WOMEN & DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

A Field Study on Women’s Political Participation in Post-revolution Egypt

Sandra Jaballah
Abstract

Among the countries involved in the 2011 Arab revolution, Egypt and Tunisia are considered to have developed the most. However, Tunisia is the only country recognised as having undergone a successful democratic transition, whilst the transition in Egypt has been unstable and not as prosperous. This study aims to increase the understanding of the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy, by analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the UN Security Council’s agenda on Women, Peace and Security, in mainly Egypt. To receive a comprehensive understanding of the issue, a case study is presented, where Egypt constitutes the main case of interest, and Tunisia a comparative background case.

In order to reach the objective, a two months field study to Egypt was undertaken, where interviews with relevant actors were conducted. To deepen the analysis further, this paper also includes policy documents, a note written by the Egyptian Ambassador Moushira Khattab on UNSCR 1325 and the National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030. It concludes by providing policy recommendations and by arguing that Egyptian women can bring about positive change for the country, if there is a wider and dedicated commitment to increase the respect for women’s rights and participation on all levels of decision-making.

Keywords:
Autocracy
Egypt
Democracy
Political Transition
Political Stability
Tunisia
UNSCR 1325
Women, Peace, and Security
Women’s Political Participation
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Gothenburg, 2019-05-22
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCCPA</td>
<td>Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>The Code of Personal Status</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NCW</td>
<td>National Council for Women</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
<td>Supreme Constitutional Court</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>The Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SSI</td>
<td>Semi-structured Interviews</td>
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<td>Strategy 2030</td>
<td>National strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace, and Security</td>
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1. Introduction

Prior to the 2011 Arab revolution, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was considered stable. The authoritarian rulers of many states had proven to be effective in co-opting and containing the opponents of the regimes. Yet, it only took one man’s act of desperation to unite the Arab population over their common political identity in what came to be the biggest upheaval the region has experienced in modern time (Gause III, 2011:82-85).

Out of the countries involved in the Arab uprisings, there has been a tendency by scholars to mainly focus on Egypt and Tunisia. Both countries managed to overthrow their president quite soon after the revolution began and have since held at least one democratic election. However, Tunisia is the only country recognised as having undergone a successful democratic transition, whilst the democratic transition in Egypt has not been as prosperous (Kao & Lust, 2017:1-2). The situation in Egypt has been volatile. Besides being faced with regional instabilities, the country is also experiencing socio-economic and political challenges within its borders (Abdel Ghafar, 2018:7). Consequently, one goal proclaimed by the current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is “to build a more stable future” (Middle East Eye and Agencies, 2014).

This study is limited to focus on mainly two of Egypt’s proclaimed goals, namely achieving democracy and stability. It places itself with the literature arguing that democracy is highly resilient and therefore promotes stability. However, in order to reach democracy, it’s important to understand the process of democratisation. This study builds on the literature arguing that there is a positive relationship between a strong civil society and a positive democratic transition. It intends to deepen the understanding of the impact of the civil society on the democratisation process by focusing on mainly one aspect, namely women.

One aspect of the roles of women is derived from the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) framework on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). Since the adoption of the WPS agenda in 2000, the concept of women as actors of change has been increasingly more accepted. The framework, which has a rights-based approach, is built on four pillars and aims to promote women’s and girl’s rights, the equal participation and influence of women and men in public life, prevent all forms of violence against women and girls and meet the relief and recovery needs of women and girls, in conflict and post-conflict situations (Sida, 2015:1-
2). This study is limited to focus on the first pillar of the WPS agenda, which is the equal participation and influence of women and men in peace and security decision-making processes.

One of the main limitations of the WPS agenda has been the tendency by countries to regard the framework as only relevant to countries in active conflict and post-conflict situations (UN Women, 2019:21-23). However, this paper opposes this narrow perspective and builds on the conviction that the WPS framework should be understood in a broader manner. Hence, its mechanisms are valuable for all countries, regardless of it being in the midst of, or emerging from, conflict. One of the main aims of the WPS framework is to facilitate stability and considering the development in Egypt, this research argues that these provisions also are relevant in the Egyptian context.

Women in the region have traditionally been marginalised, however, in the revolution women played a variety of key roles and their strong involvement resulted in the advancement of women’s rights reaching a peak. Yet, only a year after the revolution women were facing backlash to the expansion of their rights, causing human rights activists to question the future developments (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:22). Prior to the upheavals, Tunisia and Egypt had the most progressive perspective on women and women’s rights (World Economic Forum 2017:21). Yet, the women of both countries still struggle with persistent inequalities and discriminatory structures (Abdel Ghafar, 2018:40). Consequently, this raises a couple of questions, what are the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation in the Arab region and what is needed to facilitate women’s political participation?

The WPS agenda has been recognised as one of the most comprehensive frameworks for the empowerment and promotion of women and their rights. Consequently, this research argues that by looking through the lenses of the framework, it can help shine clarity on some of the prominent obstacles and facilitators of women in the political arena in Post-Arab revolution countries. It is mainly limited to focus on Egypt, however, to further deepen the understanding of the issue, it also includes Tunisia as a comparative background case.

1.1. Aim and Research Question
This study aims to contribute theoretically by increasing the understanding of the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy by analysing the
challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the WPS agenda, in mainly Egypt. This paper will, therefore, aim to answer one general research question and a set of more specific ones:

General research question:

*Q. How to understand challenges and opportunities for women in the political arena in post Arab-spring countries?*

Specific research questions:

*Q1: What are the current challenges to women’s political participation in Egypt?*

*Q2: What are the current existing enabling factors for women’s political participation in Egypt?*

*Q3: What would women like to change to facilitate their political participation in Egypt?*

*Q4: What roles do women perceive for themselves in the political arena in Egypt?*

In order to answer the research questions, a field study for two months to Cairo, Egypt, was conducted and a qualitative method in the form of semi-structured interviews with relevant actors was employed. To further deepen the analysis and provide for the authentication of the interviews, this paper also includes a set of policy documents, a note written by the Egyptian Ambassador Moushira Khattab on UNSCR 1325 and the National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030.

1.2. Outline

This research is divided into seven main sections. The second chapter aims at giving an overview of previous research and an understanding of the WPS framework. This is followed by the third section, which aims at explaining the case selection and providing an understanding of the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. The fourth chapter presents and discusses the methodology, including an evaluation of the method, analytical frameworks, and data used to answer the research questions. The subsequent chapter presents the results from the collected material, which are in the fifth chapter analysed and discussed. Finally, this research ends with a conclusion, where the purpose is to provide answers to the research questions.


2. Background and Theoretical Discussion

This chapter provides background information and a theoretical discussion on previous research and the WPS framework. It is divided into six sections, where the first three sections aim to discuss previous research on (1) the nexus between democracy and stability, (2) theory on democratisation and (3) women in the Arab world. This is followed by three sections which intend to (1) introduce the WPS framework and its components, (2) discuss the implementation of the WPS agenda, including challenges and gaps, and (3) present a literature review on the WPS framework and further clarify where the identified gap is and how this research intends to fill this gap.

2.1. The Democracy-Stability Nexus

This study focuses on the conflict that arose in the MENA region and led to a series of demonstrations and protests in the region. It mainly looks at Egypt and uses Tunisia as a background case. Tunisia and Egypt share some similarities. Both have a history of secular governments, a majority of Sunni Muslims and shared goals of achieving democracy and social and economic justice (The Guardian, 2014). Both countries started working on their transition to democracy shortly after the revolution had ended, however, Egypt’s transition has not been as stable or successful as the one in Tunisia. Consequently, one proclaimed goal made by the current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is “to build a more stable future” (Middle East Eye and Agencies, 2014).

This study is limited to focus on mainly two of the proclaimed goals of Egypt, namely achieving democracy and stability. Political stability is in general considered to be a positive and desirable goal and it is in this research explained as the uninterrupted continuation of states’ social and political structures and processes, without the risk of the state becoming stagnant (Malantowicz, 2017:57). The definition of democracy used in this research is in line with the UN General Assembly’s description, which is that “democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives” (UN, n.d.).

The link between democracy and stability has been increasingly more researched. One of the most acknowledged scholars researching this was Giovanni Sartori who argued that a highly fragmented and polarised party systems promotes instability. He claimed that a high
level of fragmentation of the party system reflects a high level of polarisation, i.e. an ideological diversity between parties (Sartori, 1976:124-126). This in turn would allow for parties to adopt extremist or anti-system sentiments, which would undermine the legitimacy of the regime and impede government formation. Consequently, the political system would find itself in a state with increased instability (Sartori, 1976:133). Samuel Huntington (1986:79) added to this by arguing that “as political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability and coherence of the society’s political institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained”.

The discussion above is derived from the assumption that democracy promotes instability because of the open nature of the democratic regime which allows for fragmentation, polarisation and pluralism. However, many researchers contest this standpoint and instead argue that democracy promotes stability, rather than impedes it.

“Stability, long-lasting stability, is based on democracy” (Africa Renewal, 2010). Arend Lijphart (1999:295-296) contested Sartori’s claim by arguing that democratic fragmentation and polarisation can increase the societal representation, which in turn can contain and reduce conflict, thereby promote stability. Lijphart’s work focused on the distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy. The former is a model in which the majority of the population governs, whilst the essence of the latter is “as many people as possible”. Both models accept the majority rule over the minority rule. However, in contrast to the majoritarian democracy, the consensus democracy does not concentrate the governing power with the bare majority. Instead it aims at broadening the representation and participation in government. (Lijphart, 1999:2). In his study Patterns of Democracy (1999), Lijphhart analysed the effect of consensus democracies on five performance variables; (1) political stability and absence of violence, (2) low risk of internal conflict, (3) weighted domestic conflict index and (4) low levels of deaths from domestic terrorism. He concluded by showing that consensus democracy is correlated with all indicators, thereby it performs better than the majoritarian democracy with regards to democratic quality (1999:270-273).

Similarly, Tusalel (2015:31-32) shows that states that are more democratic, are also more likely to be politically stable over time. This because democracies have lower levels of political risks with regards to ethnic and religious tensions, socio-economic grievances, internal and external threats to the regime, and direct military intervention. He argues that because of the openness of the democratic regime, there will be lower levels of oppression of
political and civil rights. Consequently, the population will be less likely to hold grievances, which in turn reduces the risk of riots, protests and other civil disturbances.\(^1\)

This study places itself with the literature arguing that democracy is highly resilient and therefore promotes stability. However, in order to reach democracy, it is important to understand the process of democratisation.

### 2.2. Democratisation Theory

Based on the description of democracy given by the UN General Assembly\(^2\), democratisation is defined as the process whereby a state transforms into a democratic regime. It is a complex process and is not likely to have a universally applicable course of development. Therefore, the discussion on what factors are the most conducive for a successful democratisation is widespread (Geddes, 2011:18-29).

Seymour Martin Lipset is one of the most acknowledged theorists on democracy. He argued that democracy is correlated with economic development, and that states are likely to become more democratic as they develop economically. This argument is rooted in the belief that an increase in states’ level of wealth would trigger socio-economic changes through a shift in the social classes of the society and a higher level of urbanisation as well as industrialisation (Lipset, 1959:100-102).

The mechanisms behind Lipset’s theory are seemingly true for many countries in the West, however, over time the main argument that all states that increase in wealth should also with time become more democratically invested has been contested. The reality in many non-Western countries speaks a different truth, which can be noted in the development of many of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as well as of many states in the MENA region. The former group of countries are recognised as emerging powers and have had striking economic developments; however, only Brazil, India and South Africa are considered to be democratic states (Öniş & Gençer, 2018:1792-1793). Similarly, only Israel

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\(^1\) See also Pérez-Liñán & Skigin (2017) who looks at the impact of party pluralism on the stability in democracies in Latin American countries between 1945 and 2010. They argue that pluralism reduces the risk of “bottom-up revolt”, since it opens up institutional spaces where opposition parties are allowed to engage in political processes. Consequently, promoting the democratic regime even further.

\(^2\) The UN General Assembly describes democracy “a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives” (UN, n.d.)
and Tunisia are recognised as democratic countries in the MENA region. However, despite Egypt being wealthier than Tunisia (Ventura, 2019), it is still considered an authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:39). This contest Lipset’s theory, which consequently has resulted in scholars taking another approach to explaining the process of democratisation.

In their study, Stepan and Linz (2013:15) analyses the democratisation process in the MENA region after the Arab uprisings. Their conclusion is threefold; (1) there is a positive relationship between democracy and the concept of “twin tolerations”, which refers to a state-religion relationship where “religious authorities do not control democratic officials who are acting constitutionally, while democratic officials do not control religion” (Stepan & Linz, 2013:17-19). (2) There is a negative relationship between democracy and sultanism (Stepan & Linz, 2013:26-29), and (3) there is a negative relationship between democracy and countries that are “authoritarian-democratic hybrids”. Countries that are under this kind of regime type cannot be considered fully authoritarian or democratic, but rather a mix of both. This phenomenon has been noted in many Arab countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon. In many of these states there have been a tendency by the leading actors to protect themselves by introducing policies that are restrictive to the development of democracy. Nevertheless, there are factors that could facilitate a transition, however, the direction of this transition, either democratic or authoritarian, would depend on the nature of those factors. For example, factors that could stimulate a transition to authoritarianism are military coups or withering feelings of the dignity of citizens. Factors that instead could encourage a democratic transition are (1) a collaboration between secularist and religious groups and (2) a civil society which is strong enough to create opposition against authoritarianism (Stepan & Linz, 2013:20-23).

Similarly, to Stepan and Linz, increasingly more scholars argue that there is a positive relationship between a strong civil society and a positive democratic transition (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996:1621) describes civil society as a multifaceted phenomenon which manifests itself “whenever people combine, in one fashion or another, to pursue common objectives”. They argue that people who engage in the civil society can gain power and knowledge to actually influence the regime (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996:1628).

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3 Sultanism is in Stepan and Linz’s study (2013:26) described to arise in the extreme case “when domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master […] [and] operates primarily on the basis of discretion”.

4 See for instance Orji (2009)
This study intends to deepen the understanding of the impact of the civil society on the democratisation process by focusing on mainly one aspect, namely women. It aims to study the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy by analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the WPS agenda, in mainly Egypt.

2.3. Women in the Arab World

“Women’s full participation in national and local politics, in the economy, in academia and the media is fundamental to democracy and essential to the achievement of sustainable development and peace in all contexts — during peace, through conflict and post-conflict, and during political transitions” (UN Women, 2011).

The establishment of democracy has in many parts of the world happened simultaneously with the development of women’s rights. This was for instance seen in Brazil, Argentina and Turkey, where women constituted key actors in their transition from autocracy to democracy (Moghadam, 2008). Looking at the Arab region, the issue of women’s empowerment got increasingly more attention with the 2011 upheavals. Women played a variety of key roles during the revolution and their broad participation came to be an important signal that change was about to happen (Karman, 2016).

According to Karman (2016), women and youth were the biggest victims of the dictatorial regime, which for decades had failed to respect their basic human rights. However, in 2011, women across the region risked their lives and instead took leading roles as initiators of protests, activists, journalist and bloggers aiming at spreading the news and sharing the developments of the revolution (Allen, 2017). Women stood as equals with their male counterparts on the front lines, calling for change, whilst also refuting the stereotype of them being voiceless and oppressed (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:2). Their strong involvement developed into a parallel movement, where women demanded justice and the full respect for their rights. This resulted in the advancement of women’s rights reaching a peak in 2011 and many

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believing that this development would be a turning point for women’s rights in the region (Song 2018:5-6).

Yet, only a year after the revolution women were facing backlash to the expansion of their rights, causing human rights activists to question the future developments (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:22). According to Abu Ras et al. (2012), this backlash “was not only unexpected, but it was against the virtues and values of the revolutions - democracy that should ensure inclusiveness - and thus ever more surprising”.

The upheavals brought political instability, internal conflicts and deteriorating economic conditions, which has had significant consequences for women (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:5). According Esfandiari and Heideman (2015:304-305), women experienced substantial decrease of their rights and access to justice after the revolution. Women across the region are being excluded or highly underrepresented in the political sphere, and the lack of explicit provisions regarding gender-based discrimination in many state’s constitutions has resulted in institutionalised gender discrimination and the reinforcement of stereotypical gender frames (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:19). Additionally, women and girls are victims of sexual, physical and psychological violence, which negatively impacts their abilities and willingness to engage in the public sphere (Song, 2018:17-18).

According to Johansson-Nogués (2013:394), the setback to women’s rights has particularly been evident in Egypt and Tunisia. Prior to the revolution, Tunisian women were amongst those who enjoyed the most progressive rights, both in the public and private sphere. Similarly, Egyptian women also enjoyed some extensive rights, however, more forthcoming in the public sphere than in the private realm (Johansson-Nogués, 2013:398). Despite the fact that both countries had quite progressive women’s laws and policies before the revolution, gender equality is still yet to achieve. In both countries, women played significant roles in the revolution. The strong scenery that developed in the beginning of 2011, spread a sense of community, mutual respect and solidarity between the genders. Subsequently, women came to expect greater roles in the society and increased respect for their rights (Johansson-Nogués, 2013:394).

However, several years after the revolution and it can be concluded that the reality has not lived up to the expectations. According to Alves (2015:314-315), the setback to women’s rights was mainly because of the issue being sidelined by the process of regime change. Consequently, Song (2018:19) notes that Egyptian” women [still] lack the resources and
pathways to seek justice and their lack of rights and freedoms is shown in every societal
establishment – the law, the economy, health care, media, and the criminal justice system”.
Similarly, Shash and Forden (2016:81-82) found in their studies that the biggest hinders for
women in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, are the framing of the constitution and the unwillingness
of the government to fully include women in all aspects of society.

Song (2018:44-45) and Johansson-Nogués (2013:399) also found that there has been a
division between the feminist movement in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, where, on the one
hand, the Islamic feminists are operating and on the other, the secular feminists. These two
movements have adopted different approaches to increasing the respect for women’s rights.
The former believes that Islam is egalitarian and gender equal, but the traditional religious
discourse has so far primarily been male-dominated and serving patriarchal interests. They,
therefore, aim to change the discourse by providing an alternative interpretation of the Quran.
The latter group are promoting Westernism values that scrutinise the role of Islam, which in
turn has created tension and challenges for these two movements to work together towards a
common feminist agenda.

Scholars seem to agree that even though the upheavals did not deliver on the promises of
women’s rights, it did fuel a discussion on women’s rights and the emergence of a new type
of feminist movement. Women in the region are increasingly more active in the political and
public sphere, raising their voices and challenging the status quo.

This study aims to expand the literature on the obstacles and facilitators for women’s
political participation in Post-Arab revolution countries, by looking at the contemporary
situation in mainly Egypt. It intends to deepen the understanding of the issue by analysing the
matter through the lenses of WPS agenda.

2.4. The Women, Peace, and Security Framework

The WPS agenda was in 2000 unanimously adopted through resolution6 1325 (2000) on
Women, Peace, and Security. The resolution is considered to be ground-breaking since it
recognises the importance of a gender perspective on peace and security. Since the passing of
resolution 1325, the UNSC has adopted seven more resolutions on Women, Peace, and
Security, each widens the scope and understanding of the importance of integrating a gender

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6 United Nations Security Council Resolutions will hereinafter be referred to as UNSCR
perspective in peace and security efforts (NATO, 2018:3). Together the eight UNSC resolutions constitute the WPS agenda7 (UN Women, n.d.).

The WPS framework was created as a response to the strong advocacy from within the UN system and civil society organisations (CSOs). It mainly derives from the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (PeaceWomen, n.d.b)

The central aim of the WPS framework is to guide the promotion and protection of women’s and girl’s rights in conflict and post-conflict situations. It is built on four pillars: (1) the equal participation and influence of women and men in peace and security decision-making processes, (2) the protection and promotion of women’s and girls’ rights in conflict-affected situations or other humanitarian crisis, (3) the “prevention of conflict and all forms of violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations”, and (4) meeting the relief and recovery needs of women and girls (Sida, 2015:1-2).

This study is limited to focus on the first pillar of the WPS agenda, i.e. the equal participation and influence of women and men in peace and security decision-making processes. In order to reach sustainable peace, the WPS agenda stresses the importance of having an integrated approach, which incorporates efforts in politics, security and development and is based on human rights, including gender equality, the rule of law and justice activities (UNSC, 2013a:2)8.

Even though women have always been involved in war and peace-related situations, the concept of WPS has only just recently become a global “norm” (Parashar, 2018:1). Women are recognised as having important roles in “prevention and resolution of conflict and in peacebuilding, […] [and] for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security” (UNSC, 2000:1; UNSC, 2008:2)9. It is stressed that women’s participation in efforts regarding conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, if meaningful, have a positive impact on the effectiveness and sustainability of those efforts and on the political will and accountability (UNSC,2015:1)10.

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8 UNSCR 2122(2013) [S/RES/2122 (2013)]


10 UNSCR 2242(2015) [S/RES/2242 (2015)]
The WPS agenda addresses not only the important role that women have in efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, but also the differentiated impact that conflict has on women and girls. Women are recognised as being the ones most affected by conflict, since they often become targets of sexual exploitation, violence, and abuse. They are also more likely to have to stay home from school to take care of the housework and the family. These circumstances have great impact on women and girls’ health, self-development, and empowerment, which later in the post-conflict process limits their capability in the social and political sphere (UNICEF, n.d.).

Even though progress has been made, there still remain gaps regarding women’s involvement in efforts of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Women are often perceived as victims rather than actors of change. They rarely receive the necessary support or financial means to reach their full potential. Additionally, other identified obstacles are lack of security, rule of law and education as well as cultural discrimination, stigmatisation and marginalisation (UNSC, 2009a:2; UNSC, 2008:2)\(^\text{11}\). Considering the impact that conflict has on women and girls, the WPS agenda stresses the importance of having effective institutions, and adequate and rapid responses to their particular needs (UNSC, 2009a:2)\(^\text{12}\). In order to maintain and promote international peace and security, the importance of a wider and dedicated commitment to increase the respect for women’s and girls’ human rights and participation on all levels of decision-making is highlighted. Emphasis is also given to the positive impact that the engagement by men and boys have on the promotion and meaningful participation of women (UNSC, 2015:2)\(^\text{13}\).

The WPS agenda recognises the need for the empowerment, including the economic empowerment, of women and girls through, inter alia, education and capacity-building (UNSC, 2013a:3)\(^\text{14}\). Member states are urged to increase their support to CSOs and women’s organisations and to consolidate these groups when adopting new strategies during all stages of decision-making. Member states and relevant actors are also advised to ensure gender mainstreaming, increase the awareness of the WPS agenda, and to take necessary measures to increase women’s involvement in decision-making, by promoting

\(^{12}\) UNSCR 1889(2009) [S/RES/1889 (2009)]
\(^{13}\) UNSCR 2242(2015) [S/RES/2242 (2015)]
\(^{14}\) UNSCR 2122(2013) [S/RES/2122 (2013)]
women’s leadership in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding efforts (UNSC, 2009a:3-4).15

There is throughout the eight resolutions reference to conflict and post-conflict situations. This language has proven to limit the perception of when and where the resolutions are applicable. This research argues that the concepts of conflict and post-conflict are broader than what has been recognised. Hence, it argues that the eight resolutions constituting the WPS agenda are relevant in all cases where stability is aspired, thus, also in post-revolution settings.

According to the Council of Europe and the European Commission (2012:54-56), the term “conflict” derives from Latin and means collision. This paper uses the definition that the Council of Europe and the European Commission highlights as useful in their study, that is: “a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns”. A conflict can thus take different forms and be violent or non-violent, expected or accidental, and manageable or unmanageable. Subsequently, the definition of post-conflict is the end of a conflict, i.e. when an agreement has been reached from the disagreement that caused the conflict to occur in the first place (Council of Europe & European Commission, 2012:89).

A revolution is in this thesis defined as a fundamental and sudden change in social and political structures. This change can either be peaceful or violent and primarily occurs when the population is unsatisfied with the regime and demands a change by forcing the ruling party to resign (Nationalencyklopedin, n.d.a). A revolution can thus be considered to be included in the concept of conflict, since it is also based on disagreements where the needs, interests or concerns of the parties involved are threatened. Similarly, post-revolution is part of the concept of post-conflict, since it is situation that occurs after the revolution has ended, i.e. when the ruling party has been removed from office.

2.5 Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda

In 2010, after a call to action derived from paragraph 17 of UNSCR 1889 (2009)\textsuperscript{16}, the UN developed a monitoring tool, including 26 quantitative and qualitative indicators (see table 1)\textsuperscript{17}. The aim of the tool is to serve as common basis for reporting on the implementation of the WPS agenda. States and other relevant actors should be able to assess the progress of the work on the WPS by using this tool. So far, it has been recognised as successful, since it has proven to increase the accountability and efforts of states to implement the WPS framework (PeaceWomen, n.d.c).

Figure 1 shows the countries that have adopted a national action plan (NAP) for the implementation of the WPS framework and the year it was launched. So far, only 79 out of 193 of UN’s member states have adopted a NAP. Out of the these, only nine countries are from the MENA region, among these are Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Palestine, and Tunisia (PeaceWomen, 2019). Egypt has recognised the importance of the WPS agenda on a regional level, and the country recently announced that it will be developing a NAP (CCCPA, 2019:1). The case of Egypt and Tunisia will be further discussed in the following chapter.

UN Women (2019:21-23) have identified several challenges of the implementation of the WPS agenda in the MENA region. Key challenges observed are the issues of awareness and availability of information about the WPS, particularly on the local level. The dialogue and workshop spaces are often limited to only a few elite actors due to language barriers and/or accessibility. There has also been a tendency by countries to perceive the WPS framework as only applicable to countries in active conflict, resulting in these countries perceiving it as not relevant for them.

Furthermore, it has been evident that some governments lack willingness, and capacity to fully engage on the WPS agenda, including to meaningfully collaborate with CSOs. Consequently, creating mistrust and the belief that there is little or no guaranteed commitment

\textsuperscript{16} Paragraph 17 of UNSCR 1889 (2009) states: “Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council within 6 months, for consideration, a set of indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of its resolution 1325 (2000), which could serve as a common basis for reporting by relevant United Nations entities, other international and regional organizations, and Member States, on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) in 2010 and beyond”

\textsuperscript{17} Table 1 presents a selection of the indicators of the monitoring tool. The selection is based on the relevancy for this study, thus, only indicators that concerns women’s participation and where the member states hold the primary responsibility of reporting back to the UN are presented.
by relevant parties to the WPS framework. The WPS agenda calls for greater involvement of women on all levels of decision-making and while there remain big gaps on this issue, it has been evident that the problem not only lies in increasing women’s representation. It has been argued that women have to constitute at least 30 percent of the decision-makers for them to have an actual influence (Un Women, 2015: 175). However, in some cases, women are only given a tokenistic place at the table to fill quota stipulations or baselines, rather than positions from where they can have actual influence (UN Women (2019:24-26).
Notes: The type of data-collection method is identified by the letters following the QN (quantitative) or QL (qualitative) denotation: “/c” refers to content analysis methods that will require systematic analysis of extracted language, whilst “/r” refers to reports to be assembled that will require a standard agreed format. Source: UN Security Council (2010) Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2010/498 (28 September 2010) Available at: [https://undocs.org/S/2010/498](https://undocs.org/S/2010/498) (Accessed 2019-07-19)
2.6 Previous Research on the Women Peace and Security Agenda

There is an extensive and growing literature on the WPS agenda, but there are still important gaps that need to be addressed. Scholars who have studied the topic in the MENA region have mainly focused on conflict-affected countries such as Iraq, Libya, Palestine, and Sudan. However, little research has been made on the WPS agenda in Egypt. Scholars who have studied the subject have looked primarily on the issue of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and gender mainstreaming in policy documents. Even less research has been made on the WPS agenda with regards to women’s political participation.

Nasser (2018), is one of the few researchers who have studied the topic of the WPS agenda in Egypt. In her research, Nasser discusses the relevance of the WPS agenda for the

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18 See for example Farr, 2011; Sherwood, 2012; Langhi, 2014; Parry & Aymerich, 2018
19 See for instance Amar, 2011
transitional process by incorporating the issues of SGBV, gender mainstreaming in national policies, and participation of women in decision-making. The aim of the research is to provide recommendations based on lessons learned from the WPS agenda. She argues that the mechanisms of the agenda should not be limited to conflict and post-conflict stages since they also are crucial to the development of democratic and resilient societies (Nasser, 2018:45).

The WPS agenda has been recognised as one of the most ground-breaking and comprehensive frameworks for the empowerment and promotion of women and their rights. Similar to Nasser, this research is also based on the understanding that the WPS agenda is relevant and beneficial for all countries, including post-revolution countries. Therefore, this research argues that by looking through the lenses of the framework, it can help bring further clarity to some of the prominent obstacles and facilitators of women in the political arena in Post-Arab revolution countries.
3. Cases: Egypt and Tunisia

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the case selection and provide a comparative understanding of the cases. It is divided into nine sections; (1) Case Selection, (2) The Egyptian Constitution (3) The Women of Egypt, (4) The WPS Agenda in Egypt, (5) The Tunisian Constitution, (6) The Women of Tunisia, (7) The WPS Agenda in Tunisia, (8) Egypt and Tunisia; Similarities and Difference, and (9) Why Constitutions Matter.

3.1 Case Selection

This study is limited to focus on Egypt, and two of its proclaimed objectives, namely achieving democracy and stability. It places itself with the literature arguing that democracy is highly resilient and therefore promotes stability. According to democratisation theory, there is a positive relationship between a strong civil society and a positive democratic transition. Therefore, this study intends to deepen the understanding of the civil society by focusing on the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy. It attempts to reach this objective by analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the WPS agenda.

There are several reasons why Egypt constitutes an interesting main case. Firstly, the revolution in Egypt, like in many other Arab countries, began because the people had had enough. After unitedly demanding a change and forcing the president to step down, the Egyptians were hopeful about the future and it did not take long until Egypt started working on its democratic transition. However, eight years after the revolution and not much progress have been made. Therefore, the question remains, why has not Egypt, and many other Arabic countries, had a more successful transition? What is lacking in these countries to facilitate a successful democratic change?

Previous research has shown that democracy cannot exist without women (OECD, 2018:10). Needless to say, the full and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of society is crucial. However, women in the region have historically been marginalised. Yet, the Egyptian women enjoyed quite progressive rights before the revolution and despite many believing that women’s rights would improve after the upheavals, substantial gender inequalities still remain (Johansson-Nogués, 2013:398). Therefore, there is reason to believe that there exists a relationship between Egypt’s failed democratic transition and the level of
gender inequality. In order to understand how women can impact the situation in Egypt, it is important to understand the challenges and opportunities for Egyptian women.

It is believed that the WPS agenda can shed a new light on the challenges and facilitators of women’s political participation in the region. Thus, analysing the issue through the lenses of the framework can bring new perspectives on why and how the meaningful participation of women in politics can increase, which in turn can provide insight on how women can help facilitate the transition to democracy, and in the longer run, stability. This is very much relevant to the case of Egypt, since two of the proclaimed goals of the county are to achieve democracy and stability.

Egypt has not yet adopted a NAP on the WPS agenda. However, the country recently announced that it will (CCCPA, 2019:2), which indicates that Egypt has acknowledged the importance and value of the framework. Considering that it is not possible to draw any conclusion of Egypt’s direct work on the WPS, Tunisia is in this study included as a comparative background case. This is beneficial since Tunisia has already adopted a NAP and will therefore, allow for a more deepened understanding of how, why and which provisions of the WPS agenda are useful for countries that are working on their democratic transition, but has not yet adopted a NAP. To conclude, by analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation, in mainly Egypt, this study believes that a new perspective to the debate will be added.

3.2 The Egyptian Constitution

Egypt is and has historically been, a strong military power with a political system based on republicanism and semi-presidentialism. Since 1952, almost all of the Egyptian presidents have had a background in the military. The country has undergone several transformations, which can be seen in the adoption of its several constitutions20 (Nationalencyklopedin, n.d.a).

The revolution of 2011 paved the way for a new political landscape, where freedom and democracy stood high on the agenda. Quite soon after al-Sisis had taken office, the country adopted its current constitution, the 2014 Egyptian constitution, after years of political and ideological polarisation. Both al-Sisi and the 2014 constitution were welcomed with opened arms and according to Shalaby (2016:11), women played an essential role in bringing them

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20 Such as the Constitution of 1953, 1956, 1958, 1964, and 1971
into power. However, after the election of al-Sisi for president, the old Egyptian political system was almost fully reinforced. Al-Sisi has worked to increase his constitutional power and in April 2019, the Constitution of 2014 was amended in favour of the president’s wishes (Landguiden, 2019a).

The constitution clearly states that Egypt is operating on the principles of democracy and republicanism, whereby the supreme power is retained by the people and their elected representatives;

“The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign state, united and indivisible, where nothing is dispensable, and its system is democratic republic based on citizenship and the rule of law” (Article 1).

“The rule of law is the basis of governance in the state. The state is subject to the law, while the independence, immunity and impartiality of the judiciary are essential guarantees for the protection of rights and freedoms” (Article 94)

According to the constitution, the democratic governing system is built on three branches – the legislative, executive and judiciary. The constitution affirms the independence of all three branches as well as of institutions, such as for human rights, the press and academia. Islam is the state religion and Sharia is the principle source of legislation. The president, which is elected every four years, is the head of state and the head of the executive. The prime minister is responsible for directing and overseeing the work of the government, which in turn is responsible of determining public policies. (Meyer-Resende, 2014:9). The Egyptian parliament is unicameral, consisting of the House of Representatives, which has 596 seats (Nationalencyklopedin, n.d.a). In addition, Egypt is divided into 27 provinces with 27 administrative units (local councils), which are entitled some legal power and are governed by governors. The representatives in the local council are elected to office for a term of four years. (State Information Service, n.d).

In 2019, the constitution was amended, giving more power to the president. Article 151 now stipulates that the president has the right to appoint two vice-presidents, the heads of the judicial bodies, the prosecutor general, the head of the Constitutional Court and the deputy
head of the Court. The constitutional amendments also include provisions giving the president the right hold office for six years instead of four (see Article 140 and 241 in appendix 4).

Lastly, the constitution also includes a set of new articles that in theory strengthens the protection of certain rights, including women’s right\textsuperscript{21}. For instance, for the first time, women are entitled full citizenship through Article 6;

\begin{quote}
“Citizenship is a right to anyone born to an Egyptian father or an Egyptian mother. Being legally recognized and obtaining official papers proving his personal data is a right guaranteed and organized by law”
\end{quote}

Despite the provision of the 2014 constitutions, Egypt is still considered an authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:39). The country has been criticized for corruption, limited respect of human rights, including freedom of expression and civic freedom, and lack of transparency (Freedom House 2018a). Additionally, many of the included provisions are vaguely formulated, leaving essential aspects to be determined by law. Although, the power supposedly belongs to the citizens, the president and the military still have significant impact on civilian matters (Fedtke, 2014:9; Meyer-Resende, 2014:4). Despite the constitution affirming the independence of the executive, judiciary, legislative and other institutions, there are no clear guarantees of how this independence is ensured. Therefore, due to interlocking institutions, there is risk for overlapping responsibilities, and hence, accountability issues. Moreover, rather than limiting the power of the military, the constitution increases its protection and allows it to enjoy greater privileges (Meyer-Resende, 2014:10-11).

\begin{quote}
“Rights and freedoms of individual citizens may not be suspended or reduced. No law that regulates the exercise of rights and freedoms may restrict them in such a way as infringes upon their essence and foundation”
\end{quote}

\textit{(Article 92)}

Apart from Article 92, the provisions aiming at strengthening the protection and full respect of human rights are note clearly specified, leaving aspects to be determined by national law

\textsuperscript{21} Constitutional provisions concerning women’s rights will be further analysed and discussed in the section 6. Analysis and Discussion of Results
(Meyer-Resende, 2014:12). Consequently, there is an issue of accountability and protection of these rights. Firstly, there exist some uncertainty regarding whether the elections after the upheavals have been free and fair. For instance, there is limited spaces for political opposition and pluralism, as liberals and Islamists are threatened with prosecution (Freedom House 2018a). Secondly, women, Christians, Shiite Muslims and LGTB-persons\(^{22}\) frequently face discrimination, and despite Egypt adopting several laws to prevent domestic violence, sexual harassment and female genital mutilation, these are still among the most acute challenges in the society. Lastly, the spaces for activism, CSOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and journalism have been, and still are, limited (CIVICUS, 2016a). However, actors meeting certain criteria stated in the law are allowed to operate, as long as they are not formed on the basis of religion, promoting too controversial issues or engaging “in work deemed to harm national security, public order, public morality, or public health” (Freedom House 2018b).

Despite the constitution being more progressive and including many improvements with regards to democratic principles, it is clear that it has so far not met the people’s expectations. Nevertheless, the constitution matters, but why does it matter? This will be further discussed in section 3.3.5 Why Constitutions Matter.

### 3.3 The Women of Egypt

Looking back to ancient Egypt, women were under the law given the same rights as men. It was the social status rather than gender that determined a person’s rights. Scholars have concluded that women in ancient Egypt enjoyed more equal rights than the Egyptian women of today (Mark, 2016). Nevertheless, Egyptian women have had the right to vote since 1956 (World Economic Forum 2017:142-143), and the country ratified CEDAW in 1981\(^{23}\) (UN Treaty Collections, n.d). Additionally, the country introduced its first quota system for the parliamentary election in 1979, which resulted in nine percent of women being elected for office. However, the quota system was short-lived and in 1986, it was completely removed. The discussion about quota systems was not re-introduced until 2009 and enforced in the 2010 election. Currently, with the 2019 amendments of the 2014

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\(^{22}\) LGTB stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender

\(^{23}\) Egypt ratified CEDAW with reservations made to three articles (2, 16 and 29), where the country confirmed compliance as long as it does not counter to the Islamic Sharia
constitution, there are articles reserving 25 percent of the seats in the local council and the parliament to women. However, there is not a quota system on the party level, nor has any Egyptian party adopted a voluntary quota (International IDEA, 2019a).

Moreover, big inequalities between men and women still persist. Egyptian women are faced with unequal opportunities in their access to education, health care and the job market (Abdel Gafar, 2018:40). In 2017, Egypt was ranked as 135 (out of 149 countries) regarding gender-equality by the World Economic Forum (2018:11). The difference in gross enrolment rate in primary to tertiary education between men and women was in 2016 quite equal, 78.9 percent and 78.4 percent, respectively (The World Bank, 2019a). However, the main gap arises in the post-graduation and pre-employment period. According to the International Labour Organisation (n.d), only 23 percent of women participated in the labour force in 2017, out of which 65.7 had higher education. This compared to the participation of men, which reached 69.6 percent with a total of 87.1 percent with a completed higher education (The World Bank, 2019b). The majority of women are working with informal jobs, due to limited opportunities and mechanisms for women to access the job market. Moreover, a large population (55 percent) believe that women are not as capable as men to hold certain position, while an even bigger proportion (85 percent) of the population think that men should be prioritised on the job market, since women bear the primary responsibility for taking care of family and domestic chores (National Council for Women [hereinafter NCW], 2017:28).

Despite big challenges facing women’s empowerment, a total of 76 women were elected for office in the 2015 parliamentary election. Out of these, 56 were elected by list, whilst the remaining were chosen by the single-seat system. In addition, al-Sisi appointed 14 women, resulting in 90 women, or 14.9 percent, taking a seat in the parliament. Table 2 shows the development of women in parliament in Egypt between 1979 to 2015. The first female minister was appointed in 1962, however, today, only 11.8 percent of all ministers are women. In addition, there are only two governors and five deputy governors who are females (NCW, 2017:26). Even though there are prominent gaps, the percentage of female voters has increased and during the recent election, women constituted 44 percent of the voters. However, a high number of women have fallen off the grid, because of lack of national identification (ID) cards, which are necessary for all citizens to be able to exercise their political, social and economic rights (NCW, 2017:28).
In March 2017, Egypt adopted a new national strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030 (hereinafter Strategy 2030). The new strategy is aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and aims at empowering women politically, economically and socially. The goal of the strategy is to enable women to become key players in the development process by 2030 (NCW, 2017:3-5).

### Table 2 The Development of Women in Parliament in Egypt

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### 3.4 The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Egypt

Egypt has not yet drafted a NAP on the WPS agenda, however, on the 31st of May, the country announced that the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA) in coordination with the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign affairs and the NCW will develop Egypt’s first NAP on WPS (CCCPA, 2019:2).

Within the region, Egypt is leading the efforts on the implementation of the WPS agenda. The Egyptian think tank, the CCCPA is responsible for Egyptian efforts in Africa and the Arab region. These efforts include training, education, and capacity building in efforts of
preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and post-conflict rebuilding (CCCPA, n.d.). The CCCPA works closely with other countries in the region on gender mainstreaming in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding as well as on training and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations (CCCPA, 2019:1-2).

Even though the NAP on the WPS is still to be developed, some efforts which are in line with the framework have already been made. These efforts include the adoption of the Strategy 2030 and the 2019 amendment of the 2014 constitution which reserves 25 percent of the seats in the parliament and local councils to women. This will be further discussed in section 6 Analysis and Discussion of Results.

3.5 The Tunisian Constitution

Three years after the revolution, Tunisia adopted its current constitution, the 2014 constitution. According to Williams and Mahmoud (2014), the constitution is a welcomed outcome after a short, but hectic period of consensus politics, dialogues, and compromises between Islamists, secularists, and liberals. It provides for a republican semi-presidential system, whereby the power is retained by its citizens and their elected representatives. It also ensures the commitment of the state to further decentralise the power.

"Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the rule of law" (Article 2)

"The state commits to strengthen decentralization and to apply it throughout the country, within the framework of the unity of the state" (Article 14)

Similar to Egypt, the Tunisian governing system is also built on three branches – the legislative, executive and judiciary. The constitution also ensures the independence of all three branches of the governing system, and of other institutions such as academia and human rights. The state religion is Islam and Sharia is the principle source of legislation. The president shares executive power with the prime minister. The former is elected for a five-year term and is responsible for both the security of the nation and its foreign policy. The
latter is appointed by the parliament and is responsible for Tunisia’s domestic policy. The legislative branch consists of a unicameral parliament, the Assembly of the Representatives of the People. The parliament consists of 217 seats, which are elected every five years (Landguiden, 2019c). Additionally, Tunisia is divided into 350 municipalities, which are entitled some power (Mekki, 2019).

“*The judiciary is independent. It ensures the administration of justice, the supremacy of the Constitution, the sovereignty of the law, and the protection of rights and freedoms. Judges are independent with the law being the sole authority over them in discharging their functions*” (Article 102)

In contrast to Egypt, the Tunisian constitution balances the political landscape by regulating the military power. It is stated that the military has to be completely neutral with regards to politics and supportive of civilian authorities (Fedtke, 2014:16-17). The constitution also includes provision that strengthen human rights, in particularly the rights of women\(^\text{24}\), children and people with disabilities. Article 49 explicitly states that rights and liberties are protected and guaranteed:

“*The limitations that can be imposed on the exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in this Constitution will be established by law, without compromising their essence.*”

According to Fedtke (2014:4), Tunisia has managed to create a balanced constitution, which incorporates a modern approach to the institutional frameworks, the branches of government and to the protection of human rights. Looking at the development of Tunisia since 2011, it has been recognised that the country has, so far, performed fairly well. However, Tunisia is only considered a “flawed democracy” (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:31-32), which is mainly due to persistent authoritarian structures, underdeveloped governance and limited political participation and transparency (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:39).

\(^{24}\) Constitutional provisions concerning women’s rights will be further analysed and discussed in the section 6. Analysis and Discussion of Results
Tunisia also has issues concerning corruption, economic stability and national security (Freedom House, 2018b). Despite efforts to decentralise the power, the law-making is still quite centralised to the executive (Fedtke, 2014:11). Additionally, the election for local councils have repeatedly been postponed, which has resulted in limited representation of opposition parties, as well as of women, in these instances. Furthermore, only Muslims are allowed to run for president, and despite more progressive human rights, LGTB is still illegal. Despite provisions ensuring freedom of expression, actors spreading controversial messages continues to be pressured from the government. Nevertheless, the democratic election in 2014 was recognised as fair and so far, the political arena is considered free, credible and somewhat opened to pluralism. Additionally, the spaces for CSOs, activists, and journalism have increased (CIVISUC, 2016b).

3.6 The Women of Tunisia

Tunisian women have for a long time enjoyed progressive rights compared to many other women in the region. In 1956, the first president of the country, Habib Bourguiba, adopted the Code of Personal Status (CPS), which was a set of laws that increased equality between men and women. The CPS included the establishment of women’s suffrage and the right for women to run for office (Landguiden, 2016b). Additionally, the country ratified CEDAW in 1985 and was in 2011, the first State in the region to withdraw all its reservations to the convention (UN Women, 2019:9).

In 2004, under the former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime, gender quota systems at the local and national levels were introduced. As a result, women received 23 percent of the seats in the parliament and 27 percent of the seats in the municipal council (The Program on Governance and Local Development, 2016:2). Additionally, in the 2009 election, Tunisia had the highest number of women in parliament in the region, namely 27.9 percent (Dahlerup, Danielsson & Johansson, 2012:5).

For the election to the Constituent Assembly in 2011, a proportional representation system was introduced, which ensured a 50 percent representation of women on the electoral lists. Despite the progressive parity system, women only received 27 percent of the seats (Dahlerup, Danielsson & Johansson, 2012:5). Nevertheless, for the 2014 parliamentary election, a vertical alternation of party lists was added to the proportional
representation system. Women now hold 47 percent of the seats in local councils and 31 percent of the seats in the parliament. In addition, the first female mayor was elected for the capital, Tunis, in 2018 (Un Women, 2019:13). However, similar to Egypt, Tunisia does not have a quota system on the party level, nor has any party adopted a voluntary system to increase women’s representation (International IDEA, 2019b).

The future of Tunisian women is looking prosperous. In 2016, the gross enrolment rate in primary to tertiary education was higher for females than men, namely 86.2 percent and 78.9 percent, respectively (The World Bank, 2019a). Additionally, Tunisia was in 2017 ranked as the 119 most gender-equal country out of 149 countries, making it one of the best-performing countries in the region (World Economic Forum, 2018:11).

3.7 The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Tunisia

Previously, Tunisia had not shown any interest in taking actual steps towards the implementation of the WPS agenda and studies have shown that lack of awareness and understanding of the framework were the main reasons for the delayed development (Rayman, Izen & Parker, 2016:4-5). However, in 2018, after calls by the civil society, Tunisia finally adopted a NAP, which is supposed to guide the country’s work on the WPS framework until 2020 (Un Women, 2019:6). According to Labidi25, the Tunisian implementation reflects the commitments made by Tunisia to international law and more specifically SDG 5, achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, (Tunisia Now, 2018).

The Tunisian NAP is built on five pillars; (1) prevention, (2) protection, (3) participation, (4) relief, peacebuilding and reconstruction, and (5) information and advocacy. It is based on one overall objective26 and five specific objectives, out of which three are in the context of increasing women’s roles and participation in the public and political sphere. The three specific goals are; (1) “promote the participation of women and girls in Tunisia in political life, governance and decision-making in order to maintain peace, resolve conflicts and

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25 Néziha Labidi is the Tunisian Minister for Women, Family, Child and Elderly Affairs,
26 The overall objective “is to empower women and girls, to promote their participation in the achievement of lasting peace and stability, to eradicate all forms of gender-based discrimination and to ensure the protection of society against the risks of conflict, extremism and terrorism” (Republic of Tunisia, Ministry of Women, Family, Childhood and the Elderly, 2018:5)

The Tunisian NAP recognises the important roles women have in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and the prevention of extremism and terrorism. It also states that “although Tunisia has not experienced armed conflict, it strives to ensure peace and security during the democratic transition, betting on the importance of adopting the gender approach at all levels to prevent the risks” of instabilities, such as armed conflict, civil wars and social unrest (Republic of Tunisia, 2018:5). This is in line with the approach taken in this paper, namely that the mechanisms of the WPS framework are relevant to all countries, including post-revolution countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia.

3.8 Egypt and Tunisia: Similarities and Differences

Comparing the case of Egypt with Tunisia; both countries are republican states, have a history of Sunni Islamism, authoritarianism and former presidents with backgrounds in the military. (Meijer & al-Zwaining, 2015:8-9). Both countries also managed to overthrow their presidents quite soon after the start of the upheavals and have since managed to hold at least one democratic election (Kao and Lust, 2017:1-2). The revolutions resulted in a change in the political landscape in both countries and even though it was comparable forces that caused the revolution to happen, the outcome of it has not been as similar as one could have expected.

Despite Tunisia and Egypt adopting their constitutions at the same time, Tunisia has managed to create a more balanced framework based on pluralism, greater decentralisation and stronger respect of human rights. Tunisia has generally managed to perform fairly well and is now considered a flawed democracy, whilst Egypt is still recognised as an authoritarian state. The Egyptian constitution also include some progressive provisions; however, it is somewhat vaguely formulated, which has impacted its implementation (Fedtke, 2014:16). Nevertheless, both countries share similar challenges to their transition to democracy, though, some more persistent in Egypt, than in Tunisia. Firstly, both countries are facing challenges concerning economic stability and national security. These issues are, however, more prominent in Egypt than in Tunisia. For instance, Egypt’s geographical location has made the
country particularly vulnerable of terrorism and extremism, which in turn has impacted its economy (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018:8).

Additionally, corruption, lack of transparency, decentralisation of power and pluralism are still prominent issues. However, Tunisia has performed better than Egypt on these points. For instance, in both countries only Muslims are allowed to run for office, but in Egypt there is also restrictions for liberals and Islamists. The power is, according to the constitution of each country, retained by the people. However, in Egypt it has been evident that both the executive and the military have important influence. Additionally, the 2019 amendments of the constitution strengthens the Egyptian military’s protection and allows it to enjoy greater privileges. Similarly, in Tunisia, the executive still retains a significant amount of power, however, unlike, Egypt, the Tunisian military does not have the same influence on political issues, though they did receive the right to vote in a new law adopted in January 2017 (Freedom House 2018a; Freedom House, 2018b). Another issue more worrying in Egypt than in Tunisia, is that of the independence of the judiciary, executive and legislative. The vague language in the Egyptian constitution has resulted in interlocking institutions, which in turn has led to overlapping responsibilities and accountability issues (Meyer-Resende, 2014:10-11).

Both countries have strengthened their constitutional language on the protection of human rights. There has also been progress on the implementation of these provisions, however, limitation to these rights still exists (Freedom House 2018a; Freedom House 2018b). Overall, human rights in Tunisia have been strengthened and citizens, including women, enjoy greater political and civil liberties. Compared to Egypt, Tunisia has a longer history of women in decision-making positions and bigger spaces for freedom of expression and civic rights (Meijer & al-Zwaining, 2015:8-9). However, discriminatory structure against LGTB-persons still remains and despite the increase of spaces for CSOs, activists, and journalists, there are still restriction on how they can operate and what they can advocated (CIVISUC, 2016b).

Egypt, on the other hand, has repeatedly been criticised for not fully respecting human rights, including freedom of expression and civic freedom. (Meyer-Resende, 2014:12). Similar to Tunisia, LGTB is illegal, however, in Egypt, women and Shiite Muslims also face discrimination on a regular basis. Lack of accountability and clear constitutional provisions are among the greatest challenges to the full respect and protection of human rights (Meyer-Resende, 2014:12). Additionally, the restrictive structures for CSOs, NGOs, media and
activist are also present in Egypt. However, these are more restrictive in Egypt than in Tunisia, since only actors meeting the criteria stated in the law are allowed to operate (Freedom House 2018b). Lastly, despite women playing essential roles in the revolutions in both countries and also in the beginning of the post-revolution period, the women of Egypt have not managed to be as successful in pushing for genuine social and political reforms (Shalaby, 2016:11).

Despite Tunisia generally performing better than Egypt, it has been evident that the reality in both countries do not live up to the progressive provisions of their respective constitutions. Thus, it may create questions of whether constitutions matter. This issue will be discussed in the following section.

3.9 Why Constitutions Matter

A constitution is a legal-political framework describing the basic principles, structures and processes of the state, the government and the fundamental rights of citizens (International Idea, 2014:1). According to Al-Ali (2012), the setting in countries transitioning from autocracy to democracy are often very complex, thus, the development of a new constitution based on democratic values might be a very time-consuming and multifaceted process.

Nevertheless, a good constitution is proven to be essential for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can be directly or indirectly transformative and have important impact on how well a state function. It can also impact the level of a state’s democracy and the quality of life of its citizens (Constitutionnet, 2016). Additionally, it strengthens the legitimacy of authorities, “enables an orderly and peaceful society, protects the rights of individuals and communities, and promotes the proper management of resources and the development of the economy” (International IDEA, 2015:6-7).

Lowenthal and Bitar (2015), have highlighted a set of factors that constitutes the basis for a successful framework; (1) it requires a broad participation and support of many, (2) it has to be inclusive and owned by the citizens of the state, and (3) it has to address central concerns of key sectors. Relating this to the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, it can be noted that despite the fact that both countries have improved their constitutions with regards to democratic values and human rights, there still remains gaps and limitations, hence, the constitutions could benefit from further amendments (Lowenthal and Bitar, 2015).
4 Methodological Approach and Design

The purpose of this chapter is to present and justify the methodological approach employed, including an evaluation of the method, analytical frameworks, and data used to reach the aim and answer the research questions:

General question:

Q. How to understand challenges and opportunities for women in the political arena in post Arab-spring countries?

Specific research questions:

Q1: What are the current challenges to women’s political participation in Egypt?
Q2: What are the current existing enabling factors for women’s political participation in Egypt?
Q3: What would women like to change to facilitate their political participation in Egypt?
Q4: What roles do women perceive for themselves in the political arena in Egypt?

4.1 Qualitative Content Analysis

The theoretical method used to analyse the collected data and answer the research questions was a qualitative content analysis. The qualitative content analysis is useful when the purpose of the analysis is to find a particular pattern in a set of texts, be it primary or secondary material, or verbal or written data. The aim of the method is to make a systematic and analytical description of the content of a text by successively classify the material in a coding frame. The coding frame is built on a set of questions and codes that are used to classify and analyse the collected material (Boréus & Bergström, 2018:50-51).

After the research questions were formulated, the first step of the qualitative content analysis used in this research was to collect and select the relevant material based on the desired generalisability. The data used in this study is derived from interviews, the 2014 Egyptian constitution, including the 2019 amendments, the 2014 Tunisian constitution, a note written by the Egyptian Ambassador Moushira Khattab on UNSCR 1325 (hereinafter Note on UNSCR 1325) and Strategy 2030. These were in the second step, following the transcription of the interviews, read repeatedly to acquire a good overall understanding of the material. In
the next step, the thematical analysing tool of the computer software, NVivo, was used to examine the material, where the content falling outside the relevance of the interview guide was left out. Based on the remaining material, a main theme was formulated, guided by the research questions. In the second step, the 2014 Egyptian constitution, including the 2019 amendments, and the 2014 Tunisian constitution, (hereinafter policy documents) were left out to be analysed separately. Thereafter, categories were created from the interviews, the Note on UNSCR 1325 and Strategy 2030 (hereinafter opinion documents). In the final step, these categories were divided into a set of subcategories, which constituted the foundation of the analysis.

The analytical framework of the opinion documents included seven codes; (1) the perception of equal participation between men and women, (2) the perceptions of women’s roles in politics, (3) current existing measures facilitating women’s political participation, (4) current existing obstacles for women’s political participation, (5) measures that should be put in place to facilitate women’s political participation, (6) measures in line with the WPS agenda, and (7) the expected development of women’s political participation.

The framework used for the analysis of the policy documents differs slightly from the main analytical framework. It is based on the same main theme; however, the focus of analysis was guided by the results of the analysis of the opinion documents, specifically the identified challenges and the enabling measures for women’s political participation. Two main elements were analysed; (1) constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation, and (2) similarities and differences between Egypt’s and Tunisia’s constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation. Figure 2 provides for an overview of the main theme, categories, and subcategories used in both analytical frameworks.
4.2 Semi-structured interviews

In order to answer the research questions, semi-structured interviews (SSI) were conducted. SSI is beneficial to use whenever the researcher is trying to receive an understanding of the perceptions of an issue. The interview guide is semi-structured and contains a set of open-ended questions (see appendix 3). It was guided by Harvard’s *Strategies for Qualitative Interviews* (n.d.) and interview guides from similar studies on women’s political participation. Open-ended questions are favourable to use when the researcher aims to receive detailed and more nuanced answers about the respondent’s experience and knowledge. In addition, open-ended questions within a semi-structured interview are beneficial since it also gives the interviewer the option to ask follow-up questions (Adams,

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All of the interviews conducted for this study were recorded and later transcribed and analysed in NVivo.

The process of selecting respondents was quite challenging. To receive first-hand knowledge about the challenges and opportunities for women on the political arena, the main plan was to conduct interviews with women that are currently active in politics. Therefore, to get better access to the relevant respondents and also a more comprehensive understanding of the situation of women in Egypt, a field study for two months to Cairo was conducted. However, these respondents were difficult to reach. Therefore, some alterations had to be made to the main plan. Instead, interviews with a set of people with different backgrounds were conducted. However, all the respondents included in this study have in-depth knowledge on the issues based on own experience and/or research. Hence, the problem of representation was solved for, since the participants still provide for a comprehensive material of analysis.

In total seven interviews with eight respondents were conducted, six were held in English and one in Arabic with the help of an English interpreter. Additionally, three of the eight respondents wanted to be anonymous and only include the name of the organisations they were representing. The first interview was conducted on the 11 of February 2019, with a representative of the Peace and Security Department of UN Women’s Regional Office for the Arab States in Cairo. The interview session lasted for about 33 minutes and mostly covered general information on the WPS agenda and women’s roles in decision-making processes, mainly focusing on countries in the region.

The second interview was held on the 13 of February 2019, also in Cairo. The respondent was Laila Mohamed Kandil, who is a lawyer and the former head of the Department of the Officers at the Ministry of Interior of the Arab Republic of Egypt. In the interview, which lasted for 26 minutes, Kandil gave her perception of the challenges and opportunities for Egyptian women on the political arena. Owing to language barriers, an interpreter was brought in for this particular interview. The limitations of conducting an interview with the help of an interpreter will be discussed below.

The third interview took place on the 7 of March 2019, over Skype with two representatives from CCCPA’s department for Peace and Security. For about 50 minutes the two representatives talked about the work of Egypt and the CCCPA on the WPS agenda in the region. They also touched upon the challenges and opportunities for Egyptian women in the political sphere in Egypt. Since both respondents asked to anonymously represent their
organisation, this interview will be treated as one, i.e. the respondents’ answers will not be treated separately.

Furthermore, a fourth interview was held on March 19, 2019, with Hoda Elsadda, professor of English and Comparative Literature and a founding member and current chairperson of the board of trustees of the Women and Memory Forum. The interview was held at the office of the Women and Memory Forum in Cairo. Elsadda was one of the five women involved in the drafting of the 2014 Egyptian constitution and during the interview, which lasted for 25 minutes, she talked about her experience on being on the constitution drafting committee and also about the general situation of politically active women in Egypt.

The fifth interview was conducted on March 20, 2019, with UN Women’s country representative for Egypt, Blerta Aliko, at UN Women’s Country Office for Egypt in Cairo. During this interview, Aliko explained Egypt’s approach and work on the WPS agenda. Additionally, she talked about some of the challenges and opportunities that currently exist for politically active women, and also about the efforts of the government to increase women’s roles in society and politics.

The sixth interview was held on the 1 of May 2019, over Skype with Marwa Shalaby, visiting scholar to the Program on Governance and Local Development at the University of Gothenburg and lecturer on research methodology, gender and politics of the Middle East. Through her own research, Shalaby has managed to get access to information and a comprehensive understanding of women’s issues in the MENA region. For about one hour and ten minutes, Shalaby talked about women’s rights, as well as the challenges and possibilities that women face in society and politics in both Egypt and Tunisia.

Finally, the seventh interview was conducted over Skype with UN Women’s Country Program Manager for Tunisia, Héla SKhiri. The interview lasted for 52 minutes and mainly covered the developments of, and challenges for women’s political participation in Tunisia. It also touched upon Tunisia’s work on the implementation of the WPS agenda.

4.3 Note on UNSCR 1325 and the Strategy 2030

In addition to the interviews, one note was received through personal communication with Ambassador Moushira Khattab, former Minister of Family and Population of Egypt. The note includes Ambassador Khattab’s view on the WPS agenda and her thoughts on the framework
in the Egyptian context. The note provides for good complementary information to the interviews since she has the first-hand experience of being a woman active in politics in Egypt. In addition, the Strategy 2030 is also included as a document of analysis, since it is a primary source of document provided by Egypt’s governmental entity for the empowerment of women, the NCW. The document portrays the current challenges and possibilities of Egyptian women in, inter alia, the political sphere.

4.4 Policy Documents
In order to get a more comprehensive understanding of women’s legal rights and opportunities in politics in Egypt and Tunisia, this research also includes the current constitutions of both countries, that is the 2014 Egyptian constitution, including the 2019 amendments, and the 2014 Tunisian constitution.

4.5 Analytical Framework
The material retrieved for this study was analysed in NVivo through the method of qualitative content analysis. All data, except for the interviews, are presented as citations in their original form. Interview quotes are presented in their condensed form for clarification purpose, however, the content has not been altered.

The first analytical framework comprises the interviews, the Note on UNSCR 1325 and the Strategy 2030. The documents included in the first analytical framework will hereinafter be referred to as opinion documents since all of them express opinions on the identified subcategories and can thus easily be analysed jointly. Each respondent and the two documents have been appointed a number from 1-9. The coding is as follow:
Table 3 Coding of Opinion Documents

| #1: | Representative of the Peace and Security Department of UN Women’s Regional Office for the Arab States in Cairo |
| #2: | Laila Mohamed Kandil |
| #3: | Representatives of the Peace and Security Department of the CCCPA |
| #4: | Hoda Elsadda |
| #5: | Blerta Aliko |
| #6: | Marwa Shalaby |
| #7: | Héla SKhiri |
| #8: | Note on UNSCR 1325 |
| #9: | Strategy 2030 |

The analytical framework of the opinion documents included seven codes; 1) the perception of equal participation between men and women, (2) the perceptions of women’s roles in politics, (3) current existing measures facilitating women’s political participation, (4) current existing obstacles for women’s political participation, (5) measures that should be put in place to facilitate women’s political participation, (6) measures in line with the WPS agenda, and (7) the expected development of women’s political participation.

The second analytical framework includes the legal documents. These have also been appointed a number from 1-3. The coding is as follow:

Table 4 Coding of Policy Documents

| #1: | 2014 Egyptian constitution |
| #2: | 2019 amendments of the 2014 Egyptian constitution |
| #3: | 2014 Tunisian constitution. |

For the analysis of the legal documents two elements were considered; (1) constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation, and (2) similarities and differences between Egypt’s and Tunisia’s constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation.
4.6 Limitations and Delimitations

This research, like any other, has some limitations and delimitations. Out of the seven interviews, only two were with women who have first-hand experience working in the political arena in Egypt. Therefore, all of the respondents cannot be treated as giving a perception received through direct access to experience. Nevertheless, since the respondents, in one way or another, have expert knowledge on the issue, their input provided for a good general understanding of the issue and thus the problem of representation was solved for. In addition, Ambassador Khattab’s note constitutes a good compliment to the interviews, since she also has the first-hand experience of being an active female politician in Egypt. However, one limitation that can be noted from retrieving Ambassador Khattab’s perception from the note, is that it does not touch upon all issues included in the interview guide, nor did it allow for follow-up questions, which limited the possibility to draw any further conclusion from sections that were a bit unclear.

For one of the interviews, the help of an interpreter was needed. This provided for limitations regarding the ability to get a fully correct translation, since there is not always an equivalent meaning of Arabic words in English. However, since the interviews aimed at catching the respondent’s perception of the challenges and opportunities for politically active women, rather than comprehending the latent meaning of the answers given by the respondents, the issue of correct translation could be somewhat overlooked. Nevertheless, I know some Arabic and could thus account for the issues by asking follow-up questions or clarification whenever something was not clear.

Three of the respondents asked to be kept anonymous and to only included the name of the organisation that they are representing. In cases of authoritarian states and perhaps issues of limited possibility to speak freely, I would argue that anonymity provides for a more secure space where the respondents can feel safe to express their minds. Therefore, they will be more likely to answer the questions honestly. Hence, the issue of anonymity is not seen as a limitation in this particular case.

Furthermore, it would have been interesting to also include an interview with one representative from the NCW, but because of limited time and the inability to get in touch with them, the decision to not include them was made. Nevertheless, since it was possible to access the Strategy 2030, which is a primary source of document addressing the issues relevant to this research, the problem can be seen as somewhat solved for. Nonetheless, the
limitations highlighted for the Note on UNSCR 1325, namely the limited issues included in the document and the inability to ask follow-up questions, can also be argued for in this case.

In order to account for possible limitations of not having enough variety with regards to the opinion documents, this study also includes primary data in the form of legal documents. The inclusion of these documents allows for triangulation of the data, and thus, a more comprehensive review of the material. However, in order to allow for research depth, some delimitations to the focus of the study had to be made. Firstly, this research only includes three legal documents, i.e. the countries’ current constitutional framework. However, since this study is mainly focusing on the contemporary situation in mainly Egypt, but also Tunisia, these frameworks are the most relevant to analyse and thus sufficient to give a justifiable understanding. Moreover, this paper does not aim to touch upon all the issues included in the legal frameworks, since it only focuses on the content that addresses women’s involvement in the realm of politics.

Another delimitation made because of limited time and scope was regarding the number of interviews conducted with regards to Egypt and Tunisia. Since this study primarily focuses on the challenges and opportunities for women in politics in Egypt and only has Tunisia as a comparative background case, the proportion of interviews concerning Egypt is bigger than the one concerning Tunisia. Nevertheless, the comparative element of this study is based on the interviews and also the background and previous research chapters, which provides for an equally extensive discussion of each case.

Lastly, when the interviews for this study were conducted, Egypt had not yet announced that it would be developing a NAP. Therefore, if these interviews were to be conducted at present time, the answers provided for the question regarding the WPS agenda could be slightly different.

4.7 Validity, Reliability, and Transferability

In the method of qualitative research, validity concerns the credibility of the interpretations of the included data (Silverman, 2013:285). Reliability, on the other hand, is the probability that a different observer would retrieve the same results by conducting the same research with the same method and data. Thus, in order to have validity, one must also have reliability (Silverman, 2013:448).
A qualitative interview study poses some difficulties when it comes to reliability. All interviews are unique and can be impacted by factors such as the interviewer’s technique and experience. To increase the reliability of the data retrieved, test interviews, and one-to-one interviews were conducted in beforehand (Conwall et.al, 1995:575-576). Secondly, triangulation allows for the comparison of the interviews and the legal documents. This technique provides for the authentication of the collected data and thus, increases both the validity and reliability of the study. (Silverman, 2013:449). Thirdly, the data was analysed several times, also with some time in between each session, to make sure that the interpretation would be consistent (Kvale, 1995:22).

Lastly, in order to ensure that the interviews would accurately portray the phenomena analysed, the technique of ethical consideration in combination with transparency was used. The interview guide was carefully drafted and tested with neutral subjects before the actual interview sessions. Additionally, in order to provide for a more secure space where the respondent could speak freely on the issue, the respondents were in advance informed about the purpose of the interview and the research. They were also given the opportunity to be anonymous and it was made clear that their participation was voluntary, and that they had the right to abstain from answering questions.

Finally, the transferability of a research is according to Shenton (2004:69) concerning the extent to which findings of one study are generally applicable to other cases. The findings of this research are not expected to yield exactly the same outcomes in other states since all countries have different historical backgrounds, developments, and conditions. Nevertheless, given that the aim of this research is to study the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy by analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the WPS agenda, parts of the results retrieved here could be transferred to other cases and provide for findings that are similar and in line with the ones of this research.
5 Results

This section presents a summary, citations and quotes on the results retrieved from the opinion and policy documents. The analysis of the opinion documents is based on the subcategories identified in the analytical stage. Moreover, the analysis of the policy documents is based on the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation identified from the analysis of the opinion documents as well as a discussion on constitutional language on women’s rights, including similarities and difference between the Egyptian and Tunisian constitution.

5.1 Opinion Documents

5.1.1 The Perception of Women’s Roles and Equal Participation Between Men and Women in Politics in Egypt:

#9 [...] the belief that the Egyptian state’s stability and progress will only be achieved by ensuring the active participation of women in all aspects of national work [President al-Sisi’s Speech at the Celebration of the Egyptian Women’s Day 2017, 21 March 2017, (In Preamble)]

There is a general understanding that women currently are underrepresented in the political arena in Egypt. Only one respondent stated that it was not a critical issue, though all agreed that women have to be included on all levels since they constitute half of the population and would thus bring a more balanced representation of the public opinion. Moreover, there seems to be an agreement that there has been some progress regarding women’s political participation, which partly has been evident in the number of women in ministerial and leadership positions.

#2 No, of course they do not have equal participation. It’s not a critical problem, but I really believe that both men and women should be involved in politics.

28 For more extensive citations and quotations see appendix 1 and 2
We do have a lot of progress when it comes to this. We have more than six ministers now who are women and they actually work on different topics that are not really the normal topics tackled by women in general.

The opinion documents clearly emphasise that women have important roles to play in political decision-making. It is stressed that women tend to focus on more prominent issues, such as healthcare, education, and livelihood, whilst men are usually more concerned about the issue of power. This mainly because women and their children are usually the ones most affected by conflict, which makes them keener to find a sustainable solution quickly. It is also noted that the increased inclusion of women can result in reduced levels of corruption and discrimination. Women are also recognised as being agents of peace, effective decision-makers and crucial for the progress and stability of Egypt.

Some studies have proven that having more women can actually reduce the level of corruption at a governmental level and at national level. They can bring different perspectives looking at maybe ensuring that financing is available for education, social care and so on. Generally, we think that women are more effective because they are the victims with their children of the conflict, they are more impacted by the conflict.

The way I see it, is that they bring a different perspective, they bring a different experience and it’s always more enriching than just having only men.

Voices of women can help create better institutions and stronger instruments. Women’s voice is capable of accelerating a revamped cultural, social and legal infrastructure that guarantees peace and security for every citizen without any discrimination.

However, the opinion documents also stress that the increased inclusion of women does not necessarily translate into increased gender equality or gender mainstreaming since there are women that does not have the means or keenness to use their voices to promote women’s empowerment, women’s issues or change in general. Additionally, some of the respondents noted that women and men can serve the same roles if they are equally supportive of women’s issues. Yet, it was stressed that women generally are more effective at certain positions that
concern social, cultural and legal structures, because of the different experiences and perspectives that they bring.

#1 [Women’s roles are] hugely important. [...] Having women is key and definitely useful. It doesn’t mean that it will translate automatically into gender sensitive policies or programs. There are some women that might not promote it that way, but it helps [...] 

#2 I believe that men and women can play the same roles, but if we talk about women specifically, I believe that in certain positions that serves social purposes, a woman might perform better, women do definitely improve the efficiency of decision-making processes because women bring certain points of view that might help.

5.1.2 Current Existing Measures Facilitating Women’s Political Participation:

Except for the measures included in the constitution, only one respondent knew of any other existing measures aiming at increasing women’s political participation. She explained that the government of Egypt has created a presidential youth and leadership program, which aims at empowering young women and men. Moreover, she mentioned that there are millions of women living off the grid, due to lack of some form of identification. The government has, therefore, put forward efforts to provide these women with ID-cards, to enable them their basic human rights.

#4 [...] So, so far at least I’m not seeing the parliament doing very much to support women’s rights.

#5 There are big efforts put forward by the government [...] under the leadership of the National Council for Women and the Ministry of Interior which equips those women with the ID-cards and integrates them in the national programs
5.1.3 Current Existing Obstacles for Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:

There were some disparities regarding the perception of existing obstacles for women’s political participation. Some of the respondents claimed that the challenges lie in the cultural and social structures of society. Whereas, other respondents argued that the authoritarian nature in Egypt was the main challenge for women’s participation. Additionally, women’s empowerment was stated as not being a prioritised issue in a world dominated by men, where power structures are present and where women have to adapt by constraining their voices as a trade-off for being included in the decision-making realm. Other factors that were seen as obstacles were lack of education, political will, ID-cards and services supporting women’s involvement.

#4 I would argue that we always need political will. Also, there are all sorts of traditions, obviously there are cultural problems, but I would highlight the political problems that support the argument that women’s issues are not a priority.

#5 I think this is really a social issue, the problem is that no one is relieving her from her other duties that she has. So that actually it has to do with education and the overall levels of engagement there.

#6 [...] And because of the authoritarian nature of their regime, men are not giving them a chance to run. It is because of those hungry for power, the top, they don't want to leave any space for the women to have any kind of say in decision-making process.

However, some of the respondents challenged the belief that limited access to education and power structures were the main problem. Instead, the mentality of the population and religious propaganda, such as traditional stereotypes, were emphasised as the primary challenges.

#2 I believe that men and women are provided with the same tools when it comes to education and the freedom to get involved with any part the ministry.
The Egyptian society witnessed transformations that propagate negative values, fostering an inferior view of women in society over the past few decades, adding to the challenges of women’s empowerment […] (p.11)

5.1.4 Measures That Should Be Put in Place to Facilitate Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:

Even though the opinion documents did not fully agree on the challenges, they do, however, seem to agree on the factors that should be put in place to enable women’s political participation. Quota systems on all levels were the main measure emphasised to increase women’s political participation. However, since Egypt has enacted quota systems before, the respondents were quick to point out that quota systems should not be endorsed alone. It was stressed that women’s empowerment is a collective responsibility that would benefit from having institutions and policies structured in a gender inclusive way. Moreover, the respondents argued that the quota stipulation should allow for a minimum inclusion of women, otherwise there is a risk of limiting the proportion of women to only meet the baseline of the quota. Additionally, it was stressed that a minimum of 30 percent of women in parliament was to strive for, since it could automatically translate into change.

Quotas are often set forward as a preliminary step to increase women’s participation […] if you have, for instance, within a parliament more than thirty percent women, there is an automatically sort of change and impact from that gender perspective into the law making. […] You should always when you mention a quota say “a minimum of” to ensure that it can always be higher so people don’t limit themselves to twenty percent

Quotas have been one method to address the obstacles facing women […] I mean you see quotas are not just in parliament, you can have quotas on many different levels, you can have them at the level of local councils, at the level of parties.

The opinion documents also emphasised the need for services, such as childcare and access to education, and a change in the discourse regarding women’s political participation through
awareness and encouragement programs. Other measures mentioned were the inclusion of NGOs and CSOs in the discussion, as well as the allocation of a budget specifically aimed at empowering women.

#1 [...] if you have quotas and to increase women’s participation it should be also supported by programs that you know support women locally to present themselves as candidates, to encourage women to take certain positions and promote them in doing so. It’s also like providing them with technical support, enhancing their voices et cetera.

#2 Childcare is definitely a measure that could help. [...] I believe that we need more awareness programs for women, to make them aware that they should be involved.

#5 So, if you ask me what the key to empowerment is, it’s from the education and civic empowerment activities. I think that they are all interrelated, so the education gives you the space, the culture, the opportunity to be out first of all.

#9 [...] The Strategy affirms the necessity of engaging civil society organizations in implementing its programs and activities, especially Non-Governmental Organizations (p. 61-62)

5.1.5 Expected Development of Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:

#2 I believe that in the upcoming decade it’s going to be much better and women will be involved more, because people are getting more aware of the idea of having women in politics.

There was not a coherent response when looking at the future development of women’s political participation in Egypt. Some of the respondents were very positive, stressing that Egypt is on the right track and that the progression of women’s participation would be a natural course. However, everyone did not share this view and were rather sceptical regarding
the future developments. According to the more unconvinced respondents, the future of women in Egypt will depend on whether all groups, especially men and boys, priorities women’s empowerment and also if women jointly raise their voices and call for a change.

#4 There has to be a decision to prioritize women’s issues. So, things don’t change on their own, but you have to have a strong women’s movement that support these changes

#6 In Egypt the next years I think, given the political atmosphere that they’re operating under, I think that they will continue navigating their way within the parameters of the authoritarian regime that is still in place.

#9 Its success depends on the active participation of all social groups, especially men and boys, besides all State institutions and its executive bodies (p.7) [...] Vision By 2030, Egyptian women will become active contributors to the achievement of sustainable development in a nation that guarantees their constitutional rights, ensures their full protection, and provides- without discrimination- political, social, and economic opportunities that enable them to develop their capacities and achieve their full potential (p.21)

5.1.6 Current Measures in Line with the WPS Agenda in Egypt:

Egypt has not yet created a NAP on the WPS agenda, which according to the opinion documents is because the country does not consider it to be relevant, since it is currently not in an active conflict. However, even though Egypt has not taken any direct measures to implement the agenda, there have been some developments on the national level that are in line with the WPS framework, such as efforts against SGBV and recovery assistance to refugees seeking refuge. Additionally, the majority of the respondents agreed that the provisions of WPS framework was important, even in the case of Egypt, and some even stressed that Egypt need to create a NAP for the future development of the country. However, noteworthy is that only four of the respondents were aware about the existence of the WPS agenda.

Note: The interviews were conducted before Egypt had announced that it would develop a NAP.
Egypt, they don’t have a 1325 action plan and their kind of approach to it is that they don’t really need one. They don’t consider it applies to them. [...] but indirectly they are focusing a lot on women’s participation, which is one of the pillars. They are also working on kind of recovery with assistance to refugees seeking refuge, so they are touching upon some of these pillars.

If you want to talk nationally, I don’t think we can do that, again the context is conflict and post-conflict and Egypt is not in that situation.

We [Egypt] need to formulate a national plan of action which targets the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions. [...] Finally, we need to raise awareness of Security Council resolutions and [...] this includes strengthening the perception of women as peace makers and agents for change not only as victims.

Despite Egypt not developing a NAP, the country is seen to be one of the leading actors in the region regarding the WPS agenda. In this context, Egypt has several times stressed the importance of incorporating all four pillars of the framework, and particularly the meaningful participation of women as agents of peace.

Most of the time we work on the implementation of the women peace and security agenda in the region and in Africa, including 1325 and its four pillars and including of course the participation pillar.

Egypt was even spearheading the efforts of the region in developing a regional strategy for 1325.

5.1.7 Egypt vs. Tunisia:

Egypt is a very strong positive example for the Arab States, but also for Africa and the African Union. But also Tunisia because, Tunisia has made huge progress and especially on some of the laws are like amazing, but Egypt is another country with a lot of other dynamics and the population is much bigger and more complex [...]

Comparing the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, one can note that the respondents seem to agree that both countries have, to some extent, had a positive development. However, it was noted that Tunisia has had more conducive conditions for prosperous change than Egypt. This mainly because of historical factors that have impacted the empowerment of women.

Shalaby, who in her interview gave a very comprehensive explanation of why she believes Tunisia has been more successful, argues that it is due to the dynamics of both countries and the way in which women can be used for purpose of gaining more support. She claimed that this is the main reason why women’s rights have been more progressive in Tunisia and hence, why the democratic transition has been more prosperous. Additionally, Aliko stated that whilst Egypt and Tunisia might be similar in many ways, there are also big differences with regards to the complexity of political issues in each country.

#6 So, you know that since Bourguiba, since the independence in 1956, [...] Women was always part of this kind of strategies and he shared this kind of state feminism approach where he used women’s issues to empower his own regime and also to have this effect encounter any Islamist kind of effect that might shake his rule. [...] 

#6 You will find a totally different picture in Egypt for instance [...] It's problematic in Egypt because Mubarak was not a feminist and he was not secular, and he was not interested in promoting women’s rights. [...] When Sisi came to power, it became even more dangerous. It is really dangerous when you use women’s issues, for your own gains and this is what Sisi has been doing systematically over the last five years.

Furthermore, SKhiri argues from the perspective of the UN Women that the 30 percent of women that are now in office in Tunisia will result in increased chances for women to actually have meaningful influence on the decision-making in the country. However, similarly to the women of Egypt, she also notes that Tunisian women face challenges concerning traditional stereotypes and their traditional responsibilities. Thus, she emphasizes the importance of an inclusive approach, where men and boys, the civil society and women activists are involved in the development of women’s political participation and rights.
So, we think that as the standard of the of 30 percent of presence of women is the percentage that could give the opportunity for women to influence the decisions. So, we are in a good path.

We see some obstacles sometimes a reluctance from women to accept to go for more responsibility because they have such a workload due to their responsibilities, their familial responsibility, all their duty that they continue to do even if they have no other responsibilities.

We have to continue the support to civil society directly to avoid any backlashes in gender equality attachments and we have to work more on social changes and work more with the youth. Work more with boys and girls, to ensure the most inclusive that we can do.

5.2 Policy Documents

Article 53: Citizens are equal before the law, possess equal rights and public duties, and may not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, social class, political or geographical affiliation, or for any other reason.

Article 21: All citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any discrimination. The state guarantees freedoms and individual and collective rights to all citizens, and provides all citizens the conditions for a dignified life.

The policy frameworks all include some similar provisions concerning women’s rights. All frameworks included at least one article stating that citizens have equal rights and opportunities before the law, including public rights without any discrimination. In addition to the Egyptian constitution granting women full citizenship for the first time (Article 6), it also entitles them to hold public posts and senior positions, such as ministers and judges, without discrimination. Similarly, the Tunisian constitution also grants women the right to run for office and higher positions without discrimination. However, it takes it one step further by
using the term “he/she” in the provisions relevant to the individual\textsuperscript{30} and by also stipulating that the state will ensure work on the basis of competence.

\textbf{\#1&2 Article 11:} The state commits to taking the necessary measures to ensure appropriate representation of women in the houses of parliament, in the manner specified by law. It grants women the right to hold public posts and high management posts in the state, and to appointment in judicial bodies and entities without discrimination.

\textbf{\#3 Article 34:} The rights to election, voting, and candidacy are guaranteed, in accordance with the law. The state seeks to guarantee women’s representation in elected bodies.

\textbf{\#3 Article 40:} Work is a right for every citizen, male and female. The state shall take the necessary measures to guarantee work on the basis of competence and fairness. All citizens, male and female, shall have the right to decent working conditions and to a fair wage.

The Egyptian constitution includes a 25 percent quota for women and another 25 percent quota for youth, including young females, in the local councils. It also ensures the commitment of the state to taking the necessary measure to increase women’s representation. Additionally, there is only one significant difference between the 2014 Egyptian constitution and the 2019 amendments with regards to women’s rights, namely, that it now includes a quota stipulation reserving 25 percent of the seats in parliament to women. Similarly, yet somewhat more progressive, the Tunisian constitution provides for a parity clause aiming at reaching equal representation of men and women in all elective assemblies.

\textbf{\#1&2 Article 180:} […] one quarter of the seats [in local councils] are allocated to youth under 35 years old, one quarter is allocated for women […]\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{30} For instance, Article 77 regarding the president states The President of the Republic is responsible for representing the state. \textit{He/she} is responsible for determining the general state orientations in the domains of defence, foreign relations and national security in relation to protecting the state and the national territory from all internal and external threats, after consultation with the Head of Government.
**#2 Article 102:** The House of Representatives is composed of no less than four hundred and fifty members elected by direct secret public ballot. At least one quarter of the seats shall be allocated to women.

**#3 Article 46:** The state works to attain parity between women and men in elected Assemblies.

Lastly, both the Egyptian constitution and the Tunisian constitution commits the state to ensure protection against all forms of violence, as well as the protection and care for women in, inter alia, motherhood and childhood. They also guarantee the state to ensure women’s empowerment by helping women balance her work with her duties towards the family, and by providing free education and eradicate illiteracy.

**#1&2 Article 11:** The state commits to the protection of women against all forms of violence, and ensures women empowerment to reconcile the duties of a woman toward her family and her work requirements.

**#3 Article 46:** The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights and work to strengthen and develop those rights [...] The state shall take all necessary measures in order to eradicate violence against women
6 Analysis and Discussion of Results

Based on the retrieved data, women in Egypt have enjoyed increasingly more rights after the 2011 revolution. However, the overall perception is that women and men are still not considered equals. Despite previous research on perceptions of Egyptian men and women in the workforce arguing that men are better suited for certain positions and should be prioritised on the job market, the results of this study do not agree. Instead, it reaffirms the argument of the WPS agenda by showing that there is a belief that the inclusion of women tends to reduce levels of corruption and discrimination as well increase the effectiveness and sustainability of the decisions taken.

The material collected suggests that Egyptian women have always participated in the political sphere, but, their voices have not been given any meaningful consideration. The WPS agenda clearly state that in order for women to have meaningful influence in the political arena, it is important to have well-functioning institutions and a wider and dedicated commitment to increase the rights of women. However, it seems as if the Egyptian government has not, and is still not, fully prioritising the promotion or inclusion of women, be it politically or socially. This challenge for women is not new, nor is it limited to the case of Egypt. Previous studies have found evidence that women’s rights in region is not developing because the issue is being sidelined by the process of regime change, lack of willingness of the government to include women in all aspect of society and gender-discriminating framing of the constitution.

Nevertheless, the 2019 amendments of the 2014 constitution include additional language stipulating a 25 percent quota for women in parliament and the local council. This is a positive development for Egyptian women, particularly considering that it before only included the vague formulation; “the state commits to taking the necessary measures to ensure appropriate representation of women in the houses of parliament”. Hence, it gave the legislator the responsibility to define what “appropriate” means. However, the question now is whether this is enough to actually facilitate women’s meaningful participation. Considering that theory argues that for real change to happen, there has to be at least a 30 percent representation of women, it is not surprising that some of the respondents are rather sceptical towards future developments.

31 See for instance, Alves, 2015; Johansson-Nogués 2013
32 Article 11 of the 2014 Egyptian constitution.
Additionally, the results suggest that in order for women to actually have an influential voice and to contribute a successful democratic transition and in the long run political stability, certain measures have to be taken. Firstly, women need to be aware of their possibilities, rights and potentials. To reach this objective, awareness and encouragement programs, such as civic and education programs that include the important message of the WPS agenda, should be utilised. Considering that Egypt has announced that it will be developing a NAP on the WPS agenda, one can assume that this objective is feasible and a priority of the government.

Secondly, the institutional mechanisms that are currently in place have to be adjusted to further promote and enhance women’s political involvement. To reach this objective, additional quota systems should be put in place on all levels, including on the party level. Moreover, these quota systems should not include a limitation in the form of a minimum stipulation, and they should not be introduced alone. According to previous research and the opinion documents, one of the biggest challenges for women in the region, including in Egypt and Tunisia, is the presence of traditional stereotypes and gender roles. Therefore, it is argued that measures relieving women from their traditional obligations, such as child care and parental leave, are central to increase the capabilities of women in the political sphere.

Thirdly, similar to what has been stated in the WPS agenda, this research finds that there has to be a broader involvement of the whole society to promote women’s rights and participation. Therefore, it is essential to include both men and women as well as boys and girls in the discussion. Additionally, and what is noteworthy is that some of the respondents argued that men can bring about the same change as women, as long as they share the traditional values and morals of women. Consequently, the awareness and encouragement programs mentioned above, also need to target men and boys to further refute traditional stereotypes and increase the conduciveness of the advancement of women’s rights.

Fourthly, and similar to previous research, this study finds that the framing of the current Egyptian constitution is too vague. The constitution needs to be more inclusive, distinctly formulated and aim to advance women’s rights. For instance, as Meyer-Resende and Song found in their studies, the vague language in the Egyptian constitution has resulted in interlocking institutions, which in turn has led to overlapping responsibilities and

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33 See for instance, Abu Ras et.al, 2012
34 See Shash & Forden 2016; Johansson-Nogués 2013
accountability issues. Consequently, resulting in limited resources and pathways for women to seek justice. Additionally, women and girls are victims of sexual, physical and psychological violence and according to Song (2018;17-18) and the WPS framework, this impacts their abilities and willingness to engage in the public sphere. Therefore, to ensure the due process of law, the full respect and protection of human rights and the willingness and possibility for more women to engage in politics, the independence of all branches - executive, legislative and particularly judiciary- needs to be strengthened. As was concluded by Shash and Forden (2016:80-81), women’s rights cannot be fully respected unless it is prioritised, and accountability prevails.

Lastly, the results and previous research have highlighted the important roles of CSOs, NGOs and women activists in promoting change. Despite their currently being limited space and restrictions for actors working on somewhat controversial issues in Egypt, the institutional spaces which is granted to them within the constitution could be crucial if used effectively. This was for example evident in in Tunisia, where the pressure from the CSOs resulted in the adoption of the Tunisian NAP. Additionally, a strong united women’s movement, which stay visible whilst exerting a wider and consistent socio-political pressure on the current structures, might just be the key to a more gender equal society. Therefore, women and women’s movements, despite being secular or Islamist, must take advantage of their constitutional right and jointly call for change.

However, there are provisions within the constitution that provide for some of the measures mentioned above and despite the constitution being somewhat vaguely formulated, this study finds that one issue lies in the implementation, thus the matter of not prioritising women’s rights to the extent needed. Considering that the executive power of the president has increased with the 2019 amendments of the 2014 constitution, and based on the results retrieved, there is a reason to believe that these changes to the constitution will preserve the authoritarian nature of Egypt, hence, limiting the women’s participation further.

Nevertheless, the announcement made by Egypt on its decision to develop a NAP on the WPS agenda is a step in the right direction. As previous research and this study have argued, the provisions of the WPS framework are highly relevant for post-revolution countries. As the interviews were conducted before the announcement, the understanding of the framework might be different if one were to conduct the same interviews today. Nonetheless, it was evident that not all the respondents were aware of the meaning of the framework. The ones
that knew about the UNSC resolutions stated that the reason why Egypt has not yet drafted a NAP is that the country is not in an active conflict. In contrast, Tunisia has recognised the framework as relevant, even though it is not in active conflict. Hence, the WPS framework needs to be understood in a broader way and not be limited to only countries in active conflict or post-conflict settings.

The provisions of the WPS agenda are clearly relevant for Egypt as well, and even the Egyptian president, al-Sisi, stated “that the Egyptian state’s stability and progress will only be achieved by ensuring the active participation of women in all aspects of national work”\textsuperscript{35}. When employing the WPS monitoring tool on the case of Egypt, it can be noted that the country already has made some efforts covered by some of the indicators. For instance, the constitution includes provisions that aims at protecting women’s and girls’ human rights, which is in line with indicator 5(b)\textsuperscript{36}. Moreover, the provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation in parliaments and ministerial positions are in accordance with indicator 12(a)\textsuperscript{37}. The country is also spearheading the work on the WPS in the region. Nonetheless, Egypt still has much to do before the WPS framework can be considered even partly implemented.

Comparing the case of Egypt with Tunisia; despite the development in Egypt not being as successful as the one in Tunisia, their respective constitutions are similar in many aspects concerning women’s rights. However, it appears as though the legal frameworks of Egypt has had more articles referring to women’s equal rights and participation than the frameworks of Tunisia, but why then has Tunisia progressed more than Egypt?

Firstly, Tunisia has had a longer history of women in decision-making positions and a bigger space for freedom of expression and civic rights. By applying the WPS framework, one can assume that this has made the political arena less discriminating and corrupt as well as more effective and sustainable. Additionally, Tunisia has managed to implement many of its constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation, which has for instance been evident in the high representation of women in the parliament. Considering that previous research argues that Tunisia has managed to create a more balanced and distinct constitution than Egypt, it can be reasonable to assume that it is not only an issue of

\textsuperscript{35} The quote is from the Strategy 2030, see the result section.
\textsuperscript{36} See table 1: indicator 5(b) covers the “extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human rights are included in national security policy frameworks”
\textsuperscript{37} See table 1: indicator 12(b) covers “women’s political participation in parliaments and ministerial positions”
implementation of the constitution, but also an issue of ambiguous formulation. This is for instance evident in the provisions concerning women’s participation in parliament. The Egyptian constitution provides for a 25 percent quota, whilst Tunisian constitutions includes a parity clause between men and women. As the results of this thesis and the WPS agenda states, a quota stipulation with a baseline is only effective to some extent. Hence, the Tunisian measure, which aims at reaching equal representation of men and women in all elective assemblies, is more progressive than the one of Egypt. However, despite Tunisia generally performing better than Egypt, it has been evident that the actual situation in both countries do not live up to the progressive provisions of their respective constitutions.
7 Conclusion

This research has attempted to study the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to a democracy by analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the UNSC agenda on Women, Peace and Security, in mainly Egypt. It has based its theoretical background on the belief that democracy promotes stability, but in order to reach democracy, the full inclusion of women in all aspects of society must be ensured.

The Egyptian democratic transition has been quite disruptive and considering the challenges Egypt is facing regarding its security and stability, both internal and external, it might not be too surprising that the situation in the country is tending to go backward rather than forward. The provision of the 2019 constitutional amendments of the 2014 Egyptian constitution is centralising the power even further to the president, which contradicts the attempts of the decentralisation of the original 2014 constitution. Consequently, Egypt is reinstating some of its former authoritarian nature.

This study finds that women tend to bring a more nuanced and balanced view into decision-making processes. Additionally, the decisions taken are believed to be more effective and sustainable as well as less corrupt and discriminating, than if only men participate. However, their ability to contribute is limited in authoritarian states, where their voices are restricted, and their issues are not prioritised. Women are also faced with challenges concerning SGBV, traditional stereotypes and gender roles. However, based on the Egyptian constitution, there already exist some measures to facilitate women’s political participation, however, due to a possible gap in the implementation and ambiguity in the framing of the constitution, these measures have, thus far, not contributed to the progression of women’s roles in political decision-making. The results suggest that in order for women to actually have an influential voice and contribute to a successful democratic transition and in the long run political stability, certain measures have to be taken;

The constitution needs to be more inclusive, distinctly formulated and aim to advance women’s rights. For instance, the independence of the executive, legislative and particularly judiciary needs to be strengthened to ensure the due process of law, the full respect and protection of human rights and that more women can and want to engage in politics. Additionally, the institutional mechanisms that are currently in place have to be adjusted to be able to promote and enhance women’s political involvement. To reach this objective, additional quota systems, which do not include a limitation in the form of a minimum stipulation, should be put in place on all levels, including on the party level.
Egypt would benefit from listening to women and actively working to promote women’s rights through, inter alia, gender mainstreaming on all levels, including through opening up spaces for CSOs, NGOs and in particularly women’s movements. These organisations and movements should jointly exert a wider and consistent socio-political pressure on the current structures for change to happen. Egypt should also refute stereotypes by invest in awareness and encouragement programs, such as civic and education programs, and provide support services that facilitate women’s participation, such as child care and parental leave. Additionally, the country should work to increase the awareness and understanding among men and boys to further refute traditional stereotypes and increase the conduciveness of the advancement of women’s rights.

In conclusion, the contemporary perception of women’s political participation in Egypt is rather gloomy and the future perception of women’s political participation is uncertain. The most important question is whether women will be allowed meaningful participation in all aspects of society and particularly in politics. Either Egypt risk ending up in stagnation or, instead, women could be given an honest chance and meaningful roles to contribute to a successful democratic transition and in the long run political stability.

7.1 Avenues for Future Research

It will be fascinating to follow the future developments in both countries. Particularly considering that the current Tunisian president recently passed away, only two months before the new presidential election. It will also be interesting to follow Egypt’s work on the development of the NAP and whether, this will facilitate increased participation of women in politics and thus, a successful democratic transition and in the long run political stability.

As this research has taken a contemporary approach, it would be interesting to conduct a more historical study, where the method of explaining outcome process-tracing is employed to receive an understanding of the factors that have been of importance for the development of Egypt and Tunisia until today. It would also be fascinating to conduct this study in a broader context through a quantitative analysis to confirm the findings and also its generalisability. The independent variable would thus be women’s political participation, and the stability in authoritarian states undergoing a transition to democracy would be the dependent variable. The identified challenges and opportunities for women to participate
would constitute for interesting control variables. Lastly, considering that this study has argued that the WPS framework is highly relevant in the case of Egypt and since the country recently announced that it will be developing a NAP, it would be interesting to conduct this study again, however, a few years from now. This to see whether the WPS has had an impact in Egypt and whether the perceptions of women’s political participation have changed as a consequence of this.
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8.4 Unpublished Literature


9 Appendices

9.1 Appendix 1: Condensed Quotations and Citations of Opinion Documents and Policy Documents

All data, except for the interviews, are presented as citations in their original form. Interview quotes are presented in their condensed form for clarification purposes. For the purpose of having a clear overview of the data, the quotations and citations of the opinion documents are presented first and under each relevant subcategory that was identified in the analytical stage. See table 3 for the coding of the opinion documents.

The Perception of Equal Participation Between Men and Women in Politics in Egypt:

#2 No, of course they do not have equal participation. It’s not a critical problem, but I really believe that both men and women should be involved in politics. [...] Women are a big proportion of the population, so they have to be involved in the political life. They should be involved in the political arena and they should be involved in every aspect, since they are a part of the country.

#3 We do have a lot of progress when it comes to this. We have more than six ministers now who are women and they actually work on different topics that are not really the normal topics tackled by women in general.

#4 [...] So, so far at least I’m not seeing the parliament doing very much to support women’s rights. The other thing that is also in the constitution, is that in local councils there is a twenty-five percent seats for women, since the constitution was endorsed in 2014, we haven’t had local council elections, so it hasn’t happened yet. So, this is the level of political participation this is the picture so far.

#5 During the past three years there has been huge improvement when it comes to women’s leaderships. So, you know that Egypt has eight women ministers and five deputy ministers which are all appointed by the president, we have one women governor and five deputy governors. So, these are things that was not usually seen before in the political arena and we
also have the head of security who is a woman and the deputy governor of the bank who is a woman. These are very strong positions for women’s leadership.

#8 Women remain the unsung heroes whose activism and courage continues to exceed all expectations, yet they still struggle to hold on to what little rights they have gained.

#9 In spite of this progress, the Egyptian society still faces major challenges in empowering a wide base of women (p.5)

The Perception of Women’s Roles in Politics in Egypt:

#1 [Women’s roles are] hugely important. [...] Having women is key and definitively useful. It doesn’t mean that it will translate automatically into gender sensitive policies or programs. There are some women that might not promote it that way, but it helps [...] I wouldn’t try to emphasise too much of a gender type in this response either. Well it’s like some studies have proven that having more women can actually reduce the level of corruption at a governmental level and at national level, so there are like studies that prove that sometimes women being a part of it can bring different approaches to policy implementation or even in the process itself like corruption. They can bring different perspectives looking at maybe ensuring that financing is available for education, social care et cetera. So, yeah there is a different perspective that they can bring in that way. Generally, we think that women are more effective because they are the victims with their children of the conflict, they are more impacted by the conflict. The sense of urgency for it to stop and the sense of wellbeing and livelihood is kind of they carry that on their shoulders, and they want that change to happen because of that.

#1 Basically, they [men] are going to discuss the power, how do they divide the power among themselves and how can they find a compromise that’s going to make them all feel satisfied with that little amount of power that they have divided. [...] The truth is if you bring more women to the table they are actually going to say okay you have destroyed all of these hospitals, all of these schools and we don’t have any kind of police, community or system of protection, what are we going to do? They think about the future of the society, they think about the future of the population, they think about provision of services. So, they bring to the
table other things that are not often discussed and they bring also the kind of sense of urgency, like guys please we need to have peace now, everyone is suffering, we are tired of suffering, let’s find an agreement. So, they push people to find an agreement faster but an agreement that’s also lasting longer because it is more inclusive, more comprehensive in the dimensions of what it’s going to bring in terms of actually designing a future for the country

#2 I believe that men and women can play the same roles, but if we talk about women specifically, I believe that in certain positions that serves social purposes, a woman might perform better, women do definitely improve the efficiency of decision-making processes because women bring certain points of view that might help. I believe that some places that attach more to the social benefits, such as family care and education and environmental affairs, a woman might perform better.

#3 If we talk about women’s participation, it’s important to us because know this is the whole context for the participation pillar and to have sustainable peace process and to have women inclusion and to have these gender issues. This to stress their positive roles and their role as agents of peace and this is what we think is important as well.

#4 The inclusion of women will make for a more balanced view […] It’s not about men and women, it’s about representation, it’s about having voices, it’s about saying that everyone, any society is diverse and the better representation for all voices, the better. It’s as simple as that. […] I was a member of the committee that drafted the constitution in 2013 and it was endorsed in 2014, so this is the current constitution. During this constitution writing committee out of fifty there were five who were women, so this was just a ten percent representation [...]. just having women in a committee or in parliament who are not advocates of women’s rights, becomes problematic. However, in this case, even though it was just ten percent, the five women members were advocates of women’s rights, and also, there was support from other members of the committee for women’s rights. So, actually the constitution has some really good articles that support women’s political participation.

#5 The way I see it, is that they bring a different perspective, they bring a different experience and it’s always more enriching than just having only men. Maybe they come to the same
outcome as men, but definitely the outcome will be much richer and much more thoughtful, than if it is done by just by men.

#8 Voices of women can help create better institutions and stronger instruments. Women’s voice is capable of accelerating a revamped cultural, social and legal infrastructure that guarantees peace and security for every citizen without any discrimination.

#9 [Preamble] In accordance with the Egyptian Constitution, which expresses the will of the Egyptian people and established the values of justice and equality, embracing the constitutional values of equal opportunities and the rights of women that it has set forth: [...] and the belief that the Egyptian state’s stability and progress will only be achieved by ensuring the active participation of women in all aspects of national work [President al-Sisi’s Speech at the Celebration of the Egyptian Women’s Day 2017, 21 March 2017]

Current Existing Measures Facilitating Women’s Political Participation:
#1 I believe that there are no obstacles from the government, internal or external or at any level. I believe that men and women are provided with the same tools when it comes to education and the freedom to get involved with any part the ministry

#4 [...] So, so far at least I’m not seeing the parliament doing very much to support women’s rights.

#5 In the country you have about a few millions of women who do not have an ID-card, meaning that there are two reasons for it, either that they have never had one and that they are a really fair minority or the ones that had ID-cards but they had to remove them because they have time-span and limits and for different reasons some do not know how to go about it, some might have difficulties to renew it so it’s not necessarily made deliberate but just that they fall of the grid. The cards are important, especially for the population that doesn’t have that card are really at the grassroot vulnerable and they actually need it for accessing social services, for accessing grants, additional grants for health services. It’s also important to them to really be citizens of this country and exercise their rights as a citizen. There are big efforts put forward by the government [...] under the leadership of the National Council for
Women and the Ministry of Interior which equips those women with the ID-cards and integrates them in the national programs.

5 I think that one of them is this presidential youth and leadership program and I don’t know the quotas for women, but I know that for a fact one of the deputy governor who is a women comes from that pool so I think that is one.

Current Existing Obstacles for Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:

#2 I believe that it has something more to do with the mentality of the people here. They are not used to having women participating in politics and it might take time for everyone to support this kind of idea of being involved in political life. I believe that there are no obstacles from the government, internal or external or at any level. I believe that men and women are provided with the same tools when it comes to education and the freedom to get involved with any part the ministry. I believe that the only obstacle for women could be the social life here in Egypt, like the home and the family et cetera. A woman needs a different lifestyle to participate in such matters.

#4 I would argue that we always need political will. Also, there are all sorts of traditions, obviously there are cultural problems, but I would highlight the political problems that support the argument that women’s issues are not a priority. So, there’s always some reason to justify not prioritizing women’s rights and that’s a political and not a social obstacle. It’s difficult to say, but on the individual level, because obviously women are affected by the culture so yes there are obstacles to women taking initiative to, for example, run for parliament because it’s very difficult. So far it has been a man’s world in that area, and I would say that maybe women might hesitate. […] In a dictatorship you don’t have strong social movements right, because you basically don’t have spaces for independent people to operate.

#5 in the country you have about a few millions of women who do not have an ID-card, meaning that there are two reasons for it, either that they have never had one and that they are a really fair minority or the ones that had ID-cards but they had to remove them because they have time-span and limits and for different reasons some do not know how to go about it,
some might have difficulties to renew it so it's not necessarily made deliberate but just that they fall of the grid. The cards are important, especially for the population that doesn't have that card are really at the grassroot vulnerable and they actually need it for accessing social services, for accessing grants, additional grants for health services. It's also important to them to really be citizens of this country and exercise their rights as a citizen

#5 The two things that I've noticed, I mean for me it's definitely the mentality, do not take Egypt out of the concept of patriarchy. You cannot take Egypt out of the context that the political participation as the overall participation across areas, it is dominated by men, and it's not only with regards to the political participation. I think patriarchy is one. I definitely think that we need the double burden as a certain part, meaning that don't forget that the women is working at home globally 2.6 times more than a man, so don't think that because you're doing your job at the parliament that somebody else is doing your other jobs at home. I think this is really a social issue, the problem is that no one is relieving her from her other duties that she has. So that actually it has to do with education and the overall levels of engagement there.

#6 Women participated more than men in the last three elections in Egypt. They participate, but they don't run for positions. They don't run, because they know that they're not going to win because they don't have the means. And because of the authoritarian nature of their regime, men are not giving them a chance to run. It is because of those hungry for power, the top, they don't want to leave any space for the women to have any kind of say in decision-making process. What is true, is that those on the top are controlling the power making at the top and they're not letting women run from the very beginning and this is why there are no women running. And this is why voters are not voting for them. [...] It's very difficult for women in these contexts to focus on issues that are not service related and things that are not what the others and male MPs are doing. So, you want to stay, and you want to get re-elected and they want to serve their constituents the way the male MPs are doing in this clientelist regimes. So, it's more about providing services rather than pushing for real issues for women, something like gender-based violence or issues that related to divorce, or guardianship or laws like that.
The Egyptian society witnessed transformations that propagate negative values, fostering an inferior view of women in society over the past few decades, adding to the challenges of women’s empowerment, which are reflected in the increased waves of violence against women, compromising their dignity. Besides the misinterpretation of religious texts that downplay women’s ability to contribute to the public sphere, limiting their roles to only family formation and reproduction (p.11).

Measures That Should Be Put in Place to Facilitate Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:

#1 Quotas are often set forward as a preliminary step to increase women’s participation, so like having quotas in the list of women who are participating in like different parties, who have been participating in the election, quotas for the government nominations for the ministry, for the ministers. [...] It doesn’t mean again and that was what I was saying previously that that’s going to translate automatically in gender sensitive outcomes. [...] if you have, for instance, within a parliament more than thirty percent women, there is an automatically sort of change and impact from that gender perspective into the law making. [...] if you have quotas and to increase women’s participation it should be also supported by programs that you know support women locally to present themselves as candidates, to encourage women to take certain positions and promote them in doing so. It’s also like providing them with technical support, enhancing their voices et cetera. You should always when you mention a quota say “a minimum of” to ensure that it can always be higher so people don’t limit themselves to twenty percent [...] If you’re looking at kind of more long-term measures, it’s ensuring from the beginning that women have access to education, that they are encourage to pursue certain levels of degree, that they are encouraged to join politics by actually having a discourse that is open to women, that they have role models. [...] Like small incentives, [...] support for like babysitting the children.

#2 Childcare is definitely a measure that could help. First of all, women need to want to be involved. It begins with the willingness of women to get involved. I believe that we need more awareness programs for women, to make them aware that they should be involved.
#4 Quotas have been one method to address the obstacles facing women [...] also there are other things that can be done so this is the responsibility of the State obviously. I mean you see quotas are not just in parliament, you can have quotas on many different levels, you can have them at the level of local councils, at the level of parties. [...] It can be organized to make sure that women are not for example put on top of election lists, so yes they have fulfilled the quota stipulation but women have been added at the end of the list, so at the end of the day it’s only members who are at the top of the lists who will get elected and so on. So, there are many things that can be done definitely [...] 

#5 Politically, there is a national institute for management that is looking at actually supporting women’s leaderships programs and how to boost the women’s leadership more from the government procedures but also from the general procedures that support women’s leaderships in public systems. Now if we bring this conversation at the more grassroot level, what we hear is that there is huge national efforts input in terms increasing women’s citizenships [by providing ID-cards]. 

#5 First, we need to find women, second to make them interested in that, third to support them to take the office and fourthly, support them to keep that function and help them with the double burden at home and other job that they have on the side. So, there are programs working on that and trying to expand the pool of women interested in the local government. From there they will move to being more practical agents in the society. I’m a believer that everything for increasing the civic engagement, being in general politics or just being in civic just the engagement, comes with empowerment. So, if you ask me what the key to empowerment is, it’s from the education and civic empowerment activities. I think that they are all interrelated, so the education gives you the space, the culture, the opportunity to be out first of all. 

#6 I am an institutionalist. I do believe in institutions and how you structure your rules and your laws. [...] I believe that if the government and if the decision-makers are serious about including women in politics and in decision-making process, there are specific measures to be done. Quota systems and quota systems that are well enforced and well designed. If you have
party lists, so women have to be on half of these lists, and they have to alternate when it comes to who comes on the top of the list.

#9 In order to do so [empower women], the Strategy focuses on achieving the following: 1. Women’s political empowerment and promoting their leadership roles through encouraging all forms of political participation, including parliamentary representation and representation in local councils; eliminating discrimination against women holding senior positions in executive and judicial institutions; and enabling them to succeed in these posts; 2. Women’s economic empowerment through capacity development, entrepreneurship, and equal opportunities for the women’s employment in all sectors, including the private sector and besides holding key positions in public institutions and companies; [...] Change the culture of society and challenging the stereotypes of women propagated by the media; Regard women’s empowerment as a collective responsibility that men and boys must also assume; Support women to realize their full legal rights, with special attention to the rights of marginalized, poor and disabled women, and amending existing personal status laws to guarantee the rights of women, enhancing the chances of family cohesion; Renew the religious discourse concerning women’s roles in the public domain and their right to hold public posts(p. 21-22)

#9 Interventions for strengthening the leadership roles of Egyptian women and their political empowerment: Promote the role of women as voters: Expand the issuance of national identification cards for all women in all governorates (p.30). [...] Protect the rights of working women and providing support services: Enforce the laws that protect working women and guarantee their rights with regard to working hours, maternity leave and equal wages, particularly in the private sector; [...] Provide support services for working women, pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, like childcare services (time for breastfeeding and daycare) and providing protection both in the work environment and beyond (p.40). [...] Adopting policies, planning approaches and budgets responsive to women’s needs is one of the most effective methods to bring about social change; [...] The Strategy affirms the necessity of engaging civil society organizations in implementing its programs and activities, especially Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (p. 61-62)
Expected Development of Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:

#2 I believe that in the upcoming decade it’s going to be much better and women will be involved more, because people are getting more aware of the idea of having women in politics.

#4 There has to be a decision to prioritize women’s issues. So, things don’t change on their own, but you have to have a strong women’s movement that support these changes [...] If the conditions are conducive to running fair elections, I think women will get involved absolutely.

#5 I think we are in the right track when it comes to the political will for the upcoming years and then imagine if, for example, we have one governor and in five years we will have five governors, because we have now a pool of five deputy governors, so I’m thinking that it would be a normal path.

#6 In Egypt the next years I think, given the political atmosphere that they're operating under, I think that they will continue navigating their way within the parameters of the authoritarian regime that is still in place. I really hope that they will be able now, since there is 25 percent women in parliament. I really hope that they can't come together and push for legislations, for women. There are so many serious issues in Egypt that involve women that need to be addressed [...] and since they're numerically more, I really hope that we can work together and have a stance on these issues and I really hope also that for both countries [Egypt and Tunisia] to be able to form some kind of a woman caucus to empower and kind of coordinate activities of women within these legislative bodies.

#9 Its success depends on the active participation of all social groups, especially men and boys, besides all State institutions and its executive bodies (p.7) [...] Vision By 2030, Egyptian women will become active contributors to the achievement of sustainable development in a nation that guarantees their constitutional rights, ensures their full protection, and provides- without discrimination- political, social, and economic opportunities that enable them to develop their capacities and achieve their full potential. Reproduction (p.21)
Current Measures in Line with the WPS Agenda in Egypt:

#1 Egypt, they don’t have a 1325 action plan and their kind of approach to it is that they don’t really need one. They don’t consider it applies to them. I mean usually, from looking at other countries as well whenever a country doesn’t want it it’s because they associate it with conflict, and they don’t consider themselves at conflict, but indirectly they are focusing a lot on women’s participation. which is one of the pillars. They are also working on kind of recovery with assistance to refugees seeking refuge, so they are touching upon some of these pillars, but it is always indirectly it’s not directly in terms of implementing 1325.

#3 If you want to talk nationally, I don’t think we can do that, again the context is conflict and post-conflict and Egypt is not in that situation […] because our center is an international center but it’s under the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most of the time we work on the implementation of the women peace and security agenda in the region and in Africa, including 1325 and its four pillars and including of course the participation pillar. You know the concept of 1325, is the conflict and post-conflict area, so our work is mainly directed towards African countries in conflict and the Arab region […]. Our role in the center is to make sure that this representation is actually meaningful and effective and that it’s not only based on gender issues. The idea is not just to have women on the table but to have women on the table discussing various issues, […], but because we are talking about 1325, we are talking about conflict areas and you know the conflict does change a lot of their roles.

#5 Egypt has not worked deliberately on 1325, like labelling it like it’s 1325. There was a lot done until 2010 actually. Egypt was even spearheading the efforts of the region in developing a regional strategy for 1325. I don’t think we can talk about implementation yet except from the awareness racing advocacy plans workshops et cetera. […] We are working with the government towards opening a conversation on 1325. Since 2011, Egypt has gone through three rounds of change, so we are opening avenues for conversation regarding what it takes and what doesn’t take, why we need a national action plan. There is always a need for a national action plan and then we can work even if you don’t have a plan on certain issues. We need to change that mindset to be honest. I think that one of the problems we have had with
the countries in the Arab region was that we are not in a conflict why do we need that. I think Egypt will consider it.

#8 As someone who has championed the cause of women and children’s rights for over a decade, I was personally fascinated and overly joyed to see the development of a comprehensive strategy initiated by a UN resolution which was ground-breaking in more ways than one. [...] We can see this in the way 1325 catered for the following: The participation of women and gender parity at all levels of decision-making, The protection and respect of human rights of girls and women [...] We [Egypt] need to formulate a national plan of action which targets the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions. We must also review national legislation and harmonize it with international HR [Human Rights] conventions. It is also important to promote a culture of peace and tolerance through education. We must build the capacities of professionals involved in the implementation of the resolutions and we must enhance monitoring and reporting mechanisms We need to allocate adequate human and financial resources and establish a genuine and transparent partnership with civil society. Finally, we need to raise awareness of Security Council resolutions and that gender-based violence is not a soft issue and this includes strengthening the perception of women as peace makers and agents for change not only as victims.

Egypt vs. Tunisia:

#5 Egypt is a very strong positive example for the Arab States, but also for Africa and the African Union. But also Tunisia because, Tunisia has made huge progress and especially on some of the laws are like amazing, but Egypt is another country with a lot of other dynamics and the population is much bigger and more complex, but the disability and inheritance law are huge steps in the right direction and Egypt has the passing of nationality to the children from the mother’s some of the countries still have from the fathers

#6 In Tunisia, the 2014 constitution they did the parity clause, so a little bit different from what Egypt is introducing right now. [...] the quota, which actually dates way back more than the 1325 resolution. So, you know that since Bourguiba, since the independence in 1956, [...] he was really worried about the Islamist and he was worried that they will take over, so he
started using women’s rights to counter Islamism in the country and the tribal structure of the country too. So, since 1956 you know the code of personal status that he introduced […], was that he introduced in order to empower women and curb the effect of Islamism and this was a trend. Women was always part of this kind of strategies and he shared this kind of state feminism approach where he used women’s issues to empower his own regime and also to have this effect encounter any Islamist kind of effect that might shake his rule. And then what happened in 1999, there was a huge discussion around quota systems and […] since 2004 women’s representation in Tunisia was always anywhere between 25, 30, 31 percent, […]

Women's movements were very active, and they were doing great work pushing and pushing for changes, but most of the implementation, most of the decisions were taking at the top. After the 2011 revolution […] you will see how sophisticated the women's movements and those who are working on the constitution were when it comes to women's rights […] So, in 2014, you know in the constitution they said, we must have a disparity clause and women have to be equal to men in all leadership positions. But when it came to implementation […] the fact that women did not achieve more than 30 percent, in the 2014 elections. So, what happened in the 2014 elections, […] So, they said okay we learned our lesson from this election, we should have done zipper quota and also a vertical quota. So, in the upcoming election which I think is in 2019 they will have also a vertical quota to balance the lists. […]

Some national elections last year where the vertical quota was implemented on the subnational level was so much more successful. […] I think in Tunisia the women’s representation; well I think you reach a point where you don't need to be more numerical kind of increase in their numbers. I hope that the focus will be on the quality of representation rather than the quantity of women in power […]

#6 You will find a totally different picture in Egypt for instance, […] when during the constitution writing process women's movements were almost absent from the constitution writing, […] because Islamists work dominating the constitution writing process. […] what we're seeing in Egypt over the last 10 years, it's really problematic in a way that women's issues were not part of Mubarak's agenda. But if you look at Ben Ali, it was a priority for him because he was a secular leader and he wanted to garner women's support. It was one of his priorities not because he believes in women's issues. All these rulers don't give anything about women or their rights, but they were using them to empower their own routines. It's
problematic in Egypt because Mubarak was not a feminist and he was not secular, and he was not interested in promoting women's rights. [...] There were not any organizations working on empowering women in politics versus Tunisia where they have lots of organizations, international organizations too, working on women in politics and training them. [...] The women's movements were so scattered and add to that, they became so polarized between the Islamists fight and the secular and so add to the fragmentation of the women's movement in Egypt before the uprising, after the uprising a new dimension was added which has a religious dimension. And who is with the Islamists and who is with the secular or the nationalist whatever you want to call them. So, now they're further fragmented. They were excluded from the constitution writing not because the constitution writers made it intentionally. No, because the women's movements never came together with a coherent agenda, to push on the constitution writers. [...] what he just did during the 2015 election, so the new amendment was ratified last week, it did remain 25 percent quota in the national legislator too, so now it's just a constitutional quota [...] When Sisi came to power, it became even more dangerous. It is really dangerous when you use women’s issues, to use women for your own gains and this is what Sisi has been doing systematically over the last five years. So, he keeps on appealing to women, but the problem is that he appeals without giving women anything in return. [...] And I don't know when women will stop supporting him or when they can become sophisticated enough to understand what's going on and they start negotiating right with the regime. There is not a structure, a unified voice that can even run this kind of negotiations. [...] There is this other issue that we have, the Islamists were dominating the elections over the last year in Egypt and Islamists they don’t run women. So, they rely on women to make them win and to do campaigning for them, but they don't put them on their lists. The other problem, the NDP which was Mubarak's regime and Mubarak's party before the revolution, the NDP did not care about women and they did not have any quota for women like the Tunisians RCD. So that's why there were barely any women in the Egyptian Assembly.

#7 So, we think that as the standard of the of 30 percent of presence of women is the percentage that could give the opportunity for women to influence the decisions. So, we are in a good path. [...] we have 48 percent of women participation on the municipal level. After the election, each council at municipal level they elect their head of the council and after we
ended up with 19 women heading the municipalities in all of the country. [...] I think that there are clear and concrete steps that shows that there is a clear influence or a will to support women’s participation in many thematics, but also to provide specific programs and action plans centered on women’s rights.

#7 We see some obstacles sometimes a reluctance from women to accept to go for more responsibility because they have such a workload due to their responsibilities, their familial responsibility, all their duty that they continue to do even if they have no other responsibilities. So, the very traditional tasks done by women. The traditional tasks that women are doing are still expected to be done by women. This is this is an obstacle and it depends on the different region because sometimes in some areas some people do not expect to have a woman leading in some other parts of the country.

#7 We have to continue the support to civil society directly to avoid any backlashes in gender equality attachments and we have to work more on social changes and work more with the youth. Work more with boys and girls, to ensure the most inclusive that we can do. [...] We have to find ways to secure advocacy, to work for gender equality within the parties. I think this should be a way to influence political parties so that their decision in voting and different laws is gender sensitive and not gender blind.
9.2 Appendix 2: Citations of Policy Documents

The relevant articles of the policy documents are presented continuously, starting with the Egyptian constitution and ending with Tunisian constitution. For the coding of the policy documents see table 4.

#1&2 Article 4: Sovereignty belongs to the people alone, which exercises it and protects it. They are the source of power. They safeguard their national unity, which is based on the principle of equality, justice and equal opportunity between citizens, as provided in this Constitution.

#1&2 Article 9: The state ensures equal opportunity for all citizens without discrimination.

#1&3 Article 11: The state commits to achieving equality between women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. The state commits to taking the necessary measures to ensure appropriate representation of women in the houses of parliament, in the manner specified by law. It grants women the right to hold public posts and high management posts in the state, and to appointment in judicial bodies and entities without discrimination. The state commits to the protection of women against all forms of violence, and ensures women empowerment to reconcile the duties of a woman toward her family and her work requirements. The state ensures care and protection and care for motherhood and childhood, and for breadwinning, and elderly women, and women most in need.

#1&2 Article 19: Every citizen has the right to education with the aim of building the Egyptian character, maintaining national identity, planting the roots of scientific thinking, developing talents, promoting innovation and establishing civilizational and spiritual values and the concepts of citizenship, tolerance and non-discrimination. The state commits to uphold its aims in education curricula and methods, and to provide education in accordance with global quality criteria. Education is obligatory until the end of the secondary stage or its equivalent. The state grants free education in different stages in state educational institutions as per the law.
Article 25: Illiteracy The state commits to developing a comprehensive plan to eradicate alphabetical and digital illiteracy for all citizens from all age groups. It commits to developing implementation mechanisms with the participation of civil society institutions according to a specific timeline.

Article 27: [...] The economic system is socially committed to ensuring equal opportunities and a fair distribution of development returns, to reducing the gaps between incomes by setting a minimum wage and pension to ensure a decent life, and setting a maximum wage in state agencies for whoever works for a wage as per the law.

Article 53: Citizens are equal before the law, possess equal rights and public duties, and may not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, social class, political or geographical affiliation, or for any other reason. Discrimination and incitement to hate are crimes punishable by law. The state shall take all necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and the law shall regulate the establishment of an independent commission for this purpose.

Article 72: The state shall ensure the independence of all press institutions and owned media outlets, in a way that ensures their neutrality and expressing all opinions, political and intellectual trends and social interests; and guarantees equality and equal opportunity in addressing public opinion.

Article 74: Citizens have the right to form political parties by notification as regulated by the law. No political activity may be exercised or political parties formed on the basis of religion, or discrimination based on sex, origin, sect or geographic location, nor may any activity be practiced that is hostile to democracy, secretive, or which possesses a military or quasi-military nature.

Article 75: Right to establish associations Citizens have the right to form non-governmental organizations and institutions on a democratic basis, which shall acquire legal personality upon notification. They shall be allowed to engage in activities freely. Administrative agencies shall not interfere in the affairs of such organizations, dissolve them,
their board of directors, or their board of trustees except by a judicial ruling. The establishment or continuation of non-governmental organizations and institutions whose structure and activities are operated and conducted in secret, or which possess a military or quasi-military character are forbidden, as regulated by law.

1&2 Article 180: Every local unit elects a local council by direct, secret ballot for a term of four years. A candidate must be no younger than 21 years old. [...] one quarter of the seats are allocated to youth under 35 years old, one quarter is allocated for women, workers and farmers are represented by no less than 50 percent of the total number of seats, and these percentages include a proper representation of Christians and people with disability. [...]  

2 Article 102: First paragraph: The House of Representatives is composed of no less than four hundred and fifty members elected by direct secret public ballot. At least one quarter of the seats shall be allocated to women.

3 [Preamble] With a view to building a republican, democratic and participatory system, in the framework of a civil state founded on the sovereignty of the people, exercised through the peaceful alternation of power through free elections, and on the principle of the separation and balance of powers, which guarantees the freedom of association in conformity with the principles of pluralism, an impartial administration, and good governance, which are the foundations of political competition, where the state guarantees the supremacy of the law and the respect for freedoms and human rights, the independence of the judiciary, the equality of rights and duties between all citizens, male and female, and equality between all regions,

3 Article 21: All citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any discrimination. The state guarantees freedoms and individual and collective rights to all citizens, and provides all citizens the conditions for a dignified life.

3 Article 34: The rights to election, voting, and candidacy are guaranteed, in accordance with the law. The state seeks to guarantee women’s representation in elected bodies.

3 Article 39: Education shall be mandatory up to the age of sixteen years. The state guarantees the right to free public education at all levels and ensures provisions of the
necessary resources to achieve a high quality of education, teaching, and training. It shall also work to consolidate the Arab-Muslim identity and national belonging in the young generations, and to strengthen, promote and generalize the use of the Arabic language and to openness to

#3 Article 40: Work is a right for every citizen, male and female. The state shall take the necessary measures to guarantee work on the basis of competence and fairness. All citizens, male and female, shall have the right to decent working conditions and to a fair wage.

#3 Article 46: The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights and work to strengthen and develop those rights. The state guarantees the equality of opportunities between women and men to have access to all levels of responsibility in all domains. The state works to attain parity between women and men in elected Assemblies. The state shall take all necessary measures in order to eradicate violence against women.
9.3 Appendix 3: Interview Guide

Name of respondent:

**Personal information**
1. In which age category would you place yourself?
   - □ >25
   - □ 25<40
   - □ 40<55
   - □ or 55<

2. What is your educational background?
3. What is your profession and how long have you been at your current position?

4. **How important do you think women’s political participation is?**
   4.1 Are there any downsides to including more women in political life?

5. **Do you think that women and men in general have different roles to play in politics?**

6. **What is your perception of the equal representation of men and women in politics in Egypt/Tunisia?**
   6.1 Do you think men and women have equal representation in politics in Egypt/Tunisia?
   6.2 If no, do you think that it is an issue?
   6.3 If no, how do you think that women’s political participation can be improved?

7. **Are there any obstacles facing women’s participation in politics on all levels in Egypt/Tunisia (local, national, international)?**
   7.1 Which are these obstacles, please elaborate? (Gender, class, economic indicators, culture, other.)

8. **Do you know of any current programmes or structures that facilitate women’s political participation and representation in Egypt/Tunisia?**

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38 The same interview guide was used for all interviews, however, the questions regarding Tunisia were only applied to interviews were it was known that the respondent had knowledge about Tunisia.
9. **Can you think of any other measures that would help increase women’s political participation in Egypt/Tunisia?**

10. **Describe your view of women’s participation in decision-making processes in the Egyptian/Tunisian society?**
   10.1 Would you say that the increased inclusion of women in politics would impact the efficiency of decision-making processes?
   10.2 Do you think that the increased political participation of women would contribute to the stability and further development of the society of Egypt/Tunisia?

11. **Could you tell me what the Egyptian/Tunisian government is doing to enhance women’s political participation in decision-making?**
   11.1 Are there any good practices, in the sense of support, that can help advance women’s political participation?

12. **What do you know about Security Council Resolution 1325 that was adopted in 2000?**

13. **What steps has the government in Egypt/Tunisia taken to implement the resolution 1325?**
   13.1 Is there a national action plan on the implementation of resolution 1325?

14. **Do you think that there are there any gaps on the current approach towards the implementation of resolution 1325 in Egypt/Tunisian?**

15. **How do you think the women’s political representation in Egypt/Tunisia will change in the upcoming decade?**

**Closing up**

16. Quick summary of the interview? Have I understood everything correctly?

17. **Is there something else you want to add?**
### 9.4 Appendix 4: 2019 Amendments to the 2015 Egyptian Constitution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>2014 Constitution</th>
<th>Amendments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article (102) First paragraph</td>
<td>The House of Representatives is composed of no less than four hundred and fifty members elected by direct secret public ballot.</td>
<td>Article (102) First paragraph</td>
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<td>Article (102) Third paragraph</td>
<td>Other candidacy requirements, the electoral system, and division of electoral constituencies shall be defined by law in a manner which observes fair representation of the population and governorates and equitable representation of voters. Elections based on the plurality voting system or proportional list, or a combination of both at whatsoever ratio may be adopted.</td>
<td>Article (102) Third paragraph</td>
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<td>Article (140) First paragraph</td>
<td>The president shall be elected for a period of four calendar years, commencing from the day following the termination of the term of his predecessor. The president may only be reelected once.</td>
<td>Article (140) First paragraph</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article (244 bis) Addendum</td>
<td>The provisions of the first paragraph of Article 102 shall apply as of the next legislative chapter.</td>
<td>Article (244 bis) Addendum</td>
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<td>Article (151 bis) Addendum</td>
<td>The President of the Republic may appoint one vice president or more, determine their competencies, and may delegate them in some of his duties, relieve them of their posts, and accept their resignation. The Vice-Presidents of the Republic shall take the oath before assuming office Provided for in article 144 of the Constitution before the President of the Republic. The provisions of the Constitution shall apply to the Vice-Presidents of the Republic in articles 141, 144, 145, 148 and 173. The president may also dismiss or accept the resignation of the vice president.</td>
<td>Article (151 bis) Addendum</td>
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<td>Article (160) First paragraph</td>
<td>In case the President of the Republic is temporarily prevented from assuming his powers, the Prime Minister shall act in his place.</td>
<td>Article (160) First paragraph</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article (160) Last paragraph</td>
<td>The interim President may not run for presidency or request any amendment to the Constitution or dissolve the House of Representatives or dismiss the Government.</td>
<td>Article (160) Last paragraph</td>
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Constitution, dissolve the House of Representatives, dismiss the Government or run for the presidency.

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<tr>
<th>Article (185)</th>
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<td>Each judicial body or organization shall manage its own affairs, and shall have an independent budget, the components of which shall be fully examined by the House of Representatives. Upon its approval, this budget shall be included in the State budget under one budget line. Each judicial body or organization shall be consulted with regards to the bills regulating its affairs.</td>
<td>Each judicial body or organization shall manage its own affairs, shall be consulted concerning the draft laws regulating its affairs; each of them shall have an independent budget. The President of the Republic shall appoint the heads of the judicial bodies or organizations, out of the oldest seven deputies of each of the heads, for a period of four years, or until their retirement age, whichever is earlier, and for one time throughout their terms of office, as regulated by law. A supreme council for the judicial bodies or organizations headed by the President of the Republic shall hold their common affairs. The members of the council would include the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the heads of the judicial bodies or organizations, the head of Cairo Appeal Court, and the Attorney-General. The council shall have a secretary who is appointed by the President of the Republic for a period of time specified by the law and alternately between the members of the council. In the absence of the President of the Republic, he shall be replaced temporarily by who he authorizes from among the heads of the bodies or organizations. The council shall be competent to consider the conditions of appointing, promoting and disciplining members of bodies or organizations. The council’s opinion shall be taken on the draft laws regulating the affairs of these bodies and organizations. Decisions shall be issued with the approval of a majority of its members.</td>
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<th>Article (189) second paragraph</th>
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<td>The Prosecutor General shall be in charge of the Public Prosecution. He shall be chosen by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary from among those ranked as Vice presidents of the Court of Cassation, or from those ranked as Presidents of the Courts of Appeal or from the Assistants to the Prosecutor General. He shall be appointed by virtue of a Presidential Decree for four years or for the remaining years until he reaches the age of retirement whichever is earlier, and this appointment shall be only once during his term of service.</td>
<td>The Prosecutor General shall be in charge of the Public Prosecution. He shall be chosen by the President of the Republic out of three nominees from the Supreme Judicial Council, the deputy heads of the Court of Cassation and the heads of the courts of appeal and the assistant attorneys for a period of four years or until reaching retirement age, whichever is earlier.</td>
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Article (190)
The State Council is an autonomous judicial body, and it shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to settle administrative disputes and disputes relevant to the execution of all its rulings. It shall have jurisdiction over disciplinary suits and appeals, and the exclusive jurisdiction to provide advice regarding legal issues to the administrative bodies determined by the law. It shall also review and draft bills and decrees of legislative nature, and shall review draft contracts to which the state or any other public authority is a party. The law shall determine its other jurisdictions.

Article (190)
The State Council is an autonomous judicial body, and it shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to settle administrative disputes and disputes relevant to the execution of all its rulings as well as the adjudication of disciplinary cases and appeals and decisions of disciplinary boards. It is the one concerned with giving opinions for the legal issues of the bodies determined by the law, revising the draft laws, the decisions that have a legislative character, the draft contracts which the law determines them and their values, and which the state or one of the public authorities is one of their parties.

Article (193) Third paragraph
The General Assembly of the Court shall elect its President from among the most senior three vice-presidents of the Court. It shall further choose the vice-presidents and the members of its Commissioners, and the appointment thereof shall be made by virtue of a decree by the President of the Republic. The foregoing shall be regulated by Law.

Article (193) Third paragraph
The President of the Republic shall choose the head of the Constitutional Court from among the five oldest deputy heads of the Court. The president of the Republic shall also appoint the deputy head of the Court from among two candidates, one of whom shall be nominated by the general assembly of the Court, while the head of the court shall nominate the other. The head of the board of commissioners and its members shall be appointed by a decision of the president of the republic based on the nomination of the head of the Court, and after consulting the general assembly of the court, all as prescribed by law.

Article (200) First paragraph
The Armed Forces belong to the People, and their duty is to protect the country, and preserve its security and the integrity of its territories. Only the State shall be entitled to establish the Armed Forces. No individual, organization, entity, or group shall be allowed to create military or quasi-military squadrons, groups or organizations.

Article (200) First paragraph
The Armed Forces belong to the People, and their duty is to protect the country, preserve its security and the integrity of its territories and maintain the Constitution, democracy, the basic of civil state, as well as the people's gains, rights and freedoms. Only the State shall be entitled to establish the Armed Forces. No individual, organization, entity, or group shall be allowed to create military or quasi-military squadrons, groups or organizations.

Article (204) Second paragraph
No civilian shall face trial before the Military Court, except for crimes that constitute a direct assault against military facilities or camps of the Armed Forces, or their equivalents, against military zones or border zones determined as military zones, against the Armed Forces’ equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, or its public funds, or against military factories; crimes pertaining to military service; or crimes that constitute a direct assault against the officers or personnel of the Armed Forces by reason of performing their duties.

Article (204) Second paragraph
No civilian shall face trial before the Military Court, except for crimes that constitute an assault against military facilities or camps of the Armed Forces, or their equivalents, or facilities that are protected by the Armed Forces, against military zones or border zones determined as military zones, against the Armed Forces’ equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, or its public funds, or against military factories; crimes pertaining to military service; or crimes that constitute a direct assault against the officers or personnel of the Armed Forces by reason of performing their duties.

Article (234)
The Minister of Defense shall be appointed upon the approval of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The provisions of this article shall remain in force for two full presidential terms starting from the date on which this Constitution comes into effect.

Article (234)
The Minister of Defense shall be appointed upon the approval of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.
| Article (243) | The State shall endeavor that workers and farmers be appropriately represented in the first House of Representatives to be elected after this Constitution is approved, as regulated by law. |
| Article (243) | The State shall endeavor that workers and farmers be appropriately represented, as regulated by law. |
| Article (244) | The State shall endeavor that youth, Christians, persons with disability and Egyptians living abroad be appropriately represented in the first House of Representatives to be elected after this Constitution is approved, as regulated by law. |
| Article (244) | The State shall endeavor that youth, Christians, persons with disability and Egyptians living abroad be appropriately represented in the House of Representatives, as regulated by law. |
| Article (248) Addendum | The Senate is concerned with studying and proposing what it sees as a tool to consolidate democracy, support national unity, social peace, the basic values of society, supreme values, rights, freedoms and public duties, and deepen and expand the democratic system. |
| Article (249) Addendum | The opinion of the Senate shall be taken as follows:  
- Proposals for the amendment of one or more articles of the Constitution.  
- Projects concerning the general plan for Social and Economic Development  
- Treaties of reconciliation and alliance and all treaties relating to the rights of sovereignty.  
- Draft laws supplementing the Constitution and others referred to Senate by the President of the Republic.  
- What the President of the Republic refers to the Senate concerning the general policy of the State or its policy in Arab or foreign affairs.  
The Council shall give its opinion on these matters to the President of the Republic and the President of the Council of Representatives. |
<p>| Article (250) Addendum | The Senate shall consist of a number of members determined by law, not less than 180 members. Two-thirds of the members of the Council shall be elected by direct secret universal suffrage. The President of the Republic shall appoint the remaining third and the elections shall be held in accordance with the law. |
| Article (251) Addendum | A candidate for membership in the Senate or the person who appoints him must be an Egyptian with civil and political rights. He must have at least a university degree or equivalent, and his age must be less than thirty-five years. The law specifies the conditions of candidacy, electoral system and the division of constituencies to take into account the equitable representation of the population and the governorates. Nomination can take place through single-member election or multi-member election, or both together. |</p>
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<th>Article (252) Addendum</th>
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<td>The membership of the Senate and House of Representatives shall not be combined.</td>
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<th>Article (253) Addendum</th>
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<td>The Prime Minister, his deputies, ministers and other members of the government are not accountable to the Senate.</td>
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<th>Article (254) Addendum</th>
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<td>The provisions of the Constitution shall apply to the Senate in articles 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 1, 2, 132, 133, 136 and 137, in a manner not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, provided that the specializations in the said articles shall be exercised by the Senate and its President.</td>
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<td>Titles of chapters one and two of Part VI of the Constitution shall be deleted.</td>
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