RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT & SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: The pursuit of measurable results

Master Thesis in Political Science
VT 2014
30 credits
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Words: 16000
ABSTRACT

The overall objective of this thesis is to bring forward the discursive struggle that exists between the research community and Sweden's development initiative. This is done by mapping out the discursive contents of the critiques that has been related to Results-Based Management, and analysing how Swedish development policy has changed during the past nine years, and if the criticism provided by the research community has influenced the government, or been taken into regard when constructing the newest development platform.

The study was conducted using a Critical Discourse Analysis approach, and analysed three government propositions, including Sweden's newest development platform from 2014. One of the main findings of this thesis is that the government is fully aware of the critiques presented by the research community, while the research community's critiques has also been taken into regard when constructing the newest development platform. Although we can see that the research community's standpoint is reflected, and even pursued from time to time, the strong focus on results in development is still reproduced, and even strengthened in Swedish development cooperation by adopting a results-culture in agencies and even in recipient institutions. We can also observe that Swedish development has changed during the past nine years, but the development discourse in general, has not, indicating a stronger focus on results in future development cooperation.

Keywords: Results-Based Management, Critical Discourse Analysis, National ownership, RBM complexity, Results-oriented development

I would also like to thank Martin Sjöstedt for his conclusive dedication and genuine interest with this research.
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In 2014, the Swedish government presented their new and enhanced Development Policy Platform for international development cooperation's, after being delayed for two years. During the past decade, the Swedish government has received massive criticism for spending millions of dollars to developing nations, without providing any clear results of what actually has been accomplished (Högland, 2013). This pressure has forced the government to reform its development cooperation to be more effective and results oriented. From 2006 and forward, the new “development trend” of Results Based Management (RBM) was introduced in most of Sweden's development sectors with the motivation of government accountability to taxpayers, and the need for results information to improve planning and analysis of development cooperation's (Dir.2014/15-4). But the new development approach potentially comes with a cost and has inflicted a growing amount of literature pointing to the difficulties and challenges associated with the implementation of RBM in development cooperation. What remains less researched is in what way the new strategy differs from previous development guidelines and propositions, and more importantly, has the government taken scholars’ criticism into account when forming the new development platform? The overall objective of this paper is to bring forward the discursive struggle that exists between the research community and Sweden’s development initiative. Has the criticism regarding RBM influenced or possibly changed the Swedish model of aid, or will the government and the taxpayers demand for accountability reproduce the same strategy?

1.1 AIM
This descriptive and exploratory study aims to deconstruct and map out the discursive contents of the critiques that has been related to Results Based Management, in order to analyse how Sweden’s international development policy has changed during the past nine years and if the criticism provided by the research community has influenced the government, or been taken into regard, when constructing the newest development platform. In order to do this, I will

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In order to understand the improvements in development management, a brief overview is presented here, allowing us to put the RBM method into perspective, and later followed by defining RBM and the research community's critiques

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1.2 BACKGROUND

In 1970s, 80s, and 90s, donor governments used several different approaches to combine results and financial management. For instance, the Logic Framework Approach (LFA) was introduced in development cooperation 1969 by USA, which swiftly came into fashion, the Corporate Performance Management (CPM) approach, was used in the business sphere to combine budgets and result-orientation in order to view costs with achieved results in development. In 1980s and 90s, the Performance-based budgeting (PBB) approach surfaced, mostly in public administration but also in development aid. All of these approaches used different methods of budgeting and performance managements in order to influence results "rational" in development. Although these methods of combining results and development where powerfully influential, they still experienced the difficulty of achieving widespread recognition amongst donor agencies (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011).

Members of the OECD tried different approaches to provide results in development, studies on progress in recipient countries continually indicated western efforts to produce, at best marginal and short-lived effects (Ibid). By the early 1990s, all evaluations of development projects concluded that they seldom achieved targets beyond their own internal life. Sweden was amongst many OECD countries that had undertaken extensive public sector reforms in response to economic pressures, structural problems and globalization (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011, Hatton & Schroeder, 2007). The OECD countries also faced political and social pressures, including lack of public confidence in the government, growing demands for better and more responsive services, and
better accountability for achieving results with taxpayers money (Binnendijk, 2001. Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011). Although Sweden did not face substantial pressure, as many other countries did, for instance UK, Denmark, Canada, Australia and USA, the OECD development agencies, in general, faced considerable pressure to reform their management systems to be more effective and results oriented (Binnendijk, 2001). This pressure came both from a vast public variety, but also from the research community, news and social media. Foreign aid critics raised concerning issues of western aid, claiming that aid primary benefit wealthy political elites, worsening the democratic institutions in recipient countries and increases corruption. Consequently, foreign aid showed no significant impact on human development and was likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive (Segerfeldt, 2009, Djankov et al., 2008, Svensson, 2000, Boone, 1996, Werlin, 2001). One could argue that this put considerable pressure on the Swedish government (and OECD members), to reform its development cooperation to be more effective and results oriented, in order to legitimise foreign aid. Influenced by the public’s perception that aid programmes where failing to produce development results, the raising criticism on western foreign aid, declining OECD development budgets, and government-wide reforms, have all contributed to development agencies’ efforts to focus on establishing a results oriented development (Binnendijk, 2001, Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011, Odén & Wohlgemuth 2006, Mayne, 2007).

As part of the critics mentioned, global discussions arose on the most effective strategies for financing development interventions, and the results agenda received renewed emphasis for the need to push the results-management agenda a step further in development. And towards the end of 1990s, and beginning of 2000s, the RBM perspective was formed, which suggested adaptation to local conditions and an analytical and critical approach, which in turn was challenging the foundations of Western development aid policies (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011). In 2005, with the background of globally increasing volume of international aid, a consensus was formed called The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, that required an increased coordination around how aid would be more beneficial for developing countries (Odén &
In the process, the results management perspective became an integrated part of global development aid policy, and out of five principles of the Paris Declaration, two points directly to RBM practice (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011). By coordinating international aid, and by implementing guidelines on how aid should be distributed, the international community acknowledged that enhancing the effectiveness of aid is both feasible and necessary across all aid modalities (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2006). And for the first time ever, all development agencies had a common approach to development cooperation’s, namely the RBM method.

The Paris agreement consisted on recipient Ownership of development, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for results, and Mutual accountability, the last two mentioned focuses on RBM in practice (Paris Declaration, 2005). Some of the main principles' with the newly, and globally accepted, RBM approach was that recipient countries would be given bigger responsibility over their own development policies and strategies, while the donors would form their aid on recipient's needs and recipient priorities. The donors and recipients would also coordinate aid funding to be more transparent and measurable, so that the responsibility is not only on the donor, but also on the recipients to provide development results and how funding have been allocated (Regeringskansliet, 2008). Results in development would also make anticorruption strategies more efficient, ensuring that government funding would not fall in the wrong hands, and guaranteeing that funding would be provided for the most needed. In order to get better overview over developing funding, Sweden decided to cut their aid from 125 recipients in 1980s, to 33 in 2007 (SIDA, 2009).

From 2006 and forward, the “new development trend” of Results Based Management was introduced in most of Sweden’s development sectors with the motivation of government accountability to taxpayers, and the need for results information to improve planning and analysis of development cooperation’s (Statskontoreten, 2011). The Paris declaration was followed up by a new summit in Ghana called Accra, Agenda for Action (2008). One of the important tasks was to measure progress of the Paris Declaration, and how results in development
could be more efficient. The background was that some developing countries had hundreds of different donors, while all of them had their own goals, procedures and requirements for results presentation (Accra, 2008). This led to a heavy burden for recipient administrations, and hampered poverty reduction. Basically, more emphasis was given to report results, instead of reducing poverty. And this was also observed by a number of scholars, specialised in the field of development, criticising the RBM approach for being too complex and challenging for development agencies, and the difficulties of actually being able to convince the staff to commit to results-oriented planning. Other scholars criticised its negative outcomes, considering it to be a donor requirement that diverts time, energy, and resources away from essentially doing development work (Flint, 2003, Mayne, 2007, Poate, 2007, Hatton & Schroeder 2007).

At this time, a number of researchers and scholars had struggled with the development community, criticising the use of RBM in development and provided necessary improvements for RBM to work. This was swiftly forgotten when a corruption scandal occurred in one of Sweden’s recipients. On the initiative of Sweden’s International Development Minister, Gunilla Carlsson, a debate was formed encouraging more results in development. Swedish funding had to be designed so that every Swedish taxpayer could obtain results for their money, no matter the costs. As Carlsson stated, the government has a responsibility to the taxpayers, and in order to avoid corruption, and legitimising foreign funding, Sweden needs to implement more transparency and results in its development (Carlsson, 2009). The Minister put forward that securing poor peoples needs is important, but not being able to providing results for the Swedish taxpayers is unacceptable. Each taxpayer should be able to see what kind of development results Sweden has accomplished (Ibid). However, what is often questioned is if the results that are reported, and the quality of the results presented, can be analysed or are reliable (Wohlgemuth, 2012). Scholars specialised in the field explain that development is not something that can always be measured in terms of results, especially when funding is provided for influencing gender equality or democratic policies in developing nations. And due to the lack of ability to provide results, the donor is forced to shut down
these projects, hence, narrowing the view of what is valued and how value is measured in development (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011).

Different approaches and methods have been used by the OECD members in order to combine results and financial management, while none of the approaches has gained widespread recognition amongst donors. By the end of 1990s, all evaluations of development projects concluded that the used methods seldom achieved designated development targets, putting more pressure on donors to use better and more efficient ways to combine a results oriented culture in development. This pressure came from a vast public variety, but also from the development community. Global discussions on the most effective development interventions became an important and integrated debate in foreign aid, and a consensus was formed called The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which required an increased coordination around aid funding and the RBM practice. The RBM trend received also recognition in Sweden, motivated by accountability to taxpayers and the need for results information to improve planning and analysis of development cooperation’s. And while the RBM approach received global recognition by donor governments, the critiques against this method have evolved, and are most formally coming from the research community. Interestingly, this issue has not been given any significant attention. Sweden is a strong supporter for increased results culture, but what remains less discussed is the research community’s standpoint, and more importantly, have the government taken the research community’s opinion into account when forming its development guidelines?
It is not easy to find two people who will describe RBM in the same way, and it is clear from the literature review that different organisations apply the RBM model differently. Although a single RBM model does not exist, I will briefly put forward the general descriptions of the method at hand.

1.3 SO WHAT IS RBM?

RBM has its roots in the wave of public-sector reforms that swept many of OECD countries in the early 1990s. This reform was often referred to as New Public Management (NPM), and was motivated by the demands for more efficient and responsive services, concerns about budget deficits, the need for accountability and citizens’ general discontent with their governments (Hatton & Schroeder 2007:3). Basically, New Public Management “introduced” market strategies into public management, and offered a client-focused orientation and emphasised on accountability, based on the effectiveness and relevance of results (ibid). Importantly, RBM is seen as an evolution of former management approaches, and not a revolution. Its origins are rooted in the management science, and closely linked to previous management efforts as Logic Framework Approach (LFA) or Management-By-Objectives (MBO) approach. The RBM approach is seen as a management strategy that aims at achieving important changes in the way organisations operate, with improving performance in terms of results as a central orientation. The approach offers tools for strategic planning, risk management, performance monitoring and evaluation, with the purpose to improve development efficiency and effectiveness. This is done by organisational learning-plans and accountability obligations (Meier, 2003). But RBM underlines also the importance of defining expected results with the involvement of key stakeholders, assessing the risks that may impede expected results, monitoring programmes designed to achieve these results through the use of appropriate indicators, reporting on performance in achieved results and acting on performance information. Basically, a results chain is at the core of this process, and proposes a results oriented perspective at the heart of the organisational thinking (Hatton & Schroeder, 2007, Meier, 2003, Binnendijk, 2001, Vähämäki,
Schmidt & Molander, 2011). To summarise, the RBM model influences government funding to achieve important changes in the way development organisations operate, and at the same time improving donor governments’ performances by presenting results as the central orientation. Its primary purpose is to improve government efficiency and effectiveness and secondly to fulfil accountability obligations (Meier, 2003, p. 6)

There is much greater convergence and commitment to RBM today than in the past, and this trend is continuing to grow. Fuelled by the Paris in 2005, Accra Agenda for action in 2008, and the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in South Korea 2011, RBM received even more emphasis and became the current top political priority for donor governments globally (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011). One could also claim that the model of global results oriented development is regarded as the leading discourse in the development agenda, pressuring governments and development agencies to combine development with measurable results. While the new trend is more and more embraced and strengthened by the global society, Sweden is considered as the leading country in the combination of results and development. But this new development approach does not go unnoticed, and is globally criticised for changing western development culture, and even hampering with development ideals. For this reason, it is even more important to explore and see if the research community has had any influence on government policy makers.

1.4 DEFINING THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY’S CRITIQUE

In order to analyse the government propositions and development platform, which will be presented later in this study, I have summed up the most essential critiques expressed by the research community. This will provide the reader an insight to the critiques that has been associated with the RBM, and it will also help this paper to distinguish the underlying discourse (Meyer & Wodak, 2001). The “codes” expressed below, will also provide me with the ability to do an in-depth analysis of the text, and more clearly expose if any of these critics provided by the research community has actually been taken into regard when constructing the newest Swedish development platform, and if the critiques
mentioned has been expressed in former development policies during the past years (2006-2014). Another reason why I have structured the main critiques is to compare the government guidelines with one another, and to see which criticisms has been most relevant during the past years, and if one can clearly establish an influence point.

1.4.1 Critiques regarding “National Ownership”

In recent years, a new consensus has emerged in the international community by putting more responsibility on recipient countries to take “ownership” of aid activities, and establish own national systems for managing and coordinating aid from donors (Sjöstedt, 2013). Motivated by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005, the Results Based Management (RBM) approach encouraged government donors on a new development commitments. One of them is Ownership – where partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies (Paris Declaration, 2005). In theory, this means that recipient governments should only accept aid that comes on their terms and in line with their own policies and priorities, while government donors should put their own national priorities a side.

Recipient ownership of aid funding is seen as a new way to promote development activities, and is regarded as a way to promote development instead of externally imposing on government policy building (Sjöstedt, 2013). Basically, government donors should not impose development from above or from abroad, but instead promote partnership, and align themselves with the priorities of recipient country. This has clearly increased the tension between bureaucrats when report on donor country goals on the one hand, and aligning them selves with the recipient partners (Sjöstedt, 2013, Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011). One could see it as confusion when it comes to what a donor country priority really entails and if it should be given higher priority or not. Based on Martin Sjöstedt’s findings, government donors demand for accountability is difficult to combine with an agenda of supporting partner priorities and interventions (ibid). Development agents face the difficulty of satisfying its own government priority, but at the same time, support recipient
objectives. Management for Development Results research (MfDR), made by OECD/DAC, clearly stated that there are only a few examples of donors that have actually been prepared to “lower the flag”, and neglect government priorities in favour of joint strategies (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011). Scholars and different evaluation reports recommend a stronger focus on partner relationship, and the need to adaptation a donor results system based on partner’s system. Unfortunately, the suggested adaption to local conditions and an analytical and critical approach, which was suggested by the Paris Declaration, has been challenging the foundations of western development aid policies, which is still centred on their own policy objectives, rather than the recipients (Ibid).

1.4.2 Critiques regarding “Taxpayers & Accountability”
One of the main critiques associated with RBM regards government accountability to taxpayers, both in donor and recipient countries. Western governments justify the use of RBM by arguing that it improves accountability and learning/planning in partner countries. This is also a way for the government to obtain credibility from the public by presenting results for the taxpayers because, without demonstrable results, or effective provision of value for money, there is a risk of undermining the credibility of development cooperation and willing financiers might stay away. But a literature review made by Vähämäki, Schmidt and Molander, shows that the demand for the use of RBM or results information for purposes like accountability to the taxpayers, and RBM for the purpose of learning together with donor countries is actually low. This is due to the existence of unequal power relations, often portrayed as a “principal-agent problem” because beneficiaries have limited influence of how results are defined or should be defined. The donors on the other hand provide support and demand results from recipients. Recipients in turn have much stronger accountability to their donor partners rather than their domestic citizens. Furthermore, since development cooperation funds comes from taxpayers in donor countries, large amount of funds for a certain operation is used for accountability to domestic audience in donor countries, instead of being used for actual development improvements for the recipient citizens (Vähämäki, Schmidt
Providing results for donors, are also somewhat challenging for recipient bureaucrats, because they normally need to report to different donors on how specifically their donation has given results, while donors often require incongruous reporting and results formats (Ibid). There are also accountability problems for the recipient governments, especially if the government is taking orders from donor governments. Who should the recipient electorate hold accountable, its own government or the external actors? As Sjöstedt's article shows, many recipient governments have been quick to exploit this for their own advantage, and putting the responsibility on the donors and making them the “bad guy” (Sjöstedt 2013:146).

1.4.3 Critiques regarding “Obsessive Measurement Disorder”

This was coined by Andrew Natsios, in what he sees as the most disruptive obstacles for development agencies in their work. The reason lies in the clash between the compliance side of aid programmes – the counter bureaucracy - and the technical side (Natsios, 2010). For Natsios, the rise of the counter bureaucracy and obsessive measurement disorder has led to aid funds shifting towards interventions where results are easy to quantify and measurable after a short period of time, and decreasing funding for long term development programmes, due to the lack of measurable results (Sjöstedt, 2013). He coined the term “obsessive measurement disorder” to point out the belief that development agencies have, that the more an activity can be quantified and measured, the better the policy choices and management of it will be. For Natsios, the rise of counter-bureaucracy and obsessive measurement disorder has steered aid funds to shift towards interventions where results are easy to quantify and measure after a short period of time (Natsios, 2010). Other scholars have also criticised this line of foreign aid, because it has narrowed the view of what is valued and how value is measured. Scholars point to the fact that the most transformational projects are also the least measurable ones. Moreover, the decrease of aid funding to law and order, and other government sectors which is crucial to transform “bad” governments are harder to measure, and often do not emerge until several years. This issue has been debated in the media, in various influential spheres of aid and politics, and has manifested itself in the form of
seminars such as “Can obsessive measurement Disorder be avoided” or “a results take-over of aid effectiveness? - “How to balance multiple or completing calls for more accountability” (Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011). Natsios believes that the essential balance between these two in development programmes has screwed to such degree, and risks to threaten the global development program integrity. Due to the lack and ability to provide long-term results, the government is forced to draw back funding that does not provide results. Here lies another problem within development because aid is not something that can always be measured in terms of results, especially when funding is provided for influencing gender equality or influencing democratic policies. The search for quick outcomes has diverted attention to more easily measured outcomes at the expense of those less easily observed or counted. And this practice, according to Natsios, has led to more funding being provided for development sectors in hard science such as public health and medicine, and less to softer sciences such as democracy and government programmes (Natsios, 2010). Stated differently, the profound demands for government agencies to report results can not capture the diversity of results, and may even lead to programme distortion as bureaucrats attempt to achieve measurable results instead of what is relevant (Sjöstedt, 2013:153). It can also be very difficult to assist in democratic developments and human rights activities, while demonstrating the causal link between a given intervention, and if the effects of a certain outcome is partly or wholly linked to that same intervention. One possible solution is to reduce the layers of oversight and regulation, in other words, less bureaucracy and better techniques for measuring results is needed.

1.4.4 Critiques regarding “RBM complexity”

Much of the critique against a results oriented development is aimed at its linear thinking and the technicalities involved in complex log frames, reporting documents, attributes & aggregation etc., while it is also clear that organisations apply the RBM model differently. Scholars point to the fact that RBM needs to be more efficient and cost effective. The Swedish government has also received internal criticism, namely by the State Treasury, for having adopted a complex control system for aid assistance, without having any clear objectives, and
making it more difficult for public servants to report back to the government on what has actually been achieved (Dir. 2011/84-5). The same argument has also been expressed by recipients and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA (Ibid). As many scholars have pointed out, governments strict focus on measurable results, causal effects and targeted results-objectives have caused donor to forget about establishing clear goals and well-defined development ambitions. There is also voices of concerns raised by development practitioners regarding conflicting goals within the Swedish results frameworks at different levels in SIDA, which makes it difficult to know what to prioritise, and consequently makes it even more difficult to fulfil the stated priorities of the Swedish government (Sjöstedt, 2013).

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. In what way has the Swedish development discourse changed during the past nine years, and what kind of underlying discourse is expressed?
2. Which criticism has been most relevant during the past nine years, and have the criticism regarding RBM been taken into account when forming the new development platform, and if so, in what way?
This part of the paper focuses on putting forward a short description of the government documents, theory to be used, why Sweden is the case study, method of analysing and coding, scientific quality, associating the theory with Swedish RBM approach, and limitations.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

2.1 ANALYSING GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

As mentioned, there will be four government documents analysed in this thesis. One of the documents is the most recent Swedish development platform from 2014, which is regarded as the most central document for Sweden’s international development, and is the basis of the government’s management of foreign aid. The document outlines also government priorities, principles and values of Swedish development, and provides guidelines and objectives for how foreign aid should be managed. Sweden’s most comprehensive development platform was formed in 2003, and since then, the government has not presented any real development platforms until now. For this reason, the platform from 2014 is regarded as an important object to analyse.

The three other documents are propositions for Sweden’s international assistance and state budget. These propositions are presented every year by the government and reveals how Swedish development has been conducted during every year and how it will be strengthened for the upcoming year. The documents exposes matters such as relief operations, debt relief, international development cooperation’s, new reform cooperation’s, and most importantly, it reflects on how foreign aid has been provided and how it can be reinforced. The documents are also seen as formal recommendations and guidelines for future development cooperation strategies, goals and priorities.

The first government proposition from 2006, was created just after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005, which indicated a comprehensive way to change how development and developing nations should do business with one
another, and by emphasising and internationally strengthening the RBM approach (OECD, 2005). This is also, a reason why I have chosen to have guidelines from 2006 and not earlier. I believe that this will create better validity and limit the analysis to only current historical events. There is also the risk of loosing the validity of this paper, if earlier documents provided by the government is analysed, because the Paris Declaration is regarded as the baseline of results in development projects, and analysing documents before this declaration may hamper or mislead the research. Another important reason to compare the 2006 document with the most recent development platform from 2014, is to see how Sweden’s new results strategy is justified, is there any unequal power relations visible? And is there any underlying discourse that expresses the research community’s criticisms? The government proposition documents from 2010 and 2012 are also important in order to create robustness for this thesis. By simply reflecting on a document made nine years ago, one can with little attention point at differences between the 2006 document and 2014 document. But in order to expose how Swedish development discourse has changed, and which criticism has been most relevant during the past nine years, I simply need propositions that express government strategies and methods also from years in-between 2006 to 2014. For this reason, I believe that propositions from 2010 and 2012 also need to be included, in order to expose how the government arguments have changed.

2.2 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSES

The inductive approach that is conduced in this paper, is constructed within a specific field of thought, which has been termed Critical Discourse Analysis. This type of discourse analysis was developed by Norman Fairclough, and includes prominent authors such as Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer. The critical method has its roots from the Critical Linguistics approach in 1970s, and is regarded as a modern discipline of social science that covers a wide variety of different sociolinguistic approaches (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 5), and further considered as a sub-unit to discourse analysis. The term Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) are often used interchangeably, in fact, the term CDA seems to have be preferred and is being used to denote the theory formerly

CDA can be seen as a “guideline” for human action, and seeks to not only describe and explain a certain phenomena, but also to root out a particular kind of delusion, and create awareness in agents of how they are deceived about their own needs and interests. CDA argues also that language is not powerful on its own, it gains power by the use of powerful people (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). CDA has also had a specific interest in the relationship between language and power, and aims to investigate structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control, as it is manifested in language and text (Wodak, 2006, p. 3f).

Different researchers and academic cultures use the term “discourse” very differently. According to Foucaultian approach, a discourse is a way to represent social practices as a form of knowledge. Discourse is an instrument of power and control as well as an instrument for constructing social reality (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). The view assumes that there are specific historical reasons why people come to feel, reason, and imagine as they do. Put differently, a discourse exercises power as it channels knowledge to the society, on which the collective and individual consciousness feed. This emerging knowledge is the basis of individual and collective action and the formative action that shapes reality (Ibid). Most critical discourse analysts would also agree with Habermas, that language is a channel of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Any given discourse is structured by dominance, and every discourse is historically produced and interpreted in time and space (Ibid). The “dominant structures”, are in turn legitimised by ideologies of powerful and influential groups, which stabilises it and naturalises it, until the discourse is eventually taken as “given”. As Michael Foucault explains, discourse is regarded as a flow of knowledge, and/or all societal knowledge stored, throughout all time, which determines individual and collective doing. Discourses are not interesting as mere expressions of social practice, but because they serve certain ends, namely to exercise power, they are institutionalized and regulated by powerful individuals, because they are linked to action (Ibid). In
this view, a discourse is constitutive, both in a sense that it helps sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in a sense that it contributes to strengthen or transform it (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). But if the discourse changes, by enlightenment and emancipation, it looses meaning and becomes a different object and identity. One could say that reality is meaningful and exists only as long as the people, and everyone who is bound and knitted into the discourse and who is constituted by it, have allocated and will continue to allocate meaning to it. Should the latter no longer be the case, the objects changes and loses meaning (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 43f). So what CDA want to accomplish is to make “agents” aware of hidden oppressions, thereby freeing them from it and to provide them a position to determine where their true interests lie (Ibid).

2.3 SWEDEN AS CASE STUDY

The reason why this paper has chosen Sweden, as its main focus is rather humble. International development has become a natural part of the Sweden's foreign affairs, and is regarded as an important way to influence Swedish priorities and humanitarian values on the international community (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2006, p. 13f). Sweden is also amongst the most generous providers of aid if measured by their GNI, and the nation's generous contributions have ranked Sweden as one of the top donors, giving approximately one percent of it budget annually to international development projects (OECD, 2014). At the same time, the development assistance has also been marked by a broad parliamentary support, and maintaining a high level of aid has been seen as an important and integrated part of their international image (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Having the reputation for being highly innovative and flexible donor, and at the same time adopting aid policies to the very best practices at hand, Sweden is considered as the leading country in the combination of results and development, and is simultaneously, one of the OECD countries that has clearly endorsed and pursued a results-oriented agenda in development (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006, p. 1. Vähämäki, Schmidt & Molander, 2011, p. 44).
2.4 METHOD OF ANALYSING

In order to conduct analysis of the four different documents, I have chosen to use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) when searching for fluctuations. This is because CDA regards language as a social practice, and takes consideration of the context of language used to be crucial. It also provides this paper with the ability to do an in-depth analysis of the texts, and look for possible underlying discourses. Worth mentioning, this study will also use quantitative elements in order to analyse the document language and in order to see the frequency of every “coding critique”. And for this reason, I argue that this model of study is not considered as a “classic” discourse analysis. I also believe that this method is the best way to go, because government document are rarely a work of only one individual; instead, it presents discursive differences that are negotiated. Somewhat similar thinking in text analysis is also expressed by CDA, where the theory sees texts as sites of struggle, which shows traces of differing discourses and ideologies challenging and struggling for dominance (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 15). One could possibly argue for a more Case Study Evaluation, instead of CDA, but yet again, my ambition is not to stipulate or operationalize a complex chain of events over an extended period of time like the Logic Case Study model, or build a general explanation that fits each individual case like Multiple-Case Study. My ambition is to go in-depth in the text, and find underlying influence points. My analysis will be based on the language in texts, main and underlying discourses, while taking contextual factors into regard. With a method like Logic Case Study or Multiple-Case Study, I risk missing important sub-discourses and misguide the research.

2.5 ANALYSING & CODING

One of the ways of conducting this form of analysis is to establish a broad literature review. My ambition is to create a structure of the processed material, which is at the base and the heart of CDA (Meyer & Wodak, 2001, p. 30). The processing of the material will be conducted in two different ways. The first one will sum up the most relevant criticisms expressed by the research community. Basically, in order to see how much impact the research community’s criticism has on the government, I will categorise the research community’s criticism,
expressed in the beginning of this paper, into different “agendas”, for instance, the obsessive measurement disorder agenda or taxpayers and accountability agenda. By doing it this way, I can clearly see how much impact the different criticisms has had on the government guidelines through time. It will also make it easier to establish which criticism’s that has been given most attention, and those that has been neglected. These agendas will later be coded as different numbers. The reason for this is because of my second processing, which will be discussed next.

The second processing will be with the help of the software programme MAXQDATA. This programme is a professional software for qualitative and mixed methods data analysis, and will help me to keep track of all the different codings, and provide me with a clear view of what criticism that has been shown in the documents, and how frequently they have been mentioned. In another sense, by reading the vast literature on RBM, and putting the different criticisms into agenda categories and applying coding numbers, I will minimise the risk of missing any important elements in the government documents, and it will also provide me with the ability to always keep track of what I have read, and why I have regarded parts of the texts as important. Basically, coding in this way, will be more suitable when looking at the critical opinions from the research community, and it makes it easier to clearly see what kind of dominant critical arguments are most common, and how it matches the language in the government guidelines. By doing it this way, I also create limitations for the research and exclude other underlying discourses that may be present. To fully embrace every discourse available in every text would most certainly make this research too big and not feasible. I would also end up with numerous insignificant discourses that would jeopardise the research at hand. Further more, by using two different processing methods, I will more efficiently establish and analyse the impacts that the criticisms may have, and also give validity to the thesis. I also find it hard to believe that a research can be totally objective and unbiased (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 21). With this said, I will take my own ideas and thought under consideration and be decisive that it does not influence the processing of data.
So what we have established so far is that I will analyse the different propositions/guidelines provided by the government and search for my already established codes, which is considered as a useful tool when processing the data (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). This will help me to distinguish the main and underlying discourse, and grasp the surrounding context when the documents were formed (Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p. 31f). Consequently, the data will be analysed through careful reading of the texts, while taking into regard that certain discourses are historically produced and interpreted in time and space. This will be crucial when analysing the government propositions because they are constructed during different historical contexts.

2.6 FINDING THE DISCOURSES

It is not easy to find underlying discourses simply by reading the government documents. In order to grasp the underlying discourses, I have formed a coding scheme that will be used when analysing the documents. The coding scheme is a simpler version of the presented critiques, and helps me to find words and phrases that reflect on scholars’ criticism. Most importantly, I do not believe that the government documents will simply reveal the established criticisms that are provided in this thesis, but it is still knowledgeable by looking at how words and meanings are formulated. For instance, Code 1, is about partner countries and the necessity for recipients to have effective leadership over their own development policies. The phrases that are explained in Code 1 will help me to be reminded of this agenda and assists me to look for words and phrases, that regards issues such as putting Swedish priorities aside, joint strategies, stronger focus on recipient needs or phrases that resembles or deals with this issue, even if the exact mentioned words are not revealed. The same method is also used for Code 2 and Code 3. Words such as Long-term results or transparency will probably be mentioned frequently and in different contexts. This does not mean that as soon as the word “results” is mentioned, one codes it. It must be used in arguments or phrases that expresses “results” in the context of improving government accountability, taxpayers rights or other words that reflects on the certain coding issue.
Code 4 is somewhat more difficult. Words such as effective development is probably mentioned several times and in different contexts, but it doesn't mean that it will be coded. Importantly, when coding on RBM complexity, I only mark codings that regards effective developments goals that reflects on government development issues and government development methods. Put it differently, if the document express that “Sweden needs to be more effective in development", will not be coded (!). But if the document relates to development methods, such as “Sweden needs to have effective coordination in development", will be regarded as a coding, because it concerns the RBM method in hand, and not a general statement.

2.7 SCIENTIFIC QUALITY
There are different levels of scientific quality with this research. By analysing government proposition documents and comparing them with the latest development platform, this paper aims to uncover and distinguish the main discourse in order to observe underlying forces of change. The second level of scientific quality regards how much external influence, namely the research community, has on government policy outcomes. Basically, what is the point of having scholars in the field of development, if their thoughts and ideas are not reflected. Although this paper does not seek to reach an emancipation of the discourse, one of my aims are to see how much influence the sub-discourse have on government development policies. In this paper, the research community is considered as sub-discourse, challenging and trying to influence and transform the RBM discourse into a more prominent development method. This is because the existing criticism against this discourse is evolving alongside the RBM strategy. Government development agencies have taken a number of measures to improve their international development cooperation, and produce models that strengthen development actions into measurable results. But this (global) results oriented development cooperation has inflicted to a growing amount of literature pointing to the difficulties and challenges associated with the implementation of RBM within the development community. For this reason,
awareness of the different issues is regarded as an important step, in order to provide a healthy development method.

2.8 LIMITATIONS

Results-based management can mean many different things and has many different definitions. What one institution calls outcome, another calls output, impact or intermediate outcome. The implementation of RBM, in the 1990s, was also not adopted as it was intended, and a series of studies have concluded that a more holistic RBM approach was truly challenging, due to its organisational-wide ambition. The lack of agreement on what RBM exactly is, makes it very difficult to assess or monitor its implementation. Therefore, I will not monitor the RBM implementation per se, or on a global level. Organisations apply the RBM model differently, and my ambition is not to compare different RBM models or how Sweden has implemented the RBM model if compared with other nations.

When talking about underlying discourses, one must distinguish the government documents and the vast literature on RBM. Most importantly, this thesis will look for underlying discourse in government propositions, and not in the general literature explaining the method of RBM. This is a way for me to create limitations for the research, and I argue that to fully embrace every available discourse while doing a literature review would certainly make this research too big. With this said, the reader should also be aware of that I will not analyse other issues that may be revealed after careful reading of government documents, for instance, funding capacities or fluctuations in aid funding during a certain year. Also, other foreign development changes such as, increase or decrease of recipients, the increased or decreased amount of funding to each country or changes in development organisations and their impact, will not be further elaborated either (although this also could be influenced by the argued discourses provided in this paper).

I am also aware that this thesis uses two different types of documents when analysing. The three government proposition documents is a form of documents
that are presented every year by the government, exposing debt reliefs, state budget, new reforms and are seen as formal recommendations and guidelines for future development strategies, goals and priorities. The document tells the reader how future development aid will be conducted and how to deal with past issues of foreign aid. The development platform on the other hand is seen as the basis of government’s foreign aid, and outlines priorities, principles and values of Swedish development. It forms more general guidelines for development, while propositions (2006-2010-2012) offer ways to steer the development one year at a time. These two different models of documents are not the best matching documents to compare, and may hamper the final results (because they may address different issues somewhat differently). This is also one of the weaknesses of such a comparison. This thesis argues that, due to the lack of Swedish development platforms, if one compares the 2014 platform with the 2003 platform, I risk loosing relevant information that can expose how Swedish development discourse has changed over time. Another reason why the development platform from 2003 cannot be compared with the 2014 platform is due to the long period of time that exists between them. The RBM approach was not fully embraced in 2003, and by looking at critics that started to evolve from 2006 and forward, would actually make no meaning or relevance to this paper. There is also the issue of different political parties in power, if one should make such a comparison.

2.9 RBM & CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

According to Jürgen Link, a dominant discourse can be defined as a flow of knowledge, that in turn, determines individual and collective doing that shapes societies through exercising of power. Meaning that a certain discourse exercises power and serves a certain ends by being institutionalised and regulated (Mayer & Wodak 2001, p. 34f). In this case, the results agenda in development cooperation and the RBM in particular, is considered as today’s most dominant discourse globally, and its encouraged and supported by the Swedish government. In order to find this “delusion in society” that discourses may have, I will put forward some of the main criticisms that has been provided by the research community on results oriented development. The criticism that is
provided by the research community is also a way to create awareness of the issues that has been associated with the RBM approach. As mentioned earlier, a certain discourse is a way to represent social practices. In this paper, the dominant discourse is the RBM method, which has gained acknowledgement and legitimisation by the Swedish government, but also internationally recognised as the most modern tool to use in development cooperation. One could take this also to another level, and claim that RBM discourse is also an instrument for the construction of social reality, which recipients and we live in. This reality is that the use of RBM has been globally recognised as the main tool for foreign development by being historically produced. The language, such as accountability to taxpayers, results in development, confidence, efficient and cost effective development, has been used by powerful people such as the Swedish Development Minister, in order to legitimise, institutionalise and regulate the RBM discourse.
This part of the paper presents the coding outcomes of Proposition 2006, 2010, 2012 and the newest government development platform from 2014. The table in the middle shows the amount of time every issue have been coded. The coding frequency percentage can be seen on the right side of the column, showing the amount attention that every issue has been given in the government documents.

### 3.0 RESULTS & ANALYSIS: CODING OUTCOMES

#### 3.1 Table 1: Critique Attention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 2006</th>
<th>Frequency (no)</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Ownership</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayers and Accountability</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive measurement disorder</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM Complexity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 2010</th>
<th>Frequency (no)</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Ownership</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayers and Accountability</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive measurement disorder</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM Complexity</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition 2012</th>
<th>Frequency (no)</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Ownership</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayers and Accountability</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive measurement disorder</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM Complexity</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Platform 2014</th>
<th>Frequency (no)</th>
<th>Frequency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Ownership</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayers and Accountability</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive measurement disorder</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM Complexity</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Coding outcomes of national ownership

What we can see with the coding outcomes is that national ownership had a record frequency of 21 codings, which projected 37 percent of the codings, and was clearly one of Sweden’s main priorities in 2006. The 2006 document clearly stands out from the other documents, explicitly because it puts far more interest in jointly established development cooperation while prioritising an efficient development that focuses on funding ownership for recipients (Prop. 2006/07:1), and donor strategies that is always based on partner countries own priorities and objectives (Ibid). Scholars and different evaluation reports recommend a stronger focus on partner relationships, and the need for donors to adapt development based on recipients own evaluations. The research community promotes also development activities that are domestically accepted, and not externally imposed by donors. This document is clearly in line with the research community’s ideas, while also embracing the Paris Declaration initiatives of letting recipients exercise effective leadership over their own development policies and strategies. The document uses also a more harmonised tone when it comes to Swedish priorities, and reflects on Swedish priorities that can jointly be developed together with recipient governments. The 2006 proposition reflects also on other aspects of ownership, as the research
community has pointed out, and focuses on the necessity of ownership in development, and joint responsibilities without emphasising on results.

According to the 2006 document, cooperation must reflect on recipients needs, and funding results must be tailored to match every country’s strength to bring forward strategies for development. Unfortunately, this issue has been given far less attention in the 2010 and 2012 government proposition documents. The 2010 proposition document seems also to have more expectations from recipients, and places more weight on Sweden to provide recipients with results abilities, rather than ownership. The last mentioned document stresses the importance of using recipients own working forms and project relief operations that is used in recipient countries, but at the same time, instead of having strategies that prioritises partner country objectives, as mentioned in 2006 document, Swedish development has turned and now pushes for more demands for results-presentation (Prop. 2010/11:1). As a new Swedish initiative to strengthen results oriented approach, further Swedish development cooperation that guides development collaborations are also replaced by Government Results Strategies. According to the 2012 document, this will create better results in development, while strengthening guidelines and goals for aid management (Prop. 2012/13:1). Sweden will also focus on establishing clear goals for recipients, so recipients know what they must accomplish when they receive funding. Looking at the 2012 government proposition, even less attention has been given to recipient ownership, and evidently, recipient ownership has gradually shifted to recipient accountability and results-presentation to donors. Clearly, recipient ownership is not something that is prioritised in Sweden’s 2010 and 2012 development, instead, discussions has gradually shifted to creating better cooperation abilities, which should facilitate for recipients results-presentation (Ibid).

National ownership is also somewhat hidden, or given less attention to, when reflecting on recent Swedish development platform, and at the same time, gives the reader a mixed indication on where Sweden stands on recipient ownership in development. The platform brings forward important outcomes of recipient
ownership, but at the same time, ownership is seen in the light of Swedish priorities, while underlining that Sweden must position more demands and clear objectives for recipients, in order to provide results, transparency, sustainable structures of institutions and anti-corruption measures (Skr. 13/14:131). This in turn will create a base for recipients, so that they can implement necessary tools to solve their own problems (ibid, p. 26). More importantly, national ownership based on recipients own objectives and needs, is replaced with levels of trust factors on recipient government. In this regard, national ownership, or the level of ownership and recipient priorities depends on the amount of trust that the Swedish government has (ibid, p. 47). Joint cooperation, as it was expressed in 2006 proposition is also somewhat changed, where joint cooperation is presented, but joint cooperation in order to provide better results. Recipients must also put forward how they will accomplish these goals (ibid, p. 48), but it does not reflect on if it is Swedish goals or the recipients.

3.4 CODING OUTCOMES OF TAXPAYERS & ACCOUNTABILITY
Taxpayers and accountability has gradually been given more attention from 2006, and different arguments have been expressed by government propositions for why it is of importance. What we can see is that the research community has clearly influenced the 2006 government proposition, and much of the research community's standpoint has been brought up and acknowledged. What is remarkable is also that the 2006 government proposition weights recipients’ ability to provide results, and mentions the importance of reducing recipient governments, and agents, administrative burden while giving more responsibility to and creating better cooperation with recipient nations. The document argues that the better cooperation donors have with recipients, will also reduce the costs for both the Swedish and recipient governments in the light of accountability. The proposition believes also that the quality of Swedish development must be central, in order to have convincing foreign aid, which creates better recognition from the taxpayers (Prop. 2006/07:1). Furthermore, the proposition argues that Swedish government must be able to provide development outcomes and how the government has steered development funding in recipient nations. And in order to do this, the government must put
more emphasis on results, while creating better tools to fulfil transparency goals that are expected in every democratic government (ibid, p. 41). The proposition states that an important part of development is to show the government, the parliament and its people how development is going and what the outcomes are. Although results is mentioned, the document does not say “need results”, but instead relates to results as outcomes of development cooperation, improved access to health care, improved education, a healthy environment and a strong participation in society as examples of good development results, which is also more laid-back if compared with newer development documents. Our analyses’ indicates that although taxpayers and accountability is important in the 2006 proposition, it influences on a minimum scale, and goes in line with the research community’s judgement on accountability issues and administrative burden of results presentation. More importantly, it seems like the government is aware of the possible issues that may be created if too much focus is oriented around results.

The 2010 proposition on the other hand reveals a radical shift of government standpoint, and stresses the importance of taxpayers and accountability on a whole new level. The document has more taxpayers and accountability codings than any other (analysed) government document, with the rate of 39 percentages, as the most frequent, and puts far greater attention on accountability than previous 2006 proposition. There is also much stronger focus on responsibility and accountability in development, while linking corruption initiatives with government accountability, and the need of strengthening recipient governments institutions in order to fight corruption. The 2010 document states also that in order to create accountability and transparency for both recipient and donor taxpayers, people must be able to follow Swedish funding through all levels of development chains, while also being able to observe amount of funding for every operation as well as the outcomes of the operation (Prop. 2010/11:1), without mentioning the amount of extra funding that this will require, which the research community has raised as one of the main issues with RBM method. Arguably one could see this as a well-defined technique to re-strengthen the RBM discourse, while reproducing its
necessity and by pointing at the importance of transparency. Meanwhile, the document also stresses that further work needs to be done, when it comes to accountability and transparency, while stating that Sweden, as a democratic government, has the obligation to produce and meet transparency objectives that has been asked. Worth mentioning that the document does not express, who is asking this, while any Paris declaration objectives was far reached already in 2006. The 2010 proposition argues that, by providing results and better transparency, Sweden will be able to reduce corruption, and be able to be more efficient in its aid funding (ibid, p. 29). The document raises also issues that has been expressed by the research community, namely the issues of recipient reporting systems which are not as reliable as they could be, while at the same time, the use of reporting systems and development objectives that create difficulties for recipient agents to report back to donor agents and agencies.

As the second most frequent coding, issues of accountability is even more embraced and strengthened in 2012 proposition, while the same “tougher” tone is also revealed in this document. Now, accountability measures reaches out both on vertical but also horizontal levels, stating that Sweden has the responsibility to use taxpayers funding as so appropriate as possible, and this can only be done by strengthening government's results-culture (Prop. 2012/13:1). Also here, one can observe the reproduction and re-strengthening of the RBM discourse, by implementing a results culture in the heart of organisation thinking. What is revealing is that taxpayers and accountability issues are now argued from a transparency viewpoint, and is marked as the number one priority when it comes to foreign cooperation. Transparency in turn, is also linked with the levels of recipient ownership, arguing that recipients need to be more opened and provide liable results to donors, without mentioning the difficulties that may create for donor and recipient agents, in term of whose development objectives to actually accomplish and present. This brings us also back to research community's critiques on taxpayers and accountability, where donors risk of locating large amount of funds for accountability and results presentation, instead of being used for actual development improvements. The document has also a much clearer convincement to results reporting, and argues of its
significance to taxpayers and their demands for accountability in donor countries. The research communities standpoint is also reflected and acknowledged, stating that some results are evidently harder to quantify and present, and the forms and methods for presenting results must be reviewed in order to have less reporting systems, which will benefit both government agents but also recipient bureaucrats (ibid, p. 20f).

Although issues of taxpayers and accountability is also the second most frequent coding in the latest government platform, a more harmonised tone is used here when confirming the 2012 document outlines of accountability and the need for results in order to fight corruption. The development platform also places more responsibility on recipients to provide results, and argues that results presentation is for recipients “own good”, without linking this to Swedish demands. Evidently, the 2012 proposition and the 2014 government development platform argues for more transparency and liable results presentation, but at the same time, reasoning for reduced results presentation, and creating better opportunities for long-term results analysis. This shows that the research community´s standpoint has too some degree been taken into account, although the RBM discourse is still reproduced by emphasising on liable results presentation. Donors must use results information as a basis for development steering, but still being fully aware that some results are harder to quantify, and some may even be present after several years.

3.5 CODING OUTCOMES OF OBSESSIVE MEASUREUREMENT DISORDER

Clearly, obsessive measurement disorder is an issue that has been reflected and evidently discussed in all of government documents. Despite the high coding frequency, there is also a huge difference in how government documents express their development goals and measurable results. Having the most coding frequency in 2006 proposition, the document reveals Sweden’s results initiation, and expresses the government’s desire of pursuing more and better results in development. Notably, the document stresses the importance of having long-term goals and results measures that goes in hand with recipients needs. The document also states that results in development are hard to isolate, and while
some results are not measurable, they are equally as important to fund. This gives an indication of a more narrowed view of measurable results in the future, and expresses the need for better tools to analyse development outcomes, and the difficulties of having a good follow-up strategy in order to reach national goals and objectives (Prop. 2006/07:1), which is also expressed by the research community. The proposition expresses also a more “harmonised attitude” towards results, and argues that although results in development are important, Sweden should focus on the bigger picture (ibid, p. 51), and although potential for a profound impact on recipient institutions is limited, Sweden still needs to help establish knowledge and institutional developments, even if measurable results are missing (ibid, p. 31). This is something that is clearly distinguished from newer government documents.

Issues of measurable results and follow-up strategies continue to get attention in 2010 proposition, although having a “record low” frequency. Long-term results are also somewhat replaced with the satisfaction of “only” results. But this does not mean that results in development are less of significance, on the contrary. The 2010 proposition points out that it is still hard to present outcomes of Swedish aid in some parts of operations, while ensuring that the government is aware of the difficulties of providing trustworthy results. The document points also out that government steering through results has actually given profound outcomes and for this reason, Sweden still needs to work on results-oriented development in all of its sections (Prop. 2010/11:1). Basically, the RBM discourse and its importance is reproduced yet again in this proposition, by demonstrating the importance of results in development, and by indicating the profound outcomes of such an initiative. The proposition signifies also the importance of presenting results, in agencies like SIDA and Folke Bernadotteakademin, and criticises them for not focusing enough on detailed result-outcomes, and clearly stating that these agencies need to put more efforts in results-presentation in a systematic way, while adopting better methods for producing results (ibid, p. 14).
While tendencies of Natsios obsessive measurement disorder is clearly revealed in 2010 proposition, the latter 2012 document presents a far more informed government, raising issues and challenges that can occur when donors try and measure everything into results. And while 2010 proposition focuses on results, the 2012 document expresses the importance of having long-term focus on development projects, and basically avoiding Natsios obsessive measurement disorder. Showing that the dominant RBM discourse has to some degree been manipulated by underlying forces, and guided it into a more prominent development method. This is most formerly expressed by the frequent use of “long-term” in development, goals, priorities and objectives. The 2012 proposition expresses also the research community’s standpoint, by stating that in order to receive good and measurable results, Sweden needs to have long-term involvement and long-term evaluations as its main priority (Prop. 2012/13:1). While clearly embracing a wider view of development, that is more in line with the research community’s point of view, the proposition argues also for more “flexibility” in foreign aid, and the importance of reaching results and goals in areas of rights-perspective and political influences (Ibid). Areas in which can be forgotten when too much focus is on results. This radical shift in the government’s results position, explicitly goes in line with the research community’s raising concerns, and accepts that some results cant be measured in development, and to much focus will misguide Swedish aid. Although outcomes are still as important, the proposition indicates that more funding will be prioritised in areas where results are harder to measure, while better evaluation tools are needed for having liable long-term results.

The same level of long-term engagement and donor flexibility is expressed in the latest government development platform. The platform raises also the importance of having better results quality and liability, and indicates that it is up to Sweden to provide recipients with the necessary tools, in order to receive liable results (Skr. 13/14:131). The platform expresses also the governments desire to be better and more responsive on follow-ups, evaluations and analysis of each program implementation, but clarifies that even though some results are harder to provide, it does not mean that one should not keep trying (ibid, p. 40).
On the contrary, Swedish agencies should follow up on measured results, meaning that government agencies shouldn’t only look for short-term outcomes. Sweden must also be able to provide funding’s to unstable situations even if results cannot be measured. For this reason, further changes to results presentation will occur, while reducing the reporting in aid management and concentrate their reporting’s to long-term perspectives (ibid, p. 46). In some sense, the research community has been taken into regard when it comes to long-term development initiatives. And by clearly avoiding Natsios obsessiveness on short-term results, the platform shares the same view as the research community and indirectly responds to the critiques that have been expressed.

3.6 CODING OUTCOMES OF RBM COMPLEXITY

When it comes to RBM complexity, the 2006 proposition prioritises other issues and places no real attention on this matter. The proposition reveals flaws and measurable results issues, the importance of coordinated and clear goals in development, and touches on the importance of efficient and effective foreign development (Prop. 2006/07:1). But clearly, this document does not address how these issues should be solved. One explanation to this may be that the RBM method had been implemented only a short period of time and issues of complex log frames and other technicalities had simply not revealed it self yet.

Evidently, complex control systems and difficulties with complicated log frames and aggregations in development are given far more attention in 2010 proposition. The document has RBM complexity as the second most frequent coding, and brings up issues of complexity, the absence of government efficiency and the need of having better goal-orientation, in order for the RBM approach and Sweden’s development to give results (Prop. 2010/11:1). The proposition reveals also that complex log frames and result measurements has created a significant weakness in SIDA’s development activities, especially when it comes to forming methods of results presentation. At the same time other organisations within the Swedish government that has seen drastic changes in development steering after introducing the RBM approach (ibid, p. 31). Evidently, this
documents highlights that Sweden needs to have better coordination between government organisations and at the same time spreading out responsibility areas to different organisations. The proposition pushes also for long-term development goals, especially when it comes to strengthening foreign reporting institutions. As expressed by the research community, and now by the government, too much focus on results-orientation in Swedish development without any clear objectives has created many difficulties for public servants and government agents to report back to the government.

Issues of results-measurement complexity are still prioritised when analysing 2012 proposition. The document expresses wishes of better goal-oriented developments, which will contribute to better development outcomes are further embraced, without mentioning results. It is also clear that results in development have been replaced by development goals, while also explaining the importance of development and clarifying Swedish aid policy orientations (Prop. 2012/13:1). One could argue that the research community has influenced government proposition on this subject, due to the governments emphasis on reducing the numbers of results presentation, stressing the importance of cost efficiency, while creating better opportunities for long-term results analysis (ibid, p. 26). Long-term, is also something that the research community has insisted on, this is also revealed in 2012 proposition due to the high frequency mention of long-term goals, and by openly stating that every development operation cannot be measured into results, but still are relevant, and arguing that performance is a result in its self (ibid, p. 21). At the same time, the document “agrees” with the research community’s standpoint, and states that causal link between a given intervention and a certain outcome are hard to provide. Nobody really knows if any given intervention is partly or wholly attributed in any given operation (ibid, p. 15).

Much of the same line of thinking is also expressed in government development platform. The platform clarifies the importance of clear and cost effective development objectives, and this is repeated several times, while at the same time pushing for more flexible results management. The platform expresses also
the importance of results, but still explains that short-term results or quick outcomes is not what the government is looking for, instead, focus must be on long-term and sustainable development (Skr. 13/14:131). Clearly, the research community’s standpoint on this issue has been taken into account, but there are signs of discursive struggle. Even though this platform gives a more harmonised attention to results and its complex control systems, the document uncovers that costs of an operation must always be compared to the value of that intervention, and in relations to results. Meaning that results and development goals must also be tailored to every country profile (ibid, p. 42). This gives the reader a mixed indication on what the platform actually prioritises when it comes to complexity and reporting issues, and shows the RBM discourses dominant power, when its institutionalised. The document expresses also that Sweden should provide funding even to unstable situations, even if results cannot be measured. Meaning that even if results are an important and integrated part of Swedish development, unstable situations require a more un-results oriented approach, giving the agents more flexibility and clearer goals.

This table has summarised the most essential arguments expressed in government documents, which shows how every issue has been conveyed over a period of time

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<tr>
<th>3.6.1 Table 3: Summarised arguments over time (2006-2014)</th>
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<td><strong>National Ownership</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2006 Prop.</strong></td>
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3.7 DISCUSSION

National ownership is considered as an important tool for development, and the research community’s critique has mainly focused on donor governments lack of ability to provide recipients the “freedom” that they desire, in order to own their development leadership. The trend of providing recipient ownership received great amount of attention in 2006, but a more fading attitude in 2010 and 2012, goes somewhat hand in hand with the results-culture and a more results oriented development in which Sweden is pursuing. The 2014 development platform gives also a mixed indication on what the Swedish development is actually conveying on recipient ownership. The platform raises the importance of recipient ownership, and the beneficial outcomes of such initiative, as recipient publics’ accountability to its own government, but at the same time, the platform points out that Swedish priority and targeted objectives are eminent. Clearly, Swedish policies are still centred and focused on their own policy objectives although the platform undoubtedly acknowledges the research community's standpoint. There is also far more attention given on recipient expectations, which in turn creates limitations for recipients on what they can “own” in their development. Arguably, although this may not be ownership “from above”, by putting a results perspective in recipient development ownership, creates tension for agents when reporting between donor goals on the one hand, and recipient objectives on the other. At the same time, donor agents and recipient agents, face the difficulty of satisfying their own government objectives or donor targets. While the research community’s standpoint on recipient ownership has been taken into account when forming the new development platform, the need for results is still favoured and reproduced. In this case, there has been a big shift in Sweden’s initiatives on recipient ownership and donor alignment with recipient objectives. From 2006 and forward, we can gradually see that collaboration between donors and recipient ownership has been re-
shaped into joint results strategies, which is far more in-line with donor
governments and donor priorities, than recipients needs. What the government
documents indicate, is that recipient ownership based on their objectives and
needs is basically dependent on the level of trust that the Swedish government
has for the recipient administration. And ownership is more or less given,
depending on recipient institutions and their awareness of Swedish results
initiative. One could argue that the discursive struggle between a dominant
discourse and underlying forces of change is most evident here. The research
community tries to use its power to change the government’s path, but the RBM
discourse has been reproduced to such degree that the issues of reporting
abilities for agents, or recipient ownership of its own development, are simply
not as important. One conclusion is that the research community’s standpoint
has been taken into account when forming the new development platform but at
a minimal level. Unfortunately, this study indicates that national priorities are
still centred on Swedish policy objectives in the twenty-first century
development.

Taxpayers right to follow government funding is an important and integrated
part of Swedish development. Evidently, the gradual attention that this issue has
been given during the past nine years shows the government’s dedication to
transparency and government accountability. The development platform has
also a more healthy attitude to results presentation and taxpayers need for
accountability, and expresses the governments desire to receive results,
although confirming that some results are harder to present while others may be
seen after several years. This is something that the research community has
extensively pointed out, and clearly been taken into regard by the government.
Most noticeably, the radical shift that the government had during 2010, and the
strong focus that Swedish aid had on results-presentation is still present in the
2014 development platform, but not as “obsessive” as the previous 2010 and the
2012 proposition. More importantly, the newest platform indicates transparency
as an important tool for foreign aid, but confirms the research community’s
judgement and promotes reduced results presentation, in order to minimise the
amount of funds that is channelled to domestic accountability, and more to
development improvements for recipient citizens. Clearly, the research community's standpoint is present in all of development propositions, but the level of influence has shifted from “very in line with the development researchers” in 2006, to more settling attitude in 2010 and 2012, and now embracing the research community’s standpoint somewhat again. This is a signal of a discursive struggle, which is still existent to this point of time, while also showing that the research community's critiques has been taken into regard and even persuaded the governments position on results-orientation. The healthy government reasoning is also evident when arguing for recipient transparency. Because the more transparency a government has, no matter if it's a donor or recipient government, the better accountability and state collaboration opportunities are created for the citizens, and at the same time minimising the risks of corruption. This gives also the citizens the ability to hold politicians responsible for any wrongdoings, and should increase the publics' attitude of foreign aid. Although the 2014 development platform is not as aligned with the research community as one could possibly desire, the platform argues for creating better opportunities for long-term results analysis in order to have better quality and more liable results-presentation. And indirectly agreeing with the research community's standpoint that this will benefit both government agents but also recipient bureaucrats. This clearly illustrates that the critiques regarding taxpayers and accountability made by scholars has actually been taken into account when forming the development platform.

Almost the same shifting levels of research influence can be applied on the issue of obsessive measurement disorder. What is also revealed is that this issue has been reflected and debated in all of government documents, but with different levels of attention given to the research community. From 2006 and onwards, Sweden's results initiation and the governments desire of pursuing better and more liable results has had both a strong and self evaluating tone, but at the same time, raising recipient expectations and demands for a more results-initiated and results-oriented development objectives for every year. Basically going from a more harmonised attitude towards results and directing Swedish aid on development goals and strong alignment with the research community in
2006, to a strong results-oriented shift that undoubtedly focuses only on results at any cost in 2010. But yet again, displaying a far more research informed government in 2012 and a clear research alignment standpoint in the recent development platform in 2014. This radical shift of government standpoint clearly shows that the research community has been taken into regard when forming the latest development platform while also indirectly responding to the critiques that has been expressed by the research community. One could even argue that the RBM discourse has to some degree been manipulated by underlying forces, and guided into a more prominent method of development. Evidently, after the government’s strong obsession on results and results only in the 2010 proposition, without providing any real affects on development outcomes, created far more research influenced viewpoint on the necessity of results-orientation in the 2014 development platform. Keeping in mind that results is still given great amount of attention in the newest platform, and it is still reproduced to some degree by explaining its purpose and the importance of having such initiative, while arguing for better development tools. This shows how strong a discourse can be, when it is institutionalised over a long period of time. It is also clear that better and more clear long-term development objectives is desired in future Swedish development initiatives, which in turn will create better quality and liable results. Most importantly, when arguing that results are important, one should keep in mind that too much focus on results could possibly do more harm than good. This is also why raising the importance of a long-term oriented development, and donor flexibility, is so important and is aligned with the research community’s standpoint. By expressing the importance of providing funding to operations that necessarily doesn’t provide clear results, the risk of Natsios obsessive measurement disorder and the search for quick outcomes are possibly avoided. Evidently, the research community’s criticism has been taken into account when forming the development platform, but this does not mean that Swedish results initiation is forgotten, on the contrary.

Much of the research community’s standpoint on RBM and its complex log frames and results measurements shows that the RBM method in hand, needs to be better tailored for each individual development intervention, and not as a
“general template” that can be applied in any development case. One could also see this phenomenon as development agencies trying to manipulate the RBM method into a more comprehensible approach. The adopted RBM method with its complex control system for aid assistance has shifted Swedish foreign aid to loads of technical reporting, instead of focusing on clear development objectives. This is also why we can see that the recent development platform expresses the importance of results, but “directly” responds to the critiques made by the research community, and reasons that short-term or quick outcomes are absolutely not what the government is looking for. One could even argue that the government may have implemented the RBM method to hasty, without being fully aware of the difficulties that this may cause. This is most noticeably revealed in the 2010 proposition, where complex log frames and reporting systems caused weakness in SIDA’s development activities, while simultaneously highlighting the urgent need for better coordinated development steering and simpler methods for recipient reporting. The issue of results-measurement complexity is also given strong attention in the 2012 proposition, emphasising on reduced results and reporting presentation. Evidently, the discursive struggle that exists between the research community and the government, managed to alter the government’s propositions by reducing its obsessive focus on procedures to provide results and highlighting the need for clear development objectives, but only after SIDA’s demonstrated weakness and goal disorientation in 2010. Most distinctively, the government replaced its previous development result-ambitions into development goals and objectives in 2012, while creating better opportunities for long-term results analysis, and sustainable development, giving recipients and government agents more time to present Swedish development outcomes. This issue was somewhat forgotten in 2010. The same ambition is also revealed in the 2014 development platform, where increased attention is given to clear and cost effective development objectives, during a longer period of time. The platform raises also other important aspects that are favoured by the research community, where unstable situations requires a flexible donor, and log frames and results measurements that are tailored to country profile. This demonstrates a close alignment with the research community’s standpoint. But results is still reproduced and strengthened to
some degree, even in 2014. As presented in the chapter of Coding outcomes, the development platform reasons that costs of an intervention must always be compared to the value of that certain intervention, and evidently in relations to results. This opens up for different interpretations, hence creating a mixed indication on what the platform is actually stating. This brings us back to the same issue that was expressed in 2010, with bureaucrats and government agents, prioritising the costs of any intervention with the value of actually funding a certain operation, and risking yet again, to lose its path of development objectives and focus on how to measure results in any given operation. Although the research community’s criticism regarding RBM complexity has clearly been taken into account when forming the development platform, by placing a results value on every development intervention, agents risk yet again to have difficulties when reporting back to donors on what has been achieved, creating conflicting goals on what needs to be accomplished in recipients situation, or what should be accomplished by following the state priorities.

4.0 CONCLUSION

According to CDA, a dominant discourse is seen as a flow of knowledge that determines individual and collective doing through exercising power. In this case, the RBM method is considered as today’s most dominant discourse, and the Swedish government supports this and has institutionalised it, making results-oriented development as something “given”. This study has oriented around two questions that was asked in the beginning, and has gradually analysed three government propositions and the most recent Swedish development platform that was released in 2014. One of the questions that were asked in the beginning of this study was; In what way has the Swedish development discourse changed during the past nine years, and what kind of underlying discourse is expressed? In this paper, the research community is considered as underlying discourse, challenging and trying to influence and transform the RBM discourse into a more prominent development method. As articulated in the discussion above, the Swedish development has changed during the past nine years, but the development discourse in general, has not. It is also evident that the government is fully aware of the existing criticism against the RBM discourse, and has taken a
number of measures to improve its development cooperation. But the government is still pursuing a results-based approach to development and this is reinforced every year by adopting better techniques for result-measurements and introducing a results-culture in all of its development activities. Interestingly, the governments strong pursuit for results has actually changed its own line of thinking. If one compares the Swedish development discourse on the matter of recipient ownership of development, this issue has gradually transformed during the past nine years from being one of its main priorities, to almost non-existent today. And the research community's influence on this subject can be seen, at best, side-lined. This, I believe, goes hand in hand with the results initiative that the government is pursuing, and the issue of recipient ownership, is linked with the issue of accountability and transparency. Donors need to have trust, and in order to provide ownership to receivers is highly based on recipients' institutional transparency. Basically, donors want to know how Swedish aid is distributed through all of the receiver's chain of management. But yet again, if donor funding is based on the amount of results recipients must present, in which Sweden is pursuing, issues of recipient transparency is simply to hard to measure and takes too much time, and consequently making receiver's invest in other development aspects where results are easier to quantify and present to donors. This is not only a case of method improvements, but donors must also accept that development takes time, and some results can only be observed after several years. I consider the lack of recipient ownership as the most dramatic changes in Swedish development initiatives, and gives us only negative predictions of future development. The only thing certain is that such re-orientation of recipient ownership demonstrates great stiffness and control in future development cooperation's, instead of promoting flexibility and donor alignment.

The second question is most formally oriented around the research community's criticism on the RBM method, used by Sweden in its development activities, asking; Which criticism has been most relevant during the past nine years, and have the criticism regarding RBM been taken into account when forming the new development platform, and if so, in what way? The criticism that is provided by
the research community, which is presented in the beginning of this paper, is also a way to create awareness of the issues that has been associated with the RBM approach, and the study has also shown that all of the critiques mentioned, have to some degree been taken into account, while the criticism regarding recipient ownership and national priorities is still essentially criticised to this day. Although this study clearly shows that the research community has been taken into regard when constructing the government development platform and propositions, the level or amount of influence is somewhat different. One possible conclusion is that the research community has the power to influence, but only to some degree. What is evident, is that after not succeeding with a certain government “attempt”, they tend turn to back and consult with the research community. Although we can clearly see that the research community’s standpoint is reflected, and even pursued from time to time, the strong focus on results in development is still reproduced, or even strengthened by adopting a results-culture in Swedish development organisations, agencies and even in recipient institutions. We can also observe an underlying discourse in government propositions and the development platform, but this discourse has far too little power to challenge the existing development discourse. But what it has done, and what it can do, is to make small changes in government priority areas, making it into a more prominent development method during the long run. This is clearly demonstrated by observing what the research community has raised during the past nine years, and how the government propositions have responded to those critiques.

4.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Sweden's newest development platform presents a lack of recipient ownership, and clearly, the research community has not managed to influenced or convey the importance of such initiative. This in turn will most certainly lead to a dramatic change in future ideas of foreign aid and how Swedish aid should be designed and implemented in recipient nations. As expressed earlier, different organisations adopt the RBM model differently. Unfortunately, there is still few research on the application of this model, and one needs also compare the Swedish model of aid with other western donors, to see if results-oriented model
of aid actually leads to increased aid effectiveness or not. For this reason, this study suggests more research on RBM model in particular and how results measurement systems are applied in other donor countries. In the case of Sweden, what we can see is that further research needs to be done on the matter of recipient ownership and how new result measurements will guide future Swedish development.
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