

# **Framing the Israel/Palestine Conflict in Swedish History School Textbooks**

# **Framing the Israel/Palestine Conflict in Swedish History School Textbooks**

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UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

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Centrum för utbildningsvetenskap och lärarforskning  
Forskarskolan i utbildningsvetenskap  
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# Abstract

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The following dissertation has examined the ways in which the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict has been framed in a number of Lower Secondary school Swedish History textbooks as well as in a small number of Social Science/Civics teachers' statements. The initial problem discussed has been a noted discrepancy between textbook content and scholarship on the conflict's history. The overarching question posed thus has been what is the established framework on the conflict in the textbooks and teachers' statements? Reflecting different approaches, the theoretical framework adopted here sees the construction, selection and organization of school knowledge as a political and power/knowledge problem. In this regard "official knowledge" on the conflict is linked both to the *local* political, ideological and cultural context within which it is situated as well as historical shifts in the conflict's power relations *internationally*. Thus many of the topics and themes selected in the textbooks and teachers' statements have been identified as reflecting a host of conflicting – external and internal - discourses. The first of this dissertation's main conclusions is that the linkages between scholarship, textbooks and teachers' statements in general have been very weak and do not provide a platform for a broad critical understanding of the root causes of the conflict on the basis of varying perspectives. Instead, they are far too anchored in ideological assumptions, despite the appearance in textbooks and teachers' statements of vying discourses which highlight perspectives from both sides of the conflict's history. While the latter has provided a sense of balance, it has generally been illusory. The reason for this is rooted both in the lack of perspectives and presence of ideological assumptions which in turn is reflected throughout the textbook framings and teachers' statements through the recurring notion of "equal" claim. This notion undergirds the discourses discussed above and constitutes a particular order of discourse. This functions to occlude the inherent inequities and power asymmetries of the conflict going back to its very inception and constitutes the established framework on the conflict's history in the textbooks and teachers' statements.

## Key terms

Curriculum theory, History school textbooks, teachers' statements, "official knowledge", power/knowledge, discourse, order of discourse, ideology, established framework



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# Chapter One

## Framing the Israel/Palestine Conflict

*What appears in school textbooks is legitimately sanctioned knowledge that has been allocated an official stamp of “truth”; but what textbooks offer are not truths but claims to truth.*

From Crawford & Foster’s *What Shall We Tell the Children?*<sup>1</sup>

Focusing first of all on the issue of how the history of conflicts and wars has been treated in the Swedish curriculum, in a 1992 paper “former Director of Education of the Swedish National Board of Education”<sup>2</sup>, Bengt Thelin, promoted “a curriculum that [would] address issues such as ecology, *peace and war*, overpopulation, refugees, and global issues.”<sup>3</sup>(my italics) Among other issues Thelin discussed the matter of increased immigration to Sweden

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<sup>1</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, (2006) *What Shall We Tell the Children?: International Perspectives on School History Textbooks*, Information Age Publishing, Greenwich, Connecticut, p. 8

<sup>2</sup> Bengt Thelin’s work mentioned in Pinar, W, (1995), *Understanding Curriculum*, Peter Lang, New York, p. 841

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

and the condition of “Sweden’s political neutrality”<sup>4</sup> in the wake of its application for membership into “the European Common Market in the early 1990s.”<sup>5</sup> Alluding to a conflict of interests or conflicting ideologies, the concerns he raised in connection with this were the possible “political and also military commitments”<sup>6</sup> that Sweden would be obligated to fulfil through joining the EEC. Although Thelin acknowledged that his “positive peace guidelines”<sup>7</sup> were “in great accordance with the goals and guidelines of the then centrally issued curricula”<sup>8</sup> he also pointed to a problem at the time. This was that the connections between “armed violence”<sup>9</sup> and “structural violence i.e. economic, cultural, and political oppression”<sup>10</sup> were not apparent in the Swedish curriculum guidelines. In other words, an emphasis on understanding the roots of historical conflicts as linked to the cultural, political, ideological and economic dimensions of the international system was not apparent (I will later discuss the content of the current Swedish curriculum guidelines regarding the critical aims of the History subject). Thelin’s urging for a peace education programme in the 1990s which emphasises the above connections is as pertinent as ever today. This is especially so with regard to the dramatic political changes which have occurred since Thelin’s time both in Sweden and internationally. Conflicts and wars have not decreased since the 1990s but have continued unabated and among these is the more than 100 year-long Israel/Palestine conflict. A key and straightforward question to ask is whether the History school textbooks I will examine here provide a broad and critical understanding of the historical roots of the conflict and, indeed, other conflicts. This speaks to a further aim of educating a citizenry towards understanding the importance of establishing world peace as well as the aim of examining how our own governments either contribute to it or prevent it. This also speaks to the role that history and/or social scientific education in general should take in fostering a critical-analytical approach to teaching on contemporary

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<sup>4</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 842

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> Ibid

<sup>7</sup> Pinar, W, (1995), p. 842

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

<sup>10</sup> Ibid

conflicts. This is still pertinent in a world that has witnessed at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century among many other things the failure of the Camp Davis talks and subsequent al-Aqsa *Intifada* in 2000, the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers in New York in 2001, the US invasion of Afghanistan of the same year, the US invasion and war on Iraq since 2003, the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008 and the Israeli military attack on the Mavi Marmara<sup>11</sup> in the summer of 2010. The above discussion is also interesting from a power/knowledge perspective. Put simply, with regard to the educational framing of conflicts in general, we may ask to which degree Swedish school knowledge either reflects the discourses of the powerful or the tradition of Swedish neutrality. In turn, depending on which framework exists we may ask how the Lower Secondary school subject of History particular and as part of the Social Sciences in general fosters a critical understanding of the history and roots of the Israel/Palestine conflict. Given the political and economic transformations of the last two decades both locally and internationally, these inquiries are important to keep in mind.

Proceeding from the above, then, the general problem that this thesis takes as its point of departure is what I have come to identify as a discrepancy between school knowledge and the scientific debate on the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict (more on this below). I have determined this through increased orientation with the scholarly literature on the conflict and some initial comparisons I have made with Swedish History school textbooks for the 9<sup>th</sup> grade. In turn, this problem has influenced my choice of thesis topic, namely, how the Israel/Palestine conflict is framed in Swedish History school textbooks and how it compares to established scholarly debate on the conflict and teacher discourses. In addition, as alluded to above, in accordance with my chosen theoretical approaches and the study of curriculum knowledge and/or school knowledge in general, I have chosen to frame the problem that this thesis topic takes as its point of departure as a power/knowledge problem.

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<sup>11</sup> As part of an aid flotilla, the Mavi Marmara was bound for the Gaza Strip with aid and provisions in an attempt to lift the Israeli blockade there since 2006.

## School knowledge as a power/knowledge problem

Understanding the construction of school knowledge as a power/knowledge<sup>12</sup> problem, the Crawford & Foster quotation above points to a specific problem linked to the study of the political dimensions of school knowledge which asserts that “Textbooks are... conceived, designed and authored by real people with real interests”<sup>13</sup> and are “published within the political and economic constraints of markets, resources and *power*.”<sup>14</sup> (my italic) In connection with this, since the 1970s the field of study has employed “the concepts of ideology, hegemony and reproduction”<sup>15</sup> in the study of the structuring and organisation of curriculum knowledge. Of importance too, is the study of the historical and cultural contexts within which school textbook content in particular and curriculum knowledge in general is situated. For example, with regard to understanding how particular topics and themes are selected and organised in relation to the historical conflict under analysis here, the examination of the impact of historical events significant to a particular social, cultural, political and historical context, will all provide a broader framework. For example, the asymmetrical power relations between the parties to the conflict on the ground may also have an impact on the kind of knowledge claims which enter into mainstream political and media discourse and, more specifically, mainstream educational discourse. One illustration of this has been observed by the way in which the Oslo peace process has been framed.<sup>16</sup> For example, the oft repeated claim of a “generous offer” on the part of Israel’s former premier Ehud Barak back in 2000 and its rejection at Camp David in 2000 by Yasser Arafat which, according to (then) US President Bill Clinton, led to the failure of the peace talks has been described by one expert observer at the time as “an attempt at rewriting history.”<sup>17</sup> To perhaps understand the

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<sup>12</sup> Foucault, M, (1980) *Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings*, Pantheon Books, New York

<sup>13</sup> Apple in Crawford & Foster; Ibid, p. 4

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Pinar, W, (1995), p. 243; Apple, (1979); Apple, (1989); Englund, (1980)

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Falk, R, Friel, H, (2007), *Israel-Palestine On Record: How the New York Times Misreports Conflict in the Middle East*, Verso, London/New York

<sup>17</sup> Pundak, R, (2001) “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” in *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 40

historical political power dimensions behind this we have to go back to the emergence of the so-called “special relationship” between Israel and the United States especially in relation to what Wallerstein describes as “the Western view of the utility of Israel as an element in the political stabilization of the world’s major oil zone”<sup>18</sup>. In addition, the interaction between such pivotal events as the genocide of six million European Jews and a reconnection to the Holy Land in the post-war years may together play a part in understanding some of the aspects of the cultural and political context within which mainstream knowledge on the conflict has been constructed. For example, through what some have referred to as the construction of a “Judeo-Christian tradition”<sup>19</sup> following centuries of Jews being perceived as “at once reverential fathers to and hated, detested slanderers of Christianity”<sup>20</sup>. To point to another example of the importance and effect of pivotal historical events, the explosions of the first and second *Intifadas* had an impact both on mainstream perceptions and thereto school textbook narratives (see analysis chapters). For example, this impact has been noted through coverage of the plight of the Palestinians and the nature of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza as well as the violent actions and reactions between the parties to the conflict. Pointing briefly to examples of the ideological dimensions of textbook knowledge on the conflict, topics that have either been excluded or played down refer to the examination of the political-ideological context of late 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalism, colonialism and the connection of both of these to the issue of political Zionism. In the textbooks I have examined Zionism is often framed as a political movement formed to facilitate the return of the Jewish people to its ancient homeland after millennia of persecution. Similarly, the construction of a homogenous Palestinian national people connected to

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<sup>18</sup> Wallerstein, E, (2003), *The Decline of American Power*, The New Press, New York and London, p. 120 ff.

<sup>19</sup> The bringing together of Christian and Jewish traditions as Judeo-Christian tradition had occurred after World War II; a time when, according to Sand, “sadly, [Europe] had not been dubbed Judeo-Christian.” Sand, (2009), p. 3. A similar awareness of the exclusion of Islam from Judeo-Christian tradition is expressed in the second of my interviews too.

<sup>20</sup> Bauman, Z, (1989), *Auschwitz och det moderna samhället*, Daidalos, Göteborg, p. 67 ”De var på en och samma gång ärevördiga fäder till och förhatliga, avskryvda belackare av kristendomen.”

ancient Canaan and an emphasis on Arab-Muslim history is equally played down or simply taken for granted.

### Main purpose and structure of thesis

In relation to the power/knowledge problems I have tentatively broached above, some of which I will develop in subsequent chapters, the main purpose of this study will be to examine any comparative links (or not) between the Swedish History school textbooks in the 9<sup>th</sup> grade (Lower Secondary level) and the scholarly debate. This will be done with a view to examining the ways in which the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict is presented or *framed*. This will involve exploring the cultural, political and ideological elements expressed and/or inferred in the selected topics and themes and accompanying discourses emerging in textbook narratives and which constitute their general framework. Furthermore, on the basis of a small number of interviews held with several History and Social Science teachers I will examine the ways in they relate to the textbook content and scholarly debate on the conflict and the ways in which they discuss the history of the conflict themselves. Given the paucity of these data, they are only intended to provide an indication of the possible discursive links between textbooks and teachers' statements. On the basis of the findings from my analysis in later chapters, I will discuss some of the policy implications for teaching on the conflict and will tentatively suggest other possible questions to pursue in relation to understanding and explaining the history of the conflict in 9<sup>th</sup> grade Swedish History school textbooks.

## Section 1.0 Previous Pilot Study and Initial Problem

The initial problem that this thesis takes as its point of departure, identified as already discussed as the discrepancy between Swedish history school textbooks and the scientific debate on the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict, builds upon the results of a previous pilot study entitled "Framing



Conflict and War in Lower Secondary School Books: Israel and Palestine”<sup>21</sup>. In that study I examined four History school textbooks published between the period of the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s. At that time the terrain was new to me and as a result the questions I asked were only designed to acquaint myself with their the general treatment of the conflict. In the end the findings of the study focused above all on the ways in which the parties to the conflict were represented and less about the textbooks’ political and ideological dimensions. I concluded from the findings of the study that

The information on the various issues connected to the conflict has been presented quite differently in each book. Examples of how the issues are *framed* are many and in some cases appear to contain both a negative and positive bias. Importantly, the historical plight of the Jewish people is highlighted at the beginning of some of the sections I have analysed. However, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs is not highlighted in the same way. Israelis are often presented as benign, victims, retaliatory not aggressive or violent. Arab Palestinians are represented as aggressive, violent and somewhat irrational. I discern the underlying discourse as follows: Palestinians are predisposed to violence, while Israelis merely seek peace. This discourse on the meaning of the conflict creates an impression which misleads and misinforms,

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<sup>21</sup> The study was in fact the final examination essay for my teacher certificate which I completed in the spring of 2006. The essay was entitled Walls, M, (2006), “Framing Conflict and War in Lower Secondary School Books: Israel and Palestine”

fostering prejudice and bias towards *both* parties.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to these findings I also discovered that certain topics and themes were emphasised more than others in most of the textbook chapters. For example, historical events such as the Nazi holocaust would very often introduce the history of the conflict as would references to the Jewish people's biblical-historical connection to ancient Israel and their historical suffering. These topics and themes provided a context or framework from which to introduce and study the history of the conflict. An important part of the Palestinian historical narrative, namely, the *al-Nakba* and the expulsion and flight of the Palestinian Arabs in 1948 also appeared in some of the textbooks somewhere in the middle of a text. Briefly mentioned in the textbooks, this event provided more or less the only back-drop to the plight of the Palestinian-Arabs. Another finding I made too referred to positive and negative biases in the form of reductive images or one-dimensional roles ascribed to *both* parties to the conflict. For example, references which reinforced certain stereotypes were the image of Israelis as victims, as reinforced by the references to the Nazi holocaust and historical Jewish suffering, and the Palestinians as aggressors or rejectionists, with references to the Arab rejection of the 1947 Partition Plan and the reaction of the Arab states to the establishment of Israel in 1948. Examination of the History textbook chapters for this thesis has more or less confirmed a repetition of the above with a number of important exceptions which will be discussed later.

### New analytical problems

In connection to the current thesis project, new analytical problems have emerged which greatly extend the scope of the previously pilot study. This has occurred in conjunction with a greater orientation with a particular scholarly debate on the conflict's history, critical theories on nationalism and related historical narratives as well as a greater orientation with critical

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<sup>22</sup>Walls, p. 1

approaches to examining established knowledge claims in educational or curriculum discourses. In turn, my orientation with the debate on 1948 and other sources above has prompted me to question whether the selection of topics and themes deemed relevant to understanding and explaining the root causes of the history of the conflict in the textbook chapters will foster a critical and balanced understanding of the conflict's history. This can also be connected to the Swedish National Agency for education's guidelines on the objectives of History at the Lower Secondary level which emphasise "critical thinking" and "an analytical approach". In the opening section entitled "History, Compulsory School" it states that

History is an important part of all knowledge. Not only from a long-term perspective, but also from the present, all human activity and all development of knowledge has a historical dimension. History develops a knowledge which makes it possible to see oneself and events in the present and also as part of a historical process. *The aim of the subject is to develop critical thinking and an analytical approach as a tool for understanding and explaining society and its culture.* (my italics)<sup>23</sup>

Here the subject of History is described and intended as a tool for critical thinking. In addition, under the heading of "goals to aim for", the History subject is again presented as an instrument for critical thinking and in addition to this as a source for learning about important historical figures and events. With this in mind pupils are to

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<sup>23</sup>History, Compulsory School, <http://www3.skolverket.se/ki03/front.aspx?sprak=EN&ar=0809&infotyp=24&skolform=11&id=3884&extraId=2087>

- develop the ability to differentiate between historical structures, development trends and processes of change,
- acquire a knowledge of *important historical figures, events and periods*,
- develop their [the pupils’] ability *to use history as an instrument for understanding other subjects*,
- become aware that historically determined societal and cultural forms are conditioned by time, *and that people from different periods should be viewed in terms of the conditions prevailing at that time*,
- acquire an ability to *assess different texts, media and other sources, which interpret and explain historical processes.* (my italics)<sup>24</sup>

What I would like to highlight here is a possible tension between what are considered important events and figures and the aim of encouraging critical thinking. As I touched upon in the introduction, what I wish to analyse here is the effect of the local (and global) political, ideological and cultural context on the construction of Swedish History school textbook knowledge. For example, in the same guiding document under the heading of “Structure and nature of the subject” we begin to see a movement towards a particularist and essentialist approach to learning about historical events. For example, the opening section under the above heading reads: “History covers elements from political, economic and social history, as well as *cultural history*” and that “The subject takes as its starting point the forces that have shaped *personal and collective historical identity. Essential parts of the*

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<sup>24</sup> History, Compulsory School

*subject are thus Swedish and Nordic culture, including Sami and European culture.*"<sup>25</sup> (my italics) The cultural and political point of departure or context for these guidelines is the Nordic countries and Northern Europe and their *particular* historical perspective on world events. The Nordic/European dimension is confirmed again in the selection of what the guidelines refer to as "knowledge of modern history". This we are told pupils must learn since it covers "*progress and the striving for peace, as well as genocide, especially the Holocaust, revolutions and war.*"(my italics) So from the particularist perspective of Nordic and European history and its selected topics and themes it is assumed that the "subject provides a *multifaceted picture* of events and processes". These are said to include "social, economic, technical and cultural progress, *as well as conflicts, tensions and shifts of power within and between countries.*"<sup>26</sup> The guidelines go on to state that this "applies not least to the dark and destructive forces of history operating through ethnic, religious and political persecution."<sup>27</sup>(my italics)

### Particularist history or critical learning?

The first point to make here is what I have identified as a tension between the aims connected to how the history subject should be taught in Swedish Lower Secondary schools and critical learning. For example, the aim of acquiring "*important historical figures, events and periods*" implies an already predetermined selection of historical knowledge connected to events particular to Nordic/European history. On the basis of such a set curriculum pupils are to be able to "*develop critical thinking and an analytical approach*" by using history "*as a tool for understanding and explaining society and its culture.*" What this apparent tension of subject-matter aims points to is what Englund *et al* have described on the one hand as the return of the "Social Studies subjects to their traditional essentialist positions"<sup>28</sup> in

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<sup>25</sup> History, Compulsory School

<sup>26</sup> Ibid

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28</sup> Englund, T, Östman, L, (1995/2004) article entitled "Om orienteringsämnenas möjligheter att skapa mening: En didaktisk betraktelse av läroplansbetänkandet" in *Utbildningspolitiskt systemskifte?*, HLS Förlag, Stockholm, p. 171. "sambällsorienterande ämnen återgår till sina traditionellt essentialistiska positioner", "anknytning till demokratifostran är ... "

the wake of the 1990s restructuring and in particular “a stronger move towards an objectivistic History course”<sup>29</sup> (my italics). On the other hand, the aims still express “an explicit normative and ethical dimension [and] connection to democratic ambitions [which are] *clearly articulated*”<sup>30</sup>. (my italics) Thus, pupils are encouraged to be critical within the framework of a local national and/or European History curriculum with the onus on the teaching of “shared historical memories”<sup>31</sup>. It remains to be seen, however, whether such a starting point succeeds in fostering a critical understanding of international and/or global conflicts and incorporating and contrasting the conflicting historical narratives which frame them. Apart from the changes to curriculum approaches that Englund *et al* have highlighted, and whose work I will discuss more in chapter two, what this brief examination of Swedish Lower Secondary school history curriculum goals demonstrates is the importance of understanding the very many cultural and ideological premises upon which education curriculum is based. For example, as I have tried to show, the curriculum aims presented above tacitly instantiate ideological assumptions connected to the particular national cultural setting, its History and culture. At the same time the principle of critical reflection is also encouraged. The implications of this tension with regard to the question of how the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict is *framed* in Swedish history school textbooks will be explored in this thesis too.

## Research questions

To render operational an investigation of my selected textbook sample of between 18 to 20 9<sup>th</sup> grade Lower Secondary level Swedish History school textbooks (two or more of which cover the subject of Religion) requires constructing a number of research questions which will later provide a framework for a more detailed list of questions connected to my analytical approaches (see method chapter). These questions are connected in turn to

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid, ”Om orienteringsämnenas möjligheter att skapa mening: En didaktisk betraktelse av läroplansbetänkandet” in *Utbildningspolitiskt systemskifte?*, (2004) HLS Förlag, Stockholm. ”se en starkare inriktning mot en objektivistisk historiekurs; således en inriktning g mot historiens s.k. odiskutabla fäkt och dess linjära och detaljerade kronologi etc” pp. 170-171

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 169. ”en explicit normativ-etisk dimension [and] kopplingen till demokratiska strävanden är klart uttryckt.”

<sup>31</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S,(2006), p. 4

the two overarching questions already broached in the introduction of this chapter. These are 1) what are the (if any) general links between the History school textbook chapters and teachers' statements on the conflict and the scholarly debate and 2) how is the conflict framed in the History school textbooks and teachers' statements?

What is taught on the conflict in Lower Secondary School text books (History) and teachers' material in general?

Which particular topics and themes dominate?

What do teachers themselves teach on the history of the conflict?

Which topics and themes do they select?

How do they relate to the conflict and how does this influence their selection and understanding of topics and themes?

Which contrasting and conflicting topics and themes emerge in the textbooks and teachers' statements?

How does the presentation of the conflict in textbooks and teachers' statements contrast with scholarly debates and other sources?

Upon which cultural, political and ideological assumptions are the textbook chapters' topics and themes and teachers' statements based?

Which discourses may be identified in connection with the above?

On the basis of these discourses, what might be determined as the general hegemonic framework for understanding and explaining the conflict in Swedish History school textbooks?

Finally, is the framework suitable for enhancing pupils' and teachers' general critical understanding of the historical causes of the conflict and where do we go from here?

The above questions form the basis upon which I have constructed my interview guide and questions for the analysis of textbook chapter content and interview transcriptions. But before I discuss theoretical and methodological approaches and key concepts, I will in the remainder of this chapter discuss previous research on my chosen thesis topic and portions of a particular scientific debate on the conflict's history with a brief introduction to some of the major figures in the debate.

## Section 1.1 Previous Research on the Conflict in History School Textbooks

In this section I will discuss some of the previous research on the subject of the Israel/Palestine conflict in History school textbooks. I will focus on the work of a number of Israeli scholars and their analysis of Israeli and Palestinian History school textbooks. I will also briefly discuss Swedish research in this area which, as I have discovered, has been very little and appears to basically comprise my own study from 2006 and an additional student essay (see below). I will also briefly mention a discourse analysis of the June 67 War and 1987 *Intifada* in the Swedish daily, "Dagensnyheter" (The Daily News). A common pattern throughout the different examples of the Israeli research shows how political transformations throughout the history of the conflict have impacted upon curriculum development. For example, such developments have challenged fixed ideological positions and biases. However, as the research also shows, this is by no means a linear process and even the most recent curriculum content may reproduce traces of ideological positions and bias on both sides. Following the brief overview of Swedish research on the topic, I will discuss the work of Dan Porat and Jonathan Kreiner and a study by Israeli History professor, Elie Podeh, whose work is more closely connected to my own.



## Swedish research on the conflict in History school textbooks

Research on the analysis of textbook content is extensive in Sweden, as is evident from the SFF<sup>32</sup>'s 2007 bibliography of publications going back twenty years or more. The kind of topics covered which bear some relationship to my own has been the work by among others Kjell Härenstam and his 1992 dissertation entitled *Skolboks-Islam* and more recently his *Kan du höra vindhästen?* (2000). For example, the latter examines "how Buddhism is presented in school textbooks, in particular the form developed in Tibet."<sup>33</sup> One of the things Härenstam is struck by in the study is the "high degree"<sup>34</sup> to which what is presented "mirrors each of the author's respective political and ideological points of view."<sup>35</sup> Influenced by the work of the late Edward Saïd<sup>36</sup>, the author notes that older school textbooks contained explicit "ethnocentric, racist and colonial values"<sup>37</sup> which on examining today's school books too "reappear in their representations."<sup>38</sup> However, actual research on how the Israel/Palestine conflict is presented in Swedish school educational textbooks is very scant. The closest study to my own which employs a discourse-analytical approach is a student essay for the History department at Lund University entitled *A Discourse-Analytical Study of the Israel/Palestine Conflict*. The essay analyses coverage of both the June 67 War and 1987 *Intifada* in the Swedish daily, "Dagens nyheter", from both those years.<sup>39</sup> The author concludes among other things that during the June 67 War there were a number of discourses present in the newspaper coverage, namely, the "sympathy

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<sup>32</sup> Forskning om läromedel, en bibliografi sammanställd av fil.dr Monica Reichenberg, 2007 års upplaga, Sveriges läromedelsförfattares förbund – SLFF, [www.slff.se](http://www.slff.se)

<sup>33</sup> Härenstam, K, (2000), *Kan du höra vindhästen?*, Studentlitteratur, Lund, p. 5

<sup>34</sup> Ibid

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> For example, Saïd, E, (2003), *Orientalism*, (4<sup>th</sup> ed.), Penguin Books, London; see also Lockman, Z, (2010), *Contending Visions of the Middle East*, Cambridge University Press, New York

<sup>37</sup> Härenstam, p. 6

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Tepic, D, (2007), *En diskursanalytisk studie om Israel-Palestina konflikten En studie om sexdagarskriget och intifadan utifrån Dagens Nyheter*, examensarbete, Historiska Institutionen, Lund universitet

discourse, the Arab discourse and the superpower discourse.”<sup>40</sup> The dominant sympathy discourse drew upon imagery and references to the Nazi holocaust in which the Arab states were projected with the image of the Nazis while the Israelis were presented as victims. However, in the coverage of the 1987 *Intifada* a discursive shift occurs. For example, “the occupation discourse, sympathy discourse and the international discourse”<sup>41</sup> displace previously established discourses. And while these “discourses build upon the Six Day War [...] the dominant discourse builds upon the international community and its values.”<sup>42</sup> Drawing on the work of Fairclough and Hettne, the author connects changes in the dominant discourse to changes in “social practice”. What this means is that the change in the bipolar world order shifts from a superpower discourse during the Cold War to an international discourse with implications for both policies towards the parties to the conflict and popular perceptions of the conflict and the parties to it. Turning to the study on Swedish History school textbooks, I have examined a teacher-student essay which contains a section on how the conflict is presented in a small number of Swedish school textbooks for the Upper Secondary level. The essay is worth mentioning both with regard to how it resonates with my own findings and the way in which the authors themselves relate to the content they have analysed. Furthermore, it provides a comparative point of departure along with my own pilot-study for discussing the research carried out in Israel (see below).

### Teacher-student essay on Middle Eastern history

The essay by teacher students Anders Jacobs and Carl Alberto Bettini entitled “Det är en annan historia... vilken historia ger vi våra elever?”<sup>43</sup> was written with the aim of examining how “the history of the Middle East is mediated in teaching aids for History.”<sup>44</sup> In the English abstract at the beginning of the essay the authors conclude from their findings that “1. The

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<sup>40</sup> Tepic, p. 20

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 24

<sup>42</sup> Ibid

<sup>43</sup> ”That’s Another Story ... Which History Do We Give Our Pupils?”

<sup>44</sup> Bettini, A,C, Jacobs, A, (2007), *Det är en annan historia ... Vilken historia ger vi våra elever*, examensarbete, pp. 33-42

literature used in history education does not say much about Middle East history. 2. Students want to learn more about the history of the U.S. 3. Teachers do try to make use of the ethnic background of the students.”<sup>45</sup> However, for the purposes of this thesis I will only concentrate on their analysis of how the four History textbooks they have examined cover the Israel/Palestine conflict. The authors first of all carry out a comparative analysis of the content provided on the conflict’s history in each of the textbooks. The first textbook they look at begins its coverage of the conflict’s history “as early as 70 CE in connection with the Jewish dispersion.”<sup>46</sup> In the second of the textbooks, the historical context begins in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century with “the rise of Zionism.”<sup>47</sup> The third textbook focuses on the period of the First World War and how it affected the conflict. Following this introduction to the content of the textbooks the authors go on to provide a critical analysis of their findings.

The main question they raise “concerns where textbook writers decide to begin their historical retrospective.”<sup>48</sup> What the authors consider both “good and not so good” in the first textbook is the focus on “the Jews relationship to the area of Palestine [...] and not on the actual conflict between the state of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs”<sup>49</sup>. They argue first of all that “it is good that the reader receives a long historical perspective on a current conflict” but less so in that learning about the “Israel/Palestine conflict”<sup>50</sup> is perhaps

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<sup>45</sup> Härenstam, p. 2

<sup>46</sup> Bettini, A,C, Jacobs, A, (2007), ”De fyra böckerna skildrar alla en lång historia, dock vissa något längre än andra. Gleerups båda verk, *Alla tiders historia* och *Perspektiv på historien* tar båda avstamp till konflikten redan år 70 e.kr., i och med den judiska förskingringen. Alltså går dessa båda böcker långt tillbaka i historien i deras redogörelser för bakgrundshistoriken. Riktigt lika långt tillbaka i tiden sträcker sig inte *Epok* där författarens bakgrundsresonemang tar sin början i och med sionismens framväxt under 1800-talet. *Epos* inleder i sin tur sin bakgrundskildring med första världskrigets förvecklingar i sakfrågan. De fyra böckerna använder sig alla av både ett aktörs och ett strukturperspektiv där främst FN, judarna, USA, Sovjetunionen ses som aktörer och där sionismens framväxt och kriget som specifika händelser kan ses som strukturella perspektiv.”

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

<sup>48</sup> Ibid

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. ”judarnas förhållande till området Palestina i fokus och inte den reella konflikten mellan staten Israel och palestinska araber.”

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. “Här känner vi att det både är bra och mindre bra med ett långt historiskt perspektiv.

Bra i det att man som läsare får just ett långt historiskt perspektiv på en aktuell konflikt, vilket

not “completely compatible with [learning about] the dispersion of the Jews in Antiquity.”<sup>51</sup> The authors argue that the tragic history of the Jewish people beginning in Antiquity does not perhaps “mirror today’s actual conflict between a relatively young state and an Arab people without a state.”<sup>52</sup> The authors propose that the historical point of departure presented in the second of the textbooks on the issue of the rise of Zionism is more relevant. However, they do not entirely disapprove of a longer historical perspective on the conflict since they argue that “if one is to discuss the tragic history of the Jews with the establishment of Israel as the final destination and with a conflict as a result, a longer perspective both can and ought to be provided.”<sup>53</sup> The authors do not offer any ideas about what a perspective of this kind might consist of. Nevertheless, they re-emphasise their preference for content which situates the roots of the conflict in the modern era. At the same time they offer a critique of the four textbooks they examined in which they argue that “unfortunately a concentration on concrete problems is absent.”<sup>54</sup> One of the problems they feel ought to be looked at is the matter of “the Jews demand for a national territory”<sup>55</sup> and the issue, as they define it, of “why the Palestinians had to pay for the crimes of the Nazis with regard to the crimes against Jews during the Second World War.”<sup>56</sup> The authors also mention the appearance in the textbooks of the issue of “Britain’s mixed messages to the Jews and Arabs during the First World

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ju ligger i linje med ett utav kursmålen. Mindre bra i det att Israel-Palestinakonflikten som sådan, sett med historiska glasögon, kanske inte fullt ut är kompatibel med judarnas förskingring under antiken.”

<sup>51</sup> Bettini, A, C, Jacobs, A

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. “Detta då den händelsen enligt vår mening mer speglar det judiska folkets brokiga historia än dagens faktiska konflikt mellan en relativt ung judisk stat och ett arabiskt folk utan just en stat.”

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. “Ska man diskutera judarnas brokiga historia med bildandet av staten Israel som slutdestination, förvisso också med en konflikt som resultat, både kan och bör man ange ett längre perspektiv.”

<sup>54</sup> Ibid “Överhuvud är de fyra läroböckerna väldigt metodiska i sina respektive textupplägg. Urvalsstoffen är snarlika varandra med lagom doser fakta vilka vi anser inte bör påverka vare sig läsarens helhetsförståelse eller analytiska förmåga. Men trots detta har ändå konkreta problematiseringar i texten dessvärre uteblivit. Det är egentligen bara *Epos* författare som i textflödet valt att problematisera runt judarnas krav på nationellt territorium.”

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. “Detta då de som nämnt ovan frågar sig varför palestinierna ska betala för nazisternas ogärningar, apropå deras brott mot judar under andra världskriget.”

War”<sup>57</sup> and the UN Partition Plan of 1947. They conclude finally that “on the whole” the reader or pupil using the textbooks should be able to grasp the “meaning of the roots of the conflict as well as discussing these from a historical perspective.”<sup>58</sup> The authors do not elaborate on how they have drawn this conclusion but appear to rely on the knowledge available to them in the textbooks themselves. Absent too in their essay is any orientation with some of the scholarly sources on the conflict I will be discussing in this thesis.

Although this is only one example of research on the history of the conflict in Swedish school History textbooks, and indeed in only one section of a student essay, the information the authors provides resonates with some of my earlier and later findings. In addition, and this will become clearer later, the position that the authors adopt in their examination of the textbooks also reflects in part some of the positions adopted by the teacher respondents I have interviewed for this thesis (see chapter six). Like the textbooks I have examined at the Lower Secondary level too, the historical points of departure deemed relevant for understanding and explaining the conflict’s history either begin in Antiquity, with the Nazi holocaust, the pre-war period (e.g. Zionism, Britain’s promises) or a combination of these. For the sake of clarity we may characterise the latter as points of departure which reflect a more pro-Israeli or empathetic stance towards the plight of Jews or the Jewish people throughout history. To a lesser extent too, they also adopt a pro-Palestinian position which contextualises some of the negative reactions on the part of the Palestine Arabs to the establishment of Israel. Clearly,

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<sup>57</sup>Bettini, A, C, Jacobs, A. “Noterbart är vidare att det bara är författarna till *Perspektiv på historien* som konkret redogör för briterernas dubbla budskap till judar och araber under första världskrigets skeden.”

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. “Belysandet av ett sådant faktum ger enligt oss läsaren en större inblick i konfliktens väsentliga historik, då man måhända kan skapa en förståelse för palestiniernas sätt att se på sakfrågan utifrån ett historiskt perspektiv. De allmänt deskriptiva texterna framhäver också likaledes både aktörer och strukturer som drivande i sakfrågan. Sionismens framväxande samt FN:s delning av Palestina är två exempel på struktur- respektive aktörsperspektiv som förenar läromedlens framställningar. Ingen indirekt historiskt dominerande orsak anges dock. På det stora hela tycker vi dock att läsaren utifrån respektive läroboks resonemang bör förstå innebörden av konfliktens ursprung, samt kunna resonera kring densamma utifrån en historisk infallsvinkel.”

then, there is a lacuna with regard to research on how Swedish school History textbooks and indeed other educational material presents or frames the history of the conflict and it is my hope that this thesis will go some way to filling that gap. Furthermore, as I have mentioned, this study aims to examine how the textbooks link to scholarly debates and sources on the conflict and on a more critical-analytical level how the history of the conflict is framed in connection with the political, ideological and cultural setting within which it is situated. In the following sub-section I will begin the first of my overviews of how the conflict is presented in Israeli History textbooks. This will also enable the reader to contrast and compare the impact the different political, ideological and cultural contexts (Swedish and Israeli) have had on how the conflict is presented.

### Dan Porat on the Second Temple Era in Israeli Textbooks

In Crawford & Foster's 2006 *What Shall We Tell The Children?* Israeli scholar Dan Porat has presented a study on Israeli History textbook content entitled "Reconstructing the Past, Constructing the Future in Israeli Textbooks"?<sup>59</sup> The purpose of the study is to "concentrate upon the way one historical period, the Second Temple era, has been portrayed in textbooks and examine this reconstruction to explore the goal of history teaching as advancing a national collective memory and promoting a critical approach".<sup>60</sup> To achieve this, Porat studies the period between the 1950s and 1990s and focuses on the "altering social and political circumstances in Israel [that] have shaped the history depicted in the textbooks."<sup>61</sup> Importantly, Porat emphasises the purpose of constructing a unifying historical narrative for the sake of the Jewish nation. This was done because the "population, especially in the early years of the state, came from four corners of the world [and] *no language, no culture, no belief system united these Jews*".<sup>62</sup> (my italics) By using the era of the Second Temple as its

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<sup>59</sup> Chapter 9 in Crawford, K, Foster, S, (2006) *What Shall We Tell the Children?: International Perspectives on School History Textbooks*, Information Age Publishing, Greenwich, Connecticut, pp. 195 - 225

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 197

<sup>61</sup> Ibid

<sup>62</sup> Ibid

starting point, the Israeli historical narrative marked a “movement away from Jewish history as a religious history to Jewish history as a national history.”<sup>63</sup> Porat discusses three significant events that have “played a key role”<sup>64</sup> in the shaping of Israeli collective memory. These are the Hasmonean Revolt in 167 BCE, the Masada episode in 73 CE and the Bar Kokhba Revolt in 132 CE. These events were reconstructed in order to construct “the link between the ancient past of the Jews in the land and *their modern return*.”<sup>65</sup> Specifically, the disastrous outcomes of both the Masada and Bar Kokhba Revolt were reconstructed by textbook authors “from the final defeat to the initial victory”.<sup>66</sup> For example, the offensive parts of the revolt were emphasised more than the defensive and these events were presented as “great chapters in Jewish history despite their disastrous results.”<sup>67</sup> A more effective ploy was to create a historical continuity between the “second century Jewish kingdom”<sup>68</sup> and the present. In other words, the heroic portrayal of the Masada event in which thousands died found its resolution in the “event of the victorious present”<sup>69</sup> with the establishment of the state of Israel. The reconstruction of a glorious past linked to the modern present in this manner also required a selective reading of sources. For example, instead of relying on the Greek historian, Dio Cassius, who was considered the “sole consistent”<sup>70</sup> source material on the Bar Kokhba Revolt, “textbooks cited legends from the Jewish Talmud [and] a collection of discussions and contemplations on Jewish tradition and law.”<sup>71</sup>

Another aim of constructing a unifying national historical narrative in Israel was to (re)present Jewish history as glorious and heroic in order to downplay the very many episodes of Jewish persecution. It was important not to present the Jewish people as victims of their persecutors (both past and

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<sup>63</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 197

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 198

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 199

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 200

<sup>67</sup> Ibid

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 200

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 199

present) but to emphasise how they had managed to overcome persecution or even national destruction. For example, this played into the perception of “Israel outnumbered by the Arab nations”<sup>72</sup>. In addition, this fostered too an isolationist and even aggressive stance towards its neighbours. However, with the election of Yitzhak Rabin and the beginnings of the peace process in the early 1990s Porat refers to “the post-national period”.<sup>73</sup> This was also the result of efforts going back to the early 1970s and 80s with the encouragement of critical thinking in schools. For example, the “Israeli history curriculum published in 1970, pursued students’ attainment of academic conceptions as a primary aim.”<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, the work of the so-called ‘new historians’ in the late 1980s provided a counter-narrative to the prevailing Zionist discourse. For example, as Porat writes, “Zionism, the ideological foundation of Israel, surfaced only as a sub-topic of nationalism”<sup>75</sup> and “the Holocaust, an event of greatest magnitude for the Jewish people and a central event in Israelis’ identity emerged as a sub-topic of World War II.”<sup>76</sup> The purpose of this restructuring was to place the history of Israel within the “global historical framework”<sup>77</sup> and to disconnect it from its ideological moorings. This critical approach even applied to the way in which the Second Temple era was presented and understood and marked a development in Israeli society to, among other things, “question the validity of sacrificing one’s life for the nation.”<sup>78</sup> New sources were also introduced which reframed the heroic deeds of the Bar Kokhba sects. In addition, it was even acknowledged that there was a “lack of historical sources in some cases”<sup>79</sup> on the events of that era. However, Porat concludes that the advancement of a critical history curriculum was not achieved since the authors of the post-national curriculum were merely providing another “best-story” to match “the concurrent political, cultural and academic tendencies

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<sup>72</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 200

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, p. 204

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p. 201

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, p. 205

<sup>76</sup> Ibid

<sup>77</sup> Ibid

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 206

<sup>79</sup> Ibid



better.”<sup>80</sup> Instead of enabling students to critically analyse and question the selection and content of the Second Temple era it merely reframed these events in “disastrous terms”<sup>81</sup> and implicitly retained their national-historical significance. I will now discuss the work of Jonathan Kreiner in the following sub-section.

## Jonathan Kreiner on Israeli and Palestinian History School Textbooks

In his chapter entitled “Control Through Education?”<sup>82</sup> Israeli scholar, Jonathan Kreiner, writes on the politicization of Israeli and Palestinian school textbooks. His initial point of departure concerns the appearance of anti-Semitic stereotypes in Palestinian textbooks but he then moves on to a broader question which asks to which extent “the vicissitudes of internal and external political processes have on”<sup>83</sup> both Israeli and Palestinian History school textbooks.

Kreiner lays out the impact of geopolitical events on the construction of both the Israeli and Palestinian history curriculum since the 1950s, through the 70s, 80s and 90s. Beginning with the Israeli curriculum, we learn that in the 1950s the purpose of the history curriculum was “to identify young people with the state”<sup>84</sup> and the prevalent values in society. At that time, Arab history or the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict was absent. Instead focus was placed on Arab behaviour as backwardness, fanaticism or as the

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<sup>80</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 207

<sup>81</sup> Ibid

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, pp. 211-223. Jonathan Kreiner has also been a research fellow at the Georg Eckert Institute in Germany where work on the history of the conflict in History school textbooks has been carried out by Israeli psychologist Dar Bar-On (Beer Sheva University) and the Palestinian educationalist Sami Adwan (Bethlehem University) who in association with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig/Germany together “co-founded [the PRIME institute which] has been committed since 2002 to the development of a binational textbook on the history of the Middle East conflict.” Project entitled “The Texts of “the Others” - An Israeli-Palestinian Textbook Project on the History of the Middle East Conflict”, The PRIME Institute in collaboration with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig/Germany, <http://www.gei.de/en/research/textbooks-and-conflict/4-learning-in-post-conflict-societies/schulbuchprojek-israel-palestina.html>

<sup>83</sup> Chapter 9 in Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 207

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p. 213

“misinterpretation of the Zionist movement.”<sup>85</sup> But the June 1967 war or “the Six Day War”, which the author refers to, would force Israeli society to “familiarize oneself with the Palestinian cause”.<sup>86</sup> In this light, Kreiner describes the complex period following the beginning of the Israeli occupation as one characterised by unease “about the legitimacy of the occupation ... a stronger bond to Zionism”<sup>87</sup> and following the 1973 war (Yom Kippur War) an inclusion of “an enhanced knowledge of Arab neighbours and opponents.”<sup>88</sup> By the mid-1970s this dialectical process had resulted in some of the original biblical-historical focus in the early textbooks shifting towards “Zionist and later history of the Diaspora”<sup>89</sup>. By the 1980s, although an optional topic in textbooks, the Arab-Israeli conflict itself was introduced as a “compulsory part of the history curriculum”<sup>90</sup>. However, as Kreiner notes, these had little impact in schools due to their “pedagogical deficiencies” and many teachers continued to use “school books written in the 1960s.”<sup>91</sup> Even despite the introduction of textbooks which enabled pupils to “critically discuss”<sup>92</sup> Israeli history, there were two “other books” which “were far more popular [and which were] recommended by the Ministry of Education until the 1990s”.<sup>93</sup> These “presented an uncritical view of Zionism and explained Arab resistance against the Zionist project in terms of a militant tendency”<sup>94</sup> and even compared “Arab political leaders [with] the Nazis.”<sup>95</sup> Like Porat above, Kreiner mentions the work of the new historians entering into the curriculum in the early 1990s and the impact this had on “a number of history school books for upper secondary education”.<sup>96</sup> The author also emphasises the significance of the 1987 *Intifada* and how it raised awareness both in Israel

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<sup>85</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 207

<sup>86</sup> Ibid

<sup>87</sup> Ibid

<sup>88</sup> Ibid

<sup>89</sup> Ibid

<sup>90</sup> Ibid

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 213

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 214

<sup>93</sup> Ibid

<sup>94</sup> Ibid

<sup>95</sup> Ibid

<sup>96</sup> Ibid

and internationally more “than ever of the occupation and its implications.”<sup>97</sup> Yet, following the dialectical process again, he mentions how even following the 1990s’ transformations how some textbooks did “not use the label “Palestinians” and focused on “an Israeli/Zionist point of view.”<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, also mentioned is how Jewish history is treated as “as an element of world history”<sup>99</sup> (compare Porat above). At the same time the “notion of “occupied territories”<sup>100</sup> is absent with the West Bank occasionally being referred to “by its biblical names, Judea and Samaria.”<sup>101</sup>

The Palestinian curriculum receives both a mixture of balanced appraisal and critique from the author in relation to the author’s definition of what a Palestinian curriculum dedicated to critical thinking and peaceful dialogue ought to look like. For example, the author states near the end of his analysis that as “evidenced through their recognition of Israel, they [the Palestinians] are at least prepared to take the first step towards peace.”<sup>102</sup> In addition, the author also refers to polemical statements in Palestinian textbooks describing Israel as “an expansionist aggressive state”<sup>103</sup> as “empty platitudes”<sup>104</sup>. Like the Israeli history school textbooks, the Palestinian textbooks contain ideological elements and bias as well as the inclusion of the opponent’s narrative and a critical awareness. For example, references are made to the putative existence of an “ancient Arab-Canaanite and even more ... Islamic history”<sup>105</sup> which is presented as a peaceful period and not a period of conquest. In addition, the Palestinian textbooks also contain portions of Old Testament myths such as “the immigration of the Hebrews from Egypt and the destruction of their mini-state ... by the Assyrians and Chaldeans”<sup>106</sup>. Also presented is the “struggle against Israeli occupation [which is understood] as long-standing as the fight against the colonial exploits of a

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<sup>97</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 214

<sup>98</sup> Ibid

<sup>99</sup> Ibid

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, p. 215

<sup>101</sup> Ibid

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 221

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, p. 219

<sup>104</sup> Ibid

<sup>105</sup> Ibid

<sup>106</sup> Ibid

foreign power.”<sup>107</sup> A book from the 1970s also includes information on “the Kings David and Solomon [...] described as they were in the Bible”.<sup>108</sup> The author discusses a “book for civic education for Year 8” on the basis of their stated objectives to develop a “critical way of thinking ... respecting others’ views, self-criticism”<sup>109</sup> etc. Pointing to more egregious bias, criticism is directed at among other things “allusions to the anti-Semitic stereotype ... continuously judged as positive”<sup>110</sup> and the portrayal of Israel either as “a merciless occupying power or [whose history is] neglected.”<sup>111</sup> This points to a certain trend in later textbooks too which downplay the Zionist narrative. Examples of possibly more banal anti-Semitic stereotyping appear in the 1970s books. For example, explanations for the persecution of Jews in Europe are framed in terms of their “religious fanaticism”<sup>112</sup> or because they were “competitors in European business”<sup>113</sup>. Or one explanation presented discussed an inherited religious aversion by Europeans towards Jews “as they were thought to be responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus-Christ.”<sup>114</sup> The author adds that when referring to topics such as Plan Dalet ... Allon Plan” and so on the Palestinian textbooks demonstrate an acute “knowledge of the opponent’s narrative”<sup>115</sup>. However, they are less critical of the role of Palestinian leaders such as “the Jerusalem Mufti” who the author refers to as “a core leader of the Palestinian national movement in the 1920s and early 1930s and a propaganda source for the Nazis in 1940s Berlin.”<sup>116</sup> Finally, the author takes issue with some of the unwillingness of the Palestinian textbook authors to recognise such matters as the “Israeli attempts [in the late 70s] to hold regional elections in the occupied territories”<sup>117</sup>. He argues that they fail to see such attempts as “a partial solution or a compromise that sufficiently takes into account the political rights of the Palestinians and their national

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<sup>107</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 219

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, p. 218

<sup>110</sup> Ibid

<sup>111</sup> Ibid

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p. 219

<sup>113</sup> Ibid

<sup>114</sup> Ibid

<sup>115</sup> Ibid

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, p. 220

<sup>117</sup> Ibid

identity”<sup>118</sup>. Neither do they acknowledge the “Jordanian proposal to create a federation with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”<sup>119</sup>, which the textbooks described as an attempt at imperialist regional balance which would have “put an end to an autonomous representation of Palestinian interests.”<sup>120</sup> The textbooks base their critique on Israel’s “unwillingness to withdraw to the borders defined in 1949”<sup>121</sup> in rejection of “Gunnar Jarring’s endeavours at the beginning of the 1970s to implement Resolution 242”.<sup>122</sup> The salient point to make here is whether such critical stances, on either side, foster a shared narrative which encourages both parties to discuss the contingency of their own narratives. For example, the author points to a Palestinian representation of Israeli history which appears to deny its nationalist/Zionist dimension. To support this he quotes a textbook which states that “... The linkage of the modern Jews to Palestine, many of them originating from people who converted to the Jewish religion outside Palestine in later eras, *is a purely religious-spiritual relation*, equal to the one connecting other Christians and Muslims with (Palestine).”<sup>123</sup>(my italics) Furthermore, the polemical tone of some of the Palestinian portrayals of Israel’s political and ideological moorings makes it very difficult for the opponent to engage in an open and critical discussion of such issues based on established research. I will now discuss the work of Elie Podeh in the following sub-section.

### Elie Podeh on the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli Textbooks

Elie Podeh, Israeli Professor of History, whose book entitled *The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli History Textbooks, 1948-2000* is the study most closely related to my own thesis topic; although I focus mainly on the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians as it is presented in Swedish school History textbooks. The Israeli History school textbooks Podeh has examined cover three generations. The first generation existed from “the pre-1948 period until the mid-1970s, the second during the years 1975-92; and

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<sup>118</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 220

<sup>119</sup> Ibid

<sup>120</sup> Ibid

<sup>121</sup> Ibid

<sup>122</sup> Ibid

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, p. 221

the third since the mid-1990s.”<sup>124</sup> Despite evidence of change in the portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict since the first generation onwards, the author’s assessment of them is somewhat pessimistic. In his concluding remarks he claims that “biased textbooks have played an important role in the formation of negative attitudes towards the Arabs”<sup>125</sup> and more controversially “may have been a contributing factor to the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”<sup>126</sup> The author describes the process by which construction of Israeli History textbook content was realized. He describes it as a dialectical or non-linear process between the glorification “of Zionist history but also [references to] certain shadows in this history.”<sup>127</sup> However, a striking feature of this dialectic appears to be the presence of continuity between textbooks from different generations insofar as they repeat or perpetuate a number of myths or distortions even alongside new and critical information. In his analysis of the content of the different textbook generations, Podeh provides a context from which to explain and understand how this continuity has been maintained.

Undergirding Zionist history in the first generation of textbooks from the pre-1948 period to the 1970s were references to “traditional Zionist”<sup>128</sup> myths. These were among others a land without a people, the few against the many and David and Goliath. These existed alongside notions of “the Western, civilized, peace-loving image of the Jews and the Oriental, treacherous, belligerent, and backward image of the Arab.”<sup>129</sup> In addition to these contemporary colonialist ideas which denigrated the status of the native or Other and raised the status of the civilized one, Podeh also discusses what he describes as “major prisms”<sup>130</sup> through which “Arab history was filtered and portrayed”.<sup>131</sup> These were founded on the historical

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<sup>124</sup> Podeh, E, (2003), *The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli History Textbooks, 1948-2000*, Bergin & Garvey, Westport, Connecticut/London, pp. 143-144

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, p. 151

<sup>126</sup> Ibid

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, p. 150

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, p. 80

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, p. 144; see also Pappe, (2006); Shlaim, (2003); Saïd, (2003) for further discussion

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, p. 144

<sup>131</sup> Ibid

experience of Jewish persecution both “in *the biblical*, as well as *the modern era*”.<sup>132</sup> (my italics) The upshot of this was the construction of a biased version of Arab history presented as merely an “Arab reaction to Zionism”<sup>133</sup>. This in turn projected the intentions and traits of previous persecutors of Jews onto a constructed Arab subject and prevented “an attempt to understand Arab motives and attitudes toward the Jews and the conflict.”<sup>134</sup>

Moving into the 1980s and past the first generation of textbooks, a 1984 education ministry program called “Education for Jewish-Arab Coexistence”<sup>135</sup> aimed at encouraging “intercultural contact”<sup>136</sup> through “knowledge of Arab history, culture, and language.”<sup>137</sup> The external events or “vicissitudes” which inspired this development was the growing disquiet about the legitimacy of the occupation, the peace process of the late 1970s and the Lebanon war of 1982 which “acted as a spur to the new history”.<sup>138</sup> One of a number of optional textbooks entitled “Living Together” to encourage Jewish-Arab coexistence on the part of the ministry launched in February 1984 and finalised in 1988, took care to “enable Jewish students to feel some empathy for the country’s Arab citizens.”<sup>139</sup> This textbook also reframed relations between Israel and the Arab states showing that it was not all about ‘conflict’. However, the impact of these works was minimal probably due to the fact that they were not compulsory. Biases appeared in them too which played down the Palestinian national identity of the Arabs in Israel by referring to them either as “Israeli Arabs” or “Arabs of Eretz Israel”.<sup>140</sup> In addition, the theme of Zionist consciousness would still be a primary one and in the 1981/82 “A Hundred Years since the Genesis of the New Settlement of Eretz Israel (1882-1982)”<sup>141</sup> this theme would provide an

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<sup>132</sup> Podeh, p. 144

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, p. 149

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, p. 150

<sup>136</sup> Ibid, p. 150

<sup>137</sup> Ibid

<sup>138</sup> Rogan & Shlaim, (2007), p. xxiii

<sup>139</sup> Podeh, pp. 47-49

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, p. 150

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, pp. 47-49

“awareness of Zionist unity and action *throughout the ages*.”<sup>142</sup> (my italics) Providing a source of continuity again, then, the book reconnected a number of founding myths imbued in topics and themes from the first and second generation curriculum. One, for example, was “the pioneering first Aliyah”<sup>143</sup> or ascension into Israel based on “a traditional narrative that appeared in the first – and second generation textbooks.”<sup>144</sup> Yet, moving out of the second generation into the early 1990s, perhaps one of the clearest examples of ideological transformation throughout this dialectical process came with the introduction of the work of the so-called ‘new historians’ in the general curriculum. This was carried out by the Ministry of Education but was delayed by the Knesset “because of certain omissions in the narrative of Zionist and Israeli history.”<sup>145</sup>

Pointing to some examples of the ‘new historicism’ appearing in the textbooks, Podeh discusses how for the first time, textbooks “of the second generation introduced ... extracts from the Hagana’s “Plan Dalet” [...] albeit omitting significant parts that could damage Israel’s image.”<sup>146</sup> In addition, although unauthorized by the education ministry one textbook “cited Benny Morris’s study on the Palestinian refugee problem”<sup>147</sup> and “used an academic work challenging Zionist historiography [which] showed that the classical Zionist narrative in school text-books was being eroded.”<sup>148</sup> (my italics) A more noteworthy change appeared, however, in a third generation book from 1999 in which it stated among other things that “during the battles [of 1948] many of the country’s Arabs were expelled.”<sup>149</sup> In the same book the Palestinian *Nakba* or catastrophe is also mentioned. Podeh also mentions a textbook “approved by the Ministry of Education” which “accurately

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<sup>142</sup> Podeh, pp. 47-49

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 49

<sup>144</sup> Ibid

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, p. 150

<sup>146</sup> Ibid, p. 108

<sup>147</sup> Ibid

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. The book Podeh refers is “Shahar, *From Diaspora to Independence* (1990), Vol. II, p. 313.”

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. Podeh cites “Naveh, *The Twentieth Century* (1999), pp. 143, 146.”



mirrors [the] current state of academic knowledge and shows some empathy for the refugees' plight."<sup>150</sup>

The inclusion of such perspectives marked a weakening of a hitherto dominant Zionist perspective and may perhaps be attributed to the optimism felt following the signing of the first peace agreement on the eve of the Oslo process in 1993. But if as Podeh asserts that "changes in textbooks are often the product of social and political developments"<sup>151</sup> then the period following the Camp David failure in July 2000 with the eruption of the al-Aqsa *Intifada* would probably not have inspired a "fourth generation of textbooks"<sup>152</sup>. For example, following the al-Aqsa *Intifada*, in February 2001 Prime Minister "Ariel Sharon was asked what changes he thought the education system needed"<sup>153</sup> to which he replied "I would like them [Israeli school children] to study the history of the people of Israel and the land of Israel...the children must be taught Jewish-Zionist values, and *the 'new historians' must not be taught.*"<sup>154</sup> (my italics)

Finally, I will highlight the swiftness with which certain established ideas and perceptions can once again be invoked in the wake of an escalation in the conflict. Tov describes the emerging ethos of conflict in Israel channelled through the media in the wake of Camp David and the second *Intifada*. These are described as "eight themes of societal beliefs"<sup>155</sup> not all of which "were new in the belief repertoire of the Jewish people".<sup>156</sup> This was because some "had existed earlier in Jewish tradition and were assimilated into the ethos, while others were forged in the course of the

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<sup>150</sup> Podeh p. 109. The sources Podeh refers to are "Barnavi, *The Twentieth Century* (1998), p. 195; Barnavi and Naveh, *Modern Times*, Part II (1999), p. 239."

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid*, p. 151

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>153</sup> Rogan, L, E, Shlaim, A, (2001/2007) *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, xxi

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>155</sup> Sharvit, K, Tal-Bar, D, (2007), "Ethos of Conflict in The Israeli Media During The Period of Violent Confrontation" in Tov-Siman-Bar, Y, (2007), *The Israeli Palestinian Conflict: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management*, Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, p. 205

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid*

conflict”.<sup>157</sup> Like many of the myths undergirding textbook narratives in the first and second generations of Israeli textbooks, then, the ethos of conflict drew upon “*the right of the Jewish people to settle in the land of Israel and establish a state there*”<sup>158</sup>. This also included the “development of *a victimised self-perception*”<sup>159</sup> (my italics) which in turn contributed to a siege mentality and the perception of all of “Israel’s military activities”<sup>160</sup> as “acts of self-defence.”<sup>161</sup> In addition to these, the powerful theme of “mutual delegitimization”<sup>162</sup> (emphasis in original) served to deny the other party’s humanity and portrayed the Arabs as “bent on destroying Israel and the Jewish people”<sup>163</sup> and held them responsible for the “conflict’s persistence.”<sup>164</sup>

Finally, it is important to note that the Israeli “history textbooks for high school approved by the Ministry of Education *do not present a uniform narrative*”<sup>165</sup> but might be characterised in terms of continuity and change. As the above discussion would appear to show, Israeli History textbook content reflects both the presence of persistent cultural myths and ideas as well as changes in the political culture triggered by political events such as the 2000 failure at Camp David and the al-Aqsa *Intifada* (to mention but one). Indeed, Podeh connects the debate among historians highlighted in the newspaper media in Israel following the events of the 1982 Lebanon War and the 1987 *Intifada* and notes the impact these external factors may have had on curriculum development. For example, he refers to an article in “*Ha’aretz*, 10 June and 1 July, 1994”<sup>166</sup> in which a dispute between different historians on historical narratives on 1948 was brought to the public’s attention. Podeh adds that in “a 1997 issue of *the History Teachers’ Journal*, published by the Ministry of Education, [...] the debate between old and new

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<sup>157</sup> Sharvit, K, Tal-Bar, D, (2007), p. 205

<sup>158</sup> Ibid

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, p. 206

<sup>160</sup> Ibid

<sup>161</sup> Ibid

<sup>162</sup> Ibid, p. 205

<sup>163</sup> Ibid

<sup>164</sup> Ibid

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, p. 109

<sup>166</sup> Podeh, p. 110, footnote 214

historians [was also discussed].”<sup>167</sup> He concludes from this that by “exposing the teacher to revisionist interpretations of the refugee problem, *the ministry legitimized the validity of the debate, if not the thesis itself.*”<sup>168</sup> (my italics)

Leaving the discussion on the dialectical process of Israeli curriculum as continuity and change, in the next section I will discuss what will be referred to as the scientific debate on the Israel/Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflicts. What the scientific debate represents is the most significant challenge within Israeli academia from the late 1980s onwards to the dominant Zionist narrative on among other issues what occurred in 1948 both prior to and following the so-called “War of Independence”. What the scientific debate represents in this thesis is the established research on the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict and therefore its inclusion and exclusion in the current Swedish school curriculum addresses one of the initial problems that my thesis topic takes as its point of departure. The normative position I take in relation to the scientific debate is that it provides more critical-analytical perspectives for understanding and explaining such events as the 1948 war and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. However, the debate should not be understood as the ultimate “truth” on what happened in 1948 or at any other time. Further, the debate is also characterised by the very strong political and ideological biases, emotions and conflicting interpretations expressed by each of the different scholars who have taken part in it. Nevertheless, the points of consensus and contestation that the different discussants reveal provide an interesting framework towards a more nuanced understanding of the historical roots of the conflict.

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<sup>167</sup> Podeh, pp. 109-110

<sup>168</sup> Ibid

## Section 1.2 Core Topics of the Scientific Debate on 1948

It has been argued that the emergence of the ‘new historicism’ in the late 1980s in Israel came in response to a number of different transformations in the conflict stemming from changing perceptions of the occupation, the Yom Kippur or 1973 war, the Israel and Egypt separate peace deal and the 1982 Lebanon war, which “acted as a spur to the new history”.<sup>169</sup> By the mid-1990s works published by the new historians had peaked. In short, the work of the new historians had challenged the established Israeli historiography. This challenged among other issues the history of the Zionist movement, the 1948 war in Palestine or so-called “war of independence” and, more importantly, the claim that the Palestinian refugee problem was created by the Arab states who ordered the local population to take flight. In addition, such myths as the image of a weak Israeli David up against an aggressive Arab Goliath were challenged too. Their work opened up the ways in which the history of the conflict in Israel and elsewhere could be critically examined. The new historians were not the first to challenge official versions of history on the conflict but their efforts appear to have had the most impact both in Israeli and Western academia. Other historical studies or works produced since the late 80s and early 1990s have been influenced in one way or other by the work of the new historians. For example, such works as Ze’ev Maoz’s *Defending the Holyland* (2005) on Israel’s own contribution to the escalation of conflict and Saree Makdisi’s almost anti-traditionalist position in *Occupation Inside Out* (2008) covering the day-to-day experiences of occupation and its political and ideological roots. It is important to add, however, that despite a general consensus among these historians and others on what historical archival sources appear to show, there is great disagreement on how these should be interpreted. This is due to the inevitable intrusion of ideology, politics and emotions into debates on what actually happened in 1948 and at other times and why. In this sense,

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<sup>169</sup> Rogan, L, E, Shlaim, A, (2001/2007), *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. xxiii

then, as Masalha notes, “These Israeli scholars and authors are not a monolithic group; they range from the liberal Zionist to the ‘post-Zionist’, from the good old-fashioned positivist historian to the ‘post-modernist’ relativist.”<sup>170</sup>

Here then, I will discuss those scholars which have been most influential in the debate on 1948. This by no means undermines the work of other scholars in the field whose work should be considered of equal importance and who I will only refer to briefly here. But a thorough overview of all the scholarly work on the conflict would take up considerable time and space. From a power/knowledge perspective too, my motivation for discussing these scholars and the debate they are part of has to do with the fact that they represent – as I see it - a challenge to dominant or mainstream discourses on the conflict’s history. And as already mentioned, I would assert that the kinds of debate they engage in also provide more nuanced and critical perspectives for understanding and explaining the history of the conflict.

### New historians, anti-traditionalists and traditionalists

Adopting Foster’s delineation of scholarly positions on this period, the debate about what occurred prior to, during and post the 1948 war has been maintained by three different groups of scholars, namely, the so-called “new historians”, “traditional” historians and “anti-traditional” historians.<sup>171</sup> The most prominent “new historian” is Benny Morris who is professor of History in the Middle East Studies department of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in the city of Beer-Sheva, Israel. His ground-breaking work, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949* (1988), represented a direct challenge to the dominant Zionist narrative at the time. Like most critical scholars in Israel and elsewhere, Morris stood on the political left but in recent times has begun to change position.<sup>172</sup> Other scholars more or less

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<sup>170</sup> Reviewed Work(s): *Fabricating Israeli History: The ‘New Historians’* by Efraim Karsh, Nur Masalha, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Nov, 1999), pp. 346-350. <http://links.istor.org>

<sup>171</sup> Article by Zachary Foster entitled “1948: The Fog of War”, the Michigan Observer, No.2, Spring 2006

<sup>172</sup> This was evident in a roundtable discussion between him and Saree Makdisi and Norman Finkelstein in 2008 on the anniversary of the establishment of Israel in 1948. See also

in the Morris camp are Oxford University Professor, Avi Shlaim, whose book *The Iron Wall* argued among other things that Israeli policy towards the Arabs since the beginning of the conflict has been characterised over the decades by the political ideas of Revisionist Zionist Ze'ev Jabotinsky which were not part of the Labour mainstream in Mandate Palestine around the early 1920s (more below). Another “new historian” discussed here is Ilan Pappé who was formerly a senior lecturer in political science at the university of Haifa between 1984 and 2007. Part of the reason for his relocation to England was due to the publication of his *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* in 2007 which went much further than his compatriots in its reconstruction of events preceding and following the 1948 war. In a sense, Pappé has come the closest to the so-called “anti-traditionalists” such as Nur Masalha Professor of Religion and Politics and Director of the Centre for Religion and History and the Holy Land Research Project at St Mary’s University College and Walid Khalidi who is an Oxford trained Palestinian historian who has written extensively on the Palestinian exodus. In addition to the vast empirical work of these scholars, their analytical focus has also been on the colonial dimensions of political Zionism and on Zionism *per se* as an all-encompassing ideology undergirding and informing the drive to dispossess the indigenous Arab population of Palestine and settle their country. Lastly, a smaller group of scholars who will be referred to here as traditionalists vehemently disagree with many of the findings and interpretations of both the “new historians” and “anti-traditionalists”. Of note, first of all, is Israeli historian Anita Shapira who is Ruben Merinfeld Professor of the Study of Zionism and head of the Weizmann Institute for the Study of Zionism at Tel Aviv University. She has written scathing reviews of both Morris’ work and Shlaim’s work accusing the latter of suffering from a historian’s “cognitive dissonance”. Another historian in the rank of Shapira is Efraim Karsh who is professor and head of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King’s College, London. He is the most vocal critic of the work of the “new historians”. The basic premise of both scholars is that the Zionist project of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine was a

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Jonathan Cook’s discussion on Morris’ political rebirth in Cook, J, (2006), *Blood and Religion: The Unmasking of the Jewish and Democratic State*, Pluto Press, London, p. 106

just one and that many of the early leaders of the early Zionist movement tried their utmost to forge a peaceful union with the Arab population. In addition, the scholars assume the equal claim (or right) to the land echoed from time to time in Zionist discourse. For example, one of the premises expressed in Shapira's work is the perennial existence of a Jewish nation and people going back two thousand years through "the symbiotic relationship between religion and nationality".<sup>173</sup> To support this, in a recent review article of the book *The Invention of the Jewish People* by Shlomo Sand professor of history at Tel Aviv University, Shapira posits the power of historical collective memory as a marker of the Jewish people's unity and essence throughout the ages. Shapira's thesis is powerfully supported by the historical persecution of Jews culminating in the Nazi holocaust. However, this does not prevent her from adhering to Sand's social constructionist position that the "essence" of nation-peoples is based on various myths and traditions, a position which she describes as not controversial. However, to strengthen her thesis Shapira draws upon staple Zionist biblical-national mythology and argues that "the establishment of an idolatrous Roman colony on the ruins of Jerusalem after the Bar-Kokhba Revolt was crushed, [have gone] down in Jewish collective memory as traumatic."<sup>174</sup> (my italics)

Having introduced some of the main proponents in the debate on 1948 I will now move on to a discussion of some of its core topics. In addition to returning to these scholars later I will also bring in the work of other scholars whose work will cover such matters as nationalism and national identity and even biblical archaeology. I will also bring in the work of scholars who have discussed the Israeli occupation, international law and the Oslo peace process.

### 'Transfer', 1948, and the creation of the refugee problem

The core topics or, rather, core topic connected to 1948 which all the related topics appears to hinge on is the concept of 'transfer'. Both 'new historians' and 'anti-traditional' historians debate the extent to which 'transfer' directly

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<sup>173</sup> Review article in *The Journal of Israeli History*, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 2009, 63–72, "The Jewish People Deniers", p. 63

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66

referred to a master plan or drive to “expunge the future Jewish state of Arabs”<sup>175</sup>. Traditional historians, on the other hand, attribute instances of expulsion and flight to the fog of war and not as a direct consequence of Zionist ideology linked to political aims and intentions. It could be argued that generally speaking the “new historians” adopt a kind of middle ground, albeit with the exception of Pappé and others (see below). The purpose of this section, then, will be to present the general points of consensus and disagreement between these different scholars and within their own respective ranks too with a view to comparing how the textbooks and teachers’ statements correspond to the consensus at a later stage. I will begin by discussing some of the “new historian” and anti-traditionalist positions and then move on to the more traditionalist positions.

Mainstream accounts of what occurred following the events of the 1948 war recount that the local population of Palestine either fled or were expelled by Israeli forces. Since this occurred from areas designated to the Palestinian state in accordance with the 1947 UN partition proposal, the fleeing or expelled population were classed as refugees. However, in the late 1980s there began to emerge historical research in Israel which began to question the dominant Israeli discourse on what occurred (that they fled) and indeed constituted a challenge to mainstream perceptions elsewhere (fled and/or expelled). The discussion on the concept of “transfer” has provided a kind of platform for the reinvestigation of the events of 1948 and even further back to the history of political Zionism itself. The concept of “transfer” is broached first of all by Israeli new historian Benny Morris. Morris argues that the “mind-set [among Zionist leaders] accepted transfer as a legitimate solution”<sup>176</sup> to the “Arab problem” prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. Thus, the problem in the way of the establishment of “a homogenous Jewish state or at least a state with an overwhelming Jewish majority”<sup>177</sup> was a demographic one for the leaders. It was felt that this would not be

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<sup>175</sup> Foster, p. 17

<sup>176</sup> A Critique of Benny Morris, Nur Masalha, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Autumn, 1991), pp. 90-97.

<sup>177</sup> Rogan & Shlaim, (2007), p. 40



achievable with a “very large Arab minority”<sup>178</sup> within the same state who at the same time would be hostile to “the Jewish polity to which [it] had been consigned.”<sup>179</sup> The evidence Morris presents to support this position comes in the form of “private and institutional papers, of the protocols of Israel’s Cabinet meetings between 1948 and 1953”<sup>180</sup> and most “significantly, of the massive declassification of the documentation stored in the Haganah Archive in Tel Aviv and the Israel Defence Forces and Defence Ministry Archive (IDFA) in Givatayim.”<sup>181</sup> The number of citations Morris provides in the 2007 edition of *The War for Palestine* is extensive compared to his original work on the topic, some of which is discussed by Nur Masalha in a review article from 1991. For example, on 7<sup>th</sup> August 1937 at the Twentieth Zionist Congress meeting in Zurich (against the backdrop of the publication of the Peel Commission recommendations) Israel’s first premier, David Ben-Gurion, stated among other things that

We must carefully examine the question whether transfer is possible, whether it is necessary, whether it is moral, and will it bring benefit. We do not want to dispossess. [But] transfer of population happened in the past, in the Qezreel Valley, in the Sharon (i.e., Coastal Plain) and in other places. You know of the Jewish National Fund’s actions in this regard. Now the transfer will have to be carried out on a different scale altogether. ...<sup>182</sup>

In addition to public speeches, Morris also cites diary entries by David Ben-Gurion following the Peel Commission’s publication in which he writes among other things that “this transfer is a great blessing for the Arab state – and for us it is a question of life, existence, protection of culture, [Jewish

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<sup>178</sup> Rogan & Shlaim, (2007), p. 40

<sup>179</sup> Ibid

<sup>180</sup> Ibid, p. 37

<sup>181</sup> Ibid

<sup>182</sup> A Critique of Benny Morris, Nur Masalha, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Autumn, 1991), pp. 90-97.

population] increase, freedom and independence”.<sup>183</sup> In addition, Ben-Gurion states that “the transfer clause in my eyes is more important than all our demands for additional land”.<sup>184</sup> Ben-Gurion also refers to “the evacuation [of the Arabs from] the [Jezreel] Valley”<sup>185</sup> in the Negev which he states “we shall [i.e., must] achieve now – and, if not, perhaps we will never achieve it.”<sup>186</sup> American-Palestinian historian, Rashid Khalidi argues that from Tel Aviv, Haifa to the eastern Galilee, the Jezreel Valley constituted part of “the strategic core of the new state, and the springboard for its expansion.”<sup>187</sup> Anti-traditionalist, Nur Masalha, emphasising the ideological dimension more forcefully, also presents portions of “David Ben-Gurion’s Zichronot [Memoirs], volume 4, published by Am Oved in Tel Aviv in 1974”.<sup>188</sup> He quotes Ben-Gurion there stating that “... *the compulsory transfer* [in Hebrew ‘*ha-transfer ha-kafuy*’, emphasis in the original] of the Arabs from the valleys of the proposed Jewish State could give us something which we never had, even when we stood on our own feet during the days of the First and Second Temple. (pp. 297-298).”<sup>189</sup>(emphasis in original) The latest evidence provided by Morris as discussed above is in the form of an extended extract from David Ben-Gurion’s 1937 diaries in which he states among other things that “If we do not succeed in removing the Arabs from our midst, when a royal commission proposes this to England, and transferring them to the Arab area – it will not be achievable easily (or perhaps at all) after the [Jewish] state is established”.<sup>190</sup> There are points of disagreement between the ‘new historians’ and anti-traditionalists and others cited above which can be pointed to. For example, for Morris the

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<sup>183</sup> Rogan & Shlaim, p. 42. Morris cites the David Ben-Gurion Diary, 12 July 1937, the Ben-Gurion Archive, Sede Boker, Israel. Emphasis in original.

<sup>184</sup> Rogan, Shlaim, p. 43

<sup>185</sup> Ibid

<sup>186</sup> Ibid

<sup>187</sup> R. Khalidi in Rogan & Shlaim, (2007), p. 29

<sup>188</sup> Ibid. Masalha describes these sources as follows: “The four volumes of these Memoirs are available at the SOAS library and probably at several UK universities’ libraries. I refer to only a few quotes from these memoirs on 12 July 1937 ...”

<sup>189</sup> Ibid

<sup>190</sup> Ibid. Morris quotes the following source “David Ben-Gurion Diary, 12 July 1937, the Ben-Gurion Archive, Sede Boker, Israel. Emphasis in the original. See also Ben-Gurion diary entry for 20 July 1937”

links between the transfer concept and Zionist military operations and goals are tentative. However, for Masalha and others this and many other “clues” constitute evidence, not only of the notion of ‘transfer’ built into Zionism from its very inception<sup>191</sup>, but also into its military operational dimension (see Plan D below). On this point Masalha and others critique Morris for not going far enough in his analysis.<sup>192</sup> Along with other adherents I will discuss below, Nur Masalha’s position is that “‘transfer’, expulsion, ethnic cleansing and so on are historical facts and must be seen as actions [*directly*] linked to Zionist ideology and not simply things that happened “of [their] own accord”<sup>193</sup> or once Zionist leaders became “predisposed” as Morris argues. (my italics) Even within the ranks of the new historicism there are those who would also have Morris concede that acts such as expulsion, village destruction and “ethnic cleansing” were part of an endgame or master plan to remove the Arabs from Palestine to make way for a homogenous Jewish state.

### Military Plan Dalet: a Zionist blueprint and master plan?

Considered radical in Israel, Israeli historian, Ilan Pappé, has perhaps gone the furthest of late in examining the “colonial legacies”<sup>194</sup> of political Zionism. Echoing the positions of Walid Khalidi (see below) and others to some extent, he makes the claim that military Plan Dalet was not only a blueprint for the expulsion of the local Arab population between December 1947 and May 1948<sup>195</sup> but that it was evidence of “ethnic cleansing”. However, the evidence Pappé provides for this is not in the actual wording

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<sup>191</sup> Indeed, Morris himself quotes Herzl’s diary from 12<sup>th</sup> June 1895 in which he states that “We shall try to spirit away the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries”. From *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, Raphael Patai, ed. (New York, 1960), vol I, p. 88, (12 June 1895); Cook also cites Morris but includes the following from the Herzl quote. “Both the process and expropriation of the poor must be carried out both discretely and circumspectly.” Cook, p. 97

<sup>192</sup> For example, former DePaul doctor of political science, Norman Finkelstein, has agreed with the scholarly Morris on the issue of creation of the refugee problem but has disagreed with the political Morris.

<sup>193</sup> A Critique of Benny Morris , Nur Masalha, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Autumn, 1991), pp. 90-97

<sup>194</sup> Loomba, A, (2005) *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, Routledge, London/New York, p. 16

<sup>195</sup> Pappé, I, (2007) *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Oneworld, Oxford

of Plan Dalet which “gave the villages the option to surrender”<sup>196</sup> but in “the operation orders which did not exempt any village for any reasons.”<sup>197</sup> Pappé focuses on the timing of the military operations more than any direct order since it “undermines the Israeli myth that the ‘Arabs’ ran away once the ‘Arab’ invasion began”<sup>198</sup> or that they were told on loudspeakers to leave by Arab leaders.<sup>199</sup> Pappé also points specifically to the dates of “30 March and 15 May” 1948 when he claims that “200 villages were occupied and their inhabitants expelled.”<sup>200</sup> The sources Pappé provide come from among others “the Haganah Archives in Tel-Aviv”<sup>201</sup> and the descriptions of some of the operations involved in villages near urban centres such as Tiberias, Haifa, and Jaffa. In addition, he includes accounts from witnesses of village massacres such as the one carried out at the village of Deir Yasin on 9<sup>th</sup> April 1948 which for Pappé all point to evidence of ethnic cleansing. Pappé claims too that the Haganah along with groups such as the Irgun and Stern gang had worked together during such operations. Pappé makes the boldest claim yet by arguing that in the case of Deir Yasin it was beneficial to do so in order to “absolve [the Haganah] from any official accountability”<sup>202</sup>. He adds too that the Haganah had designated Deir Yasin and other villages as enemy military targets and that the nearby villages of “Qalunya, Saris, Beit Surik and Biddu”<sup>203</sup> were also attacked and the people from there were expelled. Referring to urban areas attacked, Pappé discusses the fate of Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee on 12<sup>th</sup> April where “6000 Jews and 5000 Arabs and their forbears had for centuries co-existed peacefully.”<sup>204</sup> Pappé reports that the

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<sup>196</sup> Pappé, (2007), p. 88

<sup>197</sup> Ibid

<sup>198</sup> Ibid, p. 104

<sup>199</sup> Read, for example, “Why Did the Palestinians Leave, Revisited” Author(s): Walid Khalidi Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Winter, 2005), pp. 42-54 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 04/02/2010 06:05. “The article also deals directly with the orders and reproduces the texts of the eleven communiqués issued by the Haifa National Committee between the UN General

Assembly partition decision (November 1947) and the fall of Haifa in April, all of which have bearing on the subject.”

<sup>200</sup> Pappé, p. 104

<sup>201</sup> Ibid

<sup>202</sup> Ibid, p. 104

<sup>203</sup> Ibid, p. 91

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, p. 92

town was exposed to “rolled barrel bombs”<sup>205</sup> and the Hagana forces “used loudspeakers to broadcast terrifying noises to frighten the population.”<sup>206</sup> Pappe also implicates the British in the fate of the inhabitants of Tiberias and other urban centres. For example, the fall of Haifa was preceded by “the terrorization of the city’s Arab population”<sup>207</sup> in December of 1947 which in turn led to the flight of the town’s Arab elites. In the midst of these events, Pappe discusses the passivity of the British troops. They were supposed to remain in the city until August but had brought “their date of departure forward to May”<sup>208</sup>. To this he argues that they “still had the legal and, one could argue, moral authority to impose law and order in the city.”<sup>209</sup>

Pappe goes on to inform us that cities like Tiberias and Haifa were “allocated in the UN plan to the Jewish state”<sup>210</sup>. He then makes the claim that while the port town of Haifa was wanted by the Zionist leadership, its population of “75, 000 Palestinians who lived there”<sup>211</sup> was not. Pappe also discusses attempts by some of the locals to help the besieged population. For example, one of the Jewish members of the population, “Shabtai Levi [...] beseeched the people [of the town] to stay and promised no harm would befall them.”<sup>212</sup> But according to Pappe, at the end of the day it was the operation officer of the Carmeli Brigade, “Mordechai Maklef, [...] who called the shots”<sup>213</sup>. Pappe refers to alleged orders made by Maklef to his troops to “Kill any Arab you encounter”<sup>214</sup> and to destroy property. Following Haifa, Pappe informs us, the town of Safad also fell and only 100 “old people” were allowed to stay on, though not for long.”<sup>215</sup> According to Pappe’s analysis the balance between well-equipped and well-trained forces on the Israeli and Arab sides was instrumental in assuring the former would

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<sup>205</sup> Pappe, (2007), p. 92

<sup>206</sup> Ibid

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, pp. 92-93

<sup>208</sup> Ibid, p. 93

<sup>209</sup> Ibid

<sup>210</sup> Ibid

<sup>211</sup> Ibid

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p. 95

<sup>213</sup> Ibid

<sup>214</sup> Ibid, p. 95

<sup>215</sup> Ibid, p. 98

succeed. Finally, in the town of Jaffa on 13<sup>th</sup> May 1948, “5000 Irgun and Hagana troops” entered the town which was being defended by Muslims from Bosnia and members of the Templars who were “German colonists who had come in the mid-nineteenth century as religious missionaries and [who] now decided to defend their colonies”.<sup>216</sup> But by the end of the siege, with the ‘help’ of British mediation<sup>217</sup> Jaffa’s “population of 50,000 was expelled”<sup>218</sup> and with that all the “major cities and towns of Palestine”<sup>219</sup> were emptied of their Arab populations. Pappe’s reconstruction of events based on extensive archival research provides a line of interpretation which appears to move beyond Morris’ more middle-ground position. More than a new-historical position, Pappe appears to have shifted more to an anti-traditionalist position.

Another analyst of military Plan Dalet and Zionism prior to Pappe is anti-traditionalist Professor Walid Khalidi who argues that the “ideological premises of Plan D are to be found in the very concept of Zionism”<sup>220</sup> itself and that “the implementation of the plan [was] rooted in Zionist strategic thought”<sup>221</sup>. The evidence he provides for this claim is in the form of a confidential letter sent in 1932 by one Chaim Arlosoroff who was the “director of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency”<sup>222</sup> to Chaim Weizmann who previously secured the Balfour Declaration of 1917. According to Khalidi, Zionist strategic thought is expressed in the letter in descriptions of the various stages through which the “*Jewish minority*”<sup>223</sup> (emphasis in original) in Palestine would gain “the state apparatus, the administration, and the military establishment”<sup>224</sup>. The most

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<sup>216</sup> Pappe, (2007), p. 103

<sup>217</sup> Ibid

<sup>218</sup> Ibid

<sup>219</sup> Ibid

<sup>220</sup> Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine Author(s): Walid Khalidi Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 4-33 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 04/02/2010 06:48, p. 9

<sup>221</sup> Khalidi, (1988), p. 10

<sup>222</sup> Ibid

<sup>223</sup> Ibid

<sup>224</sup> Ibid

damning phrase for Khalidi is the somewhat vaguely expressed first part of the following sentence which refers to “*the relationship of forces* [...] to preclude any possibility of the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine.”<sup>225</sup>(my italics) Expressed more cryptically in the letter is the idea that in order to achieve “the equilibrium [...] between two peoples [and] an *agreed solution to the problem*”<sup>226</sup> (my italics) one may have to resort to “dangerously certain states of mind which we have always rejected.”<sup>227</sup> It is not clear what these states of mind may entail unless one makes the connection between rhetoric concerning ‘transfer’ and the content of the letters Khalidi refers to. In any case, the content of these letters is interpreted by the professor to mean the forging of a power-balance beneficial to the strengthening of the Zionist enclave. In a departure from ‘new historian’, Morris, Khalidi asserts that interest in the ‘transfer’ concept on the part of the Zionist leadership not only came prior to the publication of the Peel Commission of 1937 but that “Weizmann and Ormsby-Gore (then British Colonial Secretary) had thrashed them [the commission’s proposals] out together *before*”<sup>228</sup> (emphasis in original). In a document entitled “Text of Plan Dalet: Operational Orders to the Brigades”<sup>229</sup> Khalidi also provides portions of the operational orders to the brigades of the Hagana. However, he adds that the summary he provides there “refers only to the tasks assigned to the six brigades of the KHISH (Field Force) and does not include those assigned to the three brigades of the PALMACH, the mobile strategic forces of the Haganah, which operated country-wide.”<sup>230</sup> The orders written in dry militaristic prose contain references to the occupation and taking control of various towns and villages. However, what cannot be derived from the orders is a direct connection between Zionist strategic thinking and the operational aims of Plan D (at least not in the example Khalidi provides here). Briefly, to elucidate, “the Carmeli, made up of three battalions-21, 22,

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<sup>225</sup> Khalidi, (1988), p. 10

<sup>226</sup> Ibid

<sup>227</sup> Ibid

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, p. 11

<sup>229</sup> Appendix C: Text of Plan Dalet: Operational Orders to the Brigades, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948. (Autumn, 1988) 34-37.

<sup>230</sup> Text of Plan Dalet

and 23-was charged with” among other things “consolidating the hold *on the city of Haifa* \* \* through occupying its Arab quarters (“the Arabs in the quarters of Wadi al-Salib and Wadi al-Nisnas must be blockaded”).”<sup>231</sup> (my italics) Another brigade called “the Golani, made up of five battalions-1 1, 12, 13, 14, and 15-was charged with” among other things “closing the enemy's primary access road from the country's borders and from the direction of *the central Galilee*” and “taking control of the Arab villages in the areas and on the road from Metulla to *Tiberias* \* \*, from Rosh Pina to *Safad* \* \*, from *Tiberias* \* \* to 'Affula\*”<sup>232</sup> (my italics)

### Traditionalist and other criticism of the ‘new historians’ and anti-traditionalists

Two of the most vocal critics of the work of Benny Morris and Avi Shlaim and the work of the new historians in general are Professors Anita Shapira of Tel Aviv University and Efraim Karsh who is the head of Mediterranean Studies at King’s College, University of London (see above). Following Foster again, I will pigeonhole these two scholars in the traditionalist historian camp. In addition, lecturer in Military History, David Tal, from Tel Aviv university offers some interesting positions on the ‘new historical’ and anti-traditionalist positions presented above. Beginning with Tal, who appears to occupy both a traditionalist and partially revisionist (“new historical”) position, he critiques the anti-traditionalist view presented above that Plan D constituted a master plan to remove the Arabs from the land allocated to Israel and beyond.<sup>233</sup> Tal characterises Walid Khalidi’s master-plan theory as “fundamentally misconceived” and argues that a “careful scrutiny of the plan shows that its conceptual framework was still grounded in the UN Partition Resolution”<sup>234</sup> of 1947 and was therefore intended to defend against an imminent Arab invasion. Regarding the claim that the plan would also facilitate the “massive deportation of the Palestinians”<sup>235</sup> Tal

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<sup>231</sup> Text of Plan Dalet, p. 35

<sup>232</sup> Ibid

<sup>233</sup> Tal, David, (2000), “The Forgotten War: Jewish-Palestinian strife in mandatory Palestine, December 1947-May 1948”, *Israel Affairs*, 6:3, 3 - 21

<sup>234</sup> Ibid, p. 13

<sup>235</sup> Ibid



refers to a quote by Ben-Gurion when in reaction to “the flight of Haifa’s Palestinians”<sup>236</sup> he pondered, “What was the cause? Only orders from above? ... only fear?”<sup>237</sup> (Note how this contradicts Pappé’s description of events regarding Haifa above which mentions “the terrorization of the city’s Arab population”<sup>238</sup> in December of 1947 which precipitated its “ethnic cleansing”.) Tal adds that the capture of “areas allocated to the Arabs”<sup>239</sup> was done for the purposes of building lines of defence against an imminent attack. In addition, Tal stresses that the “implementation of Plan Dalet was the result of continuous Palestinian hostilities.”<sup>240</sup> The “original intention and hope”<sup>241</sup> of the *Yishuv* or Zionist leaders was the peaceful acceptance of the Partition Resolution by both parties which would have precluded the violent events following its implementation. Having argued the strategic purpose of Plan Dalet and the defence and security concerns of the Zionist-Jewish side, Tal goes on to mention incidents of expulsion and massacres. For example, along the “Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem road”<sup>242</sup> where the Haganah “assembled three brigades to fight Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini’s forces”<sup>243</sup> the latter was killed and the residents of “several Arab villages” were expelled and their homes demolished. In addition, “the Dir Yassin massacre”<sup>244</sup> witnessed the murder of “some 100 villagers”<sup>245</sup> by “dissident’ Jewish forces”<sup>246</sup>. Tal’s assertion that Plan Dalet was predicated on the tenets of the Partition Proposal also serves to play down the impact of a possible ideological link to the actions and outcomes of Zionist policy at the time. However, Tal concedes that this “is not to say that the Jewish leadership regarded the partition lines as the best possible lines”<sup>247</sup>. The leadership respected the lines of the Partition Proposal however much a “major

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<sup>236</sup> Tal, David, (2000)

<sup>237</sup> Ibid

<sup>238</sup> Pappé, (2007), pp. 92-93

<sup>239</sup> Tal, p. 14

<sup>240</sup> Ibid

<sup>241</sup> Ibid

<sup>242</sup> Ibid

<sup>243</sup> Ibid

<sup>244</sup> Tal, p. 14

<sup>245</sup> Ibid

<sup>246</sup> Ibid

<sup>247</sup> Ibid, p. 9

compromise”<sup>248</sup> it was considered to be. Tal does not discuss the possible reasons for why Partition was rejected but emphasises instead the disunity among AHC (Arab High Council) and the Arab League. They had proposed a plan at the London conference of September 1946 which envisioned Palestine as a “fundamentally Arab state, with the Jewish minority recognized as an autonomous religious community and granted no more than one third of the representation on the legislative council.”<sup>249</sup> Lastly, Tal debunks what he refers to as “the popular conspiracy theory of a Jewish-Transjordanian collusion to divide Mandatory Palestine”<sup>250</sup>. He mentions the “great efforts”<sup>251</sup> on the part of the Zionist leadership to “evict Transjordan’s British-led Arab Legion from Palestine”<sup>252</sup> and the meeting between Golda Meir and “King Abdallah, in which the latter proposed to forgo the establishment of a Jewish state in return for an autonomous Jewish province in his kingdom”.<sup>253</sup>

Moving on to Anita Shapira, in a *New Republic* article from 1999 she reviews Morris’ *Righteous Victims* and Shlaim’s *The Iron Wall*. Shapira’s general criticism of the new historians’ work appears to proceed from two underlying premises. These are that both the local Arab population and Zionist enclave have always possessed equal national rights, presumably since UN 47, and that “questioning [the] justice”<sup>254</sup> of the 1948 war and by dint the establishment of Israel constitutes “a short step to doubting Israel’s right to exist”.<sup>255</sup> From this perspective defence of one’s national interest is legitimate for both parties to the conflict. Hence, Shapira balks at Shlaim who she argues really believes that “the Palestinians are innocent victims, and that the Israelis *are outsiders and intruders*”<sup>256</sup> (emphasis in original)

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<sup>248</sup> Pappé, (2007), p. 9

<sup>249</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>250</sup> Ibid

<sup>251</sup> Ibid, p. 9

<sup>252</sup> Ibid

<sup>253</sup> Ibid

<sup>254</sup> The Failure of the New Historians to Explain War and Peace: The Past is Not a Foreign Country, review by Anita Shapira for *The New Republic*, post date 12/01/00, issue date 11/29/99

<sup>255</sup> Ibid

<sup>256</sup> Ibid

Further, she describes his position as “a kind of historian’s cognitive dissonance.”<sup>257</sup> She provides an example of this through the claim that Shlaim “is prepared to accept the principle of national interest when it comes to Arabs but not when it comes to Israel.”<sup>258</sup> This is illustrative in Shlaim’s castigation of Israel for extending “its sovereignty over”<sup>259</sup> the Sea of Galilee while failing to criticise “Abdullah’s takeover of the West Bank, or of Egypt’s seizure of the Gaza Strip”<sup>260</sup>. In this regard, Shapira concludes that Shlaim displays double-standards when it comes to “the right to seize land by force”.<sup>261</sup>

Shapira also discusses the issue of Arab rejectionism of the establishment of Israel and argues that what the Arab population rejected was the Zionist settlers’ promise of transforming Palestine from “a land with a predominantly Muslim culture”<sup>262</sup> to one “steeped in Western culture.”<sup>263</sup> The Arabs’ rejection of this was based upon their perception of “a people [the Jews] as a foreign invader”.<sup>264</sup> Shapira’s critique of Arab perception appears to proceed from the premise of the Jewish people’s historical connection to Palestine and the claims and rights that accrue from that. Further, Shapira emphasises the fact that the Left or Labour Zionist movement aspired to a “brand of Zionism with humanistic and socialist elements”<sup>265</sup> as opposed to, say, notions of expansionism or colonisation. This is linked to her position that there was plenty of space in Palestine and that the Zionist Left was prepared to share the land with the local population. This line of argumentation attempts to counter Benny Morris’ “notorious topic of “transfer”<sup>266</sup> argued as one of the controlling logics of the Zionist project. At the same time, Shapira acknowledges a momentary “gladness” on the part of the Zionist leaders over the Peel Commission’s proposal of

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<sup>257</sup> Shapira, (1999)

<sup>258</sup> Ibid

<sup>259</sup> Ibid

<sup>260</sup> Ibid

<sup>261</sup> Ibid

<sup>262</sup> Ibid

<sup>263</sup> Ibid

<sup>264</sup> Ibid

<sup>265</sup> Ibid

<sup>266</sup> Ibid

exchange or transfer, but adds that the evidence to support that this was somehow imbedded in Zionism itself is “isolated and fragmentary”.<sup>267</sup> Furthermore, given the reality of the 1939 White Paper which limited Jewish immigration to Palestine, the necessary support from Britain for such a transfer whether entertained or not had now vanished. Given this fact and other arguments already laid down by Shapira, the Arab population of Palestine could not have feared their own displacement or dispossession and expulsion but were simply predisposed to rejecting Jewish immigration and/or offers of sharing the land within which there was plenty of room for both national communities with equal rights.

Here below I will now discuss Efraim Karsh’s critique of the new historians. Before doing so I would just like to emphasise a particular point of disagreement between Karsh and Shapira. Although the two agree on the existence of rejectionist and feuding Arab elites, in almost complete contradiction to Shapira, Karsh assumes that the local Arab population were actually predisposed to the “Jewish national revival”.

In an article from 2009 entitled “1948, Israel and the Palestinians”, Efraim Karsh attempts to debunk one of the main positions of the new historicism. This position states that between 1947 and 1948 it was largely Israel who created the Palestinian refugee problem through the destruction of villages and expulsion and induced the flight of the local population. Supported by claims in the “millions of documents from the period of the British Mandate (1920-1948) and Israel’s early days” Karsh asserts that there are “documents untapped by earlier generations of writers [which have been] *ignored or distorted by the “new historians”*”.<sup>268</sup>(my italics) Karsh directs responsibility for the plight of the local population squarely on the shoulders of the Arab elites, or so-called *effendi*. Karsh concludes that “it was Palestinian Arab leaders who from the early 1920’s onward, *and very much against the wishes of their own constituents*, launched a relentless campaign *to obliterate the*

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<sup>267</sup> Shapira, (1999)

<sup>268</sup> Karsh, (2009), *1948, Israel and the Palestinians*, article appeared at [www.commentarymagazine.com](http://www.commentarymagazine.com)

*Jewish national revival.*<sup>269</sup> (my italics) In a similar understanding of the meaning of the UN 47 Partition Proposal aired in Tal and Shapira, Karsh adds that this “campaign culminated in the violent attempt to abort the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, which called for the establishment of two states in Palestine. Had these leaders, and their counterparts in the neighbouring Arab states, accepted the UN resolution, there would have been no war and no dislocation in the first place.”<sup>270</sup> (my italics) Thus the wishes of the local Arab constituents were the embracement of the Jewish national revival and the (later) UN 1947 partition proposal. In addition, the Zionist movement actually supported Palestinian nationalism. On these points we can see that Karsh goes somewhat further than Tal. Despite emphasising the acceptance of UN 47, Tal would appear to tentatively acknowledge that the Zionist leadership acted in the interests of the future Jewish state as opposed to the embracement of two states.

Karsh supports his position further by emphasising the idea of Arab-Jewish co-existence. This is expressed in “an age-old Zionist hope: that the material progress resulting from Jewish settlement of Palestine would ease the path for the local Arab populace to become permanently reconciled, if not positively well disposed, to the project of Jewish national self-determination.”<sup>271</sup> To support this position further, Karsh cites Revisionist Zionist, Ze’ev Jabotinsky (see introduction), from his 1923 article “The Iron Wall” and David Ben-Gurion from one of his public speeches. Jabotinsky had stated that he and his movement were bound to take “an oath binding ourselves and our descendants that we shall never do anything contrary to the principle of equal rights, and that *we shall never try to eject anyone.*”<sup>272</sup> Ben-Gurion on the other hand had argued in 1947 that “If the Arab citizen will *feel at home in our state*, . . . if the state will help him in a truthful and dedicated way to reach the economic, social, and cultural level of the Jewish community, then Arab distrust will accordingly subside and a bridge will be

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<sup>269</sup> Karsh, (2009)

<sup>270</sup> Ibid

<sup>271</sup> Ibid

<sup>272</sup> Ibid

built to a Semitic, Jewish-Arab alliance.”<sup>273</sup> (my italics) These selected statements also counter the notion among anti-traditionalists and ‘new historians’ that the Zionist leaders had intended or were predisposed to the ‘transfer’ or expulsion of the local population.

Karsh applies his thesis to issues such as the sale of land to the Zionist movement and crimes committed by the Hagana which for the most part were committed in the fog of war and interrupted efforts to beckon the population back to its villages. Given the local populations’ positive embracement of Zionism, the selling of Palestinian land to the Zionist movement is presented as the action of “ordinary Arabs” who “were persecuted and murdered by their alleged betters [the *effendis*] for the crime”.<sup>274</sup> These leaders accordingly were hypocrites and were not acting in the national interest of the local people. This is exemplified by the actions of “the staunch pan-Arabist Awni Abdel Hadi” who “facilitated the transfer of 7,500 acres to the Zionist movement, and some of his relatives”<sup>275</sup>. This was also exemplified by the sale of land by “numerous members of the Husseini family”<sup>276</sup> who were not liberators of their constituency in this light but simply opportunists (like the PA of later years). Even commanders of the Palestinian military forces who helped to defend villagers in the West Bank between December 1947 and April 1948 were received coldly by the populations in towns such as Hebron, Tulkarm and Qalqilya. For example,

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<sup>273</sup> Karsh cites the following source: David Ben-Gurion, *Bama'araha* (Tel Aviv: Mapai Publishing House, 1949), Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 265.

<sup>274</sup> Karsh, (2009); With regard to Jabotinsky’s views on the wishes of the local population he stated in his “The Iron Wall” that “there is not even the slightest hope of ever obtaining the agreement of the Arabs of the Land of Israel to “Palestine” becoming a country with a Jewish majority.” He stated further too fully cognizant of the native reactions to colonial projects throughout history but still embracing the moral superiority of the Zionist project that “Every reader has some idea of the early history of other countries which have been settled. I suggest that he recall all known instances. If he should attempt to seek but one instance of a country settled with the consent of those born there he will not succeed. *The inhabitants (no matter whether they are civilized or savages) have always put up a stubborn fight. Furthermore, how the settler acted had no effect whatsoever.*”

Jabotinsky, Z, (1923) “The Iron Wall: We and the Arabs”, First published in Russian under the title *O Zheleznoi Stene* in *Rassvyet*, 4 November 1923. Published in English in *Jewish Herald* (South Africa), 26 November 1937. Transcribed and revised by Lenni Brenner.

<sup>275</sup> Karsh, (2009)

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid*

“Abdel Qader Husseini, district commander of Jerusalem and the mufti’s close relative, found the populace indifferent, if not hostile, to his repeated call to arms.”<sup>277</sup> Despite Karsh’s premise that local Palestine Arabs were predisposed to the embracement of the Zionist national revival, there is a general point of agreement here between all the scholars discussed so far. This is that the interests of the local population were at times at odds with their divided national representatives and furthermore that efforts were made on an inter-communal level to resolve tensions peaceably.

On the issue of actions carried out in villages and towns between April and May 1948 by the Hagana and other forces, we see again some points of consensus between scholars. Karsh describes first of all how the “Jewish leadership and media described these gruesome events for what they were”.<sup>278</sup> At times the leadership withheld “details so as to avoid panic and [to] keep the door open for Arab-Jewish reconciliation, [while] their Arab counterparts not only inflated the toll to gigantic proportions but invented numerous nonexistent atrocities.”<sup>279</sup> In disagreement with anti-traditionalists, however, Karsh refers to false claims of slaughter following the “fall of Haifa (April 21-22)” and “false rumours [...] spread after the fall of Tiberias (April 18) [and] during the battle for Safed (in early May), and in Jaffa”.<sup>280</sup> Generally acknowledging the massacre at “Deir Yasin” Karsh critiques, the especially lurid accounts “in the Arab media” featuring “supposed hammer-and-sickle tattoos on the arms of IZL fighters and accusations of havoc and rape.”<sup>281</sup> Pointing to the occurrence of other crimes, Karsh adds that these occurred “in the heat of battle” and came about as a result of “ad-hoc military considerations”<sup>282</sup>. Echoing Tal’s emphasis on defensive strategy, these were generally aimed at “reducing civilian casualties, denying sites to Arab fighters when there were no available Jewish forces to repel them”<sup>283</sup> as opposed to “*political design*.”<sup>284</sup> (my

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<sup>277</sup> Karsh, (2009)

<sup>278</sup> Ibid

<sup>279</sup> Ibid

<sup>280</sup> Ibid

<sup>281</sup> Ibid

<sup>282</sup> Ibid

<sup>283</sup> Ibid

italics) Karsh adds, finally, that these divergences from the general conduct and spirit of the Hagana forces were “matched by [their] efforts to prevent [Arab] flight and/or to encourage the return of those who fled.”<sup>285</sup> Finally, in a statement alluding to “the outbreak of hostilities” beginning in December 1947, a full “four months after”, Karsh quotes one “ALA commander-in-chief Safwat”. On March 23<sup>rd</sup> 1948 the latter had noted that the Jews “have so far not attacked a single Arab village unless provoked by it.”<sup>286</sup> This final point is in stark disagreement with both ‘new historians’ and anti-traditionalists who time the beginning of village destruction and so on as far back as December 1947.

### General points of consensus and disagreement

What are the general points of consensus and disagreement between the various scholars discussed above? I will attempt to summarise these points in the following sub-section. The first observation to make when reading through the different positions on the 1948 war is that there appears to be broad agreement on a range of historical events occurring between the period of late 1947 to 1948. There is also general agreement, albeit with shifting emphases, on the particular actions carried out by members of the Arab notables, different Arab military groups (e.g. the Arab Legion), the local populous and Haganah military forces and their affiliate groups at the height of the war. However, there is great disagreement among all the scholars as to the political and ideological motivations and intentions of either party to the conflict. For example, such issues as Zionism and its political and ideological motivations are a heated point of debate, especially in connection with the concept of ‘transfer’. This is due to the fact that the concept itself weaves itself into a discussion concerning the political and ideological roots of Zionism going back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and provides an explanatory backdrop to the events of 1947 and 1948.

Nevertheless, for the ‘new historians’ and anti-traditionalists the concept of ‘transfer’ evenly negotiates potential connections between historical ideas

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<sup>284</sup> Karsh, (2009)

<sup>285</sup> Ibid

<sup>286</sup> Ibid



and motivations, political ideology and political action. For example, the historical context of European colonialism, late 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalism and Zionism through the contested concept of ‘transfer’ is to a varying extent connected by the above scholars to the root causes of the conflict. However, there is disagreement as to how far one should impose the concept of ‘transfer’ as a unitary explanatory framework for understanding and explaining the motivations and methods of the Zionist leadership. For example, even scant reading of both ‘new historians’, anti-traditionalists and so on would reveal that even under the unifying ideological premise of political Zionism, there were a fair share of dissenters. Even members of the Zionist leadership themselves shifted positions and interpretations pertaining to which direction the unifying vision should take.<sup>287</sup> Between the positions of Masalha, Pappé, Shlaim and Morris, there appear to be points of consensus regarding how the Palestinian refugee problem was created and indeed how and why the 1948 war began. Yet, while Morris posits the concept of ‘transfer’ as key to understanding the mindset of the Zionist leadership between the 1930s and 1940s, he does not go as far as Masalha, Khalidi or Pappé in positing transfer thinking as one of the underlying principles, indeed the very *sine qua non*, of Zionist ideology and strategic policy.

For traditionalists like Karsh and Shapira and to some extent Tal, the assumption or assertion that Zionism was governed by settler-colonial interests alone is anathema. For these scholars the early Zionist leaders were always predisposed to an Arab-Semitic union and even acknowledged the national rights of the local Arab population of Palestine. In addition, the strategy of the Israeli military was aimed at defending the borders allocated by the UN Partition Proposal of 1947 and not to complete the master plan. This was also due to the fact that it was understood and acknowledged that both the Jewish settlers and the local population possessed an ‘equal’ claim to the land and that Palestine, to quote Shapira, was not only “Arab turf”. The realisation of such a fact spoke to the very core values of Zionism too

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<sup>287</sup> Read, for example, the work of Sternhell, (1996) Davis, (2003) and Cook (2006) who provide interesting examples of this.

which was characterised by socialism and humanism and found in the speeches and articles of such leaders as Revisionist Zionist Ze'ev Jabotinsky and David Ben-Gurion. Further, if acts of expulsion, village destruction or massacres did occur, they were in part in response to local Arab resistance and rejectionism of partition and a peaceful resolution to the territorial conflict. However, if it was the case that the local population were predisposed to the vision of an Arab-Semitic union then it was the machinations of Arab elites who worked against the local populations own wishes. Not only did both parties possess an 'equal' claim to the land but there was always plenty of room for all the peoples of the land and acceptance of this fact would assuage the Arab tendency to reject and repel the establishment of the Jewish state. Indeed if generally accepted, the establishment of a Jewish state would also mean the general developmental improvement of the both the land and people residing there. In stark contrast to the concept of 'transfer', then, both Shapira and Karsh assert Zionism's more altruistic and utopian principles and both shun the implication of a drive for colonial-settler expansion. Ideologically, through their assumption of "equal" claim to the land, they also view as just and moral the national revival of the Jewish people and/or their return to their ancient homeland.

I hope the above discussion and summary has helped the reader to gauge more clearly the points of consensus and disagreement among the scholars discussed both within the different camps and between them. In line with the overarching question introduced earlier, tracing the points of consensus and disagreement of the debate above will also allow me to examine links between the textbooks and teachers' statements and the scholarly literature I have discussed. In later chapters I will introduce other scholarly sources in connection with my analysis of the textbook chapters and interviews. As the research on Israeli History school textbooks above also shows, an analysis of their content would also require examining the political, ideological and cultural context within which such content is selected, organised and implemented. This is also connected to one of my research questions which asks: what may be understood as the general established framework for understanding and explaining the conflict in both Israeli and Swedish History school textbooks? Answering this question requires examining

which discourses the textbooks (and teachers' statements) appear to draw upon and the established (hegemonic) framework they constitute. The theoretical implications of this question and others will be the subject of the following chapter.

## Chapter Two

# Ideology, Discourse and Hegemony: An Analytical Framework

In this chapter I will discuss my theoretical framework for analysing the History school textbook chapters and teacher interview statements on the Israel/Palestine conflict. As the above heading indicates, my theoretical framework combines elements from “different discourse-analytical approaches”<sup>288</sup> towards an analysis of textbook content. For example, I will draw on the work of among others Norman Fairclough and Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe whose discourse-analytical schools proceed from different premises.<sup>289</sup> In any case, my aim is to examine “how the world (or parts of it) is represented”<sup>290</sup> in texts and to a lesser extent as indicated through statements made by my teacher respondents “which social effects this has.”<sup>291</sup> This will become clearer as I proceed. As I discussed in the opening chapter of this thesis, the premise I adopt here following Crawford & Foster is that what “appears in school textbooks is legitimately sanctioned

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<sup>288</sup> Jørgensen, W, M, Phillips, L, (1999), *Diskursanalys som teori och metod*, Studentlitteratur AB, Lund, p. 131

<sup>289</sup> For example, putting it simply, that the latter view the social as discursively constituted while the former sees the social as divided up into ideological and non-ideological discourses. Furthermore, within the CDA school as a whole there is an explicit *critical* and political aim to “*study [...] the discursive reproduction of power abuse.*” Dijk, V, T, (2008), *Discourse and Power*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, p. 6. While this is not the specific aim of this thesis, I do proceed from some of the premises of the CDA school of existing power relations in society as impacting on the construction and distribution of knowledge claims. I have already alluded to this in chapter one.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid*, p. 138

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid*

knowledge that has been allocated an official stamp of “truth”; but what textbooks offer are not truths but claims to truth.”<sup>292</sup> Such claims to truth in the form of educational knowledge have to be understood in relation to the local/global (historical) cultural, political and market-economic context within which they are situated. Adopting the concepts of ideology and hegemony within a discourse-analytical approach I will attempt to illustrate how this applies to my chosen thesis topic. Understanding my topic area as part of a much broader field of analysis of the political dimensions of curriculum knowledge and practices, I will first of all discuss some of the more contemporary problems researched and discussed within this field. These are often connected to the effects of a market ideology on knowledge construction, curriculum organisation, as well as teaching and learning (for example, specifically how all the latter may impact on the Swedish school curricular aims of fostering a critical-analytical approach to historical subject-matter). Following that I will present an overview of some of the early proponents of the study of school knowledge and control as well as curriculum and ideology. Drawing upon some of the insights derived from all of the above I will attempt to construct a theoretical framework for analysing the textbooks and teachers’ statements.

## Section 2.0 Educational and Curriculum Restructuring Since the Early 1990s

Going back to the early 1990s, Englund *et al* provide a historical, political-ideological backdrop in order to understand and explain the ways in which the current Swedish school system has been restructured both through curriculum reorganisation and the restructuring of teachers’ practices. In connection with this, in an article featured in “*Pedagogisk forskning*” (Pedagogical Research) from 2007, Marcus Dahlstedt discusses the

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<sup>292</sup> Crawford, K, Foster, S, p. 8

educational policy shift in Sweden in 1990 and excerpts a so-called SOU report from the period which stated that

... the global tendency towards increased *integration* and *deregulation* at the same time brings with it a demand for a faster *internationalization of Swedish education* if we are to avoid *economic stagnation* and cultural isolation (SOU 1990:22 p. 51, my italics)<sup>293</sup>.

The impending scenario presented in the report at the time was that Sweden ran the risk of economic stagnation and cultural isolation unless Swedish education policy adjusted to the program of global market integration, deregulation and internationalization. Writing in 1995 on changes in the organization of the Social Studies block in Lower Secondary schools in particular, Englund and Östman found that "Social Studies subjects [appeared to return] to their traditional essentialist positions".<sup>294</sup> They add that the guiding principles of the curriculum did not break with "an explicit normative and ethical dimension [and] connection to democratic ambitions [which were] *clearly articulated*"<sup>295</sup> (my italics). However, the reorganization of the Social Studies block into an objective school subject block may have hampered such ambitions. In his 2010 dissertation entitled *Steering and meaning – claims for professional actions in teacher education and schools*, Joakim Krantz connects this to what he refers to as "discursive

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<sup>293</sup> Dahlstedt, M, (2007) "I val(o)frihetens spår Segregation, differentiering och två decennier av skolreformer" in *Pedagogisk Forskning* i Sverige, Årg 12, Nr 1, 2007, p. 27 Original text: "den globala tendensen till ökad integration och avreglering medför samtidigt krav på en snabbt ökande internationalisering av den svenska utbildningen om vi inte skall riskera ekonomisk stagnation och kulturell isolering (SOU 1990:22 s 51)"

<sup>294</sup> Englund, T, Östman, L, (1995/2004) article entitled "Om orienteringsämnenas möjligheter att skapa mening: En didaktisk betraktelse av läroplansbetänkandet" in *Utbildningspolitiskt systemskifte?*, HLS Förlag, Stockholm, p. 171. "samhällsorienterande ämnen återgår till sina traditionellt essensialistiska positioner", "anknytning till demokratiföstran är ..."

<sup>295</sup> Ibid, p. 169. "en explicit normativ-etisk dimension [and] kopplingen till demokratiska strävanden är klart uttryckt."

steering”<sup>296</sup> since the 2000s. This was carried out both by government and external stakeholders towards “assumptions of ”objective” or ”verifiable” knowledge”<sup>297</sup>. Englund *et al* also discuss the problem of time reorganization too in connection with the above with lesser hours set aside for these subjects and their dissolution into non-integrated subjects (separated, divided blocks). This in turn was strengthened by a traditional scientific legitimacy which has seen “a stronger move towards an objectivistic History course [and] thus a trend towards History’s so-called indisputable facts and [...] linear and detailed chronology etc.”<sup>298</sup> (my italics) The “neo-positivist political claims”<sup>299</sup> undergirding this restructuring of school knowledge may also merge with a kind of cultural conservatism; elements of this may be traced in one particular guiding document from 2002. These were formulated under the heading of “learning/education for a democratic citizenship”<sup>300</sup> and expressed as an “awareness of our cultural heritage”<sup>301</sup> alongside an emphasis on “skills requirements in the labour market”<sup>302</sup>. In his doctoral thesis from 1980<sup>303</sup>, Englund theorises on the process by which the above syncretism of different ideological elements is made possible in curriculum content and teaching aids. In particular, he states that “teaching aids can be seen as a central interface between political-ideological courses of events in which conflicts and compromises recur”<sup>304</sup>. However, he adds that the content of teaching

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<sup>296</sup> Krantz, j, (2010), *Steering and meaning – claims for professional actions in teacher education and schools*, Intellecta Infolog, Göteborg. Akademisk avhandling för filosofie doktorsexamen vid Institutionen för pedagogik vid Växjö universitet 2009

<sup>297</sup> Ibid, p. 246

<sup>298</sup> Englund, Östman, (1995/2004), ”Om orienteringsämnenas möjligheter att skapa mening: En didaktisk betraktelse av läroplansbetänkandet” in *Utbildningspolitiskt systemskifte?*, (2004) HLS Förlag, Stockholm. ” se en starkare inriktning mot en objektivistisk historiekurs; således en inriktning g mot historiens s.k. odiskutabla fäkt och dess linjära och detaljerade kronologi etc” pp. 170-171

<sup>299</sup> Krantz, p. 253

<sup>300</sup> *Bildning och kunskap*, (2002), särtryck ur skola för bildning, Skolverket (Swedish School Agency), p. 79 ff; Englund, p. 17

<sup>301</sup> Ibid

<sup>302</sup> Ibid; indeed, the *connection* between such elements and values of democratic education have also been noted more prominently in Lpo 94 (cited below).

<sup>303</sup> Englund, T, (1980/2005) *Läroplanens och skolkunskapens politiska dimension*, Daidalos, Göteborg

<sup>304</sup> Ibid, p. 132

aids “is influenced from many different directions”<sup>305</sup> all of which comprise a complex interaction of determinants such as traditions and ideas which are “political-ideological, scientific, pedagogical (- adjusted to teaching) [and] “market-oriented”.<sup>306</sup> For example, cultural conservatism can be understood in this light as a number of combined determinants such as Christian values, modern nationalism and the idea of Western civilisation (The kind of determinants or discourses interacting in relation to the topic of the Israel/Palestine conflict will be examined later here).

One of the very many problems focused on in the field is the ideological conflation of democratic education and market ideology. I will discuss this in the following sub-section.

### Democratic education and neoliberalism: “natural” connections?

Harvey provides an interesting definition of neoliberalism which underscores its ideological function. He writes, among other things, that “neo-liberalism has spawned within itself an extensive oppositional culture [which] typically takes questions of individual rights and freedoms seriously and opposes them to the authoritarianism and frequent arbitrariness of political, economic and class power.”<sup>307</sup> The following excerpts from research on educational restructuring in Sweden and internationally also provide examples of how, for example, values of democratic education become defined by a logic which is rhetorically supportive of it but practically opposed to it. In an “ethnographic investigation of efforts to reform upper-secondary schooling in Sweden from the 1990s”<sup>308</sup> Beach discusses how the subject-matter and teaching of mathematics has been restructured according to “a fetishistic and commoditized system of relations where competitive exclusion and ideological reproduction prevail.”<sup>309</sup> The market-ideological values or logic that the latter incorporate, it is argued, is

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<sup>305</sup> Englund, T, (1980/2005), p. 132

<sup>306</sup> Ibid

<sup>307</sup> Harvey, D, (2009), *Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development*, Verso, London/New York, p. 50

<sup>308</sup> Beach, D, Tuula, G, Lahelma, E, (2005), *Democratic Education: ethnographic challenges*, the Tufnell Press, London, p. 116

<sup>309</sup> Beach, D, Tuula, G, Lahelma, E, (2005), p. 125



set “against values of equity, social inclusion, social justice and critical reflection”<sup>310</sup>. In a further ethnographic study based on pupil interviews published in the *Journal of Critical Educational Policy Studies*<sup>311</sup> in 2005, the author discusses some of the practical consequences of the aforementioned logic on Upper Secondary school pupils’ creative learning. There he concludes that particularly “for successful students, the demands of *performance rather than creativity* predominate.”<sup>312</sup> (my italics) In this context, the concept of performance is connected to the pupils’ ability to get “*to the right answer* so grades can be set *according to performances* (in order to represent) *the ratified skills and knowledge of individuals*.”<sup>313</sup> Indicating more of a managerial logic than creative learning, Beach refers to systems “of regulation that employ judgements, comparisons and displays of ability by students as a means of incentive, control and exchange based on material and symbolic rewards”<sup>314</sup>. Thus, pupils are not encouraged to critically engage in a broader perspectival discussion on the subject-matter topics provided them and how it might relate to their understanding of and place in the wider social context. Instead, pupils are expected to learn a *set* curriculum of questions and answers to meet the required grade targets. Returning to Krantz, the practices of teachers in this context is constrained by political steering which emphasises “objectivity, planning, regulation and order as claims for continuity and clarity concerning assessment practices.”<sup>315</sup> Krantz traces precedents to this in “the late 1990s and, more particularly, the 2000s”<sup>316</sup> with the introduction of the Bologna system in 2007. This all marked “the transition towards a more explicit goal- and result-orientation, market-orientation, a goal-oriented political-administrative discourse and a professionalization discourse”.<sup>317</sup> For

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<sup>310</sup> Beach, D, Tuula, G, Lahelma, E, (2005), p. 126

<sup>311</sup> Article by Dennis Beach and Marianne Dovemark entitled “Creativity, Schooling and the Commodity Problem”, *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, Volume 3, Number 2 (October 2005), <<http://www.jceps.com/?pageID=article&articleID=46>>

<sup>312</sup> Ibid

<sup>313</sup> Beach and Dovemark, (2005)

<sup>314</sup> Ibid

<sup>315</sup> Krantz, (2010), p. 248

<sup>316</sup> Ibid

<sup>317</sup> Ibid, p. 241. “This reform designated that teacher education was now to be divided into a basic and an advanced level. Political claims formulated in the national evaluation

example, the notion of clarity alone in this context determines such principles as scientific and academic rigor which teachers are expected to achieve and with that a higher degree of professionalization. Thus, scientific rigor is translated into the construction of and adherence to a “clear-cut syllabus”<sup>318</sup> of objective subject-matter targets to increase the educational results of pupils’ learning outcomes. In addition, teachers administrative tasks are increased in order to provide records and documentation to parents on their children’s “knowledge progression”.<sup>319</sup> Krantz sees a pattern emerging from this whereupon “qualified knowledge is now presented as governable while democratic and social development is non-governable and, as a consequence, not assessable.”<sup>320</sup> In other words, the quality of qualified knowledge is measured by its “objectivity”, clarity and accessibility as opposed to the “lack of academic rigor and ”mumbo jumbo””<sup>321</sup> which allegedly characterized education and educational practices previously. In such a context, critical learning along with “the education system’s task to educate towards democracy is thus reduced to being a matter of individuals’ behavior and attitudes.”<sup>322</sup> What the above examples illustrate is the function of neoliberal discourse in conflating values and precepts of democratic education within the narrow precepts and managerial practices of a market ideology.

## Two international contexts: Denmark and the US

Moving beyond the borders of Sweden, Jette Steensen writes on the situation in Denmark, first of all. He points to the loss of power both in Denmark and

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programmes with the support from the Bologna reform now required increased external control. Teacher education was subjected to quality assessment and progression towards different learning outcomes. The adjustment to Bologna implicated that the joint teacher education no longer existed in coherence with the original intent of the 2001-teacher education reform. The twenty-seven universities and university colleges expressed vague to strong criticism of this. In all likelihood, this divergent criticism was due to the diminished perception of the teacher education’s shared ground. The adjustment to Bologna once again unveiled tensions within teacher education, especially with regard to the political evaluation and audit activities.”

<sup>318</sup> Ibid

<sup>319</sup> Ibid

<sup>320</sup> Ibid

<sup>321</sup> Ibid, p. 248

<sup>322</sup> Ibid

Sweden by the Social Democrats in 2001 and 2007 when “the neoliberal trend accelerated, cleverly disguised in the rhetoric of quality reform in the welfare state.”<sup>323</sup> Steensen also discusses the tectonic shifts in the Danish political system since the early 2000s with the hegemonic rise of the coalition government of “the Conservative Party and the extreme right populist and very nationalist Danish People’s Party”.<sup>324</sup> It is against this backdrop that quality reform in education was enacted in the form of “reduced public spending, additional evaluation and management, and public bashing of professionals.”<sup>325</sup> Some of the similarities to the Swedish context with regard to other changes Steensen lists may also be noted. For example, the introduction “of tests in [earlier]”<sup>326</sup> grades, the increased “ratio of students to teachers”<sup>327</sup> and the introduction of “individualised student plans”.<sup>328</sup> One disturbing development Steensen refers to which relates to the issue of curriculum content is the “Removal of social science from the teacher education curriculum.”<sup>329</sup> In the context of the Swedish teacher education curriculum, Krantz discusses the “overarching discursive struggle for teacher education’s content now [which] appear to be claims for focus on social science, or alternately natural science.”<sup>330</sup> In addition, while school subjects such as social science remain in the Swedish school curriculum, the reorganisation and restructuring of time and teachers’ tasks and responsibilities has had an impact. For example, this refers to hampering attempts to create meaningful critical lesson environments because “Meaning-making cannot be instrumentalised by increasingly perfectionist and precise steering claims.”<sup>331</sup>

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<sup>323</sup> Compton, M, Weiner, L, (2009), p. 43

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>330</sup> Krantz, (2010), p. 251

<sup>331</sup> Krantz, p. 251

Writing in the mid-2000s and from an American perspective, Allan Luke discusses the sense of “passivity and paralysis”<sup>332</sup> in education as a result of “an unmarked and unstated acquiescence to a neo-Tylerian curriculum agenda.”<sup>333</sup> A knock-on effect of this has been “a narrowing of the curriculum”<sup>334</sup> and a “shaving off of higher order and critical thinking and a lowering of cognitive demand and intellectual depth.”<sup>335</sup> This, Luke argues, has been achieved in order to meet the “taxonomies of “needs,” lists of knowledges, skills, and competences defined as necessary and sufficient for the production and shaping of human subjects for new economic conditions, however defined.”<sup>336</sup> Furthermore, this objective or “positivist listing of attributes, skills, and outcomes”<sup>337</sup> in schools in the countries of the Northern hemisphere is supported structurally by the economic agendas of powerful organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and others.<sup>338</sup> The assumption or embracement of pupil diversity and difference which the language of “knowledge economies and global connectivity”<sup>339</sup> employs belies the encouragement of a narrow basic skills curriculum and a managerial logic of schooling with its emphasis on teacher/pupil performativity and accountability. This, Luke argues, has exacerbated “disparities in educational achievement”<sup>340</sup> since its embracement of pupil diversity and needs has in mind a very narrow conception of pupil subjectivity. Connecting this to curriculum and lesson planning, Luke adds that teacher roles in some instances have been reduced to “simple occupational survival in a work environment of proliferating curricular and administrative *bids for time*”<sup>341</sup>. And this has greatly circumscribed the “face-to-face material and textual

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<sup>332</sup> Nozaki, Y, Openshaw, R, Luke, A, (2005), *Struggles over Difference*, State University of New York Press, Albany, p. 11

<sup>333</sup> Ibid

<sup>334</sup> Dimitriadis *et al*, (2006), p. 123

<sup>335</sup> Ibid

<sup>336</sup> Ibid, p. 11

<sup>337</sup> Ibid

<sup>338</sup> See also Compton and Weiner (2009)

<sup>339</sup> Dimitriadis *et al*, (2006), p. 122

<sup>340</sup> Ibid, pp. 122-123. Presumably Luke connects this disparity in achievement to the inability of a broad swath of pupils to either fulfil the performative targets allotted to them or to have their needs and interests met or acknowledged in a narrow skills curriculum.

<sup>341</sup> Dimitriadis *et al*, (2006), p. 123

conditions in classrooms for enabling critical, novel, and provocative discourse and intellectual exchange<sup>342</sup>. Connecting this to teaching aids, in such a context the “allure of the commodity”<sup>343</sup> takes hold in the form of pre-packaged curricular material which provides sure-fast standardized questions and answers to fit into the temporal demands of schooling. Textbooks in this regard provide a clear and efficient resolution to teacher time constraints but at the expense of critical approaches to topics and themes beyond the constraints characterised by the narrow targets of a marketised educational discourse.

The above was an overview of educational restructuring since the 1990s and 2000s in Sweden and elsewhere and its implications for subject-matter orientation and teaching. I will now move on to a discussion of some of the classical critical approaches to the problems of (school) knowledge and control and curriculum and ideology. Throughout, my theoretical focus will be on the relationship between ideology and hegemony in connection with the organisation and construction of educational knowledge.

## Section 2.1 The Organization of School Knowledge

The critical study of curriculum organisation established in the early 1970s can be characterised as a “systematic effort to understand curriculum as political text [which] asserted itself in the curriculum field”<sup>344</sup>. Approaches to understanding curriculum at this time and later were “avowedly Marxist and neo-Marxist” [and employed] the concepts of ideology, hegemony and reproduction”.<sup>345</sup> Put simply, the field has shifted between correspondence theories of social reproduction to theories emphasising struggle and resistance and, more recently, post-structural theories on discourse and

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<sup>342</sup> Nozaki, Y, Openshaw, R, Luke, A, p. 12

<sup>343</sup> Ibid. Or a “neoclassical form of commodity fetishism”

<sup>344</sup> Chapter 5 entitled “Understanding Curriculum as Political Text” in Pinar, W, (1995), p.

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<sup>345</sup> Ibid

curriculum as a power/knowledge problem.<sup>346</sup> Thus, depending on the problems analysed, as ideological apparatus schools today can be theorised as sites of reproduction and transformation. In this regard, some curriculum theorists have attempted to combine post-structural and neo-Marxist approaches in their studies of ideology and curriculum.<sup>347</sup> As I will later discuss, my own analysis of History school textbook knowledge and teachers' knowledge combines both structural and post-structural approaches to understanding the construction of school knowledge. For example, I assume that textbooks are authoritative texts whose content is distributed within the ideological setting of the school with all its unequal relations of power. At the same time, I acknowledge that this authority is neither fixed nor stable given the potential for teachers and pupils alike to consciously and subconsciously embrace other counter-hegemonic discourses. These, in turn, can be introduced into the educational setting in the form of complementary interpretations or viewpoints.<sup>348</sup> Drawing upon Bourdieu's concept of cultural *fields* discussed in Kalmus (2004)<sup>349</sup>, what this highlights is the fact that as *one* potential socialiser the "field of school [...] is discursively related to the fields of the political system, the media, family, and peer-groups"<sup>350</sup> which also provide other points of socialisation and alternative discourses. But even within this interplay of discourses the establishment of an ideological consensus or frame on what is or is not knowledge or 'truth'<sup>351</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> Young, (1971); Bernstein, (1971); Bourdieu, (1971); Whitty, (1985); Englund, (1980/2005); Dimitriadis, McCarthy, Weis, (2006)

<sup>347</sup> See, for example, a chapter entitled "Riding Tensions Critically: Ideology, Power/knowledge and Curriculum Making" by Yoshiko Nozaki in Dimitriadis, McCarthy, Weis, (2006)

<sup>348</sup> Fairclough employs the concept of "MR" or " 'members' resources' (MR) which people have in their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret *texts* – including their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on." Fairclough, (1989/2001), p. 20

<sup>349</sup> As "structured social spaces with dominant and dominated social agents and unequal power relations, which are constantly struggled over." "What do pupils and textbooks do with each other?: Methodological problems of research on socialization through educational media", (2004), Veronika Kalmus, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, p. 473 ; see also Young, (1971), pp. 189-207; Bourdieu, P, (2001), *Homo Academicus*, Polity Press, Blackwell Oxford

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>351</sup> I will employ both Gramsci's hegemony concept and Foucault's regime of 'truth' metaphor here.

on a particular topic is possible. This may be achieved through the assumption of various cultural traditions, political ideologies and so on which converge in school textbooks and in teachers' statements as part of an overall (objective) historical narrative.

### Knowledge and Control: the early 1970s

F.D.Young's chapter entitled "Curricula, Teaching and Learning as the Organization of Knowledge" in the 1971 edition of *Knowledge and Control* focuses on the problem of class reproduction. There he sets out to "suggest ways in which questions may be framed about how knowledge is organized and made available in curricula."<sup>352</sup> The backdrop to Young's analysis is a historical contextualisation of how "the dominant economic and political orders became the major determinants of the stratification of knowledge."<sup>353</sup> It is argued that these orders tacitly undergird and inform what Young refers to as the *underlying principles* of curricular content. These he urges need to be examined by way of linking them to "their institutional and interactional setting in schools and classrooms and to *the wider social structure*."<sup>354</sup> (my italics) The dominant political and economic orders of a society are viewed here as directly corresponding to "*determinants* of the stratification of knowledge"<sup>355</sup> (my italic) in schools not only through the processing of people but the processing of knowledge. Young provides an example of how this operates through an assumed set of societal values and goals which it is understood lead to the improvement of the life-chances of working class children. However, as an instance of class ideology, these societal values may be examined as possible hurdles to such improvement. For example, in connection with this, 'educational failures' are attributed to an inherent lack within the working-class child or pupil and thereby individualised. Ideologically this lack pertains to a set of *social assumptions* which among other things posit desired "moral standards" and "a wise use of leisure

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<sup>352</sup> Young, M, (1971), *Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the Sociology of Education*, Macmillan Publishers, London, p. 19

<sup>353</sup> Ibid, p. 40

<sup>354</sup> Ibid, p. 24

<sup>355</sup> Ibid, p. 26

time”<sup>356</sup>. Such social assumptions reflect the desired interests and mores of the dominant social classes and benefit those pupils who are already conversant in these.

An adherent to Young, Basil Bernstein, also examines the function of ideology encoded in educational knowledge and practice via his *codes* metaphor.

Bernstein offers a sociolinguistic approach to understanding the reproduction of the division of labour of educational knowledge in his chapter entitled “On the Classification and Framing of Educational Knowledge”.<sup>357</sup> There Bernstein begins by stating that “How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public, *reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control.*”<sup>358</sup> (my italics) In this correspondence theory frame, educational knowledge, argued as the “major regulator of the structure of experience”<sup>359</sup>, carries with it underlying principles which are transmitted through so-called educational *codes* or the class-inscribed language of the school. Such codes are understood here to reflect and embody the values and interests of the dominant classes. Or, importantly, the kind of *language* “within the field of symbolic control”<sup>360</sup> that the dominant classes and their children command *a priori* their induction into the school system. This means that children from the upper-middle classes are conferred an immediate advantage on entering the school since they are already familiar with the values and norms built into the class regulated codes of schooling.

At the same time, however, Bernstein also refers to the *then* “relative autonomy over the transmission of knowledge which characterises the British system of Education”<sup>361</sup>. In his later work too he argues “that education is not reducible to a mere reflection of unmediated economic

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<sup>356</sup> Young, M, p. 25

<sup>357</sup> Ibid, p. 47

<sup>358</sup> Ibid

<sup>359</sup> Ibid

<sup>360</sup> Apple, M, (2002), p. 609

<sup>361</sup> Young, (1971), p. 69 in Postscript



needs.”<sup>362</sup> The content and transmission of educational knowledge is thus characterised by what Bernstein refers to as “[c]ollection codes” and “integrated codes”<sup>363</sup>. With regard to their socialising function collection codes encourage strong boundary control at the level of roles in the school and school knowledge. Integrated codes, on the other hand, through their weak classification and relaxed frames, permit “greater expressions of differences between teachers, and possibly between pupils, in the selection of what is taught.”<sup>364</sup> Emphasising the tension between reproduction and transformation seemingly characteristic of the school, however, Bernstein warns of ways in which control of the pupil can become even more intense through integrated codes through the “closed explicit ideologies”<sup>365</sup> upon which they rest. The weakening of classification and framing of what is possible to be taught as well as modes of being “will encourage more of the student/pupil to be made public [meaning] more of his thoughts, feelings, and values [and in] this way more of the pupil [will be] available for control.”<sup>366</sup> So for Bernstein the problem of ideological control implicitly and explicitly inscribed in the institutional structure and practices of the school does not necessarily fade in a climate of institutional openness and flexibility or boundary transgression. This is because any contestation of control may always already be conditioned on “a high level of ideological consensus among the staff”<sup>367</sup> with respect to the fit between the “current ideology”<sup>368</sup> and the ‘right’ attitude of the pupils. While we may see echoes of Young’s and Bernstein’s respective theses reflected in the discussion in the opening section of this chapter, American sociologist of education Michael Apple in his work on ideology and curriculum departs from the authors above by emphasising the concept of hegemony.

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<sup>362</sup> Apple, M, (2002), “Does Education have Independent Power? Bernstein and the question of relative autonomy”, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2002, p. 609

<sup>363</sup> Bernstein in Young, M, (1971), p. 49

<sup>364</sup> Ibid, p. 64

<sup>365</sup> Ibid

<sup>366</sup> Ibid, p. 66

<sup>367</sup> Ibid

<sup>368</sup> Ibid, pp. 65-66

## Michael Apple: Ideology and Curriculum

The first point to address here is Apple's definition of ideology and how it contrasts with the above correspondence theories on class reproduction in the school system. To repeat, his definition of ideology turns on the concept of hegemony which means that he more or less rejects mechanistic correspondence theories of class/social reproduction in schools.<sup>369</sup> Instead Apple brackets perceptions taken from "achievement and socialisation models"<sup>370</sup> and urges us to look "*relationally*, if you will, to think about school knowledge as being generated out of the ideological and economic conflicts 'outside' as well as 'inside' education."<sup>371</sup> Apple argues first of all that "ideology cannot be treated as a simple phenomenon"<sup>372</sup>. He then goes on to distinguish between its *scope* and *function*. The *scope* of ideology concerns "rationalisations or justifications"<sup>373</sup> of particular activities as well as "broader political programs"<sup>374</sup> and "comprehensive world-views [or] outlooks".<sup>375</sup> He connects this to the *function* of ideology in terms of its traditional Marxist function. This refers to it as a form of "false consciousness"<sup>376</sup> to distort "one's picture of the social reality"<sup>377</sup> and "the primary ways of making otherwise incomprehensible social situations

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<sup>369</sup> Apple mentions among others Bowles and Gintis, Bernstein, Young and Bourdieu. I have not mentioned the work of the latter suffice to say that his theory of reproduction turns on an analysis of the "cultural rules, what he calls *habitus*, that link economic and cultural control and distribution together. [...] He argues that the cultural capital stored in schools acts as an effective filtering device in the reproduction of a hierarchical society." Apple, p. 32; See also Bourdieu's "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought" in *Knowledge and Control* (1971). He summarises there that "Although the school is only one socialising institution among others, the whole complex of features forming the intellectual make-up of a society – or more exactly of the educated classes of that society- is constituted or reinforced by the educational system, which is deeply marked by its particular history and capable of moulding the minds of those who are taught and those who teach both through *the content and spirit of the culture that it conveys and through the methods by which it conveys it.*" (my italics)

Young, (1971), p. 204

<sup>370</sup> Apple, (1979), p. 34

<sup>371</sup> Ibid

<sup>372</sup> Ibid, p. 22

<sup>373</sup> Ibid, p. 20

<sup>374</sup> Ibid

<sup>375</sup> Apple, (1979), p. 20

<sup>376</sup> Ibid

<sup>377</sup> Ibid

meaningful.”<sup>378</sup> With the latter in mind Apple then discusses what he refers to as the “three distinctive features”<sup>379</sup> of ideology, namely, with regard to how it “deals with legitimation, power conflict, and a special style of argument”<sup>380</sup>. Apple departs, then, from a mechanistic correspondence theory in which “the economic role of educational institutions, [...] the reproduction of the division of labor, and [...] Conscious economic manipulation by those in power is often seen as [the] determining element”<sup>381</sup> in the control of order in society and the school. He urges instead an investigation of “the day-to-day activity of school life”<sup>382</sup> that places more emphasis on understanding “the complex ways social, economic, and political tensions and contradictions are ‘mediated’ in the concrete practices of educators.”<sup>383</sup> (my italics) To be examined are the cultural and ideological mediations “which exist between the material conditions of an unequal society and the formation of the consciousness of the individuals in that society”<sup>384</sup> (my italics). Instead of the determination and control of “cultural activity”<sup>385</sup> being assumed from the outset by *a priori* social and economic conditions, Apple views the problem of “determination as a complex nexus of relationships”<sup>386</sup> with the economy as their “final moment”.<sup>387</sup> (my italics) Educators and pupils are not only understood here in terms of the rigid and predetermined roles of socialisers and socialised. But more so as politically active and conscious social subjects in a complex dialectic of ideological embracement and resistance in society and the school. As relatively autonomous agents of change, teachers and pupils bring their own interpretations and demands to the politically and ideologically formed field of education and will win the state support of the “neutral instrumentation of schooling”<sup>388</sup> (albeit while simultaneously serving concealed “ideological

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<sup>378</sup> Apple, (1979), p. 20

<sup>379</sup> Ibid, p. 21

<sup>380</sup> Ibid

<sup>381</sup> Ibid, p. 2

<sup>382</sup> Ibid

<sup>383</sup> Ibid

<sup>384</sup> Ibid

<sup>385</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>386</sup> Ibid

<sup>387</sup> Ibid; this also echoes Englund’s position, (1980/2005)

<sup>388</sup> Ibid

interests<sup>389</sup>). Finally, to clarify his point, Apple cites Raymond Williams who argues that if control of class (and cultural) consciousness were merely achieved through an imposed ideology either in “what we learn”<sup>390</sup> or through “isolable meanings and practices of the ruling classes”<sup>391</sup> we “would be glad”<sup>392</sup> because such an edifice<sup>393</sup> would be very easy to overthrow.

In the next section I will focus more on the concept of hegemony and its organisational function in the struggles for political and ideological consensus. In conjunction with this I will discuss the role of so-called traditional and organic intellectuals. These are understood to be “representatives of a class/social forces”<sup>394</sup> and it is understood that “teachers can also function as traditional intellectuals”<sup>395</sup>.

## Section 2.2 Hegemony and the Organization of Consent

On the concept of hegemony Barrett writes as follows: “Hegemony is best understood as *the organisation of consent*”<sup>396</sup> or as the non-violent organising focus of politics and ideology to maintain dominant “social assumptions”<sup>397</sup> through “*commonsense consciousness and practices*”<sup>398</sup>. This process involves the co-option or homogenising of a myriad conflicting ideas and interests through the efforts of intellectuals and the institutions within which they operate. It is crucial here to contrast the notion of co-

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<sup>389</sup> Apple, (1979), p. 4; note too Luke’s thesis concerning what he refers to as the “collusion” between neoliberal market ideology and postmodern grand theories of critical scepticism.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>393</sup> Althusser incorporates in his conception of the edifice both the base and superstructure.

Althusser, L, (1971/2008), *On Ideology*, Verso, Scandbook Ab, Sweden

<sup>394</sup> Englund, (1980s/2005), p. 153

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>396</sup> Barrett, (1991), p. 54

<sup>397</sup> Apple, (1979), p. 6

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid*

option with ideological imposition since hegemony does not rely on the latter but on a complex strategy of mystification (more on how I use this term later in relation to the concepts of ideology and discourse). Quoting Gramsci, Morton adds that every “relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educational relationship”.<sup>399</sup> Gramsci discusses too the role of intellectuals in the maintenance of hegemony who, themselves, are not necessarily politically or ideologically affiliated. For example, Gramsci discusses “traditional intellectuals”<sup>400</sup> such as “ecclesiastics or idealist philosophers”<sup>401</sup>. He discusses how they on the one hand considered themselves to be independent of social-class forces while at the same time providing a conservative function in the maintenance of ideological hegemony through their support of “preceding socio-economic and political reforms.”<sup>402</sup>

For example, one such intellectual discussed by Gramsci is that of Croce<sup>403</sup> who had strong ties with the Giolittian government of 1930s Italy. Croce’s abstract liberal philosophy, which “ignored concrete social struggles between social-class forces”<sup>404</sup>, could within the rhetoric of the political elite elaborate an idea of political and economic liberalism while at the same time “strengthening fascism by indirectly providing it with intellectual justification.”<sup>405</sup> The key word here is *indirectly* since, hegemonically, it is inferred that Croce’s support of dominant interests were connected more to his proximity to power. And his personal philosophical ideas made him oblivious to social material realities and presumably the violent response of fascism to dissent (as exemplified through Gramsci’s imprisonment). In other words, Croce might be described as a co-opted intellectual in the service of power. But irrespective of political and ideological leanings, all

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<sup>399</sup> Morton, (2007), p. 98; Englund, (1980/2005), p. 156

<sup>400</sup> Ibid

<sup>401</sup> Ibid, p. 91

<sup>402</sup> Ibid

<sup>403</sup> An Italian liberal intellectual in the 1930s who Gramsci referred to time and again as an example of a traditional intellectual. See, for example, Buttigieg, A, J, (2007) *Antonio Gramsci: Prison Notebooks, volume III*, Columbia University Press, New York

<sup>404</sup> Morton, (2007), pp. 90-91

<sup>405</sup> Ibid, p. 91

kinds of agents and social forces may be co-opted in the service of power. This is illustrated through the role and function of Gramsci's so-called 'organic intellectuals.'

### Organic intellectuals, civil society and the maintenance of ideological hegemony

Morton informs us again that Gramsci considered all people in general to be intellectuals but that "only some were noted to have an immediate social function [such as] professional intellectuals."<sup>406</sup> The latter come under the rubric of organic intellectuals. It is their "mediating function [through the propagation of certain *ideas*] in the struggle over hegemony between social class forces"<sup>407</sup> in civil society which Morton helps us to examine through the work of Gramsci. They can simultaneously be considered "instruments of hegemony"<sup>408</sup>, meaning to maintain ideological leadership, and as supporters of "subaltern classes engaged in promoting social change."<sup>409</sup> It is important to grasp this contradictory role of intellectuals and furthermore how institutions within civil society play a crucial part in providing the material structure of ideas (or ideology). Some of these "*Ideological State Apparatus*"<sup>410</sup> (emphasis in original) are listed by Morton here as "publishing houses, newspapers, journals, literature, libraries [and] *schools*"<sup>411</sup> (my italic). A current means of applying "indirect pressure"<sup>412</sup> through ideological persuasion today can be exemplified through the power of the electronic media via the Internet. The metaphor employed by Gramsci to describe the ideological institutions operating throughout the social body is that of "capillary intellectual meatuses"<sup>413</sup>. These are understood as channels through which a whole host of conflicting and commensurate ideas are transmitted (e.g. market ideology and democratic education). In this regard, the function of the school is exemplary in the maintenance of a

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<sup>406</sup> Morton, (2007), p. 90

<sup>407</sup> Ibid, p. 92

<sup>408</sup> Ibid

<sup>409</sup> Ibid

<sup>410</sup> Althusser, (1971/2008), p. 25

<sup>411</sup> Morton, (2007), p. 92

<sup>412</sup> Ibid

<sup>413</sup> Ibid

particular “historical bloc”<sup>414</sup>. By historical bloc is meant the “necessary reciprocity between social relations of production and ideas within the realm of state-civil society relations”<sup>415</sup>. For example, the belief is inculcated in pupils and teachers alike that “authority over their lives emanates from the self.”<sup>416</sup> This is achieved through the school’s “agents of cultural and ideological hegemony”<sup>417</sup> and through its state supported transmission of ideas of individual freedom and responsibility, critical thinking and tolerance enshrined in guiding documents (e.g. Lpo 94). In an era of neoliberal educational governance the above *temporarily* conceals any conflict between the stated values of democratic education and the political restructuring of schooling according to the principles or market ideology. The onus here is on the *temporary* since in times of systemic crisis, such as the economic crisis of 2009, a “golden opportunity” may arise towards ideological and structural transformation. As Zizek argues, when “the normal run of things is traumatically interrupted, the field is then opened up for a “discursive” ideological competition”.<sup>418</sup> However, the author also warns that while “crises do shake people out of their complacency ... the basic premises of the ruling ideology [are] far from put into doubt”.<sup>419</sup> In the context of the discussion on educational restructuring since the 1990s above, Zizek’s warning should perhaps give us pause.

## Connecting to my theoretical framework

The previous discussion on knowledge and control and curriculum and ideology has provided some insights into the possible ways in which the curriculum is politically and ideologically determined and contested within the institutional setting of the school by its teachers and through its teaching aids. Looking at the tension between market ideology and democratic education in particular I have attempted to show how neoliberal discourse has achieved ideological hegemony within education through the latter’s

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<sup>414</sup> Morton, (2007), p. 96

<sup>415</sup> Ibid

<sup>416</sup> Ibid, p. 93

<sup>417</sup> Apple, (1979), p. 6

<sup>418</sup> Zizek, S, (2009), *First As Tragedy, Then As Farce*, Verso, London/New York, p. 17

<sup>419</sup> Ibid, p. 18

knowledge claims and institutional practices. First of all, neoliberal discourse and its market ideology co-opt the language of democratic education and values such as equality, freedom and even critical reflection to the very detriment of these values. On another level, the language of scientific objectivity and academic rigorousness is employed in order to cast a critical light on the teaching profession as a whole. A common-sense connection is constructed between all of the latter and the business managerial values of efficiency, measurability, clarity, performance and target-orientation. This is done in order to argue for an objectivistic and easily decipherable educational curriculum. Thus the curriculum is reduced to a corpus of ready-made questions and answers which “good” and “bad” pupils alike have to learn by heart in order to improve their educational performance for future “employability and lifelong learning.”<sup>420</sup> This is achieved in turn through increased testing and assessment, the data produced from which teachers are to regularly present in audit-fashion to the pupils’ legal guardians. As Krantz writes, as opposed to learning about the meaning and purpose of educational knowledge the “predominant stream in this type of discourse are claims for pupils’ immediate understanding of the assessment criteria. Of less significance are the critical professional considerations of the validity of the knowledge and competencies subject to assessment.”<sup>421</sup>

The discussion on neoliberal discourse above illustrates theoretically the ways in which particular traditions, values, ideas and practices are naturally “connected” within the framework of a market ideology. Drawing upon these insights, in the following section I will discuss my chosen theoretical framework for my analysis of History school textbooks and teacher statements. Textbook content and teacher statements and the topics and themes they constitute will be understood in this light as mediating a host of “naturally” connected cultural traditions, political ideologies and knowledge on pivotal historical events. This is done in turn through different discourses as part of a general framework for understanding and explaining the history

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<sup>420</sup> Krantz, (2010), p. 248

<sup>421</sup> Ibid, p. 251



of the Israel/Palestine conflict. However, by adopting the concept of discourse I also wish to lower the essentialism and determinism of the concepts of ideology and hegemony by positing that maintenance of ideological hegemony is only ever partial. As I will discuss, this proceeds from the theoretical assumption that the very subjects positioned between vying discourses are simultaneously active and ideologically constrained but always creative. Thus the potential for the transformation of the established framework is always apparent.

### Section 2.3 Discourse and the Maintenance of Ideological Hegemony

In this section I will connect the concepts of ideology, discourse and hegemony as part of my theoretical framework for analysis. I will also consider briefly how the position of teachers is implicated within this framework. I will apply here Foucault's theory on discourse to a less essentialist usage of the concept of ideology in order to "lower the epistemological profile of the concept and broaden its practical applicability."<sup>422</sup> Indeed, Barrett notes that Foucault's critique of ideology marked a shift from "ideology to discourse in social theory"<sup>423</sup>. Foucault himself found the concept of ideology highly problematic and argued that "like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth."<sup>424</sup> Foucault also critiqued how the concept of ideology was always presented as standing "in a secondary position to something which acts as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc."<sup>425</sup> The upshot of Foucault's critique is that by simply removing the infrastructure, it is assumed that the truth of the dominated one will be revealed and he adds that "it is an error to assume that objective

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<sup>422</sup> Krantz, (2010), p. 251

<sup>423</sup> Barret, (1991), p. 124

<sup>424</sup> Foucault, M, (1980), p. 118; Barret, M, (1991), p. 123

<sup>425</sup> Foucault, (1980), p. 118

“knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended”<sup>426</sup>. Agreeing with Foucault here with regard to the knowledge presented in textbook chapters and teachers’ statements, I do not understand such knowledge as the opposite of the objective ‘truth’ on the conflict’s history. Instead, I understand it as knowledge which draws on a mixture of tradition, values, ideas, established facts and discourse which function ideologically to inform or frame official knowledge claims such as proliferate in institutional settings such as the school. Through his emphasis on the relationship between knowledge and power Foucault possibly alludes to the ideological function of discourse in the following excerpt from his *The Will to Knowledge* (1998) in which he states that

*It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And it is for this very reason we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden, that it comprises; with the variants and different effects – according to who is speaking, his [or her] position of power, the*

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<sup>426</sup> Yoshiko Nozaki cites Foucault from his 1979 *Discipline and Punish*. Dimitriadis, G, McCarthy, C, Weis, L,(2006), p. 73

*institutional context in which it happens to be situated ...*<sup>427</sup> (my italics)

The joining of power and knowledge in discourse, as Foucault states, works in accordance with “who is speaking, his [or her] position of power, the institutional context in which it happens to be situated ...”<sup>428</sup> For example, the authoritative knowledge or ‘truth’ that is established in various institutions is tightly connected to the politics, ideology and social mores of the day, the status of scientific knowledge and the exclusion of other knowledge. Quoting Foucault from his *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Barrett presents an outline of the process of discourse formation. Foucault states there that “Whenever one can describe, between a number of *statements*, [...], between *objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices*, [...] *a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations)*, we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with *a discursive formation*.”<sup>429</sup> (my italics) Linking this to my objects of analysis, the selection and establishment of “naturally” connected topics and themes in the curriculum, the traditions and ideologies and discourse they draw upon and produce constitute, as Foucault puts it, “a politics of a regime of truth – as opposed to a regime of falsity”<sup>430</sup>. To illustrate how different traditions are drawn upon, Foucault analyses nineteenth century conceptions of sex and describes a process in which “sex seems to have been incorporated into two very distinct *orders of knowledge*”.<sup>431</sup> These are “*a biology of reproduction* which developed continuously according to *a general scientific normativity* and *a medicine of sex* conforming to quite different rules of formation”.<sup>432</sup> (my italics) Foucault also alludes to the power dimension undergirding these and their ideological function. For example, the orders of knowledge Foucault refers to provide a

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<sup>427</sup> Foucault, M, (1998), p. 100

<sup>428</sup> Ibid

<sup>429</sup> Ibid, p. 128

<sup>430</sup> Ibid, p. 237

<sup>431</sup> Ibid, p. 54

<sup>432</sup> Ibid

frame through “which *moral obstacles, economic or political options, and traditional fears* could be recast in a *scientific sounding vocabulary*”<sup>433</sup>(my italics). The rationality undergirding this “modern knowledge” drew upon the established traditions or “the governing epistemes of the post-Enlightenment”<sup>434</sup>. Arguably then, established ‘truths’ within a discourse of neutral scientific rationality in the institutions of medical science may function ideologically in the misrepresentation and mystification of sex. This is done through said discourse’s concealment of among other things the social mores and gender politics of the day disseminated by (then) powerful institutions such as the Church, the educational system, schools of medicine and so on. As Barret states, through the interaction and establishment of different discourses the latter gives rise to, ideology may be understood here as “discursive and signifiatory mechanisms that may occlude, legitimate, naturalise or universalise in a variety of different ways but can all be said to mystify.”<sup>435</sup> As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter in Englund *et al* (1980, 1996), the return of the History school subject’s objective knowledge status through the reassertion of its so-called indisputable facts in connection with the 1990s’ structural adjustment of education also indicates a strengthening of a kind of scientific positivism. And this is done in the service of the hegemonic demands of neoliberal discourse and its constitutive market ideology. Scientific positivism may be understood here as a “governing episteme” which as part of the ruling discourse to maintain established common-sense linkages between democratic education and market ideology, hegemonically conceal the latter. The hegemonic status accrued ‘official knowledge’ or ‘truth’ on the Israel/Palestine conflict may also be understood in relation to political and ideological (power) struggles connected to it and the resulting discourses they produce. To point briefly to some concrete examples, an event such as the 1987 *Intifada* arguably highlighted in more detail the excesses of Israeli occupation and thus some awareness of the power dimensions of the conflict itself. In addition, some awareness of the conflict’s political and ideological dimensions will have

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<sup>433</sup> Foucault, M, (1998), p. 55

<sup>434</sup> Ibid

<sup>435</sup> Barret, (1991), p. 167

been highlighted and, importantly, the resulting reframing of the conflict's history will eventually have entered into the general educational curriculum.<sup>436</sup> While we may argue that the general framework for understanding and explaining the conflict is altered in light of new knowledge, such alterations have to be understood in relation to the steadfastness of established discourses which constitute the same framework. Thus, while new knowledge and perspectives may appear from time to time to alter the general framework, the established discourses which determine our understanding of the history of the conflict may remain. My theoretical understanding of the organisation of knowledge on the conflict in Swedish Lower Secondary History textbooks, then, hinges on a number of assumptions. First, the connection between complex power struggle shifts and the *inclusion/exclusion* of new knowledge and the selection of pivotal historical events. Connected to the above, the organisation of knowledge on the conflict also hinges on the presence of cultural traditions and political ideology and, as discussed in the opening chapter, the virtual absence of established scholarly knowledge on the conflict. Connecting these assumptions to the work of another member of the Critical Discourse School, Van Dijk's focus is his "discourse-cognition-society triangle"<sup>437</sup> via which he studies "personal and social cognition"<sup>438</sup> and how it "mediates between society or social situations and discourse."<sup>439</sup> Of relevance here is that he adds "at least two more dimensions that are fundamental in CDS research: *history* and *culture*".<sup>440</sup> (emphasis in original) He asserts too that arguably, "after the mass media, educational discourse is the most influential in society".<sup>441</sup> Van Dijk's analytical focus on society, discourse, history and culture and their interaction speaks in part to one of the overarching aims of this thesis and the assumptions discussed above. Namely, to explore the cultural, political and ideological elements expressed in the selected topics and themes and accompanying discourses emerging in textbook narratives

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<sup>436</sup> Indeed, the chapter on the conflict in one of the early Swedish school History textbooks I have examined attests to this.

<sup>437</sup> Dijk, V, T, (2008), p. 16

<sup>438</sup> Ibid

<sup>439</sup> Ibid

<sup>440</sup> Ibid

<sup>441</sup> Ibid, p. 114

and which constitute their general framework. This will become clearer in connection with my analysis of the textbook chapters and teachers' statements in chapters four, five and six.

In the following and final sub-section of this chapter I will briefly discuss how I envisage the position of the teacher in relation to the framework I have presented above. I will once again be drawing on some of the theoretical premises of the CDA school; this time through the work of Norman Fairclough.

### The position of the teacher

In a previous section I discussed the role of intellectuals in terms of them both being “instruments of hegemony”<sup>442</sup>. By this I meant their role of maintaining ideological leadership, and as supporters of “subaltern classes engaged in promoting social change.”<sup>443</sup> Accordingly, teachers may also be understood as both mediators and critical deconstructors of official knowledge discourses. Following Fairclough, then, I conceive of teachers in connection with the above theoretical frame as subjects who are simultaneously active and ideologically constrained but always creative. This is because, as Fairclough argues, “social determination and individual creativity are not the opposites they appear to be.”<sup>444</sup> Indeed, the very act of reproduction presupposes transformation and *vice versa* and marks the power struggles connected to maintaining or destabilising ideological hegemony. The kind of discourses teachers draw on may at once adhere to the established framework discussed above and may contain new perspectives. The function of the latter is to counter the common-sense linkages between selected topics and themes deemed “naturally” connected within the official knowledge curriculum on the conflict. The metaphor which Fairclough uses to describe people's or teachers' knowledge in this regard is members' resources or 'MR' which is described as “*knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit,*

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<sup>442</sup> Barret, (1991), p. 167

<sup>443</sup> Morton, (2007), p. 92

<sup>444</sup> Fairclough, N, (1989/2001), p. 140

*values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on.*”<sup>445</sup> (my italics) According to Fairclough, the “vitaly important foothold in the individual psyche [that]”<sup>446</sup> members’ resources provide relies on shared assumptions and beliefs among teachers and other social actors. These assumptions and beliefs concern the nature of the world, society and its various actors which, in turn, constitute the various discourses drawn upon in order to provide common-sense understandings or interpretations of historical events. To illustrate this point in relation to a specific topic discussed in the textbooks and teacher interviews, the event of the 2000 year exile of the “Jewish people” is discussed in many of the opening sections of the textbooks examined. This is done in order to provide a background to the parties to the conflict in order to situate their national-religious connections to the land. The underlying assumption is that both parties share an “equal” claim to the land and this, we are to understand, is one of the root causes of the conflict. While this emphasis on connection to the land may tell us little about the historical causes of the conflict going back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, much may be learned about the ideological position of the textbook writer and teacher. Like members of the society and international community around them, they may embrace a similar perspective for reasons to do with cultural tradition and historical experience and the emotions linked to these (affect). The particular constraints on knowledge construction and knowledge framing that the latter exemplifies, neither prevents nor precludes teachers’ critical and creative ability. For example, as indicated in the results from my interviews, one of my teacher respondents simultaneously employed potentially conflicting perspectives. For example, the concept of political geography was applied to issues of territorial power connected to Zionism and/or late 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalism and British colonialism. At the same time, the teacher reflexively adhered to assumptions pertaining to the nature of the parties to the conflict built into the general framework for understanding and explaining the conflict (see chapter six).

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<sup>445</sup> Fairclough, N, (1989/2001), p. 20

<sup>446</sup> Ibid

In the following chapter I will discuss my general methodological approach to the analysis of the textbook chapters and teacher interview transcriptions. In addition, I will discuss my selection of History school textbooks and the teachers I have interviewed in more detail.



## Chapter Three

### Methodological Approaches

In the following chapter I will discuss my chosen methodological approaches. The analytical approaches I will discuss should be understood as linked to my theoretical framework (discussed in previous chapter). My analysis of textbooks and transcriptions will generally range from a concrete analysis of content to a more interpretive analysis of emergent and latent discourses which together form a particular order of discourse. As I have already discussed, I view textbook content and teachers' statements as historically contingent. That is, situated in a specific cultural, political and ideological (historical) context. My content and discourse-analytical approach will also (as discussed) incorporate to a lesser extent other features such as a linguistical and ideology analysis. This will be done in order to highlight some of the ways in which the structure and organisation of a text, as well as the selection of words and grammar usage, communicates meaning. Beneath the general category headings of content analysis and discourse analysis I will construct a particular analytical model to help me delineate more specific levels of analysis and to facilitate a more inductive analysis of textbook and interview data through coding (more on coding below). As remarked in Cohen *et al* "to be faithful to the data, the codes themselves [must] derive from the data responsively rather than being created preordinately."<sup>447</sup> In turn this may strengthen the reliability of more

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<sup>447</sup> Cohen, L, Manion, L, Morrison, K, (2007) *Research Methods in Education*, (6th ed.) Routledge, New York, p. 478

inferential analytical approaches and the validity of results thus derived. I can say that my methodological approaches have been characterized by a tension between preordained categories and a close inductive reading of my textbook and interview data. However, on reflection it has revealed itself to be a necessary tension since it speaks to the reliance the researcher must place on previous research, established theories and methodologies in order to facilitate the investigation of new data and discovery of new findings. From this also follows a discussion on the position of the researcher, which I will discuss later in this chapter.

## Section 3.0 History School Textbooks

According to Horsely and Walker<sup>448</sup>, school textbooks and other teaching materials "delimit the essential subject matter"<sup>449</sup> teachers preside over. The authors go on to state that for "some teachers, both novices and their more experienced mentors, the textbook *is* the representation of the subject – even if texts are not used directly in the classroom"<sup>450</sup> (emphasis in original). In addition, despite a critical scepticism towards textbooks among teachers, pupils generally have "a much more positive perception about the truthfulness, breadth and value of their textbooks than their teachers do."<sup>451</sup> Corresponding to the authors' claims, data from my teacher respondents have shown that the teachers I have interviewed are both influenced by the representation of the subject-matter in textbooks while expressing critical reservations (e.g. the tone of the textbooks, lack of information, perspective etc). This ambiguity has been noted in the way in which some of my respondents, despite their criticism, generally adhere to the design of the subject-matter, the ordering of the subject-matter and general points of

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<sup>448</sup> The authors published an article in Hornsley, M, Knuden, S, Selander, S, (2003), *'Has Past Passed?' Textbooks and Educational Media for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Stockholm Institute of Education Press and SPU-Stány Pedagogický Ústav, Bratislava, Slovakia

<sup>449</sup> Ibid, p. 50

<sup>450</sup> M, Knuden, S, Selander, S, (2003), p. 50

<sup>451</sup> Ibid, p. 51

departure which frame a particular topic. This is connected to the issue of tacit (ideological) assumptions as well as structural issues of time, subject reorganisation and so on. Despite the above, the authors point out that in comparison to so-called "learning objects"<sup>452</sup> which are "primarily concerned with the *transmission* of knowledge rather than *the construction of meaning* by students"<sup>453</sup> "from a sociocultural perspective"<sup>454</sup>, (my italics) textbooks do provide a basis from which to encourage classroom discussion. This has also been confirmed by some of my teacher respondents. As authoritative documents and legitimised knowledge, then, school textbooks would appear to carry *some* weight in the context of what is taught in the school. Neither pupils nor educators are merely passive recipients of the "truths" contained in school textbooks and other curricula. Neither can it be guaranteed that what "is written in textbooks either gets taught or learnt."<sup>455</sup> To illustrate this, Crawford & Foster cite Apple from his 1993 *Official Knowledge* in which he argues that texts can be exposed to "dominant", "negotiated" and "oppositional" readings.<sup>456</sup> In a dominant reading the text is accepted uncritically, in a negotiated one the basic premise and accuracy of the text is accepted even if there are some doubts, while in an oppositional reading "the text is rejected outright".<sup>457</sup> Despite these caveats, "textbooks [still] inescapably represent a powerful means to render a particular version of a nation's past in the history classroom"<sup>458</sup> even if they are not employed or accepted uniformly. In a tentative study of textbook content, Jon Milner discusses the "(banal) nationalism"<sup>459</sup> in textbooks "even down to little semiotic details that presuppose a high level of pre-knowledge of 'our' nation."<sup>460</sup> The author also points to the socialising function of textbooks and quoting Bauman adds that as part of this function textbooks make "that vast world out there habitable through norms and rules to be memorized and

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<sup>452</sup> M, Knuden, S, Selander, S, p. 51

<sup>453</sup> Ibid, p. 67

<sup>454</sup> Ibid, p. 66. Paper entitled "Nationalism and postmodern ethics", pp. 134-139

<sup>455</sup> Crawford & Foster, (2006), p. 13

<sup>456</sup> Ibid, p. 13

<sup>457</sup> Ibid, p. 14

<sup>458</sup> Ibid, p. 15

<sup>459</sup> Hornsley, M, Knuden, S, Selander, S, p. 138

<sup>460</sup> Ibid

obeyed.”<sup>461</sup> Continuing on this theme, Agneta Bronäas asks whether “Swedish textbooks break the border of otherness?”<sup>462</sup> and responds with a resounding “No, certainly not.”<sup>463</sup> She argues that they “are focused on Swedish [national] identity [where] it is very common to write words like: “we Swedes, we from Sweden, in Sweden we do...”<sup>464</sup> In an article in *Democracy and Education* entitled “Nation Space: The construction of difference and citizenship in schools” Tuula Gorden and Janet Holland analyse the connection between “nation space” and “school space”.<sup>465</sup> The authors define the “Nation state as constituted as social in a range of practices”<sup>466</sup> noting that the “physical geometric space of the nation cannot exist without practices that assert and reassert it.”<sup>467</sup> The ideological function of the nation state or nation space is also alluded to by the authors. “Nation space is also imaginary and symbolic; it is a mental space constructed through representations and images of a common past and shared present.”<sup>468</sup> Citing H. K. Bhabba, the authors write that the former “argues that nations are narratives which have lost their origins in myths of time, [but] the mythical origins nevertheless provide a context for national iconography.”<sup>469</sup> However, the authors are eager to point out that their particular correspondence theoretical approach to this issue is more of a flexible one. By this they mean a “heuristic device through which spatiality is seen as central in both producing *links* between national state and school system and *at the same time altering and changing those links to produce discontinuities as well as continuities.*”<sup>470</sup> (my italics) In other words, the degree to which national ideology is reproduced and transformed in educational discourse both in texts and practices is neither clear-cut nor predictable. However, as I discussed in the preceding chapter, we may broaden the metaphor of national

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<sup>461</sup> M, Knuden, S, Selander, S, p. 138. The author quotes from Bauman’s 1993 *Postmodern Ethics*.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid, p. 149; From a paper entitled “Towards a Trialogue in Curricula”.

<sup>463</sup> Ibid

<sup>464</sup> Ibid

<sup>465</sup> Beach, D, Tuula, G, Lahelma, E, (2005), p. 27

<sup>466</sup> Ibid, p. 26

<sup>467</sup> Ibid

<sup>468</sup> Ibid

<sup>469</sup> Ibid

<sup>470</sup> Ibid, p. 26

ideology to encompass various traditions and ideas. These may function as a general framework for the many established discourses drawn upon by teachers, textbook writers, politicians, journalists both locally and internationally in order to construct an official history on the conflict. In the same chapter too, I discussed the position of teachers within such a framework as simultaneously constrained, relatively autonomous and always creative. I will now discuss my selection of textbooks for analysis.

### The textbooks from the 1990s and 2000s

As analytical objects, I view History school textbooks and the narratives within them as intertextual in nature in that they relate to “preceding or simultaneously occurring discourse” or discourses.<sup>471</sup> Textbooks also possess “formal criteria that link” them “to each other in particular genres or text varieties.”<sup>472</sup> History school textbooks are said to belong to different varieties such as “argumentative ... descriptive” and “instructive”.<sup>473</sup> I would also add to this list the variety of narrative which tells “stories [and] rel[ies] on temporal ordering principles.”<sup>474</sup> This will become apparent in my analysis later. The Swedish History school textbooks I have analysed from the 1990s and 2000s were published between the years of 1991 and 2007. My selection of the years of publication listed below was conditional on availability. In other words, they were the only textbooks from the period I could find. My selection of titles and publishers, on the other hand, is also guided by the fact that they are the textbooks most widely used in Swedish schools today. This I have been able to confirm through visits to schools and discussions with teachers as well as my own experience working alongside History and Social Science teachers. In addition, the teachers I interviewed who teach on the topic of the Israel/Palestine conflict usually combine the material found in History school textbooks with that of Religion school textbooks as part of the general “SO” block of subjects. However, there are also a number of complementary reference books which some of the teachers

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<sup>471</sup> Tischer, Meyer, Wodak, Vetter, (2000/2007) *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*, Sage Publications, London, p. 23

<sup>472</sup> Ibid

<sup>473</sup> Ibid

<sup>474</sup> Ibid

I have interviewed use. The content in these sometimes contrasts with the titles I have examined or it provides additional or updated information. In addition to the above motivations for selection of textbook samples, I have also proceeded from the assumption that studying a larger amount of textbooks will increase reliability. For example, by way of revealing a broader frequency of patterns or features connected to how a particular subject-matter is presented over time. By the same token, I have assumed that the contingent features of the texts will stand out more through the analysis of more textbook samples over a broader historical period. In other words, by examining more books over a longer period I have been able to “analyse the reproduction and transformation of discourses in a number of texts”.<sup>475</sup> For example, the period between 1991 and 2007 is replete with dramatic events in the course of the conflict such as the 1993 Oslo peace process and the second *Intifada* of 2000 to mention only two significant events. The discourses which have been established in connection with these events are also evident in the content I have examined (see analysis chapters). One can compare the content of each textbook in this regard too in order to gain an impression of how each textbook has incorporated these discourses. My selection of History school textbooks as opposed to predominantly Religion textbooks<sup>476</sup> (although I do refer to some here) is connected to one of the secondary purposes of this thesis, namely, to comment on the extent to which History school textbooks employ social scientific perspectives when discussing the conflict. As I discussed in the introduction, general Swedish school History subject guidelines stipulate among other things that a critical-analytical approach should be applied to the subject matter. Here, then, are the titles and publishers of the textbooks I have had under analysis listed in chronological order:

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<sup>475</sup> Jørgensen, W, M, Phillips, L, (1999), p. 94

<sup>476</sup> My analysis of the Religion textbooks reveals the source of the biblical-national dimension found in the History textbooks. In this way the introductory sections on the conflict’s history in the History textbooks are intertextually linked to the sections on Jewish History in the Religion textbooks. As the reader will later discover, the discourse on Jewish History that teachers draw upon has some significance in how the history of the conflict is explained and understood.

Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1991/1992) *SO boken Historia 9*, Gleerups Förlag

Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996), *Puls 9: Historia vår egen tid*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm

Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996) *Levande Historia Läsebok 3*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm

Berg, L, Husén, L, (1997) *Religion och liv 7-9*, Natur & Kultur, Sol 2001, Stockholm

Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998) *SO Direkt Historia 3*, Bonnier Utbildning Förlag AB, Stockholm

Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1999) *SO Direkt Historia 3*, Bonnier Utbildning Förlag AB, Stockholm

Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000) *Hållplatser i historia*, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, Stockholm

Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002) *Grundbok, Historia*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm

Lundberg, F, Olsson, L, (2002) *Samhällskunskap A, 6-9*, Interskol förlag AB, Malmö

Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003) *Levande Historia elevbok 9*, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, tredje tryckning, Stockholm

Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003) *Historia: punkt SO*, Gleerups Utbildning AB, Malmö

Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003) *Levande Historia 9: minikurs*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm

Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2003) *SOS Historia: ämnesboken*, Amquist & Wiksell

Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2004) *Levande Historia elevbok 9*, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, tredje tryckning, Stockholm

Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (2005) *SO Direkt Historia*, Bonnier Utbildning AB, Stockholm

Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (2006) *SO Direkt historia 3*, Bonnier Utbildning

Molund, M, (2007) *Historia B 6-9*, Interskol, Kristianstad

Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007) *Levande historia 9 Fokus: elevbok*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm

Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007) *SOS Historia: ämnesboken*, Amquist & Wiksell

The content of the chapters on the conflict in *SO boken Historia 9* from Gleerups differs only very slightly between the years of 1991 and 1992, as does the content of the Bonniers textbooks from 1998 and 1999. However, the content in the 1996 publications from Natur & Kultur differs greatly. Between the different publications there are significant variations in content, with some books including information which does not appear in other publications and vice versa. Even the use of language and emphases on particular themes varies to some degree, while certain topics and themes tend to uniformly appear in more or less the same sections of the textbook chapters. Similar to the textbooks from the 1990s, the content in the second and third editions of the titles in the 2000 editions tend to remain the same apart from some minor changes in the form of additional information. This information ostensibly reflects changing general perceptions on how the



conflict has changed over the years on the ground. As I discussed in the preceding chapter, the reasons for this may also be connected to shifting power struggles and the discourses they produce. Finally, many of the premises and/or tacit assumptions undergirding the framing topics and themes appear to be repeated in the new editions. Before moving on to the next section I would just like to comment on the size of the chapters in the textbooks and amount of information and their relevance for my analysis.

### Chapter and content size: implications for analysis

As I have alluded to repeatedly already in this thesis, it is my contention that the inclusion of more critical-analytical (social scientific and scholarly) perspectives on the conflict's history would contribute to a more nuanced educational discourse. Indeed, in the light of changing events on the ground and the inclusion of new information in recent years an overall more nuanced impression of the conflict may be noted. To mention one example, in the 2007 edition of John King's *Israel och Palestina* some important new perspectives on the reasons for the failure at Camp David in 2000 have appeared. At the same time, however, the section within which these perspectives appear still proceeds from established assumptions about the roles and propensities of the parties to the conflict.<sup>477</sup> That is why I would

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<sup>477</sup> King, J, (2007), *Israel och Palestina*, Gleerups Utbildning Ab, Malmö, pp. 40-41  
““The generous offer”

Prime Minister Netanyahu's strategy was to try to reach peace once and for all with the Palestinians and to come to an agreement on everything at the same time. In October 1998 he and Yassar Arafat agreed to revive the negotiations regarding the future of the Palestinians. In return Arafat was expected to come down harder on Palestinian violence.

On 18<sup>th</sup> March 1999 Netanyahu lost the election. Ehud Barak, another one of the Labour Party hawks, became Israel's new prime minister. Barak was determined to create a lasting peace agreement with the Palestinians. The Israelis demonstrated their approval by voting for him. A new round of negotiations, known as Camp David II, began in the summer of 2000.

In December 2000 Barak provided something which he called an extremely generous offer. Barak claimed that he offered the Palestinians 95% of the West Bank, but the Palestinians said that the Israeli settlements and security zones had already taken 20%. Left was less than 80% of the West Bank. The Palestinians were not happy either with the limited right they received to Jerusalem. The offer also demanded that the Palestinian refugees give up the right of return to their original homes now situated in Israel. Finally Israel would keep control of the West Bank's water resources. The Palestinians decided to reject Barak's offer.”

contend that at least in the case of how the conflict is presented in the textbooks under examination, the inclusion of new information and different perspectives does not preclude the influence of some of the cultural and ideological dimensions that I will argue are present in them. For example, while size of content is important, irrespective of whether a chapter contains a few lines or few pages the content it contains is still situated in a specific cultural, historical and socio-political context and is therefore framed by the discourses on the conflict which converge there. That is why to really understand the myriad meanings imparted or embedded in a particular text requires analysing it from different analytical perspectives: from a concrete analysis of content to a more inferential analysis of discourses which looks beyond the text. It is my hope that in the course of this thesis the reader will come to appreciate this more.

I will now discuss my chosen analytical approaches in section 3.1. These will be connected to a discussion of general category headings and levels of analysis which will go to make up an operational analytical model in order to facilitate a *hands-on* approach to analysing my data.

## Section 3.1 Analytical Approaches

As already discussed, both my theoretical and methodological approaches may be placed within the framework of a content and discourse analysis. Keeping this in mind, in this section I will discuss the different analytical approaches I will employ in my analysis of the textbooks and teacher interview transcriptions. In section 3.2 these will translate into a construction of an analytical model to include *levels of analysis* and *analytical categories* generated through coding. To begin, then, I have placed my chosen analytical approaches under the following headings:

1. Content analysis

## 2. Discourse analysis

As discussed in my theory chapter, I will also incorporate the concepts of ideology and hegemony within my content and discourse analytical frame. As mentioned above too I will discuss features of a linguistic analysis and ideology analysis as part of my general content and discourse analytical approach. Elements of these analyses should be understood as built into my general approach and not separate from it. Hence, they will not be discussed as separate stages of my general approach *per se* but as part of the general analytical approach to my data.

### Content analysis

A content analysis may generally be understood as an umbrella term for the analysis of all the approaches I have decided to treat separately here. However, the distinction I wish to make with regard to a general content analysis from the other levels concerns the question of the discrepancy between school knowledge and scholarship discussed in the introduction of this thesis. For example, the UNESCO guidebook by Falk and Pingel on content analysis argues that “*content analysis* examines the text itself [and asks the question] what does the text *tell* us? *Is it in accordance with academic research? Does it sufficiently cover the topic* in question?”<sup>478</sup> (my italics) History school textbooks according to this level of analysis refer to the very explicit details of a historical narrative covering among other things the main protagonists to the conflict, pivotal dates and events, locations, and so on. In addition, in more of a quantitative approach, ”counting words, expressions of certain ideas as well as the mentioning of certain phenomena in the texts”<sup>479</sup> are also features of a general content analysis. Bergström and Boréus also note that “looking for manifest characteristics can also be used

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<sup>478</sup> Falk, Pingel, (1999) *UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision*, UNESCO, France, p. 18

<sup>479</sup> Bergström & Boréus (2000), p. 45. “hur talar olika texter till sina mottagare, frågande, vädjande, befalvissa idéer samt omnämmande av vissa företeelser i texterna. Exempelen i kapitlet visar hur man kan räkna ord, uttryck för vissa idéer, samt omnämmande av vissa företeelser i texterna. Undersökningarna kretsar alla kring texternas innebördsaspekt.”

in order to get at that which is not directly stated.”<sup>480</sup> In this way, the boundaries between what is a general content analysis quickly shift to an “analysis of ideas or linguistical analyses”<sup>481</sup>.

Apart from the analysis of words and grammar within selected topics and themes and how meaning is communicated via these, a linguistical analysis is also connected to understanding how content is structured. Texts are structured through the ordering of syntactical features such as sentences, paragraphs and their meaning via lexical features such as verbs, nouns, adjectives and so on. Referring to this linkage between structure and meaning Titscher *et al* write that at “the syntactic-semantic level [of analysis] is a question of the influence of syntactic structures on meaning-formation.”<sup>482</sup> Content analysis according to this view is not only about the “communicative content of texts but also their (linguistic) form”.<sup>483</sup> For example, the use of either transitive or passive verb forms when describing particular events, individuals and their actions and propensities will convey a special kind of meaning. To offer one example of how grammatical form can communicate meaning, I will refer to the following description of casualties incurred during the first *Intifada* in 1987 in a History school textbook from 1996. The following extract teaches us that “*the violent riots* continued and until 1996 *had taken* 1000 Palestinian lives” while “*in Palestinian attacks* approximately 100 Israeli civilians and soldiers *were killed*.”<sup>484</sup> (my italics) In this description, the deaths of Palestinians are described in a very abstract manner yet are implicitly linked to Palestinians themselves: lives are “taken” by the *Palestinian* riots while the specific actions of other individuals or groups (e.g. the IDF or Palestinian militias) are obscured. Fairclough describes this as a “process [which occurs] in the reduced form of a

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<sup>480</sup> Bergström & Boréus (2000), p. 46. “Men sökandet efter manifesta inslag kan också användas för att komma åt det inte fullt utsagda.”

<sup>481</sup> Ibid, p. 45 “idéanalyser eller lingvistiska analyser”

<sup>482</sup> Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, Vetter, (2000/2007), p. 61

<sup>483</sup> Ibid, p. 55

<sup>484</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996) *Levande Historia Läsebok 3*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm. ”De våldsamma upploppen har fortsatt och hade fram till 1996 krävt ca 1000 palestiniers liv. Tusentals andra har utvisats. I palestinska attacker har ca 100 israeliska civilpersoner och soldater dödats. Sedan intifadan, upproret, började har även omkring 700 palestinier, misstänkta för att ha samarbetat med Israel, dödats av palestinska organisationer.”

*nominalization*” or “multi-word compound noun”.<sup>485</sup> Absent from the description is “the timing of the process” action and “an agent and/or patient.”<sup>486</sup> In contrast, descriptions of Israeli deaths are more directly attributed to implied agents through *Palestinian* attacks and their targets (soldiers and civilians). Even the use of quantifiers too (“approximately”) appears to add precise emphasis to the (smaller) number of deaths on the Israeli side in this description. As a result, the fact that the Palestinian “lives taken” far exceeds the Israelis “killed”, it does not seem to provide the same effect since it is implied that the Palestinians are responsible both for the deaths of Palestinians and Israelis alike.

Boréus and Bergström describe another use of linguistical analysis in which the use of grammar can create different roles or subject positions. For example, in the way parties to a conflict are referred to in mass media reporting.

[By using this approach] one can study in which way [parties to a conflict] are referred to. One method is to study which reporting verbs are used to cite different sources in mass media reporting. Do reporters say that they ‘inform’, ‘report’ or ‘announce’? Or do they ‘claim’ or ‘state’? [...] One can also note *to what extent the different parties are able to air their positions, whether their claims have been contested or not and also how the different parties are categorised or named.*<sup>487</sup> (my italics)

The treatment of different parties in various texts very much involves how language is used. For example, to inform, describe and explain among other things historical events, causes of conflicts, groups, individuals, identities and roles, subject-positions and so on. The issue of the degree to which different parties to a conflict have their voices aired is also connected to the issue of the *omission* and *inclusion* of information in discourse theory. For

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<sup>485</sup> Fairclough, (2000), p. 105

<sup>486</sup> Ibid

<sup>487</sup> Bergström, G, Boréus, K, (2000), p. 45

example, does the inclusion of other voices and information correspond to mere “mentioning”, to paraphrase Apple, or the provision of different perspectives to encourage a broader debate? This may also be connected to the question of how information is ordered and presented (structured) and the linguistic devices used in connection with such ordering. For example, some textual structuring may appear “purely pragmatic” and will “govern the reception of the text”<sup>488</sup>. However, the selection of which topics, themes and protagonists to begin a chapter with will influence the general interpretative framework of a particular chapter. In addition to the lexical and grammatical features of texts are the rhetorical devices employed to persuade, appeal to the emotions or reason of the reader. In turn, such devices create logical connections between units of meanings (words, sentences) which need not be stated. Again, discursively this should all be understood in light of the political and ideological context within which reporting on a particular conflict occurs.

### Rhetorical devices and ‘chains of equivalence’

Boréus and Bergström write about the interpersonal aspects of texts/content and “how different texts talk to their receivers, [either] *inquiring*, appealing [or] commanding”<sup>489</sup> (my italic) To illustrate this, I will provide an example of the power of questions asked in a selection of textbook exercises discussed below. To continue, history textbook narratives may from time to time employ similar rhetorical devices in order to emphasise a particular topic or theme. This is done by way of heightening an emotional or logical connection between the reader and the text based on tacit assumptions derived from established discourses. This might be in the form of emphasising the suffering of a particular people or through the emphasis of a particular causal connection between selected historical events. Boréus and Bergström list some of these devices as “terms such as sign, element, and logics of equivalence, node and articulation”<sup>490</sup>. They also refer to terms such as “logos ... ethos [and] pathos” in which the latter three refer to “an attempt to *convince* people about a determined action, a value-judgement or

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<sup>488</sup> Tischer *et al.*, (2000/2007), p. 62

<sup>489</sup> Bergström & Boréus, p.157

<sup>490</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229

a description of reality<sup>491</sup>” (my italics). To define these terms briefly, “logos is that part of the attempt to convince, which appeals to the recipient’s intellect and rational ability to draw conclusions [...] *Ethos* can be defined as the “character or personality that a speaker wishes to attribute to his/herself in order to gain his listeners’ interest, goodwill and confidence.”<sup>492</sup> Lastly, “*Pathos* is ‘the powerful emotions, ‘affectations’ or ‘passions’ which a speaker tries to evoke within his listeners and use in order to persuade them.”<sup>493</sup> With regard to the history presented on the conflict in the textbooks I have examined, certain references to dramatic historical events and the suffering of certain peoples may evoke a powerful emotional response from the reader.<sup>494</sup> Rhetorical arguments also contain such elements as statements and theses. As Boréus and Bergström write, a “statement [is] the thought, the idea, which is expressed via a linguistic clause.”<sup>495</sup> (my emphasis) A term connected to statement is that of “chains of equivalence” or “logics of equivalence” which refers to how information is organised in order to establish a causal link in a text between different events, topics and themes and so on.<sup>496</sup> All of these elements may converge to form part of or maintain an established discourse on a particular topic. A term connected to the above employed in my analysis and theoretical frame is that of tacit or ideological assumption which refers to the background information readers or interpreters possess when reading and constructing texts. In my theory chapter I connected tacit assumptions to the possible ideological function of established discourses. These were understood too as constitutive of a particular framework and the naturalisation of common-sense knowledge in textbooks and teacher statements.

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<sup>491</sup> Bergström & Boréus, p. 89. ”... försöket att *övertyga* människor om an handlingsinriktning, en värdering eller en verklighetsbeskrivning.”

<sup>492</sup> Ibid, pp. 89 - 90

<sup>493</sup> Ibid

<sup>494</sup> For example, references to the historical suffering of Jews and the event of the Nazi holocaust evoke powerful feelings and are also part of Western European cultural and historical discourse.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid, p. 95

<sup>496</sup> Ibid; Torfing, (2005)

## Tacit knowledge, tacit assumptions<sup>497</sup>

Tacit assumptions are constitutive of the taken-for-granted knowledge or premises upon which particular discourses and narratives are established. A premise constitutes an “undeclared or accepted statement”<sup>498</sup> which “constitutes a kind of link or bridge”<sup>499</sup> to make common-sense connections between other tacit assumptions. For example, a very powerful premise may come in the form of facts pertaining to the history and identity of a particular people, say, in the form of a perennial desire, a teleological path and/or a clearly delineated history. The tacit (ideological) assumptions and the premises upon which they are based may also be referred to as the background information of texts and arguments. “Each text is laden with references to *background information* of this kind which is understood as being *common knowledge* for the sender and receiver.”<sup>500</sup> (my italics) Common knowledge is that which does not “need energy wasted upon to declare”.<sup>501</sup> As I mentioned in the last section, I said I would include an example of the power of questions in authoritative texts such as school textbooks. The following question from a 1996 History textbook exercise is interesting I feel in connection to the unstated tacit assumptions upon which it rests and, indeed, the focus it draws away from other actors and events. The last of a series of fact-finding questions in an exercise in the textbook asks “a) What is the PLO? (b) Why is the PLO a controversial organisation?”<sup>502</sup> For these questions to even be asked requires a certain amount of tacit knowledge. Such knowledge would concern who or what the PLO is and why it is considered controversial and by whom within the context of the conflict and how it is presented in the textbook chapter. In this manner, the questions point to a political and ideological context or debate

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<sup>497</sup> The term tacit knowledge is usually attributed to Kuhn, T, (1962/1999), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 44. In his book Kuhn cites Michael Polanyi who describes tacit knowledge as “knowledge that is acquired through practice and that cannot be articulated explicitly”.

<sup>498</sup> Bergström & Boréus, p. 104

<sup>499</sup> Ibid

<sup>500</sup> Ibid, pp. 115 - 118

<sup>501</sup> Bergström & Boréus, pp. 115 - 118

<sup>502</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996) *Levande Historia Läsebok 3*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm “a) Vad är PLO? (b) Varför är PLO en omstridd organisation?”



beyond itself. It is perhaps interesting to ponder too why only the PLO is considered a controversial organisation in this particular textbook while the Zionist movement is not.<sup>503</sup> This I feel points to the ideological function/dimension of the questions and, to refer to the preceding chapter, the broader political-ideological context and concomitant power struggles within which the textbook content is produced. On that note, in relation to the analysis of texts I will now discuss the concepts of ideology and discourse here below.

### Ideology and discourse

In Bergström & Boréus the analysis of ideology in texts is described as follows: “An ideology analysis can be described [...] as an approach in which *the invisible is made visible*”.<sup>504</sup> (my italics) The invisible referred to here includes the tacit assumptions and background knowledge which enable reading of texts to make sense. There are three stages to this approach. The first stage involves “the text itself being analysed [...] this is a form of textual analysis, *but without any direct reference to how it is carried out*”.<sup>505</sup> This follows on into the next stage which is to “make comprehensible *the latent* part of the text and this is done by asking the following question: *What reality [beyond itself] does the text refer to?* [since] every part of a text is about something.”<sup>506</sup> This places the text in a socio-historical and political context, which is especially important when analysing official knowledge in school textbooks. Questions then asked are “To which audience is the text aimed at? Whose case is it putting forward and “which opinions does it limit

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<sup>503</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996), ”Sionismen. Drömmen om att återupprätta den judiska nationen fortlevde bland judama världen runt. Under 1800-talets senare del blev allt fler judar både i Europa och i Amerika anhängare av sionismen, kampen för det judiska folkets återflyttning till Palestina. Theodor Herzl skrev boken ”Den judiska staten”, där han krävde att judarna – efter århundraden av förföljelser och lidanden – borde få ett eget fosterland. Under första världskriget besattes Palestina av brittiska trupper. 1917 förklarade den brittiska regeringen att det judiska folket borde få ”ett nationellt hem”. Allt fler judar invandrade till Palestina. Araberna i Palestina blev förbittrade; britterna hade tidigare lovat att araberna skulle få Palestina.”

<sup>504</sup> Bergström, G, Boréus K, p. 165

<sup>505</sup> Ibid

<sup>506</sup> Ibid, p. 168

itself too”<sup>507</sup> We might add to this question, which historical events is the text limiting itself to? To connect the concept of tacit assumptions to the concepts of ideology and discourse, Fairclough writes that “the effectiveness of ideology depends to a considerable degree on it being *merged with this common-sense background to discourse and other forms of social action*.”<sup>508</sup> Official knowledge or curriculum knowledge taught in the institution of the school may constitute an admixture of facts, statements, values and ideological assumptions presented as ‘truth’. Equally, such knowledge may be reflexively contested and debated and even revised and incorporated into teachers’ own ‘MR’<sup>509</sup>. Thinking of textbooks and teacher materials and also teachers’ own acquired knowledge in such terms enables us to analyse discourse as functioning both in the wake of and maintenance of ideological hegemony. This is done through an interaction of *texts*, teachers and pupils and the broader socio-political *context*.<sup>510</sup> Fairclough asks, then, what “must you do to make sense of a whole text”<sup>511</sup> either written or spoken in order “to arrive at a coherent interpretation of it, assuming you already know the meanings of its constituent parts?”<sup>512</sup> To determine or uncover what Fairclough refers to as a “fit’ between text and world”<sup>513</sup> requires the presence already inside the reader or interpreter of a particular text of “background assumptions and expectations”<sup>514</sup>. This in order to create coherence between what is “in the text and what’s already in the interpreter”.<sup>515</sup>

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<sup>507</sup> Bergström, G, Boréus K, p. 165

<sup>508</sup> Fairclough, (2003), p. 64

<sup>509</sup> See Fairclough, (2003). ‘MR’ refers to members’ resources which comprises the different *texts* that people carry with them in order to make sense of everyday life and interactions.

<sup>510</sup> Barret, (1991), p. 124. Barret on Roland Barthes discusses the meaning of text and states that “Many traditional, as well as recent, forms of literary, art and film criticism [in the early 90s] concern themselves principally with the object of study as a ‘text’ to be engaged with in its own terms rather than something *to be explained with reference to external factors* such as *historical, social or biographical ‘context’*”. (my italics)

<sup>511</sup> Fairclough, p. 65

<sup>512</sup> Ibid

<sup>513</sup> Ibid

<sup>514</sup> Ibid

<sup>515</sup> Ibid

Fairclough is arguing that the common sense connections based on ideological assumptions which are inferred in texts are not “made by the text itself”<sup>516</sup> but the reader. The reader is already charged with background information and fills in the silences to give expression to what is inferred. Fairclough uses the concept of *cues* in reference to the parts of a text which activate background information. For example, in many of the History textbooks I have examined, there are so-called linguistic cues which position the reader or interpreter so that he/she “brings ideologies to the interpretations of texts.”<sup>517</sup> The recurrence of topics and themes I have examined in the textbooks all presuppose a certain order of historical events and draw upon various cultural and ideological elements. This will be discussed further in my analysis of the textbooks and teacher statements in subsequent chapters. Suffice to add, finally, that this general ordering of things is strengthened by the absence or exclusion of other information (or *cues*) which could disrupt a particular established History on the conflict.

With the previous analytical approaches in mind, in the next section I will discuss my hands-on approaches to the analysis of the textbook and interview transcription content. To this end I will construct more detailed levels of analysis connected to my general research questions. This will enable in turn the generation of analytical category headings through coding various units of the text.

## Section 3.2 Levels of Analysis, Category Headings and Hands-on

In the previous section I discussed my chosen analytical approaches. Here I will connect them to the actual *hands-on* analysis of my data through the construction of an analytical model to include *levels of analysis* and *category*

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<sup>516</sup> Fairclough, p. 65

<sup>517</sup> Ibid, p. 69

*headings*. I will also discuss how through coding small portions of my data at a time to generate data-specific categories I am “able to detect patterns, themes and begin to make generalizations”<sup>518</sup>. This will later enable me to construct a coherent interpretation of my data. Since words “and single codes on their own have limited power, [...] it is important *to move to associations between words and codes*, i.e. to look at *categories and relationships between categories*.”<sup>519</sup> (my emphasis) For example, the opening section of a textbook chapter will contain a cluster of interrelated categories in the form of topics and themes expressed through specific words or codes. These in turn may be designated a specific category derived from the coded data themselves which are then placed under an analytical category heading connected to a particular level of analysis.

In the following sub-section I will discuss my designated levels of analysis.

### Levels of analysis: from content to discourse

The purpose of constructing the following levels of analysis is to establish an operational point of departure from which to examine textbook content and teacher interview transcriptions. In this way they will provide a fairly coherent structure with which to organise analysis of my empirical data from a content level to more inferential levels of analysis. As is probably clear, incorporated into these levels of analysis too are my research questions and theoretical approaches. The levels form thus a general framework for analysis and have been placed in the following order and on the basis of these I will be able to construct a set of analytical categories generated through the coding of my data:

- a) The history of the conflict presented in the textbook chapters
- b) Topics and themes most highlighted and their organisation

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<sup>518</sup> Bergström, G, Boréus K, p. 481

<sup>519</sup> Ibid, p. 481

- c) The treatment of certain parties and figures to the conflict
- d) Identity constructs and subject-positions connected to above
- e) Correspondence with the scientific debate
- f) Tacit and/or ideological assumptions connected to selected topics and themes
- g) The latter connected to established discourses beyond the text (e.g. scholarly debate, the mass media, the Oslo peace process, international law etc)
- h) The general framework on the conflict

### Analytical category headings

Following suggestions in Boréus & Bergström and Titscher *et al* category headings have been ascribed to my different levels of analysis above. Categories should be defined before the coding of texts takes place and such categories “are understood as the *more or less operational definitions of variables*. Any definition of categories should be explicit, complete and adequate [...]. In the process of coding it is recommended that *every category should also be illustrated with textual examples* which are subsequently taken as given and which facilitate the allocation of further textual units.”<sup>520</sup> (my italics). For example, each chapter contains subjects which incorporate various topics and themes and these may be placed under the different category headings below. Coding of the various topics and themes will generate more specific designations for these and thereby more specific textual units for the category headings. This might be thought of as a process of linking the very *general* analytical approaches to the very *specific*

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<sup>520</sup> Titscher *et al*, (2007), p. 58. The authors quote “Herkner 1974: 174”

topics and themes exemplified in the texts. In this process too both analytical approaches and topics and themes may be revised.

Having organised my levels of analysis I am now able to generate operational category headings. These in turn will facilitate the determination of units of meaning to accord with these categories through the hands-on process of coding. With some amendments, the kinds of categories I will be constructing pertain to the following general category headings presented in Titscher *et al*, (2007) below. I have only selected those relevant to my research questions and analytical approaches and have omitted others from the list. Those selected are as follows:

- Topics, themes: what is it about
- Direction: how is the theme dealt with
- Actors: who initiates particular actions and who carries them out?
- Place: where do the actions take place?
- Conflicts: what is the cause of any conflict? Who are the participants?
- Time: when does the action take place?
- How is language used in the texts (e.g. the presentation and structure of content)?<sup>521</sup>

The above category headings already correspond to one of the analytical approaches already discussed above, namely, a *content analysis*. Implicated in this too are elements from other approaches. I will complement these with

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<sup>521</sup> Titscher et al, pp. 59-60

a small number of general category headings corresponding to a *discourse analysis*:

- Ideological function: Which information is presented as objective or taken-for-granted; presented as ‘truth’ and which unstated background information or tacit assumptions might be inferred?
- Interdiscursivity/intertextuality: connected to the above, which discourses converge in the framing of the textbook content and teachers’ statements, tacitly or explicitly?
- Which of these are more established (hegemonic) and which are more marginalised?

### Generation of units of meaning through coding

The next task is to code each part of a text that you have placed under one or more of the category headings above and in turn this will enable you to more accurately categorise each unit of meaning or textual variable on the basis of the data themselves. The procedure is described in Cohen *et al* as follows: “In coding a piece of transcription the researcher goes through the data systematically, typically line by line, and writes a descriptive code by the side of each piece of datum”.<sup>522</sup> Coding enables the researcher “to detect patterns, themes and begin to make generalizations (e.g. by counting the frequency of codes).”<sup>523</sup> The process of coding will help to make the body of text comprehensible but since this is also a process of text reduction there is always a danger of excluding data that might be of interest too. My very role as researcher and the problems I have chosen to concentrate on all feed into this process of text reduction. Indeed, like the writers and interpreters (see readers and users) of textbooks, I too creatively make sense of a body of texts. I do this on the basis of accumulated knowledge and assumptions from

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<sup>522</sup> Cohen *et al*, (2007), p. 480

<sup>523</sup> Ibid, p. 481

scholarly sources, mass media, political debate, the internet, educational texts and other discourses I am both constrained by and draw upon (I will elaborate on my role as researcher below). In the next sub-section I will provide an example of a unit of coded data from one of the chapters in the textbooks I have examined.

### Example of coded data

The following short paragraphs are from the 2003 edition of *Levande historia* 9. In the column marked *codes* I have designated a word or code to the corresponding text in the column marked *text*. Note that the text I have written in italics provides an initial interpretation of the unit of meaning provided by the sections in the textbook chapter. Following the two columns I will explain how I formed this interpretation.

*Text: Levande Historia elevbok 9*      *Codes*

<p>In 1897 Austrian Theodor Herzl breathed life into the dream of a Jewish state. Jerusalem was also called Zion. The idea of turning Palestine into a Jewish state was therefore called Zionism.</p> <p>At the beginning of the 20th century Palestine was controlled by</p>	<p>(TIME), THEODOR HERZL (ACTOR), BREATHED LIFE (METAPHOR),</p> <p>MESSIANIC DREAM (THEME)</p> <p>JERUSALEM/ZION</p> <p>PALESTINE, JEWISH STATE (X2)</p> <p>ZIONISM (SUBJECTS)</p> <p><i>Note: naturalised connection between religion and nation through dream and idea of a Jewish state in Zion and Palestine.</i></p>
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<p>Great Britain. But Great Britain did not want to consent to the establishment of a Jewish state in the region. However, more and more Jews were permitted to immigrate.<sup>524</sup></p>	<p>(TIME), 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY</p> <p>PALESTINE, CONTROLLED</p> <p>GREAT BRITAIN'S POSITION (ASSERTION),</p> <p>RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM</p> <p>Note: who are the Jews here?</p>
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The units of meaning coded or labelled above are then added to my category headings. As Cohen *et al* write “specific words or units of analysis are less inferential”<sup>525</sup> while categories are more so. This means that by connecting units of meaning to categories I am actively inferring meaning from these as part of my general theoretical and analytical approach. For example, from the line “the dream” in the text I have generated the code “MESSIANIC DREAM”. This I infer refers to the messianic dream within “Jewish tradition and religion [which] clearly instruct Jews to await the coming of the promised Messiah at ‘the end of times’ before they can return to Eretz Israel as a sovereign people in a Jewish theocracy”.<sup>526</sup> The word/code “ZIONISM” also appears in the passages and in turn is linked to the code “JEWISH STATE”. Note that Zionism differs in meaning and purpose from the messianic dream. The purpose of Zionism, as stated in the passages, is to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, not by Talmudic exhortation or Divine

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<sup>524</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003) *Levande Historia elevbok 9*, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, tredje tryckning, Stockholm, pp. 546 – 551. ”År 1897 blåste österrikaren Theodor Herzl liv i drömmen om en judisk stat Jerusalem kallas även Sion. Tanken att göra Palestina till en judisk stat kallades därför sionismen.

Palestina styrdes i början av 1900-talet av Storbritannien. Men Storbritannien ville inte gå med på att en judisk stat upprättades i området. Fler och fler judar fick dock tillstånd att invandra.”

<sup>525</sup> Cohen *et al*, (2007), p. 480

<sup>526</sup> Pappe, I, (2007) p. 10

intervention but through political means. My interpretation is that since this distinction is not made clear within the passages, a natural connection is established between Messianism and the political project of Zionism in the textbook chapter. Indeed, the line that “Jerusalem was also called Zion” in the text forms a commonsense node or hub for Judaism and Zionism. To bring this to another analytical level, I may interpret that the seamless merging of these three codes (MESSIANIC DREAM, ZIONISM and JEWISH STATE) possesses an ideological function. This is strengthened further within authoritative (institutional) texts such as History school textbooks and of course through its promulgation by teachers who themselves are readers/interpreters of textbook content and possessors of ‘MR’. However, it is debatable to which degree such knowledge is fully accepted or even acknowledged by teachers (I reserve any conclusions on this matter following an analysis of my interview transcriptions). This is one possible reading of the texts that may be carried out and is an illustration of how the analytical approaches work together. By this I mean levels of analysis and category headings, units of meaning and codes which work together to emphasise the interrelationship between concrete presentations of historical events in order to reveal the different discourses they draw upon.

I conclude this chapter with a discussion of my interview approach in the following section.

### Section 3.3 Interview Approaches

In this the final section of my method chapter I will discuss my interview approach. This will also include a discussion of my choice of teacher respondents (both single respondents and as part of a group), reflections on my role as interviewer and researcher, ethical issues and the general pros and cons of my approach.

## Teacher respondents


Fundamentally, the purpose of the interviews has been to provide a deeper understanding of the possible extent to which the discourses I have identified have either been subsumed and/or contested by the teachers interviewed. Given the very low sample size, the teachers I have interviewed do not represent the majority of teachers who both teach on the conflict and take an interest in it. It is therefore highly possible that the inclusion of more teachers in my sample will have provided different findings or results. Despite these lacunae it is also possible that the findings the interviews provide are equally identifiable among a broader corps of teachers. Between 2007 and 2009 I held a total of eight interviews with Lower Secondary school teachers who teach or have taught on the block subjects of History, Geography, Religion and Social Science/Civics. Trying to find teachers to interview on the Israel/Palestine conflict in textbooks and teaching was no easy task. There were very few who responded to the many emails and phone messages I left asking them to take part in an interview. However, the teachers who I did manage to entice were characteristically interested in the subject-matter and eager to opine on matters related to it. This turned out to be advantageous. Most of the schools I visited where the teachers were employed were located in the western midland region of Sweden near the city of Gothenburg. I deliberately chose teachers of different age-group, gender, ethnicity and who worked in different school settings (e.g. charter schools, independent schools or state run schools). I sought as much diversity among teachers and schools as possible. I did so in order to leave the field open to possible corollaries between school type and teacher employee and the selection and organisation of the topics and themes on the conflict. For example, the first two teacher respondents I interviewed both worked at state run schools, were of similar age and experience but, it turned out, had very conflicting perceptions of and points of view on the material they used. Thus their age and experience, type of school did not appear to influence their respective positions. What did appear to set them apart, however, were their respective political and ideological positions on matters such as Israeli and Palestinian rights, religion and power politics. A general theme I began to note throughout the interviews was that virtually all of the teachers appeared to support the national and religious claims of both parties

to the conflict. There were also other points upon which all the teachers converged and diverged. I will discuss these in my interview analysis chapter. Teachers are and wish to be perceived as professionals by outsiders or colleagues such as myself. Hence all of my respondents demonstrated a high degree of engagement and preparedness during the interviews. Equally, the fact that they knew I was a teacher myself perhaps lent to the often relaxed atmosphere and sense of trust felt before, during and after interviews. This brings me to a discussion of my interview approach.

### Interview approach and question categories

The kind of interview I carried out with my teacher respondents may be described as a semi-structured interview backed up by an interview guide “(i.e. where topics and open-ended questions are written but the exact sequence and wording does not have to be followed with each respondent)”<sup>527</sup>. The questions in my interview guide have provided a kind of frame for the direction of the interviews but have not overdetermined the possible line of questions. Following the funnel model below my line of questions have followed a pattern “in which the movement is from the general to the specific to the more specific.”<sup>528</sup>

*Fig.1 Funnel model to describe questions from general to specific*



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<sup>527</sup> Cohen *et al* (2007), p. 361

<sup>528</sup> *Ibid*, p. 358

Cohen *et al* citing Patton and Kvale discuss the kind of sequence and framing questions which might appear within a funnel movement.

The sequence and framing of the interview questions will also need to be considered, for example, ensuring that easier and less threatening; non-controversial questions are addressed earlier in the interview in order to put respondents at their ease (see Patton 1980: 210-11). This might mean that the ‘what’ questions precede the more searching and difficult ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, though, as Patton (1980: 211) reminds us, *knowledge questions – ‘what’-type questions – can be threatening*. The interviewer’s questions should be straightforward and brief, even though the responses need not be (Kvale 1996: 132). The interviewer will also need to consider the kinds of questions to be put to interviewees [...].<sup>529</sup> (my italics)

To connect the above to a discussion of question categories, mine, as I will show, appear to fall within the following categories: “knowledge questions”, “descriptive questions”, “contrast questions”, “experience questions”, “behaviour questions” and so on.<sup>530</sup> According to Kvale in Cohen these categories cover the substance of the questions but Kvale adds to these categories what are referred to as “process questions”.<sup>531</sup> These she adds “Introduce a topic or interview, follow-up on a topic or idea, probe for further information or response, ask respondents to specify and provide examples, directly ask for information, indirectly ask for information [and] interpret respondents’ replies.”<sup>532</sup>

Throughout my interviews process questions have been interspersed with substance questions in order to ensure that I have understood a particular response; and for respondents to explain things in a different way by providing examples and reflection. In line with my research questions, the

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<sup>529</sup> Cohen *et al* (2007), p. 262

<sup>530</sup> Ibid, p. 358

<sup>531</sup> Ibid, pp. 358-359

<sup>532</sup> Ibid

main purpose of my interviews has been linked to the central problem that I have taken as my point of departure. Namely, what I have determined to be a discrepancy between History school textbook knowledge on the Israel/Palestine conflict and scholarly debate. Connected to the content analytical approach discussed above, I have also compared the kind of subject matter provided by teachers with the scholarly literature. Referring to the substance and process questions discussed above, I have also asked teachers to *describe* the kind of material and/or knowledge they use in their teaching of the subject, their *perspectives* on the quality of the material they use, why they have *preferred* some texts and/or material but not others and how they *approach* the subject in their lessons (e.g. in the form of a lecture or discussion, straight from the textbooks and so on). Specific questions have concerned *awareness* of the established research on the conflict, the lack of its inclusion in textbooks and how they *relate* to this. Around the middle of my interviews I have presented them with a small sample of the scientific debate. I have then inquired as to their thoughts on the portions of the debate provided when compared with some of the points of departure established in the teaching material they recommend and employ. I have wanted to see how the introduction of new knowledge might impact on their established perception of the conflict's history (including the background information they have already drawn upon) and have noticed that such a normative line of inquiry has often had little effect on my respondents' established positions. But to get at the kind of information I have sought here I have had to ask leading questions. On the issue of leading questions, Kvale argues that they may be used in an interview depending "on the subject of your investigation and its purpose. An interviewer can consciously ask leading questions in order to gain information he/she feels is being kept back."<sup>533</sup> Generally speaking and positively too, the kind of short and to the point questions asked at the beginning of the interview and throughout most of the interviews have encouraged long and detailed responses from my respondents. Finally, something that I will discuss a little more below in

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<sup>533</sup> Kvale, S. (1997), *Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun*. Studentlitteratur, Lund, p. 145.  
"...deras användning beror på undersökningens ämne och syfte. Utfrågare kan medvetet ställa ledande frågor för att erhålla information som de misstänker hålls undan."

relation to my role as interviewer, during the course of most of my interviews the atmosphere has been very open and very relaxed and by the end of every interview I began to notice how the interview would begin to take on a conversational feel. This usually occurred following an exhaustion of questions on the conflict wherein a respondent would share something more personal or philosophical or merely express his/her feelings about something a little more. My role too would alter slightly into that of a conversational participant. I found this to be a positive thing, however.

### **Ethical considerations and interview conduct**

In the previous sub-sections I have discussed my interview approaches and illustrated how they worked in real interview situations. As I also mentioned, the majority, indeed all, of the interviews conducted were characterised by an atmosphere of openness and trust. This was denoted by the extent to which my respondents expressed their thoughts and opinions and the way in which many of the interviews near their conclusion would often turn into informal conversations. In my role as interviewer I have often tried to be sociable and congenial in order to make the respondents feel more relaxed and to be more receptive and able to provide honest and clear answers to the questions I asked them. What all of this alludes to is the importance of establishing an atmosphere of mutual consent between the interviewer and respondents. This can be achieved by following certain established procedures prior to conducting the interview.

First of all, “The conduct of the interview should be explained (what happens, and how, and the structure and organization of the interview), how responses may be recorded (and to seek permission if this is to happen), and these procedures should be observed throughout. During the interview the biases and values of the interviewer should not be revealed, and the interviewer should avoid being judgemental. [...] .”<sup>534</sup> Prior to every interview I have held I have explained to the respondent(s) how I aim to conduct the interview, the time it will take and I have always asked permission to use a recording device during the interview. Secondly, certain

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<sup>534</sup> Cohen *et al*, p. 361

ethical grounds need to be established before proceeding with your interview in order to ensure “informed consent, guarantees of confidentiality, beneficence and non-maleficence (i.e. that the interview may be to the advantage of the respondent and will not harm him or her).”<sup>535</sup> Reassuring your respondents that you will maintain their anonymity is crucial here but so too is the concealment of their identity and the values and positions of the interviewer. In the case of an often controversial topic such as the Israel/Palestine conflict, insuring all of the above is vital. Just to illustrate why, in some of my early pilot-interviews I interviewed a teacher who worked alongside collegial acquaintances to me at the time. The impression I received in an interview I held with the latter was that he/she had prior knowledge of my own particular standpoints on certain issues related to the conflict. I suspected that this was due to the fact that my acquaintances had discussed these with their colleagues in passing. Thus there was danger of the teacher in question possibly becoming predisposed to answering questions in a particular fashion. Perhaps this might have been done in order to appeal to my own (perceived) ideological or political standpoints or, even worse, to conceal how he/she really felt about the issue. However, as it transpired, the respondent in question was a very seasoned and experienced educator who did not appear swayed, not even by some of the more provocative or leading questions I asked.

During an even earlier interview, my role as interviewer was quite subdued. On the one hand, this allowed for an interesting and rich amount of information since the respondent was very confident and very opinionated but, on the other, prevented me from asking more probing questions. The respondent in question was very willing to express his/her particular positions and biases on issues. He/she was also keen to share with me his/her authoritative knowledge on matters pertaining to the roots of the conflict and the ‘radical left’ in Sweden, to mention but one specific topic raised. In some ways this was the perfect kind of interview situation since the respondent freely and openly expressed a range of ideas and issues while the interviewer

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<sup>535</sup> Cohen *et al*; Kvale, (1997), p. 142 In Swedish ”informerat samtycke” and ”konfidentialitet”



engaged in what can only be described as “active listening”.<sup>536</sup> The only time I asked a provocative question was when I raised the issue of Zionism and asked whether the teacher discussed its political and ideological dimensions in class, to wit, the response was “why would I do that?” I will discuss more of the content of that interview in the interview analysis chapter. Suffice to say for the time being that what the above points to is the issue of the “ ‘directiveness’ of the interviewer [...]”.<sup>537</sup> This has been measured according to “a 6-point scale of directiveness and responding [...] (1 = the least directive, and 6 = the most directive)”.<sup>538</sup> Referring to the work of Whyte in Cohen, the 6-point scale reads as follows:

Making encouraging noises.

Reflecting on remarks made by the informant.

Probing on the last remark made by the informant.

Probing an idea preceding the last remark by the informant.

Probing an idea expressed earlier in the interview.

Introducing a new topic.<sup>539</sup>

On reflection, most if not all of my interviews have followed the six-point scale above. Again, this could only be achieved in an atmosphere of openness and trust as well as the support of engaged and interested teacher respondents. As I have briefly discussed above, my interview respondents provided me with a great deal of information throughout most of the

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<sup>536</sup> Cohen, p. 362

<sup>537</sup> Ibid, p. 262

<sup>538</sup> Ibid

<sup>539</sup> Ibid, p. 262

interviews. These were interview situations generally characterised by brief and direct questions and long and thoughtful answers. Even in those instances where the interviews became more conversational or dialogical (intersubjective) my interview respondents still had more opportunities to express their ideas and remarks. All of this made reflecting, probing or following-up respondents' remarks and ideas a relatively easy exercise and one not marred by negative leading questions or the steering of topics and ideas. Importantly too, I was able to reinvestigate some of my preconceived ideas about the position of teachers with access to an 'official knowledge' curriculum on the conflict which did not appear to interact with perspectives from scholarly sources. I discovered a diversity of positions among a very small sample of teacher respondents even despite a general adherence to – putting it provocatively - “ontological givens”<sup>540</sup> connected to the selection of pivotal topics, themes, identities and roles.

The issue of body language is an important one to discuss too in so far as it influences the way in which respondents might answer questions. I would also add to this the issue of personal demeanour. For example, given the serious nature of the topic, I have reflexively adopted a relaxed and friendly demeanour during the interviews in order to make the atmosphere a relaxed and open one.

### Body language etc

Issues pertaining to body-language, facial expression, gestures and attentiveness are all important to creating interview conditions that will ensure optimum dialogue and a substantial amount of information too. In Cohen *et al* “Arksey and Knight (1999: 53) suggest [among other things] that the interviewer should [...] *avoid giving signs of approval or disapproval* of responses received [...], ensure that he/she (i.e. the interviewer) understands a response, checking if necessary (e.g. ‘Am I right in thinking that you mean...’).”<sup>541</sup> In addition, “if a response is inadequate, but the interviewer feels that the respondent may have more to say, thank the

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<sup>540</sup> Butler, J. (2009), *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?*, Verso, London, New York, p. 149

<sup>541</sup> Cohen, p. 262

respondent and add ‘and could you please tell me ....’<sup>542</sup> (my italics) On occasion during my interviews I have reacted to responses with an expression of heightened interest in order to signal that I wish for the respondent to carry on or develop a particular response. I have often used the Swedish expression “Aha” roughly translated as “really?” or “oh?” to signal a desire on my part for the respondent to provide more information. I have often done this in relation to remarks or statements made by my respondents which reflect repeated topics and themes appearing in the textbooks I have examined. This brings me indirectly too to the issue of interview transcription which, in my case, also involved interview translation.

### The transcription and translation stage

For a number of reasons, transcriptions of recorded interviews are not precise representations of what was said and how it was said. As Kvale writes, what is missing from the transcribed version of an interview is the interview’s spoken and live “context, whose spatial, temporal and social dimension is witnessed by those taking part but not for the reader of a draft<sup>543</sup>” Compounding this too is the fact that I am translating from Swedish to English. Sometimes the translation and transcription of interviews may result in misunderstood or misheard words, missing words swallowed up by the respondents themselves or simply not readily discerned by a non-native speaker as well as occasional background noise. In addition, transcriptions of interviews entail an organisation of the data into structured sentences with full-stops, commas, abbreviations and so on and are sometimes abridged versions of the original interview. As Kvale in Cohen remarks “the transcript can become an opaque screen between the researcher and the original live interview situation.”<sup>544</sup> To possibly rectify this I have recorded different kinds of emphases occurring in the live interview, such as, the “tone of voice” of the speaker, “inflection”, “pauses [and] silences”, “emphases placed by the speaker” as well as “mood” and so on.<sup>545</sup> Furthermore, as

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<sup>542</sup> Cohen, p. 262

<sup>543</sup> Kvale, (1997), p. 153. “sammanhang, vars rumsliga, tidsliga och sociala dimensioner framträder för de deltagande men inte för läsaren av utskriften.”

<sup>544</sup> Cohen, p. 367

<sup>545</sup> Ibid

Kvale writes, "Interview draft data are neither copies nor representations of some unfettered reality; they are *interpretative constructions* which function as usable tools for the purpose at hand."<sup>546</sup> (my italics) Thus all of the meanings communicated in an interview situation are not readily gleaned from the interview situation itself but may emerge at the transcription stage (hence the need to follow-up on occasion too). In addition, as the interviewer gains new knowledge pertaining to his/her field of study, he/she may begin to analyse other levels in a text that were previously hidden. Meanings do not always readily reveal themselves within a text or transcription but may be inferred at different stages. As Kvale writes, "The continuing dialogue with the text can lead to a renewed conversation with the interviewee; to a joint development of the zone of possible textual content which resided in the original interview."<sup>547</sup>

Fortunately, having made very clear recordings of every interview I have been able to re-orientate myself with the very many tones of voice, silences, and inflections and so on throughout the interviews; even despite the loss of body language and facial expressions. Importantly too, each reading of my interview data has also revealed new information and as such has generated new questions with which to probe again the selected portions of my data. This heuristic rule of thumb has been followed through simultaneously probing the different scholarly literature on, among other things, the conflict's history, and theories on the political dimensions of educational knowledge. I have also probed the role of teachers within the school system. I have done this through reinvestigating my data and in turn my own preconceived ideas. On those occasions I have had to listen to certain sections of the interview again in order to hear some of the Swedish words being spoken I have also corrected portions of transcription and reevaluated previous interpretations. Indeed, incorrectly hearing a particular word or

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<sup>546</sup> Kvale, p. 152. "Utskrifter är inte kopior eller representationer av någon ursprungliga verklighet; de är tolkande konstruktioner som fungerar som användbara verktyg för givna syften."

<sup>547</sup> Ibid, p. 167. "Att man glömmer bort det gemensamma skapandet av intervjuuttalandena och försummar intervjuarens konstruktiva bidrag till svaren." "Den fortsatta dialogen med texten kan leda till ett förnyat samtal med den intervjuade, till en gemensam utveckling av den zon av möjliga innebörder som rymdes i den ursprungliga intervjun."

words spoken may dramatically influence the researcher's or listener's interpretation of them. For example, for a number of weeks I had not heard a key-word expressed by one of the teachers in the group interview I had held and thus had interpreted the information incorrectly. On listening back to the section of the interview I discovered that the word was not only different but had more significance for my general thesis. Lastly, it cannot be overemphasised that the kind of values, preconceived ideas, knowledge and normative aims that a researcher invariably brings with him/her to an area of research will influence how problems are defined. This will also influence in turn the selection and focus of topics and themes as well as their interpretation. Indeed, my own normative point of departure has influenced the problems I consider to be of importance and has guided my focus. At the same time I have also discovered new problems and unexpected perspectives on understanding and explaining the political and ideological dimension of school knowledge on the Israel/Palestine conflict.

### **The limited position of the researcher**

In the previous sections I had already begun to touch upon the interpretative position of the researcher and in my theory chapter that of my teacher respondents. In this section I will briefly discuss my position as researcher. As I mentioned in the previous sections, the kind of values, preconceived ideas, (scientific, layman) knowledge and normative aims that a researcher invariably brings with him/her to an area of research will influence how he/she defines problems. The central point here is that the interaction of both layman and scientific knowledge may simultaneously act to constrain and enable paths to understanding and explaining social phenomena. On the matter of preconceived ideas, in this regard, and how they relate to one's reading of texts, Bergström and Boréus write the following

Our individual experiences, our perception of the world, people and society, in which social context we interact, our education, our

knowledge of textual genres, our language, affects our understanding of texts.<sup>548</sup>

This insight is understood as at once problematic and an unavoidable and necessary condition for enabling interpretation. As the authors write, “Without a degree of preconceived ideas, interpretation is impossible.”<sup>549</sup> In addition to the above, my identification of a particular problem with regard to the framing of the conflict is connected to other texts and discourses and my orientation with them. For example, my political and ethical stances on conflicts and wars in general, my orientation with scholarly sources on the history of the conflict as well as my commitment to encouraging critical-analytical approaches to teaching and learning about conflicts and wars, all contribute to my reading (and re-reading) of the textbooks and teachers’ statements.<sup>550</sup> In other words, these texts always “receive a new meaning”<sup>551</sup> on the basis of my readings and continued orientation with other texts. What this means too is that like my teacher respondents I too “interpret and operate in an already interpreted world”<sup>552</sup> with its “everyday language and laymen’s knowledge”.<sup>553</sup> The “double hermeneutic”<sup>554</sup> that this points to does not suggest, however, that readings of the world are impossible beyond the text but that texts and discourses are produced in interaction with a

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<sup>548</sup> Bergström, Boréus, (2000), p. 26

<sup>549</sup> Ibid

<sup>550</sup> My implied position on the importance of adhering to international law will become evident later. However, this does not preclude a criticism of international law too.

<sup>551</sup> Ibid

<sup>552</sup> Cohen *et al*, p. 9; ”Anthony Giddens och det senmoderna” i Månson, P,(1998), *Moderna samhällsteorier*, Rabén Prisma, Smedjebacken, p. 418

<sup>553</sup> Ibid

<sup>554</sup> I draw upon Giddens’ understanding of the “double hermeneutic” which assumes that there is “no absolute separation between” laymen’s knowledge and “the production of scientific knowledge”. Månson, p. 418; See also Giddens’ *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990) and *Runaway World* (1999). In the former work, Giddens discussion of the reflexivity of Modernity alludes to the “double hermeneutic” in as much as thoughts and practices are “constantly examined in the light of incoming information about those very practices. Giddens adds that even the Social Sciences (specifically, Sociology) “participate in this reflexive relation”. Giddens, (1990), p. 40. While theories and concepts may not be mastered by the lay individual, they are implicated in “the practical mastery of those notions.” ”, Giddens, (1990), pp. 38-41. In turn such lay interpretations may feedback on the system from which they were originally instantiated.

“constraining and limiting”<sup>555</sup> social reality. Although limited and constrained, then, as a researcher through my training in theoretical and methodological approaches I am able to glean scientific knowledge on particular impacting socio-historical events despite (or thanks to) the intrusion of (necessary) values and ideas. In this regard, as a researcher I am able to adopt a kind of third hermeneutic or critical analytical position with regard to my own reading of the textbooks and teachers’ statements. While this may never furnish me with absolute (or unfettered) “truth”, citing Guba and Lincoln Pring writes that “through a hermeneutic dialectic process, a new construction will emerge that is not “better” or “truer” than its predecessors, but simply more sophisticated than either”.<sup>556</sup> In the following final sub-section of this chapter I will briefly comment on some of the limitations of applying a discourse-analytical approach to my interview transcriptions.

### On the limitations of a discourse analysis of interviews

Briefly here I will discuss some of the general limitations of applying a discourse analysis to teacher respondents’ different statements. Interview transcriptions of teachers’ statements are effectively frozen in time and cannot provide a wholly reliable impression of “what people think”<sup>557</sup> and feel on a particular topic from day to day. Importantly too, it is difficult to deduce from one single interview how reliable the connection is between what teachers claim they do in a teaching situation and what actually takes place in the class room. Further, my teacher respondents are dynamic individuals who possess “experiences, feelings”<sup>558</sup> as well as “attitudes ... and memories”<sup>559</sup>, which all *change* over time and in relation to people he/she talks to and shares ideas with. A discourse-analysis cannot capture, for example, how one particular teacher really felt prior to the interview and after or whether the teacher is being wholly honest in his/her statements. To illustrate this, I received an e-mail from one of my respondents about one

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<sup>555</sup> Pring, (2000), p. 50

<sup>556</sup> Ibid

<sup>557</sup> Jørgensen, W, M, Phillips, L, (1999), p. 149

<sup>558</sup> Ibid

<sup>559</sup> Ibid

week after our interview. In response to a follow-up request I made to the teacher to elaborate on a statement he/she made during the interview, I was actually surprised to discover that the teacher had altered his/her position on a particular issue. In effect this altered my general impression of the teacher's overall political and ideological standpoint as I interpreted it during the interview. While a discourse analysis can capture a snapshot of a particular individual's different discursive influences in the moment, it cannot fully reveal the full extent to which anyone adheres to or follows such influences. The combination, perhaps, of an ethnographic approach with a discourse-analytical approach to examining what teachers claim and mean over a longer period of time would be a better approach. In addition, a series of lesson observations may also provide more reliable insights into how teachers actually put into practice what they claim ideally to be doing in lesson time. That said, the snapshots my approach provide do offer insights into the kind of curriculum material the teacher respondents employ and the kind of general assumptions they appear to adhere to. In addition, my interview material also offers indications of the teachers' individual critical standpoints.

On this final point, then, in the following chapters I will employ both my theoretical and methodological approaches to my analysis of both the textbook content and teacher interview transcriptions.



## Chapter Four

# Making Connections and Constructing Causes

In this, the first of my three analysis chapters, I will examine how the root causes of and parties to the conflict are presented in the 9<sup>th</sup> grade Swedish History school textbooks from the 1990s and 2000s. As discussed in my methodology chapter, each of the nineteen textbooks contains a short chapter of between one to four pages of text on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which are divided into a number of different sections with different headings. Beneath these separate section headings are often two or more paragraphs corresponding to the topic presented in the section heading. Many of the chapters on the conflict are followed by a list of questions or assignments for the pupils to carry out either in the form of a class discussion or in written form. Compared to coverage of other historical conflicts in the textbooks, the Israel/Palestine conflict takes up very little space and is sometimes discussed as an adjunct to the Second World War or Jewish history. For example, the period of the Second World War will take up more than four pages, sometimes even ten pages. In addition, the historical background established in the textbooks I have covered has altered slightly since the early 1990s with additional information on events which made it into the mainstream media (e.g. both *Intifadas* and the Oslo peace process).

### Distinguishing content analysis and identifying discourses

As already discussed in my method chapter, I will be carrying out a content and discourse analysis of the texts. As will become clear, while areas of the analysis simultaneously incorporate a discourse and content analysis, some

areas generally follow only one of these. In my overview of the structure of this analysis I will discuss how each section might be identified in this light. My analysis will involve a) examining the subject-matter or content selection in the texts and b) an analysis of the kinds of established (ideological) discourses the content appears to draw upon. The findings of my analysis both here and in subsequent chapters will be placed into a number of discourses that I will identify. As I will explain later, discourse three below constitutes an order of discourse within which different discourses vie and posit “natural” connections. As I will explain here below, these discourses differ from so-called established discourses beyond the text but these are also understood as constituting the order of discourse I have identified. The different headings for the discourses I have identified are as follows:

*Discourse one:* Jewish/Arab connection to the land

*Discourse two:* the discourse on people-nations

*Discourse three:* the “equal” claim discourse (order of discourse)

Both in this chapter and subsequent chapters preceding each section of my analysis I will briefly summarise what each of these discourses constitute and how they connect to the content under analysis. It will also be important for the reader to distinguish between the discourses I have identified for the presentation of my analysis and the established discourses beyond the texts and teachers’ statements I have identified which the former and latter ostensibly draw upon. The major established discourses I have identified are the Oslo discourse and international law discourse. As I discussed in chapter one, arguably the Oslo discourse has achieved hegemony in mainstream debate on why the 2000 Camp David peace negotiations failed. As I will also show, the Oslo discourse as it appears in the textbook chapters also interacts with and constitutes the discourses I have identified above. The “equal” claim discourse, as I will later discuss, may be understood as an

amalgamation of the discourses discussed or a kind of “order of discourse”.<sup>560</sup> It is my hope that the approach I have outlined above will enable the reader to more easily navigate through the different analysis chapters. On the basis of my findings, in the final chapter of this thesis I will discuss what might be inferred as the textbook chapters’ and teacher statements’ (see chapter six) established framework on the conflict. Incorporated into this analysis at times too will be some reflections on how language is employed.

While this is a structured analytical approach, following more or less the chronological ordering of the material in the chapters, I will simultaneously employ the different levels of analysis I have discussed to each topic under analysis. I will also be drawing upon secondary scholarly sources in my analysis. The secondary sources discussed earlier provide references and insights into a scientific debate on the history of the conflict in order to facilitate a comparative analysis. Here and in subsequent chapters I will also be drawing on sources which provide other theoretical insights (e.g. the work of Andersen and Hobsbawm). As I have previously discussed, History school textbooks provide a body of “official knowledge”<sup>561</sup>. In addition, in the institutional setting of the school, in the hands of teachers, they constitute a source of authoritative knowledge in interaction with other discourses (and texts) external and internal to the school (e.g. the media, the Internet, public debate, teachers’ ‘MR’ and so on). As I have discussed too, this points to a power/knowledge dimension. This means that the truth claims of “official knowledge” are conferred objective authority instead of being critically examined on the basis of whatever premises or assumptions such knowledge takes as its point of departure. Thus, established knowledge such as this invariably possesses a political and ideological dimension and as such can be contested. To put it another way, there are different discourses on the history of the conflict. For example, the textbooks provide one such discourse and scholarly sources another but with one or other wielding more authority

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<sup>560</sup> Jøregensen, Phillips, (2000), p. 34. Employing Fairclough’s analogy, the authors describe an order of discourse as “a limited number of discourses which struggle within the same terrain.”

<sup>561</sup> Apple, (1979); Luke & Nozaki, (2006); Dimitriadis, (2006)

“according to who is speaking, his [or her] position of power, the institutional context in which it happens to be situated”.<sup>562</sup>

### Critically comparing scholarship and “official knowledge”

Discussing another level of analysis, it is the premises and assumptions which undergird the more explicit claims to truth in the textbook chapters which need to be examined. This is because it is these which function ideologically as the common-sense linkages *between* actors and events, causes and outcomes presented in the textbooks. Equally, even the more rigorous scholarly literature on the conflict is open to critical comparison and contestation. Because even in the event of agreement on empirical evidence, the influence of divergent political and ideological interpretations on the part of different scholars may have some sway in framing our understanding of historical events (see discussion in chapter one). That said it is important to make a distinction between rigorous scholarly research and the “official knowledge” presented in the form of textbook content; lest the entire purpose of social scientific investigation be based on and reduced to defending flights of postmodern relativism or strength of opinion. On discussing the importance of the process of scientific research and the traditions undergirding it, Pring asserts that “the traditions through which [...] basic facts about reality have come to be conceptualised, tested and found adequate, are ‘givens’ which evolve through criticism and discovery, not through the fiat of those in positions of power.”<sup>563</sup> Holding to this position, I would argue that the facts presented in History school textbooks would quantitatively and qualitatively greatly contrast with those facts “found adequate” through scientific research. However, more often than not, History school textbooks are the sole providers of objective facts on the basis of which pupils will learn about or discuss a particular conflict-event and in addition a particular established framing of them.

### Structure of analysis

The topics and themes covered in each section of this chapter have been determined on the basis of the selection provided in the textbooks

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<sup>562</sup> Foucault, M, (1998), p. 100

<sup>563</sup> Pring, R, (2000), p. 118

themselves and what I have discovered to be the most frequently addressed topics and themes in them. So at the beginning of each section I will begin with a summary of the scientific debate on the topics and themes determined in order to compare how they are treated in the textbooks. This will be followed by a brief summary of the main points of the debate I refer to (e.g. points of consensus and so on) or what the debate boils down to. This will also allow the reader to determine both the consistencies and inconsistencies between the two sources of knowledge as well as providing a picture of which topics and themes tend to dominate in the textbook chapters. Following the summary, there will be an analysis of the textbook sources themselves and then in the last part of the sections I will discuss and summarise the findings of my analysis. Section 4.0 will be on how the opening sections in the textbook chapters establish an historical presence in the Holy land through emphasising (constructing) the respective histories and identities of Israelis and Palestinians. In this sense, section 4.0 simultaneously follows a content and discourse analysis. Section 4.1 will discuss topics and themes from the period of the Balfour Declaration onwards covering issues such as Zionism, broken promises and Arab and Jewish antagonism. Section 4.2 will discuss the issues of Partition to the 1948 war and the creation of the refugee problem. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 follow more closely a content analysis in which I examine the inclusion and ordering of historical facts on the conflict. However, such content may also contain certain premises and/or ideological assumptions concerning, for example, the roles, actions and intentions of each party to the conflict. The implications of this will be examined more closely in my analysis.

## Section 4.0 Establishing a Historical Connection to the Holy Land

In this section I will be examining how the respective histories and identities of the Israelis and Palestinians are presented in the History school textbooks. References to the scholarly debate will also appear in my analysis in order to compare and contrast with some of the facts presented in the textbooks. In

line with my general theoretical approach, the main purpose of my analysis is to determine what the established framework on the conflict is in the textbooks through the examination of different discourses and how they interact or (rather) function ideologically. For example, through examining how the topics and themes in the textbooks construct a historical connection to the land on the part of Jews and Arabs. Before doing so I will discuss some theories on the construction of nations and national identity as well as research on biblical archaeology.

### Constructing imagined communities in the Holy Land

As I will show in the following section, the historical information in the opening sections of the textbooks merges the themes of religion and nationhood in an attempt to construct a particular connection to the Holy land on the part of one or other party to the conflict. I identify this function of the textbook chapters as part of the construction of a national historical narrative for an imagined community<sup>564</sup> or nation. To quote Andersen, the symbols, artefacts and a homogenised vernacular both “ ‘new’ and ‘old’ ” which form the basis of the narrative are also “understood synchronically, co-existing within homogenous, empty time”<sup>565</sup>. This is done to construct a “simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present.”<sup>566</sup> Interestingly too, Andersen connects this process and the rise and spread of nationalism and national identity it ushered in to the “capitalist enterprise [of] book publishing”<sup>567</sup> or “print knowledge [which] lived by reproducibility and dissemination.”<sup>568</sup> This process in turn facilitated the acceptance of “the systems of meaning being presented by those [...] doing the ‘imagining’”<sup>569</sup>

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<sup>564</sup> Anderson, B, (1983/1999), *Imagined Communities*, Verso, London/New York

<sup>565</sup> *Ibid*, p. 187

<sup>566</sup> *Ibid*, p. 24

<sup>567</sup> *Ibid*, p. 37

<sup>568</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>569</sup> Stern, M, (2005), *Naming Security: constructing identity*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, UK, p. 39

through, to quote Hobsbawm, the “invention of tradition”<sup>570</sup> which is described by the latter as

[...] a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.<sup>571</sup> (my italics)

To employ a phrase coined by Keith Whitelam, in a number of cases the historical narrative in the textbooks I have examined presents a “retrojection of the nation state into antiquity”<sup>572</sup> to “provide the vital continuity”<sup>573</sup> between modern and ancient Israel/Palestine and its peoples. In one or two of the textbooks this has meant connecting the modern present, as Boyarin puts it, “with the Old Testament narrative”<sup>574</sup>. Inspired by Andersen and Hobsbawm *et al*, in his 2009 book *The Invention of the Jewish People*<sup>575</sup>, professor of contemporary history Shlomo Sand discusses and analyses how the idea of a Jewish people or *ethnos* is invented in connection to among other things the rise of late nineteenth century nationalism. Sand traces the various elements brought together in contemporary Israeli discourses on Jewish history. These constitute invented traditions, scientism, religion and political ideology in the service of establishing a distinctive and separate

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<sup>570</sup> Hobsbawm, E, Ranger, T, (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 1

<sup>571</sup> Ibid

<sup>572</sup> Whitelam, Keith (1996), *The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History* (London and New York: Routledge) cited in Masalha, (2007), p. 312

<sup>573</sup> Masalha, (2007), *The Bible & Zionism: Invented Traditions, Archeology and Post-colonialism in Israel-Palestine*, Zed Books, London, New York p. 312

<sup>574</sup> Reading Exodus into History Author(s): Jonathan Boyarin Source: *New Literary History*, Vol. 23, No. 3, History, Politics, and Culture (Summer, 1992), pp. 523-554 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/469219> Accessed: 23/10/2008 12:52, p. 533

<sup>575</sup> Sand, S, (2009), *The Invention of The Jewish People*, Verso, London

nation-people. Masalha also discusses the construction or invention of a Palestinian people and its preordained nationalism based on a history of “Arabs (Palestinians), who are Muslims [and who purportedly] originate from the people who lived in the region a thousand years before the Jews arrived there.”<sup>576</sup> The function of such a narrative too was to construct “a mythologized ancient history of Palestine in order to create an anti-Zionist Palestinian counter-narrative.”<sup>577</sup> The national narrative also finds its historicity in various mythic texts such as the Bible. With regard to the matter of the historicity of the Old Testament, there has waged a debate since the 1990s within the field of biblical archaeology about the evidence to support the historical existence of pivotal events in the Old Testament. According to Finkelstein and Silberman, in his efforts to find such evidence one of the first pioneers of the biblical archaeological research, American scholar William F. Albright, “in the early twentieth century [...] concentrated mostly on the excavation of large city mounds”<sup>578</sup> called “tells”.<sup>579</sup> Following “decades of excavation, researchers have been able to reconstruct the vast archaeological context into which biblical history must be fit.”<sup>580</sup> For the followers of Albright, the material correspondences between finds in Israel/Palestine and biblical myth suggested that the Bible was more than “late and fanciful priestly literature, written with no historical basis at all.”<sup>581</sup> This older group of archaeologists contrasted with the later generation of so-called textual critics who did not take “the historical narratives of the Bible at face value.”<sup>582</sup> But according to Finkelstein and Silberman, up until the 1990s “the Bible could be read as a basically reliable

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<sup>576</sup> Masalha, (2007), p. 167

<sup>577</sup> Ibid, p. 252. Masalha writes that “Cattan, a Palestinian Christian born in Jerusalem in 1906, operates in Foucauldian terms in a world of discourse divided between accepted (Zionist-Jewish) discourse and excluded (Palestinian) discourse, between the dominant Israeli discourse and the dominated Palestinian one. *He found it necessary to have recourse to a mythologised ancient history of Palestine in order to create an anti-Zionist Palestinian counter-narrative.*”

<sup>578</sup> Finkelstein, I, Silberman, A, N, (2002), *The Bible Unearthed*, Touchstone, New York, p.

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<sup>579</sup> Ibid

<sup>580</sup> Ibid

<sup>581</sup> Ibid, pp. 20-21

<sup>582</sup> Ibid, p. 21



historical document.”<sup>583</sup> Then a dramatic shift occurred through the application of “the methods of the social sciences [...] to examine the human realities that lay *behind* the text.”<sup>584</sup> Biblical sagas such as the age of “patriarchs to Egypt, to Exodus, [and] to the establishment of the [Davidic] monarchy”<sup>585</sup> have been re-examined in the wake of this shift. My examination of the introductory textbook chapter sections will discuss which tradition or traditions that they appear to follow. To offer one initial example, in a textbook from 1996 historical reference is made to the presence of nomadic shepherds from Mesopotamia in ancient Israel. This reference in turn tacitly invokes the biblical saga of the Patriarchs from “Mesopotamia, Iraq of today.”<sup>586</sup> In addition, in another one of the textbooks a reference is made to “Arabs (Palestinians), who are Muslims, [and who] originate from the people who lived in the region a thousand years before the Jews arrived there”<sup>587</sup>. In other words, an intermingling or interaction of discourse types *naturally* occurs in the chapter within the framework of an authoritative text. Finkelstein and Silberman claim further that the search for evidence of the *historical* patriarchs has been “ultimately unsuccessful”<sup>588</sup>. This is because “none of the periods around the biblically suggested date provided a completely compatible background to the biblical stories”<sup>589</sup>. Furthermore, evidence of “the infiltration of a clearly defined ethnic group”<sup>590</sup> whether Jewish or Canaanite is very difficult to pinpoint. Keeping these reflections in mind, I will now examine the opening sections of the History school textbook chapters which I will argue provide a discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land.

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<sup>583</sup> Finkelstein, I, Silberman, p. 21

<sup>584</sup> Ibid

<sup>585</sup> Ibid, p. 107; 34

<sup>586</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996) *Levande Historia Läsebok 3*. The references in the textbook to Palestine as part of a Jewish homeland in 1300 BCE or the 14<sup>th</sup> century BCE reinforces this too. ”Palestina, där den nuvarande staten Israel ligger, var en del av judarnas hemland från ca 1300 f Kr.”, (my italic)

<sup>587</sup> Allmgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998) *SO Direkt Historia 3*, Bonnier Utbildning Förlag AB, Stockholm, pp. 150-153

<sup>588</sup> Finkelstein, I, Silberman, A, N, p. 34

<sup>589</sup> Ibid, p. 35

<sup>590</sup> Finkelstein, I, Silberman, p. 107

## Jewish/Arab connection to the land

Briefly, by the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land is meant all the topics and themes in the textbooks which predominantly proceed from biblical-history and national ideology as a point of departure for understanding and explaining the history of the conflict.

In the opening short section of the chapter on the conflict in *SO boken historia 9* entitled “Israel and Palestine”<sup>591</sup> from 1991 and 92, the topic of the Jewish people’s historical presence in “the Roman province of Judea in Palestine with its capital as Jerusalem”<sup>592</sup> is introduced. The 98/99 textbook chapters focus on the period of the birth of Jesus when “the Romans ruled Palestine”<sup>593</sup> and the Jews had lived there for centuries.<sup>594</sup> We learn too of how the Romans crushed the “Jewish uprising many times, in particular just before year 70.”<sup>595</sup> Introducing here the theme of *Diaspora* both the Jewish Temple and Jerusalem are destroyed and the Jews of Jerusalem “either fled of their own accord or were forced into exile”<sup>596</sup>. Following this we learn of how the Jews had lived “spread out”<sup>597</sup> in countries in North Africa and Europe “for two thousand years”<sup>598</sup> and how many of them now lived in the United States after emigrating there from Europe. Returning to the 1992 textbook, the opening section in the chapter on the conflict begins by establishing a Jewish historical presence in Palestine during Roman times. The province of Judea is mentioned and Jerusalem is described as its capital city. Historical events in 60 AD are then discussed (cf. 70 AD in other textbooks) when the Jews of Judea are expelled by the Roman “occupying power”<sup>599</sup>. At the same time as the Jews from Judea are expelled, Jerusalem is destroyed and the Old Temple is razed with the Western Wall remaining.

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<sup>591</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992) *SO boken Historia 9*, Gleerups Förlag, pp. 335 – 339

<sup>592</sup> Ibid

<sup>593</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>594</sup> Ibid

<sup>595</sup> Ibid

<sup>596</sup> Ibid

<sup>597</sup> Ibid

<sup>598</sup> Ibid

<sup>599</sup> Ibid

We then learn that a “small remnant of the Jewish people”<sup>600</sup> is left in Palestine following these events. The following sentence too describes the “large majority of Jews”<sup>601</sup> who came to Europe and other nations following their expulsion. A similar presentation of this period is presented in subsequent textbooks.<sup>602</sup>

Connected to the theme of *Diaspora* in the textbooks too is the theme of return which in turn is closely connected to the religious theme of Messianism. Let us examine how this is treated in the textbooks.

In the 2000 edition of *Hållplatser i historia* we learn that “After almost 2000 years of humiliation, persecution, extermination, the state of Israel was established in 1948 and the Jews could return to the land they saw as their own.”<sup>603</sup> In the 2003 edition of *Levande historia* we learn that the “dream of

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<sup>600</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992)

<sup>601</sup> Ibid

<sup>602</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996) *Levande Historia Läsebok 3*, Natur & Kultur Stockholm; Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000) *Hållplatser i historia*, “När romarna erövrade judarnas land år 70 efter Kristus så spreds judar över stora delar av världen.” ; Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003) *Levande Historia elevbok 9*, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, tredje tryckning, Stockholm, pp. 546 – 551; Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H (2005) *SO Direkt Historia*, Bonnier Utbildning AB, Stockholm, pp. 456-458. ”Israeler och palestinier i Mellanöstern. Omkring år 70 e.Kr fördrevs många tusen judar från Palestina efter att de försökt göra uppror mot romarna, som då härskade i området. Sedan dess har judarna skingrats över stora områden i världen, en förvisning som brukar kallas diaspora. Judarna har i omgångar utsatts för svåra pogromer (förföljelser) bland annat beskyllda för att ha orsakat Jesus Kristus död. Sex miljoner av dem dog i nazisternas koncentrationsläger under andra världskriget (1939-1945).”; Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007) *SOS Historia: ämnesboken*; Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003) *Historia: punkt SO*, Gleerups Utbildning AB, Malmö; Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003) *Levande Historia 9: minikurs*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm.”<sup>4</sup>. Arabstaterna och Israel I. År 70 efter Kristus förstördes Jerusalem av romerska Soldater. Förstörelsen var ett straff för ett judiskt uppror mot romarna, som styrde Jerusalem och Palestina vid den tiden. Många judar beslöt då att fly från Palestina. De bosatte sig i olika länder. En del kom till Europa, andra till Asien eller Afrika. Men de drömde om att en gång få komma tillbaka till Jerusalem och Palestina. Nästan 2000 år senare skulle drömmen bli sann.”

<sup>603</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000) *Hållplatser i historia*, “När romarna erövrade judarnas land år 70 efter Kristus så spreds judar över stora delar av världen.”

, ”Efter nästan två tusen år av förnedring, förföljelse, förintelse, grundades staten Israel 1948 och judarna kunde återvända till det land de betraktade som sitt.”

return was kept alive”<sup>604</sup> through a ritual greeting between Jews every Easter for centuries – “Next year in Palestine”<sup>605</sup>. In the 2002 edition of *Grundbok historia* we learn about how

the Jews, who have been spread out all over the world and persecuted for hundreds of years in many countries, have dreamt of a country of their own the whole time, Palestine, the land which, according to the Bible, they had been given by God.<sup>606</sup>

The dream of return is presented as a universal aspiration among *all* Jews. Understood as a homogenous and separate people, “they”, the Jewish people have desired return “the entire time”.<sup>607</sup> In *Puls 9: Historia vår egen tid* from 1996 we learn how the Jewish people have “longed for Palestine”<sup>608</sup> which as the section informs us was “their original homeland, according to the Bible.”<sup>609</sup> In *Levande historia läsebok 3* from 1996 we learn that the causes of the conflict can only be answered by “looking back into history.”<sup>610</sup> Israel is described as “one of the world’s youngest states but at the same time one of the oldest.”<sup>611</sup> This is followed by the claim that the main source of the country’s history is “the Bible or, more correctly, the Old Testament.”<sup>612</sup> We are told too that Israeli children read the Bible both as “a holy book and a

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<sup>604</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003) *Levande Historia elevbok 9*, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, tredje tryckning, Stockholm, pp. 546 – 551

<sup>605</sup> Ibid

<sup>606</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002) *Grundbok Historia*, Natur & Kultur, Stockholm, pp. 319-320

<sup>607</sup> Ibid

<sup>608</sup> Ibid

<sup>609</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002), pp. 319-320

<sup>610</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996) *Levande Historia Läsebok 3*

<sup>611</sup> Ibid

<sup>612</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996), ” Israel är en av världens yngsta stater men samtidigt en av världens äldsta. Den främsta källan till landets äldre historia är Bibeln, eller rättare sagt Gamla testamentet. Israeliska skolbarn läser Bibeln både som helig bok och som historiebok.

Palestina, där den nuvarande staten Israel ligger, var en del av judarnas hemland från ca 1300 f Kr. De var kringvandrande fårherdar, som ursprungligen kommit från Mesopotamien, dvs nuvarande Irak. Bibeln säger att Gud lovat dem och deras barn landet Israel.”

history book.”<sup>613</sup> In another statement we learn that Palestine was “a part of the Jewish homeland from around 1300 years BC”<sup>614</sup> and that the inhabitants of this land were “nomadic shepherds who originally came from Mesopotamia, Iraq of today.”<sup>615</sup> Concluding the section we learn about the biblical claim “that God had promised them [the Jewish people] and their children the land of Israel.”<sup>616</sup> In the 2003 edition of *Historia punkt SO* we learn that “Jews have lived in Israel for over 3000 years”<sup>617</sup>. This apparently refers to the period of the Davidic Monarchy as told in Biblical saga. As mentioned, references to the historical suffering of the Jewish people are made in connection with the topics and themes above. Their historical persecution is connected to among other things pogroms, ghettoisation and accusations of them “being responsible for Jesus’ death”.<sup>618</sup> In addition, we learn that the Jews were blamed for “pestilence and war”<sup>619</sup> and were exposed to anti-Semitism. The pivotal event of Jewish historical persecution presented in the textbooks is the Nazi holocaust. The chapter in *Levande historia elevbok 9* from 2003 entitled “the Arab States and Israel”<sup>620</sup> begins by discussing how journalists and photographers in 1945 “reported on Nazi extermination and concentration camps and on the genocide of six million Jews”<sup>621</sup>. This discovery we learn precipitated a “sense of anger and shame”<sup>622</sup> which lead to people in Europe and the US permitting the establishment of a state in Palestine on behalf of the Jewish people. The establishment of Israel would prevent them from being “hunted and murdered”<sup>623</sup> and would be a place where they “could feel proud to be

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<sup>613</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996)

<sup>614</sup> Ibid

<sup>615</sup> Ibid

<sup>616</sup> Ibid. Interestingly, the claim is neither indorsed nor critically examined in the textbook but appears to conjoin other cultural claims allegedly propounded by Israeli Jews or Jews in general.

<sup>617</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003) *Historia: punkt SO*, Gleerups Utbildning AB, Malmö, pp. 118-121

<sup>618</sup> Ibid, pp. 546 – 551

<sup>619</sup> Ibid

<sup>620</sup> Ibid

<sup>621</sup> Ibid

<sup>622</sup> Ibid

<sup>623</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000), “Där skulle de slippa jagas och dödas, där skulle de kunna känna sig stolta över att vara judar.”

Jewish”.<sup>624</sup> Indeed, most of the textbooks elaborate the purpose of the establishment of Israel in similar terms. This is even done in connection with “the 19<sup>th</sup> century Jews in Europe [who] began working towards acquiring a land of their own in Palestine”<sup>625</sup> where “the Jews of the world could live in safety”<sup>626</sup>. In the 2000 edition of *Hållplatser i historia* a famous slogan “attributed to Israel Zangwill, an early supporter of [Theodor] Herzl [...]”<sup>627</sup> is echoed. We read in connection with the establishment of Israel that it was felt that a “people without a land [had returned] to a land without a people, as it is called.”<sup>628</sup> To contrast with the claim, however, in the same chapter the presence of an Arab population is mentioned (see below).

### Arab or Palestinian connection to the land

How does the Jewish connection to the land established in the textbooks contrast with the Arab connection to the land in the textbooks? In addition, which latent or emergent theme is tacitly instantiated and supported by this historical reconstruction? In the 1992 edition of *SO boken historia 9* we learn that Palestine “is invaded by Arabs”<sup>629</sup> in the centuries following the *Diaspora*. In the 1998/99 editions of *SO Direkt historia 3* in the chapter entitled “Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East”<sup>630</sup> we learn that “Israelis and Palestinians struggle over *the right* to Palestine”<sup>631</sup>. (my italic) Jewish Israelis “claim that their ancestors immigrated to Palestine about

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<sup>624</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000)

<sup>625</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007) *SOS Historia: ämnesboken*, Amquist & Wiksell, pp. 362-364

”Mellanöstern kallas den del av världen där Israel och de arabiska länderna ligger. Sedan mer än femtio år har händelser i Mellanöstern så gott som varje vecka varit i nyheterna. Dessa nyheter handlar nästan bara om krig, terror och hat. Vad beror konflikterna i Mellanöstern på?”

<sup>626</sup> Ibid

<sup>627</sup> Review article: The Immovable Flight over the Transitional Nature of Israeli Identity, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, April 2007 34(1), 75-84: 78; see also Finkelstein, (2003), p. 95

<sup>628</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007), ”Ett folk utan land återvänder till ett land utan folk”, hette det.

<sup>629</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992) *SO boken Historia 9*, Gleerups Förlag, pp. 335 – 339

<sup>630</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998) *SO Direkt Historia 3*, Bonnier Utbildning Förlag AB, Stockholm, pp. 150-153

<sup>631</sup> Ibid

1800 years before the birth of Jesus Christ”<sup>632</sup> apparently referring to the story of the journey of the Patriarchs in the desert. On the other hand, referring to the Canaanites it is claimed that the “Arabs (Palestinians), who are Muslims, originate from the people who lived in the region a thousand years before the Jews arrived there”<sup>633</sup>. In the chapter on the conflict in *Historia: punkt SO* from 2003<sup>634</sup> we learn that the conflict is difficult to resolve due to among other things the religious background. For many religious Jews and according to their holy texts “the land of Israel [...] is a “gift from God.”<sup>635</sup> We learn too that “Even Christians and Muslims” think of “the country and in particular “*the capital city*”<sup>636</sup> as holy places. In the second paragraph we learn that “Jews have lived in Israel for over 3000 years”<sup>637</sup>. Reference is also made to the “Arabic-speaking Palestinians”<sup>638</sup> who we learn during the Middle Ages “eventually became the largest population.”<sup>639</sup> Elsewhere Arab connection to the land is made with reference to “Arab nomads”<sup>640</sup> settling in Palestine. Arab connection to the land is also made with reference to the Zionist movement of the nineteenth century by the discovery that “Arabs, Palestinians, already lived”<sup>641</sup> in Palestine and “wanted to keep their land.”<sup>642</sup> (my italic)

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<sup>632</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>633</sup> Ibid

<sup>634</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003) *Historia: punkt SO*, Gleerups Utbildning AB, Malmö, pp. 118-121. ”Israel – Palestina-konflikten. Det land som haft flest krig och konflikter i mellanöstern under 1900-talet är Israel. Konflikterna är oerhört svåra att lösa. En orsak är den religiösa bakgrunden (religion). För många troende Judar är Israel ett heligt land som de enligt sina traditioner och heliga skrifter fått som gåva från Gud. Även kristna och muslimer uppfattar landet och i synnerhet huvudstaden Jerusalem som en helig plats. Det har bott judar i Israel i över 3 000 år. Men sedan romarna rev templet i Jerusalem och utvisade judarna från den heliga staden år 70 var de endast en minoritet i landet — som romarna döpte om till Palestina. Under medeltiden blev så småningom de arabisktalande palestinierna den största folkgruppen i landet.”

<sup>635</sup> Ibid

<sup>636</sup> Ibid

<sup>637</sup> Ibid

<sup>638</sup> Ibid

<sup>639</sup> Ibid

<sup>640</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992)

<sup>641</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000) ”Men så var det inte. Araber, palestinier, bodde redan där. Och de ville behålla sitt land. Sedan dess har

## Discussion and analysis: establishing connections to the land

The opening sections of the textbooks focus on a specific number of topics and themes which taken together, as Masalha puts it, form “an unbroken chain of [historical] presence” in the land.<sup>643</sup> These selected topics and themes function to construct a seamless connection between the Jews or Jewish people of ancient Israel to the state of modern Israel and to a lesser extent the Arab Palestinians to ancient Canaan. This is achieved through an interdiscursive mingling of historical, biblical and national topical and thematic references. The most poignant example of this is the reference to modern Israel as the youngest and oldest state in one of the textbooks. Other allusions to nationhood are made when Jerusalem is referred to as the capital city of ancient Israel or Judea or when it is described as the original homeland of the Jews. To strengthen this metahistorical connection further, reference is made to a 3000 year-old presence in the land and to the (national) Jewish remnant following the expulsion of the Jewish people from ancient Jerusalem by the Romans. We also learn that these same Jews were to emigrate to Europe, Africa and America following their exile into *Diaspora*. Other topics and themes connected to the above are the universally embraced dream of return and the Nazi holocaust. Both of these interact with and are reinforced by the idea of nationhood and biblical mythhistory, to borrow Sand’s phrase.<sup>644</sup> Interestingly, the Romans are cast as occupiers and expulsionists in these narratives. Arab connection to the land is established generally in terms of the invasion of Palestine or their arrival as nomads in Palestine in the Middle Ages. In one textbook, a more metahistorical Arab-Canaanite connection to the land is constructed. In general contrast, however, the Jews of ancient Israel are not portrayed as arriving in Palestine but are always present in the land. Pointing to another idea introduced in a number of the texts is what I will refer to here as the notion of ‘equal’ claim to the land (which I will later draw upon to identify a particular order of discourse). In *SO boken Historia 9* (1992), the land is

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motsättningarna lett till flera krig, otaliga attentat, mord, överfall, hämndaktioner, flygplanskapningar, gisslandramer, uppror.”

<sup>642</sup> Ibid

<sup>643</sup> Masalha, N, (2007), p. 167

<sup>644</sup> Sand, (2009)



presented as something that both Arab Palestinians and Israeli feel they Jews have a right to. In the 2007 edition of *SOS Historia: ämnesboken* the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist and the Palestinians' right to a land of their own is mentioned. In the same book, mention is made of how religious settlers viewed their biblical right to the land. There is no discussion as to the legitimacy of these claims in the textbooks and which knowledge claims (or discourses) inform them. However, arguably an "equal" claim to the land is tacitly invoked through the "natural" connections made between history, religion and nation established in the textbooks. That is, through the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land. Interestingly too, some of my interview respondents have invoked such a claim. To mention but a few, one respondent claimed that "the conflict is basically about both parties having a right to the land."<sup>645</sup> Another intoned that "*both sides are right on that point.*" Invoking the connection discourse another teacher added that "a long time [had] passed" and then "*they* [the Jewish people] were able to return". I will later discuss how the notion of "equal" claim to the land is implicated in the textbook sections on the Oslo peace process (one assumption built into the Oslo Accords was that the occupied territories were "disputed territories").<sup>646</sup> I will also compare and discuss the Oslo peace process and international law discourse and what I will identify as the "equal" claim discourse.

The following section will examine the treatment of selected topics and themes in the textbooks on the period of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century onwards. This section will follow more of a content analysis and will also examine certain premises and/or ideological assumptions concerning, for example, the roles, actions and intentions of each party to the conflict.

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<sup>645</sup> T107 "det här är en bakgrund men konflikten handlar ju om att i princip bägge har rätt till detta land"

<sup>646</sup> See Aruri (2003), p. 89 "three elements [which] upheld the Israeli position: the implication that the West Bank and Gaza are disputed rather than occupied territory; the conspicuous absence of any reference to the exchange of land for peace or to Israeli withdrawal or even redeployment, implying Israel [had] an equal right to lay claims to the land".

## Section 4.1 From the Balfour Declaration Onwards

The general set of causal events established in the textbook samples reviewed below are Britain's reneging on promises to the Palestine Arab population and the Jewish enclave, increases in Jewish immigration and subsequent Arab embitterment. Early Jewish immigration or settlement in Palestine is briefly discussed in relation to land purchases and cultural development too. Omitted from this account, however, are its political and ideological dimensions which formed the "complimentary and conflicting agendas of three culturally distinguishable parties"<sup>647</sup> and the fomenting of the conflict. For example, given the established thematic framework present in many of the textbooks (see above), the political and ideological implications of Zionism are obscured. Or its adherents are presented either as the "new agents of modernization in Palestine"<sup>648</sup> or simply as immigrants who purchase land.

For example, the chapter in the 1998 edition of *SO direct historia* describes conditions for Arabs and Jews in Palestine in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century who are said to live in "separate villages and separate towns."<sup>649</sup> The possible cause of this separation is connected to the achievements of Jewish settlement in Palestine. These are among other things "reintroducing a common language – Hebrew"<sup>650</sup> and the purchase of "land from the Arabs as well as developed agriculture"<sup>651</sup>. In addition, we learn that the Jewish settlers "started up industries and [had] set up the secret defence force [known as] the

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<sup>647</sup> Atran, (1989), p. 719

<sup>648</sup> Pappé, (2006)

<sup>649</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998) *SO Direkt Historia 3* "Araber och judar levde åtskilda, i skilda byar och skilda städer. Judarna återupprättade ett gemensamt språk – hebreiska – och de köpte jord av araberna och utvecklade jordbruket. De startade industrier och de bildade den hemliga försvarsstyrkan Haganah. Ett västerländskt politiskt system med flera partier byggdes upp. Araberna – särskilt i Palestina – kände sig svikna av engelsmän och fransmän. De gjorde motstånd mot judarnas överläge genom demonstrationer, strejker, terrorism och slutligen öppet krig. Kampen riktades även mot britterna."

<sup>650</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>651</sup> Ibid

Haganah.”<sup>652</sup> The pinnacle of these achievements is the setting up of a “Western political system of several parties”<sup>653</sup> in Palestine. Then we learn that Jewish immigrants were “often well-educated in contrast with the Palestinians”<sup>654</sup> and had more money and “could afford to purchase” land.<sup>655</sup> In the chapter on the conflict in *Historia: punkt SO*<sup>656</sup> from 2003 we learn about Palestine under the British Mandate between the years of 1918 (or 1917) to 1948. We learn that “hundreds of thousands of Jews made their way to Palestine during the 1920s and 30s.”<sup>657</sup> Then we learn that they “purchased land from the Palestinians, cultivated new land and transformed Tel Aviv into one of the Middle East’s most modern cities.”<sup>658</sup>

Before I present an examination of the other topics and themes mentioned above, I will provide an overview of the period from Balfour onwards as it is discussed in the secondary literature.

### Britain, the Yishuv, the Palestine Arabs and Land

The motivation behind Theodor Herzl’s vision of a Jewish state in Palestine around the late 19<sup>th</sup> century was spurred on by the Dreyfus Affair “in France at the end of the year 1894”<sup>659</sup>. This was when “Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer of the French General Staff was accused and convicted of espionage for Germany.”<sup>660</sup> The establishment of a Jewish state, whether in Palestine or elsewhere, would thus provide a solution to centuries of persecution against the Jews of Europe. The very early Zionist movement also embraced

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<sup>652</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>653</sup> Ibid

<sup>654</sup> Ibid

<sup>655</sup> Ibid

<sup>656</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003) *Historia: punkt SO*, Gleerups Utbildning AB, Malmö. ”Palestina under brittisk förvaltning 1918-48 hundratusentals judar sökte sig till Palestina under 20- och 30-talen. Där köpte de jord av Palestinierna, odlade upp ny mark och förvandlade Tel Aviv till Mellanösterns modernaste stad. När förföljelserna av judar ökade i Tyskland ökade också strömmen av judiska flyktingar till Palestina. En del palestinier började känna sig undanträngda och allt oftare förekom arabiska protester. Britterna lovade därför att begränsa den judiska invandringen till Palestina.”

<sup>657</sup> Ibid

<sup>658</sup> Ibid

<sup>659</sup> Arendt, H, (1979), *Antisemitism: Part one of the origins of totalitarianism*, a Harvest Book, Florida, p. 89

<sup>660</sup> Ibid

socialist-humanist values. It was felt such values would also benefit the local population and some of its leaders even viewed the local peasantry as ancestrally connected and imagined a future Arab-Semitic union (see chapter one). A number of Zionist groups did not fully embrace the idea of establishing a state in Palestine since it was felt it contradicted the very values upon which the movement had been founded. For example, the conflicts which emerged between “the anti-Zionist Marxist Bund” and “Po’alei Tzion”<sup>661</sup> as well as the views of spiritual Zionist, Asher Ginsburg, “(Ahad ha-Am) [who] was roundly opposed to the idea of a Jewish state”<sup>662</sup>. However, some Zionist leaders also understood the colonialist implications of such a project and how the population might respond to it, even despite a heart-felt desire to achieve it peaceably.<sup>663</sup> It was understood by some leaders too that to achieve the dream of a national home would involve actively lobbying for the support of a foreign power, in this case, Great Britain. The power relations that eventually emerged between the *Yishuv* and the Arab population were asymmetrical and uneven in favour of Britain and the pre-state *Yishuv*. This more accurately reflected the “complimentary and conflicting agendas of three culturally distinguishable parties”<sup>664</sup> than anything else. Kimmerling writes that “The British colonial regime provided a political and military umbrella under which the Zionist enterprise was able to develop its basic institutional, economic, and social framework, but it also

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<sup>661</sup> Sternhell, Z. (1996), *The Founding Myths of Israel*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, (1996) p. 17

<sup>662</sup> Davis, (2003), p. 7; Ginsburg is also quoted as claiming that Herzolian Zionism was the product of “anti-Semitism and [was] dependent on anti-Semitism for its existence.” In Kayyali, A-W, (1977), “Zionism and Imperialism: The Historical Origins”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 98-112 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2535582> Accessed: 19/09/2009 04:44, p. 109, Cook also quotes Ginsburg commenting on the demography of Palestine in 1891. “We abroad are used to believing that the land of Israel is now almost totally desolate, a desert that is not sowed ... But in truth this is not the case. Throughout the country it is difficult to find fields that are not sowed.” Cook, p. 111

<sup>663</sup> Read, for example, Jabotinsky, Z. (1923) “The Iron Wall: We and the Arabs”, First published in Russian under the title *O Zheleznoi Stene* in *Rassvyet*, 4 November 1923. Published in English in *Jewish Herald* (South Africa), 26 November 1937. Transcribed and revised by Lenni Brenner.

<sup>664</sup> Atran, (1989), p. 719

secured the essential interests of the Arab collectivity.”<sup>665</sup> On the matter of land purchases under the British Mandate, some scholars discuss the issue of the creation of peasant landlessness and dispossession in Palestine.<sup>666</sup> Pappé writes, for example, that by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century “there were twelve Zionist settlements in Palestine”<sup>667</sup> bought from “rich land owners in and outside Palestine.”<sup>668</sup> There were efforts on the part of the Arab nobility to issue “fatwas [against]”<sup>669</sup> the sale of land or “member[s] of local municipalities [who] passed resolutions calling on authorities to halt Jewish purchase of land”<sup>670</sup>. However, despite this property was occasionally sold by Arab landlords and even members of the nobility to “Zionist land purchase agencies or to individual buyers”<sup>671</sup>. Khalidi describes the “touchy issue of land sales by Arab landlords”<sup>672</sup> which were “carefully wretched [...] in secrecy”<sup>673</sup>. Sternhell connects the issue of land purchase to the introduction of Jewish labour in Palestine which would “in other words, [encourage] the dispossession of Arab workers in order to take their place.”<sup>674</sup> Khalidi emphasises how the latter was connected to the “growing fear among Palestinians in the 1930s”<sup>675</sup> of dispossession. He argues too that the “mounting number of attacks on travellers or on isolated Zionist settlements [were] in some measure a function of the increasing *landlessness*

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<sup>665</sup> Kimmerling, B, (2006), *Politicide: the real legacy of Ariel Sharon*, Verso, London, New York, p. 26

<sup>666</sup> See Khalidi (2007); see also George Antonius: *The Formative Years* Author(s): Susan Silsby Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Summer, 1986), pp. 81-98  
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies  
Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536613> Accessed: 26/02/2009 06:01

<sup>667</sup> Pappé (2006), p. 51

<sup>668</sup> Ibid

<sup>669</sup> Ibid

<sup>670</sup> Ibid

<sup>671</sup> Ibid

<sup>672</sup> Ibid, p. 73

<sup>673</sup> Khalidi, (2007), p. 86

<sup>674</sup> Sternhell (1996), p. 16; Pappé (2006) points out too that there was a need for Palestine Arab labour later on, but this did not reflect the support or establishment of an independent body along the lines of the *Yishuv* commenting too that it was only “after the Second World War [that] the nationalist Palestinian notables [made] an attempt to grant economic independence to their communities, but it was too little and too late, and even this attempt was divided along clan lines and did not serve the nationalist cause.” p. 97

<sup>675</sup> Almgren, B, Tollerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998), p. 91

*of the Palestinian peasantry in some parts of the country.* This was largely due to the rapid expansion of Zionist landholdings in the 1920s and early 1930s, and the gradual imposition by the Zionist movement of the policy of *avoda ivrit*, or “Hebrew labor,” which was *meant to replace Arab agricultural laborers with Jewish ones*<sup>676</sup>. (my italics)

Still on the topic of land development, American ethnologist, Scott Atran, argues that during the pre-war period, British and Zionist interests harmonised in colonial policies on land development. This led to the destruction of the local *masha'a* system according to which “village lands were distributed in a form of joint tenure”.<sup>677</sup> In 1923 in its place “the Mesha'a Land Committee drafted plans to enforce the partition (*ifraz*) of undivided lands into permanently fixed parcels, or *mafruz*.”<sup>678</sup> The main objective of this project of land settlement was “to determine and register existing rights in land; to facilitate dealings and reduce litigation; and to provide an accurate record of land holding”.<sup>679</sup> This would greatly benefit the Zionist movement since it allowed them “to buy into the village patrimony and eventually alienate it from the peasants.”<sup>680</sup> As alluded to earlier, riches could also be made by local landowners or nobility in this area at the expense of one’s own constituency. Atran concludes that although the British Administration “might roundly condemn Zionist “arrogance,” and profess to champion the fellah's “needs,” no official British policy statement or plan ever questioned the necessity for land settlement, or for using it as the cornerstone of fiscal, economic, social and ultimately political control”.<sup>681</sup> Mark Levine discusses the conquest of Palestine through town planning between 1921 and 1948 focusing on the towns of Jaffa and Tel

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<sup>676</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998), p. 86

<sup>677</sup> The Surrogate Colonization of Palestine, 1917-1939 Author(s): Scott Atran Source: *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Nov., 1989), pp. 719-744 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/645118> Accessed: 01/03/2009 09:39

<sup>678</sup> Scott Atran, pp. 724-725.

<sup>679</sup> Ibid.

<sup>680</sup> Ibid

<sup>681</sup> Atran, pp. 724-725

Aviv.<sup>682</sup> Both the Zionist leadership and the British were part of a modernizing development discourse on town planning which disappeared villages around the Tel Aviv area, annexing their areas to the city. Despite “increasing political differences [...] in which Jaffa and the Arab population”<sup>683</sup> were embroiled, the population had no hope of participating in this modernizing project. The “Tel Aviv leadership [was able to] use British land and town planning legislation to gain control of large swaths of land from neighboring Arab villages.”<sup>684</sup> (*Am* spelling) Despite early resistance to this from sometime in the 1920s on the part of educated and nationally oriented Arab leaders<sup>685</sup>, the odds were stacked against them for reasons to do with leadership disunity and complicity with British colonial policies. These granted permission of government representation to the pre-state *Yishuv*<sup>686</sup> through the Balfour Declaration and by dint, the Mandate laws. Palestine Arab demands for government representation under such an aegis would require acceptance of “the terms of the Mandate as a precondition for any change in their constitutional position”<sup>687</sup>. In turn this would “at best subordinate them completely to the national rights of the Jewish people.”<sup>688</sup>

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<sup>682</sup> Conquest Through Town Planning: The Case of Tel Aviv, 1921-48 Author(s): Mark LeVine Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4, (Summer, 1998), pp. 36-52 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538129> Accessed: 1st October 2008.

<sup>683</sup> Ibid

<sup>684</sup> Ibid

<sup>685</sup> In a review of the work *The Betrayal of Palestine* by Susan Silsby Boyle, it is noted that “almost from the moment the Balfour Declaration was proclaimed” Arab resistance was a reality “and their early leaders were every bit as intelligent and determined as Chaim Weizmann or David Ben-Gurion

Review: Early Resistance to Zionism Author(s): Lawrence Davidson and George Antonius Reviewed work(s): *Betrayal of Palestine: The Story of George Antonius* by Susan Silsby Boyle Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Summer, 2002), pp. 123-124 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3247305> Accessed: 18/02/2009 10:31

<sup>686</sup> Interestingly, the setting up of a pre-state structure – *the Yishuv* – was made possible with the autonomy granted through the Balfour Declaration and thus enabled the creation of “a Jewish privileged enclave” which also involved consenting to “the bifurcation of the country’s economy,” Pappé, (2006), p. 93

<sup>687</sup> Khalidi, R.(2007), p. 33

<sup>688</sup> Ibid

## Broken promises, collaboration or “complimentary and conflicting agendas”?

As I mentioned in the beginning, the History school textbooks I have examined tend to present the support or limitation on Jewish immigration to Palestine in terms of broken promises or collaboration with the Arab population. Broken promises are also posited as the cause of tensions between Arabs and Jews. This is because a broken promise on Arab national interests would mean more immigration, especially from European Jews facing persecution by the Nazis during the 1930s and 40s. Before I present my examination of the textbook chapters on the above issues here below I will provide still more perspectives from the secondary literature.

To employ Scott Atran’s metaphor again, the situation during the pre-state period might better be characterised as one of “complimentary and conflicting agendas of three culturally distinguishable parties”<sup>689</sup> but with the local population in a less advantageous position than the others. However, there were shifts away from British support for a Jewish state as represented, for example, in the 1939 White Paper. This was in response to the Arab revolt of the 1936-39 and more or less promised the Palestine Arabs “independence within ten years”<sup>690</sup>. The White Paper “marked a sharp change in British policy”<sup>691</sup> on support for a Jewish homeland. This was even preceded by the Passfield White Paper following the Shaw Commission report in 1930 which set “limitations on Jewish immigration and suspension of land purchases.”<sup>692</sup> Even earlier, “Winston Churchill’s white paper of 1922 limited British support for the Jewish national home in three significant ways”.<sup>693</sup> (my italics) The keyword here, however, is

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<sup>689</sup> Atran, p. 719

<sup>690</sup> Rogan & Shlaim, (2007), p. 25

<sup>691</sup> Zionism-Revisionism: The Years of Fascism and Terror Author(s): Lenni Brenner Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 66-92 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536926> Accessed: 06/11/2008, p. 87

<sup>692</sup> Atran

<sup>693</sup> Shlaim, (2003), p. 10. “it laid down for the first time economic criteria for Jewish immigration, it proposed elected institutions based on proportional representation instead of parity, and it excluded Transjordan from the area available for Jewish settlement. This



*limitation* since politically, economically and even militarily, support for the Jewish homeland in Palestine was already established from Balfour onwards. In this light, the White Paper or limitations on immigration cannot easily be interpreted as either unequivocal British-Arab collaboration or a full renegeing on promises, as the textbooks would have it. The focus is instead more on Britain's efforts to secure its own interests which both "contradicted and complemented"<sup>694</sup> Zionist and Palestine Arab interests. Indeed, since before Balfour the *Yishuv* had actively secured many of its own interests. For example, prior to 1939 the *Yishuv* had assisted Britain in "suppressing the last embers of the [Arab] revolt".<sup>695</sup> In Palestine, the local Arabs were a common enemy both to the pre-state *Yishuv* and the British and arguably military assistance provided by the former must have won them British support. Even despite the White Paper volte-face, by 1939 "Jewish settlement [had grown] in size and power"<sup>696</sup> and was "grudgingly allowed"<sup>697</sup> by the British. By the time of the 1939 White Paper, the *Yishuv* had already been able to "reinforce the separate Jewish economy"<sup>698</sup>. This was in part thanks to British reprisals during the local Arab revolt and "via a series of self-inflicted wounds on the Arab economy."<sup>699</sup> The literature I present here even questions the universal acceptance of the White Paper on the part of the Arab-Palestinian leadership. Pointing to the effects of internecine Arab conflicts, the actions of the Grand Mufti al-Husayni prevented the opposing Palestinian leadership "from taking actions it was inclined towards, such as accepting the 1939 White Paper"<sup>700</sup>. Furthermore, the local population was not always favourably treated by its putative representatives. They made "brutal attempts to impose"<sup>701</sup> themselves on the Palestinians, especially if they envisaged another future for a Palestinian

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adverse shift in British policy continued throughout the interwar period, reaching its climax in the white paper of 1939"

<sup>694</sup> Atran

<sup>695</sup> Rogan & Shlaim, p. 25

<sup>696</sup> Atran, p. 736

<sup>697</sup> Ibid

<sup>698</sup> Rogan & Shlaim, p. 25

<sup>699</sup> Ibid, p. 27

<sup>700</sup> Ibid

<sup>701</sup> Tal, (2000), p. 10

nation under Transjordanian rule. Examining the ideological level too, the positive attitude towards colonialism and British reluctance to relinquish power to the locals possibly benefitted the *Yishuv*. As Aruri argues, it was felt on the part of the British that the *Yishuv* would as “European settlers [...] contribute to the betterment of the indigenous population.”<sup>702</sup>

### Main points of discussion

In contrast with the textbooks I will examine, what the above discussion generally emphasises is Zionism’s political and ideological moorings in the context of late 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalism and colonialism. Also highlighted are the complex and contradictory roles each party to the conflict played as well as their *active* efforts in securing their respective interests. Finally, the above also reveals the asymmetrical relations of power characterising the conflict since its inception. For example, although relations between the British, Zionist movement and Arab notables were simultaneously conflicting and complimentary, in the long run the Zionist movement would benefit greatly from the support of its grudging British patron. This was manifest in the Mandate Laws which facilitated among other things land purchases which resulted in land dispossession for the local population. In addition, economic and military independence was guaranteed under British auspices and the famous Balfour Declaration written into the Mandate Law assured (potential) political hegemony for the pre-state *Yishuv* over the local Arab population. It was in Britain’s political, economic and geostrategic interests “and to the interest of the civilized nations and civilization in general that cultural station be established on the shortest road to Asia.”<sup>703</sup> This indicated too that as Europeans, Britain and the Zionist movement were ideologically attuned to the idea that the Orient would benefit from the civilizing effects of colonialism (even if it was understood that it would foment resistance). In

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<sup>702</sup> Review: The Earlier Palestinian Resistance Author(s): Naseer Aruri Reviewed work(s): Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement. by Ann Mosely Lesch Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer, 1981), pp. 113-117 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536392> Accessed: 09/03/2009 04:00, p. 115; the identification of the Zionists with British and/or European nationalism and colonialist ideology has also been discussed in Pappe (2006); Sternhell, (1996)

<sup>703</sup> Kayyali, (1977), p. 105

any case, British support culminated in the strengthening of the pre-state *Yishuv* which in turn established the policy of *avoda ivrit*, or “Hebrew labor,” to replace Arab agricultural laborers with Jewish ones. Echoing Herzl, this meant spiriting “the penniless population across the border [...] while denying it any employment in our own countries”.<sup>704</sup> Furthermore, active political and military efforts on the part of the *Yishuv*, especially during the suppression of the 1936 revolt, helped cement its position further. The discussion also shows that despite efforts on the part of the Arab nobility to prevent the sale of land, property was occasionally sold by Arab landlords and even members of the Arab nobility to Zionist land purchase agencies or to individual buyers. This reflected in turn the political in-fighting among the notables and their different visions of a future Palestine. Even in the wake of the British volte-face on Jewish immigration in 1939, there were attempts to prevent the local population from embracing Churchill’s White Paper. The above also points to early disagreements and in-fighting within the Zionist movement itself among such groups as the Po’alei Tzion and the anti-Zionist Marxist Bund and via the views of spiritual Zionist, Asher Ginsburg, (Ahad ha-Am) who was opposed to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine.

In the textbooks I will examine below Zionism is generally presented as the extension of a desire to flee late 19<sup>th</sup> century European anti-Semitism and return to one’s biblical-historical homeland. In addition, the Balfour Declaration is presented as a step along this teleological path. As a possible cause of the conflict, such topics as Britain’s support and broken promises<sup>705</sup>, Jewish immigration during the 1930s and Arab reactions are discussed. I will begin first of all with an examination of how the topic of Zionism is treated.

### The meaning and purpose of Zionism

As discussed in the previous section, the topic of Zionism and other topics interact discursively with the topics and themes of religion, nationhood and historical Jewish suffering to provide an interpretive framework (see above).

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<sup>704</sup> Quoted in Kayyali, p. 110

<sup>705</sup> I would also posit the discussion on broken promises proceeds from the notion of “equal” claim to the land.

In *Levande historia läsebok 3* from 1996, for example, the year 1917 marks British support for the realisation of "the dream of re-establishing the Jewish nation [which had] lived on among Jews around the world"<sup>706</sup>. This is connected to the event too which followed "the first and second centuries AD [when] the Jews were driven from Palestine" by the Romans.<sup>707</sup> The chapter entitled "Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East"<sup>708</sup> in *SO direkt historia 3* from 1998 and 99 introduces the messianic theme of "return", the theme of historical Jewish suffering and subsequently the topic of Zionism. This foregrounds the subject-matter of "the struggle for Palestine"<sup>709</sup> too which discusses the Balfour Declaration and the Nazi persecution of the Jews.<sup>710</sup> The theme of return is invoked through the repeated claim that "the hope of returning to Palestine [had] lived on the whole time among those [Jews] who" lived in the *Diaspora*.<sup>711</sup> The universal desire to return, it is argued, is due to the persecution that Jews have had to endure historically and in this way "religion has provided comfort and has been *a unifying power*."<sup>712</sup> (my italics) Then we learn of the "11 million Jews living in Eastern Europe"<sup>713</sup> around the end of 19th century and of half of them fleeing "persecution to countries such as the US, Argentina and South Africa."<sup>714</sup> In addition to these, a few thousand Jews from Russia had "succeeded in getting to Palestine."<sup>715</sup> (my italics) The purpose of fleeing to Palestine on the part of these few thousand Jews, we learn, is their desire to

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<sup>706</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996)

<sup>707</sup> Ibid

<sup>708</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998), pp. 150-153. "Hoppet att en gång få återvända till Palestina har hela tiden levt kvar hos de utspridda judarna. Till stor del beror detta på de svåra förföljelser (pogromer) som de utsatts för. Religionen har varit en tröst och sammanhållande kraft. I slutet av 1800-talet levde ca 11 miljoner judar i Östeuropa. Hälften av dem flyttade undan för förföljelserna till bland annat USA, Argentina och Sydafrika. Några tusen – mest från Ryssland lyckades ta sig till Palestina. De ville leva nära Jerusalem, som de kallade Sion. Theodor Herzl hette en judisk journalist i Österrike. Han blev en av de drivande bakom sionismen, en rörelse som verkade för att judar skulle flytta till Palestina. Ett slags nationell rörelse."

<sup>709</sup> Ibid

<sup>710</sup> Ibid

<sup>711</sup> Ibid

<sup>712</sup> Ibid

<sup>713</sup> Ibid

<sup>714</sup> Ibid

<sup>715</sup> Ibid

live close to “Jerusalem, which they called Zion.”<sup>716</sup> The paragraph ends on a reference to the father of political Zionism, Austrian Jew Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), who we learn was “the driving force behind Zionism”<sup>717</sup> which is described as a movement that “worked towards *allowing Jews to move to Palestine*.”<sup>718</sup> (my italics) The last sentence of the paragraph describes Zionism as “A kind of national movement”.<sup>719</sup>

In *SO boken historia* from 91 and 92, Zionism, as “a political movement”<sup>720</sup> is discussed in relation to the topic of the Russian pogroms against Jews around the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. In addition, it is mentioned that many Jews who immigrated to Palestine at the time did so to “the country they considered was their own”<sup>721</sup>. In the 1996 edition of *Levande historia*<sup>722</sup>, the author of the book “The Jewish State”<sup>723</sup>, Theodor Herzl, is mentioned. We learn about how “he demanded that the Jewish people following centuries of persecution and suffering *ought to have a native country of their own*.”<sup>724</sup> (my italics) Preceding this, the theme of return is introduced again and is described as a path towards “*re-establishing the Jewish nation*”<sup>725</sup>, the dream of which Jews around the world had kept alive for millennia.<sup>726</sup> In *Levande historia elevbok 9* from 2003, Herzl is credited with being the figure who “*breathed life [into] the dream of a Jewish state*”<sup>727</sup> in 1894. We are then

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<sup>716</sup> Almgren, B, Tollerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>717</sup> Ibid

<sup>718</sup> Ibid

<sup>719</sup> Ibid

<sup>720</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992), pp. 335 - 339

<sup>721</sup> Ibid

<sup>722</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996)

<sup>723</sup> Ibid

<sup>724</sup> Ibid

<sup>725</sup> Ibid. “Sionismen

Drömmen om att återupprätta den judiska nationen fortlevde bland judarna världen runt. Under 1800-talets senare del blev allt fler judar både i Europa och i Amerika anhängare av sionismen, kampen för det judiska folkets återflyttning till Palestina.”

<sup>726</sup> Ibid

<sup>727</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992) *SO boken Historia 9*, “År 1897 blåste österrikaren Theodor Herzl liv i drömmen om en judisk stat (Tanken att göra Palestina till en judisk stat kallades därför sionismen). Palestina styrdes i början av 1900-talet av Storbritannien. Men Storbritannien ville inte gå med på att en judisk stat upprättades i området. Fler och fler judar fick dock tillstånd att invandra.”

provided an explanation of Zionism as “the idea of turning Palestine into a Jewish state [...]”<sup>728</sup> In *Historia: punkt SO* from 2003<sup>729</sup> we learn that Zionism emerged in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and that it was “a nationalistic movement among the Jews in Europe.”<sup>730</sup> The Zionists intended for “the Jews to return to Israel (Zion)”<sup>731</sup> in order to establish a state of their own there. This, it is claimed, would allow them to “escape persecution in the countries they lived in.”<sup>732</sup> In *Levande historia 9* from 2003, we learn that Zionism spoke to the fact that “many Jews wanted a land of their own to live in”<sup>733</sup> and that “they wanted to return to their old country – Palestine.”<sup>734</sup> (my italics) Then we learn that “Zionism was a movement among Jews in different countries”<sup>735</sup> who “worked towards making Palestine *the land of the Jews again*.”<sup>736</sup> (my italics)

A topic connected to Zionism discussed in the textbooks too is the Balfour Declaration, which will now be discussed below.

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<sup>728</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992)

<sup>729</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003) *Historia: punkt SO*, Gleerups Utbildning AB, Malmö, pp. 118-121. ”Israel – Palestina-konflikten. Det land som haft flest krig och konflikter i mellanöstern under 1900-talet är Israel. Konflikterna är oerhört svåra att lösa. En orsak är den religiösa bakgrunden (religion). För många troende Judar är Israel ett heligt land som de enligt sina traditioner och heliga skrifter fått som gåva från Gud. Även kristna och muslimer uppfattar landet och i synnerhet huvudstaden Jerusalem som en helig plats. Det har bott judar i Israel i över 3 000 år. Men sedan romarna rev templet i Jerusalem och utvisade judarna från den heliga staden år 70 var de endast en minoritet i landet — som romarna döpte om till Palestina. Under medeltiden blev så småningom de arabisktalande palestinierna den största folkgruppen i landet.”

<sup>730</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003) *Historia: punkt SO*, Gleerups Utbildning AB, Malmö, pp. 118-121. ”Under 1800-talet uppstod sionismen, en nationalistisk rörelse bland judarna i Europa. Sionisterna menade att judarna skulle återvända till Israel (Sion) och bygga en egen stat där. På så sätt skulle de kunna undgå förföljelserna i de länder där de bodde. Under första världskriget lovade den brittiska regeringen att hjälpa sionisterna. Men britten lovade också palestinierna rätten till en egen, självständig stat. Dessa dubbla löften är en av de främsta orsakerna till dagens Israel-Palestina-konflikt.”

<sup>731</sup> Ibid

<sup>732</sup> Ibid

<sup>733</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003) *Levande Historia 9: minikurs*, ”Sionismen. Många judar ville ha ett eget land att bo i. Man ville Återvända till sitt gamla land – Palestina. Sionismen var en rörelse bland judar i olika länder. Rörelsen arbetade För att Palestina skulle bli judarnas land igen.”

<sup>734</sup> Ibid

<sup>735</sup> Ibid

<sup>736</sup> Ibid

## The Balfour Declaration

The section entitled “the struggle for Palestine”<sup>737</sup> in the 1998 edition of *SO direkt historia* discusses the role of Britain, the Balfour Declaration and the plight of local Arabs. The first sentence informs us of how the “British took power”<sup>738</sup> in Palestine after the First World War. We learn too that the British wanted to control the Suez Canal and how they “promised the Arabs self-rule within certain areas.”<sup>739</sup> Around the same period we learn about a letter written by Lord Balfour in 1917 to the “enormously wealthy Jewish Banker Rothschild”.<sup>740</sup> In the letter Balfour on behalf of “His Majesty’s Government”<sup>741</sup> stated that he viewed with favour “the efforts to establish *a national home for the Jewish people* in Palestine.”<sup>742</sup> (my italics) Then allusion is made in the letter to the possible plight of the “Arabs who lived in the country [and who] were not to be discriminated against”<sup>743</sup> through the establishment of a Jewish national home.<sup>744</sup> Here the possible implications of the Balfour Declaration for the local Arabs are hinted at.<sup>745</sup> In the 96 edition of *Levande historia läsebok 3* the Balfour Declaration is not mentioned in name. Instead it is referred to as the British government’s “declaration in 1917 that the Jewish people ought to have “a national home”.<sup>746</sup> In the 98 edition of *SO direkt historia 3* in a chapter entitled “The Struggle for Palestine”<sup>747</sup> we learn that “The Balfour Declaration of 1917”<sup>748</sup> led to an

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<sup>737</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998). “Men han tillade att de araber som bodde i landet inte fick kränkas.”

<sup>738</sup> Ibid

<sup>739</sup> Ibid

<sup>740</sup> Ibid

<sup>741</sup> Shlaim, A, (2003), p. 7

<sup>742</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>743</sup> Ibid

<sup>744</sup> Shlaim, (2003), p. 7. In the original letter Balfour writes let “it be clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice *the civil and religious rights* of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or *the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews* in any other country.”

<sup>745</sup> Ibid, p. 7. At “the time of [the Balfour Declaration’s] issue” there was an “Arab population of 600,000” as against 56,000” and Shlaim argues that the “civil and religious rights [...] had a distinctly hollow ring about it, since it totally ignored [the indigenous population’s] political rights.”

<sup>746</sup> Fallström, Hildingson, Wadner, (1996), *Levande historia läsebok 3*

<sup>747</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>748</sup> ”Kampen om Palestina inleds

“increase in the immigration of Jews to Palestine”<sup>749</sup>. This occurred especially between the years of 1933 to 1945 during “the Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe.”<sup>750</sup> In the 2003 edition of *Levande historia* 9, British support for a Jewish state is not forthcoming but eventually we learn that “the Jews were promised “a national home” in Palestine”<sup>751</sup>. The Balfour Declaration is indirectly referred to in the 2005 edition of *SO direkt* too stating that the British view on a Jewish “national home”<sup>752</sup> was a positive one at the time. We learn too that the Balfour Declaration would only be permitted on condition “that the Palestinians (the Arabs who had lived there for a long time) would not be discriminated against”<sup>753</sup>. Finally, the question of Britain’s support for a Jewish state is discussed in the 2003 edition of *Levande historia* and the 2005 edition of *SO direkt historia*. The former claims that “Great Britain did not want to support the establishment of a Jewish state in the region”<sup>754</sup> while tacit acknowledgement is paid to Britain’s “promise of a “national home”<sup>755</sup> but the promise is not kept. In the 2005 textbook it states that “they were positive about allowing the Jews a “national home” there.”<sup>756</sup> In other words, the significance of the 1917

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I slutet av första världskriget (1914-18) tog britterna makten i Palestina – ett viktigt område för dem. Det ligger ju nära Suezkanalen, som Storbritannien då bestämde över. Britterna lovade araberna att få styra sig själva inom vissa områden. Ungefär samtidigt (1917) skrev Lord Balfour, brittisk utrikesminister ett brev till den stormrike judiske bankiren Rothschild och meddelade att regeringen ”med välvilja såg på ansträngningarna att upprätta ett nationellt hem för det judiska folket i Palestina”. ”Balfour-deklaration” ledde till en ökad invandring av judar i Palestina. Särskilt många kom åren 1933-45 under de nazistiska förföljelserna av judar i Europa.”

<sup>749</sup> Ibid

<sup>750</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998), “Denna ”Balfour-deklaration” ledde till en ökad invandring av judar i Palestina. Särskilt många kom åren 1933-45 under de nazistiska förföljelserna av judar i Europa.”

<sup>751</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003) *Levande Historia elevbok 9*, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, tredje tryckning, Stockholm, pp. 546 - 551

<sup>752</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H (2005), ”I slutet av första världskriget (1914-1918) tog engelsmännen makten över landet. De var positiva till att låta judarna få ett ”nationellt hem” där, detta under förutsättning att palestinierna (araberna som sedan länge levde där) inte kränktes.”

<sup>753</sup> Ibid

<sup>754</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

<sup>755</sup> Ibid

<sup>756</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H (2005). ”De var positiva till att låta judarna få ett ”nationellt hem” där,”



Balfour Declaration is emphasised in *SO historia* while the theme of broken promises is emphasised in *Levande historia*. In the 2007 edition of *Levande historia* the topic of the Balfour Declaration and the pre-state period is given slightly more attention.

The issue of Britain's broken promises is discussed in the textbooks in relation to its support or lack of support towards the establishment of a Jewish and Arab state.

### Causes of conflict: Britain's support and broken promises

In *Historia punkt SO* from 2003 we learn that during the First World War the British government promised to "help the Zionists"<sup>757</sup> but that they had also promised "the Palestinians the right to their own, independent state."<sup>758</sup> We are told that it is the reneging on these "two promises" which "is one of the main reasons for today's Israel/Palestine conflict."<sup>759</sup> The chapter on the conflict in *Levande historia 3* from 2003 textbook discusses how the British had reneged on promises both to the Arabs and Jews.<sup>760</sup> In the 2007 edition of *Levande historia 9* we learn that "many Arabs lived in the areas that Britain controlled"<sup>761</sup> and that "Arabs had fought against Germany during the First World War."<sup>762</sup> Then we learn that Britain "had promised that they [the Arabs] would establish independent states"<sup>763</sup> and that "Palestine would be included in the area that was liberated."<sup>764</sup> In the 1996 edition of *Levande historia läsebok 3* the breaking of this promise results in the subsequent

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<sup>757</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003), pp. 118-121. "Under 1800-talet uppstod sionismen, en nationalistisk rörelse bland judarna i Europa. Sionisterna menade att judarna skulle återvända till Israel (Sion) och bygga en egen stat där. På så sätt skulle de kunna undgå förföljelserna i de länder där de bodde. Under första världskriget lovade den brittiska regeringen att hjälpa sionisterna.

Men britterna lovade också palestinerna rätten till en egen, självständig stat. Dessa dubbla löften är en av de främsta orsakerna till dagens Israel-Palestinakonflikt."

<sup>758</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003)

<sup>759</sup> Ibid

<sup>760</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

<sup>761</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007)

<sup>762</sup> Ibid

<sup>763</sup> Ibid

<sup>764</sup> Ibid

embitterment of the Palestine Arabs.<sup>765</sup> Britain remained in control of Palestine and “did not keep its promise on Palestine”<sup>766</sup>. And although “the Jews were promised an area that they would themselves control in Palestine”<sup>767</sup>, nothing came “of this either”<sup>768</sup>. In *Levande historia elevbok 9* we learn that “the Arabs had taken part in the First World War against Germany”<sup>769</sup> and were promised by the British “to establish independent states, in among other places Palestine.”<sup>770</sup> In a more determined tone, in *SO boken historia 9* from 1992 we learn that Great Britain “ruled [Palestine] at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”<sup>771</sup> and that it “*did not want to agree to the establishment of a Jewish state in the region.*”<sup>772</sup> Despite this, more and more Jews “gained permission”<sup>773</sup> to immigrate to Palestine. The 2007 edition of *Levande historia 9 fokus* informs us that in “1917, during the First World War, Great Britain conquered Palestine”<sup>774</sup> and displaced Turkey as the rulers of Palestine. Then we learn that “more and more Jews had begun to

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<sup>765</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996). ”Sionismen  
Drömmen om att återupprätta den judiska nationen fortlevde bland judarna världen runt.  
Under 1800-talets senare del blev allt fler judar både i Europa och i Amerika anhängare av  
sionismen, kampen för det judiska folkets återflyttning till Palestina.  
Theodor Herzl skrev boken ”Den judiska staten”, där han krävde att judarna – efter  
århundraden av förföljelser och lidanden – borde få ett eget fosterland. Under första  
världskriget besattes Palestina av brittiska trupper. 1917 förklarade den brittiska regeringen att  
det judiska folket borde få ”ett nationellt hem”. Allt fler judar invandrade till Palestina.  
Araberna i Palestina blev förbittrade; britterna hade tidigare lovat att araberna skulle få  
Palestina.”

<sup>766</sup> Ibid

<sup>767</sup> Ibid

<sup>768</sup> Ibid

<sup>769</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003), “Araberna hade deltagit i första världskriget mot  
Tyskland. Som tack hade de fått löfte av britterna att bilda självständiga stater, bland annat  
Palestina. Det löftet hölls inte. Judarna fick löfte om ”ett nationalhem” i Palestina. Det hölls  
inte heller.”

<sup>770</sup> Ibid

<sup>771</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992), “År 1897 blåste österrikaren Theodor Herzl liv i  
drömmen om en judisk stat (Tanken att göra Palestina till en judisk stat kallades därför  
sionismen). Palestina styrdes i början av 1900-talet av Storbritannien. Men Storbritannien  
ville inte gå med på att en judisk stat upprättades i området. Fler och fler judar fick dock  
tillstånd att invandra.”

<sup>772</sup> Ibid

<sup>773</sup> Ibid

<sup>774</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007), pp. 82-85

move to Palestine” and that “they dreamt of a Jewish state of their own.”<sup>775</sup> However, we then learn that Britain “did not want to support”<sup>776</sup> the dream of a Jewish state. Another topic connected to the theme of broken promises or lack of support is the charge of British collaboration with the Arabs. This is brought up in connection with the issue of Jewish immigration in the 1930s and Arab responses to it and the implementation of the 1939 White Paper. The general topics and themes framing these issues are the Nazi holocaust and the notion of “equal” claim to the land. The issue of broken promises foregrounds this notion too since it is assumed that both parties to the conflict share an “equal” claim to the land they have been equally promised.

### Immigration and increasing tensions: responses and reactions

The beginning of tensions between Jews and Palestine Arabs over territory is connected to the arrival or immigration of more and more Jews in the shadow of the Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe. The opening section to the chapter on the conflict in *Puls 9: historia vår egen tid*<sup>777</sup> from 1996 introduces some of the topics mentioned above with the additional topic of Jewish terror. This is an attempt at creating some semblance of balance with regard to how the actions and intentions of either party to the conflict are presented. In paragraphs two and three in the chapter on the conflict, the plight of European Jews under Nazism is discussed and how it “caused a mass immigration of Jews to Palestine.”<sup>778</sup> (my italics) We also learn of British attempts to “stop them [the Jews]”<sup>779</sup> in their efforts to get to Palestine. And how so-called “Jewish terror organisations”<sup>780</sup> attacked

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<sup>775</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007), pp. 82-85

<sup>776</sup> Ibid

<sup>777</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996), pp. 313 – 312

<sup>778</sup> Ibid. According to Schulz, waves of mass immigration occurred following 1948 and that five “smaller immigrant waves, *aliyah*, arrived also in the pre-state period and constituted no more than one third of the whole population in Palestine around 1948.” Schulz, M, (1996), *Israel Between Conflict and Accommodation: the Transformation of Collective Identities*, Dissertation Thesis, Department of Peace and Development Research, Gothenburg University, p. 100

<sup>779</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>780</sup> Ibid

British authorities with “murder and attacks”<sup>781</sup> in response to this. Jewish terror is also discussed in connection with the murder of Folke Bernadotte in 1947 in some of the textbooks. In the 1991 and 92 textbooks, the notion of “equal” claim to the land is introduced following references to “Nazi atrocities”<sup>782</sup>. This is referred to with reference to the arrival “of more Jewish immigrants”<sup>783</sup> and increased tensions between “Jews and Palestinians who both felt they had a right to the land”<sup>784</sup>. The increase in Jewish immigrants, we learn, is the cause of subsequent conflicts between Jews and Arabs.<sup>785</sup> The notion of “equal” claim to the land is also introduced here in the sentence which states that “Jews and Palestinians [...] both felt they had a right to the country.”<sup>786</sup> The notion of “equal” claim is interdiscursively connected to the themes of religion and nation introduced in the opening sections of the textbooks as well as the references to pivotal historical events and their concomitant themes (e.g. the Holocaust and persecution). The function of the notion of “equal” claim to the land in this light is to frame the tensions between Jewish immigrants and the indigenous Arab population as complicated dilemmas to resolve.

In the 1996 edition of *Levande historia läsebok 3* we learn that more and more Jews immigrated to Palestine and that the “Arabs became

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<sup>781</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>782</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992), ”Nazisternas illdåd mot judarna på 1930-talen ökade utvandringen ytterligare. Allt eftersom fler judiska emigranter anlände till Palestina, tilltog motsättningarna mellan judarna och palestinierna, som båda ansåg sig ha rätt till landet. I motsats till palestinierna var judarna ofta välutbildade och hade pengar att köpa jord för. Terrordåd från båda håll gjorde det allt mer klart att judar och palestinier knappast kunde leva tillsammans.”

<sup>783</sup> Ibid

<sup>784</sup> Ibid

<sup>785</sup> Ibid, ”Nazisternas illdåd mot judarna på 1930-talen ökade utvandringen ytterligare. Allt eftersom fler judiska emigranter anlände till Palestina, tilltog motsättningarna mellan Judarna och palestinierna, som båda ansåg sig ha rätt till landet.” As Kimmmerling writes too, ”were it not for the economic depression that began in the late 1920s and the subsequent immigration restrictions, it is highly likely that most European Jews would have emigrated to America in the 1930s”, Kimmmerling, (2006), p. 20; Bennis intones too that ”While European Jewish settlement had gone on since the 1880s, the numbers vastly increased in the 1930s and ’40s , as Jews escaping the Holocaust, and those who survived it, were rejected by their first-choice countries of refuge, the US and Britain, and instead turned to British-ruled Palestine, where the UK kept the door mostly open.” Bennis, (2007), p. 108

<sup>786</sup> Ibid

embittered”<sup>787</sup> since “the British had previously promised Palestine to the Arabs.”<sup>788</sup> The opening section of the chapter entitled “Israel and the Arab States”<sup>789</sup> in *SOS Historia: ämnesboken* from 2007 discusses the 19<sup>th</sup> century and informs us that at that time “Arabs mostly lived in the area”<sup>790</sup> of Palestine. In connection with this we learn that “more and more Jews moved to Palestine which was controlled by Great Britain after the First World War.”<sup>791</sup> As the number of Jews increased, “especially following the beginning of the Nazi persecution of the Jews in Germany, there were struggles between Jews and Arabs over territories.”<sup>792</sup> In the chapter on the conflict in *Grundbok historia* from 2002, the theme of historical Jewish suffering is introduced again with reference to the “Persecution of Jews under Nazism [which] caused the mass immigration of Jews to Palestine.”<sup>793</sup> Following previous textbook framings, we learn too that the arrival of these new immigrants caused increased “tensions between [them] and the

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<sup>787</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996)

<sup>788</sup> Ibid

<sup>789</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007), pp. 362-364

”Mellanöstern kallas den del av världen där Israel och de arabiska länderna ligger. Sedan mer än femtio år har händelser i Mellanöstern så gott som varje vecka varit i nyheterna. Dessa nyheter handlar nästan bara om krig, terror och hat. Vad beror konflikterna i Mellanöstern på?”

<sup>790</sup> Ibid. ”Kampen om Palestina

På 1800-talet började judar i Europa arbeta för att få ett eget land i Palestina. Där skulle världens judar kunna leva i trygghet. I Palestina låg judarnas land när det ockuperades av romarna för drygt 2 000 år

Sedan. På 1800-talet bodde det mest araber i området. Men allt fler judar flyttade till Palestina, som efter första världskriget styrdes av Storbritannien. När judarna blev fler, särskilt efter att de nazis

tiska judeförföljelserna i Tyskland börjat, blev det bråk om landområden mellan judar och araber.

Efter andra världskriget beslutade FN att dela upp Palestina i en judisk och en arabisk stat. Det stora problemet var hur landet skulle delas mellan judar och araber. FN kom med ett delningsförslag som varken judar eller araber godkände.”

<sup>791</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007)

<sup>792</sup> Ibid

<sup>793</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002), pp. 319-320. ”Judeförföljelserna under nazismen orsakade en massinvandring av Judar till Palestina. Spänningen mellan de nyanlända judarna och palestinierna, som hade bott i området i mer än tusen år, ökade. Palestina hade stått under brittiskt beskydd trettioåret, och när briterna försökte hejda invandringen svarade judiska terrororganisationer med mord och attentat. Detta ledde till att många palestinier flydde. FN ”löste” problemet genom att föreslå en delning av området i en judisk och en palestinsk stat. Judarna accepterade förslaget, men palestinierna och de arabiska staterna gjorde det inte.”

Palestinians<sup>794</sup>. In the 2005 edition of *SO direkt historia* and the chapter on the conflict entitled “Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East”<sup>795</sup>, the topic of the Nazi holocaust is discussed and that “six million of them [the Jews] died in Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War (1939-1945).”<sup>796</sup> We learn too that “the immigration of Jews [to Palestine] increased quickly, something which the Palestinians disliked.”<sup>797</sup> A more explicit example of how the topics and themes I have discussed interconnect in the textbooks is presented in the 91-92 textbooks. For example, there we learn that the “Palestinians asked themselves if it was right for them to pay the price of Nazi atrocities through the loss of their country.”<sup>798</sup> This is connected to the issue of increased tensions between “Jews and Palestinians”<sup>799</sup> with the arrival of Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution in the 1930s and of the immigration of “even more Jews who had survived the concentration camps”<sup>800</sup>. These events are also presented as proof that Arabs and Jews “could hardly live together.”<sup>801</sup> The series of connecting topics and themes presented above construct a difficult moral dilemma for the reader or pupil: should one support the Holocaust survivors or the Arabs of Palestine? In combination with the general framework of the chapters discussed above too through the notion of “equal” claim to the land, the pupils’ understanding of the root causes of the conflict become inexorable. The dilemma is strengthened further in relation to the issue of the 1939 White Paper discussed below.

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<sup>794</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002), pp. 319-320

<sup>795</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H (2005), pp. 456-458. ”Israeler och palestinier i Mellanöstern. Omkring år 70 e.Kn fördrevs många tusen judar från Palestina efter att de försökt göra uppror mot romarna, som då härskade i området. Sedan dess har judarna skingrats över stora områden i världen, en förvisning som brukar kallas diaspora. Judarna har i omgångar utsatts för svåra pogromer (förföljelser) bland annat beskyllda för att ha orsakat Jesus Kristus död. Sex miljoner av dem dog i nazisternas koncentrationsläger under andra världskriget (1939-1945).”

<sup>796</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H (2005)

<sup>797</sup> Ibid. ”Invandringen av judar ökade snabbt, något som inte gillades av palestinerna. Snart tog båda sidor till terror och ibland öppet krig”

<sup>798</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992), pp. 335 – 339

<sup>799</sup> Ibid

<sup>800</sup> Ibid

<sup>801</sup> Ibid

Responses to the British supported White Paper of 1939 are discussed in the textbooks as is the Jewish response to it. Emphasis is placed on the efforts of Holocaust survivors to get to Palestine in the wake of the paper.

The period of the 1930s in the textbooks is marked by events such as the 1936 Arab Revolt and the 1939 White Paper by Britain. According to Brenner, the paper “curtailed Zionist land purchases, limited immigration to 75,000 for the next five years, and proposed an *Arab dominated state* within ten years”<sup>802</sup>. Issues such as British support and rejection are also explained within this framework. For example, this is done through highlighting the dramatic consequences of a British *volte-face* on support for a Jewish state and the resulting limitations on Jewish immigration to Palestine. In the chapter in *SO direkt historia 3* from 1998 it is claimed that Britain had “*rejected* the demand of the Jews to establish a state of their own”<sup>803</sup>. (my emphasis) In addition, by “1945 [, Britain] only allowed 75,000 Jews to enter into Palestine – which was agreed upon. Following that, only 1500 Jews per month were allowed to immigrate”<sup>804</sup>. In the 1998 textbooks, the topic of the repatriation of Jews to Europe or placement in camps in Cyprus is preceded by the allusions to the White Paper of 1939. Preceding this too is the topic of “the Nazi attempt at extermination”<sup>805</sup>. The reason for limitations on immigration is framed here in terms of British cooperation “with the Arabs in order to maintain [British] influence in the Arab world”<sup>806</sup>. Referred to in paragraph five of the chapter too are the many local Arab protests and

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<sup>802</sup> Brenner, (1983), p. 87

<sup>803</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998). ”Andra världskriget 1939-45

Under andra världskriget skulle britterna samarbeta med araberna för att behålla sitt inflytande i arabvärlden. Efter kriget avslög de kravet från judarna att få bilda en egen stat. Året 1945 lät de bara 75 000 judar – vilket var avtalat – komma in i Palestina. Därefter fick högst 1 500 judar per månad invandra. Många, som försökte ta sig in på olagligt sätt, sändes tillbaka till Europa eller placerades i läger, bland annat på Cypern. De judar som överlevt Nazisternas försök till utrotning insåg att segrarmakterna inte kunde hjälpa dem till trygghet. Enda säkra tillflykten skulle vara en egen judisk stat, Israel.”

<sup>804</sup> Ibid

<sup>805</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>806</sup> Ibid

demonstrations towards “Jewish superiority”<sup>807</sup>. In the 98 textbook too we learn that as a result of the change in British policy, the survivors of the Holocaust “realised that the victors [of the Second World War] could not bring them security”<sup>808</sup> and that the only “safe retreat”<sup>809</sup> would be “a Jewish state of their own, Israel”.<sup>810</sup> In the 2002 edition of *Grundbok historia* we learn that “Palestine had been a British protectorate in the 1930s and when the *British tried to prevent immigration Jewish terror organisations* responded through *murder and attacks*.”<sup>811</sup> (my italics). Following the reaction of the “Jewish terror organisations”<sup>812</sup> to British limitations on immigration, in the same passage it states that “this led to many Palestinians fleeing.”<sup>813</sup> These violent acts are contextualised in the 1996 edition of *Puls: historia vår egen tid* through “Jewish suffering”<sup>814</sup> under Nazism and the actions of Great Britain to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine. In the chapter on the conflict in *Historia: punkt SO* from 2003, we learn of the increased persecution of Jews in Germany which in turn increased the “flow of Jewish refugees to Palestine.”<sup>815</sup> Then reference is made again to Arab Palestinian concerns connected to the influx of Jewish refugees/immigrants. We learn that some “Palestinians began to feel pushed out and more Arab

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<sup>807</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998). ”Araberna – särskilt i Palestina – kände sig svikna av engelsmän och fransmän. De gjorde motstånd mot judarnas överläge genom demonstrationer, strejker, terrorism och slutligen öppet krig. Kampen riktades även mot briterna.”

<sup>808</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998) ”De judar som överlevt Nazisternas försök till utrotning insåg att segrarmakterna inte kunde hjälpa dem till trygghet. Enda säkra tillflykten skulle vara en egen judisk stat, Israel.”

<sup>809</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>810</sup> Ibid, Emphasising the predicament faced by one group of Holocaust survivors in particular, Pappé writes about the “last British attempt to limit illegal Jewish immigration, [and] the return of the *Exodus*, full of Holocaust survivors, to Germany, which coincided with one of UNSCOP’s visits”, Pappé, I, (2006) *A History of Modern Palestine* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 123 Perhaps much like a portion of the framings offered in the textbooks, but far from all, it is this tragic history which has “accentuated even further *the nexus between the Holocaust and the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine*” as Pappé describes it.

<sup>811</sup> Ibid

<sup>812</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002)

<sup>813</sup> Ibid

<sup>814</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>815</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003)



protests began to take place”<sup>816</sup>. In response to this we learn that “the British [in reference to the White Paper] promised to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine.”<sup>817</sup>

## Discussion and analysis

How are the issues of Zionism, the Balfour Declaration, Britain’s support and broken promises, immigration and increasing tensions treated in the textbooks examined above? The general discursive framework for understanding these issues consists of a number of interconnected topics and themes introduced throughout the textbook chapters. First of all, in the opening sections, both the construction of a Palestinian and Jewish connection to the land is established in the textbook chapters through, as Andersen puts it, “the reimagining of an ancient religious community *as a nation*”.<sup>818</sup> (my italics) Themes such as religion and nationhood and topics connected to them provide a common-sense framework for understanding and explaining the histories of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. In turn this supports the emergent and recurrent notion of “equal” claim to the land. In addition, Jewish (meta)historical identity is constructed around the above topics and themes to seamlessly connect the modern Zionist movement and modern Israel to “the vast Diasporan centre”<sup>819</sup> and ancient (biblical) Israel. In turn, the purpose of Zionism is not discussed in terms of its political (colonial) or ideological moorings. Instead it is discussed in terms of a natural connection between Judaism and Zionism and the latter’s purpose to provide a safe haven for Jews everywhere under the auspices of Theodor Herzl following increased anti-Semitism in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Subsequently, the issue of the Balfour Declaration and broken promises

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<sup>816</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003)

<sup>817</sup> Ibid

<sup>818</sup> Andersen, (1983/1999), p. 149

<sup>819</sup> As Taylor writes around the time of Herzl’s “convened [...] First Zionist Congress in 1897” that the character of the Zionist movement was “defined by the fact that its adherents comprised a minority of the Jewish world. This was an embarrassing reality, since the Zionists claimed to represent the whole Jewish people by reviving its national ethos and thereby preserving Jewish identity in the context of modern civilization.” *Zionism and Jewish History* Author(s): Alan R. Taylor Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1972), pp. 35-51 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 17/08/2009 07:25, pages 37 and 41

hinges on the previous framework and Britain's part in ambivalently supporting and denying the assumed "equal" claims of both parties to the conflict. The latter point is highlighted in response to increasing tensions between Jews and Arabs and the limitation on Jewish immigration. The theme of historical Jewish suffering introduced in the opening sections of the textbooks (e.g. pogroms, ghettoisation, expulsions etc) is reintroduced in the historical event of the extermination of six million European Jews during the Nazi holocaust. This event acts as the subsequent backdrop to the topic of Jewish immigration and the explanatory framework for acts of Jewish terror in the wake of the 1939 White Paper along with allusions to British collaboration with the Arabs. In addition, the shifting of the topic of Jewish immigration to the plight of Holocaust survivors pits the latter against the indigenous population and constructs a difficult moral dilemma (e.g. whose plight should the reader adhere to the most).

In the following section I will discuss how the topics of the UN Partition Plan of 1947, the "War of Independence" of 1948 and Israel's establishment and the subsequent flight/Expulsion of the Palestinians are treated in the textbooks. This will be preceded by a discussion on these issues via the secondary literature.

## Section 4.2 Partition, 1948 and the Creation of the Refugee Problem

According to the debate discussed in chapter one between the 'new historians' and anti-traditionalists, the topics of partition in the 1930s and 1940s, the 1948 war and the subsequent plight of the Palestine Arabs all find their unifying expression in the concept of 'transfer'. As I also noted, there is great disagreement between these scholars on the extent to which the concept accurately reflects some overarching ideological drive directly guiding certain policies from the outset. At the same time, traditionalist historians reject the concept either for being overly deterministic or for presenting a negative image of Zionism in general. What can we learn from

the debate between here? We learn that there are often parallel *tendencies* within any political movement both towards the ideological drives the anti-traditionalists posit or for ideological transformation through compromise and reconciliation. This indeed has been demonstrated a number of times over the years by the change of position by the PLO and the Israeli leadership in connection, for example, with the emergence of various peace processes. To contrast with the textbook representations, for the purposes of this section I will employ what can be learnt from the concept of ‘transfer’ with regard to possible connections between partition, 1948 and the creation of the refugee problem. Furthermore, I contend that different positions within the debate on 1948 provide a set of broader perspectives to the ones established in the textbooks. I will now revisit some of the ‘new historian’ and anti-traditionalist positions on the concept and will keep in mind the caveats expressed by traditionalists and ‘new historians’ too (see chapter one).

Connecting Zionism to late 19<sup>th</sup> century colonialism, Walid Khalidi argues that the concept can be traced back to the first Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897 and “Theodor Herzl’s little-publicised draft for a “Charter” for the colonization of Palestine”<sup>820</sup>. Further, Morris also cites Theodor Herzl from a collection of his diaries in which he allegedly alludes to the ‘transfer’ idea.<sup>821</sup> What does this kind of evidence appear to show? First of all, that it was either felt or intended that the transfer of the local population on the part of some Zionist leaders would solve the demographic problem connected to the establishment of a Jewish state. This referred to the areas gained through land purchases, village clearings, areas provided by the UN partition plan of 1947 and areas gained following the 1948 war (1949 DMZ). Evidence for the persistence of this mindset (logic) connected to ‘transfer’ can be found in

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<sup>820</sup> Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution Author(s): Walid Khalidi Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 5-21 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537806> Accessed: 03/11/2008 03:35, p. 6

<sup>821</sup> Shlaim & Rogan, (2005), p. 41. Morris quotes from Herzl’s diaries the following, “We must expropriate gently ... we shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our country ... “

speeches, diaries and correspondence by a number of Zionist leaders, such as, Theodor Herzl, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann and Yosef Weitz. Transfer could be achieved either voluntarily or through force, but ideally the former. Revisionist Zionist, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, did not support the removal of the local population but only their hoped-for embracement of the Jewish national revival, albeit under an "iron wall" of military, economic and diplomatic power.<sup>822</sup> However, conversely or parallel to such tendencies, there came the expressed desire to accommodate through the creation or offer of unity between the Zionists and the local Arab notables and population. For traditionalists, this would represent a tendency far removed from the ideological constraints of the 'transfer' concept.

The concept of 'transfer' may help us to understand the implications of the drive to establish a modern Jewish state in Palestine. 'Transfer' may be understood as a possible explanatory ideological link or logic between Herzl's vision, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the 1937 Peel Commission up to the UN 1947 Partition Proposal which facilitated the "acquisition of land".<sup>823</sup> As I have already discussed, the politics of British colonial land settlement provided a springboard for this process and enabled access to land for purchase.<sup>824</sup> Once adopted, and some would even claim *invented*, by the UN, partition effectively implemented a "revolution"<sup>825</sup>. This enabled the Zionist movement to "increase what [they had] 8-fold (from 7 percent to 55 percent of the country)"<sup>826</sup> while the local population yielded "45 percent of what [they had] and let one-third of [their] population live as

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<sup>822</sup> Yet his insistence on a Jewish majority in Palestine would perhaps require a transfer of the local population.

<sup>823</sup> Shlaim, (2003), pp. 3 – 6; Sternhell (1996), p. 17. While political Zionism sought through diplomacy to secure "International support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine", practical Zionism, represented by the movement of the Russian Hovevi Zion, promoted "immigration and settlement activities in Palestine" and "land acquisition [as well as] the building of a Jewish economy there", according to Shlaim. The contradiction in vision of how a Zionist-Jewish society would be realised in Palestine might best be expressed by one of the conflicts which emerged between "the anti-Zionist Marxist Bund" and "Po'alei Tzion", writes Sternhell.

<sup>824</sup> See Atran above (1989)

<sup>825</sup> Khalidi, (1988)

<sup>826</sup> Khalidi, (1991), p. 8

a permanent minority under alien rule.”<sup>827</sup> Phyllis Bennis writes that under UNSCOP, partition did not take note of the demographic and geographic realities on the ground<sup>828</sup> and went “against the will of the indigenous majority population”<sup>829</sup>. UN Resolution 181 allotted the pre-state *Yishuv* fifty-five to “fifty-six percent of the land”<sup>830</sup> despite the fact that it only owned six to seven per cent of the land by 1947.<sup>831</sup> Whether or not the percentages proposed were acceptable to the Zionist leadership at the time or not<sup>832</sup>, it was expressed by leaders that a possible resolution to the demographic problem would be through the active ‘transfer’ of Arab communities “from the area apportioned to the proposed Jewish state”<sup>833</sup> by the UN. This was an idea originally advanced in the 1937 Peel Commission.<sup>834</sup> Unable to acquire enough territory through land purchases, Kimmerling asserts that between 1947 and 48 the leadership would acquire territory through “the sword instead of money”.<sup>835</sup> Traditionalists would also remind us that local resistance to the establishment of the state was a factor in unsheathing the sword and in carrying out defensive policies (e.g. Plan D) sometimes detrimental to the local population. In addition, the woes of the

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<sup>827</sup> Khalidi, (1991), p. 8

<sup>828</sup> Bennis, (2007), p. 30 “That so few Jews had settled in the Palestinian countryside proved to be a serious problem for those who wanted to base their solution to the growing conflict between the two communities on the principle of partition. On the one hand, logic and common sense dictated that the countryside as a whole – more than three quarters of the territory – should remain Palestinian. The towns, on the other hand, were almost equally inhabited. The question was how to divide two distinct Palestinian and Jewish entities with homogenous populations when this was the reality on the ground?”

<sup>829</sup> Bennis, p. 30

<sup>830</sup> Pappé (2007), p. 32; Bennis (2007), p. 12

<sup>831</sup> This contrasts with the 10 percent figure presented in one of the textbooks.

<sup>832</sup> The Zionist proposal for 80% of Palestine brought to UNSCOP was not approved, for example. See Pappé (2007), Chapter Three, section entitled “The UN’s Partition Plan”, p. 31

<sup>833</sup> A History of the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionism Author(s): Israel Shahak Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring, 1989), pp. 22-37 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537340> Accessed: 19/11/2008 07:47; see also Morris, (1998); Pappé (2007); Masalha, (1991); Khalidi, (1988)

<sup>834</sup> Ample evidence is provided in the form of quotations from various figures within the Zionist leadership from among others Morris (1998) and Shahak (1989) who both cite David Ben-Gurion and Josef Weitz at the twentieth Zionist Congress of 1937 and the Mapai Congress of 1938, respectively.

<sup>835</sup> Kimmerling, (2006). P. 26

local population were also exacerbated by the actions of some members of the Arab leadership as well as Arab leaders; those of whom sought only to fulfil their own particular interests (e.g. King Abdullah). Furthermore, it has been argued that some of the local population either supported Transjordanian hegemony and/or sought a rapprochement between their Jewish neighbours.

Beginning with the topic of partition, let us now contrast the above portions of the debate from chapter one with the textbooks, followed by The 1948 War or “War of Independence” and the Palestinian Refugee Problem.

### UN 1947 or the Partition Proposal

In *SO boken historia 9* from 1992 the UN Partition Plan of 1947 is connected to the issue of the areas seized by Israel following the 1948 war.<sup>836</sup> In *Puls 9: historia vår egen tid* from 1996 the 1947 UN Partition Plan is referred to as a solution to “the problem”<sup>837</sup> (marks in original) with the word solution placed in speech marks indicating a critical tone. The UN had resolved the problem through “partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish parts.”<sup>838</sup> Then we learn that partition would mean that the Jewish people “would finally have a home of their own”<sup>839</sup> through the establishment of the state of Israel. The response on the part of the Arab Palestinians is expressed in terms of them “not wanting partition”<sup>840</sup> and their subsequent “taking up of arms.”<sup>841</sup> The purpose of the 1947 UN Partition Proposal in *Levande*

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<sup>836</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992). “Israel bildas. Den 14 maj 1948 utropades den judiska staten Israel. Tolv timmar senare dånade egyptiska attackplan över hustaken i huvudstaden Tel Aviv. Egypten, Syrien, Jordanien och Irak hade anfallit för att förhindra att den judiska staten Israel bildades. När vapenstillestånd slöts efter ett år, hade Israel *lagt beslag på* områden som enligt 1947-års FN-förslag skulle ha tillhört palestinierna. *Kriget medförde också* att flera hundra tusen palestinier flyttade eller fördrevs till flyktingläger i Jordanien, Gazaremsan, Syrien och Libanon. Jerusalem delades mellan Jordanien och Israel. År 1964 bildades Palestinska befrielseorganisationen, PLO, för att bekämpa staten Israel och bilda en palestinsk stat.”

<sup>837</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>838</sup> Ibid

<sup>839</sup> Ibid

<sup>840</sup> Ibid

<sup>841</sup> Ibid. ”Men arabiska palestinierna ville inte ha någon delning. Nu var det deras tur att ta till vapen.”

*historia läsebok 3* from 1996 is described as dividing “Palestine [...] into a Jewish state, an Arab state and an area around Jerusalem under UN jurisdiction”<sup>842</sup>. Then the acceptance of the proposal by “the Jews” and its rejection by “the Arabs”<sup>843</sup> is mentioned. The size of the Jewish population in the country in 1947 is also mentioned which is estimated to be “650,000, that is, 40 percent of the total population.”<sup>844</sup> In the 2007 edition of *Levande historia 9 fokus: elevbok*<sup>845</sup>, prior to references to partition we learn of how photographers spoke of the Nazi extermination and concentration camps and that six million Jews had been murdered. We learn too that people in Europe and the US “were ashamed that it [the Nazi holocaust] had been allowed to happen”<sup>846</sup> and that “many people now said that the Jews *must have a land of their own*.”<sup>847</sup> (my italics) The purpose of allowing the Jews a land of their own was to “prevent something like this [the Holocaust] ever happening again.”<sup>848</sup> Here the references to the Nazi holocaust foreground the topic of the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and how “Palestine would be divided between Jews and Arabs”.<sup>849</sup> In *SOS historia: ämnesboken* from 2007 the chapter entitled “Israel and the Arab States”<sup>850</sup> discusses again the UN Partition Plan of 1947 which we learn addressed the “great problem of how to divide the land between Jews and Arabs.”<sup>851</sup> Contrary to other textbooks, it is claimed

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<sup>842</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996), “Palestina delas i en judisk stat, en arabisk stat och ett område kring Jerusalem under FN:s ledning”

<sup>843</sup> Ibid

<sup>844</sup> Ibid. Note that the figure of 700,000 is put forward in another textbook.

<sup>845</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007)

<sup>846</sup> Ibid. “Efter andra världskrigets slut 1945 kunde journalister och fotografer berätta om nazisternas förintelsläger och koncentrationsläger. Sex miljoner judar hade dödats av nazisterna. I Europa och USA skämdes människor för att Det hade fått hända. Många sa nu att judarna måste få ett eget land. Det skulle förhindra att något sådant hände igen.

År 1947 lade FN fram en plan för hur Palestina skulle delas Mellan judar och araber.”

<sup>847</sup> Ibid

<sup>848</sup> Ibid

<sup>849</sup> Ibid

<sup>850</sup> Ibid

”Mellanöstern kallas den del av världen där Israel och de arabiska länderna ligger. Sedan mer än femtio år har händelser i Mellanöstern så gott som varje vecka varit i nyheterna. Dessa nyheter handlar nästan bara om krig, terror och hat. Vad beror konflikterna i Mellanöstern på?”

<sup>851</sup> Ibid

that the proposal was neither “accepted by Jews nor Arabs.”<sup>852</sup> The chapter on the conflict in *Historia B 6-9*<sup>853</sup> from 2007 entitled “The State of Israel”<sup>854</sup> is very brief and consists of only two paragraphs. The first paragraph begins by recounting how the “mass murder of Jews following the Second World War increased the demand for the Jewish people to be able to establish a state of their own.”<sup>855</sup> Following “stormy negotiations at the UN it was decided in 1947 that British controlled Palestine would be divided into an Arab and Jewish state.”<sup>856</sup> Then it is claimed that because “the Arab states voted no to the plan it could not be carried out peacefully.”<sup>857</sup> Then we learn that “Israel had become an independent Jewish state and a haven for Jews around the world.”<sup>858</sup> In the 2003 edition of *Levande historia elevbok 9* in a section entitled “Israel is Established”<sup>859</sup> we learn that in “1947 the UN presented a plan for the partition of Palestine.”<sup>860</sup> In tacit reference to Cold War rivalries we learn too that “the region was drawn into a power struggle between the superpowers.”<sup>861</sup> The US we are told was “sceptical about the UN proposal”<sup>862</sup> since they did not want to “make enemies of the 90 million Arabs in the oil-rich Middle East.”<sup>863</sup> In *Historia punkt SO* from 2003 we

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<sup>852</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007); Where we learn that the Zionist leaders had accepted the UN Proposal while the Arabs alone had rejected it.

<sup>853</sup> Molund, M, (2007) *Historia B 6-9*, Interskol, Kristianstad, p. 154

<sup>854</sup> Ibid, ”Staten Israel

Staten Israel bildades år 1948. Efter andra världskrigets massmord på judar växte kravet på att det judiska folket måste kunna bilda en egen stat. Efter stormiga förhandlingar i FN bestämdes 1947 att det brittiskt styrda Palestina skulle delas i en arabisk och en judisk stat. Eftersom arabstaterna röstade nej till planen, kunde den inte genomföras fredligt. Judar i Palestina utropade staten Israel. De arabiska grannstaterna anföll genast men besegrades. Israel hade blivit en självständig judisk nation och en tillflyktsort för judar världen över.”

<sup>855</sup> Ibid

<sup>856</sup> Ibid

<sup>857</sup> Ibid

<sup>858</sup> Ibid

<sup>859</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003). ” Israel bildas år 1947 lade FN fram en plan för delningen av Palestina. Området drogs in i maktkampen mellan supermakterna. USA var tveksamt till FN:s förslag. De ville inte få 90 miljoner araber i det oljerika Mellanöstern till fiender. Sovjetunionen stödde förslaget och i FN:s omröstning gick det igenom.”

<sup>860</sup> Ibid

<sup>861</sup> Ibid

<sup>862</sup> Ibid

<sup>863</sup> Ibid; Shlaim counters this claim and writes that “On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations passed its historic Resolution 181 in favor of the partition of



learn of the impact of limited immigration to Palestine on Jews fleeing the Nazi tyranny in Europe when “during the Second World War it was almost impossible for the Jews to flee to Palestine”<sup>864</sup> and that “the Holocaust continued”<sup>865</sup> at the same time. We then learn that when “the war was over the British tried for a long time to prevent Jewish survivors from getting to Palestine.”<sup>866</sup> Following international protest “the British gave up and asked the UN to divide the country between Jews and Palestinians.”<sup>867</sup> The first sentence of the chapter in *Levande historia minikurs 9* from 2003 entitled “Israel is established”<sup>868</sup> emphasises the local Arab population’s connection to the land and informs us that “Arabs lived in Palestine. Palestine was their country.”<sup>869</sup> Then the 1947 partition plan is mentioned and how a part of Palestine “would become a home to those Jews who wanted to move there.”<sup>870</sup> In *Grundbok historia* from 2002 we learn, again in ironic tone, that the “UN “solved” the problem by proposing a partition of the territory into a Jewish and Palestinian state.”<sup>871</sup> (speech marks in original) Then we learn of its rejection by “the Palestinians and the Arab states”<sup>872</sup> and its acceptance by “the Jews”.<sup>873</sup> The sentence almost reproduces word for word a sentence

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Palestine. In a rare instance of agreement during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union voted for the resolution while Britain abstained.” Shlaim, (2003), p. 25

<sup>864</sup> Nilsson, E, Olofsson, H, Uppström, R, (2003). ”Under andra världskriget blev det nästan omöjligt för judarna att fly till Palestina. Samtidigt pågick Förintelsen (se sid. 65-66). När kriget var över försökte britterna länge hindra överlevande judar att söka sig till Palestina. Men den brittiska politiken mötte allt starkare motstånd i världen. Till slut gav britterna upp och bad FN att dela landet mellan judar och Palestinier.”

<sup>865</sup> Ibid; Coverage of the Nazi holocaust is quite extensive in many of the textbooks, sometimes comprising chapters of five or more pages.

<sup>866</sup> Ibid

<sup>867</sup> Ibid

<sup>868</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003). “Israel bildas. I Palestina bodde araber. *Palestina var deras land*. År 1947 lade FN fram en plan: Palestina skulle delas. En del skulle tillhöra de palestinska araberna och en del skulle bli ett hem för de judar som ville flytta dit. Redan tidigare under 1900-talet hade en del judar invandrat till Palestina. I maj 1948 förklarade de judiska ledarna att staten Israel hade bildats i den judiska delen av Palestina. Sovjetunionen och USA erkände Israel. Andra länder erkände också den nya staten.”

<sup>869</sup> Ibid

<sup>870</sup> Ibid

<sup>871</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002). “FN ”löste” problemet genom att föreslå en delning av området i en judisk och en palestinsk stat.”

<sup>872</sup> Ibid

<sup>873</sup> Ibid

in an earlier textbook from 1996 but switching the word “part” for the word “state” in the later version.<sup>874</sup>

I will now examine the treatment of the 1948 war and its aftermath in the next section. The treatment of this period combines elements of the Jewish/Arab connection to the land discourse and brings in elements of the international law discourse to highlight the creation of the refugee problem. This provides a kind of balance between Israeli and Palestinian accounts. Partition is presented as a problematic resolution to the burgeoning conflict. In addition, it is understood in the chapters that Israel is attacked first and then the refugee problem is created.

### The 1948 War or “War of Independence” and the Palestinian Refugee Problem

In the first few sentences of the chapter in the 91-92 textbooks we learn that following the 1948 declaration of the establishment of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq “had attacked in order to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state.”<sup>875</sup> Preceding this we are presented with the dramatic image of “Egyptian attack planes over rooftops in Tel Aviv”<sup>876</sup>. Then we learn that the war had caused the “flight or expulsion of several hundred thousand Palestinians to refugee camps in Jordan, Gaza, Syria and Israel.”<sup>877</sup> Following the foregrounding topics and themes of the Nazi holocaust and the Arab rejection of the UN Partition Plan, in the 96 edition of *Levande historia*

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<sup>874</sup> See for example in *Puls: Historia vår tid* from 1996 in paragraph two where it states that the UN “solved” the problem through dividing Palestine into an Arab *part* and a Jewish *part*. “FN ”löste” problemet genom att dela Palestina i en arabisk *del* och en judisk *del*.” (my italics), Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>875</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992), pp. 335 – 339. “Israel bildas. Den 14 maj 1948 utropades den judiska staten Israel. Tolv timmar senare dånade egyptiska attackplan över hustaken i huvudstaden Tel Aviv. Egypten, Syrien, Jordanien och Irak hade anfällt för att förhindra att den judiska staten Israel bildades. När vapenstillestånd slöts efter ett år, hade Israel lagt beslag på områden som enligt 1947-års FN-förslag skulle ha tillhört palestinerna. Kriget medförde också att flera hundra tusen palestinier flyttade eller fördrevs till flyktingläger i Jordanien, Gazaremsan, Syrien och Libanon. Jerusalem delades mellan Jordanien och Israel. År 1964 bildades Palestinska befrielseorganisationen, PLO, för att bekämpa staten Israel och bilda en palestinsk stat.”

<sup>876</sup> Ibid

<sup>877</sup> Ibid

*läsebok 3* we learn of the attack on the state of Israel by neighbouring Arab states whose “aim was to destroy the Jewish state”<sup>878</sup>. We also learn of Israel’s repulsion of the attack and the “flight” of Palestinian Arabs. In the 1998-99 textbooks, following the declaration of “the independent state of Israel”<sup>879</sup> by “David Ben-Gurion”<sup>880</sup> we learn of the Arab states “declaring war”<sup>881</sup> on the state of Israel. The text also mentions appeals made by the UN for a ceasefire which was “continually broken”<sup>882</sup> by both sides who all the while “strengthened their armies”.<sup>883</sup> The title of the section “The State of Israel is established and the Palestinians are expelled”<sup>884</sup> promises a discussion on the creation of the refugee problem. While the issue of expulsion is not directly broached we learn that “the Palestinians were the ones who were to suffer”<sup>885</sup> and that “a half, maybe a million [Palestinians] left Palestine in 1948.”<sup>886</sup> (my emphasis) The creation of the refugee problem is presented as two conflicting opinions. We are told that “the Jews claimed that they [the Palestinians had] left on the command of the Arab League” and that “the Arabs asserted that the Palestinians were expelled through Jewish terror”<sup>887</sup>. In *Hållplatser i historia* from 2000 reference is made to the

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<sup>878</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996), “De omgivande arabstaterna gick omedelbart till angrepp. Målet var att krossa den judiska staten. Många palestinaaraber flydde. Israels armé slog tillbaka arabstaternas anfall. ”

<sup>879</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>880</sup> Just a brief aside, it is interesting to note how David Ben-Gurion’s role contrasts with that of Yasser Arafat in the textbooks. The chapter sections on the conflict in the 2000 edition of *Hållplatser i historia* (2000) attest to this. At the most David Ben-Gurion’s is only active when declaring the state of Israel into existence in May of 1948. Israeli leaders are generally portrayed in a very neutral light in the textbooks.

<sup>881</sup> Ibid

<sup>882</sup> Ibid

<sup>883</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>884</sup> Ibid

<sup>885</sup> Ibid

<sup>886</sup> Ibid; See also article by Arnon Golan, (1999),”The Transformation of Abandoned Arab Rural Areas” for *Israel Studies*, Volume 2, no. 1, p. 96. These estimates appear to incorporate information provided by the Israelis, the British and the Arab states, which estimated the number of expelled Palestine Arabs, according to Golan, at somewhere between “520,000 [...] 750,000 and 100,000”

<sup>887</sup> Ibid, “Efter hårda strider slöt Israel 1949 vapenstillestånd, först med Egypten och senare med de andra arabstaterna. Det blev palestinierna som fick lida och närmare en miljon av dem lämnade Palestina

plight of the Palestinians. After mentioning Yasser Arafat's disappointment and the Arab defeat following the 1948 war, we read that "the Palestinians' tragedy [had begun]"<sup>888</sup> and that they "became refugees"<sup>889</sup>. In *Grundbok historia* from 2002 we learn that "Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were chased away or were frightened away."<sup>890</sup> We learn too why "Israel refused to allow the Palestinian refugees to return home [because] at the same time a large stream of Jewish refugees from the Arab states was received."<sup>891</sup> We also learn that "Israel felt threatened from all directions but with the help of the US it became a very strong military power."<sup>892</sup> A similar explanation is provided in *Levande historia 9* from 2003 when "Israelis had occupied [Palestinian] houses and land"<sup>893</sup>. In the 2005 edition of *Grundbok historia* we learn of the declaration of "the Jewish state of Israel on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1948"<sup>894</sup> and how the "next day the new state was attacked by the surrounding Arab countries."<sup>895</sup> In the next sentence we learn that "hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled"<sup>896</sup> mainly to Jordan and Lebanon. The chapter entitled "The New Land of Israel"<sup>897</sup> in *SOS historia* from 2007 opens with the declaration of Israel by "the Jewish leaders"<sup>898</sup> in 1948 "on

*Enligt araberna* fördrevs de, enligt Judarna gav de sig av på uppmaning av flera Arabländer. Palestinierna hamnade i flyktingläger som FN skötte. Och de har inte fått återvända till Israel." (my italics)

<sup>888</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000)

<sup>889</sup> Ibid

<sup>890</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002)

<sup>891</sup> Ibid

<sup>892</sup> Ibid, "Israel kände sig hotat från alla håll och skaffade sig, med USA:s hjälp, en mycket stark krigsmakt."

<sup>893</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

<sup>894</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002), "Den judiska staten Israel utropades den 14 maj 1948 och redan dagen efter angreps den nya staten av de omgivande arabländerna. Hundratusentals palestinier flydde, främst till Jordanien och Libanon. FN lyckades skapa ett vapenstillestånd och i det sammanhanget mördades den Svenske medlaren Folke Bernadotte av en judisk terrorgrupp. Israel vägrade att låta de palestinska flyktingarna återvända hem, men samtidigt tog man emot en stor judisk flyktingström från arabstaterna.

Israel kände sig hotat från alla håll och skaffade sig, med USA:s hjälp, en mycket stark krigsmakt."

<sup>895</sup> Ibid

<sup>896</sup> Ibid

<sup>897</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007)

<sup>898</sup> Ibid . "Det nya landet Israel. År 1948, samma dag som engelsmännen lämnade Palestina, utropade de judiska ledarna själva staten Israel. Arabländerna runt Palestina anföll genast det

the same day the British left Palestine”<sup>899</sup>. Then we learn that “the Arab states neighbouring Palestine immediately attacked the newly established Israel.”<sup>900</sup> After an Israeli victory we learn that Israel had “seized more land”<sup>901</sup> and in the next sentence we learn that “hundreds of thousands of Arabs left Israel.”<sup>902</sup> Highlighted here are conflicting Arab and Israeli claims on the number of Arabs who left Israel. “The Israelis say it was about 500,000 that fled [while] the Palestinians [say] it was 900,000 who were expelled.”<sup>903</sup> In the final sentence of the paragraph we learn that since “1948 Palestinian refugees have lived in camps outside of Israel.”<sup>904</sup> The 2005 textbook mentions Israel’s declaration of independence and the US’s immediate recognition of it, contrasting this with a previous textbook which claimed the US had rejected the declaration.<sup>905</sup> In the 2003 edition of *Levande historia 9: minikurs* we learn that “already earlier on in the 20<sup>th</sup> century”<sup>906</sup> some Jews had moved to Palestine. We also learn about the declaration of the state of Israel and its recognition by a number of other

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nybildade Israel. Men israelerna vann kriget, och tog mer land. Hundratusentals araber lämnade Israel. Israelerna säger att det var ungefär 500 000 som flydde, palestinierna att det var 900 000 som utvisades. Ända sedan 1948 bodde palestinska flyktingar i läger utanför Israel.”

<sup>899</sup> Ibid

<sup>900</sup> Ibid

<sup>901</sup> Ibid

<sup>902</sup> Ibid

<sup>903</sup> Ibid

<sup>904</sup> Ibid

<sup>905</sup> The matter of US and British support is treated differently in each textbook as noted already. As Khalidi and others have discussed, however, US and British support shifted from time to time but they never unequivocally rejected support for a Jewish state. As Khalidi informs us, on the matter of partition, by the middle of March 1948 the “U.S. had to all intents and purposes turned its back on partition whatever may have been President Truman’s personal feelings on the subject.” This was in light of the feeling that partition could not be implemented peacefully. One of the most interesting responses to this by “Dr. E. Neumann, president of the Zionist organisation of America, [was that] if the General Assembly recommendation is nullified there is no doubt about it, the Jews will press the claim for immigration and settlement in *all* of Palestine.” Khalidi, (1988), pp. 16-17

<sup>906</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003). “Israel bildas. I Palestina bodde araber. *Palestina var deras land*. År 1947 lade FN fram en plan: Palestina skulle delas. En del skulle tillhöra de palestinska araberna och en del skulle bli ett hem för de judar som ville flytta dit. Redan tidigare under 1900-talet hade en del judar invandrat till Palestina. I maj 1948 förklarade de judiska ledarna att staten Israel hade bildats i den judiska delen av Palestina. Sovjetunionen och USA erkände Israel. Andra länder erkände också den nya staten.”

states including the US and Soviet Union. In addition, we learn that the “Arabs [who] lived in the neighbouring countries [...] did not want a Jewish state as a neighbour”<sup>907</sup> because “they thought that Palestine should be Arab in future too.”<sup>908</sup> This foregrounds and explains the motivation for the immediate “attack against Israel”<sup>909</sup>. In the section entitled “War and Terror”<sup>910</sup> in *SO direct historia* from 2005 we learn that in “three bloody wars Israel has defended its independence towards the neighbouring Arab states.”<sup>911</sup> Here the official Israeli war of independence narrative is employed. The narrative strengthens assumptions such as the indigenous status of the Zionist settlers (defending their territorial independence from exterior forces) and the Palestine Arabs and in turn the notion of “equal” claim to the land. In the chapter entitled “The Middle East”<sup>912</sup> in *Samhällskunskap A, 6-9* from 2002, we read in the first two sentences that “one of the longest threats of war in the world [has been] in the Middle East and concerns Israel’s conflict with the surrounding Arab countries.”<sup>913</sup> Then we learn that ever since “the state of Israel was established in 1948 the country has found itself in continual conflict with its neighbouring Arab countries.”<sup>914</sup> Following this we learn why the state of Israel “was established”<sup>915</sup>, namely, to provide the Jewish people with a “state of their

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<sup>907</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003)

<sup>908</sup> Ibid

<sup>909</sup> Ibid

<sup>910</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjornsson, H, Tillman, H (2005)

<sup>911</sup> Ibid. ”Krig och terror

I tre blodiga krig har Israel försvarat sin självständighet mot de omgivande arabländerna. Med hjälp från USA, där cirka fem miljoner judar där bor, har Israel byggt upp en stark krigsmakt och även utvecklat kärnvapen. Förhållandet till palestinierna är fortfarande ett svårlöst problem. Förhandlingarna om fred mellan de båda folken har gått trögt. Brutala arabiska bombsprängningar, ofta av unga självmordsbombare, och hänsynslös israelisk vedergällning låser fast parterna vid sina ståndpunkter och hindrar kompromisser.”

<sup>912</sup> Lundberg, F, Olsson, L, (2002), p. 138. ”Ett av de mest långvariga krigshoten i världen finns i Mellanöstern. Det handlar om Israels konflikt med de omgivande arabländerna. Sedan staten Israel bildades 1948 har landet befunnit sig i ständig konflikt med de arabiska grannländerna. Israel tillkom för att judarna skulle få en egen nation efter allt lidande de genomgått under andra världskriget.”

<sup>913</sup> Ibid

<sup>914</sup> Lundberg, F, Olsson, L, (2002)

<sup>915</sup> Ibid

own”<sup>916</sup> following “all the suffering they had endured during the Second World War.”<sup>917</sup> Then a tacit causal link is established to explain the plight of the “Arabs in Palestine”<sup>918</sup> when we learn that “when Israel was created another group ended up without a homeland – the Palestine Arabs.”<sup>919</sup> In the 2005 edition of *SO direct historia* we learn that the US immediately recognised Israel and that “the Soviets followed a little later, as did France and Great Britain”<sup>920</sup> while “Egypt and the other neighbouring Arab states declared war on Israel.”<sup>921</sup> In the 2003 edition of *Levande historia elevbok 9* we learn about the reaction to Israel’s establishment on the part of “the Arab states [who launched] an attack [beginning] the first war between them and Israel”<sup>922</sup> and that by the 1949 ceasefire “550,000 Arabs had fled Israel.”<sup>923</sup> The 2007 edition of *Levande historia 9* in the section entitled “War against Israel” we learn that “Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan immediately attacked” Israel following its establishment.<sup>924</sup> In *Levande historia fokus*

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<sup>916</sup> Lundberg, F, Olsson, L, (2002)

<sup>917</sup> Ibid

<sup>918</sup> Ibid, ”Men när Israel skapades blev en annan grupp utan hemland – araberna i Palestina. Gång på gång har krig blossat upp mellan Israel och de omgivande arabländerna. Åren 1948, 1956, 1967 och 1973 inträffade stora krig i området.”

<sup>919</sup> Ibid

<sup>920</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjornsson, H, Tillman, H (2005). ” FN antog 1947 en resolution (en rekommendation) om en delning av Palestina. Den judiska staten skulle bli något större än den arabiska. De båda länderna skulle samarbeta ekonomiskt. Den 14 maj 1948 utropades den självständiga staten Israel. USA erkände genast Israel. Sovjet följde efter något senare, likaså Frankrike och Storbritannien. Egypten och de andra omgivande arabstaterna däremot förklarade krig mot Israel.”

<sup>921</sup> Ibid

<sup>922</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

<sup>923</sup> Ibid. ”Israel slog tillbaka det arabiska anfallet och 1949 undertecknades en vapenvila. Då hade 550 000 araber flytt från Israel. Meningen var att de skulle komma tillbaka efter kriget. Men israelerna hade ockuperat deras hus och mark och förklarade att Israel hade varit tvunget att ta emot 500 000 judar som tvingats fly från arabiska länder. Den stat som enligt delningsplanen skulle vara de palestinska arabernas var nu ockuperad av Israel, Egypten och Jordanien.”

<sup>924</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007). ”Krig mot Israel. År 1948 förklarade judarna att staten Israel var bildad. Både Sovjetunionen och USA erkände den nya staten, men Arabstaterna Egypten, Syrien, Libanon, Irak och Jordanien gick till angrepp. Israel slog tillbaka angreppet och 1949 skrev man under ett avtal om vapenvila. Då hade 650000 palestinska araber flytt från Israel.

Så började konflikten mellan Israel och arabstaterna. Den beror alltså på att två olika folk vill ha samma land! Det var meningen att de araber som hade flytt 1948 skulle komma tillbaka

from 2007 we learn that the conflict is about “two people wanting the same land/country.”<sup>925</sup> In *Historia B 6-9* from 2007 we learn that “the Jews declared the establishment of the state of Israel”<sup>926</sup> and that the “Arab states attacked immediately but were defeated.”<sup>927</sup>

In the following final sub-section of this chapter I will summarise and discuss some of the main points of the above analysis.

## Discussion and analysis

How are the topics of the partition proposal, the 1948 war and the creation of the refugee problem treated in the textbooks examined above? I have already discussed the general framework established in the textbooks in the opening sections of this chapter (see above). Some of these are reinvoked in the treatment of the partition proposal in the textbooks too. For example, the historical event of the extermination of six million European Jews during the Nazi holocaust serves as part of the explanatory frame for understanding the purpose of partition. Partition is understood here to prevent the Holocaust from ever happening again and to provide the Jewish people with a state of

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när kriget var slut. Men när de återvände hade israelerna ockuperat deras hus och mark. Regeringen sa att det berodde på att Israel hade tagit emot 500000 judar som flytt från arabiska länder. Det område som enligt FN:s plan skulle bli de palestinska arabernas land var efter kriget 15 ockuperat av Israel, Egypten och Jordanien.” ;

”Femtio år av oro. I över femtio år har det alltså varit konflikt mellan Israel, de flesta arabstaterna och palestinierna. Palestinierna organiserade sig för att bekämpa Israel och fick pengar från arabstaterna. Störst av organisationerna blev PLO, Palestinas befrielseorganisation. Sedan 1948 har det varit flera krig. Efter ett nytt krig 1967 tog Israel ännu mer land, bland annat Västbanken och östra Jerusalem. En miljon palestinier levde efter 1967 i Israel och områden som var ockuperade av Israel. Många bodde i läger för flyktingar i Libanon och Jordanien. Både bland israeler och palestinier finns det grupper som tycker olika. En del vill ha fred och säger att israeler och palestinier måste dela på det område man strider om. Andra vill inte dela området. Israel och palestinierna misstror varandra. Därför är det lätt för grupper som är emot fred att sätta igång oroligheter.”

<sup>925</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007)

<sup>926</sup> Molund, M, (2007)

”Samtidigt med att en judisk invandring tog fart, flydde och fördrevs ett stort antal av områdets tidigare invånare som nu började kalla sig palestinier. De tvingades leva i flyktingläger i grannländerna utan möjlighet att bilda en egen stat. Alltsedan dess har det rått en svår konflikt mellan Israeler och palestinier. Konflikten har växt till att ställa västerlandet mot arab- och till viss del den muslimska världen. Mot mitten av 1990-talet gav Israel dock palestinierna ett visst självstyre genom den så kallade Palestinska myndigheten.”

<sup>927</sup> Ibid



their own. We also learn that the Arabs rejected partition while the Jews accepted it. One textbook chapter in particular emphasises how the plan could not be passed peacefully due to Arab rejection of it. The roles of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union are presented differently in terms of their acceptance or rejection of the proposal and the US is presented in one textbook as rejecting partition due to its desire to avoid upsetting “90 million Arabs”. One critical voice emerges in the form of an ironic use of the word “resolved” which appears to cast a sceptical light on the successful implementation of the proposal. However, to refer to the chapters’ general framework again, it is already understood that the problem of the proposal’s resolution would hinge on the claims of two separate peoples to the land, the plight of the Jewish people and the local Palestine Arab population. Indeed, as noted before, a moral dilemma is created in some of the chapters whereby one is urged to choose between the immigrant survivors of the Holocaust and the local Arab population.

The general framework discussed is also present in relation to the topics of the 1948 war or “War of Independence” and the creation of the refugee problem, including the idea of “equal” claim to the land. This is mediated through among other things the employment of the term independence to describe Israel’s defensive war against the Arab states. As soon as the state of Israel is established and its political independence declared in the textbooks we learn that the Arab states have launched an aggressive attack on it in order to destroy it. The reasons given range from a non-desire to have a Jewish state as a neighbour or a desire to have Palestine continue as an Arabic country. Bringing in the international law discourse, the creation of the refugee problem is also treated in the textbooks. However, no direct connection is made to Israel’s own actions but instead “the war” is ascribed an agentive role in causing either the flight or expulsion of the Palestine Arabs. The issue of Arab flight or expulsion is treated as a contested one in the textbooks. Mention is made of the fact that in defiance of international law the Palestinian refugees are not permitted to return to their homes occupied by Israel in 1949. Mitigating this, it is explained that these homes were needed to accommodate Jewish refugees expelled from Arab countries. As with the issue of partition discussed above, emphasis is placed on the

recognition or rejection of Israel's declaration of independence on the part of the US, Britain, France and the Soviets despite disagreement between the textbooks on this matter (e.g. whether the US recognised or rejected the declaration). Absent from the overall framing of the pre-war period are the political and ideological dimensions of the conflict's history tied, for example, to the roles of and power relations between the Zionist movement or pre-state *Yishuv*, Great Britain and the Arab leadership. Instead much is made of both peoples' connection and "equal" claim to the land. What the above chapter analyses have also revealed is the pivotal function that identity constructs and subject positions play in maintaining the overall historical narrative. For example, it is understood throughout the chapters that there is a metahistorical connection between the Zionist settlers, Holocaust survivors and the Jews of ancient biblical times since they are considered one and the same people or nation.<sup>928</sup> In similar fashion too, when Palestinian connection to the land is discussed it is understood that they too are a distinctive nation-people metahistorically connected to the land with their roots in ancient Canaan. On the matter of roles and/or subject-positions, the Israelis are cast as both defensive and aggressive and this is set against the backdrop of their long history and metahistorical identity. The Arab states are portrayed as aggressive and rejectionist while Palestinian Arabs are portrayed as victims of the 1948 war. This is exemplified through the Arab states' rejection of partition, their attempt to destroy Israel and the plight of the Palestinian refugees.

In the following analysis chapter among other topics I will examine the representation of the June 67 War, the 1987 *Intifada* and the Oslo Peace Process.

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<sup>928</sup> As Taylor writes this echoes the Zionist contention that the "movement represents the fulfilment of Jewish experience: the recovery of institutional nationhood, the restoration to the ancestral homeland, and the resumption of Israel's messianic role in the reconstruction of history and metahistory" Zionism and Jewish History Author(s): Alan R. Taylor Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1972), pp. 35-51 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 17/08/2009 07:25, p. 35

## Chapter Five

### Pivotal Conflicts and Processes of Peace

Following the methodological approach already established and applied in chapter four, in this the second of my textbook analyses I will focus on the key events of conflict and peace. Section 5.0 will examine representations of the June 67 War and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, section 5.1 will examine how early peace proposals such as Camp David I of 1979 are treated. Section 5.2 will be on the treatment of the issue of occupation in the textbooks. Section 5.3 will examine the treatment of the first *Intifada* and section 5.4 will examine how the 1993 peace process or Oslo process is treated. My analysis of the Oslo peace process will more closely follow an analysis of the underlying discourse(s) present in its framing. I will identify the amalgamation of these as the "equal" claim discourse which I have categorised as an order of discourse. What this entails will be discussed before my analysis. My selection of the topics and themes presented in the textbooks is dependent on the degree to which they contrast with the secondary literature. My analysis of the opening sections of the textbook chapters in chapter four made some interesting discoveries. Apart from a discrepancy between scholarly perspectives and the textbook content the history of the conflict is often framed by references to biblical myth and national ideology and identity constructs related to these. In addition, I have identified a number of ideas or assumptions connected to these underpinning much of the narrative there. In the following chapter, other emergent topics and themes will be examined in relation to how much they contribute to the general framing of the topics discussed. The order in which my examination of the topics has been placed corresponds more or less to the chronology laid down in the textbooks themselves. But before I present my analysis of the June 67 war in the textbooks I will begin by

discussing some of the secondary literature on the war in order to compare and contrast with the textbook chapters. Between the sections on the secondary literature and textbook analysis I will highlight the main conclusions drawn from the secondary literature on the June 67 War. This will allow the reader to compare and contrast with what has been laid down in the textbook chapters.

### Scholarly perspectives on June 67

Popular accounts of the roots of the June 67 war discuss Egyptian President Nasser's halting maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aqaba, the removal of UN troops from Israel's border and Israel launching an attack in response to this *cassus belli*. In contrast, the events leading up to the June 67 war in the scholarly literature not only proceed from tensions on the border in late June but also to events going back to the border wars in the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) of the early 1960s and earlier events. Dimensions such as provocations and aggression as well as fears and threat perceptions and a reluctance to fight are also highlighted. These are attributed both to Israel and its neighbours. The literature also shows that there is disagreement among scholars about which events are considered most pivotal and the influence of ideology is an issue both downplayed and at times exaggerated. For example, as I attempted to demonstrate with the debate on the 1948 war discussed in chapter one, there is often (tacit) agreement on a wide range of facts but not on how they ought to be interpreted.

Beginning with Maoz, employing the Israeli narrative, he argues that the "roots of the Six Day War are to be found both in strategic and political events that took place in Israel in the late 1950s and the early 1960s."<sup>929</sup> Applying his "process of unwanted escalation"<sup>930</sup> thesis he goes on to explain that the Israeli decision to embark on a nuclear weapons project in the early 1960s "raised the threat perception of Egypt for several reasons. First, it was the most powerful Arab state and as such constituted the main

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<sup>929</sup> Maoz, Z. (2006) *Defending the Holyland*, the University of Michigan Press, United States, p. 99

<sup>930</sup> *Ibid*, p. 108

strategic challenge for Israel.”<sup>931</sup> Second, Maoz argues that by the 1956 war or Sinai Campaign, Egypt “had already been the target of an unprovoked Israeli attack in collusion with two Western powers.”<sup>932</sup> Emphasising both Israeli and Syrian provocations, other scholars too have focused on the conflict over resources in the DMZ in the mid 60s, Syrian support for Palestinian guerrilla incursions and the Israeli raid on the Jordanian village of Samu in 1966. Highlighting Arab threat perceptions, Shlaim cites a pre June 67 Arab League summit statement in 1964. It stated among other things that “the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation [since] the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. [...]”<sup>933</sup>. According to this historical framing, the threat so perceived encouraged the Arab League to prepare “the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel”<sup>934</sup>. Turning to territorial ambitions in the DMZ, Maoz discusses Syria’s “Hatzbani diversion project”<sup>935</sup> and Israel’s “wish to derail”<sup>936</sup> it. Israel would take “non-military actions”<sup>937</sup> there which would “provoke Syrian military retaliation”<sup>938</sup> which Israel would respond to with force. One possible subsequent response was Syria’s “indirect support of the PLO, especially the Al Fatah guerrilla operations inside Israel”<sup>939</sup> which was also a threat to Israel’s security. Israeli military activity along the border continued and “even escalated throughout 1966”<sup>940</sup> employing similar tactics to provoke the Syrians. One of the most dramatic events of escalation it is argued was the “devastating attack on the [Jordanian] village of Samu”<sup>941</sup> on 13 November 1966. On learning of a change in the Syrian power base (Ba’ath regime) anti-Syrian propensities within the IDF were strengthened in Israel and in “early 1967 [Israel] resumed cultivation of land in the DMZ in a manner calculated to provoke

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<sup>931</sup> Maoz, p. 99

<sup>932</sup> Ibid. This issue is also discussed in Masalha, (1996)

<sup>933</sup> Shlaim, (2003), p. 230

<sup>934</sup> Ibid

<sup>935</sup> Maoz, p. 101

<sup>936</sup> Ibid

<sup>937</sup> Ibid, p. 102

<sup>938</sup> Ibid

<sup>939</sup> Ibid

<sup>940</sup> Ibid

<sup>941</sup> Maoz (2005); Shlaim, (2003), p. 233; Finkelstein, (2003)

clashes with the Syrians.”<sup>942</sup> Emphasising Israel’s threat perceptions in connection with this, American-Israeli historian Michael Oren, discusses how “Fatah members carried out terror attacks from the West Bank, while other Palestinian groups emerged from southern Lebanon with the aim of hitting Israeli targets.”<sup>943</sup> Fears for Israel’s security according to this view were spurred on by “Syria, which at the time was also controlled by the Baath party, [which] frequently called for war to liberate “occupied Arab land.”<sup>944</sup> As a reprisal strategy, Oren describes the attack on the village of Samu as a “revenge operation”<sup>945</sup> aimed at a “terrorist stronghold in the West Bank village of Samua in November 1966.”<sup>946</sup> Oren goes on to argue that although “Syria, rather than Jordan, was behind Fatah attacks, ministers were concerned about punishing Damascus because of the possibility of confrontation with the Syrian army and its Soviet patrons.”<sup>947</sup>

The literature also teaches us that threat perceptions as well as a reluctance to wage war were high both in Israel and Egypt. The Israeli leadership under Levi Eshkol “hesitated on the brink [and that the] government [was] paralyzed by fear and by conflicting currents of opinion [and the preceding weeks] were a traumatic experience for the Israeli public”<sup>948</sup>. Despite this the Israeli military<sup>949</sup> was confident since it knew that a victory against Egypt

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<sup>942</sup> Shlaim, p. 234. Posthumously, a revealing interview with General Moshe Dayan appears to affirm Israel’s policy of provocation. Dayan goes on to say that “We thought then, and it lasted for a long time, that we can change the armistice lines by a series of military operations that are less than war, that is, to snatch some territory and hold on to it until the enemy would give up on it. . . .” See also Maoz, (2006), p. 103; Finkelstein, (2003), p. 187

<sup>943</sup> Oren, M, (2007), “Wisdom of Waiting: Lessons of Six Day War in the face of ongoing rocket attacks”, web article at <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/1,7340,L-3402180,00.html>

<sup>944</sup> Ibid

<sup>945</sup> Ibid

<sup>946</sup> Ibid

<sup>947</sup> Ibid

<sup>948</sup> Shlaim, p. 238

<sup>949</sup> Maoz, (2007), p. 102. This was also evident in earlier years spurred on by Israeli military superiority. For example, no Israeli jets were damaged on the “several occasions during 1965 and 1966, the IAF was activated” while “seven Syrian jets were shot down”. Maoz, (2007), p. 102; As Finkelstein discusses too, both US and Israeli military intelligence on the Egypt did not view it as a particular threat predicting that “the IDF would win a war in two weeks even if it attacked on three fronts simultaneously”. Finkelstein, (2003), p. 192; Shlaim and

would be swift. The secondary literature appears to also show that the war was neither explicitly planned nor desired even if there were dormant ambitions on the part of some leaders to depose the Egyptian leader<sup>950</sup>. For example, David Ben-Gurion had admonished “Rabin for putting Israel at risk [...] through irresponsible provocations of the Syrians.”<sup>951</sup> This was a far-cry from the leader who had proposed a secret plan to French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, in 1956 for “creating a ‘new order’ in the Middle East.”<sup>952</sup> Even General Dayan, who previously admitted to Israeli provocations in the DMZ, could criticize Yitzhak Rabin, Eshkol’s principle military adviser, for having “contributed to the crisis by ill-considered actions such as the attack on Samu and the air battle over Damascus.”<sup>953</sup>

In a roundtable discussion from 2007 on the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the June 67 war Tom Segev emphasizes Israeli threat perceptions and its defensive posture again. He asserts that in conjunction with Palestinian provocations “Egypt made threats and threatening moves, and Israelis generally believed they were facing a second holocaust”<sup>954</sup>. This fear was triggered by Egyptian

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Finkelstein also cite Johnson’s famous line to Abba Eban that “all our intelligence people are unanimous that if Egypt attacks, you will whip the hell out of them.” Finkelstein, p. 135

<sup>950</sup> Viewed as a born-again Kemal Ataturk.

<sup>951</sup> Maoz, p. 108. Of significance too perhaps was Rabin’s fiery rhetoric in escalating the threat perception on the part of Syria

<sup>952</sup> Nur Masalha Source: *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (May, 1996), p. 59. The plan would have involved “the occupation and annexation of Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the overthrow of Nasser; the dismantling of Lebanon and the annexation of southern Lebanon to Israel and the creation of a Christian state in other parts of the country; and the partitioning of Jordan between Israel and Iraq.”

<sup>953</sup> Shlaim, p. 239

<sup>954</sup> Debate between Tom Segev, Mona El-Farra and Professor Norman Finkelstein on Democracy Now! back in June of 2007. Israeli Historian Tom Segev, Palestinian Physician Mona El-Farra and U.S. Scholar Norman Finkelstein on 6-Day War and Its 40-Year Legacy, Friday, June 8th, 2007 <http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07/06/08/1512241> Full paragraph quotation: “Egypt made threats and threatening moves, and Israelis generally believed they were facing a second holocaust. There were very, very weak; their society was very weak. And so I think that war with Egypt, at that time, was inevitable for this reason, because Israelis were too weak not to strike at Egypt. But, that was only one week of the three weeks fought that week. Um, there was also a war with Jordan and also a war with Syria. I think that taking the West Bank and East Jerusalem contradicted Israel’s national interest. This is not something I’m saying in hindsight; this is something Israeli policymakers knew at the time, six months prior to the war. They had actually concluded it will not be in Israel’s interest to take to West Bank. Then comes the day of June 5, 1967: Jordan attacks West Jerusalem, all

President Nasser's provocative acts of halting maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aqaba and removing the UN troops from Israel's border. This act constituted a *cassus belli* on the part of the Israeli establishment in the run up to the war. It is this fear when "Jordan attacks West Jerusalem, [and] all reason is forgotten" which results in the taking of "East Jerusalem and the West Bank, in contrast to Israel's national interest, as defined by them six months previously."<sup>955</sup> Segev argues that the "taking [of] the West Bank and East Jerusalem"<sup>956</sup> was "about religion, emotion, [it was] about 2000 years of longing for Zion. It is not about strategy or national interest."<sup>957</sup> Returning to Arab threat perceptions, it is argued in some of the literature that despite Gamal Abdul Nasser's established role as *agent provocateur* there are a number of factors which contribute to the thesis that he perhaps "did not want a war".<sup>958</sup> Mossad chief Meir Amit, for example, claimed that "Egypt was not ready for war; and Nasser did not want a war."<sup>959</sup> For example, forcing Nasser's hand were a combination of factors. These were among other things fear, threat perceptions, previous border skirmishes and his declining political standing in the Arab world. In addition, economic debt and high unemployment, the withdrawal of US aid as well as a previously adopted Syrian-Egyptian defence pact which he was obligated to adhere to.

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reason is forgotten. And they take East Jerusalem and the West Bank, in contrast to Israel's national interest, as defined by them six months previously. So it's a completely irrational thing. It is about religion, emotion, it's about 2,000 years of longing for Zion. It is not about strategy or national interest.

<sup>955</sup> Ibid

<sup>956</sup> Ibid

<sup>957</sup> Ibid

<sup>958</sup> Maoz, p. 93

<sup>959</sup> Finkelstein, (2003), pp. 134 and 253-254 where the author cites Security Council Official Records, Twenty Second Year, 9 June 1967, 1352<sup>nd</sup> meeting as well as extracts from Brecher, Quandt, Eban, Rikhye and the *New York Times* of 4 June 1967



## Main points of discussion on the June 67 war

What the above discussion emphasises is that provocations and aggression as well as fears and threat perceptions and a reluctance to fight characterised the positions of all the parties to the conflict. The root causes of the June 67 War are traced back to the conflict over resources in the DMZ in the mid 60s, Syrian support for Palestinian guerrilla incursions and the Israeli raid on the Jordanian village of Samu in 1966. What is also highlighted is how actions taken against Egypt by Israel along with Britain and France in 1956 later contributed to Arab League and Egyptian threat perceptions. David Ben-Gurion had sought Nasser's removal at that time and had ambitions to expand Israel's territory further. Syrian sponsorship of Al Fatah guerrilla operations inside Israel raised Israel's threat perceptions in the early 1960s too. The discussion above also highlights the fear and anxiety felt by members of the Eshkol government and the Egyptian leader himself. Fears felt by the Israeli public and the Eshkol government were contrasted by Israeli military confidence in defeating the Egyptian leader. In contrast with popular accounts, then, the above contextualisation shows that Egypt's actions were not the main cause of tensions along the border. Aggressive acts and provocations on the part of Israel are also highlighted. Causally, events beginning in the later 1950s and early 1960s are given precedence. What the above helps to demonstrate too is how the actions of either party to the conflict can be driven by a multitude of factors. These might have to do with aggressive acts such as territorial expansion and resource dominance, guerrilla incursion and terroristic acts, existential survival, fear, overconfidence but ultimately a reluctance to fight.

Let us now examine how the causes of the June 67 war are presented in the textbooks. The topic of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is discussed below too and with that further reference to the international law discourse is made in the textbooks.

## Section 5.0 The June 67 War: Causes and Consequences

In the section entitled “the Holy City” in the 91-92 textbooks, connection is made to the three religions of the region following the June 67 war. First of all we learn that after 1967 “the Old City belonged to the part of Jerusalem which ended up on the Jordanian side [and that] among other sites, the Western Wall is situated there – the most important religious site for the Jewish people.”<sup>960</sup> The importance of the other religious sites is also highlighted. For example, the site of the *Al-Aqsa Mosque* from where Mohammed is purported to have ascended to heaven according to Islamic tradition is also situated in the Old City. For Christians too the tomb of Jesus Christ and Golgotha is situated there. We learn that these sites are all important points of pilgrimage for all the three monotheistic religions. Then under the section heading of “the 1967 Six Day War”, the second of the major wars between Israel and the Arab states is discussed. The first sentence of the section begins by informing us that tensions had “increased [...] between Israel and the Arab states, where Egypt was the leading state.”<sup>961</sup> The cause of the tensions is attributed to the stopping of “maritime traffic [in May by] Egypt in the Gulf of Aqaba from the Israeli port of Eilat.”<sup>962</sup> Then in the last paragraph of the section we learn of Israel’s “blitzkrieg towards Egypt, Jordan and Syria”<sup>963</sup> which occurred on June 5 1967 with the quick advance of Israeli troops to “the Suez Canal and the Jordan river.”<sup>964</sup> Israel is then described as marching into the “Jordanian part

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<sup>960</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992)

<sup>961</sup> Ibid

<sup>962</sup> Ibid, “I maj stoppade Egypten sjötrafiken i Akabaviken till och från den israeliska hamnstaden Eilat.”

<sup>963</sup> Ibid, ” Då slog Israel till. Den 5 juni 1967 genomförde Israel ett blixtnfall mot Egypten, Jordanien och Syrien. De israeliska trupperna avancerade snabbt till Suezkanalen och till Jordanfloden.”

<sup>964</sup> Ibid

of Jerusalem with the Old City”<sup>965</sup>. The Arab countries are described as being forced to accept a ceasefire agreement following Israel’s “crushing victory”<sup>966</sup> after only six days. Following this we learn that following its victory Israel had “expanded its territory dramatically and occupied”<sup>967</sup> the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights and West Bank; that is, “the area between Jerusalem and the Jordan River.”<sup>968</sup> Drawing on the international law discourse, this is the first reference to occupation made in the textbook in relation to the post 67 war period. Reference is also made to international law in the form of the UN Security Council’s demand that Israel “return the conquered territories”<sup>969</sup>. In addition to this, the theme of Israeli security is introduced as a framework for understanding the occupation. For example, it is explained that Israel “refused to meet [UN demands because it] felt it needed the territories in order to protect its citizens against attacks.”<sup>970</sup> In the last sentence of the section reference is made to international law again. For example, when we read that the “Security Council has several times condemned”<sup>971</sup> the unification of Jerusalem with Israel and the fact that Israel had “made it its capital”<sup>972</sup> following the June 67 war. In the 1996 edition of *Levande historia* the roots of the June 1967 war and the wars preceding it and subsequent to it are not examined but the aftermath of the

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<sup>965</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992) . ”Efter en våldsam strid intog israelerna den jordanska delen av Jerusalem med Gamla staden. Israel vann en förkrossande seger och efter bara sex dygn tvingades arabländerna gå med på vapenstillestånd. Genom det sk sexdagarskriget utvidgade Israel sitt territorium betydligt och ockuperade i söder Gazaremsan och Sinaihalvön, i norr Golanhöjderna och i öster Västbanken, dvs området mellan Jerusalem och Jordanfloden. FN:s säkerhetsråd krävde att Israel skulle lämna tillbaka de erövrade områdena. Israel vägrade emellertid att tillmötesgå kraven. Israel ansåg sig behöva dessa områden för att skydda sin befolkning mot attacker. Efter sexdagarskriget behärskade således Israel hela Jerusalem och har tom införlivat staden med Israel och gjort den till huvudstad. Detta har FN:s säkerhetsråd fördömt flera gånger.”

<sup>966</sup> Ibid

<sup>967</sup> Ibid

<sup>968</sup> Ibid

<sup>969</sup> Ibid

<sup>970</sup> Ibid

<sup>971</sup> Ibid

<sup>972</sup> Ibid

war is. We learn that<sup>973</sup> “it was during the so-called Six Day War in 1967 that Israel occupied West Jordan, that is, the West Bank including East Jerusalem”<sup>974</sup>. The extent of the occupation is explained in more detail here, including the status of East Jerusalem as currently occupied.<sup>975</sup> It is noted too that the “Israeli state has shown itself to be militarily superior”<sup>976</sup> in the wars between it and the Arab states. In *Puls: historia vår tid* from 1996 a connection is made between the expansion of Israeli territory and the Palestinian refugee problem. For example, it reads that “during the three great wars waged between Israel and the Arab states (above all Egypt) Israel has expanded its *original* territory, which has meant even more Palestinian refugees in the Middle East.”<sup>977</sup>(my italics) This contrasts with the references to the post 1948 war context in both the 1996 edition of *Levande historia* and the *SO historia* textbooks from 1991 and 92 which allude to an already expanded territory. For example, we learn in the 1991 and 92 textbooks about the Israeli “seizure of territories [following the Armistice agreement of 1949] which according to the UN Partition Proposal were to belong to the Palestinians”<sup>978</sup>. In the 1996 textbook we learn about the fact that Israeli territory was “30 percent greater than previously determined by the UN”<sup>979</sup>. In both textbooks territorial seizure or expansion is almost directly connected to a breach of the former UN Partition Plan of 1947 and as such represents a strong international law perspective. In other textbook chapters Israel’s seizure or expansion of territory has been explained either in terms of providing homes to Jewish refugees expelled from Arab countries or as a

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<sup>973</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996). “Tre gånger har den israelisk-arabiska konflikten lett till öppet krig: 1956, 1967 och 1973. Den israeliska staten har visat sig militärt överlägsen.”

<sup>974</sup> Ibid, ”Det var i det s k sexdagarskriget 1967 som Israel ockuperade Västjordanien, dvs Västbanken inklusive östra Jerusalem.”

<sup>975</sup> Auri, (2003), p. 127. Israel had previously “proclaimed [as its] capital on January 23, 1950”

<sup>976</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996), “Tre gånger har den israelisk-arabiska konflikten lett till öppet krig: 1956, 1967 och 1973. Den israeliska staten har visat sig militärt överlägsen.”

<sup>977</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996), *Puls 9: Historia vår egen tid* ”Under de tre stora krig som rasat mellan Israel och arabstaterna (främst Egypten) har Israel utvidgat sitt ursprungliga område, vilket har betytt ännu fler palestinska flyktingar i Mellanöstern.”

<sup>978</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992)

<sup>979</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996)

defensive strategy in order to improve its security. As we have seen above too, the theme of security is employed to explain Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

In the 2000 edition of *Hållplatser in historia* we learn that "several Palestinian organisations were formed [and] some more aggressive than others."<sup>980</sup> (my italics) The establishment of the "larger organisation [of] the PLO, the Palestinian Liberation Organization"<sup>981</sup> is discussed. Bringing in a Palestinian perspective, the section entitled "Tensions increase"<sup>982</sup> discusses the "great catastrophe for the Arabs"<sup>983</sup> which it states came in 1967. The statement appears to be referring to the *al-Naqba* of 1948 or great catastrophe for the Palestine Arab population. Then we learn that the areas Israel came to occupy were "a large part of Jordan, that which was situated west of the Jordan River – the West Bank"<sup>984</sup> (my italics) The 2002 edition of *Grundbok historia* covers the "Six Day War of 1967"<sup>985</sup> and the occupation and peace process (more on the latter below). In the first sentence of the chapter we learn that "Israel captured the territory west of the Jordan River, the West Bank and the Eastern Arab part of Jerusalem from Jordan."<sup>986</sup> During the same war we learn too that the Israelis "captured Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt as well as the Golan Heights from

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<sup>980</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000)

<sup>981</sup> Ibid

<sup>982</sup> Ibid. "Motsättningarna ökar

Den stora katastrofen för araberna kom 1967. Krig mellan Israel och arabstaterna. Israelerna vann en förkrossande seger. De ockuperade en stor del av Jordanien, det som låg väster om Jordanfloden—"Västbanken". De tog också delar av Egypten och Syrien."

<sup>983</sup> Ibid

<sup>984</sup> Ibid, "Motsättningarna ökar

Den stora katastrofen för araberna kom 1967. Krig mellan Israel och arabstaterna. Israelerna vann en förkrossande seger. De ockuperade en stor del av Jordanien, det som låg väster om Jordanfloden—"Västbanken". De tog också delar av Egypten och Syrien."

<sup>985</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002), pp. 319-320. "I sexdagarskriget 1967 erövrade Israel området väster om Jordanfloden, Västbanken, och den östra, arabiska, delen av Jerusalem från Jordanien. I samma krig erövrade de Gaza och Sinaihalvön från Egypten samt Golanhöjderna från Syrien. I oktober kriget 1973 nåddes vapenstillestånd efter en månads strider, sedan Israel fått övertaget. År 1979 slöts separat fred mellan Israel och Egypten, som då fick tillbaka Sinaihalvön."

<sup>986</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002)

Syria.”<sup>987</sup> The June 1967 war is mentioned in *Levande historia 9* from 2007 and Israel’s “seizing of even more land in among other places the West Bank and East Jerusalem.”<sup>988</sup> Following 1967 and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land, we learn that “a million Palestinians lived in Israel and areas occupied by Israel”<sup>989</sup> and that “many lived in refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan.”<sup>990</sup> Departing from the previous textbooks which only mention Israel’s seizure or capture of areas, in the section entitled ”1967 – The Six Day War” in the 2003 edition of *Levande historia elevbok 9*, a causal backdrop to the war is offered. We learn that “Egypt and other Arab states gathered troops along Israel’s’ borders”<sup>991</sup> and that in response to this Israel “launched a *counter-attack*.”<sup>992</sup> The term counter-attack is significant here since it presupposes a previous attack on Israel by Egypt or Syria to trigger the war. Then in the next sentence we learn that Israel “conquered the entire Sinai Peninsula, West Bank and East Jerusalem in only a few days”<sup>993</sup> occupying the “remaining parts of the land which according to the UN were”<sup>994</sup> intended for the “Arabs in Palestine”<sup>995</sup>. Despite this, in the last sentence we learn that the Palestinians had “*increased* in strength and populous”<sup>996</sup> and that they “lived in several countries.”<sup>997</sup> Then we learn of the “one million”<sup>998</sup> Palestinians living in Israel and “in areas occupied by

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<sup>987</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002)

<sup>988</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007)

<sup>989</sup> Ibid

<sup>990</sup> Ibid

<sup>991</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003). “1967 – sexdagarskriget. År 1967 samlade Egypten och andra arabstater trupper längs Israels gränser. Israel gick till motanfall och erövrade på några dagar hela Sinaihalvön, Västbanken och östra Jerusalem. Efter kriget ockuperade Israel de sista delarna av det land som enligt FN:s beslut var arabernas Palestina. Men palestinierna ökade i sin styrka och folkmängd. De levde i flera länder.”

<sup>992</sup> Ibid

<sup>993</sup> Ibid

<sup>994</sup> Ibid

<sup>995</sup> Ibid

<sup>996</sup> Ibid

<sup>997</sup> Ibid

<sup>998</sup> Ibid. “En miljon levde i Israel och inom områden som var ockuperade av Israel. Många bodde i flyktingläger i Libanon och Jordanien. Palestinier började bilda sabotagegrupper och gerillaförband för att bekämpa Israel. De fick ekonomiskt stöd från arabstaterna. Flera olika

Israel.”<sup>999</sup> Many Palestinians we are told now “lived in refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan”<sup>1000</sup> and that from there “Palestinians began to form sabotage groups and guerrilla groups in order to combat Israel.”<sup>1001</sup> They received economic support from the Arab states and the PLO is referred to as a “liberation organisation”<sup>1002</sup>. Here, then, adopting a Palestinian perspective, connection is made to the Israeli occupation and the purpose of the PLO to combat it.

In a departure from the events presented in previous editions, the section entitled “the Six Day War”<sup>1003</sup> in the chapter in *Levande historia 9: minikurs* from 2003 begins by claiming that “in 1967, Egypt and the other Arab states launched a new attack on Israel.”<sup>1004</sup> According to this version, the June 67 War was started by Egypt and the Arab states. Corresponding to a previous textbook<sup>1005</sup> we learn again that “Israel launched a counter-attack”<sup>1006</sup> conquering territories belonging to Egypt, Jordan as well as East Jerusalem.

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befrielseorganisationer bildades. Störst blev PLO, Palestinas befrielseorganisation ledd av Yassir Arafat. PLO samlade i sig flera andra organisationer.”

<sup>999</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

<sup>1000</sup> Ibid

<sup>1001</sup> Ibid

<sup>1002</sup> Ibid

<sup>1003</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003). ” 1967 – sexdagarskriget

År 1967 gick Egypten och andra arabstater till nytt anfall mot Israel. Israel gick till motanfall och erövrade

På några dagar Sinaihalvön, Västbanken (området vid västra Jordanstranden), och östra Jerusalem. Efter kriget

Ockuperade Israel de sista områdena som tillhörde de palestinska araberna. Palestinierna levde i flera länder. En miljon bodde Israel. Många bodde också i Libanon och Jordanien.

Palestinierna ville ha tillbaka det land som de ansåg var deras. Därför började de bilda gerillagrupper som bekämpade Israel. Grupperna växte till stora

Organisationer. Den största var PLO, Palestinas befrielseorganisation, som i sig bestod av flera mindre

Organisationer. PLO:s ledare var Yassir Arafat.”

<sup>1004</sup> Ibid

<sup>1005</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003). År 1967 samlade Egypten och andra arabstater trupper längs Israels gränser. Israel gick till motanfall och erövrade på några dagar hela Sinaihalvön, Västbanken och östra Jerusalem.

Efter kriget ockuperade Israel de sista delarna av det land som enligt FN:s beslut var arabernas Palestina. Men palestinierna ökade i sin styrka och folkmängd. De levde i flera länder.”

<sup>1006</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003)

Then we learn of the plight of the Palestinians who “lived in several countries.”<sup>1007</sup> Without reference to their refugee status following 1967 we learn that “a million lived in Israel [while] many also lived in Lebanon and Jordan.”<sup>1008</sup> In the next paragraph we learn that “the Palestinians wanted back the land that they felt was theirs.”<sup>1009</sup> Echoing the framework examined in previous textbook chapters, the nature of Palestinian or local Arab ownership of the land is reduced to a strongly-felt desire or claim.

## Analysis and discussion

How is the June 67 war treated in the textbooks and which causes and consequences are discussed? First of all, the seminal events or conflict triggers presented in the texts are among other things Egypt’s stopping of maritime traffic, the gathering of Egyptian troops along the border and even the claim of an attack launched on Israel. Israel’s victory and occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (as well as the Golan Heights and the Sinai) is explained in terms of its security needs or as a defensive act (a “counter-attack”). Bringing in the international law discourse, the consequences of the occupation for the Palestinians are discussed too in terms of their becoming refugees again and reference is made to UN demands on Israel to return the occupied territories including Jerusalem. In addition, continuing this Palestinian perspective, the Palestinians are said to have formed liberation movements with which to win back their land. This international law contextualisation of the meaning of occupation represents a departure from the general framework presented in the textbooks discussed above and provides a semblance of balance. At the same time, the general framework underlying this and other historical events also provides common-sense linkages between such topics and themes as international law, security and occupation. As I will discuss below, aspects of this framework are reinvented

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<sup>1007</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003). ”Palestinierna levde i flera länder. En miljon bodde Israel. Många bodde också i Libanon och Jordanien.

Palestinierna ville ha tillbaka det land som de ansåg var deras. Därför började de bilda gerillagrupper som bekämpade Israel. Grupperna växte till stora Organisationer. Den största var PLO, Palestinas befrielseorganisation, som i sig bestod av flera mindre organisationer. PLO:s ledare var Yassir Arafat.”

<sup>1008</sup> Ibid

<sup>1009</sup> Ibid



in discussions of peace processes and so on (this will also provide part of the discussion on the "equal" claim discourse, identified as an order of discourse). Later I will also discuss how further international law perspectives on the conflict provide an alternative framework for understanding some of the background causes to the conflict as well as the positions of the parties to it. This I will do by contrasting the Oslo discourse with the international law discourse and how it pertains to the Israel/Palestine conflict.

In the following section I will examine how the topic of the Camp David I peace treaty is presented in the textbooks. But before that I will begin by providing a brief overview of some of the scholarly literature on the topic.

## Section 5.1 Camp David I

### Scholarship on Camp David I: bringing in international law

The Camp David peace treaty of 1979 marked an historic moment in the conflict between Israel and the leading Arab state in the conflict, Egypt. Drawing on a previous point, the very fact that a figure like Menachem Begin was prepared to make peace with Israel's greatest nemesis state stands the traditionalist perspective in good stead. This was especially so given the fact that Begin had previously protested partition, was the son of Holocaust victims and stood heavily on the ideological right. Prior to Camp David I came the June 67 war and then the post-war victory fig-leaf to the Arab states. This was roundly rejected by the Arab states (see "three nos") arguably in part due to the fact that the offer did not include Jerusalem and for reasons of general enmity towards Israel. It was not until the PLO made signals about the possibility of accepting partition and the inclusion of recognition of Palestinian national rights into Security Council Resolution 242 that the basis for subsequent peace proposals regarding the two-state solution could get under way. Camp David I held out a hope along this path but in the end marked another setback on the road to ending occupation and the realisation of a Palestinian state. The key notions that this problem hinged on, even since Oslo too, were that of autonomy or self-rule and their

relationship to the concepts of peace and security. As I will later show the definition and linkages between these terms are treated differently in the textbooks.

Geoffrey Aronson writes on the issue of ending the occupation of the West Bank in the period before Camp David I. He writes that at the time the so-called “Camp David autonomy accords”<sup>1010</sup> were designed within the “parameters of “self-rule” [...] to strengthen [...] Israel’s control over the *disputed areas*.”<sup>1011</sup> (my italics) Autonomy would be governed under an Israeli military administration. This meant Israel’s further institutionalisation of the annexation of “the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip as well as East Jerusalem”<sup>1012</sup> thus granting “autonomy for the Palestinian people [but] not for the Palestinian land as well.”<sup>1013</sup> Fayeze Sayegh argues too that “the Begin Plan of December 1977” which was reincarnated in “the Camp David Framework”<sup>1014</sup> bestowed legitimacy on “the continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian areas in question for years to come.”<sup>1015</sup> This was achieved

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<sup>1010</sup> Aronson, G, (1987), *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians & the West Bank*, Institute of Palestine Studies, Washington DC, Hagerstown Bookbinding & Printing, USA, p. 95.

<sup>1011</sup> Ibid, p. 94

<sup>1012</sup> Ibid, p. 95

<sup>1013</sup> Boyle, (2003), *Palestine, Palestinians and International Law*, Clarity Press Inc, Atlanta, p. 120; In a couple of articles from the period, it is made quite clear by a “team of Israeli experts who prepared the autonomy document” that “the autonomy institutions never try to express any national independence in any way.” Israel’s Autonomy Plan Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring, 1980), pp. 159-162 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536559> Accessed: 23/04/2009 05:26, p. 161; Shimon Peres expressed his views on the autonomy plan in *Maariv* in September 1978 in which he made it clear that “Israel [...] has an interest in Jordan joining the negotiations [as] her absence will create a momentum toward the establishment of a Palestinian state” meaning that Israel preferred “to solve the Palestinian problem within a Jordanian-Palestinian framework.” The Camp David 1 agreement did lead Begin to unambiguously recognise “the existence of a ‘Palestinian people’” but not their rights to a Palestinian state. Camp David Seen from Israel Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Winter, 1979), pp. 144-155 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 23/04/2009 04:42, pp. 148-147

<sup>1014</sup> The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem Author(s): Fayeze A. Sayegh Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Winter, 1979), pp. 3-40 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 11/03/2009 13:07, p. 5

<sup>1015</sup> Fayeze, p. 10

through a predetermined five-year interim “agreement of the United States, Egypt and Israel at Camp David”<sup>1016</sup>, the conditions of which the so-called “self-governing authority”<sup>1017</sup> in the occupied territories would have to acquiesce to. In addition, each of the negotiating parties, including Jordan, would determine at a later date the extent of powers and responsibilities granted to the self-governing authority. It was important too that the countries “agree” on this, which meant that “each government [would] have a veto power.”<sup>1018</sup> In other words, the powers and responsibilities accruing to self-rule or autonomy would only be those each government including Israel would “consent to confer upon it.”<sup>1019</sup> Sayegh adds too that as far as the status of Jerusalem was concerned, “both presidents [Carter and Sadat] bowed to the wishes of the Prime Minister [Begin] and accepted his ultimata”<sup>1020</sup> that the city not be described as occupied. Boyle discusses the international law dimension and its significance in relation to the above. He argues that within the framework of international law concerning Camp David I “neither Israel nor Egypt [had] any right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people”.<sup>1021</sup> Neither did they have the right to construct “an agreement that attempted to do that and to deprive the Palestinian people of self-determination”.<sup>1022</sup> According to this framework, negotiating a separate peace with Egypt would mean the weakening of Palestinian Arab opposition to Israel’s annexation of these areas and would not lead to a Palestinian state.

Remaining on the issue of international law there was an earlier peace feeler delivered by Anwar Sadat in the Egyptian leader’s earlier interim proposal of 1971. The proposal stated that “Egypt will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the aforementioned obligations provided for in Security Council Resolution 242.”<sup>1023</sup> However, at that time, the terms of 242 did not include or recognise Palestinian national rights. The terms

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<sup>1016</sup> Fayez, p. 9

<sup>1017</sup> Ibid

<sup>1018</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>1019</sup> Ibid

<sup>1020</sup> Ibid, p. 11

<sup>1021</sup> Boyle, F, (2003), p. 50

<sup>1022</sup> Ibid

<sup>1023</sup> Shlaim, (2001), p. 299

only referred to each existing state at the time being obligated to either meet “all claims *or* [cease] states of belligerency”<sup>1024</sup> but not necessarily “both”<sup>1025</sup>. Despite the fact that Israel had expressed it was ready to enter into peace talks on the death of President Nasser, it decided to reject Sadat’s offer since “the pledge for complete territorial withdrawal requested by [Gunnar] Jarring”<sup>1026</sup> was considered problematic. Focusing on US rejection of the two-state solution before Oslo, we learn that “the international consensus [from the early 1970s] shifted toward the recognition of Palestinian rights”<sup>1027</sup> adding those rights to “UN 242 in the diplomatic process”.<sup>1028</sup> However, Washington actually changed its interpretation of 242 in 1971 “to permit only partial withdrawal”<sup>1029</sup> from the occupied territories. By 1976 the UN Security Council issued a resolution “now calling for a Palestinian state alongside Israel [...] incorporating the language of UN 242 but abandoning its rejectionism.”<sup>1030</sup> The “two-state approach”<sup>1031</sup> goes back to “January 1976 [when in] a PLO-drafted resolution backed by a number of Arab countries as well as the Soviet Union [it] was put before the UN security Council”.<sup>1032</sup> The US vetoed the resolution and did so again in 1980.<sup>1033</sup>

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<sup>1024</sup> Boyle, (2003), p. 84

<sup>1025</sup> Ibid

<sup>1026</sup> Ibid, p. 300

<sup>1027</sup> Chomsky, (2003), p. 182

<sup>1028</sup> Aruri, (2003); Bennis, (2007); Chomsky, (2003), pp. 182-183

<sup>1029</sup> Chomsky, (2003), p. 182

<sup>1030</sup> Ibid; UNGA, 3236, recognising Palestinian rights (22 November 1974) .The first article reads: “1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) The right to self-determination without external interference; (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty” United Nations General Assembly document

<sup>1031</sup> Bennis, p. 35

<sup>1032</sup> Ibid

<sup>1033</sup> The Security Council on reiterating in 1976 that “Having considered the item entitled “The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights”, in accordance with the request contained in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975” the number of votes for and against were as follows, ”In favour: Benin, China, Guyana, Japan, Pakistan, Panama, Libyan Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Against: United States of America. Abstained: France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sweden.”

Crucially, what this brief orientation with the secondary literature discusses is the meaning of such terms as autonomy, self-rule, self-determination and the two-state solution. Simply put, the first two were intended to strengthen the occupation and prevent the realisation of a Palestinian state under the premise of a separate peace. The latter two were, self-evidently, designed to realise the establishment of a Palestinian state following amendments to Resolution 242. While Egypt offered peace feelers prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel had rejected them. In addition, the US had vetoed the two-state solution amendment from the outset and continued to do so even during the Oslo Accords.

In the following section I will contrast the above with how Camp David I is treated in the History school textbooks. I will also show how topics and themes begin to emerge to combine with previous ones. These again are understood as part of the general framework for understanding and explaining this stage of the conflict's history.

The section entitled "Israel and Egypt make peace" in the 1991-92 textbooks discusses the peace treaty of 1979 between the two countries. The conditions of the treaty we learn were that "Egypt recognised Israel's right to exist in exchange for the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt"<sup>1034</sup> occupied by Israel. As a result of the peace treaty we learn too that "the borders were opened between both countries and diplomatic ties were established."<sup>1035</sup> The reaction from the rest of the Arab world is described as "violent and Egypt was dismissed from the Arab League."<sup>1036</sup> In *Levande historia* from 1996 the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab state, Egypt, is discussed. We learn that "At the end of the 1970s the relationship between Israel and the leading Arab state Egypt was totally changed; with the involvement of the US, a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed in 1979."<sup>1037</sup> The response from the other Arab states and Palestinian guerrillas, we learn, was to describe the agreement as an "Egyptian

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<sup>1034</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992)

<sup>1035</sup> Ibid

<sup>1036</sup> Ibid

<sup>1037</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996)

betrayal”<sup>1038</sup>. In the 2002 edition of *Grundbok historia*, following the 1973 War it states that a “ceasefire was reached following a month’s fighting when Israel had gained the upper hand.”<sup>1039</sup> Then reference is made to the peace agreement signed between Israel and Egypt in the late 1970s. This is described here as “a separate peace”<sup>1040</sup> in which Egypt “got back the Sinai Peninsula.”<sup>1041</sup> The meaning of the term “separate peace” is not explained in the textbook, however.<sup>1042</sup> The section entitled “1973 – War Again”<sup>1043</sup> in *Levande historia minikurs* from 2003 briefly recounts the series of events following the Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973. The war is described in the context of the Cold War stating that “even in the Middle East, the Cold War was played out.”<sup>1044</sup> Then the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in the late 1970s is discussed when we learn that “the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, broke ties with the Soviet Union”<sup>1045</sup> because he “preferred to move closer to the US.”<sup>1046</sup> Then in the next sentence we learn that the US “had managed to persuade Israel to hand back the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.”<sup>1047</sup> Presenting the US as a peace-broker between Sadat

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<sup>1038</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996) , “I slutet av 1970-talet förändrades helt förhållandet mellan Israel och den ledande arabstaten Egypten; under medverkan av USA slöts ett fredsavtal mellan Israel och Egypten 1979. Men övriga arabstater och den palestinska gerillan talade om egyptiskt förräderi.”

<sup>1039</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002). ”I sexdagarskriget 1967 erövrade Israel området väster om Jordanfloden, Västbanken, och den östra, arabiska, delen av Jerusalem från Jordanien. I samma krig erövrade de Gaza och Sinaihalvön från Egypten samt Golanhöjderna från Syrien. I oktober kriget 1973 nåddes vapenstillstånd efter en månads strider, sedan Israel fått övertaget. År 1979 slöts separat fred mellan Israel och Egypten, som då fick tillbaka Sinaihalvön.”

<sup>1040</sup> Ibid

<sup>1041</sup> Ibid

<sup>1042</sup> Hiro, D, (2003), *The Essential Middle East: A Comprehensive Guide*, Carroll & Graf Publishers, New York, pp. 102-103

<sup>1043</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003)

<sup>1044</sup> Ibid

<sup>1045</sup> Ibid

<sup>1046</sup> Ibid

<sup>1047</sup> Ibid. “Anwar Sadat och freden. Den egyptiske presidenten Anwar Sadat bröt samarbetet med Sovjetunionen.

Han ville hellre stå nära USA. USA lyckades övertala Israel att lämna tillbaka Sinaihalvön till Egypten. Det var ett tack till Anwar Sadat. År 1977 reste Anwar Sadat till Israel. Han var den förste arabiske ledare som besökt Israel sedan 1948. Hans besök visade att ett arabland kunde tänka sig att leva i fred med Israel.”

and Israel we then learn that the return of the Sinai was “a thank-you to Anwar Sadat”<sup>1048</sup> presumably referring to his breaking ties with the Soviet Union. Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977 is discussed and he is described as “the first Arab leader to visit Israel since 1948”, but more significantly that his visit “demonstrated that an Arab country could imagine living in peace with Israel.”<sup>1049</sup> Lastly, the end of the chapter informs us that many “Arabs did not like Sadat’s visit and peace with Israel [and in] 1981 he was murdered by discontent Arabs.”<sup>1050</sup> The section entitled “1973 another war begins, the October War or Yom Kippur War” in the 2003 edition of *Levande historia elevbok 9* recounts briefly how Egypt and Syria gained the upper hand first of all but lost later to Israel. Both sides we learn were provided with weaponry from the US and Soviet Union. Then in the section entitled “Change in the balance of power”<sup>1051</sup> the first peace agreement between Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Israel is discussed.<sup>1052</sup> Repeating content on the issue in previous textbooks, we learn that Sadat had broken with the Soviets and moved closer “to the US”<sup>1053</sup> and that the US “managed to get Israel to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1975.”<sup>1054</sup> Lastly we learn that Sadat travelled to Israel and that he was the first ever Arab leader to do so since 1948 while the “Arab states had refused to recognise Israel and that there was no reference to Israel’s existence on Arab maps.”<sup>1055</sup> Finally, we learn that Sadat’s peace gesture, through breaking “the Arab front”<sup>1056</sup>,

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<sup>1048</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003)

<sup>1049</sup> Ibid

<sup>1050</sup> Ibid

<sup>1051</sup> Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

”Ändrad maktbalans.Långsamt förändrades maktbalansen i Mellanöstern. Anwar Sadat som blivit president i Egypten efter Nasser bröt med Sovjetunionen och närmade sig USA. USA lyckades förmå Israel att lämna tillbaka Sinaihalvön till Egypten 1975”

<sup>1052</sup> Ibid

<sup>1053</sup> Ibid

<sup>1054</sup> Ibid

<sup>1055</sup> Ibid,”År 1977 reste Anwar Sadat till Israel. Han var den förste arabiske ledare som besökt landet sedan 1948. De arabiska länderna hade vägrat att erkänna staten Israel och på arabiska kartor saknades varje hänvisning till statens existens. Israel och Egypten slöt fred och den arabiska fronten var bruten. Det kostade Sadat livet. Han mördades under en militärparad 1981.”

<sup>1056</sup> Ibid

would cost him dearly when he “was murdered during a military parade in 1981”.<sup>1057</sup>

### Discussion and analysis: peace discourse as politics

How do the textbook chapters discussed above treat the topic of the 1979 Camp David I Peace Treaty and which topics and themes generally frame it? First of all, in the textbooks there are a number of repeated themes employed to explain and understand both the Camp David I peace agreement and the Oslo peace process. The first of these is the recognition of Israel’s right to exist which marks a point of departure for explaining and understanding the problems of achieving peace. This theme also echoes the notion of “equal” claim to the land discussed previously. The absence of Israel on Arab maps is an indicator of Arab rejection of Israel’s right to exist. The attack on Israel in 1973 mentioned in the textbooks too strengthens this image. However, Anwar Sadat disrupts this image by entering into the established peace camp of Israel and the United States. The Arab front against Israel and by association the US is broken as is Soviet hegemony. The US is presented as peace-broker in persuading Israel to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Other explanations for either the PLO’s or Arab states’ reaction to Camp David I other than a rejection of Israel are not indicated within this framework. An examination of the term referred to in the textbook as a so-called “separate peace”<sup>1058</sup> would help to explain the PLO reaction. For example, that Camp David I was also about the hoped-for creation of a Palestinian state. Israeli requirements are alluded to in the textbooks with regard to its returning the Sinai to Egypt. However, Israel’s position on recognising or accepting the existence of a Palestinian state is not discussed at this point. The conditionalities for peace expressed in connection with the Camp David I peace agreement above such as Israel’s right to exist are also incorporated into discussions of the Oslo peace process. In interaction with other topics and themes too (already discussed), such conditionalities provide a commonsense understanding of the meaning of peace in relation to the conflict. With this in mind, I will examine the framing of the Oslo

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<sup>1057</sup> Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

<sup>1058</sup> Hiro, (2003), pp. 416-417



Process following the section below on the topic of Israeli occupation and how it is treated in the textbooks. Once again I will provide some background information on the occupation by drawing on secondary (scholarly) sources.

## The Israeli Occupation

Although mentioned from time to time, perhaps one of the least covered contexts presented in the textbooks is that of the Israeli occupation in the post 67 war period; despite the fact that there exists an abundance of information from various sources such as human rights organisations, NGOs etc. Among these are the Israeli Human Rights group, B'Tselem, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Red Cross.<sup>1059</sup> For example, since the 1990s B'tselem has reported on issues such as Israeli house demolitions, torture, closure, deportations, increased Israeli control of the Gaza Strip following the 2005 disengagement, the use of firearms and so on.<sup>1060</sup> Equally, the organisation has reported on Palestinian violence in the form of human rights violations against Palestinians by the PA security forces and suicide bomb attacks on Israeli civilians, the firing of Kaytusha rockets into civilian areas of Israel as well as Israeli and Palestinian deaths.<sup>1061</sup> In early 2009 Amnesty produced a report on Israel's campaign in

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<sup>1059</sup> <http://www.btselem.org/English/index.asp>; <http://www.hrw.org/>; <http://www.amnesty.se/>; <http://www.icrc.org/>

<sup>1060</sup> On this issue alone B'Tselem writes that during "2007, Israeli security forces killed 377 Palestinians, 53 of them minors. 84 were from the West Bank and 293 from the Gaza Strip. In comparison, in 2006, the total number of Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces was 657: 523 from the Gaza Strip and 134 from the West Bank, among them 140 minors. Of those killed in 2007, at least 132 (about 35 percent) were civilians who were not taking part in the hostilities at the time they were killed. B'Tselem has been unable to determine the cause of death of 50 persons (about 13 percent). In 2006, 348 Palestinians were killed when not taking a direct part in the hostilities at the time of death, representing 54 percent of Palestinians killed that year by Israeli security forces."

<http://www.btselem.org/English/Firearms/Index.asp>

<sup>1061</sup> Ibid. The site writes that "Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, there has been a sharp increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by Palestinian organizations against Israeli civilians. These attacks have killed hundreds of Israelis and wounded thousands, including many minors, inside Israel and in the Occupied Territories."

"Attacks aimed at civilians undermine all rules of morality and law. Specifically, the intentional killing of civilians is considered a "grave breach" of international humanitarian law and a war crime. Whatever the circumstances, such acts are unjustifiable." "B'Tselem

Gaza, Operation 'Cast Lead'<sup>1062</sup> while in September of 2009 the Goldstone Report on alleged violations of human rights and war crimes during that campaign was published.<sup>1063</sup> To further contextualise the report and the run up to the December 2008 crisis, one of the leading experts in the field is Harvard Professor Sara Roy and her work on Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip. For example, on the disengagement plan in 2005 Roy writes that

[...] the [Disengagement] Plan gives Israel "exclusive authority" over Gaza's airspace and territorial waters, which translates into full control over the movement of people and goods into and out of the Strip. Israel will also "continue, for full price, to supply electricity, water, gas and petrol to the Palestinians, in accordance with current arrangements," Israel will also continue to collect customs duties on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli shekel will remain the local currency. Further, the Israeli government is building a new terminal at the point where Gaza, Israel and Egypt meet that would require Palestinian labor and goods to go through Israeli territory. Israel's Interior Ministry retains full control over the issuing of Palestinian identity cards and all population data—births, deaths, marriages—and all Palestinians must continue to be registered with the ministry.

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expressed its grave concern following the renewed fighting in Gaza. During the first 2 months of 2008, Israeli security forces killed 146 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. 132 were killed in the Gaza Strip and 14 in the West Bank, according to B'Tselem statistics. Of the total number, at least 42 did not participate in the fighting when killed, and 11 were minors. 87 people were killed during January, and 59 during February (until the 28th)." "Palestinians killed 2 Israeli civilians, and one member of the Israeli security forces. A woman was killed in a suicide bombing in Dimona, and another man was killed by a Qassam rocket in the Sapir College, in Sderot" [http://www.btselem.org/English/Israeli\\_Civilians/Index.asp](http://www.btselem.org/English/Israeli_Civilians/Index.asp)

<sup>1062</sup> In 2009 Amnesty produced a report on the Israeli invasion of Gaza in December 2008 called operation "Cast Lead". AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI Index: MDE 15/021/2009 Embargoed for 00:01 GMT Thursday 02 July 2009, Israel/Gaza: Operation 'Cast Lead' - 22 Days of Death and Destruction, Facts and Figures, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/021/2009/en/eeff3af-ace9-4ff2-845a-a8eca2ae1ad4/mde150212009eng.pdf>

<sup>1063</sup> HUMAN RIGHTS IN PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Twelfth session, Agenda item 7, A/HRC/12/48, 15 September 2009

There would be no point in the PA acting unilaterally and issuing Palestinian identity cards because Israel Controls the international border crossings and Palestinian movements within the West Bank.<sup>1064</sup>

Going even further back in time, Aronson describes some instances of oppression in the occupied West Bank during the period of the policy of the Iron Fist in the late 1970s. Then as now, “soldiers doing service in the West Bank who were outraged by the IDF actions told MK Uri Avneri that they were instructed by their officers to enforce the curfew in Hebron in the following manner: If you catch a small child, order his whole family out, make them stand in a row, and beat the father in front of his children. [...] They understand no other way. [...] But if someone causes trouble, throws stones or something, first break his bones and then put him on the vehicle and we will take him to the military headquarters.”<sup>1065</sup> Aronson also discusses occurrences at military checkpoints and the closing down of newspapers and the issuance of permits (or lack thereof) governing freedom of movement.<sup>1066</sup> Other issues connected to occupation both in Israel proper and the occupied territories are connected to human rights, citizen equality and so forth. The following authors discuss military service as an indicator of these. For example, Meron Benvenisti writes that “The two million Palestinians [in Israel/Palestine] divide into Israeli Palestinians and Palestinians in the territories. Though the former are citizens of the republic, their citizenship does not assure them equality in law as one crucial test of citizenship is military service; and Israeli Palestinians who are exempt from service are, as a result, second class citizens.”<sup>1067</sup> In his *Palestine Inside Out*, Saree Makdisi discusses another dimension to the various “military regulations [which] specifically enable rights for foreign, non-Israeli Jews

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<sup>1064</sup>Roy, S, (2007) *Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, Pluto Press, London, pp. 314-315

<sup>1065</sup> Aronson, (1987), pp. 215-217

<sup>1066</sup> Ibid

<sup>1067</sup> The Second Republic Author(s): Meron Benvenisti Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring, 1987), pp. 197-201 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 25/03/2009 02:48, p.199

[...] denied to native Palestinians, [...]”<sup>1068</sup> One such right enables the former “to move into homes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem—as almost half a million settlers have done”<sup>1069</sup> and has been greatly encouraged by the Israeli state. In relation to this, Aruri points to a “10 billion [dollar] loan”<sup>1070</sup> requested by Israel for the provision of housing to Soviet Jews in 1990, which “the Bush Administration had initially held up for better diplomatic terms but finally released during the heat of presidential elections”<sup>1071</sup>. Bennis points to the fact that dramatic “settlement construction”<sup>1072</sup> preceded the early 90s period with a 1977 Likud election win while in connection with this Boyle discusses among other things the “domestic political pressures [in the US] mounted by the Israel lobby and its supporters in Congress and the Executive Branch of the federal government”<sup>1073</sup>.

Despite these general lacunae, as I will demonstrate in the following section the textbooks from 1991 and 1992 come the closest in providing critical coverage of topics linked to the occupation. For example, issues such as Arab rights in Israel, allusion to Israeli rejectionism and even Israeli settlement expansion are covered (although mitigating circumstances such as water shortages are provided to explain one of these issues). In addition, Israeli security is recontextualised and topics discussed in other textbooks such as the plight of the Palestinian refugees are given a human face to tell of their plight. Once again too, the emancipatory purpose of Palestinian guerrilla groups is discussed.

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<sup>1068</sup> Makdisi, S, (2008), *Palestine Inside Out*, W. W. Norton & Co, New York, London, p. 12

<sup>1069</sup> Ibid

<sup>1070</sup> Aruri, (2003), p. 31

<sup>1071</sup> Ibid

<sup>1072</sup> Bennis, (2007), p. 19

<sup>1073</sup> Boyle, (2003), p. 68. Boyle also refers to article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which provides that “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Common article 1 provides too that “all state parties to the Four Geneva Conventions undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions by all other state parties “in all circumstances.” See also Walt & Mearshemier’s work on the Israel Lobby published in 2005.

## Section 5.2 Contextualizing Occupation

The 1992 edition of *SO boken historia 9* begins a new section entitled “Palestinians under Israeli occupation” and provides a critique of Israel’s occupation. Adopting similar language to describe the historical plight of the Jewish people discussed in previous sections, the textbook states that “the Palestinian people still do not have a land of their own”<sup>1074</sup>. The reason for this we discover is that Israel “has refused to return the West Bank and the other areas conquered in 1967.”<sup>1075</sup> Following this, an explanation is provided for Israel’s refusal which has to do with “water shortages”. This we learn “is an important reason for why Israel intends to keep the West Bank”<sup>1076</sup> because “Israel gathers much of its drinking-water from the occupied West Bank.”<sup>1077</sup> Previously in the same textbook we learn that the reasons for Israeli occupation have to do with “security”. Thus the textbook establishes the mitigating hurdles toward ending the occupation as Israeli security and Israeli water shortages but not the occupation itself. More focus is placed on the plight of the Palestinians again when we learn that “approximately two million Palestinians live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which is occupied by the Israeli army”<sup>1078</sup>. Then, focusing on the issue of Palestinian-Arab rights, it is stated that those living in Israel do not enjoy “the right to vote and other political rights other citizens of Israel enjoy.”<sup>1079</sup> Lastly in the textbook we learn that “many Palestinians also live as refugees in other Arab states”<sup>1080</sup> and some in “refugee camps”<sup>1081</sup>. In a cutaway box

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<sup>1074</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992), “Det palestinska folket saknar fortfarande eget land. Israels regering har vägrat lämna tillbaka Västbanken och de övriga erövringarna från 1967. Bristen på vatten är en viktig orsak till att Israel ämnar behålla Västbanken. Israel hämtar nämligen en stor del av sitt dricksvatten från den ockuperade Västbanken.”

<sup>1075</sup> Ibid. ”Cirka två miljoner palestinier bor på Västbanken och i Gazaremsan, som är ockuperade av den israeliska armén. Förutom att palestinerna lever under ockupation, saknar de också rösträtt och andra politiska rättigheter som medborgarna i Israel har. Många palestinier lever också som flyktingar i andra arabländer, en del av dem i flyktingläger.”

<sup>1076</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992)

<sup>1077</sup> Ibid

<sup>1078</sup> Ibid

<sup>1079</sup> Ibid

<sup>1080</sup> Ibid

or window between the paragraphs in the textbook, the plight of the Palestinian refugees is focused on once again via the personal experiences of a fourteen year-old second generation Palestinian refugee told in the first person. This is a highlighted part of the text which more forcefully emphasises the theme of Palestinian plight going back to 1948 and 1967. The girl tells of how her “parents lost their home in 1948”<sup>1082</sup> and how they were “forced to flee again in 1967”<sup>1083</sup>. We learn from the girl too that “life is very hard in the tents. When it rains all the rivets get wet and you have to huddle up to keep warm.”<sup>1084</sup> Alluding to the emancipatory purpose of the PLO discussed in a previous chapter, we learn too that the hardship of living in refugee tents causes the girl to “join the guerrillas to liberate [her] country and [she thinks] everyone should join in order to change this terrible way to live.”<sup>1085</sup> For the most part, the references in the 1991-92 textbooks point to a shift more towards the Palestinian discourse.

### Settlement expansion and preventing a Palestinian state

The final section of the chapter in the 1991-92 textbooks is by far the most critical on the issue of occupation. The section entitled “The Israeli Settlers”<sup>1086</sup> places the issues of Israeli settlements and security in a different light. The difficulty of “realising the idea of an independent Palestine”<sup>1087</sup> is

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<sup>1081</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992)

<sup>1082</sup> Ibid, ”Mina föräldrar förlorade sitt hem 1948. De var sedan tvungna att sticka igen 1967. Livet är mycket hårt i tälten. När det regnar blir alla nitar våta och man måste kura ihop för att hålla sig varm. Jag vill gå med gerillakrigarna för att befria vårt land och jag tycker att alla borde vara med, för att få en ändring på det här fruktansvärda sättet att leva.”

<sup>1083</sup> Ibid

<sup>1084</sup> Ibid

<sup>1085</sup> Ibid

<sup>1086</sup> Ibid, “De israeliska bosättningarna

”Jag bygger en stad här för Israels säkerhet och för att stoppa alla planer på en palestinsk stat.” Så uttalade sig borgmästaren i en israelisk bosättning på Västbanken våren 1991. Längre hade den israeliska regeringen, i strid med internationell rätt, tillåtit *judiska nybyggare* att slå sig ned på Västbanken och i Gazaremsan. Där byggdes det mängder av villor och lägenheter. Byggnadsarbetarna var ofta palestinier medan de som lockades att flytta till de ockuperade områdena ofta var unga familjer från Tel Aviv eller nyanlända sovjetiska judar. Sedan Sovjetunionen lättat på utresebestämmelserna 1990, kom en ström av sovjetiska judar till Israel. Ju fler israeler som har bosatt sig på Västbanken och i Gazaremsan, desto svårare har det blivit att förverkliga tanken på ett självständigt Palestina.”

<sup>1087</sup> Ibid

connected to the security of Israel and the context of international law is directly referred to. Note too that the year of publication of the textbook predates the Oslo peace process by at least two years. The section begins with a quote from the mayor of an Israeli settlement in the West Bank in 1991 who states that “I am building a town here for Israel’s security and to stop all plans for a Palestinian state.”<sup>1088</sup> Here, through the voice of the mayor, the issue of security is linked to the prevention of a Palestinian state through the construction of a town. Referring to international law, the section goes on to directly implicate the Israeli government in its “contravention of international law [by] permitting Jewish settlers to settle down in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”<sup>1089</sup> The builders of the houses and flats are “often Palestinians”<sup>1090</sup>, it is claimed, while those who were “persuaded to move to the occupied territories were often young families from Tel Aviv or newly-arrived Soviet Jews.”<sup>1091</sup> The Soviet settlement wave alluded to took place following the collapse of the Berlin Wall at the end of the Cold War (late 80s, early 90s). The chapter in *Grundbok historia* from 2002 on the conflict repeats a couple of topics discussed in previous textbooks on American support for Israel, how this has assured its existence and how US and Soviet support for different Arab states has caused division among them. The last sentence touches on the issue of Israeli expansion “in the wars between Israel and its Arab neighbours”<sup>1092</sup> and the “expansion of its original territory, which has led to even more refugees in the Middle East.”<sup>1093</sup>

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<sup>1088</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992)

<sup>1089</sup> Ibid

<sup>1090</sup> Ibid

<sup>1091</sup> Ibid; Boyle, p. 68. For example, Boyle refers to remarks made by Yitzhak Shamir in the wake of the Soviet immigration in which he purportedly “publicly admitted, a “great aliyah” requires a “greater Israel.” Shamir’s remarks also point to an ideological undercurrent in the thinking behind Soviet immigration, presumably going back to the ideological shift following the 1967 war

<sup>1092</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002), ”Utan USA:s hjälp, bl a vapenhjälp, hade Israel inte existerat i dag. Och Arabländerna har varit splittrade, eftersom USA och Sovjetunionen stött än den ena än den andra av de olika arabstaterna. I kriget mellan Israel och de arabiska grannländerna har Israel utvidgat sitt ursprungliga område, vilket har lett till ännu fler palestinska flyktingar i Mellanöstern.”

<sup>1093</sup> Ibid

## Discussion and analysis

In contrast to later publications, the 1991 and 1992 textbooks provide a more critical appraisal of the occupation. First of all, allusion is made to Israeli rejection of releasing the occupied territories and the plight of the Palestinian refugees – a topic discussed in all the textbooks - is given a human face. The issue of Arab rights in Israel is also discussed and how these are not enjoyed equally. Then in a departure from subsequent textbooks the issue of security is connected to the issue of settlement expansion which, it is mentioned, is against international law and is designed to prevent the realisation of a Palestinian state. In subsequent textbooks, the issue of security is connected to such matters as Israel's right to exist and peace conditionalities linked to the Oslo discourse. Although the Israeli refusal to release the West Bank and Gaza is mitigated by the issue of water shortages in the textbooks, generally they go furthest in contextualising the occupation. Interestingly too the textbooks predate the 1993 Oslo Accords and effectively too the establishment of the Oslo discourse which will be discussed in more detail later.

In the following section I will continue on the subject of the occupation and examine how the topics of the 1987 *Intifada*, the declaration of Palestinian statehood and peace are connected to the former in the textbook chapters. Beforehand I will briefly discuss some of the secondary literature on the connection between these topics and themes. Put simply, the events arguably follow a process which would eventually lead to a peace process based on a two-state solution between Palestinians and the state of Israel.

### The 1988 State of Palestine Declaration: a precursor to the Oslo peace process

On the 1988 declaration of Palestine, Jerome Segal writes that even if the declared State of Palestine was not an objective fact on the ground in 1988, the act of “recognizing the State of Palestine”<sup>1094</sup> gained the recognition of the international community who supported its “morally legitimate claim to

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<sup>1094</sup> Does the State of Palestine Exist? Author(s): Jerome Segal Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Autumn, 1989), pp. 14-31 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 06/04/2009 10:17, p. 29



be a state.”<sup>1095</sup> Proclaiming an “independent state”<sup>1096</sup> too would bring “United Nations Organization”<sup>1097</sup> recognition and would provide an approach “to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied state of Palestine”.<sup>1098</sup> Although an “independent state must have determinable territory, it is not critical that the territory of the state be fixed and permanent.”<sup>1099</sup> For example, the state of Israel “does not have any type of fixed boundaries that are internationally recognized but only armistice lines that came into existence after the 1948 war.”<sup>1100</sup> Bringing in the other topics introduced above, the political upheaval that made the 1988 declaration possible was the 1987 *Intifada* which came about as a result of twenty “years of Israeli occupation.”<sup>1101</sup> Importantly, the 1988 declaration and the recognition it accrued enabled the PLO to officially accept the two-state approach and to recognise Israel as an independent state. In this regard, the PLO had fulfilled some of the conditionalities of the future peace process (more on this below). Pointedly, Boyle argues that “President Arafat [addressing] the UN General Assembly meeting in a Special Session at Geneva [...] was the *real* start of the Middle East Peace Process - by the Palestinian people themselves [...]”<sup>1102</sup> (emphasis in original) However, in the wake of the 1991 Iraq War Palestinian standing in the eyes of the US was seriously weakened given the former’s expressed support for Saddam Hussein. Such meetings as the Madrid Conference in 1991 would also signal tentative steps towards an approach “on the principle of the exchange of territory for peace”<sup>1103</sup> albeit leaving it unclear whether this meant the West Bank and Gaza Strip or “only the Golan Heights of Syria”.

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<sup>1095</sup> Segal, (1989)

<sup>1096</sup> Boyle, (2003), p. 25

<sup>1097</sup> Ibid

<sup>1098</sup> Ibid

<sup>1099</sup> Ibid, p. 33

<sup>1100</sup> Ibid

<sup>1101</sup> Review: Background to the Intifadah. Reviewed Work(s): *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank*. by Geoffrey Aronson, Ann M. Lesch, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948. (Autumn, 1988), pp.214-216. Lesch reviews a work already cited here, see above.

<sup>1102</sup> Boyle, F, (2003), p. 19

<sup>1103</sup> Aruri, (2003), p. 8

What the above discusses, briefly, is how the events of the first *Intifada* and the 1988 State of Palestine Declaration marked the precursor to the Oslo peace process. In other words, it was the Palestinians who began the steps towards a two-state solution. Keeping this in mind, in the following section I will discuss how the textbook chapters treat the topics of the first *Intifada*, Palestinian statehood, peace and occupation.

## Section 5.3 Intifada, Statehood and Peace

Following the story provided by the Palestinian refugee girl in the chapter on the conflict in *SO boken historia 9* from 1991/92, the topic of Palestinian statehood is discussed. We learn that in 1988 “the PLO declared that the state of Palestine had been established with Yassar Arafat as its President.”<sup>1104</sup> We also learn that the PLO had “at the same time recognised that Israel ought to exist as an independent state too and the organisation distanced itself from terror in its struggle.”<sup>1105</sup> As mentioned before, the PLO recognition of Israel and its renouncing of terror became part of the future conditionalities of the Oslo peace process (Oslo discourse). Despite the fulfilment of these pre-Oslo conditionalities, however, the last sentence of the paragraph informs us that a “Palestinian state [still] only existed on paper”<sup>1106</sup>. In a chronological turnaround, *following* the 1988 PLO declaration the topic of the Palestinian *Intifada* of 1987 is discussed. It is described as a “new phase in Palestinian protests”<sup>1107</sup> in which “Palestinian

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<sup>1104</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S (1992), “År 1988 förklarade PLO att staten Palestina hade bildats med Yassir Arafat som president. I samband därmed erkände PLO att också Israel borde få finnas som en självständig stat och organisationen tog avstånd från terror i sin kamp. Men ännu vid 1990-talets början existerade staten Palestina endast på papperet.”

<sup>1105</sup> Almgren, H, Almgren, B, Wikén, S, (1992)

<sup>1106</sup> Ibid

<sup>1107</sup> Ibid, “Intifadan

*Vid slutet av 1980-talet* började en ny fas i palestiniernas protester: Intifadan, det palestinska upproret. Palestinska barn och ungdomar visade sitt förakt mot de israeliska soldaterna genom att kasta sten på dem och deras fordon. Flera hundra Palestinier har dödats av israelerna och världspinionen har reagerat mot de israeliska soldaternas *hårda framfart* mot palestinierna.

children and youths demonstrated their contempt for Israeli soldiers by throwing stones at them and their vehicles.”<sup>1108</sup> We learn too that “several hundred Palestinians were killed by the Israelis”<sup>1109</sup> and that world opinion reacted “to the harsh onslaught of the Israeli soldiers”<sup>1110</sup> towards the Palestinians. Finally we learn that Israelis were also killed and that hundreds of Palestinians were killed “by their own”<sup>1111</sup> in summary executions. Turning to the plight of the Palestinian refugees, in the chapter on the conflict in *Puls: historia vår egen tid* from 1996<sup>1112</sup> we learn that “refugee children have grown up and many of them have joined the PLO (the Palestinian Liberation Organisation) under the leadership of Yassar Arafat or some other Arab organisation.”<sup>1113</sup> Then acts of violence by “Palestinian guerrilla groups”<sup>1114</sup> such as “murder, hijackings, bomb attacks and brutal acts of terror”<sup>1115</sup> aimed at Israel around the world are mentioned. One such act is the murder of Israeli Olympic athletes in München by Palestinian assassins in the 1970s. These acts of Palestinian violence are then indirectly connected to the plight of Palestinians. Alluding to occupation, the textbook explains that “The [Palestinian] acts of violence were also a way of making the world aware of *the desperate situation* of the Palestinians.”<sup>1116</sup> In the next sentence Israel is described as “avenging itself”<sup>1117</sup> through the bombing of “guerrilla bases and refugee camps”<sup>1118</sup> in retaliation for the terroristic attacks in München. While the beginning of the violence is

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Men också israeler har dödats och hundratals palestinier har dödats av sina egna efter summariska rättegångar, anklagade för att vara samarbetsmän, ”kollaboratörer”, med Israel.”

<sup>1108</sup> Ibid

<sup>1109</sup> Ibid

<sup>1110</sup> Ibid

<sup>1111</sup> Ibid

<sup>1112</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>1113</sup> Ibid, ”Flyktningbarnen har hunnit bli vuxna och många av dem har gått in i t ex PLO (Palestinska befrielseorganisationen) under Yasir Arafats ledning eller någon annan arabisk organisation.

Under många år utförde palestinska gerillagrupper mord, flygkapningar, bombattentat och brutala terrordåd på olika håll i världen riktade mot Israel. (Jämför Olympiska spelen i München, s 297.)

<sup>1114</sup> Ibid

<sup>1115</sup> Ibid

<sup>1116</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>1117</sup> Ibid

<sup>1118</sup> Ibid

understood as connected to the first *Intifada* as opposed to the occupation up to that point, descriptions of both Palestinian and Israeli violence appear balanced here. Echoing the Oslo discourse, it is also understood again that Palestinian rejection of terrorism and recognition of Israel are the general paths to peace. This is opposed to an international law framing which would posit the 1988 Declaration of Palestine as an attempt to begin the peace process.

The section entitled “Tensions Increase”<sup>1119</sup> in the chapter on the conflict in *Hållplatser i historia* from 2000 describes the PLO’s new approach to its struggle. The PLO and Yasser Arafat would now carry out its struggle with words and not weapons and would have to accept only a part of historical Palestine.<sup>1120</sup> We learn, however, that the path to peace was “a very long-term plan”<sup>1121</sup>. This was because Israelis “could not imagine negotiating with a terrorist like Arafat and the Palestinians would not agree to anything else but armed struggle against Israel.”<sup>1122</sup> (my italics) In the last sentence, however, we learn that “the struggle continued with renewed strength and enthusiasm whether Arafat wanted it or not.”<sup>1123</sup> (my italic) Then we are told that in “Jordan the Palestinian population grew and grew and had become more powerful”<sup>1124</sup> and that they constituted “something of a state within a state.”<sup>1125</sup> Then we learn that “their [the PLO] raids on Israel led to Israeli reprisals through the bombings of towns and villages.”<sup>1126</sup> This caused the

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<sup>1119</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L (2000)

<sup>1120</sup> Ibid, ”Men Arafat började inse att palestinierna aldrig skulle kunna besegra Israel militärt. Han måste börja arbeta politiskt, det vill säga åstadkomma en fredlig överenskommelse med Israel och framförallt nöja sig med en del av Palestina. Landet måste delas mellan israeler och palestinier; att jaga bort israelerna var helt uteslutet. Kampen måste föras med ord, inte med vapen.”

<sup>1121</sup> Ibid, ”Det var en mycket långsiktig tanke. Israelerna kunde inte tänka sig att förhandla med en terrorist som Arafat och palestinierna skulle inte gå med på något annat än väpnad kamp mot Israel. Den kampen fortsatte också med förnyad styrka och entusiasm vare sig Arafat ville det eller inte.”

<sup>1122</sup> Ibid

<sup>1123</sup> Ibid)

<sup>1124</sup> Ibid. ”I Jordanien blev palestinierna allt fler och allt mäktigare, något av en stat i staten. Deras räder mot Israel ledde till israeliska hämndaktioner med bombningar av städer och byar. Jordaniens kung Hussein kände sig hotad. Han beslöt sig för att kasta ut palestinierna.”

<sup>1125</sup> Ibid

<sup>1126</sup> Ibid

Jordanian king to feel “threatened”<sup>1127</sup> and he decided to “throw the Palestinians out”<sup>1128</sup> of Jordan. This event refers to the period of “Black September”<sup>1129</sup>, namely, September 1970 when “the Palestinians were forced to leave Jordan and to reside in Lebanon.”<sup>1130</sup> Then we learn of “two important events for Yasser Arafat”<sup>1131</sup> in the 1970s. The first was the recognition of the PLO on behalf of the Arab states and the second was Arafat’s “appearance in front of the United Nations General Assembly.”<sup>1132</sup> The political significance of this event as an early peace feeler by the PLO is not mentioned. Focus is placed instead on the symbolism of “an olive branch”<sup>1133</sup> and Arafat’s empty gun holster. The last part of the chapter on the conflict in the 2000 edition of *Hållplatser i historia* discusses the first *Intifada* and the Oslo peace process. The trigger for the uprising is attributed to the death of six Palestinians “killed by a lorry.”<sup>1134</sup> The text presents conflicting opinions on the causes of the uprising such as a traffic accident or shooting by Israeli soldiers but concludes that “in any case a teenage Palestinian picked up a stone and threw it at some Israeli soldiers.”<sup>1135</sup> This we learn was the beginning of a many years long “uprising in the West Bank

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<sup>1127</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L (2000)

<sup>1128</sup> Ibid

<sup>1129</sup> Ibid

<sup>1130</sup> Ibid

<sup>1131</sup> Ibid

<sup>1132</sup> Ibid ” Det var i september 1970 – ”Svarta september”, säger palestinierna. Palestinierna tvingades lämna Jordanien och bosatte sig i Libanon. I mitten av 70-talet inträffade två viktiga händelser för Arafat. För det första erkände Arabstaterna PLO som palestiniernas enda lagliga organisation. För det andra fick Arafat framträda i Förenta Nationernas generalförsamling. I handen höll han en olivkvist, fredens symbol. Vid höften hängde ett hölster som dock lär ha varit tomt. ”Jag har kommit med olivkvist och med frihetskämpens vapen. Låt inte olivkvisten falla ur min hand”, sa han.”

<sup>1133</sup> Ibid

<sup>1134</sup> Ibid, ”Intifadan

I december 1987 dödades sex palestinier på en lastbil. En trafikolycka, sade israelerna. Ihjälksjutna av israeliska soldater, sade palestinierna. Hur som helst en tonårig palestinier tog upp en sten och kastade den på några israeliska soldater. Det var början på ett flera år långt uppror på Västbanken och i Gaza, den så kallade intifadan. Det var ett spontant uppror. ”stenarnas krig”, men blev med tiden alltmer välorganiserat. Israelerna försökte slå ner intifadan med våld men motståndet bara ökade. Slogs ett upplopp ner på ett ställe så flammade det samtidigt upp någon annanstans. Det var många år av förödmjukelser och förtryck som äntligen fick utlopp och det gick inte att hejda.”

<sup>1135</sup> Ibid

and Gaza”<sup>1136</sup> which in time became “well-organised.”<sup>1137</sup> The Israelis we learn tried to “repel the Intifada with violence but resistance [to this] only increased.”<sup>1138</sup> The last sentence attempts to contextualise the possible causes of the *Intifada* by vaguely alluding to the occupation. Employing abstract language, the sentence reads that “it was many years of humiliation and oppression which finally found a release and it could not be stopped.”<sup>1139</sup>

## Discussion and analysis

How do the textbooks examined above treat the topics and themes of occupation, the first *Intifada*, Palestinian statehood and peace and how are they connected? If we recall the treatment of these topics and themes in the literature discussed above we might conclude that the textbooks tend to disconnect the topics and themes from one another. First of all, in one textbook the causes of the *Intifada* are linked to Palestinian actions through stone-throwing or protest. In a later textbook the initial trigger of the *Intifada* is attributed to the death of six Palestinians run over by a lorry or shooting by Israeli soldiers. Israeli retaliation to the *Intifada* is described as harsh and world reaction to this is also mentioned in the textbooks. Generally speaking, while the beginning of the first *Intifada* is connected to Palestinian actions it is only vaguely connected to the Israeli occupation through such slogans as “humiliation and repression” or a “desperate situation”. The tendency, then, is to focus on Palestinian violence as the general trigger and Israeli retaliation as the general response.

Echoing the Oslo discourse (see below), the historical significance of the 1988 declaration of statehood is presented in the textbooks as signifying the PLO’s coming to the realisation that armed struggle against Israel is fruitless and that making peace is the only way. It is emphasised too that the Palestinians have accepted that they cannot have the whole of Palestine and that destroying Israel is not the way. Invoking the Oslo discourse again, mention of the conditionalities of the Oslo Accords is made with reference to

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<sup>1136</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L (2000)

<sup>1137</sup> Ibid

<sup>1138</sup> Ibid

<sup>1139</sup> Ibid

the recognition of Israel and the renouncement of terrorism. Mention is made of the fact too that the state of Palestine still only exists on paper despite the 1988 declaration of Palestine and the acceptance of Israel's right to exist. The Israeli occupation itself is not described as a direct cause of conflict or even as a direct act of violence which Palestinians would respond or retaliate to. However, ending the occupation as a direct conditionality of peace is inferred in the 1991-92 textbooks wherein Israeli military occupation and territorial expansion are pointed to as hurdles to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Tentatively, we may begin to observe that the textbooks are more or less dominated or framed by what I have referred to here as the "equal" claim discourse. As I will discuss in more detail later, the "equal" claim order of discourse incorporates the Oslo discourse, elements of the international law discourse and the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land. As I will discuss later too, this order of discourse forms part of the general established framework for understanding and explaining the history of the conflict through the notion of "equal" claim to the land.

In the following textbook analysis section I will discuss how the Oslo Peace Process from 1993 is treated. Beforehand I will discuss some of the scholarly debate on the topic.

### Debate on the Oslo Peace Process

Discussing the beginnings of the 1990s peace process, the scholarly debate would tend to refer to the early 1970s and the PLO's "move toward a two-state solution",<sup>1140</sup> as well as the 1988 declaration of Palestine which also included recognition of Israel and the end of armed struggle.<sup>1141</sup> The Oslo peace process which began in 1993 heralded an historical event wherein for the first time since 1948 two belligerent parties were prepared to make historical concessions and alter previously entrenched positions. For the Israelis this meant recognising the Palestinian right to an independent state. On the Palestinian side, this meant recognition of Israel, an end to armed struggle and far-reaching concessions on territory (e.g. giving up nearly 80%

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<sup>1140</sup> Aruri, (2003), p. 3

<sup>1141</sup> Boyle, (2003); Aruri, (2003); Shlaim, (2003); Bennis, (2007)

of mandatory Palestine).<sup>1142</sup> Yitzhak Rabin's historic decision along with "most of Meretz"<sup>1143</sup> after years of Labor opposition was to generally favour "the establishment of"<sup>1144</sup> a Palestinian state which, in turn, helped the Oslo process of 1993 to get underway. Crucially, a new conception of the conflict had emerged within the Israeli camp where it was understood that "the conflict cannot be decided by military means"<sup>1145</sup> and that Israel did not want "to continue ruling over the Palestinians and [wanted] to separate from them."<sup>1146</sup> It was also understood that as a result of "Israel's strength and the PLO's political weakness"<sup>1147</sup> Israel would be accorded "enhanced bargaining powers in the negotiations."<sup>1148</sup> As alluded to, the historical leap here was towards accepting a resolution to the conflict which embraced an international law dimension. However, under the auspices of the United States as peace broker, interpretation of UN resolutions 242 and 338 entered the Oslo discourse only to be marginalised as a framework of international law. In other words, the starting point for negotiations deferred such issues as "the status of Jerusalem, the refugee problem, the borders, the settlements, and the security arrangements".<sup>1149</sup> Crucially too, the PLO was prepared to take this step and "take responsibility for the Gaza Strip and an additional symbolic part of the West Bank without insisting on the prior negotiation of a detailed final-status agreement."<sup>1150</sup> Certain aspects of control and privileges would be transferred to the newly established PNA under the provisions of the DOP (Declaration of Principles). However, in effect none of the settlements in the occupied territories would be removed and would continue to be protected by the IDF. Furthermore, the DOP contained "three elements [which] upheld the Israeli position: the implication that the West Bank and Gaza are disputed rather than occupied territory; the conspicuous

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<sup>1142</sup> Pundak, (2001), p. 40

<sup>1143</sup> Kimmerling, (2006), p. 108

<sup>1144</sup> Ibid, p. 108

<sup>1145</sup> Chapter Three entitled "The Israeli-Palestinian Violent Confrontation: An Israeli Perspective" in Tov-Siman-Bar, Y, (2007), *The Israeli Palestinian Conflict: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management*, (ed) Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, p. 70

<sup>1146</sup> Ibid

<sup>1147</sup> Ibid. Following events from the early 1990s onwards

<sup>1148</sup> Tov-Siman-Bar, Y, (2007), p. 70

<sup>1149</sup> Ibid

<sup>1150</sup> Ibid, p. 109



absence of any reference to the exchange of land for peace or to Israeli withdrawal or even redeployment, implying Israel [had] an equal right to lay claims to the land”.<sup>1151</sup> From 1993 onwards “settlement construction was effectively excised from the broad agenda”<sup>1152</sup>. Despite the Oslo Process and public pronouncements to the contrary, the Rabin government had still planned to “build 300,000 apartments along the Green Line”<sup>1153</sup>. This was confirmed by one Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israel’s military intelligence cited in *Yedi’ot Aharonot* on 22 January 1995. Gazit stated that “in the four years of this Labor government, Israel will complete 30,000 dwelling units in the territories.”<sup>1154</sup> In addition, despite Israeli leaders’ expressed willingness to recognise Palestinian rights, the Oslo Accords made no mention “of the occupation, the exchange of land for peace, the inadmissibility of conquest by force [in UN resolution 242], or the national rights of the Palestinian people.”<sup>1155</sup> Affirming some of these points, Camille Mansour points to the extent to which the conditions of peace settlements were determined by the powerful brokers. Adopting Kissinger’s “constructive ambiguity” doctrine<sup>1156</sup> the parties to the conflict were conceded the “right to differing interpretations of the resolution, particularly on the question of Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian and Syrian fronts”<sup>1157</sup>. In addition, “... the extent of Palestinian self-government was not specified and was to be agreed upon during the negotiations, and there was no reference to the principle of Palestinian self-determination or

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<sup>1151</sup> Aruri, (2003), p. 89

<sup>1152</sup> Ibid, p. 139

<sup>1153</sup> Settlement Monitor: Quarterly Update Author(s): Geoffrey Aronson Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Spring, 1995), pp. 122-134 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 14/09/2009 11:03, p. 124

<sup>1154</sup> Aronson, (1995)

<sup>1155</sup> Ibid, p. 90

<sup>1156</sup> See Kimmerling, (2006)

<sup>1157</sup> The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Overview and Assessment Author(s): Camille Mansour Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-31 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 25/03/2009 03:12, pp. 5-6 “First, although the settlement to be attained was based on Security Council Resolution 242, the United States made no mention of the “land for peace” principle in the letter of invitation to the conference”.

statehood.”<sup>1158</sup> In other words, public pronouncements and public perception assumed the realisation of a two-state solution through the embracement of the Oslo peace process and its ostensible embracement of international law. However, powerful manoeuvring and PA complicity from the outset precluded such an outcome in the “spirit” of negotiations. As a result of its willingness to accept the conditions in the early stages of the process, the “PLO, which had been wanting to take part in negotiations since 1974, was called upon to put aside its 1988 November declaration of a state, supported by the vast majority of Palestinians and recognized by more than 100 countries around the world.”<sup>1159</sup> In other words, international law was either removed from or heavily subordinated to the Oslo process and Oslo discourse while Israel’s “security was “frontloaded” in the agreement.”<sup>1160</sup> Fatah’s corruption and harsh treatment by its security wing on protesting Palestinians did not bode well for the future either. This was echoed in the 2000 al-Aqsa *Intifada* which was as much a protest against the Palestinian leadership as it was against Israel’s continued occupation and security measures. Such measures resulted in among other things “restrictions on movement, and a constant military presence [...] continued building in the settlements, land expropriations, and the building of bypass roads”<sup>1161</sup>. In turn this precipitated further heinous acts of terrorism in Israeli civilian areas.

### Territorial Arrangements during the Interim Period: security first, Palestine later

Under the above aegis, the areas known as A, B and C were set up in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As Bennis argues, with the long-term deferral of Palestinian national rights and an emphasis on Israeli security, “The 1993 Oslo peace process brought about a division of the West Bank into “A, B, and C” areas. The B areas (over 400 Palestinian villages), which amounted

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<sup>1158</sup> Mansour, (1993), pp. 5-6

<sup>1159</sup> Mansour, pp. 5-6; see also Segal (1989)

<sup>1160</sup> Swisher, E, C, (2004) *The Truth About Camp David*, Nation Books, New York, pp. 137-138. Swisher refers to the work of Israeli sociologist, the late Baruch Kimmerling and American political scientist Joel Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History* (2003)

<sup>1161</sup> Tov-Siman-Bar, Y, (2007), p. 74

to 23% of the West Bank, and the C areas, 70% of the land (including Israeli settlements, army camps, and state seized land that used to be cultivated by Palestinian farmers), remained officially under Israeli control. Areas A (the cities) which amounted to only about 3% of the West Bank were ostensibly placed under Palestinian security control. But the Palestinian controlled areas were tiny islands [or Bantustans] surrounded by roads and lands [and] remained under direct Israeli military occupation.”<sup>1162</sup> The Oslo II agreement or “the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza of September 24, 1995”<sup>1163</sup> was born out of a stalemate concerning Israel’s desire to ensure the “security of [...] settlements”<sup>1164</sup> in the West Bank.<sup>1165</sup> These settlements would not be removed during the interim agreements but would remain in the Oslo II zones labelled A, B and C “in which Israel and the PA had a division of functions.”<sup>1166</sup> In Area B the security of the settlements were ensured by Israel while internal security was ensured by the PA. In Area C, Israel controlled the internal and external security of the Area, the public order and “civil affairs related to territory (planning, zoning, archaeology, etc).”<sup>1167</sup> Sara Roy also traces precedents for Israel’s plans for control of the occupied territories which were laid down “early on in 1967 [and] which defined the framework for Israeli land control. The [Allon] plan called for the annexation of 25-40 per cent of the West Bank and established key territorial fundamentals that were used and expanded by subsequent Israeli governments. These fundamentals separated Jerusalem from the West Bank, which in turn would separate the northern from the southern West Bank, a reality directly imposed over 25 years later by the Oslo agreements.”<sup>1168</sup> Roy adds too that the plan established the concept of “security borders, used by Israel to justify land confiscations, and reasserted the importance of building Israeli settlements”<sup>1169</sup>. This would ensure the maximum amount of land and the least amount of Palestinians (“separation”, see above). As the reader

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<sup>1162</sup> Bennis, (2007), p. 23; Boyle, (2003), p. 119 ff

<sup>1163</sup> Aruri, p. 99

<sup>1164</sup> Ibid, p. 99

<sup>1165</sup> Ibid, These numbered 150,000 and “another 150,000 in villages adjacent to Jerusalem.”

<sup>1166</sup> Ibid, pp. 99-100

<sup>1167</sup> Ibid

<sup>1168</sup> Roy, S, (2007), p. 324

<sup>1169</sup> Ibid

might note, the accords appear to repeat some of the fundamentals of the Camp David I proposal of the late 1970s. In that proposal the Palestinians were permitted some form of self-rule or autonomy within areas otherwise controlled by Israel both with regard to such concepts as “security” and “development”. This arrangement also precluded (or deferred in more recent parlance) the end of the occupation and, instead, strengthened “[...] Israel’s control over the *disputed areas*.”<sup>1170</sup> (my italics)

### The “Generous Offer” of 2000 and Taba 2001

The Camp David II Accords and their failure have been discussed in mainstream debate as Yasser Arafat’s rejection of Ehud Barak’s so-called “generous offer”. This allegedly offered the Palestinians 95% “and an additional 5% in compensation, or alternatively 97% and another 3% compensation”. But Ron Pundak *et al*, present at the negotiations, have referred to this claim as “an attempt at rewriting history.”<sup>1171</sup> A survey was carried out by Hermann in Israel at the time of the 2000 ‘generous offer’ and in the same period the Israeli government portrayed the Palestinians as rejecting it. Following the violent Palestinian uprising that ensued, Hermann has also confirmed that 69 percent of Israelis at the time believed “the Palestinians were responsible for the deterioration of the situation.”<sup>1172</sup> This portrayal excluded problems connected to the matters of “Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders [and] ‘generic issues’ such as water and economics”<sup>1173</sup>. Not to mention the vast concessions made by Palestinians. Indeed, under international law, Israel was unable to make offers on territory it had occupied. Bennis outlines the terms of the Barak offer as follows:

The [Palestinian] capital would not be in Jerusalem, although some limited municipal authority in Palestinian neighborhoods might be granted. The 20 percent of the West

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<sup>1170</sup> Aronson, (1986), p. 94

<sup>1171</sup> Pundak, R, (2001) “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?” in *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 3, Autumn 2001, p. 40

<sup>1172</sup> Tamar Hermann in Tov, S, B, Y, (2007), p. 151

<sup>1173</sup> *Ibid*, p. 38

Bank that Israel would keep would be made up of the settlements, military bases, *and, crucially, the bypass roads that effectively divide the West Bank into separate regions.* It was as though a family's house had been occupied against their will for many years, and they were suddenly told that they could have all the rooms back, but the occupier was going to keep control of the hallways between the rooms. How much of a home would that be?<sup>1174</sup> (my italics)

Roy points to how with "Oslo and the division of Palestinian lands into areas a, b and c, the need arose to delineate Palestinian from non-Palestinian areas and checkpoints were increasingly used to surround the former. It is vital to understand that although the absolute area under full or partial Palestinian control had increased during Oslo, these areas were non-contiguous and remained isolated cantons separated by areas under the control of Israel, allowing the occupation to remain in a powerful form."<sup>1175</sup> There are similarities too between the Barak offer and previous agreements in which Israel's security arrangements would still remain intact and by dint the separate regions or cantons which the PNA (Palestinian National Authority) presided over. The crisscrossing network roads and their securitisation would further exacerbate the cutting up of these separate islands. This would continue too with the implementation of closure policies and other restrictions on movement already in place since the late 1960s.<sup>1176</sup> What was new about the Barak offer, however, is the stance on the status of Jerusalem, which, it seems, would no longer be the Palestinian capital with regard to "sovereignty over East Jerusalem"<sup>1177</sup>. Kimmerling comments too that "Yasser Arafat did not trust Barak"<sup>1178</sup> since the Israeli premier failed to implement additional stages of the "interim agreements"<sup>1179</sup> during the negotiations. For example, actions not implemented were, among others, a freeze on "settlements, and during his short term, their number increased by

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<sup>1174</sup> Bennis, P, (2007), p. 142

<sup>1175</sup> Roy, (2007), pp. 216-217

<sup>1176</sup> See Roy, (2007) and Aronson, (1986); Junne, Verkoren, (2005)

<sup>1177</sup> Swisher, p. 261

<sup>1178</sup> Kimmerling, (2006), pp. 129-130

<sup>1179</sup> Ibid

more than 10 percent.”<sup>1180</sup> Furthermore, increased or continued acts of terrorism strengthened the perception on the part of the Israelis that Yasser Arafat was not prepared to quell the violence, a promise upheld prior to the onset of the Oslo process. On the issue of refugees, “Barak’s “generosity” on the refugee issue extended to allowing 4,000 refugees to enter what is now Israel each year within the framework of what he called family reunions,” and not the “right of return”.<sup>1181</sup> With regard to generous offers from the Palestinian camp, Robert Malley and Hussein Aghabi in an article from 2002 point to what appears to be one made by Yassar Arafat to Ehud Barak following Camp David. The authors describe it as follows:

A State of Israel incorporating some land captured in 1967 and including a very large majority of its settlers, the largest Jewish Jerusalem in the city’s history, preservation of Israel’s demographic balance between Jews and Arabs, security guarantees by a U.S.-led international presence.<sup>1182</sup>

It should be reiterated too that while this far exceeded even Oslo conditionalities, the Palestinian leadership signed on to it; Even in the face of protests from far more skilful academic Palestinian negotiators who perceived Oslo as a repackaged autonomy plan à la Camp David I. To reiterate a previous point regarding the transformation of strongly held positions held by either side, as a result of Taba 2001 the trappings of an agreement that could genuinely be embraced by both parties was achieved for the first time in seven years. This was in large part thanks to the Israelis

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<sup>1180</sup> Kimmerling, (2006), pp. 129-130

<sup>1181</sup> Aruri, (2003), p. 170

<sup>1182</sup> This is cited in Aruri (2003) from a *Guardian* article from 2002 entitled “Why Barak is Wrong”, Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, Monday 27 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/27/israel1>

who in a stronger bargaining position and under the influence of Clinton's parameters were able to go the extra mile. Sontag claims that "In Taba, the Israelis for the first time accepted the Palestinian principle of a return to the 1967 borders, the Palestinians said. The Palestinians therefore agreed to settlement blocs, provided there would be a swap of equivalent land."<sup>1183</sup> In addition, this meant 10 percent more territory than they were allowed back during Camp David. The Israelis too "agreed for the first time to give the Palestinians full sovereignty over all Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem"<sup>1184</sup> and to give them rights over their land. Finally, "Beilin, the Israeli who ran the negotiations on refugees at Taba, said the two sides were exploring an 'agreed narrative' that would defuse the explosive nature of this issue and protect the Jewish identity of Israel. They noted that about 200,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem would drop off the Israeli demographic rolls, and they devised a mechanism giving refugees more financial incentive to settle outside Israel."<sup>1185</sup>

As the reader has probably understood, in the literature debate on the Oslo peace process topics and themes discussed previously here are all causally connected to it. These are, for example, the occupation, the 1987 *Intifada*, the 1988 declaration of statehood and peace and security and together they all help to explain some of the successes and failures of the peace process. Before examining how the Oslo peace process has been treated in the textbooks, I will summarise what the main points of the Oslo process are and then contrast them with what has been established in international law. In addition, as mentioned in chapter four and the introduction I will briefly discuss what I will identify as the "equal" claim discourse on the conflict as inferred in the textbooks and (later) teachers' statements. To repeat, the

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<sup>1183</sup> Sontag, Deborah, (2001), "Quest for Middle East Peace and Why It Failed," *New York Times* in *The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond* Author(s): Robert Malley and Hussein Agha Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 62-85 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 25/09/2008 13:21; see also Brynen in Junne, G, Verkoren, W, (2005), *Postconflict Development: meeting new challenges*, United Kingdom, Lynne Rienner, p.230

<sup>1184</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84

<sup>1185</sup> Sontag, Deborah, (2001)

”equal” claim discourse may be understood as an intersection of such discourses as the Oslo discourse, Jewish/Arab connection to the land and elements of the international law discourse. This forms part of the general established framework or order of discourse for understanding and explaining the history of the conflict.

### Comparing the Oslo and international law discourses

I will discuss here briefly the key differences between the Oslo discourse and international law discourse with regard to how the matter of peace – its hurdles and resolutions – is understood in each. The issue of how international law defines the parameters of the conflict is complex so for the purposes of this discussion I will only stick to the key issues. These will be divided up into a number of UN Security Council Resolutions, some of which have been amended over the decades in order to galvanize the Palestinian national rights position further. First of all, Security Council Resolution 194<sup>1186</sup> recognises the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to their homes occupied by Israel in 1948. While not explicitly referring to Israel, it states that “compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, *should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible*”.<sup>1187</sup> (my italics) This proceeds from another pillar of international law, now universally accepted, in UN Security Council Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947, which called for the establishment of two independent and sovereign states in Palestine which would cooperate in economic union. Critical discussion of UN 47 aside, it is here that the notion of right to designated areas of Palestine is understood (as opposed to the Jewish/Arab connection and Oslo discourses which advance the notion of “equal” claim to all of the “disputed” territories). Another of the pillars of

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<sup>1186</sup> Security Council resolution 194 resolves that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible”. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), 11 December 1948, <http://www.mideastweb.org/194.htm>

<sup>1187</sup> Ibid



the peace process going back many years is UN Security Council resolution 242. However, it was not always in its current form since as Davis remarks the “global, regional and local power relations that are reflected in the formulation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 [...] have dramatically changed in the decades since the 1967 war”<sup>1188</sup> Security Council Resolution 242 in its original form did not recognise the Palestinian people or state since their state did not yet “exist in 1967.”<sup>1189</sup> In 1976 UN Security Council Resolution 242 was amended to include the two-state approach. This called for a “Palestinian state alongside Israel [...] incorporating the language of UN 242 but abandoning its rejectionism”<sup>1190</sup>. Thus, 242, 338 and their precedents (181) now represent “internationally legally recognized”<sup>1191</sup> boundaries both for Israel and an eventual state of Palestine. In addition, international law neither recognises any ideologically based claims to “West Jerusalem, Safad or Jaffa, occupied in 1948-49 [or] claims to East Jerusalem, Hebron or Gaza, occupied in 1967.”<sup>1192</sup> More generally this also refers to the June 1967 borders of the West Bank and Gaza and Israel proper. It is also stated in international law that the accumulation or expansion and thereby occupation of territory by force or during war is in breach of international law.

I have thus covered the basic tenets of international law with regard to the Israel/Palestine conflict. The next point I will discuss with regard to hurdles and possible resolutions is how the Oslo peace process and its various agreements has generally framed the conflict. Again, I will only focus on the general differences between international law and Oslo here. First of all, it has to be stated that the Oslo discourse has gained more leverage in mainstream debate than international law. One of the reasons for this as I

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<sup>1188</sup> Davis, (2003), p. 61

<sup>1189</sup> Boyle, (2003), p. 84

<sup>1190</sup> Ibid; UNGA, 3236, recognising Palestinian rights (22 November 1974) .The first article reads: “1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: (a) The right to self-determination without external interference; (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty” United Nations General Assembly document at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/025974039acfb171852560de00548bbe?OpenDocument>

<sup>1191</sup> Davis, p. 65

<sup>1192</sup> Ibid

discussed in chapter one is the leverage both Israel and the US has had over the decades in framing the discourse on the conflict.

Key terms and conditionalities connected to the Oslo Accords and/or peace process are Israel's security, ceasing terrorism, Palestinian autonomy and/or self-rule, recognition of Israel and its right to exist. A crucial feature of the Oslo discourse that the accords form part of is how the status of the occupied territories is defined. To repeat a previous point, the occupied territories were referred to as "disputed territories"<sup>1193</sup> in former DoP's (Declaration of Principles) which implied that not only the Palestinians but "Israel [had] an *equal right to lay claims to the land*".<sup>1194</sup> (my italics) As I have already discussed, it is this idea of "equal" claim to the land which more or less frames the texts and statements through the intersecting discourses I have identified. Nevertheless, to understand the meaning of Oslo requires examining its various legacies. For example, the UN resolutions, Camp David I peace process discussed above as well as the Oslo peace process have their own historical legacies connected to established resolutions and prior peace agreements. Oslo I and II, Wye and Camp David II all have historical precedents and are characterised by the red threads of autonomy and Israeli security. As I discussed in chapter five, Roy charts the historical trajectory of the post 67 war Allon Plan named after the famous Israeli General which "called for the annexation of 25-40 per cent of the West Bank and established key territorial fundamentals that were used and expanded by subsequent Israeli governments. These fundamentals separated Jerusalem from the West Bank, which in turn would separate the northern from the southern West Bank, *a reality directly imposed over 25 years later by the Oslo agreements*."<sup>1195</sup> (my italics) Roy adds too that the plan established the concept of "security borders, used by Israel to justify land confiscations, and

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<sup>1193</sup> See Aruri (2003), p. 89 "three elements [which] upheld the Israeli position: the implication that the West Bank and Gaza are disputed rather than occupied territory; the conspicuous absence of any reference to the exchange of land for peace or to Israeli withdrawal or even redeployment, implying Israel [had] an equal right to lay claims to the land".

<sup>1194</sup> Ibid

<sup>1195</sup> Roy, S, (2007), p. 324

reasserted the importance of building Israeli settlements<sup>1196</sup> to ensure the maximum amount of land and the least amount of Palestinians. The security issue also emerged to renegotiate the international law stipulation on the June 1967 borders which would take into consideration “the realities on the ground and the strategic needs of Israel”.<sup>1197</sup> Referring to the paradigm set for how autonomy would look on the ground during the Oslo period, the so-called “Camp David autonomy accords”<sup>1198</sup> penned before Camp David I were designed within the “parameters of “self-rule” [...] to strengthen [...] Israel’s control over the *disputed areas*.”<sup>1199</sup> (my italics) Autonomy would be governed under an Israeli military administration and Israel’s further institutionalisation of the annexation of “the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip as well as East Jerusalem”<sup>1200</sup> thus granting “autonomy for the Palestinian people [but] not for the Palestinian land as well.”<sup>1201</sup> The division of the West Bank under Oslo II into “three zones – [or Bantustans] A, B and C – in which Israel and the PA had a division of functions”<sup>1202</sup> echoed the previous autonomy plan and was predicated on the assurance that Israel “retained overall security responsibility”<sup>1203</sup> in areas B and C in order to protect illegal settlements and maintain public order. In this context, the role

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<sup>1196</sup> Roy, S. (2007), p. 324

<sup>1197</sup> Swisher, p. 267

<sup>1198</sup> Aronson, p. 95.

<sup>1199</sup> Ibid, p. 94

<sup>1200</sup> Ibid

<sup>1201</sup> Boyle, (2003), p. 120; In a couple of articles from the period, it is made quite clear by a “team of Israeli experts who prepared the autonomy document” that “the autonomy institutions never try to express any national independence in any way.” Israel’s Autonomy Plan Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring, 1980), pp. 159-162 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 23/04/2009 05:26, p. 161; Shimon Peres expressed his views on the autonomy plan in *Maariv* in September 1978 in which he made it clear that “Israel [...] has an interest in Jordan joining the negotiations [as] her absence will create a momentum toward the establishment of a Palestinian state” meaning that Israel preferred “to solve the Palestinian problem within a Jordanian-Palestinian framework.” The Camp David I agreement did lead Begin to unambiguously recognise “the existence of a ‘Palestinian people’” but not their rights to a Palestinian state. Camp David Seen from Israel Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Winter, 1979), pp. 144-155 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Accessed: 23/04/2009 04:42, pp. 148-147

<sup>1202</sup> Aruri, (2003), p. 100

<sup>1203</sup> Ibid

of the PA's police forces or security forces was to ensure the general security of Israel.

### Convergence of historical precedents: from Allon to Oslo

The Wye Memorandum of 1996 onwards marked the “incongruity of the security needs and “security actions” described in Section II of the Memorandum.”<sup>1204</sup> Again it was incumbent on the PA to guarantee the security of Israel and the areas within which settlements had been established such as in “450 villages in designated as Area B”<sup>1205</sup> and downtown “Hebron [whose status was also] deferred”<sup>1206</sup> along with Area B. Perhaps we can see in the “generous offer” of 2000 a convergence of some of these historical precedents. For example, Labour’s Allon Plan and the “doctrine of “separation””<sup>1207</sup> combined with the Likud “mixture of population”.<sup>1208</sup> Palestinian autonomy under Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank also echoes Moshe Dayan’s “functional compromise”<sup>1209</sup> albeit under Oslo with the transference of powers to the Palestinians who would be in control of the internal running of areas assigned to it. Citing Bennis again, Barak’s generous offer consisted of the following: the “[Palestinian] capital would not be in Jerusalem, although some limited municipal authority in Palestinian neighborhoods might be granted. The 20 percent of the West Bank that Israel would keep would be made up of the settlements, military bases, and, crucially, the bypass roads that effectively divide the West Bank into separate regions.”<sup>1210</sup> Here we see the trappings of autonomy and the mixture of peoples in the same land separated by the many roads and military bases. However, recognition of the inequities of the “generous offer” came from the self-same Clinton Administration that tilted towards Israel morally, culturally and geopolitically in the form of the Clinton parameters at Taba in January of 2001. The Clinton parameters bore a

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<sup>1204</sup> Aruri, p. 119

<sup>1205</sup> Ibid, p. 100

<sup>1206</sup> Ibid

<sup>1207</sup> Ibid 116

<sup>1208</sup> Ibid

<sup>1209</sup> Ibid, p. 117

<sup>1210</sup> Bennis, P, (2007), p. 142

“remarkable similarity”<sup>1211</sup> to “unprecedented concessions”<sup>1212</sup> made by the Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat previously. Although the plan again repeated much of the security needs of Israel and its “demographic realities”<sup>1213</sup> the thorny issue of Jerusalem sovereignty and some territorial control issues were addressed. Finally, to reiterate, high-ups in the Palestinian leadership did for the most part acquiesce to many of these inequities in the “spirit of the agreement”<sup>1214</sup> which also meant making more and more concessions. Furthermore, some within the Palestinian leadership benefitted from the trappings of Oslo both economically and politically but essentially it was their own constituencies who suffered in the end and indeed *all* the innocent lives lost as a result of the ongoing occupation and responses to it continuing throughout the Oslo process.

### “Equal” claim as an order of discourse

As I previously discussed, I have identified the “equal” claim discourse framing the textbook narratives as the intersection between the Oslo discourse, language and perspectives from the international law discourse and the Jewish/Arab connection to the land discourse. Simultaneously, the “equal” claim discourse is maintained through the exclusion of critical international law perspectives pertaining to the Israel/Palestine conflict (see above). To provide some examples of the international law discourse again from the textbooks, in the 1991 and 1992 textbooks condemnation by the Security Council of Israel making Jerusalem its capital is discussed. In other textbooks, mention is made of Israel’s breach of the UN Partition Proposal through its occupation of Palestinian territories. Along with this, the occupation is mentioned in connection with the Palestinian refugee situation which is generally discussed in most of the textbooks but is given particular emphasis in the 1991-92 textbooks. As I have discussed previously, however, from a power/knowledge perspective the Oslo discourse may be regarded as the dominant framework for understanding and explaining the issue of peace and its hurdles. Crucially too the Oslo discourse intersects

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<sup>1211</sup> Aruri, p. 172

<sup>1212</sup> Ibid

<sup>1213</sup> Ibid, p. 185

<sup>1214</sup> Ibid, p. 94

with the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land (see chapter four). Within this order of discourse it is understood that the parties to the conflict have an “equal” claim or right to the land on the basis of religious and/or national connection. This order of discourse essentially trumps the references to the international law discourse appearing in the textbooks. For example, given the assumption that both parties share an “equal” claim to the land, such condemnations by the UN on the status of Jerusalem are subordinated to the assumed claim. “Equal” claim also gains its authority through the exclusion of broader perspectives from the international law discourse discussed above which, as I discussed, trumps any ideological claims to the land. In addition, perspectives from the debate on 1948 discussed in chapter one are also excluded and arguably prevent critical analysis of various knowledge claims in the textbook chapters. For example, although reference to UN 47 and its breach by Israel draws on the international law discourse, the proposal itself and the premises it is built upon are not critically examined. An orientation with the 1948 debate, for example, would trace a connection to partition through the concept of ‘transfer’ by discussing the contexts and connections between late 19<sup>th</sup> nationalism, colonialism and political Zionism.

To point to other, more concrete examples of how “equal” claim functions here, the interaction of discourses on connection to the land, people-nations and international law at once mentions the occupation but effectively renders the occupied territories *disputed*. For example, it is mentioned in some of the textbooks that Jerusalem is a stumbling block and that both parties must equally divide the area they are struggling over. Further, it is mentioned that the Israelis and Palestinians have had difficulty in agreeing on how big the Palestinian state would be since settlers claimed religious connections to the areas. Textbooks and teachers also mention the return to one’s biblical homeland as well as the right to a land of one’s own.<sup>1215</sup> Peace conditionalities from the Oslo discourse such as Israel’s right to exist and the Palestinian right to a homeland also partially feed into the notion of “equal”

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<sup>1215</sup> As I will later show in my analysis of teachers’ statements, the interaction between the discourses I have identified thus far is much sharper.

claim. In addition, as a kind of tacit point of departure for achieving peace it is understood that Palestinian compliance with the above peace conditionalities must be a first step towards peace; since denying either party's right to exist and a state of one's own is anathema to peace. Thus, ending the occupation is not discussed as a possible first step to peace but insuring the "equal" claims and rights of either party are.

In contrast with the secondary literature above, in the following section I will examine how the Oslo peace process has been presented in the textbook chapters. It is my hope too that the previous comparison of the Oslo, international law and "equal" claim discourses will provide the reader with a suitable backdrop.

## Section 5.4 The 1993 Oslo Peace Process

The following textbook excerpts draw upon an interaction of the discourses discussed above, an absence of critical (scholarly) perspectives and some factual errors. Drawing on the international law discourse first of all, in *Puls:historia* from 1996 the Oslo peace process is discussed following the outcome of many wars and the "expansion of [Israel's] original territory, which has meant even more Palestinian refugees in the Middle East"<sup>1216</sup>. Drawing on the Oslo discourse we learn that "in 1995 the PLO and Israel succeeded *in agreeing upon* the Palestinians having self-rule in certain parts of the Israeli occupied territories."<sup>1217</sup> (my italics) In the 1996 edition of *Levande historia* more topics are discussed pertaining to the peace process. In a section entitled "The Double Tragedy" we learn that due to the static nature of the conflict until 1993 "the Arabs viewed the Jews as a hateful

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<sup>1216</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996). "Under de tre stora krig som rasat mellan Israel och arabstaterna (främst Egypten) har Israel *utvidgat* sitt ursprungliga område, vilket *har betytt* ännu fler palestinska flyktingar i Mellanöstern.

Först 1995 lyckades PLO och Israel *enas* om att palestinierna *skulle få självstyre* i vissa delar av de Israel-ockuperade områdena."

<sup>1217</sup> Ibid

occupying power and the Jews regarded the Arabs as potential terrorists.”<sup>1218</sup> Pointing to previous obstacles to peace, we learn that “*as long as* the PLO [...] did not want to recognise the state of Israel, the Israelis refused to negotiate with the PLO. In addition, Israel viewed the PLO as a terrorist organisation, responsible for a countless number of violent attacks in and outside of Israel.”<sup>1219</sup> (my italics) Returning to *Puls:historia* from 1996, at the end of the chapter<sup>1220</sup> two maps are displayed which show the West Bank (indicated in green) under complete self-rule. Probably given the period of publication, the maps do not show the delineation into different areas (A, B and C) of the West Bank. Neither do they show the levels of control for these areas through, for example, the appearance of constructed criss-cross highways. The text beneath the maps interestingly states that “the Jewish state of Israel has seized Palestinian and Syrian territories: *Jerusalem*, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.”<sup>1221</sup> Here Jerusalem is referred to as Palestinian territory along with the West Bank and Gaza. During the Oslo process the parties struggled over the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem, with the Palestinians agreeing to East Jerusalem while Israel wanted the whole of Jerusalem. In previous textbooks Jerusalem is presented for the most part as Israel’s capital both in modern and Roman times or as a city that holds religious significance to all three monotheistic faiths.

In *Levande historia* from 1996 again we learn of the many “different proposals for a resolution of the conflict”<sup>1222</sup>. We learn too that none of the proposals appealed to any party to the conflict. I will list them one by one as they appear in the textbook. First, 1) that “... the Palestine Arabs were

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<sup>1218</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996). ”Den dubbla tragedin Fram till 1993. pekade allt åt samma håll: att Israel förblev en brännpunkt på världssarenan. Araberna såg judarna som en förhållig ockupationsmakt, och judarna betraktade araberna som eventuella terrorister.”

<sup>1219</sup> Ibid. ”Så länge PLO, den palestinska befrielseorganisationen inte ville erkänna staten Israel vägrade israelerna att förhandla med PLO. Israel betraktade dessutom PLO som en terroristorganisation, skyldig till ett otal våldsdåd både i och utanför Israel.”

<sup>1220</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996), ” Den judiska staten Israel har lagt beslag på palestinska och syriska områden: Jerusalem, Västbanken Golanhöjderna och Gazaremsan. Den gröna färgen markerar palestinska självstyrande områden.”

<sup>1221</sup> Ibid

<sup>1222</sup> Ibid



allowed to *establish a state of their own* on the West Bank – with or without parts of Jerusalem – and the Gaza Strip”<sup>1223</sup> or 2) “that the Palestinians would be allowed the right of *self-determination in the occupied territories*”<sup>1224</sup> or 3) “that the Jewish state would be transformed into a mixed state which made the Jews and the Arabs equals.”<sup>1225</sup> Let us examine the first proposal which would appear to refer to a two-state solution in accordance with UN Resolutions 242 and 338 incorporating Palestinian national rights. As I have discussed previously, the two-state solution was indeed embraced by the Palestinians. However, they also wanted East Jerusalem as the capital of their state. The exclusion of East Jerusalem among other things was part of the “generous” offer rejected at Camp David in 2000. What the Palestinians were offered was an autonomy plan under continued occupation, enhanced Israeli security but not a sovereign Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital. The third proposal appears to refer to the one-state solution which has only been supported by a small number of people.<sup>1226</sup> In the same chapter we learn that “at the beginning of the 1990s the bitter opposition between leading Israelis and Palestinians died down”<sup>1227</sup> and that under US auspices “Israel’s government

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<sup>1223</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996)

<sup>1224</sup> Ibid

<sup>1225</sup> Ibid. “Politiker och debattörer i skilda delar av världen hade lagt fram olika förslag till lösning av konflikten. Ett var att Palestina-araberna fick bilda en egen stat av Västbanken – med eller utan delar av Jerusalem – och Gazaremsan. Ett annat var att palestinierna fick självbestämmanderätt på de ockuperade områdena. Ett tredje förslag var att den judiska staten Israel omvandlades till en blandad stat som jämställde de arabiska invånarna med judarna. Inget av förslagen lockade någondera parten”

<sup>1226</sup> See Ali Abunimah’s *One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse* from 2006 or Saree Makdisi’s *Palestine Inside Out* from 2008. In his latest book, *Blood and Religion*, (2006) Jonathan Cook also discusses MK Azmi Bshara’s idea of a state of all its citizens which won favour among Israel’s Arab minorities.

<sup>1227</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996), ”Fred i sikte

I början av 1990-talet dämpades dock de hätska motsättningarna mellan ledande israeler och palestinier. I USA:s regi inledde Israels regering och PLO förhandlingar. År 1993 undertecknades ett avtal om palestinskt självstyre i Gaza och på Västbanken. Berömt är handslaget mellan Israels premiärminister Yitzhak Rabin och PLO-ledaren Yassir Arafat framför Vita huset i Washington.

Men Rabin fick plikta med sitt liv för uppgörelsen. Han mördades av en judisk fanatiker i Tel Aviv 1995. Utrikesminister Shimon Perez, som också i hög grad medverkat vid fredsprocessen, blev premiärminister. Risken för ny blodspillan kan inte uteslutas.”

and the PLO began negotiations.”<sup>1228</sup> Then in the next sentence we learn that an “agreement on Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and the West Bank”<sup>1229</sup> was signed in 1993. The meaning and implications of the concept of Palestinian self-rule are not examined in the chapter and the US is ascribed the role of peace negotiator.

Looking now at the 1998-99 textbooks, in a section entitled “A Palestinian State”, the first sentence begins by stating that “the relationship towards the Palestinians has been a difficult problem to resolve.”<sup>1230</sup> A similar description is presented in the 2005 edition of *SO direkt* where the problem is exacerbated by a cycle of “brutal Arab” suicide attacks and “indiscriminate Israeli retaliations”.<sup>1231</sup> In the 1998-99 textbooks we learn that Yasser Arafat was chosen as president of “the Palestinian state *that was established*”.<sup>1232</sup> (my italics) In the next sentence it is claimed that despite this “peace negotiations between *the two states* has been slow”<sup>1233</sup> (my italics) because “Israel is divided on the peace issue.”<sup>1234</sup> The reason for this we learn is that “those Jews who have immigrated from the West have a more conciliatory attitude towards the Arabs than those from the East, that is, from the Arab states.”<sup>1235</sup> Israeli division is presented here as a possible

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<sup>1228</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996)

<sup>1229</sup> Ibid

<sup>1230</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998). ”Förhållandet till palestinierna har varit ett svårlöst problem. Ledaren för palestiniernas frihetsrörelse PLO, Yassir Arafat, har valts till president i den palestinska stat, som upprättats, men förhandlingarna om fred mellan de båda staterna har gått trögt. Israel är nämligen splittrat i fredsfrågan. De judar som invandrat från väst har en försonligare inställning till araberna än de judar, som kommit från öst, d.v.s. från arabländerna. Terror och vedergällning låser fast parterna vid sina ståndpunkter och hindrar kompromisser.”

<sup>1231</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H (2005), ”Krig och terror I tre blodiga krig har Israel försvarat sin självständighet mot de omgivande arabländerna. Med hjälp från USA, där cirka fem miljoner judar där bor, har Israel byggt upp en stark krigsmakt och även utvecklat kärnvapen.

Förhållandet till palestinierna är fortfarande ett svårlöst problem. Förhandlingarna om fred mellan de båda folken har gått trögt. Brutala arabiska bombsprängningar, ofta av unga självmordsbombare, och hänsynslös israelisk vedergällning låser fast parterna vid sina ståndpunkter och hindrar kompromisser.”

<sup>1232</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>1233</sup> Ibid

<sup>1234</sup> Ibid

<sup>1235</sup> Ibid

hurdle to peace. The last sentence of the section ends by stating that “*Terror and retribution* have locked both parties into their respective positions and has prevented *compromise*”<sup>1236</sup>. (my italics) The notion of compromise fits into the Oslo discourse too whereupon it is assumed that both parties have an “equal” claim to the land with which to make compromises over (this is especially the case with the status of Jerusalem). Finally, at the end of the chapter there are a number of study-questions for the pupils to prepare. Question one urges the pupils to mention three to four important events in the history of the conflict. Invoking the notion of “equal” claim to the land again, question three of four urges the pupil to ponder “Who *has most right* to Palestine – The Jews or the Arabs?” and urges the pupils to “Give reasons for [their] answer/opinion!”<sup>1237</sup> (my italics) Although this is presented as an open question, the main chapter has already established the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land for the pupils to proceed from (see chapter four).<sup>1238</sup> In the questions following the chapter on the conflict in *Levande historia* from 1996, questions one and two ask the students to present a historical background to the conflict and to discuss the meaning of Zionism. Questions seven and ten ask the students to provide the date of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, what the PLO is and why it is a controversial organisation. This indicates more of a critical focus on the PLO than, for example, the Zionist movement but still invokes the international law discourse acknowledging Israel’s occupation.<sup>1239</sup> As I have

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<sup>1236</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H, (1998)

<sup>1237</sup> Ibid, ”UPPGIFTER

- 1 Nämn 3-4 särskilt viktiga händelser i konfliktens historia.
- 2 Varför har så många andra länder blandat sig i kampen mellan israeler och palestinier?
- 3 Vem har störst rätt till Palestina – judarna eller araberna? Motivera dina åsikt.
- 4 Hur kommer det att gå i konflikten, tror Du? Motivera dina funderingar.”

<sup>1238</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjörnsson, H, Tillman, H (1998), ”Flertalet israeler är Judar och menar att deras förfäder invandrade i Palestina ungefär 1800 år före Jesus Kristus födelse. Araberna (palestinierna), som är muslimer, hävdar att de härstammar från det folk som bodde i samma område redan tusen år innan judarna kom dit.”

<sup>1239</sup> Fallström, J O, Hildingson, L, Wadner, G, (1996), ”Sionismen. Drömmen om att återupprätta den judiska nationen fortlevde bland judama världen runt. Under 1800-talets

already discussed, the role and purpose of the Zionist movement is not placed in any critical light. Instead, it is described as existing to return a persecuted Jewish people to its biblical-historical (and national) homeland to create a haven for all Jews.

Alluding again to the existence of a Palestinian state, the chapter on the conflict in *Samhällskunskap A, 6-9* from 2002 discusses “a historic peace agreement between *Israel and Palestine*”<sup>1240</sup> (my italics) in 1994. Then the terms of the peace agreement of 1994 are discussed which would “provide Palestine autonomy/self-rule and [would] mean Israel gradually handing over territories”<sup>1241</sup>. Alluding to the existence of a Palestinian state again we learn in the last sentence that the “agreement has, however, brought with it continued conflicts between *Israel and Palestine*”<sup>1242</sup> (my italics). The 2002 edition of *Grundbok historia* discusses the issues of occupation and the 1993 Oslo Agreement. In the first sentence we learn that “Israel’s occupation continued for years without interruption but in the 1993 Oslo agreement a framework was drawn up for limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza.”<sup>1243</sup> Then we learn in the last sentence that throughout the period

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senare del blev allt fler judar både i Europa och i Amerika anhängare av sionismen, kampen för det judiska folkets återflyttning till Palestina.

Theodor Herzl skrev boken ”Den judiska staten”, där han krävde att judarna – efter århundraden av förföljelser och lidanden – borde få ett eget fosterland. Under första världskriget besattes Palestina av brittiska trupper. 1917 förklarade den brittiska regeringen att det judiska folket borde få ”ett nationellt hem”. Allt fler judar invandrade till Palestina. Araberna i Palestina blev förbittrade; britterna hade tidigare lovat att araberna skulle få Palestina.” M

<sup>1240</sup> Lundberg, F, Olsson, L, (2002), ”Under 1994 tecknades dock ett historiskt fredsavtal mellan Israel och Palestina.

Avtalet ska ge Palestina eget självstyre, och innebär att Israel successivt ska lämna över landområden.

Avtalet har dock medfört fortsatta konflikter mellan Israel och Palestina, och det råder ingen stabil fred i området.”

<sup>1241</sup> Ibid

<sup>1242</sup> Ibid

<sup>1243</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002), ”Israels ockupation har pågått i alla år utan avbrott, men i Oslo-avtalet 1993 drogs ramarna upp för ett begränsat palestinskt självstyre på Västbanken och i Gaza, se kartan på s 319. Under tiden har allt fler judar flyttat till Israel och byggt judiska samhällen på ockuperade områden, så kallade bosättningar. Spänningen mellan de två folken har kvarstått och år 2000 blossade konflikterna upp igen med samma mönster som tidigare: terrordåd och hämndaktioner.”

of the Oslo agreement “more Jews [had] moved to Israel and built Jewish communities in the occupied territories, so-called settlements.”<sup>1244</sup> In *Historia b 6-9* from 2007 a resolving of tensions between the parties to the conflict is discussed. Here it is claimed that “towards the middle of the 1990s, however, Israel gave the Palestinians a certain degree of self-rule/autonomy through the so-called Palestinian Authority.”<sup>1245</sup> (my italics) The 2005 edition of *SO direkt historia* discusses the cycle of suicide bombings and Israeli reprisals and how this had “prevented compromises.”<sup>1246</sup> (my italics) Finally, the chapter ends on a set of discussion questions or tasks for pupils to tackle.<sup>1247</sup> The questions or tasks are presented as follows:

#### TASKS

1. Why have Jews lived spread out in different countries for almost 2000 years?
2. What is meant by “Zionism”?
3. How did the British (who governed Palestine) try to create peace and justice between Jews and Arabs?
4. How was the state of Israel established?
5. Why is the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians so intractable?

The answers to these questions are provided in the textbook chapter itself and proceed from the discourses identified previously (e.g. Jewish/Arab

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<sup>1244</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (2002)

<sup>1245</sup> Molund, M, (2007)

<sup>1246</sup> Almgren, B, Tallerud, B, Thorbjornsson, H, Tillman, H (2005)

<sup>1247</sup> Ibid, ”UPPGIFTER

1 Varför har judar bott utspridda i olika länder under nära 2 000 ar?

2 Vad menas med ”sionism”?

3 Hur försökte engelsmannen (som styrde Palestina) skapa fred och rättvisa mellan judar och araber?

4 Hur gick det till när staten Israel bildades?

5 Varför är konflikten mellan Israel och palestinierna sa svårlöst?”

connection to the land, nation-peoples and the notion of "equal" claim to the land).

The chapter in *Levande historia 9 Fokus elevbok* from 2007 discusses Israeli and Palestinian positions on peace stating that there "are groups who think differently"<sup>1248</sup> among them. Invoking the notion of "equal" claim to the land again we learn that there are "some who want peace"<sup>1249</sup> and who say "that Israelis and Palestinians must divide the area they are struggling over. Others do not want to divide the area."<sup>1250</sup> Two sections in *SOS Historia: ämnesboken*<sup>1251</sup> from 2007 entitled "Conflict between Israelis and Palestinians" and "Palestinian protest"<sup>1252</sup> discuss respectively the 50 years since Israel's establishment and tacitly drawing on the international law discourse, "*the problem of land for the Palestinian refugees*" not being resolved<sup>1253</sup>. (my italics) In addition, drawing on the Oslo discourse, it is discussed that "in the beginning, the refugee organisations refused to support Israel's right to exist"<sup>1254</sup> and that they "together with Israel's Arab neighbours tried to destroy Israel."<sup>1255</sup> Then we learn that "however, by the beginning of the 1990s, peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO" had begun.<sup>1256</sup> In the next sentence we learn that "the PLO had then recognised

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<sup>1248</sup> Hildingson, L, Hildingson, K, (2007), "Både bland israeler och palestinier finns det grupper som tycker olika. En del vill ha fred och säger att israeler och palestinier måste dela på det område man strider om.

Andra vill inte dela området.

Israel och palestinierna misstror varandra. Därför är det lätt för grupper som är emot fred att sätta igång oroligheter."

<sup>1249</sup> Ibid

<sup>1250</sup> Ibid

<sup>1251</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007)

<sup>1252</sup> Ibid. "Konflikten mellan israeler och palestinier trots att det är mer än femtio år sedan Israel bildades har man ännu inte löst problemet med land åt de palestinska flyktingarna. Från början vägrade flyktingarnas organisationer att gå med på Israels rätt att finnas. Tillsammans med Israels arabiska grannländer försökte palestinierna krossa Israel. Men i början av 1990-talet började fredssamtal mellan Israel och PLO, den palestinska befrielseorganisationen. PLO erkände då Israels rätt att finnas, och Israel erkände palestiniernas rätt att få ett eget land. Palestinierna skulle få bilda en egen stat av Gazaremsan och delar av västbanken som ockuperats av Israel sedan 1967."

<sup>1253</sup> Ibid

<sup>1254</sup> Ibid

<sup>1255</sup> Ibid

<sup>1256</sup> Ibid

Israel's right to exist and Israel had recognised the Palestinians' right to a land of their own [and would be] *allowed* to establish a state of their own" in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.<sup>1257</sup> (my italics) Again it is assumed that Israel has the right to permit or allow the establishment of a Palestinian state since it shares an "equal" claim to the land. The section in the 2000 edition of *Hållplatser i historia* entitled "Israel and the Palestinians negotiate"<sup>1258</sup> discusses the beginning of the Oslo peace process in 1993. The section states that "Arafat knew that his idea of giving the Palestinians a state of their own could not be carried out without him distancing himself from terrorism and recognising Israel's right to exist."<sup>1259</sup> (my italics) Then we learn that the process "looked hopeful around the end of the century" and that it looked as though "the state of Palestine would become a reality."<sup>1260</sup> Drawing on the international law discourse, we learn that this is due to the fact that "Israel had handed back a part of the occupied West Bank to the Palestinians"<sup>1261</sup>. Invoking "equal" claim to the land again, Jerusalem is discussed as a stumbling block between "Israelis and Palestinians" who both regard the city as their holy city.<sup>1262</sup> In the section entitled "Palestinian Uprising" in *SOS historia* from 2007 and drawing on the Oslo discourse, the problem for why the process appeared to fail is explained in terms of "Israel and the PLO not being able to agree on how big the Palestinian state would be."<sup>1263</sup> The

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<sup>1257</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007)

<sup>1258</sup> Bjelfvenstam, B, Bergquist, L, Bergström, G, Åberg, L, (2000), " Det var ett stort ögonblick när Israels premiärminister Yitzhak Rabin och palestiniernas ledare Yasir Arafat skakade hand efter förhandlingar i Washington 1993. Men därifrån var det långt till en säker och varaktig fred. Meningen var att fredsförhandlingarna skulle fortsätta och man skulle ta itu med en rad problem och svårigheter. Åren har gått och fredsprocessen har under långa tider närmast djupfrysats. Men den har överlevt. Vid sekelskiftet 2000 såg det hoppfullt ut. Israel hade lämnat tillbaka en del av den ockuperade Västbanken till palestinierna. Det såg ut som om staten Palestina skulle bli verklighet."

<sup>1259</sup> Ibid

<sup>1260</sup> Ibid

<sup>1261</sup> Ibid

<sup>1262</sup> Ibid, "Men var ska huvudstaden ligga? I Jerusalem, krävde palestinierna. Aldrig någonsin i Jerusalem, svarade israelerna. Jerusalem är en helig stad för både israeler och palestinier. Förenta Nationerna föreslog för många år sedan att Jerusalem skulle ställas under internationell kontroll. Men så blev det ju inte."

<sup>1263</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007), " Palestinskt uppror

Men Israel och PLO kunde inte komma överens om hur stor den palestinska staten skulle bli. Många judar hade bosatt sig på Västbanken, och menade att bibeln gav dem rätt till landet.

reasons for this we learn are that “many Jews had lived in the West Bank and argued that the Bible gave them the right to the land”<sup>1264</sup>. It was therefore “difficult for the Israeli leaders to give back the land to the Palestinians.”<sup>1265</sup> We then learn of the murder of Yitzhak Rabin by a “religious Israeli fanatic”<sup>1266</sup> and Rabin’s willingness to “exchange land for peace with the Palestinians”<sup>1267</sup>. The exchange of land for peace also implies the “equal” claim notion. Alluding to Palestinian discontent over the peace process too we learn that “the PLO leader Yasser Arafat did not have the full support of his people either”<sup>1268</sup> because he had agreed to “end the struggle in exchange for some territories.”<sup>1269</sup> This is an interesting example of how the Palestinian leader himself also contributed to the maintenance of the Oslo discourse. Detached from the context of continuing occupation, however, the chapter discusses the “Palestinian protest against the Israelis”<sup>1270</sup> in the year 2000 and this we are told too was the cause of the negotiations “on Palestinian self-rule”<sup>1271</sup> breaking down. In the first paragraph of the section entitled “Peace agreement between Israel and the PLO”<sup>1272</sup> in *Levande*

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Därför var det svårt för de israeliska ledarna att ge tillbaka landet åt palestinierna. År 1994 mördades den israeliske premiärministern Yitzhak Rabin av en fanatiskt religiös israeler. Rabin hade velat byta land mot fred med palestinierna.

PLO-ledaren Yassir Arafat hade inte heller stöd av hela sitt folk. Många palestinier tyckte att Arafat gjort fel. Han gick ju med på att stoppa kampen mot Israel i utbyte mot några landområden.

År 2000 startade ett stort palestinskt uppror mot israelerna. Då avbröts förhandlingarna om palestinskt självstyre, och våldet förvärrades. Palestinska självmordsbombare tog sig in i Israel. På bussar, i shoppingcenter och på kaféer sprängde de sig själva och civila israeler till döds. Israel hämnades genom krig mot palestinierna.”

<sup>1264</sup> Ibid

<sup>1265</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007)

<sup>1266</sup> Ibid

<sup>1267</sup> Ibid

<sup>1268</sup> Ibid, ”PLO-ledaren Yassir Arafat hade inte heller stöd av hela sitt folk. Många palestinier tyckte att Arafat gjort fel. Han gick ju med på att stoppa kampen mot Israel i utbyte mot några landområden. År 2000 startade ett stort palestinskt uppror mot israelerna. Då avbröts förhandlingarna om palestinskt självstyre, och våldet förvärrades. Palestinska självmordsbombare tog sig in i Israel. På bussar, i shoppingcenter och på kaféer sprängde de sig själva och civila israeler till döds. Israel hämnades genom krig mot palestinierna.”

<sup>1269</sup> Ibid

<sup>1270</sup> Ibid

<sup>1271</sup> Ibid

<sup>1272</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003), “Fredsavtal mellan israel och PLO motvilligt slöt Israel och PLO till sist ett fredsavtal där de ömsesidigt *erkände* varandra på Vita husets



*historia elevbok 9* from 2003 we learn that in the end both Israel and the PLO “reluctantly”<sup>1273</sup> signed a “peace agreement where they mutually recognised each other”.<sup>1274</sup> Again this implies recognition of “equal” claims or rights. We then learn too that despite the contacts that “several Arab states had previously had with Israel”<sup>1275</sup> they were unable to “make peace before the PLO did”<sup>1276</sup> for political reasons. Unlike previous textbooks, details of the Oslo process are not mentioned in the 2003 edition of *Levande historia elevbok 9*. Focused on instead is the murder of Yitzhak Rabin by “an ultra-nationalist Jew who was against the peace agreement with the PLO”<sup>1277</sup>. Tacitly referring to the second *Intifada*, the last sentence of the section on the murder of Yitzhak Rabin refers to “new conflicts between Palestinians and Israelis breaking out in 2000”<sup>1278</sup>. In the last paragraph we learn of attacks by Hamas on Israeli civilians and that “the conflicts had become so many that many people began to talk about the peace process”<sup>1279</sup> going nowhere. The final section in the chapter on the conflict in *Levande historia 9 minikurs* from 2003 discusses the “Peace Agreement between Israel and the PLO”.<sup>1280</sup> Once again it is assumed that the path to peace is predicated on the Palestinians or PLO first making a gesture, one which may be reciprocated by Israel. We learn that “The PLO gave up its demand to

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gräsmatta skakade Yassir Arafat och med premiärminister Yitzhak Rabin hand. Flera arabstater hade tidigare haft kontakter med Israel, men de hade av politiska skäl inte kunnat sluta fred innan PLO gjorde det.”

<sup>1273</sup> Ibid

<sup>1274</sup> Ibid

<sup>1275</sup> Ibid

<sup>1276</sup> Ibid

<sup>1277</sup> Ibid. ”I Israel mördades premiärminister Rabin 1995 av en ultranationalistisk Jude som var emot fredsavtalet med PLO. I början av 2000-talet utbröt nya strider mellan palestinier och israeler. Den palestinska organisationen Hamas tog på sig skulden för flera *angrepp* på israelerna. *Striderna* blev så omfattande att många började tala om att fredsavtalet mellan Israel och PLO inte hade lett till något.”

<sup>1278</sup> Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003)

<sup>1279</sup> Ibid

<sup>1280</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003). ”Fredsavtal mellan Israel och PLO. År 1993 slöts ett fredsavtal mellan PLO och Israel. PLO representerade det palestinska folket. PLO gav upp kravet på att Israel skulle förstöras. Israel gick med på att palestinerna skulle få en egen stat, i Gazaområdet och på Västbanken i början av 2000-talet bröt nya strider ut mellan palestinier och israeler, trots fredsavtalet. Palestinska självmordsattacker och israeliska militära hämndattacker avlöste varandra. Freden var fortfarande långt borta.”

destroy Israel [and that] Israel agreed to the Palestinians having a state of their own in the Gaza region and the West Bank.”<sup>1281</sup> In the last paragraphs of the section the 2000 *al-Aqsa Intifada* is alluded to when we learn that “new conflicts broke out between Palestinians and Israelis despite the peace agreement.”<sup>1282</sup> The 2007 edition of *SOS historia* discusses the appearance of Palestinian suicide bombers who “entered Israel”<sup>1283</sup> and “blew themselves and Israeli civilians up”.<sup>1284</sup> We then learn that Israel responded by taking “revenge through war against the Palestinians.”<sup>1285</sup> At the bottom of the page in the chapter, there is a picture of the separation/security wall cutting through the West Bank and a caption which reads “with walls like these [...] the Israelis try to close in the Palestinians in their villages and towns on the West Bank and in Gaza.”<sup>1286</sup> Then the caption attempts to explain “why?” the wall was constructed, namely, to prevent “suicide bombers from entering into Israel.”<sup>1287</sup> Focusing on the plight of Palestinians, the caption also reads that “many Palestinians are cut off from their plantations which have been divided up by the wall. Palestinians who work in Israel cannot get to work”<sup>1288</sup> and for many “it is difficult to get to a hospital and to get their children to school.”<sup>1289</sup>

## Discussion and analysis

How do the textbooks I have examined treat the Oslo peace process? The textbook treatment of the Oslo peace process appears to speak predominantly to what I have identified here as the Oslo discourse which also incorporates and frames references drawn from the international law discourse. As I have discussed above too, the latter discourses all form part of the “equal” claim discourse which also includes the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land. This is implicated in the texts with

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<sup>1281</sup> Dahlberg, H, Henricsson, B, (2003)

<sup>1282</sup> Ibid

<sup>1283</sup> Ivansson, E, Tordai, M, (2007)

<sup>1284</sup> Ibid

<sup>1285</sup> Ibid

<sup>1286</sup> Ibid

<sup>1287</sup> Ibid

<sup>1288</sup> Ibid

<sup>1289</sup> Ibid

reference to among other things Israel's right to exist and assumed claims and rights connected to this, the Palestinians' right to a homeland, difficulties in negotiating land between the parties to the conflict (e.g. with regard to Jerusalem, the size of the Palestinian state), and reference to settlers' biblical claims. The exclusion of other perspectives maintains this order of discourse and effectively prevents critical analysis of many of the knowledge claims built into the discourses. Since it is assumed that both parties share an "equal" claim to the land, the hurdles to peace discussed in the textbook are understood as hinging on a denial or prevention of this shared claim (this has been more explicitly expressed by some of my teacher respondents). For example, hurdles to peace such as cycles of violence in the form of terror and retaliation and perceptions among Israelis and Palestinians alike of hateful occupiers and terrorists are discussed. Other hurdles to peace and by association denial of "equal" claim are, for example, terrorism, threats to destroy Israel and cycles of violence. It is also understood that for peace to be achieved it is important that Israel's opponents (the Palestinians and Arab states) make the first move. Drawing on the Oslo discourse, peace conditionalities such as the importance of recognising Israel's right to exist and the cessation of terrorism are mentioned. To reciprocate, Israel will recognise Palestinians' right to a land of their own and will agree to allow Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories. The inclusion of these conditionalities in the narrative effectively trumps the international law discourse drawn upon in the textbooks too. For example, echoing "the principle of ethnic self-determination"(see below) in international law, the reference to both parties' right to a land of their own is effectively subordinated to the peace conditionalities of the Oslo discourse. Despite the peace agreement we learn of renewed cycles of violence emerging especially following the failure at Camp David in 2000. While the 2000 *Intifada* and Hamas terroristic acts as well as Israeli reprisals are discussed, the causes of these new cycles of violence are not explained. As I discussed earlier, this is probably due to the absence of a critical discussion on the occupation as a direct cause of the violence and even as a potential hurdle to peace.

In chapter six I will carry out an analysis of the teacher interviews I held between 2007 and 2009. The statements the teachers have made with regard

to how they perceive and teach on the history of the conflict will be examined and contrasted with the textbook analyses. While the interview statements do not comprise my main body of data, they do provide an interesting indication of how much influence the textbooks and concomitant discourses may have on teachers' established knowledge on the conflict's history.

## Chapter Six

### Teacher Discourses on the Conflict

In the following chapter I will present an analysis of eight interviews held with Lower Secondary school Social Science/Civics teachers between 2007 and 2009. As mentioned in chapter three, given my analytical focus and the paucity of my sample size, the data only serve to provide an indication of the extent to which the discourses I have identified on the conflict might be drawn upon by the teachers. In addition, as I also discussed in my method chapter, a discourse analysis of interview transcripts can only provide a snapshot frozen in time of how a particular individual may or may not adhere to one position or other. Nevertheless, by teacher discourses on the conflict I refer generally to the teacher respondents' background information or what Fairclough refers to as 'MR' (members' resources). Members' resources constitute thus "*knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, [ideological] assumptions, and so on.*"<sup>1290</sup> (my italics) One source of teachers' background information on the history of conflict may be drawn from the textbooks and their selected topics and themes which, situated in the institution of the school, are considered objective or authoritative. In chapters four and five I discussed the elements that informed the topics and themes on the conflict in the textbooks. These I identified as cultural (religious) tradition, political ideology (nationalism) as well as established (selected) knowledge on pivotal historical events (e.g. the Nazi holocaust, 1948, the *Intifada*, the Oslo

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<sup>1290</sup> Fairclough, N, (1989/2001), p. 20

peace process etc) and references to international law. On the basis of this, I have identified a number of interacting discourses, namely, the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land, the discourse on people-nations, external discourses such as the Oslo discourse and the international law discourse. Inspired by the notion of “equal” claim to the land which I have argued has permeated the textbook narratives, I have also identified an order of discourse (the “equal” claim discourse) which incorporates the previous discourses mentioned and acts as a general framework. In the previous chapter too I discussed information in the 1991-92 textbooks which sometimes provided an alternative frame for understanding such topics as security and settlement expansion. What was significant about these topics and themes is that they appeared in the textbooks published prior to the 1993 Oslo Accords but never appeared again in textbooks published following the Oslo Accords. What this also pointed to was a general lack of orientation with more critical (scholarly) perspectives; many of which would enhance and nuance international law perspectives already included in the textbooks. Thus, while on occasion providing new (critical) information in light of changing events on the ground, since the early 1990s textbook content has continually been framed by the order of discourse mentioned. Looking at teacher statements in this light appears to show that teachers simultaneously critically reflect on the roots and causes of the conflict and proceed from established knowledge built into the discourses identified. Beyond this, teachers are relatively autonomous with regard to how they reconstruct the conflict’s history and, as I will show, they provide a varied range of individual perspectives on the history of the conflict. Thus the dominant status that the three discourses appear to have also has to be understood in light of the discrepancy between the scholarly debate on the conflict, textbook knowledge and teachers’ knowledge. For example, as I discussed in chapter five, the international law discourse may be subordinate to and/or framed by the Oslo discourse, the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land and nation-peoples. Pointing to a concrete example of how teachers, texts and discourse interact, one of the teachers in the group-interview I held who taught on the conflict from a political geographical perspective also appeared to simultaneously adhere to established “truths” in one or more of the discourses discussed. Keeping in mind the above, then, the main purpose

of this chapter will be to examine the teacher statements on the conflict with a view to identifying which discourses they appear to adhere to on the basis of the topics and themes they select and the discourses they produce. This will provide a further clue to answering the question what is the established (hegemonic) framework for understanding and explaining the history of the conflict in History school textbooks and teacher statements.

But before doing so, a few comments on the kind of teaching aids the teacher interview respondents use.

### Textbooks and other resources teachers employ

Generally speaking all of my teacher respondents have used one or more of the History school textbooks I have examined. The one most frequently used has been *Levande historia* published by Gleerups and the *SO* series of textbooks published by Bonniers. In addition to these, teachers have used textbooks by the same publishers on the subjects of *Religion* and *Geography*. Having only briefly examined some of the content in the *Religion* textbooks, I have come to notice an overlap between Religion and History school textbooks between the topics and themes discussed in relation to the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict. To briefly illustrate, the 1997 edition of *Religion och liv 9* discusses the period between 70 CE and 135 CE as a point of departure for the topic-area of Jewish history.<sup>1291</sup> In the same textbook, topics and themes such as the Jewish people's "violent counter-attack and the expulsion of all Roman soldiers" in 60 CE – alluding to the Masada uprising - the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and "the 2000 year exile" in 135 CE with a "smaller number of Jews remaining in Palestine" all appear together.<sup>1292</sup> The same textbook also combines the historical moment

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<sup>1291</sup> Berg, L. Husén, L. (1997), *Religion och liv 9*, Lärobok, Natur & Kultur, pp. 250-253. In this edition it is mentioned that "thousands of Jews were imprisoned in Rome" in 70 CE while the "2000 year diaspora had begun" in 135 CE.

<sup>1292</sup> Ibid. Compare a recent Wikipedia presentation of the period from 135 CE and the Bar-Kokhba revolt, "Revoltan ledde till att den sista sammanhängande bosättningen i den romerska provinsen Judéen förintades och att *den största delen av den kvarvarande judiska befolkningen fördrevs från det "heliga landet"*. *Judarna levde hädanefter i "diasporan" ända fram till nutiden, det vill säga till 1948 då staten Israel grundades.*" The key phrase I have marked in italics is that "the largest part of the remaining Jewish population were expelled from the "Holy Land". The Jews lived from

of the state of Israel becoming “an independent state”<sup>1293</sup> and the biblical-historical claim that the “kingdom of David had been re-established.”<sup>1294</sup> In the last sentence of a section entitled “the Diaspora”<sup>1295</sup> in the 2003 edition of *SOS Religion* we learn that “between 70 AD and 1948 the Jews did not have a *land of their own* where they could live.”<sup>1296</sup> It is claimed too that the creation of the *Diaspora* is “a decisive event in *Jewish history*”.<sup>1297</sup> (my italics) Prior to this we learn that “during different periods ever since the Jewish people have existed they have lived in the land today called Israel.”<sup>1298</sup> In an earlier section in the same textbook we learn of the reign and grandeur of King David’s Israel with a geographical map provided depicting the kingdom from “1000 to 961 BCE”.<sup>1299</sup> Preceding this too we learn of the story of the Exodus from Egypt and the return to Canaan of the Israelites by Joshua. As I have already noted in my examination of the History school textbooks, the biblical-historical and national-ideological topics and themes referred to in the Religion textbooks appear in some of the introductory sections of the History school textbooks. Lastly, teachers have also relied on single school book publications which have dealt with the history of the conflict, the most recent one of which, published in 2007, has provided new information on the conflict’s history.<sup>1300</sup> Teachers have also used articles from various Swedish newspapers, the most popular among

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here on in *Diaspora* up until the present day, that is until 1948 when the state of Israel was established.”

<sup>1293</sup> The references to “the Jewish people” and their 2000 year exile underpin the narrative, however. For example, under the heading of “A Jewish State” it states that on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1948 Israel became an independent state. The new flag was adorned with a Star of David. *The Kingdom of David had been re-established.*” (my italics) In chapter three of the textbook entitled “Israel – Jewish State” a quotation is provided by a “young Jew” in Israel around the June 67 war who explains how “the conquering of a city [such as Jerusalem could] arouse such strong emotions”. Ibid, p. 252

<sup>1294</sup> Ibid

<sup>1295</sup> Berlin, I, Ring, B, (2003), *SOS Religion*, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, p. 177

<sup>1296</sup> Ibid, “mellan åren 70 och 1948 hade judarna inte något land som var deras eget där de kunde bo”

<sup>1297</sup> Ibid

<sup>1298</sup> Ibid “Så länge det judiska folket funnits till har det under olika perioder bott i det land som idag kallas för Israel.”

<sup>1299</sup> Ibid, p. 160

<sup>1300</sup> For example, John King’s “Israel and Palestine” (2007) from Gleerups as well as *Konflikterna i mellanöstern*, Gleerups *Mellanöstern idag*



these being *Dagensnyheter* or DN, *Aftonbladet*, *Svenska dagbladet* and *Göteborgsposten* or GP. Nearly half of the teachers have emphasised the importance of using information from Internet sites such as [www.sakerhetspolitik.se](http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se), the Swedish Foreign Office's homepage as well as "urikespolitiska institutet" and Wikipedia. The advantages of being able to stream news items from the internet has been emphasised too enabling one teacher to bring events such as the December 2008 incursion into Gaza into the classroom setting. I will return to the teachers' responses to media representations of the conflict in the analysis below.

To assist me in my analysis of the interview transcriptions, I will proceed from the following questions based on my general research questions:

- 1) What particular subject-matter is taught by the teachers?
- 2) Which topics and themes are emphasised by the teachers?
- 3) What are teachers' own perspectives on the history of the conflict?
- 4) How do teachers respond to portions of the scientific debate?
- 5) What kind of knowledge and/or assumptions do they appear to proceed from?
- 6) What is the teachers' discourse on the conflict?

## Section 6.0 Reconstructing “Jewish History”

The term “Jewish History” is employed by some of the teachers to describe a particular subject area within the subject-matter block of Religion, History and Social Science. The topics and themes which provide information on “Jewish History” are also found in the Religion and History textbooks and appear in the introductory sections of the chapters on the conflict. The conflict’s history is even addressed in some of the Religion textbooks I have examined. In the following interview analysis and chapter I will connect the term “Jewish History” to its authoritative function: as a broad, established corpus of official educational knowledge on the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict serving as a point of departure for teaching on the conflict. “Jewish History” draws on the discourses I identified in chapters four and five and constitutes textbook content. It also appears to influence in part the teachers’ own selection of topics and themes and the individual emphases they make. For example, alluded to or emphasised throughout the interviews in particular is the notion of “equal” claim to the land. ‘Equal’ claim appears to draw upon established discourses such as “the post-Westphalian division of the world into sovereign states [and] the principle of ethnic self-determination”<sup>1301</sup> as well as religious and moral right (e.g. the right to a land of one’s own following millennia of persecution). As I will later illustrate, the notion of “equal” claim to the land functions as a nodal point which fixes “the content of a range of floating signifiers by articulating them within a chain of equivalence.”<sup>1302</sup> In other words, the notion of “equal” claim to the land provides a common-sense point of departure

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<sup>1301</sup> In an article by Oren Yiftachel on ethnocracy and the state of Israel he discusses among other things the fusing of “two principles of political order: the post-Westphalian division of the world into sovereign states, and the principle of ethnic self-determination.” Within such a framework both Israelis and Palestinians possess a right to a national homeland. Such a right is also recognised in international law. For my purposes, arguably such elements may undergird the notion of ‘right’ apparent in the textbooks and teacher statements. Article by Oren Yiftachel entitled ‘Ethnocracy’: The Politics of Judaizing, *Constellations*, Volume 6, No 3, 1999

Israel/Palestine

<sup>1302</sup> Torfing, J, (2003) *New Theories of Discourse*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, p. 303

linking knowledge claims. These are expressed in a “patchwork of disparate events and traditional elements”<sup>1303</sup> or topics and themes, discourses and so on, on the history of the conflict in the textbooks and teachers’ statements. One such event is the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple in 70 CE which is presented by the teachers as a significant event in the subject-area of “Jewish History”.<sup>1304</sup> Note that in chapter five how I connected the notion of ‘equal’ claim to the Oslo discourse and discourses discussed above which I argued found their expression in the “equal” claim discourse (understood as an order of discourse).

In the following sub-section I will examine which topics and themes the teachers select and emphasise as a point of departure for teaching on the history of the conflict.

### Teachers’ topical and thematic selection

In my first interview the teacher refers to the creation of the Jewish *Diaspora* in 70 CE and the struggle at Masada, an event emphasised in Zionist historiography. The teacher states first of all that “in the first century AD *they* [the Jews] were driven out by the Romans” and adds that “the population are driven out so you could say *they haven’t left there of their own free will.*”<sup>1305</sup> (my italics) The dispersal or expulsion takes place we are told “around the time of the birth of Jesus ... when they [the Jewish population] lost the battle at Masada.”<sup>1306</sup> Via the subjects of Religion and

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<sup>1303</sup> Sand, (2009), p. 130

<sup>1304</sup> In his book, Sand discusses at length how this event has been reconstructed in both ancient Roman historical accounts, framed in biblical tracts and more recently in national-ideological narratives around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>1305</sup> T107, ” på 100 talet de körs ju ut av romarna, den befolkningen körs ut, så de har ju inte lämnat det frivilligt kan man säga.” Interestingly, there is disagreement among scholars and laypersons on the matter of whether Jewish communities left of their own free-will and indeed whether this occurred en masse and whether it occurred during the allotted period. Note that the teacher links the battle at Masada and 70 CE in the same dispersion story.

<sup>1306</sup> ”där kring strax efter kristusfödelset ... när de förlorade på Masad”; According to Zerubavel in Whitelam the Masada event is considered a “relatively obscure incident in the past [which is] ignored in the Talmud and medieval Jewish literature” but has powerful significance as part of Israeli national-heroic discourse wherein, according to Dan Porat, lecturer in education at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, the Masada event is invoked to create “a link between the heroes of Masada and modern Israelis” but adds that it is the “Pharisaic sect” who modern Jews are often identified with and not the “religious doctrine” of

History, some of the teachers in the group I interviewed proceed from the Roman period when they teach on the conflict but generally within the Social Science block. One teacher talks about how “[...] Judaism and Christianity” were studied quite recently “with eighth graders” during Religion periods and “Jewish history and modern history [were discussed] quite a lot too”. The purpose of this was “to explain the problem even today that *they [the Jewish people] were to regain a country and that there were new people there ...*”<sup>1307</sup> When in a follow-up question I ask what is meant by regaining a country, the teacher in question reacts nervously and there are blushes and laughter from the rest of the group. This possibly indicates awareness of some controversy around the topic within the group, which, incidentally was expressed later on. It is argued nevertheless that the topic is relevant “since it is the introduction [to] *the Jews and Jewish history*”.<sup>1308</sup> Here we may note a connection being established between the ancient past, biblical myth and the modern present under the heading of Jewish history. Another teacher in the group combines the latter perspective with “political geographical causes, which are the background to conflicts”.<sup>1309</sup> The teacher argues, for example, that “what is interesting to look at when you look at Jewish history is how it has evolved *during that period*” meaning the Roman period during which “*they were expelled by the Romans*”. The teacher then urges the rest of the group to “look at how *they* become [...] with the rise of *the Zionist state after the Second World War*” and the treatment of the Palestinians (my italics). Thus, as indicated by the use of the impersonal pronoun, *they*, the teacher appears to inadvertently connect a biblical-

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“Sicarii [at Masada]”; Dan Porat, chapter entitled “Reconstructing the Past, Constructing the Future in Israeli Textbooks” in Crawford, K, Foster, S, (2006) *What Shall We Tell the Children?: International Perspectives on School History Textbooks*, Information Age Publishing, Greenwich, Connecticut, pp. 200-201; Dan Porat, chapter entitled “Reconstructing the Past, Constructing the Future in Israeli Textbooks” in Crawford, K, Foster, S, (2006), pp. 200-201

<sup>1307</sup> “quite recently studied/read Judaism and Christianity with my eighth graders and we were discussing Jewish history quite a lot and also modern history I discussed; and it was Judaism we discussed and I really tried to explain the problem even today that they were to regain a country and that there were “*nya dār*” ... and that was in the subject of Religion I managed to bring in”

<sup>1308</sup> Ibid

<sup>1309</sup> Israeli scholar, Oren Yiftachel cited in this dissertation, has also written on the political geography of Israel/Palestine in his work.

historical past to the present via the assumption of a metahistorical Jewish people. This is indicated further, for example, when the same teacher states that “*they* have had opinions their *entire history* about how they ought to be treated *in accordance with their own teachings.*” (my italics) Thus, it is probably understood that the Jews or Jewish people of the first and second centuries CE are the same Jews or Jewish people of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

In my fifth interview I am informed that “the causes of the conflict” have their starting point in Roman Times up until the contemporary period.<sup>1310</sup> It is explained to me that we have to go “a bit further back”<sup>1311</sup> in history to discuss “*Israel’s* coming into being” and “why [the state] was established”. One of the contemporary causes of the conflict, we learn, is “the fact that *the people who live there now [the Palestinians] were driven away* so that the Jews could live there.” This allusion to the expulsion of the Palestinians or Palestine Arabs in the contemporary period is then connected to a similar experience from the ancient past. For example, it is explained that “*they* [the Jews] were driven out by the Romans 2000 years ago” and following this “naturally of course *new people move in* who [say that] “*it is empty, we can live here*”.(my italics). This causal explanation for Israel’s coming into being in 1948 also appears to rest upon the assumption of a metahistorically present people. Implicitly referring to the notion of “equal” claim to the land, the lesson to be learnt from the above is that the Jews “have experienced”

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<sup>1310</sup> T509, “since I have a burning interest in History and have read a great deal I usually say that the Jews were driven out 2000 years ago, for example, and then naturally of course new people move in who “it is empty, we can live here”. And so their descendants who came later feel that this is their land and we have lived here for many generations. In that sense, they are right. At the same time, I can understand those who say that the Jews feel that it is their land since it is a long way back in history and one has felt that religion and the land, ... or Palestine ... has a lot to do with one another in the Jewish religion. They have come to this land and felt that this is their land, we shall live here. So both sides are right on that point.”

<sup>1311</sup> T507, “But we have even gone further back to understand why did other Jews suddenly live here; that they were driven out by the Romans 2000 years ago and have experienced such things. And I also try to point out that there are things that support the notion that both sides are right and that both sides are wrong.”

expulsion like the Palestinians and more importantly “that *both sides are right and that both sides are wrong*”.<sup>1312</sup>

In the sixth interview I learn that the history of the conflict is brought “up in so many different [subject] areas.” As the following chronology provided by the teacher indicates, these areas crossover the subjects of History and Religion. For example, from “*the Roman period and [...] the Diaspora [or] exiling of the Jews, the fall of Jerusalem*” and “*the Second World War, Hitler and the establishment of the state of Israel*”. Rounding off this chronology is the issue of how the “Palestinians are displaced and become very angry.” (my italics) In this listing of important events we see an even more pronounced chronology covering the biblical-historical past to the modern present such as “the fall of the Second Temple in 70 CE”<sup>1313</sup>, the exile myth and/or *Diaspora* and the period of World War Two. Alluding to the Nazi holocaust as another possible starting-point for teaching on the history of the conflict, the teacher states that “you very easily end up on this topic [the Israel/Palestine conflict]” when it comes to the issue of “the persecution of Jews [and] when you discuss Muslims and the Arab world in the subject of Religion”. My seventh teacher interviewee informs me that the conflict is only brought up once every three years in both the eighth and ninth grades and emphasis is placed more on “the period before the First World War, ...the interwar years, ...the seeds of Nazism [and] the outbreak of World War II.” Echoing some of the topics and themes expressed by the other teachers, the teacher states that “*the Israelis feel they have a right to the territory because they were forced into Diaspora and were driven out and spread out all over the world.*” Underlying this statement is the notion of ‘equal’ claim to the land again, biblical-history and the assumption that the

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<sup>1312</sup> “I have tried to discuss why, what can the causes of this conflict be, the major conflict. And then of course we have discussed what has just happened when Israel has entered the Gaza Strip and I have also tried to discuss a bit further back, what are the causes of the conflict. And so we have discussed Israel’s coming in to being, why it was established and that the people who lived there were driven away so that the Jews could live there. But we have even gone further back to understand why did other Jews suddenly live here; that they were driven out by the Romans 2000 years ago and have experienced such things. And I also try to point out that there are things that support the notion that both sides are right and that both sides are wrong. And I try to be objective in that way.”

<sup>1313</sup> Sand, p. 129

Israelis are the same Jewish people both past and present. The teacher then opines that “I perceive this as a big part of *the Jewish culture, tradition, [and] Jewish unity* around the world”. Finally, alluding to the themes of nationhood, national belonging and the theme of Messianism and/or return the teacher speaks on behalf of the Jewish people in the first person to explain how they have perceived their predicament throughout the ages. The Jews or Jewish people felt that “we do not have a *land of our own, once we had it and one day we will regain it.*” For my eighth teacher respondent Jewish history is taught via the subject of Religion and is provided as the backdrop to what is taught on the conflict. Approaching the history of the conflict from the perspective of “Jewish history [it is claimed] can provide a basis for understanding why the conflict emerged too.” Referring again to biblical myth, it is claimed that this understanding can be achieved by going back to the beginning and “*the people of Israel, the Promised Land*, which happened a very long time ago” and then on to “*the Romans [...] and the Diaspora*” and from there “you have a thematic thing.” The teacher in a sense goes further than the previous teachers by beginning with references to the Old Testament (e.g. the Promised Land etc). Added to this is reference to “*the post-war years [and] what happened after WWII*” when the murder of six million European Jews was discovered. Bringing in biblical themes again, the teacher also explains how “*the Jewish people [...] slowly but surely return*” to the land both prior to and following the Nazi holocaust.

Building upon the analysis in the previous section, in the following section I will focus on the most pivotal events on the history of the conflict present in the teachers’ statements. Just to recap, the previous analysis demonstrated the stronger presence of what I have identified thus far as the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land and the emergent notion of “equal” claim to the land. However, throughout the previous analysis and in both textbook analyses “ontological givens”<sup>1314</sup> are expressed concerning national-religious identity. Such givens are indicated in the textbooks and interviews by the continual tacit references to Arabs and Jews as separate and distinctive national-religious peoples metahistorically connected to the land. This

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<sup>1314</sup> Butler, (2009), p. 149

discourse is also discursively connected to the previous discourses discussed here and in previous chapters. In the following section I will refer to this as the discourse on people-nations and will examine how it interacts with and informs pivotal historical events on the history of the conflict.

## Section 6.1 The Discourse on People-Nations and Pivotal Events

Some of the teacher respondents proceed from events and themes central to European history. For example, the Nazi holocaust and anti-Semitism are treated by some of the teachers as natural starting-points or pedagogically sound approaches to discussing the history of the post-war years in general and the Israel/Palestine conflict in particular. As one teacher argues, “the Holocaust is something *that most of us know about* and from a *pedagogical point of view* it is, perhaps, well argued, *to begin there.*”<sup>1315</sup> Similar sentiments are expressed by members of the teacher group too. I will explore how the topics and themes of the Nazi holocaust and anti-Semitism emerge in the interviews in the sub-section below as well as other topics and themes which become “naturally” connected to these.

### The Nazi holocaust, anti-Semitism and other topics and themes

Like the topics and themes discussed above, the Nazi holocaust and anti-Semitism possess a similar function as framing topics and themes on the history of the conflict. In my sixth interview the topics and themes of the Nazi holocaust and collective guilt are discussed as factors which help us to understand the reasons for the establishment of the state of Israel. The teacher states that “basically [people] felt bad because *we had treated the Jews so badly* and that was partly why the state of Israel was established.” The Nazi holocaust is mentioned in my second interview and incorporates some of the language connected to the biblical-national narratives discussed

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<sup>1315</sup> Interview with T408, “the Holocaust is something that most of us know about and it is from a pedagogical point of view, perhaps well argued, to begin there.”



previously. We learn that “the issue was about giving the Jews a country of their own”<sup>1316</sup> following the Holocaust. In response to a Swedish government lead campaign in 2008<sup>1317</sup> to improve teachers’ knowledge of the Holocaust, in critical tone some of the teachers in the group interviewed described it as “a kind of educational politics”. The campaign was perceived as being dictated from above: “this is what we have to do! [and] so we live under a kind of political control”. Despite this, it seemed apparent to most of the teachers in the group that the Nazi holocaust provided “a natural springboard” for teaching on the topic of the Israel/Palestine conflict. As one teacher put it, it is “something that just happens”. This natural connection to the conflict would also tie in with the post-war period during which the state of Israel is established not long after the discovery of the murder of six million European Jews. The topic of anti-Semitism is also discussed in the interviews, both in relation to the pre-war period and post-war period. My eighth interview respondent discusses the above period and draws on biblical-national themes following a question I ask on the historical reliability of the Moses tracts in the Old Testament. The teacher responds by saying that “We have the Holocaust: *that is a fact*. And there we have the British occupation of Palestine *before the Jews came back*.” A biblical-national construction of the Jewish people through the theme of return situated in the period of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century enables us thus to understand the historical event of the Nazi holocaust and by association the establishment of Israel. This is made more apparent in the following interview extract and is assisted by the assumption of two separate and equally distinctive peoples (Israelis and Palestinians).

... one can see a start during the Second World War and *the Holocaust there and that's when the return really gets going*. ... when *two peoples*, when more of *the Israeli people come into Palestine/Israel* and, according to my way

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<sup>1316</sup> T207 ”grejen var ju först att ge judarna ett eget land och grejen ju blir efter andravärlds kriget att kompensera för det man upptäckte hade hänt.”

<sup>1317</sup> In 2008 a survey was carried out by the Forum to assess school teachers’ knowledge on the Nazi holocaust. The apparently very poor results from the survey led one Forum spokesperson, Eskil Franck, to conclude that “my hypothesis is that there is far too little emphasis placed on 20<sup>th</sup> century history.” In *Skolvärlden 13*, september 4th 2008, p. 11

of seeing things, the British caused a lot of problems there. When they moved around and to a certain extent *oppressed the Israelis* in the beginning by setting up more stringent weapons laws *than they did for the Palestinians*.

I then ask the teacher whether the topic of Zionism is discussed at all during lessons and I am informed that it is discussed in connection with “a group of lectures [on] Judaism, *Jewish history*, on the Zionist movement” and so on. I also find out that the same class “also discuss anti-Semitism.” I then ask whether the period of the late 1800s is discussed in relation to the above. The teacher describes the period of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century as “*the beginning of the return*”. The return to Palestine or the Holy Land is also explained by the teacher in terms of the fact that “*the Jews did not have anywhere to go really*.” In my earliest interview the topic of anti-Semitism is presented as a framework for understanding the reaction to Zionism and the establishment of Israel in Palestine. To support this thesis it is claimed that “contact [...] made by the Nazis in the 1930s in *order to implant anti-Semitism in the Arabs*.” Other actors instrumental in fomenting anti-Semitism there were the Red Brigade who trained “those [Arabs] in the Palestinian camps *to become terrorists*.”<sup>1318</sup>

According to my eighth interview respondent anti-Israel sentiment in Sweden has probably grown in relation to the presence of Left-Wing activism and a “large group of people with an Islamic faith”. It is emphasised, however, that it “has pushed society not towards anti-Semitism but an anti-Israel climate a bit, where you often see people demonstrating [and] Left-wing groups [who are] very pro-Palestine.” While it is also stressed by the teacher that this need not “be wrong” it is feared that such protest may encourage the reception “sometimes [of] a very simplistic impression” of the conflict. The example the teacher provides is when one constructs an image of “*a big strong Israel against Palestine, which is in*

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<sup>1318</sup> T107 ”från nazisternas sida fanns det kontakt med araberna på 30-talet för att implantera antisemitism hos araberna. Och man kan se hos de här terroristorganisationerna i Europa (20-30 år sedan) ... det röda brigaderna...de är ju ner i de här palestinska lägren och utbildas som terrorister utav palestinierna och blir ju också antisemiter därnere.”

*part true*". The explanation the teacher provides for this partial truth is "Sweden's fear of *being anti-Muslim* [which has led to] people *taking the Palestinian side too*." The teacher also comments on the television and news media renditions of the conflict and concludes that "I don't think you can compare it to the 1930s but when it comes to the Israel/Palestine conflict it has become a bit like that." Criticism of biased news media coverage has been discussed by some of the other respondents too, especially in relation to the 2008 invasion of Gaza. In connection to the latter the teacher opines that "I didn't see that much on the Swedish news about the rockets launched into Israel but on the other hand I saw a lot on the invasion." A theme connected to anti-Semitism or anti-Israeli critique brought up in another interview is the theme of existential threat. For example, in my fifth interview I ask whether "the Six Day War/June 67 [...] or *al-Naqba*?" are discussed in lessons. It is explained to me that from 1948 onwards "Israel feels threatened" and that when Israel strikes first in June 1967 it is because the PLO had said it "wants to *destroy Israel*". This is then connected to contemporary issues concerning Iran who, it is argued, are also "interested in destroying Israel" and "*naturally [Israel] sees every little thing as a threat*." Corresponding to the textbooks, the theme of existential threat is also connected to the theme of security and in turn the historical reality of Jewish persecution and the destruction of European Jewry during WWII.

Another theme emerging in many of the interviews and textbooks is what I have previously referred to as the notion of "equal" claim to the land. As I have already argued, this notion or idea is also connected to the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land and the discourse on people-nations which find expression in the "equal" claim order of discourse. Note too that the "equal" claim order of discourse incorporates the previous discourses as well as the Oslo and international law discourses (the latter two are understood as established discourse beyond the texts examined). As I discussed in the introduction, the recurrent theme or notion of "equal" claim to the land runs right through the other discourses and functions as a kind of nodal point from which the topics and themes of the discourses identified appear to make sense. As I will later discuss too, the notion of "equal" claim to the land also functions alongside the exclusion of other perspectives and

their concomitant knowledge claims which would provide a different framework for understanding and explaining the historical causes of the conflict (more on this later).

### “Equal” claim to the land

The notion of “equal” claim to the land emerges at different times throughout the interviews. The first time it emerges is in connection with a discussion on the historical Jewish presence in Palestine. A theme discussed which is closely connected to the notion of “equal” claim to the land mentioned in the interviews too is the theme of broken promises. Employing a highly-charged national-socialist term, my first teacher respondent notes that “the [region of Palestine] was never, to use a German term, *judenfrei*.” What the teacher means by this is that the land “was never free from Jews. Jews lived there *the whole time*”<sup>1319</sup> and adds that Jews had lived in the country for the last “2000 years”. The teacher also argues that the ““new immigration” from the concentration camps” was not new and that “*They* [the Jews] had already begun to move in [to the land] during the 20s and 30s.”<sup>1320</sup> But then in the following statement the biblical connection to the land is emphasised. This is done when the teacher claims that “the Jews in Lithuania thought, “what the hell are we doing here? *The Romans have left a long time ago, we can return back.*” The teacher adds that “*the dream* then becomes to *recreate the Israeli state*”. The theme of “equal” claim to the land is also introduced within the above framework when the teacher remarks that “this is [only] one background, but the conflict is about the fact that *both parties have a right to this land*”.<sup>1321</sup> (my italics)

In the fifth interview the notion of “equal” claim to the land proceeds again from many of the topics and themes already discussed. The notion of “equal”

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<sup>1319</sup> T107 ”Det [området] var aldrig, för att ta en tysk term, *judenfrei*. Det var aldrig fritt från Judar. Judar bodde ju där hela tiden. Det var mosesiska trosbekännelser... under dessa 2000 år bodde ju här. Ibland förföljde, ibland hjälpte av den armeniska ... de skyddar ju judarna i Israel väldigt mycket ... under framförallt turkarnas regim. Som bor ju fortfarande kvar. Det är inte så att det är en ”nyinvandring” som folk ofta tror från koncentrationslägen.. de har redan börjat flytta in under 20-30 talet.”

<sup>1320</sup> T107

<sup>1321</sup> ”det här är en bakgrund men konflikten handlar ju om att i princip bägge har rätt till detta land”

claim to the land is also implied in the statement that “*both sides are right on that point.*” This time, however, Jewish/Israeli and Arab/Palestinian presence in the land appears to be discussed in relation to a later period in history, namely, the period of the conquest of Palestine when the “*new people [the Arabs] move in.*” However, it is also claimed that prior to the Arab presence the land is “empty”. Neither do we learn of a new exile from Palestine following the Arab conquest. Acknowledging the Palestine Arab claim to the land, first of all, the teacher argues that “their descendants who came later *feel that this is their land* [since they] have lived here for many generations” and “in that sense, *they are right.*” Then acknowledging the right of the Jewish/Israeli people to the land the teacher adds that: “I can understand people who say that the Jews feel that it is their land since they go back *a long way in history* and it is felt that *religion and the land, ... or Palestine ...* are connected to one another *in the Jewish religion.*” It is also acknowledged that the fact that both parties allegedly share an “equal” claim to the land can cause problems, especially when “both sides claim that the other *does not have a right* to be there.” In my seventh interview the theme of “equal” claim to the land is supported by the assertion that “a long time [had] passed” and then “*they [the Jewish people] were able to return.*” However, as they began to return “*there were people already living there.*” Again the unbroken connection to the land of a metahistorical Jewish people-nation and the later connection of a distinctive Arab-Palestinian people to the land are the driving assumptions here. The latter is discussed when we learn that “*the Palestinians claim [that] they have a right to the territory* because they [had] lived [...] there for 1500 years” up until the end of the Second World War. The teacher also mentions the role of the British in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and how they carved up the territory (a point also emphasized in my first interview). My seventh interview respondent brings in the theme of “equal” claim to the land when arguing that the conflict is “*incredibly complex [because] when it comes to Jerusalem [and when] you discuss Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan Heights you [also] have to mention Jerusalem.*” This is due to the fact that “Christians, Muslims and Jews *have a strong religious historical connection there.*” The theme of “equal” claim to the land, then, draws on biblical-historical claims and national ideology through the presence of a metahistorical and distinctive Jewish people and

their Arab-Palestinian opposite in the land. The description of the land as “empty” in lieu of the arrival of the Arab (Canaanite) Palestinians, the alleged natural descendants of modern Palestinians, emphasizes the point all the more and at the same time echoes the Zionist myth on a land without a people.

### Who Are the Jewish People/the Israelis and who are the Arabs/Palestinians?

To bring into sharper focus some of the underlying assumptions which either establish or destabilise the existence of the respective “peoples” discussed above, in my fourth interview doubt is cast on the authenticity of the Palestinians as a national people. Referring to the textbooks, the teacher claims that “another mistake in the books” is made when “they call them Palestinians but really at that time *there were no Palestinians*, they didn't see themselves as Palestinians but as Arabs.” Palestinian national identity, it is claimed, emerged “perhaps during the 1950s with Arab nationalism, pan Arabism and so on and other nationalist tendencies.” Another comment on Palestinian national identity is made in my first interview. Following a question on whether the situation for the Palestinians in the occupied territories is taught or discussed during lessons the teacher says that “well, first of all, who are these people really: *they are very closely related to the Jews!*” To support this claim the teacher relies on genetic science and the claim of a “90 percent hereditary connection [between Jews and Arabs]”. Building on the latter claim the teacher adds that between “European Jews and American Jews there is also a 90 percent [genetic] connection.”<sup>1322</sup> The conclusion the teacher draws from this is the possibility “that *these Arabs once upon a time were Jews* in large part, that is, *the regular, peasant population who stayed behind* and who *converted to Islam*”.<sup>1323</sup> The presence

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<sup>1322</sup> ”ja, ... för det första, vad är det för folk? De är ju väldigt nära släkt med judarna. Det är 90 procent av arvsanlagen som stämmer och det är ganska intressant att se att mellan europeiska judar och amerikanska judar är överensstämmelsen också 90 procent.”

<sup>1323</sup> ”Och det här kastar ju lite misstanke om att de här Araberna till stor del en gång i tiden har varit judar, alltså det vanliga, fattig befolkningen som stannade kvar, och som övergår till Islam i hög grad. Det var ekonomisk helt enkelt nödvändigt. Därför att araberna beskattade alla andra religioner. Det var väldigt många som blev muslimer efter det... Och då kan undra är de här palestinierna före detta Israeler till stor del, uppblandade med araberna naturligtvis?”

of an original homogenous and distinctive Jewish people in Palestine is apparently taken-for-granted before the Arabs arrived. Allusion is made to a (national) remnant that stayed behind despite the fact that this might contradict the story of the exile or dispersal of the Jewish people. The assertion of a remnant peasant population and its connection to the Palestinians echoes a claim made by “the founding fathers of Zionism, Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi and Ben-Gurion, [who] initially raised the idea of assimilation of the Palestinian peasants and turning them into Jews.”<sup>1324</sup> This was inspired by the “notion that the Palestinian peasants might be the descendants of the ancient Israelites who had lived during the period of the second Temple, beginning around the fifth century BC, and who (according to Ben-Tzvi and Ben-Gurion) had survived the Romans’ ‘destruction of the country and had remained in Palestine.’”<sup>1325</sup> We see here, then, the discourse on connection to the land being supported by genetic science to support the existence of two distinctive, separate biblical/national peoples. Analyses of the “political unconscious”<sup>1326</sup> of scientific claims such as the above have been carried out previously. A study of Israeli population surveys in the 1950s held by Nurit Kirsh examines the “rhetoric employed by Israeli geneticists and medical doctors”<sup>1327</sup> who employed “inappropriate nationalistic terms.”<sup>1328</sup> For example, Kirsh points to various anachronisms in the language of survey results such as “the people of Israel in 1200

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<sup>1324</sup> Masalha, (2007), p. 36

<sup>1325</sup> Ibid

<sup>1326</sup> For example in Harding, (2007), the author states that “Almost five decades of postpositivist science and technology studies in the North, including feminist accounts, have permanently undermined central assumptions of conventional philosophies of science. One of their most important findings is that it is impossible in principle, not just difficult in practice, to produce “pure sciences,” completely devoid of any social and cultural values, interests, or other such features. This realization has enabled us to think about the kinds of economic, social, cultural, and political assumptions and ideals that have helped to shape the sorts of sciences originating in the Global North. We can explore the political unconscious of modern Northern sciences.” Harding, S, (2007) *Science and Social Inequality: Feminist and Postcolonial Issues*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, p. 113

<sup>1327</sup> Population Genetics in Israel in the 1950s: The Unconscious Internalization of Ideology Author(s): Nurit Kirsh Source: *Isis*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 631-655 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society Accessed: 04/12/2009 04:44, p. 650

<sup>1328</sup> Ibid

B.C.E” and “the wandering of the nation [...] being dispersed in distant diasporas for almost a hundred generations”<sup>1329</sup>. She adds too that the rhetoric of national and religious connection reproduced the notion of “a single entity”<sup>1330</sup> through “an assumption of noninterrupted genealogical ties among the Jews”<sup>1331</sup> over the millennia.

In my eighth and final interview similar assumptions are echoed to describe the people of Israel who “are *one of the most distinctive of peoples* there are, in that they are *one people with the same religion, the same culture [...] irrespective of where they live in the world really.*” Furthermore, the Israeli people’s distinctiveness irrespective of location is also connected to their distinctiveness irrespective of historical epoch. It is argued that “for the Israelis it is so easy to go to *the Old Testament, The book of Moses*, to show that *we were promised the land back then*”. The ethnic distinctiveness and metahistorical presence in the land of the people of Israel is then contrasted with the Palestinians. For the Palestinians it is argued that it is “*more difficult*” to make a similar claim despite the fact that they “have lived there *the whole time too.*” According to the teacher the reason for this difficulty is that the Palestinians allegedly do not share “the same *sense of belonging/unity* in a way” as the people of Israel do. One of the themes undergirding the above claims is the notion of “equal” claim to the land because it is understood that both Israelis and Palestinians have been equally present in the land the whole time. However, it is also understood that the people of Israel possess a greater connection to the land thanks to their distinctiveness, unity and their biblical-historical origins in Jerusalem and further back in time.

In the following section I will discuss some of the teachers’ critical reflections and responses to the scientific debate on the conflict’s history.

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<sup>1329</sup> Kirsh, p. 650

<sup>1330</sup> Ibid

<sup>1331</sup> Ibid



## Section 6.2 Teachers' Critical Reflections and the Scientific Debate

Throughout the interviews the teachers have critically reflected on various different topics relating to how the history of the conflict is presented in the textbooks as well as the nature of approaches to teaching on the conflict and so on. Also, halfway through the interviews the teachers responded to portions of the scientific debate on the conflict. I will discuss some of these reflections and responses now below.

### Critical Reflections

In my second interview the teacher respondent continually critiques the content presented in the textbooks. First of all, a chronological error in *Levande historia 9* is mentioned which describes the “Palestinians ruled by Britain at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”. The teacher claims that “even this is incorrect” and adds that “I would say that [Palestine was ruled by Britain] after the First World War”.<sup>1332</sup> In response to a question on whether the occupation is mentioned in the textbook, the teacher reflects that “if you really want to be pro-Palestinian” you could argue that “the Israeli version has been adopted”. This is confirmed by the teacher with reference to one of the textbook chapter excerpts which states that “The [Palestinians] were to return following the [1948] war. But the Israelis had occupied their houses and lands and explained that *Israel was forced to receive 500 000 Jews forced to flee from Arab countries.*”<sup>1333</sup> While there is an international law

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<sup>1332</sup> “arabstaterna hade kämpat mot Tyskland under andravärldskriget och hade fått löfte om en egen stat, och ... sedan det betyder till exempel att Balfourdeklarationen är inte här... (igen) palestinierna styrdes i början av 1900-talet av Storbritannien ... det är *till och med fel, jag skulle säga att det var efter första världskriget* ... man kunde gått med att säga att palestinierna ... under turkisk, det ottomanska imperiet fram till första världskriget.”

<sup>1333</sup> “Om man vill verkligen vara propalestinier ... man har köpt den israeliska versionen så att säga. Det är snarare så att okupationen om man så vill det ... Det står ju här att (han citerar) den stat som enligt FN planerna skulle vara den palestinska ... det ockuperar Israel, Egypten och Jordanien det står ju i den gamla boken (han bläddrar i den nya boken) Precis samma mening!” ”Meningen var att de [palestinierna] skulle komma tillbaka efter kriget. Men israelerna hade ockuperat deras hus och mark och *förklarade att Israel hade varit tvunget att ta emot 500 000 judar som tvingats fly från arabiska länder.* Den stat som enligt

tone, it is this mitigating circumstance which indicates embracement of the Israeli version of events. The teacher also reflects on the general thematic points of departure built into the textbooks. The teacher argues that they “follow Western tradition” and that “traditionally there are two ways of presenting [the conflict as] either a struggle over land or a struggle between two different religions”. Following this the teacher points to a picture in one of the textbooks of a Rabbi holding the Torah who says “to an Arab, God has given us this land while the [Arab] says that we have lived here *since you left.*”<sup>1334</sup> (my italics) Despite this the teacher adds that the History textbooks have not bought the “worst kind of Zionist propaganda either have they [such as] it was a desert when we came?”<sup>1335</sup> The teacher then concludes that “if we are to follow the rule that Swedish teaching aids should be objective, at least factual and impartial, we ought to bring these points up and discuss them”. Pointing to the problem of time constraints, the teacher points out that to successfully address the above would “take up a lot of space you see!”<sup>1336</sup>

During the group interview a number of teachers raised critical voices about issues directly or indirectly connected to the conflict’s history. As touched upon previously, the perspective of political geography is embraced by one of the teachers in the group. The teacher argues that it helps you to look at “the geopolitical causes” of the conflict connected to “the rise of the Zionist

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delningsplanen skulle vara de palestinska arabernas var nu *ockuperad av Israel, Egypten och Jordanien.*” Hildingson, Caj, Hildingson, Lars (2003) *Levande Historia elevbok 9*,

Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, tredje tryckning, Stockholm, pp. 546 - 551

<sup>1334</sup> “det finns ju liksom traditionellt sett två olika sätt att skildra det (konflikten menar han här), antingen är det en *kamp om land* eller *kamp mellan två olika religioner ... det finns ju här exempelvis bild på en man med toranrulle som säger till en arab, Gud har gett oss detta land medan den andra säger att vi har varit här sedan ni har lämnat.*”

<sup>1335</sup> ”historia böckerna inte har köpt den historiska varianten heller av den värsta sionist propagandan heller va.... *Det var öken tills vi kom, så står det inte va*”

<sup>1336</sup> “och det finns ju liksom traditionellt sett två olika sätt att skildra det (konflikten menar han här), antingen är det en *kamp om land* eller *kamp mellan två olika religioner ... det finns ju här exempelvis bild på en man med toranrulle som säger till en arab, Gud har gett oss detta land medan den andra säger att vi har varit här sedan ni har lämnat. Om vi har den där regeln om att svenska läromedel ska vara objektiva, åtminstone sakliga och opartiska, så får man ta upp de där aspekterna och kommenterar de...men det tar ju det en massa utrymme va? Man kan ju ta bort...*”

state after the Second World War, between 47 and 48". In addition, it enables you to ask how they, the Jews who established the state of Israel, "deal with the problem of different cultures [and how] they view different religions". This question is asked in relation to past historical atrocities committed against Jews and how Israel treats the Palestinians from 1948 onwards. Thus "from a humanitarian perspective" it is pondered "what happens when one is in power?"<sup>1337</sup> The issue of power is also connected to Zionism because, as the teacher argues, when you "discuss power structural issues then of course naturally you have to discuss Zionism". The teacher goes on to discuss the topic of "Christian values" in relation to how Islam is presented "as some malign party in this context".<sup>1338</sup> Echoing the comments of the teacher above, other critical commentary in the group revolves around the way in which pictures in the textbooks portray different peoples or groups (e.g. Arabs and Jews). Another teacher in the group suggests that

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<sup>1337</sup> " ... of class you have but when you look at political geography, where are the conflicts what are the political geographical causes that are the background to the conflicts, or the geopolitical causes, what is interesting to look at when you look at history is Jewish history, how it has evolved during that period, that they were expelled by the Romans, that they ended up in ghettos (ghetto verksamheten) throughout the whole of Europe and yet anyway they've had in some cases quite an enormous significant influence and effect on form state development. Economic power in some places, of course. And then how they are used as a punching bag when necessary and then you look at how they become when they find themselves in this situation with the rise of the Zionist state after the Second World War, between 47 and 48. How do they deal with the problem of different cultures? How do they view different religions? They had opinions their entire history about how they ought to be treated in accordance with their own teachings. Do they treat the Palestinians in the way they would like to be treated? And that aspect may be interesting to look at. From a humanitarian perspective what happens when one is in power? And this doesn't only have to be about the Israel/Palestine conflict. You can apply this to different places in the world. What happens when you are in a position of power?"

<sup>1338</sup> " ... yes if you are going to discuss power structural issues then of course you have to discuss Zionism naturally. Because it is there that the Zionist state's - how should I put it - it is there that they have a political opportunity to influence the outcome of gaining a state. That is why you have to look at what it is that drives them to do what they do for this. And it's interesting to look at which standpoint one should take or standpoints on the basis of Christian values if one wants to look at how the role of Religion is played out in this case. Often, Martin discussed the issue of pictures/images, often there is material in the form of pictures, probably not consciously but who knows, Islam is often painted as some malign party in this context. And they do not always follow the rules of the game either that have always existed. They were there already and it's their territory that has been taken. So how can one really condemn one side or the other on the basis of historical causes? It is very difficult."

sometimes one “had the feeling” that the textbooks often urged you to “feel sorry for the Jews”.

In my fourth interview the teacher directs a lot of criticism at the political correctness of the History school textbooks and even news media representations of the conflict and remarks that the “books are always looking for compromises: they are far too correct.” The teacher proposes that the textbooks encourage more of a debate or discussion to enable pupils to take a position. As already discussed above, the same teacher also discussed how Palestinian national identity is presented in the textbooks (see above). One of the most significant critical reflections expressed by the teacher, however, concerns the underlying tradition framing the History school textbooks. I then offer a brief description of how I perceive the organisation of textbook chapters and the topics and themes selected within them<sup>1339</sup>. The teacher responds to this by saying that “one is influenced [by this] isn’t one...”. After a brief pause the teacher adds that “I think that it is connected to quite *old customs in Jewish history* that are studied together with *Christian education*. I have a book entitled *Palestine during the time of Jesus* from the 60s [and] that entire history is told there but ... it’s about Jesus. But it’s the history of the Jews of course. It talks about 60 AD when the Romans come ... *It is a powerful tradition to provide a certain orientation of Jewish history, that is already there.*” The teacher ends by saying that “on the other hand, *there is nothing on Islam’s or Arab history.*” Critically, then, the teacher appears aware of a particular tradition underlying the textbook narratives and also notes the absence of Islamic or Arab history.<sup>1340</sup> Focusing on more contemporary topics linked to the conflict, the above discussion appears to spur the teacher on to critically reflect on the way in which Hamas and the PLO are represented in the news media and elsewhere. The

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<sup>1339</sup> “the Roman incursion of Jerusalem, that one calls Zion, and the Jewish protest against that and then one brings up the pogroms against the Jews in Russia and has to do with Communism’s crimes perhaps. And then one brings up Zionism a bit and then the Holocaust. And that is four paragraphs on Jewish historical suffering. *Then* one begins discussing the conflict.”

<sup>1340</sup> The bringing together of Christian and Jewish traditions has been described by some as the construction of a kind of Judeo-Christian tradition after World War II. At a time when, according to Sand, “sadly, [Europe] had not been dubbed Judeo-Christian.” Sand, (2009), p. 3

teacher reflects on the roles of the PLO and Hamas and how these groups have been labelled differently over the years for different reasons. Referring to terroristic acts during the 1970s carried out by the PLO, the teacher opines that “they are now accepted aren’t they? But *they began as terrorists, as a terrorist organisation*. And now the focus has been placed on Hamas [who now] *carry the terrorist label*. But that’s not really precise either, and the PLO [are] the good democratic powers [now], but *perhaps they are not really, so this image is characterised by a great deal of ignorance* because it is complicated.” The teacher challenges here many popular perceptions concerning the image of the current PA (Palestinian Authority) and Hamas while embracing other perceptions. For example, the teacher makes a distinction between the Hamas “who provide the [Palestinian] people with the *necessary means for life, with medical care*” and the Hamas “which *struggles militarily* towards their goals” and adds that “without knowledge of Islam you can never really understand how these dimensions interconnect.” It is interesting to note that the teacher employs the language of military struggle to describe Hamas’ actions; a language that could also have described the actions of the PLO in the 60s and 70s.

Remaining on the issue of how the Palestinians are represented in textbooks and the news media, in my fifth interview the teacher notes that the Palestinian position is seldom explained. To resolve this discrepancy the teacher discusses “it a lot [during lessons] because in this textbook and in the media it is often explained very well why *Israel is right*. And it is explained very well that *this is the old homeland of the Jews*. But I think they are very bad at explaining *the rights of the Palestinians*”. (my italics) One might detect here an underlying ambition to present a neutral or balanced overview of the conflict’s history<sup>1341</sup> and also a desire to move towards “a deeper analysis” beyond repeated facts, such as “this happened, that happened”. This is done in a number of ways by the teacher; either through giving lectures in order to fill in the gaps or through classroom discussions. The importance of a deeper analysis is stressed too since “many of [the pupils at the school] have relatives who come from [the region].” To enable this

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<sup>1341</sup> The ambition described here is also present among the other teachers interviewed.

deeper analysis the teacher avidly reads historical biographies by figures connected to the conflict's history (e.g. Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat) and prefers "historical idealism [to] historical materialism" as an approach to understanding the history of the conflict. In my seventh interview, critical light is shed on the period during which "Palestine became a British protectorate". Alluding to the Balfour Declaration and possibly the UN partition plan of 1947 too, the teacher describes in a critical tone how "in a meeting it is decided that *Israelis and Jews should be allowed to return* [and that] they should receive a piece of land". The teacher adds that "*the Arab world directly opposes this [...]* because they don't think it is a good decision." This is a "decisive stage of the conflict" for the teacher since the policy decisions made at that meeting would "of course" lead to "a conflict". This is because they, the Palestinians, "were not just going to give up." The teacher adds in conclusion that "irrespective of what has happened earlier, whether you look at *[the conflict] biblically or 100,000 years back in history, I think that the above [context] is an important one.*" In contrast to previous responses, my eighth interview respondent critically reflects on "the book of Moses [as] an historical document" in relation to the conflict's history. The teacher states that "I can see a problem there that it proceeds from a *Jewish perspective*" and that "one ought to see all of this as *religious documents*". The teacher adds too that "the earlier things *such as what happened during the Diaspora [...]* should be treated a little more cautiously because [ ...] *the further back you go the harder it is to determine what is history or not.*" To guard against this problem, the teacher explains during lessons to the "pupils that this is *one view of what happened up to the present day*". The underlying theme informing Jewish history for the teacher is the memory of historical suffering and persecution Jews have had to endure and adds that "the closer we come to the present day *the more it becomes established that this happened historically too.*"<sup>1342</sup>

In my first interview the period of the 1930s as well as the UN partition plan of 1947 is discussed critically. Partition is referred to as a so-called "English solution" that is employed to force "together people *who do not belong*

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<sup>1342</sup> T809

together.” The consequences of such a policy in the contemporary period are referred to in relation to the situation in Iraq following the 2003 US invasion and occupation. The biblical-national narrative echoed by the teacher in previous sections is interrupted temporarily when it is claimed that “Palestine was not always borne in mind”<sup>1343</sup> as a destination for Zionist settlement.<sup>1344</sup> Finally, the December 2008 to January 2009 Gaza invasion triggered some critical reactions on the part of some of the teachers. For example, my fifth interview respondent notes similarities between the treatment of “the Palestinians in Gaza, which is the best example right now” and the “Nazi or fascist [ghettoisation] policy before the war broke out and what happened during the first *Intifada*, 1988 to 1995”. My seventh respondent also states unequivocally that in the wake of the Gaza invasion “one thing is obvious [...] that the balance of military power is completely unbalanced [...]” The teacher adds “Just look at what happened in Gaza recently [when] thousands of Palestinians died and were injured while you can only count ten or twenty Israelis.” The role of the media and on-line video streaming technology are discussed in this context too. The teacher explains that the events of December 2008 were brought live into the classroom and the imagery of “Palestinians [...] defenseless and basically exposed to the whim of the Israeli military” was witnessed by pupils and had a profound effect on them. In the following sub-section I will discuss some of the teachers’ responses to the scientific debate discussed in chapter one.

## Reactions to the 1948 debate

Given the teachers’ lack of familiarity with the debate on 1948 and secondary sources I have employed in this thesis, the responses below do not specifically deal with the topics of the 1948 debate *per se*. However, introduction of the debate into the interview dialogues triggered other

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<sup>1343</sup> ” det är ett led i nationalismen på 1800-talet. Det skapade ju Italien och Tyskland och judarna de bara ju tänker ju bara i Litauen, va sjutton sitter vi här för? Romarna har stuckit för länge sedan, vi kan väl sticka tillbaks. Och drömmen blir då att återskapa den israeliska staten. Tanken var ju inte Palestina alltid...”

<sup>1344</sup> This point is confirmed too in Herzl’s diaries. Herzl, T, (1941), *Theodor Herzl: Excerpts From His Diaries*, Jewish Pocket Library, Scopus Publishing Company, Inc, New York, p. 7 From an entry in Paris at Pentecost in 1895, Herzl in a letter to Mr Jacob Schiff he discusses an “experiment with the Jews in the Argentine” which produced “no results or bad ones.”

responses related to some of the critical reflections expressed in the previous sections. What the introduction of the scientific debate topics also revealed is a level of openness among the majority of my respondents to the idea of incorporating new perspectives into what they already teach on the conflict.

As I begin to cover the topic of village expulsions between 1947 and 49, my fourth teacher respondent interjects with the phrase “preparing terrain”, which suggested a familiarity with some of the research on the topic. Following my brief coverage of the ‘transfer’ concept, the speeches of David Ben-Gurion and the Peel Commission, I ask whether it would “be possible to bring in this kind of knowledge [into lessons], in a critical way, to enable discussion”? The teacher acknowledges the importance of bringing in other topics and themes into the curriculum. The teacher turns my attention to a conference on “the ‘Crimes of Communism’” attended by the teacher. The teacher then informs me that it “is *also* a bit of a taboo subject here in Sweden, since Swedish social democracy *was totally dominated by* [or] never really faced its Soviet [historical connections] seriously (laughs).”<sup>1345</sup> Thus, the teacher was open to a discussion on “the crimes of communism and [...] Israeli crimes against humanity” in lessons. In my group interview I tell the teachers a little bit about Israeli historian Benny Morris’ work. I note how he concluded that “the refugee problem was created by Israel [and how] he employs a term called ‘transfer’ which means the same thing as to expel.” I also refer to “evidence of massacres in villages that were destroyed [...] people who were murdered, women raped between the years of 1947 and 1949 [and, connecting to Pappe’s work, that] the Arab states did not attack before this occurred.” Then I ask the group whether they could “imagine bringing in this kind of perspective into” their teaching and whether they could “imagine researching or referencing the Israeli sources more as well as Palestinian sources?” Generally the response among teachers is positive. However, one teacher in the group points out that in “the cold light of day this is part of an entire history that we are to go through and to try to acquaint ourselves with ... [and it] *cannot be done time-wise.*” The teacher

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<sup>1345</sup> The teacher adds too that this “is a really big issue that is hardly touched on in school education.”



points out too that teaching on conflicts at the Lower Secondary level of education is “about providing an orientation on the subject”. The problem of time was also linked to other historical conflicts such as the Kosovo conflict. Responding more directly to the information I provide, another teacher in the group returns to the issue of “massacres ... [at] the end of the 1940s” adding that “I think that we only cover things more sweepingly perhaps [and] we don’t go into very many specific occurrences [...]”. Again it is explained to me that this is because “the major events” have to be covered in order “to provide the pupils with some form of overview.” Another teacher in the group adds that the “responsibility lies with the authors of the textbooks” to provide teachers with the correct information since teachers did not have time to probe these issues themselves.

In my fifth interview I discuss some of the work of Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé and go through some of “the series of events between 47 and 49” as well as the concepts of ‘transfer’, ethnic cleansing and so on. The initial reaction to these perspectives is curiosity with the teacher stating that “it would be interesting to read” some of the work. But then I am urged by the teacher to return to “when we talked about values” built into the textbooks. Critically reflecting, the teacher argues that “one is encouraged to think [and feel] more about Israel” in the textbooks and compares them to “the news media today [which] tends to present Israel *in a negative light*.” This claim is made around the time of the Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip in 2008. The teacher goes on to opine about the influence of the media on school pupils who “*believe [that] what the media says is the truth*”. While there is little discussion on the 1948 debate here, the teacher and I do engage in a discussion on representations of events connected to the Gaza invasion at the time of the interview. For example, the teacher opines that while “Israel possibly overreacted” it has to be understood “that Hamas broke the ceasefire”. I respond to this by referring to among other sources human rights organisations, scholars, the mainstream media and even the Israeli foreign affairs website: all of the latter have in different ways challenged the

general claim that Hamas had broken the ceasefire<sup>1346</sup>. The teacher responds by saying that “we see nothing of this [information] here”.

In my sixth interview I discuss some of the scholarship on the conflict and claim that “certain perceptions are turned on their head” there. I run through topics such as expulsions, massacres, discussion and disagreement over the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ and Benny Morris’ position that Arabs feared their displacement and dispossession prior to 48. I then ask whether such information could be introduced into the teacher’s lessons. The teacher responds by saying that “if I understand it correctly, the small sample you have just told me sounded quite similar to what I thought really and *it’s kind of [...] what I try to teach.*” By this the teacher suggests that the conflict “was about *protecting one’s territory and not about religion. It was about some kind of exercise of power.*” Earlier on in the interview the teacher’s background in the Church is discussed and I interpret the previous response as an attempt to remove the issue of religion from any causal explanation behind the conflict. The attempt, however, is accompanied by its reinsertion. For example, when I ask what the teacher means by “*their territory*”, I am told that it “is claimed by both sides that *they have a right* to the territories [and that] they have different *historical arguments* for this.” Here the teacher is referring to the “equal” claim to the land idea voiced by both parties. At this point the teacher criticises “the media, [and adds that] I hear very few

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<sup>1346</sup> BBC article entitled “Rockets Fired After Gaza Clashes”, 8<sup>th</sup> November 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/7709603.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7709603.stm). The previous article is interesting in that it frames the beginning of tensions in terms of Hamas rocket fire while providing evidence to contradict the general framework. This evidence is also featured in an on-line Guardian article on November 5<sup>th</sup> 2008 entitled “Gaza truce broken as Israeli raid kills six Hamas gunmen”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/05/israelandthepalestinians/print> Israeli historian, Avi Shlaim, was also cited in an interview describing the above claim as “Israeli propaganda, and it is a pack of lies.” Interview for Democracy Now!, 14<sup>th</sup> January 2009, “Leading Israeli Scholar Avi Shlaim: Israel Committing “State Terror” in Gaza Attack, Preventing Peace”; [www.btselem.com](http://www.btselem.com) [http://www.democracynow.org/2009/1/14/leading\\_israeli\\_scholar\\_avi\\_shlaim\\_israel](http://www.democracynow.org/2009/1/14/leading_israeli_scholar_avi_shlaim_israel) YEAR IN REVIEW: Israeli propaganda campaign downplays the success of the truce, PAUL WOODWARD on DECEMBER 26, 2009, War in Context, January 4, 2009 [http://warincontext.org/2009/12/26/year-in-review-israeli-propaganda-campaign-downplays-the-success-of-the-truce/?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=email](http://warincontext.org/2009/12/26/year-in-review-israeli-propaganda-campaign-downplays-the-success-of-the-truce/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email)

voices saying that this is *our territory together*, let's try to get along. [...].” The teacher adds that it is more often you hear that “We” Palestinians or “We” Israel have *a right to [the land]*.” The apparent assertion that this is our land together may draw upon the notion of “equal” claim too, albeit by the teacher this time. However, previously too the teacher claims “that *none of these nations or ethnic groups* [...] has a right to the territory more than anyone else really.” Thus the teacher is probably ambivalent with regard to the legitimacy of “equal” claim to the land. Initially, the critical statements made by the teacher appear to reject some of the ideological claims made by each party to the conflict. But then I ask about the kind of assumptions one generally proceeds from when discussing or teaching on the history of the conflict. To this the teacher responds by stating that “if I understand the question correctly, there are *historical assumptions* [that] they [both] go back to. *Israel* wants to *claim many thousands of years* and the Palestinians *also go back many thousands of years* and *claim their things*.” To conclude, it would appear that along with the references to Israel and the Palestinians as “nations” or “ethnic groups” mentioned above the teacher neither appears to fully embrace or reject the notion of “equal” claim to the land.

In the following final section I will discuss the main findings of my analysis in this chapter. On the basis of these I will identify the teacher discourse on the conflict. In my final chapter, chapter seven, I will discuss both the findings from this chapter and the two previous analysis chapters on the History school textbooks.

### Section 6.3 Tracing the Teachers' Discourse on the Conflict

In this section I will discuss what I will come to identify as the teachers' discourse on the Israel/Palestine conflict. Simply put, what my findings show is that my teacher respondents are simultaneously ideologically constrained and critically reflective with regard to how they treat the subject of the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict. I will begin, first of all, by

discussing the ideological aspects of the teachers' discourse followed by a discussion of its critical reflective aspects. Identifying the teachers' discourse as the official knowledge discourse on "Jewish History" I will discuss its implications as a power/knowledge problem with regard to how the Israel/Palestine conflict is framed.

### Ideologically constrained

Summarising the main findings of the previous analysis, then, in sections 6.0 to 6.2 I have analysed and discussed the teachers' selection of topics and themes for providing a historical overview of the history of the conflict. These topics and themes comprise pivotal events and important themes for understanding and explaining the history of the conflict. For example, under the aegis of "Jewish History" the teachers have generally focused on a number of specific topics and themes (e.g. the Nazi holocaust and anti-Semitism) as well as topics and themes constituting the discourses on Jewish/Arab connection to the land and people-nation. Influenced by these discourses, the teachers have discussed and taught "Jewish History" on the premise of the existence of two distinct and separate metahistorical people-nations both connected to the (Holy) land in the past and present. In turn, this has provided a framework for understanding and explaining the history of the conflict. We might argue thus that religion, or in this case, Judaism and Islam, has been framed by "the modern discourse of nationalism and that the nation has functioned as a nodal point"<sup>1347</sup> around which the teachers' understanding of peoples and their histories has been constructed.

The theme that I have argued more frequently pervades and determines the teachers' discourse on the conflict is what I have previously discussed here and elsewhere as the notion of "equal" claim to the land. In other words, the notion of "equal" claim to the land more or less provides the ideological glue and/or normative point of departure for linking and/or making sense of knowledge claims on the history of the conflict in the textbooks and teachers' statements. As I have also argued above, the notion of "equal" claim functions in the absence of other perspectives and knowledge claims

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<sup>1347</sup> Torfing, J. (2003), p. 199

which would provide a different framework for understanding and explaining the historical causes of the conflict. In the midst of this, the teachers strive to be balanced and fair in their treatment of the conflict in order to make the pupils aware that there are two sides to the conflict and that both versions must be heard. Thus, the notion of “equal” claim to the land simultaneously draws upon and is informed by the discourses I have discussed above and is reinforced by the discrepancy between teachers’ knowledge on the conflict and other (scholarly) sources such as the 1948 debate and so on.

### Critically reflective

However, what my findings have also shown is that my teacher respondents are not entirely ideologically constrained by the discourses I have identified. Indeed, as a number of my respondents have demonstrated, they are able to freely change position on how they explain and understand the conflict’s history. This they do by simultaneously adopting a critical position and by drawing on some of the assumptions built into the discourses I have discussed previously. For example, throughout the same interview my eighth teacher respondent simultaneously proceeded from biblical-national framings of the history of the Jewish people and later on critically questioned such framings. One of the teachers within the group I interviewed too was able to simultaneously proceed from a political-geographical perspective on the conflict’s history and from some of the assumptions built into the discourses discussed. My fifth teacher respondent generally proceeded from the textbook narratives and emphasized the Nazi holocaust as a starting point while surreptitiously referring to village clearings during the period of the 1948 war. What these examples also demonstrate in effect is one of the drawbacks of a discourse-analysis when interpreting interview transcriptions. As I discussed in my method chapter, interview transcriptions are comments and statements frozen in time. In other words, what my discourse-analysis could not trace were any significant changes in position on the part of my teachers *post* my interview or, for that matter, any other thoughts and perspectives that the teachers either did not express or could not express during the interviews. To really gain a thorough understanding of how the teachers related to the conflict in general would require several

more interviews with more probing questions. Nevertheless, these critical caveats aside I still maintain that on the strength of the snapshots I have provided my interview results have generally revealed a tendency on the part of the teacher respondents to proceed from the discourses discussed previously via the notion of “equal” claim to the land. As I mentioned in chapter one, I decided to view the framing of the Israel/Palestine conflict in Swedish History school textbooks and (to a lesser extent) teachers’ statements as a power/knowledge problem. With the previous findings from my analysis of the teachers’ statements in mind, then, in the following final sub-section I will discuss the implications of this further.

### “Jewish History”, “Equal” Claim and the Occlusion of Power

However striking the teachers’ points of critical reflection are, they still appear to proceed from the topics, themes and ideological assumptions constituting the discourses built into the epistemological aegis of “Jewish History”. Within the setting of the school this constitutes the official knowledge on the conflict’s history. The emergent norm or nodal point transmitted through “Jewish History” is the notion of “equal” claim to the land; both decisively and ambivalently drawn upon across my teacher respondent sample. This in turn transforms “Jewish History” into a framework for understanding and explaining the history as well as the causes of the Israel/Palestine conflict.<sup>1348</sup> The notion of “equal” claim to the land possibly underscores too ethical stances on the part of teachers who strive towards balance and/or neutrality both in terms of how the conflict’s history is taught and how a resolution of it may be discussed in a classroom situation. In this light, some of the teachers emphasized the point that both parties are sometimes right and wrong and have bemoaned the respective denial of each party’s “equal” claim to the land. Allow me to recap on some of the ways in which a sense of equality or symmetry built into the notion of “equal” claim to the land informs a number of topics and themes in “Jewish History”. First of all, the period from 70 CE, the creation of the *Diaspora*, anti-Semitism, the historical purpose of Zionism connected to the latter, the

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<sup>1348</sup> For example, a reference to causes has been noted in chapter five with the arrival of holocaust survivors to Palestine pitted against the embitterment of the local Arab population.

Nazi holocaust and establishment of Israel all serve to illustrate the historical suffering of Jews and to reinforce the Jewish people's historical right to a country of their own and its claim to the land. In addition, by drawing on biblical-historical myth and the construction of a metahistorical Jewish people connected to the land of Israel, they are imbued with the *right to return* to their ancient homeland. In addition, the Palestinian people benefit from the notion of "equal" claim since their metahistorical connection to the land, Canaanite heritage and suffering since 1948 is acknowledged too. Given this frame of "equal" claim to the land and "equal" suffering, neither nation-people may occupy a subject-position of absolute power or hegemony in the official knowledge discourse on "Jewish History". I would argue then that the prominence of the notion of "equal" claim to the land along with the other discourses discussed and an absence of critical perspectives generally occludes the asymmetrical power relations that have defined the history of the conflict from its inception.

In the following concluding chapter I will summarise and discuss the main findings of the analyses in chapters four, five and six. Then I will discuss the kind of established framework (already alluded to previously) for understanding and explaining the conflict which has emerged. I will connect these too to my theoretical premises discussed in chapter one and theoretical framework discussed in chapter two. Finally, I will discuss some policy implications and new questions with regard to how the conflict is presented in the textbooks and teachers' statements.

# Chapter Seven

## Concluding Discussion

*Hegemonic discourse must be undermined and exposed as ideology,  
not taken on its own terms in counter-argument.  
To do the latter would be to play to the rules of the hegemon  
by buying into the illusion of symmetry<sup>1349</sup>*

In the first part of this chapter I will summarise and discuss the main findings of the previous analysis chapters. I will focus on the elements which have emerged most frequently in both the textbooks and teachers' statements and which in turn have had the most influence on how the conflict has been understood and explained. Specifically, I will discuss the recurring topics and themes and their concomitant and/or constitutive discourses which have appeared time and again in the textbooks and teachers' statements. The points I will discuss here on the strength of my findings concern first of all the appearance and extent of both a pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian bias in the textbooks and teachers' statements and how these are occluded by the notion of "equal" claim to the land. Secondly, as part of a discussion on the main conclusions of this thesis I will discuss the possible links between the textbooks and the debate on 1948 and other sources discussed in this thesis and will attempt to theorise why the framework presented in the textbooks appears as it does. Finally, in relation to my findings I will discuss policy implications and new questions for future projects.

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<sup>1349</sup> Miall, H, Ramsbotham, O, Woodhouse, T, (2006), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 296



## Section 7.0 Framing Discourses and “Equal” Claim to the Land

In the last three chapters I have come to identify a number of discourses which together have informed and/or framed the selected topics and themes in the textbooks and teachers’ statements on the history of the conflict. These I have referred to as the discourse on Jewish/Arab connection to the land, the discourse on people-nations and the Oslo discourse which has incorporated aspects from the international law discourse. Taken together these discourses comprise topics and themes connected to biblical myth, national ideology and international conventions. Importantly, from a power/knowledge perspective, I have addressed the ideological function of these discourses. That is, with regard to the many premises and tacit assumptions upon which they are established and taken for granted. As I will later discuss, such premises and assumptions are also connected to the pivotal events selected in the textbooks and referred to by the teachers I have interviewed. All of these elements are interdiscursively connected, in other words. I will now discuss these discourses below.

What are the topics and themes selected in the textbooks and teachers’ statements which describe biblical-historical events under the rubric of “Jewish History” and what is their ideological function? In the textbooks, the opening sections of the textbooks focus on a specific number of topics and themes which taken together form “an unbroken chain of [historical] presence”<sup>1350</sup> in the land for Jews and the Jewish people and to a lesser degree Arab Palestinians. The biblical-historical events most emphasised are the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and the creation of the 2000 year Jewish *Disapora* and/or exile. In addition to this, events such as the Bar Kokhba Revolt and the battle of Masada are mentioned or alluded to. Reference is also made to events in the Old Testament and the Exodus myth. In addition, the Jews or Jewish people are also described in one section as God’s chosen people and reference is made to the Promised Land too.

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<sup>1350</sup> Masalha, N, (2007), p. 167

Interestingly, in one textbook in particular archaeological reference is made to a wandering people of the desert 3000 years ago. Equally, the presence of the Palestinians is also connected to a mythical Canaanite people in the land. In the teachers' statements too, the event of 70 CE, the *Diaspora* and exile are also emphasised with one teacher mentioning the Masada uprising in one of the interviews. The biblical themes which bind these events together are connected to Messianism or the dream of return which both in the textbooks and teachers' statements is argued to have been upheld by Jews since their dispersion or exile 2000 years ago and celebrated in Jewish tradition. Pointing to the ideological function of the above, through the discourse on Jewish nationalism the events of 70 CE, Bar Kokhba and Masada<sup>1351</sup> "naturally" draw upon Messianism to defy the Talmudic injunction connected to it. Thus, the dream of return is understood in the textbooks and teachers' statements to actually mean the physical, political return of the Jewish people metahistorically connected to the land.

As Whitelam puts it, the presence of an "incipient nation state provides the controlling assumption which surmounts any obstacles or professed reservations"<sup>1352</sup> and naturally connects references to biblical myth and allusions to nationhood. As discussed previously, such allusions are also supported by the discourse on "the principle of ethnic self-determination"<sup>1353</sup> following World War II which confers an equal right to independent sovereignty on to separate nation peoples. In the textbooks, the most poignant example of this is the reference in one of the textbooks to modern Israel as the youngest and oldest state. Jerusalem is also referred to as the

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<sup>1351</sup> Note too that the Masada event was only deemed a prominent feature in collective Jewish memory with the rise of Zionism, see Whitelam, (1996) and Porat in Crawford & Foster. (2006)

<sup>1352</sup> Whitelam, (1996/2009), pp. 30-31

<sup>1353</sup> In an article by Oren Yiftachel on ethnocracy and the state of Israel he discusses among other things the fusing of "two principles of political order: the post-Westphalian division of the world into sovereign states, and the principle of ethnic self-determination." Within such a framework both Israelis and Palestinians possess a right to a national homeland. Such a right is also recognised in international law. For my purposes, arguably such elements may undergird the notion of 'right' apparent in the textbooks and teacher statements. Article by Oren Yiftachel entitled 'Ethnocracy': The Politics of Judaizing, *Constellations*, Volume 6, No 3, 1999  
Israel/Palestine

capital city of ancient Israel or Judea and Israel and Jerusalem (Zion) are described as the original homeland of the Jews. Reference is also made to the (national) Jewish remnant in Jerusalem following the expulsion of the Jewish people from there by the Romans. The notion of national self-determination and the right to a land of one's own is also emphasised since, it is claimed, the Jewish people have never had a country of their own or have had nowhere to go since their expulsion from Jerusalem. The right of national self-determination for the Palestinians is also mentioned and/or assumed in the textbooks and teachers' statements. The teachers' statements highlight the right to a national homeland or home of one's own through the prism of historical Jewish suffering and the pivotal event of the Nazi holocaust is referred to. For the teachers, the beginning of historical persecution is located in the event of the destruction of the Jewish Temple in 70 CE and the dispersion following that. It is as a result of this that it is felt that the Jewish people have a historical right to a country of their own or that they have the right to return or regain their country. It is between the assumed rights of both peoples to a country of their own that the notion of "equal" claim to the land operates. Indeed, the notion functions as a driving theme framing the discourses discussed above and subsequent ones to be discussed here. In the textbooks, the notion of "equal" claim to the land is first introduced with reference to the Arab Palestinians and Israeli Jews' struggle over the right to the land. For example, the Balfour Declaration discussed in most of the textbook chapters and the theme of broken promises hinges on the problem of Britain's part in either ambivalently supporting or denying claims made to the land by both parties to the conflict. The latter point is highlighted in response to increasing tensions between Jews and Arabs during the 1930s and the limitation on Jewish immigration following the issue of the 1939 White Paper. The notion of "equal" claim is also assumed through the employment of such terms as war of independence to describe Israel's defensive war against the Arab states in 1948 as well as through topics such as the recognition or rejection of Israel's declaration of independence on the part of the US, Britain, France and the Soviets (despite disagreement between the textbooks on this matter; e.g. whether the US recognised or rejected the declaration). Even the topic of the Oslo peace process draws upon the notion of "equal" claim through mention of Israel's

right to exist which represents a point of departure for achieving peace. Although the right to a Palestinian nation state is acknowledged in the textbooks, the issues of occupation, refugees and a Palestinian state are understood in connection with what I have referred to as the "equal" claim order of discourse in previous chapters. As I will discuss below, and touched upon in the previous chapter, the "equal" claim discourse occludes a power dimension connected to the issues of peace and Palestinian statehood.

In the teachers' statements the notion of "equal" claim to the land emerges frequently. As I argue in chapter six, the notion functions as a nodal point which fixes "the content of a range of floating signifiers by articulating them within a chain of equivalence."<sup>1354</sup> In other words, the notion of "equal" claim to the land provides the ideological glue and/or normative point of departure for linking and/or making sense of knowledge claims on the history of the conflict in teachers' statements and in the textbooks. The notion underscores ethical stances on the part of the teachers interviewed too who appear to strive towards balance and/or neutrality both in terms of how the conflict's history is taught and how a resolution of it may be discussed in a classroom situation.<sup>1355</sup> This indicated in some of the interviews with statements pertaining to the equal distribution of blame, the equal presence of radicals and the general sense that the conflict is of a symmetrical nature between two equal parties who are (both) occasionally right and wrong. Connecting this to topic and theme selection, the period from 70 CE, the creation of the *Diaspora*, anti-Semitism, and the historical purpose of Zionism connected to the latter, the Nazi holocaust and establishment of Israel all serve to illustrate the historical suffering of Jews or the Jewish people. This in turn serves to reinforce the Jewish people's historical *right* to a country of their own or *right to return* to their ancient homeland. In addition, the Palestinian people benefit from the notion of "equal" claim to the land since their metahistorical connection to the land, Canaanite heritage and suffering since 1948 is acknowledged too, albeit marginally.

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<sup>1354</sup> Torfing, p. 303

<sup>1355</sup> For example, in a lesson plan presented to me by one of the teachers, emphasis was placed on the difficulty of sharing a country which both parties share an equal right to historically and religiously.

International law perspectives also strengthen either party's "equal" claim or connection to the land. The notion of "equal" claim to the land also undergirds the construction and reification of biblical-national identities, roles and subject-positions, as I will now discuss.

## Section 7.1 Distinctive Peoples and Their Respective Roles

The construction of two distinctive peoples is achieved in the textbooks and teachers' statements via the discourse on nation-peoples which, in turn, interacts with and draws upon previously discussed discourses. In other words, it is understood throughout the textbook chapters that there is a metahistorical connection between the Zionist settlers, Nazi holocaust survivors and the Jews of ancient biblical times since they are considered one and the same nation-people. I have already touched on the various topics and themes which come into play in the textbooks and teachers' statements which tacitly support the construction of separate and distinctive nation-peoples. Equally important too are the construction of the historical roles attributed to these peoples which feature in the textbooks and teachers' statements. Generally speaking, the role of the Jewish people or Jews in the textbook chapters is predicated on such themes and events as the historical persecution or suffering of the Jewish people or Jews and the Nazi holocaust. In addition, such themes as existential threat and security provide backdrops to the kinds of roles ascribed to the Jewish people. In contrast, through the international law discourse the sometimes brutal retaliatory actions of Jewish Israelis in response to acts of terror committed by Arab Palestinians are also discussed. In one textbook too, mention is made of the terroristic acts of the Stern Gang and the murder of Swedish UN envoy, Folke Bernadotte. In addition, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as well as the Golan Heights and Jerusalem is mentioned. However, the occupation is never cast as a potential cause of the violence. Instead, cycles of violence are referred to whereupon is inferred that these cycles of violence are often ignited by the Palestinians, for example with the failure of the 2000 peace summit. More

generally too there is a tendency to portray the Arab side as more prone to aggressive and/or rejectionist actions; for example, through their unequivocal intention to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel or simply to destroy it. This image is contrasted, however, with reference to the plight and sentiments of the local Palestinian Arab population and tacit references to the Palestinian tragedy of 1948 or *al-Naqba* (an event which is never directly attributed to the actions of Israel but to “the war”). The role of both parties to the conflict in connection with how various peace processes are discussed is also interesting. Via the Oslo discourse identified earlier, it is understood that the “equal” claim must be respected and that the peace conditionalities laid down in the Oslo Accords be respected before peace can be achieved. With regard to events prior to the Oslo peace process, for example, the historical significance of the 1988 declaration of statehood on behalf of the PLO is presented as signifying their coming to the realisation that armed struggle against Israel is fruitless and that making peace is the only way. It is emphasised too that the Palestinians have accepted that they cannot have the whole of Palestine and that destroying Israel is not the way. The Oslo discourse is invoked through mention of the conditionalities of recognising Israel and the renouncement of terrorism and thereto the rejectionist stance of the Palestinians; a stance, incidentally, that they have changed in order to embrace the path of peace. The Israeli role of occupier is never directly referred to and neither is the occupation itself described as a direct cause of the conflict. Nor is the occupation even described as an act of violence which Palestinians would respond or retaliate to or even *resist*. This also goes back the innocuous role of political Zionism presented in the textbooks as a vehicle for the fulfilment of the Jewish people’s “equal” claim to the land through their return. The only time one gains some insight into Palestinian *responses* to something externally affecting them is through abstract formulations such as “humiliation and repression” or mention of their “desperate situation” in connection to the 1987 *Intifada* or uprising. In one significant departure from the general framework, ending the occupation as a direct conditionality of peace is inferred in the 1991-92 textbooks. There, Israeli military occupation and territorial expansion are explained by one settler mayor as deliberate hurdles to the establishment of a Palestinian state. In another textbook too, mention is made of influential Jews in the

U.S. and how without U.S. support Israel would not have existed today.<sup>1356</sup> In many of the textbooks the roles of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union are presented in terms of their acceptance or rejection of the partition proposal of 1947. For example, in one textbook the US is presented as rejecting partition because of its desire not to upset “90 million Arabs”.

In the teachers’ statements, religion - or in this case, Judaism and Islam - has been framed by “the modern discourse of nationalism”.<sup>1357</sup> Furthermore, “the nation has functioned as a nodal point”<sup>1358</sup> around which the teachers’ understanding of peoples and their historical roles have been constructed. However, in one of the interviews Palestinian national identity is critically discussed. In contrast, through the “natural” connections established between the Bible, nation and “equal” claim to the land the Jewish/Israeli national identity, to borrow Judith Butler’s phrase, is an “ontological given[...].”<sup>1359</sup> In one interview too the genetic connection between Jews and Palestinians is also asserted with the Palestinian Arabs being presented as direct descendants of the original Jewish peasant population of ancient Israel/Palestine. Some roles or subject-positions connected to the distinctive nation-peoples are both upheld and partially challenged in the interviews. More so in the interviews, for example, the defensive role of Israel and the historical suffering of the Jews are emphasised. For example, the latter is upheld via the sense of guilt felt by Europeans following the Second World War and is connected to the horrendous treatment of European Jews and why the state of Israel was established. In addition, connected to their historical role as homeless throughout the 2000 year *Diaspora*, it is acknowledged by one of the teachers that “*the Jews did not have anywhere to go really.*” Placing Israel in a defensive subject-position, the theme of existential threat is also invoked and is simultaneously connected to the theme of security. For example, in connection with the Six Day War/June 67 War it is explained that from 1948 onwards Israel feels threatened and that

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<sup>1356</sup> Körner, G, Lagheim, L, (1996). ”I USA bor många inflytelserika judar och utan USA:s hjälp och ett mycket starkt försvar hade Israel aldrig existerat i dag.

<sup>1357</sup> Torfing, J, p. 199

<sup>1358</sup> Ibid

<sup>1359</sup> Butler, (2009), p. 100

when Israel strikes first in June 1967 it is because the PLO had said it “wants to destroy Israel”. The theme of power is also brought up in connection with the historical role of the Jewish/Israeli people. For example, concern is expressed in connection with a very simplistic impression of the conflict which casts an image of “*a big strong Israel against Palestine*” which, incidentally, is acknowledged as being “*in part true*”. To contrast with the above, one teacher in particular ascribes another power role to the state of Israel through the topic of Zionism and the thematic prism of political geography. There it is argued that in order to understand how Israel treats the Palestinians it is important to examine the issue of territorial power. In one of the interviews the roles of the PLO and Hamas are examined too and how these groups have been labelled differently over the years and for different reasons. Referring to terroristic acts during the 1970s carried out by the PLO, it is discussed how the latter originally began as terrorists but that now they were accepted (as partners in peace). It is also discussed how currently Hamas carries the terrorist label and that neither label of democratic or terrorist attributed to the PLO or Hamas is accurate since it “*is characterised by a great deal of ignorance.*” A distinction is made too between the Hamas who provide the people with the necessary means for life along with medical care and the Hamas which struggles militarily to fulfil its goals.

## Section 7.2 Pro-Israeli and Pro-Palestinian Bias and the Textbooks’ History

In this section I will emphasise the points of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian bias in the textbooks and teachers’ statements. Then in comparison with the debate discussed in chapter one and other sources as well as the discussion on Israeli textbooks I will discuss the version of history on the conflict the textbooks present. This will in turn be linked to my theoretical points of departure.



## Pro-Israeli bias

The points of pro-Israeli bias emerging in the textbooks are imparted first of all through a rendering of “Jewish History” which begins in 70 CE with the destruction of the Second Temple. From there it continues to the creation of the 2000 year Jewish *Diaspora* or through direct reference to the Nazi genocide and with that an explanation for why Israel was established. Furthermore, it is understood in the textbooks and more so in teachers’ statements that “Jewish History” and in particular the Nazi holocaust is the educational topic within which the Israel/Palestine conflict may be explained and understood. Secondly, the textbooks construct a notion of a homogenous, metahistorical Jewish people in the *Diaspora* who have desired to return to their ancient homeland for 2000 years. Assuming a natural connection between religion and nation, then, other aspects of “Jewish History” are emphasised too. For example, the perennial suffering of the Jewish people since their dispersion from Jerusalem two millennia ago. Again, the pinnacle of this suffering is connected to the heinous genocide of six million European Jews during the Nazi holocaust. In connection with this event and historical suffering, the textbooks mention the right to a homeland on the part of the Jewish people (incidentally, a right which has been enshrined in international law since the 1940s in recognition of the rights of ethnic peoples). In addition, this right is naturally (ideologically) connected to an assumed biblical-national “claim” to the land invoked through such themes as the dream of return. Furthermore, this claim is understood as “equal” to both parties to the conflict. Further pro-Israeli bias in connection with the above relates to the identity constructs (as mentioned) and roles Jews or the Jewish people are ascribed. First of all, it is understood in the textbooks that Jews in general and Jewish-Israelis in particular are the same people historically and contemporaneously. Given their role as a persecuted people they have had to defend their independence in Israel sometimes through brutal retaliation in response to Palestinian or Arab threats to their existence. Given this backdrop, such topics as political Zionism, various conflicts and peace processes are generally presented from an Israeli perspective. This functions in turn due to the fact that there is little or no orientation with the debate 1948 or other sources discussed here, albeit perhaps only with some of the perspectives presented by traditionalist

historians (see chapter one). I will now discuss the level of pro-Palestinian bias in the textbooks.

### Pro-Palestinian bias

Points of pro-Palestinian bias also appear repeatedly in the textbooks but without an educational aegis such as “Jewish History” to contrast with. First of all, the historical plight of the Palestinians is generally connected to the events following the 1948 war. Possibly drawing on some aspects of the debate discussed in chapter one, it is discussed whether the Palestinians were expelled or fled following the war. However, the question is left open and perhaps as a result no direct causal connection to Israeli actions and the creation of the refugee problem are discussed. On the other hand, mention is made of the occupation of Palestinian homes following the war and the plight of the Palestinians. Personal accounts are provided too through one teenage Palestinian girl who is forced to reside in refugee camps year after year with her family. The PLO is sometimes portrayed too in its political role as a liberation organisation determined to win back the territories lost in 1948. In one textbook in particular from 1991-92, a connection is made between the continuing construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank, Israeli security and the prevention of a Palestinian state. With regard to national rights, the textbooks emphasise the point that both the Palestinians and Israelis share an “equal” claim to the land. Albeit marginal, some contextualisation of the reality of occupation is expressed through vague formulations such as “humiliation” and/or “suffering”. From that a tacit connection is also made to the beginnings of the 1987 or first *Intifada* or uprising. Even acts of terrorism and protest are contextualised in connection with the suffering of Palestinians under occupation, although direct reference to the realities of the Israeli occupation is never made.

I would conclude that these differing biases emerging in the textbooks represent two opposing political and ideological positions of the different textbook writers characterised by an ambition to be balanced and neutral. Arguably too such a confluence of different biases reflects the political and ideological culture within which the matter of the conflict has been deliberated over the years between different power blocs. It is perhaps possible to conclude that the writers of the textbooks have drawn both upon

the established Swedish political consensus or debate on the conflict and have perhaps been influenced by other external discourses.<sup>1360</sup> Very little, however, would indicate an orientation with scholarly sources. Given the lack of scholarly oversight which many Swedish school textbooks were released from in 1991 to be placed on the market, this is perhaps unsurprising.

### Comparing scholarship and the textbooks

All in all, in connection with how the history of the conflict is presented in the scholarly debate, the version provided in the textbooks is of a character more concerned with instilling an ideological message than exploring the political and ideological roots of the conflict (albeit via a neutral language form that avoids explicitly adopting either bias discussed above). For example, generally speaking while the textbooks rely on biblical myth and national ideology as a point of departure, scholarship, whether on the history of the conflict or on Israeli and Palestinian textbooks, tends to proceed from a discussion of the political and ideological roots of the conflict. In other words, the scholarly literature I have cited in this thesis tends to provide more critical-analytical perspectives. In turn, perhaps unsurprisingly, Israeli historians and educational scientists tend to be far more critically aware of their own nation's narrative than the Swedish textbook writers. When it comes to ideologically informed role ascriptions, the Israeli textbooks would appear to present Jewish-Israelis or the Jewish people in a more heroic light historically. That is, in contrast to that of a historically persecuted people sometimes presented in the Swedish textbooks and teachers' statements. This is especially the case in connection with biblical-historical events such as the Masada uprising which has been introduced into the Israeli national discourse and educational discourse. Indeed, the discourse on the birth of the nation is presented in a highly positive light and, like the Swedish textbooks,

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<sup>1360</sup> An edited collection of articles and papers presented by various Swedish political figures and missionary groups has been compiled by Ulf Carmesund and Ulf Bjérelid. The book entitled *60 år i våra röda hjärtan* (2009) (literally, 60 Years in Our Red hearts) reveals the Swedish Social Democratic consensus on the conflict with its various conflicts since 1948. The book provides at least one insight into what might be understood as the traditional Swedish position on the conflict, politically and culturally.

emphasises a perennial connection to the land predicated on a notion of religious-national connection. As one of the scholars on the Israeli textbooks noted, the Israeli textbooks tend to follow the traditional Zionist version of history with such themes as “the few against the many” in Israel’s struggle for independence.

Apart from the unique framework the Swedish textbooks proceed from, there is another significant difference between them and the scholarly literature and from time to time the Israeli textbooks themselves. This difference concerns the manner in which the root causes of the conflict are presented. In the Swedish textbooks we learn that the conflict is about two distinctive metahistorical peoples who are struggling over the same piece of land that they share an “equal” claim to. In contrast, in the scholarly literature, such issues as the political and ideological roots of Zionism are discussed and fought out. And whether ‘new historians’ or traditional historians agree or not such a discussion appears to be connected to a further one concerning the background causes of the conflict. In addition, there appears to be agreement too on when and where a number of historical events occurred and which actions were carried out and by whom. For example, despite different political interpretations provided by traditionalist and ‘new historians’, the events leading up to the 1948 and June 67 wars tend to cover a broad range of perspectives which can be connected to the root causes of these wars. What such agreement and provision of perspectives also reflects in contrast with the Swedish textbooks is a tendency not to ascribe fixed roles, identities and actions to Jewish-Israelis or Arab-Palestinians. Instead it is understood that dynamic roles and actions are possible on either side of the conflict, precisely as a result of the conflict dynamics. However, there is enormous disagreement over the political and ideological moorings of the conflict’s roots. For example, whether such events may be rooted in political Zionism and late 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalism and colonialism as an *a priori* logic of the former or whether such actions merely emerged as an unforeseen consequence of the chaos of war. This is particularly acute between the traditionalists and anti-traditionalists, especially in connection with the discussion on the concept of ‘transfer’ and military Plan Dalet. The Swedish textbooks tend not to address the political and ideological dimensions of the

conflict's history; for example, through a more critical-analytical discussion of colonialism and political Zionism. Instead through the assumption of "equal" claim and connection to the land they focus more on topics and themes which both affirm this claim and tacitly critique denial of it. For example, this is expressed more directly with reference to threats to Israeli existence and the themes of security and terrorism and indirectly with reference to the occupation and the plight of Palestinian refugees. It is also understood in the textbooks which party to the conflict has to embrace the "equal" claim thesis first. For example, when the Palestinians begin to embrace the conditionalities of the Oslo discourse and understand that they have to share the land and reject violence in order to tread the path to peace.

### Teachers and the scholarly debate

Generally, the teachers interviewed have had little or no orientation with the scholarly debate on the conflict's history. However, some of their statements may arguably be considered reflections of different scholarly positions ranging from 'new historical', traditionalist and anti-traditionalist positions. As mentioned, the Nazi holocaust provides a natural starting-point for many of the teachers interviewed. In addition, many of the teachers proceed from the general framework discussed above under the heading or topic area of "Jewish History" within which the conflict is understood as a sub-topic. However, despite the small sample of respondents interviewed, they all appear to adopt varied positions from time to time. This signals their so-called "relative autonomy" in relation to what is presented in official knowledge textbooks. In addition, it also represents the tension between being at once ideologically constrained and critically creative or reflective. The most explicit example of this emerged in one of the teachers' comments on the importance of studying the historical roots of the conflict from a political geography perspective. The teacher at once assumed established truths about who the Jewish people were and their general role in history while noting that *they* ought to have learnt from their own history concerning the treatment of people under occupation. In this sense too we might conclude that the teacher appeared generally pro-Palestinian and simultaneously adopted influences from both a 'new historian' and traditional historian perspective (similarly the mentioning of the expulsion of

Palestinians in the textbooks indicates some orientation with the ‘new history’). In a similar vein, another teacher expressed an awareness of the traditional Zionist narrative attributed to Israel Zangwill (a people without a land for a land without a people) and expressed a critical position on how the different religions of Islam and Judaism were portrayed in the textbooks. The teacher noted that the textbooks presented a concocted division between the three monotheistic religions instead of emphasising their interconnectedness.

Pro-Palestinian positions and, generally speaking, positions sympathetic to the historical plight of the Jews tended to be wary of any portrayals of Jews which emphasised a role or position which contradicted any established roles ascribed to them. For example, to suggest that Jews were more powerful than the Palestinians appeared tantamount to anti-Semitism as indeed was any criticism of Israel coming from the Left. On another level, the denial of both Israelis’ and Palestinians’ “equal” claims was considered anathema to resolving the conflict. At the same time, the actions and reactions of the Israelis throughout the conflict had to be explained in connection with perceived threats to their very existence by the PLO and Arab states who had threatened to destroy Israel. By one teacher in particular, this was evident in the run-up to the June 67 war and other conflicts. In this way, we might argue that the teacher embraced oppositional positions: one which embraced the Israeli security narrative and one which embraced the Palestinian resistance narrative. Even though the same teacher bemoaned the military power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians too, generalised notions about Hamas reinforced the role of Palestinians as generally more aggressive and as instigators of violence.

The most pro-Israeli position among the teachers was expressed in connection with the mentioning of the Masada uprising and genetic connections between European Jews and Middle Eastern Jews. This was presented as proof of a metahistorically connected people and even connections between Palestinians and their putative Jewish ancestors in ancient Israel who converted to Islam. Indeed, this last connection echoed sentiments from some of the early Zionist leaders. Echoing 19<sup>th</sup> century historian, Henrich Graetz, too the same teacher (and the textbooks) even

mentioned the existence of “a remnant of the people [who were left] clinging to their homeland”<sup>1361</sup>. At the same time, the teacher could emphasise the importance of 70 CE and the creation of the Jewish *Diaspora* with the dispersal of an entire people from ancient Zion. The position the teacher adopted was more in tune with a traditional position than any of the other teachers. Another teacher who critically discussed the national identity of the Palestinians appeared to be simultaneously aware of a topic related to the debate on Plan D, namely, village clearances. In addition, the same teacher was critical of reductionist portrayals of Hamas whose role it was argued had to be situated in its historical context in order to understand them. Generally speaking, the remainder of teachers interviewed adhered to a more or less traditional version of the conflict’s history. Dissenting positions from this tended to come in the form of a lack of Palestinian perspectives in the media where, it was argued, more could be learned about the Israeli position. In addition, one teacher expressed a general disdain towards the claims either party made to the land which, it was felt, did not belong to anyone in particular.

On the basis of the above discussion, I will discuss the main conclusions I have drawn. In addition, I will link my conclusions to previous theoretical discussions on history textbooks my theoretical framework and in order to discuss what I understand to be the established framework on the conflict in the textbooks and teachers’ statements.

## Section 7.3 Main Conclusions and Established Framework on the Conflict

In this section I will discuss my main conclusions and what I have identified as the established framework on the conflict in the textbooks and teachers’

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<sup>1361</sup> Sand, (2009), p. 137. I have noted too in one of the textbooks I examined that the remnant of a people is mentioned in one chapter paragraph.

statements. Before doing so I will recap on my theoretical framework discussed in chapter and will include some critical reflections.

In chapter two, I discussed my theoretical understanding of the organisation of knowledge on the conflict in Swedish Lower Secondary History textbooks. First of all this hinged on the complex interaction or dialectic between power struggle shifts, the *inclusion* of new knowledge and the selection of pivotal historical events. Such power struggle shifts were linked to changes in the conflict on the ground and the discourses which were established as a result. For example, I discussed the *Intifada* and Oslo peace process as examples of shifts in power relations and the highlighting of the plight of the Palestinians. At the same time, the emergence of the Oslo discourse provided (what became in time) a channel for mediating the interpretation of the conflict's parameters as well as the peace process' failings on behalf of the most powerful parties to the conflict. In addition, I argued that the maintenance of such discourses hinged on the presence of cultural traditions, political ideology, memories of pivotal historical events (e.g., the Nazi holocaust) and the virtual absence or *exclusion* of other perspectives discussed in the introduction of this thesis and in the analysis chapters. Finally, I argued that within the institution of the school such established knowledge claims and how they are ideologically interconnected through the power relations mentioned appear as "natural" through the authoritative medium of the textbook and position of the teacher. The theoretical and analytical framework I constructed in relation to this understanding has been applied to the textbooks and teachers' statements in this thesis. In addition to the other research questions applied to my data, then, I will in this section attempt to come closer to answering the question: what is the established framework on the conflict? I suggested in my theory chapter that the maintenance of established knowledge on the conflict in the textbooks and teachers' statements may be understood as the maintenance of some kind of ideological hegemony. However, on reflection, and as I discussed in my theory chapter too, I have found it necessary to "lower the epistemological profile of [such concepts] and broaden [their] practical



applicability.”<sup>1362</sup> This I have done by way of adopting a discourse-analytical approach which incorporated the concepts of ideology and hegemony but in a less deterministic manner. Indeed, the fortuitousness of this became all the more apparent in my analysis of teachers’ statements. This revealed to me that the way in which they relate to authoritative knowledge claims or established discourses is highly dynamic. This forced me to conclude that as relative autonomous agents, teachers can simultaneously be ideologically constrained and critically creative with regard to how they relate to various knowledge claims. In turn, this connects to the proposition in Foucault that knowledge, understood as “united with power”<sup>1363</sup>, opens up the possibility of a wider range of knowledge claims or discourses entering the setting of the school and that such claims are neither fully determined (and contested) from above or below but from numerous locations discursively.

Pointing to my main conclusions, the first of these proceeds from the general problem I took as my point of departure in chapter one that generally speaking the links between scholarship, textbooks and teachers’ statements are very weak. In this regard, focusing on the textbooks alone, they do not provide the teachers or pupils with a platform for a broad critical-analytical and balanced understanding of the root causes of the conflict on the basis of varying perspectives. Instead, they are far too anchored in ideological assumptions and affect transmitted through a mixture of biblical-historical events, the construction of metahistorical nation-peoples and the selection of pivotal events. For example, the official knowledge subject area “Jewish History” featured in Religion textbooks and adopted by some of the teachers incorporates all of the above. The general influence or dominance of this official knowledge is also maintained through the absence of alternative or complementary perspectives such as can be found in the debate discussed in chapter one and in the secondary sources I have drawn upon. Despite this, the textbooks and teachers’ statements have also drawn upon established and vying discourses such as the Oslo discourse and international law discourse in their framing of the conflict’s history. As I touched upon previously,

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<sup>1362</sup> Barret, (1991), p. 124

<sup>1363</sup> Åberg, M, (2008), *Lärardrömmar*, Mara, Göteborg, p. 42

while this provided a sense of balance I conclude that such balance has generally been illusory. The reason for this has been the presence throughout the textbook framings and teachers' statements of the notion of "equal" claim to the land. As I argued previously, this notion or theme is built into almost all the discourses I have identified in this thesis. I have concluded thus that the discourses mentioned as undergirded by the notion of "equal" claim constitute a particular order of discourse. To repeat, the maintenance of such an order of discourse is reliant on the absence of broader critical perspectives too. The discourse on international law I mentioned above has, however, provided the one exception within this order of (vying) discourses. As I discussed in chapter five, the 1991 to 92 textbooks provided perhaps the most critical analysis of the conflict's history. While the international law discourse has continued to appear in later textbooks too, I still maintain that it has become more or less subordinate to the Oslo discourse in textbooks after 1993. Again, to repeat, this was due to the presence of already established discourses such as Jewish/Arab connection to the land, nation-peoples and so on (in the 1991 and 92 textbooks too) and the absence of other perspectives. Finally, I would also conclude that the dominance of the order of discourse I have identified functions in order to essentially mask the inherent inequities and power asymmetries of the conflict going back to its very inception. Again, this has been achieved through the interaction of the discourses I have identified and the influence of external established discourses such as the Oslo discourse and those figures in power who have held the preferential right of interpretation. In this sense, then, the international law discourse has had a dual function: 1) to provide a "balanced" perspective from both sides and 2) to perpetuate the notion of "equal" claim. As I have alluded to previously, this requires understanding those aspects of the international law discourse included in the textbooks which simultaneously shed light on the plight of Palestinians *and* maintain the notion of "equal" claim to the land. To provide one example, the topic of the 1947 UN partition proposal, while tacitly critiqued in some of the textbooks at times, forms the basis of some of the conditionalities discussed in the sections on the Oslo peace process (For example, when it is discussed that the land must be equally divided between Israel and the Palestinians). In this manner, then, the international law discourse effectively maintains the

notion of “equal” claim to the land. Furthermore, a lack of orientation with the background history of partition and its roots in early British mandate laws, colonialism and Zionist political ideology (not to mention international law perspectives on the legal rights of both parties to the conflict) occludes the asymmetrical power dimensions of the conflict going back to its very inception in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, the order of discourse (“equal” claim) and absence of scholarly (and critical) perspectives in the textbooks and for the most part in teachers’ statements constitutes the established framework on the Israel/Palestine conflict (the notion of “equal” claim and the occlusion of power).

## Section 7.4 Policy Implications and Proposals for Change

In this final section I will discuss some proposals for change in the curriculum content provided on the conflict and proposals for developing more critical-analytical approaches. In addition, I will discuss some of the possible policy implications in connection with how the history of the conflict is presented in the textbooks and some further questions which have arisen as a result of my overall findings.

The proposals on content change I will discuss here below draw upon many of the sources I have discussed and provided in this thesis. For example, the work of traditional, ‘new historian’ and anti-traditional perspectives which together present both mainstream and non-mainstream Israeli positions and Palestinian/Arab positions. But to repeat a previous important point, the purpose of providing such sources is not to replace one epistemological aegis with another. The purpose, instead, is to provide an orientation on the conflict which provides diverse perspectives on the conflict’s history anchored *in* history and understood as an area of knowledge claims based on consensus and contestation. The first proposal for change in this regard, then, would be to develop a more critical social scientific orientation in order to counter the prominence of biblical-national ideology and/or myth. This

would entail, first of all, a critical discussion of how two separate peoples have been invented in the light of historical events and processes. This would also mean more closely discussing the connections between late 19th century nationalism, colonialism and political Zionism as well as the asymmetrical power dimensions which characterized these connections. Given this context, it could also be discussed that this is not a conflict about two ontologically distinct separate peoples with an equal right to lay claim to the land but about political relations of power going back to the colonial settlement of land with an indigenous population around the late 19th century. Indeed, the rise of Palestinian nationalism and Jewish nationalism could be discussed in this context. In addition, it could also be highlighted that all the parties to the conflict were active in trying to achieve their specific political aims and even to the detriment of their constituencies at times. A discussion of the contexts of European anti-Semitism and persecution could also highlight the motivation on the part of Theodor Herzl to resolve the “Jewish problem” in late 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. The differences between Zionism and Judaism should also be discussed critically, namely, that they are not synonymous. The introduction of portions of the 1948 debate discussed in chapter one could contribute to this.

What should also be brought in too is the international law discourse on the Israel/Palestine conflict and its concomitant resolutions and a critical assessment of the Oslo discourse. For example, on matters such as Jerusalem it should be understood that neither national group has an equal right to lay claim to it. The notion of “equal” claim too has to be explored critically in light of pivotal historical events and not as an ontological given. For example, European anti-Semitism can be understood as the motor which inspired Herzl's political ideology and that his idea was more or less embraced by contemporary colonialists who believed that Palestine should be Judeo-Christian and that the Jews or Jewish people could represent the bastion of European civilization in the Orient. The heinous genocide of six million European Jews during the Second World War could also be understood as the event which led to the conventions on ethnic sovereignty and in turn strengthened the right to a home of one's own both for Holocaust survivors (and indirectly the indigenous Arab population of Palestine). It

could also be discussed how the UN conventions and the national-ideological narrative connecting Israelis and Palestinians to the land beyond the edicts of international law somehow became the dominant discourse as part of the Oslo discourse. It could be explored more critically how various conflicts have emerged throughout the decades. For example, with regard to the causes of the 1948 war, the June 1967 war as well as both *Intifadas*. Finally, the identity constructs and subject-positions of the parties to the conflict would need to be examined more critically with a view to presenting many different facets of Jewish and Arab culture and, importantly too, many diverse positions on how the conflict's history is perceived and discussed both within and across different groups. This should not preclude discussion concerning the right of either party to define itself according to its respective national identity markers. However, these have to be understood as contingent in their historical, cultural, political and ideological contexts and not as metahistorical or ontologically given. Thus, a critical social scientific orientation with the history of the conflict is necessary in order to provide a broader understanding of its cultural, political and ideological dynamics. As I alluded to in chapter one, this should also apply to more recent conflicts such as have emerged since the 9/11 attacks and the "war on terror" reprised by one George W. Bush following in the footsteps of another President, Ronald Reagan.

### Curriculum guidelines revisited and further proposals

To revisit the Swedish National Agency for education's guidelines on the objectives of History at the Lower Secondary level which emphasise "critical thinking" and "an analytical approach", it states in the opening section entitled "History, Compulsory School" that

History is an important part of all knowledge. Not only from a long-term perspective, but also from the present, all human activity and all development of knowledge have a historical dimension. History develops a knowledge which makes it possible to see oneself and events in the present and also as part of a

historical process. *The aim of the subject is to develop critical thinking and an analytical approach as a tool for understanding and explaining society and its culture.* (my italics)<sup>1364</sup>

The aim of using the subject of History as a platform for developing critical and analytical thinking as a tool for examining “social, economic, technical and cultural progress, as well as conflicts, tensions and shifts of power within and between countries”<sup>1365</sup> is an exemplary aim. Exemplary too is the aim of highlighting the “destructive forces of history operating through ethnic, religious and political persecution”<sup>1366</sup>. However, the question remains whether these have been achieved in the textbooks I have analysed with regard to the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict. In other words, does the material examined provide a “multifaceted picture of events and processes”<sup>1367</sup> connected to the conflict’s history? Clearly not! To repeat, one of the main reasons for this is the dominant presence and assumption of ideological discourses framing the textbooks and a lack of orientation with scholarly sources on the conflict. Another reason is connected to the way in which the textbook knowledge on the conflict is presented. The textbooks provide what appears to be an authoritative perspective on the conflict’s history which in turn is employed to encourage classroom discussion. Furthermore, as one teacher explained, the pupils tend to accept what is written in the textbooks as objective knowledge and, despite many critical reflections from the teachers interviewed, they too tend to adopt some of the points of departure the textbooks provide (albeit to varying degrees). I would add too that the teachers themselves assume many of the established assumptions built into the official knowledge curriculum provided on the conflict. And in their role as “provider of knowledge”<sup>1368</sup> deliver an “authoritative perception of the subject matter content which almost

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<sup>1364</sup>History, Compulsory School,

<sup>1365</sup> Ibid

<sup>1366</sup> Ibid

<sup>1367</sup> Ibid

<sup>1368</sup> Englund, (2007), “Om relevansen av begreppet didaktik”, *Acta didactica Norge*, p. 3

ontologises epistemology.”<sup>1369</sup> What this means in relation to the “SO” or Social Science block in general and in relation to the topic I have focused on in particular is that it is understood to some extent that the former presents “reality as it really is and that such school knowledge is not questioned.”<sup>1370</sup> Two such ontological givens I have identified in this thesis are connected to the representation of the history of the conflict on the basis of religious and “national myth”<sup>1371</sup>. Another is what Hobsbawm refers to as “the passions of identity politics”<sup>1372</sup> which, to cite Farahmandpur and McLaren, “lose sight of the determinate character of global”<sup>1373</sup> relations of power. In such a situation, the strongly felt ambition on the part of some of the teachers to provide a balanced and open discussion on the conflict, to communicate and deliberate on points of conflictual perspectives in order to understand and explain the possible causes of the conflict, is compromised.

In order to fulfil the stated aims within the guiding documents on critical thinking, then, the development of critical reading approaches might be an inroad. Anita Norlund outlines in her doctoral dissertation from 2009 “four aspects of critical reading”<sup>1374</sup> which she adds “are not well-defined and”<sup>1375</sup> that “some or all of the aspects can be expected to work simultaneously”<sup>1376</sup> at times. Norlund begins her typology by describing a “*critical-analytical* reading, [which involves] comparisons, drawing parallels, looking for cause and effect or placing data in timelines”.<sup>1377</sup> Then she describes a “*critical-integrative* reading [which] includes integrating one’s standpoints with those in texts or integrating the contents in a couple of texts with each other.”<sup>1378</sup> Thirdly a “*critical-evaluative reading* [judges] the usefulness of a text for the

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<sup>1369</sup> Englund, (2007), p. 8. ”auktoritär ämnesinnehållsuppfattning som näst intill ontologiserar epistemologin”.

<sup>1370</sup> Ibid. “gör anspråk på att tala om hur verkligheten ’verkligen’ och ’egentligen’ är beskaffad och att denna skolkunskap ej problematiseras.”

<sup>1371</sup> Hobsbawm, E, (1997), *On History*, Abacus, London, p. 10

<sup>1372</sup> Ibid

<sup>1373</sup> Farahmandpur, R, McLaren, P (2005) *Teaching Against Global Capitalism and the New Imperialism*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Oxford, p. 26

<sup>1374</sup> Norlund, A, (2009), p. 208

<sup>1375</sup> Ibid

<sup>1376</sup> Ibid

<sup>1377</sup> Ibid

<sup>1378</sup> Ibid

purpose at hand or the degree of credibility in the text [and, fourthly, a] *critical-ideological* aspect [which] involves questioning views of the world, reading to understand underprivileged groups of people and their conditions, or to make visible the pupils' own conditions."<sup>1379</sup> Norlund concludes that a "common prevailing attitude"<sup>1380</sup>, presumably among teachers, is that "a critical reader mainly evaluates reliability in texts, and judges them as true or false"<sup>1381</sup>.

In partial agreement with Norlund and in reference to the discussion above, the impression I have received on the part of the teachers I have interviewed is that a lot of stock is placed in the authoritativeness of the textbooks. In the event of the teachers' critical examination of the textbook content, it is often determined as good or bad according to the quantity of information provided. Reliability and critical analysis appear to rest too on how much of the information in the textbooks corresponds with each other. It would appear too that little time is spent on a critical comparison of knowledge claims *per se* through, as already discussed, bringing in other (scholarly) perspectives. Neither evident is an analysis of how the material is organised and presented nor the traditions and values guiding the selection of topics and themes. Nor are the tacit (ideological) assumptions undergirding the portrayals of the different parties to the conflict examined with regard to their ascribed roles and constructed identities. If anything at all, some of the teachers appear to have made an effort to maintain many of the underlying assumptions connected to the roles and identities of both Jewish-Israelis (and Jews in general) and Arabs and Arab-Palestinians alike. For example, each party to the conflict has been protected from mainstream media portrayals and even from claims made by each party to the conflict that would deny the other of his/her equal claims, whether to the land, an identity or a history. In other words, more than providing a platform for discussing the historical roots of the conflict and its possible causes, the textbooks and to some degree, teachers, have tended towards embracing the identity politics of the conflict as a point of departure through the pervasive notion of "equal" claim

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<sup>1379</sup> Norlund, A, (2009), p. 208

<sup>1380</sup> Ibid

<sup>1381</sup> Ibid



to the land. As I will discuss below in my closing comments, the ambition of deliberative communication which many of the teachers interviewed alluded to both through their emphasis on the importance of open classroom debate may be compromised unless coupled with a critical-analytical approach.

### **New questions and towards a critical deliberative approach**

In conclusion, the question of what frames the history of the Israel/Palestine conflict in Swedish school History textbooks and indeed others should not end here. In addition to a further examination of the textbooks and teacher discourses on the conflict, what also needs to be explored are the pupils' own perspectives and understandings of the conflict's history and how teachers and pupils discuss the conflict's history in a classroom setting. How do pupils respond in a classroom discussion on the conflict and outside the classroom? What do they include or omit in either setting and why? What kind of meaning in relation to the conflict do they feel the teacher is transmitting and how do they respond to it? In addition, we might also explore the political and ideological positions of the textbook writers themselves and the premises upon which they base their selection of historical facts on the conflict's history. Finally, on the basis of the findings and suggestions above, how might we imagine an educational dialogical setting for encouraging a critical understanding among the pupils, one that is both beneficial to the teachers and the pupils?

To offer a tentative inroad here, one point of departure would be to acknowledge that since one is learning about a conflict, the emergence of conflicting positions should be acknowledged, aired, weighed up and discussed. This should be done with a view to nurturing a deeper understanding of the conflict's background and creative ways with which to imagine possible resolutions. Further, the assumptions upon which such resolutions are based should also be deliberated over critically. What this tentative inroad echoes in part is an approach to democratic education which has already been advocated by the "Ministry of Education (2000) and the

National Agency for Education (2000)”<sup>1382</sup> in Sweden. The approach is based on the concept of deliberative communication inspired by Jürgen Habermas and proposed by Tomas Englund which is “understood in this [educational] context as communication in which different opinions and values can be brought face to face”<sup>1383</sup>. A Habermasian approach of “communicative ethics” has also been introduced into peace discourses together with critical theory. This has been done in order to first of all identify “the structures of domination and exclusion”<sup>1384</sup> which undergird asymmetric conflicts with a view to establishing “an independent locus for a transformative ‘discourse on peace’ [beyond them] in which all affected parties participate freely.”<sup>1385</sup> Key to this process too is the embracement and/or acknowledgement of conflict or *disagreement* which is understood as simultaneously a threat in its most serious form and “within the wider economy of action oriented to reaching understanding as a subordinate and reflective moment”.<sup>1386</sup> To return to a previous point concerning the importance of developing critical-analytical skills, knowledge on the conflict based on an academic consensus should also be understood as a platform for continual critical discussion combined with communicative deliberation. Such a platform should be constructed in order to encourage and embrace points of disagreement and agreement critically in order to avoid the establishment of a rigid consensus. The aim of this kind of critical deliberation, then, is “to represent the free play of difference in the emancipated world that discourse ethics aspires above all to promote.”<sup>1387</sup> Finally, the institution of the school itself can provide such emancipated worlds in a classroom situation peopled by what Englund refers to as ‘weak publics’. By this is meant “teachers and students” who are understood as

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<sup>1382</sup> Englund, T. (2008), “Deliberative Communication: A Pragmatist Proposal”, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, p. 504

<sup>1383</sup> Ibid, p. 504

<sup>1384</sup> Miall, H, Ramsbotham, O, Woodhouse, T, (2006), p. 296

<sup>1385</sup> Ibid, pp. 296-297

<sup>1386</sup> Ibid, p. 299

<sup>1387</sup> Ibid, p. 299

“individuals with differing knowledge and experience and differences in authority, formal as well as real, deliberating within a ‘weak public’.”<sup>1388</sup>

It is my hope that this thesis has provided the reader with a critical understanding of the cultural, political and ideological dimensions undergirding authoritative or official knowledge discourses on the conflict within the Swedish educational curriculum. It is also my hope that the reader understands the potential power that knowledge claims possess and how once such knowledge claims are established institutionally (as “truth”) they tend to exclude other knowledge claims. Further, I hope the reader also understands that critical discussion and examination of established discourses and their concomitant norms and traditions is possible at a practical level. Although I have not examined this dimension, a critical-analytical approach to one’s own practices in the presentation and representation of the historical events would greatly enhance the teacher’s own approaches too. I hope that the framework for analysis that this thesis provides will benefit the efforts of educationalists in schools towards developing a critical-analytical approach to understanding and explaining conflict histories and fulfilling the principles of democratic education in relation to this.

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<sup>1388</sup> Englund, (2008), p. 507

## Sammanfattning på svenska (summary in Swedish)

I kursplanen för historia, som är ett delämne inom de samhällsorienterade ämnesblocken på grundskolan, står det under ”ämnets karaktär och uppbyggnad” bland annat att i ”ämnet ryms en mångfasetterad bild av skeenden och händelser” där ”ingår de sociala, ekonomiska, tekniska och kulturella framstegen, men också konflikter, spänningar och maktförskjutningar inom och mellan länder.” (2000-07 SKOLFS: 2000:135) Historieämnet framställs som ett redskap för orientering i en förståelse av orsakssambanden kopplade till de olika ”skeenden och händelser” och under ”ämnets syfte och roll i utbildningen” står det också att syftet ”med utbildningen i historia är att utveckla *ett kritiskt tänkande och ett analytiskt betraktelsesätt som redskap för att förstå och förklara samhället och dess kultur*”(Ibid., min kursivering). Med andra ord är ambitionen med historieämnet att hjälpa eleverna att försöka förklara och förstå bland annat historiska konflikters uppkomst. Huruvida ambitionen har uppnåtts har många teoretiker diskuterat i samband med 90-talets ekonomiska och politiska omstrukturering. Redan då skrev Englund *et al* om de samhällsorienterade ämnenas återgång till ”sina traditionellt essensialistiska positioner”<sup>1389</sup> (Englund, Östman, 1995: 171). Andra har skrivit om en krympning av de samhällsvetenskapliga ämnenas innehåll och undervisningstimmar och en tendens att göra den svenska skolutbildningen mer konkurrenskraftig (Dahlstedt, 2007).<sup>1390</sup> Angående frågan om hur internationella frågor har behandlats i den svenska läroplanen skrev Bengt Thelin<sup>1391</sup> redan 1992 om vikten av “en läroplan som [skulle] ta upp frågor som ekologi, krig och fred, överbefolkning, flyktingar, och globala

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<sup>1389</sup> Englund, T, Östman, L, (1995/2004) article entitled ”Om orienteringsämnenas möjligheter att skapa mening: En didaktisk betraktelse av läroplansbetänkandet” in *Utbildningspolitiskt systemskifte?*, HLS Förlag, Stockholm, p. 171. ”samhällsorienterade ämnen återgår till sina traditionellt essensialistiska positioner”, ”anknytning till demokratifostran är ...”

<sup>1390</sup> Dahlstedt citerar SOU rapporten som diskuterar ”den globala tendensen till ökad integration och avreglering” och ”krav på en snabbt ökande internationalisering av den svenska utbildningen om [Sverige inte skulle] riskera ekonomisk stagnation och kulturell isolering”. SOU 1990:22 s 51

<sup>1391</sup> Bengt Thelin’s work mentioned in Pinar, W, (1995), *Understanding Curriculum*, Peter Lang, New York, p. 841. “former Director of Education of the Swedish National Board of Education”

frågor”<sup>1392</sup>(i Pinar, 1995: 841, min kursivering). Thelin diskuterade också hur “Sveriges politiska neutralitet”<sup>1393</sup> såg ut efter medlemskapet i “den europeiska gemensamma marknaden tidigt på 90-talet”<sup>1394</sup> och pekade på de möjliga “politiska och militära förpliktelser”<sup>1395</sup> som Sverige skulle vara tvungen att uppfylla i sambandet med medlemskapet. De “positive peace riktlinjer”<sup>1396</sup> som han ville införa i den centrala läroplanen erkände han stämde överens ”i stort med de mål och riktlinjer i den dåvarande centrala läroplanen”<sup>1397</sup>. Men han såg också en lucka i skolans läroplansinnehåll. Kopplingen mellan “beväpnat våld”<sup>1398</sup> och “strukturellt våld t.ex. ekonomiskt, kulturellt, och politiskt förtryck”<sup>1399</sup> var svag i den svenska läroplanen. Med andra ord betonades inte förståelsen av orsakerna till historiska konflikter kopplat till hur det internationella systemet ser och har sett ut. I den nuvarande samhällsvetenskapliga läroplanen för gymnasiet finns det dock en icke-obligatorisk kurs i ämnet internationella relationer på gymnasiet. Men med tanke på att internationella konflikter och krig inte har avtagit sedan 90-talet utan intensifierat kan det argumenteras att det redan i grundskolan behövs en bredare förankring i perspektiv om de internationella konflikternas historiska bakgrund och orsaker. För att återgå till Thelins analys kan det idag se ut som delar av hans farhågor har bekräftats. Då det i Sverige råder en marknadsideologisk konsensus och numera finns det en svensk militär närvaro under NATO:s regi i Afghanistan. Som ett bidrag till en kritisk-analytisk förståelse av internationella konflikter och hur de framställs i skolans läromedel kommer föreliggande avhandling att ta upp den drygt hundraåriga Israel/Palestina-konflikten.

Syftet med avhandlingen har varit att undersöka hur Israel/Palestina-konflikten framställs i läroböckerna i ämnet historia för nionde klass på

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<sup>1392</sup> “a curriculum that [would] address issues such as ecology, *peace and war*, overpopulation, refugees, and global issues.”

<sup>1393</sup> “Sweden’s political neutrality”

<sup>1394</sup> “the European Common Market in the early 1990s.”

<sup>1395</sup> “political and also military commitments”

<sup>1396</sup> “positive peace guidelines”

<sup>1397</sup> “in great accordance with the goals and guidelines of the then centrally issued curricula”

<sup>1398</sup> “armed violence”

<sup>1399</sup> “structural violence i.e. economic, cultural, and political oppression”

grundskolan och i ett litet antal SO-lärares uttalanden. Problemet som avhandlingen har tagit som utgångspunkt är diskrepansen mellan skolkunskapen och forskning om Israel/Palestina-konfliktens historia (Walls, 2006). Följande huvudfrågeställningar har operationaliserat avhandlingens allmänna syften:

- Vilka är de generella kopplingar (om sådana finns) mellan skolböckernas innehåll och lärarnas uttalanden om konfliktens historia och den (etablerade) forskningen?
- Hur framställs konflikten i skolböckerna och lärarnas uttalanden?

Tidigare forskning om mitt ämnesområde har jag hittat i israelisk och palestinsk forskning (Podeh, 2005; Porat, Kreiner i Crawford & Foster, 2006; Adwan, 2002; Peled i Compton & Weiner, 2009) I svenskt sammanhang har inte ämnesområdet undersökts i stor utsträckning, utan i ett antal lärarstudenters examinationsuppsatser. Dessutom har jag utgått ifrån forskningen inom läroplansteorin och utbildningssociologin där skolkunskapens politiska, ideologiska och kulturella dimension lyfts fram. I min teoriram och metodram har jag valt en kombination av innehållsanalys och diskursanalys där skolkunskap lyfts fram som en makt/kunskapsproblem. Ytterligare ett syfte med avhandlingen har varit att undersöka vilka diskurser och/eller vilken diskursordning det är som *ramar in* den officiella skolkunskapen om Israel/Palestina-konfliktens historia i läroböckerna och ett antal lärares uttalanden (Englund, 2005; Van Dijk, 2008; Foucault, 1980; Apple, 1979). De nyckelbegrepp som jag har fört till min teoriram från de utbildningssociologiska och läroplansteoretiska fälten är ideologi och hegemoni och på så sätt betonar jag diskursernas ideologiska och hegemoniska *funktion* snarare än en uppsättning kunskapsanspråk som motsätter någon *apriori* ”sanning” (Barret, 1991). Detta innebär att de kunskapsanspråk som finns i etablerade utbildningsdiskurser kan ses som ”naturaliserande” eller ”commonsense” och därmed uppfattat av såväl elever som lärare som objektiva sanningar. Fairclough betonar dock att lärare eller elever är relativt autonoma och reflektiva individer med möjlighet att skapa motdiskurser (Fairclough, 2000). Ytterligare en maktaspekt i etableringen av rådande diskurser som har lyfts fram i avhandlingen har varit interaktionen mellan olika diskurser både lokalt och internationellt och hur dessa möjligen

också kan ha bidragit till utformningen och selektionen av skolkunskapen om konfliktens historia. Till exempel kan nämnas upploppet till 67-kriget eller misslyckandet vid Camp David 2000.

Följande moment ska illustrera ovanstående interaktion av historiska händelser, diskurser, läromedel och lärare mer konkret:

- Konfliktens inherenta asymmetriska maktrelationer sedan dess början
- Viktiga händelser i den europeiska historien (t.ex. andra världskriget, Förintelsen)
- Viktiga historiska händelser utanför Europa (t.ex. 1948, 67-kriget, den israeliska ockupationen, *Intifadan*, fredsprocessen)
- Dominerande kulturella och politisk-ideologiska antaganden och premisser och hur dessa genomsyrar läroplanen
- Läroplanens och lärarnas kritisk-analytiska och demokratiska ambitioner
- De två sista punkterna som representativ av den politiska (och kulturideologiska) konsensus om läroplanens innehåll och syfte (Se Englund, 2005)
- Läroplanens och lärarnas koppling till forskning om konfliktens historia och internationella konflikter i stort
- Påverkan av ovanstående interaktionen på utformning och organisation av skolkunskapen om konflikten
- Skolor som ”*Ideologiska Statsapparater*” (Althusser, 1962) med *intellektuella* och/eller ämnesexperter (lärare) som förmedlar den officiella kunskapen om konfliktens historia (Apple, 1979)
- Lärarnas relativa autonomi, reflexivitet och skapandet av motdiskurser
- Den resulterande diskursordningen och rådande normer som fungerar som ramverk för förståelsen och förklaringen av konfliktens historiska bakgrundsorsaker

De första slutsatser som jag har dragits är kopplade till avhandlingens problem, nämligen, att kopplingen mellan forskningen, skolböckernas innehåll och lärarnas uttalande är svag. Skolböckerna förser varken lärarna

eller eleverna med en plattform för en kritisk-analytisk förståelse av konfliktens historiska orsaker utifrån varierande perspektiv. I stället är böckerna mer förankrade i ideologiska antaganden och affekt som förmedlas via en blandning av biblisk-historiska händelser, konstruktionen av metahistoriska nationella folkgrupper och selektionen av viktiga historiska händelser. Till exempel, delämnet "judarnas historia" i religionsböckerna och som införlivas i historieskolböckerna och som lärarrespondenterna utgår ifrån är representativ för den ämnesblandning som nämnts ovan. Denna "officiella kunskapens" allmänna inflytande upprätthålls också genom avsaknaden av kompletterande perspektiv som kan hittas i etablerad forskning. Trots det har skolböckerna innehållit kunskap från stridande diskurser som påvisar ett försök att inkludera flera politiska perspektiv i framställningen av konfliktens historia. Man har försökt att berätta om såväl palestiniernas som judarnas historiska lidande och har kastat både Israels och palestiniernas agerande i kritiskt ljus. Men detta försök till balans har i stort varit illusorisk, då man inte inkluderat viktiga historiska händelser och skeenden och inte heller viktiga politiska och ideologiska utgångspunkter och den historiska maktasymmetrin som präglat konflikten sedan dess början. Tendensen har varit i stället att framställa konfliktparterna som jämlika. Speciellt har detta gällt det "jämlika" anspråk till landet som identifierats i skolböckerna och lärarnas uttalanden. Jag har identifierat denna tendens som idén om "jämlikt" anspråk. Denna idé har genomsyrat nästan alla de diskurserna som jag har identifierat i denna avhandling. Tillsammans utgör dessa diskurser och idén en diskursordning; dvs., den etablerade ramverket om Israel/Palestina-konfliktens historia (idén om "jämlikt" anspråk och maktens ocklusion).



## Appendices

### Interview Guide (in Swedish)

Undervisar du någonting om konflikten i skolan?

Vilka skolböcker och annat material använder du, exempelvis, internet källor?

Finns det andra källor som man kan använda sig av?

Varför väljer du just det materialet?

Hur behandlas ämnet under lektionerna? Vilka undervisningsmetoder använder du dig av?

Vilka specifika moment koncentrerar du dig på?

Varför koncentrerar du dig på just dessa moment?

Hur förhåller du dig till böckernas innehåll/annat material?

Är det något som du tycker är bra/dåligt i böckernas innehåll?

Varför/varför inte?

Är det andra källor som du anser vore pålitligare, av bättre kvalitet?

Varför/varför inte?

Vad är din uppfattning om hur kunskapen kring konflikten presenteras?

Presenteras det exempelvis på ett balanserat/ neutralt/partiskt/opartiskt sätt eller hur tycker du?

Upplever du att det inte behövs något mer/saknas någonting i framställningen kunskapsmässigt?

Hur påverkar aktuella händelser undervisningen kring konflikten tror du?

Har du märkt några intressanta förändringar innehållsmässigt under åren?

Hur har du förhållit dig till förändringarna?

I skolböckerna brukar det presenteras ett antal delämne och tema som täcker de viktigaste händelse under konfliktens historia. (Till exempel, händelser som Förintelsen, 1948, *al-Nakba*, 67). Finns det andra tema och/eller händelser som brukar tas upp i anslutning till konflikten?

Vad tycker du om en sådan översikt av konflikten? Skulle det kunna förbättras eller räcker det som det är?

Hur mycket av den aktuella forskningen om konfliktens historia tar du upp? Till exempel, Israels ledande nyhistoriker Benny Morris i sin forskning hävdar följande att det arabiska anfallet mot staten Israel 1948 berodde främst på rädslan för berövandet av och förflyttning från eget territorium. Dessutom skriver han och andra israeliska historiker om perioden mellan 47 och 48 då en rad massaker och förintelse av palestinska byar ägde rum, dvs. innan ett anfallet på den nyetablerade staten. Morris har också diskuterat temat ”transfer” inom sionismen.

Skulle sådana fakta om konflikten inkluderas i undervisning?

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