The Decline of Class Voting in Sweden 1968–2014
Reconsiderations, Explanations and the Role of the New Middle Class

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List of articles

This thesis is based on the following studies.


II. Vestin, Erik ‘Work Logics and the Political Attitudes of Skilled Employees: Causality or Self-selection?’ Unpublished manuscript.


IV. Vestin, Erik ‘Swing Voters, the Middle Class and Election Outcomes in Sweden 1979–2014’ Unpublished manuscript.
Acknowledgements

First of all, my supervisors Maria Oskarson and Johan Martinsson has my gratitude for their guidance through the maze that is the literature on class and political behavior, their encouragement, and their patience.

Maria Solevid and Dietmar Rauch provided comments on the first version of the thesis frame and one of the articles at the 80% seminar which came of very good use. Jonas Hinnfors and Henrik Oscarsson read the entire manuscript at a late stage, and gave several suggestions that made the final product considerably better. Mikael Persson, in his role as Director of Graduate Studies, was very helpful as sounding board and cheerleader in pushing the thesis over the finish line. This dissertation would have been much more difficult to write, if not for Per Hedberg and Henrik Oscarsson providing quick answers to all kinds of queries about the structure and the finer details of the Swedish National Election Studies datasets. For all of this help I am very grateful. Thanks also to Jacob Severin for constructing the first version of a cumulative dataset that I could work from.

The administrative staff at the Department of Political Science have been a blessing in making life as a PhD student very convenient, administratively speaking. A special thanks to Margaretha Hellgren Glimje, Karin Jorthé, and Lena Caspers who have helped with all kinds of business related to the program. Thanks to Maria Lilleste, Britten Ivarsson-Liljeblad, Carl-Magnus Forsudd, Caroline Fällgren, and the late Christina Pettersson for help with matters of teaching and office logistics.

I have had the fortune to be a part of the great Fab 5 generation, with Sebastian Lundmark, Olof Larsson, Rasmus Broms, and Akssel Sundström. I am very glad that I got to spend this time with you guys. Special thanks to Sebastian for being an excellent roommate during the better part of the program. (Thanks also to Niels Markwat for being a great, though not particularly present roommate during the last years.) Special thanks also to Olof for coming by the office in the afternoons, and for appreciating Whit Stillman with me.
The Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg has been a terrific research environment, as there are so many smart people to talk to there all the time. Thanks to Anders Sundell, Andrej Kokkonen, Stefan Dahlberg, Jacob Sohlberg, Mikael Persson, Mikael Gilljam, Urban Strandberg, Jan Turvall, Richard Svensson, Dennis Andersson, Edvin Boije, Johan Hyrén, Ann-Kristin Kölln, Jonathan Polk, Ann-Kristin Jonasson, Anna Bendz, Frida Boräng, Helena Stensöta, Monica Bauhr, Markus Johansson, Sverker Jagers, Niklas Harring (who gave me the best compliment I have ever received), Karin Zelano, Marina Povitkina, Petrus Olander, Elin Bergman, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Fredrik D. Hjorthen, Ole Martin Lægreid, Sofia Jonsson, Elina Lindgren, Mikael Holmgren, Anders Malm, Maria Andreasson, Elias Markstedt, Moa Frödin Gruneau, Love Christensen, Maria Tyrberg, Mattias Agerberg, and Anne-Kathrin Kreft for interesting conversations, helpful advice, or simply for being kind to me at important moments. Thanks to Sofie Blombäck, Jenny de Fine Licht, Aiysha Varraich, and Lukas Lindstrand for the Simone de Beauvoir reading group. Thanks again to Sofie Blombäck for the personal seminar in university politics. Special thanks to Peter Esaiasson for hiring me as a research assistant eight years ago, helping me getting my first foot in the door of the department.

Thanks also to the people at the Department of Sociology and Work Science, Tomas Berglund, Patrik Vulkan, and Johan Alfonsson, for nice lunches and occasions to discuss all kinds of class-related stuff. For similarly nice lunches and discussions of the Swedish economic crisis of the 1990s and the housing market, I thank Olof Larsson, Erik Bengtsson, Lovisa Broström, and Magnus Åsblad. Pär Nyman, Jonas Larsson Taghizadeh, Marcus Österman, and Linda Moberg have made visits to Uppsala wonderfully pleasant. Thanks to Magnus Wennerhag for excellent leadership of Arbetarrörelsens forskarnätverk. Jonas Nilsson was my landlord for three wonderful months in Malmö in the beginning of the program. Towards the end of my time in the program, Marika Lindgren-Åsbrink hired me to write reports for LO, providing me with a much needed sense of purpose. Anders Lindbom’s interest in my expertise for his project on welfare attitudes has had a similar effect on me.

Filosofiska fakulteternas gemensamma donationsnämnd, the Swedish National Data Service, and Helge Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse have
provided generous financial support for traveling costs and summer courses.

I would also like to thank Kees Arts, who invited me to visit Universiteit Twente for three months, which was very rewarding. Thanks also to Giedo Jansen for having tea with me in the afternoons, and for agreeing to write a paper with me — the highest professional recognition I have received so far.

To Peter Egge Langsæther, Line Rennwald, Mads Thau and Aino Tiihonen, I say that it has been a pleasure to meet you, and you make me think that we have great things before us in the field of class and political behavior.

One thing that has become clear to me as a PhD student, is the importance of having a life and a sense of self outside of academia. I thank Jimmy Sand and Johannes Hulter for the fun we’ve had in our local party association, and for giving me a sense of politics in practice. Rasmus Wadsten, Andreas Hedberg, Henrik Wallheim, Anna Hougström, Urban Jarvid, Wilhelm Caspary, and Hannes Johnson have been with me since before I moved to Gothenburg, and your friendship continues to be rewarding.

A thesis is never the work of only one person, and that also goes for the production of its physical incarnation. Thanks to Språkservice for swift and excellent language review, and to Ewa Vestin, Jonas Westin, Ann-Marie Markström, Doris Lydahl, Anton Jansson, Per Beijer, Sebastian Lundmark, Olof Larsson, and Jonathan Polk for proof-reading. Bengt Johansson deserves a shout-out for assistance with a high-resolution digital copy of the Social Democratic election poster to which the cover pays homage. Karl Westin did a marvelous cover design. Thanks also to Pär Nyman, Olof Larsson, Sebastian Lundmark, and Jonas Westin for sharing their experience with \LaTeX. Thanks to BrandFactory for a quick and smooth process with the printing.

Finally, I thank my mother Ewa, my late father Olof, and my brothers Jonas and Karl. My thinking about our family, how we got where we are, and our place in the history of Sweden, has been an important part of my interest in the issues discussed here. Thus, this book is dedicated to you.
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Sammanfattning på svenska

Historien om väljarbeteende i de västerländska demokratierna under 1900-talet, är till största delen historien om klassröстning. Arbetarklassen har röstat på socialistiska partier, och väljare i mer välbeställda samhällsskikt på liberala, konservativa eller kristdemokratiska partier. Idag ser vi att denna ordning är i upplösning i de flesta länder — en trend som har pågått en vid det här laget ganska lång tid. För att förstå dagens politiska situation i dessa länder krävs ett gott grepp om frågan om hur och varför den gamla ordningen kom att börja förändras.

Denna avhandling bidrar till att svara på dessa frågor med fyra studier av väljarbeteende och politiska attityder i Sverige. Samtliga studier använder den surveydata om de nationella valen som har samlats in av det svenska Valforskningsprogrammet.


Avhandlingen innehåller fyra artiklar som är relaterade till dessa teman.

Den två första artiklarna kan ses som en diskussion av en specifik teori om en nyordning, nämligen Daniel Oesch klassschema, framlagt i dennes avhandling Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland (2006). Det nya i detta klassschema är indelningar av yrken efter olika work logics, dvs. den typ av uppgifter och allmänna arbetssituation som olika yrken är förknippade med. Organizational work logic handlar om administrativa uppgifter, att verkställa order och att implementera regelverk. Technical work logic handlar om att konstruera och underhålla tekniska system. Interpersonal work logic syftar på vad som i dagligt tal brukar kallas ”att jobba med människor”, det vill säga personliga tjänster med ett stort inslag av direkt klientkontakt. Oesch menar att denna typologi har stort förklaringsvärde för
dagens politiska utveckling — framförallt för variationen bland de mer välbeställda löntagarna (den nya medelklassen).


I artikel 2, *Work Logics and the Political Attitudes of Skilled Employees: Causality or Self-selection?* granskas ett av de underliggande antagandena i Oeschs schema närmare, nämligen att erfarenheten av att arbeta i yrken med en viss work logic har en kausal effekt på ens politiska attityder. Något förenklat tänker Oesch och andra forskare sig att de som arbetar i yrken med interpersonal work logic blir mer benägna att vara positiva till ekonomisk omfördelning, mer frihetliga i sin syn på social ordning och mindre restriktiva kring vilka de vill räkna som en del av den egna gruppen. De som arbetar i yrken med organizational work logic hamnar i andra änden av skalan, och är mer negativa till omfördelning, mer auktoritär och mer exkluderande. Människor i yrken med technical work logic tänks hamna någonstans mittemellan.

I tidigare forskning har detta enbart studerats med data där individerna endast tillfrågats vid en tidpunkt (tvärsnittsundersökningar). I ljuset av moderna diskussioner om behovet av mer rigorösa strategier för att identifiera kausala effekter, kan man dock resa frågan om hur hållbart antagandet om effekter av work logics egentligen är? Man kan även tänka sig att det istället är människor med vissa politiska attityder som väljer vissa yrken, eller att det finns en gemensam bakomliggande orsak (t.ex. att människor med vissa personligheter både söker sig till vissa yrken och utvecklar vissa politiska värderingar). I artikel 2 används de svenska valundersökningarnas paneldesign för att utröna ett närmare svar på frågan. I detta fall har samma individer tillfrågats om sitt yrke och sina politiska åsikter igen, tre-fyra år senare. Resultaten visar att byte av yrke
inte är associerat med någon förändring i åsikter enligt det mön-
ster som Oesch och andra forskare förutsäger. Den samvariation
mellan yrken och politiska attityder eller partival som Oesch och
andra finner, är alltså uteslutande en fråga om att folk med vissa
åsikter har en tendens att välja vissa yrken.

En slutsats av de två första artiklarna är att det finns skäl att vara
skeptisk till att Oeschs klasschema skulle vara ett nytt grundmön-
ster för den politiska utvecklingen i de västerländska demokratierna.
Den bild som framträder är i grund och botten densamma som med
äldre klass scheman, och ett av de centrala underliggande antagandena
finner inte empiriskt stöd.

Om de två första artiklarna utspelar sig i debatten mellan dealign-
ment och realignment, handlar de båda senare snarare om olika hy-
poteser inom dealignment-litteraturen.

Artikel 3, *The Decline of Class Voting in Sweden 1968–2014: Con-
temporary Context or Generational Replacement?* anknryt till till
den allmänna debatten om klassröstningens nedgång. På senare år
har denna diskussionen främst intresserat sig för förändringar i den
samtida politiska kontexten, som ideologisk konvergens, skifte i
sakfrågefokus, och uppkomsten av nya partier. Dessa förklaringar
tenderar att se dealignment som ett fenomen med sin grund främst
i samtiden: De politiska förändringarna har gjort klasspositionen
mindre relevant som vägledning för hur man ska rösta. I grunden
kvarstår dock samma politiska konflikter under ytan. Även när
denna litteratur undersöker mer strukturella faktorer, som förän-
dringar i utbildningsnivån, så arbetar den enligt antagandet att dessa
strukterar har sin verkan genom den samtida situationen. Denna ar-
tikel undersöker tesen om ideologisk konvergens mellan partierna,
och finner att den har begränsat förklaringsvärde när det gäller ned-
gången i klassröstningen i Sverige, eftersom en sådan konvergens, i
den mån den alls skett, tycks ha varit alltför subtil för att få brett
genomslag på väljarnivån. Istället betonas förändringar över gen-
erationerna. Nedgången i klassröstning är inte i första hand en
fråga om att individer har bytt parti, utan i högre grad en fråga
om att individerna har ersatts av andra, genom generationsomsät-
tning. Senare generationer röstar efter de traditionella klassmön-
stren i betydligt mindre utsträckning än sina föräldrar. Detta gäller
framförallt de yngre generationernas arbetarklass.

Artikel 4, *Swing Voters, the Middle Class, and Election Outcomes*
in Sweden 1979–2014, behandlar olika idéer om ”medelklassens” (i varierande mening) ställning som swing voters i svenska val. Med swing voters avses här väljare som tvekar mellan de två blocken i svensk politik, de rödgröna och de borgerliga/Alliansen. Tanken på att denna grupp i någon mån är synonym med medelklassen finns i flera olika varianter i den statsvetenskapliga litteraturen. Resultaten visar dock att medelklassen, oavsett om man syftar på yrke, inkomst eller utbildning, inte är överrepresenterad i denna grupp. Däremot finns även här generationsskillnader i det att senare generationer tenderar att uppvisa denna tvekan i högre grad än de äldre. Dealignment — upplösandet av koppling mellan den socioekonomiska strukturen och de politiska partierna — är således inte någon enkel funktion av uppkomsten av en medelklass utan klar politisk hemvist, utan en trend i hela klasstrukturen.

Båda artiklarna pekar på den potentiella nyttan i ett återupplivande av generationsanalys i undersökningar av klass och politiskt beteende, i vilken förändring sker långsamt och kumulativt, snarare som en ren reaktion på samtidens svängningar. Klassröstningen och dess nedgång i Sverige har sin grund i generationsskillnader, och den kan knappast omedelbart nå sextioåtlets nivåer enbart genom en större ideologisk intensitet i den politiska debatten. Jämte de två första artiklarna kan resultaten i denna avhandling också sägas peka mot att väljarforskningen inte har något särskilt bra grepp om vilken roll den lönearbetande medelklassen har i politiken i dagens samhälle. Således kan fler forskningsansträngningar på detta område vara av intresse i framtiden.
The history of voting behavior in Western democracies during the 20th century is to a great extent the history of class voting (Alford, 1963; Butler and Stokes, 1974; Franklin et al., 1992; Korpi, 1983; Lipset, 1981; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rose and Särlvik, 1974). According to several prominent scholars, the very creation of democracy in Western Europe was a result of the working class coming together in unions and political parties to demand political citizenship (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Korpi, 1983; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Therborn, 1977). Other social groups had already started similar projects, or were on their way. Relationships between classes and parties became an important part of the political order of Western Europe after World War II (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Nowhere was this more the case than in Sweden, the country that is analyzed in the articles that make up this dissertation (Jansen, 2011; Oskarson, 2015).

Since the 1990s, there has been an extensive scholarly debate about the continued relevance of class to voting behavior, political attitudes and Western politics in general (Clark and Lipset, 2001; Evans, 2000, 1999; Evans and Graaf, 2013; Oesch, 2008, pp. 329–331). But, while class has been proclaimed to be both ‘dying’ (Clark and Lipset, 1991) and ‘dead’ (Pakulski and Waters, 1996), scholars have kept the field alive with new methods, new conceptualizations, and new explanatory candidates (Evans, 2000; Evans and Graaf, 2013; Güveli, 2006; Jansen, 2011; Knutsen, 2006; Oesch, 2008; Rennwald and Evans, 2014). This dissertation starts off from the position that an important part of understanding where Western democracies are today is to understand how the ‘classical’ order of class politics (Alford, 1963; Butler and Stokes, 1974; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) came to change. While the correlation between class position and voting behavior is indeed in decline (Jansen et al., 2013; Nieuwbeerta, 1995), it is still a relevant question to determine why
this is so. This is especially true in an age when economic inequality is on the rise (Piketty, 2014) and unemployment is persistently high (Lindvall, 2010) — factors which prima facie would seem to provide good grounds for mobilization around class issues.

The observation of the decline in class voting has been accompanied by many interpretations. In this dissertation, they are discussed in terms of two main themes: dealignment and realignment. The first interpretation argues that the ties between socio-economic structures and political parties is trending towards a general dissolution, whereas the second describes how a new order is replacing the old. The common thread of the articles in this thesis is that they all bear some relation to the discussion of these two themes. While the articles do not cohere into a systematic test that can adjudicate between these two interpretations, they all have a bearing on critical points in this literature, which have arguably been under-investigated (or, in one instance, forgotten), but nevertheless are relevant to the understanding of political development in Western democracies.

First, many discussions of class have revolved around how it is operationalized, which class schema to use (Oesch, 2006; Wright, 2005), and to what extent old schemas are still ‘relevant’ today (Beramendi et al., 2015; Oesch, 2006, ch. 1–5; Kitschelt, 1994; Breen, 2005). The claim that ‘old’ class schemas are outdated, and should be replaced, is common in the realignment literature (Beramendi et al., 2015; Oesch, 2006). The empirical claims made in such debates tend to revolve around the predictive power of class for a number of political and social variables. However, actual comparisons of different class schemas are rare.

Second, since the 2000s, research on class and politics has mostly forgotten about cohort analysis and the possibility of change through generational replacement. While there has been considerable discussion of structural vs. political explanations for the decline in class voting, both of these models have in common that they only consider the contemporary situation in society. Two of the articles in this dissertation revive the idea of generational replacement: that older generations have a persistent tendency to vote more according to class than younger ones, and that class voting declines as the older generations fade away. It also discusses how this type of explanation relates to structural or political ones. This kind of think-
Third, research on class and political behavior — in both the dealignment and the realignment vein — has put forward many causal claims about the relations between class position and various political variables. However, it is still quite rare in this literature to use more solid strategies to identify causal effects, especially at the individual level.

Fourth, an important part of the discussion about dealignment and realignment revolves around the general trend of decline in party alignments and stable voting behavior among voters in Western democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002). This phenomenon has often been understood as related to the decline in the proportion of working-class voters and the growth of the middle class. However, studies that look into the relationship between class position and party alignments have actually been very uncommon, especially those that consider data on individuals (Zelle, 1995). The results of the articles in this thesis point towards three more general conclusions. First, several results underline the importance of investigating slow, cumulative, generational change. As mentioned above, modern research in both the realignment and dealignment vein has seemingly forgotten the aspect of cohort effects and generational replacement, and has a tendency to treat everything like period effects — as though everything that happens is caused by things that are happening at the same moment. However, when it comes to both class voting (Article III) and swing voters (Article IV), the results show that much of the change that we see has happened not because individuals have changed, but because they have been replaced by other individuals from new generations. The absence of causal effects of work logics (a kind of period effect), also points in this direction. The results demonstrate that research on political development at the voter level has considerable gains to make by reviving the idea that political change at the mass level happens cumulatively, rather than disruptively, especially in studies of dealignment and realignment. For example, realignment patterns that are difficult to distinguish at the level of the general population (as will be seen in Article I), may be more visible in younger cohorts. Second, many results go against central assumptions and predictions in the realignment literature, specifically with regard to
the theory of work logic (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Oesch, 2006). At the basic level of predicting party choice, the class schema based on work logics does not account for political developments in the way it claims. In fact, the development of class voting looks very similar, regardless of which class schema we use. Additionally, the expected causal effects of work logics do not show up in empirical testing. Third, several results suggest that the importance of the middle class for political development is overrated. The proportion of people in middle-class occupations has indeed grown. However, the impact of a middle-class occupational characteristic like work logic seems to be non-existent, and various notions of the middle class as decisive swing voters in elections do not hold up. The middle class group may be large, but it is questionable whether it is important *qua* middle class.

In the next section, I further outline the research context to which this dissertation makes its contributions. After that follows a statement about how the central term ‘class’ is used in these studies. In the fourth section, I give reasons for the focus on the case of Sweden, and a general account of the Swedish National Election Studies — the main data source for all four articles. In the second to last section, the articles are summarized, and related to the broader research context. Finally, the last section summarizes the overall conclusions and reflects upon relevant further research.

**Explanations for the decline in class voting**

The relationship between class and voting is one of the oldest and richest literatures in political science (Campbell et al., 1960, ch. 13; Lipset, 1981; Franklin et al., 1992; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Evans, 2000; Manza and Brooks, 2008; Evans and Graaf, 2013). The complexity of the field, and the circumstance that many analyses are focused on specific historical situations, rather than theoretical models, makes it a challenge to summarize. In this section, I start out from three basic results in the field, and then describe two main strands of interpretation of these results: dealignment and realignment. The term dealignment is often used in the broader sense of the dissolution of *all* social patterns of voting, most importantly voting according to religious denomination. In this thesis frame, it is used in a slightly narrower sense (although arguably the original one, see Crewe et
al., 1977), referring to the dissolution or lack of ties between voters and parties in the socio-economic (or class) aspect of social life.

Both of these strands include bottom-up (or demand-oriented) explanations, which refer to changes in society (including some organizational factors, like union membership and religious denomination), as well as top-down (or supply-oriented) explanations, which refer to changes among the political parties (Jansen, 2011). Examples of the former are changes in the distribution of a structural variable (e.g. class positions), changes in the relationship between such variables (e.g. class position becoming less correlated with income) or changes in the relationship between individuals with different characteristics (e.g. a greater or smaller proportion of families in which the adults have the same class position). Examples of the latter are the emergence of new parties, parties changing their policy positions, or parties trying to influence the salience of some issues over others. The section ends with a discussion of four different aspects that the literature on class and political behavior has so far not given attention to, or, in one case, arguably forgotten about. This discussion provides the research context within which the articles of this dissertation make their contribution.

Three points of departure

A good place to start a dissertation about class voting is with the fact that class and vote choice have correlated, and still correlate in most Western European countries, and have done so for at least as long as election studies have been going on (Berelson et al., 1954, ch. 3–4; Converse, 1958; Campbell et al., 1960, ch. 13; Alford, 1963; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rose and Särlvik, 1974; Franklin et al., 1992; Nieuwbeerta, 1995, ch. 1). The general pattern is that people in the working class have a stronger tendency to vote for Socialist parties, whereas white-collar employees and the self-employed have a higher probability of voting for Liberal, Conservative or Christian-Democratic parties. In some countries, there have also been agrarian parties that have served as the political arm of farmers (Batory and Sitter, 2004; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Even many of the new parties that have emerged since the 1970s around supposedly non-class issues like the environment, gender equality and migration, still often have a class base in the sense that it is more common to vote for them in some classes than in others (Dolezal, 2010; Ryd-
gren, 2013). While class voting has mostly been studied in Western democracies, there are also a few findings of similar patterns in Eastern Europe (Evans, 2006; Evans and Whitefield, 2006; Letki, 2013). In other places, like Latin America, the situation can be more complicated (Handlin, 2013; Lupu, 2010; Roberts, 2002).

A second point of departure is the observation that the correlation between class position and voting choice has been declining in almost all Western democracies (Clark and Lipset, 1991, 2001; Evans and Graaf, 2013; Jansen, 2011; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). The few exceptions are countries where class voting has never been particularly strong, like the United States (Hout et al., 1995; Jansen et al., 2013). When this trend was first observed and discussed more systematically at the beginning of the 1990s (Clark and Lipset, 1991; Franklin et al., 1992), one point of contention was to question whether this was a temporary deviation or a methodological artifact, and to discuss the measurement of class voting Evans, 1999; Hout et al., 1995; Manza et al., 1995. Nowadays, the observation that class voting has declined is uncontroversial.

Third, in recent times, researchers have taken a particular interest in the voting behavior and political attitudes of people in the upper echelons of the wage-earner group.¹ Several studies have shown

¹ In this instance, voting behavior, party choice and attitudes go hand in hand, as studies of both variables get similar results. More broadly speaking, the relationship between class and political attitudes has received far less attention than the relationship between class and voting. This may be due to the fact that the early literature on voting did not ascribe opinions on issues much importance for voting behavior (Campbell et al., 1960). There are, for example, very few studies of how the relationship between class and political attitudes has developed over time (though see Evans and Tilley, 2017, ch. 4). What we have are some general observations about correlations between class and political attitudes, both with regard to economic issues — redistribution, labor-market regulation, the welfare state — and social issues — immigration, gender equality, attitudes towards sexual minorities etc. Such studies find that the working class, or more generally people with a lower class position or socio-economic status, are more in favor of redistribution, expansion of the welfare state etc., and more negative towards immigrants, gender equality etc. (Bengtsson et al., 2013; Houtman, 2003; Lipset, 1959; McCall and Manza, 2011; Svalldors, 1997, 2006, 2012; Svensson and Togeby, 1992). We also have some cross-sectional evidence about which variables overlap with the relationship between class and attitudes (Bengtsson et al., 2013; Brooks and Svalldors, 2010; Houtman, 2003) and about the variation in class differences in attitudes between countries (Svalldors, 1997, 2006, 2012).
differences not only at a hierarchical level, but also ‘horizontally’ across groups that are different in their type of work rather than in their place in the labor market hierarchy (Kriesi, 1989; Oesch, 2006; Savage et al., 1992). The typical result here is that people who work in so-called socio-cultural occupations (teachers, social workers, medical professions) vote to a disproportionate extent for left-libertarian parties and have more pro-redistributive and more inclusive attitudes than people in technical or administrative professions (Güveli, 2006; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014). The focus of this dissertation will be primarily on the second of these findings — the decline in class voting — and the many different interpretations and explanations of this. For the purposes of this dissertation, they can be classified in terms of two broad strands: dealignment and realignment. The next two sections will introduce these concepts.

**Dealignment**

By ‘dealignment’, I refer to hypotheses about a trend towards the dissolution of stable relationships between the socio-economic structure (or the class structure) and political parties. This literature takes its point of departure in Lipset and Rokkan (1967; see also Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Crewe et al., 1977), who theorized the interaction between voters and parties in terms of social cleavages. Their model of the development of Western societies states that the social conflicts that emerged from the establishment of the nation-state, the Reformation, and the industrial revolution together led to the creation of a small number of social milieus, of which the working class was one. In the ideal-typical case, these milieus were rather isolated, in the sense that the members of each milieu had very few social ties to people outside of it, even while they inhabited the same territory. These milieus then became a more or less self-evident basis for the formation of political parties, and the strength of these parties could be explained by the size of each milieu and the extent to which the milieus were isolated or overlapping.

In this literature, voting behavior is thought of mostly in terms of social identity, and how these identities came to be linked to specific parties.² From this ‘bottom-up’ perspective (Evans and Tilley, 1987), it may be useful here to keep in mind the distinction between social identity and party identification as different mechanisms for voting (Berglund et al., 2005; Thomassen, 1976; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009).

² It may be useful here to keep in mind the distinction between social identity and party identification as different mechanisms for voting (Berglund et al., 2005; Thomassen, 1976; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009).
2012; Jansen, 2011), the decline in the correlation between class and voting is analyzed in terms of the dissolution of the working-class milieu. The most common theory in this literature is various versions of the individualization hypothesis: that different social structures have become more overlapping\(^3\), and increasing wealth and the welfare state have created new political constituencies (see the citations in Evans and Tilley, 2012, pp. 138–140; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991; for a more analytical approach to the concept of individualization, see Oscarsson, 2005). This means more social heterogeneity, and greater difficulties in using one’s social position to decide which party to vote for. In the same vein, Lipset and Rokkan (1967; see also Lipset, 1964) in one respect saw the decline in class voting early on, in that they noticed the emergence of new wage-earner groups outside of the working-class milieu — what they called ‘the new middle class’. They considered this group to be unintegrated vis-à-vis the classical milieus, to have a less clear social identity and more unstable political sympathies.

A slightly different view of the dissolution of social identities is offered by cognitive mobilization theory (CMT). This theory argues that, as the public has become more educated and better informed, party identification and the social milieus have become less useful as information shortcuts for voters. Voters now tend to use more sophisticated strategies in their choice of party, such as issue voting and candidate evaluations (Baker et al., 1981; Beck et al., 1984; Dalton, 1984, 2007, 2013). Thus, according to CMT, it is not just the level of class voting that has changed, but also its character, as voting has become more tied to opinions on issues, rather than social identities.

Alongside the bottom-up literature, there are also top-down perspectives, which explain the political development towards dealignment through developments in the political system. These arguments, unlike the bottom-up perspective, claim that rather little has actually changed with regard to the conflict structure in contemporary societies, in terms of interests and attitude differences. The decline in voting is instead mainly driven by the fact that political parties for various reasons choose voter appeals that make class position a less useful cue when voters make their choice. It

\(^3\) In Article III, this is called the heterogeneity hypothesis, following the terminology in Evans and Tilley (2012).
is worth noting that this type of argument has been made from different ideas about how voting behavior works at the basic level. This type of argument has been made from both a more issue-based perspective on class voting, and a more social-identity-based one. Geoffrey Evans, in his ‘political choice model’ (Evans and Graaf, 2013), relates this to issue voting, and considers dealignment to be a result of ideological convergence, which makes issue opinions less relevant for vote choice. Thau (2017a,b), on the other hand, comes from a social-identity perspective and argues that it has its origins in the decline of class-based group appeals. Mostly in line with the dealignment perspective, a similar case has also been made with regard to the emergence of new political issues (Rennwald and Evans, 2014). Specifically, this theory argues that issues related to migration and integration have led to cross-pressures on the working class, who typically have pro-redistribution and anti-migration attitudes — the latter of which is in conflict with the positions of many left-leaning parties (Oesch and Rennwald, 2010, 2018; Rydgren, 2013).

**Realignment**

In the literature on realignment, the main argument is that, rather than class conflicts being resolved or dissolved, or the ties between parties and voters being severed, to be replaced with nothing, the nature of socio-economic interests and the associated linkages between classes and political parties have been, or are on their way towards being, transformed (Beramendi et al., 2015; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015; Hout et al., 1995; Houtman et al., 2008; Häusermann, 2006; Manza et al., 1995; Oesch, 2006, 2008). Unlike the literature on dealignment, this strand of research suggests that there are, or are emerging, new stable patterns of relations between the social structure and the political parties. This process involves both social changes from below and political changes in party systems, issue repertoire and policy positions.

The literature on realignment offers several different ideas about the mechanisms behind these changes, but top-down arguments tend to be in the forefront. Some authors argue that changes in public institutions and the political world have changed which groups have interests in the welfare state, and are represented by which parties. Gingrich and Häusermann (2015, p. 54) account for the argument that the emergence of human-capital-oriented policies in the wel-
fare state (Morel et al., 2012; Rothstein, 1998) has most benefited segments of the middle-class wage-earners (especially middle-class women), and made them part of a pro-welfare coalition. This development is also associated with changes in the positions of left-of-center parties, although the claims about what moved first can be a bit fuzzy.

Other authors have made bottom-up arguments about changes in society and how they have influenced the mass public. These types of change are not so much concerned with identity (as some of the dealignment literature is), but with (a) the emergence of new political values and attitudes, (b) changes in the location within the social structure of support for the welfare state and economic redistribution, and (c) the social trends that have caused these changes. In this case, the works of Inglehart (1977; see also Inglehart and Rabier, 1986) can be considered the starting point for the notion of the emergence of a new order. While his observations on the emergence of new cultural values, and eventually new political issues and new political parties, still by and large stand, his theory on the economic and social origins of these changes has attracted competitors. Inglehart’s main explanation for these changes was increased economic prosperity. Others have argued for the expansion of the educational system as a driver of this development in its own right (Stubager, 2013, 2010, 2009; Surridge, 2016; see, however, Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015). Another prominent line of argument has connected the expansion of education to developments in the economy in the tracks of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008).

In addition, there are also theories arguing that institutional changes at the top have led to complications in the economic left–right dimension. There is a considerable literature on the complicated relationship between insiders and outsiders on the labor market, and how this leads to both changes in the strategic considerations of the parties and a muddling of interests in the working class and other groups with weaker labor-market ties — including some with rather high qualifications (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015, p. 54; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014; Rueda, 2005; Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009; Rovny and Rovny, 2017; Marx and Picot, 2013; Häusermann, 2010, ch. 4). Another variant of such arguments is the idea of the emergence of new economic cleavages, such as the public and private sector as a new political cleavage (Dunleavy,
1980; Heath et al., 1991), or more generally about how middle-class professions can have different interests with regard to profit maximization, autonomy and organizational power (Kriesi, 1989; Lamont, 1987; Savage et al., 1992).

Finally, and most centrally here, Daniel Oesch (2006) has put forward a new class schema designed to serve as a framework for describing the new post-industrial labor market, just as more traditional class schemas did for industrial society (see the section ‘Varieties of class schemas’ below). The important innovation here is the classification of occupations according to their work logic, of which there are three central types: organizational, technical and interpersonal. Broadly speaking, organizational work logics consist of administrative and managerial jobs, where the most significant task is to execute orders and make sure that rules are being followed; technical work logics are about designing and implementing technical systems; and occupations with interpersonal work logic are typically services that include considerable human interaction. In particular, the latter type of work situation is associated with people who tend to be more leftist in both economic and cultural issues. While most of this literature is about correlations with party choice (Oesch, 2006, 2008, 2013b; see also the similar analysis in Güveli, 2006), Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) have argued that work logics have causal effects on both economic and cultural attitudes as well (see also the similar argument by Güveli et al., 2007), and that the expansion of these kinds of occupations is at least partially responsible for the trend of people with higher education and well-paid jobs becoming more leftist in recent years.

Gaps and issues

Both the realignment and dealignment literatures are theoretical visions of the entirety of political development in Western democracies for the past fifty years. While the literature on these trends is indeed very rich, there are still many aspects of these theories that have remained uninvestigated empirically. This dissertation points out four central gaps that merit further investigation, and where it contributes to the literature.

First of all, the realignment literature often make claims about

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4 Oesch (2006) sometimes also discusses the situation of small-business owners as an ‘independent work-logic’.
how older ways of measuring class are irrelevant now, and that new socio-economic conflicts are in the process of taking over, if they haven’t already. This claim is a major premise for the construction of new class schemas and the modification of older ones (Oesch, 2006; Güveli, 2006; Hout et al., 1995). There are, however, few evaluations of the extent to which these new schemas really succeed in providing a better summary of political tensions and voting behavior in contemporary societies than that offered by the old class schemas. The claim that different societies (industrial vs. post-industrial) require different class schemas also implies that we should expect new and old class schemas to display very different developments over time in how much variation in party choice they can capture. It is thus of interest to raise the question: Do new class schemas explain party choice better in today’s society, and does the development in class voting over time change when we use them? This is empirically investigated in Article I.

Second, one part of the realignment literature looks into new ideas about the causal effects of labor-market positions on political attitudes—economic as well as cultural. The empirical evidence in this research so far consists of cross-sectional data, at best under a large number of controls (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Oesch, 2008; Savage et al., 1992; Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; Güveli et al., 2007; Güveli, 2006). There are, however, several different reasons to think that these correlations stem from self-selection mechanisms or common underlying causes (e.g. personality traits influencing both political attitudes and occupational choice, see references in Article II). This is a good example of why class research should apply more solid identification strategies (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). The research question in this instance is: to what extent do the new labor-market mechanisms (in this instance, work logics) have the causal effects on political attitudes that some authors in the realignment literature argue? This is investigated in Article II.

Third, one weakness that the dealignment and realignment literatures have in common is that, at least in their most recent incarnations, they pay very little attention to the cohort perspective. The view that political experiences in early adulthood often create impressions that last throughout life is a staple in research on political behavior generally, as well as the insight that such experiences sometimes create differences between cohorts in values and voting
behavior (Jennings, 2007; Neundorf and Niemi, 2014; Grasso et al., 2017; Neundorf and Soroka, 2018; Svallfors, 2010). This insight used to also be present in research on class voting (Franklin et al., 1992). In the last generation of work, however, it seems to have almost disappeared (Evans, 1999; Evans and Graaf, 2013). The idea of cohort effects is not present in either the empirical analysis (which may be understandable, as the data is often cross-sectional) or in the theoretical considerations. Instead, the focus is on the present (as though everything consists of period effects). In the models used in this research, social structures and political parties influence voters only through their contemporary constellation and actions.

One possible reason for this omission is the association of cohort effects with effects that are uniform and move an entire cohort in a certain political direction. It is not so very hard to imagine, however, that generational experiences can also be divisive, in that they may move different groups (like classes) in different directions. The research question here is: what can cohort effects contribute to the explanation of the decline in class voting, compared to models that only take period effects into account? This is analyzed in Article III.

Finally, for all its discussions of class and alignments, research on class and political behavior has been remarkably uninterested in how class and political alignments work at the individual level. As Zelle (1995) points out, it often seems as though class research assumes alignment at the group level (a large proportion of a group votes for the same party) to be the same as alignment at the individual level (the ties between a party and an individual are durable). There are indeed many claims about differences in inclination between people in different class positions to form alignments with parties. According to CMT (Dalton, 1984, 2013), education and political knowledge are associated with issue-based voting decisions rather than identity-based ones, and thus middle-class people of the modern variety do not develop permanent alignments (at least not beyond their issue opinions) because they make decisions in more sophisticated ways. The social cleavage model suggested, in its time, that the new middle-class groups were emerging outside of the traditional social milieus (Lipset, 1964), and that they were thus less aligned to any of the parties than the other classes.\footnote{Wright (1985, ch. 2, 1986) sometimes sounds as though he is suggesting some-}
they were more heterogeneous in their party choice was often interpreted as evidence for this (Zelle, 1995, p. 341). This interpretation was also common in the broader literature on class, sometimes phrased in terms of the new class being not yet fully formed (Goldthorpe, 1982).

As a consequence of this, it has not been uncommon to interpret, for example, increasing voter volatility as a consequence of the growth of the new middle class (Clarke et al., 2004, p. 2; Zelle, 1995), and to think of the middle class as a key constituency in elections: all other groups already have ‘their’ parties, and the middle class is the one you can compete for. However, actual empirical studies on the relationship between class and party alignments at the individual level are rare, to the point that we do not even have many basic descriptive results. The research question with which Article IV in this dissertation engages is: are there class differences at the individual level in the tendency to form political alignments?

The concept of class

In this section, I discuss how the term ‘class’ is used and operationalized in this dissertation, with a focus on the variety of criteria that have been suggested for how to make distinctions within the wage-earner group. The section ends with a discussion of the selection of class schemas to be used in this dissertation.

Class in general

The history of the use of the term ‘class’ is rich enough to itself be the object of many research projects (Calvert, 1982; Ossowski, 1963; Wright, 2005). The reasons why these discussions never end are several. One reason is that the term is simultaneously involved in both scientific and political discourse, and thus used with many different purposes. Another may be the conflicts between the theoretical edifices of social scientists and the more practical needs that bureaus of official statistics are attempting to fill (Evans and Mills, 1998). A third reason may be that the conceptual discussions are often tied up with broader debates about the relevance of different
research agendas; at least, it is often unclear how the conceptual discussions are tied to positions on the validity of specific hypotheses (this is one way to read the essays in Wright, 2005).

Without any desire to call other approaches invalid, this dissertation follows the path of Svallfors (2006, ch. 2) and uses ‘class’ to refer to groups of people whose position in the economy have similar objective properties, with a particular interest in the characteristics and relationships of their employment. This can be contrasted with more subjective approaches that make a common social identity and outlook on the world a defining feature of class (e.g. Thompson, 1963). It also stands in contrast to approaches that define class as a total summary of a person’s resources (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984). The use of the term in this thesis also falls into the camp of ‘relational’ definitions, rather than ‘gradational’ ones (Wright, 1979, pp. 5–8; see also Ossowski, 1963, who labels the former type of definition ‘functional’). This means that people’s class position is defined by their relations to other people in the division of labor (such as in the content of their work or their relations to their employers or employees), rather than as a relative position on a continuous dimension, like income, wealth or socio-economic status.

This relatively narrow notion of class has the primary advantage of analytical clarity. As Svallfors (2006, ch. 2) argues, this type of definition makes clear the distinction between class and adjacent phenomena such as class identity or class consciousness. If the meaning of the term ‘class’ is restricted to objective conditions within the economic and social world, it also becomes clearer what is meant by questions about how and under what circumstances such conditions give rise to common identities, political attitudes, unionization, political alignments, voting behavior, etc. For ex-

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6 Crompton (2008, ch. 4) labels this ‘the employment aggregate approach’. This approach has solidly dominated research on class and voting over the years (Alford, 1963; Franklin et al., 1992; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Evans, 1999; Clark and Lipset, 2001; Evans and Graaf, 2013). There are, however, a few exceptions that use more subjective approaches (D’Hooge et al., 2018; Jackman and Jackman, 1983; Sosnaud et al., 2013).

7 This distinction between structural and cultural, or between objective and subjective approaches to class, runs through much of the class literature under different names. Marx called it Klasse-an-sich and Klasse-für-sich. In more modern days, Scott (1994) makes essentially the same distinction, using the terms class position and social class (Oesch, 2008, pp. 331–332).

8 This is a paraphrase of the basic model of Structure → Consciousness → Ac-
ample, the objective kind of definition gives the question of the existence of classes in society a clear answer: classes are groups of people who have similar positions in the economy and the labor market (according to certain criteria), and classes exist to the extent that there are people who work or operate under such conditions. More subjective definitions, or definitions that include some idea of a clustering of social characteristics, make even this question very complex (at least empirically), and the answer will have to be specified as a matter of degree, as much as a matter of size. Also, other descriptive questions, like the degree of heterogeneity or the social cohesion of a certain class, become conceptually easier to handle with a narrower definition of what constitutes the class as such.

Along the same lines, this approach does not make it a definitional question to determine whether a society is ‘a class society’ in the sense of ‘a society characterized by considerable inequalities and undeserved privileges’. This is rather something that has to be inferred from empirical research about the relationships between different classes. While it certainly seems more meaningful for research efforts to focus on those aspects of the economy and the labor market that are most problematic for inequality, inequality itself is nevertheless not part of this definition of class. From this perspective, the statement that we live in a class society is simply a statement that our society has a diverse economy and a significant division of labor, where people tend to remain in their positions.

In this dissertation, class position is conceived of as a characteristic of the individual. In earlier generations of research, class position was often conceived of as a household phenomenon, where a person’s class position was the class position of his/her family, and the family’s class position was determined by the position of the father/husband (Acker, 1973; Goldthorpe, 1983). Such approaches had a certain adequacy in a society where considerable numbers of women were not active in the labor market, and almost none of them owned any meaningful amounts of property. However, in an age where these distributions have begun to change over time, this approach seems less tenable. This is not to deny that marriage, presented in Crompton (2008), with many caveats about how complicated the relationships between these three phenomena can be. In later years, we have also seen an increased interest in the role of top-down influence, in the form of political parties, union organizers etc.

\footnote{It is the opinion of this author that the literature on class should be more care-}
riage and family patterns may have considerable effects on voting behavior, or that social heritage plays a considerable role in family relationships — but rather to claim that the intersection of these patterns with class is an interesting object to research in its own right, and that they should be considered a separate explanatory mechanism for class voting, rather than built into the phenomenon itself. On a methodological note, in this approach, respondents who are not active on the labor market at the time of a survey are usually asked about and classified according to their last occupation. This approach has also been followed in the data used in this dissertation.

**Varieties of class schemas**

Even though, generally speaking, a large body of work in class research agrees on this view of the concept of class (Evans and Tilley, 2017; Goldthorpe, 2000; Svalfors, 2006; Wright, 1985), there are still issues regarding *which aspects* of the economy and the labor market should be the basis for class categories. This section discusses the most prominent candidates for such classifications, and discusses how they motivate their focus — the schemas associated with the names Alford, Goldthorpe (EGP), Wright, and Oesch. The debates about the definition of class and the construction of class schemas (Goldthorpe, 1987, 2000; Güveli, 2006; Oesch, 2006; Wright, 1985) is often a debate about which aspects of the economy and the labor market are of ‘primary importance’ or ‘relevant’, in one sense or another (Beramendi et al., 2015, p. 23; Breen, 2005; Kitschelt, 1994, pp. 12–30; Marshall et al., 1989). The section then leads on to a discussion of the motivations for choosing the class schemas used in this dissertation.

The first schema to become a standard in research on class voting was the distinction between manual and non-manual occupations. As Grusky and Galescu (2005) point out, even when class is conceptualized as an individual phenomenon, as by Wright and Goldthorpe, it is sometimes measured at the occupational level, in that it is assumed that all individuals with the same occupation have the same working conditions (and often also that these do not vary over time). These conceptualizations and assumptions are also used in this dissertation.

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10 In this tradition, persons who do not have employment at the time of the survey (the unemployed, pensioners, students) are usually classified in accordance with their last occupation.

11 One may note that both of these categories include both employees and people
proposed by Alford (1962) as the foundation for his class voting index (Nieuwbeerta, 1995, pp. 4-9). His original motivations for focusing on this distinction were several. First, it was the overall best predictor of other candidates, like income, education, or other occupational distinctions. Second, occupational measurements were, at least in practice, easier to compare across countries. Third, the distinction between manual and non-manual work ‘has a similar meaning in most Western societies’ (Alford, 1962, p. 420). And, although Alford already suspected that this meaning had started to blur, according to him the differences in status and life chances were still larger between manual and non-manual occupations, than between other potential distinctions.

In modern research, by far the most widely used class schema in research on class voting is the work by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, known by the abbreviation EGP (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Erikson et al., 1979; Goldthorpe, 1987, 2000). This schema was initially developed to study social mobility. For that purpose, the important task was to map out categories that captured social divisions — the crossing of which could meaningfully be described as mobility. It was introduced into class voting research in order to capture more nuances and variations within the manual and non-manual classes (Nieuwbeerta, 1995, pp. 12–13; Evans, 2000). While the early versions of this schema seem to lack a thorough theoretical motivation (Goldthorpe, 1987, ch. 2), later work by Goldthorpe (2000) lays out the rationale of the schema in terms of employment relations — that is, different forms of contracts between the employer and the employee. He describes these contracts as the outcome of two separate problems that must be solved, from the employer’s point of view. First, the degree of specificity in the skills that the employee brings to the organization, which determines how difficult it would be for the employer to replace the employee. Second, the possibilities for the employer to supervise and control the work of the employee. The strategic considerations of the employer and the employee then result in different forms of contract, where employees with unique skills and/or who perform tasks that are difficult to supervise have the best bargaining position vis-à-vis the employer.12

who run their own businesses.

12 In comparison with Alford (1962), one may note that the EGP has a special
When the EGP schema was first published in the 1980s, it was often compared to the work of Erik Olin Wright (Wright, 1985, 1997). Wright’s schema has a clearer theoretical point of departure, and revolves around the concept of exploitation (Wright, 1985, ch. 2). It distinguishes the dimensions of ownership of the means of production, skills, and control over organizational assets (authority) as the important dimensions of the economy and the labor market. This effort has attracted considerable attention from sociologists, to the extent that it is standard to compare Wright’s schema and EGP in textbooks. In actual studies of class and political behavior, however, applications of the Wright schema are rather rare (although see Marshall et al., 1989; Wright, 1985, ch. 5–7), especially with regard to historical analyses. This is possibly due to the larger data requirements of this schema (Wright, 1985, ch. 5).

Over the last few decades, the most ambitious efforts to construct a new class schema have come from the Swiss scholar Daniel Oesch. Building on earlier calls for more distinctions among high-earning, educated wage-earners (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 1989), he constructed a schema based on two theoretical dimensions: marketable skills and work logics. The first dimension is ‘hierarchical’ and similar to the aspects mentioned above, although Oesch relates it more to Goldthorpe’s discussion of employers’ incentives, rather than to Wright’s discussion of skills-related exploitation. The second dimension is ‘horizontal’, and relates to the type of tasks involved in work (Oesch, 2006, ch. 5). Oesch distinguishes three types of work logic: (1) organizational or administrative work logic, which involves coordination, control, and the creation and enforcement of rules; (2) technical work logic, which involves creating, managing or using technical systems; and (3) inter-personal work logic, which involves considerable face-to-face interaction with clients in order to foster their welfare, rather than managing them as strategic resources — what we in ordinary language call ‘working with people’. Just as with the EGP schema, the most basic impulse seems to be empirical: to create a schema that captures the essential social divisions of the era.

category for small-business owners, but not for large-scale employers. Instead, the last group is included among the higher wage-earners, like professionals, administrators and managers. The main rationale for this seems to be that this group is too small to study with national surveys of standard sample size.
Considering all these candidates for class schemas, what criteria should we use to choose between them? The easy (and very sensible) answer would be that it depends on our question. However, class research seems to have the capacity to make things more complicated, as it goes into discussions of the ‘true meaning’ of class. In a critical discussion of class theorists who follow this type of thinking, Grusky and Galescu (2005) mention three different ways in which scholars justify such schemas:

1. By appealing to faithfulness to and/or logical consistency with a certain theoretical tradition.

2. By a theory of politics, which claims that the groups in the class schema are or have the potential to become important social and political actors. The degree to which scholars specify the conditions for such potential to be actualized may vary.

3. By claiming that the schema captures important variations in social and political outcomes that happen to be of interest (like, for example, variations in party choice). This is particularly common in the Weberian tradition of class analysis, where the most common outcome in question is the rather broad concept of life chances (Breen, 2005).\(^{13}\)

To these three justifications, one may add a fourth that a socio-economic group can be interesting in itself if a major political actor claims to represent it. Then it more or less automatically becomes interesting to investigate the extent to which that political actor succeeds in doing so.

How should a scholar decide which class schema to use? In the case of (1), the decision is made by interest in and willingness to adhere to the tradition in question. In the case of (4), the relevance of this specific group is probably clear from the context. The cases (2) and (3), however, require further empirical investigation in order to decide the expediency of a schema, both in itself and in comparison with competitors.

In the case of (2), we require further studies of the micro-mechanisms between class position, political attitudes and organizational

\(^{13}\) See Swift (2004) for a philosophical critique of this concept.
alignments that are assumed by the theory of politics. Such studies should have a focus on causality rather than description and use more solid identification strategies than the standard cross-sectional datasets can provide, e.g. panel data. However, as mentioned above, such studies seem to be very rare.

The empirical stakes involved in (3) are slightly more vague, but this is where the arguments about class schemas often take the form of discussions about ‘relevance’. Such justifications stem from the notion that the job of a class schema is not only to measure certain theoretical dimensions of the labor market, but also to be a good tool for summarizing some or all of the important social and political trends of the day. Such motivations are important to both Oesch (2006, ch. 1–5) and scholars in the tradition of Goldthorpe (Breen, 2005). As the correlation between a class schema and various social phenomena may vary over time, this line of reasoning opens up the possibility that different groups (and thus different schemas) may be more or less relevant during different epochs. On a larger scale, such shifts can be rather obvious — as in the example that farmers are not as interesting in the analysis of politics in post-industrial societies as in agrarian ones. On other occasions, however, the shifts are not as obvious. One way to evaluate such claims, for example the relevance of a specific class schema in the study of politics, is to measures how well it correlates with party choice.

The schemas used in this dissertation

The articles in this dissertation employ two different class schemas. First, the schema constructed by Petersson (1977), which is included in the Swedish National Elections Datasets and used in numerous books and reports on Swedish electoral behavior (Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2016, ch. 4; Oskarson, 2015, 1994). The other is the schema developed by Oesch (2006, see above), including a version with a slight modification by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014).

The theoretical foundations of the SNES schema are not well documented, but it is based on similar ideas to the EGP schema (Petersson, 1977). The operational correspondence between the categories in the two schemas has been validated by Oskarson (2007). It is also to some extent founded in the Swedish political context, in that the division of wage-earner groups to a great extent mirrors the organization of the unions, with workers being organized in LO —
an organization with strong ties to the Swedish Social Democratic Party — and white-collar employees in TCO and Saco (in 1968, this correlation was close to perfect, but it has declined over the years). The use of the SNES schema is thus motivated by an interest in the groups that significant political actors in Sweden claim to represent (4) and by its similarities with the EGP schema, which in turn is based on its ability to explain a considerable part of the variation in life chances of Swedish voters (3).

The dominance of the EGP schema in international research and the similarity of the SNES schema to EGP makes the SNES schema an adequate tool to keep the analysis comparable to much of the international literature on the subject (Evans and Graaf, 2013; Evans and Tilley, 2017). The advantage of keeping the SNES schema, rather than recoding the occupational data into the EGP schema directly, is the ability to relate the results directly to earlier research on class voting in Sweden.

Our preoccupation with the Oesch schema is motivated by an interest in testing the claim that the schema surpasses the EGP schema (and similar ones) in relevance for the analysis of party choice (Article I), as well as testing the causal impact of work logics (Article II). These analyses have both a methodological interest (assessing the performance of the schema in predicting a variable over time, and the validity of its causal assumptions, see the section ‘Varieties of class schemas’) and a substantial interest (assessing whether realignment is happening, see the subsection ‘Realignment’).

The case of Sweden

While many of the research questions asked in this thesis are about class and political development in Western Europe generally, the data used in all of the empirical analyses is the Swedish National Election Studies from 1968–2014. This deserves some remarks, both with regard to why this particular case is of interest, and the data source specifically.

The country

In the study of class voting from a historical perspective, individual-level data is only available in a handful of cases. In the last major comparative study of class voting in Western democracies, Jansen
(2011, pp. 42–45) found useful surveys for 15 countries that covered a time period long enough to be relevant. Nieuwbeerta (1995) used different selection criteria and included 16 countries in his *International Social Mobility and Politics* (ISMP) file, but three countries had conducted only one survey. Considering the unique historical experiences that some of these countries have gone through, it is the assessment of this author that any country that has this kind of data is interesting in its own right.

In addition to this, Sweden is also of particular interest in the study of class and politics generally. Considerable parts of the literature, at least outside studies of political behavior, take Sweden as their ‘model case’. Sweden is both the homeland of the power resource theory (Korpi, 1978, 1983), the prime example of the social democratic ‘world of welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990), and contains one of the most, if not the most, successful labor movements in history (Przeworski, 1985). This makes it important to get the facts of the case right.

In the study of class voting per se, Sweden is also a rewarding case. The class cleavage reigned more or less supreme in Swedish politics throughout the 20th century. In research on class voting, comparative studies show that Sweden, together with the other Nordic countries, has had one of the highest levels of class voting (Clark and Lipset, 1991; Jansen et al., 2013). While this level has declined over the years, Sweden is still a country where class voting is relatively strong, comparatively speaking. If there is anywhere we can see class voting in its pure form, it is here (and in some of its Nordic neighbors). There is thus little or nothing of alternative cleavages to be accounted for, which is a methodological advantage.

In the international literature, however, interest has hardly been overwhelming. In the latest large effort at comparative studies of class voting, the country is curiously absent (Evans and Graaf, 2013), and in the former generation of literature, it is present only as one case among others, or with regard to attitudes to the welfare state (Clark and Lipset, 2001; Evans, 1999). This dissertation thus pro-

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14 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
15 For comparative graphs of the strength of class voting in different countries, see Jansen et al. (2013, pp. 384–386) or Jansen (2011, pp. 102–104), especially graph c (the same graphs are in both publications).
vides the first comprehensive, in-depth case study of Swedish class voting in 25 years (Oskarson, 1994, although see her review chapter from 2015).

In addition, Sweden should also be a case of interest when it comes to the arguments about realignment and the need for a new class schema, referred to above. Oesch (2006, ch. 2) builds his argument for a new class schema by pointing out three important labor-market trends: the expansion of the service sector, the growth of women’s employment, and the expansion of education, including occupational upgrading. Sweden is a country where all of these trends have been relatively strong (Fernández-Macías, 2012; Gupta et al., 2008; Korpi et al., 2013; OECD, 2017, pp. 50–51; Oesch, 2006, ch. 1); thus, the political realignment that many scholars think is underway should be ripe for research there. In this regard, Sweden can be considered a critical case. It was also, in fact, one of the four countries that Oesch (2006) himself selected for his own original application of his class schema.

The data

All four articles in this dissertation use cumulative datasets constructed from the surveys of the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES). This research program has been located in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg since 1952, and has conducted a survey for each national election in Sweden since 1956. The surveys are conducted using face-to-face interviews with a random sample of Swedish voters. This historical and methodological continuation has made the Swedish National Election Studies one of the most esteemed series of voter surveys that exists in the world today.

A particularly exquisite feature, which is discussed in more depth in some of the articles, is the rolling two-wave panels, whereby half of the sample for one election is also part of the sample for the next election. This design makes these election studies more useful than most for the task of testing causal claims. It was first imple-

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16 Before the system with one chamber was introduced in the election of 1970, this meant the surveying of elections to the second chamber. In addition, the SNES program has also surveyed the elections to the European Parliament since 1995, and many of the national referenda.

17 In addition, the surveys for the elections of 1964, 1968, and 1970 included a three-wave panel.
mented in the election of 1973 and has been part of the research program ever since. This feature is put to particularly good use in Article II.

This dissertation uses the surveys from 1968–2014, as 1968 marks the arrival of an occupational variable, which has been present in the datasets ever since, and forms the basis for the coding of the class schemas used in the four articles.\(^{18}\) (Petersson, 1978; Holmberg and Nordlöf, 1982; Holmberg and Gilljam, 1985; Holmberg et al., 1988; Gilljam et al., 1991). Individuals who did not have an occupation at the time of the survey are asked about and classified according to their last occupation.

As in all survey research, the response rate for the SNES surveys has declined over the years. The situation, however, is relatively strong from a comparative perspective. In 1968, the response rate was 85%. In the last survey, of 2014, the response rate was still 56%, but many of the respondents participated in an abbreviated interview (Oleskog Tryggvason and Hedberg, 2015, p. 24). Of the four different types of interview, only participants in ‘full interviews’ and ‘partial interviews’ answered a question about their occupation. This means that, for the last three elections (2006–2014), the proportion of the sample that provides useful data for this dissertation has been 59%, 51%, and 41%, respectively.

While this development is concerning, it is far from obvious that it is a general problem for the use of the data. A meta-analysis from 2008 concluded that the non-response rate is a poor predictor of non-response bias in surveys (Groves and Peytcheva, 2008). Oleskog Tryggvason and Hedberg (2015, p. 24) report that, in spite of falling response rates, the mean deviation in the vote choice variable in SNES from the actual election results has not increased over the years. And, while low-income groups and people with low education were underrepresented in the 2014 survey (Oleskog Tryggvason and Hedberg, 2015, p. 22), this will probably still not make that much of a difference in analyses that are mostly concerned with comparisons of classes, rather than, for example, estimating the true mean for the total population.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{18}\) A list of the occupational codes can be found in the technical reports that were written for each survey of the elections from 1976–1988 (Gilljam et al., 1991; Holmberg and Gilljam, 1985; Holmberg and Nordlöf, 1982; Holmberg et al., 1988; Petersson, 1978)

\(^{19}\) Another concern in this respect is the increasing over-representation of respon-
The articles

In this section, I summarize the content of the four articles in the dissertation. These articles contribute to the four research gaps that were discussed in second section of this introduction, and to the deepening of our knowledge about class voting in Sweden.

Class Voting in Sweden in Decline: Does a New Class Schema Make a Difference?

This article, co-authored with Maria Oskarson, compares the explanatory power on vote choice of the SNES class schema (which is similar to the EGP schema, see Oskarson, 2007) with the newer class schema constructed by Daniel Oesch (2006, 2008), employing the SNES surveys from 1968–2014. This is one of the first studies of how different class schemas describe developments in class voting over a long period of time. The study employs a number of statistical measurements in order to compare the two schemas, such as Cramér’s V and Nagelkerke’s R², but also uses measurements more specifically related to class voting research, such as the Alford Index (Alford, 1962), the Kappa Index (Hout et al., 1995), and the Lambda Index (Lachat, 2007b).

Oesch (2006) has many different purposes in mind for his schema, but a major one is that it should serve as a good summary of contemporary political trends, which he in turn considers to be founded on three social trends — the feminization of employment, the expansion of higher education and the expansion of the service sector. Oesch claims that older class schemas are on the way to becoming irrelevant for describing politics in Western societies (in empirical terms, declining in explanatory power) in the face of post-industrialism and the emergence of new political parties. These claims are in line with the realignment perspective described in section 2.

However, Knutsen and Langsæther (2016) find that old and new class schemas are about on a par with each other when it comes to predicting party choice in the contemporary era; therefore, there is
reason to look into the historical trend as well. If Oesch’s claims about relevance are correct, we should see that, while old class schemas are declining in predictive power for party choice (i.e. are becoming irrelevant), his class schema should be improving.

The results show that, when we look at it historically, there is very little difference between the old and the new class schemas in how well they explain voter choice in Sweden. The schemas have very similar overall historical developments, and the Oesch schema is not markedly better at explaining variations in voting for new parties (Populist Right or New Left). The analysis also shows that the decline in class voting that is observed in both the SNES and the Oesch class schema is due to internal changes in the voting patterns of classes, rather than an increase in the size of politically heterogeneous classes.20

While the results confirm Oesch’s claims about the decline in predictive power of older class schemas, they also raise doubts about how much his own schema really brings to the debate about political development in Western democracies. The results of this article show that, for the overall population, it does not give a picture of political development that is ‘more relevant’ or even particularly different from an EGP-style schema. This does not mean, however, that the schema is not useful in other respects, such as the analysis of trends in unionization or the reach of welfare state protection, that Oesch (2006) also engages in. It should, however, be admitted that, while the schemas often explain the same amount of variation in vote choice, this study does not compare the schemas with regard to whether the variation that they explain is overlapping or separate. This would be an interesting question for further research.

Work Logics and the Political Attitudes of Skilled Employees: Causality of Self-selection?

The work logic typology constructed by Oesch (2006) has not only been employed in class schemas, but also in order to explain variations in voting, party choice and political attitudes (here, these three types of variables go hand in hand) between people with different occupations (Güveli et al., 2007; Güveli, 2006; Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Kriesi, 1989; Oesch, 2006, 2008). Such

20 This is also in line with the results of Article IV, that the working class is also part of the general trend towards dealignment.
theories serve as an individual-level underpinning of the Oesch schema and more broadly of the realignment perspective as a whole.

Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) argue explicitly that the correlations between work logics and a broad spectrum of political attitudes (with regard to both economic and cultural issues) should be interpreted causally, rather than as a result of people with certain political attitudes self-selecting into certain occupations. They argue for a mechanism that they call ‘the generalization of problem-solving attitudes’, meaning that individuals generalize the strategies they use in their occupation to political problems, leading them to adopt certain attitudes. This is one of the many mechanisms suggested by authors who defend the realignment perspective discussed above.

However, like other authors, Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) provide only cross-sectional data as evidence for their claims. Essentially, their main evidence is that there are correlations between type of work logic and political attitudes that are sustained even after applying a large number of socio-economic controls. This article takes things one step further by bringing in evidence from panel data. The SNES has been conducted in two-wave rolling panels since 1973, so that half of the sample is also interviewed at the next election. Consistent and relevant attitude measurements can be found in these surveys since 1988. In total, this means that the analysis is founded on a maximum of seven rounds of two-wave panel data.

The question asked in this article is whether a change in the work logic of one’s occupation correlates with a change in one’s attitudes. Such a result would give more credibility to the claim that work logics have immediate causal effects on political attitudes. However, the results of the study show that no such correlation can be found, across a number of different model specifications and attitude measurements. The results of the study thus point towards the conclusion that the cross-sectional variation between work logic and political attitudes is exclusively a matter of self-selection. This can be considered a defeat for the realignment perspective, in that the study fails to find evidence for one of its theories about individual-level mechanisms behind the change that they describe. It also raises further doubts about the value of the Oesch (2006) class schema, as the idea of the causal effects of work logics is part of its motivation.
The third article engages with explanations for the decline in class voting — a trend that has been well-known for many years (Oskarsson and Holmberg, 2016, pp. 85–87; Oskarson 1994, 2015). This topic has been the focus of many of the studies on class and voting over recent decades, although there has been a curious absence of the case of Sweden from the discussion. This study uses the SNES surveys from 1968–2014, in combination with the Manifesto Project Database for data on party positions, and revolves around the classical question of how to explain the declining relationship between class (working class vs. others) and vote choice (left vs. non-left) over time. The article compares three different hypotheses about why class voting has declined in Sweden: increased heterogeneity in the social structure, a decline in party polarization in economic left–right issues, and generational replacement, in that newer generations vote less according to class than older generations.

The generational perspective is not new in class voting research, but has not been discussed much in the international literature over the past 20 years (although see Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2016, pp. 85–87). The central characteristic of this explanation, in contrast to the others, is that it pulls the focus away from the situation in society at each election, and instead views class voting as the cumulative result of how different generations have been socialized, or not socialized, into seeing politics in terms of a conflict between classes.

The article finds that generational replacement is a better explanation for the decline in class voting in Sweden than the other two. While the contemporary political situation also seems to make some difference to the voting behavior of the classes (especially in the latter half of the period under study), the evidence for strong effects of the contemporary party polarization in Sweden is weak — in many respects because it is not clear how much depolarization has really taken place.

A good avenue for further research would thus be to analyze how these generational differences came about in the first place. It might be that the role of party polarization is important, but the polarization that matters is that which occurred when people were young, rather than the situation at each new election.
Swing Voters, the Middle Class and Election Outcomes in Sweden 1979–2014

The last article in this thesis goes slightly beyond the occupational approach to class described in section 3 above. Instead, it takes its starting point in the observation that several theoretical perspectives claim that ‘the middle class’ as a group is less attached to parties, and more pivotal than other classes in elections in Western democracies, especially with regard to its role in the class struggle side of democracy (Korpi, 1983; Lipset, 1981). Depending on the theory, ‘middle class’ can mean several different things: an occupational group, a certain position on the income distribution curve, or a certain level of education.

However, there have been few actual studies of the swing voter group. Political scientists have made considerable efforts to understand similar groups, like volatile voters, undecideds, centrists/independents, but not those voters who have the potential to ‘go either way’ (Mayer, 2007, p. 359). This study sets out to create a measurement of swing voters in Sweden, meaning voters who hesitate in their choice between blocs on the left and the right. It then employs this measurement in a descriptive study of the class composition of these swing voters and their role in the outcome of elections in Sweden.

The results show, surprisingly, that, regardless of definition (white-collar occupation, middle-income earners, the highly educated), ‘the middle class’ has not been a particularly decisive group in the electoral competition between the right and the left. While there is variation between elections, the middle class is not over-represented among swing voters, compared to, for example, the working class or low-income earners. The results also suggest that swing voters rarely, if ever, change the outcome of an election. Instead, swing voters have the same tendencies in their voting behavior as the more decisive part of the electorate.

The results concerning the lack of over-representation of the middle class among swing voters in Sweden goes against many different theories about politics in Western democracies, and deserves to be replicated in a broader empirical context. These observations could even be considered to be so unexpected that it is worth looking into the question of why the middle class isn’t over-represented in this group.
The results also have a bearing on the considerations in section 2 above. While the observation of an increased proportion of swing voters throughout the class structure fits the notion of a general dealignment, it goes against the specifics of some dealignment views (like CMT), in that they would have expected middle-class voters (at least according to the occupational definition) to have been consistently more volatile from the start, whereas the working class and other groups would eventually catch up with them. This suggests that it might be worth re-examining the roots of the stability in voting behavior that was observed during the early era of election studies. The middle class may not have lacked alignment to the same extent as Lipset and Rokkan thought they did, or the stability of the working class and other groups may have been created by other factors than the supposedly stable social milieus.

Conclusions and further research

This thesis consists of four articles that all relate to the question of how and why class voting has declined in Sweden, and most other Western democracies, over the past few decades. As the class cleavage used to be one of the dominating forces behind voting behavior in most Western democracies, understanding the nature and causes behind its decline is of vital importance for understanding the nature of our current political situation. In this introduction, the decline of class voting has been discussed in terms of two major interpretations: realignment and dealignment. The first suggests that a new order in the relations between the social structure and the political parties is emerging, while the second suggests that these relations are in the process of dissolution.

Theoretically, Articles I and II both cast doubt on the realignment perspective. Article I does so by showing that a prime candidate for describing such a new order, the class schema of Daniel Oesch (2006), does not explain more variation in party choice than the EGP schema — sometimes described as a monument to the old industrial society. Article 2 does so by finding few signs of causal effects of work logics on political attitudes — one of several suggested micro-mechanisms behind the order in question. These results imply that the need to reconceptualize the socio-economic conflicts in Western democracies is not as urgent as some scholars
think (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Oesch, 2006), and that, to the extent that we really need to make more distinctions within the new middle class, minor adjustments to the old schemas (Güveli, 2006) would work just as well.

Articles III and IV, on the other hand, can be considered a discussion of different hypotheses within the dealignment perspective. Article III argues that ideological polarization, and the political choice models proposed by Evans and Graaf (2013), is not very applicable to the Swedish case, but that the cohort perspective, and the cumulative historical experience of the Swedish electorate, is a better way to analyze the decline in class voting in Sweden. This does not mean that the role of political factors at the level of class voting is dismissed entirely. Especially during the later period under investigation, period effects do seem to come into play, through changes in party supply and issue salience. Still, cohort effects remain something for which models that effectively include only period effects cannot really account. Article IV, meanwhile, finds no class differences in the composition of swing voters, which suggests that the dealignment process has been much more evenly spread throughout the social structure than either Lipset and Rokkan (1967; Lipset, 1964) or CMT (Dalton, 1984, 2013) thought it was.

The focus on the case of Sweden requires some comments about the generalizability of the findings. As discussed in section 4, Sweden is a country where the class cleavage reigned supreme for almost the entire 20th century, and still remains a major dimension in politics. It is also a country where the labor-market trends discussed by Oesch (2006) have gone furthest. These class-related and labor-market-related dynamics should thus exist here in a relatively pure form. In this regard, Sweden should be considered a most-likely case (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 120–124) for finding the middle-class-as-swing-voter dynamics that are discussed in Article IV, and the political trends implied by Oesch (2006) that are analyzed in Article I. In both of these instances, the absence of the expected results throws doubt upon the general validity of these ideas.

In Articles II and III, Sweden takes a different position in the theoretical contexts; namely, as a typical case. With regard to the relevance of cohort effects on class voting, there is already older evidence (Franklin et al., 1992) that such effects have applicability for many other Western democracies. The theory of work logics is
a newer idea with fewer findings to build upon, and the general idea that Sweden could perhaps ‘be special’ is more difficult to refute. However, as far as this author can determine, there are no obvious elements in the theory under consideration (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014) that lead to a suspicion that the effects of work logics would be context dependent. More evidence is, of course, always welcome.

In the light of Article III, and to a certain extent also Article IV, a natural next step for further research is to look more into the origins of these cohort differences — both to formulate more precise theories and to test them empirically. As the traditional Age-Period-Cohort framework has the character of an ‘accounting equation’ (Markus, 1983, p. 720) rather than a substantial theory, models of generational learning could be of interest in this endeavor (Bartels and Jackman, 2014). There are also several new suggestions for better strategies for causal identification in these types of studies (Neundorf and Niemi, 2014; Svallfors, 2010).

Aside from the obvious point that the comparison of class schemas should be applied to more countries to test the generalizability of these findings, it also seems relevant to encourage further research in the vein of Article II, with a stronger focus on specific causal effects and mechanisms rather than on the general statistical relationships between class and party choice, or class and political attitudes. There already exist several such research fields that could be integrated more explicitly into the class framework, such as studies of patrimony (Persson and Martinsson, 2018) or the effects of unemployment and other economic shocks (Martén, 2019; O’Grady, 2017). In the name of causal inference, such studies should be conducted more often with panel data. Such data is already available in considerable quantities, even over longer time periods, such as the Level of Living Surveys in Sweden, and the socio-economic household panels that exist, for example, in Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Web survey tools have also made it considerably easier to collect such data. There are also many instances in which experimental methods can be utilized (Ballard-Rosa et al., 2016; Carnes and Lupu, 2016), especially with regard to the interest in how people in different class positions respond to party appeals (Evans and Graaf, 2013; Rennwald and Evans, 2014; Thau, 2017a).

This thesis frame started out from the observation that, in order
to understand contemporary politics, which manifests a considerable degree of voter volatility and party system change, we have to understand how the classical, largely class-based order (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) came to begin to dissolve. This dissertation has argued, against the realignment literature, that there are few signs that a new socio-economic order is on its way towards emerging. On the other hand, against certain top-down hypotheses in the dealignment literature, there seems to be a rather long way to go before regaining the old stability. While Evans and Tilley (2017), in their study of Great Britain, have a point in arguing that the basic nature of class conflict in Western democracies has, in important respects, not changed, this does not mean that the lack of ideological fervor in the present is the best explanation for why it does not take the same strong expressions in voting behavior nowadays as in the past. And, while cohort effects may very well be coherent with some kinds of top-down explanations, it nevertheless suggests that the recreation of the classical class alignments is a much larger project than just changing the appeal of the parties.

The results of Article IV also suggest that there might be a need to revisit the question of how the (allegedly) solid alignments before the 1970s really worked. The received wisdom that voters in the past, particularly those from the working class, voted as an expressive act of identity rather than for instrumental reasons (Evans and Tilley, 2012, pp. 140–141), or even that they did not really choose (Clarke et al., 2004, p. 2; Rose and McAllister, 1986), but rather succumbed to social pressures, may need to be considered more carefully. While there has indeed been a decline in party identification in many Western democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002), there are also reasons to doubt that those indicators have much meaning beyond party choice in Europe (Thomassen, 1976; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009). In this regard, models of how complex party competition influences voting behavior (Meguid, 2008; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018) may be useful not just for analyzing the current situation, but also for explaining historical developments.
Article I

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Class Voting in Sweden in Decline: Does a New Class Schema Make a Difference?

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Abstract: In light of observations of a decline in the relationship between class and voting, some scholars have proposed a reconstruction of the class variable that better distinguishes post-industrial labor-market trends. A leading proponent of this view is Daniel Oesch. In this article, we compare the development of the relationship between class and voting in the Oesch class schema and a more traditional one, in the Swedish National Election Studies 1968–2014. The results show that the two schemas give remarkably similar results, that the Oesch schema does not work markedly better for new political parties, and that developments in the distribution of positions in the labor market have not made very much of a difference to the development of the strength of class voting. We discuss the implications of this.

The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers, and the editors of Politica for valuable suggestions.
Introduction

The observation that the correlation between class position and party choice has declined is by now conventional wisdom (Dalton, 2008a; Evans and Graaf, 2013). One reaction to this observation has been to discuss how class is measured, and whether the traditional class categories are fully adequate for describing socio-economic cleavages in contemporary post-industrial societies. Observations that new parties also seem to have some kind of class base (Dolezal, 2010; Rydgren, 2013) make this thesis look plausible.

In the following analysis, we compare how class voting has developed over time in Sweden, using both a class schema of an older type, and a new variant that claims to better represent conditions on the labor market in a post-industrial society, constructed by Oesch (2006). This class schema has received considerable attention, and is based on ideas also put forward by other leading social scientists (Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 1989).

In this context, Sweden is a particularly interesting case to analyze. Sweden is a country where historically class voting has been very high (and still is high compared to other countries) but where at the same time such voting patterns have clearly declined over the last five decades (Jansen, 2011, p. 111; Oskarson, 2015). It is also a country where the labor market trends that justify the Oesch schema — a higher participation rate for women and the expansion of the service sector — have been very strong. Sweden should thus be a case where Oesch’s class schema will come into its own. As we will see in the results section, however, this is not the case. The analysis thus brings into question how well the Oesch class schema succeeds in providing a better picture of the relationship between the labor market and politics in post-industrial societies than traditional schemas.

The article begins with a theoretical discussion of class voting and the theoretical foundations of the different class schemas. After that, we discuss methodological considerations, such as choice of measurement for comparing how well the schemas explain voters’ choice of party. Then the results are reported, and it is shown that the older and newer class schemas tend to follow each other over time and, to the extent that there are any differences, the Oesch schema is slightly worse. In conclusion, we discuss the implications
Class voting

That people’s choice of party is correlated with their social position is one of the most fundamental and well-documented insights in research on voting behavior (Rose and Särlvik, 1974), and the social cleavage model is still the main theoretical framework for the study of how cleavages are mobilized, institutionalized and politicized by political parties (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Deegan-Krause, 2007; Oskarson, 2005). Specifically, the politicization and mobilization of the class cleavage has for a long time been considered fundamental to many party systems, especially in the Scandinavian countries. In particular for Sweden, class voting was long considered a distinguishing characteristic (Oskarson, 2015). During the last few decades, however, class voting in the traditional sense has declined in Sweden, similarly to many other advanced industrial democracies (Jansen, 2011; Oskarson, 2015).

The decline in class voting has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the lack of relevance of the concept of class, and an indication that class position no longer has any significance for political behavior in post-industrial societies (Clark and Lipset, 1991). Instead, an increasing trend of individualism is assumed to be prevalent, and political opinions are created by factors other than the social and economic situation of the voter (Dalton, 2008a). These ideas, however, have not gone unchallenged (Evans, 2000; Manza et al., 1995). First, there is research arguing that the level of class voting is related to how the party systems articulate and politicize class-related issues, and that it is rather in the party system than in the class structure, that the explanation for the decline in class voting is to be found (Evans and Graaf, 2013; Evans and Tilley, 2012). Others argue that class voting is undergoing change rather than decline, and point to new political ties between white-collar employees in the public sector (Dunleavy, 1980) or between the working class and populist-nationalist parties (Oskarson and Demker, 2015; Rydgren, 2013; see also the role of globalization according to Kriesi et al., 2006). Lastly, there is also criticism focusing on how the concept of class voting is defined and operationalized (Kitschelt, 2013; Oesch, 2006). It is mainly the last type of argument that will be
considered here.

For a long time, class voting was defined as the difference between the working class and the middle class (other voters) in their support for socialist parties — also known as the Alford Index (Alford, 1962). This index has been criticized for being based on a crude class schema that does not capture changes in the social structure. Another point of critique is that class voting is often analyzed in relation to two political blocs, even in multi-party systems. With only a dichotomy between left and right, it is not possible to relate class-based voting to changes in the party system, and the emergence of new ideological cleavages. A third kind of criticism is that, when the Alford Index is used over time, it cannot distinguish changes in the class structure from changes in party strength overall. During the last decade, most research has therefore used more detailed class schemas, more detailed party variables, and new types of correlational measurement, and has shown that in many cases class position is still related to voting behavior (Brooks et al., 2006; Evans, 1999; Knutsen, 2006). The following analysis takes all three of these points into account. We will test an alternative class schema, constructed to capture post-industrial labor-market trends. We will analyze voting in relation to four ideological families rather than only two blocks, and we will measure the relationships using measurements that capture the total level of class voting. We are thus asking the following three questions:

• How much does the development in class voting during the last few decades change if we use a new class schema, more suited to post-industrial societies?
• Is the new class schema better at explaining support for the newer parties on the political scene?
• Do the changes in class voting depend on changes in the distribution of class positions, or on changes in the distribution of votes within the classes?

Class schemas

The most common class schema for analyses of the relationship between social position and party choice or political attitudes, has
for a long time been the so-called EGP schema, constructed by John Goldthorpe and Robert Erikson (Erikson et al., 1979). It is based on the distinction between business owners and employees, and a dimension among employees based on expertise and autonomy. Theoretically, it begins with the idea that one can distinguish between different kinds of occupational groups depending on the kind of contract that characterizes their relationship with their employer. White-collar groups overall have a ‘service relationship’, which means that the employer is dependent on their expertise and is willing to give them autonomy and better working conditions in order to gain access to their expert knowledge. A ‘labor contract’, on the other hand, is found in situations where expertise is less salient, and where the employer has better opportunities to supervise the work and measure productivity. Thus, employers do not have the same incentives to offer good working conditions in all instances. In reality, positions do not always accord perfectly with these ideal types, but these dimensions are nevertheless the points of departure for the categories within this schema (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 2000).

Since the 1970s, Swedish National Election Studies have used a similar schema, here called the SNES schema (Oskarson, 2007; Petersson, 1977). The SNES schema and the EGP schema are both constructed with an industrial society in mind. The huge growth of occupations in, for example, the service and care sector, or the ICT sector, are merged together, rather than distinguished as separate trends. One can thus question whether these schemas capture the relevant class dimensions of a post-industrial society.

The Swiss scholar Daniel Oesch argues that this is not the case. In 2006, he presented a new schema that sets out to capture the class structure of post-industrial societies better than earlier ones (Oesch, 2006) — not least in relation to voting for new kinds of parties, such as ‘the new left’ and ‘the populist right’ (Oesch, 2008). Oesch argues that, aside from the vertical division between working-class and middle-class voters, there are new horizontal divisions between sectors characterized by different ‘work logics’.21 The technical work

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21 Even though Oesch (2006) constructs a partially new typology for grouping occupations into classes, he does not seem to be aiming for a revision of the very definition of class. His text contains no such discussion. Instead, he justifies his schema by arguing that it makes a better job of distinguishing certain labor-
logic is based on technical expertise and skill, while the *organizational* work logic is about administrative responsibility, and the *interpersonal* work logic is about direct personal interactions and taking care of the needs of others. When you work in an interpersonal setting, the centrality of communication and social interaction is expected to lead to more libertarian values. People who work in a more hierarchically organized administrative or technical setting, where the objects of work are mainly machines or documents, are expected to develop more traditional, hierarchical values. In sum, this means that the socio-cultural cleavage pits poorly educated workers with a technical work logic against highly educated socio-cultural specialists with an interpersonal work logic. This is reflected in voting for New Left parties, that stand for individualist, libertarian values, among highly educated socio-cultural specialists, while poorly educated individuals in technical work logics are more drawn to the Populist Right. This pattern has been found in several empirical analyses of class voting in European countries that have these kinds of parties (Oesch, 2013b, 2008; Oesch and Rennwald, 2010; see also Oskarson, 2010).

A reasonable way to move this discussion forward is to compare how well different class schemas predict party choice. So far, there have been few studies that do this. When it comes to Oesch’s schema, there are preliminary results from Knutsen and Langsæther (2016), which show that, with a party variable of four values, the differences between EGP and Oesch are not particularly large, in data from the European Values Survey 2008. Güveli et al. (2007) compare the original version of EGP with a modified version that splits wage earners with more qualified, well-paid jobs (Service class) into Technocrats and Socio-cultural specialists — a distinction that is very similar to the Oesch schema (see ibid., p. 143 for more references on this). They find that the modified schema is better than the original at explaining the political orientations of voters in the Netherlands. This difference is due to the fact that Socio-cultural specialists are more prone to vote for left-leaning parties.

In sum, Güveli et al. (2007) find support for modifying the EGP, while Knutsen and Langsæther’s (2016) results place a question mark beside the idea that more pervasive modifications would change market trends, and how these trends influence differences in labor conditions, institutional protection and life chances.
the picture. None of them, however, study how the predictive power of the class schema has developed over time. We argue that an assessment of whether we should revise our class schemas should be founded upon such observations. If it is the development towards a post-industrial society that is the reason for the inadequacy of the traditional class schemas, then we should be able to observe that, while class voting is declining over time in the old schemas, it is rising in the new ones — or at least holding steady. In addition, we should see that Oesch’s schema is better at explaining the new parties that have emerged along the new cleavages. Thirdly, it is relevant to compare how much of the development in each schema that is due to changes in the voting patterns of the classes, and how much it is due to changes in the relative size of the classes. Our expectation is that, for the old schema, the more politically unified classes have gotten smaller, and that the more unified classes in the new schemas have gotten larger.

The categories of the class schemas

Before we turn to the data and the method of analysis, we would like to present the categories in the SNES and Oesch schemas.

The SNES schema has the following meaning. Industrial workers (Industriarbetare) and Other workers (Övriga arbetare) are employed under labor contracts. These are the groups that EGP calls ‘Workers’. However, the SNES categories are not exactly congruent with the subdivisions made in EGP (see the comparison with ESeC in Oskarson, 2007). The different levels of white-collar employees (tjänstemän) describe groups that to an increasing degree have more of a service relationship to their employer. White-collar employees (Lägre tjänstemän) are a combination of what EGP calls Routine non-manual employees and Lower professionals. Lower salariat (Tjänstemän i mellanställning) and Higher salariat correspond to Lower and Higher professionals in EGP, while Small-business owners (Småföretagare) and Farmers (Jordbrukare) are different forms of Self-employed. The larger business-owners are classified together with Higher salariat (Högre tjänstemän), based on the assumption that, formally, they are often employed by the companies they are leading and that these business leaders are often recruited from the same group.
The full Oesch schema contains 17 categories, which in practice is too many to handle in a statistical analysis with samples of the size used in SNES surveys. In addition, so many categories gives a built-in advantage to Oesch’s schema that we consider unfair. For these reasons, we use a version with eight categories that Oesch himself has used several times (Oesch, 2008, 2013b). Each work logic has one category for professionals and one for workers: Technical professions, Socio-cultural professions, Organizational professions, Production workers, Service workers, and Office clerks. In addition, leaders of larger companies and self-employed from the professions, and self-employed in occupations that are not professions, are moved into categories of their own. The difference between leaders of larger companies and professions on the one hand, and workers and small-business owners on the other, captures the dimension ‘marketable skills’, which is similar to the dimension that is expressed in the EGP schema and other more traditional class schemas.

Appendices I:2 and I:3 present tables showing how the respondents are distributed in each class schema, and how the class schemas relate to each other (Figure I:A3.1–2 and Figure I:A2.1).

Method

The data in our study consists of the surveys of the Swedish National Election Studies from 1968–2014. They are based on a random sample of the Swedish electorate in each election.

The analyses are based on: (a) an occupational variable which, together with data on whether the respondent runs a business or not, serves as the foundation for the class schemas, and (b) a question about which party the respondent voted for.

The occupational variable is constructed from an occupational coding schema that has been used with the SNES surveys since 1968 (SNES OCC). The recoding of the occupational schema to the SNES class schema was made in accordance with Petersson (1977). The recoding to the Oesch schema was made via a recoding of the occupational schema in two steps. First, to SSYK (Standard för svensk yrkesklassificering) (Oskarson, 2007), and after that to the international standard ISCO, which was then used as the basis for the Oesch schema. In addition, a question about subjective occu-
A national group was used to determine whether the person is self-employed, and the size of their business. Data on number of employees was only to be found in the SNES surveys from 1982 onwards. For the period before that, the classification was based on an assessment of the typical scale of a business within the sector in question.

Regarding the validity of the recoding, SSYK and ISCO are so close to each other that the step is almost trivial. The step from SNES to OCC, however, contains some uncertainties regarding the equivalence of the occupational titles. In particular, Oesch has based his schema on the four-digit ISCO codes, while SNES OCC can only be translated to the three-digit one. In those cases where there are ambiguities, we have put the three-digit code into the category in the Oesch schema that includes the largest number of the four-digit codes. See Appendix 1 for a validation of this procedure.

When it comes to the party choice variable, we have merged the parties that have been competitive in the Swedish elections into four categories: Old Left, Old Right, New Left and Populist Right. The Old Left is the Social Democrats. The Old Right is the Center Party, the Liberals, the Conservatives (Moderaterna) and the Christian Democrats. The New Left is the Left Party, the Greens (from 1982) and the Feminist Initiative (from 2010). The Populist Right is New Democracy (1991–1994) and the Sweden Democrats (from 2010). These classifications are for the most part uncontroversial, but two of them deserve further comment. The Left Party has a longer history as Old Left, but should today be classified as New Left, with a more libertarian approach and putting gender equality and the environment higher up the agenda. We argue that the classification as New Left is reasonable for the entire period of study. In 1968, the party started its transformation in a more libertarian direction, with a change in party name and by distancing itself from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (Holmberg, 1982). The Christian Democrats have a shorter history than most of the parties that are classified as Old Right. The party was founded in 1964 as a reaction to modernity-related phenomena such as sexual liberation and secularization (Johansson, 1985). However, the party has settled in well among the Old Right parties, and it lacks the focus on tax cuts and migration issues that usually characterizes the Populist Right.
In our analysis, we use several different measurements for the strength of class voting. For the first question about the general ability of the class schemas to predict party choice, we follow Knutsen and Langsæther (2016), who use Cramér’s V and Nagelkerke’s R² in a multinomial regression. Cramér’s V is a summary of the deviations from a completely proportional distribution of the cases in a cross tabulation, which has then been standardized to a value between 0 and 1, where 0 is a perfectly even distribution, and 1 is where every case with a specific value for one variable has the same value for the other variable (that is, in this case, that everybody in each class votes for the same party). Nagelkerke’s R² is based on a comparison between how much the class variable improves the prediction of the party choice for an individual, compared to if we only had information about how party choice is distributed across the entire sample, standardized to a value between 0 and 1. 0 means that the model does not improve the prediction at all, and 1 that the model predicts all respondents correctly.⁵² We also use the Alford Index, which is the difference between the share of the working class who vote for left-leaning parties and the share of other voters who also do so (Alford, 1962). In this context, we define the working class as Industrial workers and Other workers in the SNES schema, and for the Oesch schema as Production workers, Service workers and Office clerks. The Alford Index also requires a dichotomous party variable. We have therefore in this instance merged the two left-wing categories and the two right-wing categories.

For the question about the effect of class position on voting for different parties, we use the kappa index (Hout et al., 1995). We calculate this index by estimating a logistic regression model with a dichotomous dependent variable (whether you vote for a party or not) and all class categories as dummy variables. The kappa index is the standard deviation for the regression coefficients in this model.

Finally, for the third question, we use Romain Lachat’s lambda index (Lachat, 2007b). While the kappa index is sensitive to extreme values that may arise if the classes or the parties are very small, the lambda index is weighted on every party’s share of the vote, and the

⁵² This means that Nagelkerke’s R² (and other pseudo-R² statistics for logistic regression models) in theory is a problematic measurement of the strength of class voting, since a more skewed distribution in the dependent variable makes it harder for a model to improve the prediction. In practice, Nagelkerke’s R² follows the other indicators rather well (see Figure I:1).
size of each class as a share of the voters. This gives more weight to bigger parties and bigger classes. The lambda index also gives us the opportunity to simulate that the shares of the classes are held constant over time, which can then be compared with the actual development. This means that we can assess how much of the change is caused by changes in the size of the classes, and how much is caused by changing voting patterns within the classes. We show both the absolute and the relative version of the index, where the first is based on vote shares, and the other on a multinomial logistic regression.

All measurements have been computed with smoothing, so that the estimate for each election is calculated on that election, and the previous and succeeding elections. In this way, we can avoid some of the sharp increases and decreases that are due to coincidences in the samples (see footnote 23). This procedure makes the estimates less reliable for single elections, but more reliable with regard to the general trend and development over time. Appendix I:3 contains versions of these graphs without smoothing (Figure I:A3.3 and I:A3.4).

Results — Class and voting in Sweden

In Table 1, we give an overview of how the relationship has changed over time, by showing how people in different positions voted in the national elections in 2014 and 1968, for both of the schemas.

Table 1 shows that, in 2014, there are still many rather distinct differences in party choice between the classes. For example, support for the Social Democrats varies between 18 and 46 percent in different groups (there are too few Farmers to be analyzed) and for the Conservatives between 16 and 34 percent if we use the SNES schema. With the Oesch schema, support for the Social Democrats varies from 12 to 43 percent between different class positions and for the Conservatives from 16 to 38 percent. At the same time, it is also clear that a lot has changed since 1968. In SNES, the support for the Social Democrats among Industrial workers has declined from 76 to 46 percent, and a similar decline is to be found among Production workers in the Oesch schema (from 68 to 39). For the Conservatives, there are considerable increases in these groups.

For a more detailed overview of the developments over time,
Table 1. Class Position and Party Choice in Sweden 2014 and 1968 According to the SNES and Oesch Class Schema

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<th>FI</th>
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Notes: Dash (-) means that the party did not exist in 1968. V = Left Party, S = Social Democrats, MP = Greens, C = Center Party, L = Liberals, M = Conservatives, KD = Christian Democrats, SD = Sweden Democrats, FI = Feminist Initiative.
see Appendix I:3.

Results — Developments in the strength of class voting

In the following sections, we show how the ability of the class schemas to predict party choice has developed over the years. We start with the simplest measurements for the total development, and then continue by looking at how well the different class schemas explain different parties. Finally, we look at the lambda index, which helps us to distinguish what kinds of changes we are really seeing.

The overall strength of class voting

In accordance with our theory section, we expect that the SNES schema should show a stronger relationship during the first part of the period of study, but that it would decline over time. The Oesch schema, on the other hand, should grow stronger over time, and possibly even surpass the SNES schema towards the end of the period.

In Figure I:1, however, we can see that these expectations are, for the most part, not fulfilled. All three measurements for the overall strength of class voting show a declining trend for the SNES schema, but none of them show increasing strength for the Oesch schema. Instead, both schemas follow each other in a parallel decline — at least from 1979 on. The Oesch schema is indeed slightly worse at the beginning, but it does not achieve any corresponding advantage during the most recent years. Instead, it is striking how well the two schemas follow each other. Our first result is thus that, even though the explanatory power of the SNES schema is declining, it has not become completely irrelevant. Even more striking, however, is that the Oesch schema has not strengthened over time, or even maintained its value from 1968.

The strength of class voting for different parties

Why, then, are these expectations not fulfilled? One possible explanation is that the older parties are still so dominant in Swedish politics that the hierarchical dimension is still the strongest, in both the SNES and the Oesch schema. If this was the case, we should expect considerable differences in how well the class schemas explain
Figure I:1 The Development in the Strength of Class Voting for Each Class Schema 1968–2014

Notes: The values are smoothed and estimated with weights (see the methods section). Cramér’s V, however, is not weighted as Stata does not allow for weighting when this statistic is estimated.

different parties, i.e. that SNES should explain the old parties better, while the Oesch gets higher values for the new ones. In Figure I:2, we therefore show the kappa index for SNES and Oesch for each of the four different party types, over time.

However, in this case, as well, our expectations are not fulfilled. In line with expectations, the SNES schema is often better than the Oesch for the old parties. The high values for the Oesch schema for Old Left and Old Right during the early years (ca 1968–1976) are mostly due to the fact that the Petit bourgeoisie voted exclusively for the Old Right during this period. This phenomenon, that small categories can have a very strong influence on the kappa index, is discussed more extensively by Lachat (2007b, p. 12). The problem has also been discussed by the original inventors (Hout et al., 1995, p. 18).

23 But when it comes to the New Left, SNES is in many instances also better than Oesch. Only with regard to the Populist Right is the kappa index higher for the Oesch schema, and then only by a very small margin.

Thus, the suggestion that the limited explanatory power of the
Oesch schema is due to the continuing dominance of the old parties in Swedish politics does not hold. The only thing that might possibly change the overall picture is a very strong increase for the Populist Right (who already took 13 percent of the vote in the 2014 election).

The strength of class voting and structural development

A point of departure for the construction of new class schemas has been the idea that the old schemas have become obsolete due to structural developments, i.e. that the distribution of sizes of the groups is changing. There are fewer of the uniformly socialist Industrial workers, and the more heterogeneous employee groups are now a larger proportion of the workforce, which contributes to the decline in class voting. Lachat’s lambda index can help us to see how the SNES and Oesch schemas work when the distribution of class positions is held constant over time, and this is shown in Figure I:3.

Our expectation here was that, while the values for the SNES schema should increase when we exclude structural developments,
the values for the Oesch schema should decrease. Expressed differently, the Oesch schema should turn out to be more sustainable in the light of these changes, since its is better suited to capturing the development towards post-industrialism.

What the graphs in Figure I:3 show, however, is that not very much changes when structural developments are excluded. There is possibly a weak tendency for the values of the SNES to be larger, for the absolute lambda index. The overall impression, however, is that the curves that include and exclude structural developments, respectively, follow each other rather well. In other words, the decline in class voting is mostly due to the patterns of voting having changed within the classes, both for the SNES and the Oesch schema.

Not even in this last instance does the Oesch schema appear to be a substantially better alternative for the future. The changes are very similar in the SNES and the Oesch schema, and there are no signs that the latter is declining in explanatory power to a lesser degree than the former.
Conclusions

In sum, the empirical analysis goes against most of our theoretical expectations. The strength of class voting is decreasing over time in both schemas. The Oesch schema does not explain the new parties better. We also do not see any signs that the Oesch schema will be better than the SNES in the future. The is in line with the preliminary results from Knutsen and Langsæther (2016). In the grand scheme of things, it looks as though the hope that the Oesch schema would restore the strength of class voting in post-industrial societies has not been fulfilled.

At the same time, predictive power does not say everything about how social position and political orientation are related. There could be relevant patterns for some groups, while not for others. A pattern that becomes more visible in the Oesch schema is the support of Socio-cultural professionals for the New Left (see Figure I:A3.2 in Appendix I:2). It has also been shown in previous research that the Sweden Democrats have their strongest support among Production workers (Oskarson and Demker 2015). At the same time, other studies have pointed out that it might not be work logic that best explains this relationship, but rather level of education (Bengtsson et al., 2013; Stubager, 2009).

However, as mentioned above, class voting in Sweden is declining no matter which of these class schemas is used. What reasons do we have to believe that these conclusions are valid for other countries? As we mentioned in the introduction, several of the trends that motivated the Oesch schema are particularly strong in Sweden. Sweden should thus be an easy case for the Oesch schema, but it does not seem to be particularly successful even there. A possible objection is that the differences between the SNES schema and EGP, which is the schema from which Oesch is really distancing himself theoretically, could have considerable significance. However, the similarities between the SNES schema and EGP that have been shown in previous analyses (Oskarson, 2007) makes it difficult for us to see how that could be the case. Our conclusion is that, even if newer class schemas of the Oesch variety are useful for some purposes, we should be skeptical about broader claims that older class schemas have become irrelevant, or that the new post-industrial era in some sense ‘requires’ schemas of the Oesch kind.
Research on class and politics can react to this conclusion in two ways. On the one hand, one can further try out new ways of constructing and testing new class schemas, to see if we can find another solution that works better. For example, analyses like this should be made with Ayşe Güveli’s modification of the EGP schema (Güveli, 2006). The analysis here points towards the conclusion that such simpler modifications with a new category for Socio-cultural specialists could do well enough at analyzing recent voter trends. On the other hand, class research can accept that the relationship between class position and party choice is in decline, and focus on explaining why this is happening. Here, there are several new, interesting avenues to explore. Recently, Achen and Bartels (2016) have emphasized the identity aspects of voting behavior, which could be more extensively applied to the class aspects of politics. As mentioned, several articles have argued that the positions of political parties and their agenda strategies have a role to play in this (Evans and Graaf, 2013; Rennwald and Evans, 2014). The arguments and evidence for this thesis can be further developed, especially with regard to the Oesch schema.
Appendix I:1 — Validation of the recoding of occupational codes

As mentioned in the methods section, there are uncertainties relating to the recoding from SNES OCC to ISCO — the latter of which serves as the foundation for the Oesch schema. As a validity check, we have compared the distribution of occupations in the SNES surveys of 2006 and 2010 with the distribution in two other surveys from about the same time, which have been coded as ISCO directly: first the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2008, second a survey from the SOM institute from 2008 that had a particular focus on working life in Sweden. The distributions are shown in Table A1:1.

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<th>ESS</th>
<th>SOM</th>
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<td>Socio-cultural professions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production workers</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office clerks</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
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<td>22.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>1766</td>
<td>2121</td>
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</table>

Notes: Unweighted data.

In this table, we can see that the SNES surveys do not deviate from the other surveys in any conspicuous way.

For the surveys from 2006–2014, there are also variables where occupational data has been coded directly into SSYK (2006) or register data from Statistics Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån) with such coding. A comparison between these variables and the recoding used in this article shows that for the three-digit codes, the variable values match for ca 40% of the respondents. When we recode it to the Oesch schema with eight categories, the variable values match in ca 70% of the cases. For all of Cramér’s V, Nagelkerke’s R², the Alford Index, the kappa index and the lambda index, the new variable...
has somewhat more explanatory power, but only marginally. The most remarkable change is the kappa index for the Populist Right in 2010, which is over 8. This value, however, is an extreme value of the kind discussed in the methods and results sections, which has its origins in the circumstance that there are few voters for this party (the Sweden Democrats) in the sample — no respondent in the groups Managerial professions or Petit bourgeoisie voted for this party.
Appendix I:2 — Comparison of the distribution of class positions in the class schemas

In order to demonstrate that the results are not caused by the class schemas being very similar to begin with, we want to show how they differ with regard to how they classify the different occupations. In Table A2:1, we compare the distribution of class positions in the Oesch schema with the SNES schema. The numbers denote the share of a certain category that belong to each category in the Oesch schema. The SNES category Industrial workers is more or less completely sorted into the Oesch category Production workers. These categories are not equivalent, however, since part of the SNES category Other workers is also included in Production workers. The others in Other workers are mostly classified as Service workers by Oesch. The SNES category Lower employees is split between Service workers and Office clerks. The two higher employee categories in SNES are mostly sorted into the professional categories, split between all three work logics. This is expected, as the theoretical point of the schema is to be ‘horizontal’ in relation to earlier hierarchical occupational classifications (Oesch, 2006, pp. 51–58).

Small-business owners in SNES are mostly sorted into the Bourgeoisie category in Oesch (49.0%) while Farmers are mostly sorted into the Petit bourgeoisie. The explanation for these differences is that, while the Small-business owners in SNES are distinguished based on their occupational title and assumptions regarding the size of the business, Oesch is using a direct question about whether the respondent is a business owner and how many employees they have (ibid., pp. 75–84, 222). Those who report themselves as business owners and have at least ten employees, or are business owners and working in certain professions, are sorted into the Bourgeoisie category, and those in less qualified occupations with fewer than ten employees are sorted into the Petit bourgeoisie. It seems as though Oesch wants in this way to distinguish between small-business owners in a more traditional sense, and modern consulting firms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Position</th>
<th>Industrial workers</th>
<th>Other workers</th>
<th>White collars</th>
<th>Lower salariat</th>
<th>Higher salariat</th>
<th>Small-business owners</th>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>5.3</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>Office clerks</td>
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Notes: Unweighted data.
Appendix I:3 — Descriptive statistics

Tables showing the development of the class structure over time (SNES and Oesch).

Graphs showing the development in party choice within different classes (four-category party variable, SNES and Oesch).

Graphs showing kappa and lambda indices that have not been smoothed (see the methods section).
### Table I: Distribution of Class Positions Over Time, SNES

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Lower salariat</th>
<th>Higher sal. and large-bus. owners</th>
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Notes: Unweighted data.
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Socio-cultural professions</th>
<th>Managerial professions</th>
<th>Petit bourgeoisie</th>
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Notes: Unweighted data.
Figure I:A3.1 The Development of Party Choice in the Different Classes, SNES

Notes: The gaps in the time series for the Populist Right are due to there being no such party achieving more than marginal success in those elections. The gaps for Old and New Left among Farmers is due to the sample containing not a single respondent who voted that way in those elections.
Figure I:A3.2 The Development of Party Choice in the Different Classes, Oesch

Notes: The gaps in the time series for the populist right are due to there being no such party achieving more than marginal success in those elections. The gaps for old and new left among Farmers is due to the sample containing not a single respondent that voted that way in those elections.
Figure I:A3.3 Kappa Index for Class Position (SNES and Oesch) and Each Party Choice — No Smoothing

Notes: The values are here estimated with only data from the year in question. The occasionally very high values are due to the method being sensitive to small classes or parties. See the discussion in the methods section.
Figure I:A3.4 Absolute and Relative Lambda Index for SNES and Oesch, w/ and w/o Structural Change — No Smoothing

Notes: The values are here estimated with only data from the year in question. The occasionally very high values are due to the method being sensitive to small classes or parties. See the discussion in the methods section.