THE BORDER IS NOT THE END

The geostrategies of the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament towards the Turkish border

Juan José Fernández Romero

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Abstract

When it comes to Turkey, facts show that sometimes the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament have preferred other forms of cooperation along with accession. These have entailed different approaches towards the border’s management. This thesis aims to study what these different approaches are. In fulfilling this aim, William Walters’ geostrategical framework (2004) lays the theoretical foundations for this research. In his framework, each way of organising the border corresponds to the application of a certain geostrategy. Each geostrategy touches upon the border’s spatiality, its temporality, the type of function that it is supposed to achieve, and the perception that the EU institutions have of the “inside” (i.e., themselves) and the “outside” (i.e., in this case Turkey). The method of directed content analysis is applied over a selection of documents issued by the three analysed institutions to see what their geostrategical preferences are. The coding frame is constructed deductively, deriving from Walters’ framework. The chosen timeframe of analysis is 2004-2015. Results show that all of these institutions privileged Turkey’s candidacy status over any other forms of cooperations. However, other ways of approaching the border’s management are also present. Nonetheless, there are not dramatic variations in their preferences when the results are compared between institutions, nor between periods of time. Walters’ framework is also inductively developed, as the existence of one new geostrategy is found.

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Acknowledgments

This thesis is dedicated to the following:

To Ricky LaBontee, Clemens Schubert and Janita Sahijwani: my “Gothenburg bros”.

To Bosco Govantes: if not for you, these years would have been harder.

Juan José Fernández Romero.
Sevilla, 18 October 2016.

Foreword

“Life can’t be all that bad, I’d think from time to time. Whatever happens, I can always take a long walk along the Bosphorus.” - Orhan Pamuk:2003, p.55.
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Abbreviations

COM - European Commission
EC - European Council
e.g. - for example
EP - European Parliament
et al. - and others
EU - European Union
i.e. - that/it is
no. - number
p. - page
pp. - pages
vol. - volume
1. Introduction

1.1 Research’s Scope

Both the European Union (EU) and Turkey are actors of major importance in the international arena today. Especially since 2004 (when Turkey’s candidacy status for the EU was approved) they have experienced a complicated relationship. It has been marked by a duality between fruitful cooperation in certain areas, and retrogression and loss of interest in others. Depending on the area of cooperation, the EU has organised its external border in a certain way. This has led to multiplicity of scenarios in which the border is more or less present depending on the function that it is supposed to address. For example, Turkey’s current biggest trading partner in the world is the EU, which receives nearly half of total Turkey’s exports. That is because, when it comes to the trading of goods, the border has been dissolved on its spatial sense in the wake of a customs union (COM:2016). However, most of the Turkish producers of those goods are not allowed to enter the EU without the correspondent visa and without crossing a police border control. Another example is the current refugees crisis (COM:2015a), in which the EU has traded an acceleration of Turkey’s accession process in exchange for the signing of an agreement to send back to Turkey most of the asylum seekers coming from its territory (EU Observer:2016). On the one hand, the accession process ultimately means the disappearance of the border in every respect for the greater good that is European integration. On the other hand, the re-admission of unwanted asylum seekers coming from Turkey entails a threatening view of the latter, as it also implies a reinforcement of the EU-Turkey physical borderline.

The examples mentioned above illustrate how the EU organises its external borders in multiple ways. However, there are of course more ways in which this border organisation can be done. These depend on the border’s spatiality, temporality, the type of function that the border is supposed to achieve, and the perception that the EU institutions have of the inside (i.e., themselves) and the outside (i.e., in this case Turkey). Each of these ways of organising the border is a geostrategy. When it comes to Turkey, analysing the EU’s geostrategies towards its border with the former is quite complicated. Most scholars have not fully succeeded in understanding and conceptualising these geostrategies into something that could be extrapolated both between institutions and periods of time. This research fills this gap but only for the study of the European Council’s (EC), the
European Commission’s (COM) and the European Parliament’s (EP) border geostrategical preferences towards Turkey.

The theoretical framework created by William Walters (2004) plays a crucial role in this research. His framework compresses the different ways in which the EU can organise its external borders into four different geostrategies. Each of these entail a different broad organisation of the border. This framework is the best of its kind and suits well this research's aim and objectives (chapter 1.2). This research will apply this framework to some of the EU’s major institutions: the EC, the COM and the EP. The chosen timeframe of the study is 2004-2015 (chapter 4).

The qualitative method of directed content analysis will be applied on a selection of texts coming from these institutions and timeframe. While applying the framework, it will also be developed to see if there is room for new geostrategies to co-exist with the ones originally outlined.

There are many reasons why a study of this kind should be conducted now. Just to mention a few, it is interesting from an academic perspective to see how different EU institutions might present different preferences towards the Turkish border, and how these might also change over time. Furthermore, Turkey’s accession is a very complex phenomenon that started in 2004 and is still ongoing. The former’s accession has not failed so far only because of its incapacity to assume the membership obligations. Facts show that sometimes the EU has also advocated for other forms of cooperation together with accession. These other forms of cooperation also entail different ways of organising the space of the border, and would benefit from being conceptualised into a broader framework of geostrategies.

There are also other reasons why this case is interesting from a political perspective. Firstly, the nature of the EU’s border with Turkey is something that affects the daily lives of millions of people. Secondly, the choice of Turkey is interesting per se due to its uniqueness: it is the longest-standing candidate country in the history of the EU so far; unlike most European countries, it lacks a Christian tradition and its population is mainly Muslim; it is also the only candidate country which is almost completely located in Asia (only 3% of the physical territory of Turkey is in Europe). Finally, its very peculiar geographical position in the world map, bordering Europe in the West and the Middle East in the East. However, the uniqueness of Turkey is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Turkey’s special features are what make it so interesting to study. On the other hand, these same features limit the generalisability of the study to other candidate countries (chapter 8).
1.2 Aim, Objectives and Research Questions

This research’s aim is the following:

• The aim of this research is to study how the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament approach the management of the European Union’s external borders with Turkey.

From the research’s aim, stated just above, the research’s objectives derive. These objectives are the following:

• The objectives of this research are to investigate the geostrategy(ies) that the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament have advocated for in their relationship with Turkey between 2004 and 2015, and how these might differ between institutions and/or over time. In fulfilling these objectives, Walters’ framework (2004) will be applied and developed to a selection of documents issued by those three institutions.

Consequently, in fulfilling the research’s aim and objectives, the following research questions will be answered:

• What geostrategy(ies) do the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament have advocated for in regards to their relationship with Turkey between 2004 and 2015?,
• do they diverge between institutions and/or over time?,
• and if so, how?

1.3 Previous Clarification

At some point, the reader will probably notice the systematic exclusion from the analysis (and thus, from the whole research) of the Cyprus issue. There is not enough evidence to support the application of any type of geostrategy in order to resolve the Cyprus conflict, neither any of the four geostrategies originally outlined by Walters (2004), nor a new one. To recapitulate: a geostrategy corresponds to a way of organising the border. It presupposes many things: different conceptions of

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1 The main research question is the first one, while the second and third are sub-questions.
the inside and the outside of the border, the type of problem that the border has to address, and different accounts of the time and space. Consequently, each geostrategy also implies a certain territorialisation, together with forms of controlling the space and the population within the border (Walters:2004, p.675). What the EU has in North Cyprus is a border conflict: there is uncertainty of what the physical EU’s borderline in the island is (officially, the whole island is part of the EU; but in practice, the Northern part of it remains under Turkish control). Due to this issue, the EU cannot successfully control the space nor the population within the border. Furthermore, the EU can neither frame the border with different territorialisations that would address certain problems nor entail conceptions of the inside/outside. Furthermore, the Cyprus issue is often treated by the EU as a domestic policy issue, as it has not only to do with Turkey but also with one of its Member States. In conclusion, even though the Cyprus issue treats on EU’s borders, it does not so on geostrategies. It is more of a territorial dispute in which the EU is calling Turkey to respect the international law and the sovereignty of Cyprus. However, this call for respect as such cannot be framed as a geostrategy because of the reasons stated above.

2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Overview

The scope of this chapter is three-folded: 1) to lay down the grounds of this research’s theoretical framework, 2) to give an overview of the field of study of the EU-Turkey border, and 3) to frame the identified literature gap within the existing research.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this research is based on William Walter’s geostrategical approach (2004). Walters argues that even though state borders still are the main frontiers within geopolitics, regional blocs are also acquiring frontier characteristics. He aims to explain the function and identity of such frontiers by developing the concept of geostrategy. He then identifies four geostrategies: the networked (non)borders, the march, the colonial frontiers and the limes (ibid., p. 674). His definition of the term geostrategy lays down the theoretical grounds in which the four different geostrategies are developed. Thus, his contribution to academia consists of the creation of a flexible framework of geostrategies that can be applied to multiple cases. What this research will do with his framework is using it both for defining the theoretical grounds for this study, as well as using it as a tool for studying the underlying geostrategical preferences of the three studies EU
institutions towards Turkey. Consequently, the point of departure is his definition of the term geostrategy, which is the following:

“[A] geostrategy corresponds with a particular way of organising the space of the border. It presupposes many things, including particular definitions of the inside and the outside of the polity, the types of threat or problem which the border is to address, and specific accounts of the time and the space of the border. Geostrategies entail certain territorialisations. Each implies a particular form of controlling space and population. But they also presuppose particular definitions as to the identity and political rationality of Europe.” (Walters:2004, p.675)

Therefore, in order to be able to use a geostrategic approach to the study of borders, multiple border-organisations should co-exist, and it should be possible to frame these within the different geostrategies. Thus, the case-study of Turkey perfectly fits in the proposed approach. That is because the EU’s external frontiers to Turkey present a multiplicity of scenarios (e.g., the existent agreements for the free movement of goods, but not for the free movement of people, among others). Conceptualising these scenarios into a broader framework of geostrategies would facilitate the comprehension of the EU’s foreign policy interests towards Turkey. It would explain how the different space and time organisations of the EU-Turkey border are underpinned and legitimated by certain goals, images, or threats. That would be this study’s contribution to the field of study of EU-Turkey borders. Furthermore, if through the analysis a new geostrategy (other than the originally outlined four) is found as a mean of organising the border, the study of the case of Turkey would also enrich the field of geostrategies.

The aim of this research is to study how the three analysed institutions (the EC, the COM and the EP) approach the management of the EU’s external borders with Turkey. The objectives add to this aim the study of how these approaches towards the management of the border might change between institutions and/or over time. In order to fulfil these aim and objectives, it is crucial to ensure that all the different approaches are captured in the analysis. Hence, this framework is well suited because of its overarching applicability over all the possible approaches that might take place towards the EU’s external borders management. Furthermore, it also allows for new geostrategies (other than the four originally outlined) to appear if certain criteria are identified (i.e., the defining characteristics of the concept geostrategy, as explained by Walters [2004, p.675] in its wider meaning). This is what makes the framework’s development possible. The framework’s
development (together with its application) is what ensures that all the different approaches towards the management of the border are captured.

Walters’ original contribution to the field of geostrategy is the successful explanation he gives on how geostrategies shape the borders characteristics in terms of space, functions and purposes. He studies how transformations in the EU external borders are underpinned and legitimated by certain images, geographies and insecurities (ibid., p.677). First and foremost, his understanding of the concept of geostrategy is intimately related to that of border (as seen above). There is no other well known framework of geostrategies with similar characteristics. Therefore a comparison cannot be established. However, as discussed through this chapter, this framework addresses problems (e.g., to ensure that all the approaches are captured) that would be hardly addressed otherwise (this will be further developed in chapter 2.2.3).

It is important to pinpoint, that there are different cases that are worth studying and suitable for this research (e.g., other European countries with prospects of EU accession, like Serbia). However, Turkey’s special academic and political relevance (chapter 1.1) is what make it unique and an outstanding case to be studied.

Having said all of that, it is important to see how the application and development of this framework is positioned in the existing research on the matter.

2.2 Previous Research

There is a clear-cut gap in the existing literature that this research aims to fill: the study of the EC’s, COM’s and EP’s border geostrategical preferences towards Turkey. More concretely, the application and development of William Walters’ framework to the case of Turkey.

Some scholars have also conducted similar studies on EU-Turkey borders and geostrategies. However, these two fields of study have never been successfully connected. Furthermore, the particular border-preferences of the analysed institutions towards Turkey have never been studied explicitly. In order to frame the contribution of this research to the existing literature, some lines of analysis will be examined. These are: 1) other similar studies, 2) the study of EU borders, and 3) the study of geopolitics and geostrategy.
2.2.1 Other Applications of William Walters’ Framework

Another advantage of using this framework is that its quality has already been acknowledged by the academic community. This framework has already been applied to other cases. The most sounded application of the chosen framework up to that is the one made by Browning and Joenniemi (2008). They study the geostrategies of the EU towards its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Thus, they conceptualise the different geostrategies that the EU applies to some of its borders external borders. Then, they proceed to study each of the ENP branches (Northern, Eastern, and Southern) separately. What they found is that the EU is applying a geostrategy of colonial frontiers (chapter 2.3.3) to its neighbours in the East, as those countries’ aspirations of becoming candidate countries for accession are increasing while the EU also reflects on its interest for further expansion. In the North prevails the geostrategy of the networked (non)border (chapter 2.3.1), and in the South that of the limes (chapter 2.3.4).

With their publication (ibid.), a new sub-field of research within the study of EU borders was initiated: the application and development of Walters’ framework to other cases of EU external borders. In this context, this research is the first application ever made to the case of the EU’s external borders with Turkey. However, in order to better see what their contribution to the academia is, one needs to examine what has been said in the field of study of EU borders.

2.2.2 The Study of EU Borders

This research can also be framed within the field of study of EU borders. Originally, the chosen framework lacks a concrete definition of what is a border, possibly because it is not strictly necessary. As each geostrategy implies different perceptions of the inside as well as the outside, different understandings of what the border is or should be are contained within. On the other hand, there seems to be an agreement in academia about what the main definitional characteristics of a border are. Nowadays, borders are understood as political institutions which establish where a jurisdiction ends and another one begins. From a legal point of view, borders also define the identity, nationality and rights of the individuals living within it. They are established by international agreements, and usually globally recognised (Anderson:1998). Borders can also be defined by looking at their geographical position, the State within them, their inherent culture, their economic organisation, or even at the security community that they delimit (Anderson&Bort:2001).

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2 It is important to remember that this article was published in 2008.
From a geostrategical point of view, “border[s] should be regarded not merely as a line, a physical location, or even as a symbol, but in terms of a larger heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and nondiscursive practices” (Walters:2002, p.572).

More concretely, in the field of EU-borders, there are two lines of analysis that are benefitted from this research: 1) the study of how the disappearance of borders within the EU has been accompanied by a strengthening of the EU’s external borders, and 2) the studies that give the whole of Turkey border characteristics, framing it as a buffer zone between the EU and the Middle East.

Firstly, within the EU the disappearance of internal borders in the wake of the Single Market has been accompanied to a great extent by the reinforcement of its external frontiers with third countries. This has happened due to the Member States’ fears regarding the security threats coming from outside the EU. These threats are not other states in particular, but rather modern phenomenons that pose a security threat to the EU’s member states’ welfare (like illegal immigration, asylum-seekers, terrorism, human trafficking, etc.) (Anderson:1998, Walters:2002). In fact, since the mid-1980s the removal of physical and psychological frontiers within the Schengen area has been accompanied by a trial of harmonising visa and asylum policies for those countries that are not part of Schengen (Vedsten-Hamsen:2005, Miles&Thränhardt:1995, pp.2-5). This reinforcement of the UE’s external frontiers has been done mainly (but not exclusively) by increasing police and security co-operation among states (Anderson:1998), even though the extent to which this has done largely depends on the neighbouring countries. For the EU, the importance of its external frontiers relies precisely on the profound way in which they affect its institutions, the security of the member states, and even the nature of the European identity as such. The management of the EU’s external frontiers shows the degree of integration achieved by the EU (Anderson&Bort:2001, p.113).

Secondly, some people’s view of Turkey as an isolator between the conflictive Middle East and peaceful Europe runs counter to Turkey’s self-perception as being a bridge between civilisations. Therefore, they give the whole of Turkey border characteristics. That is, they consider that Turkey is a buffer state (or a border) between the EU and the Middle East, preventing from conflicts in the latter to spill over the former. That is, separating EU’s security dynamics from the conflictive Middle East (Buzan&Diez:1999). However, other scholars think that Turkey does not act any longer as a buffer state because the EU already borders the Middle East through Cyprus (by sea, not by land), and also because the spatial function of land borders is vanishing due to technology and
more modern means of trade. That is, many security issues are transnational in nature and they would threat the EU independently of Turkey. Therefore, Turkey should be understood as part of the EU’s security sphere and be treated as such as soon as possible. That is because if accession negotiations are delayed even more, there are increased chances that both actors will perceive each other as security threats (Desai:2005, Diez:2005, Oğuzlu:2002).

The contribution of this study to these two lines of research is the conceptualisation of these behaviours into a broader framework of geostrategies. This conceptualisation would help explaining how the different organisations of the EU-Turkey border are underpinned and legitimated by certain goals, images, or threats. For example, the strengthening or weakening of the EU-Turkey border, depending on the area of cooperation, is something that is best explained through geostrategies (chapter 2.1). A concrete example is the framing of Turkey as a buffer zone between the EU and the Middle East. This could be explained through the geostrategy of the march (chapter 2.4.2).

However, before these geostrategies are defined, it is necessary to know what the foundation of the concept geostrategy is. In order to know them, it is crucial to examine what the state of art in this field is, and what this thesis’ contribution to it would be.

### 2.2.3 The Study of Geopolitics and Geostrategy

The used framework also touches upon the field of geostrategy. This section will examine the existing literature both in the fields of geopolitics and geostrategy. Due to their similar nature, these will be treated together. They often arrive to conclusions that are both similar and complementary to each other.

The definition that academia gives for the terms geopolitics and geostrategy is far from clear-cut. They are often used indistinctly (even though geostrategy should be studied as a subfield of geopolitics). As this research is developing an already existing geostrategical framework on the case of EU-Turkey frontiers, all the literature that discusses this topic is of relevance.

Academia lacks a distinct definition of the term geopolitics. Therefore, each scholar chooses to subscribe to a different school of thought that applies the term in a certain way. Today, geopolitics are understood as the method for studying the application of geographical considerations (both of nature and human kind) to the projection of the States’ foreign policy in the international arena (Devetak et al.:2012, p.492), that is, taking into consideration the physical reality of a State and its
surroundings (Grygiel:2006, p. 21) and emphasising the impact of geography on international politics (Brzezinski:1986, p. xiv). In a similar vein, geopolitics are also understood as a method of geographical analysis of certain socio-political scenarios (Foucher:2000, p.163).

Whereas there are several approaches to the term geopolitics, there seems to be consensus about its main definitional characteristics. On other hand the term geostrategy does not enjoy such consensus. Two of the most widely known definitions of the term will be used as a point of departure for discussing it:

The first definition is the one given by Brzezinski (1986, p. xiv), who defines the concept of geostrategy as a combination of strategic considerations (i.e. the comprehensive and planned application of measures to achieve military goals) and geopolitical considerations (i.e., the combination of geographic and political factors). The second definition is the one given by Grygiel (2006, pp. ix-x), who defines the concept of geostrategy as the geographical direction of a state’s foreign policy. That is, the geographical direction where a state projects its military power and diplomatic activity.

The reason why these two definitions are given is to exemplify how they fail giving the concept a flexibility that would enable it to be applied on multiple scenarios. That is, these definitions are so fixed that they cannot explain the changing nature of borders. Probably, that is because they were created for purposes other than this thesis’ aim. However, conceptualising the changing nature of EU external borders into a broader framework of geostrategies would require a definition that is flexible enough to contain the possibility of multiple scenarios coexisting together. In this regard, Walters’ definition of the concept embraces all the geographical, political and foreign policy characteristics given to the term by all the scholars outlined before, as well as giving it a new dimension. This new dimension is crucial for fulfilling the research’s aim and answering the questions.

For the reasons outlined above, this thesis’ understanding of the term geostrategy goes beyond the discussed definitions. However, at the same time it is complemented by them and even constructed upon them. As a reminder, this research’s definition of the concept geostrategy is the one presented above (chapter 2.1).
All these definitions of the term geostrategy take into account geographical considerations. In this thesis, these are conceptualised around the figure of the border: including its definition of the polity, the threat that the border addresses, as well as time and space considerations. All of these considerations might change from case to case, resulting in different types of borders. Walters compresses these into four different geostrategies.

2.3 Four Geostrategies

Walters’ article develops four geostrategies that conceptualise the facets of the EU’s shifting borders. He calls these the: 1) the networked (non)border, 2) the march, 3) the colonial frontier, and 4) the limes.

Concerning the four geostrategies, he also points out that even though they are multiple and competing with each other (ibid. p.675), more than one of them can be found at the same time (i.e., that more than one can co-exist) (ibid. p.679). Consequently, a geostrategy does not intend to give a total description of the state of the border but rather to identify the political and logical reasoning of it (ibid. p.679). The four geostrategies that conceptualise the facets of the EU’s shifting borders are the following.

2.3.1 The Networked (Non)Border

This geostrategy promotes the elimination of the physical borders with fixed geographical positions between the countries that participate in the Schengen Agreement and substituting them for new forms of regulation. This geostrategy of borderless countries is driven by the neoliberal imperative of removing the obstacles for the free movement of people, goods and services (ibid. 679). Walters defines these new forms of border regulation as:

*The most notable of these are the enhancement of cross-border police cooperation, mobile surveillance teams operating within an extended border strip on either side of the old frontier, a commitment to information exchange, common visas and the gradual harmonisation of migration and asylum policy, and the recognition of common standard in the management of the EU’s external frontiers. [...] [The networked (non)border] is meant to convey the sense in which networks of control come to substitute for the functions that were previously physically concentrated at the border.* (ibid., p.280).
Consequently, this geostrategy implies the disappearance of the spatial connotation of the border, that acquires a transnational dimension. The policing functions that were attributed to the previous fixed border, are now substituted for a transnational and transversal cooperation between the police and the military of the neighbouring countries. Therefore, the old spatial border is substituted for a new one strategic node of police cooperation that is situated within a transnational network of control (ibid., p.680-683). This model, though it is still far from being perfect, is the one that is for example being implemented in the EU borders with Norway.

A graphical representation of this geostrategy is the following:

In the graph above, the dashed line in the middle represents the border between the EU and the outside. The black dots are the different nodes of cooperation on different areas, on both sides of the border. This happens because, as said before, the border has lost its spatiality.

2.3.2 The March

One cannot treat the deterritorialisation of borders without touching upon their new territorialisation in geographical and identity terms. The march refers to a kind of border that is fluid and fragmented, subject to change over time, and acts as a buffer zone between powers. It has a very long historical association with the central and eastern European countries. For example, before their adhesion to the EU, the former were perceived as a safety belt that isolated the EU from the criminal networks and clandestine migrants coming from the crumbling Soviet empire (Walters: 2004, p.683-4). Walters points out:
These measures [those that this geostrategy imply] include the ‘safe third country’ agreement and readmission treaties which seek to smooth the deflection or expulsion of rejected asylum-seekers and unwanted migrants from many EU states. But also the various programmes and policies which, either in exchange for aid, or as a condition forfeiture membership, ‘encourage’ bordering countries to close down known routes of clandestine entry, to improve their detection and surveillance procedures. A particular phenomenon is of bordering countries strengthening their eastern borders (ibid., p.684).

Walters also points out that the march does not necessarily take the form of a belt of territory. He identified two other tendencies: one tendency is the territorialisation of a more global but also more dispersed march (e.g., airport controls); the other tendency is the EU migration and border policies (e.g., the use of consulates and visa policies to prevent illegal immigrants to show up in the border). These measures have a certain resonance with the previous geostrategy, the networked (non)border. Even though they have divergencies that are mainly related to the perception that these two geostrategies have of the outside, they are compatible and can co-exist with each other. That is, they are not mutually excluding (ibid., p.685-6).

A graphical representation of this geostrategy is the following:

Figure 2

In the graph above, the vertical lines represent the EU’s border with the neighbour country, and the former’s border with another country or territory. The country or territory situated in the outside is the one perceived as a threat by the EU. The buffer zone, situated in between both vertical lines, filled with diagonal lines, is the EU’s neighbours country that acts as a march.
2.3.3 The Colonial Frontier

There are other aspects of the EU’s frontiers that cannot be explained by any of the geostrategies discussed before. That is, when looking at the enlargement policy that the EU has been pursuing since its creation 1950, and the asymmetries of the multi-speed integration project that the EU indeed is, the EU might look like an empire in the traditional meaning of the word. That is, also having a distinction between the centre and the periphery. This is particularly the case of the EU as it enlarges eastwards (ibid., p.686).

Walters defines the colonial frontier as a type of dynamic non-fixed border that seeks expansion. Therefore, the border functions as a temporary need that can be removed and thus disposed of when an equilibrium between the inside and the outside is achieved. That is precisely the case with EU enlargement: the EU differs from the traditional definition of empire because it is not an expanding state but rather a union of many states. The reason why the EU pursues further enlargement is also not because of expansion as such, but rather to make Europe a safer and more prosperous place, in particular through its promotion of democracy and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the single market. […] These benefits have been shared among an increasing number of people as the EU has grown in size (COM:2013b, p.1).

In the case of Turkey, the EU would be applying a colonial frontier geostrategy as it seeks to give prospects of full membership to the former.

A graphical representation of this geostrategy is the following:

![Figure 3](source: Browning&Joenniemi:2008, p.528.)

In the graph above, the vertical dashed line represents the non-fixed border, and the arrows point to the direction in which the EU’s border is expanding.
2.3.4 The Limes

If the frontier between two powers is a finite and thin line demarcating and separating the territories, that is a limes. It distinguishes from the march because the frontier is more like an edge, fringe or limit, and not a space. A lime is situated between a power and its outside. It is also different from the colonial frontier because while the former geostrategy implies a certain mobility and temporality, the limess are nevertheless more permanent and consistent over time. The strategy behind the limes is to create a zone of stability and peace around the empire by separating and regulating relations between unequal powers. The source stability that the limes imply resides precisely in their not-expansionist nature. That is, limes do not seek to expand and annex the outside, but rather to isolate it. To sum up, limes draw a line between the inside and the outside (Walters:2004, p.690-1).

The limes geostrategy is for example clearly applied by the EU to its border with Morocco. That is, the fence that has been built with EU funds between the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla and Morocco. The function of this fence is to prevent the fluxes of illegal immigrants from Africa to enter the EU (ibid., p.691-2).

Another example is the extensive fence that Bulgaria has built along its border with Turkey, whose surveillance in late 2015 was reinforced with 1000 soldiers. The reason this fence exists is to prevent illegal immigrants coming from Turkey to enter the EU from Bulgaria (Zhelev:2015).

A graphical representation of this geostrategy is the following:

![Figure 4](Source: Browning&Joenniemi:2008, p.528.)
In the graph above, the vertical line represents the border, the black arrows are the people from inside the border, and the white arrows represent the unwanted movements of people that the border is trying to prevent.

3. Methodology

Before the foundations of the method and the coding procedures are laid down, it is worth stating that this research is a multiple case study. Multiple because it studies a few EU institutions and then compares them with each other. The frontiers of the case study are the three studied institutions (i.e., the EC, the COM and the EP) and the chosen timeframe (2004-2015).

3.1 Directed Content Analysis

Directed content analysis is a method within the branch of qualitative textual analysis. This is the selected method for this research. This method enables the researcher either to test a theory or to extend it.

It is to be used over the selection of texts (chapter 4). Explained in a hands-on manner, the first proposed step is the construction of the coding frame. It will consist on a compendium of main codes (in this research, these will be the four main geostrategies), and subcodes (these will be the instances in which those four geostrategies occur). The second step would be to carefully read all the texts and highlight instances in which any of those geostrategies happen, and then assign them to a certain code(s) (more than one geostrategy can co-exist at the same time) and a subcode. In case an instance that grasps any of the foundational characteristics of what a geostrategy is (i.e., certain accounts of the organisation of the border, as explained in chapter 2.2.3) is found, it must be checked whether it fits the four existing codes or not. If it does not, it will then constitute a new one (that would be the framework’s development) (Hsieh and Shannon:2005).

Regarding the coding procedure as such (i.e., the analysis), scholars propose two different strategies depending on the research questions: 1) if the goal is to identify all the possible instances in which the different geostrategies happen, then the researcher would first highlight some passages from the analysed selection of texts that would subsequently be categorised using the predetermined codes and subcodes. Any data that does not fit the existing codes will create a new one. 2) The other strategy should be used if the researcher is confident that the initial coding would not bias the texts analysis. In that case the data can be coded straight into the predetermined codes. If there is data
that does not fit any of the already existing codes (i.e., any of the main for geostrategies), it can then constitute a new code (i.e., a new geostrategy) or subcode (a new instance in which any of the originally outlined four geostrategies happen). The framework would be used to guide the findings of the research (ibid).

In this research, the initial coding would not bias the identification of geostrategies in the texts, as the main codes are the geostrategies that are to be identified in the analysed texts. That is supported in the solid theoretical grounds on which the coding frame is built upon. Therefore, out of the two proposed coding geostrategies, the second is the most suitable one.

For all those reasons, directed content analysis is selected as this research’s method. This framework has been used for narrowing the research questions (chapter 1.2) and determining the initial coding frame (chapter 3.2). Applied to the selection of texts, it will enable the researcher to see which is/are the geostrategy(ies) that the three analysed institutions advocate in their relationship with Turkey. Also, it will bring results that will admit a comparison both between institutions and over time, in order to reveal possible variations. Finally, this method also admits the framework’s application and development.

In conclusion, the results of applying the method should be a selection of passages extracted from the analysed text. Each of them will have assigned one or more codes, and one subcode per main code. By looking at the main categories, the researcher would be able to see which geostrategy(ies) have advocated for, by which institutions, and when. The use of the subcodes would clarify under which particular circumstances each geostrategy appeared. Thus, they will enrich the quality of the results.

3.2 Coding Frame

The coding frame is the heart of analysis. It is the tool that allows for a systematic separation of the wheat from the chaff, or said differently, between what is valuable in the analysed texts and what is not. The coding frame can be considered as a filter because everything that is not included in the main codes, will not be visible nor relevant for further analysis (Bauer&Garkell:2000, pp.132-3).

The coding frame is constituted by main codes (i.e., the four geostrategies), from which the consequent subcodes derive (the instances in which those geostrategies happen). These subcodes, together with the four main codes, represent the framework’s application, while the possibility of
finding a new geostrategy in the data is its further development. All of these also means that some main codes of analysis (the geostrategies) will have more subcodes than others. This is because some geostrategies present a wider range of scenarios in which they can be applied. However, this does not necessarily mean that some geostrategies are more likely to appear than others. Furthermore, as perfect reliability is expected in any type of content analysis, there is room for some codes to be slightly more ambiguous than others (Bauer&Garkell:2000,p.144).

The initial coding frame is the following:

*Table 1*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Networked (Non)Border</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>The Colonial Frontier</th>
<th>Limes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Measures for the free movement of goods and capital.</td>
<td>• Safe third country agreements for the expulsion of rejected asylum-seekers and unwanted migrants.</td>
<td>• Adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.</td>
<td>• The constructions of walls in the borderlines with non-EU countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Measures for the free movement of services.</td>
<td>• Closure of migration routes.</td>
<td>• Implementation of the Acquis Communautaire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Measures for the free movement of people.</td>
<td>• Measures for EU bordering countries strengthening their external borders.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The removal of border controls from fixed positions.</td>
<td>• Improvement of relations with non-EU neighbouring countries.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State agencies cooperating for an effective frontier control.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Harmonisation of migration and asylum policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The recognition of common border standards in the EU’s external frontier.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of these subcodes are intended to be self-defined and broad in their meaning. This is the reason why they have not been defined one by one.

As said above, it is possible that a new main code(s) will emerge from the data. That is, the rise of a new geostrategy other than the originally outlined four. That will result in a modification of the coding frame from that moment on, as it will be stated in the analysis process if it happens. This extension of the coding frame would be the framework’s development.

When it comes to the application of the coding frame to the selection of texts, there is a high degree of personal interpretation involved (the extent to which it can be regarded as a weakness is discussed in greater detail in the following section). All the instances in which personal judgement is involved, are stated and developed throughout the whole analysis (chapter 6). The first decision to make is whether a piece of text is to be coded within any geostrategy or not. The grounds in which the coding procedures will take place were explained above (chapter 3.1). The second decision to make is whether the selected piece of text is to be coded within any of the existing geostrategies, or if it would create a new one. A piece of text would fit within any of the four originally outlined geostrategies if they share similar accounts of space and time in the border; and therefore if it fits with any of its subcodes (i.e., the different instances in which the geostrategies occur). If a piece of text includes accounts of space and time in the border that were not seen before, then a new geostrategy will be defined and developed. The third and last decision to make, is the conceptualisation of the chosen pieces of text around their correspondent geostrategy (i.e., how the selected passage fits the code(s) and subcode(s). For this, what the state of EU-Turkey relations was when that report was published will be taken into consideration, along with any relevant information that might be included in the report itself.

3.3 Method’s Limitations

In qualitative research, reliability refers to the degree of consistency of the results. That is, if another researcher repeats this research, she/he should come up with the same results. Four strategies have been followed through the whole writing process in order to increase it: 1) the whole researching process is transparent, as it has been stated through all the pages; 2) all the theoretical stances that serve as the departing point of this research have been clearly stated and explained, and 3) making sure that all the selected documents for analysis are easily accessible on-line.
The biggest weakness in terms of reliability that this research’s design has, is the geostrategical framework’s development. It is very likely that researchers replicating this research will stop on the same instances the author of this thesis did (as discussed in the analysis, chapter 6). However, the extent to which they decide to create a new geostrategy out of them, or decide to merge them with another existing geostrategy, is very much subject to personal judgement. Obviously, this decision influences the answer of the research questions. Therefore, the measures taken in this regard to ensure the maximum possible replicability has been to explain the theoretical and methodological grounds on which the framework’s development was made, also explaining why these instances were not merged with other existing geostrategies. However, in contrast to this weakness, the author argues that on the other side of the coin resides one of this thesis’ strengths: its replicability. Due to its foundational characteristics (e.g., the construction of the coding framework out of an already existing framework, the easily accessible sampling, etc.), it is easy for other scholars to replicate this research and test its results.

When it comes to the choice of method in particular, it is crucial to remember that each of them face their own limitations. Directed content analysis is often accused by some scholars of being biased. That is because as the data is to some extent subject to personal interpretation, it is more likely that the researcher will find data supporting their theory than the other way around (ibid., pp. 1281-1283). However, this research acknowledges the fact that there is not only one true reading of the data. Therefore, the conclusions drawn should be understood within the context in which they were obtained: these are the answers to a specific set of research questions, that derived from previous objectives and an aim. Moreover, the personal interpretation that the method brings with it is a constitutive part of the analysis process. This is especially true in qualitative methods. Thus, the exclusion of the researcher’s interpretation from the analysis would lead to poorly presented results. Following an advice on qualitative content analysis given by Kracauer (1952-53), throughout the whole research process personal interpretation was used as an indispensable tool, rather than taking it as an obstacle.

It is argued that that same bias also brings with it the difficulty of looking for alternative explanations for the results (ibid.). This adds to the limited generalisability of this study due to Turkey’s uniqueness (chapter 1.1) However, their effect on the research’s generalisability can be minimised. If the results show consistency over periods of time and institutions (without
unexplained dramatic variations), it can be expected that they were not obtained by coincidence. That is because reliability can be addressed when the same phenomenon is studied over time, and the results are constant along the time axis (i.e., there is constancy over time) (Andersson:1974, pp. 23-4). Either way, there is no qualitative content analysis that expects perfect reliability, as human judgement is involved (Bauer&Garkell:2000,p.144).

To conclude, it is worth mentioning that in content analysis, the validity of the results must not be addressed against a true reading of the original texts but rather in light of the research’s aim and questions. That is, validity should be addressed in terms of its grounding in the texts and its congruence with the theoretical framework (ibid., p.135).

### 3.4 Alternative Methods

Textual analysis has many variants that, for different reasons, have been dismissed from this research. One of them is conventional content analysis. This is an appropriate variant of the method when the literature on the matter is very limited or even inexistent (ibid., pp.1279-1281), which is not the case as this research takes as its point of departure an already existing framework and all the theoretical stances on which it is built (i.e., geostrategies and EU-borders literature). Another dismissed variant of textual analysis is summative content analysis. It proposes a research that would start off by identifying and quantifying some key words/concepts in the texts (ibid., pp. 1283-125). This variant of the method does not suit this research because all the reports that will be taken into consideration for the analysis have been carefully written by EU institutions expert policy makers on the matter. Therefore, their language is concise and avoids repetitions of concepts. Thus, quantifying the number of times that a certain idea/word appears is senseless.

There are other methods outside the textual analysis branch that have also been excluded. Among those are all the methods related to process-tracing, due to the absence of a cause-effect link that evolves over time (i.e., the process). Also all the variants of discourse analysis have been excluded, because this research does not aim to see how the geostrategical representation of Turkey has been constructed by the EU institutions (i.e., the type of language, assumptions and images related to Turkey), but rather just to see which geostrategies are in there, and if there are changes over time and between institutions, and if yes, what kind.
4. Sampling Strategies

The sampling procedures have followed different rules depending on the institution that was being examined, but always taking into consideration the issues of the representativeness and size of the sample.

The sampling conducted is purposive, as opposed to random, because the selection of texts has been made according to their suitability in answering the research questions. To a minor extent, the sampling is also theoretical because it is expected to have the necessary characteristics for developing Walters’ theoretical framework.

The chosen timeframe (2004-2015) could be regarded as a sampling decision. 2004 is the departing year because this is the year in which the EU leaders and institutions agreed to start accession negotiations with Turkey (which finally started in October 2005). Therefore, it is a good point of departure because 2004 is the year in which Turkey’s accession process started to materialise. Regarding 2015 as the ending point, this choice is motivated mainly by the need for having a clear-cut timeframe. Relevant EC and EP conclusions have been issued during 2016. However, the COM’s enlargement report from 2016 has not been issued yet. The hypothetical inclusion of the EC and EP reports from 2016 might have distorted the results. That is because of the multiple events that occurred in the field of EU-Turkey relations throughout that year, together with the impossibility of comparing the analysis results with the COM’s ones. Furthermore, 2016 is still an ongoing year. Therefore, only a glimpse of it can be captured so far.

When it comes to the accessibility of the material, all the documents are available on-line on each institution’s website. In some cases, navigation through the websites might be confusing. However, there is always the possibility of writing an e-mail to the institution asking for specific documents.

4.1 European Council’s Sampling

The EC is not a legislating institution within the EU (i.e., it does not adopt or negotiate EU law). Instead, its role is to define the EU’s overall political agenda. It does so by adopting conclusions during the EC meetings. In the case of Turkey, these conclusions identify areas of concern and set future actions to be taken. The EC’s conclusions can also set the deadline for reaching an agreement
on a certain issue with Turkey. These conclusions are also issued in order to let the citizens know about the topics discussed.

The documents that will be used in the analysis are all the EC conclusions issued between 2004 to 2015 that are relevant for answering the research questions. In total there are seven documents. These documents are:

- 2006: 10633/1/06-REV1-CONCL2.

This selection of documents presents a few concerns to be addressed: 1) there are many years within the analysed timeframe (2004-2015) where no document was issued. The only way of dealing with this concern is by assuming that, during the years which have not been covered, the EC’s geostrategical preference towards Turkey did not change. 2) As there is not a systematic way of looking for those documents, and all the EC conclusions published between 2004 and 2015 have to be checked one by one, there is a risk that at least one of them is missing. In order not to miss any relevant document, the sampling has been conducted twice, leaving four weeks between each procedure. Both times the result was the same.

Due to their similar functions and names, and in order not to confuse them, it is worth mentioning the differences between the Council of the EU and the EC. On the one side, the Council of the EU (usually just known as Council) is the institution where the member states' governments are represented (by the gathering of the corresponding ministers). It negotiates and adopts EU law. All the decisions or regulations issued by the Council of the EU have been left out of the analysis for not being the institution under examination. Furthermore, these decisions and regulations are adopted as a follow-up of the political direction set by the EC. On the other side, the EC is the institution that defines the EU’s overall political direction and priorities. It consists of the gathering of EU Heads of States together with its President and the President of the COM.

It should be clarified that the selection of EC conclusions previously mentioned has a few peculiarities. Between the years 2004 and 2009 all the selected documents were issued as
Presidency Conclusions, while the documents after that date are issued just as EC Conclusions. Those documents are indeed the same. The conclusions of the presidency are the draft documents for the EC Conclusions as it is not possible to draft such a long document during the meeting. It is the duty of the Presidency to share before the meeting a draft document on which only few changes will be made to reflect the discussions. So their different categorisation only relates to a change in the way those documents were named. Furthermore, some EC conclusions include in their title the reference REV. This means that the EC noticed something which was wrong or missing in the first document and is corrected in the REV version (REV stands for revised). This is why some documents were issued much later after the EC's meeting took place (taking also in account the translation in all official languages of that year).

Another important document that has been left out of the analysis is the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation (2014). The reason is that this agreement is about a very technical aspect of EU-Turkey relations, and does not express the point of view of the EC nor any of the other analysed institutions in particular.

### 4.2 European Commission’s Sampling

The COM is the executive body of the EU, and it represents the latter’s interests as a whole (and not of each Member State in particular). Together with the Council of the European Union (not to be confused with the EC) and the EP, it exercises the legislative function of the EU. The COM is the institution in charge of the enlargement policy. Therefore, it is also the institution in charge of monitoring Turkey’s accession process and conducting the accession negotiations.

When running COM’s sampling, the goal was to include all the Turkish Progress Reports issued from 2004 to 2015. These accession reports are usually issued at the end of each year. They contain the COM’s assessment of what Turkey has already achieved towards a future accession during the last year, as well as setting out a guideline of reforms and priorities. They also draw conclusions on the matter. Taking into account all the documents issued by the COM during each year regarding Turkey’s accession, these Progress Reports are the best possible choice. Their analysis presents a series of advantages: 1) regarding their representativeness over the total, each of the reports

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3 Sometimes, these reports are issued under different yet similar names. Independently of their titling, they are all the same type of document.
contains the COM’s last word towards Turkey’s relations on each year, therefore including also all the relevant information given in other documents that were issued during the same year. 2) These reports include the COM’s position towards Turkey in every respect, including those that might be of geostrategical relevance. 3) Finally, regarding the size of the sample, there are just 12 documents in total from which only relevant pieces of text within them are going to be coded. Therefore, it is a manageable size. Furthermore, the ability to include all the reports increases the representativeness of the sample.

Among all the documents issued by the COM that have not been included in the analysis, it is important to highlight the non-inclusion of the Enlargement Strategy Papers. These documents set the way forward and take stock of the progress made by Turkey as well as the other candidate or potential candidate countries, but do not go into as much detail as the accession reports. They are not issued for each country separately. They set the long term agenda of the EU policy towards enlargement. Other documents that have also been left out of the analysis are the COM’s communications to the Council of the EU and the EP on Turkey’s progress, the negotiation framework from 2005, and other sources of secondary information like press releases. The main reason why all of those have not been included in the research is because of their little relevance in comparison with the Progress Reports.

4.3 European Parliament’s Sampling

The EP is the only EU institution whose members are directly elected by all the Member States citizens. Together with the Council of the European Union and the COM, it exercises the legislative function of the EU. In relation with Turkey, if the former’s accession to the EU or a visa waiver were to happen, the EP’s consent would be necessary.

The documents to analyse are all the EP’S Progress Reports on Turkey issued between 2004 and 2015. These resolutions are the EP’s reassessment of the COM’s Progress Reports issued in the preceding year. It is a reassessment of the way in which negotiations have been conducted so far, raising the EP’s concerns, especially in regards of democracy and Human Rights. On these

4 Sometimes, these reports are issued under different yet similar names. Independently of their titling, they are all the same type of document.

5 With the exceptions of 2004, year in which the two EP’s resolution where published: one for the COM’s Progress Report of 2013 and another for the COM’s Progress Report of 2004. Only the second one is taken into consideration for the analysis.
resolutions the EP also calls on Turkey to place the reform process at the centre of its domestic policy choices and to commit itself to respecting democratic values and principles, which the EP considers to be at the heart of the EU. The analysis of these resolutions over other documents issued by the EP on the matter is motivated by the following: 1) regarding their representativeness over the total, these resolutions contain the EP’s last word on the matter for each year, therefore also including all the relevant information given in other documents that were issued during the same year, and 2) the size of the sample is just 11 documents in total from which only relevant pieces of text within them are going to be coded. Therefore, it is a manageable size.

Some relevant documents coming from the EP that have not been included are the many press releases on Turkey, as the most relevant part of their content is already included in the analysed resolutions. Other documents not taken into consideration for the analysis are those issued by the EP’s Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, for not having done almost any relevant publication after 2004 and for its very little weight in the final outcome.

The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 introduced many changes in the way the EP works, equalising it as a legislative power with the Council of the EU, and giving it the right to approve or reject international agreements, just to mention the major changes. However, as these resolutions do not have legislative effects, it is not thought that the Treaty of Lisbon brought any change in the way they were written or issued, although it can be expected that in light of the agreements signed with Turkey the COM took them more into consideration. However, it is not in the aim of this research nor useful for answering the research questions to analyse the changes brought by the ToL.

4.4 Sampling’s Size

It is hard to measure with precision the total volume of the relevant data. Furthermore, there are great variations from one institution to another. That is because one thing is the total amount of pages that all the documents have, and another thing is how much information in these pages was relevant for answering the research questions. There is no precise way to measure that. In many documents issued by the EC, there are only one or two instances where Turkey is mentioned. However, it is still important to know in which context these documents were issued, and how Turkey’s instances are framed within them. The COM’s reports are the largest documents by far. However, they all share very similar structures and present a lot of repetitions from one report to the
next. Both times arriving to the same result. The EP is the only institution in which almost all the pages were relevant for answering the research questions. Therefore, they all had to be taken into consideration and carefully read.

All the relevant documents coming from all the institutions sum up to the following number of pages:

- EC: 148 pages.
- COM: 1258 pages.

5. Software: NVivo

Due to the large amount of text to be analysed, this research resorted to the use of software in order to make things easier. The selected software is NVivo 11.3.2 for MAC. The NVivo software is designed for qualitative and mixed methods of research. It is designed to help the researcher organise, analyse and find insights in qualitative data like institutional documents. Its main goal is to serve as a place where all the material can be easily organised, in order to make the navigation through the data less time consuming, less challenging, and easier to navigate (QSR International: 2016). Its interface is indeed very similar to what a run-by-hand analysis would look like (as explained in chapter 3.1), but with all the advantages that working with a computer affords.

In order to provide a graphical representation of how the software works, a selection of screenshots of its interface is provided in the appendix 1.

6. Analysis and Results

This chapter will present the main phase of analysis of the research. The coding frame will be applied to the selected selection of texts coming from the EC, the COM, and the EP. As the analysis is conducted, the results will be discussed and presented in a qualitative style. There are two ways of presenting the results: by codes or by cases. As the research question emphasises the study of the three mentioned institutions in order to see what their underlying geostrategical preferences are, the results will then be presented by cases (i.e., institutions). In order to make things easier for the reader, as well as facilitating the subsequent comparison between cases, the analysis’ results will be split into three different timeframes of four years each.
Due to the nature of the research question, the analysis’ results will not highlight the numerical frequency in which each code or subcode of the coding frame is repeated, but rather which of those codes and subcodes are in the texts and how they are framed. In conclusion, the analysis will see which are the main geostrategical preferences of each institution for each period of time, and within each geostrategy, which one is the institution’s frame of it.

It is important to notice that before the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the EU’s institutional structure was different, and that it was still named as European Communities. All the documents issued before that date refer to the European Communities. However, in order to make the reading process easier, all the references are made using the EU’s name.

The structure to be followed during the analysis is the following: the results will first be presented within each timeframe. Within each timeframe, the first institution discussed will be the EC, followed by the COM, and finally the EP. At the end of each timeframe, there will be a table representation on the geostrategies that were found through the analysis for each institution.

In addition to that, a political map of Turkey and its neighbours will be provided in appendix 2. This appendix’s purpose is to help the reader positioning Turkey in the world map.

6.1 2004 - 2007

*European Council*

In this timeframe, the EC only published two conclusions that mention Turkey in a relevant way for answering the research questions. One in 2004, right after the former candidacy status was approved, and another one in 2006. The first thing we find in both texts is the presence of the colonial frontier geostrategy, as the EC is actively promoting Turkey’s membership to the EU. In that regard, the EU’s borders are considered a temporary need as the former seeks further expansion through enlargement. The analysis shows that at this early stage of Turkey’s accession, the EC’s urgings towards Turkey are mainly related to the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria. This is due to the EC’s high interest in Turkey becoming an EU member. For example:

“[The EC] expects Turkey to actively pursue its efforts to bring into force the six specific items of legislation identified by the Commission. To ensure the irreversibility of the political reform process
and its full, effective and comprehensive implementation, notably with regard to fundamental freedoms and to full respect of human rights, that process will continue to be closely monitored by the Commission [...]” (EC:2004, p.5).

The analysis also shows one instance that vaguely fits into the march geostrategy. It is:

“[The EC], while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbours [...]” (EC:2004, p.5).

This passage fits vaguely the march geostrategy. According to this geostrategy, the whole of Turkey has border characteristics as it becomes a sort of buffer zone between the EU and the threatening (e.g., because of migration) Middle East. However, this passage does not make explicit references to any country in particular. It pinpoints Turkey’s commitment to improve its relation with its neighbours, without linking this commitment to the accession process of any other form of cooperation.

In the same vein, the analysis shows that the EC’s conclusions of 2006 follow and reiterate the path initiated by the EC’s conclusions of 2004. There is a high presence of the colonial frontier, also by reviewing Turkey’s adoption of the acquis, as well as prompting Turkey to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. This reiteration has to do with the promotion of Turkey’s EU candidacy. This candidacy was just launched and had to be backed up by the EU institutions.

*European Commission*

When it comes to the COM, the analysis shows the former’s geostrategical advocacy of the colonial frontier. That is, the COM favouring Turkey’s candidacy status the same way the EC does. It does so by encouraging Turkey to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and to align itself with the acquis. In the analysed reports, there are plenty of references to the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria throughout the texts. Furthermore, every report contains one chapter that carefully examines everything that has been achieved by Turkey during the previous year in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, and which steps need to be taken from then on. This has to do both with the COM's role and the early years of Turkey’s accession. On the one side, the COM is the institution in charge of monitoring every country’s accession process. Thus, it is expected that throughout its reports the
references to the colonial frontier are plentiful. On the other side, it is also expected that all the institutions were strongly promoting Turkey’s accession as it was starting off and everybody’s expectations towards it were high.

Regarding the COM’s reports, their last chapter (which is also the longest by far one when it comes to its extension) is always related to Turkey’s alignment with the *acquis*. This chapter includes an assessment of what has been achieved by Turkey on each of the *acquis* chapters, and which future steps needs to be taken. At the end of each *acquis* chapter is stated everything that Turkey has achieved during the preceding year, and what is yet to be done. Furthermore, the reports from 2004 and 2005 finish with an overall evaluation of the state of things in the year in which the report was published:

“*Turkey’s alignment has progressed in many areas but remains at an early stage for most chapters. Further work is required in all areas, new legislation should not move away from the acquis […]*” (COM:2004, p.160).

The COM’s support for the accession process is strong, as one could expect. At this early years of Turkey’s accession, this attitude is shared with the other EU institutions. However, it also has to do with the COM’s official role in the accession process. It is the main institution in charge of monitoring it.

In the COM’s reports from this period of time we also find references to the EU-Turkey Customs Union6. The main goal of the Customs Union is the creation of a customs-free trade zone of industrial goods between the EU and Turkey (excluding most agricultural products, services and public procurement). Consequently, it entails a dissolution of the border in favour of the free movement of goods. This fits into the networked (non)border geostrategy. For example:

“*When preparing the establishment of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey, trade restrictions were dismantled gradually, which led to a marked increase in bilateral trade.*” (COM: 2004, p.69).

6 Not to be confused with the chapter 25 of the *acquis*, also called customs unions.
At the same time, the Customs Union also touches upon all the acquis chapters that are related to the internal market, especially those in regard to industrial standards. That means that the proper functioning of the Customs Union also implies the application of the colonial frontier geostrategy. So far, this is the only instance found in which two different geostrategies co-exist. For example:

“Turkey should speed up its efforts on the adoption of instruments aimed at removing technical barriers to trade and to ensure correct implementation of the acquis and compliance with the obligations arising from the Customs Union.” (COM:2004, p.81).

As a clarification, chapters 30 and 31 of the acquis are called “External relations” and “Foreign, security and defence policy” respectively. On the one side, chapter 30 is about the candidate country’s alignment with EU’s bilateral commerce agreements and humanitarian aid and development policy with third countries. On the other side, chapter 31 is about Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy, including the possibility of taking part in EU actions against third countries. There might be instances in which Turkey’s compliance with these chapters could be framed within the geostrategy of the march, depending on the actions to be taken against third countries; or maybe even a new geostrategy. However, these are part of the alignment with the acquis and therefore part of the accession process of Turkey to the EU. Thus, they are part of the colonial frontier geostrategy. Having said that, it is important to remember that multiple geostrategies can co-exist at the same time. However, in this particular case there is not enough evidence supporting the co-existence of any other geostrategy.

European Parliament

In this period of time, there are three EP’s Progress Reports on Turkey published: 2004, 2006 and 2007. They all contain the EP’s assessment on Turkey’s accession, having also taken into consideration the COM’s progress report of the previous year. That is, the EP reports are both an assessment of Turkey’s accession as well as an answer to the COM’s report of the previous year.

The first thing analysis shows is the presence of the colonial frontier geostrategy. In these early years of Turkey’s accession, the EP also emphasises the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis by Turkey. For example:
“[...] the opening of the accession negotiations should imply that the political criteria are fulfilled and the EU will have the capacity to absorb Turkey while maintaining the momentum of European integration, and whereas compliance with ‘all’ the Copenhagen criteria has been the basis for accession to the Union” (EP:2004, p.3).

The EP’s advocacy for the colonial frontier geostrategy (i.e., the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria) has a peculiarity. That is that, unlike the other two analysed institutions, the EP makes a greater emphasis matters related to Human Rights.

However, there are a few statements related to Turkey’s improvement of its relation with its neighbours that fit into the march geostrategy as they entail a somehow threatening view of the outside. One of them even explicitly mentions Syria. It shows the EU’s sensitivity about the regional stability on the East side of the Turkish border. These statements fit in the subcode of improvement of relations with non-EU neighbouring countries. It is:

“In the context of continuing to improve regional stability and fostering better relations with her neighbours, asks Turkey to be sensitive to the water requirements of these countries, [...] requests that Turkey set up working groups with her neighbours, including Syria, to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of water from rivers with their headwaters rising in Turkey” (EP:2004, p.9).

In addition to that, the EP also understands that a Turkey closer to the EU is an asset for the wider region. Even so, this is not presented as a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession. These statements also fit in the geostrategy of the march, and the subcode of improvement of relations with non-EU neighbouring countries:

“[The EP] [r]eaffirms its belief that a modern, democratic and secular Turkey, whilst progressively aligning itself with the policies of the EU Member States, could play a constructive and stabilising role in promoting understanding between civilisations and between the European Union and countries in the region surrounding Turkey, particularly in the Middle East [...]” (EP:2006, p.12).

In the report from 2006, we also find an entry referring to the Customs Union. As said before, the Customs Union promotes the free movement of goods between the EU and Turkey. It implies a disappearance of the border between both actors, at least on that regard. However, the candidate’s
ability to integrate in the EU’s internal market is also a requirement for accession. Therefore, it fits both in the networked (non)border geostrategy as well as in the colonial frontier one.

In another vein, this research aims was not only to apply Walters’ framework (2004) but also to develop it. To achieve that purpose, the following passage is of special relevance:

"[W]hereas a continuation of the process of democratisation and the programme of socioeconomic modernisation could lead Turkey to: [...] - have a positive impact on the EU's external policy achievements in a number of potentially unstable neighbouring regions, such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia" (EP:2004, p.4).

This instance partially fits into the colonial frontier geostrategy as it entails a view of an expanding EU (in this case, by exploiting the potential of the EU’s foreign policy in the mentioned regions). To recapitulate: the colonial frontier geostrategy says that the EU’s border nature is a temporary need as the former seeks further expansion. That is, according to this geostrategy, the EU’s behaviour outside its borders might look like an empire on the traditional meaning of the term. The quote above does not entail any form of expansion on its traditional sense. That is, the EU does not ought to physically enlarge its border to any of the mentioned regions. However, this instance does entail an imperialistic self-perception of the EU as it seeks to expand its area of influence outside its borders (by exploiting the potential of EU-Turkey relations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia). This foreign policy alignment results in a virtual enlargement of the EU’s border for the inclusion of Turkey. This is done in order to better achieve foreign policy goals.

For all the reasons stated above, one cannot fully fit the quoted instance into the colonial frontier geostrategy. Even though they both share some common features, they are still different. For that reason, a new geostrategy should be created. It is important to remember that Walters (2004) recognised the possibility of new geostrategies to arise, given certain conditions. This new geostrategy will be from now on called the Semi-Colonial Frontier. It establishes a change in the coding frame that will apply from now on to all the period of time and all institutions.

On the other hand, Turkey’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is also part of the acquis (chapter 31). Therefore, one might consider these instances as part of Turkey’s obligations to align with the acquis. However, the EP’s emphasis does not rely on the alignment
with the acquis as such (as the COM does on its reports), but on expanding the EU’s influence and power abroad. This could also be tested because more of these instances (in this period of time, as well as in the following ones) most of the time do not mention the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

More instances of this new geostrategy are also found in the reports from 2006 and 2007. For example:

“[The EP] stresses the importance of Turkey's potential with regard to the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and the Central Asian region in bringing stability, democratic governance, mutual confidence and prosperity to those regions, in particular through regional cooperation projects; stresses Turkey's role in the Middle East; calls upon the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with the Turkish Government concerning the EU's policy towards those regions.” (EP:2007, p.6).

A more in-depth definition of this new geostrategy follows:

**The Semi-Colonial Frontier Geostrategy**

This geostrategy entails a rather different view of the border than the one portrayed by the other three geostrategies. The semi-colonial frontier entails an imperialistic self-perception of the EU, as it seeks to expand its foreign policy influence beyond its borders. Thus, Turkey is viewed as a potential ally for expanding the EU’s foreign policy influence in the broader regions of the Middle East and Asia. Therefore, the territorialisation of the space in the border that the semi-colonial frontier proposes is fluid. Unlike the colonial frontier, this geostrategy does not seek the physical expansion of the border by any means. Consequently, it does not bring along prospects of accession for Turkey. This is consistent with the view that other scholars have, who consider that by leaving Turkey out of the EU’s area on influence, the latter is losing the opportunity to use Turkey’s strategic location in the world map to have an even greater security influence in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even Central Asia (e.g., Desai:2005).

A graphical representation of this geostrategy is the following:
In the graph above, the vertical line represents the border. The solid arrows represent the EU’s foreign policy influence towards Turkey and its neighbours to the East. The discontinuous arrows represent Turkey’s desired foreign policy contribution to the EU goals in the region.

Table representation of the results for this period of time

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6.2 2008 - 2011

European Council

In this period of time there are only two conclusions issued by the EC that are useful for answering the research questions. One of them was published in June 2009, and the other one in October 2009.

In the first of those conclusions, the EC highlighted the need to strengthen efforts to fight against illegal immigration in the EU’s Southern border in light of the tragic events that took place in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta. The purpose was to prevent more human tragedies in the Mediterranean sea. What the EC is indeed doing is inviting the COM to negotiate safe-third country
agreements for the expulsion of rejected asylum-seekers and unwanted migrants with Turkey. In this statement, Turkey is presented as the transit country of unwanted migrants coming from third countries. Consequently, the agreements of readmissions which the EC invited the COM to negotiate with Turkey entail a view of the former as a buffer zone between the countries of origin and the EU. Therefore, it is the geostrategy of the march.

“The European Council underlines the need for a significant strengthening of cooperation with the main countries of origin and transit. It invites the Commission to explore concrete cooperation with third countries in line with earlier mandates adopted by the Council. The effectiveness of the EU’s readmission agreements needs to be increased as part of the overall EU external policies. Concluding the negotiations on the EC readmission agreements with key countries of origin and transit such as Libya and Turkey is a priority […]” (EC:2009a, p.15).

The second conclusion issued by the EC in this period of time praises the advances achieved in the same matter. It does so in similar terms as before. Therefore, it also fits into the march geostrategy.

The main difference of this period of time, when compared to the previous one, is the absence of entries promoting Turkey’s membership. Very likely this has to do with the cooling of Turkey’s accession process and a gradual loss of interest by the involved actors.

European Commission

In this period of time the colonial frontier geostrategy remains very present, mostly by encouraging Turkey to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria and to align itself with the acquis. Regarding the state of things in EU-Turkey relations, the COM's report from 2011 stated:

“Accession negotiations with Turkey continued. […]

So far, negotiations have been opened on 13 chapters [...].

The enhanced political dialogue between the EU and Turkey has continued. A political dialogue meeting was held at political director level in July 2011. These meetings focused on the main challenges faced by Turkey in terms of the Copenhagen political criteria and reviewed the progress made towards fulfilling Accession Partnership priorities. [...]” (COM:2011, pp.4-5).
When one compares the reports of this period of time with the reports from the previous one, a lot of repetition is found in the COM’s narrative. This has to do with Turkey’s little progress in fulfilling its membership obligations.

Regarding the Customs Union, the COM still promotes its development. By doing so, it is applying both the networked (non)border and the colonial frontier geostrategies in the same terms as in the previous period of time. That is, by promoting the free movement of goods and the alignment with the acquis. The COM recognises that little progress is made in this regard. It still highlights Turkey’s obligation to remove the last technical barriers to trade. For example:

“The EU-Turkey Customs Union continues to boost bilateral trade between the EU and Turkey […]. Turkey is the EU's seventh biggest trading partner while the EU is Turkey's biggest. […] However, Turkey is not implementing the Customs Union fully and maintains legislation that violates its commitments under the Customs Union. As a result, several trade issues remain unresolved. A number of Turkey's commitments on removing technical barriers to trade such as import licences, restrictions on imports of goods from third countries in free circulation in the EU, State aid, enforcement of intellectual property rights, requirements for the registration of new pharmaceutical products and discriminatory tax treatment remain unfulfilled. […]” (COM:2011, p.5).

When it comes to chapters 30 and 31 of the acquis (External relations and Foreign, security and defence policy), there is still not enough evidence to support the co-existence of any other geostrategy. That is, COM is still mainly promoting Turkey’s alignment with the acquis in these areas.

In conclusion, for this period of time the analysis shows similar results than in the preceding period.

*European Parliament*

In this period of time, there are four EP’s Progress Reports on Turkey published (one per year). They all share the same characteristics with the previous ones.
The analysis again shows a high presence of the colonial frontier geostrategy. Within this geostrategy, a great emphasis is given to Turkey’s implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, especially in matters of Human Rights. For example:

“[The EP] [r]egrets the fact that, where legislation relevant to the Copenhagen political criteria is in place, its implementation continues to be insufficient; urges the Government in particular to intensify the implementation of legislation in the areas of women's rights, nondiscrimination, freedom of religion, thought and belief, freedom of speech and expression, zero tolerance of torture and the fight against corruption” (EP:2010, p.2).

It is worth mentioning that the reports issued in 2009, 2010 and 2011 all contain a section called Fulfiling the Copenhagen Criteria. This section is always placed in the first position of the texts, right after the introductory clarifications that every document includes. The information that is contained in this section was also in all the previous reports but under a more vague titling (sometimes none at all). However, its more explicit inclusion in the texts after 2009 underpins the EP’s interests towards Turkey’s implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria, and consequently, Turkey’s accession. However, any reason is given stating why this change was implemented in the structure of the reports.

The analysis shows other instances in which the EP urges Turkey to comply with the acquis in the reports from from 2009 and 2011. However, they are not especially relevant as they are mentioned just in one instance on each report.

One distinctive characteristic of this period of time is that the march geostrategy is more present than in the previous period. That means that the threatening view of Turkey is also more present that before. For example:

“[The EP] [p]oints out that one of the main immigration routes to Europe from the broader Middle East and South Asia passes through Turkish territory; notes the limited progress achieved in the field of migration management; calls on the Commission and Turkey to intensify the negotiations on a readmission agreement” (EP:2008, p.9).

The previews quote is the perfect example of the march as it shows a threatening view of the outside (the immigrants coming from the Middle East and South Asia). In this case, EP calls for the
intensification of readmission agreements with Turkey, which is one of the issues where the march in present. References to this issue are also found in the reports from 2009, 2010 and 2011. For example:

“[The EP] [p]oints to Turkey's importance as a transit and destination country for irregular migration; [...] takes note of the resumption of negotiations on an EU-Turkey readmission agreement, and urges Turkey fully to implement, in the meantime, the existing bilateral readmission agreements with the Member States” (EP:2010, p.8).

The EP’s increasing emphasis on the march geostrategy is explained by also increasing inflows of migrants coming to Europe from the Middle East through Turkey. This greater emphasis on this issue is also present in the reports by the COM and the EC.

In the previous period of time, a new geostrategy emerged from the text (i.e., the Semi-Colonial Frontier). New instances of this are found in the reports from 2008, 2010 and 2011. For example:

“[The EP] [n]otes Turkey's increasingly active foreign policy and appreciates its efforts to contribute to solutions in various crisis regions; calls on the Turkish Government to intensify its foreign policy coordination with the EU, in particular as regards Iran; acknowledges Turkey's role as an important partner of the EU with a view to the realisation of EU foreign policy goals in the Black Sea region, Central Asia and the broader Middle East [...]” (EP:2010, p.8).

All of the entries that are found of this geostrategy always refer to Turkey’s potential as a partner for fulfilling EU foreign policy goals in the Black Sea region, Central Asia and the Middle East. This view of Turkey as a foreign policy ally is only explicitly present in the reports from the EP. This new geostrategy is possible due to Turkey’s predominant alignment with the EU foreign policy in those regions, as well as Turkey’s membership to NATO (most EU countries are also members).

In line with the report from 2006, there are instances referring to Turkey’s failure fulfilling the requirements of the Customs Union between the EU and the former. These entries are placed within a sub-chapter of the report called “Ability to take on the obligations of membership”. As pointed out before, the Customs Union’s primary goal is the free movement of goods between the EU and Turkey. However, Turkey’s ability to participate in the EU’s internal market is also a requirement
for accession. Therefore, it fits both into the networked (non)border geostrategy, and the colonial frontier one. This geostrategy is shared by both the COM and the EP. For example:

“[The EP] regrets that a number of commitments made by Turkey within the EC-Turkey customs union remain unfulfilled, distorting bilateral trade relations” (EP:2009, p.5).

In this case, the geostrategy of the networked (non)border pinpoints the institution’s interest in benefitting from the Customs Union with Turkey’s. This is presented as a necessary prerequisite for full membership (and this is why to a certain degree the colonial frontier geostrategy is also present). However, as far as all the membership requisites are not fulfilled, it enables the EU to benefit from Turkey’s access to the access to the European Single Market (named differently, the Customs Union) without having to give up autonomy in other areas (e.g., visa liberalisation).

In conclusion, this period of time shows similar results than the preceding one. However, the EP shows an increasing advocacy for the march geostrategy as the inflows of unwanted migrants coming through Turkey was also increasing.

*Table representation of the results for this period of time*

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In this period of time there are only three conclusions issued by EC that are useful for answering the research questions. All of them were published in 2015, in the months of June, October and December. All of them follow up the EC conclusions issued in the previous period of time. These conclusions highlighted the EU’s need to strengthen its cooperation with Turkey in regard to readmission agreements for unwanted immigrants. By the time in which the 2015 EC conclusions were published, the still ongoing refugees crisis (COM:2015a) started to become a more apparent problem for the EU’s Member States. The EC published three reports referring to this issue and Turkey’s role on it within a timeframe of seven months. This is explained by the increasing gravity of this problem, the velocity in which events were happening, and Turkey’s role as a transit country for unwanted migrants.

In the report from October 2015 there is a chapter called “Cooperating with third countries to stem the flows”. Its title refers to the flows of immigrants fleeing from the wars in the Middle East. In this chapter, there is an instance in which the EU says it would reward Turkey’s cooperation with an acceleration of the visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens going to the EU. Visa liberalisation is a measure that implies a certain emaciation of the border between the EU and Turkey. Therefore, this measure fits under the networked (non)border geostrategy. Furthermore, these conclusions also entail a view of Turkey as a buffer zone between the countries of origin and the EU. Therefore, these instances fit into the application of the march. This is consistent with the previous EC’s geostrategical preferences towards Turkey. Consequently, there are different geostrategies found in only one entry. There is a very illustrative example in the conclusion issued in October 2015:

“[The EC] welcomes the joint Action Plan [for managing the flows of immigrants] with Turkey as part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda based on shared responsibility, mutual commitments and delivery. Successful implementation will contribute to accelerating the implementation of the visa liberalisation roadmap towards all participating Member States and the full implementation of the readmission agreement. Progress will be assessed in spring 2016. ” (EP:2015b, p.2).

Furthermore, also in the October 2015 conclusions there are instances in which the application of the EU’s demands by Turkey would result in a re-vitalisation of the accession process. These entries
fits into the colonial frontier geostrategy. They do because they offer Turkey an incentive to speed up the cooperation in fulfilling the *acquis*.

These revitalised interest by the EC in speeding up the accession process again is used as an incentive for Turkey for cooperating in migrations issues. Unlike in the previous periods of time, Turkey’s cooperation is explicitly rewarded with concrete actions. Speeding up the accession process, by softening the requisites for membership, plays in Turkey’s interest. Even though it is not said explicitly in the documents, Turkey used the unwanted migrants re-admission agreements as a trade-off for its own EU accession interests.

In conclusion, this period of time follows the EC geostrategical preferences of the previous one. However, unlike in the first period of time, the presence of the colonial frontier geostrategy is not motivated by the same reasons. If in the very beginning it was present due to the EC’s interest in backing up Turkey’s EU membership, now it present due to the migrants crisis and Turkey’s crucial role on it.

*European Commission*

In this period of time, the geostrategical preferences of the COM remain almost the same as in the previous two. There are, however, little changes. The COM is still encouraging Turkey’s candidacy. That is, by encouraging Turkey to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria and to align with the *acquis*. Therefore, the colonial frontier is still a very present geostrategy during this period of time.

“*Active and credible accession negotiations provide the most suitable framework for exploiting the full potential of EU-Turkey relations. Given its unrivalled scope and depth, the accession process, which no alternative can replace, promotes EU-related reforms and provides an important basis for intensifying dialogue on foreign policy and security issues and for strengthening economic competitiveness and trade opportunities.*” (COM:2014, p.2).

The main difference with the previous periods of time is that the COM is now giving a greater emphasis, within the accession requirements, to the fulfilment of Turkey’s commitments towards the EU as a whole. It is very likely that these refer to the agreements for the return of unwanted migrants coming from Turkish territory. This would be congruent with the demands that the EC expressed to Turkey also in this period of time (as seen above). However, there is no explicit
mention to the migrants crisis as such. This is probably because the COM is trying to stick to only its functions within Turkey’s accession (i.e., monitoring it, by measuring what has already been achieved and what is yet to be done).

There is, however, one new issue that arises in this period of time that was not present in the previous two. In the report from 2012, the COM started taking into consideration a possible long-term visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens traveling to Europe, but on the condition Turkey would sign an agreement of readmission for unwanted migrants that entered Europe from Turkey. These entries are present in all the reports of this period of time. The first one, from the 2012 report, is as follows:

“The Council invited the Commission to take steps towards visa liberalisation as a gradual and long-term perspective, in parallel with the signing of the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU which was initialled in June. It is now crucial that Turkey signs the readmission agreement to allow for a proper roadmap to be finalised, effectively starting the process” (COM: 2012, pp. 4-5).

The measures for visa liberalisation are consistent with the networked (non)border geostrategy; and those related to the safe-third country agreements that the EU wants to implement together with Turkey are consistent with the geostrategy of the march. For more details, these same measures are also explained in the same terms in the EC entry of this period of time (in the previous section).

In the year 2015, when the still ongoing refugees crisis (COM:2015a) reached its highest peak, the COM’s advocacy for this measures was also more evident than in previous reports. The COM praised the advances done by Turkey in this regard, and it also pointed out further directions to be taken. In the COM’s report from 2015 (the last one published in this period of time) it is stated:

“[…] Turkey continued making considerable efforts to provide massive and unprecedented humanitarian aid and support to a continuously increasing influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq of about 2.2 million. It introduced reforms aimed at meeting the benchmarks of the visa liberalisation roadmap. […] In the coming year, Turkey should in particular:

→ complete establishing the institutional and regulatory structures (e.g. services, bodies, legislation) needed to effectively implement the law on foreigners and international protection […]” (COM:2015b, pp. 69-70).
When it comes to chapters 30 and 31 of the acquis (External relations and Foreign, security and defence policy), there is still not enough evidence to support the co-existence of any other geostrategy. That is because the COM is still just favouring Turkey’s alignment with the acquis in these areas.

Regarding the Customs Union with Turkey, the COM still promotes its development. By doing so, it is applying both the networked (non)border and the colonial frontier geostrategies in the same terms as in the previous periods of time. That is, by promoting the free movement of goods and the alignment with the acquis. For example:

“There was some progress in the past year towards further aligning legislation with the acquis, notably in eco-design requirements, medical devices and improving market surveillance for certain goods. However, some technical barriers to trade delay or prevent the free movement of goods in violation of Turkey’s obligations under the Customs Union” (COM:2015b, p.34).

In conclusion, in this period of time the COM shows a great continuity with the previous two. The only differences are the application of the networked (non)border geostrategy due to visa liberalisation, and the march geostrategy due to the safe-third country agreements with Turkey. These changes has to do with external factors (i.e., the migrants crisis).

**European Parliament**

In this period of time, there are four EP’s Progress Reports on Turkey published (one per year). They all share the same characteristics with the previous ones.

In terms of geostrategical preferences, what we find in this period of time is continuity. The colonial frontier geostrategy is still very present. Most of the instances in which it is mentioned in the texts refer to the promotion of Turkey’s accession to the EU, mainly by fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria (especially in matters related to Human Rights). In the reports from 2012, 2013 and 2014 there is a chapter called Fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. In the report from 2015 this chapter is substituted by two others, called Rule of law and democracy and Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms respectively. They all contain the EP’s assessment to Turkey’s accession in similar terms as in the two previous periods of time.
All four reports from this period of time also contain measures for considering Turkey as a safe-third country were asylum seekers coming from the Middle East could be rejected. Not only that, but these measures are more present than ever. These measures fit in the march geostrategy as they entail a vision of Turkey as a buffer zone between the countries of origin of the unwanted migrants and the EU. These measures are a continuum with the EP’s results in the previous period of time, as well as all the EC’s and COM’s reports from 2015. These entries are more present now due to the continuous deterioration of the refugee crisis (COM:2015a). Furthermore, Turkey’s alignment with these measures is to be rewarded with visa liberalisation for its citizens. As pointed out before, visa liberalisation is one of the instances in which the networked (non)border geostrategy applies. An illustrative example is:

“[The EP] welcomes the signing of the readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey and the initiation of the visa liberalisation dialogue on 16 December 2013; stresses the importance of achieving a common understanding between Turkey and the EU on the relevance for both parties of the readmission agreement and the roadmap leading to visa liberalisation; calls, in this connection, for the EU to provide full technical and financial support to Turkey for the implementation of the readmission agreement, and on Turkey to put in place adequate policies aimed at providing effective international protection to asylum-seekers and securing respect for the human rights of migrants […]” (EP:2014, p.3).

Furthermore, we also find instances that fit into the semi-colonial frontier geostrategy. That is the case with all the instances that promote Turkey’s role as a partner for fulfilling EU’s foreign policy goals. This type of instances were first found in the report from 2006, and have been present in all the analysed periods of time. However, it is also in this period that they are more present than ever (especially in the 2012 report). For example:

“[The EP] underlines the importance of more frequent high level dialogue and consultation between the EU and Turkey on foreign and security policy issues in order to ensure that our policies complement one another and that Turkey progressively aligns its foreign policy with that of the EU” (EP:2015, p.12).

What all these quotations have in common is the imperialistic self-perception that the EU has of itself, that encourages Turkey to align and comply with its foreign policy (and not necessarily the other way around). It is worth reminding that these instances do not fully fit in the colonial frontier
geostrategy. That is because even though they promote an expansion of the EU’s influence and power outside of its own frontiers, they do not entail any prospects of accession.

In the reports from 2012, 2014 and 2015 there are also entries supporting the EU-Turkey Customs Union and criticising Turkey’s poor alignment with some of its technical aspects. These entries fit in the networked (non)border geostrategy, as they promote a disappearance of the border, at least for the free movement of goods. For example:

“[The EP] notes that Turkey is still the EU’s sixth biggest trading partner and that the EU is Turkey’s biggest, with 38 % of Turkey’s total trade going to the EU and almost 71 % of foreign direct investment coming from the EU; welcomes the ongoing Commission evaluation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union aimed at assessing its impact on both parties and ways to update it, and urges Turkey to remove the remaining restrictions on the free movement of goods” (EP:2014, p.10).

In conclusion, the analysis shows great continuity in the EP geostrategical preferences in this period of time. This continuity is true when one compares the results with those of the preceding periods of times as well as when comparing to the EC and the COM.

*Table representation of the results for this period of time*

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Semi-Colonial Frontier</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
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</table>
7. Research’s Findings

7.1 Discussion of Results

It is one of the objectives of this research not only to apply Walters’ framework but also to develop it. This contributes to the ongoing development of this framework to particular cases. This entrepreneurship started with its application to the European Neighbourhood Policy and its different branches (Browning&Joenniemi:2008). The framework’s development was intended to be done by finding the application of (a) new geostrategy(ies). Consequently, a new geostrategy was found and discussed during the analysis of the EP in the first period of time. It was named the semi-colonial frontier.

In this research, Walters’ definition of the concept of geostrategy (2004) has been applied and developed in parallel with the already existing ones (Brzezinski:1986, Grygiel:2006). There are two contributions made to academia in this regard: 1) raising awareness on the importance of the study of geostrategy, as well as geopolitics, in light of their political implications (a detailed overview of the policy implications of this research is at the end of this section) and usefulness for understanding the way in which the EC, the COM and the EP approach the management of the EU’s external borders. 2) On a theoretical level, there is not a common agreement on the definitional characteristics of the term. This research expects to have contributed to that debate, by giving examples on how some wide characteristics of the term (e.g., its geographical connotations) can be applied to practical grounds (i.e., the analysis).

This research proposed a set of three research questions (that derived from the research’s objectives). These are interlinked, and thus their answers cannot be treated separately. However, the period of time to which they refer can be divided in three parts in order to gain a better understanding of the geostrategical preferences of the analysed institutions were.

In the first period of time (2004-2007) the analysis shows a high presence of the colonial frontier geostrategy because the three analysed institutions were prioritising Turkey’s candidacy status (just approved in 2004). It is in the COM where this geostrategical presence becomes more obvious. That is because the COM is the main institution in charge of monitoring the accession process. Therefore, it would have been incongruous with its own functioning rules if it had prevailed other forms of cooperation, other than accession. The only other geostrategy that the COM also promotes
in this period of time is the networked (non)border by encouraging Turkey to comply with the rules established for the proper functioning of the Customs Union (i.e., the removal of technical barriers to trade in certain aspects). The EC presents preferences similar to those of the COM, with the only exception that one instance of the march is found in the report from 2004. This instance entails a different view of Turkey and its neighbours to the East, as it encourages the former to improve its relations with said neighbours. The EP is, however, the institution which shows the most interesting results. It also favours Turkey’s accession (i.e., the colonial frontier) in the same way the other institutions do; and it also perceives Turkey’s neighbours to the East as threatening to the EU (i.e., the march geostrategy). However, the uniqueness of the study of the EP is the rise of a new geostrategy: the semi-colonial frontier, which has been defined and discussed above (chapter 6.1).

Most of the instances found in the march geostrategy are congruent with the conclusions drawn by those scholars who position Turkey as a buffer zone between threats coming from the Middle East and the EU (Buzan&Diez:1999, Desai:2005, Diez:2005, Oğuzlu:2002). Among these threats, the most highlighted one by the institutions (especially during the second and third periods of time) is the arrival of unwanted migrants coming from the Middle East through Turkish territory (Anderson: 1998, Walters:2002).

The second period of time (2008-2011) shows a lot of continuity with the previous one, and almost the same results. The COM and the EP have the same geostrategical preferences as in the previous period of time, and these are presented in similar terms. There are only two variations: 1) There is a higher presence of instances of the march geostrategy found in the EP documents. That means that the threatening view of the countries bordering Turkey in the East increased. That is because of the increased size of the flows of unwanted migrants coming from the Middle East through Turkey to Europe. 2) In this period of time, there are only two relevant EC documents issued. In both of them the entries that mention Turkey also refer to the march, in the same terms as the EP does.

In the third and last period of time (2012-2015) is where we find the greatest variation in the results. However, there is still a high degree of continuity both between institutions and periods of time. The COM is still encouraging Turkey’s candidacy status (i.e., colonial frontier), and promoting the proper functioning of the Customs Union (the networked (non)border). However, the increasing size of the flows of unwanted migrants coming from the Middle East (mostly fleeing from the Syrian war, in what was later called as the refugees crisis [COM:2015a]) forced the COM to
examine new forms of cooperation. This included the signing with Turkey of readmission agreements for those migrants (i.e., the march), in exchange for speeding up the accession process (i.e., the colonial frontier) and accelerating the formalities for a future visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens (i.e., the networked (non)border). When it comes to the EC and the EP, the analysis arrives to nearly the same conclusions. However, more instances of the semi-colonial frontier are found in the documents issued by the EP in this period of time than ever before.

Consequently, this research’s aim (to study how the three analysed institutions approach the management of the EU’s external borders with Turkey) has also been fulfilled. The analysis, together with the results outlined above, show that the three institutions, between 2004 and 2015, favour accession over other forms of cooperation. This entails a dissolving view of the border in favour of further European integration. However, Turkey’s lack of action in making the necessary reforms seems to have provoked a reaction in the analysed institutions (especially between 2012 and 2015) that started giving a greater emphasis to forms of cooperation other than accession. Thus, one can safely conclude that the management of these three institutions towards the EU’s external borders is shaped to a great extent by the level of cooperation that the country at the other side of the border is willing to have with the EU.

Would the author of this research be given the chance to conduct this research again, it’s likely that some aspects of the design would have been different. For example, the analysis would have focused exclusively on the EC and the EP, leaving the COM aside. At some point while conducting the analysis, it became clear that the geostrategical preference of the COM for all three periods of time was going to be that of the colonial frontier, due to the COM’s almost exclusive advocacy for Turkey’s implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria and alignment with the acquis (as seen above). Thus, running the analysis only in the EC and the EP (perhaps by also including some other documents issued by these two institutions) would have allowed for a more in-depth insight on their geostrategical preferences. This deeper insight could not be achieved through the actual analysis due to the normal space constraints expected from a research of this kind.

When it comes to the policy implications of this research, it is clearer now that Turkey’s accession has not failed so far only due to the former’s incapacity to assume the obligations of membership, but also because of the different forms of cooperation that sometimes the EU institutions advocate for. This research also reinforces those studies that pinpoint the strategical importance of Turkey’s
geographical position for the EU’s interest in the broader regions of the Middle East and Asia (Buzan&Diez:1999, Desai:2005).

### 7.2 Suggestions for Future Researchers

Other scholars might replicate this research but only to one institution in particular, allowing the possibility of including more documents issued by the former. That would allow them to gain a more in-depth view on the geostrategical preferences of that institution. Another recommendation for future researchers would be to apply this research design to another acceding country. This would lead to obtaining very interesting results that would allow for a comparison between countries.

Another path that future researchers might take is applying a different qualitative method to the studied case. For example, any of the branches of discourse analysis. That would show very interesting results on how the EU institutions frame Turkey in their documents, and even to which extent the latter is perceived as being European.

### 8. Bibliography

#### 8.1 Scientific Literature

• Devetak, Richard; Burke, Anthony; and George, Jim (2012). “An Introduction to International Relations”. Cambridge University Press.
• Schreier, Margrit (2012). “Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice”. SAGE publications.

8.2 EU Publications

• European Council (2009a). 11225/2/09-REV2-CONCL2.
8.3 Other Sources

Appendix 1

Screenshot of the Selection of Documents

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Source: own elaboration
**Screenshot of the Coding Frame**

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*Source: own elaboration*
2. Today, the European Council set out the following further orientations:

**Cooperating with third countries to stem the flows**

a) welcomes the joint Action Plan with Turkey as part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda based on shared responsibility, mutual commitments and delivery. Successful implementation will contribute to accelerating the fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap towards all participating Member States and the full implementation of the readmission agreement. Progress will be assessed in spring 2016. The EU and its Member States stand ready to increase cooperation with Turkey and step up their political and financial engagement substantially within the established framework. The accession process needs to be re-energized with a view to achieving progress in the negotiations in accordance with the negotiating framework and the relevant Council conclusions.

The European Council expressed its condolences to the people of Turkey following the Ankara bomb attack and pledged its support to fight terrorism;

**Source:** own elaboration
Appendix 2

Turkey’s Political Map

Source: http://images.slideplayer.biz.tr/32/10008487/slides/slide_7.jpg