In recent years, a new type of public administrator has emerged: cross-sector strategists. They are usually responsible for promoting certain values relating to strategic issues such as sustainability, safety/security, diversity, children/youth, public health, human rights, gender equality, etc. Their positions are formalized but they lack formal decision powers, and their challenge is to work horizontally across sectorial lines within otherwise hierarchical organizations.

This study examines for the first time how cross-sector strategists in Swedish local government cope with their conflicting roles. Using a mixed-methods approach, Petra Svensson shows how they use the ambivalence of their work for their strategic purposes. In their ambition to successfully promote strategic values, cross-sector strategists are required to be highly reflexive and flexible actors, balancing conflicting expectations of being both bureaucrats and lobbyists.

The findings raise new important questions on whether employing cross-sector strategists is a successful way of safeguarding crucial democratic and ethical values, or if the strategists are part of a more dubious development where un-elected administrators overtake responsibilities for political issues, disguising important political value conflicts as administrative problems.

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In 1998, in the mud of an Indonesian river, scientists discovered a previously unknown form of octopus. The octopus, named as *Thaumoctopus mimicus*, possesses an unusual skill of impersonating a wide range of animals, plants and objects, for hunting and defense. In a similar way, cross-sector strategists adapt to the actors in the local government administration. They do this in order to render influence for the policy areas they work with, while simultaneously working to remain dedicated bureaucrats in the local government administration.
Cross-Sector Strategists

Dedicated Bureaucrats in Local Government Administration

Petra Svensson
To my grandfather Arvid Swenson (1923–2009)
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Petra, Västra Frölunda, November 2017
1

Cross-Sector Strategists

Well, we do try to work with raising the awareness of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the environment, gender equality, diversity, and public health. But we also have a business to run.

(Municipal manager)

My closest coworkers are all the managers. And my task is to support and help them to become aware of cross-sectoral topics and to get started. Because they do not have the time to remember everything. That is how I perceive the strategic role, that you should bring up things you know others should do.

(Municipal cross-sector strategist)

Ideas for how the public sector should be governed and how the role of the public administrator should look are under constant development and change. It is argued that contemporary societal developments are increasingly complex, challenging political and administrative organizations to develop substantial objectives as well as forms of governance that require the crossing of boundaries between policy areas. As a governance response to these challenges, we can find a new group of administrators in the political-administrative organization. They are assigned the task of monitoring and promoting strategic political objectives for the handling of such complex societal developments, and they can be found at all levels of government.

In Swedish local government organizations, there are administrators working for policy areas such as sustainability, safety, security, human rights, children and youth, public health, gender equality, diversity, disability, regional development, etc. They are called strategists, coordinators, and developers, and their formal task across the public administration is to monitor and promote values that are defined as crucial to the political-administrative organization and to organize the processes around these values. Here, they will be referred to as cross-sector strategists.

We do not know much about what cross-sector strategists do. What we do know is that they exist, and we also know that they are generally working horizontally across sector boundaries within the municipal organization in
order to integrate and mainstream strategic policy areas. The quotes above illustrate typical approaches to strategic work held by managers responsible for ongoing work in the municipal organization and by cross-sector strategists working in strategic policy areas. The manager is pointing out the problem of trying to fit a wide range of horizontal strategic policy areas in the specific work of the department, and the cross-sector strategist is stressing that the purpose of strategic work is to make managers understand that they need to take the strategic policy area into consideration. These municipal cross-sector strategists are the objects of this dissertation.

A formally informal post

Cross-sector strategists normally do not have a clear description of their posts; they have varying titles, and they have varying tasks. There are cross-sector strategists for numerous policy areas, topics, and interests in the political-administrative organization. The focus of this study is the cross-sector strategists working with value-related policy areas defined as cross-sectoral. Whether or not a policy area can be defined as value-related must be estimated on a scale rather than with strict categories because all policy areas to some extent are defined by values. However, this study focuses towards the end of the scale, where policy areas such as those mentioned in the introduction can be argued to belong – policy areas that are closer to the values of politics. Sometimes cross-sector strategists’ titles are directly pointing towards a strategic policy area, like strategist/coordinator for gender equality/sustainability/safety, and sometimes it is a more vague general title, like development strategist, developer, or development leader. Hidden under the vague titles, more precise tasks can sometimes be formulated, for example, as a “development strategist for gender equality and human rights”. Or the reversed is also possible; the title is precise, but in it, several strategic topics are hidden.

The emergence of this kind of “new” administrator has been argued to belong to the development of network and horizontal governance, public value management, and sustainability in general and as an administrative response to an increasingly complex world (Sørensen 2006; Poulsen 2009; Weber & Khademian 2008). An ongoing discussion is if and how this group fit within the ideal-typical dichotomy of political-administrative organizations, where politicians decide and administrators execute (Rhodes 2015; Triantafillou 2015). There have always been administrators working closely and complementarily to politics and working to bridge actors and values. The difference
is that more and more focus has been put on this action, and on management of policy areas that are considered an effect of this increasingly complex world. Cross-sector strategists might be argued to be the most extreme version of this kind of administrator because they hold a specific feature in relation to other administrators in that the cross-sector strategists have a formal and explicit post to behave like this.

**Balancing and generating support for values**

In this study, the formal refers to the establishment of posts with the explicit task to behave like the “new” administrators. We know from previous studies that administrators often act like this, but what distinguishes cross-sector strategists is that they have it as their explicit task and post, not as an additional behavior. Lundquist (2011), Miztal (2005), and Morand (1995) define the ideal-typical formality as consisting of institutions and organizations with explicit rules, whereas the ideal-typical informality consists of individuals and networks between individuals. These are closely intertwined and fill important purposes – the formal creates accountability and responsibility, and the informal creates cooperative and flexible arrangements. The municipal organization, which is the context where the formal cross-sector strategist posts are found, can be described as a hierarchic and sectorized organization, based on formality. The hierarchic and sectorized structure is enacted by people, in their formal posts and professions, and it constitutes the order in which cross-sector strategists as a new group are positioned.

The actions of administrators who do not act according to the ideal-typical model for public administrators and who deal with complex policy areas have been defined in various ways. The questions, which the different definitions are addressing from various angles, are to what extent the roles between administrators, managers, and politicians are blurred in the organization and how the topics at hand are affected. Focus is generally on one of two relations – either the relation between the actor and the roles in the organization when balancing values, or on the relation between the actor and the topic when generating support for values. This distinction is of importance due to how the administrators are perceived in relation to the ideal-typical model for administrative behavior. Balancing and coordination of values has an organizational focus, which is less politically connotated (although, of course, the method for how to organize is itself a political statement). Balancing and coordinating are functional and organizational tasks, rather than agenda
changing, and they focus on the process of working. Generation of support for values, on the other hand, is about lobbying for certain policies and actions. That is, it is the work in relation to specific content in terms of how actors doing this work have the discretion to affect policies and the role they play in the policy process for this policy content. This behavior is usually more problematized from a political-administrative perspective than coordinating and balancing behaviors are.

The first group of concepts – balancing of values – is focused on coordination and mediation. Sometimes, the actors referred to almost physically cross borders when connecting actors, departments, and organizations. Boundary spanners refer to administrators working to bridge organizational boundaries (Williams 2012; Williams 2013; Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk 2015; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014). Boundary spanners are actors who either have boundary spanning as an explicit task, or they do it as a part of their job without specifying that it is included. Another balancer is the grey-zone administrator, as defined by Sørensen (2004). She refers to public administrators working to establish strong networks in their policy areas, both within and outside the political-administrative organization. Both boundary spanners and grey-zone administrators as definitions refer to the work of creating strong networks and of bridging boundaries. Other definitions of administrators working to balance values are more directed towards mediating and balancing policies. Actors who take on the role of a neutral actor mediating between advocacy coalitions have been defined as policy brokers (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible & Jenkins-Smith 2016). These actors still network and coordinate, but their focus is not directly on their networking but rather on using networks and the coordination of groups of actors as tools to mediate policy. The same goes for the negotiating bureaucrats, as defined by Johansson (2012). Negotiating bureaucrats are actors with an implementation target who are negotiating between groups and actors in order to pave the way for policy decisions. Both the definitions of policy brokers and negotiating bureaucrats are focused on the balancing process in relation to policy outcome, rather than just the coordination of values. Finally, Noordegraaf et al. (2014) and Noordegraaf (2016) use the concept of connective professionals when referring to the professionalization of the skill needed to connect and manage relations and to act proactively for policy. This includes balancing and mediating policies and working to create networks and coordination. Noordegraaf et al. (2014) also specify that connective professionals work proactively for policy, and thus the definition also holds certain aspects of generating support for values. So do the definitions of
policy brokers and negotiating bureaucrats. However, the difference is that definitions focusing on generating values are more directed towards the politics embedded in values, and towards the struggle to get support for one or several values, rather than the procedural aspect of coordinating and mediating.

The second group of concepts – generation of values – is focused on generating support for values by strategically reaching out to key actors and trying to influence processes. A commonly used concept is policy entrepreneur (Kingsdon 1984/2003), which refers to an actor working for policy by identifying and connecting streams of opportunities and by being persistent, convincing, and knowledgeable. Anyone can be a policy entrepreneur, not just actors within the political-administrative organization. This has led to criticism regarding the usability of the concept due to its vagueness on who the policy entrepreneur really is and what the scope of the policy entrepreneur’s agency is in a non-rational policy process (Mintrom & Norman 2009; Hammond 2013; Mintrom 2015; Petridou & Olausson 2017). Olsson and Hysing (2012) define their studied group of administrators as inside activists as a way to specify policy entrepreneurship. Inside activists as a concept refer to administrators working for a personal value commitment in the political-administrative organization. This has some resemblance to Downs’ (1967) definition of zealots, which is used to capture actors using their posts to further their personal interests. This can mean both personal interest and the interest of the professional actor, like generating support and funding for a specific policy or department. Zealots, as different from inside activists, can be found in any kind of bureaucratic organization, not just the political-administrative. Another definition of actors working to generate support for values is femocrats (Yeatman 1990; Van der Ros 1996; Eistenstein 1996; Findlay 2015). This definition refers to public administrators working to enhance gender equality, and they often have a connection to the women’s movement.

Policy entrepreneurs, inside activists, zealots, and femocrats are empirical concepts created to capture a behavior of a group of actors. None of these definitions hold explicit normative standpoints regarding whether these are desired behaviors or not, although the authors presenting them provide discussions on potential effects of such behaviors. In the literature on public administrators, the active administrator working to generate support for values and policies is generally perceived negatively and as a threat to the democratic system. There is, however, also a counter argument, that public
administrators should take active stands on values as guardians of the common good (see Frederickson 1969/2010). One concept referring to administrators stepping away from value neutrality in planning is the advocacy planner (Davidoff 1965). This concept can be placed in the normative argument for active administrators.

Value neutrality and personal interests and attitudes are presented in the literature on public administrators as two incommensurable but sometimes desired features of the public administrator. Apart from advocacy planners, none of the definitions regarding balancing or generating support for values take a clear normative stand for what is a desired approach for a public administrator. The definitions do, however, lead to discussions on the level of personal commitment and attitudes towards the values and policies with which the actors are working. The definitions for actors balancing values generally do not put that much focus on personal interest as a necessary feature of the actor. The exception is the grey-zone administrator, who according to the definition tends to hold some personal interest in the topic at hand, but not from a political point of view, but rather from a professional point of view depending on the context. The definitions of actors working to generate support for values generally stress the importance of personal interest and attitudes. In the definition of policy entrepreneurs and femocrats, it is specified that these actors do not necessarily hold personal commitment to the topics for which they are working, but they usually do. Because cross-sector strategists are employed in a formal post, it is hard to estimate whether or not they hold personal commitment or if this commitment matters.

None of the concepts for administrators working to balance or generate support for values discuss if and how specific values, i.e. the content of the balance and support, matters. Only within discussions on femocrats and their work is the significance of specific content brought up as a factor shaping their work, and this is due to power struggles and the politicization of gender equality. All of the other definitions ignore the discussion on content, which makes them insufficient when applying them to the work of cross-sector strategists. Cross-sector strategists are responsible for strategic policy areas that can be expected to involve power struggles and politicization, but also can be expected to hold variation regarding these elements. Power struggles and the politicization of strategic policy areas can also take different expressions depending on the organizational and political context in which cross-sector strategists are acting, on their personal commitment, and on how they personally perceive potential politicization.
Neither of the concepts (balancing or generating) focuses on formalization of the action, but on the action in itself. This is a limitation in relation to cross-sector strategists because the degree of formalization is likely to have an impact on how the actors form their roles. The existing concepts point out characteristics of a certain behavior, i.e. the role, and of the actors performing the action, but they do not link these actors and their actions to an expression of governance, which the establishment of formal posts is a part of. Thus, the focus has generally been on informal aspects of the work, that is, things that are done without being controlled by explicit rules and expectations. In general, research focusing on administrators balancing values tends to be slightly more directed towards actors in specific posts, although these posts are not directly aimed at performing balancing work. Research focusing on administrators generating values is generally less focused on specific posts, and more on personal commitment to values. The closest we seem to get to cross-sector strategists in terms of having a formal role to work strategically is Noordegraaf et al’s connective professionals, due to the group of actors they empirically focus on. In this group, strategists with more formal tasks and posts are included (Noordegraaf et al. 2014). Their results show that strategists show tendencies towards professionalization in terms establishing a certain set of identities and work standards, i.e. dedication to specific positions and interests, but their field is heterogeneous and ambivalent (Noordegraaf et al. 2014; Noordegraaf 2015). However, Noordegraaf et al. do not focus on the formality of the strategist role, but rather on the role that connective professionals play in the organization.

Another aspect that makes connective professionals a useful but insufficient concept when addressing cross-sector strategists is that Noordegraaf et al do not problematize the implications for connective professionals in relation to their posts as public administrators. The same issue comes with the definition of boundary spanners. Williams discusses both formal and informal aspects of boundary spanning, and also points out that the object of boundary spanning, i.e. the content that boundary spanners are working with, requires further research (Williams 2012). But the implications of working in a political-administrative context as a boundary spanner are ignored. When it comes to the political-administrative context, the closest we get to cross-sector strategists in previous research is Olsson & Hysing’s inside activists, due to their focus on Swedish local government (Olsson & Hysing 2012). Olsson & Hysing discuss inside activists as public administrators, but because the definition of inside activists does not take formalization into
consideration, the definition cannot be used for an extended discussion linking actors to governance due to the sole focus on action rather than post.

The distinction between balancing and generating values is of importance in the case of cross-sector strategists due to what we know about them in their organization. They do seem to have the less controversial task of coordinating and balancing, like connective professionals, boundary spanners, policy brokers, negotiating administrators, and grey-zone administrators. They also seem to be working according to the definitions of generating support for certain values, like femocrats, zealots, advocacy planners, policy entrepreneurs, and inside activists. Thus, all of these definitions can to some extent be applied to cross-sector strategists in terms of what they are expected to do in their formal post. However, none of them is fully sufficient due to what seems to be for cross-sector strategists a mix of the less controversial task of balancing values and the more controversial task of generating values. Thus, we cannot tell from previous research how cross-sector strategists become a part of the political-administrative organization. The aim of this study is not to establish another definition to capture cross-sector strategists as a specific group of public administrators. Cross-sector strategists fit within almost all of the presented definitions to some extent, and all of the definitions can be used to analyze some aspect of their work. The objective of this study is to grasp how cross-sector strategists, based on their formal post and the roles they are undertaking, participate in the political-administrative organization. Therefore, the focus is not on how cross-sector strategists can be characterized in terms of what they do and who they are. The focus is instead on how cross-sector strategists reach their conclusions on what to do, who to be, how they will do this, and why they will do it.

The cross-sector strategists encounter and cope with situations in the political-administrative organization when values on what to do, whom to be, how, and why conflict. Into these situations, cross-sector strategists bring characteristics of their formal posts, their assigned strategic policy area, and their own reflexivity. We know that value conflicts are common in political-administrative organizations (Stewart 2006; Selden et al 1999; De Graaf 2011), and studies often aim at establishing the output and outcome of these conflicts, such as the actions of administrators and consequences for content, which in this case is the strategic policy area with which the cross-sector strategist is working. However, the forgoing reflexive process of actors in which they internally reflect on their action and externally interact with other actors when forming the action still needs further elaboration.
This process of negotiation in research thus seems to be important in two aspects, for “new” administrators in general, and for cross-sector strategists in particular. First, it is important because of the unclear roles the cross-sector strategists seem to have in the political-administrative organization, which makes it reasonable to argue that establishing agency requires negotiation and reflexivity. Second, it is important because of the content they work with, that is, the policy areas that are connected to the emergence of “new” administrators that are considered complex in terms of definition and organization, which opens space for negotiation for the actor assigned to them. We know from earlier research that the roles of actors in the political-administrative organization sometimes become blurred, and we know that there are many policy areas that are considered complex. With the presence of cross-sector strategists, we can observe what is presumably a governance attempt to formalize and institutionalize the imprecise roles and governance of complex policy areas. The argument for studying cross-sector strategists and their negotiation processes in reaching their conclusions on how to form their role is thus twofold.

1) Cross-sector strategists’ posts and the strategic policy areas that they are assigned are a formally established part of the governance of the political-administrative organization. Although it is still vague what cross-sector strategists do, they distinguish themselves from other previously studied versions of “new” administrators due to their formal post as public administrators tasked with performing the informal work of promoting, coordinating, and monitoring a specific topic.

2) Previous research has highlighted the action of “new” administrators and the methods they are using to push for specific policy areas and topics, and this body of literature is in many ways applicable to cross-sector strategists. However, because the process leading up to the action is absent in previous research, we need to complement the existing research with a theoretical frame to capture how cross-sector strategists are reflecting on what to do, how, and why based on both the formal informality of their posts as public administrators and on the vagueness of the strategic policy areas with which they work.

**Aim and research questions**

Any organization, in this case the municipal political-administrative organization, can be viewed as a negotiated order (Strauss et al. 1963). The
approach for this study is that negotiation and mediation between values via reflexivity is a constant process for all actors in all contexts, although varying in intensity depending on how institutionalized the situation is (Strauss et al. 1963; Fine 1984). It is reasonable to assume that the cross-sector strategists also apply reflexivity in their work regarding their roles and posts. Post is referring to the formal posts, and role is referring to the form that this post is turned into by the actor through the position they take in relation to other actors. Furthermore, cross-sector strategists have as their task to promote values in the municipal organizations, which are characterized by political-administrative complexity. This promoting work indicates that cross-sector strategists are approaching ambiguity not only regarding their posts and roles, but also regarding the strategic policy areas at hand. It is thus not only the role and post that can be expected to be the object of mediation in the municipal political-administrative organization, but also the content of the strategic work.

Studying how cross-sector strategists work in this negotiated order, as characteristic examples of new administrators dealing with complex topics, will contribute to a discussion on the work of cross-sector strategists in particular and to a more general discussion on value conflicts in the political-administrative organization. By investigating how an individual actor forms an organizational role (Van Maanen & Schein 1979), that is, what to do, who to be, how they will do this, and why they will do it, we get an of how simultaneously existing values are mediated within the organization (Fine 1984).

Thus, the aim of this dissertation is to explore how cross-sector strategists become a part of the political-administrative organization when representing, enacting, and reflecting on values in the undertaking of their formal posts.

The focus is on the process leading up to cross-sector strategists’ formulation of what to do, who to be, how, and why. Both cross-sector strategists as public administrators and reflexive negotiation as a process are areas that have not been much studied in public administration research. Therefore, this study takes an explorative approach in order to contribute to the development of the research field of how the public administrator plays a part in shaping the public administration by focusing on cross-sector strategists as a specific group. The fuzzy empirical reality of cross-sector strategists’ seemingly formal informality requires a research design to create more clarity, and one
additional aim of the study is to contribute to this clarity. The study is constructed around four research questions.

With the first question, the target is to grasp the normative values on which cross-sector strategists’ formal posts are established and that constitute a representation of the contextual expectations that situate cross-sector strategists’ agency. The background of this descriptive question is the ambiguous state of the empirical field. In order to go deeper into cross-sector strategists’ negotiation processes in the political-administrative organization, it is important to have an idea of the discursive contextual expectations placed on them. Therefore, the first research question is:

1: What are cross-sector strategists expected to do compared to other administrators?

The second and third research questions focus on how the cross-sector strategists perceive their roles and posts. The second question is:

2: Do cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts?

By this question, the target is to capture whether the cross-sector strategists in their roles and posts experience value conflict to the extent that the previous research on cross-sector work suggests.

The second question is intertwined with the third research question, focusing on how cross-sector strategists handle value conflict in order to form a sustainable work situation:

3: How do the cross-sector strategists cope with value conflicts?

The first three research questions constitute the main parts of the study. The result from the analysis of if and how cross-sector strategists experience and cope with value conflicts will towards the end of the study be used as the foundation to discuss how the result of cross-sector strategists’ agency, when solving value conflicts, becomes a part of the political-administrative organization. The fourth research question is thus:

4: How can the result of the cross-sector strategists’ formation of their roles be understood as part of governance?
Outline

The first chapter has aimed at providing a first presentation of the cross-sector strategists and why they constitute a paradoxical existence in the political-administrative organization. Previous research on non-ideal-typical administrators has been presented, ending up in the argument that none of the established categories for these administrators are fully sufficient to describe the cross-sector strategists due to these categories’ neglect of the formality of the posts and of the process leading up to a direction of agency. The next chapter presents an overview of the administrators in the Swedish local government and of the municipal governance through time. It continues to present the theoretical framework of previous research on cross-sector work and the potential structural, agency, and ideational dilemmas that cross-sector strategists might encounter. Chapter 3 presents the method and data of the study. Situated agency and the internal conversation are discussed as analytical tools for analyzing value conflicts caused by dilemmas. The study’s mixed-methods approach is discussed, followed by a presentation of methods and the document, interview, and survey data. In Chapter 4, the focus is on research question 1, contextual expectations. A framework of administrator values is presented and applied to job advertisements for cross-sector strategists, public managers, and social worker posts in order to determine the expectations on each group and the differences between them. In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the focus is on the second and third research questions, whether the cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts, and if so, how they solve them. These three chapters build on the framework of ideational, structural, and agency dilemmas, and each chapter focuses on one set of dilemmas and the cross-sector strategists’ reflexive process to solve them. In Chapter 8, overall conclusions on the process of solving the dilemmas are presented, and the chapter continues to answer the fourth research question, how cross-sector strategists become a part of governance. The results from Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are analyzed with arguments from the current debate on value consensus and value conflict. Finally, in Chapter 9, overall conclusions are presented, followed by a discussion on theoretical and practical implications of the cross-sector strategists in the political-administrative organization.
2

What Do We Know About Cross-Sector Strategists

As mentioned in Chapter 1, cross-sector strategists can be found on all levels of government. This study focuses on the Swedish local level. Given the aim of the study – to explore how cross-sector strategists become a part of the political-administrative organization when representing, enacting, and reflecting on values in undertaking their formal posts – the Swedish local government level becomes an appropriate choice of study. First, this is because of Sweden’s long tradition of working with today’s cross-sector policy areas (although not always governed cross-sectorally) and its direct governance of values (Sainsbury & Bergqvist 2009). This increases the chances of finding more deeper-running patterns. Second, this is because of Swedish municipalities’ wide-ranging responsibilities regarding the policy areas of cross-sectoral work and because they hold extensive responsibilities and autonomy. This increases the chances of finding enough variety regarding cross-sector strategists’ work to draw more general conclusions. This chapter presents the context in which we find the cross-sector strategists, which is the local government level’s administrators and governance. It continues to present a theoretical framework to interpret the situation of cross-sector strategists in the given context, situated between the logic of verticality and horizontality. This framework draws on previous research on cross-sector work and cross-sector actors, and it presents potential structural, agency, and ideational dilemmas that cross-sector strategists might encounter.

Administrators in Swedish local government

About 25 percent of all employees in Sweden, both public and private, work for the municipalities, and of all public employees, 80 percent can be found in the municipal organization. The state delegates power to the municipalities, which have the right of taxation. Municipalities are legally responsible for preschool, primary, secondary, and upper secondary school, elderly care, care of the disabled, social aid, libraries, planning and building, environment and health protection, water and sewerage, waste management, and mainte-
nance of municipal streets and parks. Municipalities can also, if they so decide (and many do), provide open preschool, leisure activities, consumer guidance, house building, energy, health care in the home, employment, industry and commerce development, culture, and citizen’s offices. Municipalities are state regulated via the law, but also via state benefits that constitute about 80 percent of the municipal budget, via control over some decisions, via supervision, and via requisites to establish various kinds of community planning, such as a security plan, emergency plan, child care plan, etc. (Montin 2016). Municipalities’ strategic cross-sector work sometimes touches into the state-regulated frame, but strategic work is mostly organized without state involvement, which creates an extensive variety of organization and interpretation.

Municipal public administrators as we perceive them today were unusual in Swedish administration until the 1950s. Public employees such as teachers, priests, and midwives existed, but elected officials did the administration. When general political rights were established, other arrangements were requested. Public administration organizations became one such stabilizing factor, and in the Municipal Act of the 1950s, it was established that municipalities should have an administrator responsible for finances as the head official. After this time, the number of municipal administrators gradually increased. The system of municipal administrations spread during the period from 1945 to 1960 from the urban regions to the countryside, and it expanded accordingly with the growth of welfare programs (Tapper 1962; Lennqvist-Lindén 2010).

From the 1980s to 2015, the number of posts (titles) in municipal administrations increased by 300 percent. However, during the same time period the number of employees increased by only 17 percent, which indicates specialization and the establishment of new posts. This increase can be understood as a response to growing acknowledgment of complex cross-sectoral topics, which put pressure on politicians in terms of knowledge. This development requires a further clarification of the relation between politicians and administrators (Montin 2015; SOU 2015:24).

The existence of cross-sector strategists can be defined as part of this development in the municipalities, with their directed focus on cross-sectoral work. The first evidence of the existence of cross-sector strategists is the overall observation of them – when browsing the webpages of Swedish municipalities, they show up every now and then. Their number also seems to
have increased. Forssell and Ivarsson Westerberg (2014) present statistics on professional titles in three Swedish municipalities from 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2012. In 1985 and 1995, the group of coordinators, controllers, strategists, and consultants was nonexistent. In 2005, the number of posts in this group represented 0.4 percent of the total posts in the three municipalities. In 2012, the number of posts in this group increased to 0.9 percent. However, the analyzed group includes all posts with the above titles, including cross-sector strategists, which prevents further conclusions on the number of cross-sector strategists specifically. Nevertheless, the increase can be interpreted as an indication of their increasing numbers.

The relation between administrators, politicians, and other actors has been perceived in different light throughout time (Montin 2016), and it can be understood as a movement between horizontality/verticality and between informality/formality.

In the 1970s, the priority of municipal administration was the sector organization, which sought to increase professional competence in order to carry out extensive national welfare programs. During this time, a discussion emerged as to whether there was a risk that the growing sector organization would lead to an overextension of administrative power (Strömberg & Westerståhl 1984).

In the 1980s, New Public Management reformulated the problem of administration with the perspective that politicians were involved in too many details at the cost of efficiency. Decentralization and delegation were seen as solutions, and management ideas from the private sector were implemented to enhance entrepreneurship, competition, and initiatives. Thus, focus on the informal vertical aspects increased, including the freedom for in particular public managers to lead their organizations, take initiatives beyond the vertical hierarchy, and argue their case for resources if necessary. This was also combined with tighter formal steering in terms of output units and auditing. At the end of the 1980s, the size of both administration and politics was considered too extensive, and restricting measures were discussed. Marketization, freedom to choose, and user influence were catchwords, and

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1 In this study, the term sector is applied when referring to the abstract notion of an organizational branch. When referring to the practical organizational branch, the term department is applied. Finally, when referring to the activities within the departments, the term applied is business (Swedish: verksamhet).
one step to increase efficiency was to implement a purchaser-provider model (Montin 2016).

During the 1990s, self-governance of the municipalities increased based on the new law regulating the relationship between the municipalities and the state (Kommunallagen). However, the state control also increased, with more legislation concerning general rights and more control from administrative courts. Topics discussed were how to secure quality considering the increased number of external actors, collaborations, and partnerships within and outside the municipality; changes in the political role as representatives for citizens rather than for business; and a too weak civil society (Montin 2016). The horizontal informality was stressed, that is, how to bring together ideas and actors, but also many formal horizontal efforts, such as projects for institutional learning.

During the 2000s, this discussion continued with an increased focus on democracy in municipal development work. However, the concept of democracy has expanded to include other forms of democracy than just the representative. User democracy, e-democracy, and referendums are examples of this (Montin 2016). As a part of the discussions on extended democracy and initiatives, characterized by informal and formal horizontality, the concepts of social inclusion and social investment increasingly gained more attention, albeit with a wide variety in terminology, definition, and organization. In a municipal context, the social investment concept is manifested through a rising discussion on social investment funds and projects (Fred 2015, Fred & Hall 2017). The origin of this can be traced to the European discourse. This highlights the multi-level character of the cross-sector policy areas. The emergence of strategic policy areas with which cross-sector strategists work can also be traced to this development. Collaboration and horizontal governance gained more importance during the 2000s and were recognized as proper methods to approach policy development (SOU 2012:30). This is often referred to as mainstreaming of a perspective into the organizational units in terms of policy-making, organiza-

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2 Generally, the ideational dilemmas are only problematized on a theoretical level. It has repeatedly been pointed out that more research on putting the concepts into practice is required. Some attempts have been made on a theoretical level to bridge discussion on the role and values of the political-administrative organization with sustainability, social investment, and human rights (Benington 2009; Fiorino 2010). Benington presents a model where ecological value means reducing public evils such as pollution and global warming; political value means stimulating the democratic dialogue and public participation and engagement; economic value means generating economic activity and employment; and social and cultural value means contributing to social cohesion and cultural identity (Benington 2009:237).
tion and normative change, and awareness. In the Swedish practical context, the most commonly used term is “cross-sectoral” or “horizontal work” (“tvärsektoriellt” or “horisontellt arbete”).

Cross-sector governance
The theoretical terminology describing the governance that cross-sector strategists are part of is extensive and sometimes overlapping. Horizontal governance, mainstreaming, joined-up government, whole-of-government, and cross-sectoral governance are often used interchangeably (Halligan et al. 2011; Christensen & Laegreid 2007; Pollitt 2003; 6 et al 2002; Verhoest & Lagreid 2010). To some extent, they are alike in that they address a multi-level and multi-sector approach to governance. On the other hand, the concepts vary in the extent to which they have bearing on normative change, that is, how much they stress the informal aspect of governance. Horizontal governance, joined-up government, and cross-sectoral governance are less normative, whereas mainstreaming holds an embedded expectation on value change, not only change of organization, and is thus a combination of formality and informality. A striving towards this combination is expressed in current development in the Swedish administration. It has been argued that the important thing is to integrate informal horizontal perspectives (i.e. norms and values) into the formal system (the structure of vertical sectors) in order

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3 Mainstreaming has been used from the 1990s and onward in Swedish public administration, but mainly focused on gender. As the number of cross-sectoral policy areas has increased, the concept of mainstreaming has expanded in the 2000s to include other target groups such as immigrants, children, and the disabled. The basic idea is that these policy areas are of such importance that they should be dealt with across organizational borders because they are depending on a variety of sectors to be comprehensively approached. Therefore, every sector should be responsible for them, and they should be mainstreamed into all parts of the organization. In Swedish context, mainstreaming is used together with the term “cross-sectoral” or “horizontal” to describe the idea that one policy area is dependent on its integration with others in order to be successful. The development on the Swedish national and local level of an increased focus on cross-sector governance is parallel to the development on the European and global level. Mainstreaming started to become the acknowledged method for gender equality work after the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action at the UN Women Conference. In the European Union, the term gender mainstreaming had been used since 1991 in the Third Action Programme on Equal Opportunities; however, no real attempts were made to create an organizational structure for it. In the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, the power of the European Parliament expanded, and because there was an earlier tendency from the Parliament to advocate stronger EU-policies regarding equality issues, this opened up for more powerful policy work. In 1995, with a number of new member states, the interest for equal opportunities rose, and especially the commissioners from Sweden and Finland expressed interest. In the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, equal opportunities (not just pay and equal treatment in the workplace) became a central objective. Thus, the context of cross-sector work, mainstreaming, and cross-sector strategists is connected to developments on the global and European levels.
to secure them. Simultaneously, there has been a critique towards the method of integration and institutional learning via projects and partnerships due to the fragile durability of such initiatives.

Thus, the current development holds contradictive tendencies. On one hand, there is an effort towards strengthening and improving the formal vertical system in order to make it capable of also grasping the more wide-spanning policy problems. On the other hand, there is a worry that the formal system is incapable of this, or that it is not necessary or appropriate to use the formal structure for the horizontal policy areas, due to their character, and that instead formal and informal horizontal methods to show the mutual benefits between the horizontal and the vertical should be applied.

In the gender mainstreaming literature, two approaches are presented, and gender mainstreaming can either be dealt with as a way to change the agenda with a more power-focused approach where power-asymmetries between groups are highlighted, or as a method for integrating mainstreaming into the mainstream and for finding mutual utility-based benefits via differences. These approaches are generally referred to as agenda-setting versus integrationist mainstreaming (Jahan 1995) or mainstreaming versus diversity management (Prügl 2011; Squires 2005; Eveline et al 2009; Sainsbury & Bergqvist 2009; Hankivsky 2005). If the focus is on equality, the discussion on inclusion turns into a matter of structural inequality, power, and social rights, and more attention is paid to the bureaucratic structure. If the focus is on differences, then the discussion on inclusion turns into a matter of empowering and equipping the individual to be a part of the economic model and to contribute to growth via the positive advantages of difference and utility that come from it (Hedlund & Sundin 2011). This positive perspective thus means paying attention to common understanding and consensus rather than power struggles. The fundamental contradiction is whether or not conflicts of interests with potential negative outcomes for one party should be acknowledged and negotiated, or whether the focus should be on mutually positive aspects, i.e. utility for both parties. This leads to fundamentally different approaches to cross-sector governance.
Traditions, dilemmas, and cross-sector strategists

The presentation above on the development of governance and of the role of public administrators in Swedish municipalities shows that the political-administrative organization has different focal points depending on time and context. Sometimes these focal points are referred to as paradigms (see, for example, Cox & Béland 2013, Stoker 2006); however, in this study they will be referred to as traditions. This term is used by researchers with the argument that it marks a more fluent and open category than paradigm (Bevir 2004; Stout 2013). Tradition refers to the set of values constituting a fundamental discourse of governance. Values are understood as “qualities appreciated for, contributing to, or constituting what is good, right, beautiful or worthy of praise and admiration” (De Graaf & Van der Wal 2008:84; De Graaf et al. 2014:3). When cross-sector strategists undertake their formal posts in the political-administrative organization, they are involved in negotiation and reflexivity processes related to governance traditions. Dilemmas arise for an individual “whenever they adopt a new belief that stands in opposition to their existing ones and so forces a reconsideration of the latter” (Bevir 2004:619). I argue that in practical situations, this can happen when values collide, when it is not possible to fulfill all of the values that are considered to be legitimate in a given situation, or when there is no good solution available. Negotiation and reflection then becomes a matter of practical problem solving when dealing with dilemmas in different situations, and it becomes an enacted expression of governance traditions (Bevir et al 2003; Bevir 2004).

Bevir argues that analyzing traditions and dilemmas between values in traditions is a way to “unpack the composition of governance” (Bevir 2004:623). Thus, by discerning the elements of conflict – including the traditions and the dilemmas they give rise to – we get an idea of the foundation for cross-sector strategists as actors in the political-administrative organization who are situated between traditions of verticality/horizontality and formality/informality.

Verticality and horizontality

In the meeting between the vertical and the horizontal tradition, a number of dilemmas arise. Lundquist’s (2011) model of horizontal network/vertical organization and formality/informality illustrates the relation between horizontality/verticality and informality/formality discussed in the previous section. Horizontal interaction is characterized by face-to-face interaction and
the possibility of each member of the group to supervise the others. Thus, horizontal interaction is limited by human cognitive capacity. The limit is around 150 individuals. If the group is bigger, social instincts need to be “manipulated” by vertical hierarchical organization. Lundquist applies the concepts of informal and formal to grasp the characteristics of horizontal and vertical organization, with formality consisting of institutions and organizations with explicit rules in order to create accountability and responsibility, and informality consisting of individuals and networks between individuals to create cooperative and flexible arrangements.

By using Lundquist’s model, the formal informality in the expectations on cross-sector strategists’ posts becomes clear – informal contacts between individuals and networks, and the cooperation and flexibility they create, are via cross-sector strategists’ posts becoming more integrated into the formal and more stable organization. If we combine the concepts of horizontal/vertical with the concepts of formal/informal, we can analyze different forms of organization in current public administration as illustrated in Figure 1.

**Figure 1. Formality/informality in vertical/horizontal settings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertical</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sectors in hierarchy (Bureaucracy)</td>
<td>Networks I For resource allocation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal</td>
<td>Projects and partnerships</td>
<td>Networks II To establish common understanding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s diagram inspired by Lundquist 2011*

*Sectors in hierarchy* are a representation of classic bureaucracy with specialization and a clear chain of command. Between these vertical sectors are informal networks, *networks I*. Informal networks are also occurring horizontally, across sectors, *networks II*. The vertical and the horizontal networks have fundamentally different principles – the vertical being about advocating for an interest and allocating resources for it within the hierarchy, and the horizontal being about creating common understanding. Finally, *projects and partnerships* represent an attempt to formalize horizontal collaboration by turning it into an organizable unit.

The meeting between the vertical and horizontal traditions consists of *ideational factors* (influential narratives and discourses), *structural factors* (organizational factors outside the actor, providing frames for action), and
agency factors (the capacity to pursue the individual’s interests and what motivates, influences, constrains, and enables it) (see, for example, Williams 2012). The objective of this study puts the focus on the micro-level of governance. Williams (2012) presents a framework to bridge structure and agency by highlighting how values of structure, agency, and ideas are all interconnected. Structure constrains or enables agency, and agency forms structure via learning, knowledge, and experience. Ideas provide cognitive frames for agency, and agents reform the ideas when making sense of them. Structure is the result of ideas, and it is the platform for the generation of new ones. Ideas, structure, and agency are all formed within traditions, and components of ideas, structure, and agency are interlocked. Thus cross-sector strategists’ negotiations on what to do, who to be, how, and why must be interpreted by considering how they approach ideational, structural, and agency dilemmas. As pointed out by Walby (2005), there is an inherent tension in the relation between the mainstreaming (the “new” horizontal tradition of administration) and the “mainstream” (the “old” vertical tradition of administration (see also Malloy 2003; Chappell 2002)). When becoming a part of the political-administrative organization, the cross-sector strategists need to negotiate and reflect on their roles. The following review of structural, agency, and ideational dilemmas illustrates what previous research has pointed out as potential areas of tension within horizontal work and within cross-sectoral policy areas. Cross-sector strategists have various options for solving the dilemmas depending on whether they choose to stress the informal or formal aspects of work and if they choose to do so with a focus on horizontal or vertical possibilities.

Given the structure in which they operate, the ideas they are surrounded by, and the defining factors of their professional agency, what does previous research say about which dilemmas cross-sector strategists are likely to encounter?

**Ideational dilemmas**

The coexistence of horizontal and vertical traditions leads to several coexisting ideas of both the process and content of cross-sector work. The vertical tradition emphasizes sectorization in how problems are perceived and solved, whereas the horizontal tradition emphasizes integration. It could be argued that all agency and structure is infused by ideas, and that adding ideas to the analysis thus does not fill an extended purpose beyond agency and structure. However, ideas become of particular interest in order to understand action
when analyzing policy areas in which different interests collide (Williams 2012).

Ideational dilemmas mean conceptual aspects, i.e. how the cross-sector strategists position themselves in relation to the ambiguous defining values of horizontal work and content. Cross-sector strategists have the task of handling ideas, i.e. perspectives that are directly linked to the development of the horizontal tradition, both in terms of how to work and what to work for, i.e. the specific content ideas relating to social inclusion. In practice, cross-sector strategists’ posts often emerge from the acknowledgement of these ideas. However, the terminology referring to the content of strategic policy areas is wide and overlapping, which creates a situation where it can be difficult to distinguish one aspect of strategic work from another. The terminology also includes variation in terms of political direction. Strategic policy areas are part of an international development, and they are also affected by legislation, which means that there are various sources when defining the work. Within the field of horizontal work, there is a debate about whether the policy areas involved should be understood as being characterized by conflict of interest and power, i.e. as power-focused, agenda-changing diversity management or as utility-based diversity management. Depending on ideational positioning, the conceptual foundation of what to work for and how might vary.

The conceptual intertwining and political ambivalence of strategic policy areas thus creates two potential ideational dilemmas for the cross-sector strategists: 1) A dilemma of defining process, meaning determining how the process of working horizontally and strategically should look, and 2) A dilemma of defining content, meaning how the strategic policy areas should be politically defined, how the overlapping between them should be handled, and how to prioritize between input coming from various sources due to the multi-level character of strategic policy areas.

**Dilemma of defining processes**
The first process aspect leading to a potential ideational dilemma for cross-sector strategists is how to define their strategic work. Here it is important to point out that although the cross-sector strategists in this study are referred to as “strategists”, they have slightly varying titles. The variation can be interpreted as an indication of varying ideas of how strategic work should be defined. In a study of gender equality advisers by Page (2011), this was referred to as “strategic leadership”. Page concludes that the main strategy
used by equality advisers in local authorities was to “outsource” their advocacy by leading via others. Their strategic work consisted of making sure that other actors in the organization performed the advocacy role, and the advisers themselves would be seen as coaches for change rather than “thought police”. Weiss’ calls this “knowledge creep” (Weiss 1980), and by this she means that knowledge is not only utilized explicitly. What happens when knowledge comes into use in an organization is more a matter of knowledge creeping into the mindset, and thus serving as an implicit foundation for decisions, rather than as an active tool and thus being an implicit version of advocacy. However, strategic leadership and knowledge creep can be performed in various ways, and in Page’s study strategic work was mixed with more supportive approaches and operative work in order to achieve knowledge creep. Strategic work, i.e. the work performed by cross-sector strategists, can thus be defined in different ways. This is a potential dilemma to solve – should the strategic work mean supporting others in the organization and thus aiming for knowledge creep, or should it mean performing advocacy and engaging in active operative work?

The second process aspect causing an ideational dilemma for cross-sector strategists concerns the level of integration of the strategic policy areas in the vertical sectors. Prügl (2011) explores the differences between power-focused, agenda-changing diversity management and utility-based diversity management as tools of government, concluding that the distinctive perspectives on the difference between the two approaches have effects on the measures taken. Utility-based diversity management frames difference as something that produces positive effects and can be strengthened by encouraging communication and creativity. Power-focused agenda-changing diversity management frames difference as something inherently negative because differences are the foundation for discrimination and thus need to be eliminated through corrective measures. The perspective that is applied has consequences for how the individual is perceived and for which governmental measurements and tools are considered appropriate. The positive focus on differences in utility-based diversity management supports the principle of empowering individuals to become personal entrepreneurs where differences are considered a form of capital (Prügl 2011). Translated to the organizational level, the positive focus on difference supports a higher level of informal policy integration between the horizontal and the vertical due to the approach that there are mutual gains between sectors and that with the right methods horizontal policy areas can fully merge into the vertical. The negative focus on difference in power-focused agenda-changing diversity management
supports the logic of bureaucracy, where managers are educated and methods are developed to tame the negative effects of difference (Prügl 2011). Translated to the organizational level, the negative focus on difference supports a lower level of organic integration between the horizontal and the vertical due to the approach that there is an inherent power struggle between policy areas and the groups represented in them and that it is necessary to acknowledge this explicitly via the formal vertical structure. With a negative focus on difference, power struggles are perceived as unavoidable, and the vertical organization is expected to resist integration due to the fear of losing resources. With a positive focus on difference, power struggles might still be acknowledged, but they are perceived as a technical problem that can be solved and erased through solutions that manage to bring forth the gains of the positive differences. This leads to a dilemma in terms of whether horizontal work should be considered a process of full horizontal integration into the vertical organization, or whether it should be considered a process where this full horizontal integration is impossible due to the inherent power struggle between horizontal and vertical priorities.

Dilemma of defining content
The first content aspect causing a potential ideational dilemma for cross-sector strategist is how to politically define the content of their work. The conceptual apparatus to approach the ideas of cross-sector strategists’ work is, as mentioned, extensive and highly overlapping. Sustainability and social investment are simultaneously used concepts in both practice and theory. This intertwinement has been highlighted as something positive due to its inherent capacity to bridge the current economic model with more sustainable forms of development (Sommestad 2012), but also as a problem where the environmental and social pillars of sustainability become tools for the economic, similar to the discussion of power-focused agenda-changing and utility-based diversity management. This tension exists also within human rights, which are founded on a liberal premise of individual rights bearers. Briefly, throughout the last 30 years there has been an intensified focus on the responsibility aspects of being a rights bearer (Jenson & Levi 2013). In the same period, a discussion has emerged on whether rights should include development as a way to bridge neoliberalism and human rights and to what extent state interference should be seen as legitimate in order to create sustainability and protect rights. (Jenson & Levi 2013:78). Also, social investment has been discussed as a policy tool for combining the advantages of the recessive neoliberal state and the state involvement of the early welfare state. At its core, the social investment concept represents a shift away from
neo-liberalism in that the state and social policies are viewed as necessary tools for fighting social exclusion and for creating sustainable growth. However, it does not mean a return to the old version of state involvement in that social investment also has the future-oriented perspective of neo-liberalism (Jenson 2012). However, social investment is not a coherent and clearly defined concept, and there is a neoliberal version, with a focus on the individual in the market and fighting intergenerational inequality; an inclusive liberal version, combining state-secured security with a flexible labor market and focusing on equality over the course of the life-cycle; and a social-democratic version, which to the other two also adds a Keynesian focus on immediate equity (Mahon 2013). Another related aspect are the fluid definitions of the sustainability concept. Social sustainability in particular is considered problematic, balancing between analytical, normative, and political aspects (Littig & Grießler 2005). Social sustainability thus has potential, just as equality, to be transformed into various political projects with varying degrees of politicization and power struggle. The more universal a concept gets, and the more valence it manages to aggregate (Cox & Béland 2013), the more the concept will be incorporated in the general discourse and thus the degree of politicization will decrease. The various options to transform the strategic policy areas into different projects constitute a potential dilemma for the cross-sector strategists in how to position themselves, i.e. how they define the content of their work.

The second content aspect causing an ideational dilemma for cross-sector strategists is the close intertwinements between strategic policy areas, i.e. the overlapping. In the gender mainstreaming literature, this is discussed in terms of how different inequalities relate to each other (Walby 2005; Acker 2000; 4 Politically, social investment ideas began to gain ground at the end of the 1990s in favor of the center-right. In 2000, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder together published the manifesto “Europe: the third way/die Neue Mitte”, where ideas of social investment were addressed (Morel et al. 2012). In the Swedish context, we see influences of social investment in the rhetoric of the 2006 election, where the conservative party had the opportunity to form a government under the banner “new workers’ party”, focusing on “making work pay” and “jobs instead of subsidies”. It might be considered a paradox that a term such as “social investment” became a catchword for center-right politics, but it highlights that social investment does not represent a direct continuation of the social democratic welfare state. Neither is it claimed to represent a revised version of pure neoliberalism. 5 Sustainability is used by Cox and Béland as an example of a concept that has reached a high level of valence. However, definitions of the social pillar also vary in the field of sustainability and can either be based more explicitly on equitable access or can be more focused on a collective sustainability regarding the whole community (Dempsey et al. 2009), i.e. the individual versus the structural approach, which is equivalent to the distinction between diversity management and power-focused mainstreaming or the distinction between neoliberal and social-democratic social investment.
Verloo 2006; Yuval-Davis 2006). When this relation was first discussed, the focus was on the study of different subfields one by one, such as gender, ethnicity, age, and disability. With an intersectional perspective, the focus has shifted towards how inequalities relate to each other and to the multi-dimensional character of inequality (Gunnarsson 2017; Squires 2005; Squires 2008). Inequalities are fluid, i.e. constantly changing, because they are based on relations, which might change according to the construction and distribution of resources. There is an inherent dilemma in the intersectional approach based on the need to form stable categories for analysis and the simultaneous acknowledgement of inequalities as fluid concepts. Accordingly, there are different discursive and political projects connected to different inequalities, which can take various political forms (Walby et al. 2012). Most of the strategic policy areas that cross-sector strategists work with address inequalities of some kind, although the policy area in itself might not be directly addressing an unequal relationship. Walby points out that the inherent dilemma of how to handle the relationships between strategic policy areas brings different risks that are applicable to the coexisting strategic policy areas. A first risk is that bringing together different inequalities might lead to false over-generalizations. A second risk is that analyzing the inequalities as single units with unique foundations leads to neglect of the relational aspect of intersectionality, i.e. the intersections between them. A third risk is that acknowledging the infinite number of categories needed to recognize the fluidity and nuances of inequalities leads to analytical and practical paralysis, and so does the opposite. A fourth risk is that rejecting the categories altogether will make analysis difficult (Walby 2007). The discussion of intersecting inequalities can be related to the discussion of the three pillars within the sustainability concept. Sustainability as defined in “the Brundtland report” demands a combination of economic, ecological, and social development, stating that the pillars are of equal importance and mutually dependent (WCED 1987). However, the pillars are often considered side by side instead of as a whole, which creates the same risk as when analyzing inequalities as single units. The entwinement between strategic policy areas thus leads to a dilemma in terms of how to conceptually draw the line between them.

The third content aspect causing an ideational dilemma for cross-sector strategists is the multi-level character of the strategic policy areas concerning how to handle the input to the policy areas coming from many different sources. Walby (2005) points out that the transnational character of the development of gender mainstreaming, with translation between states, the EU as a driving actor, and the normative development of the human rights
discourse, leads to a dilemma in terms of definitions. This is valid for other cross-sectoral policy areas as well. The inputs from different levels are sometimes contradictory, and definitions, solutions, and interconnections appear to be infinite (Rittel & Webber 1973). When analyzing the work of cross-sector strategists, it is also necessary to add the local and regional level to this multi-level model. In the case of the municipal strategic policy areas, the local and regional levels play an important role due to the strong municipal self-governance in Sweden. This is why it is important to take into consideration the multi-level governance occurring in the subnational level, where goals regarding strategic social policy areas are established by the national government and by the regional and local level (Montin 2011)⁶. Thus, the multi-level character of the cross-sector policy areas leads to a potential dilemma for the cross-sector strategists regarding how to organize and prioritize the input.

**Structural dilemmas**

Differing values of horizontal and vertical traditions set the structural frames for cross-sector strategists’ work – the vertical tradition is characterized by the idea of efficiency, accountability, formality, and specialization, whereas the horizontal tradition is characterized by ideas of deliberation, collaboration, informality, and networking. The meeting between the vertical and the horizontal traditions leads to structural dilemmas due to different organizational and cultural values. Structural dilemmas thus mean organization-based aspects, including how cross-sector strategists develop methods and strategies to handle ambiguous values at the breaking point between horizontal and vertical organization.

The increase of horizontal governance has been described as a response to the economic view of sectorization and performance management in New Public Management, as a response to wicked problems, and as a strategic governance enabler (Pollitt 2003). In practice, there is wide variety of actions taken in the name of collaboration.⁷ Halligan et al. differentiate between

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⁶ Montin (2011) points out that the multi-level character has consequences for whether strategic policy areas are defined as part of social politics and welfare, as it traditionally has been approached in national and municipal politics, or as strategic development for social cohesion, as it is defined in EU politics.

⁷ O’Flynn (2009) calls the collaborative turn a “cult” and is critical towards the lack of definition of what really is referred to when speaking of collaboration (see also (Andersson 2016). She takes on the work of Himmelman (2002) and Mattessich & Monsey (1992) and differentiates between four different versions of collaboration, which also can be categorized as weaker and stronger forms of collaboration, including networking, which is the weakest form and is mostly focused on information exchange; coordination, where more
whole-of-government as service delivery integration, as coordination and collaboration of activities, as a way to integrate and rebalance governance, and as a cultural change. Thus, collaboration can mean formal organizational changes around a specific topic, looser nodes of collaboration, and coordination in terms of networks, or as informal ways to change the culture of the organization in a more holistic direction that values diversity of views and favors innovation (Halligan et al. 2011).

Christensen and Laegreid analyze the whole-of-government approach from a structural/instrumental, a cultural/institutional, and a myth-based perspective, and they distinguish between the different frames it takes. From a structural/instrumental perspective, whole-of-government is best used with a top-down approach to implementation and with a strengthening of central steering. With the cultural approach, the development of whole-of-government should be seen as evolution rather than an explicit and instrumental design. Path dependency and trajectories play an important role in the shaping of whole-of-government and constitute the frames for it. Thus, it is not enough to just add the structure of whole-of-government; it requires a cultural change in attitudes. With the myth perspective, the whole-of-government can be interpreted as myth and symbol, the kind of “recipe” that is offered and sold by consulting firms and used to increase legitimacy (Christensen & Laegreid 2007). The top-down versus the cultural approach to whole-of-government is a categorization that corresponds with the categorization between the agenda-setting and diversity management approach to gender mainstreaming. In the former, the mainstream develops and changes according to the mainstreaming, with transformed decision-making processes and by giving priority to the mainstreaming goals and objectives. In the latter, the mainstreaming is “sold” to the mainstream as a tool to achieve existing policy goals. It is not per definition a bottom-up perspective, but it still shares some features with the cultural approach in Christensen and Laegreid’s categorization of whole-of-government in that the focus is on evolution and integration rather than on explicit formal changes. Both whole-of-government and mainstreaming are thus objects of structural dilemmas that are related both to the formal structures surrounding them in

formal links are established and where a higher level of trust is required than in networking; cooperation, which entails strategies of actually working together and thus has a stronger level of collaboration; and finally collaboration, where the parties share risks, trust, goals, and rewards. In practice, there is a lack of differentiation between these different forms, which leads to difficulties in understanding what is actually meant when speaking about collaboration (O’Flynn 2009).
the vertical organization and to the cultural frames that are embedded in these (Halligan 2010).

Thus, the structural dilemmas can be divided in two groups: 1) *dilemmas caused by organizational frames* surrounding the meeting of the vertical and the horizontal in terms of budget, accountability/responsibility, and evaluation, and 2) *dilemmas caused by cultural frames*, which matter in terms of trust, commonality, and leadership (Christensen & Lagreid 2010; Huxham et al. 2000; O’Flynn et al. 2011).

**Dilemma of organization**

The first organizational aspect causing a potential dilemma for cross-sector strategists is related to financial and power-related resources. Cross-sector strategists are placed at the breaking point of vertical and horizontal structures of resources. They are expected to be brokers and catalysts of horizontal work and mainstreaming, i.e. “directors”. However, their lack of formal power means that their participation in negotiations regarding authority, goals, and resources in collaborative settings starts from a point different from other participants who have vertical residence. The vertical structure also causes a lack of continuity in horizontal work because of the horizontal being added to the vertical organization and thus becoming an activity on the side, organized by what the vertical can spare in terms of time and resources (Halligan et al. 2011). Pooled resources and projects have increasingly become a way to overcome problems of traditional budgets based on vertical structure. Since the end of the 1980s, there has been an increased tendency in Swedish local government to use this form of organization, especially for development projects. One driving factor has been the European Union membership and increased availability of project funding. The idea is usually that a limited project will lead to institutional learning and change, and thus that the effects from the project will live on. Project organization is also a method to unite multiple goals (Montin 2007; Hall 2011; Fred 2015; Fred & Hall 2017). The dilemma consists of how to approach the contradiction of having a formal post and task, but no formal financial or power-related resources.

The second organizational aspect causing a potential dilemma for cross-sector strategists is accountability/responsibility, in other words, who is responsible for getting things done. Vertical interests are likely to have priority because they belong to the formal organizational structure, and this opens the way for the negotiation of priorities. Accountability in horizontal
settings is sometimes framed as a potential democratic problem because of a lack of transparency. Wilkins describes different versions of shared accountability. In one version, all participants in collaboration can be responsible for their own part, but they make their reports in the vertical line. In a second version, one participant can take the lead role, which leads to integrated reporting but side-lines other participants. In a third role, one non-participating actor can acquire a coordinating role, which leads to impartiality, but this actor answers for results without having any direct responsibility for the services involved. In a fourth version, the participants might answer as a group, which leads to integrated reporting but creates problems with transparency in the traditional system of accountability (Wilkins 2002). Cross-sector strategists are once again placed at the breaking point of multiple accountabilities by multiple actors, and the dilemma consists of who should be considered responsible.

The third organizational aspect causing a potential dilemma for cross-sector strategists is evaluation. Moynihan et al. argue that performance management is also a desirable approach in a complex governance system such as collaborative governance, but that it requires recognition of the complex environment and a reflexive design of performance regimes (Moynihan et al. 2011). Kloosterman et al. (2012) and Rao and Kelleher (2005) discuss an attempt at analyzing the outcome of collaboration from the field of gender mainstreaming. They present the framework used by the Gender at Work association to evaluate the effects of gender mainstreaming. The model analyses effects in terms of individual and systemic change and in formal and informal arenas of change. Systemic informal change means change in cultural norms; systemic formal change means change in formal institutions like laws and policies; individual informal change means consciousness, such as knowledge, skills, and commitment for individuals; and individual formal change means access to resources. This example highlights the evaluation dilemma of wicked issues (Rittel & Webber 1973) – there are multiple dimensions to take into consideration in order to fully be able to evaluate the success of collaboration-based horizontal perspectives. The dilemma consists of how to evaluate the outcome of strategic work when the analysis of such work can take place on many different levels.

**Dilemma of culture**

The first cultural aspect causing a potential dilemma for cross-sector strategists is trust. Within the network governance discourse, hard measures are usually avoided, and instead, seeking mutual understanding and trust is
considered to be the key to successful collaboration (Williams 2012). Mishra defines trust as one party’s "willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the belief that the latter party is a) competent, b) open, c) concerned, and d) reliable" (Mishra 1996:265). Ansell and Gash (2008) point out that trust-building requires continuity, time, and acknowledgement of the inter-dependency situated between the vertical and the horizontal, and thus we can make the assumption that cross-sector strategists might be expected to be brokers with the job of creating the trust needed to bridge the vertical and horizontal. This leads to a potential dilemma regarding how trust is built, that is, how continuity, time, and acknowledgement are created at the breaking-point between the vertical/horizontal and the informal/formal.

The second cultural aspect causing a potential dilemma for cross-sector strategists is commonality. Commonality means a sense of shared goals. In order to achieve this, framing and bridging are necessary skills. Forming a shared reality can be hard because just as with trust, the perception of goals and outcomes is formed by the organization and by the culture within that organization. Once again, cross-sector strategists represent an idea of a solution for boundary crossing, and “boundary spanners” depend on their capacity to communicate with different actors and to interpret and handle information (Williams 2012). These skills are also pointed out in the field of mainstreaming as crucial to success (Eveline et al. 2009). The focus is on soft methods to reach consensus and shared goals. Wittman (2010) argues that the norm of network governance in terms of deliberation and communication creates dependency on appointed brokers of network and commonality, in this case cross-sector strategists, to handle this ongoing negotiation regarding commonality. Another aspect of commonality is that many policy areas hold both utility-based and power-based arguments. In the consensus approach, policy areas run the risk of having their main focus on utility. This means that people can “get on with their jobs” without questioning or changing their norms or behaviors (Wittman 2010). This is the reason why diversity management has been seen as appealing. Prügl argues that diversity management works because it is embedded in logics that fit beyond the apparatus of, in this case, gender (but relates to all strategic policy areas) and that this makes it easier to create commonality. Diversity management also gets validity from the market, which also contributes to a shared understanding of goals (Prügl 2011). The dilemma consists of how to form this commonality where there are many coexisting goals and priorities.
The third cultural aspect causing a potential dilemma for cross-sector strategists is leadership. Actors in the formal hierarchy face leadership dilemmas that they need to negotiate, e.g. how to lead someone who does not formally answer to you and who comes from another organizational culture (Silvia 2011; Page 2011; Ingraham & Van Slyke 2006). The question that arises is thus how cross-sector strategists, who do not have a formal position in the hierarchy but have the formal task of organizing collaboration, handle this potential dilemma. Purdy differentiates between formal authority, resources, and discursive legitimacy as sources of power in collaborative settings, which can be applied to the potential dilemma of how to execute leadership without formal authority. Authority in this sense means “a trump card that dictates which participant ultimately gets to decide an issue” (Purdy 2012:410). In collaboration, authority can be executed by selecting participants, owning the process, and setting the agenda. Resource-based power means access to financial resources, people, knowledge, culture, and capabilities. It can be executed in terms of how the process is paid for, in understanding the topics, and in the production of documents, for example, meeting records. Finally, discursive legitimacy means the ability to act on behalf of the values and norms of society. It can be executed by framing the topics at hand, by the use of voice in order to render attention, and by forming coalitions (Purdy 2012). In the execution of leadership to organize collaboration in strategic policy areas without formal authority, these different versions of power constitute possible ways forward, and the dilemma consists of whether and how leadership can be executed.

Agency dilemmas

In the horizontal and vertical traditions, different values of agency are present. The vertical tradition has a focus on specialization and a clear hierarchy in the political-administrative organization, whereas the horizontal tradition has a focus on discretion and the integration of knowledge. As a cross-sector strategist, agency is likely to be influenced by the double role of being both a part of the vertical tradition in terms of being a public administrator in the hierarchic political-administrative organization and being a proactive strategist working for integration of a cross-sectoral policy area. Agency dilemmas thus mean the personal aspects of how cross-sector strategists form and legitimate their professional agency between the ambiguous values of being both a public administrator and a lobbyist and of being both a professional expert in their own right and providing an advisory support function to other professions.
The vertical tradition of governance emphasizes a dichotomy between administration and politics in order to protect the democratic process and maintain efficiency. The dichotomy between public administration and politics has been an important theme within the field of public administration since the subject first arose. The Weberian ideal type for the public administrator as a neutral executor of democratically made decisions has been studied in different forms, and the conclusion is that public administrators are not just executors (Brunsson & Jönsson 1979). Public administrators are experts in their fields (Demir & Nyhan 2008), and this generates a weight and autonomy in the execution of their work that can be seen as democratically problematic (Lennqvist-Lindén 2010; Overeem 2005).8

The more common approach, however, is to talk about a model of complementarity (Svara 2006a, Svara 2006 b, Svara 2006 c). Svara states that complementary roles do require a certain amount of separation, but that neutrality does not always presuppose dichotomy. One aspect of the professional administrator role is to be familiar with the roles of politicians and administrators, and to navigate between these two, even in situations where they as administrators are expected to enter the political arena (Svara 2006 a). Svara also points out that there is a rising tendency to see senior administrators as important actors when it comes to acting as entrepreneurs and introducing policy innovation (Svara 2006 c). This is the debate from the horizontal tradition of governance. The administrators defined as generating support for values (see p. 9-10) can be argued to belong to this group. Aberbach and Rockman (2006) conclude that there seems to be a move from

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8 Almost as old as the concept and ideal of dichotomy and separated roles is criticism against it. The argument is that although there is an ideal of separated roles where politicians are experts on values and administrators have professional knowledge that they neutrally present to politicians for decision-making (Peterson 2006), in reality administrators play an extensive role in policymaking. One of the most classical examples is Appleby (1949) who broadened the scope of politics to include most activities of the public organization in order to highlight the interconnectedness between politics and administration. Another example is Lipsky (1980), whose seminal work on street-level administrators points out that due to the necessary discretion of administrators operating at “street-level” e.g. teachers, doctors, policemen, etc., policy is created not only before the decision but also after.

9 Internationally, the academic field of public administration constitutes an important base for the vindication of public administrators as a professional group, with expertise and professional values as public administrators (Svara & Terry 2009; Pugh 1989). In the Swedish context, this has not been an equally clear discussion, although the importance of professionalism and expertise within public administration was an important question for the reorganization of municipalities during second half of the 20th century (Montin & Granberg 2013). The American discourse within the field of public administration highlights the responsiveness of public administrators towards politicians and the citizens as an important part of their professional identity (Demir 2011, Svara 2009).
more overlapping roles to a more technocratic mode where senior executives serve the policy process and politicians with expert knowledge, but where they do not necessarily work as political advocates for certain values. The administrators defined as balancing values (see p. 8-9) can be argued to belong to this group. Triantafillou also follows this argument when claiming that on the one hand expertise can be viewed as a preventer of abuse of public resources, and in that sense is considered value neutral. On the other hand, expertise might also cause restrained political agency (Triantafillou 2015). The discussion of complementary roles can be related to the discussion of how to define mainstreaming – as power-focused and agenda-changing, or as a utility-based method to find mutual benefits between mainstreaming and the mainstream. The extent to which politics and power are present in the framing of mainstreaming strategic policy areas is likely to have effects on which position cross-sector strategists take and consider appropriate in light of the classical dichotomy ideal. Thus, drawing a line between complementary roles and a technocratic approach can sometimes be a tricky matter because complementarity presupposes expert knowledge. Depending on whether the framing of strategic policy areas takes the character of power-focused agenda-changing or utility-based methods, expert knowledge is perceived differently. This might in turn lead to different expectations of policy influence, where a technocratic approach opens for more direct influence politically but simultaneously also for more adjustments in how the problem is defined due to a reduced focus on power.

A third approach is to see the appointed administrators like cross-sector strategists, with the specific task of working as advocates for values, and as a solution to compensate for a more technocratic approach by managers by expecting them to safeguard the perspectives that otherwise run the risk of disappearing between the vertical departments and their fields of technocratic expertise. However, the dilemma remains, and cross-sector strategists’ mainstreaming of policy areas is simultaneously considered to be both a technical and a political process (see Walby 2005), which leaves it unclear for cross-sector strategists where their loyalties really should reside. Should they be purely obedient administrators and work for their strategic policy area according to the political will, or should they also be experts in their fields and stand up for an expert point of view based on professional norms, even if it means trying to change the view of politicians? And if they should stand up for an expert point of view, two other dilemmas occur. First, what kind of knowledge do cross-sector strategists define as their source of expertise, e.g. how do they define themselves as professionals, and second, how do they
differentiate between expert knowledge in strategic policy areas in relation to the expertise of the rest of the organization in which they are working to mainstream strategic policy areas? This is a classical organizational problem relating to the relation between the hierarchy in the sectors and support functions (Lundquist 1998:169). But in the case of cross-sector strategists and the mainstreaming of strategic policy areas, this question comes in a slightly different form because cross-sector strategists to some extent are formally expected to, if not actively interfere in the hierarchy, at least try to influence and monitor it.

Thus, the formation of agency for cross-sector strategists holds two potential dilemmas: 1) the relation between administrative freedom and political responsiveness, and 2) the relation between representing independent expertise and performing an advisory support function. In both, the question of how cross-sector strategists perceive themselves as professional agents – as professional administrators and as professionals within their own field – is relevant.

Dilemma of discretion: relation to politicians
The first discretion aspect causing a potential agency dilemma for cross-sector strategists is how to determine what to do as public administrators. All public administrators are in some way or another faced with combining different kinds of loyalties. De Graaf identified four different kinds of administrators from the perspective of loyalty, and the classic image of the neutral administrator varied between these groups. However, hierarchal loyalty towards politicians was ranked high among all four groups as an important part of their role, and the study found no support for the assumption that public administrators valued values such as cost efficiency higher than impartiality and justice, and instead showed that the administrators felt strong loyalty towards society and citizens (De Graaf 2011). These themes of loyalty towards politicians, and towards society and citizens, which were found in all groups of administrators, could be claimed to be a professional foundation for public administrators. The ideal type from Weber, with a clear separation between politicians and administrators, might be an overly simplified model for grasping the principles behind the actions and loyalties of modern public administrators, but it is obvious that the ideal still is active. Hartley et al. (2015) use the term political astuteness to describe the set of capabilities that public managers use to create public value in their work as they seek balance in the grey area between politics and administration. This includes strategic direction and scanning, building alignments and alliances, reading people and situations, interpersonal skills such as convincing and
negotiating, and personal skills such as self-awareness. Page (2010) concludes that the administrators have an advantage over politicians in that they hold more information on the topic, and although it is true that they potentially could use expert arguments to gain influence in the process, they rarely seem to do that. The expertise used by administrators and the power connected to it is more about the ability to create order and sense than about actual content and expert knowledge\(^{10}\). However, in the field of horizontal work, where order and sense in themselves could be argued to be an expression of politics, the grey-zone of political astuteness and discretion is likely to be more complex, and cross-sector strategists in that zone might face a complex agency formation when determining what to do. Thus, there is a dilemma for cross-sector strategists in that strategic policy areas are complex and are balanced at the border between science, expertise, and general opinions, and they need to determine how to balance this with the relation to politicians in their role as public administrators.

The second discretion aspect causing a potential agency dilemma for cross-sector strategists is whether or not the role as cross-sector strategists is considered a threat or a problem for the democratic process, and if so, how to deal with that. There are different ideas of whether administrative discretion should be considered a democratic hazard or if this discretion, when handled in an anticipating way, is a part of administrative professionalism. Svara uses the metaphor of the administrator as a conductor who is responsible for turning the political score into a symphony by using the professional skill of responsiveness. Svara stresses that the potential democratic dilemma of having active administrators is compensated by the complementary roles that politicians and administrators take, which is an interplay that is usually characterized by mutual respect for each other’s competences, roles, and professionalism (Svara 2006 b). The overall conclusion drawn by researchers less skeptical of complementary roles is that administrative professionalism to a large extent consists of awareness of and methods to make the roles of both administrators and politicians as balanced and harmonized as possible. It is pointed out that in general it is not what administrators do that affects the possibility of politicians to have control over the policy process (Page 2010),

\(^{10}\) Page concludes that the reason why we still have the assumption that administrators exert power because of their advantage in expert knowledge and information can be traced back to Weber, who gave it great emphasis. In reality, Page claims, politicians still hold the power, and “it is less likely to be what the bureaucrat knows, information asymmetry, that shapes politicians’ ability to control what goes on in bureaucratic organizations, but the opportunity for, and motivation of, politicians to take an interest in what is done in their name” (Page 2010:271).
and that administrators need a certain amount of discretion to exert their political astuteness (Hartley et al. 2015). What matters is whether politicians actually show interest in what is happening, and when they do, administrators tend to be responsive and to anticipate the political will (Page 2010). In the case of cross-sector strategists’ work with mainstreaming and the expectation on them to be active lobbyists for strategic policy areas, it is thus possible to argue that there is no inherent problem regarding a dissolved dichotomy. Instead, cross-sector strategists’ discretion and their lobbying work for strategic policy areas could be argued to be a governance tool to steer policy into a politically desired direction (Andersson & Hedlund 2011). With this perspective, cross-sector strategists’ potential room for maneuver constitutes a necessary protection for democracy rather than a potential threat. In other words, the assumed discretion of cross-sector strategists becomes an outcome of a political negotiation on appropriate solutions. Prügl (2011) calls power-focused agenda-changing and utility-based diversity management technologies of government. With this approach, cross-sector strategists turn into a technology and governance tool. The counter argument to complementary roles is that there is an inherent democratic danger in a potentially dissolved dichotomy between administrators and politicians due to weakened democratic representation and transparency. Like Page, Turner (2001) discusses the implications of experts and concludes that experts belong in the democratic system. However, Turner (2001) also states that “experts”, who are supported in speaking as experts and trying to claim expertise, and who are trying to convince a wider audience that they actually are experts in order to generate support for a certain political action, do not belong. This is due to the lack of public validation and that their knowledge resides in fields where there are no recognized methods or perspectives. It is possible to argue that cross-sector strategists constitute this particular group of experts who are dangerous to democracy and political agency in that their role often is to work close to policy makers and managers and to have the function of experts even though their topics are sometimes politically contested. By using this perspective, the argument that cross-sector strategists might be a potential democratic danger becomes valid. Triantafillou also draws the conclusion that expertise might constitute a danger to democracy, but with another argument – that there is danger in letting evidence-based policymaking be considered politics of necessity. The political scope should be perceived as wider, and so should methods of expertise, otherwise there is a risk that political agency will be constrained (Triantafillou 2015). The dilemma thus consists of how the cross-sector strategists understand their own
discretion because their role can be interpreted as both a tool and a threat for the political process.

**Dilemma of expertise: relation to administration**

The first expertise aspect causing a potential agency dilemma for cross-sector strategists is the extent to which cross-sector strategists claim jurisdiction towards the vertical organization. Cross-sector strategists are balancing between being independent experts and providing support functions to politicians and administrators. This could be argued to constitute a foundation for developing methods and expertise, which we can see in Page’s (2011) and Scala and Paterson’s (2017) studies on gender equality advisors. Cross-sector strategists thus face a potential dilemma in whether they should be public administrators with the task of promoting and monitoring a strategic policy area with subjective characteristics (hence an object for political debate), or if they should be technocratic experts representing a field of knowledge with objective solutions (hence representing utility and organizational adjustments rather than power). In the case of strategic policy areas, definitions and solutions hold inherent tensions due to differing ideas of what is objective and subjective. The right to decide the subjective properties of a problem and to be accepted in this right by the context is a matter of jurisdiction for professional groups. Jurisdiction has three parts: claims to diagnose the problem, to make inferences about it, and to treat it. Additionally, a profession requires an abstract academic knowledge system that ensures that the knowledge exists outside the given situation (Abbott 1988). In the case of strategic policy areas and cross-sector strategists, a potential dilemma arises in that their jurisdiction is focused on how to meet other jurisdictions and make them do things. It is once again a tension between the mainstreaming and the mainstream (Walby 2005), but this time with a focus on how cross-sector strategists negotiate their own role in the meeting of actors in the vertical and horizontal organization and on the professional claims of these actors. The dilemma thus consists of if and how the cross-sector strategists can claim jurisdiction.

The second aspect of the dilemma of expertise concerns the character of jurisdiction, e.g. what kind of professionalism that is stressed. Cross-sector strategists’ work holds a potential dilemma in what expert knowledge for them really means – if it means expert knowledge of the strategic policy area in itself, expert knowledge of how to be a cross-sector strategist public
administrator, or expert knowledge of how to support others in their professional work. Cross-sector strategists’ mixed role of being an expert and having an advisory support function can be related to Evetts’ distinction between organizational and occupational professionalism. The first is a discourse of control, used more and more by managers, with standardized work procedures and accountability measures. The second concerns authority and control within a collegial group. Evetts argues that with New Public Management there has been an increased focus on organizational professionalism and an undermining of occupational professionalism. This can be seen as two tendencies – either as de-professionalization when it comes to classic strong occupations, in terms of increased control, or as pressure to professionalization when it comes to “new” occupations (Evetts 2009). This follows the argument of Noordegraaf (2007; 2011), who claims that we can observe the development of a hybrid professionalism regarding organizational skills in the ambiguous fields of the public sector. Cross-sector strategists can be argued to be one of these newer occupations. Noordegraaf et al. (2014) studied strategists in Dutch public administration and concluded that they execute connective professionalism, meaning that they tend to create embedded workspaces within relevant contexts. Thus, they are not claiming jurisdiction of their own, but rather focusing on the relational aspects of connective work in order to find a place in the organization. This skill requires the capacity to connect actors and definitions (Noordegraaf 2015). The dilemma of expertise thus consists of what form of expertise the cross-sector strategists appeal to.

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11 Expertise is generally discussed within the field of professionalism and professionalization. Although professionalism is a contested concept, both in the profession research discourse and as a concept characterizing the work of public administrators, it has, especially in the American context, been used to discuss public administrators’ occupation. The basic definition of professionalism is as an institutionalized way of organizing expert work (Abbott 1988). Abbott wished to show how professions rise, grow, split, join, adapt, and die because earlier research focused on professionalization as a natural process or concept. He presents a model with the ambition to show how professions create and are created by their work, how forces like bureaucratization and knowledge change affect professions, and why professions sometimes fail and die. He starts with the relation between tasks and professions and how the formulation of problems decides which tasks become subjects for professional knowledge. A problem can be objective, and given by natural imperative, or subjective, and imposed by culture, and there is a move between the two, where knowledge can switch from being seen as subjective to taking the form of objective and naturally given. So can solutions and explanations, and thus the character of problems and solutions decides the formation of professions (Abbott 1988:35-40).
Situated agency and internal conversation as methodological tools when analyzing value conflict dilemmas

In their formal posts in the political-administrative organization, cross-sector strategists can be argued to be placed between the vertical and horizontal tradition and between formality and informality. As the framework in the previous chapter showed, this intersection leads to potential ideational, structural, and identity dilemmas and to various options for action.

When figuring out what to do and how to solve dilemmas where values conflict, the cross-sector strategists are involved in negotiation with their surroundings and in reflexive processes within themselves. Their action and agency is situated, meaning that it is influenced by contextual factors, but not fully determined by them (Bevir 2004). The process of finding a way forward for action is referred to by Archer as the "internal conversation". The framework of internal conversation was created by Archer as a method to bridge structure and agency by highlighting how agent and context interact via the agent’s reflexive process, which consists of discernment, deliberation, and dedication (Archer 2000: 2003; 2012). The framework of situated agency and the internal conversation will be used as a methodological tool when approaching the cross-sector strategists’ work in terms of what the cross-sector strategists are expected to do, if they experience value conflicts, and how they cope with value conflicts.

From the perspective of situated agency, the formality of the cross-sector strategists’ posts is an important argument for stressing contextual expectations and the process of the cross-sector strategists to negotiate reciprocity and justice between their own perspective and the contexts of what it means to be a cross-sector strategist. Agency, in short, means the capacity to pursue the individual’s interests and positions and what motivates, influences, constrains, and enables it (Emirbayer & Mische 1998; Sullivan et al. 2012). The classic rational-choice approach to agency perceives the agent as auto-
nomous from the context, and thus free to form agency according to personal interest, whereas the post-structuralist approach to agency means perceiving agency as being determined under discursive structures that go beyond formal structures. The post-structural critique towards the rational modernistic approach holds a contradiction – while arguing that discursive structure goes further than formal structure and extensively determines agency, it is also focusing on particularity and contingency (Bevir & Richards 2009; Bevir & Rhodes 2006). Situated agency serves as a bridge between autonomy and structure. Instead of taking the approach that agency is fully determined under surrounding structures, or is fully autonomous without any involvement of the contextual background, situated agency acknowledges that agency is influenced by social context, but is not fully determined by it (Sullivan et al. 2012; Bevir & Richards 2009; Bevir & Rhodes 2006). This study follows this approach, that the situating context can be expected to be influential, both regarding norms and practical hindrance and facilitation.

In order to understand how the cross-sector strategists become a part of the political-administrative organization when representing, enacting, and reflecting on values in a situated context, we need to differentiate between specific action related to a specific theme (short-term formation) and more comprehensive sets of values and actions (long-term formation). The concepts of interests and positions are applied when discussing the work related to a specific theme, and the concept of role is applied when talking about more comprehensive sets of actions and values that can be generalized to cross-sector strategists. Negotiation scholars (Fisher et al. 1983/2011; Lax & Sebenius 1986; Schmueli et al 2008) differentiate between interests and positions. Interests are values guiding the actor, and positions are measures of negotiation in terms of presented demands or action-taking. Positions resemble the sociological concept of role, and roles reflect the enactment of values in the political-administrative organization where there is a constant interplay between roles and identities (Poulsen 2009; Bevir 2004). Identity resembles what negotiation scholars refer to as interests, i.e. the values the agent profoundly identifies with. The difference between the concepts is the stressing of the interactive action in the concept of position, i.e. the position-taking is directed towards someone/something and interests and position relate to one specific problem, whereas identity and role refer to a more extensive holistic approach to agency and profession (although it may also shift between situations).
The formation of interests is informed by different sources depending on the character of the actor’s reflexivity, including contact with others, personal goals, and societal values (Archer 2003:176-297; 2012:13, 16-41). The interactive process where components of interests and positions come together might lead to a change in position, and sometimes also to the evolvement of interests. (Schmueli et al 2008; Kelman 1996; Ansell & Gash 2008; Halligan 2010; Agranoff & McGuire 2004). Thus, when involving in negotiation, internal reflexivity is applied to create the bridge between the agent’s personal interests and the context, which can result in different positions in interaction with others. Interests are discerned ends, and positions are deliberated measures to reach these ends.

The first component of internal conversation is discernment – distinguishing between interests and dilemmas. The second component is deliberation on solutions, that is, alternatives for position-taking and the conditions connected to them. The third component is dedication to a practice by legitimizing and creating a supportive environment for this position. (Adapted from Kelman 1996; Archer 2000:230-41; 2003:102-103; 2012:43-44; Schmueli et al 2008; Bevir 2004). Because the process of internal conversation is situated, i.e. depending on the situation, the process is also influenced by contextual expectations. Figure 2 illustrates the process of the internal conversation.

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12 Archer does not use the term position-taking, but refers to the result of the dedication as the modus vivendi. The target of the process of internal conversation is to establish practices that match the agent’s concerns. Modus vivendi is a set of practices that together form a ‘well-rounded life’ (Archer 2003: 149). The argument for not using the concept of modus vivendi in this study is that this study focuses on one particular aspect of cross-sector strategists, namely, their professional role. Whether or not the established practices contribute to a modus vivendi is beyond the scope of this study because modus vivendi refers to a set of practices that together make up a sustainable life as a whole, whereas this study is purely focused on the practices in the professional arena. Instead, the framework of internal conversation is combined with the negotiation literature in order to better capture the situated internal conversation in a specific arena.
Archer has received criticism for neglecting contextual interdependency when focusing her analysis solely on the agent’s reflexivity. The critics argue that instead of perceiving contextual social relations and interactions as things that either constrain or enable agency, they should be considered the core of agency itself. Agents are thus to be considered as interactants rather than agents who can apply free reflexivity (see for example Burkitt 2016). I agree with the points of the critique in terms of interdependency between agents and how interdependency between agent and context forms agency itself (both as a direct and as an internal negotiation). However, in a study on how one agent negotiates posts and roles, as in the case with cross-sector strategists in this study, it is neither empirically possible, nor necessary, to fully capture this interdependency. We assume that it is there, but we put the focus on one specific agent of the interdependency, namely, cross-sector strategists, and how they use their reflexivity. Given that we do not know that much about the expectations on cross-sector strategists as part of governance, apart from their basic tasks of working strategically for certain policy areas, nor about their practical work, the framework of discernment, deliberation, and dedication is a suitable way to approach them as study objects due to the model’s covering of the three steps of internal conversation from an actor perspective influenced by the situating context.

**Discernment**

Discernment is the process of distinguishing existing values, represented by interests, in a specific situation. When agents discern a situation to establish a foundation for deliberating on which position to dedicate themselves to, they look at the expectations of their context. They also look at which possibilities
these expectations are opening for, i.e., which positions they can and want to undertake as a part of the context. Finally, they also look at what they themselves as agents desire to achieve. This set of discerned values and the dilemmas between them constitute the foundation for the internal conversation.

**Deliberation**

Deliberation is here used to capture the agent’s examination of conditions for discerned interests and possible positions. The target of this examination is to find mutual gains between what the context and the agent want in order to minimize discrepancy. The deliberation process is framed according to the individual’s reflexive approach, i.e. how the agent runs the deliberation process. In the deliberation process, structure and agency become linked.

Agents have different approaches in the process of deliberating on interests and positions in the relation between context and agency. A first approach to link contextual and personal interest and to find mutual gains between them is to look at contextual continuity, content, and the closest relations. A cross-sector strategist of this type is likely to be more responsive to contextual demands and to the dominating values of the political-administrative organization, and also to be communicative, willing to adapt, and not wanting to cross the line too far. A second approach to link context and personal interests is to be focused on change and performance, and therefore to have a more individualistic and strategic approach in relation to the organization. A cross-sector strategist of this type is likely to be more focused on dealing with interests from the context strategically and calculatingly, and to be more focused on learning what they as agents need to do in the organization in order to get what they want in a performative and instrumental way. A third approach to link context and personal interests is to be focused on overall ideals and to reflect on the situation more in relation to these ideals than to the context. A cross-sector strategist of this type is likely to examine these ideals and interests, and also to monitor and reflect on the reflexive process itself in order to be sure of where they stand. This third approach is likely to be less adaptive to the organization and more focused on overall visionary values and morals (Adapted from Archer 2003; 2012). Drawing the line between contextual expectations and the agent’s interests in the deliberation process is only possible in theory because in practice the flow between them is constant and intertwined. By interacting with others and using the internal

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13 Archer also argues that different times in history emphasize different reflexivities (Archer 2012: 10-46).
conversation, cross-sector strategists establish which position to take in order to minimize discrepancy and to develop a functioning praxis.

**Dedication**

When the agent has deliberated on the terms and conditions for discerned interests and possible positions, he/she decides on a position to take. This dedication means legitimizing the position and creating a support structure for it. Via legitimization, the measure, i.e. the position, is turned into a justified method to reach the end, i.e. the interest. This legitimization is important for the agent’s internal process in order not to end up with an unbearable dissonance between interest and position.

Legitimization is derived from strongly rooted personal convictions about what the right interest and position values are and from the contextual discursive dominance of values, i.e. dominating ideas of appropriate action. We know from previous research that the political-administrative organization has competing sets of values, which influences the actions of public administrators (see for example Poulsen 2009; De Graaf 2011). In the case of the cross-sector strategists, where the formal post represents contradictions, it is not obvious where the internal conversation might end up.

**A mixed-methods approach**

To summarize, cross-sector strategists hold a formal position to engage in what has previously only been studied as informal behavior. When they take on their roles as formal cross-sector strategists, they are likely to encounter a number of dilemmas regarding structure, ideas, and agency due to the current development of simultaneous attempts towards both informality and formality, which the cross-sector strategists can be interpreted as an expression of. When solving these dilemmas, the cross-sector strategists use their internal conversation in order to form a sustainable role in the political-administrative organization. By studying the contextual expectations, and the internal conversation in solving dilemmas, we can better understand how cross-sector strategists in their situated agency negotiate and reflect on their role and thus contribute to the formation and development of the political-administrative organization.

The prerequisites of empirical vagueness open for a pragmatic approach to design, general inferences, and the use of theory (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998; Plano Clark & Ivankova 2015; Creswell & Plano Clark 2011; Johnson
The research design of this thesis thus has a simultaneous mixed-methods character with the aim of bringing clarity to the empirical field and of exploring how cross-sector strategists’ internal conversations – on what to do, how to do it, and why – become a part of the political-administrative organization.

When studying cross-sectoral strategic work in public administrative organizations, the first necessary selection is which cases to focus on. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the case of Sweden is a reasonable choice due to the long tradition of working with mainstreaming and social perspectives in Swedish public administration. This history of cross-sector work makes it more likely to find expressions of intersection between horizontal and vertical logics. A second choice concerns which tier of government to study. As indicated previously, this study focuses on the local level due to the wide-ranging responsibilities of Swedish municipalities, including cross-sector policy areas. The local tier of government is also an appropriate choice according to the most-likely argument because the cross-sector policy area is characterized by ambiguous multi-level input, and the most-likely place to find dilemmas and reflections on how to solve them is on the level that is likely to encounter information from several other instances. The decision on which policy areas to focus on within Swedish local government is a third methodological challenge. Cross-sectoral strategic work covers numerous policy areas such as sustainability, safety, security, human rights, children and youth, public health, gender equality, diversity, disability, regional development, the EU, communication, IT, quality, etc. Many have argued that agency formation among administrators becomes most crucial when the values that are present are politically contested (Bevir et al. 2003; Williams 2012). As discussed in Chapter 2, cross-sector policy areas focusing on societal development contain a high number of such dilemmas, making this policy area especially suited for closer studies.

The first research question (What are cross-sector strategists expected to do compared to other administrators?) will be answered in a study built on content analysis of job advertisements for cross-sector strategists, managers, and social workers in the municipal administration. This study is based on an analytical model of different traditions and values for administrative work in general and derived from the historical development of administration in the movement between formality/informality and horizontal/vertical. This model is presented in the next chapter and should be considered a complement to the study’s overall framework of dilemmas for cross-sector work in order to
distinguish the contextual expectations on the cross-sector strategists as part of the development of governance. Job advertisements contain refined representations of values in the political-administrative organization. By studying ads for three different kinds of positions, it is possible to draw conclusions on the contextual expectations on cross-sector strategists as compared to other groups of public administrators. The results of this study provide a greater understanding of how cross-sector strategists’ agency is situated. Chapter 4 focuses on the first research question and presents the analytical model and the results from the content analysis.

The second and third research questions (Do cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts? and How do they negotiate value conflicts?) put focus on the discernment, deliberation, and dedication of cross-sector strategists. This is analyzed by using two different methods: 1) an in-depth interview study and 2) a web-survey answered by 182 cross-sector strategists. The interviews were analyzed using thematic content analysis in order to distinguish the internal conversation regarding potential dilemmas, and the survey was analyzed by statistical methods. The methods are complementary. The interviews capture all three steps of the internal conversation, in particular deliberation. The survey cannot capture much of the deliberation process, but it offers an opportunity to highlight discernment and dedication due to the possibility to distinguish cross-sector strategists’ positioning in relation to specific values. To some extent, aspects of deliberation appear also in the survey due to questions such as what the respondent finds to be important input when deciding what to do. The results of the two analyses are presented thematically and discussed side by side. The aim of both the interviews and the survey is to distinguish administrators’ processes of discernment, deliberation, and dedication regarding the potential dilemmas of working as a cross-sector strategist. The aim is also to determine whether cross-sector strategists perceive such dilemmas at all. The review of potential dilemmas constitutes a foundation for distinguishing between the relevant aspects of cross-sector strategists’ work when representing, enacting, and reflecting on values in undertaking their formal positions. However, the review serves only as a frame, and the study is open for additional dilemmas or that some dilemmas might not be relevant. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 focus on the second and third research questions, with one set of dilemmas per chapter. Each chapter presents results from the thematic analysis from the interview study and the analysis of the survey data. In Chapter 8, the results of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are added together for overall conclusions to research question two and three.
The fourth research question (How can the result of the cross-sector strategists’ formation of their roles be understood as part of governance?) arose from the analyses seeking answers to questions two and three. The question is answered by relating the results of questions two and three to the main principles of the current discussion on value plurality in political-administrative organizations, the consensus-oriented approach represented by Giddens, Beck, and Habermas, and the conflict-oriented approach represented by Mouffe and Laclau. This analysis is presented in Chapter 8.

Throughout the research process, there have been extensive opportunities to present results and lead discussions on cross-sector work with different constellations of cross-sector strategists. These sessions have had the character of semi-structured focus groups, where results and conclusions from the study have been presented and discussed in both smaller and larger groups. This has provided an opportunity to gain deeper insights regarding the conclusions. Thanks to the framework of dilemmas, it has been possible to balance such an intertwined process with scientific reliability.

**Data and methods of analysis**

**Job advertisements**

*Data*

The data material used in the first study consists of work advertisements for three groups of Swedish local government administrators: 1) cross-sector strategists, 2) public managers for education, culture, leisure, or social service, and 3) social workers. The reason for choosing these groups is that they all have a focus on social topics, but from different angles – cross-sector strategists are tasked with working strategically, managers are responsible for the management of departments, and social workers are operative staff. The purpose is to distinguish how contextual expectations for the three groups are expressed. Table 1 summarizes the data material.
Table 1. Work advertisements overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Published</th>
<th>Advertisements for strategists</th>
<th>Advertisements for public managers</th>
<th>Advertisements for social workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Search terms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health strategist (15)</td>
<td>Manager of social service (11)</td>
<td>Social secretary (32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability strategist (1)</td>
<td>Manager of education (11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality strategist (3)</td>
<td>Manager of culture and leisure (10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development strategist (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity strategist (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children strategist + Youth strategist (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security strategist + Safety coordinator (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tier of government</strong></td>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic level/sometimes placed in specific sectors</td>
<td>Specific sectors</td>
<td>Specific sectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic level/sometimes placed in specific sectors</td>
<td>Specific sectors</td>
<td>Specific sectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of ads</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analyzed data consist of a total of 138 pages (excluding the general mandatory information about the organizations’ recruitment process and contact information for the manager and union representative). The advertisements were collected by using the web page www.vakanser.se, a free search tool where job advertisements from all sectors are collected. One alternative, and perhaps more obvious, source of data would have been the Swedish Employment Agency. Unfortunately, this agency does not have a system of saving advertisements for more than two months, which makes data access more restricted. Furthermore, another commonly used web service for public jobs, www.offentligajobb.se, is owned by a private company that is under no obligation to provide free access to their data. This means that www.vakanser.se is the most useful way to gain access to old employment ads. Unfortunately, this site does not cover all ads published, but it covers many of them, and can thus be argued to give a reasonably systemized overview.

The cross-sector strategist group consists of a variety of public administrators who are expected to work strategically. The ads for posts as cross-sector strategists were found using the titles commonly used for this group of administrators. One of these titles – “development strategists” (utvecklingsstrateger) – is somewhat problematic because this generic title has come to signify positions with a wide variety of tasks. Among ads referring to development strategist positions, cases were selected based on a scanning of the listed tasks in each ad, and if development strategists have tasks cover-
ing social cross-sector policy areas in some way, and on a more general level (not directed towards a specific sector), they were included. By doing so, ads referring to development strategists in a specific sector were excluded based on the same criteria.

By using these search terms, a number of ads were presented via the search tool. Because the study focuses on the municipal level, only ads with titles matching the search terms and with a placement in local government were selected. Most of these positions were placed on a strategic level in the municipalities; however, some had their organizational placement in a specific sector. When the latter was the case, the ads were scanned to ensure that the post still included a general municipal focus. The time period covered for cross-sector strategist ads was 2009–2013. By including ads from a time period as long as 5 years it was possible to increase the variety of ads – and to include such ads for positions that are not advertised very often. In some cases a municipality published advertisements for the same post two times during the time period, and in these cases, the most present ad was included in the analysis. It could be argued that the time period constitutes a problem due to potential changes in the development of cross-sector work. However, before conducting the analysis, potential variation over time was controlled for and was found to be non-existent.

Advertisements for public manager posts were selected by using the search term “manager of social service” (socialchef), “manager of education” (utbildningschef), and “manager of culture and leisure” (kultur- och fritidschef). This rendered an extensive search result. The first 11 ads for managers of social service, the first 11 ads for managers of education, and the first 10 ads for managers of culture and leisure were included in the analysis. The criterion for the selected ads was that they should be for municipal managers directly answering to the executive council committee responsible for the department. All ads in this group were from 2013.

Advertisements for social worker posts were selected by using the search term “social secretary” (socialsekreterare). This generated a large number of ads, of which the first 32 were selected. All ads in this group were from 2013.

Analysis
The analysis was conducted in two steps. First, six ads were scanned (two for each administrator group) in order to identify common words and phrases. These were placed into the ideal-types and used to turn the themes of the
ideal-types into a working model for analysis. Second, the material was coded according to the model. To each indicator, the word or section of words that had bearing on the indicator was coded as a unit, providing a foundation for classical content analysis. A challenge with this method is to identify the notions correctly. Some notions clearly distinguish themselves in accordance with the indicators, while others are more difficult to place. Usually this difficulty is manifested grammatically, by one phrase using one indicator word as verb, another as object, and a third as adjective. In these cases, the phrase was coded word by word, based on the word stem, and these words were counted as separate units in order to create a systematic analysis. When formulations in the ads used notions that according to the indicators could refer to both a personality feature and a task (ex. “to plan”, ”ability to plan”, “work strategically”, “be strategic”, “create networks”, “be a networking person”), the stem of the words was strictly used as far as possible with the argument that the person who is requested to perform a certain task most likely is also expected to hold matching features and skills, and – vice versa – if a feature or skill is requested, it is likely that the tasks which this person will be performing will hold traits of these skills and features. Another occurring problem of similar character is when a notion is used as an adjective or adverb in order to describe a certain task or a skill (for example, ”Your task is to drive strategic development”). On these occasions, each word was coded according to its stem form: “drive” was coded as actively observing, driving, and initiating, “strategic” was coded as strategic, and “development” was coded as develop/evaluate. The aim of the analytical frame was to cover the notions used in the ads as far as possible, at least in the stem form. However, in certain cases, a more open interpretation was necessary, especially when the formulations used were not exactly corresponding with the framework but still pointing to a specific task or skill in the framework.

Limitations
The purpose of this study is to distinguish contextual expectations for administrators working with different social topics in order to see how cross-sector strategists distinguish themselves from other types of administrators. The ads are not necessarily a reliable source on what administrators really do, and they say nothing about how they might later experience their work. However, in relation to the purpose of distinguishing contextual expectations of different administrator groups, the data are well suited. Ads are often carefully worded in order to communicate what employers are looking for in a very condensed and poignant text.
Interviews with cross-sector strategists

Data
The interview study consists of 27 interviews with cross-sector strategists for varying strategic policy areas, as described in Table 2. They are here all referred to as “cross-sector strategists” even when their formal titles are strategists, coordinators, development leader, or developer. In general, titles are not a stable way to categorize cross-sector strategists because it appears to be rather ad hoc how a title in a specific setting emerged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic policy area</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and youth</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents came from eight different municipalities. The sample of interviewees was made based on an initial mapping of cross-sector work in Swedish municipalities based on information on web pages or requests for information by e-mail. The result of this mapping shows a great variety among municipalities. In some cases strategic cross-sector work seemed to be more symbolic, while in other cases there could be a multitude of administrators focusing entirely on strategic work. Based on this information, eight municipalities with more explicit strategic cross-sector work were selected, and from them the target was to interview all or nearly all of the cross-sector strategists who are specialized in social strategic policy areas and who have a more general cross-sectoral approach. The choice to focus on most-likely cases was motivated by the overall purpose of the study. The aim is not to characterize the typical cross-sector strategist, but to study how cross-sector strategists form their agency in the intersection of horizontal and vertical logics. This makes it appropriate to focus on the cases with more active cross-sector work in order to generate more data. Initially, the idea was to make comparisons between the municipalities as cases, hence the variation between the eight municipalities. However, this approach soon turned out to be less fruitful due to very similar patterns. Instead, the main study aspect of the cross-sector work appeared to be the agency of the cross-sector strategists. The municipalities are thus not considered as cases in terms of units of analysis, and the focus is not on the determining characteristics of the municipalities for cross-sector work, but on the cross-sector strategists within them. Thus, the study should not be considered a classical case study, but an interview study.
The sampling was done by first identifying one cross-sector strategist in each municipality, usually the ones who were contacted during the initial mapping, and asking them for more names of their colleagues. The sample was thus purposive in the sense that the focus was on finding interviewees relevant for the overall research question. Three interviewed cross-sector strategists had managerial functions. Deliberatively, the three major cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö) as well as smaller municipalities were excluded because of organization and size deviance. The populations in the municipalities where the respondents work varied between approx. 25,000 to approx. 130,000. Four of the municipalities have a left-wing political majority, three have center-right majority, and one has a mixed majority. The interview respondents consisted of 21 women and 6 men. The respondents’ age stretched from late the 20s to retirement age, around 65.

The interviews lasted between approximately one hour and two and a half hours. The transcribed and analyzed text consists of a total of 672 pages. The interview guide (Table 3) had a semi-structured character, starting from the framework of potential dilemmas for cross-sector work.

Table 3. Interview guide

1. How would you describe your formal post as defined in terms of mission, directives, target group, budget, organization, etc.?
2. How would you describe an average work day in terms of practical work?
3. What would you say characterizes horizontal and strategic work?
4. How do you perceive your role as public administrator in terms of discretion?
5. How do you perceive yourself as a professional and an expert?
6. What is the most important input when defining your work?

Analysis

The interviews were analyzed with thematic content analysis, where respondents’ stories about experienced value conflicts and reflexive processes related to these dilemmas. The analysis was conducted in four steps (Boyatzis 1998). First, the data were scanned to sense how the themes under the dilemmas are expressed. Second, the data were coded according to the respondents’ stories about the dilemmas in the framework. Additionally, other potential themes constituting dilemmas were coded. Third, the respondent’s elaborations on the discernment, deliberation, and dedication in the dilemmas was coded by marking values and themes the respondents’ presented in relation to the dilemmas and their solutions. Fourth, these themes were grouped and condensed into a comprehensive picture of internal conversation. The thematic analysis had a certain quantifying approach in that presented themes were
expressed by about half or more of the respondents if nothing else was explicitly mentioned.

**Limitations**
The interview data are especially valuable in relation to the second research question regarding whether cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts. It is also possible to use the interview data in order to draw conclusions regarding the third research question on how the cross-sector strategists handle value conflicts from a reflexive perspective. As in all interview studies, the data are limited to what the respondents were willing to share. Thus, there might be certain situations where the actual action by the respondents might not match the stories they present. Tales of their reflections and behaviors is self-reported if not substantiated by other data. There might be instances where the respondents have incentives to present a picture legitimizing their role, actions, thought and emotions rather than giving a more critical description. This was balanced by the semi-structured character of the interviews combined with the solid theoretical framework, which provided the possibility to ask for deeper elaborations and sometimes repeating crucial questions (see Wettergren 2015). The approach turned out to be fruitful as evidenced by more elaborated and critical answers towards the end of the interviews. The presented results should be interpreted as depictions of the respondents’ realities and their internal conversations, not as an objective representation of reality. However, this does not constitute a major methodological issue due to the study’s overall approach of focusing on the cross-sector strategists’ reflexive process when becoming a part of the political-administrative organization.

A related methodological challenge was the approach of starting from a solid theoretical framework while simultaneously keeping enough flexibility to capture unexpected stories and adding new insights. This was a challenge due to the risk of biasing and leading the respondents in specific directions. However, the situated agency approach requires a certain understanding of the situating context, and by using the framework as a guide while simultaneously making sure that questions were asked openly, both objectives were possible to reach.

A final methodological question is whether the respondents should be analyzed as one cohesive group even though the members work in different policy areas. It could be argued that some policy areas hold such specific characteristics that they are unsuited to be grouped with other policy areas.
However, the extensive overlapping and various organization of cross-sector policy areas supports the approach of studying cross-sector work and cross-sector strategists as one phenomenon.

Survey data

*Data*

To complement the interview data, a web survey on strategic work was conducted among a larger number of cross-sector strategists focusing on social topics. Practically all cross-sector strategists in Swedish local government are members of professional networks of some kind comprised of administrators with similar assignments, and many of them are members of national networks. Using these networks and contact information for their members was therefore an efficient way of reaching a large number of strategists – almost the whole population within each policy area. The survey was sent to members in four networks, including gender equality, public health, diversity, and youth politics. The gender equality, diversity, and youth politics networks have national coverage, and the public health network covers the 49 municipalities in the region of Västra Götaland. This regional network can be argued to be comparable to the rest of Sweden due to the variation of municipalities in it. These networks were selected because of the policy areas they target. The contact information of the network members was obtained via the contact person for each network. Some cross-sector strategists are participating in two, and in some cases three, networks. The web-survey was sent to 303 members of the networks during 2013. Thirty-six e-mails bounced as faulty, leaving 267 potential respondents. Out of these, 182 respondents answered the questionnaire, i.e. the response rate was 68 percent. Nothing indicates that the group of missing respondents deviated from the group of respondents regarding general characteristics. The survey data have been useful in illustrating aspects of cross-sector strategists’ work and the outcome of their reflexive process in a situating context. The initial questions were constructed based on the framework of dilemmas. The survey was distributed after the interview study had begun, which made it possible to adjust the questions with information from the interviews.

*Analysis*

The survey data were used to conduct factor, frequency, and regression analyses related to the dilemmas in the framework. The respondents in the interview study had very similar social characteristics as the main part of the survey respondents, indicating that the former selection was relatively representative of the larger population of strategists. And it is also quite like-
ly that a number of the respondents in the interview study later responded to the survey as well because some of them were members in the studied networks. Because the selection of respondents included an extensive number of cross-sector strategists working in the four policy areas, the results from the survey are also useful in giving a general overview of the characteristics of cross-sector strategists in Swedish local government. These results are presented in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of employment in the municipality</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5 years</td>
<td>18-29 years</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 years</td>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 years</td>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20 years</td>
<td>50-59 years</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25 years</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26+</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Low (primary, secondary, other)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>High (University studies, bachelor/master/PhD)</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy areas</th>
<th>Reason for present responsibilities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Was assigned the tasks</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Applied to an advertised position</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>Requested the tasks</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Staff department</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Special department</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>Municipal district department</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Town hall</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: It is possible to be responsible for several policy areas and hence the percentages of cross-sector strategists with different policy areas greatly exceed 100 percent. N = 182.

The results show that most cross-sector strategists have worked in the municipality for some years and the most common age group is 40–49 years. The cross-sector strategists are overwhelmingly women (81 percent), and they are well educated (92 percent have university education). Almost half of the cross-sector strategists (45 percent) report that the main reason for their present responsibilities is that they actively applied for such a job. About half of the cross-sector strategists (49 percent) work in the town hall, while the other half work in other more specialized municipal departments. Most cross-sector strategists also report that they have responsibilities in relation to several strategic policy areas.
In the survey, cross-sector strategists were asked about the extent to which 10 different tasks were a part of their work. The results show that it is common for cross-sector strategists to have distinguishable combinations of responsibilities. These combinations could be identified through factor analysis, and the results are presented in Table 5. The results produce three factor dimensions, called policy strategist, project strategist, and bureaucrat strategist, which could be interpreted as three modes of being a cross-sector strategist. Because the factor dimensions per definition are un-correlated, it is possible for one strategist to lean on one of the three modes or to combine them in different ways. Cross-sector strategists can be pure policy, project, or bureaucrat strategists or a combination of the three.

Table 5. Three modes of being a cross-sector strategist – a factor analysis based on combinations of responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Factor 1 “policy strategists”</th>
<th>Factor 2 “project strategists”</th>
<th>Factor 3 “bureaucrat strategists”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget responsibility</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing in boards/councils</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide the politicians with information and knowledge</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in managerial groups</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiate projects</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execute projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation/evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give lectures in the municipal organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance</td>
<td>22.96</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: Principal component analysis, 3 components extracted from varimax rotation. Factor scores below 0.60 are not presented. N = 182

Factor 1 shows the correlation between tasks that are common among cross-sector strategists working close to the policy level of local politics and who are likely to hold a managerial position, including budget responsibility, briefing boards/councils, providing the politicians with information and knowledge, and participating in managerial groups. Cross-sector strategists scoring high on this factor are policy strategists due to their presumed closeness to the political and managerial level. Factor 2 shows the correlation between tasks common among cross-sector strategists working with initiating, executing, and managing projects. Cross-sector strategists scoring high on this factor are project strategists due to their obviously project-focused responsibilities. Factor 3 shows the correlation between tasks common among cross-sector strategists working with different tasks on the administrative level, such as investigation/evaluation, giving lectures, and processing cases. Cross-sector strategists scoring high on this factor are bureaucrat
strategists due to their more classical administrative focus. These variations are of importance because when we speak about the new administrator, we mainly refer to the policy strategists’ tasks. However, as the analysis shows, the cross-sector strategist group contains variations, and most likely these variations can be found both on a personal level and in the work they perform.

Based on the factors, three additive indexes have been created\textsuperscript{14}. In the following chapters, these three indexes will be used as a first group of independent control variables for the analysis of different aspects of cross-sector strategist work. The argument for using the modes as independent variables is that among cross-sector strategists there are likely to be variations when explaining differences in cross-sector strategists’ work. Although most cross-sector strategists, both in the work advertisement study and the survey, are hybrids of several traditions and values, the differences between them highlight how the framing of cross-sector strategists’ positions might be directed towards different administrative traditions and values. This might in turn cause variations in aspects such as framing of strategic policy areas, what is considered facilitating for the strategic work, and how discretion is perceived. The second group of control variables is personal and organizational characteristics, such as gender, age, education, placement in the municipal organization, municipality population, and political majority. The argument for looking at whether the placement matters is that it is likely to affect access to actors and resources. The argument for looking at whether population size matters is that big and small municipalities differ in terms of resources and organization. The argument for looking at whether political majority matters is that the cross-sector policy areas are politically contested. The third group of control variables consists of strategic policy areas and whether it matters with which policy area the cross-sector strategists work.

Background information on survey respondents makes it possible to conclude that the two data sources (interviews and survey data) are comparable, and thus they offer a possibility of triangulating the analysis.

\textsuperscript{14} The indexes have 16 steps for policy strategists and 12 for project and bureaucrat strategist due to the number of variables constituting different factors (4*4 for policy strategists, 3*4 for project and bureaucrat strategists). These in turn were divided into index steps, 16 for policy strategists and 12 for project and bureaucrat strategists, in order to get a result ranging between 0 and 1. These indexes show the extent to which a cross-sector strategist works in the mode of a policy, project, or bureaucrat strategist.
Limitations

It might perhaps be argued that the use of survey data is not compatible with the overall epistemological approach of a study aiming at grasping the reflexive process in situated agency. But my experience has been that the survey data serve an important purpose by widening the scope of the reflexive process by capturing discerned values and, in particular, the dedication of an extended number of cross-sector strategists.
In this chapter, job advertisements for cross-sector strategists are compared with job advertisements for public managers and social workers in the municipal organization. The question in focus is:

*What are cross-sector strategists expected to do compared to other administrators?*

In the context of Swedish municipalities, cross-sector strategists are employed with certain expectations on what they should do. These expectations hold values that represent ideas of how to govern the political-administrative organization, that is, administrative traditions. The expectations form a foundation for an expected work mode of administrators, i.e. a normative set of values of what to do, how, and why. In practice, the formal posts and the roles taken by administrators seldom, if ever, fit perfectly in a theoretical model. This can be explained by two factors – first, because every administrator post includes aspects of different work modes, and second, depending on the situation, certain values might be considered as superior because they have stronger valence. The public administration contains a mix of values with high legitimacy (e.g. Beck-Jørgensen & Bozeman 2007; De Graaf 2011; Beck Jørgensen & Sørensen 2013; Cox & Béland 2013).

From a study of job advertisements for general administrative positions at the state level in Denmark and the Netherlands between 1966 and 2008, there are indications that there has been a shift towards more value intensity in job advertisements, that there has been a shift towards more informal and personal merits, and that the previously requested political loyalty has turned more towards commitment to the public interest (Beck-Jørgensen & Rutgers 2014). The results of that study show that work modes might shift over time, and one conclusion by Beck-Jørgensen and Rutgers is that it seems like the necessity of handling competing values is increasing. Beck-Jørgensen and Rutgers do not differentiate between different types of posts in the political-administrative organization. However it is reasonable to assume that different administrator posts are guided by different work modes. The idea and definition of formal posts do not necessarily need to match the actual action of the
administrator holding the post, but the idea behind the formal post still reflects which work mode is expected to guide the work. In order to understand the internal conversation of situated agency on what to do, how, and why, it is thus appropriate to have insight on the contextual expectations on cross-sector strategists’ formal posts.

**Administrator work modes**

The movement between the governance traditions of horizontality/verticality and informality/formality and the organizational forms it has given rise to also has expectations on how the posts and roles of public administrators should look. A common model to analyze governance traditions is what Stout refers to as constitutional, discretionary, and collaborative traditions. Each tradition has a distinct foundation for legitimacy, which consist of a set of values (Stout 2013). The following section aims at identifying coexisting work modes stemming from these traditions. The review follows a certain chronological order, drawing on the presentation of Stout (2013) with four separate work modes. This is based on the fact that theoretical origins of work modes can be traced to specific moments in time and relating to the development of political-administrative traditions. However, this does not mean that work modes are clearly succeeding one another, but rather that they might vary in prevalence.

The constitutional tradition was manifested in the early years of western democracy, with a distinct dichotomy between administrators and politicians in order to protect politicians from potential corruption via administrator influence, and with a focus on legality, impartiality, and transparency, e.g. bureaucracy. Vertical formality was at the center. As a reaction to this bureaucratic vertical formality, the informal verticality was highlighted in the years after the Second World War, when the effects of overly rigid formal roles of administrators were highlighted. As an informal verticality, the importance of having the discretion to stand up for ethical and moral values and to lobby for resources was stressed. The discretionary tradition was manifested during the New Public Management movement emerging in the 1980s, with a focus on the discretion of administrators to develop methods for obtaining results as efficiently as possible and a focus on seeing citizens as clients. This tradition also highlights informal verticality, but now with a focus on the efficiency of the administration rather than ethics and morals. The current collaborative tradition emerged in a discussion on public value governance and networking, with a focus on networks, collaboration, deliber-
ation, and governing by public values as an explicit form of governance (Moore 2014; Stoker 2006; Bryson et al 2014). Intertwined with the development of public value and network governance, sustainability has emerged as a political manifestation of the collaborative tradition (Benington 2009; Fiorino 2010). In this tradition, horizontal informality and formality is stressed along with methods to approach the gaps created between vertical sectors and to make sure that public values are safeguarded. Thus, the three traditions have given rise to four normative public administrator work modes: focus on legality and process to safeguard values of the constitutional tradition; focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship to compensate for the effects of the constitutional tradition; focus on results to safeguard values of the discretionary tradition; and focus on deliberation and communication to safeguard values of the collaborative tradition.

In the following section, these four work modes’ normative expectations of administrators’ education and experience, tasks, and personality are described. The division of education and experience, tasks, and personality is purely practical, and the review is aimed at constructing a tool for analysis that can be applied to the data material consisting of work ads. Because the categories of education and experience, tasks, and personality are the most common form for these kinds of ads, using these categories in the analytical tool will make data processing easier. In each category, a number of indicators are presented (in italics), and these constitute practical operationalizations of work modes. This model of indicators for four work modes was created by connecting commonly used words and phrases in six work advertisements to the ideal-types, and it was used as an analytical tool when analyzing the data material of work advertisements for different public administrator posts. The analysis of work advertisements aims at distinguishing which work modes are present and in what ways the normative expectations on cross-sector strategists differ from other groups.

Focus on legality and process
This is the classical approach to administrative work, where separation of roles between administrators and politicians is stressed as the model to maintain bureaucratic efficiency and justice and to simultaneously maintain administration as a servant of democracy. The core mission is administration.

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15 Although all traditions represent ideas of public value.
When analyzing roles of public administrators, the starting point, with hardly any exceptions, is the presumed dichotomy between administrators and politicians, where politicians make decisions and administrators execute and administer them. The classical references for the dichotomy concept are Weber (1948/2009) and Wilson (1887). Both of them proscribed such a division in order to protect administrators from politicians and to protect politicians from the influence of administrators. Weber to a greater extent stresses an organizational demarcation as the best way to fulfill the common good, whereas Wilson is more focused on doing this via thoroughly educated and morally upright administrators (Sager & Rosser 2009:1143). However, both Wilson and Weber considered it important to have a bureaucracy based on meritocracy in order to make sure that the administration could represent knowledge and expertise and act as a balancing force to politics in terms of stability (Ibid. 2009:1143). In 1939, Robert Merton elaborated on Weberian bureaucracy as a rising ideal for an efficient organization, and he pinpoints some important aspects of the bureaucratic personality. He concluded: “The bureaucratic structure exerts a constant pressure upon the official to be ‘methodological, prudent disciplined.’ If the bureaucracy is to operate successfully, it must attain a high degree of conformity with prescribed patterns of action” (Merton 1939:562). Weber (Weber 1948/2009) defined the bureaucratic structure and administrators’ posts accordingly:

1. Administrator posts are placed in a hierarchy with clearly specified functions.
2. Administrators are appointed based on a contract and are elected according to professional qualifications.
3. Administrators have a salary based on the hierarchical position, and are provided with financial stability in terms of salary and pension.
4. Administrators have their positions as their primary occupation.
5. Administrators have fixed career paths based on merits, years of service, or the judgment of superiors.
6. Administrators usually have lifetime positions, but they do not personally own their positions or the resources connected to it, and they follow only obligations proscribed by their positions.
7. Administrators are subject to a uniform system of control and discipline.
These are the founding principles in the classic approach to administrative work where the focus is on legality and process\textsuperscript{16}. In terms of potential requirements on an administrator post framed according to this mode, we can expect the following when it comes to education, tasks, and personality.

**Education and experience**

The model of separated roles and the task to be the administrator of political decisions, which leads to a work mode of legality and process, requires public administrators with the knowledge of working in this kind of organization. Thus *experience from a political organization* can be expected to be a part of the necessary qualifications. The political organization might look different, thus an additional professional qualification is experience from working in a public sector in order to understand not only what it means to be a democratic executive, but also to have an understanding of the hierarchy and sectorization in the public organization. Alternatively, this could also mean having *experience from the overall field of work in the public sector*, that is, experience from the content of the post, in order to have gained an understanding of professional norms. According to Weber, administrators should be appointed based on professional qualifications, among which these kinds of experiences should be a part. Administrators’ work should be characterized by precision, speed, expert control, continuity, and discretion (Merton 1939:561). This stressing of professionalism makes it logical to assume that administrators also should have *specific professional training/education*.

**Tasks**

The tasks performed by administrators with a focus on legality and process are based on *processing of general cases* within the professional field. They should *work according to professionally established methods and the legislation in effect*. The model of separated roles means that administrators should have their *focus on serving political decisions and administration*. The separated roles might also be stressed in terms of *accomplishing specified missions*, which are technically clear and specified by the political board. This is ensured, according to the Weberian ideal and to Merton, who are proscribing a model of replaceable administrators whose posts make up the core of administration, by implementing political decisions according to the

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\textsuperscript{16} Criticism on the classical bureaucracy is best captured with the New Public Management approach, here reviewed under the results-focused work mode.
law and by keeping bureaucratic processes separate from politicians (Weber 1948/2009, Merton 1939).

**Personality**

Merton refers to the bureaucratic personality as “trained incapacity” (Merton 1939:565). The impersonality is nucleate of any administrator, and with this comes the incapacity to change and adjust. The administrator is expected to have a focus on legality and process and thus can be expected to be *oriented towards impartiality and justice*. Having good *administrative ability and meticulousness* is also necessary (Ibid. 1939:562). They are first and foremost administrators in a system of separated roles, and the required personal characteristics should reflect this. Separation of roles was a method to make administration a servant of democracy in terms of rule of law, by making it stable, efficient, professional, and neutral. Merton stresses that administrators need to have a good understanding of the political process, and that they need to be *professional* in order to maintain the balance of responsiveness and separated roles, where “neutrality” means to distinguish and present the best alternatives to politicians.

To summarize, the administrator who is expected to have a focus on legality and process should maintain the balance between responsiveness and separated roles, and they should, according to the Weberian ideal, be aware of what specific function their post is based on. The professional identity as an administrator matters, regardless of formal posts, because this is the foundation of recruitment, according to Weber, and this, in combination with the balance of responsiveness and separated roles, is what provides the administrator with legitimacy.

**Focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship**

The work mode of legality and process means focusing on administration and the execution of decisions. The opposite ideal work mode is a focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship. In this, administrators are not neutral executors; instead, they use their expertise and discretion to affect policy-making, both in the decision phase and during implementation. The core mission in this work mode is *change*.

The classical demarcation between politicians and administrators is based on the idea of protecting one group from the other – letting managers manage and strengthening democracy by giving politicians free space to develop policies. However, neutrality does not mean passivity; it means freedom from
political and personal opinions and judgment. A professional administrator is responsible for serving politicians with expertise, but should still be clearly aware of the separated roles. This model holds two embedded problems, which lead to the development of a work mode of advocacy and entrepreneurship.

1. There is no such thing as a neutral administration. In the middle of the 20th century, there became a rising awareness that efficiency and economy might not apply to all citizens equally, and that public administration actually played a role in the distribution of goods as being politics put to practice. This gave rise to a request for a social equity ethics in public administration carried by administrators. In 1965, Davidoff argued that urban planners not only might, but also should, engage in the political process as advocates of groups or parts of governmental organizations, and in order to do so they need a thorough education and the skills to express their social objectives (Davidoff 1965). Fredericksen also argued that the public administrator post should include a social equity perspective, that is, advocacy of equity and justice as a third pillar of public administration alongside efficiency and economy (Fredericksen 1969/2010). Thus, public administrators should be advocates, in defense of equity values, and sometimes activists, in an active search for opportunities to improve certain values.

2. Passive administrators will create a very static and inflexible administration, and the knowledge that administrators possess is better used if they do their best to work for policy with responsiveness towards political will. Kingdon (1984/2003) created the concept of “policy entrepreneurs” in order to describe actors (not necessarily public administrators) who shape policy by having the capability to distinguish “windows of opportunities”. This is a concept that relates to advocacy. The difference between advocacy and entrepreneurship is that the entrepreneur does not necessarily need a strong personal commitment to the topic, which the advocate does.

In this study, the concepts of advocates and entrepreneurs are used side by side to capture the different aspects of a desired work mode – an active public administrator who advocates certain important values and who searches for the opportunity to enhance these values in the public organization. The concept of advocacy describes behavior, but also a normative stand on those values that should be advocated by the administrators. The behavior of advocates can be captured with the concept of entrepreneurship, which is less focused on the normative aspects, and more on the actual activities taking
place when an administrator (or any actor) gets involved in the process of pushing through a certain agenda. Advocacy and entrepreneurship are thus established work modes. In order to distinguish how administrators working with an advocacy and entrepreneurship focus should work, we can use research on how they actually work, and see what constitutes a successful advocate/entrepreneur in terms of education, tasks, and personality.

**Education and experience**

Administrators working according to the work mode of advocacy and entrepreneurship should have good political connections, according to Kingdon. They also need to find ways to claim their legitimacy. This can be done based on post, experience, and expertise and on the capacity to speak on behalf of others (Kingdon 1984/2003: 180). Professional training is not a top priority, and first and foremost experience in the field is necessary. However, expertise can serve as a source of legitimacy, and knowledge and experience from the specific topic at hand can thus be useful. Appropriate knowledge and experience to fulfill this should be experience from driving work, change work, and projects – to learn the skill of pushing for a certain topic – because working according to the advocacy and entrepreneurship mode means focusing on one specific topic as a project with the goal to affect policy accordingly (ibid: 181). The requirements of formal education for this work mode might vary considerably; however, education and training in a specific field, with a bearing on the topic at hand, is most likely necessary in order to support claims of legitimacy, although it does not necessarily have to be a specific professional education.

**Tasks**

Being an advocate or entrepreneur means promoting values or policies. The activity of promoting something as an administrator means actively working for policy, which is clearly different from passively implementing decisions made by politicians. In Frederickson’s essay from 1969, he states that when introducing social equity as the third pillar of public administration, it is also important to see that public administrators not only are not, but also should not be, neutral. Their role and task is to be active, to search for inequalities and flaws in democratic systems, and to contribute to diminishing them. He

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17 Both activists and entrepreneurs come with a dilemma – neither activists nor entrepreneurs might stand up for values desired by the politicians, the public, or the common good. The sharpest critique on the concept of social equity is related to the discretion of administrators, and that the promotion of advocacy of social equity as the foundation of public administrator work would take away sovereignty from elected officials.
analyzes public administration from an organization theory angle and distinguishes four processes where advocacy and entrepreneurship can be executed, and in which the administrator can be expected to be an advocate and entrepreneur: 1) the distributive process, in which administrators can be expected to be active in taking risks in bargaining for resources in order to push for their topic, that is, to promote, monitor, and conduct external analysis; 2) the integrative process, where they should focus on the whole organization, that is, to engage, inspire, and support for change; 3) the boundary-exchange process, where they should speak for minorities and be a representative and speaker of neglected groups and perspectives in the organization, that is, be a consultative knowledge carrier and educator; and 4) the socio-emotional process, where they should work for deeper change by using other methods than regular bureaucracy, that is, have visionary and long-term focus (Fredericksen 1969/2010:11-21).

**Personality**

In the proactive role of advocates and entrepreneurs, we can expect to find administrators who have an idea of which policy direction they prefer and are willing to use their resources in order to get there. Qualities of these administrators are: 1) the ability to claim to be heard, based on expertise, the ability to speak for others, or an authoritative position; 2) negotiating skills; 3) persistency; 4) patience; 5) creativity; and 6) being convincing when brokering (Kingdon 1984/2003:180-183). Their motivation might vary, and the foundation of their work can be a concern about a specific problem, attempts to improve their own sector’s budget or credentials, their desire to promote certain values, or simply the pleasure of participating (ibid:123). Regardless of motivation, we can conclude that personal will and interest are important for this administrator. We can also conclude that the proactive administrator has the claim to be heard and is committed in this, which can be expressed as being dedicated, engaged, and persistent. This administrator needs to be actively observing, driving, and initiating. Creativity and curiosity are also useful entrepreneurial skills in finding new ways to advocate for a topic.

To summarize, the existence of administrator posts working with a focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship means a desire for administrators to function as agents for change. By standing up for specific values in the political-administration, legitimacy is rendered.
Focus on results

In the 1980s, New Public Management became a prominent ideal in public administration. The public sector was seen as stagnated and inefficient, and principles of the private sector were considered the cure by creating competition by privatizing or creating quasi-markets of public service. The implication this had for public administrator work is described by Aberbach and Rockman (2006) as a move towards more separated roles after a period of more overlapping roles. The argument for separated roles thus shifted from law, which was the case during the first period of separated roles, to economy. The argument is thus very similar to the Weberian demarcation – politicians make decisions and administrators execute them, and they need discretion and a focus on efficiency in order to figure out the best way of doing this. The administrator work should also be controlled and measured in order to secure efficiency. The core mission is **management**. It thus means a fundamental value change from administration as the overall principle to management for cost-effectiveness, and it ultimately means a new regime of motivations, sanctions, rewards, and work conditions for public administrators (Cheung 1997).

New Public Management and the work mode of focusing on results was defended by neo-liberals with the argument that bureaucratic structures become inefficient due to technocratic stagnation and a lack of focus on development and improvement. New Public Management was also defended by neo-Marxists, who saw the reforms as a way to dismantle professional and technocratic power (Belloubet-Frier & Timsit 1993:533). Starting from very different positions, neo-Marxists and neo-liberals thus ended up with a similar kind of conclusion. New Public Management has a clear focus on management and managers, and the idea is that managers should have the professional management skills and freedom to lead and develop their organizations as separated departments run by purchase-provider contracts and free from politics (Røvik 2008). Hood (1991:4-5) summarizes the doctrinal components of New Public Management:

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18 New Public Management has received extensive criticism. In the early age of New Public Management, Hood (1991) examined the post-bureaucratic reforms of New Public Management and concluded that New Public Management is a consistent agenda, but that it requires openness to criticism and adjustments in order to function properly (see also Hood 1995). The free market and cost-efficiency are key principles in classical liberalism and New Public Management, and when these principles are dominating and public services are contracted out, the chief value of democracy – equality – might easily be out-weighted (Adams & Balfour 2010). Pierre and Painter (2010) take a clear stand against the attempts at finding a middle way, and they argue
1. Hands-on professional management: “let the managers manage”

2. Explicit standards and measures of performance: clear goals and objectives increase accountability and efficiency

3. Greater emphasis on out-controls: results rather than procedures

4. Shift to disaggregation: creating manageable departments, separating provision and production, contract arrangements inside and outside the public sector

5. Shift to greater competition: rivalry is key to lower costs and higher quality

6. Stress on private-sector styles of management practices: use the “proven” tools of management from the private sector

7. Stress on greater discipline and parsimony: “do more with less”.

The focus is on results and the management needed to achieve them. New Public Management was a normative perspective when it was launched, and thus holds several points on what should be expected from administrators in terms of education, tasks, and personality.

**Education and experience**

Based on New Public Management’s doctrines, knowledge from specific topics is not the main focus when working according to a results-focused work mode; instead, the focus is on knowledge and experience from working towards results and development. The management focus means that management experience might be requested. Management focus means a focus on steering and measures to increase efficiency, which is an expertise in itself, that of “professional management”. Finally, one target of a results-focused work mode is to break the professional autonomy created in the bureaucratic system that is presumably leading to stagnation and overly powerful groups, and instead to focus on results and efficiency. The stressing of clear and explicit standards and measures of performance (Hood 1991:4) is an expression of controlling professionals via management. This means that specific professional education is not as desired as before, and preference is rather for general academic education and training providing administrators with the needed analytical skills and general management knowledge without turning them into autonomous professionals.

that it is impossible to combine the two principles of efficiency in terms of democratic legality and public ethics and market efficiency.
Tasks
The task of government and administrators in the results-focused work mode is first and foremost performance management, which can be generally expressed as achieving goals and cost-efficiency. Osbourne and Gaebler express this in a number of images of what government should be. Government should be catalytic, that is, the focus should be on steering rather than rowing, and administrators and managers should be active in this (Osbourne & Gaebler 1992:34). Another efficiency aspect is that government should be competitive (ibid.:76) and mission-driven (ibid.:108) in order to boost both the pride and morale of administrators, and focus should as far as possible be on the market (ibid.:280). Government should also be enterprising, which means a focus on earning rather than spending (ibid:195). This requires a redefinition of what profit really means and an emphasis on directing costs towards people who use the actual service.

Barzelay (1992) names this approach the “post-bureaucratic paradigm”. In the old bureaucratic paradigm, bureaucratic managers were expected to plan, organize, and coordinate. This role has several deficits, according to Barzelay. The main approach of administrators should be to be flexible and deliberative about their role. They must be open to a varied mode of work because they should engage in marketing and customer identification, exercise leadership, coach, and structure incentives and provide a climate for innovation. Most importantly, they should make sure that the whole organization and the people working in it are focused on the result and product so as not to let procedures become a target in themselves (Barzelay 1992:132-133). Having an organizational overview is thus of importance. The founding principle of letting managers manage means giving managers sufficient discretion to continuously improve processes (Barzelay 1992:118), that is, to develop and evaluate the organization in order to reach highest possible efficiency. This marks a clear break with the classical approach. Because efficiency, development, and overview are expected to be inspired by good examples from other (preferably private) organizations (Hood 1991), looking for quality (in general) and best practice (in particular) can also be considered an important aspect of the tasks of administrators within the results-focused work mode.

Personality
The main desired personal trait of administrators in the results-focused work mode is thus to be flexible and deliberative about their role. Flexibility and progress-orientation can thus be expected to be a desired feature in order to
make sure that administrators do not get stuck in procedures. They must also have the ability to plan, organize, and be a clear leader. They should make sure that the whole organization keeps efficiency in focus, thus motivating and delegating are key skills (Barzelay 1992; Osbourne & Gaebler 1992). The personality of administrators should be directed to fit into a model based on best practice, benchmarking, and results in terms of product and customer satisfaction. The ability to motivate people is necessary in the management-focused organization, which is focused on decentralization and teamwork (Osbourne & Gaebler 1992:250). Finally, in a results-focused work mode, the administrators should be emphasizing customers and service because the main orientation is on market principles.

To summarize the results-focused work mode, we see that demands on education are likely to be less specified. When a focus on results is stressed, the tendency to empower administrators is strong, and this means “empowerment” in terms of depolitization and de-professionalization in order to steer the focus towards results and not procedures (Pierre & Painter 2010). This does not mean, however, that expertise is considered irrelevant, although the focus above all is on management skills. The stressing of “letting the managers manage” highlights this, and public administrators should have sufficient discretion to perform their work, and the role of politicians should be to formulate overall goals (Aucoin 1990). Management towards results is thus the principle providing legitimacy.

Focus on deliberation and communication
Although both Svara (2006 a; b; c) and Aberbach and Rockman (2006) distinguish a withdrawal from more overlapping roles between politicians and administrators towards a model of more separate roles, the interaction between state and market and the interconnection with different levels in society has continued to grow. As an expression of this, multi-level and cross-sector governance is given increased attention, together with an explicit focus on public value management. In this networked version of governance, administrators who function as negotiators and sector bridgers by bringing levels and sectors together are likely to become more and more common. Notions used to describe this mode of governance are, as mentioned in Chapter 2, joined-up-government, whole-of-government, and holistic governance (Christensen & Laegreid 2007; Pollitt 2003; et al 2002).

This deliberation and communication work mode has been described as a response to the economic view of pillarization and performance management
in New Public Management (Christensen & Laegreid 2007; Pollitt 2003; Denhardt & Denhardt 2015; Bryson et al 2014). The core mission of this approach is collaboration, with a focus on deliberation and communication. Stoker (2006:47-49) presents four propositions to define network governance and the role for the public administrator in it:

1. Public interventions are defined by a search for public value. The role of administrators should thus be to create public value by addressing the issue of whether public policies and interventions are achieving positive outcomes.

2. There is a need to recognize the legitimacy of a wide range of stakeholders. Making a legitimate decision requires the involvement of all stakeholders, and the role of administrators should thus be to open up for their involvement.

3. The approach to the procurement of services should be open-minded. There is no ideological dimension in terms of who provides services, and there should not be a clear division between contractor and client. The public service ethos, based on performance, accountability, universality, and professionalism, is vital and runs through the system regardless of provider.

4. An adaptable and learning-based approach to the challenge of public service delivery is required. The focus is on challenge and change, and administrators frequently ask the question of whether the activities being performed are bringing a net benefit to society.

Overall, the task of administrators is to open the system for as many as possible in order to widen the scope of participation. This is reflected in demands on the education, tasks, and personality of administrators:

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19 While the first scholarly work on network governance mostly pointed out the advantages of networks (see Rhodes 1997, Klijn & Koppenjan 2000), the latter pays attention to limitations. McGuire and Agranoff (2011) point out that networks contain resolution barriers in terms of power imbalances, overprocessing, and policy barriers and that there are difficulties in measuring the performance of networks with an outcome-based approach. They also stress the potential problems of the relationship between public administration and multi-organizational arrangements. Also, Stoker highlights a problem related to the administrative work in network governance, namely, the dilemma that occurs when administrators are expected to manage democracy. This might push citizens and politicians to the margin because managing full democracy, in terms of full legitimate involvement of stakeholders, is very demanding (Stoker 2006).
Education and experience
Administrators working according to the deliberation and communication work mode can be requested to have knowledge and experience from collaboration processes because the focus is on deliberation rather than hierarchy (Williams 2012:37-45). 6 et al. (2002:139) mention that the old notion of the “civil service generalist” should get an update. However, training is stressed as being of main importance. Formal education is thus likely to be of less importance because this work mode requires skills that are not formalized. Administrators will also be asked to have experience from network building because this requires certain skills, and in some cases the administrator’s own network is considered a useful asset. Finally, the deliberation and communication work mode stresses strategic planning as a useful skill for administrators because of the many contacts that will be necessary within this work mode. Strategic planning is not only a skill, it is also a certain kind of work that addresses the task of coordinating the organization into a specific direction, and thus experience from strategic work can also be expected to be desired if the expectation is that administrators should work according to the work mode of deliberation and communication.

Tasks
6 et al. (2002) call the deliberation and communication work mode “holistic governance” and stress that if it is desired to enhance network governance via more holistic work, it is important to recognize this because engaging in holistic work might come with professional risks. Other sectors might not recognize the work and effort by an administrator bridging sectors, and the administrator’s own organization might consider it a disadvantage because the sector-bridging administrator is engaging in other departments. These boundary spanners (Williams 2012) are liaison persons and organizers, dealing more with collaboration and coordination than actual content. They can be expected to have an extroverted focus or a focus on deliberative methods such as dialogue and participation, meaning it is in itself a task to be an outgoing personality, both inside and outside the organization. These administrators are expected to be active in creating and maintaining networks. They are also to a high extent involved in representation because networking means an increased number of meetings across boundaries (6 et al. 2002; Williams 2012).
Personality

Dedicated boundary spanners are described as reticulists, interpreters/communicators, coordinators, and entrepreneurs (Williams 2012:142). The entrepreneur role indicates that the advocacy/entrepreneurship work mode and the deliberation and communication work mode are closely connected. Also, 6 et al (2002) includes the advocacy/entrepreneur administrator when describing the administrator working in holistic governance. In this study, they are treated as two separated work modes based on their core missions. In the advocacy and entrepreneurship work mode, the focus is on entrepreneurship for change, in terms of specific values or interests, whereas the deliberation and communication work mode focuses on entrepreneurship in terms of creating coordination and collaboration.

The administrator working according to the deliberation and communication work mode needs to be cooperative in order to make these processes function smoothly. The personality of an administrator in the deliberation and communication work mode is focused on cultivating networks, e.g. to be relationship-oriented and confidence-inspiring (Williams 2012:38) and communicative and perceptive, because one task is to handle large amounts of information, and they need the skill to create dialogue and a common understanding (Williams 2012:37-45). This makes them different from administrators in the advocacy/entrepreneurship mode, who are not always expected to be smooth, but rather, to break norms in order to create change. Deliberation and communication administrators need the ability to frame things in suitable ways and to appreciate when and whom to speak to, e.g. a strategic personality (ibid: 39). If we consider advocacy and entrepreneurship to be something else than deliberation and communication, we can also see that there is a difference in the expectation of initiatives. The advocacy and entrepreneurship mode sees administrators as initiators, whereas the deliberation and communication mode is focused on the coordination of ideas and the administrator as a broker of them.

Summarizing the work mode of deliberation and communication, we see that awareness of public value and stakeholders is at the center, together with collaboration as a value in itself. The administrator’s task is to initiate, maintain, and coordinate collaboration and to be representative in networks, and the skills for this are what render legitimacy.
Model for analysis

The presented work modes represent ideals of public administrator work. The definition of the core mission within these ideals varies, and this determines what administrators are expected to have experience from, what they are expected to do, and what their personalities are expected to benefit. Figure 3 summarizes the work modes and indicators that will be used as an analytical tool to investigate what the cross-sector strategists are expected to do. This model will be applied to the whole data material of work advertisements with the main purpose of distinguishing to what extent the work modes are present in different ads and thus distinguishing how contextual expectations on the formal posts are composed.

The presentation of the results is done in two steps. First, percentage data are given showing how phrases for each category of education and experience, tasks, and personality are distributed according to the four work modes. The numbers of phrases sorted under one category are treated as the full data, and the percentage shows the relative distribution of phrases according to work modes. By doing so, we can distinguish to what extent the different work modes are present in the ads. Second, indicator data are presented showing the number of times indicator phrases are used in each group of ads, e.g. cross-sector strategists, managers, and social workers. The indicator data are presented according to each category of education and experience, tasks, and personality. The indicator data are complemented with extracts from the ads.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant work mode</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Personality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education and experience</td>
<td>Tasks</td>
<td>Personality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on legality and process</td>
<td>Knowledge/ experience from the field and/or public sector work</td>
<td>Process general cases (investigation/trial/action/case follow-up/documentation)</td>
<td>Oriented towards impartiality/legality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core mission: Administration</td>
<td>Experience from political organization</td>
<td>Work according to established methods/legislation in effect</td>
<td>Have administrative ability/meticulousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific professional education/training</td>
<td>Have focus on and serve political decisions/administration</td>
<td>Understanding of the political process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accomplish specific missions</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Knowledge/experience from a specific topic</td>
<td>Promote/monitor/conduct external analysis</td>
<td>Personal will/interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core mission: Change</td>
<td>Experience from driving work/change work and projects</td>
<td>Engage/ inspire/support for change</td>
<td>Dedicated/engaged/persistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education/training in a specific field</td>
<td>Be a consultative knowledge carrier/educator</td>
<td>Actively observing/driving/initiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Have visionary/long-term focus</td>
<td>Creative/curious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on results</td>
<td>Knowledge/experience from working towards results and development</td>
<td>Achieve goals/cost-efficiency</td>
<td>Flexible/progress-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core mission: Management</td>
<td>Management experience</td>
<td>Have organizational overview/management focus/comprehensive perspective</td>
<td>Ability to plan/organize/be a clear leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General education/training</td>
<td>Develop/evaluate</td>
<td>Motivating/delegating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Look for quality/best practice</td>
<td>Emphasizing customers/service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on deliberation and communication</td>
<td>Knowledge/experience of collaboration processes</td>
<td>Collaboration/coordination</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core mission: Collaboration</td>
<td>Experience from network building</td>
<td>Have an extroverted focus on dialogue/participation</td>
<td>Relationship-oriented/confidence-inspiring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience from strategic work</td>
<td>Create/maintain networks</td>
<td>Communicative/percipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis of work advertisements

Percentage data

This section shows the extent to which the different work modes are expressed in the work ads per administrator group by showing how the categories of *Education and experience*, *Tasks*, and *Personality* are divided according to the work modes in each group. Table 6 shows the results for the cross-sector strategist ads.

Table 6. Percentage data for cross-sector strategist ads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Focus on legality and process</th>
<th>Focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship</th>
<th>Focus on results</th>
<th>Focus on deliberation and communication</th>
<th>Total, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; experience</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this table, we can see that cross-sector strategists to a large extent are expected to work according to the advocacy and entrepreneurship work mode, and also that their personality is expected to fulfill an advocate and entrepreneurial role. But even more prominent is the expectation that their personality features should be deliberative and communicative. This could be interpreted that networking is considered the most appropriate tool for the task of advocating the values that cross-sector strategists are responsible for. To a very limited extent, cross-sector strategists are expected to follow the legality and process work mode in terms of personality. The demands on education and experience also match the advocacy and entrepreneurship work mode based on demands on experience from this kind of work. Remarkably often, however, demands on education and experience fit within the legality and process work mode.

Table 7 shows the results for public manager ads.
Table 7. Percentage data for public manager ads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Focus on legality and process</th>
<th>Focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship</th>
<th>Focus on results</th>
<th>Focus on deliberation and communication</th>
<th>Total, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; experience</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this table, we can see that the dominating expectation on the managers is a focus on results in terms of education and experience, tasks, and personality. When it comes to education and experience, the requests are sometimes within the legality and process mode. The tasks are clearly expressed in one work mode, with strains from the other three. This could be interpreted as the tasks being clearly dominated by the results-oriented work mode, but experience and personality traits considered necessary to fulfill them come from the results-oriented work mode as well from the advocacy and entrepreneurship work mode and the deliberation and communication work mode.

Table 8 shows the results for the social worker ads.

Table 8. Percentage data for social worker ads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Focus on legality and process</th>
<th>Focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship</th>
<th>Focus on results</th>
<th>Focus on deliberation and communication</th>
<th>Total, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; experience</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on this table, we can see that the education and experience and tasks categories are clearly dominated by the legality and process work mode based on demands on specific professional education and training. The tasks first and foremost consist of processing general cases and working according to established methods and the legislation in effect. To a certain extent, demands on education also come from the advocacy and entrepreneurship mode. Requested personality features, however, are only to a very limited extent described by the legality and process work mode. The dominating work mode when it comes to personality is the deliberation and communication work mode, with clear demands also on advocacy and entrepreneurship and a results-oriented focus. This could be interpreted as a request for classical administrators in terms of education and experience and tasks, but that they are expected to be the most capable of fulfilling their tasks if they have personality features of less classical work modes.

In the next section, the result will be presented as frequencies on the indicator level to show how many times the indicators are present in each group of ads.

**Indicator data**

*Education and experience*

Table 9 shows indicator data for Education and experience. What we can see is that the demands are mixed, and all work modes are present in all groups of ads, but also that there is one work mode that dominates more in each group – advocacy and entrepreneurship dominates in cross-sector strategist ads, results dominate in manager ads, and legality and process dominate in social worker ads.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant work mode</th>
<th>Number of phrases</th>
<th>Cross-sector strategists</th>
<th>Public managers</th>
<th>Social workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on legality and process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/experience from the field and/or public sector work</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience from political organization</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific professional education/training</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of legality and process phrases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on advocating general values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/experience from a specific topic</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience from driving work/change work and projects</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/training in a specific field</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of advocating general values phrases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/experience from working towards results and development</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management experience</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General education/training</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of results phrases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on deliberation and communication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/experience of collaboration processes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience from network building</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience from strategic work</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of deliberation and communication phrases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of Education &amp; experience phrases</strong></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The demands for cross-sector strategist posts mostly come from an advocacy and entrepreneurship-focused work mode, but also from results-oriented and legality and process-oriented work modes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Swedish original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You have a relevant university college degree, preferably with a social science orientation, plus experience from working in a politically governed organization, and you have a great understanding of the political process. (Development strategist)</td>
<td>Du har relevant högskoleexamen, gärna med samhällsvetenskaplig inriktning samt erfarenhet från att arbeta i en politiskt styrd organisation med stor förståelse för den demokratiska processen (Utvecklingsstrateg)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dominant request is knowledge/experience in a specific topic, usually the one for which they will be working strategically. The request for education for public managers mostly comes from the results-oriented work mode, but also from the legality and process-focused work mode. The request for management experience stands out, as does the request for knowledge/experience from the field and/or public sector work. Experience from political organization and general education/training are also prominent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Swedish original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your formal competence might look different, but experience from working with young people is of course a merit. You have to have a strong personal interest in social topics, and you must be very well oriented in municipal organization. (Youth strategist)</td>
<td>Din formella kompetens kan se ut på olika sätt, men erfarenhet av arbete med unga är självklart meriterande. Du måste ha ett starkt personligt intresse för samhällsfrågor, och vara mycket väl orinterad i kommunal organisation. (Ungdomsstrateg)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The division-line between knowledge/experience from the field and/or public sector work, and knowledge/experience from a specific topic is drawn between “field” and “topic”. “Field” is considered to be a wider concept with assigned sectors, such as knowledge/experience from social work, education, etc., whereas “topic” is more specific, such as knowledge/experience from working with drug abuse, gender equality issues, or the convention of the rights of the child.

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20 The division-line between knowledge/experience from the field and/or public sector work, and knowledge/experience from a specific topic is drawn between “field” and “topic”. “Field” is considered to be a wider concept with assigned sectors, such as knowledge/experience from social work, education, etc., whereas “topic” is more specific, such as knowledge/experience from working with drug abuse, gender equality issues, or the convention of the rights of the child.
We are looking for you with an academic education oriented towards social services, caregiving, or other social science field. You have experience from qualified leadership positions in the social sector and good knowledge about current legislation, plus good knowledge of economics and have an economical mindset. (Social manager)

Social workers have first and foremost demands from the legality and process mode, but also from the advocacy and entrepreneurship-focused mode. This is mostly due to demands on specific professional education/training, i.e. a social work degree (socionomexamen).

A degree in social work or other equivalent education. Great importance is given to personal suitability. Experience from processing social service cases or the exercise of authority within public administration is desirable. (Social secretary)

They also face requests on knowledge/experience from the field or public sector work, and knowledge/experience from a specific topic, which is usually the specific area with which they will be working. Thus there are sometimes requests on them being more generally educated or trained in their field and to hold more specific knowledge about certain topics, but they are not expected to have experience from driving work, change work, or projects.
English translation:
We are looking for you who are an educated social worker and have experience exercising authority within the social service. We also want you to have good knowledge about SoL [The Social Services Act], LVU [The Care of Young Persons Act], and LVM [The Care of Drug Abusers Act]. If you have knowledge in BBIC (Integrated Children’s System) and MI (Motivational Interviewing), it is an advantage. If you also have work experience in the field of abuse, we consider it a merit.

Swedish original:
Vi söker dig som är utbildad socionom och har erfarenhet av myndighetsutövning inom socialtjänsten. Vi vill även att du har goda kunskaper inom SoL, LVU och LVM. Om du har kunskaper inom BBIC (Barns Behov I Centrum) och MI (Motivational Interviewing) är det en fördel. Har du dessutom arbetslivserfarenhet av missbruk ser vi det som meriterande.

Once conclusion that can be drawn from the indicator data for Education and experience is that the mix of expectations to a certain extent is caused by demands on experience from the field and/or public sector work, as well as experience from political organization. The most plausible explanation for this is the fact that all three ad groups are ads for public administrators. Thus, experience and knowledge about this specific kind of organization will be useful in all groups, regardless of whether their tasks and personality are expected to come from this work mode.

Another conclusion is that ads for cross-sector strategist posts express the greatest variety of expectations, followed by manager ads and social worker ads. This can be explained by the fact that this group is the least well defined.

Tasks
Table 10 shows the indicator data for Tasks. It shows a clear pattern, where the three groups of administrator ads are connected to different work modes. There are clearly dominating work modes for different administrator ads, and advocacy and entrepreneurship dominate in cross-sector strategist ads, results dominate in manager ads, and legality and process dominate in social worker ads. At the same time, the develop/evaluate tasks and the collaboration/coordination tasks are stressed in all three groups of ads, although they are stressed more highly in some than in others.
Table 10. Indicator data *Tasks*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant work mode</th>
<th>Number of phrases</th>
<th>Cross-sector strategists</th>
<th>Public managers</th>
<th>Social workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on legality and process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process general cases (Investigation/trial/action/case follow-up/documentation)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work according to established methods/legislation in effect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have focus on and serve political decisions/administration</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accomplish specific missions</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of legality and process phrases</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote/monitor/conduct external analysis</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage/inspire/support for change</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be a consultative knowledge carrier/educator</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have visionary/long-term focus</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of advocacy and entrepreneurship phrases</strong></td>
<td>176</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve goals/cost-efficiency</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have organizational overview/management focus/comprehensive perspective</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop/evaluate</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look for quality/best practice</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of results phrases</strong></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on deliberation and communication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration/coordination</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have an extroverted focus on dialogue/participation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create/maintain networks</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of deliberation and communication phrases</strong></td>
<td>109</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of <em>Tasks</em> phrases</strong></td>
<td>456</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cross-sector strategists’ tasks are dominated by the advocacy and entrepreneurship work mode. However, they are expected to perform tasks within all four modes. Develop/evaluate is one important task within the results-focused work mode, and collaboration/coordination is important within the deliberation and communication-focused work mode.

**English translation:**
It is about implementation and realization (application) of the convention of the rights of the child in the businesses of the municipality, the preparation of the municipality’s children balance sheet, education of the municipality’s employees, and the spreading of knowledge, plus contributing to strengthening cooperation in the region. (Children strategist)

**Swedish original:**
Detta handlar om implementering och genomförande (tillämpning) av barnkonventionen i kommunens verksamheter, framtagande av kommunens barnbokslut, utbildning av kommunens anställda och kunskapspridning samt att medverka till att det regionala samarbetet förstärks. (Barnstrateg)

**English translation:**
As a gender equality strategist, you will coordinate, support, and drive the municipality’s development work connected to the strategy for gender mainstreaming. (Gender equality strategist)

**Swedish original:**
Som Jämställdhetsstrateg ska du samorda, stödja och driva kommunens utvecklingsarbete kopplat till strategin jämställdhetsintegration. (Jämställdhetsstrateg)

The numbers of tasks within the legality and process-focused work mode are also significant – having a focus on carrying out political decisions and accomplishing specific missions stand out.

Public managers’ tasks are dominated by the results-focused mode, with strains from the other three; in particular, the collaboration/coordination tasks within the deliberation and communication work mode and the focus on carrying out political decisions/administration within the legality and process work mode are prominent.
English translation:
Your assignment is to lead and organize and to coordinate the department’s business in order to achieve the long-term goals prescribed by elected politicians. To do this, new ways of thinking, the energy to act, and an ability to find new approaches are demanded. One prerequisite is also a good view of the external world and to be good at external analysis, plus having a comprehensive way of thinking. (Manager of education)

Swedish original:
Ditt uppdrag är att leda och organisera samt samordna förvaltningens verksamhet för att uppnå de långsiktiga målen som är fastställda av de förtroendevalda politikerna. För detta krävs ett nytänkande, handlingskraft och en förmåga att hitta nya angreppssätt. En förutsättning är också en god omvärldsbild och aktiv omvärldsbevakning samt ett helhetstänk. (Utbildningschef)

Social workers’ tasks are dominated by the legality and process work mode, with a stress on the processing of general cases and working according to established methods and legislation. The tasks also have strains from other work modes, and just like in the cross-sector strategist ads, develop/evaluate is considered an important task within the results-focused work mode, and collaboration/coordination is important within the deliberation and communication-focused work mode.

English translation:
The tasks include processing of economic assistance. The position includes client meetings, examining needs, documentation, and the establishment of action plans. An important part of the work is cooperating with different actors, both within the agency and other external agencies such as the Employment Service, the Social Insurance Office, health care, etc. As a social secretary, we assume that you work from a comprehensive perspective regarding both people and business. (Social secretary)

Swedish original:
Arbetsuppgifterna omfattar handläggning av ekonomiskt bistånd. I anställningen ingår klientmöten, utreda behov, dokumenterar samt upprätta handlingsplaner. En viktig del i arbetet är att samarbeta med olika aktörer, både inom förvaltningen och andra externa såsom Arbetsförmedlingen, Försäkringskassan och sjukvården etc. Som socialsekreterare förutsätter vi att du arbetar utifrån en helhetssyn avseende både människor och verksamhet. (Socialsekreterare)
One conclusion we can draw from the Tasks indicator data is that tasks that are prominent for all groups (develop/evaluate and collaboration/communication), can be interpreted as having strong valence, meaning they hold a strong legitimacy and thus need to be stressed for all groups, regardless of whether the original tasks for the group are close or far from these tasks. Another conclusion that can be drawn is that cross-sector strategists have the most mixed tasks. The advocacy and entrepreneurship work mode is dominating, but numbers are high also for other work modes.

**Personality**

Table 11 shows the indicator data for Personality. Here the results generally are a bit more mixed than for Tasks. The requested personality matches the dominating work modes in Tasks for cross-sector strategists and public managers, but not for social workers. Requests for personality traits in social worker ads are dominated by the deliberation and communication work mode.
Table 11. Indicator data *Personality*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant work mode</th>
<th>Cross-sector strategists</th>
<th>Public managers</th>
<th>Social workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on legality and process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriented towards impartiality/legality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have administrative ability/meticulousness</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of the political process</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of legality and process phrases</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on advocacy and entrepreneurship</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal will/interest</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated/engaged/persistent</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively observing/driving/initiating</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative/curious</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of advocacy and entrepreneurship phrases</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible/progress-oriented</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to plan/organize/be a clear leader</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivating/delegating</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasizing customers/service</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of results phrases</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus on deliberation and communication</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship-oriented/confidence-inspiring</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative/percipient</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of deliberation and communication phrases</strong></td>
<td>81</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of Personality phrases</strong></td>
<td>201</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Requests for cross-sector strategists’ personality traits show rather equal numbers of personality traits within the deliberation and communication work mode as in the advocacy and entrepreneurship work mode. In particular, cross-sector strategist ads request actively driving/observing/initiating persons who are communicative/percipient. The score for Personality in the results-focused work mode is also significant.

English translation:
As a person, we want you to find it easy to cooperate with varying actors and to create engagement. You are used to working independently, have a structured way of working, and have a driving personality. You are development minded and have the ability to see the overall picture in public health work. (Public health strategist)

Swedish original:
Som person vill vi att du har lätt för att samverka med olika aktörer och skapa engagement. Du är van att arbeta självständigt, har ett strukturerat arbetssätt och är drivande. Du är utvecklingsinriktad och har förmågan att se helheten i folkhälsoarbetet. (Folkhälsostrateg)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Swedish original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a person, you are inspiring and have a good ability to motivate others. You are extroverted and thrive by developing relations and networks. You are also good at starting, leading, and following up activities and have good analytical abilities. (Gender equality strategist)</td>
<td>Som person är du inspirerande och du har god förmåga att motivera andra. Du är utåtriktad och trivs med att utveckla relationer och nätverk. Du är också bra på att starta upp, leda och följa upp aktiviteter och har god analytisk förmåga. (Jämställdhetsstrateg)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The requested cross-sector strategist personality traits obviously describe a person who is dedicated and engaged in his/her work and to the topic he/she represents, and this is combined with strong networking skills.

Requests for public managers’ personality traits are also mixed, dominated by the results-focused work mode, but high also within the deliberation and communication and advocacy and entrepreneurship work modes. The main request is the ability to plan/organize/be a good leader, someone who like cross-sector strategists is communicative/percipient and who is dedicated, engaged, and persistent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Swedish original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You shall be a clear leader for the department and will work to steer the organization through vision, goals, and follow-up/evaluation. With a good understanding of processes in a politically governed organization, you will work for constructive dialogue and a good collaborative climate. (Manager of children and education)</td>
<td>Du ska vara en tydlig ledare för förvaltningen och verka för att organisationen styrs genom vision, mål och uppföljning/utvärdering. Med god förståelse för processerna i en politiskt styrd organisation ska du verka för en konstruktiv dialog och ett gott samarbetsklimat. (Barn- och utbildningschef)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mix of requested features is also valid for social workers. The dominant requested personality trait is found within the deliberation and communication work mode, but scores for the results-focused and advocacy and entrepreneurship work modes are also high. The main request is that they should be cooperative and communicative/percipient people with a personal will/interest to engage in the topic they work with.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English translation</th>
<th>Swedish original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You express yourself well in speech and in writing. You are meticulous and structured and have a good ability to plan and organize your work. You are flexible and accustomed to working independently. As a person, you are stable, development minded, and have a good ability for analysis and reflection. You find it easy to cooperate with others. (Social secretary)</td>
<td>Du uttrycker dig väl i tal och i skrift. Du är noggrann och strukturerad och har god förmåga att planera och organisera ditt arbete. Du är flexibel och är van vid att arbeta självständigt. Som person är du stabil, utvecklingsriktad och har god förmåga till analys och reflektion. Du har lätt att samarbeta med andra. (Socialsekreterare)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One conclusion we can draw is that the personality that is considered suitable to perform certain tasks does not always match the work mode of these tasks, as is the case with the expectations expressed in social worker ads where
requests on Personality are dominated by the deliberation and communication work mode, and the Tasks are dominated by the legality and process work mode. This can be interpreted as if the deliberation and communication work mode includes personality traits that are considered to be more suitable for performing legality and process tasks. For cross-sector strategists, advocacy and entrepreneurship personality traits are considered suitable to perform advocacy and entrepreneurship tasks, and the same goes for managers with regard to results-focused personality and tasks.

Another conclusion is that even though there are certain dominant work modes, there is a clear mix of demands. More mixed requests for personality traits might indicate a desire to find “Jacks of all trades” personnel as a way to keep the organization flexible. However, the mixed requests only cover three categories of the four, and requests for legality and process-focused personality are generally low (although they are slightly higher for public managers), and this indicates a low valence for these traits. One illustrating example is that an orientation towards impartiality/legality is only mentioned once in all of the ads.

Conclusions

The analysis of the ads shows us that cross-sector strategists above all are expected to work according to the advocacy and entrepreneurship-focused work mode. This could be expected because their formal posts can be argued to constitute an attempt to formalize a behavior that we know from previous research exists among public administrators. However, other work modes are also clearly present, and cross-sector strategists are required to be aware of the separate roles between administration and politics, which is expressed by demands that they should have a focus on carrying out political decisions, administration, and accomplishing specific missions. They are also required to work with a focus on results, which is expressed by the demand that they should work with development/evaluation. It could of course be argued that working with development/evaluation is a suitable tool for the advocacy/entrepreneurship work mode, and thus, high numbers for this indicator do not support the argument that they should have a results-oriented focus. Yet I argue that it does because other tools regarding other modes are present in the analytical table but this one stands out. Even stronger is the expression of both tasks and personality within the deliberation and communication work mode.
Thus, cross-sector strategists have certain executive and administrative tasks that fit within a bureaucratic model. In most cases, they are not expected to have a clear professional legitimation, as long as they have a higher education of some kind that provides them with the skills to carry out the strategist’s mission. But when it comes to personality, the work mode is clear – cross-sector strategists should be active advocates and entrepreneurs who know how to communicate and form networks. They are expected to cross boundaries, both organizational and normative, and thus to work horizontally both informally and formally.

When comparing cross-sector strategists with managers and social workers, we see that certain things are similar. For example, social workers and managers are also expected to be communicative and to work with collaboration. Ads for social workers express clear demands on specific professional education, which supports the bureaucratic ideal, whereas managers are required to have appropriate education, but this might include many things. When it comes to tasks, social worker ads are more specific, and they seek people who will process cases within their department and profession. Managers’ job descriptions are more vague, but one thing stands out – they are to have a main responsibility for the efficient management of their sector, and as persons they are expected to have the ability to plan and organize in order to achieve the best results. This is not so clearly present in the cross-sector strategist and social worker ads.

When comparing the dominant work modes for the three groups, the first conclusion is that all groups are faced with all work modes. The work modes are coexisting, and how and when they are expressed will in practice be up to the situation and the personal administrator’s judgment. The second conclusion is that the ads for the three groups of administrators, although they all hold aspects of all work modes, emphasize the work modes differently. Social workers’ dominant work mode is a focus on legality and process, combined with some aspects of deliberation and communication. They are not expected to be active advocates, they are not expected to create and maintain networks, and they are not expected to have a focus on organizational efficiency. The main guiding principles are their professional knowledge, the law, and their ability to communicate and collaborate. Public managers’ dominant work mode is a focus on results. They are expected to have a holistic view and to work for the good of the organization. Bureaucratic principles are not that that important. Networks, advocacy, and entrepreneurship are strong sources of legitimacy because managers are expected to work with
developing and improving their organizations. But this legitimacy stems from an organizational efficiency perspective, and they should engage in entrepreneurship, advocacy, and networking in the name of organizational efficiency. Cross-sector strategists at first glimpse look similar to managers in many ways – they should also be engaged in networking, entrepreneurship, and advocacy. However, their focus is different. While managers gain legitimacy via the efficiency of their organizations, thus in a more vertical way, cross-sector strategists gain their legitimacy via their capacity to increase the overall impact of their assigned topic across boundaries, i.e. horizontally. Their advocacy and entrepreneurial skills are expected to be used in the name of the topic itself. Thus, their dominant work mode has an advocacy-entrepreneurship focus combined with deliberation and communication. The main requested characteristics of cross-sector strategists are that they should be actively driving their topic and they should have the networking and communicative skills needed to give their topic a stronger impact.

To summarize, the contextual expectations on what cross-sector strategists are expected to do are more varied compared to the expectations on the other two groups of administrators in the study. They also have a more extensive presentation of tasks and personality features, indicating that the expectations on what they should do include an extensive mix of both informal and formal aspects. This supports the argument that the cross-sector strategists are likely to face more value conflicts related to negotiation and reflection than other administrators. This is as far this study takes us. The next step is to look at research questions 2 and 3:

*Do cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts in ideational, structural, and agency dilemmas?*

*If so, how do they cope with them?*
Ideational Dilemmas

Ideational dilemmas refer to conceptual clashes in the terminology that is used to define the process and content of the horizontal tradition, i.e. strategic policy areas and cross-sectoral work. The strategic policy areas and cross-sectoral work consist of a wide conceptual apparatus that is overlapping and that includes ambiguous political definitions. This leads to ideational dilemmas regarding how the process and content should be defined.

Dilemma of defining process

The themes that previous research have pointed out as potentially troublesome for defining process is how to define strategic work and which level of integration with the vertical sectors is appropriate. Based on the analysis of work advertisements, we can conclude that contextual expectations on cross-sector strategists appear to include strong variations. The interviewed cross-sector strategists differentiate between strategic, operative and consultative work, similar to what Page (2011) points out as the work methods for gender equality advisors. (Strategic work is here used as an empirical term to describe the specific form of work for cross-sector strategists. The respondents thus elaborate upon their “strategic work” in terms of strategic, operative, and consultative work.) When the cross-sector strategists in this study elaborate on what this means, consultative work is defined as supporting departments in their work with strategic policy areas, operative work means performing active work directly towards citizens, and strategic work means getting others in the organization do things, with integration in mind. A majority of cross-sector strategists say that their overall task can be summarized as monitoring the policy areas at hand in relation to politics and the municipal organization.

How to define strategic

On the question of what it means to work strategically, a common answer is to make others do things and to think in certain ways. “The goals should be in the departments, not on us” is something that cross-sector strategists stress repeatedly, meaning that formal responsibility should reside in the departments. As the cross-sector strategist in the introduction says, the strategic role
means that you should bring up things you know that others (usually the managers) should do. But in order to achieve this, other work methods than explicit strategic lobbying must be applied. Working consultatively or opera-
tively is thus often perceived as a way to open up for more long-term strategic work. However, working consultatively with support is sometimes also the overall target of the strategic work, according to several cross-sector strategists. In this imagined scenario, the organization has taken on the responsibility of ensuring that the strategic policy areas are included in the processes of the departments. The cross-sector strategists express that they in this scenario work as consultants to the departments, providing them with tools and methods, but they do not have to be strategic lobbyists or to monitor the strategic policy area in the municipal organization. This imagined scenario resembles the current situation in that cross-sector strategists often take on the consultative role in order to reach out to others. (This will be further elaborated upon in the following chapters.) However, in the desired imagined scenario, they do not have to take on a consultative role with a hidden strategic agenda because the responsibility for the strategic policy areas is secured by the organization. In the imagined scenario, cross-sector strategists instead put focus on developing methods and keeping up-to-date with developments in the field, and thus they become more experts than lobbyists. The respondents’ elaborations on how they wish they could work and their stories on what they are actually doing when working strategically show a gap between interests and positions. The respondents do not find defining strategic work to be a dilemma; for them it means working to make others do things. In the process of convincing others to take on the cross-sector policy areas, they apply various methods with a more or less hidden strategic agenda.

In the survey, cross-sector strategists were asked to estimate the extent to which they would describe their work as strategic, operative, or consultative. The cross-sector strategists responded on a five-grade scale from “not at all” to “a very high extent”. The results show that a vast majority define their work as strategic, and 61 percent consider their work strategic to a very high extent. Furthermore, 26 percent define their work as consultative to very high extent, and 15 percent describe their work as operative to very high extent. But what then explains the extent to which cross-sector strategists operate in different ways? For instance, do cross-sector strategists of the three different types identified in the previous chapter lean on different methods?
Regression analysis: What explains the choice of work methods – strategic, operative, or consultative – among cross-sector strategists?

This question is answered by a multiple OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression analysis, where the three questions about methods are the dependent variables and the indexes defining the three types of strategists are the main independent variables. The results are presented in Table 12. The results show strong significant effects indicating that cross-sector strategists who to a higher degree could be described as “policy strategists” are much more inclined to describe their work as strategic, and there is also a weaker but still significant positive effect of being a bureaucrat strategist in Models 1 and 2 (controlling for personal and organizational characteristics). The extent to which a cross-sector strategist could be described as a project strategist does not seem to affect the choice of strategic methods. In contrast, the analysis shows significant effects indicating that policy strategists are less inclined to use operative methods, whereas there is a weak effect in Model 3 (controlling for strategic policy areas) suggesting that project strategists choose these methods to a higher degree. The extent to which a cross-sector strategist could be described as a bureaucrat strategist does not seem to affect the choice of operative methods. But the results also show that bureaucrat strategists are the ones most likely to choose consultative methods. The choice of these methods is not correlated to the extent the respondents could be described as policy or project strategists. In Model 3 (controlling for strategic policy area), the strategic policy areas for which the respondents are responsible are also included as independent variables. The results show that there is little evidence for claiming that the policy area affects the choice of methods, with two exceptions – cross-sector strategists responsible for disability as a strategic policy are much more inclined to use consultative methods, whereas those responsible for gender equality policy are less likely to use these methods. Furthermore, the survey results indicate that strategic methods are more common in larger municipalities and that cross-sector strategists with a higher education are more inclined to work with consultative methods and less so with operative methods. Age, gender, and workplace of the cross-sector strategists do not significantly affect their choice of methods.
Table 12. What explains the choice of work methods – strategic, operative, or consultative – among cross-sector strategists?

**OLS regression (B-values)**

| Dependent variables: | Strategic methods (0–4) | | | Operative methods (0–4) | | | Consultative methods (0–4) | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                      | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Strategist type      |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Policy strategist    | 1.528** | 1.649** | 1.670** | - .801* | - .930** | - .791* | .007 | .119 | -.170  |          |          |          |
| Project strategist   | -.008   | -.046   | -.078   | .587    | .607    | .780*   | .253   | .194 | .277   |          |          |          |
| Bureaucrat strategist| .654**  | .586*   | .522    | -.131   | .074    | .026    | 1.473**| 1.339**| 1.465**|          |          |          |
| Personal and organizational characteristics |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Age: years           | .002    | -.001   | -.004   | -.007   | .007    | .005    |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Gender: Male = 1     | -.219   | -.183   | .241    | .156    | -.227   | -.164   |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Education: High = 1  | .060    | -.018   | -.631*  | -.646*  | .619**  | .564*   |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Municipal office     | .045    | .068    | -.007   | -.023   | -.071   | .033    |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Municipality population (thousands of inhabitants) | .001** | .001** |          | .000    | .000    | .000    |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Political regime: Left = 1 | .020 | .067 | .090    | -.025   | -.124   | -.130   |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Strategic policy area (1 = yes, 0 = no) |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Diversity            | .136    |          | .239    |          | .001    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Integration          | .075    |          | .264    |          | .042    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Gender equality      | .027    |          | .002    |          | -.140*  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Public health        | .126    |          | -.295   |          | .106    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Security             | -.072   |          | .219    |          | -.150   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Youth                | -.007   |          | -.164   |          | -.203   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Children             | -.042   |          | .070    |          | .109    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Disability           | .152    |          | -.067   |          | .568**  |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Human rights         | -.097   |          | -.206   |          | -.274   |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Democracy            | -.285   |          | .144    |          | .045    |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Adjusted R²          | .278    | .306    | .305    | .023    | .049    | .056    | .119   | .153 | .185   |          |          |          |

Comments: The dependent variables are responses to the question "To what extent do you define your work as strategic, operative, or consultative?" where the strategists responded on a five-grade scale from 0 = "not at all" to 4 = "to a very high extent". The categorization of cross-sector strategists are based on the factor analysis index, see Table 5. N = 182. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05.
The survey question of to what extent the work can be defined as strategic, operative, or consultative was asked to find out how cross-sector strategists define the work they are actually performing, not how they would like things to be. In the interviews, cross-sector strategists were asked to elaborate on the actual situation in relation to how they wish the work to be organized. This gives a deeper understanding of the inbuilt conceptual dilemma of how to define the strategic work when there are several coexisting ideas. There is a variety among cross-sector strategists in how they perceive the relation between the current situation and what is desired. The majority of interviewed cross-sector strategists stress that they mix operational and strategic work, but that they would like to reach a state where they could dedicate themselves to pure strategic work, with the overall if yet utopic and hypothetical goal of eventually making themselves redundant once the organizational departments fully undertake the responsibility for the strategic policy areas. However, they realize that there is no support structure for this yet. The cross-sector strategists mention that contextual support structures for strategic and consultative work have become dramatically stronger in recent years. However, the job of a cross-sector strategist often still contains a certain amount of operative work. The institutionalization of the strategic approach, where cross-sector strategists as far as possible try to stay away from executive work, is mentioned by a majority of the respondents as a result of years of hard work explaining and pushing for it in their organizations. In particular, public health strategists stress that it has taken them time to “explain to the organizations that a public health strategist’s job is to work with strategic public health; not being a healthy life style group leader who gives gym classes and courses in eating habits”. Several cross-sector strategists stress that “it can be difficult sometimes, because everyone has an opinion about what we should do”. At the same time, they also mention that they have extensive discretion to frame their formal posts, and they do so with their conceptual idea of how strategic work should be defined in mind.

The cross-sector strategists generally have an agenda-setting dedication, focusing on structural change. However, in practical work, the cross-sector strategists perceive the utility-focus of diversity management to be a fruitful method for reaching out to different actors and as a necessary step towards deeper changes and integration of the strategic policy areas in the rest of the organization. Cross-sector strategists thus make a clear and explicit distinction between interests (which is a more agenda-setting dedication) and positions (where they deliberate on the utility focus to reach out to crucial actors). They deliberate on who they can be in the organization, and they reach the
conclusion that in order to bring together the dedication to the agenda-setting approach and the contextual conditioning, the utility approach is often the most fruitful way. This deliberation process thus has an instrumental character in terms how to reach the goals, but it also has a focus on the overall ideals in that the reflexive position-taking in order to achieve a specific dedicated interest is a very active process. The cross-sector strategists thus have a rather pragmatic and instrumental approach – “what works works”. In most cases, this means trying to reduce the power struggle between the vertical sectors and the strategic policy areas. The power struggle to some extent varies between strategic policy areas. In the survey, the extent to which the policy area matters when it comes to explaining the cross-sector strategists’ choice of work methods might be related to the perceived level of inherent power struggle. It might also be related to whether diversity management’s focus on utility and the individual is perceived as applicable.

The stories from the interviewed cross-sector strategists support this assumption. If a strategic policy area is perceived as less structurally power-focused and more focused on utility, it is easier to reach out to different actors and to work consultatively without a hidden strategic target. If we compare the interviews, the gender equality strategists are compared to other cross-sector strategists who are more eager to highlight the power struggle as an important aspect of their work. They also more than others seem to be adjusting their methods, if possible, to appear smoother than what they really are. Security strategists, on the other hand, either do not mention power struggles at all, or they mention them but only in contrast to other strategic cross-sector strategists and other strategic policy areas. They highlight that strategic security work still might be difficult, but less so than the work of other cross-sector strategists due to the more solid regulation in the security field. “When I think of how tough I find strategic work within my policy area to be, me, who still has this hard regulation and definition with me, I feel sorry for the others!” one security strategist says. The interviewed cross-sector strategists who are less focused on power struggle to a lesser extent see consultative work as a method for being secretly strategic, but more as the core of the work itself. The perception of power struggle in turn appears to have some effects on the extent to which cross-sector strategists define consultative work as a method for being secretly strategic, i.e. they position themselves as consultative, but with a strategic interest in mind. This might (albeit somewhat speculatively) explain why the policy strategists in the analysis in Table 12 say that they perform mostly strategic work – through their closer relation to the political and managerial level, they have an arena where they can be
more openly strategic and do not have to disguise their strategic work as consultative work.

Thus, the definition of strategic work is not a strong conceptual dilemma for the cross-sector strategists, and they generally have similar ideas of how process and content should be defined and they do not express extensive deliberation on other options (although with some variation regarding the extent to which a consultative approach should be seen as a method for strategic work or if it is the core of the work). However, as the respondents’ stories show, the conceptual idea of strategic work that the respondents generally dedicate themselves to becomes a dilemma (albeit not ideational) in terms how to organize the work in relation to the organization and other actors. The reason for this is the various contextual expectations on what cross-sector strategists should do, which do not always match the cross-sector strategists’ conceptual ideas. The organization of the work in relation to these expectations is elaborated upon in Chapters 6 and 7 on Structural dilemmas and Agency dilemmas.

Level of integration
The second process aspect of conceptual dilemmas is the level of integration. Integration refers to the levels of incorporation and acknowledgement of horizontal strategic policy areas in the vertical sectors. The interviews were conducted from autumn 2011 until autumn 2013, and during this time period, some re-organizations occurred. Whether or not these re-organizations are generalizable is hard to tell, but there seemed to be a tendency towards removing strategic posts with explicit responsibilities, with the argument being a desire to incorporate the strategic policy areas in the organizational departments, i.e. taking steps towards more integration of the horizontal into the vertical. One gender equality strategist mentions that the job previously was defined as working directly towards citizens and the departments, but now the role has changed to one with an indirect focus on gender equality by working with the staff, who in turn are the ones who encounter citizens via regular activities in the departments. A youth strategist was moved from the central municipal office to the sector of culture and leisure in order to ease the integration with the departments (although the youth strategist himself did not agree with the argument). In another municipality, nothing changed in terms of organization, but the longstanding policy was that no specialist strategists should be employed. Instead, the group of administrators (not formally referred to as strategists/coordinators or developers, but formally holding strategic tasks) working in the central office should be prepared to
deal with various tasks regarding strategic policy areas. (However, this group of cross-sector strategist-administrators had created a semi-formal division between themselves). Then again, there were also opposite examples. In one municipality, a sustainability strategist was employed explicitly to work with the central vision of the municipality and was in charge of the newly formed “strategist” group that gathered all cross-sector strategists from the municipality. But also here, the public health strategists in the municipality had shared the responsibility between each other and thus created what could be defined as cross-sectoral sectorization. Both versions are expressions of a contextual governance aspiration to create more integration of strategic policy areas, but the solutions go in different directions – one by avoiding special cross-sector strategist posts, and one by having several special cross-sector strategists but joining them in one group. Thus, the municipalities in the interview study have different approaches and thus create various contextual expectations and frames. One has chosen to not have any explicit topics for their cross-sector strategists in order to stress that the topics are in fact everyone’s responsibility. Two others have taken a turn in a similar if not as far direction, by in one case transferring a cross-sector strategist away from the central level, and in one case changing the job description to be more internal rather than external. In some cases, the situation is the opposite, and cross-sector strategists actually have their own special department. The most common, however, if we look at all the respondents in the interview study, is that cross-sector strategists have their own strategic policy area and are centrally placed in the municipality.

In the interviews, two aspects of integration are frequently elaborated upon and appear to be objects of extensive discernment and deliberation from the cross-sector strategists: 1) the degree of operational work and how it is divided between cross-sector strategists and departments, and 2) the division of responsibility between cross-sector strategists and departments. The version and level of integration varies depending on these factors. The typology in Figure 4 is a systematized interpretation of the respondents’ discussions.
If the cross-sector strategist is the only actor in the municipality involved in the work with strategic policy areas, and is mostly or only focused on operational work, there is no integration (A) of the strategic policy areas taking place. If the cross-sector strategists mixes operational and strategic work, and the departments of the organization are to some extent involved in this work, then the state of the work could be described as semi-integration (B). If the cross-sector strategist does not perform any operational work, but stays in the background performing strategic work that makes the departments take on their responsibly and integrate the policy area in their normal activities, a slightly higher level of semi-integration (C) is the case. The last box, where the cross-sector strategist does not perform any operational work, and nor do the organizational departments, is described by cross-sector strategists as the utopic stage they are striving towards. Here strategic work and integration have succeeded to the extent that strategic policy areas do not even have to be mentioned explicitly in either strategic or operational work because they are already fully integrated in the organizational departments. In this utopic stage, there is no need for a cross-sector strategist in the background performing strategic work. After all, as one of them expresses it, “We are working against our own existence”, or another who says, “At first, you have to make it visible to push it into the organization, but after that, you should make it invisible and it should work by itself”. Thus, this could mean perfect integration (D1). However, in an organization where neither the cross-sector strategist nor the organizational departments work explicitly with strategic policy areas, the likelihood is high that instead of perfect integration this leads to complete neglect of the policy area (D2). This paradox, where the goal of the work might also lead to the opposite situation, constitutes a discerned tension that the cross-sector strategists deliberate upon quite a bit. They dedicate their efforts to perfect integration, but they express that they work according to what can be called semi-integration as a way to strategical-
ly develop and push the strategic policy areas further into the vertical organization.

The dedicated effort towards perfect integration can be interpreted as an expression of diversity management’s embedding in the organization. It is expressed in the organizations by removing specific strategic policy areas, and by cross-sector strategists in their stressing of the strategic work to “make others do things”. In the municipalities where specific strategic policy areas have been removed, the political argument has been that the removal of the specific policy areas and cross-sector strategists also indicates that it is in everyone’s interest to monitor and deal with the topic at hand. However, the cross-sector strategists when deliberating upon this solution appear somewhat skeptical. This can be interpreted as an attempt to highlight the positive side of difference, by claiming the utility of the strategic policy areas for the departments. The example of creating a more distinct and cohesive strategic work by forming a cross-sector strategist group/department is harder to categorize in terms of agenda-setting or the utility of positive difference. It might be seen as an attempt to make strategic work and cross-sector strategists more resourceful for agenda-setting and change, or it could be interpreted as an efficiency measurement in order to make it easier to explain to the organization the advantage of strategic policy areas with a utility focus. The cross-sector strategists’ stories about these measurements are generally positive – they find it helpful to have a group of other cross-sector strategists to collaborate and discuss things with. They also deliberate upon the advantage of having a united strategic discussion to fall back on when they approach the vertical organization, both in terms of how to work with integration and how to define the content of the various strategic policy areas.

**Dilemma of defining content**

The dilemma of defining content has a focus on how strategic policy areas content-wise are defined and how they relate to each other. Themes that previous research has pointed out as potentially troublesome when it comes to content is how strategic policy areas politically should be defined, how to deal with overlapping between them, and how to prioritize input coming from various sources due to the multi-level character of strategic policy areas.

**Political definition**

Whether political definition is perceived as a conceptual dilemma varies depending on the situation, and a majority of cross-sector strategists seem to have deliberated upon a professional foundation for their work, consisting of
a dedication to strategic work with a focus on structural changes, integration, planning, and policy rather than a focus on individual behavior and operational work. They defend this foundation if there are conceptual variations that contradict it. And simultaneously, given that their dedicated position is intact, they appreciate the opportunity to make politics of the strategic policy areas, that is, to highlight that strategic policy areas do contain various political definitions and to have politicians discuss the direction of the content.

When it comes to political definition, the language used by cross-sector strategists when describing the content of their work to a certain extent varies between them, but even more it varies within the same interview. As an interviewer, some caution was required related to this. On more than one occasion, a respondent corrected me as an interviewer because of what they saw as hasty assumptions on means and ends.

I: Diversity is also related to the global order of human rights.
R: Yes, that is one perspective. But you can also see the growth perspective in diversity. In several places they have placed diversity under the department for economic growth instead. Here it is under the employer department, right now. One can ask why. I mean, you can see that there are other strengths in diversity. Other than just making sure that they enter the labor market and move away from social relief. That we get the competence we need. One could also see the effects of synergy. That people come here who are not only prisoners or refugees from war, but people with potential are coming here. And who have children who grow up here and, well, are up and coming. That is how new activities are formed in the municipality, which we do not have any idea of what it will be. Maybe that part instead should be placed under economic growth. (Diversity 1)

The diversity strategist points out that human rights is one way of framing diversity, but that diversity holds other potential synergies. The diversity strategist uses utility-based arguments by pointing out that there are other beneficial aspects in diversity than just making sure that people can enter the labor market and get off of welfare assistance. The argument is fully within the diversity management rhetoric, and it shows a turn from the basic plus minus one economic argument, where people do not remain dependent on welfare assistance, to a positive one with synergies, similar to the economic-advocating arguments for social investment, sustainability, and human rights. According to the diversity strategist, this could be seen as an argument for organizing diversity under the department of growth, which is currently not the case in this municipality. Overall, the diversity management approach with a focus on utility is commonly used, due in large part to its embedded possibilities to frame strategic policy areas with economic arguments. The
next quote, from a safety strategist, illustrates the presence of other arguments and the problems that occur when these arguments are put next to economic arguments.

R: Of course I find all of this equally important, but I do not think it is like that for the rest. I feel that it is valued higher to work with industrial policy areas than welfare related and social ones. I think that the difficulties about working with this on a strategic level therefore become very different. X [the industry and commerce strategist] has to stop X-self from talking too long, and everyone is focusing on it and everyone is talking about it and it takes more than 30% of our common department time to discuss those questions. Whereas I constantly have to hammer on people to make them understand that they need to think about these policy areas. Whether it depends on being masculine or feminine, or hard or soft, or whatever it may be, I do not know, but it coincides with how much attention is given. (Safety 1)

The safety strategist describes a situation of having to work hard to get people’s attention, whereas the strategist for industry/commerce does not have any problems to get attention, interest, or understanding of how industry/commerce relates to other policy areas. From this quote, we cannot tell whether this lack of attention is because of a lack of economical framing, or if it is merely a matter of interest. However, the safety strategist finishes by connecting the difference between safety and industry/commerce to the classical dichotomy between feminine and masculine values, and this could be understood as the same balance as the one between power-loaded mainstreaming (with a focus on rights) and utility-focused diversity management – the socially oriented version of safety does not garner as much attention to utility as the economically based argumentation of industry and commerce. This shows the tension between perceiving strategic policy areas as goals in themselves or as tools to reach something else, usually as a tool contributing to economic growth. Cross-sector strategists deliberate extensively upon this, which will be discussed in the following chapters, and most of them dedicate themselves to different positions depending on the situation, meaning they are pragmatic in changing terminology when the situation so requires.

The cross-sector strategists thus see the strategic opportunities of the various political definitions and terminologies. However, the stories from the respondents do not present a homogenous picture of the extent to which they personally find the political definition to be a conceptual dilemma. The public health strategists are very clear about disliking the center-right government’s (2006-2014) attempt to govern towards individual lifestyle factors, because this does not go along with their professional view.
The road to create an equal society is a bit different, more on the individual level in the center-right side. And we notice that a lot in national politics. I can say that national politics is not really keeping up with what we are doing at the local level. And that is a bit of an obstacle for us, and we see this obstacle. All municipalities see it. In national politics, they focus a lot on living habits, and here we almost do not work with that at all. Because we think that these things are affected by how the structure looks; structural changes matter more for living habits than participating in an anti-smoking course or getting more exercise or whatever it may be. If you see it from a municipal perspective, it may be more about changing food in the schools than giving children or parents diet counseling. That is, make sure you give societal preconditions (…). All that is more important for us than trying to target pure living habits. (Public health 1)

Several public health strategists express that if they did not have the overall goal of public health to hold on to (the general national goal for public health under which other public health goals are sorted), formulated as it is (good and equal health), they would face serious problems because of clashes between professional values and national politics. These examples of public health strategists are the most obvious, although an ambiguous perception of what strategic policy areas really should include seems, albeit a bit vague, to be valid for all cross-sector strategists. However, during the interviews, political definition is one dilemma less elaborated upon by the respondents. One important reason for this might be that a majority of cross-sector strategists are dedicated to strategic work and perceive this dedication as a part of their professional identity. This dedication to strategic work to some extent diminishes the range of political options for cross-sector strategists to consider, in that strategic work has a focus on the policy and organizational level rather than the operational level. This limits the scope of action of what can be achieved on these levels. It also does not appear as if the cross-sector strategists find the contextual expectations to differentiate that much from this approach. The remaining variation of perceived political definition appears to be only a minor dilemma for the respondents because they are dedicated to making use of the possibility to apply the varying political arguments within the strategic policy areas and thus make the strategic policy areas appealing regardless of political orientation.

Overlapping
The mixing of concepts for strategic policy areas sometimes makes it hard to draw clear lines around and between them in the municipalities. In some cases, strategic policy areas are closely connected under one umbrella term, while in others the strategic policy areas might be very active, but not very connected, and the definitions and concepts might vary while the active work
is similar. This is pointed out by some cross-sector strategists as problematic because it contributes to what is generally referred to as “perspective crowding”. Perspective crowding is a term used by cross-sector strategists to describe the situation of having several interrelated strategic policy areas or “perspectives” in one organization. The existence of this empirical term to capture the dilemma of overlapping highlights that this an important matter for cross-sector strategists. They elaborate extensively on how to handle overlapping, both conceptually and practically, with regard to how to create a support structure for their strategic policy area in relation to others and how to arrange priorities in the municipality.

The municipalities in the interview study have a variation of cross-sector strategists and strategic policy areas. In most municipalities, there seems to be one strategic policy area that serves as the “umbrella perspective” for others. This appears to be a method to form a stable category in order to have something to form policy on while simultaneously making room for several other categories when organizing them under the umbrella. However, which policy area serves as the umbrella varies between municipalities. This has consequences for the cross-sector strategists’ work in terms of how they handle the language of their strategic policy areas. It also has consequences in terms difficulties in evaluating the strategic policy areas. One practical example of this difficulty was expressed in the 3-year joint agreement between the national government and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions on strengthening the work with human rights on the municipal level (Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet A2014/2289/DISK; SKL Dnr 11/7554). As a part of the program, a consultancy bureau mapped the work concerning human rights. The conclusion was that the human rights work in the municipalities is framed under for example of the work with children, gender equality, public health, safety, diversity, sustainability, and democracy (Emerga 2015). In this case, human rights were the targeted strategic policy area, and in order to get a comprehensive view of human rights work, it was also necessary to cover the work with several other strategic policy areas due to varying organization of those areas.

One indicator of an umbrella perspective is the existence of political advisory boards for one strategic policy area, under which other cross-sector strategists gather and from which they get guidance. In the municipalities in this study, we find advisory boards for public health and safety consisting of politicians, managers, and cross-sector strategists. These boards are also considered to be important sources of steering for cross-sector strategists. The boards are in-
tended to serve as a node for bringing the municipality together around one strategic policy area with the idea that the board should contribute to highlighting the relation between mainstreaming and the mainstream. This is illustrated by a safety coordinator when talking about how measurements in the vertical sectors can be viewed from a safety perspective by members of the safety board.

R: Often in this network we say: Look at this, it leads to increased safety here! Then you get kind of, Wow! Shivers! Because then we build this common knowledge. Awareness raising is one of those key concepts. And I feel a little extra responsible for it, in the network, to try to show that: ‘Look here now, what we are doing together leads to increased safety, and what do we see that is missing?’ By doing this, you get the “safety track” in your head. Well, before you did not know it was a safety track, it was rather lots of various tracks, which you all found important. But now we are building knowledge around it, we get better and better, and it is professional. We know what we are doing and can more and more distinguish what is lacking or what we should invest in. (Safety 2)

The advisory board for safety officially has the name “board for public health and safety”, and when being asked how these terms relates to each other, the respondent gives following answer:

R: When I think public health, I think more in the direction of “eat fruits”, that is, things concerning topics about bodyweight and healthy living habits, if you want to take it to the extreme. And with safety, we have more of crime prevention, which is a little bit different. But we meet anyway, because it is a lot about children and youth, and how they are growing up and that there is support for parents. We think a lot about that; the support for parents is really important. And that is public health, so in the children perspective we meet a lot. And if you feel well, then you feel safe at school, well, that is health. (Safety 2)

Thus, in this municipality, the framing of strategic work is done under safety as the umbrella. In another municipality, public health is the umbrella, with various angles, among them being safety. As mentioned, public health strategists point out that professionally they take a clear stand against the “old-style” approach to public health as a matter of individual living habits, and that they identify with a structural approach where the focus is on poverty reduction. However, they also stress that if the actors of the context take another approach, then they are pragmatic in which positions they choose. If it means calling the overall umbrella safety instead of public health (or something else depending on the situation and strategic policy area), the position that most cross-sector strategists seem to resort to is pragmatism.
They know where they stand, and they want to get things done accordingly. If this means that the cross-sector strategists have to call the strategic work something different than what they would choose themselves, they do not consider it to be too much of a conceptual dilemma. Focus is more on the content in the umbrella than on whether they like or dislike the umbrella term in itself. In this way, the dilemma of overlapping is diminished by the deliberation of the cross-sector strategists.

The cross-sector strategists express that one effect of perspective crowding is strong frustration in the end of the vertical organization, in the operational departments, here illustrated by a sustainability strategist:

R: We have also gathered the actors who have a strategic mission into something we call the strategy group, and that was simply because there are many actors who have strategic missions in terms of having a perspective to bring out to the whole organization, for example, public health, gender equality, disability, and the environment. We have, for example a goal area concerning children and young people. Of course, many strategists already today have a mission concerning that. But these actors often do not know of each other, and we cannot really succeed with cross-sectoral governance if we constantly use double and parallel tracks. Because at the end of the day, furthest down in the department level, it is often the case that you take the same measures regardless of whether it is a public health perspective or a gender equality perspective or an environment perspective or a child rights perspective. You end up with the same thing anyway, and it leads to a lack of quality, and it gets really messy and weird and frustrating for the people furthest out in the chain. If I may say so, it is not the best use of time to have eleventy-one strategists running around and maintaining their tracks and who are all trying to tug and pull the people furthest out. (Sustainability 1)

This quote shows both the organizational merging of strategic policy areas in terms of policy goals and the overlapping of theoretical distinctions between strategic policy areas. The sustainability strategist expresses an awareness of this and describes the strategy group as an attempt to overcome “perspective crowding” problems. Another applied method to ease the effects of perspective crowding is to explain to the departments that although the cross-sectoral strategic policy areas might be many, they usually do not require extensive changes in what is actually done, which is illustrated by another safety coordinator:

R: I still think here that it is expressed that safety is of importance; maybe everything has not been turned into results, but still. It is a small step towards having people starting to think of safety in their everyday lives, and I try to tell the department managers or other
managers when I see them that it might not be the case at all that you need to do something new. But rather to think of whether you already do something that may contribute to increased safety, and to describe it as a safety measure. Because you often do things that are meant to have an effect on public health or participation or whatever it may be, and it also contributes to increased safety. Because it is hard to say what safety really is. (Safety 1)

By presenting safety as one perspective or strategic policy area, although it contains many others, and as something that does not require fundamental changes, but rather a change in rhetoric, the tension between safety and the departments, or between safety and other strategic policy areas, is reduced.

On a policy level, the umbrella terms and focal points shift and vary. Due to their pragmatic approach, the cross-sector strategists generally do not find this to be a strong conceptual dilemma causing ambiguity in what to do, although they do not always agree with or appreciate the conceptual construction. On a central administrative level, adjustments are in practice made accordingly to the policy shifts by employing new cross-sector strategists, transferring them to other departments, or assigning them other strategic policy areas depending on whether the dominating idea is to reduce categories or to acknowledge them. The cross-sector strategists appear highly pragmatic and flexible about this, and they use an instrumental approach, although they still have their visionary ideals as guiding principles for deliberation. Methods are promoted and developed from a central administrative level, and often these methods have strong similarities. The departments normally do not change dramatically based on changes in strategic policy areas or in methods. Rather, adjustments are made as additions, for example, by joining a network, adapting a policy, or writing the annual report differently. This means that for the departments it is not seen to be a conceptual dilemma if the policy areas overlap in definition because this theoretical elaboration is not something they put any focus on. It is, however, a practical dilemma in that several strategic policy areas and cross-sector strategists have claims on the departments (see Chapter 6, Structural dilemmas). This practical dilemma is something that cross-sector strategists discern and deliberate upon, and their approach is often to try to place the conceptual deliberation on the policy and the central level and thus to present a less ambiguous approach to the departments.

Which strategic policy area that is turned into an umbrella varies, but something that from the respondents’ stories seems to be a determining factor is that the umbrella should not be too controversial, i.e. it should have a low
degree of politicization. The umbrella terms have characteristics similar to the utility-focused diversity management version of mainstreaming, and they also relate to what Cox and Béland stress as important for valence, namely, they raise strong positive emotions. The commonly used umbrellas (safety, human rights, public health, and sustainability) do not differentiate between groups; instead, they have a general approach that can include everyone. The reason for why they have become umbrella terms can be found in the level of abstraction (Cox & Béland 2013). They have the potential to mean different things depending on the situation, and thus they can be turned into varying political projects. Generally, cross-sector strategists appear positive towards umbrella terms as a way of working. One explanation for why the cross-sector strategists dedicate themselves to umbrellas as a method is that the umbrellas are abstract, meaning they hold various political possibilities. Umbrella terms are also positively associated by removing the negative inequality perspective in them. They have a holistic character, which means that the categories within them are rejected (Walby 2007), and this makes them more flexible and the cross-sector strategists can use this as an advantage in their work. This holistic character hides both the clash between inequalities and the potential risk of clashes between the strategic policy areas and between the strategic policy areas and the regular work of the departments.

Some respondents express how they discern conflicting values in the umbrella terms due to diminished conflict but also diminished political visibility, and how if umbrella terms are to be fully functioning they need to be combined with distinct political priorities. The necessity of priorities pointed out by public health strategists highlights the problem of having overly vague categories. In order to make strategic priorities between inequalities in public health and other strategic policy areas, political positioning is necessary. This political positioning can be made either by the administration or on a political level.

R: You choose to make priorities. It is very important, like now, for example, when we have chosen to prioritize upbringing conditions for children and youth. The group for the elderly and the advisory board for pensioners argue: ‘What about the elderly, are they not important?’ And of course they are. We do not claim that we will not do anything for the elderly. But you have to make priorities because there are not enough resources to devote to everything.
I: How do you argue for it?
R: Statistics. The experiences of the administration. And with the socio-economic approach – the cost of not preventing social exclusion, it is the cost of a whole life. But then again, there is of course also a cost if you fall and break your hip. (Public health 2)
The most common solution is that priorities for strategic work are decided in a dialogue between politicians, managers, and cross-sector strategists. Cross-sector strategists generally do not perceive very strong clashes in these situations. Rather, they express that other actors are receptive of their desired priories and that there is consensus regarding measurements. However, this absence of value conflict is related to the respondents’ discussion on definitions and priorities on a conceptual level. The respondents tell a more conflict-based story when elaborating on what they are practically doing when approaching the vertical organization and when elaborating on the role of cross-sector strategists as public administrators, which will be discussed in the two following chapters.

The respondents thus differentiate between symbolic support and support that affects the vertical organization. On a conceptual level, they do not experience clashes with the perspective of other actors regarding how to make priorities, but when it comes to turning the conceptually agreed upon priorities into action, there might be resistance. This aspect is further elaborated upon in Chapter 6, Structural dilemmas. The cross-sector strategists also do not perceive it as a conceptual dilemma to formulate these priorities. But they sometimes think of it as a dilemma in terms of being public administrators, and they deliberate upon how the political level should be more involved and how the political prioritization should be more visible. This aspect is further elaborated upon in Chapter 7, Agency dilemmas.

**Multi-level character**

In order to investigate the potential dilemma of the multi-level character of strategic policy areas, the cross-sector strategists were asked in the survey to grade how important goals and legislations produced in different tiers of government are for their work. The results show that the most important political goals in the eyes of the strategists are the local goals (85 percent considered them as “very important”), followed by national legislation (56 percent), national goals (54 percent), regional goals (32 percent), and goals relating to international conventions (30 percent). Because the perception of the importance of these different kinds of goals differs greatly, we will now turn to identifying which factors affect the degree to which cross-sector strategists deem a certain category of goals to be important.
Regression analysis: What explains the importance of different kinds of policy goals among cross-sector strategists?

This analysis was carried out by OLS multiple regression analysis presented in Table 13 using the same model strategy and variables as described previously. The adjusted R² is low for local goals due to the high number of cross-sector strategists defining them as very important; however, it is still interesting to see how the multiple regression for local goals differs from the others. The results in Table 13 show that cross-sector strategists who to a higher degree could be described as policy strategists find local, regional, and national goals, as well as – in particular – international conventions as more important. The perceived importance of national legislation is not correlated with being a policy strategist. Instead, it is those who to a higher degree could be described as bureaucrat strategists who find legislation to be especially important. For the perceived importance of all other types of goals, being a bureaucrat strategist or a project strategist has no significant effect.

In Model 3 of the analyses presented in Table 13, the strategic policy area for which the respondents are responsible are also included as independent variables. The results show that policy area affects the perceived importance of certain goals in a few cases. Cross-sector strategists responsible for public health policies find regional goals more important (health care and hospitals are mainly a regional responsibility in Sweden), cross-sector strategists responsible for democracy policies find national goals to be less important, cross-sector strategists responsible for human rights policies find international conventions more important, whereas those responsible for public health policies find those conventions less important, and cross-sector strategists responsible for diversity policies find legislation more important than others do. When it comes to regional goals, international conventions, and – especially – legislation, the explanatory power increases considerably when policy area is added in Model 3. This indicates that policy area is more important for explaining those goals and less so for explaining local and national goals. Furthermore, the results indicate that older and male strategists find legislation more important than their younger and female colleagues. In Model 2, not controlling for policy area, there is also a weak effect indicating that legislation is perceived as less important in municipalities with a left-leaning political regime. With these exceptions, neither age, gender, education level, or workplace of the cross-sector strategists, nor the municipal size or color of the political regime, affect the importance put in these five different kinds of goals.
Table 13. What explains the importance of different kinds of policy goals among cross-sector strategists? OLS regression (B-values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Local goals (0–3)</th>
<th>Regional goals (0–3)</th>
<th>National goals (0–3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategist type</td>
<td>Strategist type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy strategist</td>
<td>.426**</td>
<td>.446**</td>
<td>.414**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project strategist</td>
<td>-1.19**</td>
<td>-2.03**</td>
<td>-2.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat strategist</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: years</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male = 1</td>
<td>-.108</td>
<td>-.148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: High = 1</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal office</td>
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<td>-.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality population (thousands of inhabitants)</td>
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<td>4.949E-5</td>
<td>.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political regime: Left = 1</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.907</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic policy area (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: The dependent variables are responses to the question "How important is the following in your work?" where the cross-sector strategists responded on a four-grade scale from 0 = "not at all important" to 3 = "very important". The categorization of cross-sector strategists is based on the factor analysis index, see Table 5. N = 182. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05
Table 13 (continued). What explains the importance of different kinds of policy goals among cross-sector strategists? OLS regression (B-values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables:</th>
<th>International conventions (0–3)</th>
<th>Legislation (0–3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategist type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy strategist</td>
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<td>.730*</td>
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<td>Project strategist</td>
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<td>.340</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age: years</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male = 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education: High = 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal office</td>
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<td>Municipality population (thousands of inhabitants)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political regime: Left = 1</td>
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<td>-.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic policy area (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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<td>.070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: The dependent variables are responses to the question "How important is the following in your work?" where the cross-sector strategists responded on a four-grade scale from 0 = "not at all important" to 3 = "very important". The categorization of cross-sector strategists is based on the factor analysis index, see Table 5. N = 182. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05
The conclusion from this analysis is that there is definitely a variation in the extent to which cross-sector strategists find goals from different tiers of government to be important. This variation, together with the finding that almost all cross-sector strategists find local political goals to be a very important input, highlights some of the ways in which multi-level inputs play an active part in forming the role of cross-sector strategists. However, in order to get a deeper understanding for how cross-sector strategists distinguish between different kinds of input, we have to turn to the interview study. Several cross-sector strategists mention it as their specific task to bring all the varying input together and that they have extensive discretion to do so.

R: I do not know how much that comes from me, and that is also interesting, because I have worked for such a long time that the question is what is my opinion, if I had chosen to change jobs, and someone without a frame of reference comes in, I think you would have given them a completely different picture. Much of it is constructed around the individual. I feel that the mission is there, but what I choose to fill it with is very much up to me. And, in the best of worlds, those things would be clear and done. But because it is very much so that one is breaking new ground, it is oscillating a bit where they [politicians] think one should have focus, how much you should be hands on and show that things are really happening, or whether you should be a strict strategist who is referring to research and development on an international and national level. In that, there are still oscillations, which become pretty clear between the elections, because I have followed a number of different oscillations politically with different individuals. So it swings quite a bit and can turn rather rapidly from working with culture and health and arrangements on the town square, to trying to be strictly strategic and talking about gaps in health and how to eliminate them at a rather strict strategic level. (Public health 3)

The public health strategist mentions that because of the extensive discretion to formulate positions, it can be tricky to distinguish why they do what they do. After a while, the opinions coming from the cross-sector strategists can become the narrative of the organization and the context. This might be an explanation for why being a policy strategist in the survey has a significant correlation with finding local goals to be important. Policy strategists are active on a policy level, in that they work with briefings in boards/councils, provide politicians with information and knowledge, participate in managerial groups, and have budget responsibility. On this level, cross-sector strategists become a part of policy formulation, both directly by giving information and input to the
process, and/or indirectly by having discretion to frame the cross-sector strategist position and work.

Which input is considered to be most important varies between cross-sector strategists, as the result in Table 12 shows, but one factor is strongly stressed by all cross-sector strategists as very important for framing of their job, namely local politicians and local political goals. This is valid for all strategic policy areas, and it corresponds with the survey result. However, this does not mean that cross-sector strategists are always accepting the input they get from local politicians. When they do not, it is usually related to a clash of some kind between the various kinds of input they deal with, usually coming from the professional field of the cross-sector strategist. When this happens, cross-sector strategists usually change their approach to local politicians by turning into experts whose task it is to educate the decision makers. The possibility to take the expert role might also be an explanation for why cross-sector strategists do not speak that much about clashes on the political level in terms of political definitions and priorities, as will be discussed in Chapter 7.

On the question of whether there can be a collision between inputs coming from different levels, this manager for various strategic policy areas answers:

R: Yes, that happens all the time. Definitely, just look at human rights; they collide with parts of Swedish legislation. That is why there is a hesitation to pass the convention on the rights of the child as law, because that will collide with the rights of parents. Society is complex – what is good for one is bad for another, and then you have to choose. And I actually believe that the global and UN level is furthest down on the agenda. What is absolutely most important is what we have in front of us here and now. So the dignity of the input is reversed, I would say, in terms of which effect legislation and regulation have.

I: Can the international conventions be used as a battering ram? Now I am expressing it very straightforwardly.

R: Yes, certainly. Of course one could use them. But I do not think it will lead to stronger influence. (Manager, development department 1)

The transnational character of strategic work does not appear to be discerned by the respondents as a dilemma. When talking to cross-sector strategists, the picture presented is that their policy areas are ambiguous to define and present to other actors, but not necessarily because of their transnational multi-level character. The dilemma of the multi-level
character of strategic policy areas seems to be more connected to levels of government within Sweden. International input in terms of, for example, the charter of human rights, the convention of the rights of the child, or the sustainability concept (in its original version) play an important role, but more as symbolic framing rather than as something affecting the actual work in detail. The cross-sector strategists do not find the process of deliberating on international input particularly demanding because of a clear hierarchy of input where local goals serve as a frame. Based on the survey, it is clear that the multi-level character of strategic policy areas is present in cross-sector strategists’ discernment of values because a majority of the respondents answered that all goals and legislation are very or relatively important. However, international and regional goals are generally considered to be only relatively important rather than very important. This result says something about the identity of cross-sector strategists – their input comes from various sources, and they are governed by multi-level goals and, in some cases, by legislation and by more defined professional norms. However, the cross-sector strategists stress the importance of local goals and relations with local politicians. As pointed out by the manager for the development department, of course international conventions could be used as an argument, but this would not lead to greater legitimacy. This hierarchy reduces the potential dilemma of the multi-level character of the policy area and makes the deliberation process easier. However, the hierarchy with local goals as the primary input is not set in stone and might change depending on how the cross-sector strategists desire to frame their work. Thus, local goals and policies are considered primary, but there is still a strong multi-level influence.

Conclusion

Do cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts regarding ideational dilemmas, and if so, how do they cope with them in terms of discernment, deliberation, and dedication?

To summarize the dilemma of process, the cross-sector strategists firmly dedicate themselves to strategic work, as defined as making others do things, and do not perceive strategic work and the level of integration to be a strong conceptual dilemma. However, the process of how to achieve this requires pragmatism in what to do, and in order to be strategic in this sense, the cross-sector strategists work operatively and consultatively when they sometimes wish they would not need to. When cross-sector
strategists elaborate on what they are doing, they first and foremost resort to this position of pragmatism, where they show the advantages of strategic policy areas and of showing themselves as tools for the organization. Some respondents define the consultative approach as the core of the work, whereas others see it as a method to work strategically for the integration of their strategic policy area. A consultative approach is not too challenging to the legitimacy of the sectorized organization, and thus support structures are more easily obtained and the goal of making others do things is more easily achieved. The cross-sector strategists thus generally make a dedicated effort towards the full integration of the strategic policy areas into the vertical organization, although they vary in the extent to which they see the process of achieving this a strategic struggle or not.

To summarize the dilemma of defining content, the overall conclusion that can be drawn from the data is that positive utility-based diversity management is the dominating approach in cross-sector strategists’ decision in how to work. This approach conceptually puts economic goals as the ends and the strategic policy areas as the means, as this is highlighted among the critiques of social investment, sustainability, and human rights. However, this position-taking by cross-sector strategists is generally done for pragmatic reasons, although they generally personally gravitate more to the structural power-focused interests rather than utility-based interests. They also do not find political definition to be a dilemma, as long as it does not question what the cross-sector strategists see as the foundation for their professional role, i.e. to work for strategically for integration. When it comes to overlapping, the generally used method in the organizations where the interview respondents’ work is umbrella terms, under which several strategic policy areas can fit. The respondents generally find the umbrellas to be a good method, but that the umbrellas also run the risk of hiding political priorities. Finally, regarding the multi-level character of cross-sector policy areas, the cross-sector strategists discern that there are sometimes inbuilt clashes in the input they have to deal with, and that they perceive it as part of their job to bring such inputs together. However, this dilemma is strongly reduced due to the respondents’ dedication to the local goals, which become the guidelines when bringing in the other sources of input.

Cross-sector strategists’ processes of discernment, deliberation, and dedication of ideational dilemmas appear to hold only minor dissonances.
They discern the conceptual dilemmas but have rather clear processes for how to solve them. Generally, cross-sector strategists dedicate their efforts to perfect integration. Cross-sector strategists express that they believe in this as a visionary ideal and objective. However, many times they cannot formally use their dedicated approach for how to work due to the lack of support structures for it. Externally, the negotiation about this is still on-going and is expressed when cross-sector strategists tell stories of how actors do not agree on who is responsible or on what strategic work means. The dilemma of process is solved by cross-sector strategists by generally applying a more instrumental approach to the context and for pragmatic reasons shifting between what they would formally like to do and what they see fit for the moment in order to achieve results. The same pragmatic approach is applied when strategic policy areas are vaguely defined or are overlapping, and cross-sector strategists in general do not find it very problematic to change the name or framing of their policy areas, as long as things gets done. Cross-sector strategists point out that overlapping and perspective crowding is problematic from a governance perspective due to the confusion it sometimes creates for the organization and the negotiation it requires regarding resources. But cross-sector strategists themselves, albeit to some varying extent, find it less problematic due to the conceptual commonalities they see between strategic policy areas. In order to solve the dilemma, cross-sector strategists thus separate between interests and positions, i.e. they are willing to change position if they consider it beneficial to their overall interest. Thus, although it is not perceived as an overwhelming conceptual dilemma, it is an active dilemma that requires practical considerations.

Regarding multi-level input in strategic work, cross-sector strategists show a unanimous view – they are dedicated to the local goals. Here, there is less discrepancy between interests and positions compared with how they deal with process dilemmas, political definitions, and overlapping, where they are highly pragmatic in taking various positions in order to reach their interests. They express dedication to the formal obligations as public administrators in a political-administrative organization. Although cross-sector strategists sometimes might find local goals problematic in relation to what they want to achieve, they remain clear in their dedication and its foundation for legitimacy – local goals comes first, and a cross-sector strategist’s role is to match the local government and strategic policy areas. One slightly speculative conclusion is that the multi-faceted input of strategic policy areas (from international and
national levels) might create a somewhat stressful and ambiguous situation for cross-sector strategists in discernment and deliberation, but the presence of a well-performing cross-sector strategist might reduce ambiguity for the rest of the organization. The argument is that cross-sector strategists in many cases seem to acquire a role of being a node where various levels of input come together. When deliberating on how to form functional dedications for their own work with this ambiguous and contradictive input, they simultaneously perform a deliberation process that the rest of the organization can potentially make use of within the frame of local goals.

Thus, although the cross-sector strategists generally do not find the conceptual aspects of process and content to be extensive dilemmas, ideational dilemmas require intense discernment and deliberation in order to form a functional work situation. The discerned values of process and content for strategic work are consequently not perceived by the cross-sector strategists as dilemmas in themselves, but they become dilemmas to deliberate upon when they are juxtaposed with the structural values of the organization and with the political-administrative values on which their agency as public administrators is formed.

Table 14 summarizes the conclusions on the cross-sector strategists’ experiences of and ways of coping with ideational dilemmas.
Table 14. Cross-sector strategists’ experience of and ways of coping with ideational dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma of defining process</th>
<th>Experience of value conflicts</th>
<th>Coping with value conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How to define strategic work</td>
<td>Neither the definition of strategic work nor the level of integration is perceived as a strong dilemma.</td>
<td>Because there is little value conflict in the definition of process, the coping with conceptual value conflict is rather unproblematic. The cross-sector strategists are dedicated to strategic work and to full integration in the sectors by showing the utility of the strategic policy areas and of the cross-sector strategists’ work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma of defining content</th>
<th>Experience of value conflicts</th>
<th>Coping with value conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political definition</td>
<td>The political definition of the strategic policy areas is to some extent experienced as a dilemma.</td>
<td>The dilemma of political definition is solved via a dedication to the positive utility approach as a method to reach out to other actors. This gives the economic arguments priority, although the cross-sector strategists themselves are dedicated to a more structure-based approach to the political definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overlapping</td>
<td>The overlapping between strategic policy areas is experienced as a dilemma.</td>
<td>The dilemma of overlapping is solved via umbrella terms under which many cross-sector policy areas fit, and by a dedication to pragmatism in re-naming the cross-sector policy areas if necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-level character</td>
<td>The multi-level character of strategic policy areas is to a small extent perceived as a dilemma.</td>
<td>The dilemma of multi-level character is not perceived as a very active dilemma, although the cross-sector strategists do acknowledge the potential for clashes. However, the loyalty to governance of the local government diminishes the dilemma by creating a clear hierarchy between the levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Structural Dilemmas

Structural dilemmas relate to organization-based clashes of vertical and horizontal values, and there are potential structural dilemmas of organizational and cultural character. The organizational dilemmas mean clashes of values regarding the organizational structure, and the cultural dilemmas mean clashes of values regarding the cultural values embedded in this organizational structure.

Dilemma of organization

The themes that previous research has pointed out as potentially troublesome in the organization of vertical and horizontal traditions are mandate and resources, responsibility/accountability, and evaluation. In the respondents’ municipalities, we find different examples of how to organize strategic work. The organizational placement of cross-sector strategists varies between municipalities, and so does the organization of strategic policy areas. Some cross-sector strategists have posts with managerial tasks, providing them with slightly stronger formal influence. Cross-sector strategists deliberate upon formal organizational placement as something crucial because closeness to politicians (and political power) and ownership of the strategic policy area are heavily affected by where the cross-sector strategist formally and physically belongs.

Mandate and resources

In terms of vertical hierarchy, the cross-sector strategists are outside the formal chain of command. They discern various approaches in how to cope with this, and they generally apply framing and “charm” to reach out to actors with power, especially managers and politicians. The respondents also deliberate upon knowledge as a source of legitimacy, but it appears that they find knowledge to be more useful once the political support is established and not in the initial phase when trying to generate this support. Formal influence and mandate are usually absent. The
respondents repeatedly express that they discern that in many situations there might not be any active resistance to the strategic policy areas, but the vertical hierarchy still creates hindrances for the strategic policy areas to be actively acknowledged by the rest of the municipal administration.

A majority of the cross-sector strategists express that in the political-administrative organization, they are dedicated to “make politics” of the strategic policy area in order to highlight the political power over them. This means working to put strategic policy areas on the agenda. In this, cross-sector strategists are dedicated to being lobbyists. What they often find to be a problem is that some strategic policy areas often are inviolable for public administration, meaning they are all considered to be normatively and politically important. The cross-sector strategists deliberate upon this as something giving them the upper hand when reaching out and trying to create interest for strategic policy areas on a symbolic level. However, because both political and administrative organizations need to make priorities, strategic policy areas might not always be given strong attention in terms of resources.

R: It is hard because everyone placed in departments are extremely stressed most of the time, and you do not have time to accept new missions and new thoughts and you might not even have the education or understanding to listen to something new. And if you do not hear, you will not do anything either. What I perceive as the most difficult, it must be the time. It is rare that someone thinks you are wrong or says that ‘I do not agree at all about that or have another conviction about how things should be done’. It rarely happens, or has never happened to me. But it is this, that ‘Well, now she is also coming’, so you shut down or listen and are polite and then you do nothing with it, so it is very much about selling and winning. And about selling, I think it is said if you pitch a hundred times, ten are listening, and one is acting! (Safety 1)

This quote indicates ambiguity – the safety strategist highlights the difficulty of reaching out, due to passive resistance, and stresses that the problem is normally not interest, but time. At the same time, the depiction of the behavior that she is sometimes faced with indicates a lack of interest, and the safety strategist perceives herself as a salesperson for the safety perspective and explicitly uses the terms ”pitching” and ”selling” when trying to reach out to the departments.

This selling becomes crucial due to the formal mandate and ownership of topics in the vertical hierarchy. One public health strategist, in charge of
the “welfare balance sheet” in the municipality, and placed under the leisure and public health board, expresses that placement puts limits to how far strategic work can go.

R: I have tried to pull the welfare balance sheet as close as I can to the annual report, to use it in the budget, that is, setting the direction of the goals based on the result, and there has also been public health funding assigned, which has a bearing on the direction of these goals. But now I cannot reach any further. For several reasons, but the main reason really is that we are placed here, that I am placed here. (Public health 4)

The public health strategist talks about how she managed to bring the welfare balance sheet as close as possible to the annual report and to the establishment of municipal goals. However, her conclusion is that this is as far as she can go because her placement formally makes the welfare balance sheet a product of the specialized board to which she belongs (the leisure and public health board) and not the municipality as a whole21. The ownership of the welfare balance sheet thus resides in this board, and the other boards, in particular the city council, have their full freedom to refuse it if they feel like it. As the public health strategist explains, there is still a clear interest in the welfare balance sheet, but her possibilities as a cross-sector strategist to use methods normally used for influence and lobbying are limited because of this formal ownership.

However, being placed in the city council administration is also sometimes discerned by the respondents as potentially limiting for action when there is a need to speak to a specific sector. A security strategist uses the organizational tree to explain the procedure of obtaining personal alarms for elderly care personnel, which the manager for elderly care did not find crucial. She concludes with a rather heavy sigh, when pointing at her own placement in the tree, and shows that for her, as for other cross-sector strategists in the organization, there is no formal connection to the vertical hierarchy in the form of an arrow in the organization tree, and thus no mandate.

21 In Swedish local governance, the political committees for different policy areas or districts are independent from the municipal assembly and executive committee, i.e. the latter do not have the authority to interfere with the decisions made in the political committees.
R: When we have a comprehensive project, no one is in charge. Let me borrow your pen. (Draws the organization tree.) Here you have the city council. Under them, there is the city board. And under them is, in our case it is called the city office, which has the function of an administration department. And the problem is that under the city board, you also find the political boards for Children and Families, and Health and Social Care. And they have administrative departments under them, each with a manager. This means that one manager does not have power over the other. There are no arrows between them in the tree. And you cannot take this question (about the alarms) to the city board, because this is a question of fact that has nothing to do with the city board, it just happens to be a comprehensive question. But the city council does not have any arrows to the other administrative departments, unless it is taken in a policy somewhere, that my manager has mandate to make decisions about the work environment guidelines or something. But in my field, there is nothing like that. So I do not have any mandate at all. (Security 1)

In the quote, the access to formal influence and formal channels is stressed. The solution in this particular example was that the manager of the security strategist used her own contacts and convinced the manager for elderly care to take action. The vertical structure thus sets frames that cross-sector strategists find limiting, and they are constantly deliberating upon ways to get around these organizational obstacles when negotiating strategic policy areas. One discerned method, mentioned also in other examples, is to do what the security strategist did, which was to use her manager’s contacts.

Another important frame deliberated upon by the cross-sector strategists is the economic structure. An example of this can be found in the trend among the Swedish municipalities to establish social investment funds (SKL 2015). In region Västra Götaland, 16 of 49 municipalities had by 2015 decided to establish such funds, and an additional 10 had ongoing discussions about it (Västra Götalandsregionen “Karta sociala investeringar VGR 2015” www.vgregion.se). The funds have become prominent as a method of creating structure for long-term investments; however, it has been discussed whether or not these funds are appropriate in terms of municipal budget regulation. This is also mentioned by several of the respondents. The argument against the funds is that they do not

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22 According to the law regulating municipalities (Kommunallagen 1991:900), investments can only be made for material goods, such as buildings and machines. Long-term social investments, without a clearly defined recipient, have by the board for the council for municipal accounting (Rådet för Kommunal Redovisning) been defined to be outside legal frames (Kommunal ekonomi nr 6 2012 p. 22).
provide enough transparency because of their long-term character and difficulties in evaluating the return of investments. However, this questionable legality is something many municipalities have chosen to ignore due to their stressing of the need of these kinds of investments, as illustrated by a cross-sector strategist with managerial responsibilities:

R: We are trying to create a social investment fund, money that is not a part of the regular budget, from which you can apply for resources for project funding. But there is the Swedish Local Government Act, which says that it is not allowed to transfer money from one year to another. So municipal investment funds are actually illegal, even though they exist in some municipalities. And our economic manager says that we will absolutely not have a fund, and it cannot consist of money that is the profit of one year to another. If we are going to get money for this kind of budget, we have to take the money from the boards. This is a fight we will take up in the autumn. Everyone says this is important, but no one wants to share their own space to finance it. There is an interest both from the administration and from politicians, but when it comes to the crunch, we often hear, “Well, we have to spend one full pre-school teacher salary on this”, so that is why we cannot do it. It is the constant fight over scarce resources. (Manager, development department 1)

The cross-sector strategist mentions a clash with the economic department when discussing the social investment fund and the problem of getting the boards to assign a share of their budgets to the fund. She mentions that the argument that is commonly used is that the share to the fund could be used to finance other things in the vertical structure, in this case, one full pre-school teacher. Obtaining pooled resources is generally discerned by the cross-sector strategists as a struggle. One part of the deliberation on methods to cope with and get around the vertical hierarchy concerns the discernment of methods to achieve this. When asked about what financial resources the cross-sector strategists actually have, the common answer is that they have themselves and their time, but nothing more. Social investment funds constitute an attempt to create a formal frame around horizontal strategic policy areas. However, from cross-sector strategists’ positions towards other actors, social investment funds are deliberated upon as very useful because a politically supported social investment fund paves the way for the cross-sector strategist in the vertical structures.

In the interviews, it is thus clear that cross-sector strategists find support from top managers, political interest, and specific budgets to be important to get things done. Also in the survey, the respondents were asked to what
extent active managers, financial resources, support from political management, and clear political goals are facilitating for their work. More than 70 percent of the respondents answered that active managers, support from political management, and clear political goals are all facilitating their strategic work to a very high extent. In addition, 45 percent listed financial resources as equally facilitating, which is a clear indicator that key actors matter more than money for cross-sector strategists to succeed in their work.

*Regression analysis: What explains what cross-sector strategists find to be facilitating factors?*

Because the perceptions of different facilitating factors appear to be rather similar, it is valid to ask the question of whether there is still some kind of variety between the respondents, especially between the modes of being a policy, project, or bureaucrat strategist. The different modes of being a strategist indicate varying closeness to the management level and political level, where the policy strategists are close in their interaction, the bureaucrat strategist are further away due to their classical bureaucratic tasks, and the project strategists vary in their closeness. This analysis was carried out by OLS multiple regression, and the results are presented in Table 15.

The analysis shows some variations between strategist groups. It appears that the extent to which a cross-sector strategist works as a bureaucrat strategist has some influence on the extent to which active managers, financial resources, support from political management, and clear political goals are seen as facilitating (the result is not significant, but it still stands out in relation to the other independent variables due to the consistency in negative correlation). The greater the extent of a bureaucrat strategist work mode, the lower the tendency to see these factors as facilitating. This corresponds with the tasks carried out by the bureaucrat strategists.

The correlation between the extent of being a project strategist and the extent to which active managers, financial resources, support from political management, and clear political goals are seen as facilitating is mostly weakly positive (although also not significant), that is, it is possible to argue that the greater a project strategist you are, you are at least slightly more likely to find active managers, financial resources,
support from political management, and clear political goals to be facilitating for your work.

As for the extent to which cross-sector strategists can be described as policy strategists, this as well indicates a tendency to find active managers, financial resources, support from political management, and clear political goals to be facilitating. These results are significant. Thus when it comes to support from political management and clear political goals, being a policy strategist stands out from the other types in showing a stronger positive correlation, whereas the others show weaker positive or negative correlations in all models. Thus it seems as though the extent to which a cross-sector strategist can be described as a policy strategist to a greater extent makes them consider politics as important for facilitating their strategic work.

In Model 2, controlling for personal and organizational characteristics, we only find one variable showing a weak significance, and older age is positively associated with finding clear political goals to be facilitating. When controlling for strategic policy areas in Model 3, the results do not show any systematic variation. It thus seems like the major factor determining why cross-sector strategists find active managers, financial resources, support from political management, and clear political goals facilitating is the extent of the strategist work mode.
Table 15. What explains what cross-sector strategists find to be facilitating factors? OLS regression B-values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables:</th>
<th>Active managers (0–4)</th>
<th>Financial resources (0–4)</th>
<th>Support from political management (0–4)</th>
<th>Clear political goals (0–4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategist type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy strategist</td>
<td>.762*</td>
<td>.921**</td>
<td>.874*</td>
<td>1.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project strategist</td>
<td>.594</td>
<td>.581</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td>.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat strategist</td>
<td>-.144</td>
<td>-.105</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and organ-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and organizational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: years</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male = 1</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: High = 1</td>
<td>-.174</td>
<td>-.146</td>
<td>-.061</td>
<td>-.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal office</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>-.216</td>
<td>-.063</td>
<td>-.306*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality popula-</td>
<td>3.888E-05</td>
<td>4830</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tion (thousands of</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inhabitants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political regime:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left = 1</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic policy area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1= yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td></td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>-.431</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.256</td>
<td>-.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>-.030</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.323</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>-.135</td>
<td></td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>.349</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td></td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.486*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.059*</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: The dependent variables are responses to the question “To what extent are the following facilitating factors in your work?” where the cross-sector strategists responded on a five-grade scale from 0 = “not at all” to 4 = “to a very high extent”. The categorization of cross-sector strategists is based on the factor analysis index, see Table 10. N = 182. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05
The question of what facilitates the cross-sector work does not answer the extent to which the cross-sector strategists actually experience such facilitating factors in their work. However, it highlights how the respondents perceive their work situation and what would, even if not currently available, facilitate their work. The overall result of the survey analysis, that a majority of the respondents find active managers, support from political management, and clear political goals facilitating for their work, indicates that it is perceived to be of great importance to have access to organizational and political management. Financial resources matter as well, but by combining the information from the interviews and the survey data, it is fair to assume that access to financial resources cannot make up for a lack of interest from managers and politicians. Based on the stories from the interview respondents, the conclusion can be drawn that they perceive the organizational dilemmas as very active. They express how organizational aspects restrain them from doing what they think is their formal responsibility, and generally (but not always) this puts pressure on cross-sector strategists’ deliberations regarding strategic moves to generate or maintain support from actors with formal power.

Responsibility and accountability
How responsibility and accountability should be distributed is another aspect of structural dilemmas. Usually, the cross-sector strategists express that they have neither mandates nor obligations regarding their assigned strategic policy area. This sometime causes confusion in the organization because at the same time as cross-sector strategists are lacking mandate, they experience that they are considered to be formal authorities in their fields.

R: Sometimes people say ‘You, who are responsible for security’. No, I am not; every manager is responsible for his or her own department and the security in it. However, what I can do is to provide good advice and make sure that they are in an environment that facilitates taking on that responsibility. (…) When it comes to the topic of fire, the managers are actually accountable for it, for pupils getting killed in a fire. I am not accountable for anything, but a headmaster is, and this is a major driving factor for me. That they should know what the legislation is demanding from them. Because they are accountable for it. And after, they do whatever they want, that I do not care about. But they need to know, and if you have not explained it to them, you can put a person in a terrible situation. (Security 1)
The security strategist points out that she is not responsible for municipal security, which is instead a strategic policy area for which every manager is accountable in their specific department. Formal responsibility, and the consequences of not fulfilling it, is on these managers’ shoulders. The security strategist points out that her formal role is to make sure that managers know about this responsibility and to support them with expertise in their work of taking it on. This requires communication between cross-sector strategists and the departments, and many cross-sector strategists are explicit about a dedication to clarifying accountability and responsibility in the organization. They see clarification of responsibility and accountability as a way to demonstrate to the vertical organization the usefulness of cross-sector strategists as a consultative support function. They point out that being an activist for strategic policy areas is not an appropriate approach; rather, there must also be a dedication to contribute to the political-administrative organization.

Several cross-sector strategists deliberate upon legislation and regulation as a problematic aspect when it comes to responsibility and accountability. Sectors with extensive national legislation and regulation are generally considered by the respondents to be more difficult to reach. This is both because they are under more pressure and because the national governance places them within a harder frame of responsibility and accountability that can be used to define things in specific ways.

R: We get to propose priorities, and if it is clear which priorities to make, this is not problematic. But before, when plans and programs were not that clear, it felt like you were coming with something from the side that you were trying to squeeze into the departments. And I definitely did not want that; it should be something built up within regular departments. That is the basic thought when we wrote the plan, that we should develop the regular departments, and already-existing meeting points, first. To live up to the overall goal of offering parental support to everyone. If we do not do that, it is problem. I have experienced that you come with a goal, which is approved by a strategic or political group of some kind, and then, when you get to the departments, they say ‘Stop, we have our legislation’. Above all, this applies to the department of education, because they are pressed from all angles, and I have full understanding of that. It is impossible to do everything. That is why I think it is so important that we take goals apart in a proper way and merge them into regular business. (Public health 5)

This public health strategist mentions that the school can be a problematic organization to negotiate with, based on both the pressure that they
experience and extensive legislation. The school is mentioned by several cross-sector strategists as difficult to reach, mainly due to the fact that everyone wants to get access to the school, both horizontally and vertically. The public health strategist expresses full understanding of this, and stresses the importance of taking horizontal goals apart and integrating them into vertical sectors in order to make the assessment of responsibility and accountability more transparent and smoother.

All cross-sector strategists stress that networking, cooperation, and collaboration are major factors in their work, to which they are firmly dedicated.

R: You cannot stress it enough, the importance of collaboration when it comes to these topics. And even if there is no board here, there is still a will to collaborate between most of the departments. And the departments that have not yet woken up, well, I hope that they will wake up eventually. Because I believe that regardless of which field you are working in in the municipality, we have to collaborate, to reach further. (Sustainability 2)

The sustainability strategist mentions that in this case there is no specific advisory board for sustainability, but there is a willingness to collaborate. Networking groups with which cross-sector strategists interact can have varying functions, including steering groups with managers where cross-sector strategists participate, political/administrative advisory boards, as in the example above, which often have the principle function of carrying out strategic work, and development groups consisting of either representatives from different departments or of cross-sector strategists working for different policy areas, or both. In one municipality, a manager for a development department describes the newly started welfare group. When being asked how the meeting between this group and the municipal organization works, she gives the following reflection:

R: These groups start to live their own lives, and in them you get an idea that there is someone in charge, and you come up with lots of good ideas. And these are presented to the municipal managerial group and they say ‘No, it costs too much’. This creates a lot of frustration in the group, who understood it as if they had a mandate that later is removed when things get hot. Sometimes a very nice collaborative environment

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23 The Swedish municipalities are responsible for childcare, preschool, 10-year compulsory school, and upper secondary school, which are regulated via the national school legislation.
can develop within a group, but it is important that you are constantly aware that it is very conditioned. One of the things I am trying to carry through is a better structure for projects, so that we, when we start new work, try to describe it in project terms. Or process terms, but it is a similar structure, we have a purchaser of something, we have a steering group, reference groups, a project leader with a mandate, and clear action plans. And a description of why you should do it, which goals to achieve, when to evaluate. And this has taken a long time, to get acceptance for this structural thinking, because from the managerial side, they want to stay as flexible as possible, to make chopping and changing possible and make sure the politicians are standing with the election-winning topics and not to be overburdened with lots of debris that you made a decision about four years ago and then forgot about. (Manager, development department 1)

The manager describes a collaborative situation where it is unclear who has a mandate. Collaboration groups might work well and have good ideas, but they experience that the work is conditioned in relation to the vertical hierarchy, which also includes the political steering groups. Similar stories are expressed from several respondents, and the cross-sector strategists deliberate on this conditioning as leading to a clash between the collaboration group and the managerial group, who is holding formal vertical mandates to control resources. The manager mentions that one tactic she has tried to use in order to make collaboration groups work smoother is project models to create a structure with a mission, an action plan, and a mandate. Projects can thus be a way to work around institutionalized structures and to open up for negotiation and collaboration on strategic policy areas. The majority of the respondents engage in project organization in some sense. However, some also mention that they discern that not all projects are appreciated by actors in the formal structure. Forming a project means creating a more solid and formal structure for the strategic policy area. This move between informal and formal sometimes creates resistance from the political-administrative organization due to lower flexibility to withdraw or replace people and financial resources.

Cross-sector strategists spend a lot of their time networking, both within the municipality and on the regional and national level. In the survey, 77 percent say that they participate in intra-municipal networks, and 80 percent participate in regional and national networks. Seventeen percent also say that they participate in international networks. The following quote illustrates the importance and practice of networking:
R: I have been participating in the employment of new coordinators, and certain aspects have been stressed a lot. Like, this is about networks, you need to be able to deal with bigger groups, to make presentations without shaking so much your knees break, and I would say that it is hard to make it work if you do not manage those things. Of course, sometimes people are placed in these positions anyway, but it does not work very well. You need to show yourself outside, it is enough if you have a bad period, then you often close yourself off a little and focus on internal work, not making a lot of contacts. But you have to compensate for that later, the consequences appear rather quickly, because other perspectives take over. It is always a struggle to keep your perspective on the agenda.

I: How do you do that?

R: Via networks and the lobby work. For me, if I want something on the agenda, I have to work harder, because I am not physically placed in city hall. I can say it is not enough to email; face-to-face is the deal, talk, persuade, that is, badgering. One example is when we first did the LUPP [Lokal Uppföljning av Ungdomspolitiken; Local evaluation of the youth politics]. We tried to speak about it as much as possible. Not so much really telling the results, just saying LUPP in as many settings as possible. It paid off; the rallying around the survey was great in the beginning. So this is an important competence. (Youth 1)

Cross-sector strategists themselves thus seem to dedicate to networking as their major tool, especially when it comes to networking within their own organization. However, networking for influence does not necessarily mean networking for collaboration or shared responsibility, as pointed out by O’Flynn (2009). The fact that a cross-sector strategist is networking does not have to mean that the rest of the organization is doing so. In the cross-sector strategists’ perspective, they are dedicated to networking as a matter of keeping communication channels open. The focus is to later on develop a smoother negotiation process regarding responsibility and accountability, where it is easier for cross-sector strategists to convince actors of a specific interest or position. Networking is thus considered by the cross-sector strategists as a method to overcome potential discrepancies, and by keeping contact channels warm, and keeping the approach positive and utility-focused, it is likelier that cross-sector strategists will get an audience and a positive response for their perspective, and that others will be willing to take on and acknowledge responsibility for it.

Evaluation
The majority of the cross-sector strategists express that they discern a difficulty in evaluating strategic work and methods. One aspect of this is the problem with measuring results, and another is how the evaluation
should be executed. The following quote comes from a security strategist who reflects upon evaluation:

R: I dare say that we have rather poor follow-up and evaluation regarding this. And maybe it is because it is so scattered. I hope it will be one of the things we will strengthen up now, in the purchaser model, so that we get someone to report to. Maybe a continuous follow-up every year, six months, or quarter, not only in big pieces every four years. But certain things are really tricky and not possible to measure. Everyone loves measurable things, and in some ways you are only expected to do the measurable things. But not everything is so simple. You can measure really well, but you cannot ignore the rest just because it is tricky. When it comes to social risks, we have adopted the model from Region Västra Götaland. They have developed indicators for social risks, and they measure them over time. It makes it measurable, at least to some extent. (Security 2)

In this particular organization, the security work at the time of the interview had just been transferred to the municipal emergency service, and simultaneously it was adopting a clearer purchaser-provider model. The security strategist expresses hope that this will lead to easier evaluation, but at the same time says that measuring can be treacherous because many aspects can be overlooked if they are not measurable. The cross-sector strategists deliberate upon how the commonly discussed risk of directing focus to the measurable, and neglecting actions and measurements that might be fruitful but more difficult to measure, is of particular relevance for their work. Several add that this requires caution. It might be tempting to steer the work with strategic policy areas into a measurable direction because this is premiered by the organizational context, but this is not always the most appropriate. Many respondents mention that the work with strategic policy areas is often focused on changing people’s values. They also discern difficulties about how to estimate this. A manager for a diversity department deliberates upon whether it is possible to assess the outcome of strategic work:

R: We have talked a lot about this, that it is hard to evaluate and to estimate when we have succeeded. We do not know, because at the end of the day it is a matter of values, and it is very hard to measure whether you have changed the values with these efforts. It is really tricky to measure the diversity work; however, we can claim that X [the diversity strategist] has met with 20 groups and had values workshops where 200 people have participated, the topic has been lifted and discussed, but whether it has made a difference in values we do not know, but at least we have done that. (Manager, diversity 1)
This quote highlights how many cross-sector strategists discern the evaluation aspect of the organizational dilemma – they do lots of things, and they usually have a pretty clear idea about why they are doing what they are doing, but this is not easy to measure. However, in order to fit within the performance measurement structure with their dedicated approach, they deliberate upon how they construct measurements, in this case, the number of workshops held by the diversity strategist. The change that they are really interested in targeting is change of peoples’ values, but because this is beyond a measurable reach, the constructed measurement of workshops will have to do. This is also an example of how cross-sector strategists generally have a visionary outlook that they combine with more instrumental methods. The respondents deliberate upon the necessity to use two sets of methods – measurable ones, to show that certain things are achieved and to keep up good spirits in the organization, and more long-term ones in order to achieve fundamental change.

Another aspect of evaluation that the respondents deliberate extensively upon is related to perspective crowding, i.e. the existence of several overlapping strategic policy areas. They discern that it creates a risk of parallel evaluation from the top, that in turn leads to confusion from the bottom, in the departments. In some cases, the respondents give examples of how overlapping is dealt with through the creation of top-down evaluation focusing on one umbrella concept (see Chapter 5 for more elaboration on how cross-sector strategists deliberate on the conceptual aspects of overlapping). The effort to create a holistic approach in evaluation is an attempt to ease the burden of both staff at the end of vertical chain of command and the responsible managers.

R: We are thinking about making one policy for work environment, gender equality, equal treatment, and management. We want to make one plan for all of them, and one annual evaluation, so that we can see that everything is connected. I usually add financial goals so you can see equal treatment work in the annual report. I try to facilitate the work of managers so they will have fewer evaluations to hand in and a more comprehensive understanding of how things are going. (Gender equality 1)

This is an example of top-down coordination, as a bridge over vertical structures. The cross-sector strategist in the quote, along with several of the other respondents, is dedicated to the position where it is their task to bring together and negotiate different holistic aspects in policy documents and evaluations in order to facilitate and support the work in vertical sectors. Another version of bridging, to which many cross-sector
strategists also claim to be dedicated to, is the bottom-up approach, where already existing vertical goals are fitted under horizontal objectives. These methods appear to have developed organically in cross-sector strategists’ posts and in professional forums. The deliberation is done in interaction with actors in the surrounding context, both in the municipality and in the general debate on how to integrate certain strategic policy areas into existing organizational structures. Cross-sector strategists do not appear to discern a strong discrepancy between their preferences and the contextual discourse regarding evaluation. They are dedicated to the methods because they consider them to work.

Resources, evaluation, and responsibility/accountability appear to be objects of extensive deliberation regarding methods to diminish the dilemmas they are associated with. However, although the cross-sector strategists discern some conflicts in what is a possible and appropriate solution, they do not experience strong discrepancy with other actors or surrounding context regarding whether or not the dilemmas are valid.

Dilemma of culture

When studying the structural dilemmas, it becomes clear that they do exist and that cross-sector strategists’ methods of coping with them are based on cultural and relational factors. Themes that previous research has pointed out as potentially troublesome in the meeting of cultures in the vertical and horizontal traditions include trust, commonality, and leadership. Cross-sector strategists spend a lot of their time in organized networks, as shown above, but they also spend a lot of time performing informal networking and trust building. An often-used expression is “walking and talking”, and one cross-sector strategists mentions that the lunchroom coffee machine is an excellent spot for keeping in contact with different actors and to cope with the cultural aspects of structural dilemmas.

Trust

Many cross-sector strategists mention that their first years of work were tough because they did not know people in the organization and thus did not have a network of personal contacts. Cross-sector strategists generally express that they dedicated their first years to introducing themselves and creating these contacts in order to inform about strategic work and to convince contextual actors in the vertical structure that they are
competent, open, concerned, and reliable. The cross-sector strategists point out that reorganizations and people who change workplaces make dedication to constantly maintaining networks and contacts necessary, and that in general it is important to keeping the strategic policy area fresh and active. Generally, trust is perceived by the respondents to be more a matter of personality; however, several cross-sector strategists also express that sectors that deal with what are sometimes referred to as “harder” topics, such as roads, water, and housing, are more difficult to discuss, and the reason is often said to be differing language and mindset. (The cross-sector strategists are careful to point out that they do not like the terms “hard” and “soft” to describe different policy areas, although the terms are used in the interview situations.)

There appear to be variations between the cross-sector strategists in terms of how much they interact with different actors, and the effort they put into these interactions, but they all stress that networking both within and outside their municipal organization and keeping updated about what is happening in their field is an extensive part of their job. However, as was pointed out in previous section, their organizational belonging is a factor they constantly have to take into consideration when it comes to networking and contacts. Cross-sector strategists discern advantages of having contacts “closer to the ground” for this informal trust-building, which is easier when being placed in a department. But they also acknowledge the importance of being close to the political level. Regardless of which structural solution a municipality has chosen, there are inherent gaps in contacts as a consequence. These gaps are the object of extensive deliberation from cross-sector strategists regarding their informal networking strategies to create trust.

When asking the interviewed cross-sector strategists what makes them succeed in their work, with no exception they say it is their personal network and good relations. If several cross-sector strategists work closely together, they mention that they make use of each other’s networks to create trust. In meeting with other actors, cross-sector strategists usually have a rather clear understanding of how to form this trust. This public health strategist describes how she tries to act in order to provide a foundation of trust:
R: Just a simple thing, how you run meetings. How important that can be, that there is order, that it is serious – introduction, middle, closure. And all the time, the good hosting, it should feel important to come to this meeting, we have a purpose, we get taken care of, and it should feel good when we leave. (Public health 6)

Above all, the respondents point out that trust takes time to establish, and this is especially so for cross-sector strategists because their formal role is generally perceived as unclear. An illustrative example comes from a municipality in which public health strategists fought a long battle to get themselves included in city planning processes. They were faced with suspicion at first, but after spending some years informing about their posts and extending their networks, they eventually got more invitations to city planning processes than they could handle. The public health strategists express great joy about this, but stress that it is the result of hard, strategic, and dedicated work.

Commonality
Trust is not the only important aspect to consider. In the meeting of vertical and horizontal structure, culture and priorities might also create clashes, regardless of whether there is trust between actors. Cross-sector strategists generally try to frame strategic policy areas to fit within what is already on the table in order to avoid cultural clashes. One strategy to do this and to integrate strategic policy areas is to talk about activities already in place in the vertical structure (bottom up). The approach of taking horizontal goals apart and integrating them in the vertical sectors is the method that most cross-sector strategists seem to dedicate to. It is usually the way cross-sector strategists define mainstreaming that is seen as both the main task and main tool for cross-sector work; otherwise, departments perceive strategic policy areas as something coming “from the side” or “from above”, which creates the situation referred to in the introduction: “Well, we do try to work with raising the awareness of the convention of the rights of the child, the environment, gender equality, diversity, and public health. But we also have a business to run”. Key factors stressed repeatedly by cross-sector strategists include making departments feel that they are active, responsible, and accountable in the work with strategic policy areas. They express an overall dedication to the role of cross-sector strategists to be a facilitator of this by observing, lobbying, and supporting.
When cross-sector strategists try to bring vertical and the horizontal together through negotiation, they are faced with inherent power struggles between different departments and between strategic policy areas. Sometimes this becomes visible in collaboration groups.

R: People sometimes have very different perspectives of what it is about. Those who are appointed by their department to be a part of a collaboration work can have very different backgrounds, and very different instructions on what to achieve. So many times there is a strong imbalance in these groups. (Manager, development department 1)

Collaboration is discerned by almost all the cross-sector strategists to be crucial to achieving common goals and results, but it can be difficult to bring together different organizational cultures. The levels of inviolability and politicization vary between strategic policy areas, but mostly they are all considered acceptable. This makes the process of making priorities politically tricky. The cross-sector strategists express that they sometimes find the creation of commonality in these situations to be a delicate matter because political priorities might become visible. One way of creating commonality in terms of goals is (as mentioned) to form umbrella terms in which many of the strategic policy areas fit. The respondents express that these umbrella terms might create back doors for other perspectives, and thus contribute to commonality by highlighting how the various strategic policy areas are connected. The respondents also express that they sometime experience that the vagueness of the umbrella terms might disguise the power struggle inherent within and between some strategic policy areas. Thus, value conflicts and the dilemma of commonality are hidden. The cross-sector strategists deliberate upon this in two ways. First, they generally argue that making priorities clear is necessary but difficult, and second they express how they find it useful that the power struggle be hidden because it makes it easier to transform the topic into approaches that work. Most respondents add that they discern this to be a double-edged sword – a hidden power struggle can make the process easier in the short run, but it might also create difficulties in achieving real action if it is not possible to point out priorities. Creating commonality is thus something that cross-sector strategists are dedicated to as both their task (when trying to form a common understanding of how vertical and horizontal goals relate to each other) and as a tool (when using the inviolability and the overlapping and vague character of strategic policy areas as a method to work strategically).
The cross-sector strategists mention the importance of discerning and striking while the iron is hot, meaning having a sensitivity to what is going on and framing the strategic policy area in that direction, as illustrated by a youth politics strategist:

R: When you are in city hall, you get a rather quick feeling about what is on the table and what is not, like when 75 percent are discussing public health. You understand quickly which perspective to use as a frame. But of course, there are logical reasons as to why the youth perspective should be placed under public health; we are really working towards the same target group. In general, it is just the feeling, about what is on the agenda, and the public health perspective has become very clear in the municipality during the last year. (Youth 1)

The youth policy strategist has framed youth politics under public health because public health was already on the agenda and in people’s mindsets, and thus the goals merged into a common understanding. Several cross-sector strategists mention that this can also be done by appealing to external events in order to bring the strategic policy areas to the agenda and make them a political and organizational priority. Another example comes from a sustainability strategist who mentions that the implementation of the “lean” management system, or “constant improvements” as it is called in the municipalities, might be a way to “sneak in” the sustainability perspective:

R: Because I believe that the sustainability issues are not a question that comes from top to down. It needs to come from down to top. And the problem is, how do I reach down? Because I am up here. I need help from the management to come down, do you understand what I mean? And it is a process. In order to get there, you have to be let in. But we will start working with something called lean, or constant improvements as we say in the municipalities. And I think that I, with the help of constant improvements, will be able to lift in the sustainability perspective. Because sustainable workplace, which was another management system, has not really reached out; I am not requested. But constant improvements are requested, because there are several of us who have gone through courses in this, and it is bubbling in the departments; the people who have taken the courses want to get started. And my ambition is to sneak sustainability in that way. (Sustainability 2)

The sustainability strategist mentions that this strategy (to sneak sustainability in via the implementation of lean) might actually work because people are requesting this system, in contrast to the earlier attempt to
implement the “sustainable workplace management” system. This failed because people did not request the help of the sustainability strategist.

In the work to reach commonality, strategic policy areas can be expressed and framed in varying ways depending on who the receiver is. The cross-sector strategists generally dedicate to position strategic policy areas in relation to other policy areas, especially through economic framing. The following quote is from a manager for diversity and describes the importance of economic framing in the case of unaccompanied minors:

R: The topic of unaccompanied minors has been discussed a lot. In X municipality it is very stable and very good, and for the municipality it is great that they are coming, we get paid by the state for everything until they turn 21. If we are good and succeed, then it will not cost anything. What do other youths cost who have gone through kindergarten and school, they cost an awful lot if we see it in strictly financial terms. But then it is also about which perspective you have. If we choose that they are a resource and that we work and improve this, well then they will become a resource. But if we consider it an encumbrance for the municipality, they will also become that. For example, we had pretty strong resistance from the social department. They did not want to get involved because it will give them more work. But for me, it is just one mission among others that they have. But in general in the municipality, it is very positive. And what matters is to explain this to the politicians, that they should think like this, and if you are chair of the board of social affairs and hear from your administrators that this will become an encumbrance, if you have this perspective, then this is what will happen if you do not explain things. (Manager diversity 1)

The respondent stresses that it is important to highlight the economic advantages of receiving unaccompanied minors, and that it is the respondent’s task to explain this to politicians. The argumentation from the quote follows a pattern similar to many cross-sector strategists – they focus primarily on the municipal organization and financial benefits as well as on the long-term societal gains. The cross-sector strategists’ work to create commonality generally seems to be characterized by a dedication to economic positioning because these arguments work. However, the cross-sector strategists point out that there is usually a genuine interest and ambition in the organization, but to unite the vertical and horizontal culturally it is necessary to apply economic arguments because the economy sets the frames and shapes the understanding of what is possible and culturally appropriate in the organization.
Leadership

Cross-sector strategists do not have any formal authority, but the cross-sector strategist post still holds power aspects that can be applied when wanting to lead others in certain directions. These power aspects consist of the informal discretionary space held by cross-sector strategists. Most cross-sector strategists deliberate actively on this discretionary space and the power that comes with it.

Executing leadership without formal authority can be done in several ways. One aspect, which cross-sector strategists repeatedly point out, is that pragmatism and networking are necessary for being successful in strategic work. This approach also appears to generally give cross-sector strategists rather strong influence in the framing of the strategic policy area at hand. In negotiation between the cross-sector strategist and other actors on who is responsible and accountable for the cross-sector work, there is a risk that the cross-sector strategist might have to compromise with the definition of the cross-sector policy area. However, the formality of their posts combined with the otherwise fuzzy state of responsibility and accountability of the cross-sector policy areas seems to provide the cross-sector strategists with a strong influence in the contextual framing of strategic policy areas and strategic work. This is how they combine a desire to work for shared accountability and responsibility with being the actor with a formal task to work for the topic. Via networking and positive contacts, cross-sector strategists strive towards disguising their lobbying so well that they are not perceived as troublesome, and instead are able to act as an organizational support, collaboration, and responsibility facilitator and to maintain their identity as a responsive public administrator. Thus, the cross-sector strategists’ balance act in executing leadership without formal authority relates to 1) the political level, where they keep themselves pragmatic by staying away from politically colored framing even though they have the ambition to make politics of their topics, and 2) the managerial level, where cross-sector strategists use economic argumentation to fit within the results-oriented structure of vertical sectors. Basically, cross-sector strategists strive towards having good enough contacts with crucial actors in the organization (managers and politicians) to secure support when they try to exert influence. Exerted in a responsive and pragmatic way, this makes it possible for cross-sector strategists to nurture their own dedication to simultaneously be responsive public administrators and provide support to the organization because their posts allow them to participate in the formation
of their principle positions, which in turn guides the work of cross-sector strategists. The cross-sector strategists thus manage to cope with the dilemma of leadership by dedicating to two positions at once – they want to support and share the responsibility, and they simultaneously want to be able to define and lead the direction of the support.

The majority of the respondents seem to be dedicated to the use of power as a part of their professional identity in order to promote the strategic policy area. Although their formal authority is limited, cross-sector strategists use certain aspects of their formal post. Their formal positions provide them a certain amount of discursive and symbolic power, which can be applied in the early stages of problem formulation in the organization. In general, this discursive power is strong because of the inviolability of strategic policy areas, but this is not always an advantage. As some cross-sector strategists point out, it can create situations of hypocrisy, where everyone symbolically stands up for strategic policy areas but tend to be reserved when it comes to making changes that affect the vertical structure. In these cases, the situation for the cross-sector strategist can be complicated because the power game is moved to the structural arena, where discursive negotiating power is less influential. Page (2011) mentions that in order for the gender equality advisors in her study to be able to take a smoother and more cooperative role within the organization, advocacy is outsourced to actors outside the organization. To a certain extent, this is the case also with cross-sector strategists; however, their target is to outsource the advocacy to actors with more power within the organization, and to make them run the advocacy and pave the way for influence of the cross-sector strategist and the strategic policy area. The advocacy is thus not fully outsourced, merely disguised.

Conclusion
Do cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts regarding structural dilemmas, and if so, how do they cope with them in terms of discernment, deliberation, and dedication?

To summarize the dilemma of organization, we can see that cross-sector strategists do not have any formal organizational mandate. Different collaborative attempts that are made in terms of social investment funds and collaboration groups are conditioned when it comes to what they can and cannot do because of the robustness in the vertical structure, which is
where the mandates are. Sometimes, cross-sector strategists can pass the vertical structure by taking the role as experts, which gives them slightly more formal influence, but still the decision resides with managers and politicians within the vertical structure. Nurturing relations with these actors through charm and sympathy via informal and preferably face-to-face contacts thus becomes a key ingredient for cross-sector strategists. The cross-sector strategist post, which contains both expert aspects and lobbyist aspects, but without any mandate, is sometimes misunderstood in the organization. The cross-sector strategists point out repeatedly that they might not have any mandate, but they also do not have any formal responsibility. The position that cross-sector strategists generally take is to make others do things and to ease others’ jobs as much as they can by supporting them with advice. One way of doing this is to adapt to the structure as much as possible and to create an easier interpretation of perspective crowding while simultaneously trying to get the organization to take on more responsibility for the strategic policy areas. This can be done either from top-down, by gathering several horizontal topics in one evaluation, or from bottom-up, by using already existing goals and fitting them under strategic policy areas. Evaluation is also approached and used in a strategic way by combining short-term goals to keep up the organizational spirit regarding the strategic policy areas and more long-term visionary goals, which are the real target. Cross-sector strategists are usually responsible for this framing and see it as a part of their work to facilitate the vertical formal structure. The main instrument to achieve this while simultaneously working for strategic policy areas is to maintain active networking with crucial actors.

To summarize the dilemma of culture, we can see that building horizontal trust in a vertical structure is done by walking, talking, and networking in order to work their way into the vertical structure via informal networks. It is based more or less purely on personal relations. Cross-sector strategists are creating horizontal commonality in a vertical structure by listening and having their finger in the air regarding what is going on in the organization. They engineer their policy areas in such a way that they fit them within the ongoing policy process in order to avoid cultural clashes. They also take advantage of what is going on externally to create politics of strategic policy areas and to highlight priorities. Cross-sector strategists whose strategic policy area is currently not high on the agenda can use other strategic policy areas to “sneak in”. They often use economic arguments in order to reach out and create a common understanding be-
cause even if there might be a tension between the different values, economic arguments tend to be an easier ground for commonality. Trust building is important, and the cross-sector strategists stress that establishing necessary contacts can take several years. If there are several cross-sector strategists in one municipality, they tend to make use of each other’s networks in order to maximize their strategic scope. Another aspect of trust needed to create a support structure is to nurture the pragmatic and smooth aspects of the cross-sector strategist’s role, e.g. the support function rather than the advocacy role. Cross-sector strategists put focus on consensus aspects, in terms of discursive power, which they use in negotiations with others. This dedicated pragmatism is an important aspect of the informal leadership that cross-sector strategists are trying to engage in when working without a formal mandate to make people do things. The advocacy ambition is still there, and is usually explicit in the interviews, but it is executed from a distance, and indirectly, through the attempts to make the actors with formal power run the advocacy. Thus, cross-sector strategists are usually rather precise in what they want to achieve. Still, in their methods of achieving this, the cross-sector strategists see it as important to be flexible enough to change positions in order to keep the organization motivated and to push strategic policy areas into different arenas of the formal structure. By keeping contacts open, the likelihood is greater that any cultural discrepancy between organization and cross-sector strategist can be overcome through implicit lobbying from the cross-sector strategists’ side. In other words, good contacts provide openings through which cross-sector strategists to some extent can control the organization they desire to facilitate so that the facilitation and support of the formal structure goes in the “right direction”.

To conclude, the cross-sector strategists have rather clearly defined objectives in their deliberation regarding structural dilemmas – to bring their strategic policy areas into the vertical structure. But in order to overcome structural and cultural boundaries and the dilemmas they constitute, they maintain an ongoing and reflexive process of discernment on what values work at the moment in relation to the context. The cross-sector strategists maintain ongoing deliberation on the strategic choices they make in how to act in order to reach out as far as possible with strategic policy in the formal vertical structure. Via this deliberation, they simultaneously manage to keep their own personal and professional convictions by influencing the context. The overall dedication regarding methods to
reach out and try to create support structures for strategic policy areas are economic framing and contacts – economic framing as a way to overcome the gap between the horizontal and the vertical, and contacts and networking to keep the channels into the vertical organization open.

This is an effect of the informal formality of cross-sector strategists – in order to make formal room for strategic policy areas without a formal mandate, formality must be given from the place where it resides, e.g. the vertical sector and their budgets. And in order to get access to this, informal channels for trust must be active. The cross-sector strategists’ deliberation on structural dilemmas appears instrumental, in that cross-sector strategists are pragmatic in overcoming them. However, this instrumental approach is more considered to be a strategic method to reach the objectives. These objectives have strong visionary character rather than a dedication to instrumentality and pragmatism as objectives in themselves. Still, some cross-sector strategists express that their main professional skill is to be instrumentally pragmatic and strategic. They still find the overall arguments for negotiating horizontal and vertical structures the way they do in the content of the strategic policy areas, i.e. the strategic policy areas constitute the overall objectives. But the respondents who highlight that they are dedicated to pragmatism and a strategic approach as their main professional features recognize that the core of what they are doing as cross-sector strategists does not necessarily have to be rooted in a strong dedication to the strategic content. However, the cross-sector strategists who reflect upon their own behavior as instrumental and pragmatic strategists still express personal dedication to their strategic policy area. Their reasoning about instrumental strategic pragmatism as something that potentially could be executed without such dedication to the topic is not based on their personal approach, but should rather be seen as a reflection on what the cross-sector strategists perceive as professional values. They thus find it potentially sufficient to have the skill to work strategically by being instrumental and pragmatic and dedicated to these methods, although they themselves are dedicated to the topic itself.

Thus, cross-sector strategists in the study dedicate themselves to interests coming from the content of the strategic policy areas. The position taken by cross-sector strategists is characterized by a more communicative approach, by being an anticipating public administrator and a support function to the organization. This is who the cross-sector strategist can be,
given their dedication to the strategic policy areas, their own appreciation of the public administrator role, and the contextual demands on a public administrator. The cross-sector strategists appear torn between different reflexive logics in this process – they act communicatively to get the blessing from the context, and they also believe that being a support function is part of the legitimacy of the cross-sector strategist position. It is mainly a position rather than an interest, but it also holds some dedicated interest values as well in terms of how the cross-sector strategist post belongs to and contributes to the political-administrative organization. Thus, they act communicatively towards the organization in a rather instrumental way because this works when trying to diminish potential discrepancies. But the goal of acting instrumentally in order to get the ear of the context and to influence it is to pave the wave for the strategic policy areas, which the cross-sector strategists generally believe strongly in. This strong dedication is not strategically instrumental or an expression of a desire to be a responsive public administrator and organizational support. However, in the political-administrative organization it does not always work to act according to the visionary logic, and instead the cross-sector strategists form a highly instrumental position, which means adapting the logics of the political organization in order to create space for strategic policy areas and to combine the otherwise contradicting values of being a public administrator and a lobbyist/activist. The latter will be further elaborated in next chapter.

The cross-sector strategists sometimes express that they wish they did not have to work so hard with the methods used to balance these gaps between formal and informal modes of working. But at the same time, their dedication to the methods is rather unanimous. The structural dilemma thus appears to be solved by intense deliberation and networking footwork from cross-sector strategists. This process could have been described as a differentiation between interests and positions, and to some extent this would be a valid conclusion. However, such a differentiation would require a deliberate separation between means and ends. The cross-sector strategists generally do not make this clear separation because they discern and appreciate all of the values, including the ones they consider to be their own overall interests, the positions they choose to take, and the contextual structures.

Table 16 summarizes the conclusions on the cross-sector strategists’ experiences and ways of coping with structural dilemmas.
Table 16. Cross-sector strategists’ experience of and ways of coping with structural dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma of organization</th>
<th>Experience of value conflicts</th>
<th>Coping with value conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandate and resources</td>
<td>Mandate and resources are to a great extent considered to be a dilemma. The cross-sector strategists are dependent on mandate and resources to get something done, but they do not have formal access to these.</td>
<td>The dilemma of mandate and resources is solved by nurturing relations with actors with formal resources and mandate – the managers and politicians. Sometimes cross-sector strategists take on an expert role to generate more legitimacy in the formal structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility and accountability</td>
<td>Responsibility and accountability are considered to be a dilemma in the organization because it is often misunderstood as if the cross-sector strategists have formal responsibility in the organization, which they do not (the managers do). However, the cross-sector strategists do not find it to be a dilemma to define how the responsibility should look (see Ideational dilemmas).</td>
<td>The dilemma of responsibility and accountability is solved via the method to which the cross-sector strategists dedicate – working strategically to make others do things. They seek to explain this to actors with formal responsibility and accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Evaluation is experienced as a strong dilemma due to the difficulties in measuring cross-sector work, and especially because what they are really targeting is to change people’s values. It is also considered a dilemma due to perspective crowding.</td>
<td>The dilemma of evaluation is solved by combining short-term goals to fit the formal structure and more long-term goals for changes that are the real target – value changes. It is also solved via attempts to fit strategic policy areas into already existing goals, or by trying to gather them under one umbrella perspective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilemma of culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Trust is experienced as a strong dilemma by the cross-sector strategists due to its importance for the work and the time it takes to create it.</td>
<td>When the cross-sector strategists start to work at their posts, they spend a few years to create the necessary network and to prove themselves and explain their role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonality</td>
<td>Commonality is to a great extent experienced as a dilemma due to colliding priorities.</td>
<td>The dilemma of commonality is solved via economic and consensus framing of the strategic policy areas. This is found by the cross-sector strategists to be the most efficient framing in order to reach out and create commonality. They also solve it by sneaking one strategic policy area into another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership is to some extent experienced as a dilemma due to the lack of formal authority.</td>
<td>The pragmatism of the cross-sector strategists to reframe the strategic policy areas and their networks diminishes the dilemma of leadership by offering the possibility to exert indirect influence towards crucial actors in the organization so that these actors can take on direct leadership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Agency Dilemmas

Agency dilemmas relate to the personal aspects of being an actor in the meeting between horizontal and vertical traditions. The traditions have different legitimizing agency values, and the vertical tradition has a focus on specialization and has a clear hierarchy in the political-administrative organization, whereas the horizontal tradition has a focus on discretion and the integration of knowledge. This leads to potential agency dilemmas regarding the relation between administrative freedom and political responsiveness and the relation between representing independent expertise and being an advisory support function.

Dilemma of discretion: administrative freedom and political responsiveness

The themes that previous research has been pointed out as potentially troublesome for combining administrative freedom and political responsiveness include how to determine what to do and how to handle discretion. In the interviews, cross-sector strategists generally discern that they have strong freedom to control their work by starting projects, making contacts, and raising their voices to get influence. They deliberate upon this as one of the most important aspects of their posts because they appreciate the freedom and possibility to exert influence. They also sometimes find this freedom very frustrating.

How to determine what to do

In the interviews, the cross-sector strategists were asked how they know what to do and if they think they have clear directives. When the question in the interviews was asked to all cross-sector strategists if they feel like they have clear directives, the vast majority answer no. On the question on how they know what to do, an illustrative example is as follows:
R: We do not know. What guides me is that I have a general interest in society; I follow the debate and notice that this is an important topic, and I have my moral compass. And I have my coworkers, and we try to find solutions to achieve something that could be a result with very small resources. (Manager, development department 1)

Cross-sector strategists express that having clearer directives, and more hard regulation, might be helpful, but at the same time they mention that they do not always appreciate the input they get in defining what they should do. Cross-sector strategists individually appear to be torn between wanting to focus on the contextual expectations and using an instrumental approach in their deliberation process regarding how much weight to put on different inputs. From an identity perspective, the question to cross-sector strategists of how they determine what to do sheds light on who they consider themselves to be and how they negotiate this with other actors. The answers to the question vary slightly between respondents. Some find it very clear what to do and how they know what to do, whereas others do many things but have a hard time specifying how they actually decide on what to do. Others explicitly reflect upon having an unclear formal post and both the difficulties and freedom that come with this. They point out that they would appreciate more communicative interaction regarding what to do, which can be interpreted as a wish to not have to act independently when formulating the direction of strategic work. But at the same time, they reason rather freely about how to position themselves when they do not like the political stand or organizational expectations on things.

What is stressed again and again, both for cross-sector strategists who find it reasonably clear what they are expected to do and the ones who perceive their posts as vague and unlimited, is the importance of having a responsive and interested manager to discern and deliberate with. Having an active manager is helpful both when it comes to distinguishing what to do and how to relate to and interpret signals from the local politicians. Political goals and policies are considered to be of strong importance in the process of determining what to do. The following quote from a sustainability strategist illustrates the mix of freedom and responsiveness when determining what to do:
R: It is also about lobbying for the topics internally because although politics says that now we will work with this it still requires that you as an administrator, you have to, not defend, but you have to lobby for your topics. That is, you have to make the topics visible, you have to create a good relation both to the public or associations or other parties. You also have to create a good relation to politics so that you always have a good line of communication. So I have to say it is a mix of missions from politicians, missions from the administrative level, missions from the bottom-up, or needs that show up from the bottom. (Sustainability 3)

This quote illustrates that cross-sector strategists perceive the free lobby work as an important task, and that the input varies from the administration and political levels. In general, cross-sector strategists are dedicated to an anticipating approach, where they stress the necessity to listen to politicians and discern political direction. This corresponds with what we saw in the work advertisements for strategist posts, which sometimes requested experience of working in a political organization. There is thus a tension between how the cross-sector strategists perceive lobbying and anticipation in the political-administrative organization, as was also mentioned in the previous chapter. They switch between these activities depending on the situation. Sometimes they are acting as anticipating administrators towards politicians, and act as lobbyists towards the administration, in order to pave the way for the anticipated political direction. Sometimes they act the opposite, by anticipating the administration’s ideas, usually to keep the organization positive. And simultaneously, they lobby towards the politicians in order to try to push for a specific direction of the strategic policy areas, which could then be useful when approaching the administration. The relation between lobbying and anticipation is thus filled with many coexisting values, which the cross-sector strategists need to juggle.

The survey respondents were also asked about how they determine what to do. The foundation for this question is the ambiguous work modes for cross-sector strategists presented in the work advertisement study, and whether there is variation between them regarding how they perceive input for how to determine what to do. The respondents were asked to what extent political goals, demands from departments, demands from politicians, ongoing directives from managers, and self-formulated tasks determine what they should do. Eighty-seven percent of the respondents answered that political goals are important to a rather or very high extent, and 78 percent answered that they to a rather or very high extent formulate tasks on their own. Demands from departments, from politicians,
mission descriptions, and ongoing directives from managers are also of strong importance, but political goals and the self-formulated tasks stand out.

*Regression analysis: What explains how cross-sector strategists determine what to do?*

The survey question gives some indications on how the cross-sector strategists determine what to do. It seems likely that the degree to which a cross-sector strategist is a policy, project, or bureaucrat strategist might correlate with the categories of how to determine what to do. The degree to which a cross-sector strategist can be described as a policy strategist appears to be based on the tasks they are performing (budget responsibility, briefing in boards/councils, providing politicians with information and knowledge, participating in managerial groups) to be an indication of active policy work. This could also mean a higher level of independence. The degree to which a cross-sector strategist can be described as a bureaucrat strategist can, based on the tasks they are performing (investigation/evaluation, giving lectures within the municipal organization, processing cases), be expected to show a more classical administrator identity. The degree to which a cross-sector strategist can be described as a project strategist can, based on the project-related tasks, be expected to find mission description to be more important in determining what to do because they can be expected to be focused on a more limited part of the municipal administration and not focused on the entire organization in terms of demands and goals.

In order to determine if there is variation between the cross-sector strategists regarding the degree to which they consider one category of how to determine what to do important, an OLS multiple regression was carried out, as presented in Table 17. The results show that cross-sector strategists who to a higher degree could be described as policy strategists find political goals and demands from politicians to be more important. They also seem to find the mission description to be important. It is possible to draw the conclusion that the cross-sector strategists who could be described as project strategists are more independent in formulating what they should do. Thus, the initial expectations on how strategist mode might explain how cross-sector strategists determine what to do are not valid. The degree to which a cross-sector strategist can be described as a policy strategist does not indicate a perception of more independence in
determining what to do; rather, it indicates active responsiveness to political governance. The results also show that cross-sector strategists who to a higher degree could be described as bureaucrat strategists find ongoing directives from managers to be more important. They also seem to find demands from departments in the organization to be important. This corresponds well with the tasks performed by these cross-sector strategists.

There is no significant difference between the policy areas, which indicates that the pattern of a higher degree of policy strategist means working close to politics and paying attention to political governance, while a higher degree of project strategist means more independence, and a higher degree of bureaucrat strategist, or more classical administrator, is the same for all strategic policy areas.

The analysis must be interpreted from a consideration of strategist type as measuring the extent to which a respondent is a policy, project, or bureaucrat strategist. The result corresponds with the tasks they are performing in the different roles, and thus it is possible that one cross-sector strategist considers political goals important when acting as a policy strategist, the demands from the department and managers to be most important when acting as a bureaucrat strategist, and the importance of being more independent when acting as a project strategist. However, the result is still of importance by supporting the conclusions from the interviews – that the cross-sector strategists, regardless of which strategic policy area they work for, generally have extensive discretion in relation to the departments and politicians and that they use this to anticipate the political direction and the requests from the departments.
Table 17. What explains how cross-sector strategists determine what to do? OLS regression (B-values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Political goals (0–4)</th>
<th>Demands from departments (0–4)</th>
<th>Demands from politicians (0–4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategist type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy strategist</td>
<td>1.340***</td>
<td>1.342**</td>
<td>.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.926***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project strategist</td>
<td>-.160</td>
<td>-.191</td>
<td>-.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat strategist</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>-.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal and organizational characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: years</td>
<td>.020***</td>
<td>.021***</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
<td>-.224</td>
<td>-.359*</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: High</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal office</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>-.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality population (thousands of inhabitants)</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political regime: Left = 1</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>-.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic policy area (1 = yes, 0 = no)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td></td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>.199</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>.279</td>
<td></td>
<td>.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>-.185</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td></td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.335</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: The dependent variables are responses to the question "What determines what you should do?" where the cross-sector strategists responded on a five-grade scale from 0 = "not at all" to 4 = "to a very high extent". The categorization of cross-sector strategists is based on the factor analysis index, see Table 5. N = 182. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05
Table 17. (Continued). What explains how cross-sector strategists determine what to do? OLS regression (B-values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables:</th>
<th>Ongoing directives from manager (0–4)</th>
<th>Formulate the tasks on my own (0–4)</th>
<th>Mission description (0–4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategist type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy strategist</td>
<td>.428</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>.573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project strategist</td>
<td>-.673</td>
<td>-.747</td>
<td>-.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat strategist</td>
<td>.978*</td>
<td>1.094**</td>
<td>1.050*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: years</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.014*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male = 1</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>-.401</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education: High = 1</td>
<td>-.322</td>
<td>-.319</td>
<td>-.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal office</td>
<td>-.237</td>
<td>-.223</td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality population (thousands of inhabitants)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political regime: Left = 1</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic policy area (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>.533*</td>
<td>.279</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>-.307</td>
<td>-.270</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality,</td>
<td>-.127</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>-.217</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>-.337</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>-.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-.150</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>-.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: The dependent variables are responses to the question "What determines what you should do?" where the cross-sector strategists responded on a five-grade scale from 0 = "not at all" to 4 = "to a very high extent". The categorization of cross-sector strategists is based on the factor analysis index, see Table 5. N = 182. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05
In the interviews, the cross-sector strategists talk about the sometimes-occurring steering groups or advisory boards for strategic policy areas as examples of how resources, management, and politics come together. These groups are seen as important for determining the direction of the work, to get support for it, and to influence main actors. The groups or advisory boards are sometimes named after the umbrella perspective, such as social sustainability, public health, or safety, but still serve as a source of input for several cross-sector strategists. It can also be a steering group consisting of municipal top managers, to which cross-sector strategists occasionally get access. By establishing a steering group of managers, support from all parts of the municipal organization is secured, and it is possible to get signals of what needs to be done. In steering groups/advisory boards explicitly focusing on strategic policy areas, cross-sector strategists often have the function of participating members who are included in discussions of which action to take or direction to go. Thus, such a group also offers an opportunity to anticipate, affect, and shape the political direction and distribution of resources.

Level of discretion
Several cross-sector strategists mention how “if you want to work yourself to death on a position like this, no one will stop you”. The vagueness provides cross-sector strategists with strong discretion to frame their positions, but generally they try to do so in an anticipating way towards politicians and departments. But cross-sector strategists also want to change the agenda, and that is why they also appreciate the freedom and discretion. The solution to this ambivalence is to hold all values active simultaneously. Cross-sector strategists do not hold a static and stable dedication regarding discretion. Instead, they battle contradictory emotions and situations with constant discernment and deliberation where they manage to find legitimacy in contradictory interests.

The cross-sector strategists thus clearly experience strong freedom in their posts. They both appreciate this freedom and find it troublesome and frustrating. The reason for this ambivalence is seen to be both personal and organizational. On a personal level, the freedom requires a rather intense level of deliberation on what to do and how. This is sometimes perceived as demanding. On an organizational level, the freedom sometimes makes it difficult for cross-sector strategists to know who they are expected to be by politicians, e.g. what position they should take and what they should do. Cross-sector strategists desire to be responsive
administrators, and when there are no signals for which direction to take, they take action based on personal judgment (influenced by other sources). In general, cross-sector strategists stress that there are no ordinary days, that it can be demanding to keep everything organized and to deliberate on it, and that it takes a certain kind of person to handle these posts. However, all interview respondents also stress that they like their jobs very much, precisely because of the extensive discretion, and will most likely continue in the same field. Cross-sector strategists who have worked for a few years point out that it has taken them quite some time to discern and deliberate upon the characteristics of their own posts. The ones who are newer to their posts often mention that it can be a struggle to understand what to do and how to handle the perceived extensive discretion. They give examples of how they as newly employed strategists “crossed the line” between politics and administration and “entered a grey zone” without realizing it. With a few exceptions, cross-sector strategists, although they enjoy the freedom, generally also speak about discretion in problematizing ways regarding aspects such as potential democratic deficit, efficiency, and personal limitations.

R: On the surface, the discretion might look very extensive. But if it is to have any effect, it is actually quite limited. Because I cannot do it myself. I constantly need to base it on having others who pick up, others who take initiatives and do their share. So it is actually very limited if you are to wait for the municipality to figure out that this is what we want and what we should do.

I: Does it have any effect on the discretion that there is no clear definition of what you should do?

R: Yes, it is very limiting. If I knew exactly what was meant with the diversity council, I do not know, but at least it turns into action. It facilitates action. You can sit there and push pencils forever, and if the topic does not come up, you become a hostage. And that is not my role.

(Diversity 1)

The diversity strategist points out that although he has significant discretion in terms of taking initiatives, in order to actually get things done others have to be involved, and vague formulations regarding what should be done can complicate this action. The example he mentions is the diversity council, a political steering group for diversity, which he perceives as a good idea, but still problematic in the sense that it is still not clear how diversity will be put into action via this council.
The survey respondents were also asked to answer the question of how extensive they perceive their opportunities to influence what they should do to be. Ninety-four percent answered that they have very or relatively extensive opportunities to influence what they should do. Thus, there seems to be a tendency among the respondents to stress both the importance of responsiveness towards political governance and the discretion to determine what to do. This could be interpreted as indications that the cross-sector strategists, and in particular the ones who to a higher extent are policy strategists, perceive that they have a high level of discretion, but that they choose to direct it towards the politicians and that they consider it inappropriate to use their discretion in other ways, although they could.

The relationship to the political level is, however, more complex than just anticipating the political direction. Cross-sector strategists in general are dedicated to be responsive to politicians, but also to influence them in certain directions, as discussed in Chapter 5. The following quote from a security strategist illustrates the political level as constituting a principle, an object for education, and a tool and agent in strategic work:

R: It is all about making things visible, which is something I have learned from working in the municipal organization. I did not know that before I started. And I myself have developed my perspective on using the politics and politicians. I used to be placed in the emergency services department, in a department and not even physically in city hall. Which made me rather remote from politics. And I could not really understand why I had a hard time pushing for my topics, why I could not move forward and get approval in certain contexts. I understand that now. Because in order to move forward, you need the politics with you, to get emphasis in the matter. With time, I have learned to initiate. The politicians should not be kept away as much as possible, which was my approach in the beginning. That it was easiest to keep things on the administrative level. But no! Try to involve them, that is what makes it easy. Because then you get some pressure instruments to actually move forward. Plus, they should be aware. We cannot cover everything and be good at everything. They should see and know that and sometimes also make choices about what we should be good at. (Security 3)

Having interested politicians and gaining support from them is thus important for two reasons. The first is that when determining what to do, cross-sector strategists want political input and interest in order to avoid any discrepancy between their images of themselves as both lobbyists and administrators. This discrepancy is avoided both by anticipating political
direction and by influencing it. The second is that political support is considered to be the most important tool for cross-sector strategists when creating support structures for their strategic policy areas. A gender equality strategist, who describes how political will can ease or complicate her job, illustrates this in the following quote:

R: The politicians added certain commitments and they also wrote in the introduction to the strategic plan that there should be a gender analysis of goals and commitments. It is written there. I can get fuel and motivation from it, when I am saying, ‘You should take this course’, and ‘You need to do this’. But later, when a popular version of the strategic plan was made, this crucial sentence was no longer there. The introduction, where it is written about goals and commitments, was cut. And then, well, the incentive disappeared. (Gender equality 2)

Although all cross-sector strategists mention political support and interest as crucial, one strategist group, gender equality strategists, stand out in their stressing of how important it is to have support and that others know about this support. Strategic policy areas have various degrees of politicization based on the extent to which they include a power perspective, where security can be categorized as the least controversial, and gender equality as the other extreme. Some cross-sector strategists point this out as a possible explanation for why some strategic policy areas are more dependent than others in terms of political support. The most extreme example of politicization brought up during an interview illustrates how political controversy can be used as a counter force:

R: Everything about gender equality that has passed through the council has been given penetrating power thanks to him [Sweden Democrat politician] being like that, ‘No’. That is how he has been sitting there, with ‘radical feminism’ (…). I was in the Sweden Democrats’ saving program so I was kind of like, ok, kick me out. And then my boss said, ‘You are the only one who is safe in the entire organization’. (…) Do you understand? Opposition is actuation, there are many forces that empower a perspective, and every now and then SD is a factor. (Gender equality 1)\(^24\)

This gender equality strategist describes how the political resistance to her position by the Sweden Democrats actually strengthened her position

\(^{24}\) The Sweden Democrats is a right-conservative populist party that entered national parliament in the election of 2006. Previously, the party had scattered representatives in local governments, and by 2006, these seats increased as well. Due to the party’s roots in neofascist movements, this political situation has caused many controversies on the national, regional, and local government levels.
because it made others more willing to stand up for gender equality work, at least on a symbolic level.

Political input is thus of strong importance when cross-sector strategists reflect upon how to handle discretion, and they try as far as possible to be responsive. However, as shown, they also discuss the importance of influencing politicians in certain directions, and when doing so, other sources of input are deciding the direction of strategic work. Several cross-sector strategists mention it as their specific task to bring all this varying input together, including research and local, national, and international steering. Local steering comes first, in terms of being the factor that all other sources of input are related to. The impression from the interviews is that the cross-sector strategists are hired more or less explicitly for the task of making strategic policy areas tangible and to operationalize them in the local context, and this might be one argument behind the extensive discretion. This does not mean that cross-sector strategists are always accepting the input they get from local politicians. They normally do not speak in terms of actively influencing and affecting politicians. But most cross-sector strategists are dedicated to a position of enlightening and educating both administrative and political level about strategic policy areas in order to “politicize it”, as one safety coordinator says about her main goal:

R: It is important to get things on the agenda – the project that was undertaken last year would not have happened had I not reported the things I saw and presented the reoccurring statistical numbers. And I see it as my role to transmit what it looks like. I can also transmit that compared to other municipalities, it looks better or worse, and then whether it is a priority matter is up to the politicians to decide. My role is to transmit the images however I can with differing levels of persistence and energy. (Safety 1)

In this quote, the safety strategist highlights another aspect of discretion, namely, that although the priorities are political decisions, cross-sector strategists can choose the extent to which to push for an idea. This extent tends to be a personal matter. Although cross-sector strategists usually take an anticipating approach, they are individuals with personal opinions about their strategic policy area, and as was illustrated by the sustainability strategist, these personal convictions are an important foundation for their strategic work. The political level is thus discerned both as a principle and as an object for cross-sector strategists. The freedom coming with a lack of political definition is framed as an advantage because it provides
cross-sector strategists with the discretion to frame strategic policy areas as they find suitable, as illustrated by a public health strategist:

R: Equal living conditions is a very hard concept for the center-right political side. Traditionally, you have worked with this on the socialist side, for example, *The Spirit Level*. That is why, maybe I should not say that, but you can try to soften things, not speak too much of equality, but say that there should be equal preconditions. You use different notions, but you are referring to the same thing. Because at the end of the day, the center-right side of politics also does not want unequal conditions, but you may need to call it something else. (Public health 3)

But it also creates uncertainty and ambivalence in the role as public administrator, as this quote by a youth strategist illustrates:

R: The effect in my role is that it becomes unclear. Although I have extensive freedom and gladly have that freedom, I want something behind me. Like saying that I am at least a little right when I say that we should move in this direction. Then I need to know that we have a manager, a leader behind me, telling me that this is the direction we should take. But there is nothing like that, and it is rather very much so that the coordinators, or the ones with these functions, manage it themselves. You form the agenda on your own, and if something would go wrong ‘we back you up’. It is a reversed process. I think that is a challenge; I often experience it that way. Also in other municipalities you are left with it; these posts are kind of lonely and you are expected to take lots of responsibility. It is of course very positive from many aspects, and there is the possibility for an individual to sort of put their stamp on it. But you are still an administrator in a political organization, and I think it is easy to forget that with such a mission. I definitely have on several occasions. (Youth 1)

The youth strategist describes, as previously mentioned, that it is helpful to have a department and manager to support cross-sector strategists in formulating what to do, especially in relation to the rest of the organization.

During the interviews, all respondents were asked what a person working as a cross-sector strategist should be like. The following quote from a sustainability strategist is very representative of the answers:

R: You need to be extremely competent in your field, with extensive specialist knowledge. And you have to be driven by a certain energy in terms of believing in the topics; I do not think you can work with this if you do not have an interest. You can mature into taking responsibility for a topic, but I think it is important that you see these topics as crucial for a comprehensive society. You need to be persistent, but not hard-headed. Patient but also able to stand up and say now it is time, but also understanding of what it is like to work in a bigger organization and have an understanding of the prerequisites of politics. You need to be rather flexible and fast, and be able to switch, because politics can change. It is like in the state departments, we could face the same development here, that politics would switch, and what would that imply for me as an administrator? Potentially, if the Sweden Democrats were to get 35 percent of the citizens’ votes, what would that imply for my work? A different political management would imply a lot, of course. And you have to have a personal preference for these topics, feel that you know, like, and master them. (...) Maybe it is wrong to say something like this, but I see my mission as bigger, to also enable the voice that the politicians are actually there to hear. I do not perceive myself as just the extended arm of politics. I see it as my role to show that this is what it looks like in society: you have to form an opinion on it, for us to provide proper material. Maybe that could be interpreted as an administrative regime, but I do not see it that way. (Sustainability 3)

The sustainability strategist points out many personality characteristics mentioned in the work advertisements: knowledgeable, interested, patient, flexible, and personally committed, but also driven and persistent and with an understanding of the political organization. She stresses the reflexive aspects of the role, which is necessary in order to have the capacity to switch when politics switches. The sustainability strategist shows an example of the reflexivity most of the strategists have. She mentions a potential scenario that would have effects on her role as a public administrator, if the political climate were to change drastically, and she points out that it is important to reflect upon such things. Almost all cross-sector strategists show this active deliberation about their role as public administrators, although they vary somewhat in their conclusions. Some do not perceive it as a complex matter, but for different reasons – they can dedicate themselves to a very active political role where they use their discretion as far they can, both towards politicians and organizations, or they can take a rather passive role with the argument that they after all are administrators and executors in a political organization. However, the majority of cross-sector strategists in the interviews discuss the balance of public administrator and lobbyist as a rather complex matter, which they are often deliberating upon. The sustainabil-
ity strategist from the quote above mentions that she is aware of the fact that her conclusion and dedication might even be perceived as misconduct in her post as a public administrator, but that it still is necessary for her work as a cross-sector strategist to formulate such a standpoint. Thus, the cross-sector strategists generally seem to experience strong ambiguity regarding discretion, and they feel that they should exert influence to change the agenda due to their dedication to strategic policy areas. Simultaneously, they also want to restrain themselves from doing too much influencing and operational work. The reason for this is that they feel an obligation as public administrators to be responsive, and they fear that too much direct active work might lead to reliance from politics and organizations that the cross-sector strategists carry out the actual work in the strategic policy areas. This would go against the foundation of the cross-sector strategists’ dedication to how to work and who to be. They are dedicated to carrying the strategic policy areas, both in terms of influence and action, but indirectly, by getting the formal vertical organization to embrace the topics.

Dilemma of expertise: Independent knowledge and advisory support function

The themes that previous research has pointed out as potentially troublesome for combining independent knowledge with being an advisory support function is whether the actor in a cross-sector strategist post should claim jurisdiction and what kind of professionalism is required for the post. A majority of cross-sector strategists stress that they are dedicated to strategic work, e.g. to get others to do things, and that they try to avoid operational work. When being asked if they perceive themselves as consultants within the organization, the answer is mostly yes, that they are a tool for the departments to use. The argument is that the formal responsibility is in the departments, and thus the cross-sector strategists’ function is to make managers observant of what they actually need to do. However, although there is a clear tendency among cross-sector strategists to stress this dedication to professional strategic work, it is a fragmented tendency that still seems dependent on situation and person, and thus making their jurisdiction and professionalism ambiguous.

Claims of jurisdiction

Cross-sector strategists’ strong discretion and simultaneous desire to be responsive are also expressed in terms of their perception of themselves.
as a group with jurisdiction. The following quote comes from a public health strategist who is explaining what happens when the scientific foundation for public health work meets the municipal political situation:

R: I think one gets research in the most substantial way when catching things from the WHO and Michael Marmot, who in public health contexts is an important actor from England working with this. It is really not loose opinions but rather heavy perspectives there, and where we as administrators collect information and implement it in the municipality. Here we have a center-right majority, and thus one gets directly reminded a little about politics. This might be politics, and it is associated to the left a lot, a lot of social democracy, so we had the matter of equal health under scrutiny for a very long time. There is no one who just wants to go ahead and undertake it, and I think that might be because it feels very political. So my approach to it is not that I have a political color and value in it, but rather, that it is important from a public health perspective. We have scientific substance, but it gets complicated, loaded, a little tricky, and I think that is because it kind of touches on and awakens so many connections of political character. So what we have tried to do then, kind of from the micro level, is, for example, to be very alert. When one comes as freshly graduated, one is using one’s terminology and thinking that everyone understands it and thinks alike and that it is nothing problematic. But instead of talking equality, one can talk about how all children in X municipality should have the same opportunities for a good life. If I choose to speak about equality, I am given the cold shoulder from an extensive part of the politicians. (Public health 3)

The public health strategist expresses that the rhetoric of the scientific foundation that the public health work is built upon causes trouble in strategic work due to political connotations. This public health strategist maintains a professional foundation, but after some years of working has learned how to frame this to fit the climate in the municipality. The respondents express that it is important to have extensive expert knowledge about the strategic policy areas because they use this knowledge to frame the strategic policy areas in varying ways, depending on the situation, in order to reach out and do their job, e.g. lobby. The cross-sector strategists’ perceptions about whether and how to perform this framing vary, but a majority speak explicitly about this ability as being the main professional skill for a cross-sector strategist. The overall impression, as mentioned, is that cross-sector strategists take a very

26 Professor Sir Michael Marmot is the Director of the Institute of Health Equity at University College of London, and his publications are standard references in public health science.
pragmatic approach to how to use different arguments and to which identity to appeal to when talking to other actors. If the setting requires economic framing, the cross-sector strategist does not push for equality-based arguments, but instead sees economic arguments and framing as a tool for their job. This is valid for both the political and administrative level because cross-sector strategists dedicate to various positions depending on the situation – as expert (although this in itself constitutes a matter of framing depending on situation), as administrator, or as advocate/catalyst for stakeholders or the public. In the specific situation, they look for jurisdiction for this position in order to diagnose, make inferences, and treat the problem. The stories from the respondents indicate that the contextual demands on them have changed in the last ten to fifteen years, from having little possibility to claim any jurisdiction to “everyone is asking for us now”, as one public health strategist says. One possible explanation for this mentioned by many cross-sector strategists is that people have started to think of strategic policy areas in economic terms. This makes it easier for cross-sector strategists to argue for the importance of strategic policy areas and to claim jurisdiction by focusing on utility-focused technocratic arguments. Thus, this is the character the jurisdiction also takes; however, as with the methods of making others take responsibility for the strategic policy areas, the cross-sector strategists generally do not perceive this technocratic economic jurisdiction to be their main professional dedication. Rather, it is a position in order to sustain their actual interest, which is to integrate the strategic policy areas into the vertical formal organization. Thus, the stories from the interviews and the discussion in the networks during focus groups indicate two versions of jurisdiction depending on the context – one towards the organization in which they are working as cross-sector strategists, and one towards the group of cross-sector strategists with which they identify professionally. The former is generally seen a tool for the latter.

Cross-sector strategists express the same kind of ambiguity in relation to organization and professions as they do to politicians. On the one hand, they see it as their role to make others do and think in certain ways. Cross-sector strategists mention that it can be very annoying that everyone tends to have opinions about strategic policy areas because most people have experience from them, and they are related to values and norms. On the other hand, cross-sector strategists repeatedly point out that they are not really the experts and that it is very important to be respon-
sive towards professions and expertise in different organizational departments. Cross-sector strategists run a seemingly constant deliberation based on this ambivalence. The balance is hard to maintain due to the fact that strategic policy areas have a strong bearing on values, norms, and attention.

R: We work a lot with values and norms. It is hard to measure, but it is also hard to change because it is not only about Kalle the operating engineer, it is also about Kalle the individual. I cannot just change the opinions of Kalle the operating engineer because it does not hold, so it becomes very big all of a sudden. (Diversity 2)

Security stands out as being the least value-focused perspective. The security strategists point this out, but they also mention that being a strategist for security means working for a changed mindset, just like other cross-sector strategists do. In this sense, the establishment of cross-sector strategist posts can be interpreted as a tool for political steering, where negotiation and deliberation of ambiguous strategic policy areas is outsourced to cross-sector strategists.

The cross-sector strategists’ personal dedication to their posts in terms of jurisdiction and legitimacy is mixed – they simultaneously like the idea of turning cross-sector strategist work into a profession, but they also see problems with it.

R: I am ambivalent. I both wish that it would become a profession and some field of expertise, and at the same time I feel that this is something we all have to work with, and to be honest I do not know if it is right that we have experts in gender equality or disability. I understand that we have to, but I wish we did not. It is a conflict, and I am a bit scared of all the targeted measurements. Maybe we instead need to revise the school plan or the society as a whole. (…) We have a person in the municipality who is working with gender equality. It cannot only be her who is working with that, all of us need to do it, and it is the same thing with diversity, it cannot only be me who is working with it. But I do not know if it is possible to reach that state, where it is natural, without first relying on experts. (Diversity 2)

Throughout the interviews, this aspect of agency was discussed back and forth, and cross-sector strategists usually seem to have given this much deliberation. Cross-sector strategists remain dedicated to mainstreaming as an ideal, meaning that they prefer when departments are undertaking tasks themselves. In this, they want to remain as support functions rather than being experts. But they are also dedicated to the professional
knowledge of the strategic policy areas, both in the occupational and strategic policy areas, and to the organizational and connective skills used to lobby for them. This professional dedication takes cross-sector strategists further than being merely a support function, and it means an ongoing balancing act of if and how to claim jurisdiction.

**Version of expertise/professionalism**

When being asked the direct question of whether strategic work could be perceived as one field of expertise in relation to various strategic policy areas and the rest of the organization, some say no, but more say yes. When it comes to occupational knowledge, security stands out as the policy area that is mostly not considered to be in the same field as the rest of the strategic policy areas. However, how security is framed varies between municipalities, and in cases where security is perceived as a more structural matter involving other aspects than purely physical safety, it is considered to be the same type of work and to have the same foundation for expertise as other strategic policy areas.

When being asked the question of whether they perceive themselves as experts, the cross-sector strategists’ answers are ambivalent. Many point out that they do not dedicate themselves to becoming experts; they consider the professionals in the departments to be the experts. As cross-sector strategists, they are supposed to support these professionals. However, this is perceived as a dilemma.

R: It is a dilemma, because we are generalists. And there are others who are more specialists within the smaller parts, so we are not specialists in anything, more than maybe security issues or so. There are not a lot like that. So we often get disregarded, because someone else knows some details a little better than we do. But our role is to have the overall perspective. So it is very much about our own personal mandate, and how easy we find it to pedagogically bring things forward, describe things, how credible we are. (…) The overall perspective is a profession in itself, to have the ability to take a holistic perspective. And then, public health topics are the entirety, I mean, basically everything can be described as a matter of public health. (Manager, development department 1)

The respondent points out that being a cross-sector strategist means having a helicopter perspective, and that having this comprehensive view is a profession in itself. This is something different than the normal appreciation of occupational knowledge, but not the same as connective or organizational professionalism (Evetts 2009; Noordegraaf et al. 2014),
because the helicopter perspective is still founded in the content of the strategic policy areas.

However, there is also a clear tendency among the respondents to acknowledge specific strategic and coordinating knowledge and competence, rather than purely focusing on the strategic policy area itself.

R: That has been our approach when we have been recruiting. Of course, we have also expected knowledge in the field of security. But we have also focused a lot on coordination competence, and not necessarily from coordinating experience. But rather, you have to have a personality and mode of working that is appropriate as a coordinator. The rest can be learned, so we have put lots of emphasis on finding a person who fits the role. (Security 3)

Connective and coordinating expertise is mentioned by several cross-sector strategists, including the ones who do not want to call themselves experts in their strategic policy areas.

R: I should not call myself expert, because the municipal executive board always has precedence, and the experts are in the departments. This is very clear, so expert might be the wrong word. In that case, it would be the executive board’s expert in social matters. Because I know where to turn to find out more, in the departments. (…) I am not a deep expert, I am the expert on coordinating, I know the channels, where to get information and knowledge. (Different social perspectives 1)

Thus, cross-sector strategists mix knowledge of process, in terms of how to work strategically, connectively, and in a coordinating manner, and knowledge of content, which is more occupational, and they vary in the extent to which they stress one or the other. However, the one can be used as a tool for the other. The skill to frame occupational knowledge and arguments according to the audience is a way to apply connective and organizational knowledge to occupational knowledge in order to make way for the latter. Sometimes the situation might be reversed, and the cross-sector strategist might apply occupational knowledge in order to make way for the connective and organizational knowledge. A public health strategist responsible for damage prevention, who tells about how she used occupational knowledge to reach through as a tool for organizational and connective work, illustrates this opposite example:

R: The main thing is contacts, personal relations, and contact with politicians. Because they can point directly on what they want to get done. If I want to speak to
the technical department, for example, I have to have contact with that political board. So you see, it is necessary to have contacts exactly everywhere in order to succeed in this job.

I: So how was it when you started seven years ago? How do you do initially, before you had all these contacts?

R: You have to prove yourself, frankly. Compared to other public health topics, damage prevention is somewhat hard. But my competence was really questioned initially: ‘What do you know about damage prevention, you are a public health worker’. And you know, as a public health worker, I have a general knowledge about all public health topics. But I actually started to intensely study personal injuries. To get respect and in that way to build good relations. (Public health 6)

Thus, cross-sector strategists are working according to occupational, organizational, and connective professionalism and tend to be dedicated to all of them in a pragmatic way in order to reach out with strategic policy areas.

Most cross-sector strategists stress that it is important for them to talk to other cross-sector strategists. They have personal networks of colleagues in their own and in other municipalities, which are a source of inspiration, and they are often participating in more formally organized professional networks. Generally, cross-sector strategists point out that getting inspiration from other municipalities and cross-sector strategists is important when deliberating on what to do and who to be, and that they often cooperate or consult other cross-sector strategists in the municipality. In one case, as mentioned previously, several cross-sector strategists formed a professional group in the municipality in which they discuss strategic work as one specific field of expertise. During one interview, a direct question about the relation between cross-sector strategists and other administrators led to a reflection from the respondent, where she contrasted herself and her cross-sector strategist colleagues with other administrators they encounter in their work:

R: In certain contexts when I meet other administrators, it is like we come from two different worlds. We do not speak the same language. I think we all often want the same thing – better conditions for the people. But the communication does not work and we cannot reach each other. Sometimes I feel like, and especially I felt initially, that we were perceived as kind of, not threatening, because that is too strong a word, but kind of troublesome. Like we were trying to show off. I felt that from some managers and higher administrators, and I think that it is because we come with an approach where we like to push and talk and have opinions about almost everything.
And we express them pretty clearly. And we want to be where the action is, and we do not have this administrative approach, where you sit in a meeting and discuss paragraph after paragraph and don’t make any flowery statements, and one person is in control. We are not like that. And that is why I in certain contexts find it hard to reach others, who are more the other way, like the technical side. Now when we have seen them many times, a relation has been established and they have stopped perceiving us as a threat; we do not try to steal their tasks or take the glory for something that they do. Before, I used to think that it was a matter of background, like the economists like to think in numbers. But now when we speak about it I realize that it has quite a lot to do with them being traditional administrators, which I actually do not perceive myself as. (Public health 4)

What is expressed in this quote is that in the municipal organization, where cross-sector strategists are coexisting with other administrators (like the other two groups in the work advertisements study) there can be clashes of logics. Cross-sector strategists might in this clash be perceived as cumbersome and inconvenient, and in the example above it took a while for them to establish a relation that made them seem less threatening in their professionalism. The cross-sector strategists generally do not wish to be perceived as threatening, and when reflecting on their agency, they repeatedly stress that although their post and role is different from other administrators in the political-administrative organization, they still identify as a public administrator whose main task is to support the logics of administration and the professional departments in the sectorized organization.

Conclusion

Do cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts regarding agency dilemmas, and if so, how do they cope with them in terms of discernment, deliberation, and dedication?

To summarize the dilemma of discretion, the cross-sector strategists have extensive discretion and they both appreciate it and find it frustrating and sometimes problematic in their role as a public administrator. They are responsive towards politicians and dedicated to anticipating the political will. But they are also dedicated to steering politicians in certain directions. This causes an ambivalent situation for cross-sector strategists regarding how they perceive themselves as administrators because they claim their job to be both to anticipate the political direction and to control this direction. The general approach that cross-sector strategists
tend to take in this ambivalent situation is to think of themselves as a tool, to create sense and to lower the ambiguity level of their strategic policy area. When they are trying to influence politicians, they do so because they find it to be their professional role to be a processor and catalyst of their strategic policy area by bringing together varying data on the field and to present a cleaner version that is easier to grasp while still being based on expert knowledge. In the balance of responsiveness and full discretion, cross-sector strategists take an active reflexive approach, both in relation to strategic policy areas and to the organization by framing topics according to the audience. The cross-sector strategists consider this to be an important professional skill for them. Although there is a certain variation in the extent to which cross-sector strategists would define themselves as administrators or lobbyists in the first place, the deliberation process for most of them has led to the conclusion that their role as a tool for fulfilling the goals and desires of local politicians is a founding prerequisite for their existence. But in the process of doing so, cross-sector strategists sometimes dedicate themselves to being indirect (and sometimes direct) lobbyists by affecting and controlling political direction.

To summarize the dilemma of expertise, the cross-sector strategists tend to oscillate between seeing themselves as lobbying experts and as a support function. They certainly are dedicated to trying to influence what is going on in the organizational departments, but they do so in a rather subtle way, where they try to avoid confrontation. Cross-sector strategists thus show some professionalization ambition and tendencies in their development of methods and approaches to strategic work, and they find support in interaction with other cross-sector strategists. Simultaneously, as a part of their post as cross-sector strategists, they are dedicated to being responsive to organizational departments and to the professional jurisdiction represented by the departments. The ambivalence of being coordinators and cross-sector strategists for strategic policy areas, which according to the mainstreaming logic should not be dealt with as a specific field of expertise, is something that is mentioned frequently by the interviewed cross-sector strategists, both directly and indirectly. Cross-sector strategists tend to use their occupational knowledge of strategic policy areas as a strategic argument to claim legitimacy in their struggle for support structures, but they also stress that it is necessary to combine it with good skills in connective and organizational processes, e.g. being able to frame topics in a way that seems desirable. And again,
cross-sector strategists repeatedly stress that the crucial thing is to have the support of politicians. This support is considered both a subject i.e. a main dedication and interest for legitimacy, and an object, e.g. a tool for reaching another main dedication and interest (influencing the rest of the organization). Thus, this is the value dominating the discernment of cross-sector strategists, and it is highly present when they deliberate on who they should be in the political-administrative organization, both in relation to politicians and in relation to actors in the vertical organization of the administration.

To conclude, when comparing cross-sector strategists’ processes of discernment, deliberation, and dedication regarding agency with the same process in terms of structural and ideational dilemmas, one difference stands out. When it comes to the approach of who to be in the political-administrative organization and where to appeal for legitimacy, the cross-sector strategists’ discernment is characterized by values from the political-administrative context in which they are situated. They also seem to have a more communicative deliberation, where they express a desire to fit within the expectations of the context. They still have visionary interests founded in the dedication that they want to push for their strategic policy areas because they believe in them. But the post as administrator and the need to be integrated as such make the deliberation change character. Cross-sector strategists find legitimizing arguments in strategic policy areas for performing strategic methods as described in Structural dilemmas. That is, when they come across the dilemma of being a lobbyist-neutral executor, they generally legitimate lobbyist actions for themselves by appealing to the overall good of the strategic policy area. But cross-sector strategists also stress that the necessary organizational and connective knowledge of public administration excludes excessive lobbying; if they want to succeed as a cross-sector strategist, the context simply does not allow it, and the cross-sector strategists themselves do not find it appropriate.

Also, when it comes to the dilemma of expert-support function, organizational and connective knowledge is of importance in order to frame strategic policy areas to fit in different contexts. Although this framing seems to be developed as an instrumentally founded method to reach visionary objectives, the cross-sector strategists are generally dedicated to the position that they are not the experts. In some cases, cross-sector strategists might take on the expert role when focusing on legislation
regarding strategic policy areas, but in these cases they do so in the name of a support function. Thus, cross-sector strategists focus directly on their role as a public administrator in the political-administrative organization, and they deliberate on their choices as cross-sector strategists accordingly. The cross-sector strategists’ processes of discernment, deliberation, and dedication do not end up in firmly dedicated positions for agency due to the desire to fulfill values of a both lobbyist/neutral executor and an expertise/support function. The solution to diminish this dissonance is to change position according to the situation at hand. This makes the external negotiation with other actors smoother. And it makes the internal deliberation less demanding because it gives the possibility to combine seemingly contradictory values. However, it also most likely contributes to the initial confusion that many cross-sector strategists affirm to have experienced when initially working to find paths for their agency when they first started at their posts.

Table 18 summarizes the conclusions on the cross-sector strategists’ experience and ways of coping with agency dilemmas.
Table 18. Cross-sector strategists’ experience of and ways of coping with agency dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma of discretion: administrative freedom and political responsiveness</th>
<th>Experience of value conflicts</th>
<th>Coping with value conflicts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How to determine what to do is experienced by the cross-sector strategists as a strong dilemma due to the double dedication to both be responsive public administrators anticipating the political direction and to control this direction.</td>
<td>The dilemma of how to determine what to do is solved by a combination of being a lobbyist and a responsive public administrator; by influencing leading actors, the direction can go more into the direction desired by the cross-sector strategists, and then it is possible for them to dedicate themselves to the role as a responsive public administrator working for this direction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of discretion</td>
<td>The level of discretion is sometimes experienced as a dilemma due to the desire to be responsive public administrators.</td>
<td>The dilemma of discretion is solved by the cross-sector strategists by thinking of themselves as a tool to create sense and to be catalysts for the strategic policy area, and thus using their discretion in the name of the political-administrative organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilemma of expertise: independent knowledge and advisory support function</td>
<td>Claims of jurisdiction are experienced as a strong dilemma due to the double dedication to be both experts and a support function to the organization.</td>
<td>The dilemma of claims of jurisdiction is solved by trying to avoid confrontation by being responsive to the expertise represented by the organizational departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims of jurisdiction</td>
<td>Versions of expertise/professionalism are experienced as a strong dilemma due to necessity to oscillate between the different forms.</td>
<td>The dilemma of versions of expertise/jurisdiction is solved by using the occupational knowledge as a strategic argument, but combining it with the skills of connective and organizational professionalism in order to reach out to the organization. When possible, the cross-sector strategists appeal to their role as public administrators by using the political support to garner the support of the organization and to maintain their own dedication to being a responsive public administrator.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cross-Sector Strategists as Part of Governance

The three chapters on ideational, structural, and agency dilemmas elaborate on whether cross-sector strategists are experiencing value conflicts in their posts and, if so, how they deal with those conflicts. Based on these three chapters, conclusions on cross-sector strategists’ discernment, deliberation, and dedication can be drawn. In the following chapter, the conclusions from Chapters 5 (Ideational Dilemmas), 6 (Structural Dilemmas), and 7 (Agency Dilemmas) are compiled into overall conclusions for research question 3, how the cross-sector strategists cope with value conflict in terms of discerning values, deliberating on conditions, and dedicating to positions. Based on the compiled results of how cross-sector strategists cope with value conflict, an elaboration on research question 4, how the cross-sector strategists’ coping with value conflict can be understood as a part of governance, is presented.

When looking at the cross-sector strategists’ process of discernment, deliberation, and dedication on ideational, structural, and agency dilemmas, it becomes clear that it is necessary to analyze all three groups of dilemmas in order to get a comprehensive picture of the contradictive role of cross-sector strategists in the political-administrative organization. Conceptually, they do not find the process and content of their work to be a dilemma, but structurally it becomes a dilemma when facing and negotiating their formal role with other actors in terms of organization and culture, and it also becomes a dilemma in how to form agency in the logics of the political-administrative organization in terms of discretion and expertise.

The development of necessary skills to handle these contradictive values indicates a movement towards a professional awareness and identity. In
the positions the cross-sector strategists dedicate themselves to, they search for legitimization in different traditions. By switching between them, cross-sector strategists solve occurring dilemmas, temporarily, until it is time for a new process of discernment, deliberation, and dedication. An important aspect of reducing the impact of dilemmas for cross-sector strategists is thus their ability to recognize, although not always explicitly, that a founding part of the cross-sector strategist identity is to perform this deliberation on how to combine a formal post with informal methods. In the crossing between verticality and horizontality, their identity as a public administrator in a political-administrative organization is strong, and present, but it is complemented with other values in order to form a comprehensive identity as a cross-sector strategist.

Discerning values

When cross-sector strategists discern the values of specific situations they encounter, they keep many values active simultaneously. The expectation on their posts, which puts them between the formal and informal, and between the ideal-typical behavior of public administrators and politicians, brings a multiplicity of values. When asking cross-sector strategists how they perceive their post and role, they stress that they are a part of a political-administrative organization and that political goals are the most important source of input. They also generally prefer to call themselves a support function rather than an expert or lobbyist (see Risi & Wickert 2017, on corporate social responsibility managers). However, at the same time, cross-sector strategists usually have their agenda and they consider it as a part of their post and role to bring this agenda forward.

Thus, the formal approach that cross-sector strategists usually take when identifying themselves are as a formal and anticipating consultative support function to the organization in their work of fulfilling political goals on strategic policy areas. However, more or less implicitly, when analyzing the descriptions of cross-sector strategists’ work, another identity shines through – the identity of a committed lobbyist and advocate who works according to classical policy entrepreneurial methods, by convincing, sneaking-in, networking, and reframing. The question of how cross-sector strategists handle the discerned values of who to be has to be answered by saying that they are all these things at once. And this ambiguity turns into a third role and competence, which cross-sector
strategists are also discerning, that of how to manage all these things at once. This is expressed when cross-sector strategists speak about how important it is to meet others who work with similar topics and in similar posts.

Cross-sector strategists thus perceive their role as being carriers of a specific policy area, but also as being public administrators. Generally, cross-sector strategists perceive the situation according to their public administrator identity, and they think of situations with awareness of the function of a political-administrative organization. It is according to this logic that they approach other actors and explain their positions. In this situation, cross-sector strategists then try to fit their own advocacy ambitions. Their authority can shift depending on how they dedicate themselves to the situation they are in, and they do this by taking on different roles depending on whom they are talking to. Thus, in order to fit in the situation, they take on different approaches depending on what they find appropriate. The difference from the normal "logic of appropriateness" is that they do not do this only to get accepted, they do it from the "logic of consequences" (see March & Olsen 1996), that is, to achieve what they are aiming for. In this situation, logics of bureaucracy and lobbyism, of verticality and horizontality, formal and informal, and of multi-level and strong self-governance need to make sense. The cross-sector strategists do what they can to “muddle through” these multiple and many times contradictory values (see Lindblom 1959 and Noordegraaf 2000 on public managers).

The most defining feature of the situation is thus the multiplicity of discerned values and the combination of both accepting the multiplicity and using it strategically. This multiplicity creates an arena for intense deliberation and provides many options for dedication to different positions.

**Deliberating on conditions**

Cross-sector strategists are generally intentional and reflexive in their deliberation processes, meaning that they reflect on the deliberation process in itself. They find it important to reflect upon their role and on what they personally want to achieve in their role. Sometimes this deliberation is instrumental, directed towards strategic work as such and how to perform in the most efficient way, and sometimes it is more
directed towards the strategic policy area in itself, and towards the personal satisfaction of working with it.

Cross-sector strategist work is characterized by clashes of traditions and thus by multiple dilemmas that need to be solved. Cross-sector strategists generally solve the dilemmas by organizing most of the work under the processes and goals of local governance, both politically and organizationally. The reason for this is both the strong identity as a public administrator and that the fact that local governance is where the support structure is most easily obtained. This is also clear in the quantitative analysis. By doing so, there is usually some space created where discretion regarding expertise and advocacy claims can fit. The desired outcome of this behavior is to make the double role less complex by claiming legitimacy of a proper public administrator in the local administration while still being able to keep some advocacy embedded in the post, in the person, and in the policy areas. At the same time, they have a desire to not only support but also to influence what is going on, and this is done via the method of “sneaking-in”. The main method of doing this is to act in an anticipating manner, both towards politicians and towards managers in the municipal organization. This might sound as if cross-sector strategists take on a very manipulative approach; however, this is not a deliberatively elaborated project. Rather, it should be seen as a professional coping mechanism in order to deal with dilemmas of clashing traditions. By keeping conflict out, by adjusting to the agenda of organizational departments, and by depoliticizing their strategic policy areas when they are addressing politicians, cross-sector strategists manage to make their policy areas general, and in that way sneak them in to the work of departments or policy processes. “Sneaking-in” can be a Janus-faced method, however. Cross-sector strategists manage to get strategic policy areas on the agenda, and they can control their framing, but this also disguises actual political conflict and power structures. Sometimes it also causes conflicts between the formal vertical tradition, which cross-sector strategists use as their main source of legitimization, and their own expert knowledge. Even when they actually hold strong expert arguments for why something should be done in a certain way, it might still be a safer way to use the anticipating approach and the method of sneaking-in rather than claiming legitimacy for expert knowledge.

In this anticipating way, cross-sector strategists also deal with the balance of informality and formality. Their post is formal, but their method of
working and their resources are mostly informal. By appealing to the formal vertical tradition by seeking support from actors with formal power, they obtain the discretion to do numerous things informally in order to push for their policy areas. Of course, it could be discussed exactly where the border between informal and formal should be drawn in the case of cross-sector strategists – they are formally expected to monitor and lobby for their topics, but they realize that in order to actually do so in an efficient way, they have to do it at least in part secretly. Otherwise the clash between traditions becomes too overwhelming, both when it comes to the relation to politicians, as a public administrator/lobbyist, and when it comes to the relation to departments, as a horizontal/vertical executor. This is also why cross-sector strategists are constantly working to secure support both from politicians and managers.

The very existence of cross-sector strategists in the political-administrative organization contains a dilemma because of their horizontal foundation. When the target is achieved, that is, when the strategic policy areas are fully integrated in the vertical organization, there is no longer a need for a cross-sector strategist. Thus, cross-sector strategists are by their existence highlighting that the target has not been met. This makes it slightly tricky to balance the work because every step they take also consolidates what they want to move away from. If they move towards more lobbying politically, their administrator identity is in jeopardy, but if they lobby towards the organization, the integration ideal is in jeopardy. Cross-sector strategists solve this by constant reflexivity, but this can lead to a constant feeling of insufficiency because they are trying to adapt to several traditions at once. Many of them have the potential of appealing more to their expertise and the legislative side of their work because, as some express it, “quite a lot in the strategic policy areas is not about being nice, but is actually legally binding”. But they seem to try to avoid this more professional and judicial approach so as not to jeopardize consensus and the informal advantages that consensus brings (see Page 2011).

The first conclusion of how cross-sector strategists deliberate in situations characterized by multiple values from different traditions is that they are very active in their deliberation on which role to take in different situations in order to secure influence and support. This does not mean that all cross-sector strategists end up with the same conclusion on what to dedicate themselves to. One explaining factor as to why cross-sector
strategists take on different roles when deliberating on how to find a balance between these multiple values is the character of cross-sector strategists’ deliberation. They have, to a varying extent, a focus on the local context and the current situation. For some, the administrative role in the local political-administrative organization is the most important aspect of their role, whereas others combine the role as administrator in the local administration with visionary goals that stretch beyond the local arena and thus act as lobbyists. But everyone, even the ones who have strong visionary goals and act directly upon them, mention repeatedly the importance of being a local public administrator. Most tend to have visionary goals as their ultimate target, combined with a strong loyalty towards their role as a public administrator in the local political-administrative organization. The second conclusion on the cross-sector strategists’ deliberation is thus that they generally express what could be interpreted as a desire for more communicative and anticipating processes within the local political-administrative context, e.g. to be in a situation where they can appeal more strongly to their role as a public administrator and less to their role as a lobbyist and strategist.

Dedicating to a position and interest

Cross-sector strategists rarely take one position and stick to it. They switch frequently, depending on their counterparts and the current situation. This switching is done by reading the situation and then framing strategic policy areas and their cross-sector strategist role accordingly. By being flexible in their dedication to their position, and by negotiating and renegotiating both themselves and their strategic policy areas, cross-sector strategists create and secure support structures.

Cross-sector strategists are employed based on the horizontal tradition, and this is also to a large extent how they work. Their formal post without a formal mandate or resources requires them to use the informal network modes of work. When doing this, they dedicate themselves to different values depending on the situation in order to legitimize themselves and their claims in the political-administrative context (see Poulsen 2009). The main strategy is to become “generalist specialists”, that is, experts of framing and negotiation. Depending on the situation, cross-sector strategists choose their positions actively, and they acknowledge that the positions between which they switch are to some extent valid to describe what they are doing. But at the same time, cross-sector strategists usually
have a fundamental idea of what kind of actor they are, and when they act as something else they perceive that as playing a role in order to achieve the goals of their fundamental identity.

The following three positions between which the cross-sector strategists switch can be observed:

1) Organizational value expert. In this position, cross-sector strategists act as experts in their organization by conducting training and providing departments with advice regarding implementation and management. The position stresses separation between the roles of administrator and of politician. Cross-sector strategists in this position have a focus on legislation and established methods, and they serve their organization with knowledge. One way in which this position is manifesting itself is when cross-sector strategists express it as their job to inform politicians and managers about their obligations: “They are very busy, both managers and politicians, and cannot keep track of everything. However, they are responsible for this, and I consider it to be my task to keep them informed about their formal responsibilities”. The legitimization of this dedication comes from the vertical tradition. When cross-sector strategists in this position encounter dilemmas because they have to cross the line of administrative discretion, they normally legitimize this by perceiving it as a way of helping the organization to maintain administrative responsibility.

2) Ambiguity processor. Cross-sector strategists take on the position of “ambiguity minimizers” in order to serve the organizational needs for a coherent story on strategic policy areas. This is sometimes done by interlinking strategic policy areas with notions such as efficiency, indicators, and performance management and by applying an economics-oriented terminology to “make sense” of and appropriately construct strategic policy areas within this context. However, it does not necessarily have to mean the application of economic arguments, although this is often the case. Instead of making the organization deal with ambivalence caused by multiple sources of input and interpretation, this processing is placed on the individual cross-sector strategist. It might not be very good for their health, and many of them express that “no one will stop you if you want to work yourself to death” and “people get extremely frustrated because of the lack of clear governance on what we should do”; however, by organizing ambiguity management like this, the organization might avoid incapacity due to ambivalence. The legitimization of this dedication
comes from rational economic arguments, and if cross-sector strategists hit grey zones in this position regarding discretion, efficiency arguments and economic arguments are used for legitimization.

3) Equality advocate. One of the key features of the work with the strategic policy areas in the political-administrative organization is that it appeals to moral values of administrators. Some of this morality is reflected in the normativity of the collaborative tradition and is embedded in the language of participation, co-determination, and empowerment. Cross-sector strategists who have this position as a fundamental interest are generally driven by a very strong personal conviction – both about the process of the strategic work and the content of the work. When they encounter dilemmas, their legitimization is not administrative or economic efficiency, as it is for the other two roles, but the justice argument, that this is the right thing to do. The logic is mainly informal and horizontal due to the use of informal networks in convincing and reaching out to others.

The cross-sector strategists generally acknowledge the values from all three positions, and they generally use the positions they are not personally dedicated to in a strategic way when necessary. All three positions are defined by traditions in public administration, but with various focal points. The overall conclusion in terms of dedication is that cross-sector strategists identify themselves as public administrators, and the different positions, which they undertake in relation to their formal cross-sector strategist post, are used as a legitimization in the construction of their cross-sector strategist identity. This legitimization is necessary because in combination with their dedication as public administrators, they generally also have a strong dedication towards their cross-sector strategist task, which is defined as bringing their policy areas forward, and also a rather strong personal conviction and interest to do so.
How can the result of coping with value conflicts be understood as part of governance

By analyzing the dilemmas of cross-sector strategists’ posts, conclusions covering different aspects of cross-sector strategists’ work have been made possible. We can see that the answer to the question of how cross-sector strategists cope with value conflict is reflexivity, flexibility, and pragmatism. They do not change position only to reach a dedicated interest, i.e., the simpler form of negotiation and deliberation. Rather, this reflexivity, flexibility, and pragmatism is at the core of cross-sector strategists’ professional identity, and all three are necessary in order to combine their identity as a public administrator with their loyalty to the topic they work with. They change depending on the situation, and they do this deliberately and strategically in order to generate as much support as possible for their strategic values.

Cross-sector strategists integrate themselves into the political-administrative organization by appealing to local politicians and to their roles as public administrators, while simultaneously framing and reframing their strategic policy areas in such a way that support is maintained. This is not different from other actors’ (presented in chapter 1) situations, but what makes cross-sector strategists special is the extensive arena in which they do this, due to their formal post. In order to cope with their ambiguous posts, they need to discern and deliberate on values, and while going through this process of discernment, deliberation, and dedication for themselves, they simultaneously deal with dilemmas on behalf of the political-administrative organization.

Cross-sector strategists have to make sense out of their posts, and regardless of which conclusion they reach regarding which position to take, they perform a deliberation process that masks ambiguities that they and the governance of strategic policy areas represent. Value conflict is in this way dealt with by the cross-sector strategists, and not on the political level. This collides with the conclusion from several authors in the field of public value, who stress the importance of keeping politics in the center and not turning away from conflict when negotiating public value (O’Flynn 2007; Rhodes & Wanna 2007; Stoker 2006; Mintrom & Luetjens 2017). Value pluralism and the conflict embedded in it are considered important aspects of public value (Wagenaar 2014; Spicer 2014), and
the role of administrators should be to safeguard value pluralism (Overeem & Verhoef 2014). Cross-sector strategists can be argued to represent this safeguarding in terms of how they keep their strategic policy areas on the agenda. However, as has been demonstrated in this study, the deliberation and negotiation that cross-sector strategists are required to perform in order to make sense out of their posts and maintain the efficiency of their work speaks of redirecting the reflexive process from the political level to the cross-sector strategists. This means that politicians are served a processed and adaptable version, rather than the actual complex reality.

Thus, we now have a foundation to elaborate on the final research question:

*How can the result of the cross-sector strategists’ formation of their roles be understood as part of governance?*

There is a normative philosophical division regarding the existence and definition of common values in general. From a liberal perspective, it is argued that defining a common good is not possible without violating the integrity and autonomy of the individual because this will lead to paternalism, but from a communitarian perspective it is argued that defining common values is necessary to reach solidarity and care instead of selfishness and survival-of-the-fittest (Lundquist 1998:68). This is a topic that has been elaborated within sociological modernity literature, where two strands can be distinguished – the consensus-oriented approach represented by, for example, Giddens, Beck, and Habermas, and the conflict-oriented approach represented by, for example, Mouffe and Laclau.

The argument of the consensus-oriented approach is that in the process of evolving modernity, new risks and patterns have developed that destabilize the traditional lines of conflict in democratic systems and lead to decreased relevance for party systems as a model for opponents to meet. Instead, in late modern society, subpolitics, i.e. politics that takes place in other arenas than within representative democracy, has gained more importance (Beck 1993, 1998). Giddens argues that a state that helps to empower people in their process of embracing and dealing with new risks, so-called life politics, is necessary to facilitate this development of subpolitics. This has been elaborated upon as the new version of social
democracy, called the third way (Giddens 1998; 2000), and as mentioned in Chapter 2 it is directly linked to the development of social investment ideas (Morel et al. 2012).

The argument of the conflict-oriented approach is that the consensus model might seem liberal, but in fact is based on communitarian logic. Mouffe’s argument is that politics is based on identity and passions, and that these are relational. Thus, in subpolitics new categories and differences will be constructed, and without articulated opponents in politics to channel these differences as “political agonisms”, they will articulate themselves as moralistic antagonisms. Mouffe’s main argument is thus that the ideal of late modernity – a cosmopolitical world no longer organized around power relations – will prevent the political channeling of the hegemonic nature of traditional organization (Mouffe 2008; Mouffe 2013). The argument resembles that of Sørensen (2002), who in her study of the public administrator role in network governance rejects the idea of a “common good”, guarded by administrators, because such a common good is always established through political processes. This is a counterargument to the post-political approach presented by Beck, that the traditional institutionalized version of politics already has the character of “zombie institutions” – keeping their form but having lost their nerve – because politics is already mostly performed at the sub-political level (Beck 1993).

Both the consensus-oriented and the conflict-oriented approach start in the discussion of how to transform politics and society in order to adjust to the effects of modernity. Their arguments end up in different conclusions on how to organize the public, as a consensus apparatus to use the state as a means to facilitate subpolitics or more as politics to facilitate conflicting opponents. Placed in this framework, cross-sector strategists can be interpreted either as a threat or as a facilitator. Cross-sector strategists use a variety of values depending on what works in a specific setting. Values of democracy, human rights, and economic development are all present, and a reoccurring method used by cross-sector strategists is to show how democracy and human rights contribute to economic development in the organization. Cross-sector strategists work according to a revisionist ideal in that sense because they clearly state that when working as a cross-sector strategist you cannot stand on the barricades because you have to play the game well, and the most
frequent method is to show the strategic policy areas in economic terms so as to fit it into the logic of the vertical sectors.

Thus, the identity that cross-sector strategists form is a mix of economic tool for development, as a guardian of democracy, and as an advocate of human rights, social equity, and inclusion. They are truly dedicated to lobbying for their strategic policy areas, and simultaneously truly dedicated to the bureaucratic values of the political-administrative organization. When they encounter a clash between democracy in terms of process, that is, when they take on a strong lobbyist or advocate role, their dedication can be legitimized via the argument of network governance and public value, that certain values have a prerogative in relation to administrative function because they are fundamental (Stoker 2006). This argument fits within the communitarian logic, where cross-sector strategists can be interpreted as guardians of these ultimate values. The counter argument is a critique from a democratic approach, that the danger with network governance is that procedural justice and accountability are at risk because of the diminished transparency of the political process and priorities and an adaptation to technocratic and utility-focused market solutions (Lundquist 2011; Mouffe 2008; 2013; Squires 2008; Dahl & Soss 2014; Jenson & Levi 2013).

The cross-sector strategists in cross-sectoral governance can thereby be understood from two different angles.

1) Cross-sector strategists may be seen as a driving factor in the depoliticization taking place when political negotiations are more and more informally run in network forms. Cross-sector strategists can be argued to contribute to this via their formal informality. By deliberating, negotiating, and framing strategic policy areas, political tensions in terms of priorities within and between values are hidden because they are usually transformed into a version of consensus where processing of tensions is not done by democratically elected representatives but by cross-sector strategists.

2) Cross-sector strategists may be seen as a counter force to depoliticization due to increased horizontal governance because of their other identity as lobbyist and advocate. With this approach, cross-sector strategists can be understood as a method of sneaking politics into the depoliticized system, rather than contributing to its sidelining. Instead of
perceiving their negotiation as something hiding political value conflict in strategic policy areas, it might be seen as a method of bringing these values into the horizontal governance where these political values otherwise run the risk of disappearing.
Cross-Sector Strategists in the Political-Administrative Organization

Summarized conclusions

The overall conclusions of research questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 can be summarized as follows:

1: What are cross-sector strategists expected to do compared to other administrators?

Compared to other administrators in the work advertisement study, the expectations on the cross-sector strategists include a greater number of different values, and more focus is put on their personal commitment. The ads for managers and social secretaries include values from various work modes as well, but the cross-sector strategists stand out in terms of range of variation. The stressing of personal characteristics and of networking skills indicates that the theoretical elaboration on the clash of formality and informality has empirical support. This also indicates that compared to other administrators, the cross-sector strategists are likely to face more value conflicts and, as a result, more dilemmas to cope with.

2: Do cross-sector strategists experience value conflicts?

Cross-sector strategists do not experience a high level of value conflict regarding ideational dilemmas (to conceptually define what to do and how). However, there is dissonance between the dedication of the cross-sector strategists and the contextual expectations of what a cross-sector strategist should formally do, which becomes visible both in the work advertisement study and the respondents’ stories of how they approach their organizations. The exception regarding ideational dilemmas is how
they handle the multi-level input. The cross-sector strategists emphasize that the multi-level input can have various conceptual ideas related to the content of the strategic work. However, because they have clear views of the hierarchy between the sources of input, where the local goals come first, these variations do not constitute a strong dilemma. In this, cross-sector strategists rather remain within the formal frame of the organization because their dedication to the role as public administrator matches the formal contextual expectations and possibilities.

Cross-sector strategists experience a high level of value conflict regarding structural dilemmas, especially when it comes to how to balance what they see as their task (to influence and lobby towards the organization) and their main method of reaching out (to frame themselves as a support function for the organization). They want to be networking lobbyists who influence the organization in the direction of specific strategic policy areas and eventually to become formal consultative experts. But they also acknowledge that doing so means trying to execute a hidden leadership that requires smoothness, extensive personal networking skills, and staying away from overly harsh advocacy. This ambiguity expresses a clash between traditions of public administration work, and cross-sector strategists solve this dilemma by reframing their main governing tradition into the ones that work according to their counterpart at the time. By transforming themselves, their strategic policy area, and their approach, they manage to sneak into the processes of the departments. Thus, they have a formal role to represent the values of the horizontal tradition, but the tools they have for doing so are mostly informal. This clashes within cross-sector strategists, many of whom report that it took them a long time to understand that this informal way of working was the defining feature of their formal and often quite “high ranking” posts. However, as they learn the art of being a cross-sector strategist, they also dedicate themselves to these methods because they work and because they have the visionary target of working to integrate the strategic policy areas into the organization as the driving factor.

As becomes visible in the handling of ideational dilemmas, the cross-sector strategists dedicate themselves to their formal role as public administrators, and that dedication becomes a way to organize the sometimes-ambivalent multi-level input within the strategic policy areas. Thus, regarding agency dilemmas, cross-sector strategists experience value conflict. They handle the dilemma of discretion by organizing their
lobbyist claims under the goals of local politics and are thus able to keep their public administrator identity reasonably intact and are still able to reach out to the rest of the organization. However, this is made possible due to the exchange that cross-sector strategists generally have with politicians, where they have the possibility to inform and propose alternative paths. In balancing between lobbying and being an administrator, cross-sector strategists attempt to merge the vertical tradition of the more classical administrator with the horizontal tradition of acting as a lobbyist across the sectors and levels of the political-administrative organization. When it comes to being an expert or support function, the dilemma becomes visible in the cross-sector strategists’ conceptual dedication to strategic work, which they combine in practice with consultative and operative methods, and the fact that they have rather clear conceptual ideas on content. The cross-sector strategists find the dilemma of expertise to be an active part of their work, and they oscillate between wanting to push for their definition of the strategic policy area and wanting to adjust their work to give room for the knowledge that is found in the formal vertical sectors, which they see as legitimate. The cross-sector strategists thus apply a rather communicative and adjustable deliberation in how to legitimize their agency – they are dedicated to adjusting to the logic of the vertical organization in a communicative way, both in terms of discretion in relation to politics and in terms of expertise in relation to the sectors. In order to do so, while simultaneously being able to work for the strategic policy areas and their integration, the cross-sector strategists change position depending on what works at the moment. In this way, the negotiation with other actors and the internal conversation becomes smoother.

3: How do the cross-sector strategists cope with value conflicts?
Flexibility and pragmatism are the defining characteristics of the cross-sector strategists’ professional identity and are a necessary approach to deal with value conflict and the ambiguity of formal informality. The flexible and pragmatic approach is aimed at reducing ambiguity and organizational and political efficiency, and it is expressed in methods of using umbrella terms to fit various strategic policy areas and definitions and to make them less controversial. It is also expressed in their positioning as a support function rather than as advocates in order to get access to the organization. And finally, it is expressed in the double identity in relation to the local political level, which is defined by strong responsiveness towards politics as a legitimizing principle, while this principal is
simultaneously also under the influence, or at least attempts of influence, from cross-sector strategists.

Diversity management’s conflict reduction, by removing potential conflict, is defining for the cross-sector strategists and acts as a bridge between formal and informal work. The common method of using economic terms places strategic work within the structure at hand and reduces tensions between governance traditions. The ambiguity and conflict reduction, which becomes a major part of the cross-sector strategists’ work, can be analytically placed within the diversity management approach, where conflict is reduced as part of the utility approach of diversity. This is the framing that cross-sector strategists generally use with both their strategic policy areas and their methods of reaching out. Cross-sector strategists usually share a rather strong sense of advocacy related to their policy areas; however, they avoid this approach in practical work because it would collide with their positioning as a support function and it would undermine the foundation for their attempts at hidden leadership, which is their preferred method of dealing with their formal informality. Thus, cross-sector strategists generally hold clear distinctions between their interests and their positions. The required flexibility to do so constitutes a bridge between formal and informal work, where informal methods (networking, lobbying, and convincing) constitute a necessary model of work in order to bring the formal task, i.e. the strategic policy area, into to the formal channels, to which cross-sector strategists, despite their formal posts, do not have formal access.

4: How can the results of the cross-sector strategists’ formation of their roles be understood as part of governance?

In attempts to reduce ambiguity and conflict, the power struggle between values embedded in it is hidden. This might be a fruitful method when it comes to cross-sector strategists’ individual work, but on a policy level the hiding of power struggle has the potential of turning political conflict into technocratic and market-adjusted utility-focused solutions. Social sustainability or human rights might seem neutral and consensus-based, but even these concepts hold political tension. The use of umbrella terms has several advantages, not least by allowing for cross-sector strategists to work strategically. However, umbrellas hide conflicts, and thus contribute to an often-tenuous consensus. This tenuous consensus leads to ambiguity by making conflicts seem illegitimate. On a political level, the consequence of reducing conflict by forming and reforming strategic
policy areas and the cross-sector strategist’s role is thus twofold – it helps to create unity around strategic policy areas, which is symbolically important, and it might be pragmatic from a practical strategic perspective, which might lead to greater acknowledgement of the strategic policy areas. However, because it also hides embedded ideological power struggles, the risk of reducing conflict is that strategic policy areas and strategic work might become diluted on the political level and de-coupled on the organizational level.

What Comes Next

The purpose of this dissertation has been to analyze cross-sector strategists’ work and to better understand how they form their posts and their roles within the political-administrative organization. One overall conclusion from this study of cross-sectoral governance and cross-sector strategists in the political-administrative organization can be drawn. Both the research field of horizontal governance and the practical cross-sector work are characterized by a multiplicity of concepts and perspectives, which leads to extensive ambiguity, but also offers possibilities in performing cross-sector work and analysis. As is shown in the compiled frameworks for analyzing dilemmas, the research field of horizontal governance holds several angles and concepts. In this study, an attempt has been made to compile the concepts to create a comprehensive empirical frame for the analysis of cross-sector strategists’ work. In the studies, it becomes clear that the multiplicity of concepts and values is also an important characteristic of the practical cross-sector work. Both the theoretical and practical multiplicities represent attempts to capture a holistic approach to governance. These attempts, and the struggle between them, are in turn an expression of a formative process both on the theoretical and empirical level. This formative process is often approached with a desire to reduce complexity and value conflicts by presenting another concept to “capture it all”, i.e. an umbrella term. The conclusion of this study is that the attempts to reduce conflict in this way are a necessary part of the formative process, but we should not expect that such conflict reduction is the key to what in many aspects is regarded as the target of the cross-sector strategists’ posts, namely, a changed political-administrative organization. Rather, it is the process of deliberating on the value conflict at the political, administrative, and academic level that step by step leads to fundamental change. The establishment of formal cross-sector strategist posts and the cross-sector strategists’
discernment, deliberation, and dedication when coping with value conflicts and formal informality are integral parts of this formative process. As a bonus, we have also learned some of the tricks of the trade of this odd group of public administrators.

From a research perspective, a number of paths of continued research can be distinguished:

First, this study shows that further work is required regarding the theoretical frameworks that are available to study cross-sectoral governance. The frameworks currently used to elaborate on dilemmas are compilations of different bodies of literature, and they capture different aspects of cross-sectoral governance. These frameworks are usually not put together in a coherent manner, and they might appear disparate. However, in order to get a comprehensive understanding and theoretical tool to grasp cross-sectoral governance and its impact on the political-administrative organization, these various angles are necessary, as is shown by the result that cross-sector strategists use their post, their role, and their strategic topic in order to find their way within the organization. This is a contribution of this study. In order to further the theoretical elaboration and usability, the various bodies of literature covering cross-sectoral governance and the results of empirical studies of cross-sectoral governance need to be further theorized and compiled.

Second, we need to learn more about the effects of perspective crowding. Perspective crowding is a characteristic aspect of cross-sectoral governance and the work of cross-sector strategists, both on a theoretical and practical level, and it makes both research and practical work difficult. Thus, developing methods of analysis for bringing theory and practice together without simply adding another umbrella term would be a contribution both to research and to practical management reality.

Third, both previous research and the empirical experiences of cross-sector strategists are very much focused on how to get access to the formal organization. The question that requires more investigation is what happens once this access is established. In this study, cross-sector strategists elaborate on this to some extent, but the focus is still on convincing others in order to gain such access. What needs more elaboration is the actual encountering of strategic policy areas and the perspective of the sector in decision-making and policy formulation.
Fourth, we also need to continue the analysis of the public administrator in terms of who this multi-faceted actor is and might be. What is shown in this study is that most of the classical dilemmas of the public administrator are still valid, but changing contexts and governance traditions creates new situations towards which the classic approaches are reflected.

A fifth path for future research is comparative studies of negotiation and deliberation of values between different public administration contexts. Sweden is an interesting example because of its tradition of direct governance of values (Sainsbury & Bergqvist 2009), but this needs to be contrasted with other administration traditions in order to get a comprehensive image of which values come into conflict and what the roles of public administrators in such traditions can lead to.

From an organizational and professional perspective, some tricks of the trade aggregated from the cross-sector strategists’ stories are worth pointing out (without leaving critical analysis behind). These tricks of the trade should not be considered as checklists, but rather as an analytical approach to the practical reality of horizontal and vertical governance.

First, separating levels of analysis: When approaching strategic policy areas, we encounter numerous defining concepts, sometimes contradictory, and each concept holds philosophical and political differentiations. This is, from a democratic perspective, important to acknowledge, especially on the political level, because otherwise the power struggle within the concepts run the risk of being disguised within a fictitious consensus. However, when working at multiple levels of strategic work, as cross-sector strategists are doing, including policy process, bureaucratic administration, professional expertise, and sometimes direct operative work, it is important to notice that this complex and ambiguous body of interpretations will not be meaningful to highlight at every level. In operative departments, it might be beneficial to gather strategic work into some feasible methods, rather than stacking definitions on top of one another. This does not mean that the political conflict that is embedded in strategic work does not fill a purpose; on the contrary; it is crucial to keep the discussion and balancing act between politics, professional expertise, and ethical considerations, and on all levels there is a purpose in acknowledging this ambiguity. However, in
practical terms, it is fair to let operative departments focus more on methods and not on political and philosophical distinctions.

Second, keeping track of perspective crowding and overlapping: This is another aspect of the multiplicity of values involved in strategic work. Because strategic work can be considered a method of governing both public ethos and values in society as a whole, it tends to develop and change, expand and shrink, depending on the political climate. This development tends to occur faster than organizational adjustments. The practical effect of this is decoupling, where strategic policy areas are placed on the side as something symbolically necessary, but where the real focus still is on the departments’ own budgets and professional values. Although this might not be possible to avoid totally, it is something worth putting extra focus on when reflecting upon continuous governance of strategic policy areas. Combining horizontal and vertical governance is predefined to create certain clashes, and cross-sector strategists are placed at the breaking point of these logics. From a pragmatic perspective, acknowledging perspective crowding and distinguishing among overlapping aspects of strategic policy areas will help organizational departments to merge horizontal values with vertical work. As mentioned above, this does not have to mean oversimplification, and on a political level there are good, if not to say crucial, reasons to maintain the level of ambiguity by keeping various perspectives as alternative approaches. However, the departments will be much helped by not having to report the same activity under multiple separate evaluations on different aspects of strategic work.

Third, working bottom-up: Another pragmatic trick of the trade, which is also related to the merging of horizontal and vertical governance, is to work bottom-up. This is especially important for strategic policy areas due to their closeness to welfare politics. When evaluating a certain strategic policy area, many activities, which already are part of the everyday business of the vertical sector, can in most cases be considered a part of the measures to work towards the strategic policy area as well. When implementing horizontal values, it can thus be fruitful to go from the bottom-up and consider what is already going on under different umbrellas. By doing so, the meeting between horizontal and vertical might be less tense due to the acknowledgement of a common focus. This is not to say that improvements cannot or should not be made, but measures
specifically focused on horizontal values are likely to fit easier in vertical sectors if this acknowledgement of commonalities is made.

Fourth, separating definitions and knowing what is what: A fourth reflection on tricks of the trade of strategic work is about knowing what is what in terms of politics, expertise, legislation, and morale. Cross-sector strategists are balancing between these modes, and they use this balancing act as a tactical strategic tool to reach out to the different departments. However, they often have a specific point of view, based on their professional skill and knowledge, and they use different positions to put this point of view forward. Although this changing positioning can be fruitful as a short to medium-term method to reach out, it might have implications in the long run for how strategic work is perceived. By constantly changing between modes and taking on different roles depending on what is most fruitful, the technical and professional expertise of strategic work runs the risk of becoming marginalized. As expressed by a human rights strategist: “I hate the word ‘basic values’. It sounds like it is about being kind and nice. And that is not the deal at all, it is about hard legislation, obligations, and facts”. Establishing how cross-sector strategists are to push harder for their knowledge on hard legislation, obligations, and facts is not easily done, but it is worth keeping in mind that taking the chameleon costume too far might make it harder to highlight hard expertise and legislative demands in the long run, although it often provides greater influence in shorter term. Or it might have opposite effect, and the switching of roles currently occurring within cross-sector strategists’ formal posts might help pave way for harder knowledge. However, there is a tension embedded in this, which is worth highlighting and keeping under scrutiny. We also have to take into consideration that cross-sector strategists are sometimes strongly affected by their personal convictions. This could be interpreted as a democratic dilemma, but cross-sector strategists are formally employed to guard certain values, and as we could see in the study of work advertisements, one of the requirements is their personal conviction to work as a “formal advocate”.

Fifth, effects of working formally informal: The last aspect that will be discussed is the method of dealing with a post defined by formal informality. This is the characteristic of cross-sector strategist posts that in most cases constitutes the foundation and reasoning behind the changing of roles and definitions as a main feature of their strategic work. Cross-sector strategists are formally employed to be personally convinced
networking advocates and lobbyists, while also being classical administrators in a classical institutionalized vertical structure. Thus, the formal informality of their posts is an attempt to combine the acknowledged positive effects of having advocates, policy entrepreneurs, and whistle-blowers in the organization with democratically necessary neutral executioners in the political-administrative organization. This combination of logics makes cross-sector strategists weak in the sense that they do not have any formal channels of influence, but it also provides them with extensive possibilities. Just like for cross-sector strategists’ informal cousins and predecessors – informal advocates and entrepreneurs – that we find here and there in organizations, cross-sector strategists’ personal agendas are crucial when deciding which approach to dedicate themselves to or which proposal or definition to push for. The question then is what this simultaneous weakening and facilitation of cross-sector strategists means for the formalization of informal behavior. Is it a threat to public administration, as we perceive it, or is it a method of stabilizing values in the political-administrative organization? When studying different positions that cross-sector strategists dedicate themselves to, it seems clear that it could be both, but judging from the results of this study, at this point the latter seems more accurate. We might also want to ask the question of what the next step is because cross-sector strategists in their positions represent this formal informality. What other informal aspects are we profiting from in public administration? Can these be expected to be transformed into formality? If so, what might the consequences be?

Finally, from an individual actor perspective, some notes deserve to be mentioned. The number of sick-leaves among cross-sector strategists seems to be high, and many respondents in the study often express stress and uncertainty based on the constant demand for reflexivity and negotiation. This is worth reflecting upon because based on this study this reflexivity and negotiation seem to be the characteristic professional features of cross-sector strategists in handling formal informality. They change their shape and content depending on the context at hand. In the process of bringing political-administrative traditions and values together, cross-sector strategists develop into masters of negotiation and deliberation, both regarding their strategic policy areas and themselves. However, this takes time and effort, and what the consequences and outcomes of this formal solution might be, in terms of personal health, democracy, and organization, are yet to be seen.
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Swedish summary


Avhandlingen har en mixed-methods-design som innehåller 1) kvantitativ och kvalitativ innehållsanalys av platsannonser för tvärsektorstrateger, förvaltningschefer och socialsekreterare, 2) tematisk analys av djupintervjuer med tvärsektorstrateger, och 3) frekvens-, faktor- och regressionsanalyser baserade på en enkät riktad till professionella nätverk för tvärsektorstrateger.

Resultatet visar att tvärsektorstrateger möter ambivalenta och ofta motsägelserfulla kontextuella förväntningar. Tvärsektorstrategerna använder dessutom ambivalensen för strategiska syften i sitt arbete. Ambivalensen gör att möjligheter öppnas upp för strategerna att omformulera de politikområden de arbetar med, sina metoder, sina argument och sin identitet beroende på vad situationen kräver av dem. Detta gör de dels för att öka genomslagskraften för de strategiska politikområden de arbetar med, och dels för att minska den
inre konflikten som uppstår eftersom tvärsektorstrategerna vill vara både responsiva byråkrater och aktiva lobbyister. För att kombinera dessa två identiteter fordras det att tvärsektorstrategerna är både reflexiva och flexibla.

Resultatet av tvärsektorstrategernas hantering av värdekonflikter kan tolkas på två sätt: 1) som att tvärsektorstrategerna är ett formellt verktyg för att värna om demokratiska och etiska värden genom att dessa värden (de strategiska politikområdena) smygs in i den ordinarie verksamheten av tvärsektorstrategerna. Eller 2) som ett för demokratin långsiktigt skadligt beteende, då värdekonflikter döljs och de politiska möjligheterna att processa dessa konflikter minskar när tvärsektorstrategerna omformulerar de strategiska politikområdena och sin egen roll som offentliga tjänstemän för att få genomslag i den formella politisk-administrativa organisationen.
Avhandlingar vid Förvaltningshögskolan

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