EXPLORING CRITIQUES OF COSMOPOLITANISM

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Abstract

Critiques of cosmopolitanism and its derivatives are explored along the lines of philosophy of politics to find several points of contention with the ideology itself. Primarily it is alleged that cosmopolitanism is a failed marriage between unfeasible philosophy and incoherent politics, the failed synthesis of which leads to a state of apathetic nihilism. Cosmopolitanism is evaluated along specific touchpoint of love, religion, morality, ethics and gender. To complete the analysis, an alternative explanation to nihilism is given in the form of loss of a special case of knowledge, metis.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, critique of cosmopolitanism, philosophy of politics
Preface

This essay was born out of a very contemporary question on the nature of interplay between political society and the educational system, and what essential qualities the participants of said society possess when it does well and not so well. Naturally such a broad question surpasses the scope of a bachelor thesis, so this will instead be a discussion on a special case and the particular rather than the general. Specifically, I chose to look at an early critique of cosmopolitanism as it perhaps is, unbeknownst to many, the most relevant political paradigm of education with prominent thinkers like Martha Nussbaum attached to it. I hope the contents of this thesis will find the reader in a state of open-mindedness, as historically the word cosmopolitanism has been utilized euphemistically to promulgate anti-semitism and as such may be negatively charged. During my research I found no such writings and it seems modern academia has been diligent in removing texts of such intellectually dishonest nature. But genuine criticism of cosmopolitanism in mainstream academia seems rare, despite the exploding number of papers published on the subject. I am therefore hoping that a discussion of it will be worthwhile to the reader and something quite novel.

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Theory and method

A quick summary

This thesis will concern itself with a plethora of disciplines, but primarily it is to be considered as a thesis on the philosophy of politics. The distinction between what is philosophy and what is political science, and the agglomerated philosophy of politics is in and of itself an interesting separation, but not one that is afforded any consideration in this thesis. To introduce the political and philosophical concepts most pertinent to cosmopolitanism, namely freedom, it revealed itself to be fruitful to include excerpts from Thucydides and other ancient figures. Famed for his rather pessimistic outlook on humanity, not only can he introduce the concepts, but also kickstart an understanding of why the freedoms of cosmopolitanism seem to be so unattainable in the view of our main subject of study. A brief excursion into the thoughts of other ancient greek thinkers further elucidates this point.

The main object of study will be the paper *Cosmopolitanism as Nihilism*\(^1\) by Mark Kremer, which dissects the subject of cosmopolitanism along the dialectic dimensions of a synthesis between philosophy and political science. The study is particularly interesting considering given that it focuses on the very time period of the 18th century where we are told cosmopolitanism took shape. In his view cosmopolitanism leads to a nihilistic dystopia, or as he very unapologetically puts it :”Ultimately, cosmopolitans are neither philosophers nor citizens and their attempt to be both means that they are nothing at all.”\(^2\)

The general structure of arguments is deceptively difficult to disentangle. Take the supposed synthetic structure of cosmopolitanism for example, which is described as applicable both to modernity and the particular time-period of the past which Kremer is studying:”Today’s cosmopolitanism...is an attempt to bring together the universality of philosophy with the dedication of politics....This attempted synthesis was also attempted in the eighteenth

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\(^1\) Kremer, Mark: Cosmopolitanism as Nihilism: Rousseau's Study of Paris (2006)

\(^2\) Kremer (2016), p. 32
century…”.

But while Kremer makes liberal use of Parisian examples to advance his points about the synthetic structure, he never returns to modernity to explain why one should interpret them as analogous. This is an overall problem with the essay, to cherry-pick a specific locale and time-period and extrapolating it to be true for all locales and all times. This inductive process requires an ironclad formal argumentation, which there is none and why this analysis is even required.

While this is problematic, it serves as a convenient analytical starting point and a theoretical framework for discussing cosmopolitanism, which is an otherwise slippery subject to define. One of the main challenges presented by the dialectic approach is the difficulty in separating Kremer’s thoughts from those of his objects of study. At times there might even be as many as 3 separate voices at play (counting Kremer himself as well): "Rousseau, therefore, brings two sets of eyes upon Paris: his hero St. Preux and his own eyes—those of the philosopher.”

This is particularly burdensome when the discussion turns to what Rosseau calls the gynaecocracy of Paris and one could easily suspect a chauvinistic streak to the discourse. To reign in the theoretic scope of the thesis, a lesser focus will be accorded to issues like the supposed gynaecocracy and more time spent on the educational, ontological and epistemological issues.

The end result of cosmopolitanism according to its detractors is nihilism. As such, one would have to perhaps introduce it more, both as a philosophical concept and to give it a theoretical definition for the purpose of analysis. This would however also exceed the scope of this thesis and is superfluous. Rather, nihilism in the sense of Kremer and the other writers seems to be a state of meaninglessness; a casting aside of a set of values to the benefit of another set, but with the end result being that no set of values are actually held at all.

To conclude the thesis, rather than leave it at a descriptive desiccation of Kremer’s study and the arguments that were fruitfully extracted from it, an alternative possible source of solutions

\[3\] Kremer (2016), p. 32
\[4\] Kremer, M., (2016), p. 34
\[5\] Kremer, M., (2016), p. 36
to the problem of nihilism is discussed. Namely, metis, which is a form of knowledge separate from other forms of epistemic knowledge.⁶

The argument comes from Scott’s Seeing Like a State and in structure is very similar to arguments laid out by other authors who, roughly speaking, assert that new forms of thinking have pushed out the old, resulting in the loss of valuable skills/knowledge. Metis is a valuable aspect of knowledge, that Scott writes, is being pushed out by a false sense of progress: “...many forms of high modernism have replaced a valuable collaboration between these two dialects of knowledge...”.⁷ Epistemic deterioration will play a role in almost every aspect of this thesis and is found in love, religion, sex and other areas.

⁶ Scott, J. C. (2008). Seeing like a state - how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed., p. 311
Introduction

Background

The advent of cosmopolitanism

In response to the horrors of the 20th century, which had seen the advent of the national state and then the two subsequent attempts at what can best be described as collective suicide, ideas promoting a post-national mode of the world rose to prominence. Searches and queries for cosmopolitan articles and papers yield an ever growing number of results, despite the relative obscurity of the term among the common man.

These ideas weren’t new, they had really begun to take a formalized shape somewhere around the 18th century in European philosophy and can loosely be grouped together under the term cosmopolitanism. Instead of belonging to a community organized in the form of a nation state, the cosmopolitans belong to broader and universal community of global humanism, or as Cheah puts it:”what is imagined is a universal circle of belonging that involves the transcendence of the particularistic and blindly given ties of kinship and country”. And intuitively, this seems to be a rather uncontroversial and good idea that could only be benign. If unity between people is good (in contrast to let’s say infighting or conflict), as does the nationalist agree, then certainly more unity between more people is more of that good thing. Where the nationalist disagrees is on the basis of unity, which he or she takes in part from tribal factors such as shared ancestry and eugenic factors. The merits of such tribal modes of thinking have been thoroughly disproven and warrant no further consideration.

Further, cosmopolitans claim for themselves a very strong philosophical basis of political organization: “The bonds of humanity, whether they are predicated in terms of reason or moral sentiment, may be the strongest possible ties.”. This too seems like a rather uncontroversial and intuitively sound argument. It both defeats the nationalist’s claims by

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positing their own as superior, while laying out a moral and intellectual framework as the basis for their political philosophy as opposed to those aforementioned tribal factors.

**Why care about cosmopolitanism**

“World citizenship, if not a practiced duty, is certainly the moral imperative of today’s liberal education”\(^{11}\) states Kremer who will be the main subject of this thesis. The formulation posits the core tenet of cosmopolitanism of global citizenship in a shared polis as the dominant ideology of our educational system. The formulation is deceptively laden with value judgements as we will come to see further into this essay.

Firstly, the reservation of world citizenship (and by extension: cosmopolitanism) not being a practiced duty is not so much meant as a lamentation of inefficient or insufficient execution of the ideology. Rather, the reservation is meant to introduce the conclusion that cosmopolitanism is a lie; something the adherents profess in the abstract but scarcely believe or adhere to. This theme of attributing disingenuousness runs through Kremer’s analysis as perhaps the only unifying theme of the discussion. Nowhere is this as obvious to the reader as when he quotes Rosseau directly from his work Emile:”Distrust the cosmopolitans who go to great lengths in their books to discover duties they do not deign to fulfill around them. A philosopher loves the Tartars so as to be spared having to love his own neighbors”.\(^{12}\)

As to the claims of cosmopolitanism, which he decries as “endless contradiction”\(^{13}\), there seems to be not much love lost either as he attributes both the existence of and the solutions to said contradictions to a sense of unserious incompetence:”Cosmopolitan liberalism deals with these contradictions by ignoring them, and it can do so because it exists in an atmosphere of unseriousness...”.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{11}\) Kremer, M, (2006), p. 32  
\(^{12}\) Kremer, M, (2006), p. 33  
\(^{13}\) Kremer, M, (2006), p. 32  
\(^{14}\) Kremer, M, (2006), p. 32
The problem of cosmopolitanism

The issue remains however, that while we can agree to the denigrations of nationalism as a poor organizing principle of political philosophy, both cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans agree that the product of cosmopolitanism has been underwhelming. Cheah laments:”It becomes an ideology used by a state to attract high-end expatriate workers in the high-tech, finance, and other high-end service sectors as well as to justify its exploitation of its own citizens and the lower-end migrant workers”.\textsuperscript{15} Particular attention is paid to the economic consequences of professing a global interconnectedness and sense of belonging in the abstract, while in the concrete one is merely looking for excuses to propagate selfish interests unto a broader set of victims and expand the horizon of injustice. The philosophical issue that can be identified here then is one of authenticity.

Cheah does not seem to think that the problems with cosmopolitanism lie with cosmopolitanism itself though, but the world. Using his economic argument, one surmises that he is accusing the idea of having been hijacked by the right, or what he denotes as Neo-Liberal. Cheah introduces the problem as follows:”One should cast a more discriminating eye on the various emergent forms of cosmopolitanism and distinguish them in terms of how they are connected to the operations of neoliberal capital”.\textsuperscript{16} His theory seems to be that influence of capital outmuscles the influence of people, as “meaningful cosmopolitanisms”\textsuperscript{17} cannot be generated by a rise in globalization alone.

The argument ultimately is that political institutions are needed for the spread of cosmopolitanism and the shared values will ensure a uniform global approach to problems posed by, primarily, uneven distribution of capital and its consequences.

The much acclaimed Martha Nussbaum argued a different solution to the lack of globally shared values or spread of cosmopolitan ideals in her book \textit{Not for Profit}\textsuperscript{18}, which draws

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{15}] Cheah, P., (2006), p. 495
\item[\textsuperscript{16}] Cheah, P., (2006), p. 492
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] Cheah, P., (2006), p. 492
\end{footnotes}
heavily on her work on cosmopolitan philosophy. Her core argument seems to be that education, and in particular education in the fields of the humanities, is the key towards unlocking the potential of cosmopolitanism. This runs contrary to Kremer’s earlier comment about cosmopolitanism being the central educational paradigm of the 21st century, as Nussbaum argues that the “…humanities and the arts are being cut away, in both primary/secondary and college/university education, in virtually every nation of the world”.\(^{19}\) It seems that she is discussing a more recent and ongoing development however, warning of future developments. Quite interestingly, the results she predicts as a consequence of cutting out the humanities is that “…nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of useful machines,…”\(^{20}\) that are uncapable to “…understand the significance of another person’s sufferings and achievements.”\(^{21}\) This is usefull to us in the sense that Nussbaum is hinting that cosmopolitanism requires a certain kind of knowledge level and acquaintance with certain ideas in order to take effect. We will explore this, and Cheah’s focus on institutions further in the section about *metis*.

\(^{19}\) Nussbaum, M. C. (2010), p. 2  
\(^{20}\) Nussbaum, M. C. (2010), p. 2  
\(^{21}\) Nussbaum, M. C. (2010), p. 2
Analysis

What is a political philosophy?

A basic definition

First, we need to establish what a genuine philosophy of politics is. For our purposes, it suffices to create a baseline model which can serve as an analytical tool for evaluating our cosmopolitan friends from Kremer’s study, but also to maybe elucidate why Kremer and Rosseau pay them such little respect as to call them “...degradations of philosophy and of politics...”.  

The following paragraph from Strauss (1957) defines the basis of the philosophy of politics very simply and elegantly:

”All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we wish to bring about something better. All political action is, then, guided by some thought of better or worse”.  

This simple paragraph encompasses every wonderful and noble or destructive and deplorable political paradigm in the history of mankind. Because “better” or “worse” are value judgements, they depend entirely on what our values are. But from this simple proposition can arise an immense complexity.

We could hold values such that we believe strongly in the existence of economic activity, but also in the existence of a state which needs to levy taxes to exist. A person’s political stance on the introduction of a tax will therefore be such that the economic activity does not suffer, but it should also be high enough to sustain the state, i.e a problem of mathematical calculus and differential optimization. These problems can be quite hard to solve and thus we end up

22 Kremer (2016), p. 33
23 Strauss, Leo: (1957). What is Political Philosophy?, p. 343
not with knowledge, but with guesses or opinions which are not as solid or reliable as concrete knowledge.

We would much prefer to not be given to opinions about what to do, and that is why we form a political philosophy, to guide us as a compass would, to the good society. As Strauss puts it: “Political philosophy will then be the attempt to replace opinion about the nature of political things by knowledge of the nature of political thing”.24

The problem of ascertaining what the value structure should be like persists however, and creates a certain infinite feedback loop. We cannot reason around values without making a value judgement. Let’s say we have person A and person B who would opposing views on the merits of the aforementioned tax. If person A wishes to critique person B’s political philosophy, according to the model we laid out he or she can only do so by attacking the state of knowledge on epistemological or ontological grounds (the effect of the tax could be in dispute), or by attacking B’s values at their core or in their structure (A and B value the economic activity and/or the state differently). By not agreeing to the value structure however, it is automatically postulated that their values differ, they could not be the same.

Strauss comedically remarks:

“A man who sees no reason for not despising people whose horizon is limited to their consumption of food and their digestion may be a tolerable econometrist; he cannot say anything relevant about the character of human society. A man who refuses to distinguish between great statesmen, mediocrities, and insane imposters may be a good bibliographer; he cannot say anything relevant about politics and political history”.25

To Strauss it is not a worthwhile endeavour to study the philosophy of politics without considering the values that underpin them.

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24 Strauss (1957), p. 344
25 Strauss (1957), p. 349
Early Western models

A brief sketch of early Western political philosophy can elucidate why the critics of cosmopolitanism may have such a low opinion of it, and while the argument may seem far-fetched at first, a quick indulgence reveals itself to yield quite potent results.

In Western thought, philosophy of politics is with us all the way from the Great Masters such as Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, in Plato’s The Republic, the ultimate governance of a perfect society is envisioned to be lead by philosopher kings. Aristotle, who studied under Plato, continued the study of political theory and both served in an advisory capacity to various rulers during their lives. It would seem that philosophy has a special practical application to governance and politics which it seems to have lost in other branches of societal life and academic departments.

Going further back in time, we can also find philosophy and politics as central focal points for Herodotus and Thucydides, despite their authorships being more directed towards the study of military matters. Famously, Thucydides proclaimed his work to be of importance beyond times, as he thought the lessons from the Peloponnesian War had lessons for humanity that transcended merely the short timespan of his fellow Athenians.

In particular, his second book which contains the funeral orations of Pericles contains many interesting bits of political philosophy. Pericles says, or Thucydides has him saying the following to the Athenian citizens: “These take as your model, and judging happiness to be the fruit of freedom and freedom of valor, never decline the dangers of war”. He is no doubt trying to inspire the young Athenians and the survivors of war to continue the armed struggle, but nevertheless he weaves in these small nuggets of political philosophy and postulates that happiness and freedom are deeply connected. In particular, the notion of interconnectedness between what a society can enjoy and that there is some amount of sacrifice that has to take place to reach this enjoyment, seems central to Pericles’s argument and attempt to rally his populace. This seemingly simple concept seems to underpin our very civilizational structure,

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or as the renowned Bertrand Russell puts it:” The civilized man is distinguished from the savage mainly by prudence, or, to use a slightly wider term, forethought. He is willing to endure present pains for the sake of future pleasures, even if the future pleasures are rather distant.”. In Pericles’s case, the pleasure then indeed is distant, as directly preceding the connection between freedom and sacrifice, he warns his compatriots that for some people it will mean death.

Having defined this link, we can now again turn to Kremer, who seems to share Russell’s and Pericles’s affinity for sacrifice and its connection to real happiness. Sacrifice, he argues, is completely missing from Parisian morals and mode of social interaction, because “cosmopolitanism replaces virtue and inner awareness with politeness” and “politeness is falseness” that “...asks nothing in the way of a real sacrifice...” and thus kills any possibility of morality in social life. Essentially, if all a member of society needs to accomplish to join the social community of society is to master this code of politeness, then the value of that community is eroded. Instead of the character of the individual participating in society, it is the ability to play by the rules that describes cosmopolitan social life.

**First findings**

Social behaviour has transactional/economic analogies, where membership in society or a subset of society comes with both rewards and costs, incentives and punishment and there is a common social capital as currency. From Bowles and Gintis we can learn that: “Social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one's community and to punish those who do not.” Precisely this trust and concern is what Rosseau’s character remark a glaring lack of, rather preferring “Spartan frankness to false politeness”, as the Spartan has virtue by means of his citizenship which he had to earn at great cost, and the value he derives from citizenship is so great that his friends mean more to him than he does himself. It seems that the social aspect of cosmopolitan political philosophy can be characterized exactly as “good rules of the game thus came to displace

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28 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33
29 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33
30 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33
32 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 35
good citizens as the sine qua non of good government” \(^{33}\), where Bowles and Gintis echo the lamentations of Kremer, that the 18th century philosophers came to redefine politics and philosophy to the detriment of the species.

So it seems that the primary critique of cosmopolitanism’s effect on social relations can be summed up as follows: By emphasizing the rules of interaction in society and removing barriers of entry to it, the morality of individual members participating in it suffers and paradoxically erodes the very basis for having a society in the first place. It would seem that there is reasonably good argument to be made that this negative effect arises from a deficiency of cosmopolitan political philosophy, as we discussed contrasting philosophies of Athens and Sparta to find genuine societal care and trust among the citizens who’s basis of citizenship was not universal/global and not without cost.

To further connect the dots between our discussion of the Periclean excerpt of political philosophy, the Russelian definition of civilization as the ability to sacrifice present for future and the supposed failure of cosmopolitanism, we can consult Kremer’s conclusion which says the following about the citizens of Paris:”At one moment, modern man grabs for pleasures as if he were about to die and, at another, he accumulates wealth as if he had forever to put aside for his pleasures.”\(^{34}\), again hinting at a comprehensive civilizational critique underpinning the disapproval of cosmopolitanism.


\(^{34}\) Kremer, M (2016), p. 44
Religion, Love and Sex

Divinity in excess

While the austere ways of Sparta have transcended time by becoming a semantically corresponding adjective in most modern languages, the Athenians were famous for excesses. Even Socrates, the philosopher par-excellence, imbibes frivolously at times and in his Apologia famously lambasts his accusers for immorality and putting a premium on displays of fake emotion rather than formality of court proceedings. So perhaps the cosmopolitans can be forgiven?

Russell offers an interesting theory on the relationship of blindly indulging in present plesantries and practicing exaggerated restraint for future pay-offs. His solution to these antithetical and extreme opposites is religion and religious rituals. For indeed, both sides of the spectrum are extreme, as Russell would probably tell the Spartan “... , prudence may easily involve the loss of some of the most important things in life.”. The way out of overt prudence is by physical or spiritual intoxication, which can range from anything like sexual activities, religious experiences of trance or drinking alcohol. In ancient Greece, these activities were behelensed to religion, specifically Bacchic religion. Indeed, even modern religions like Catholicism contain such elements of intoxication such as the ingestion of wine and bread as a symbol of Christ, but also mental things such as feelings of connections to the Divine. The process of intoxication seems to be important to the atheist Russell, as it “...recovers an intensity of feeling that prudence had destroyed;...” and seems to act as a balancing force in what is described as a perennial conflict of the human condition; prudence versus passion.

This ties in well with our previous discussion of the excesses of cosmopolitan Paris. Perhaps Kremer and Rousseau are too harsh in judging the cosmopolitans, as Kremer alleges “Modern man is incoherent because his ambitions conflict with his pleasures.” and connecting the root of this conflict to cosmopolitanism thus advances his arguments against it. Could the

35 Russell, B, (1972), p. 16
36 Russell, B, (1972), p. 16
37 Kremer, M (2016), p. 44
cosmopolitan himself simply be engaged in the eternal struggle of prudence versus passion? Kremer does not seem to think so, rather he castigates them as having simply forfeited all responsibilities to the benefit of more leisure: “Country and God are replaced by the salon and the theater”. But while one could suppose an overtly pious motif to the critique here, the true loyalties of Rousseau and Kremer seem to lie with reason, and the reasonable man yearns “...to be free from religion...”. It is therefore again rather a problem of authenticity which is remarked on, cosmopolitanism which professes to liberate the mind from religion has simply replaced the object of religious worship. We see clear indications of that pious reverence of the arts, as the cosmopolitans are not allowed to freely discuss it. Quoting Rousseau’s fictional character:”“It is not as free as you think it, to speak your opinion on this subject. Here, one can dispute everything except their music and opera”.

It seems Kremer and Russell are in agreement as to the beneficial effect on reason of the existence of religious or spiritual elements in society. Saying that ancient Greeks would steel themselves and thus achieve greater levels, Kremer remarks:“Their reason, so far from being a prejudice, is exerted against religion and develops itself by trying itself against its adversary”.

The importance of love

The claim in Kremer seems to be to say that the cosmopolitan is simply incapable of true love or passion, and if anything he certainly only loves himself and his passions are thusly confined. Nowhere is this as evident as in the collation of tombstone epitaphs, where the Parisian’s epitaph is described as having “...the bombastic character of a man who wants to be thought of as a god” while the ancient examples used to contrast show positive character traits, chiefly of selflessness and a healthy relation to death.

38 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 36
39 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33
40 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 46
41 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 34
42 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 45
The loss of true love in society is catastrophic not just in the emotional sense, but in the epistemic sense as well:”... acts of knowing or inquiring have as a necessary condition the human person's love, desire, or care.”.\(^{43}\) This epistemological deterioration is explored further both on love and sex, but particularly in the section on metis.

Selfishness, self-aggrandizing and self-obsession is a charge not just frequently repeated in Kremer, but is a centerpiece of Hanson & Heath’s critique of the cosmopolitan concept of multiculturalism in academia in *Who Killed Homer?:”..., we learn little of the Greeks from today’s theorists, but a great deal about their own all-encompassing narcissism”.\(^{44}\) They go on to quote Page Dubois and comment on the frequent use of personal pronouns pertaining to Dubois himself. Finally, they finish by accusing this subset of academics to be inauthentic, professing something they do not themselves adhere to, precisely as we see in Kremer’s description of cosmopolitan Parisian philosophers.

Man’s relation to his inevitable death recurs frequently in Kremers text and emerges as ever more important. By the end, it has to be considered one of his central arguments against cosmopolitanism. Writing of the upper class, he says:”The failure of civil man to attach himself to others is inextricably connected to his failure to situate himself in relation to death and eternity.”.\(^{45}\)

**Sidenotes on death**

Before continuing our discussion on attachments in the particular forms of love and sex, we need to discuss death, as it figures so heavily in the discussion on other matters. The endless barrage of criticism in Kremer along multiple avenues of thought creates a confusing flood of arguments. Are we to understand the relationship to death as the primary cause of lack of attachment to others, or is it the polite falseness? One possible explanation seems to be that the “civic man”, and his supposedly faulty relation to death, denotes an explicitly aristocratic class of people. The upper-class critique runs through Kremers text as indeed it seems to run


\(^{45}\) Kremer, M, (2016), p. 44
through most criticism of cosmopolitanism. Cheah calls it “...the popular view of cosmopolitanism as an elite form of rootlessness and a state of detachment...”

Our discussion of Greek political philosophy was closely linked to death, especially death in battle. There is a need to distinguish between acceptance of death, natural or for example in the course of battle, and a devaluation of death, such as for example the fascist creed of deliberately seeking death to the supposed benefit of the state. When Pericles delivers his funeral oration, he remarks that “... heroes have the whole earth for their tomb;...” which is quite a cosmopolitan claim, as the appeal of sacrifice is given a universal and transnational reach. Quite to the contrary of a fascist, Pericles does not wish for death, he does not seek for his audience to wish it, but he surely wishes to establish respect, gratefulness and a commemorative sense.

A speech that is quite reminiscent of this is the Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln. In the speech, much like Pericles, Lincoln mentions death as meaningful sacrifice and the obligations of the living to the dead by virtue of that meaningfulness. Importantly, death and sacrifice also seem to lose some their meaning, as Lincoln urges his listeners not to let the dead have died in vain. We can safely conclude that the political philosophies of non-cosmopolitan societies included some sort of reasoning of the human relationship to death, now let us return to our cosmopolitan friends.

Kremer contends that a multitude of malaises derive from an ill defined relation to death. “The bombast characteristic of his tombstones, his music, and his philosophy is a consequence of not living in relation to death, for only a man who has forgotten death would try to bloat himself into a god.” Having no relationship to death means the cosmopolitan is free to leave his humanity for the status of an immortal god, but we also learn that death is still an irksome feature of life that bothers the cosmopolitan. The passage: “Death is too ugly for the marquesses to look at. Like crime, there is no way to laugh at it, and, therefore, like crime, it is ignored.” shows how cosmopolitan entertainment has to censor out or comically

48 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 45
49 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 39
distort death so as to not be an affront to the delicate sensibilities of the cosmopolitan crowd. Ultimately, it is politeness which brings about these sensibilities and therefore precludes death from entering in the philosophical thought of cosmopolitanism seriously.\textsuperscript{50}

**Love and sex continued**

With this detour completed we are free to return to love and sex, which occupy a lot (the word love occurs 105 times) of Kremers discussion as much of the analysis is done on the fictional love letters of Rousseau's writings. We already saw that a faulty relationship to death brings about a lack of attachment, and attachment is one form of love. Our previous discussion of sacrifice is also pertinent to love, as love usually involves some kind of sacrifice between the two interested parties. Politeness is the culprit, as it “...asks nothing in the way of a real sacrifice...it liberates them from the demands,...even of romantic love.”.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, love is nonexistent with the cosmopolitans, but the causal chain is greater.

Love, taken in the greater Augustinian sense and not strictly romantic, is dispensed with as well, as the cosmopolitan is derided as a hypocritical liar right off the bat:”... the European cosmopolitan loves the Turk half way around the world, so that he will not have to love his own neighbor at home.”.\textsuperscript{52} This statement also introduces the impossibility of friendship and love of hobbies as the only love the cosmopolitan has is for himself.

As to the “romantic” relationships that are mentioned, they are characterized by “hedonism and faithlessness”\textsuperscript{53} as opposed to the narrator Rousseau employs, who is elevated by love above the moral deficiencies that he observes in others. This derision of casual sexual relations as “hedonism” would be problematic to modern readers who are products of the sexual liberation, would it not be for the observation that these casual sexual relations were the only sexual relation there was for the cosmopolitans. Vanity reigns in the worst excesses of sexual hedonism, but it “...is a substitute for modesty, rather than civic virtue.”\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{50} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 38
\textsuperscript{51} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33
\textsuperscript{52} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33
\textsuperscript{53} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35
\textsuperscript{54} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 40
partners are discarded immediately after the act, as even vanity cannot mask the underlying contempt everyone has for each other: “the final act of their sexual play; they conclude with mutual contempt.”.\textsuperscript{55}

For women there is no love or attachment to be had or desired, but “Sex and vain attentions make up her erotic life.”.\textsuperscript{56} And why should she, given that the character qualities of the men are summarized as: “His gallantry is an empty form. He knows what he wants and how to win it.”.\textsuperscript{57} The men have no genuine interest in anything but themselves, certainly not in a serious romantic relationship that would require trust, honesty and sacrifice (a cosmopolitan three-strike rule according to Kremer/Rousseau).

Sexual relations are as confusing as they are, again, hypocritical. Paradoxically, the readily available supply of sexual partners fosters a spirit of competition among women, which in turn breeds contempt. The women of cosmopolitanism learn to treat men like puppets whom they can manipulate with sex. On the other hand, among men it breeds a contempt for women, but again it hypocritical: “If the male were truly contemptuous of the female, he would not have sex with her, not even to display his disdain.”.\textsuperscript{58}

In conclusion, love and sex is just another path down the road of nihilism, as the overly complicated and paradoxical nature of love and sex with the cosmopolitan setting seems to overload the citizens with absurdity.

\textsuperscript{55} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 42  
\textsuperscript{56} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 40  
\textsuperscript{57} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 41  
\textsuperscript{58} Kremer, M., (2016), p. 42
Next stop: Nihilism

We are now ready fully describe the mechanisms of cosmopolitanism that lead to a state of nihilism, and thus it is advisable to take a brief excursion into it and assemble the argument. Kremer defines Rousseau as having made a “comedy about nihilism”\(^\text{59}\), sort of similar to the novel American Psycho and its depiction of insider people during the rise of high-finance.

As we saw earlier, a special emphasis is put on the erosion of morals via extraneous “rules of the game”, the quality of the citizen of the polis is of little importance and sensing that, his impetus for quality is eroded. Given to his pleasures, and religiously enslaved to the arts there is scarcely any description of citizens with dedication, only drifters. As everyone is so indistinguishable from one another in character and taste, cosmopolitanism fosters a herd mentality of clones, resulting in what Kremer calls a collective of “easy and smug nihilism”\(^\text{60}\).

Politically, politeness rears its ugly head again. Because politeness not only applies to social life, but to the political arena as well, the tone of debate is a muted and disinterested one. “There is neither attack nor defense because there is indifference.”\(^\text{61}\) The importance of appearing civil precludes the possibility of a real or lively debate.

There is a clear class-based component to the critique, one that we saw in Cheah that cosmopolitans are aware of (but very readily dismiss). Similar to the argument of universality and hypocrisy, Rousseau seems to claim that cosmopolitans don’t care any more for poor people than they care for their neighbor, they don’t care at all unless they are involved themselves. Content to just frequent the opera and make false promises of shared wealth, they are described by Rousseau as being nothing: “If the Parisians are not citizens, philosophers, poets, lovers, husbands and wives, or devotees, then what are they? The answer is that they are bourgeois or what Rousseau also calls nothing. The letters are a comprehensive account of cosmopolitan nihilism”.\(^\text{62}\)

\(^{59}\) Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35
\(^{60}\) Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33
\(^{61}\) Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35
\(^{62}\) Kremer, M., (2016), p. 34
Note on Kremer's style

Now that we have discussed Kremer quite a bit, it is feasible to introduce a critical remark on the style with which he argues in his paper. Essentially, he posits that there is an inherent problem with the theoretical construct of cosmopolitanism, but presents mostly practical and empirical claims to support this thesis rather than attacking the theory itself. This is a weak point in his study, because there is no self-evident link between the social interactions and activities of a particular people in a particular time-period and the philosophical ideas to which they may or may not subscribe to. It is as if one would argue the merit or fallacy of communism by only looking at a subset of people in, let’s say, Soviet Russia during the 50’s when it was very successful.

Further, his literary style is very poignant, callous and crass. This tone is taken in Who Killed Homer as well and is unnecessary for the issues discussed, in fact it rather obscures them under a layer of vitriol.

Taking insipiration from Nussbaum and Cheah, the analysis will now proceed with a focus on political institutions and epistemology.
Lost knowledge: metis

The importance of agriculture

Again we must venture out on a bifurcated detour similar to our earlier discussion of political philosophy, sacrifice and civilization to develop the argument fully. The aim will be to establish agriculture, class and political institutions as central to a discussion of loss of societal knowledge and values. And again, we shall see that the patient reader is rewarded in the end.

In the earlier passage introducing Greek political philosophy we encountered Bertrand Russell and his definition of a civilized society or human. He makes a peculiar observation directly succeeding the definition concerning the special relationship between civilization and agriculture: “This habit began to be important with the rise of agriculture, no animal and no savage would work in the spring in order to have food next winter,...” 63 Particular attention is paid to separate instinctual behaviour which is merely a programmed or unconscious behaviour and thus not the calculated forethought which characterizes a state of civilization.

However, Kremer alleges that these practitioners of agriculture have no place in cosmopolitan society: “The rusticity of the country and the virtues of a citizen would be offensive to polite society”. 64 An interesting corollary to the agricultural subcontext can, again, be found with the Greeks who according to Hanson & Heath 65 apparently “…said that war and agriculture are the two most important things we humans do.”. Further, we are told that no other actions better “…reveal virtue…, civilization and barbarism.” which have been key components of the critique of cosmopolitanism.

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63 Russell, B, (1972), p. 15
64 Kremer, M, (2016), p. 33
65 Hanson & Heath, (2001), p. 58
A touch of class

As we saw, agriculture and class seems inextricably linked. The critique of Kremer turns to aspects of class and distribution of wealth at many times, noting that “... the discrepancy between rich and poor in Paris is greater than any place on earth”. The odd thing is that we already saw Cheah agree that cosmopolitanism can lead to class-based oppression. The fault according to him lies not with cosmopolitanism however, but with insufficient institutions: ”... philosophers of the French Enlightenment could not envision feasible political structures for the regular and widespread institutionalization of mass-based cosmopolitan feeling” and he even quotes Rosseau to his advantage on this very subject. More specifically, Cheah attributes the modern failures of cosmopolitanism to Habermas and the inadequacies of his theoretical framework, which roots cosmopolitan political institutions in the liberal welfare state, and thus it is feasible to solve the problems via adaptations of political structures.

Perhaps, rather than accepting the notion of cosmopolitanism as a cul de sac road to nihilism, we could find another possible explanation of Kremers and Rosseaus disgust then, by looking at targeted political action.

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66 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35
Political Institutions

In *Seeing Like A State*, precisely this argument of political actions and institutions in the name of improving the human condition is discussed, with a special eye towards deleterious effects of such actions. The general thrust of theory as it pertains to this thesis, is that whenever a regime wishes to use political action to remake a society as an exogenous agent, the impossibility of perfectly describing modes of society and production sneaks its way into that political action and usually causes harm. Scott writes:”... the necessarily thin, schematic model of social organization and production animating the planning was inadequate as a set of instructions…”\(^{69}\) because “Formal order, to be more explicit, is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognize”.\(^{70}\) *Metis* is not necessarily the informal process, but can be composite parts that make up the sum total result of an informal. Just like *logos*, it is a subset, but much more difficult to define: “...practical skills, variously called know-how (savoir faire or arts de faire) common sense, experience, a knack, or *metis*.”.\(^{71}\) It seems to be one of those things that one can rather easily recognize when met with it in person, but then has a hard time explaining or describing it in a satisfactory fashion. For example, what makes a good diplomat? One may study the sciences of history, politics and international relations, yet we still have the phrase of “the art of diplomacy” which signifies something other than the level of scientific proficiency, but yet also not merely courtesy or behaviourisms. Rather, it is perhaps the practical application of courtesy and knowledge in combination, to the problem of diplomacy.

Scott gives several examples of *metis* in agricultural contexts, citing the ubiquitous farmers’ almanacs of yonder, that usually contained local adaptations as to the optimal times for sowing certain crops in that particular area. But the applications needn’t be that practical, although they seem to require a utility in use. Leadership skills that inspire and elevate a community can be counted as *metis* too.

\(^{71}\) Scott, J. C. (2008). p. 311
Indeed, the spatial geographic difference in metis seems to be a big part of the reason why central political action fails. Scott uses phrases like “...based on more universalistic units of measurement.”72 to hint at the fact that in fact, one size does not fit all. This is problematic for the cosmopolitan, who we saw takes universality to be one of the organizing principles of his political philosophy.

Further: “The necessarily implicit, experiential nature of metis seems central.”73 It seems that metis, even if described and understood, is not transferable by traditional learning. It is something that has to be experienced in order to be actualized and inher in a person. We can recognize this distinctive feature from military affairs, where one might be very learned as to the nature of war, but can not truly understand its horrors unless having experienced it himself. This does not bode well for our cosmopolitan friends, of whom we learned that they spent all of their waking hours consumed with leisure. In fact, no mention is made about learning or exertion in any capacity. It seems problematic for Cheah’s assumption as well, that cosmopolitan identity and feeling would spread more successfully under the guise of political institutions. Scott takes an even more damning view of those who would use institutional reach for this purpose: “The relation between scientific knowledge and practical knowledge is, as we shall see, part of a political struggle for institutional hegemony by experts and their institutions.”74 The composite argument against institutions as harbingers of cosmopolitan success then becomes that a) it is not feasible to assume universality is applicable across a the spatial divide of the world, b) social order rests several subsets of knowledge, some of which can not be transferred as easily as concrete epistemic forms and c) that the agent who uses political institutions to such an end is actually more interested in his political hegemony than, what Strauss told us was, moving society forward towards the better.

Returning again to Kremer, he alleges that cosmopolitan theory is fraught with contradictions as they pertain to the universality of humanity and humanism:”...man is a cultural being belonging to his unique history and that he is a natural being belonging to a common humanity,... and so on in endless contradiction.”.75 On one hand, f man has a unique history,

75 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33
then the axiom of universality does not apply and we can forget forging humanity under the umbrella of global political institutions. On the other hand, if he is a natural being in a common humanity, then we simultaneously strip him of his uniqueness in culture and history, which arguably constitute some form of metis. To solve this, cosmopolitanism teaches tolerance. But Kremer laments: “If there is more toleration, there is less belief in anything. Despite the goods provided by cosmopolitanism and despite its overcoming certain prejudices, it only creates new and more destructive prejudices”. An example of how tolerance in cosmopolitan society fails to respect the status of its minorities or foreign guests is provided by the arts:“...foreigners do not dare speak their minds about the opera...”. Hence, the multicultural paradigm in Kremer’s view destroys the prospect of both parts of the synthesis via the dialectic process. What is proposed is that instead of the failed synthesis, perhaps the loss of metis is the actual problem, as for example in the case of tolerance and politeness, which prohibits foreigners to freely speak their mind about the arts and thus cosmopolitan society loses valuable external opinions and points of view. Kremer, instead, alleges that the foreigner himself is not well served by the supposed tolerance shown to him by cosmopolitan society, giving the example of Rousseau’s Swiss character:”St. Preux is never more alone than when he is in society, and his only consolation is to lock himself up by himself” as mostly anything offends him in Paris. Because of cosmopolitanism’s insistence on tolerance and politeness, the failed synthesis arrives at a nihilism of values that is offensive to foreigner and Parisian alike. The difference may seems subtle, but if we assume that the loss of metis is the problem of cosmopolitanism, one could envision a solution as opposed to the impasse of the failed synthesis proposed by Kremer.

76 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33
77 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 43
78 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 35
Applications to Gender

To further elucidate the merits of the theory that loss of knowledge, rather than nihilism, is a fruitful tool for analysis and reading, let’s apply this way of thinking to the (in this author’s view) problematic theme of gender in Kremer.

In the duality of agriculture and war that we met earlier, we are also reminded that the Greeks, through Heraclitus, thought of war as the father of us all and agriculture, or more accurately nature, as the mother. While “female” agriculture seems to be the patient process of prudently creating sustenance, “male” war is the passionate business of destruction of what has been built up. This assignment of gender to phenomena of the world is also found in gnostic traditions and mythology. The duality runs strangely akin to Russell’s theory of a perpetual interplay of passion and prudence, and while they are separate and different, they both need each other for balance and thus become equal in value in proportion to how much is needed of each to achieve balance. Applying this model analogously, we thus have a basis from which to discuss the gender relations that figure so heavily in Kremer on what seems a gender neutral setting. Gender in cosmopolitan Paris is as already mentioned, problematic. Therefore, to salvage a more neutral reading we can use this theoretical model instead of sifting through what otherwise would be pure misogyny.

Women are the rulers of cosmopolitan Paris, by proxy and not through explicit institutions, but through control of the men which they make “effeminate”. The use of the more pejorative effeminate, rather than the neutral feminine, is peculiar. It again could imply that what Rosseau and his fictional characters judge harshly, Kremer instead wishes to subtly differentiate and attribute to the aforementioned problem of authenticity. In other words, it is not a matter of true feminine behaviour, but a bastardized version of it, hence the use of the word effeminate. There is some support for this if we look at the description of how women are valued and evaluated by themselves and others in cosmopolitan Paris. “Shocking immodesty changes the nature of female pride by teaching that the most honorable woman is

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79 Hanson & Heath, (2001), p. 58
80 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 36
the one who is desired the most, which means by the most men.”.\textsuperscript{81} It seems Kremer is lamenting the reduced state of women in Paris, affirming for them the ability to be more than objects of desire of “effeminate men”. The ideal cosmopolitan male seems to be a source of misogyny by virtue of himself, as the cosmopolitan state-of-affairs is to upheave the supposedly natural distance between man and woman, and thus male chastity becomes rare and idealized: “Chastity, in fleeing the female, becomes the virtue of the male. The female must now submissively seek to be degraded,...”.\textsuperscript{82} Having already reduced women to merely be judged by their number of suitors, cosmopolitanism further reduces women by having them chase the men.

This rather heavy hitting line of discussion does not seem to go unnoticed; Kremer remarks:”Rousseau is not a critic of compassion in general any more than he is a critic of the influence of women in general. What he does object to is the hypocritical use of cosmopolitan when it is pushed beyond the narrow limits of real feeling and action.”\textsuperscript{83} So it seems Kremer is at least aware of the tone of the article as it pertains to women. Instead it seems that what he is trying to get at is nature, and that when nature is corrupted as he alleges with cosmopolitanism, the changes on man and woman become such that they warrant extensive criticism. In fact, one could venture so far as to say that what is being critiqued is a pseudo-man and pseudo-woman, imposters of their gender.

Already in his introduction, Kremer levies the charge that cosmopolitanism fuses politics and philosophy by denying nature.\textsuperscript{84} It seems then, that what really bothers Rousseau and Kremer is not gender in the concrete, but that earlier civilizational interplay we discussed, where both genders are on equal footing because of nature, not because of a lack of it. Having artificially removed the natural differences, the status of both man and woman is reduced.

But while the male still holds all the material advantages of a more patriarchal society, and can compete freely along those lines with other men, the female has to compete for resources and social status in other ways. “It is, thus, that ceasing to be women, … they prefer their rank

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\item \textsuperscript{81} Kremer, M., (2006), p. 40
\item \textsuperscript{82} Kremer, M., (2006), p. 42
\item \textsuperscript{83} Kremer, M., (2006), p. 37
\item \textsuperscript{84} Kremer, M., (2006), p. 32
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
to their sex, and imitate prostitutes…” 85 Alas, the point closely resembles that of Cheah that we saw earlier, where he complained that unequal competition was one of the reasons for the failure of cosmopolitanism. Looking at our combined Hanson & Heath - Russell model of nature as gendered, we found that in fact competition between the sexes was an interdependency, where passion needed to be reigned in by prudence, and prudence not fruitfull without some passion. Examining gender, we have now extracted this counterclaim, that cosmopolitanism is what turns competition into something horrible.

The corollary to our discussion of *metis* is that nature seems to have put high demands on both man and woman when it comes to requirements for successful participation in society and life in general. By casting nature aside, it seems both man and woman lose important social skills and moral heading, i.e. the same as loss of *metis*. About this Kremer writes:”Modesty is accompanied by a desire for an exclusive and permanent attachment and is therefore a virtue proving a woman’s worthiness. Respect for it proves a man’s” 86 and that modesty ultimately is informed by an understanding of sexual desire, one’s own wellfare and status and that without it, there can be no love. But the Parisians are instead confined to act out their pseudo-gendered roles and thus show no competencies in social skills.

Conclusion

Concluding remarks

In summary, the problems of cosmopolitanism seem real, as we saw that both cosmopolitan thinkers like Cheah and several non-cosmopolitans agree that there are areas of deficiency. Where they disagree is about where the problems originate from, its detractors argue they are with cosmopolitan theory and its defenders seem to argue that it is a mix of not enough institutional power and to a lesser extent an overreliance on Western liberal democracy as a one-size-fits-all model.

Moreover, the problems with cosmopolitanism seem to be important. The mass of literature about cosmopolitanism is certainly growing at a rapid pace, and is produced by a large number of people and certainly some very noteworthy names. Rousseau is one of the greats in European history of philosophy, while thinkers such as Nussbaum occupy similarly elevated positions in the modern age. What is fascinating however is that at many aspects, the same sources lie at the heart of vile criticism as in Kremer and simultaneously serve as a basis for the opposite stance as in Nussbaum:”... Rousseau’s great work Emile, which describes an education aimed at rendering the young man autonomous, capable of his own independent thought and of solving practical problems on his own, without reliance on authority.”.\footnote{Nussbaum, M. C., (2010), p. 53} Now, \textit{Emile} is one of the most prominent sources in Kremer, whose aggregate assessment of cosmopolitanism certainly does not contain autonomous thinkers:” Cosmopolitanism is not a freedom for anything and instead of culminating in free minds, promotes mass conformity to a herdlike existence.”.\footnote{Kremer, M., (2016), p. 33} It is simply fascinating to see the rift between the two sides, and one has to wonder how similar sources can underpin two such different conclusions.
A further example of the same phenomenon being at the heart for both pro- and con-cosmopolitan thinking was shown in the case of gender and competition. Moreover, it offered some merit to the critique of cosmopolitanisms insistence on changing nature.

Along the basic models of philosophy of politics, the detractors of cosmopolitanism can be described as having a different value structure and when they look at the same phenomenon but arrive at contrarian conclusions, they are not seeing different facts, they are simply making a value judgment along Straussian lines. Interestingly, the detractors affirm no ability for cosmopolitanism to make value judgements:”There is no right or wrong but only relative "values"...” and those values by definition of multiculturalism have no hierarchy of better or worse.

There is a very strong conservative breeze that blows through the criticisms we have met with, decrying cosmopolitanism as irresponsible and unserious. The inhabitant of Paris “exists in an atmosphere of unseriousness, where human beings are accustomed to saying things that have no meaning and where there are no political responsibilities.” and this supposedly childish environment can breed quite dangerous results, as “...liberty without responsibility is more often savagery;...”.

This savagery takes the shape of nihilism, where people behave inauthentically and word never matches deed, ideals remain unattainable despite promises of the contrary, friendship and love are dead, etc. ad nauseam.

Finally, instead of beating the dead horse of dialectic synthesis, an alternative synthesis was produced. Namely, that state intervention inadvertently disrupts local communities and in the process destroy a special subset of knowledge, metis. This seems to correlate better with scholars like Scott, who are not engaged in the quite contemptuous debate on the merits of cosmopolitanism. It seems to echo Nussbaums sentiments as well, that a lack of some kind of knowledge, and therefore educational elements, is at the heart of the problem.

89 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 32
90 Kremer, M., (2016), p. 32
91 Hanson & Heath., (2001), p. 41
References


