fertiliser seem to have increased, as illustrated by the way that the price tripled during the 1988/89 season. Lack of fertiliser was identified during the late 1980s as the major problem among farmers in Chipata District, while, for example, soil depletion was less talked about (Sylwander & Egnell 1990:17-18). This contrasts with the 1970s when access to fertiliser was perceived as less of a problem (Tuthill 1973:44).

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<sup>54</sup> The area cultivated for groundnuts might be an underestimate, due to the large black market in groundnuts (see e.g. Fenichel & Smith 1992:1315).

### *Extension services, soil conservation and soil degradation*

In terms of extension services and work in the study area these follow certain trends and patterns. The issue of land degradation and soil conservation was hardly discussed in the annual reports from the Ministry of Rural Development during the 1970s. Neither was it brought up in the different studies of the South Ngoni Area (Tuthill 1975; Hedlund 1980). Hedlund (1980:7) concluded, however, that soils in Chief Sayiri are both sandy and of low fertility partly due to historical reasons of overcrowded native reserves. Extension work in the 1970s was largely oriented towards supporting increased maize production and advising on the application of fertilisers. In the South Ngoni Area, over 80 percent of extension officer activities dealt with fertiliser application and planting methods for maize while crops like groundnuts were not subject to any specific advice (Tuthill 1975). In Tuthill's study of extension services in South Ngoni Area in 1972/73, soil conservation and land degradation were hardly mentioned at all in relation to extension work. Extension officers focused almost entirely on the early planting of hybrid maize, correct spacing, timely application of basal and top dressing fertiliser, discouraging of intercropping of maize and groundnuts, encouraging ridge cultivation instead of mound cultivation and advising on how to control weeds (ibid:36-37). For the South Ngoni Area the extension services during the early 1970s were also highly biased towards the better off farmers, especially in terms of which farmers received individual visits to their fields (ibid:26-30).

From the mid-1980s, however, a vivid discussion on the issue of soil degradation and soil conservation in the area developed within the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development. Under discussion were the loss of fertile top soils into streams and rivers, loss of crop nutrients, reduced infiltration rates and increased run-off (RoZ 1987a). The major symptom was the declining productivity of the land, caused by an intensification of traditional land-use practices and low adoption of soil conservation methods. Here, certain aspects were highlighted such as poor ridge alignment, planting on mounds, monocropping, cultivation of non-arable land, shifting cultivation, overstocking, bush-fires and deforestation. Soil conservation was from the mid-1980s seen as the main activity "to combat these practices" (ibid). It was in this context that the Soil Conservation Agroforestry Extension Programme, SCAFE, was initiated in 1985 in order to promote soil conservation and sustainable farming systems, through provision of improved agricultural extension. A main aim was to reduce soil erosion through tree plantation and prevention of cutting of natural forest. Furthermore the project advocated mixed cropping, crop rotation, control of

bush-fires and the establishment of contour ridges and grass strips (RoZ 1987a; RoZ 1990). Another main aim was to increase the productivity of the land.

SCAFE encountered great problems in its implementation. The adoption rates among the farmers were low and the project did not lead to any productivity increase (Aongola 1993). Several explanations for this lack of success are provided in the literature. Some suggest that the soil conservation methods advocated for involved too much labour and sometimes also too much capital from the farmers. It was suggested that several of the promoted practices were inappropriate, but there were also references to ignorance among the farmers (*ibid*). A major problem, according to Aongola, was that most of the conservation methods demanded increased labour input, but did not result in proportional increases in production. Promoted activities such as tree planting demanded fertilisers and pesticides. Another problem was that tree crops and conservation structures were damaged by grazing animals during the period of free ranging, when cattle feed on crop residues. There was also a male bias in the project, in that male farmers were targeted by the project and in that female-headed households faced even greater problems in devoting the time and labour needed for the activities, and also in less possession of equipment such as ploughs, demanded for some types of soil conservation work (Sylwander & Egnell 1990:39-40). Still, studies show that soil degradation and erosion were seen as a problem by the farmers and that land scarcity in Chipata South district had led people to open up fields on slope land (Sylwander & Egnell 1990:18, 32).

A bleak picture is painted of the extension work in Chipata District in the late 1980s. It was largely non-existent. Much conservation work was left half-done with the consequence that farmers pulled out and lost interest in the activities. The officers had hardly any means to travel around and carry out their work effectively. Most of them travelled around on bicycles, but several of them did not even have bicycles, making it impossible to reach the majority of the households. The system of working through contact farmers in the villages also proved inefficient, since these farmers did not disseminate the information further (Sylwander & Egnell 1990). The extension officers in general agreed that farmers faced many legitimate problems when implementing soil conservation and agroforestry measures. There were, however, also those blaming the farmer for being lazy and for showing “unwillingness to listen to and learn from extension workers” (Sylwander & Egnell 1990:50).<sup>55</sup> The focus of extension

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<sup>55</sup> Interestingly, Sylwander & Egnell (1990:49p) show that several extension officers did not implement soil conservation themselves, on the fields they had been allocated to produce for own consumption.

work on supporting better off farmers also continued during the 1980s (Fenichel & Smith 1990:1321).

#### *Market access, agricultural production*

After independence, the marketing of agricultural produce in the Eastern Province was handled by EPCMA, Eastern Province Co-operative Marketing Association (later called ECU), while Namboard was responsible for the distribution and sale of fertilisers, seeds, pesticides and farm implements. EPCMA was organised through Primary Producer Societies, handling the marketing arrangements in direct contact with the farmers (MRD 1/2/6 1972). In 1973 there were 16 selling and buying centres for maize within the Chipata District (EP4/2/167 1973). In addition to this there were many village markets delivering to the buying centres. A study made in the South Ngoni Area (Eastern Block) in 1972/73 concludes that most villages in the area had an average distance to a market of between 2,5 - 3,1 km, and no village was further than eight km from a market point. The exception was, however, the area from Feni to Makwe where the average distance to a village market was 13,5 km and several of the farmers stated that they had to market their produce in Chipata town (Tuthill 1975:16-17). By the end of the 1980s there were two main depots, 26 buying and selling centres and 154 village markets within Chipata District handling both input distribution and farmers' produce (Wanmali 1992:209; Aongola 1993:9).

As for fertiliser delivery, market arrangements are reported as having been satisfactory some years and problematic other years (RoZ 1971a; MRD1/2/6 1972). The EPCMA faced many financial problems and depended largely on the government for additional assistance to maintain its activities (NAZ MRD1/2/6 1973). Overall, the marketing of maize developed well. In 1973 a new record sale of maize to EPCMA was reported within Eastern Province and as can be seen in Table 8-1, new marketing records were often reported during the 1970s. A lot of maize was also sold to the 'line of rail' area (NAZ MRD1/2/6 1973). According to Table 8-1, there was also a large increase in marketed maize in the Kalunga IDZ area, which corresponds roughly to Chief Sayiri, including both Yelesani and Kasauka villages.

**Table 8-1: Marketed maize, 90 kg bags**

Year	Eastern Province	Chipata District	Kalunga IDZ area
1973	506,000	180,000	11,000
1974	612,000	217,000	18,000
1975	770,000	256,000	20,000
1976	912,000	349,000	26,000
1977	942,000	366,000	32,000

Source: RoZ 1978:98

Available sources report a continuing increase in the production of maize as a cash crop in the Kalunga area until the mid-1980s (Fenichel & Smith 1992:1315). The price of maize was considered good compared to other crops, such as groundnuts and beans. Even during years of poor rains, record crops of maize were produced in Eastern Province, while groundnuts largely failed (NAZ MRD1/2/6 1973). Already during the early 1970s official reports expressed concern that maize production was about to take over the production to the extent that other food crops were being marginalised (NAZ MRD1/2/6 1972-1974).

Unless something is done, the production of maize will continue to increase whilst the decrease of such crops as chalimbana groundnuts, cotton and beans will continue. It is recommended that the present production pricing policies of the various crops be carefully reviewed to take into account the present situation, demands, prices and production costs. (NAZ MRD1/2/6 1973[emphasis in original])

The focus on maize production continued, however, throughout the 1970s and 1980s and it is emphasised in the annual reports that the crop should be further encouraged (RoZ 1976; RoZ 1992). During the whole of the 1980s the land area under maize cultivation increased considerably in Eastern Province and in Chipata District (RoZ 1982; RoZ 1988; RoZ 1992). No other crop experienced a similar increase. The hectares planted with groundnuts and cotton instead decreased during the same period. Sylwander & Egnell (1990:35) further estimate that the smallholders usually grew hybrid maize for sale on at least half their cultivated land in the late 1980s. From 1988, however, the hectares planted with maize stopped expanding in the southern part of Chipata District, while the area planted with groundnuts increased in both the province and the southern part of the district (RoZ 1992). In the Provincial Annual report for 1989/1990 (RoZ 1990), meanwhile, the language also changed and the stated ambition was now to encourage production of all major crops.

There are no reports of late payments and failure in payments in the documents and when farmers' payment is discussed it is not referred to in any problematic way (NAZ EP4/15/17 1979). Fenichel & Smith (1992:1317-1318) looked specifically into production, pricing and incentives for smallholder farmers' cultivation of maize in the light of the increased pressure from the World Bank and the donor community to liberalise markets. They weighed the government controlled prices, subsidies on fertilisers and transport against export prices and concluded that there was little to suggest that smallholder farmers in the Kalunga area would benefit from a liberalised market, with fluctuating prices and where they themselves would need to bear the higher costs for inputs and transportation. They concluded that there might be other reasons for criticising the government control in the agricultural sector but in terms of agricultural production and productivity "there is no reason to assume a negative relationship" (Fenichel & Smith 1992:1318)

### *Development projects*

The area around Eastern Block and the Kalunga Camp was subject to several area specific development programmes during the 1970s and 1980s. The first major project was the Intensive Development Zone, IDZ, which focused on two areas within the district, one of them the Kalunga area (corresponding roughly to the Chief Sayiri area). As the name of the project indicates, it focused on the development of certain places, with the benefits to be subsequently spread to surrounding areas. The IDZ in Kalunga included efforts to improve road networks, agricultural productivity, marketing systems, credit systems and water access. The work in Kalunga started in 1974. During the project, the road network expanded, marketing sheds were established, extension services expanded and a number of projects to encourage fish pond management, improve nutrition, safe water access, job opportunities and irrigation were initiated (RoZ 1978). Extension improved greatly, not least through access to motorbikes within the IDZ areas during the project period (outside IDZ areas, extension officers had no access to motorbikes). Furthermore, the IDZ provided credits for buying pigs, poultry and ox-drawn equipment to some farmers. A major purpose of the IDZ was to improve the general living standard of all smallholders, increase incomes and decrease urban-rural gaps to stifle rural-urban migration.

The target population of IDZ is small-scale farmers. This is a rather heterogeneous group. It ranges from very poor subsistence farmers with no motivation at all to improve their situation up to well-equipped farmers cultivating several hectares and with many profitable side activities. (ibid:78)

On the other hand it was rather clear that this had not been the outcome of the project.

The predominant group among the primary beneficiaries of this programme consists of small-scale farmers who have just emerged from the subsistence farming level. The farmers at lower levels have benefited (...) only to a smaller extent. The gap already existing between these two sections of farmers has not been narrowed. On the other hand, if the limited IDZ resources are allocated to cover the lowest level of farmers as well, the increase in agricultural production can be slow. (ibid:119)

The evaluation report concludes that the better-off farmers benefited most from the IDZ. It is also quite openly stated that it was an objective of the project to support certain farmers in certain areas with the main aim to increase production (ibid:139). There was a considerable degree of criticism within the Ministry of Rural Development towards the IDZ project in the Chipata District. It was criticised for its parallel structures, for not involving Zambian staff and for focusing on planning procedures and surveys with less focus on implementation of practices aimed at actually increasing production and welfare in the area, especially for the poorer segments (NAZ MRD1/2/6 1973; Hedlund & Lundahl 1983:35). In 1987, when the Zambian government had broken with the IMF, the donor community and their demands for liberalisation and deregulation, the IDZ project was described as donor dominated and:

Above all, the programme worked against the egalitarian principles as promulgated by the Zambian government due to its trickle down concept and approach. (RoZ 1987b:iii)

In the Second National Development Plan 1972-1976, the reasoning had, however, been quite different. Arguing the need for 'islands of development', previous policies were said to have suffered from an "undue dispersion of scarce resources" (RoZ 1971b:177). As a further defence for spending the major part of the budget on the 'line of rail' provinces it was stated that:

In planning, there is need to apply scarce resources to areas and lines of investment which offer the best economic returns for the country as a whole. (RoZ 1971b:167)

In the evaluation report the economic profitability of the IDZ project was deemed "very high" and "superior to other rural development strategies employed up to now" (RoZ 1978:135). However, this conclusion is clearly built on false premises. The report refers to increased production and productivity

within the IDZ zone, when compared to Chipata District and to Eastern Province as whole. For the Kalunga IDZ area, for example, this is only valid if the years previous to the IDZ project are included (see Table 8-1). But increased production and productivity before the IDZ was launched can hardly be attributed to the project. If these years are excluded the IDZ project had no impact at all on production rates (RoZ 1978:98).

This does not mean that there were no positive effects for the local population in terms of roads and extension. In terms of safe water access it seems quite clear that the situation improved in the Kalunga IDZ area during the project time. The IDZ project was replaced in 1978 by the Integrated Rural Development Programme, IRDP. This programme was largely a continuation of the IDZ but aimed at spreading resources more evenly over a larger area. The standpoint in the IRDP was (as for the IDZ) a broad approach to rural development and the integration of different services such as extension, road network development, and the provision of education, health and market services. Importantly, both the IDZ and IRDP aimed at further commercialisation of the small-scale farmers through increased production of hybrid maize for the market and increased use of fertilisers. According to the overall production in the district, as well as at Kalunga, the projects were in some sense successful then. As Fenichel & Smith (1992:1316) conclude, the farmers in the area were “largely captured by the market”.

Several extension officers in the Eastern Block look back upon these earlier projects in a rather critical way. Their perception seems to be that a lot of resources were spent with very little outcome in terms of implementation and adoption. Aquaculture, for example, is said to be non-existent in the area. There is hardly any use of water pumps in the study area, only manual irrigation, through carrying buckets of water from nearby streams. A common opinion among the extension officers is that many of these programmes, as well as the work of NGOs in the area, made the farmers dependent on handouts. SCAFE is, for example, criticised for giving different types of gifts to the farmers as incentives for implementing soil conservation measures.

After independence the farmers depended on handouts. Then the NGOs came in... the SCAFE programme by Sida. We gave handouts and animals. Then we changed and stopped giving handouts in 2000/2002. And very few came to our meetings. Handouts made them very lazy [laughter] (...) For example contour ridges were established [during SCAFE], some are still there but they are not being maintained. And they do not make new, some have even been removed, I have seen it in all the blocks where I have been working.  
(EO11, extension officer)



In summary then, Eastern Block and Chipata District have been subject to several programmes that have assisted small-scale farmers in their access to extension, inputs and markets. Even though the projects are not described as very successful and several of them as failures, it is likely that at least some farmers in the area have benefited from them.

## **8.4 The Kaunda years in retrospect**

### **8.4.1 Focusing on farmers' views**

At national level the post-independence policy regime has been depicted in rather negative terms. When focusing on the broader study area of Chipata district, the picture becomes more ambiguous, suggesting both great achievements and setbacks. This picture might, however, be influenced by the high reliance on official documents. Therefore it is particularly important to throw light on the smallholders' perceptions of the Humanism era. When discussing the livelihood situations after independence and onwards with smallholders in Kasauka, Yelesani and villages around, the respondents point at several issues. As always, the issue of fertiliser access is brought up.

There was a change. We started to receive extension. We harvested a lot of food. We were also taught how to use fertiliser. So there was a difference because before independence we did not harvest a lot of food because of no fertiliser.

(OF8, older female farmer)

The older farmers bring up the easy access to fertiliser, the low input prices and the possibility of getting loans. This was somehow surprising considering the literature on the situation at national level pointing at problems with late deliveries and insufficient supplies. This was discussed with the respondents, but the response was uniform. Fertiliser was there when they needed it, throughout the 1980s, and in contrast to today:

Q: What about fertiliser during the 1970s and 1980s. Did it happen that fertiliser was not available?

R: No, fertiliser was always available through the cooperatives.

Q: What about the availability of fertiliser today?

R: The cooperatives are not working well.

Q: Why not?

R: They are not transparent. They just want to steal, the leaders. The leaders of the cooperatives steal money.

Q: So why do you buy through the cooperatives?

R: Because the fertiliser is subsidised.

Q: But are you given the fertiliser you pay for?  
R: Sometimes I am given the right amount, sometimes not.  
(OF14, older male farmer)

According to the farmers, the easy access to fertilisers led to an increased food production, although many of them also refer back to the colonial era as a time of higher food insecurity.

During Kaunda's rule things were not bad, things were okay. During the colonial times we did not harvest enough food. But after independence we were given fertiliser and started to cultivate a lot of food.  
(OF13, older male farmer)

The farmers began to market maize to a greater extent and some of them started to cultivate larger areas of land. They also state that casual work was not as common as today.

Q: What about food shortages during the 1970s and 1980s. Did you experience that?  
R: Never in my household. Only very few farmers experienced food shortage during that time. Unlike today, many more households experience food shortage.  
Q: Why is that do you think?  
R: It is because they do not have enough fertiliser.  
Q: How do people solve the problem of lack of food?  
R: They go for piecework.  
Q: Was it common with piecework in the 1970s?  
R: Very few went for piecework that time.  
(OF15, older male farmer)

Fenichel & Smith's study (1992:1316) also indicates that the farmers in Chief Sayiri accessed substantially more fertiliser in the mid-1980s compared to during the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The older farmers refer to higher food security in the area during the 1960s and 1970s. The main issue was the accessibility of fertilisers, but the older farmers also state that the soil fertility was substantially better, at least during the 1960s. Resettlement of people to the Chipangali area is also likely to have contributed to the improved situation in Chief Sayiri, which is also mentioned by several of the older farmers (OF1, older male farmer; OF9, older female farmer; OFG2, older male farmers group). Population figures for Chief Sayiri also show a declining trend during the 1950s from 5,011 inhabitants in 1953 to 4,398 inhabitants in 1958 (NAZ SEC2/88 1954-1958; NAZ EP4/2/9 1958).

Several respondents state that after independence it was still possible to cultivate enough maize for subsistence, even without applying chemical fertilisers, something that very few regard as possible today in the study area. Today the soils are viewed as highly depleted compared to the 1960s. This is to the extent that it is no longer possible to cultivate vegetables and fruits, like cucumber and watermelon that used to be common in the area. However, several respondents claim that already during the early 1970s, farmers had started to face increased problems with soil fertility. From then on fertiliser application was necessary even for subsistence cultivation. In terms of fallow periods there seem to have been rather small changes from the 1960s up to present times. The fallow was usually between 2-4 years, which is not very different from today. Several farmers state, however that fallow periods have decreased, sometimes to zero (OF8, older female farmer; OF11, older male farmer; OF13, older male farmers).

In terms of soil conservation and extension, there are also partly conflicting answers. The popular view in the literature that contour ridges and other soil conservation methods were less stressed after independence is not fully confirmed by the farmers. Many of the older respondents state that they were encouraged to use crop rotation, construct and maintain contour ridges and use animal manure during the 1960s and 1970s. However, there are also those stating that farmers in the area stopped maintaining and making contours after independence, referring especially to the fact that they used to be forced to construct them during colonial days (OF1, older male farmer; OF7, older male farmer). In terms of market access and prices, the farmers deliver a positive picture of the situation after independence and also during the 1970s and 1980s. The respondents state that there was a seasonal market available at Kalunga village or Kasauka village.

Q: What about markets during the 1960s and 1970s? Where did you sell your produce?

R: There used to be a market at Kasauka.

Q: Did you at that time ever experience problems with late payments?

R: No, we were paid instantly. There was never a problem.

Q: What about today?

R: The problem is there today that farmers are not paid in time. Last year we sold in August but did not get our payment until February this year.

(OFG12, older female and male farmers group)

All interviewees state that markets for maize and groundnuts were accessible when they needed them and that they never experienced problems with late payment. The perception is also that marketing of their produce worked well

throughout the 1980s until the local market disappeared in 1991. On the contrary, several respondents bring up problems with late payment when selling to the FRA nowadays. The respondents are also positive towards prices paid for their produce during the pre-liberalisation period. Policymakers especially at international level, expected farmers producer prices to raise when markets were liberalised, but according to the respondents this did not make up for the increased cost of fertiliser.

In the beginning of the 1980s we could buy three bags of fertiliser through selling one bag of maize. Today, one bag of maize is not even sufficient to buy one bag of fertiliser. (Female group interview 1998, Kasauka village) (Amberntsson 1999:84).

It might be that people look back in appreciation of a time when they were younger and stronger and there is likely to be an element of romanticising the past in their descriptions of the Kaunda years, or the time “before democracy” as one male farmer phrased it. However, during the 1998 study more or less all respondents in Kasauka village spoke of the Humanism era as a time when they produced enough food, when markets were there and inputs accessible. In addition primary schooling was free of charge just as primary healthcare. Also the interviews with younger farmers in Yelesani and Kasauka villages between 2006 and 2008 present a similar picture of the pre-liberalisation period as a time when life was better and arrangements in terms of markets and inputs worked rather well. There was no difference visible between respondents from poorer and richer households members on this issue. And although there are some indications that things were deteriorating during the 1980s (lack of basic commodities, long queues, deterioration in healthcare and education system), it is the changes during the 1990s that are argued to have severely constrained farmers’ possibilities to make an adequate living.

Q: You said that Kaunda government was better. What was good about the Kaunda government?

R: During the Kaunda government people afforded to buy fertiliser, many people had enough money. And there were plenty of markets. We did not have to go to Chipata. The fertiliser was available at Kalunga.

Q: Is there anything that has been improved since the Kaunda era, anything that is better now?

R: No, nothing.

(YV1, middle aged man, less poor, 9 children)

Still in 2008, the state controlled model of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s seems to be the ideal type as far as the smallholders are concerned. The extension

officers' responses agree with the picture delivered by the farmers. However, they interpret the period more negatively as a time when farmers became dependent on subsidies and market arrangements that are basically gone forever. To them the issue is now chiefly about changing farmers' attitudes and making them realise that things will not go back to what they once were.

R: Well, farmers say that it was better before when the government controlled markets and prices, and basically they are correct, they were probably better off at that time, when for example the prices were controlled. Now they have to negotiate with the private buyers, but usually the farmers have no say in these negotiations.

Q: Why is it so hard for the farmers to negotiate for a better price?


R: I think the government first should have educated the farmers and the households in how to negotiate with the buyers. But they did not do that, they just changed from controlled to private. But this is actually what we are doing now, we try to educate them on this matter.

(EO8, extension officer)

Karttunen's study (2009) of income diversification in Eastern Zambia strengthens the impression that smallholder livelihoods have deteriorated in many respects from the mid-1980s and onwards. The study indicates that household incomes halved between 1986 and 2003, and that the relative importance of off-farm incomes has increased, mainly due to a sharp decline in crop income. However, in absolute terms, the value of off-farm incomes decreased between 1986 and 2003, indicating a rather ambiguous diversification pattern. The diversification is also labelled as slow and can hardly be attributed to any general process of deagrarianisation. The share of income from farming decreased between 1986 and 2003 from 86 percent to 76 percent. The decline is dominated by decreased returns from crop production, while income from livestock has increased in relative terms (*ibid*:107, 124).

The relative increase in importance of off-farm incomes is dominated by small-scale businesses, including retailing and trade, while income shares from wage employment and remittances were rather constant between the years 1986 and 2002 (*ibid*:109). The percentage of households engaged in trading and retailing has increased heavily between 1986 and 2003 from 9 to 31 percent. The number of households involved in activities such as beer brewing, mat weaving and tailoring has decreased (*ibid*:113). In terms of farming, the use of fertiliser declined in Eastern Province from the mid-1980s up to 2003. The number of hectares of maize production on smallholder farms has decreased from 1,65 hectare to less than a hectare, while there is no overall decrease in the planted area (*ibid*:108-111). Together with interview data presented in Chapter Six,

these figures indicate that any deagrarianisation trend in the area is weak, whether in terms of off-farm income or social and cultural identification. To further explore this issue, the land use patterns around Kasauka village have been mapped out (Table 8-2 and Figure 8-3). This covers an area of 14 square kilometres (around 1,400 hectares), constituting approximately 15 percent of the Chief Sayiri area. For methodological reasons the focus is on the category ‘active agricultural land’.



**Figure 8-3: Land use around Kasauka village**

Source: Analysis based on aerial photos obtained from MACO, Lusaka (1965, 1988) & Google Earth (2003).

**Table 8-2: Land use around Kasauka village (hectare)**

Year	1965	1988	2003
Active agricultural land	467 ha	585 ha	620 ha
Gardens	54 ha	76 ha	157 ha
<i>Total</i>	<i>521 ha</i>	<i>661 ha</i>	<i>777 ha</i>

The coverage of active agricultural land increased substantially after independence, with around 25 percent from 1965 to 1988 and around 33 percent from 1965 to 2003. It is further likely that the population pressure in the area increased from independence up to 1988, after an initial decrease due to the resettlement to Chipangali.<sup>56</sup> The expansion of active agricultural land between 1964 and 1988 support the farmers views that the prerequisites for smallholder farming improved in the study area. The increase in active agricultural land is, however, rather slow from 1988 to 2003 (if gardens are excluded). This is also in line with the general picture that the farmers started to face increased difficulties in sustaining a farming way of life from the early 1990s onwards.

### **8.5 Diverging views**

The responses of the farmers concerning the post-independence situation do not correspond well with the literature on policy implementation and policy outcomes in rural Zambia during the Kaunda regime. The literature is generally very critical of the post-independence period, with critique coming from both liberal and socialist camps. Some focus their criticism on the regulations and inefficiency of the Zambian government. Others concentrated on the lack of egalitarian principles guiding the policy implementations and the increased differentiation between the better off and the majority of rural villagers. Other important lines of criticism were that policies were urban biased and in general discriminatory against smallholders. When looking closer into the documentation of the development in Eastern Province and Chipata District, the picture is more mixed. It is no longer clear that policies discouraged small-scale farmers from producing surpluses. Markets and fertilisers were rather accessible, although there were problems at times, especially in making enough top dressing available at the different depots. These (mostly) documents also confirm that

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<sup>56</sup> However, the cultivation pattern in 1965 does not fully agree with what is stated in the colonial documentation, where overcrowding is elaborated as a major issue. The land use development during the post-independence era indicates that there was land available for cultivation at independence. This might have several explanations though, where exaggeration from the colonial administrations' side is only one. Resettlement to Chipangali led to a decrease in population pressure during the 1950s (NAZ SEC2/88 1954-1957; NAZ EP4/2/9 1958). The last decade before independence is also likely to have led to an increased migration from the area, when women and children started to accompany their husbands/fathers to a larger degree. Squatting on fertile European farmland became a possibility the last years before independence. Less clearance of new lands for cultivation due to the heavy male migration during the colonial era might be another factor of importance. An aerial photo from the late 1940s would possibly have indicated a more intensive land use compared to the 1965 photo.

development projects and services such as extension focused on the better off farmers in the area of study. When talking to the farmers in the area, however, the picture of the Kaunda years is in fact a positive one.

Why these diverging views on the post-independence period, especially between the farmers and the broader literature? It might be that the study area is a special case. One reason for suggesting that is that the study area was subject to several donor sponsored development projects during the post-independence era. These projects and their impact on farmers' views and the development in the area are probably of some importance here. Another reason is that the area is relatively suitable for maize cultivation, compared to other parts of the country.

It is therefore likely that there are differences between different parts of the country, especially in terms of how suitable various areas were for maize cultivation and how familiar with maize cultivation smallholder farmers in different parts of the country were. A brief look at people-centred studies in other parts of the country tell us, however, that neither Kasauka and Yelesani villages nor Eastern Block nor Chipata District are special cases. Several studies from elsewhere in the country tell a story where small-scale farmers look back at the Kaunda years in a similar way to the farmers interviewed for this study (Keller-Herzog et al. 1997; Francis et al. 1997; Milimo et al. 2002; White et al. 2005). By the same token, the liberalisation process, which followed the Kaunda years is perceived negatively. It is therefore likely that farmers' perception of the Kaunda years as relatively prosperous in terms of their livelihood situation is of general relevance in Zambia. The critique of inefficient state organisations, corruption and state-controlled policies tends to create the impression that small-scale farmers were almost further marginalised after independence. The statements of the farmers themselves do not, however, support that contention.

Finally, the humanistic ideology impacted on policies towards smallholder farmers in the study area but not in the profound way of offering a development route different from modernisation. Subsidies and markets were aimed at and directed towards peripheral areas, but social differentiation among rural dwellers and a further commercialisation of individual farmers also took place after independence. The regional and urban bias founded in colonial rule continued. How then shall we interpret the Humanism era in Zambia in relation to both previous and subsequent policy regimes? And how can the contemporary livelihoods, of smallholders in Eastern Province, and the historical origins of those livelihoods, be interpreted in a broader African context? To answer these questions will be the task for the final chapter.



## **9. Conclusions and final interpretations**

### **9.1 Conclusions**

The aim of this study has been to, through a historical perspective on rural livelihoods and policy regimes, uncover the political and economic processes, with their discursive foundations, that shape contemporary rural livelihoods in peripheral areas.

Two research questions have been asked in order to fulfil the study aim:

1. What factors have shaped the livelihood situations of smallholder farmers in peripheral areas over time?
2. How have rural policy regimes changed over time, in terms of their practical implementation, their impact and their ideological/discursive foundations?

I embarked on this study for a number of reasons. Rural Africa is generally depicted as in a state of chronic poverty, where policies of different ideological persuasions have failed to substantially improve the livelihoods of rural poor. This led to an interest in thoroughly explore rural livelihoods and rural policy regimes over time, in order to make possible an identification of the factors and processes that underlie changes as well as continuities in rural livelihood situations. This study has been developed in relation to debates on livelihood research, which have repeatedly called for research approaches that more thoroughly link the specifics of local livelihoods to larger scale political and economic processes over time, which include both material and discursive dimensions. Finally the farming as a business approach motivated me to explore what informs policies and how we can understand their formation, especially since they are clearly not grounded in rural people's own perceptions of what constitute the causes of their situation.

In this chapter the aim and the research questions will be discussed in light of the analytical framework presented in Chapter Two and the contextual background outlined in Chapter Three. The analytical framework suggested four sets of forces shaping rural livelihoods, namely: world-economic integration of place; rural policy regimes over time; ideologies of modernity and development and smallholders' ways of making a living. This framework will inform the discussion in this concluding chapter which is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the policy regimes and political and economic processes behind contemporary livelihoods. The second section focuses on the discursive foundations of the processes and policy regimes impacting on rural livelihoods.

There are several important conclusions running through the chapter summarily listed below:

- Contemporary livelihoods are shaped by long-term political-economic-discursive processes, which have their roots in the terms of the study area's initial integration into the world economy.
- The contemporary composition of rural livelihoods in the study area, as well as in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, expresses a historical and ongoing process of semi-proletarianisation, rather than a response to economic and social change in the late twentieth century.
- The Humanism era (and similar political periods in other African countries) constitutes a parenthesis, which slowed down this semi-proletarianisation. As such, smallholders have a much more positive interpretation of this period in time, than that which is prevalent in the contemporary policy discourse and among academic sources analysing this period in time.
- Rural policy regimes show a great deal of continuity. Importantly, colonial discourses on African peasants have been reproduced in present times and have repercussions in terms of how smallholders are approached in contemporary policies.
- Modernisation is a fundamental ideological force shaping rural livelihoods and rural households' room for manoeuvre. The overarching idea of modernity as the definite goal in development has led to a continuous process of othering of smallholder farmers, who for various reasons have not proved amenable to the policy instruments of the various regimes. This othering process has ethnic dimensions in the study area.
- The othering process has served different purposes at different periods of time, such as *justifying* the exclusion of smallholders (as was the case during the colonial era), or *explaining* the exclusion of smallholders (as is the case during the PRSP era).

## **9.2 Explaining contemporary livelihoods**

A long-term process of political and economic change has shaped the contemporary livelihood situations of smallholders in Chipata District. The area was drawn into the world economy at a time and along a course that undermined any possibility of locally driven development. The people in the area were displaced, pressed forcibly together and compelled to become sedentary at the

same time as they were taxed and deliberately excluded from agricultural markets. At this point in time, periphery processes started to dominate the area. Subsequent policies have then failed to turn these processes around. Consequently, contemporary livelihoods are characterised by food insecurity, soil depletion and a peripheral position in contemporary agricultural markets.

To explore these periphery processes a bit further we need to take a look at the four layers of goals, problem descriptions, instruments and processes of rural policy regimes in Chipata District from the inception of colonial rule until present time (Table 9-1).

**Table 9-1: Rural Policy Regimes in Chipata District**

Time-period	<u>Early colonial era</u> 1900-1940	<u>Late colonial era</u> 1940-1964	<u>Humanism era</u> 1964-1991	<u>Adjustment era</u> 1991-2001	<u>PRSP era</u> 2001-2008
<b>Major Goals of the rural policy regime</b>	Modernity Economic growth Civilisation Cheap labour Land for settlers Extraction of resources <i>Urban food security</i>	Modernity Economic growth Civilisation Cheap labour <i>(Market economy)</i> Extraction of resources <i>Urban food security</i>	Modernity Economic growth Spiritual/moral dev. Poverty reduction Regional balance Equality <i>(Urban) food security</i>	Modernity Economic growth <i>(Poverty reduction)</i> Market economy <i>(Food security)</i>	Modernity Economic growth Civilisation Poverty reduction Market economy Food security
<b>Problem-description informing the rural policy regime</b>	<i>Irrational/ignorant peasants</i> <i>Wrong agricultural methods</i> Ngoni	<i>Irrational/ignorant peasants</i> <i>Wrong agricultural methods</i> Ngoni <i>(Poverty)</i>	Exclusion Inequality <i>(Wrong agricultural methods)</i> Poverty	State control No private market <i>Wrong agricultural methods</i> Poverty	<i>Irrational/ignorant peasants</i> <i>Wrong agricultural methods</i> Ngoni Poverty
<b>Major instruments of the rural policy regime</b>	State control Taxes on smallholders Native reserves Discrimination <i>Soil conservation</i>	State control Support to progressive farmers Discrimination Resettlement <i>Soil conservation</i>	State control Fixed prices and subsidies. -pan territorial -pan seasonal <i>(Soil conservation)</i> (Resettlement) IRDP/IDZ/LIMA	Liberalisation Deregulation Cuts in subsidies  <i>Soil conservation</i>	Liberalisation Farming as business (State engagement) - FRA - FSP <i>Soil conservation</i>
<b>Rural processes during the rural policy regime</b>	<i>Labour migration</i> <i>Social differentiation (Maize production)</i> <i>Soil depletion</i> <i>Peripheralisation</i> <i>Semi-proletarianisation</i> <i>Modernisation</i>	<i>Labour migration</i> <i>Social differentiation</i> <i>Maize production</i> <i>Soil Depletion</i> <i>Peripheralisation</i> <i>Semi-proletarianisation</i> <i>Modernisation</i>	<i>Labour migration</i> <i>Social differentiation</i> <i>Maize production</i> <i>Soil depletion</i> (Inclusion) <i>(Semi-proletarianisation)</i> <i>Modernisation</i>	<i>Social differentiating</i> (Crop diversification) <i>Soil depletion</i> <i>Peripheralisation</i> <i>Semi-proletarianisation</i> <i>Modernisation</i>	<i>Social differentiation</i> <i>Maize production</i> <i>Soil depletion</i> <i>Peripheralisation</i> <i>Semi-proletarianisation</i> <i>Modernisation</i>

NB! Goals, problem descriptions, instruments and processes put in parenthesis indicate that they are of secondary importance. Goals, problem descriptions, instruments and processes that appear during at least three policy regimes are written in italics.

Table 9-1 indicates the remarkable extent of continuity in goals, problem descriptions and processes from era to era. Dominating processes in smallholder areas since the inception of colonial rule are semi-proletarianisation,

modernisation, social differentiation, peripheralisation and soil depletion. The Humanism era is the period that separates itself in terms of the problem description and several of the goals, although the material impacts of Humanism are less distinctively different.

A consequence of colonial policy goals and instruments was a long-standing process of semi-proletarianisation in smallholder areas, meaning that households that previously relied on agriculture for making a living now needed both wage labour and agriculture to make ends meet. A main conclusion of this study is that livelihood diversification in sub-Saharan Africa is best understood as a continuing process of semi-proletarianisation with deep roots in the colonial era and the initial integration of African rural areas into the world economy. In the case of Eastern Zambia, semi-proletarianisation runs throughout the colonial and post-independence periods, with the partial exception of the Humanism era. Similar trends have been visible in large parts of Southern and Eastern Africa (as well as in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole) as discussed in Chapter Two and Three. Since the inception of colonial rule, smallholders have faced immense difficulties (and often been restrained) in making a living out of agriculture, without engaging in off-farm activities and temporary labour migration.

Today, farmers clearly state that they would focus on a farming life if it were possible to do so. This preference for farming and the related view of off-farm activities as necessary to make farming possible is corroborated by other studies on rural livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Larsson 2001; Bryceson 2009). However, a life devoted solely to farming has hardly been a possibility for the past 100 years or more (notwithstanding that policies during the Humanism era brought substantial improvements in that respect). The contemporary semi-proletarianisation is therefore primarily neither a consequence of neoliberal policies nor some kind of social/cultural change, but is foremost a consequence of rural Africa's initial world-economic integration and continuing peripheralisation.

It is true that contemporary neoliberal policies boosted semi-proletarianisation, after the ultimately futile attempts by African governments to establish an own brand process of rural development. In Zambia, as in many other African countries, support structures were established during the first phase of independence that supported smallholders. Markets, inputs, credits and social services were in many places made available to farmers (see Table 9-1). According to the farmers in the study area, rural policies during the Humanism era improved their farming life through increased production, incomes and improved food security. Their apprehension of these policies as supportive of their way of living is in sharp contrast to how these policies have been judged as

deeply urban biased, unfair and exploitative of smallholder farmers. However, since these support structures were abandoned during the 1990s (in many countries during the 1980s), casual work and off-farm incomes have increased in relative importance, but not necessarily in absolute importance, as for example Karttunen's (2009) study in Eastern Zambia illustrates.

The immediate post-independence period with its rather extensive support structures directed towards smallholders was a parenthesis. Policies during this parenthesis slowed down the process of semi-proletarianisation of rural households, and tried to encourage processes of proletarianisation and agrarianisation. In Taylor's (1993) terms, the Humanism in Zambia was an attempt by the Kaunda government to 'distort' the effects of the global world economy, and act against the peripheralisation of smallholders. For Zambia, as in other cases, this first phase of independence led to a debt crisis and a hollow treasury, and consequently to a deep and long-term dependency on external actors promoting neoliberal economic policies.

The lack of historical perspectives in contemporary livelihood research has contributed to the obscuration of this continuity in rural livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa. In a sense, of course, diversification and semi-proletarianisation describe the same process, that rural livelihoods are multiple. But, by using the concept of diversification, elements of choice and opportunity versus distress are highlighted, as well as elements of social and cultural change. This is not wrong *per se*, and these aspects and debates *are* relevant, but in some places more than in other. The point is, however, when we study contemporary rural livelihoods from the perspective of diversification it may lead us astray since fundamental processes tend to be overshadowed. This is the case, I would argue, for large parts of sub-Saharan Africa where the diversification of rural livelihoods foremost constitutes a periphery process. This is in fact a major problem with the actor-oriented livelihood approach. Since people's ways of making a living are framed as 'livelihood strategies' (which, again, is not wrong *per se*, but is a very partial truth) we tend to lose sight of the underlying processes creating poverty and shaping livelihoods in rural areas.

Semi-proletarianisation, on the other hand, exposes much more clearly the exploitation processes underlying farmers' inability to make a living out of agriculture in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa. It helps us understand the foundations of unequal exchange as discussed by Taylor (1993), and the further purpose of excluding reproductive costs in wages. The events in Eastern Zambia, as well as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, present a rather clear case of primitive accumulation. Since the inception of colonial rule, these rural households have supplied labour to a capitalist sector of employment, while

reproducing and sustaining household members through subsistence activities. Since colonial rule this has enabled a transfer of wealth from smallholder communities to other sectors of economic activities within as well as outside of Zambia.

There are, however, differences between the semi-proletarianisation of the colonial era, and what is today described as diversification in many rural settings of Africa. The formal employment of adult males during the colonial era has largely been replaced by self-employment, informal work and a smaller segment of formally or semi-formally employed. In that sense it is a different type of proletariat, a type of sub-proletariat, a reserve labour force to draw from when needed. We could of course start to talk about semi-lumpen-proletarianisation or a growing semi-precariat, especially since terms like rural slums are likely to become increasingly valid in the context of rural Africa. But what is needed is not another concept. Rather we need to revitalise old ones and further extend our understanding of the rootedness of processes such as semi-proletarianisation, primitive accumulation and peripheralisation of rural Africa. Because if we do not interpret contemporary events in rural sub-Saharan in this historical perspective, the analysis will continue to limp and give further way for rather deficient and murky policy recommendations at both national and local level.

When structural adjustment policies failed in rural Africa, policymakers were surprised that a functioning market economy benefiting rural communities had not arrived as a result of these policies. There are, however, few reasons for being surprised. This can be further illustrated by the history of rural policy regimes in Chipata District, which resembles many other African areas. In Chipata District, agricultural markets were state-controlled during the whole colonial era and Africans were excluded or at best awarded a peripheral position. After independence followed a period of even deeper state-control, but where African farmers were included and encouraged through high agricultural subsidies. Then, after almost a century of control and regulation, markets were rapidly liberalised. Farmers with minimal experience of free market arrangements were now to attract buyers, negotiate prices and compete with heavily subsidised cheap imports. Instead of benefiting from the deregulation of agricultural markets, farmers in the study area have experienced exclusion and further peripheralisation. And finally, the Zambian government, to a limited extent re-introduced both the input subsidies and market arrangements abandoned during the adjustment period, and have preserved with them in spite of the obvious annoyance of the donor community.

In a sense, the contemporary farming as a business approach in Zambia is therefore logical. In areas where farmers have had little or no experience of

acting in a free market within a capitalist mode of production, training in entrepreneurship and changing attitudes might be conceived as reasonable measures. However, given long-standing processes of peripheralisation, semi-proletarianisation, primitive accumulation and the smallholders' contemporary position in the international agricultural market, the approach might be conceived as both arrogant and naive.

### **9.3 Rural livelihoods under the command of modernisation**

Households' strong preference for maintaining agriculture as their main activity, shown in this study, is in some contrast to the literature that suggests that deagrarianisation is a central and rather positive dynamic. In the light of the pentagon of capitals in the livelihood framework, this means that the 'natural capital' of land is of crucial importance for the rural households, not only as a source of making a living, but also in terms of making life meaningful. To permanently trade the 'natural capital' of land for other types of capital is not therefore done lightly by the households in the study area, and certainly not without a sense of loss. Their strong appreciation of a farming life is based on the attraction of producing their own food, but also affection for rural life including dimensions of independence in a village context of social cohesion. Respect for earlier generations' lifestyles is also of implicit importance. The households' vision of a good life partly represents an alternative to the ideas of modernisation and individualisation that have dominated rural policies in the study area. Ideas of reciprocity, self-reliance and local exchange are important ingredients in this alternative.

Households can, however, not be seen as independent in the sense of Hydén's original idea of the peasant mode of production. Rather they are 'captured' as a consequence of long-term integration into a broader economy. But the fact that farmers are captured does not necessarily affect their preference for a farming life. Continuing social stratification and policies like farming as a business are, however, likely to further weaken the possibilities for a rural life that is not in accordance with the demands of a modern, individual-centred and capitalist-oriented model of development.

The farmers, especially older farmers, do at the same time report decreasing cooperation and weakening networks of social cohesion. There are long-standing processes of social stratification, which have been encouraged by policy regimes since the inception of colonial rule, as well as tendencies of a decline in reciprocity within the extended family. There are therefore conflicting processes in motion, where an affectionate proclivity for a farming- and village-

based-life is in tension with increased stratification and individual ambitions for economic progress and a willingness to separate oneself from the obligations of local social networks.

To state that there are conflicting processes might be to obscure the fact that one process, modernisation, and one goal, modernity, have been dominating rural livelihoods ever since the inception of colonial rule. When colonial rule was established in Eastern Zambia, the African farmer was directly identified as ‘the other’, as an unmodern figure living in traditional societies without the necessary cultural prerequisites for progress in line with European thought. Consequently, farmers needed assistance in order to modernise and to prepare for a modern world. In Chipata District the colonial administration identified the Ngoni people as the purest representative of ‘the other’. Since that time, these portrayals of the smallholders have been a recurrent theme of problem descriptions underlying rural policy formulation and implementation in the study area.

Today, these ideas are taken up within the frame of the ASP – farming as a business project identifying the farmer in terms of otherness. The basic assumption of the project is that farmers culturally lack a lot of things that are fundamental for a modern society and a modern person. Farmers in Kasauka and Yelesani villages are depicted as irrational people working at random without a clear vision of economic progress at either individual or household level. They are furthermore seen as passive, mainly waiting for handouts instead of working actively in order to improve their lives.

Contemporary framings of farmers in Kasauka and Yelesani village, in Eastern Block and Chipata District as primitive or even child-like are deeply rooted in the early history of thought on modernity and modernisation. The founding ideas are referred to in Chapter Two largely through the practices and ideas of pre-colonial explorers, enlightenment philosophers, imperial powers and early sociologists. Both past and present policy regimes incorporate ideas of global difference and are based on a binary logic, where the smallholders and their society represent a more primitive stage in that they are different from Europeans in their mindsets and social practices. They are supposed to be educated and enlightened to enable their move from traditional to modern. The idea of the farmer as ‘the other’ and the Ngoni as the most authentic representative of this otherness has been kept intact since the inception of colonial rule.

However, this study shows that the othering of smallholder farmers served different purposes during different periods of time. During the colonial project ideas of otherness *justified* the exclusion of African farmers from markets as



well as their forced removal into native reserves. The imperial interest in exploiting both human and natural resources did of course underpin colonial policies, but the different measures were also justified as being for the smallholders' protection, in order to secure their land and prevent them from cultivating it too intensively. This is an important difference compared to today when the othering of smallholder farmers rather serves the purpose of *explaining why* the farmers are excluded. Yesterday the peasants' pre-modern behaviour was a chief argument to deliberately exclude them; today it simply explains their exclusion. The discourse is, however, fundamentally the same.

On a more systematic level, The ASP project and Hydén's share the same point of departure. According to Hydén, the peasant mode of production with its major institution of the extended family hinders the social behaviour necessary for economic growth. Production is not in focus and wealth is of subordinate value. Focus, according to Hydén, is instead on reproduction and subsistence and everyone's right to survive. Investments for economic growth are not prioritised since the needs of the members of the local community are of primary value. According to Hydén, farmers are resistant to modernisation and capitalism since they see these processes as threats to their independent and domestically oriented way of life. The ASP project pinpoints what is labelled as "deep rooted business unfriendly like mental attitudes among farming households" (Ramboll 2008:26) as a root cause to poverty and lack of development. The ASP team leader's ideas about the effects of the extended family are in line with Hydén's initial thought about the peasant mode of production and the economy of affection, but these thoughts have not been explicitly operationalised in the project. The logic is, however, substantially the same, that there exist social structures hostile to development that need to fall apart.

Furthermore, within the frame of projects like ASP, farmers who adopt what is suggested to them are described as alert, responsive, cooperative, disciplined and hardworking, those who do not take up advice given to them are backward, unproductive, stubborn, conservative and dull. This, I believe, is Durkheim's idea of modern behaviour as a code of conduct in digest. Farmers, who strive for a different type of life are constantly being othered and charged with not realising the best, either for themselves, their families or the society as a whole. Humanism in Zambia represented something quite different in this respect. Although not realised in any comprehensive way, Kaunda's Humanism strived to upgrade institutions like the extended family, ideas of consensus and egalitarianism, and the intrinsic value of each individual (irrespective of their

material contributions), launching these aspects as guiding principles when framing society, politically, economically and socially.

Finally, analysis of economic structures, power relations, historical issues and events are largely absent in programmes such as ASP. Instead these programmes have used an analysis that in a rather straightforward sense 'explains' poverty in terms of farmers' unfashionable outlook on life. The failure of interventions to make farming more environmentally stable, such as the lack of adoption of improved tree fallow in Eastern Block are then explained by the conservatism among the farmers and by their general unwillingness to change, an explanatory framework that ignores the good 'rational' reasons for non-adoption. That smallholders apply the 'wrong' type of agricultural technique can therefore continue as a key part of the problem description when discussing issues of soil depletion and food insecurity. A consequence of the current approach is that most aspects of poverty as well as project failure can be explained in ways that do not call for any self-criticism or any reflection on structural causes of failure. And importantly, the approach postulates that there is nothing wrong with the overall policy framework. There is no need for criticism towards neoliberal economic policies or the working of the modern world-system, all this is just fine. It is peoples' failure to adjust to policies and the dominating mode of production that is the root of the problem. Just as resistance towards colonial rule in different parts of Africa did not need to be reflected upon, since it was logical given people's 'backwardness' and 'uncivilised' behaviour, their unwillingness to adopt farming as business can be dismissed using the same logic. The supposedly traditional and reactionary attitudes of the local people therefore serve today as the reason to have a project, the reason for the project's failure, and the continuing need in the future for further such interventions.

The smallholders' livelihood situations in Kasauka and Yelesani villages are shaped by the terms of the area's integration into the world-economy, rural policy regimes over time, the modernisation and development discourse and their own ways of making a living in their own environment. If one message of this study has been the importance of incorporating structural factors more comprehensively and systematically into the analysis of the situations of African smallholders, a complementary conclusion regards the agency of smallholders. Resistance to modernisation can be observed in smallholder areas, such as those of Eastern Zambia. There exists, as this study has made clear, a wish for a rather independent way of life, which is in dissonance, I believe, with parts of what is required for western-style modernisation. When extension officers state that smallholders run away to avoid questions regarding whether they have budgeted,

planned and envisioned their farming activities in accordance with the business approach, their reasons for this are likely to be multifaceted. An obvious reason is that most farmers do not expect these activities to bring any material benefits, therefore they do not see the point in them. Another reason is that such activities are simply not adjusted to the kind of life many of them strive for. Instead of absorbing and devoting themselves to a peripheral position in the modern world-economy, with whatever limited material benefits such devotion might produce, many farmers still implicitly demand their right to formulate fundamental preferences in terms of what sort of lives and lifestyles they want to pursue. In the light of contemporary policy approaches of bottom-up development, participation, empowerment and people-centred livelihood frameworks this demand sounds right and uncontroversial. However, in the era of modernisation, nothing could be further from the truth.

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# Appendix I. Interview guide smallholders

## 1. Introduction of the project/the researcher/interviewee/interview

### 2. Background information

Age

Short history of the household

How many in the household?

Education

Spouse education

Childrens' education, schooling

### 3. Livelihood situation, resources and activities

Land under crop cultivation

Crops

Fallow land

Fallow periods

Size of land under maize

Use and ownership of farming equipment

Own animals or access to animals

Transport

Cultivation of garden

Crops in the garden

Selling of produce?

- Do you sell?

- Where do you sell?

- What do you sell?

- Every year?

- Transport to market

Other sources of income?

- Remittances

- Selling of animals

- Business

- Beer brewing

- Garden

Are there a lot of activities except farming in the village in order to raise money?

Do you see any change in these activities? Have they increased? Decreased?

Major expenditures?

Cooperation in the village

-what type?

-selling, saving

-why/why not?

Membership in any organisation

#### **4. Questions on poverty and wealth**

Thoughts about the area and village

Thoughts on living in the area and village

Are you living a good life?

- Why?

- Why not?

Are there many people in the village who are living a good life?

- What kind of life are they living?

What is it to live a good life?

What is it to live a poor life?

Are there many in the village that are living poor lives?

- What kind of life are they living?

In your household, do you have enough food for the whole year?

- How many times per day do you eat?

- During different periods of the year?

What do people do when they face lack of food and money?

When people need money for different purposes like soap, fertiliser oil etcetera. How do they raise money?

Do you go for piecework?

- Why?

- How often?

Do you employ people for piecework?

- Why?

- How often?

#### **5. Comparison over time**

If you compare your life today with the late 1990s? Changes/differences?

If you compare further back to the late 1980s?

Changes in cultivation practices? (crop rotation, improved fallow, use of manure, intercropping)

#### **6. Future**

Thoughts about the future?

Do you want to stay in the village?

Plans for the future?

Plans for childrens' future?

#### **7. Questions, comments from the respondent**

Questions?

Comments?

#### **8. Ending up**



## **Appendix II. Interview guide extension officers**

### **1. Introduction of the project/the researcher/interviewee/interview**

#### **2. Background information**

Name

Age

Education

How long as an extension officer?

How long at this camp?

Work at other camps/blocks/districts?

#### **3. Livelihood situation of small-scale farmers**

Resources, life and activities among farmers in this camp

- compared to other places where you have been working

What are the major issues discussed by farmers in this camp

Major problems in this area in terms of smallholders' livelihoods

- what are the causes to these problems?

How can farmers' livelihoods be improved?

How do you view their situation if you compare in time during the time you have been working?

Is there any period that you remember were the situation was better/worse?

What is being done in terms of supporting the livelihoods of small-scale farmers in this area?

#### **4. Differences between different camps/places**

A discussion regarding differences between different camps the extension officer have knowledge about.

- soil fertility
- crops
- food security
- market access
- market engagement
- diversification/off-farm incomes.

#### **5. Approach in extension, support and work with the farmers**

What changes do you see in this government compared to other governments in terms of agriculture policies?

- Do you see any changes?
- What do you think about these changes?

How do you normally interact with the smallholders?

How do you try to support the smallholders in your daily work?

Are you working within the ASP programme?

- How do you understand the objective of this programme?
- Opinion about the programme?
- Progress?
- Problems?

What do you think about other programmes and organisations working in this area?

In what way have the way you work with extension changed over the years you have been active?

- what do you think about these changes?

## **7. Outcomes and responses from farmers**

A discussion on how the farmers respond to extension support and development programmes

- ASP
- Improved fallow
- FSP
- FRA

## **8. Future**

Would you like to see any changes in the way smallholders live and sustain their livelihood?

- Why?
- In what way?
- How are you trying to support such a change within extension?
- The future for smallholders in this area

## Appendix III. Food Availability Calendars

\* The food stuff was bought or partly bought

+ The household was given the food stuff

Respondent: Male and female farmer, poor (KV22)

Type of food	Item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	
Staple	Dry maize	1	0-1	0-1	2	2	2#	3#	3#	3#	3#	3	2	
	Sweetpotatoc	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	2	
	Cassava	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
	Rice	2*	3*	0	0	0	0	0	2*	2*	2*	0	2*	2*
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Beans	0	0	3	3	3	3	0	3	3	3	2	1	
	Groundnuts	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
	Cowpeas	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Assorted veg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vegetables	Green maize	0	3	3	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	
	Pumpkin leafs	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	0	2	2	3	
	Cowpeas leafs	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	
Fruits	Mango	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	
	Bananas	3	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	3	
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	1+	1+	1+	0	0	0	0	0	
	Guavas	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	
	Masuko	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	
Protein food	Milk	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	
	Egg	2	0	0	2	0	0	3	2	1	3	3	3	
	Meat	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2*	0	2	2	
	Fish	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*+	1*	2*+	2+	1*	1*	
	Meals per day	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	
	Workload	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	

Respondent: Female farmer, poor (KV 34)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Sweetpotatoc	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Cassava	0	1*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rice	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Millet	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Beans	0	0	0	0	1*	1*	0	0	0	1*	1*	0
	Groundnuts	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Cowpeas	1+	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Vegetables	Green maize	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	0-1	0-1	0-1	1*	1
	Cowpeas leafs	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Assorted veg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fruits	Mango	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
	Bananas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Guavas	0	0	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	0	0	0
	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein food	Milk	0	2*	0	2	2+	2+	2+	2*	0	2*	0	0
	Egg	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Meat	0	0	2	2*	2	0	2*	0	0	2*	0	0
	Fish*	0	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	0	0	1*	1*	0	0
	Meals per day	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Workload	3	3	2	1	1	3	3	1	1	1	1	2

Respondent: Female farmer, very poor (wife to KV20)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Sweetpotatloe	0	0	1*	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	2	0
	Cassava	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	0	0	0
	Rice	0	1*	0	1*	0	0	0	0	0	1*	0	0
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Beans	0	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	0	0
	Groundnuts	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	0
Vegetables	Cowpeas	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
	Green maize	1+	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	1	0	0	2
	Cowpeas leafs	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
Fruits	Assorted veg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mango	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
	Bananas	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
	Guavas	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0
Protein food	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
	Milk	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Egg	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2
	Meat	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
	Fish	0	1*	1*	0	1*	0	0	0	2*	2*	2*	0
	Meals per day	2	2	2-3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2-3	2	2
	Workload	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	3	3
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Respondent: Female and male farmer, very poor KV26:32

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	1*	1	1	1	1
	Sweetpotatloe	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Cassava	1+	1+	0	0-1+	1+	1+	1+	0	0	0	0	0
	Rice	2+	2+	2+	2+	1+	1+	2+	2+	2+	1	2+	2+
	Sorghum	0	0	0	2+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Beans	2	2	2	0	0	1+	1+	0	0	0	0	0
	Groundnuts	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Cowpeas	2	2	2	1	1+	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Vegetables	Green maize	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Cowpeas leafs	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
	Assorted veg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fruits	Mango	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	Bananas	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
	Oranges	1+	1*	1-2+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1+
	Guavas	0	3	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Protein food	Milk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Egg	2+	2+	2+	3+	3+	2+	2+	2+	2+	2+	2+	2+
	Meat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1*
	Fish	1	1	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Meals per day	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Workload	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	3	3
			Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov

This household did casual work during most of the year and received a lot of food aid from a relative in order to get enough food

Respondent: Female and male farmer, poor (KV9:35)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Sweetpotatote	0	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	0	0
	Cassava	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Rice	1*	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	1*
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Beans	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
	Groundnuts	0	0	3	1-2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Vegetables	Cowpeas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Green maize	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
	Cowpeas leafs	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
Fruits	Assorted veg.	2	0	1	1*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	1
	Mango	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
	Bananas	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Guavas	1	3	3	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein food	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0
	Milk	0	0	0	2	2	2	3	0	0	0	0	0
	Egg	2	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	2
	Meat	2	0	0	1*	1*	0	0	1*	0	0	0	2
	Fish	0	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	0
	Meals per day	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Workload	3	3	-	-	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	2*	2*	2*	2	2	2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1	1
	Sweetpotatote	2*	2	2	2	2	2*	2*	2*	0	0	0	0
	Cassava	1*	0	0	1*	1+	2+	0	0	0	0	0	1*
	Rice	1*	0	0	2*	0	0	2*	0	0	1*	0	2*
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Millet	2*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2*
	Beans	0	2*	2*	2	2	2	2	2	2*	2*	2*	2*
	Groundnuts	0	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	0
Vegetables	Cowpeas	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
	Green maize	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Cowpeas leafs	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	0
Fruits	Assorted veg.	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*
	Mango	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
	Bananas	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
	Oranges	1*	1*	1*	0	1*	0	1+	1+	1*	1*	1*	0
	Guavas	1	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein food	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0
	Milk	2	2	2	1	0	1*	0	0	0	0	0	2
	Egg	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
	Meat	2	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
	Fish	2*	0	0	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*
	Meals per day	1	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
	Workload	3	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	3	3
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Respondent: Male and female farmer, very poor (YV7)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Sweetpotatoe	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0
	Cassava	0	1*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rice	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1*
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Beans	0	0	1	3	3	0	0	2	2	2	0	0
	Groundnuts	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Cowpeas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Vegetables	Green maize	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Cowpeas leafs	0	0	2+	1+	0	1+	0	0	0	1+	0	0
	Assorted veg.	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Fruits	Mango	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
	Bananas	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Oranges	0	0	1*	1*	0	1*	0	0	1*	0	1*	0
	Guavas	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Protein food	Milk	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
	Egg	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Meat	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	Fish	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
	Meals per day	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Workload	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Respondent: Female farmers, less poor (Wife of YV9)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Sweetpotatoe	0	2	2	1	0	1*	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Cassava	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rice	0	0	0	0	2*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crop	Beans	0	1	1-2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
	Groundnuts	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
	Cowpeas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1*	0	0
Vegetables	Green maize	0	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Cowpeas leafs	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Assorted veg.	0	0	0	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*
Fruits	Mango	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
	Bananas	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Guavas	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0
Protein food	Milk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Egg	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2*	2*
	Meat	0	0	2*	2*	2	0	0	0	2*	0	0	2
	Fish	1-2*	1*	1-2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	1*	2*
	Meals per day	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
	Workload	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	1	1	2	2	3
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Respondent: Female farmer, very poor (YV12)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	1	1	1	1	1*	1*	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Sweetpotatote	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1-	0	0	0	0
	Cassava	0	0	1+	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rice	0	1*	0	1*	0	1*	0	0	0	1*	0	0
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Beans	0	0	0	1	1	1*	0	0	1*	1	1	0
	Groundnuts	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1*	1*	1*	1*	0
Vegetables	Cowpeas	0	0	0	1*	1*	0	0	0	0	0	1*	0
	Green maize	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leaves	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	0	0	3	3	3
	Cowpeas leafs	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Fruits	Assorted veg.	2*-	0	0	3	3	3	1	1	2*-	2*	2*-	2*-
	Mango	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
	Bananas	1*+	1*+	0	1*	1*	1*	1*+	1*+	1*+	1*+	1*+	1*+
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Guavas	2	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Protein food	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
	Milk	1*	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	0	1*	1*	1*
	Egg	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
	Meat	0	1*	0	1*	0	0	0	1*	1*	2*	0	0
	Fish	0	0	0	1*+	1*+	0	0	0	1*	1*+	0	2*+
	Meals per day	1	1	1	2	1-3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1
	Workload	2	2	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	3	3
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

The household depended heavily on casual work to access food.

Respondent: Female and male farmer, poor (YV14:3)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	1*	1*	1*	1	1	2	2	2	1	1*	1*	1*
	Sweetpotatote	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	1*	1*	0
	Cassava	1*	1*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rice	1*	1*	1*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1*
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Beans	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	2	1	1	0
	Groundnuts	0	0	0	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	0	0
	Cowpeas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vegetables	Green maize	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	1	2	3	3	2	1	3	3	1	0	0	0
	Cowpeas leafs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fruits	Mango	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
	Bananas	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	2	0	2	0
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Guavas	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
	Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0
Protein food	Milk	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	1	1
	Egg	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	2
	Meat	2	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	2
	Fish	1*	2+	2+	0	3*	2*	1+	1+	0	0	1*	1*
	Meals per day	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2
	Workload	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Respondent: Female farmer, poor (KV4)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	1*	1*	1*	1*	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
	Sweetpotatote	0	0	1*	1*	1*	2	1	1	1	0	0	0
	Cassava	1*	1*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rice	1*	1*	1*	0	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1	0	0
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Beans	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1	1	1*	0	0
	Groundnuts	1	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
	Cowpeas	0	0	0	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vegetables	Green maize	0	1*	2	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Pumpkin leafs	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	0	1
	Cowpeas leafs	2	2	2	2	2	2	1*	1*	1	0	0	1
	Assorted veg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fruits	Mango	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
	Bananas	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	0	0
	Oranges	0	0	0	0	0	0	1*	1*	0	0	0	0
	Guavas	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
	Masuko	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3
Protein food	Milk	0	0	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	0	0
	Egg	2	1	1	1*	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2
	Meat	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	1*	1*	1*	0	0	1*	1*
	Fish	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*	1*
	Meals per day	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2
	Workload	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Respondent: Male farmer, better off (KV6)

Type of food	Food item	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Staple	Dry maize	2	2	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	2
	Sweetpotatote	0	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	0	0
	Cassava	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1*	1*	0
	Rice	0	0	0	0	0	0	2*	2*	2*	2*	0	0
	Sorghum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Millet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protein crops	Beans	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Groundnuts	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2
	Cowpeas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vegetables	Green maize	1	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Pumpkin leafs	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	Cowpeas leafs	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	1
	Assorted veg.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fruits	Mango	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
	Bananas	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Oranges	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Guavas	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
		Masuko	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Protein food	Milk	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
	Egg	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Meat	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Fish	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*	2*
	Meals per day	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
	Workload	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec



## Appendix IV. List of Respondents

### Kasauka village

Respondent No.	Age-group/Sex	Position in hh.	No. in hh.	Wealth group	Time of interview
KV1	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	8	Less poor	May 2006
KV2	Middle-aged man	Head of ho	12	Better off	May 2006
KV3	(Young) female	Wife	7	Poor	May 2006
KV4	Middle-aged woman	Head of hh.	6	Poor	May 2006
KV5	Younger middle-aged woman	Head of hh.	5	Very poor	May 2006
KV6	Middle-aged men	Head of hh.	9	Better Off	May 2006
KV7	Middle-aged woman	Wife	11	Poor	May 2006
KV8:6	Middle-aged woman	Wife	9	Better off	May 2006
KV9	Middle-aged woman	Wife	5	Poor	May 2006
KV10:2	Middle-aged woman	Wife	12	Better off	May 2006
KV11:3	Older man	Head of hh.	7	Poor	May 2006
KV12	Older women	Wife	13	Very poor	May 2006
KV14	Older man	Head of hh.	2	Very poor	May 2006
KV15	Younger man	Head of hh.	4	Very poor	May 2006
KV16	Younger middle-aged man	Head of hh.	6	Less poor	May 2006
KV17	Middle-aged woman	Head of hh.	4	Very poor	May 2006
KV18	Young woman	Wife	3	Less poor	May 2006
KV19:7	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	11	Poor	May 2006
KV20	Young man	Head of hh.	3	Poor	May 2006
KV21	Older man	Head of hh.	5	Better off	May 2006
KV22	Young middle-aged man	Head of hh.	7	Poor	May 2006
KV23	Young man	Head of hh.	5	Very poor	May 2006
KV24	Young woman	Head of hh.	2	Very poor	May 2006
KV25	Young woman	Wife	7	Poor	May 2006
KV26	Young man	Head of hh.	3	Very poor	May 2006
KV27	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	7	Poor	June 2006
KV28:1	Middle-aged woman	Wife	8	Less poor	June 2006
KV29	Older man	Head of hh.	1	Poor	June 2006
KV30	Older woman	Head of hh.	4	Better off	June 2006
KV31:25	Young man	Head of hh.	7	Poor	June 2006
KV32:26	Young woman	Wife	3	Very poor	June 2006
KV33	Young man	Head of hh.	3	Poor	June 2006
KV34	Older woman	Head of hh.	1	Poor	June 2006
KV35:9	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	5	Poor	June 2006
KV36:15	Young woman	Wife	4	Very poor	June 2006
KV37:27	Young woman	Wife	7	Poor	June 2006
KV39:12	Older man	Head of hh.	13	Very poor	June 2006
KV40	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	7	Less poor	March 2007

## Yelesani village

Respondent No.	Age-group/Sex	Position in hh.	No. in hh.	Wealth group	Time of interview
YV1	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	12	Less poor	June 2006
YV2	Middle-aged woman	Head of hh.	2	Very poor	June 2006
YV3	Young middle-aged man	Head of hh.	10	Poor	June 2006
YV4	Young middle-aged woman	Wife	9	Less poor	June 2006
YV5	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	8	Poor	June 2006
YV6	Middle-aged woman	Head of hh.	11	Very poor	June 2006
YV7	Young man	Head of hh.	2	Very poor	June 2006
YV8	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	4	Poor	June 2006
YV9	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	9	Less poor	June 2006
YV10	Young man	Head of hh.	7	Very poor	March 2007
YV11	Young man	Head of hh.	2	Very poor	March 2007
YV12	Middle-aged woman	Head of hh.	6	Very poor	March 2007
YV13	Young woman	Head of hh.	10	Poor	March 2007
YV14:3	Young middle-aged woman	Wife	13	Poor	April 2007
YV15	Young woman	Wife	6	Poor	April 2007
YV16	Young woman	Wife	4	Very poor	April 2007
YV17	Young woman	Wife	4	Poor	April 2007

## Other villages

KV13*	Young middle-aged man	Head of hh.	5	Very poor	May 2006
KV38*	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	15	Less poor	June 2006
MC1+	Middle-aged man	Head of hh.	-	-	April 2007

\*Households that had moved from Kasauka village since 1998

+ Male farmer interviewed in within Mtowe camp

## Interviews with older farmers

Respondent No.	No. of respondents/sex	Location	Time of interview
EF1	One older man	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	March 2007
EFG2	Five older men	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	March 2007
EFG3	Two older women	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	April 2006
EFG4	One older man, two older women	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	April 2007
EF5	One older woman	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	April 2007
EF6	One older woman	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	April 2007
EF7	One older man	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	April 2007
EF8	One older woman	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008
EF9	One older woman	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008
EF10	One older woman	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008
EF11	One older man	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008
EFG12	One older man, one older woman	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008
EF13	One older man	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008
EF14	One older man	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008
EF15	One older man	Chief Sayiri/Kalunga camp	October 2008

### Interviews with Extension Officer

Respondent No.	Position	Location	Time of interview
EO1	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO2	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO3	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO4	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO5	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO6	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO7	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO8	Extension officer	Chipata District	April 2007
EO9	Extension officer	Chipata District	October 2008
EO10	Extension officer	Chipata District	October 2008
EO11	Extension officer	Chipata District	October 2008

### Informant interviews

Respondent No.	Position	Time of interview
Informant 1	Team leader, Agricultural Support Programme, Lusaka	May 2006
Informant 2	Provincial Agricultural Research Officer	March 2007
Informant 3	Senior Agricultural Officer, Chipata District	April 2007
Informant 4	Wholesaler Chipata	October 2008
Informant 5	Provincial Resettlement Officer	October 2008
Informant 6	Provincial Resettlement Officer's assistant	October 2008
Informant 6	Coordinator Chipata District Farmers Association	October 2008
Informant 7	Provincial Resettlement Officer	October 2008
Informant 8	District Coordinator of Marketing Service, FRA	October 2008

### Follow-up interviews

Respondent No.	Type of interview	Time of interview
KVFU1	Three female farmers (group)	October 2008
KVFU2	Three male farmers (group)	October 2008
YVFU1	Three female farmers (group)	October 2008
YVFU2	Three male farmers (group)	October 2008
EOFU1	Extension officer	October 2008
EOFU2	Extension officer	October 2008



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