INFLUENCING DEMOCRACY

The importance of contextual factors for UN peacekeeping missions in post-conflict states

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ABSTRACT

Achieving peace and democracy is a declared goal for the United Nations (UN). It is a difficult task concerning the current increase of conflicts and international political challenges. One of the UN’s tools to contribute to peace and democracy worldwide is peacekeeping missions. However, the opinions regarding these missions’ effectiveness and influence on democracy vary. Therefore, this thesis explores the relationship between the presence of UN peacekeeping missions and democracy promotion. It examines the impact contextual factors have on this relationship by using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data. This data, combined with other sources, allows for empirical analysis of the development of democracy. The regression analysis conducted in this thesis covers all 28 UN peacekeeping missions deployed following intra state conflicts. The empirical findings suggest that the longer a peacekeeping mission is active in a state, the higher the level of democracy is during and after peacekeeping missions. Also, the distribution of power between social groups and the previous presence of peacekeeping missions are identified to have a significant impact on the democratization in the host states. However, no statistical significance is found for a negative impact on the level of democracy in countries with a high level of natural resources. To more carefully explore the relationship between UN peacekeeping mission and democracy, a case study of the UNTAG peacekeeping mission in Namibia is performed. The study indicates that the peacekeeping mission contributed to democratization by amongst other creating stability, enabling and monitoring an election and spreading information.

Key words: peacekeeping, democracy, United Nations, post-conflict development, UNTAG
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1. INTRODUCTION

In its 2015 Yearbook, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) concluded that the positive trend towards less violence in the world had been broken. The number of conflicts in the world had risen during 2014, leaving world leaders with an even greater challenge of creating and maintaining global security. Conflicts and weak states across the globe entail global challenges. These challenges include the misery and violation of human rights following armed conflict, and the threat to international security and stability posed by conflict-prone societies (Newman et al 2009:4). Ongoing conflicts also risk spreading geographically. They can force millions of people to flee their own countries, compelling other states to face the challenge of accommodating large groups of refugees (Paris, 2004:2). Furthermore, conflicts and war-torn societies can become a breeding ground for terrorists and criminal networks (Ibid). Due to these reasons, conflicts and civil unrests are contemplated as a key modern-day challenge for the international community, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Newman et al 2009:4). Efforts to end conflicts and rebuild weak societies are therefor considered important for both humanitarian and security purposes (Ibid).

An essential step for creating long-lasting peace and stability in areas damaged by conflicts is to ensure a sustainable reconstruction of the post-conflict society. International actors, including the United Nations (UN), frequently argue that such reconstruction should include democratization as an overarching goal (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004:91). In its reach for democracy and a peaceful development in post-conflict states the UN regularly uses peacekeeping missions as an instrument. These missions are currently considered to be the best available tool for the international community to prevent conflict and foster peace and stability (Howard, 2008:1). Thus, peacebuilding and democratization are often intertwined in post-conflict reconstruction; democracy is assumed to imply peace and peace to imply democracy (Jarstad, 2008:19). However, despite the close relationship between peace and democracy, they are not always easy to combine. Democratization of post-conflict societies often faces several challenges. Unresolved injustices can affect both the political elite and civil society, creating polarization among the people (Ibid). Such a polarization affects core democratic elements, for example mobilization of interest groups and open competition between different political parties. It can also increase the risk for internal conflict in societies.
approaching democracy. Efforts made with the aim of supporting peace agreements and ending conflicts can also have a negative impact by, for example, allowing rebel leaders to join a government to maintain a ceasefire (Ibid).

The effectiveness of peacekeeping, and other conflict preventing measures such as peacebuilding, has long been debated within amongst academics (Newman et al, 2009:3). There is a gap in the literature regarding the potential tradeoff between the development of peace and the emergence of democracy in post-conflict societies (Jarstad, 2008:18). Therefore, it is important to explore the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions deployed by the UN. Learning more regarding peacekeeping missions effectiveness will increase the knowledge of how these missions affect the societies they are deployed into. This awareness can then be used in order to better evaluate policies concerning the deployment of peacekeeping missions, and to increase the attentiveness to contextual impact.

In this thesis, I explore the UN’s efforts to establish peace in post-conflict states. In particular, I examine how certain contextual factors impact the democratic development in connection to peacekeeping missions. One important assumption made within the academia is that free and fair elections are the core element of a democratic development (Teorell et al, 2016:3). Due to this assumption, the focus of this thesis lies on electoral democracy. The concept applied is based on Robert Dahl’s (1971) definition of polyarchy. Also, since the end of the Cold War, the number of intrastate conflicts has increased compared with the number of interstate ones (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015:536-537). This change calls for more research specifically examining intrastate conflicts and their aftermath in order to better adapt policies to such prerequisites. Therefore, this thesis focuses solely on the democratic development in states where the UN has employed peacekeeping missions following an intrastate conflict.

The release of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (Coppedge et al, 2016B) provides access to a new and extensive data set. This enables the examination of how democracy has developed during and after UN peacekeeping missions placement. By using this dataset, I aim to investigate the emergence of democracy following UN peacekeeping missions and add to the knowledge of the effects these missions have on the host states. I also want to examine if contextual factors impact these missions influence on the democratic development in a host country. I thereby have the ambition to answer the question which contextual factors are
favorable to democratization in countries with peacekeeping missions deployed by the UN, following an intrastate conflict? I will control for different variables, which can possibly have an effect on the development of democracy in post-conflict societies. I hope to encircle some preconditions useful for future deployment of peacekeeping mission. However, I do not intend to evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in certain states; my interest lies in exploring the overarching influence that UN peacekeeping possibly has on host states. Further, I do not assess whether peacekeeping missions are overall an effective tool for the international community or not, since I do not compare states with peacekeeping missions deployed to states without such treatment.

This thesis includes 28 different UN peacekeeping missions, hosted by the same number of states. The data used is the result of a combination of three different datasets: the V-Dem dataset, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) dataset and the UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict dataset. By combining these datasets, and complement with additional information, I am able to explore the relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and democracy under the influence of multiple control variables. The length of the missions examined varies from 1 to 25 years and 10 of them are currently ongoing. I also conduct a case study on the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) peacekeeping mission, deployed in Namibia 1989-1990, to examine how the peacekeeping mission contributed to an increased level of democracy in the host state and further clarify the causal mechanism between UN peacekeeping missions deployment and democratization.

The structure of this thesis is as follows: first, I discuss the relevant theoretical findings regarding the development of democracy, different types of conflicts, the role of the UN as a provider of peacekeeping missions and the effectiveness of such missions. This is followed by a presentation of the research question and the hypotheses. After comes an introduction and discussion of the data used to test the hypotheses, an outline of the methodological strategy and a review of the main findings. Then follows the case study of UN peacekeeping in Namibia before the conclusions, a discussion regarding policy implications of the results, and proposals for future research are presented.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The political situation in a post-conflict society is extra precarious since it often resembles anarchy more than hierarchy (Flores and Nooruddin, 2009:5). Barry Posen (1993:104) refers to this as a “domestic security dilemma”. Posen argues that even though an intrastate conflict is officially concluded, parties have mistrust towards each other (Ibid). Everyone involved might desire a long-lasting end to a conflict, but due to the fear that the (former) enemy will reinitiate the conflict without a warning, they prefer to attack first. By doing so, they are the one with the advantage. However, they are also thereby fulfilling their enemy’s fear of a returned use of arms (Ibid).

Due to this overarching risk for actors to relapse into conflict, it is important to use the tools available to, as effectively as possible, reach a sustainable and long-lasting peace. According to the liberal peacebuilding theory, the establishment of democracy is an important factor when striving for peace (Newman, 2009:39). The theory states that since democracy creates institutional constraints within states, it is difficult for their leaders to go to war (Ibid). Also, democracies tend to be interdependent on each other in terms of economy and trade, creating a resistance to going to war since it can disrupt fruitful relationships (Ibid). The liberal peacebuilding theory argues that the promotion of democracy and market economic reforms, together with institutional development, is the most effective way to build peace (Newman et al, 2009:3). However, even though democracy is associated with peace, the road to reach it is often filled with conflicts (Jarstad, 2008:19). One of the challenges to liberal peacebuilding theory is research identifying societies transitioning towards democracy, in particular poor and divided states, as more likely to suffer from civil conflicts (Newman, 2009:39). Research shows that transitional states are farther exposed to armed conflicts than societies with an established political order (Krause and Suzuki, 2005; Engbert and Ron, 2004). Further, studies also indicate that conflicts are most likely to occur in partially democratic or transitional states, in particular in states where factionalism takes place (Goldstone et al, 2010:19). The connection between the increased risk of conflict and democratization depends

Footnote 1: Factionalism occurs when formal political structures are broken and temporary factions appear, with the aim of solving each problem as it appears (Lewellen, 2003:231). It is common to emerge in new democracies due to their weak party systems and political participation relying on networks based on traditional identities (Newman, 2009:39).
on polarization and volatility within the transitioning societies (Newman 2009:40). These vulnerabilities are often based on social inequality, heterogeneity and weak state capacity. Democratization may threaten the interest of elite groups, and can worsen existing divisions within a society created by societal and religious differences (Ibid). Due to these factors, democratization may actually lead to destabilization of a society rather than favoring peaceful development (Ibid). The liberal peacebuilding theory has also been debated because of the challenges of defining democracy and conflicts/wars (Newman, 2009:39). Therefore, the following parts will discuss the definitions of these two terms.

2.1. Democracy

Among academics, constant efforts have been made in order to properly define democracy (Collier and Levitsky, 1997:433). An influential definition of democracy is the one of Robert A. Dahl from 1971.\(^2\) Dahl defines democracy as “a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” (1971:2). However, such a system is only an ideal type according to Dahl, who instead defined a political system open to receiving and including the public’s opinions as a polyarchy (Dahl, 1971:8). Dahl’s description of polyarchy has led to a consensus among academics, where elections and the institutions holding them are considered as the core features of democracy (Teorell et al, 2016:3, Coppedge et al, 2016A:5). This approach is called the electoral conception of democracy, separating it from other concepts such as liberal, deliberative, or egalitarian democracy. These other concepts do not align with the view that elections form the core of democracy; instead they are focused on other features (Teorell et al, 2016:3).

In a functioning democracy, the citizens appoint a government based on their preferences through elections (as summarized in Lührmann, 2015:22). Elections are the best way to ensure democratic legitimacy (Jarstad, 2008:25) and should be considered as a core feature of a democracy (Teorell et al, 2016:3). Elections can also represent a positive step within a democratization process. Research shows that repeated occurrences of elections can increase the level of democracy, even if the elections are manipulated and inadequate (Lindberg, 2009:86). However, several scholars points out that the existence of elections alone is not

\(^2\) See, for example, Fukuyama (2006) and O’Donnell and Schmitter (2013).
enough to define a country as democratic (Diamond, 2002; Schelder, 2002; Lindberg, 2006 and 2009). Dahl also agrees that the mere existence of elections is not sufficient; elections must also be “free and fair” by giving citizens equal opportunities to participate (1971:2-3).

Electoral democracy is thereby to be considered as the key to a democratic development. Its emergence in societies is however far from given: a majority of the countries in the world are not considered as democratic (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016:2). Part of these countries has recently been, or is currently, involve in conflicts. Thus, the following part explores the challenges for the emergence of democracy in these states.

2.1.1. The Emergence of Democracy in Post-Conflict States

The transitional process required in order to move from conflict to democracy is challenging for the society undertaking it (Adebo, 2005:18). In order to successfully be able to increase the level of democracy in a post-conflict society, it is necessary to focus on the political patterns in each country and avoid striving after a universal solution based on general assumptions (Carothers, 2002:18-19).

Multiple scholars (e.g. Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1991; Rusechemeyer et al, 1992) identify a causal relationship between economic development and the level of democracy. Also, Prezworski et al (2000) argue that even though economic development does not determine democratization, it plays a role in the potential for emergence of democracy. It is therefore possible to partly predict democratic sustainability by studying a country’s level of gross domestic product (GDP) (Ibid). Hadenius and Teorell (2005:102) agree that economic development may not turn states into democracies, but it can support an ongoing democratization process. When states become more democratic, economic development plays an increasing role in the continuation of further democratic development (Ibid). Also, Acemoglu et al (2008:836) underline that there is a positive relationship between democracy and economic development, even though they find no causal effect between these two factors. Collier et al (2003:83) argues that the risk for a relapse into conflict within the first peaceful year is almost twice as high as when the conflict ended if there has been a negative economic development during and after the conflict.
Another factor considered important for the possibilities of a democratic development in post-conflict situations is the previous history of a state. Countries that have not experienced democracy prior to the outbreak of a conflict, and thereby lack the experience of a democratic political process, risk aggravating already existing divisions within society and thus risk falling back into conflict when trying to establish democracy (Ball and Halevy, 1996:31). Newly democratic political institutions may be too fragile and cannot be expected to hold as a base for a peaceful development in the short term (Walter, 1999:139). The previous history of a state can also be connected to a diversity and polarization of the society. Societies with a high level of ethnic polarization are statistically more likely to fall into civil conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Queroll, 2004:26-27).

Also a high level to of natural resources, such as oil, minerals, and gas, can influence the democratic development in states. Paul Collier (2008:38-39) refers to a wealth in natural resources, together with lack of taxes and skewed national competitiveness countries, as the natural resource trap. States with such wealth can be more internally fragile and affected by conflicts. This depends on that the sought out value of the resources tend to result in greed and a lack of transparency (Ibid). Another factor also described by Collier (2008:33), the conflict trap, highlights that countries that have already suffered major conflicts are likely to relapse into violence. This in particular valid if the conflict has lasted over a longer period of time (Ibid). For the states that have suffered through conflicts, the way that those conflicts ended can influence the future development of democracy. Several scholars, such as Hartzell et al (2001) and Atlas and Licklider (1999), argue that peace built on a negotiated settlement is more fragile then peace reached by military victory. This fragility affects the fundamental base for a peaceful, democratic development and increases the risk that a society will fall back into conflict.

There are thereby multiple factors affecting the possible democratic development in post-conflict states. One of the main advocates such a development in post-conflict states is the UN (United Nations, 2007:1). Due to its role a key player on the international arena, it is important to understand its contention regarding democracy. Therefore, the following part explores the relation between the UN and its advocacy of democracy.
2.1.2. The UN and the Promotion of Democracy

The UN is widely involved in conflict and post-conflict states across the world. The organization views itself as a promoter of democracy (United Nations, 2007:1). As presented in Rich (2010), the three most recent UN Secretary Generals have all, in different ways, highlighted the importance of democracy and the development of it. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1996) underlined the interconnection between peace, democracy and development. Kofi Annan (2005) identified democracy as a universal rights, and Ban Ki-moon (2009) underlined the importance of a continued democratic development in the world. Democracy is thereby highly valued and promoted by the UN and considered as one of the core principles of the organization (United Nations, 2007:1). This aligns with the liberal peace theory. However, the UN does not take a stance in what type of democracy states should strive for. Instead, the promotion of democratic governance highlights values and principles that endorse increased participation, security, equality and human development (Ibid). Several decisions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly reflects upon this promotion (Rich, 2010:426-427). They have contained various aspects, such as conducting and observing elections and promoting the rule of law, which support democratic development (Ibid). One example, highlighting the UN’s dedication to the promotion of democracy, is the 2005 World Summit Outcome. In them the UN member states established that “democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives” (General Assembly, 2005). Further on in the document they agreed ”to support democracy by strengthening countries’ capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy and resolve to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to assist Member States upon their request” (Ibid).

The Summit Outcome shows that the UN is dedicated to promoting democracy and supporting countries in their democratic development. Supporting elections through electoral assistance is a part of this dedication (United Nations, 2007:3). This has showed to increase the quality of elections, strengthen the publics’ trust in them, and improve the verdicts from election observers (Lührmann, 2015:179). The UN is also involved in the establishment of democracy worldwide through several other UN actors, such as the UN Development Program (UNDP) (Rich, 2010:427). The UN agencies support the development of national
parliaments; electoral commissions and the development of legal systems to further enable a democratic process (United Nations, 2007:3).

Despite its promotion of democracy, the UN itself is not always considered as democratic (Jett, 2000:190). The veto system is in particular often seen as problematic, since it has a non-democratic impact on the UN’s internal process (Ibid). The lack of internal democracy risk having a negative effect on the credibility of the organization, and may thereby impede on the UN’s ability to promote democracy. The promotion of democracy in post-conflict states is also often considered as problematic, regardless of the UN’s capabilities and limitations. The emergence of democracy in such a state can according to Ball and Halevy (1996) not be considered a stable base for a peaceful development in the short-term perspective. Instead, it risk opening up for power struggles that may easily lead to violence (Ibid). Also Flores and Nooruddin are critical to direct implementation of democracy after the end of a conflict. They argue that recovery from conflicts is slowed down by extensive democratization directly connected to the immediate post-conflict period (Flores and Nooruddin, 2009:17).

As previously established, electoral democracy is a core factor in the endeavor for democratization. This strive is internationally lead by the UN, advocating for peoples rights to affect their everyday life. One of the areas where the UN pursues its promotion of democracy, through for example electoral assistance, is in post-conflict states. In such states, there are however several contextual factors that can influence the democratization process. To understand these factors it is first important to comprehend the emergence of conflicts. Also, to be able to examine the effect of the UN presence it is necessary to apprehend the UN’s efforts to prevent conflicts and rebuild societies afterwards. Therefore, the next part is aimed at exploring different types of conflicts.

2.2. Conflicts

Conflicts can be defined in different ways. In this thesis I apply the influential definition from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The program identifies three types of conflict: non-state conflict, one-sided violence and state-based conflict. The first type, non-state conflicts, refers to the use of armed force between organized parties, where none of them is the government of a state. The second type, one-sided violence, refers to when a government
or formally organized group is uses armed forces against civilians, which do not fight back (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016).

The third conflict type defined by UCDP, state-based conflicts, consists of three subcategories: armed conflict, interstate conflict and intrastate conflict. Armed conflict refers to a conflict in which armed forces are used between the participating parties, and at least one of the parties is the government of a state (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2016). The second subcategory, interstate conflict, is a state-based conflict where the incompatibility lies between two governments (Ibid). The third category is intrastate conflict. This is a conflict between a government and one or several other, non-governmental parties (Ibid). It can take place with or without support to one or both sides by foreign actors. All subcategories can contain secondary support from an external party to one of the primary parties (Ibid). This support can consist of troops, but can also take the form of non-warring support. When governments stand on different sides in a conflict it is the incompatibility criteria that decide whether a conflict should be classified as intra or interstate (Ibid).

Another commonly used term when labeling conflicts is civil war. It can be difficult to distinguish these wars from intrastate conflicts, as they both involve governmental and non-governmental parties. Small and Singer (1972) differentiates the two conflict types by adding that civil wars includes longing and returned state violence. The definition of war, which they apply, is that there are 1000 or more battle related casualties³. Sambanis (2004:854-855) finds in his research that, even though definitions such as the one presented by Smile and Singer, there is a lack of consensus regarding when the term civil war is applied to a conflict.

Conflicts are thereby defined in different ways depending on the extent of their damages and the actors involved. As intrastate conflicts are the conflict type that is increasing compare to other kinds (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015:536-537), the focus of this thesis is directed towards them. Before further exploring the situation related to intrastate conflicts, the UN’s involvement in conflict and post-conflict societies will be presented in the following section.

³ This definition of war is commonly used; see for example Ramsbotham et al (2005) and Uppsala Conflict database Program (2016).
2.3. UN Peacekeeping Missions

Various parties and organizations can be involved in the development of peace and security for different reasons. The UN is, however, the one actor that has taken the main responsibility to enforce peace in post-conflict areas (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:22). The UN’s peace operations can be divided into three principal areas; conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping (United Nations, 2000:2). Under certain circumstances the UN can also employ peace enforcement; establishing peace by using coercive measures, including military force (United Nations, 2008:18). The relationship between the different areas of peace operations is illustrated in Figure 1.

The first area, conflict prevention and peacemaking, refers to preventive work to address the structural sources of conflicts (United Nations, 2002:2). The goal is to ensure a stable foundation for peace. This preventative measures is regularly taken on a diplomatic level with low-profile activity, often unnoticed if successful (Ibid). Peacemaking addresses issues where conflicts are evolving. The aim is to end developing violence, with tools such as diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers can be representatives from governments, regional organizations or the UN. They can also be from non-governmental groups or a single influential person working independently (Ibid).

The second principal area for UN peace operations is peacebuilding. It addresses those activities taking place towards the end of and after a conflict (United Nations, 2000:3). The goal is to reestablish a peaceful foundation in the host state by providing tools for building peace (Ibid). The peace should go beyond just the absence of war, and the efforts include strengthening the rule of law and providing technical assistance for the development of democracy (Ibid). For peacebuilding to be a success it is also important to provide for support for the fight against corruption, demining programs and education regarding infectious diseases (Ibid).
The third area of UN peace operations, peacekeeping, comprises military and civilian personnel collaborating to build peace in the aftermath of wars. Peacekeeping missions are used as a tool for the international community to foster peace and stability in the transition from war to peace (Fortna, 2008:39), and to prevent continuation of a conflict (Fortna 2004:271). The role of peacekeeping missions has developed since the end of the Cold War (Howard, 2008:13). Today the term does not only cover “traditional” peacekeeping, which focuses on interstate conflicts, but also involvement in civil conflicts and monitoring of the transition from war to peace (Fortna 2004:269). As a result, peacekeepers often have administrative and management roles to facilitate the transition process (Ibid). The current peacekeeping missions are thereby more multidimensional then the ones previously deployed (Howard, 2008:1).

Peacekeeping mission conducted by the UN are considered as the most effective tool in post-conflict management (Howard, 2008:1). International legitimacy, burden sharing, and the capability to gather and deploy both civilian and military personnel from various parts of the
globe are strengths of this type of peace operation (United Nations Peacekeeping B). Also, enabling peacekeepers to integrate with national actors in order to ensure a multidimensional intervention force is considered an asset (Ibid). The first two peacekeeping mission organized by the UN were the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), deployed in 1948 in the Middle East, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), deployed in 1949. Both missions are still ongoing today (United Nations, 2016). Including these two missions, in its history the UN has deployed a total of 71 peacekeeping missions, of which 16 are presently active (Ibid).

UN peacekeeping relies on three basic principles; consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force (United Nations, 2008:31). The Security Council is responsible for giving mandate to UN peacekeeping missions, which are deployed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Langholtz, 2010:19). The mandates are adapted to each particular situation, and thereby vary in range, time frame and tasks (Ibid). The aim of a mission can be prevention of an outbreak of a conflict, stabilizing a conflict area after ceasefire is reached, strengthening the implementation of peace agreements or supporting states thorough a transition period towards a more stabile government and economic development (United Nations Peacekeeping C). Some activities that can be performed by a mission are disarmament, removal of mines, electoral assistance and reform of the security sector (Ibid).


Another type of UN missions, sometimes confused with peacekeeping missions, are political missions. Theses missions are supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs and can be involved in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding amongst others (United Nations, 2014). The missions are different from peacekeeping missions as they
have a strong political engagement, including good officers and mediation, as their core task (Kugel, 2011:2).

2.3.1. The success of peacekeeping missions
There are several factors that need to be taken into consideration when discussing whether a peacekeeping mission has been successful or not. Pushkina identifies four, broader, criteria for a successful peacekeeping mission; limiting violence, reduction of human suffering, preventing the spread of a conflict, and promoting conflict resolution to prevent reoccurrence of the aggressions (2006:134). The UN also presents several factors essential in order for a peacekeeping mission to be considered as a success. First and foremost, the mission should have followed the three main principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (United Nations Peacekeeping A). The mission should be considered as legitimate by the population in the host country and emphasize the importance of local ownership of the peace process (Ibid). Factors such as commitment to the process by the concerned parties, a clear mandate and supportive engagement by neighboring countries are all deemed to contribute to a successful mission (Ibid). Also, the professionalism and ability to act according to high standards by the deployed personnel are considered of high importance for a mission to be deemed as successful (Ibid).

The UN’s efforts to promote democracy in accordance to the liberal peacebuilding theory have been met with criticism. According to Joshi, a majority of this criticism concerns the fact that multiple states have fallen back into conflict after the withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission (2013:163). There are ambiguous findings in the literature regarding the effect that deployment of peacekeeping missions has on the chances of reaching a long-lasting peace and democracy in a state. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) conclude that multilateral UN peacekeeping operations have a positive impact on the duration of peace and political stability in states. In particular, they find strong evidence for positive effect of multidimensional peacekeeping, such as peacekeeping missions with a focus on institutional reform and economic construction, on the likelihood for a positive development in the host state (Ibid). Weaker evidence is found regarding the progressive effect observer and enforcement missions have on the development of peace (Ibid). However, Dubey (cited in Fortna, 2004), using the same dataset as Doyle and Sambanis, reaches a different conclusion. He finds that third-party
intervention does not have any significant impact on the duration of peace and possibility for democracy. By contrast, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) identify a positive effect on the development and duration of peace from the involvement of third parties such as peacekeeping missions. Fortna (2004) supports this conclusion, and determines that international interventions do help maintain peace in post-conflict societies.

Despite the often-considered positive effects of peacekeeping missions on the development of peace within a state, they can have a mixed effect on the democratization process (Fortna, 2008:39). Howard (2002:128) argues that the presence of a peacekeeping mission can, if peace is achieved, “tip the balance” towards democracy. However, post-conflict societies often face difficult challenges regarding the negative impact peace and democratization can have on each other’s development (Jarstad, 2008:17). Due to the demanding process of combining the two, positive and negative effects of peacekeeping missions risk to cancelling each other out (Fortna, 2008:39). This creates a dilemma where actions taken to develop a democracy may have a negative effect on the peace process and vice versa. The dilemma results in challenges for both local and international actors involved in the peace-building and democratization process within a state (Jarstad, 2008:19).

As presented above, the UN is involved in multiple ways to prevent and end conflicts and reconstruct post-conflict societies. The theoretical framework has laid out mixed findings regarding the promotion of democracy in post-conflict states by UN peacekeeping missions. Several of the states that have received peacekeeping mission have fallen back into war, and there is often a conflict of interest between peace and democracy which risk cancelling out the two against each other. However, there are also findings that indicate that peacekeeping missions have a positive influence on the development of democracy within the host states, if peace is achieved. In the following parts of this thesis, the focus is directed towards UN peacekeeping missions and the contextual factors that affect their ability to increase the level of electoral democracy in a host state.
2.4. Research Question and Hypotheses

Regardless, or perhaps because, the UN’s frequent usage of peacekeeping missions to manage post-conflict situations is the missions’ effect and success rate debated. Also, as discussed above, a simultaneous development of peace and democracy is not easily achieved. This calls for a further investigation regarding the usage of peacekeeping mission as a peace operation and tool for democratization. The V-Dem data on democracy enables such an investigation based on new and detailed figures.

The overarching research question of thesis is which contextual factors are favorable to democratization in countries with peacekeeping missions deployed by the UN, following an intrastate conflict? To be able to explore the impact of contextual factors on the relationship between democratization and peacekeeping missions it is first important to establish how that relationship look like. As UN peacekeeping missions actions are based on the UN’s core promotion of democracy, the presence of a peacekeeping missions should have a positive impact on the level of democracy in the host state. Also, peacekeeping missions have a stabilizing effect on the level of democracy within host states, and thereby lay the base for a continued peaceful and democratic development. Therefore,

*Hypothesis 1: The level of electoral democracy in a UN peacekeeping mission host state is higher the final year of a peacekeeping mission, compared to the level of democracy when the mission was deployed.*

*Hypothesis 2: The level of electoral democracy in a UN peacekeeping mission host state is higher five year after the withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission, compared to the level of democracy the year the mission was withdrawn.*

The result of a peacekeeping mission is not only based on the presence of a mission itself; an important influence to the performance is the contextual factors. It is therefore important that each peacekeeping mission’s mandate is well adapted to the surrounding circumstances. The more well adapted, the more likely is the mission to reach its aims. Also, the possibilities for democracy to develop in accordance to the UN’s ambitions are affected by contextual factors. The history of a state, together with its geographical prerequisites, are some of the factors possibly affecting the conditions for democratic development. To understand the effectiveness
of peacekeeping missions it is therefore important to explore how these conditions affects democratization. Thus,

*Hypothesis 3: The level of a state’s internal polarization of social groups is negatively correlated with the level of electoral democracy during the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.*

*Hypothesis 4: A high level of natural resources negatively affects the level of electoral democracy in the host state during the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.*

*Hypothesis 5: Previous experience of peacekeeping missions has a positive impact on the level of electoral democracy in the host states during the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.*

3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

To examine the hypotheses presented above, I used secondary data to perform ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The regressions were run in Stata. The main source was newly released data from the V-Dem Institute. These data allow for detailed empirical tests of arguments from the field of democracy studies. However, as explained in section 3.4, I limit my sample only to countries that have received a UN peacekeeping mission following armed internal conflict. The selection of the sample was made through information gathering from two other datasets, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Dataset (UNPKO dataset) and the UCDP/PRIO (International Peace Research Institute) Armed Conflict dataset. Below, the three datasets are presented. After follows a presentation of the case-selection process, the choice of methodology used and the independent and control variables included in the regression.

3.1. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Dataset

The UNPKO dataset includes all UN peacekeeping missions since the first one deployed in 1948. The dataset includes the location, duration and role of each peacekeeping mission. The

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4 I am grateful to Thomas Flores, Assistant Professor in Conflict Resolution and Political Science at George Mason University, for sharing this dataset, which he compiled for his forthcoming book (Flores forthcoming) based on information from the UN. I have crosschecked the dataset with the UN List of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations) and the information available on the UN
information reaches as far as 2011.\(^5\) In order to include as many peacekeeping missions as possible, I have added later peacekeeping missions that were ongoing and/or deployed until 2015.\(^6\)

### 3.2. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset

The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset provides information regarding armed conflicts that have taken place between 1946 and 2014, where at least one of the fighting parties was a government. For a conflict to be included in the dataset there must have been 25 or more casualties. This is in accordance with the UCDP definition of battles, with 25 to 999 related casualties defined as minor armed conflicts, and those with more then 1000 casualties per year defined as wars (Reid Sarkees, 2014:237).

### 3.3. Varieties of Democracy Dataset

The purpose of the V-Dem project is to offer a new approach on how to conceptualize and measure democracy (V-Dem, 2016).\(^7\) The dataset includes all countries, and some independent territories, in the world from 1900 until today. The material consists of information from existing data sources as well as material developed by carefully selected experts (Coppedge et al, 2016A:17).

V-Dem aims to create a quantitative measurement of democracy that can capture dimensional variations in a country’s level of democracy. To enable this, V-Dem uses seven main principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, majoritarian, consensual, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy (Coppedge et al, 2012:22). Each of the principles is disaggregated into several fundamental components, measured by multiple indicators. By

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\(^5\) In the dataset, each state hosting a mission is referenced by a number. These numbers correspond to a fourth dataset, the UCDP Actor Dataset, which provides the names for each host state/country. I have therefore completed the UNPKO dataset by adding host country names from the UCDP dataset. In certain cases, the name of the host country used by UCDP and the UNPKO did not correspond. In these situations, I used the UCDP designation because this, for the most part, corresponded with the V-Dem data.

\(^6\) This addition has been made in accordance with the UN List of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations) and the information available on the UN peacekeeping website: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.

\(^7\) Currently, the most widely used measurements of democracy those defined by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) and Polity IV (www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html).
offering a selection of indicators, the disaggregated data permit researchers to create their own indices and combine those aspects of highest interest (V-Dem, 2016).

3.3.1. The collection of the V-Dem data

It is challenging to quantify the level of democracy and other phenomena, such as political equality, in a state. As described by Mechkova (2014:17), individuals often disagree regarding to what extent two diverse cases differ from each other, even though they agree that there is an overall difference. For example, although consensus can be reached that certain elections are freer then others, individuals tend to value the concept of “free elections” differently based on their own experiences. This difference in perception makes people rate a state’s level of electoral freedom at various levels. The reason being that different individuals vary in their opinion regarding of the midpoint of these extremes lies. Therefore, they ascribe different quantities to the same case.

The V-Dem dataset coders’ background, education and interpretation of concepts, such as “free elections”, may also influence how they understand and code a situation (Mechkova, 2014:17). Coders may have various views regarding when a shift occurs on a scale of no elections to free elections. This can result in coders providing biased ratings for various indicators, due to their own assumption of the level of development within a certain country (Ibid). To minimize the impact on of such bias, the V-Dem applies the method of “bridge coding” (Coppedge et al. 2016A:25). This method means that one expert codes more then one country, to ensure cross-country equivalence. Coders are also encouraged to use latent coding, namely coding limited to just one single year (Ibid). By using bridge and lateral coding, inter-coder reliability is improved and validity of the data is strengthened (Mechkova, 2014:17).

An additional effort made to minimize errors related to the coding is that a minimum of five, carefully selected, county experts are used to quantify the information for each county (Coppedge et al, 2016A:18). In general, three out of the five experts are also nationals of the country that they are coding (Coppedge et al, 2016A:19). Allowing a majority of local experts to code a state ensures a knowledge and understanding of the historical and current situation of the country.
3.4. Selection

The UN does not carry out all deployed peacekeeping missions. Initiatives can be taken from other actors, such as regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Heldt and Wallensteen, 2007:4). However, due to the UN’s prominent role as a promoter of peace and security on the global arena, I have chosen to limit this thesis selection to only include UN led peacekeeping missions.

Peacekeeping missions can be deployed after several different types of conflicts. The area of interest in this thesis is peacekeeping mission deployed following intrastate conflicts. The reason for this interest is the increased number of intrastate conflicts, compared to interstate ones. Since intrastate and interstate conflicts are fundamentally different, investigations concerning them need to be performed in different ways (Howard, 2008:6). Also, since UN peacekeeping mission are not randomly assigned to states, inference from a fuller dataset would have required treatment effect models. Therefore, only peacekeeping missions launched to survey development after intrastate conflict were included in this analysis.

The classification of conflicts related to peacekeeping missions was made according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset classification. The dataset defines four different types of conflict; extra systemic armed conflict, interstate armed conflict, internal armed conflict and internationalized internal armed conflicts (UCDP, 2015:9). I coded the first two types of conflict as interstate, and the second two as intrastate. Each definition was crosschecked against UN background information for the same conflict, which was created by the UN following each peacekeeping mission mandate. This verification was performed to ensure that the purpose of the UN peacekeeping mission matched what was described in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset. If no appropriate information was available through the dataset, I turned to the UN-provided background information and mandate. This was then used to assess whether the conflict prior to a deployment of a peacekeeping mission was intrastate, interstate or other. After removing preventative and post-interstate conflict peacekeeping missions from the UNPKO dataset, 55 interstate related missions remained.

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8 The UN provides a webpage for each deployed peacekeeping mission.
9 Due to the focus of this thesis on the impact of peacekeeping missions in post-conflict areas, missions of a preventative nature were not included in the analysis.
To simplify the quantitative examination of the peacekeeping missions, and to adapt to the scope of this thesis, two more limitations were applied in addition to the focus on intrastate conflicts. The first limitation was that only one peacekeeping mission in each host country was included in the dataset. When multiple missions had been launched within a country, I included the mission that was most recently ended or the mission that was still ongoing.\(^{10}\) The second limitation was the exclusion of peacekeeping missions that were geographically spread to multiple host countries.

Based on these selection criteria, 28 out of the 55 intrastate-related peacekeeping missions were included in the analysis.\(^{11}\) These missions have, in accordance with the second limitation criterion, thereby been deployed in 28 countries. 17 of the states included in the created dataset have had one or several peacekeeping missions deployed in them prior to the peacekeeping mission explored in this thesis. Altogether, the examined missions have been active for 182 years. The two shortest missions lasted 1 year each, and the longest for 25 years.\(^{12}\) The mean length of the missions in the sample is 6.5 years, the median length is 5 years. 10 of the missions included in the analysis are currently ongoing. The first year of each peacekeeping has been coded as year 1 in the dataset, as it was the first year the mission was active in the host state.

### 3.4.1. Limitations of the Selection

As mentioned above, the data to be analyzed consists of 28 peacekeeping missions. It would have been an alternative to include all 71 UN peacekeeping missions ever deployed. Due to the variation in context surrounding the origin of the missions, and with consideration the time and scope devoted to this thesis, I have made the choice to select certain missions in accordance to the criteria discussed above. Even though the sample is limited, all possible cases according to the selection criteria are included in the analysis.

An important aspect of the data is the change in name of a peacekeeping mission that occurs when the UN changes its mandate. This result in that also minor change in a mandate has

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\(^{10}\) For the case of Sudan, where two peacekeeping operations are currently active, I included the mission that had been active for the shortest length of time. By choosing the most recently deployed mission, any possible impact that deployment of a parallel mission may have on the data was avoided.

\(^{11}\) A list of these missions is presented in the Appendix.

\(^{12}\) In the UNPKO dataset, the length of each mission is measured in whole years and not in months.
resulted in a new mission. It is therefore possible that the UN can have had personnel on the ground for a longer, continuous time than indicated by the list of peacekeeping missions. However, the effect this has on the results of this thesis is limited, due to that the focus lies on the relative development of democracy in countries and not the actual one.

3.5. Operationalization of the Dependent Variable: Electoral Democracy

As previously discussed, elections are considered a core element in democratic societies. Therefore, the operationalization of the dependent variable is strongly related to electoral democracy. In accordance to Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, the V-Dem data present a variable for measuring the level of polyarchy within a state.\(^\text{13}\)

The polyarchy measurement is composed of five different components based on Dahl’s definition: elected executive, clean elections, freedom of organization, suffrage and freedom of expression (Teorell et al, 2016:22). The value for polyarchy is an aggregate of the five component scores. Countries reaching a polyarchy score above 0.5 are considered as passing the threshold for when states are referred to as electoral democracies, although only in the narrowest sense (Coppedge et al, 2016A:9).

3.6. Independent and Control Variables

When analyzing the change in the level of democracy in connection to the deployment of peacekeeping missions, it is important to account for possible factors that might affect the relationship.\(^\text{14}\) One of the factors controlled for is differences related to time. More precisely, the years a peacekeeping is ongoing and the first five years after a mission is terminated were used as independent variables. These two factors were included to enable studying how the length of a mission affects its effectiveness. Further, exploring the level of democracy after a peacekeeping mission provided knowledge of how long lasting the effects is.

Following the two time aspects, five other factors were used in the analysis. Three of those factors, internal distribution of power, level of natural resources and previous presence of

\(^\text{13}\) A further description of the dependent variable is available in the Appendix.

\(^\text{14}\) A further description of the independent and control variables is available in the Appendix.
peacekeeping missions, were used as independent variables in order to be able to answer the hypotheses.\textsuperscript{15}

The first independent variable controlled for, except the impact of time, is the internal distribution of power within the host states. This is examined since ethic polarization is related to the emergence of conflicts (Montalvo and Reynal-Queroll, 2004:26-27). By studying if certain groups (for example ethnical, religious or regional ones) have more power than others, I was able to examine whether a possible change in the level of democracy related to a change in the internal power distribution. If more groups are to be included into a society and allowed to speak their terms, this may affect the level of democracy.

The second independent variable controlled for is the level of natural resources within a country. Good access to natural resources, such as oil, gas and minerals, within the territory of a state can contribute greatly to a state’s financial development. However, the ownership of natural resources can also be a reason of conflict, as described in section 2.1.1. Due to the possible impact that the existence of natural resources can have on a county’s stability and potential for a democratic development, I controlled for the impact of high levels of natural resources.

The third independent variable tested was previous presence of peacekeeping missions. Since a preceding peacekeeping mission may influence the impact of a subsequent one, it was important to examine if this affected the democratic level in the host state.

The two other factors, the level of democracy prior to a peacekeeping mission and gross domestic product (GDP), were used as control variables. By controlling for such variables, I have reduced the risk of spurious findings between the independent and dependent variables.

The first control variable controlled for the level of democracy prior to the conflict related to the deployment of each peacekeeping mission. States with prior experience of a democratic system may find it easier to return to democratic governance after a conflict than states with

\textsuperscript{15} To control for the impact of independent and control variables, I have combined and completed the abovementioned datasets with information from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Further information related to each control variable and descriptions of the statistical data are available in the Appendix.
no prior experience (Ball and Halevy, 1996) and it was therefore important to examine this relationship.

The second control variable was GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) rates (World Bank). This variable was applied in order to control for changes in the dependent variable that may have been due to differences in the countries’ economic development.

### 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

To test the hypotheses and explore the relationship between UN peacekeeping mission and the development of democracy, I perform an OLS regression analysis. The aim with the analysis is not to compare the level of democracy between the different states where peacekeeping missions have been deployed. Instead, it is focused on the internal change in democracy in each state. 28 states are included in the data. The information covers a total of 182 years with peacekeeping missions deployed. Also, data for the years before and after each conflict is included in the dataset. Of the 28 missions 10 are currently ongoing. The countries included in the analysis all have various backgrounds and prerequisites. They are spread across 5 continents, providing a geographical variation. The peacekeeping missions are also spread over time, from the 1960’s until present day.

Table 1 below presents a summary of the variables used in the dataset. The first variable is the dependent variable: electoral democracy. The variable is continuous; Graph A.1 in the Appendix presents the distribution of it, during the years when peacekeeping missions are deployed. It shows that the observations are close to normally distributed. Also, Graph A.2 in the appendix, controlling the residuals distribution, indicates that the dependent variable is normally distributed. The first five factors following electoral democracy in the table are the independent variables and the final two are the control variables.

Table 2 presents the values of electoral democracy for each host state. The levels are measured for the year prior to the outbreak of the conflict related to the peacekeeping mission, the first year of the mission, the last year of the mission, and five years after the mission has ended.
Note: The variation in N is due to missing information in the V-Dem dataset.

Also, the difference in electoral democracy from the year before the start of the related conflict to five years after is presented.

In a majority of the states the value of polyarchy increases over time. There is a relative increase in 16 of the 28 countries, comparing the first year of peacekeeping to the last year of it. Also, 14 of the 17 countries with data available for the year before the related conflict broke out to the last year of the mission show an increase in the level of democracy. 11 out of 14 countries with data available has an overall increase for the year before the conflict related to the mission until 5 years after the withdrawal of the latest deployed mission. The average increase in electoral democracy for these 14 countries is 0.1626.

4.1. Regression Analysis

The estimates of the models produced provide information regarding the statistical significance and coefficients. These estimates are presented in Table 3, and used to determine if the hypotheses are to be rejected or supported. The variation of observations in Table 3 depends on the various accesses to information in the used datasets. Also, Model 8 and 9 accounts for the years after a peacekeeping mission has been terminated. Since 10 of the 28 peacekeeping missions in the analysis are currently ongoing, these missions are excluded from the two models. The number of observations is therefor considerably smaller in them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std.Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of peacekeeping</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>5.435</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years after peacekeeping</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2.966</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distributed by social groups</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-2.337</td>
<td>2.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year before a conflict</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>3000.94</td>
<td>167.93</td>
<td>239.74</td>
<td>13644.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used

Note: The variation in N is due to missing information in the V-Dem dataset.
Table 2. Polyarchy in conjunction with deployment and withdrawal of UN peacekeeping missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Before conflict</th>
<th>1st year of peacekeeping</th>
<th>Last year of peacekeeping</th>
<th>5 years after peacekeeping</th>
<th>Difference before conflict and after peacekeeping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>0.0267</td>
<td>0.1647</td>
<td>0.1649</td>
<td>0.1805</td>
<td>0.1537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>0.1977</td>
<td>0.3710</td>
<td>0.3624</td>
<td>0.3624</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.1091</td>
<td>0.2233</td>
<td>0.3699</td>
<td>0.3596</td>
<td>0.2506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.3150</td>
<td>0.1008</td>
<td>0.3811</td>
<td>0.4183</td>
<td>0.1033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic *</td>
<td>0.3325</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo*</td>
<td>0.27367</td>
<td>0.4263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>0.1826</td>
<td>0.3733</td>
<td>0.1431</td>
<td>0.0968</td>
<td>-0.0858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0.1685</td>
<td>0.1687</td>
<td>0.2601</td>
<td>0.2880</td>
<td>0.1195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.6104</td>
<td>0.6064</td>
<td>0.6532</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>0.1807</td>
<td>0.2395</td>
<td>0.5304</td>
<td>0.5724</td>
<td>0.3917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.3446</td>
<td>0.2897</td>
<td>0.5752</td>
<td>0.7325</td>
<td>0.3879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.1736</td>
<td>0.5356</td>
<td>0.5356</td>
<td>0.5530</td>
<td>0.3794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.4255</td>
<td>0.3430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti *</td>
<td>0.5030</td>
<td>0.4963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast *</td>
<td>0.3863</td>
<td>0.3937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo *</td>
<td>0.2307</td>
<td>0.5858</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia *</td>
<td>0.3863</td>
<td>0.3937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali *</td>
<td>0.7120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco *</td>
<td>0.1481</td>
<td>0.1983</td>
<td>0.3101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.1957</td>
<td>0.2913</td>
<td>0.4643</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>0.0951</td>
<td>0.2571</td>
<td>0.5776</td>
<td>0.6978</td>
<td>0.6027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.2384</td>
<td>0.2278</td>
<td>0.1151</td>
<td>0.1215</td>
<td>-0.1170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0.3907</td>
<td>0.2459</td>
<td>0.6401</td>
<td>0.5799</td>
<td>0.1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.1555</td>
<td>0.1631</td>
<td>0.1691</td>
<td>0.1726</td>
<td>0.0171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan *</td>
<td>0.2375</td>
<td>0.2117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan *</td>
<td>0.2334</td>
<td>0.2355</td>
<td>0.2617</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.3715</td>
<td>0.1895</td>
<td>0.2585</td>
<td>0.2450</td>
<td>-0.1222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.0282</td>
<td>0.0372</td>
<td>0.0362</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
<td>0.0067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Countries marked with * have currently a peacekeeping mission deployed in them, and thereby lack a value for five years after peacekeeping. 2014 is coded as the last year of peacekeeping mission for these countries.
### Table 3. Regression Estimates of the effect of Peacekeeping Missions on Electoral Democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years of peacekeeping</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power by social groups</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
<td>0.085***</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>0.082***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level of natural resources</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
<td>0.075**</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP</td>
<td>0.00002***</td>
<td>-3.621e-06</td>
<td>(3.94e-06)</td>
<td>(5.35e-06)</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5.18e-06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year before conflict</td>
<td>-0.096*</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.644)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years after peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0049</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Constant                                  | 0.331***     | 0.342**      | 0.371***     | 0.305***     | 0.355***     | 0.374***     | 0.258***     | 0.385*** | 0.350*** |
| Observations                              | 166          | 293          | 294          | 294          | 232          | 294          | 160          | 87       | 62      |
| R-squared                                 | 0.053        | 0.409        | 0.0015       | 0.093        | 0.107        | 0.019        | 0.55         | 0.0001   | 0.57    |

Legend: ED = Electoral democracy. * p <0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Standard errors within parenthesis.
The first model presented in Table 3 examines the relationship between the level of electoral democracy and years of peacekeeping. The model indicates a, statistically significant, positive relationship between peacekeeping missions and the level of electoral democracy. Also in Model 7, where all variables are included, is the relationship between years of peacekeeping and electoral democracy positive and significant. The comparison of the level of peacekeeping mission the first year of a peacekeeping mission and the final year of it is visible in Graph A.4 in the Appendix. The graph shows a positive relationship between the time a peacekeeping mission is deployed and the development of electoral democracy. The level of democracy increases during the time the peacekeeping missions are active in the host state. To control for the possible biased effect of the longest ongoing peacekeeping mission, Graph A.5 presents the same relationship without this mission included. Also here a positive relationship is indicated. Thus, the first hypothesis, regarding an increase in electoral democracy the final year of a peacekeeping mission compared to the first one, is supported.

Model 2 examines the influence a polarized distribution of power within a society has on the level of electoral democracy. The relationship identified by the model shows that the level of electoral democracy relates to how polarized a society is between different social groups on a significant level. This is illustrated by Graph A.7 in the Appendix. If the power within a society is more equally distributed, the level of electoral democracy is higher. The correlation in Model 3 includes all observations of internal social division in the dataset. Hypothesis 3 focuses on the relationship between social division and electoral democracy during the time a peacekeeping mission is ongoing. Table A.2 in the Appendix therefor compares the coefficient from Model 2, where all available data is included, to the coefficient that evolves when only observations from the years where the peacekeeping missions are ongoing are included. Excluding observations not related to ongoing mission raises the coefficient from 0.113 to 0.116. The value is significant, and remains so also in Model 7 and 9. Thereby, social polarization is the only factor where all the coefficients are statistically significant. These stabile results indicate that less socially polarized societies have higher values of democracy, and the third hypothesis is thereby accepted.

The fourth hypothesis predicts a negative influence of high level of natural resources on electoral democracy during the time a mission is ongoing. Model 3 indicates such a negative relationship, but it is not statistical significant. Table A.3 in the Appendix compares this result
to the same factors where only years with an active peacekeeping mission are included. Even when the years without active missions are excluded from the analysis there is a negative, but insignificant relationship. In Model 7 and 9 from Table 3 this relationship has however turned to a positive one, as more variables are introduced. The value in Model 7, where the variable years of peacekeeping is included, is statistically significant. The positive, significant, relationship goes against the hypothesis. So does the negative relationship found in Model 3 and Table A.3. Thereby, the hypothesis that a high level of natural resources has a negative impact on the democratic development is rejected. Important to notice is that high level of natural resources is coded as a binary variable (as shown in Table 1). This may have had an influence on the result, compared if the variable contained continuous values. The coding of natural resources as a binary variable was made based on the data available.

The fourth model in Table 3 explores the impact that the factor of previously deployed peacekeeping missions has on the democratic development. This indicates a positive, significant relationship. The same does Model 6, controlling for all variables during the years of an active peacekeeping mission. However, when controlling for the relationship up to five years after the end of a peacekeeping mission the result is negative, and no longer significant. This change can possibly depend on the small number of observations included in Model 8. Since the hypothesis concerns the impact of previous mission on the democratic development during the time a mission is active, it is still accepted. When discussing the impacts of previous peacekeeping missions, it is important to recall the discussion form chapter 3.4.1. regarding the difference in when they were deployed. Since a previous mission can have been very similar to the mission tested in the analysis, extra caution is called for when claiming connection between these missions and the level of democratization during following UN presence.

Model 5 presents a small, but statistically significant, relationship between the levels of GDP per capita, calculated as PPP, and the level of electoral democracy. However, when placed in Model 7 and 8 the impact of GDP is no longer significant. This indicates the level of economic assets is not influential enough to affect the relationship between peacekeeping missions and electoral democratization.
Model 6 shows the same impact as previously accounted for in Table 2; the level of electoral democracy is lower the year before a conflict is started compared to during and after the intervention of a peacekeeping mission. The impact is significant when tested alone, but when other factors are introduced in Model 7 it looses its significance. In Model 9, the level of democracy before a conflict was omitted due to collinearity.

Returning to Table 2, it becomes clear there is a certain increase in the level of electoral democracy between the last year of a peacekeeping mission and five years after. 11 out of 17 countries with data available has an overall increase for the year before the conflict related to the mission until 5 years after the withdrawal of the latest deployed mission. However, Model 8 shows that this increase is not statistically significant. Also Model 9, where the variable of years after a peacekeeping is ended is added to the other variables, presents an insignificant result. Thereby the second hypothesis, which predicted an increase in electoral democracy until 5 years after a peacekeeping mission, is rejected.

The democratic development after the withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission is further explored in Graph A.6 in the Appendix. The graph indicates an almost horizontal relationship between the level of electoral democracy the last year of a mission and five years later. Judging by the graph, there is barely any continued development of electoral democracy after peacekeeping missions departure. This implies that states are facing challenges, or lack the ambition, to continue the democratization process. I leave it to future research to establish the reason for this decrement in democratic development.

The regression estimates indicates that the level of democracy related to peacekeeping mission is affected by several conditional factors. Three out of the five hypotheses are accepted. This implies that the influence peacekeeping missions have on democracy is affected by the time a peacekeeping mission is active, by the distribution of power between social groups in the host state and of the existence of previous peacekeeping missions. The two factors with high R-squared values are GDP per capita and, in particular, power distributed by social groups. These two variables have the highest explanatory value for the level of electoral democracy of all the variables tested in the analysis.

The distribution of the observations is, as previously mentioned, presented in Graph A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. Graph A.1 illustrates the spread of the sample compared to a normal
distribution curve. It shows that there are some deviation between the curve and the sample, but that the majority of the sample follows the normal distribution line. Graph A.2 also compares the sample to a normal distribution by showing the standardized normal probability. The deviations from the diagonal line show how the sample departures from normality, through for example outliers and skewedness. There are minor abbreviations between the sample and the normality line, but the sample is still to be considered as following normality. Similarly, graph A.3 indicates a close to normal distribution of the residuals, despite a small abnormality in the beginning and end of the lining. Table A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix checks for multicolinearity between the variables in Model 7 and 9 by measuring the Variance Inflator Factor (VIF). Since VIF is smaller then 10 in both models no multicolinearity is found.

4.3. Limitations

To test the theoretical assumptions I have used quantitative methods to conduct regression analysis. The method has enabled me to look for an average effect of the various factors in connection to peacekeeping and democratization. However, because of the general approach of the method, no further explorations have been made regarding the unique conditions related to each state. Therefor, complimentary case studies would have enabled a deeper analysis, and possibly explained why certain contextual factors are more influential then others. Due to the limited scope and time dedicated for this thesis, this is left for future research.

Not all peacekeeping missions deployed by the UN are included in this analysis, in accordance with the selection criteria. The deployment of UN peacekeeping missions is also not randomly assigned to post-conflict areas. Gilligan and Stedman (2001:38) identify the placement of peacekeeping mission as skewed towards conflicts in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Further, placement of UN peacekeeping missions depends on the power in the host state, risks and costs (Ibid). This entails that the host states of the missions are carefully chosen, which brings a risk for a biased selection. It may be that the Security Council choses to deploy peacekeeping missions in certain countries to be able reach a certain aim beyond peace. If this is the case, this thesis is influenced by the biased selection. An alternative approach would have been to compare the impact of UN led mission with the impact from
missions led by other organizers. This approach was however deselected due to time constraints.

Regardless where peacekeeping missions are deployed, there are multiple factors that can influence the democratic development within a state. These factors can be active direct or indirect, be historically rooted or just appear. Do to the increased level of globalization and thereby interconnection in the world factors in other states can also have a great impact on how this development is formed. It is not possible to control for all factors, and so this thesis only aims at exploring the connections to the factors mentioned in it. Also, the intention of this thesis is not to take a stance for or against UN led peacekeeping missions, or the promotion of democracy. Therefore, no such discussion is included, neither in the analysis nor the conclusion.

4.4. Case study: UNTAG in Namibia

To further explore the relationship between democratization and UN peacekeeping missions I will take a closer look on how a peacekeeping mission have affected this development in a host country. As seen in Table 2 on page 29, the peacekeeping mission associated with the highest increase in the level of electoral democracy (V-Dem polyarchy-index) was the one carried out in Namibia. Therefore, the following section will seek to explore how the presence of the peacekeeping mission might have influenced the democratization in its host state.

The mission carried out in Namibia was called the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). It was a one year long mission that took place from April 1989 to March 1990 (United Nations, 2001). UNTAG was deployed with the overarching purpose to monitor and support the liberalization of Namibia from South Africa, which had illegally occupied it from 1915 (United Nations, 2001). From 1966, multiple armed battles took place in Namibia between Namibian and South African forces, but also between multiple Namibian actors fighting each other for the control of the country (Howard, 2001:102-103). In the end of the 1980’s, negotiations concerning Namibia’s independence were enabled since South Africa was put under great international pressure through anti-apartheid sanctions (Ibid). In order to end the internal battles and enable a peaceful liberation process, South Africa and Namibia jointly requested assistance from the United Nations (Ibid).
After initial violence between South African and Namibian forces in connection with the launch of UNTAG, the mission was successfully deployed in April and May 1989 (Howard, 108-109). UNTAG consisted of 8000 staff from over 100 countries (Besenyo and Molnár, 2013:103). It was a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission, meaning that it consisted of both civil, including civilian police, and military parts (Dzinesa 2004:650). The primary goal of the mission was to ensure Namibia’s independence through its first free and fair election of a Constituent Assembly (Howard 2002:121). This included enabling the political parties to participate in the election and carry out their campaigns without interference (United Nations, 2001). All UNTAG’s operations in Namibia were thereby subordinated to this goal (Ibid). However, before such election could take place the mission also was responsible to monitor the ceasefire between Namibian fighters and the South African Forces (Ibid).

During UNTAGs presence in Namibia the level of the V-Dem polyarchy-index for the country rose from 0,2571 to 0,5776 (Coppedge et al. 2016B). This can be assume to depend on the monitoring of the ceasefire, the holding of an election and other UN led activities conducted in Namibia during this period. After these activities, and the withdrawal of UNTAG, Namibia continued to transition into democracy. The polyarchy-index continued to rise; in 1995 the polyarchy level reached 0,6978 (Coppedge et al. 2016B). The level of polyarchy has since then remained stable and never gone below 0,6; in 2014 the level was 0,6445 (Ibid). This mirrors the political situation in Namibia; the country has remain democratic, even though it has faced challenges such as an uprising in its northern parts in 1999 and a rapid spreading of HIV/Aids in 2004 (Landguiden, 2016).

One of the major activities conducted by UNTAG during its time in Namibia was the deployment of civil police officers to monitor the ceasefire and to support the withdrawal and demobilization of military forces (Besenyo and Molnár, 2013:104). The civil polices’ tasks also included monitoring the preparations and performance of the election, to assure that the electoral process was free from manipulations, and ensuring that people could express themselves freely without being harmed, by showing its presence and thereby enhance stability and safety (Howard, 2002:118). Further, the civil police surveyed the national police’s monitoring of law and order so that it was performed in a professional and non-biased way (United Nations 2001). To ensure an efficient implementation of the election result, and to achieve long-term stability after the withdrawal of UNTAG, the civil police also
helped to establish and train a new generation of Namibian police (Howard, 2002:121). The contributions of the UNTAG civilian police thereby helped to create stability and enable a democratic development in Namibia, both during and after the mission. It also strengthened the electoral process by monitoring the elections, and thereby safeguarding that it was conducted in a correct manner, and consolidating people’s rights to openly express their opinions.

There was also a military component in UNTAG (Howard, 2002:115). The task of this component was to support the disarmament of the fighting parties and monitor the South African troops’ withdrawal from Namibia (Ibid). The component had difficulties ensuring that all small weapons were collected and that all fighters not coming from Namibia had left, but it managed to collect a majority of the weapons and ensure that most of the fighters withdrew and/or left the country (Howard, 2002:116-117). This was an important contribution to the democratic development, since it helped to create a secure environment for both UN personnel and the local population to pursue with the elections in. It was also important that the withdrawal of the South African troops took place to underline that the independence process was ongoing.

The special representative for the mission, Martti Ahtisaari, stated in 1988 that goal of free and fair elections could only be fulfilled if there was a change in the atmosphere so that the citizens would feel free, informed and safe enough to express their opinion (United Nations, 2001). One part of this was the, above mentioned, civil police’s monitoring of people’s rights to express themselves freely and the presence of military personnel. Another important part was the interaction with the Namibian people, and not only the political elite, to achieve long term improvement of the situation in the country (Howard, 2002:110). To gain the Namibian people’s support for the mission information concerning it were communicated through radio, TV and other media sources, as well as traditional word of mouth (United Nations, 2001). Together with the pressure and interest from external actors, this created the momentum needed in order to get both South Africa and Namibia to maintain the missions plan and carry out the election (Ibid). To be able to spread the information concerning the elections the physical presence and availability of the mission in Namibia was also highly prioritized (Howard, 2002:111). This presence was achieved by the establishment of 42 regional offices around the country, enabling direct interaction with the citizens (Howard, 2002:112). Through
these offices the information of the forthcoming election was spread, giving the citizens an opportunity to make an informed decision (Howard, 2002:114). People could also register to vote in the offices (Ibid). By being present in multiple areas in Namibia to promote a democratic development through elections the UNTAG personnel contributed to the positive development of the country (Hearn, 1999:222).

Prior to the performance of the election UNTAG, together with the representatives for the country’s political parties, establish a Code of Conduct for the political performance in Namibia (United Nations, 2001). This code was agreed upon and used by all the political parties, as well as UNTAG (Ibid). The Code was also used as the starting point when answering questions from local, regional and national political leaders (Ibid). By establishing and using the Code in this way, UNTAG ensured that the parties involved in the election were aware of what was expected of them and that equivalent and correct information was given to the ones requesting it. UNTAG also assisted the adaption of the Namibian legislation to the independence of the country following the election (United Nations, 2001) and to the coming elections (Howard, 2002:122). For example what political majority would be needed to change or adopt a Constitution was decided and rules for who would be considered as entitled to vote were drawn up (Howard, 2002:122-123). Further, two requirements were set for parties wanting to participate in the election; they had to have 2000 signatures and a 10 000 rand deposit (Ibid). These requirements we instituted to avoid an election result with a too fragmented parliament (Ibid). The changes of the constitution ensured equal rights to vote and participate in the election for all Namibians, giving them an equivalent opportunity to engage in the decision making process.

The mission also supported, together with United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), the return before the election of those Namibians who had been forced to flee their country during the South African occupation (United Nations 2001). This was achieved through negotiations with South Africa, conducted by primary the Special Representative of the mission but also by the UN Secretary General (Ibid). The return of the refugees strengthened the legitimacy and democratic level of the election in 1989, since it ensured that the Namibians previously forced to leave their country were let back in and allowed to participate in the decision-making of Namibia’s next steps.
The electoral process was, as previously mentioned, facilitated through the set-up of regional offices around the country where voters could register, receive information and vote (Howard, 2002:123-124). The accessibility of the regional offices made it easier for the citizens who wanted to participate to register and vote, in the end 105% of the estimated electorate registered to vote\(^\text{16}\) and 97% of them participated in the election (Ibid). As previously described, the UN civil police helped to monitor both the campaign and the election, which warded off multiple disputes and disturbances were settled by the civil police (Howard, 2002:124). This helped to stabilize the situation in Namibia prior to the election, in order to ensure that the election would be able to take place. During the five days that the voting took place the civil police were present at each voting station as well as military ballot box supervisors and civil electoral supervisors from UNTAG (Ibid).

The supervision of the electoral campaign and the voting, the adoption of the legislative framework, the rules set up for the registration of parties and the support with the registration of voters were all considered as the UNTAGs major contributions to the conduction of the election in Namibia according to Howard (Ibid). Through these steps UNTAG was able to create a clear framework for the execution of the election, which contributed to transparency concerning the electoral process and reliability of the result (Howard, 2002:122-124). The outcome of the elections was accepted by both the Namibians and the South Africans (Besenyo and Molnár, 2013:104). After the election, UNTAG stayed in Namibia for another four months to ensure that the newly elected Constitutional Assembly were settled in and that there were no uprisings following the results of the election (United Nations, 2001). A majority of the regional offices were kept active after the elections to monitor the outcome of the voting and establish local capacity to continue the positive development following UNTAGs withdrawal (United Nations 2001). The activities of the mission were gradually faded out before they were ended in March 1990 (Ibid).

Even though the conduct of free and fair elections, which are a crucial part of a democratic political system, was the main goal of the UNTAG mission the UN did not decide what

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\(^{16}\) The Administrator-General’s office, set up by UNTAG, had estimated that there would be 685 000 eligible voters in Namibia. However, when the registration of voters was completed over 700 000 voters had registered. The census predictions made before the start of the registration had thereby underestimated the number of eligible voters in the country (Howard, 2002:123).
political system the country would have after the election of the Constituent Assembly and the end of the mission (Melber, 2003:15). The decision of what political system Namibia would use after the withdrawal of the UN personnel was thereby left to the elected representatives of the country (Ibid). They did in turn decide to institutionalize constitutional democracy in Namibia (Ibid). As a democratic political system was strongly promoted by UNTAG, the mission can be considered to have set the framework for the future political system in Namibia, without forcing anything onto the citizens or the legislators (Melber, 2003:16). The Namibian choice of constitutional democracy can be seen as a successful spreading of UN’s democratic values, enabled by the UNTAG’s presence and activities in Namibia.

The UNTAG mission is today considered as very fruitful. Besenyo and Molnár (2013:93) identifies UNTAG as a long-term successful mission, leaving Namibia democratic even more than 20 years after the withdrawal of the peacekeepers. The main goal of the mission was the performance of a first free and fair election of a Constituent Assembly, where all parties and voters fulfilling the criteria set out in the legislation were allowed to participate. This was executed in November 1989. To be able to arrange for the election all activities carried out by UNTAG was directed towards this goal. Also Howard (2002:99) describes UNTAG as a victory, both regarding the implementation of the given mandate as well as concerning the establishment of political conditions for a long term political stability in Namibia. Through the activities the UN ensured a stabilization of the current situation and engaged both prior to, during and after the election. Both South Africa and Namibia had requested the deployment of the mission. The political will to find a peaceful solution and good compromises enabled the UNTAG staff to focus on other areas than convincing the political elite. Since the mission contained a broad variation of conflict resolution strategies, which together decreased the usage of violence in the country, the electoral process could be successfully performed (Hearn, 1999:220).

Also the adaptiveness of the UNTAG organization is pointed out as crucial for the success of the mission (Howard, 2002:127). The peacekeepers were allowed to be flexible in their contacts with the Namibians, and the rules created to support the political process came out of compromises in order to be as inclusive as possible (Ibid). UNTAG helped to ensure that the election were possible to carry out in a correct, democratic matter, and thereby saw to the
establishment and strengthening of democracy in Namibia. An important instrument for the success of the mission was the usage of civil police to supervise the ceasefire and create stability, oversee the preparations and the execution of the election and to train the Namibian police force to take over after the end of the mission. Another important factor for the success of the mission, and the establishment of the election, was the dedication to connect and involve not only the political elite but the whole society (Howard, 2002:99). By providing broad information spreading, creating a stable and safe environment and monitoring the returns of refugees UNTAG increased the Namibian population’s possibilities to participate in the election and make an informed decision when doing so. This, together with the implementation of a Code of Conduct and the monitoring of the election, may also have increased the acceptance of the results and the electoral system since it might have increase the citizens’ conception of the election being conducted in a correct manner.

It is difficult to say what might have happened in Namibia without the UN’s presence. It is possible that an election would have been performed in a later state and the level of democracy increased, but it is also likely that the withdrawal of South Africa would have been postponed or that this would have caused long going internal conflicts and instability. However, it seems evident that the way UNTAG was performed, using information spreading together with stabilizing and demilitarizing methods to enable an election, led to a raised the level of democracy in Namibia.

5. CONCLUSION

The current increase in warfare and change in global security demands an enlarged focus on preventing and mitigating the consequences of conflicts. The purpose of this thesis has been to explore the relationship between the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions and the development of democracy in post-conflict states. The focus has been on identifying contextual factors that have a positive impact on the relationship between peacekeeping missions and democracy. Such an impact is identified for several of the factors examined. More precisely, the quantitative analysis finds that the factors distribution of power between social groups and the previous presence of peacekeeping missions have a positive impact on the level of democracy in peacekeeping mission host states. The results also indicate that the level of electoral democracy is increasing in host states during a peacekeeping mission, but then grinds as the mission is withdrawn. This suggests that it would be profitable for UN
peacekeeping missions to be deployed over a longer period of time to increase the level of electoral democracy in the host state.

The findings provide initial insights regarding the impact contextual factors have on the development of democracy related to UN peacekeeping missions. However, as previously discussed, there might be other factors affecting this relationship that are not explored here. The case study of UNTAG in Namibia shows that the interaction with the local population, the adaptation of the mission to the unique situation and the successful performance of an election were crucial factors for the raised level of polyarchy in Namibia. The holding of Namibia’s first election was made possible through the usage of a comprehensive number of instruments, such as military, civil police, information spreading, legislative review and electoral supervision. Notable is that even if UNTAG was one of the shorter missions included in the study, it was able to have a positive influence on the long term democratic development in Namibia. This shows how complex the interaction of a peacekeeping mission is, and that all missions and the contexts they are deployed in are different.

This thesis contributes to the debate regarding the studied missions’ capabilities and limitations. The result should be considered as an explorative effort to find contextual factors linked to democratization and peacekeeping missions. The insight that various contextual factors impacts democratization differently is important for understanding how host states are affected by peacekeeping missions. It is also important in order to improve the transitional process from war to democracy through future development of peacekeeping policies. As varying preconditions makes each conflict unique, the mapping of these contextual implications enables adaption of the peacekeeping mission employed to each particular situation. This thesis contributes with an indicator of the importance the contextual factors explored.

It is however important to be cautious when interpreting the results of this thesis, since of the number of years of peacekeeping for each host state varies in the sample. As different peacekeeping last during different numbers of years, this might have a biased impact on the result. Multiple observations per country can also result in autocorrelation. As this thesis is of explorative nature the choice have been to use simple regression, but for more profound research on the matter I suggest the usage of more complex statistical models.
To fully explore the relationship between the deployment of peacekeeping missions and democratization more research is needed. A continued investigation of this area will further advance the adaption of policies, and thereby mandates of peacekeeping missions, to the surrounding circumstances. Larger studies, including all UN deployed peacekeeping missions, could help determine if conflicts following different conflict types entails for different treatment in order to enhance democracy. Further, a comparison of the contextual factors affecting UN led missions with the contextual factors affecting missions led by other organizations would increase the knowledge regarding peacekeeping missions overall. Also, a comparison to post-conflict states, which have not received support of a peacekeeping mission, is needed to increase the knowledge. By measuring counterfactuals, and thereby explore what impact the presence of peacekeeping missions have on post-conflict societies, knowledge would be gathered which could favor global democratization. Peacekeeping missions also vary in their nature, considering amongst others the scope of the mission, the current political and social situation in the host state and the targets of the intervention. Therefor it can also be fruitful to perform multiple case studies, as the one of UNTAG, to examine how the specific missions have been shaped and what tools that have been used in order to even further expand the knowledge of peacekeeping missions deployed by the UN.
REFERENCES


United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI.


## APPENDIX

### Table A.1. List of UN Peacekeeping Missions included in the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of operation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Mission name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1960 - 1964</td>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
<td>Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 -1964</td>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 -1966</td>
<td>DOMREP</td>
<td>Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989- 1990</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 – 1993</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 - 2009</td>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995 – 2002</td>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999 - Present</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Mission Description</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003 - Present</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>2004 - Present</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoir</td>
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<td>2004 - Present</td>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<td>2011 - Present</td>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011 – Present</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Organization in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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**Table A.2 Regression estimates for power distributed by social groups on Electoral Democracy.**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Power distributed by social groups</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.342***</td>
<td>0.347***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: *** $p<0.001$. Standard errors within parenthesis. Model 1 includes all observations available in the dataset; Model 2 only includes observations for the years where peacekeeping missions are ongoing and not from the years before/after the mission’s deployment.

**Table A.3 Regression estimates for a high level of natural resources on Electoral Democracy.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High level of natural resources</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.371***</td>
<td>0.380***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: *** $p<0.001$. Standard errors within parenthesis. Model 1 includes all observations available in the dataset; Model 2 only includes observations for the years where peacekeeping missions are ongoing and not from the years before/after the mission’s deployment.
Table A.4 Variance inflation factor for Model 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>VIF</th>
<th>1/VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year of peacekeeping</td>
<td>2,02</td>
<td>0,494839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distributed by social groups</td>
<td>1,18</td>
<td>0,847734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>1,50</td>
<td>0,665047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>1,74</td>
<td>0,575660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP</td>
<td>2,01</td>
<td>0,498384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean VIF</td>
<td>1,58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.5 Variance inflation factor for Model 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>VIF</th>
<th>1/VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year after peacekeeping</td>
<td>1,05</td>
<td>0,952731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power distributed by social groups</td>
<td>1,37</td>
<td>0,730284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>1,15</td>
<td>0,871461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>1,22</td>
<td>0,871461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP</td>
<td>1,36</td>
<td>0,733619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean VIF</td>
<td>1,23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph A.1 Distribution of the observations of electoral democracy, for years with ongoing peacekeeping missions.
Graph A.2 Standardized normal probability (P-p) plot.
Graph A.3 Standardized quantile plot.
Graph A.4 Plot of electoral democracy during years of ongoing peacekeeping missions.

Note: The first year of a peacekeeping mission is coded as year 1.

n=166
Graph A.5 Plot of electoral democracy during years of ongoing peacekeeping missions.

Note: The first year of a peacekeeping mission is coded as year 1, longest peacekeeping mission excluded.

n=140
Graph A.6 Plot of electoral democracy (polyarchy) for years after peacekeeping mission withdrawal.

n=87
Graph A.7 Plot of electoral democracy and power distributed by social groups, calculated for the year with ongoing peacekeeping mission.

n=269
Description of the variables used in the analysis:

Electoral democracy index  
*Description borrowed from Coppedge et al, 2016C:44.*

*V-Dem dataset:* v2x_polyarchy  

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell  

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (v2x_accex) and freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing (partial) "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahls sub-components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index is aggregated using this formula:

\[
v2x\_polyarchy = 0.5 \text{MPI} + 0.5 \text{API} = 0.5(v2x\_accex \times v2xel\_frefair \times v2x\_frassoc\_thick \times v2x\_suffr \times v2x\_freexp\_thick) + 0.5(1/8 v2x\_accex + 1/4 v2xel\_frefair + 1/4 v2x\_frassoc\_thick + 1/8 v2x\_suffr + 1/4 v2x\_freexp\_thick)\]

*Scale:* Interval

**Year before the conflict related to the peacekeeping mission**

The year before a conflict related to the peacekeeping mission has been determined by using the UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict dataset. The determination have been made with consideration to the background information published on the UN Peacekeeping website (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping). Each year before a conflict has been coded as 1, the
other years in the dataset as 0.

**Years of peacekeeping mission**

The years of a peacekeeping mission have been coded based on the UNPKO dataset. The first year of a mission has been coded as 1; the following years have been coded continuously. The coding ends at year 2015.

**Years after peacekeeping mission**

The coding of years after a peacekeeping mission has started the year after the UNPKO dataset has declared a mission as finished. The variable covers up to five years after a peacekeeping mission is determined and reaches until year 2015.

**Power distributed by social group**

*Description borrowed from Coppedge et al, 2016C:250.*

V-Dem dataset: v2pepwrsoc

*Project manager: John Gerring*

*Question:* Is political power distributed according to social groups?

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another – but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model

**GDP/PPP**

By using the International Comparison Program database provided by the World Bank information regarding GDP per capita based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) was collected. The value of each country’s currency is converted into international dollars, which has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S dollar has in the United States. The value has been calculated without taking consideration to depreciation of fabricated assets or for degradation of natural resources. The variable includes the years 1990 to 2014.

**Democracy prior to the conflict**

Based on the UCDP/Prio armed conflict dataset, the first year of the conflict prior to each peacekeeping mission has been identified. The level of polyarchy, according the V-Dem dataset from the year before to the outbreak of the conflict relevant to the mission, the last year not included in the UCDP/Prio data, is then used to indicate the states grade of democracy prior to the conflict. The variable does not control for the year prior without conflict, only without a conflict, which is mentioned in the missions mandate.

**Natural resources**

In accordance with the IMF definition and calculations (International Monetary Fund, 2012:47), the countries included in the analysis with natural resource revenues or exports exceeding 20% of the total fiscal revenue and exports based on the average from the years 2006-2010 have been coded as resource rich. Countries with known prospective natural resources where the extraction have not yet started/reached a wider level, are considered as rich in natural resources in this analysis since the mere knowledge of a future potential can be the cause of conflict. Out of total 28 states included in the dataset 11 are coded as rich on natural resources.

**Previous presence of peacekeeping missions**

To determine if a country as has a UN peacekeeping mission deployed in it previous to the latest one, which is examined in the analysis, the UNPKO dataset in is full size have been
used to access information of all peacekeeping missions ever deployed by the UN. The selection has been done with consideration to changes in territories, for example is Kosovo considered to have had previous peacekeeping missions, as it was a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when a peacekeeping mission was deployed there. If multiple missions in one host state has started within the same year this is not coded as previous missions.