Institutional Impediments and Reluctant Actors

The Limited Role of Democracy Aid in Democratic Development

Agnes Cornell
Institutional Impediments and Reluctant Actors – The Limited Role of Democracy Aid in Democratic Development
Agnes Cornell
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To Anna
Acknowledgments

‘I have a view, I have a view.’ (Forster 1908, 2)

I am writing these acknowledgments on a balcony with a great view, not overlooking the Arno, as in *A Room With a View*, but if you lean out you may get a glimpse of the Göta River. I would like to start by expressing my gratitude to all those persons that in one way or another supported me in the process of writing the doctoral dissertation: Thanks a lot!

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‘I believe in democracy.’

‘No, you don’t, she snapped. You don’t know what the word means.’ (Forster 1908, 114)

Jan, thanks to you, I now know considerably more about what democracy means than before I met you. Thanks Jan for learning me so much about the sub-field of democratization research, for all good suggestions that improved tremendously on my thesis, for helping me out whenever I had some methodological problems, and for introducing me to the international community of comparativists.

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‘What are we to do? Two lone females in an unknown town. Now, this is what I call an adventure’ (Forster 1908, 16)

Michelle D’Arcy, we are soon to embark on a real adventure, which I really look forward to. Doing research with you is great!

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Thanks, Martín, Sana, and Sven for all the adventures we have had together in Argentina and elsewhere.

‘For something tremendous has happened; I must face it without getting muddled.’
//…// ‘It has happened’, he repeated, ‘and I mean to find out what it is.’ (Forster 1908, 42)

Andrej, I am so very happy you found out. Let’s pretend we are young for a while and then grow older together while very often visiting ruins at hilltops.

Anna, you were my best friend. I miss you. I dedicate this book to you.

Gråberget, Gothenburg, May 21, 2013.

All quotes in the acknowledgements are from:
Introduction

Billions of people around the world live in countries that are far from democratic. A majority of these countries are relatively poor, developing countries, and therefore recipients of foreign aid. In fact, authoritarian regimes receive more development aid than democracies (OECD.Stat 2012b, author’s calculation) and only three of the top ten receivers of aid (Official Development Aid as percentage of Gross National Income [GNI]) are rated as free (Freedom House 2012; World Bank 2012).

Poverty reduction and societal modernization have traditionally been the main goals for development aid but increasingly, since the early 1990s, democracy and human rights have ascended in importance (Burnell 2000a; Carothers 1999; Crawford 2001) and democracy aid has been growing steadily, both in total amounts and as a share of the total aid package (OECD.Stat 2012a; b; author’s calculation). Democracy is now a priority for many aid donors. In fact, for some donors, the absence of democracy and therefore the lack of freedom is considered an essential component of poverty (see for example Sida 2009; USAID 2012).

The accentuated focus on democracy aid inevitably has consequences. The increase in democracy aid comes at the expense of other areas of development cooperation. Hence, it is of great importance to know whether this type of aid deserves to be prioritized. This dissertation therefore endeavors to examine the impact of democracy aid on democratic development.

In doing this, this dissertation contributes to the literatures on democratization and aid effectiveness, and particularly to the understanding of why and under what circumstances democracy aid may play a role in democratic development. Additionally, this dissertation contributes to the democratization literature by examining the impact of different types of administrative structures on democratic survival. In turn, this also adds to the future development aid agenda by stressing the importance of supporting administrative reforms in order to foster successful long-term democratic development.

Democracy aid is only one way of promoting democracy through foreign aid. Arguably, foreign aid could impact democratic development through
three ways: development aid in general, conditional aid, and democracy aid. Development aid in general could be seen as economic inflows that could be invested in productive or unproductive projects (e.g., Wright 2008). In relation to democracy we could relate foreign aid flows to modernization theory (e.g., Lipset 1959) and the idea that material improvements of peoples’ lives will eventually lead to demand for and in the longer run, democratization. Aggregate aid flows may therefore foster democratization unintentionally by improving material standards and reducing poverty.

The other two means that could make foreign aid have an impact on democracy are intentional tools of democracy promotion. Firstly, foreign aid flows could come with conditions attached to them. Donors may condition aid on political reforms or threaten to withdraw aid if a regime leader violates the democratic process. Secondly, donors may choose to allocate aid flows to programs that specifically aim at improving democracy, i.e. democracy aid, which is the focus of this dissertation.

What do we know about the effects of these three ways that foreign aid could have an impact on democracy? Development aid in general is probably the most studied of the three. Scholars have concluded that this aggregate aid has no effect on democracy levels (Knack 2004), that aid tends to deteriorate democratic institutions (Djankov et al. 2008; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2012), and that aid tends to stabilize regimes irrespective of whether they are authoritarian or democratic (Morrison 2009). However, scholars have also shown that aid may, under some circumstances, foster democratization. For example, depending on how costly liberalization would be for the ruler (Wright 2009) or depending on the time period under examination, during or after the Cold War (Dunning 2004; c.f., Goldsmith 2001), aid could in fact lead to a regime change in a democratic direction. The time period examined is related to the prospects of conditional aid. Scholars argue that conditional aid, the second approach for democracy promotion, could work under some conditions: for example when the recipient country has less bargaining power (Bearce and Tirone 2010; Gibson et al. 2005).

However, aid flows is an aggregate of thousands of specific projects and programs in very different areas of society. Foreign aid is directed to almost every aspect of societal life, from healthcare to the construction of roads. In research it might therefore also be fruitful, for both theoretical and empirical reasons, to disaggregate aid according to its different purposes.

The quantitative studies of democracy aid however present different findings than the studies that examine the effects of aid in general. The most comprehensive study (Finkel et al. 2007) shows that US democracy aid has
INTRODUCTION

had positive effects on democracy levels (see also Scott and Steele 2011; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010).

This short review of previous quantitative research, in the field of democracy promotion through foreign aid, shows that previous research is rather limited in its scope. It has focused on aid in general with a large sample of donors and recipients, or on democracy aid in particular but has been restricted to only one (although the biggest) donor. Moreover, previous studies of aggregate aid, that show no effects of aggregate foreign aid flows, do not take into account that different types of aid may have very different effects and that the purpose of aid in general is not primarily to promote democracy.

However, the most serious drawback of previous research on democracy aid is not the limited scope of the empirical studies but rather the limited theoretical development of the mechanisms. Previous studies on democracy aid fail to answer why and under what circumstances we would expect this type of aid to have an effect. This dissertation deepens the understanding of these contexts by taking as the point of departure that actors make decisions according to the risk scenario they perceive and assess the particular trade-offs in their institutional environment. The theoretical arguments are based on how different types of institutions shape actors’ incentives and therefore their actions.

This dissertation includes four papers, three of which examine the role of democracy aid in democratic development and a fourth one which develops why, and tests whether, a meritocratic-based administrative structure is important for democratic survival and therefore a key aspect to take into consideration for future efforts of promoting democracy.

The first two papers of this dissertation show that democracy aid may have positive effects on democracy levels and regime change but that the effects are limited to certain contexts: when recipient rulers perceive that they have more to gain than to lose from implementing democracy aid activities. Democracy aid only has a positive effect on democracy levels in one-party regimes and in preventing democratic breakdown in existing democracies. Democracy aid does not contribute to democratization in authoritarian regimes. The third paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding why democracy aid could be difficult to implement in democracies with unstable bureaucracies and, in particular, in bureaucracies where this instability is due to a high rate of turnover caused by political appointments. The fourth paper shows that democracies with meritocratic types of bureaucracies survive longer than democracies with patronage-based administrations.
The main joint conclusion is that democracy aid may alter things on the margin but only under some fruitful conditions when donors’ and recipients’ interests coincide. In other circumstances institutional impediments and reluctant actors are likely to limit the role of democracy aid in democratic development. Moreover, the fruitful conditions imply political stability; therefore the prospects of radical change, as a result of aid projects, are small. This is a paradoxical conclusion given that the very aim of democracy aid is rather to promote political change than the status quo.

The research design is mainly oriented towards performing large N-empirical tests of hypotheses (Papers I, II, and IV) but it also includes more qualitative accounts on how theoretical mechanisms play out in practice, both based on field interviews (Paper III) and historical examples (Paper IV). This empirical contribution, in comparison to previous research on democracy aid, broadens the analytical scope in terms of time frame, and the recipients and donors included. The qualitative accounts, on the other hand, explore mechanisms not studied previously in relation to the novel hypotheses developed in this dissertation. Table 1 summarizes shortly the four papers included in this dissertation.

This introductory chapter has two aims: to present the main contributions of the dissertation in relation to previous research in the related fields, and to discuss conceptual issues and measurement problems in relation to the empirical research in the papers. Other methodological issues, related particularly to the type of analysis that is being performed, are discussed more thoroughly in the papers.

The chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces definitions and measurements of democracy. This section is followed by an introduction to definitions, measurements, the scope of democracy aid and the patterns of allocation. Thereafter, the contribution of this dissertation is discussed in relation to the most important issues in research on democratization and aid. The fourth section provides some concluding remarks and a discussion on the implications for future research. Summaries of the four papers are provided in Appendix 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper I.</th>
<th>Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing or decreasing democracy levels within authoritarian regimes.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Different types of authoritarian regimes and their characteristics; time horizons and political institutions.</td>
<td>Large N. All recipients and all donors.</td>
<td>Democracy aid has only a positive effect on democracy levels in one-party regimes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper II.</td>
<td>The Limited Effects of Democracy Aid on Regime Change</td>
<td>Regime change; democratization, and democratic breakdown.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Democracy aid is a potential threat to authoritarian leaders while it is a potential safeguard for democratically elected leaders.</td>
<td>Large N. All recipients and all donors.</td>
<td>Democracy aid prevents democratic breakdown but does not foster democratization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper III.</td>
<td>Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs</td>
<td>Democratic consolidation.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>The importance of bureaucratic stability and administrative structure for the implementation of democratic governance programs.</td>
<td>Small N. The recipient countries Peru and Bolivia, and their biggest democratic governance aid donors.</td>
<td>The implementation of democracy aid/democratic governance aid is obstructed by instability (high turnover among staff) in the public sector. Instability caused by political appointments is probably worse than instability among meritocratically recruited staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper IV.</td>
<td>Administrative Structure and Democratic Survival (with Victor Lapuente)</td>
<td>Regime change; democratic survival.</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>The Administrative structure; meritocratic vs. patronage-based bureaucracy creates different incentives for political actors to act in ways that disrupt democracy.</td>
<td>Large N. Both developing countries and industrial countries included.</td>
<td>Having a merit-based bureaucracy as opposed to a patronage-based one makes democracies survive longer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Democratization – Definitions and Measurement

A necessary point of departure for developing theories on democratization is to define democracy and, for testing these theories empirically, it is necessary to develop valid measurements of the defined concept. The following sections, therefore, discuss different definitions and measures of democracy in relation to the issues explored in the following papers.

How to Define Democracy, Democratization, and Democratic Survival?

The definition of democracy employed in this dissertation is based on the concept of political democracy, as a regime with certain procedures (Collier and Levitsky 1997). But what are those procedures? Joseph Schumpeter offers one of the more minimalistic definitions:

> The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s voice. (1976, 269)

This definition only refers to the procedures of democracy in a very minimalistic way and does not attach a certain set of rights or freedoms to the procedures. According to Schumpeter: “the democratic method does not necessarily guarantee a greater amount of individual freedom than another political method would permit in similar circumstances.” (1976, 271) More recently, other scholars, most notably Adam Przeworski and fellows (Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub et al. 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000), have also taken this minimalistic stand arguing that if a lot of content is put into the definition, factors that we want to explore would be a part of the definition per se and thus impossible to include in the analysis as explanatory independent variables. Democracy according to these scholars is: “a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections.” (Alvarez et al. 1996, 4) “Some governmental offices” are essentially the chief executive and the seats in the “effective legislative body.” Contestation means that the opposition “has some chance of winning offices as a consequence of elections.” (Alvarez et al. 1996, 5)
These scholars also argue that democracy is inherently an either-or concept and that democracy is qualitatively different from dictatorship. (Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub et al. 2010):

We believe that while some regimes are more democratic than others, unless offices are contested, they should not be considered democratic. The analogy with the proverbial pregnancy is thus that while democracy can be more or less advanced, one cannot be half-democratic: there is a natural zero point. (Alvarez et al. 1996, 21)

Other scholars argue that a procedural definition of political democracy should also include some fundamental rights. An example of a more inclusive definition is Robert Dahl’s (1989) concept of polyarchy; according to which seven different institutions are necessary, including not only the minimalist procedures described above, but also freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information, and freedom of association. According to this view, political and civil rights are essential for the democratic process to be exercised following democratic principles (Dahl 1989, 222).

Also definitions of democracy that are closer to the Dahlian definition of polyarchy are used in empirical analyses on democratization. Such as: in a democracy important decision-making offices are elected in free and fair elections with universal suffrage. In addition fundamental political freedoms are sustained (e.g., Hadenius 1992; Teorell 2010). According to these scholars democracy is a matter of gradations rather than an either-or concept (e.g., Bollen 1990).

For scholars that define democracy in dichotomous terms, democratization occurs whenever a regime shifts from being authoritarian into becoming a democracy; for scholars that define democracy continuously, democratization is a process of upward shifts of democracy levels (e.g., Teorell 2010).

As we will see below the empirical analyses included in this dissertation employ different measures based on either the inclusive definitions or the more minimalistic definitions of democracy depending on the specific purpose of the study.

I agree with Jørgen Möller and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2013, 145) that “it makes sense” to use the minimal criteria of Schumpeter based on competitive elections “to separate democracies from autocracies.” Even though it is hard to argue that democracy is never about nuances and only about thresholds between authoritarian and democratic regimes, it is also often very enlightening and in fact necessary for some research questions to examine
why certain events occur, such as coups d'état against democratic regimes. However to study these events and define them as coups against democracy we must first decide whether the regime was in fact a democracy before the coup d'état took place, or else we would not know whether the coup was made against a democracy or in fact took place in an authoritarian setting. Compare for example the overthrow of the Shah in Iran during 1979, which certainly implied the breakdown of a regime, but in an authoritarian setting (Snyder 1992), with the military coup against Isabel Peron’s government in Argentina, 1976, which was a coup against a democratically elected government (albeit in a fragile and short-lived democracy) (Schamis 1991). In these occasions, when there is clearly a need for defining a qualitative difference or threshold between democracies and authoritarian regimes, an either-or definition of democracy is of great use. It allows the researcher to define when these breaks take place and how long regimes survive as democracies or autocracies. The use of democracy as an either-or concept in this dissertation is thus closely related to events and regime change.

However, all regimes may demonstrate varying levels of democracy, even authoritarian ones (Elkins 2000), for example, contemporary North Korea is certainly more authoritarian than present day Singapore even though both countries are dictatorships according to dichotomous definitions (Freedom House 2012; Cheibub et al. 2010). Therefore it is also of interest to examine the fine-tuned upturns and downturns of democracy levels within authoritarian regimes.

Increases in democracy levels in an authoritarian regime, without a regime change, is defined as liberalization. Liberalization is a phase under which the authoritarian regime opens up, extending civil and political rights without losing power (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). For example, the recent political reforms in Burma made by the authoritarian leadership could be signs of a process of liberalization (Callahan 2012).

Democratization in this dissertation is the process when an authoritarian regime becomes democratic which implies a qualitative system shift and not only increasing democracy levels. This is similar to the approach taken by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) in their seminal work on democratic transitions. Democratization for these scholars is the process of applying new (democratic) principles to the political system, increasing the inclusiveness, and extending democracy to new issues in a previously authoritarian regime. For example, the general elections of 1983 in Argentina implied such a qualitative shift, which marked the end of an authoritarian
military regime and was followed by the inauguration of a democratically elected president (Karl 1990).

Similarly to the authoritarian regimes there are also differences in democracy levels between different democracies. There are different degrees of stability within democracies, which is sometimes referred to as democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996; Schedler 2001). Some scholars use this label only to denote democratic survival (e.g., Ulfelder 2010; Svolik 2008; Schedler 1998), which is also how democratic consolidation is mainly approached in this dissertation. However, others argue that consolidation not only implies the survival of democracy but also the deepening of democracy (e.g., Diamond 1999).

Processes of democratization – liberalization, transition, and consolidation – may be considered as different phases (Rustow 1970) but this is not to say that a process that starts with liberalization always ends in a consolidated democracy. In other words, these phases should not be considered as a deterministic process. Authoritarian regimes may experience liberalization without regime change and transitions to democracy may happen without a subsequent consolidation.

In sum, this dissertation makes use of procedural definitions of democracy that may be more or less minimalistic, dichotomous, or continuous, depending on the research question. In the next section we will see how these different definitions may be measured.

How to Measure Democracy Levels, Democratization, and Democratic Survival?

Five different measures of democracy are used in the following papers, Freedom House (2012), Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2010), Freedom House and Polity IV combined (Hadenius and Teorell 2005), Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited (DD) (Cheibub et al. 2010) and Opposition (Przeworski et al. 2011). All of them have in common that their coverage is broad both in terms of time period and countries included, even though the scope varies between the different measures. These measures are discussed in more detail in the next sections.

A Dichotomous or a Graded Measure of Democracy?

The debate on whether democracy should be defined in dichotomous terms or in gradations is disputed in parallel to the debate on how democracy should be measured (Cheibub et al. 2010; Collier and Adcock 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Teorell 2010). This controversy is related to the debate on the

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1 Freedom House is only available from 1972, DD is available from 1946, while Polity IV and Opposition are available from about 1800.
foundations of democracy as a theoretical construct as well as to the methodological question on how to measure democracy in empirical analyses. Kenneth Bollen states that: “It is easy to confuse treating a concept as dichotomous with measuring a continuous concept with a dichotomous indicator.” (1990, 13) A dichotomous measure of democracy would according to Bollen imply a “crude lumping of countries into the same category when in reality they have very different degrees of political democracy.” (1990, 13–14) Thus, with a dichotomous measure we would lose information regarding the degrees of differences in democracy levels between the countries (see also Hadenius and Teorell 2005).

Whether we choose to make use of a dichotomous or a graded measure of democracy may in fact result in quite different empirical results (Collier and Adcock 1999). Scholars wanting to explain regime change have opted for a dichotomous approach while scholars interested in explaining more gradual democratic developments have opted for graded measures of democracy (Collier and Adcock 1999). Certainly, the perspective on the concept as such, in this case whether democracy is a graded concept or a dichotomous one, could also lead scholars to pose different research questions.

As mentioned above, this dissertation takes a rather pragmatic stand in this debate. It uses different types of operationalizations depending on what is most appropriate given the research question (Collier and Adcock 1999; see also Coppedge et al. 2011). Three of the measures used in this dissertation (Freedom House, Polity IV, and the composite Freedom House/Polity measure) are graded measures of democracy; two of the measures are dichotomous (DD and Opposition). When this dissertation studies gradual changes within authoritarian regimes it employs graded measures of democracy (Paper I) and when it examines regime duration and events it uses dichotomous measures of democracy (Paper II and IV).

**Description of the Measures Used**

Freedom House and Polity IV are close to the Dahlian definition of polyarchy and include political procedures, institutions, and political freedoms. There is more emphasis on freedoms in the Freedom House measure and more emphasis on political institutions in the Polity measure, but they are highly correlated. Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell (2005) argue that these two, in combination, better capture political democracy than when the two are measured separately. In this dissertation, these two measures of democracy are used to assess changes in democracy levels. Paper I uses the composite index of these two measures constructed by Hadenius and Teorell but the same analyses are also run with the two measures separately.
Moreover, Polity IV is also used to measure democratization and democratic survival as robustness checks in Papers II and IV. In these analyses the Polity IV index that ranges from -10 to +10 is transformed into dichotomous variables indicating regime changes from or to democracy.

Both Freedom House and Polity IV have their weaknesses. In addition to the bias in their content mentioned above, Freedom House has for example been criticized for including freedoms that are not related to democracy, such as for example, economic freedoms (e.g., Munck and Verkuilen 2002). On the other hand Polity has, for example, been criticized for not capturing the issue of participation (e.g., Munck and Verkuilen 2002). But so far these measures are the best available gauges of democracy levels with an extensive coverage over time and across countries (Teorell 2010, 33) and they are the most commonly used in empirical studies on democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011). Furthermore, Freedom House and Polity IV are the measures of democracy used in the most well-known quantitative study on democracy aid (Finkel et al. 2007).

DD is based on the more minimalistic definition proposed by Przeworski and fellows which was described above. DD was coded and presented by Michael Alvarez et al. (1996) and later extended to cover more countries and years by José Cheibub et al. (2010). This index has been applauded for its clarity when it comes to coding rules and for its selection of indicators, but is criticized for its very minimalistic definition of democracy (Munch and Verkuilen 2002). DD is used in Paper II to delimit democracies and autocracies and in order to gauge when democratization and democratic breakdown take place.

Opposition is a measure that is based on an even more minimal definition than DD. Opposition only includes some aspects of democracy: “This variable is intended to indicate whether the institutional system allows at least some political pluralism.” (Przeworski et al. 2011, 14) In practice countries are coded as Opposition=1 “if as of December 31 there is a legislature that was at least in part elected by voters facing more than one choice” and coded 0 or -1 otherwise (Przeworski et al. 2011, 14). This for example implies that countries do not need to have universal suffrage to be considered “democracies” (according to this definition). Opposition is used in Paper IV to define democracies because earlier proto-democracies of the

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2 For example, Polity codes Sweden with a score of 10 (highest level of democracy) since 1917, despite the fact that women were excluded from the right to vote until 1921.

3 0 = “if the above is not true OR [sic], only in presidential systems, if it is true BUT [sic] either the chief executive is not elected OR [sic] was elected unopposed.” -1 = “if the legislature was closed at some point during the year and the state as of December 31 is unclear.” (Przeworski et al. 2011, 15)
nineteenth century, for example in the US, France, and Spain, are relevant for the theoretical framework. Opposition is not used to measure when a democratic breakdown occurs but only to restrict the sample to the countries that are defined as proto-democracies. Instead a variable denoting an important event, namely coups against a regime, both coups from outside the regime, and autocoups (coup from inside the regime), are used to define when democratic breakdowns occur (data on coups are from Przeworski et al. 2011).

Democracy Aid – Definition, Measure, Scope, and Patterns of Allocation

Definition – What is Democracy Aid?
As stated above, this dissertation aims at studying a particular type of foreign aid: democracy aid. However, in order to properly define democracy aid we must first characterize foreign aid flows.

Definition of Foreign Aid
The most commonly used definition of foreign aid is the definition employed by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for defining Official Development Assistance (ODA). This definition defines ODA’s recipients, donors, purpose, and form, claiming that foreign aid consists of:

Those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). (OECD/DAC 2011)

According to this definition, foreign aid is restricted to official flows from OECD members to the countries that are eligible recipients, according to the OECD/DAC list of developing countries. This list is revised every three years according to the recipient countries’ economic development (per capita GNI). Moreover, ODA’s purpose is restricted to economic development and

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4 Different terms for democracy aid are used in the literature: political aid (Crawford 2001), democracy assistance (Burnell 2000b; Finkel et al. 2007), democracy aid (e.g., Scott and Steele 2011).
welfare but it is normally up to the donors to define the purpose of their aid (Riddell 2007, 20).

**Democracy Aid – Content and Purpose**

Thus, democracy aid is a part of the flows of foreign aid that were defined above. But what foreign aid flows should be considered as democracy aid? In other words, what distinguishes democracy aid from other types of aid?

One way of defining democracy aid would be to include every type of aid that could in a remote way promote democracy, in other words, to define democracy aid broadly according to its purpose and to some extent according to its content. Thomas Carothers (2009) is close to this broad approach when he makes a distinction between political and developmental democracy assistance and includes all types of assistance that could foster democracy in the concept. Carothers (2009, 5) distinguishes between aid directed to “core political processes and institutions,” the so-called political approach; aid directed to socioeconomic sectors, in particular to the strengthening of the state and governance, the so-called developmental approach. The political approach to democracy aid defines democracy along the same lines as this dissertation, similar to the Dahlian definition of polyarchy. The developmental approach includes more “substantive outcomes” and positive rights in its definition of democracy (Carothers 2009, 8). According to Carothers both types of democracy assistance may work but it depends on how the programs are performed, “whether they conform to the basic best practices of democracy aid generally” (2009, 12).

However, to include everything that could foster democracy in the democracy aid concept, or everything coming from the donors that empirically promote democracy, renders the concept tautological. What if it happens to be that the particular efforts that are meant to promote democracy do not promote democracy while other efforts that are not meant to actually do? Would we then change the definition so that only unintentional aid would be called democracy aid because it actually has an impact on democracy?

The definition of democracy aid made by most other scholars is restricted to more specific efforts with the explicit purpose of actually promoting democracy and its content seems to be largely accepted among other researchers. But, there are more subtle differences between them, especially when it comes to whether to include governance aid as a part of the democracy aid package or not.

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5 There are different modalities of aid (Gibson et al. 2005, 120–127). This dissertation mainly addresses project aid and program aid. Although aid in the form of general budget support has increased over the last decade, project aid still dominates the ODA flows (Riddell 2007, 47, 180).
Gordon Crawford (2001, 15–30) writes about “the new policy agenda” which includes the three concepts human rights, democracy, and governance. It is also these three concepts that are included in his study on allocation of what he calls political aid. Political aid is defined according to whether the objective is to at least promote one of these three: human rights, democracy, or governance. Richard Youngs (2008) also includes governance in the concept of democracy assistance, together with human rights, and support to civil society. Peter Burnell tries to make a difference between “efforts that are focused directly on democracy’s political variables, to the exclusion of democracy’s supporting conditions.” (2000b, 12) He argues for distinctions between democracy, governance, and human rights but then admits that it is hard to make such distinctions in part because: “The boundaries around each one of these three domains – democracy, governance and human rights – are malleable and inconclusive.” (Burnell 2000b, 19)

When discussing the ways in which foreign aid can promote democracy Steven Finkel et al. (2007) stress that the micro-perspective, and especially actors, for democracy aid, and in turn, the macro-perspective and structural processes are related to the potential impact of general foreign aid on democracy. But, the Finkel et al. scholars define democracy aid like this:

Democracy assistance is a form of democracy promotion. It provides funds or direct assistance to governments, institutions, or civil society actors that are working either to strengthen an emerging democracy or to foster conditions that could lead to democracy’s rise where a nondemocratic regime holds power. (Azpuru de Cuestas et al. 2008, 151)

Similar to Finkel et al. (2007) and other scholars, this dissertation defines democracy aid as a type of foreign aid with a specific purpose, namely, to foster democracy in the aid recipient countries. Thus, in order for aid activities to be included in the definition, the donors’ purpose with a particular aid activity should primarily be to support democracy.

Crawford has noted that there are some differences among the donors he examines – Sweden, the US, the UK and the EU – on how they define democracy, but they all stress, “free and fair elections within a multi-party [sic] system as a minimal, necessary condition of democracy.” (2001, 72) This is similar to the more minimalistic definitions of democracy that were discussed in more detail above. Thus, there is some kind of common threshold for democracy among donors, even though there are subtle differences in their definitions of democracy.
INTRODUCTION

Democracy aid activities as defined in this dissertation should thus be related to the purpose of fostering democracy in accordance with the definition of democracy, presented above, that is commonly agreed upon among donors. Moreover, the definition of democracy aid employed in this dissertation, also defines a specific characteristics. The content should be related to the political system, inside and outside of the state. Both input factors, such as political parties, legislatures, civil society and civic education, and output factors, such as the public administration’s implementation of political decisions are included in the definition of democracy aid employed in this dissertation. Thus, other factors, not related to the purpose of promoting democracy or its specific features, that may or may not promote democracy are not included in the definition, such as aid to general education or health.

What types of activities are included in this definition? A new bluish building stands out on a predominantly colonial square in La Paz, Bolivia. This new building is the main office of the Bolivian ombudsman, an institution which gets over 50% of its funding from international cooperation (Interviews in Paper III; Swedish MFA 2009; Danish MFA and Bolivian MFPD 2009). This type of funding is part of the package of democracy aid that recipients receive and is included in the definition employed in this dissertation. Also, legislative support to the Jordanian (USAID 2011) and the Egyptian parliaments (Kamel Al-Sayyid 2000) from USAID, support from Sweden to organizations working with information and communication technologies in Egypt (Sida 2011), support from Germany to local administrations and decentralization processes in Bolivia (GTZ 2009), and USAID’s support to organizations working with the strengthening of political parties in Peru (IRI 2010) are all examples of aid activities that fit into the definition employed in this dissertation.

How to Measure Democracy Aid Flows?

Foreign Aid Data
The aid statistics from the OECD/DAC are the most comprehensive source on developmental aid that exists today. Most aid figures are taken from this source, to include World Bank data (World Bank 2012) and the bulk of the Project-level Aid data (the PLAID project) (Aid Data 2012). The OECD/DAC (OECD.Stat 2012a) provides a specific database on aid activities, the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), to which the member donors report aid projects, together with their specific purposes, according to a standardized OECD/DAC classification of purposes (OECD/DAC 2012). A purpose code is assigned to each project according to the particular project’s
purpose. Thus, these purpose codes should be comparable between different donor countries and the DAC statistical reporting directives state: “Comparability is the essence: the data should be reported on the same basis by all donor countries.” (DCD/DAC 2007, 5)

The CRS data is probably the best data obtainable if we want to cover the whole OECD member community’s aid to eligible ODA recipient countries (e.g. Savun and Tirone 2011). An alternative would be to gather separate data from each donor (e.g., Crawford 2001; Youngs 2008). But that would imply that the researcher has to gauge whether the classifications of aid projects that different donors use are comparable or not. This strategy would also involve numerous and risky calculations of different exchange rates and deflators depending on the currency used by the donors.

On the other hand, one risk of using the CRS purpose codes is that different donors may interpret the purpose codes differently and choose to report similar projects under different purpose codes, even though these are supposed to be standardized. Another risk with using the CRS data is that the coverage has varied between donors and over time (OECD/DAC 2010). Yet, when using the strategy of gathering data from the different donors separately, the access to the data would certainly be different from donor to donor; thus the final resulting data set would, most probably, also risk including different coverage ratios for different donors, as in the case with the CRS data.

In sum, the use of the CRS data is, at present, the best strategy given this research’s purpose to take into account the whole donor community.6

There is not a purpose code for democracy aid, but there are different purpose codes that together capture the concept. The sector Government and Civil Society contains a number of different purpose codes which include democracy aid projects in different areas. Thus, for a researcher of democracy aid there is a choice to make whether to 1) include all the categories under this sector into the definition, like for example is done by Burcu Savun and Daniel Tirone (2011) and Saranti Kalyvitis and Irene Vlachaki (2010) (Kalyvitis and Vlachaki even include some purpose codes outside the category); or 2) opt for a less broad measurement that is more similar to the one used by Finkel et al. (2007) in their study on US aid, but still captures what most donors agree is democracy aid or democracy and governance aid.

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6 It should be noted that the ”whole donor community” refers to the OECD/DAC donors and does not include donors outside of DAC; like for example, China, Brazil, or India.
In their empirical analysis, Finkel et al. (2007) measure democracy aid as aid flows classified as Democracy and Governance according to the USAID sector categorization. This sector contains four subsectors, Elections and Political Processes, Rule of Law (human rights and judicial development), Civil Society (mass media, civic education, and labor), and Governance (decentralization, transparency, and anti-corruption programs). In fact, this measure seems to be broader than their definition of democracy aid. The governance sector, which is quite absent from the Finkel et al. study’s definition, amounts to 29.4% with their measure of democracy aid (Azpuru de Cuestas et al. 2008).7

The measure of democracy aid used in Papers I (Cornell aForthcoming) and II is close to the Finkel et al. (2007) measure. It includes purpose codes in the CRS that capture both aid to civil society and to government administration but excludes Economic and Development Policy/Planning, Public Sector Financial Management, and Women’s Equality Organizations and institutions (according to the older purpose code scheme).8 In contrast, the descriptive statistics included in Paper III (Cornell bForthcoming), are based on a newer purpose code scheme and therefore a broader set of purpose codes is included; all the purpose codes under the sector of Government and Civil Society.9

A problem that arises when combining purpose codes is that they have changed over the years. It should be noted that changes between sectors are much less common. Therefore if we are interested in comparisons over time,

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7 Finkel et al. (2007) found that the correlation between their measure of democracy assistance from the USAID and their measure of democracy assistance from OECD/DAC was quite low (0.62). However they included all projects in the CRS database, which were coded as Policy Objective Participatory Development/Good Government (principal or significant objective) or coded with the purpose codes 15050-16065. This is probably a broader measurement of democracy assistance than the purposes included in their own data on democracy assistance from the USAID. This measurement could include projects engaged in issues that probably not are included; like post-conflict peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution, etc. (DCD/DAC 2007).
8 Papers I and II include the former purpose codes: Legal and Judicial Development (15130), Government Administration (15140), Strengthening Civil Society (15150), Elections (15161), Human Rights (15162), and Free Flow of Information (15163) according to the DCD/DAC (2007) Reporting Directives.
9 Paper III includes according to the new purpose code scheme: Public Sector Policy and Administrative Management (15110), Public Sector Finance Management (15111), Decentralization and Support to Subnational Government (15112), Anti-corruption Organizations and Institutions (15113), Legal and Judicial Development (15130), Democratic Participation and Civil Society (15150), Elections (15151), Legislatures and Political Parties (15152), Media and Free Flow of Information (15153), Human Rights (15160), Women’s Equality Organizations (15170).
it may be more reliable, especially with the newer purpose code scheme since 2009, to sum up all the subsectors (purpose codes) in one sector (the so-called DAC 5 codes); as for example, the Government and Civil Society sector (OECD/DAC 2008).

This dissertation adheres to both the purpose and the content of the democracy aid definition previously discussed and the measurement of democracy aid is decided on according to this definition. The purpose, where donors report aid according to certain purposes; the content, where only certain purpose codes are included (those under the broader sector Government and Civil Society).

Hence, this measure is a combination of donors’ purposes and the specific content related to institutions that are vital for democracy and civil society’s democracy activities.

**Denominators in the Measurement of Aid**

Some issues regarding how to measure development aid also affect the measurement of democracy aid. There is, for example, disagreement on whether a denominator should be used in the measurement of aid, and in that case, what type of denominator that should be used. Some scholars argue that it is problematic to deflate aid by GDP or GNI, because if the aid figure is dependent on GNI or GDP, fluctuations in these will affect the measure and thus the whole model (Bearce and Tirone 2010; Wright 2010; Wright and Winters 2010). Still this is a commonly used denominator in the literature on aid effectiveness. Also aid per capita is a common deflator, which builds on the assumption that the influence is relative to the size of the population (e.g., Alesina and Weder 2002). On the other hand, Finkel et al. (2007) argue that there is no good reason for why democracy aid should be measured per GDP or per capita.

The quantitative analyses with democracy aid included in this dissertation (Papers I and II) use per capita as the denominator because it is probable that the impact of democracy aid is relative to the size of the population. A big country would probably benefit less from the same amounts of funding than a smaller country with smaller state infrastructure and smaller civil society.

**Commitments versus Disbursements**

Another choice to make is whether to measure the disbursements or the commitments of aid. Disbursements are the flows that are disbursed to the recipient country, while commitments are written obligations that the donor country makes to allocate certain amounts.
A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a recipient country or agency, or in the case of internal development-related expenditures, the outlay of funds by the official sector. (DCD/DAC 2007, 11)

A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of the recipient country. (DCD/DAC 2007, 11)

Most aggregate aid data used in research is on disbursements but there are also some scholars that use commitments (Harrigan and Wang 2011; Johansson 2011). Finkel et al. (2007) measure obligations reported in USAID’s Congressional Budget Justifications which are not as close as disbursements to the actual delivery of aid but probably closer than commitments. James Scott and Carie Steele argue that they use a “measure of actual expenditures on democracy assistance” (2011, 56) but in fact their measure seems to be quite close to the one used by Finkel et al. (2007).

When measuring aid disbursements for specific purposes from the CRS, the historical data is not very reliable. In fact, OECD/DAC (2010) recommends not analyzing this data on disbursements before 2002. Therefore when measuring democracy aid from the CRS this dissertation has mostly relied on commitments figures.

Scope – How Much Aid to Democracy Aid?
How much money is spent on democracy aid? In the following section all of the purpose codes, according to the current classification under the sector Government and Civil Society (OECD/DAC 2012), are totaled to describe the scope of democracy aid in terms of amounts, main recipients, and main donors. It could be argued that this broader classification captures the concept of democratic governance aid rather than strictly democracy aid but, as mentioned above, with the new purpose code scheme it is more appropriate to include the whole sector.

Figure 1 shows the total amounts of democracy aid disbursed and committed from 1990–2010. Data from the CRS is available from 1973 but for democracy aid it is the period after 1990 that is of most interest; since then democracy aid has been on the fore of the aid agenda. We can see that from 1990, the global trend has been that of increasing amounts of democracy aid, both in terms of commitments and disbursements, with

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10 See footnote 9 for a list of the purpose codes included.
smaller downturns in the middle of the 1990s, in the middle of the 2000s, and a more recent decrease from 2009 to 2010. In the beginning of the 1990s, the global total of democracy aid amounted to about 2,000 million USD yearly. Twenty years later, in 2010 this figure had increased to almost 14,000 million USD.

Figure 1. Total Amounts of Democratic Governance Aid, 1990–2010

![Graph showing total amounts of democratic governance aid from 1990 to 2010.](image)


Figure 2 shows democratic-governance-aid disbursements as a share of the total net disbursements of ODA, 1990–2010. We can see that democratic governance aid has increased over the period also in relation to the total amounts of official development aid. In the beginning of the 1990s, democratic governance aid accounted for less than 1% of total ODA but in 2010 the figure had increased to 12%. Thus it seems that democracy aid has increased at the expense of other types of aid.
What is the distribution between the different subsectors of democracy aid according to the purpose codes assigned in the CRS? The biggest sector, as a mean over the period, 1990–2010, is Public Sector and Administrative Management, which accounts for about 47%. This category includes assistance to institution building, like for example civil service reform and human resource management (OECD/DAC 2012). The second biggest sector included in democracy aid is Democratic Participation and Civil Society, which accounts for more than 12%. This category includes for example activities to foster participation and civic education (OECD/DAC 2012). The subsectors which can be defined as governance (Public Sector and Administrative Management, Public Sector Management, Decentralization and Support to Subnational Government, and Anticorruption Organizations and Institutions) together sum up to 60%. The subsector Human Rights accounts for 11%. (See also Table A1 in Appendix 1.)

However, as mentioned above, these subsectors have been changed over time. For example, according to the data from OECD/DAC there is no aid before 2009 to legislatures and political parties, but this is most certainly due to changes in the CRS classifications. Before 2009 legislatures were included in the category for government administration. However, as mentioned...
above, while changes between the subsectors, within the broader sectors, have been made frequently, these changes do not affect the Government and Civil Society sector as a whole.

**Recipients and Donors**
The presentation of democracy aid above was concentrated on global totals. This section gives an overview of what countries are engaged in democracy aid. Who receives democracy aid and who gives democracy aid?

Table 2 shows the 11 biggest receivers of democracy aid, 1990–2010. Both the biggest recipient of democracy aid, Iraq, and the second biggest, Afghanistan, were rated as not free in 2010 by Freedom House. Pakistan and Tanzania, the third and fourth biggest recipients were rated partly free while the fifth, India, and the sixth biggest recipient, Indonesia, were rated as free in 2010 (Freedom House 2012). It should be noted that the allocation of democracy aid is spread between many countries. The biggest recipient, Iraq, accounts for 8% of total democracy aid during the period, but the 11 biggest recipients only account for about 33% of total democracy aid flows.

### Table 2. Top 11 Recipients of Democratic Governance Aid, 1990–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Disbursements USD millions</th>
<th>% of total Democratic Governance Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Iraq</td>
<td>8409.797</td>
<td>8.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Afghanistan</td>
<td>5970.165</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pakistan</td>
<td>2993.168</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tanzania</td>
<td>2573.561</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. India</td>
<td>2523.77</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Indonesia</td>
<td>2361.611</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mozambique</td>
<td>2150.886</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. West Bank &amp; Gaza Strip</td>
<td>2029.009</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>1953.962</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bangladesh</td>
<td>1867.957</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Uganda</td>
<td>1850.231</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 11 biggest recipients</td>
<td>34684.117</td>
<td>33.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other recipients</td>
<td>69489.583</td>
<td>66.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>104173.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Constant 2010 prices. The author’s calculations.


Table 3 shows the ten biggest donors of democracy aid, 1990–2010. There are fewer donors than recipients and naturally, the aid flows from donors are more concentrated than the allocation to the recipients. The ten biggest donors account for about 84% of total democracy aid flows. The US is by and large the biggest bilateral donor, with 23% of democracy aid’s global total. The second and third donors are both multilateral organizations. The
next bilateral donor, the UK, thus takes the fourth place and contributes only 7% of total democracy aid.

Table 3. The Ten Biggest Donors of Democratic Governance Aid, 1990–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total Democratic-Governance-Aid Disbursements USD millions</th>
<th>% of total Democratic-Governance-Aid Disbursements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. United States</td>
<td>23982.6</td>
<td>23.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development Association</td>
<td>18915.22</td>
<td>18.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(World Bank)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EU Institutions</td>
<td>10346.21</td>
<td>9.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. United Kingdom</td>
<td>7602.811</td>
<td>7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Germany</td>
<td>5561.558</td>
<td>5.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Australia</td>
<td>5464.13</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sweden</td>
<td>5428.39</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Canada</td>
<td>4036.234</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Norway</td>
<td>3326.881</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Netherlands</td>
<td>3186.553</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ten biggest donors</td>
<td>87850.587</td>
<td>84.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>16323.113</td>
<td>15.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>104173.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Constant 2010 prices. The author’s calculations.

Patterns of Allocation of Democracy Aid – An Exposé
How do donors allocate democracy aid? A great effort has been made in the literature on general development aid to explain aid allocation (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Weder 2002; Harrigan and Wang 2011; Johansson 2011). It is usually suspected that poorer countries receive more development aid than richer countries (e.g. Johansson 2011) and that donors allocate more aid to their former colonies and to other strategic allies (Alesina and Dollar 2000). There is also research showing that higher democracy levels are related to increased general aid flows, suggesting that donors actually take a stand for democracy in their choice of allocation (Dollar and Levin 2006). These studies also show that there are clear differences in allocation patterns between different donors (Alesina and Dollar 2000).

However, the pattern of aid allocation is not necessarily the same for democracy aid and there is no parallel quantitative research on democracy
aid’s allocation patterns, as there is for aid in general, even though the pattern of allocation may be important in order to understand democracy aid’s potential effects. This introduction therefore includes an initial analysis of the patterns of democracy aid allocation. There are three potential patterns of allocation that we could assume on the basis of research on democracy aid and on allocation patterns of aid in general.

The strategic selection pattern would imply that donors strategically choose to support countries when they are likely to democratize. If there is such a strategic selection of the most promising cases we may have difficulties separating the effects of democracy aid from other factors in the democratization process (Scott and Steele 2011). It would then likely lead to a selection bias in the studies on democracy aid. If a potential strategic selection is not accounted for it could lead to an overestimation of democracy aid’s effects in the examination of its impacts on democracy.

The need pattern would imply supporting those recipients in the most need of democracy aid. But what countries could be considered in the greatest need of democracy aid? As a parallel to the concept that the poorest countries are the ones that need economic aid most, we may think the least democratic countries are the countries in most need of democracy aid.

The aid package pattern implies that democracy aid has the same pattern as other types of aid. Thus, the decisions attached to contributing democracy aid are dependent on decisions on the allocation of other types of aid (c.f., Scott and Steele 2011; Cornell aForthcoming). Then, there would not be any significant independent decisions on the allocation of democracy aid.

Analyses on the allocation of democracy aid could shed light on whether these three patterns have empirical support. Here, a first set of analyses is done on all democracy aid flows irrespective of the donor and a second set of analyses looks into whether different donors allocate democracy aid differently. I follow one of the most influential publications on the allocation of general aid when measuring the dependent variable as the log of democracy aid disbursements and its five-year average (Alesina and Dollar 2000).

A first bivariate analysis shows that a 1% increase in other aid would lead to a 0.7% increase in democracy aid (Table 4, Model 1). Thus democracy aid is indeed affected by the allocation of other types of aid. Thus, the aid package pattern gets support in this first analysis. The next sets of analyses
include also the usual suspicions in the literature on aggregate aid flows, mentioned above.\footnote{Table A4 in Appendix 1 reports the models in Table 4 but with aid per capita. The results are similar to the ones presented in Table 4 without the per capita denominator.}

The results show that including several controls in the models do not alter the result that there is a significant and positive relationship between aggregate aid flows and democracy aid (Table 4, Models 2–3). Hence, there seems to be support for the aid package pattern also when several controls are added to the model, even though the effects of other aid flows are smaller with these controls.

Table 4. General Patterns of Democratic-Governance-Aid Allocation, 1995–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log(Other aid, five-year average)(_t)_1</td>
<td>0.705***</td>
<td>0.281*</td>
<td>0.235*</td>
<td>0.253*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Population)(_t)_1</td>
<td>0.520***</td>
<td>0.522***</td>
<td>0.502***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0844)</td>
<td>(0.0834)</td>
<td>(0.0813)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(GDP/capita)(_t)_1</td>
<td>-0.263*</td>
<td>2.782**</td>
<td>-0.233*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.981)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Log(GDP/capita)(_t)_1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.221**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0703)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level(_t)_1</td>
<td>0.149***</td>
<td>0.148***</td>
<td>0.426***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0341)</td>
<td>(0.0335)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Democracy level(_t)_1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0277**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00984)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former colony</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.903***</td>
<td>-7.850***</td>
<td>-17.71***</td>
<td>-8.038***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td>(1.753)</td>
<td>(3.281)</td>
<td>(1.683)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root-Mean-Squared Error</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N countries</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years observed by country</td>
<td>12.67</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Prais-Winsten regression. Unstandardized regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses. The dependent variable is Log(Democracy aid, five-year average). First-order autocorrelation specified.

** p<0.1, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001.

Sources: OECD.Stat 2012 a;b; Teorell et al. 2011.

Moreover, the results also show that countries with higher democracy levels tend to receive more democracy aid (Table 4, Models 2–3). Democracy level
is determined with the composite measure of Freedom House and Polity IV, ranging from one (lowest level of democracy) to ten (highest level of democracy) (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). Because this effect is positive rather than negative we can conclude that the more democratic countries, not the least democratic countries, receive more democracy aid. This gives initial support to the strategic selection pattern rather than the need pattern.

However, Table 4 also shows a model where a squared version of the democracy variable is included (Model 4). We can see, as mentioned before, that the linear democracy variable indicates a positive relationship between democracy and democracy aid, but since the squared democracy variable is negative this may indicate that the relationship is reversed at higher levels of democracy. Figure 3 illustrates this point showing how the allocation of democracy aid goes up with higher levels of democracy, but that this effect is leveled out at higher levels of democracy. Thus, countries with higher levels of democracy receive more democracy aid, but above 7, on the Freedom House/Polity composite index scale, donors do not tend to reward higher levels of democracy to the same extent.

Moreover, the average marginal effects of higher democracy levels indicate that the effects of higher democracy levels is reversed (and no longer significant) at democracy levels from 7 and above on the composite Freedom House/Polity scale.12 It should be noted that Hadenius and Teorell (2007) set the threshold between democracies and authoritarian regimes at 7.5 on the scale of the composite index. In a later article it is set to 7, based on the average score on this index for a number of categorical measures of democracy, for the year before democratic breakdown and the year after democratic transition (Wahman et al. 2013). Thus, it seems like increasing democracy levels are rewarded with more aid until the recipient countries become democracies.

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12 Not reported here, but available from the author upon request.
Figure 3. Democratic-Governance-Aid Allocation at Different Democracy Levels

Note: The graph is based on Table 4, Model 4. Note that the fitted values are taken from a logged version of democratic governance aid. 95% confidence intervals.

The other controls included could be considered as support to the aid package pattern assumption in that democracy aid roughly follows the pattern expected of other aid. Poorer countries seem to receive more democracy aid (Table 4, Models 2–3). A 1% positive change in GDP/capita would lead to a 26% decrease in democracy aid inflows. When also including a squared variable for GDP/capita we can see that democracy aid in fact increases with higher GDP/capita but as GDP/capita increases the relationship become reversed so that democracy aid decreases with higher GDP/capita.13 In other words, very poor countries receive less democracy aid than countries a little better off but richer countries receive less democracy aid than poorer countries.

However, it is interesting to note that in these models, with democracy aid from all the OECD/DAC donors included, there is no significant effect of being a former colony as opposed to never have been colonized (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000). Moreover, more populous countries seem to receive more

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13 The marginal effects indicate the effects are negative at Log(GDP/capita) higher than about 6.3 which equals about 544 US dollars (at constant 1990 prices) per capita GDP. Not reported here but available upon request.
democracy aid, however, when democracy aid is taken per capita the population variable is negative indicating that bigger countries, in terms of population, receive less democracy aid per capita (reported in Table A4, Appendix 1).

In sum, the aid package pattern is supported by these analyses on allocation but the need pattern is not corroborated since we cannot conclude that the least democratic recipients are the ones receiving more democracy aid. The results are slightly more complicated when it comes to the selection pattern. Here we can see that countries with higher democracy levels seem to be rewarded with more democracy aid but only up to a certain level of democracy.

The models above showed the allocation pattern for all democracy aid flows without taking into account that different donors may follow different patterns. The next set of analyses examines the allocation patterns of four different donors separately: Sweden, the US, the UK, and France. These donors were chosen to represent different parts of the donor community reflecting the categorizations of the different types of donors in previous research (e.g., Crawford 2001; Alesina and Dollar 2000).

Table 5 includes the control variables included in Table 4 above and two additional aid controls: other aid from the same donor (excluding democracy aid) and other aid from other donors (including democracy aid). When these controls are included we can see that there is not only a significant relationship between the donors’ democracy aid and their own other aggregate aid but all donors, except for the US, also allocate more to countries that receive other aid from other donors (democracy aid included). This implies that the aid package pattern assumption is supported also for separate donors.
Democracy levels are positively related to the allocation of democracy aid for Sweden and the UK (Table 5, Models 1 and 3) but not for the US and France (Table 5, Models 2 and 4).

To examine more specifically the relationship between democracy levels and how much democracy aid that is allocated from the different donors a squared term is introduced to the models (Table 6). For all donors, except the US, higher democracy levels increases the amount of democracy aid that is allocated to a particular country. However, the inclusion of the squared
variable for democracy levels indicates that for all donors, except the US, this effect is decreasing as the level of democracy goes up.

Table 6. Patterns of Democratic-Governance-Aid Allocation for Different Donors – The Impact of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Sweden</th>
<th>Model 2 US</th>
<th>Model 3 UK</th>
<th>Model 4 France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log(Other aid from the same donor, five-year average)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.435***</td>
<td>0.694***</td>
<td>0.482***</td>
<td>0.201***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0891)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.0816)</td>
<td>(0.0539)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Other aid from other donors, five-year average)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.553***</td>
<td>0.0744</td>
<td>0.425**</td>
<td>0.204**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.0752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Population)_{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>0.346***</td>
<td>-0.0294</td>
<td>0.0529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0969)</td>
<td>(0.0896)</td>
<td>(0.0707)</td>
<td>(0.0841)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(GDP/capita)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.240*</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.303*</td>
<td>0.0656</td>
<td>0.294*</td>
<td>0.250*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0902)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Democracy level_{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.0204^{*}</td>
<td>-0.00555</td>
<td>-0.0223^{*}</td>
<td>-0.0218^{*}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0121)</td>
<td>(0.00856)</td>
<td>(0.0132)</td>
<td>(0.00902)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British colonial heritage</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>-0.569***</td>
<td>0.631^{*}</td>
<td>-0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.319)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French colonial heritage</td>
<td>-1.555***</td>
<td>-1.068***</td>
<td>-0.995**</td>
<td>2.428***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US colonial heritage</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>-3.704***</td>
<td>-3.408**</td>
<td>1.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
<td>(0.519)</td>
<td>(1.046)</td>
<td>(1.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.068**</td>
<td>-9.566***</td>
<td>-5.720***</td>
<td>-6.996***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.684)</td>
<td>(1.552)</td>
<td>(1.668)</td>
<td>(1.852)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Prais-Winsten regression. Unstandardized regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses. Dependent variable is Log(Democracy aid five-year average). First-order autocorrelation specified.

*p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Sources: OECD.Stat 2012 a;b; Teorell et al. 2011.
See Figure 4 for an illustration of the marginal effect at different levels of democracy in the Swedish case. We can see that the marginal effect of democracy levels decreases as democracy levels go up. At higher levels the democracy levels effect is no longer significant. Thus we have some support for the selection pattern but this is conditional on the level of democracy.

Figure 4. Sweden – Marginal Effects at Different Democracy Levels

Note: The figure shows the marginal effects of democracy levels on democratic-governance-aid allocation at different democracy levels (Freedom House/Polity). 95% confidence intervals.

When it comes to the other controls, the US allocates more democracy aid to countries with more population (Table 5, Model 2) but there is no significant relationship between population and democracy aid among the other donors. Moreover, the relationship between democracy aid and GDP/capita is only significant for the US. The linear effect is positive (Table 5, Model 2) contrary to the results shown in the models with aggregate aid (Table 4). The inclusion of the squared version of GDP/capita indicates that the marginal effect of GDP/capita on the allocation of democracy aid is greater at higher levels of GDP/capita (Reported in Appendix 1, Table A5); in fact the effects of GDP/capita are reversed at lower levels of GDP/capita.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{14}\) Not reported here but available upon request.
The relation between colonial heritage and the allocation of democracy aid follows the expected pattern that donors tend to give more general aid to their former colonies (Crawford 2001; Alesina and Dollar 2000). The biggest effects are found for French democracy aid where the allocation of democracy aid increases by 250% if the recipient country is a former French colony (Table 5, Model 4). It should be noted that the other donors’ allocation of democracy aid is negatively related to being a former French colony. Also being a former British colony increases the allocation of British democracy aid but these effects are smaller than for the French colonial heritage, and only significant at p < 0.1. The coefficients indicate an increase of about 60% for British former colonies, compared to other aid recipients.\textsuperscript{15}

In sum, looking at separate donors we can see that there are indeed different patterns of allocation between them. The former colonial powers, Great Britain and France, allocate more democracy aid to their own colonies. A pattern that is most accentuated in the French case. Another separate pattern is that democracy levels seem to matter less for the US, than for the other donors included here; the US is also the only donor to allocate more to bigger countries in terms of population.

But, the donors all have in common that they tend to allocate more democracy aid to those countries to which they also allocate other types of aid. These results indicate that democracy aid comes in a package with other types of aid and that the decisions to earmark democracy aid are attached to the other aid allocation decisions. In other words, the aid package pattern assumption is supported.

What implications do these findings have for the results presented in this dissertation’s papers? First, the most solid finding seems to be that democracy aid allocation follow the pattern of other types of aid. In other words, the aid package pattern presented above seems to be an important explanatory factor for the allocation patterns of democracy aid. This means that recipients could receive more aid of other types, if they adopt policies that the donors like. This is important for the theoretical arguments presented in Papers I and II. Second, the selection pattern is only supported at lower levels of democracy. This implies that the effects found in Paper II on democracies are probably not driven by a selection bias for promising democracies. If the selection pattern actually drove the results we would

\textsuperscript{15} Only two US former colonies are included in the US sample, the Philippines and the Marshall Islands. Thus the significant and negative relationship between US democracy aid flows and US colonial heritage (Table 5, Model 2) is related to democracy aid flows to these two former-colony countries only.
observe a democratizing effect in autocracies, something that is not supported by the results in Paper II.

The Contribution – What Factors Drive Democratization and Democratic Survival?

One of the main issues in research on democratization is determining what factors drive democratization, in other words, how can we explain that democratization and democratic breakdown occurs (and does not occur)? What factors explain that the level of democracy varies substantially between and within countries over time?

Traditionally, research on democratization has been divided between those scholars arguing for and examining structural factors, such as social and economic modernization, as determinants of democratization (e.g., Lipset 1959; Moore 1966; Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1997) and those scholars arguing that actors, often political elites, might change the direction of a country’s path (e.g., Higley and Gunther 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rustow 1970). Also how different types of institutional arrangements affect democracy have been studied extensively, particularly in relation to democratic survival, such as the differences between parliamentarian and presidential systems (Cheibub 2002; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Stepan and Linz 1978; Stepan and Skach 1993).

Increasingly, these perspectives are combined into a more nuanced and complete explanation that take into consideration short- and long-term effects and differentiate between factors that affect democracy’s upturns or democratization, and factors that affect democracy’s downturns or democratic breakdown, and survival (Alemán and Yang 2011; Przeworski et al. 2000; Teorell 2010). Among other things, it is taken into account that it is not necessarily the same factors that prevent democratic breakdown that lead to democratization (c.f., Rustow 1970).

In addition to the domestic elements – social structures, actors, and political institutions – that still dominate the research, there are also another set of factors that have been brought up in more recent studies: the international factors that may drive democratization (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Levitsky and Way 2005; Whitehead 2001). Examples of international factors include diffusion (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006), international trade, other capital inflows (Rudra 2005), regional organizations (Pevehouse 2005), and foreign aid (e.g., Djankov et al. 2008; Wright 2009).
This dissertation contributes to the literature on democratization and democratic survival in two ways. First, it deepens the understanding of international factors in relation to democracy by examining the impact of democracy aid in different types of regimes. As we will see below, this dissertation attempts to advance the theoretical understanding of democracy aid in presenting theoretical frameworks, that subsequently are tested empirically, on why the effects of democracy aid could be expected to differ between different types of authoritarian regimes; on why the effects of democracy aid could be expected to differ between authoritarian regimes and democracies; and why we would expect democracy aid, granted to democracies with more stable bureaucracies, to be more effective than democracy aid implemented in very unstable public administrations.

Secondly, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on democratic survival by adding an unexplored factor, administrative structure, to the previously dominate explanations. While economic development may very well be important, there may also be other factors regarding democratic survival that are more susceptible to human agency. Those scholars studying such factors, i.e. political institutions and actors (e.g., presidentialism versus parliamentarism and elite pacts), have concentrated on the top policymaking sphere and have neglected the role of institutions in policy implementation and its potential influence on democratic survival.

Theoretical and Empirical Contribution – International Factors Driving Democratization – Democracy Aid

Previous research on aggregate aid presents mixed conclusions when it comes to aid’s effects on democracy. Aggregate aid flows are assumed to be similar to other exogenous economic inflows and may therefore be used at the regime’s discretion (e.g., Morrison 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Aid is also assumed to be fungible which means that earmarked aid to certain sectors frees resources to be used elsewhere (Pack and Pack 1993). Along this line, some scholars show that aid deteriorates democracy (Djankov et al. 2008), while others show that aid has no effect on democracy levels (Knack 2004), or that aid stabilizes both authoritarian and democratic regimes (Morrison 2009).

Some studies on aggregate aid flows show that aid has democratizing effects but these effects are restricted to the specific circumstances when aid is conditional on democratic reforms. For example, Joseph Wright (2009) shows that aid has promoted democratization in authoritarian regimes with a larger incumbent coalition, but only after the end of the Cold War; while Thad Dunning (2004) shows that aid is positively related to democracy levels
in Sub-Saharan Africa, but again, only after the end of the Cold War, which 
he argues is due to the greater possibility for conditional aid donations. All 
these studies examine aggregate aid flows and do not take into account that 
different types of aid may have different effects.

Aggregate foreign aid flows include a broad range of activities with 
different purposes. The promotion of democracy is only one of them. The 
sparse effects of aggregate aid flows on democracy levels, shown in previous 
research, are therefore not very surprising.

In this dissertation it is argued that democracy aid is different from 
aggregate aid because, first, it directly promotes political change towards 
democracy compared to aggregate aid flows which could be argued to 
promote social change more generally (and political change only indirectly); 
second, it is plausible to assume that democracy aid is not as fungible as 
other types of aid (c.f., Mavrotas and Ouattara 2006; Pack and Pack 1993; 
Feyzioglu et al. 1998).

Clearly allocating and implementing democracy aid is not free from 
controversy. The core idea is to promote a particular type of political system, 
which could be a very sensitive issue and is probably more controversial than 
other types of aid that are more politically neutral. Democracy aid is part of 
the larger democracy promotion agenda of imposing democracy on other 
countries, and in that sense it is clearly an interventionist tool (Schraeder 
tools on a “spectrum of violence” of which foreign aid is certainly one of the 
least coercive tools that democracy promoters may use, but nevertheless an 
encroachment. This spectrum ranges from “classic diplomacy” to “military 
intervention.” Moreover, in its essence, democratic “institutions require 
voluntary cooperation, they cannot be imposed, even in conditions of 
asymmetries of power.” (Bermeo 2009, 243) It is argued that democracy 
cannot be exported wholesale. However, what donors are doing when 
allocating democracy aid is to a certain degree an export of a particular 
political system, even though this political system may come in slightly 
different forms.

Thus, democracy aid is an interventionist tool that may be in conflict with 
the notions of ownership that are currently on the aid community’s agenda. 
Such discussions on ownership present that the recipient countries 
themselves should be the ones setting the agenda for their own development 
(Sjöstedt 2013). This is for example manifested in the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness and in the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 2005; OECD 
2008).
Moreover, it is clear from the literature that some recipients have tried to counteract this type of aid more than other less controversial aid flows, and in part, this hampering of democracy aid activities hinders its effect in more hostile environments, as is discussed in Paper I and Paper II.

As mentioned above, democracy aid is not as fungible as other types of aid. This is due to the unneeded nature of many democracy aid activities. Other types of aid, as for example, aid to the health sector, may very well free up resources for the recipient government that may be used elsewhere. But, the types of activities sponsored by democracy aid funding are not likely to have been implemented by the recipient state if it was not for international funding. Thus, there are no freed resources from democracy aid to be used in other sectors.

Most large N-studies on foreign aid do not take into account that different types of aid may have different impacts. However, there are a few quantitative studies on democracy aid that show another pattern of effects than the research on aggregate aid flows.

The most famous study is the one by Finkel et al. (2007).16 These scholars show that democracy aid from the US has had a positive impact on democracy levels over the period 1990–2003. There are 165 countries included in their study, comprising also of countries that did not receive democracy aid during the period in question. The time period is relatively short but is understandable given the prominence that democracy aid has been given after the end of the Cold War (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Youngs 2001).

In a more recent study, Scott and Steele (2011) also test the impact of US donated democracy aid on democracy levels, for a slightly different time period, 1988–2001; they reach the same conclusion that US democracy aid has had a positive impact on democracy levels.

Apart from these two studies concentrating on US democracy aid, there is a study (Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2012) that examines the effects of democracy aid from other donors over a longer time period, 1971–2004. Though, it should be noted that the sample is restricted to only 59 recipients. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the study tests the effects of democracy aid on regime change or only the probability that countries receiving more democracy aid appear in one group or another (any of the groups Free, Partly Free, or Nonfree, as coded by Freedom House) without considering whether democracy aid actually induced regime change, that is, moved from one

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16 See also the two reports written by the same research team (Finkel et al. 2006; 2008).
political system to another. These authors also conclude that democracy aid has positive effects on democratization.

The studies on aggregate aid present thorough theoretical arguments for why we should expect aid to have certain effects. However, the studies on democracy aid do not, to the same extent, develop theoretically why democracy aid would have effect. There are some attempts, like for example, when democracy aid is placed within the framework of other factors brought up in research on democratization (i.e., Finkel et al. 2007). According to this view, democracy aid is considered an actor-oriented international factor, in contrast to aggregate aid that is considered a structural international factor. Moreover, Scott and Steele (2011) present two different mechanisms for how democracy aid could impact democracy levels: through agent empowerment and anticipated reactions. “Agent empowerment” implies that actors that are important in the democratization process are empowered by democracy aid projects. “Anticipated reactions” is a mechanism that plays out both on the donor and the recipient side. Donors anticipate in which countries democracy aid has the most potential to have a positive impact and allocate their programs accordingly. In turn, recipients anticipate that they will get more aid if they do as the donors want and therefore they will do their best to implement the programs.

The joint purpose of the three papers on democracy aid included in this dissertation is to, in relation to the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of previous research, deepen the understanding of why and how the effect of democracy aid varies between the different types of regimes and administrative structures. The next two sections summarize the theoretical arguments, developed in this dissertation, on democracy aid’s effects on democratic development in authoritarian regimes and democracies. The third section summarizes the theoretical argument presented in this dissertation on the specific challenge of democracy aid in public administration.

Democracy Aid Under Authoritarian Rule
Authoritarian regimes are authoritarian because their leaders cannot get elected in democratic elections (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Authoritarian regimes would therefore always prefer not to democratize. Yet, democracy aid’s very aim is to promote political change in a democratic direction that per its definition would threaten an authoritarian leader.

Research on aggregate aid points out that regime leaders have some discretion when receiving aid and may, if they want to, even hamper the

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17 Only in a much smaller subsample of only 26 “initially nondemocratic” countries do they differentiate between the actual change and the general probability to appear in one group or another.
implementation of aid programs (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). Hence, we may assume that authoritarian leaders tend to perceive democracy aid activities as a threat to their survival and in most cases will try to obstruct its implementation.

But in fact there are considerable differences between different types of authoritarian regimes and there is a large literature on these differences, and its implications (Geddes 1999; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Magaloni 2008), also in relation to aggregate aid flows (Wright 2008; 2009).

The threat to their survival that dictators face is not the same for all authoritarian regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). In some types of authoritarian regimes the rulers perceive their time horizons to be long and thus feel less threatened than other authoritarian leaders. Another factor that differs between different types of authoritarian regimes is the degree to which they employ political institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007). Some authoritarian regimes install political institutions that resemble those in democratic regimes, like for example, legislatures.

However, even though authoritarian rulers in general would not be expected to like democracy, they may under some circumstances be willing to implement democracy aid. This dissertation argues that even though authoritarian regime rulers are in general reluctant to accept democracy aid, there are differences between the types of authoritarian regimes on the two factors, time horizons and political institutions. These factors affect the prospect of accepting democracy aid and not obstructing its implementation. Dictators with longer time-horizons can afford the implementation of democracy aid without the risk of losing power. They will therefore not obstruct its implementation, with the calculation of receiving more aid if they cooperate. Moreover, regimes that employ political institutions, similar to the ones in democratic systems, have a better basis for the implementation of democracy aid than regimes without them. Following this logic, the regimes in which democracy aid would have the most potential would be one-party regimes. This type of authoritarian regime is both stable and employs political institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008), in contrast to monarchies which tend to be stable but do not make use of political institutions to the same extent; limited multiparty regimes which make use of political institutions, but, tend to have shorter time-horizons; and military regimes which tend to be very unstable and do not employ these types of political institutions.
In sum, we would expect democracy aid to have the best prospect of effectiveness in one-party regimes. Paradoxically enough, the stability of this type of regime implies that this effectiveness is not expected to lead to any radical regime change. Thus, we would only expect democracy aid to have effects of liberalization, but not democratization, in these regimes.

Paper I shows empirically that democracy aid only has significant positive effects on democracy levels in one-party regimes. Paper II shows that there is no effect of democracy aid on democratization in authoritarian regimes. Thus the effects found in Paper I are probably related to liberalization rather than regime change.

Democracy Aid to Democracies
In contrast to authoritarian leaders, democratic ones are not threatened by a successful implementation of democracy aid to the same extent. On the contrary, these regimes could very well benefit substantially from receiving democracy aid.

Democracy aid aims at supporting political and administrative institutions so that these are strengthened and threats to democracy from outside are mitigated (c.f. Ulfelder 2010). The interests of democratic regime leaders could therefore be expected to coincide with the donors. Consequently, democratic regime leaders will not try to obstruct the implementation of democracy aid. Moreover, similarly to the stable authoritarian regimes, aid-recipient democracies can hope for more aid if they behave in accordance with their aid terms (Scott and Steele 2011) and therefore they may be less inclined to engage in overt undemocratic behavior that could entail the risk of donors withdrawing funding. Therefore potentially also the threats of “autocoups” from inside the regime (c.f. Ulfelder 2010) are alleviated by aid.

Paper II shows empirically that democracy aid prevents democratic breakdown in democracies.

Public Administration and Democratic Governance Aid
– The Specific Challenge of Strengthening the State

In addition to the willingness or unwillingness of the recipient country to implement democracy aid programs we could, on the basis of previous research on aggregate aid, think of three other main reasons for why democracy aid could have limited effects: 1) the funds disappear in rent-seeking activities (corruption); 2) aid investments free resources to be used elsewhere and this other use has negative effects for aid programs; 3) aid programs are ineffective.

The first factor depends on the rate of corruption in the aid recipient country. Scholars even argue that aid increases rent-seeking activities (e.g.,
Bräutigam 2000; Djankov et al. 2008). Democracy aid is certainly not immune from rent-seeking activities but the study of why corruption is more widespread in some environments than others is outside the scope of this dissertation. The second factor depends on the degree to which democracy aid is fungible. The question of fungibility was discussed above and it was argued that democracy aid is probably a type of aid that is less prone to being fungible compared to aid allocated to more “needed” areas. The third factor is addressed in this dissertation in relation to aid activities in the public administration. This dissertation contributes to the aid effectiveness research by presenting a theoretical argument on democracy aid implementation in the public sector. As we will see below, the challenges to aid implementation are likely to differ between different types of public administrations.

Most previous research on aid effectiveness concentrates on the incentives donors create (e.g., Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Busse and Gröning 2009). It is certainly the case that donors play an important role in the implementation of aid projects but the actors and institutions at the recipient side are also important. For example, it is quite evident in the interviews conducted for Paper III that donors often see a conflict of goals between ownership and intervention in their day-to-day work. Ownership is clearly a part of their set of phrases to mention in interviews on aid. However, they deal with it in different ways. Some donors use ownership as a way of delimiting their own sphere of influence and hence what they can do to improve the workings of the implementation, while other donors more actively use their own influence to improve and intervene whenever they think necessary.

As stated in Paper III, recipient bureaucracies often create their own challenges. In fact, the problems on the recipient side often compel donors to choose parallel organizations for the implementation of aid projects (Bräutigam 2000; Grindle 2004; El Baradei 2011; Pressman and Wildavsky 1974, 137).

One aspect of the recipient side that may be of importance for the implementation of aid projects is high turnover rates among the staff in the public administration, which this dissertation hypothesizes, would be a severe challenge for democracy aid programs. This is a challenge in particular for democracy aid programs as they are often supposed to be implemented in the state bureaucracy and aims specifically at strengthening the state infrastructure.

A high turnover rate among the personnel is an impediment for the implementation of aid programs since it implies that the aid projects have to
start over and over again with new personnel that are not experienced in working with the ongoing projects. Because of this “lack of experience” factor, a high turnover rate is assumed to delay the execution of aid programs. In addition, high turnover rates among the personnel shorten the time horizons. It is less beneficial for the personnel to engage in long-term assignments since it is unlikely that they will benefit from its future fruits (c.f., Bräutigam 2000, cf., Wright 2008). “Short time-horizons” is the second factor that impedes implementation.

There are two major causes behind high turnover rates. Turnover rates due to labor market conditions tend to be high if salaries are very low in the public sector compared to the private sector. The civil servants then search for better opportunities elsewhere which makes it hard to keep them for a longer duration in the public sector (Hilderbrand and Grindle 1997). Turnover rates are also increased by the degree to which there are political appointments in the public sector; patronage-based administration, as opposed to an administration based on meritocratic appointments. Meritocratic recruitment versus political or personalistic appointments are also the main characteristics of the two different types of administrative structures, meritocratic versus patronage-based administrations (Horn 1995, 97).

This dissertation argues that not only turnover rates per se but also the recruitment patterns that create high alternation among the staff are assumed to be important for the implementation of aid programs since those affect both the frequency of turnover and the effectiveness of the implementation.

Turnover rates due to political appointments are high particularly after elections and in the midst of political instability. High alternation among the staff due to political appointments not only delays the implementation of the aid programs but also brings further impediments to the effectiveness of the implementation. Politically appointed staff is assumed to have stronger feelings for or against particular programs (c.f., Frant 1996). The challenge for aid programs is that the implementation does not follow the time periods of the political mandates, which means that during an aid program’s implementation there may be many changes in civil servants due to political appointments. Moreover, turnover rates caused by political appointments increase not only after elections but they also tend to increase in times of political instability. These newly appointed implementers may be reluctant to engage in aid programs that were started by the “old” political regime. Thus turnover rates caused by political appointments add an additional problem to aid implementation: the reluctance to engage in “old” projects.
Case study evidence from democratic governance programs in Bolivia and Peru, presented in Paper III, shows that high turnover rates are indeed perceived as a severe implementation problem for these types of projects. All three mechanisms mentioned above, lack of experience, short time-horizons, and reluctance to engage in old projects, are cited as explanations for how high turnover rates affect implementation. But turnover caused by political appointments seems to be more of a problem in the more politically unstable country, Bolivia, than in Peru where most turnover, due to political appointment, seems to occur after elections.

**Theoretical and Empirical Contribution**

**– Administrative Structure and Democratic Survival**

The literature on political institutions stresses the importance of the incentives of the electorally accountable officials in maintaining democracy but seems to neglect that there are more unelected officials beneath the top-officials whose incentives may be important to take into account.

We (Cornell and Lapuente) depart from the commonly held assumption in the literature that the incumbents’ primary incentive is to stay in power (Collier 2009). However, we apply this assumption not only to the elected incumbents but also to all those public officials who got their job from the electoral victory. This number varies according to the type of administrative structure a country has. As mentioned above, there are two main types of administrations, the patrimonial administration (Ertman 1997), or patronage-based bureaucracy (e.g., Geddes 1994; Shefter 1977), and the meritocratic administration. In a patrimonial administration the public administration officials are to a large extent appointed on a political basis. In a meritocratic bureaucracy where they are hired on the basis of merit, the civil servants are less directly accountable to the political power.

A tacit acceptance of the democratic game rules among the principal actors is considered a main feature of a consolidated democracy (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996; Ulfelder 2010). In consolidated democracies actors have agreed on the “legitimate boundaries of the state” (Weingast 1997, 260) and citizens’ rights are secured. When this equilibrium is reached, democracy is self-enforcing since political actors perceive that they have more to gain in the long run from maintaining the democratic institutions than from undermining them (Przeworski 1991, 30-31; see also Alexander 2002).

We argue that it is harder to reach this equilibrium in a patronage-based administration since this type of administration creates both motivation and opportunities to implement particularistic policies. The motivation to do everything in their ability to stay in power increases since there are many
more officials that lose their job if elections are lost. Further, in democracies with this type of administration losers risk becoming permanent losers since there are more opportunities to use means, like political appointments, to uphold power. On the other hand, in countries with meritocratic administrations, political actors lack both the motives and the opportunities to act in a particularistic way and will therefore more easily accept the democratic game once democracy has been installed. This is, in short, the argument for why we hypothesize that countries with a meritocratic administration tend to survive longer than countries with a patronage-based administration.

It should be noted that some of the features of our arguments are similar to sequencing theories on democratic consolidation. The main argument of these theories is that a fruitful democratic consolidation that avoids severe conflict requires state capacity prior to democratization (Huntington 1968; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). However it is unclear what elements of state capacity are needed. Empirically Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2005) use a proxy for how the political institutions work rather than one for administrative institutions that would be more appropriate given the theoretical argument. Moreover, in contrast to the more deterministic sequencing argument, we argue that countries may choose to change their administrative structures over time, which could have effects on their future democratic trajectory.

This argument is tested empirically in Paper IV. The results show that democracies with merit-based bureaucracies tend to survive longer than democracies with patrimonial administrations.

Concluding Remarks

As stated in the introduction to this chapter it is of great importance to know whether democracy aid deserves to be prioritized over other types of aid. So, does democracy aid deserve to be prioritized? I happily leave the decisions, on the exact amounts and specific types of aid that should be allocated, to the politicians in donor countries. They, together with the potential receivers of aid, and not the researchers, are the ones that should develop aid policies. Still, the research community could certainly contribute in valuable ways to the thinking about these issues. To this intellectual exercise, this dissertation adds the cautious note that the effects of aid on political development probably are limited to particular beneficial circumstances.

In the introduction it was stated that this dissertation aimed at contributing to the understanding of the third means through which aid may
INSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS AND RELUCTANT ACTORS

promote democracy, namely democracy aid. What does this dissertation add to the knowledge about this particular type of aid? Now, we know more about the circumstances where democracy aid has an effect and why (Papers I and II). Moreover, we also know more about what impedes the implementation of democracy aid in public administrations (Paper III). In addition to these contributions we also know more about the impact of administrative structures on democratic survival (Paper IV), which should be considered in relation to the prospects of different types of democracy aid.

The main conclusion of this dissertation is that democracy aid could potentially have some positive effects on democracy, but these effects are limited to certain environments where there are less institutional impediments and the actors are less reluctant.

It also seems that democracy aid does not necessarily have the same effect as other types of aid. In relation to previous literature on the impact of foreign aid, it is potentially fruitful to examine different types of aid separately and relate those to different types of outcomes (e.g., Wright and Winters 2010). Moreover, this also calls for a more fine-tuned examination of the impact on democracy. Dankwart Rustow (1970) was certainly correct in his view that the factors that drive democratization are different from those that hinder democratic breakdown.

A second conclusion is that both the implementation of aid and the prospects of democracy are related to the structure of the administration. Policy makers should be aware of the potential importance of administrative reforms for improving both aid implementation and democratic stability. There is a great value in taking into consideration how the workings of the public administration shape the incentives of those actors involved. In the democracy promotion field Jay Ulfelder (2010, 126) calls for the avoidance of “the fuzzy concepts of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘good governance’.” This dissertation shows, as a parallel, that it could be of great use to scrutinize how certain aspects of good governance shape the expectations and the actions of the “specific, powerful actors” that Ulfelder claims are crucial for whether democracy survives. The same argument could be put forward about the concepts of state capacity (c.f., Mansfield and Snyder 2005) and institutional environment (c.f., Gibson et al. 2005). What is it in state capacity and the institutional environment that needs to be improved? This dissertation has tried to disentangle these concepts and discuss more specific factors in relation to aid, democracy, its main actors, and the institutions involved.

Moreover, the results of Paper III show that political influence over the public administration impedes the implementation of democracy aid
programs. Furthermore, Paper IV shows that a democratic public administration (politically appointed civil servants) is rather an impediment than a guarantor of democratic survival, while a public administration over which the elected politicians have less influence makes democracies endure. Thus, to strengthen democracy is not the same as strengthening the political influence over the public administration (c.f., Riggs 1963).

Stability seems to be of importance for the prospects of democracy aid in two ways. First, it seems easier to support stability than to support change and second, it seems that instability is an important impediment to the implementation of aid programs. These two ways, through which stability is important, lead to a paradoxical implication, namely that even though democracy aid activities aim at political transformation, we would not expect any radical political changes as a result of these types of activities. This also demonstrates the complicated nature of the decisions that donor countries face on whether to allocate democracy aid and if so when, and how to allocate and implement it.

Stability is related to the degree of security that is felt by the principal actors. In turn, the relative security is related to the risk of losing power or losing a position. This is true both when it comes to the potential threat of democracy aid (Papers I and II) and the time horizons that the implementers perceive (Paper III).

Given the results from this dissertation we would not expect radical changes to occur since the effects of democracy aid are restricted to very stable circumstances, which, per se, imply the absence of radical change. We saw above that when it comes to authoritarian regimes, democracy aid only has a significant and positive effect in one-party regimes, which together with monarchies are the most stable types of authoritarian regimes. In other words, these regimes tend to survive longer than other types of authoritarian regimes. We would therefore not expect changes in democracy levels to be radical changes but rather a certain degree of liberalization in stable authoritarian settings. Moreover, democracy aid has no impact on regime change of authoritarian regimes, that is, democratization, but only in preventing democratic breakdown. This result suggests that democracy aid only has a stabilizing effect in democracies. In other words, it seems easier to support stability than to support change, which is in line with previous research on aggregate aid showing that aid in general fosters stability in both authoritarian and democratic regimes (eg., Morrison 2009).

Furthermore, we have seen that the instability of bureaucracies, due to labor market conditions and/or political instability and political appointments, is an impediment to the successful implementation of
democracy aid. Thus, radical political changes do not result from the implementation of democracy aid; rather, they serve to hinder its impact.

**Implications for Future Research**

This dissertation is by no means the last word to be said about aid and democracy aid in relation to the political development of aid recipient countries. Thanks to the disaggregation of different types of aid, different types of regimes, and different types of political processes, it has been possible to show that the effects of democracy aid are limited to some beneficial circumstances and restricted to minor changes rather than radical transformations. In fact this disaggregation has been a crucial part of this dissertation’s research design. Given the challenges with using the CRS data from OECD/DAC, presented above, this disaggregation also has its weaknesses. Nevertheless, for future research the next step would be to disaggregate democracy aid into different components. Finkel et al. (2007) made a first attempt of this on US aid but the quality of the data on democracy aid from the OECD/DAC has so far not been good enough to allow for further disaggregation for the whole donor community. However, the figures in the CRS system are improving and soon new data will be available on different aspects of democracy, making it possible to study more disaggregated components of democracy. This new data allows for studying the impact of different democracy aid activities on different subcomponents of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011). Perhaps more importantly this data could also improve on the possibilities to study the sequencing of aid allocation in relation to the sequencing of democratization processes.

An important future contribution would relate the effects of aid to the decisions made by the donors and recipients under different phases in the processes of democratization. Also beneficial would be studying the reactions of and actions taken by the most important actors involved in the allocation and implementation not only of democracy aid but also of other types of aid. For example, the analyses of democracy aid allocation presented in this introductory chapter point to the importance of taking into account donors’ strategic selection of recipient countries and time periods when studying the impact of aid. Moreover, future research should also delve into the increasing financial importance of “new” donors, not members of the OECD/DAC, like for example China, and what impacts they may have on democracy aid prospects.

Additional research can also be conducted on the challenges that implementers of aid confront in their day-to-day work. Here, it would be desirable to follow up the case study presented in this dissertation (Paper III)
with an empirical test on a larger set of countries and/or aid projects on whether high turnover rates affect implementation; more in particular, turnover rates in interaction with merit-based and politically-based appointments of the public officials.

In relation to the theory developed on the impact of administrative structures on democratic survival (Paper IV) future research should gather data, preferably over time, that captures more specifically the degree to which the administrations recruit their civil servants with political appointments.

References


INTRODUCTION


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INTRODUCTION


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OECD/DAC. 2010. *User’s Guide to the CRS Aid Activities database*. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,en_2649_34447_14987506_1_1_1_1,00.html (October 6, 2010).


### Appendix 1. Supplemental Tables

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Mean 47.23 10.61 2.07 0.52 7.25 12.51 3.59 0.10 1.70 11.20 3.22
### Table A4. General Patterns of Democratic-Governance-Aid Allocation, 1995–2008 (Aid per Capita)

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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root-Mean-Squared Error</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N countries</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years observed by country</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Prais-Winsten regression. Unstandardized regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses. The dependent variable is Log(Democracy aid per capita, five-year average). First-order autocorrelation specified.

*p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Sources: OECD.Stat 2012 a;b; Teorell et al. 2011.
Table A5. Patterns of Democratic-Governance-Aid Allocation for Different Donors (Squared GDP per Capita)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (Sweden)</th>
<th>Model 2 (US)</th>
<th>Model 3 (UK)</th>
<th>Model 4 (France)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log (Other aid from the same donor, five-year average)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.437*** (0.0905)</td>
<td>0.701*** (0.111)</td>
<td>0.490*** (0.0784)</td>
<td>0.204*** (0.0551)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log (Other aid from other donors, five-year average)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.587*** (0.160)</td>
<td>0.106 (0.137)</td>
<td>0.500*** (0.130)</td>
<td>0.229*** (0.0763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log (Population)_{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.130 (0.0992)</td>
<td>0.337*** (0.0898)</td>
<td>-0.0488 (0.0673)</td>
<td>0.0462 (0.0859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log (GDP/capita)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.0845 (1.112)</td>
<td>-0.914* (0.547)</td>
<td>-1.109 (1.179)</td>
<td>0.252 (1.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Log (GDP/capita)_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.00680 (0.0817)</td>
<td>0.0852* (0.0389)</td>
<td>0.0928 (0.0878)</td>
<td>-0.00970 (0.0806)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy level_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.101** (0.0325)</td>
<td>0.00762 (0.0301)</td>
<td>0.0722* (0.0320)</td>
<td>0.0368 (0.0316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British colonial heritage</td>
<td>-0.250 (0.315)</td>
<td>-0.555** (0.171)</td>
<td>0.631* (0.323)</td>
<td>-0.295 (0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French colonial heritage</td>
<td>-1.514*** (0.321)</td>
<td>-1.026*** (0.206)</td>
<td>-0.980** (0.301)</td>
<td>2.496*** (0.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US colonial heritage</td>
<td>-0.287 (0.353)</td>
<td>-3.634*** (0.508)</td>
<td>-3.408*** (1.016)</td>
<td>1.784 (1.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.253 (3.958)</td>
<td>-5.706* (2.639)</td>
<td>-1.254 (4.119)</td>
<td>-6.915 (4.984)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root-Mean-Squared Error</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N observations</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>1112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N countries</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years observed by country</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>9.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Prais-Winsten regression. Unstandardized regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) in parentheses. Dependent variable is Log (Democracy aid, five-year average). First-order autocorrelation specified.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\*\* p < 0.001.

Sources: OECD.Stat 2012 a;b; Teorell et al. 2011.
Appendix 2. Summaries of the Papers

Paper I. Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?

During the last decades democracy aid, which aims at fostering democracy in aid recipient countries, has become a popular type of foreign aid among major donor countries. This paper asks whether the effect of democracy aid on democracy differs between different types of authoritarian regimes.

According to previous research the rulers’ risk of losing power varies among the types of regimes. Theoretically, we may assume that when the risk of losing power is low, authoritarian rulers tend to be more willing to accept democracy aid, given the other benefits that foreign aid could bring to the ruler. In addition, it is also easier to implement democracy aid projects where certain political institutions are in place.

From this theoretical argument follows that the effect of democracy aid in one-party regimes should be greater than the effects in other types of regimes. One-party regimes are both stable and employ important political institutions. The effect of democracy aid in military regimes (unstable regimes without a high degree of political institutionalization) should be smaller than the effect in limited multiparty regimes (unstable regimes but with political institutions) and in monarchies (stable regimes without a high degree of political institutionalization).

The theoretical argument is tested using time series cross-section analysis on a global data set covering 143 aid-receiving countries from 1990 to 2007. Aid data is from OECD/DAC’s Creditor Reporting System.

The results show that the impact of democracy aid differs between different types of authoritarian regimes. Democracy aid has a positive impact on democracy levels in the most stable types of authoritarian regimes where political institutions are also in place, that is, one-party regimes. But there is no significant effect of democracy aid in any of the other type of authoritarian regime. The results are robust to specifications with different regime typologies and different measures of democracy.

Paradoxically, the more stable regimes, where democracy aid seems to have a positive effect on democratic development, are also the ones that are least likely to go through a transition to democracy. Dictators probably do not need to democratize to the point of holding elections and bringing about regime change in order to get further funding. They might only need to improve their record slightly to be awarded more aid. Why would the rulers then choose to democratize, which is a very risky affair, and not simply...
liberalize within the regime, which seems much less risky? What is more, the stability of the regime per se makes a regime change less likely. In very stable types of regimes we could therefore assume that democracy aid may contribute to political liberalization rather than a full-fledged democratization. Further research is needed to examine whether the impact on democracy levels in these regimes could also have a democratizing effect resulting in a transition to democracy, or whether the impact is restricted to political liberalization.

(Forthcoming. Accepted for publication in Democratization and available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.659021.)

Paper II. The Limited Effects of Democracy Aid on Regime Change

We should not take for granted that aid directed for the specific purpose of promoting democracy has the same effects as aggregate aid inflows. There are very few previous quantitative studies on democracy aid but these show, in contrast to the negative effects or null effects often found in research on aggregate aid flows, that democracy aid has positive effects on democratic development. However, these previous studies do not develop strong theoretical arguments for how and why democracy aid would have positive effects. This paper aims at reducing this theoretical gap in the democracy aid literature.

In this paper it is argued that democracy aid is different from other types of aid since its purpose is to promote political change as opposed to the more diffuse social change promoted by aggregate aid flows. Thus, this paper challenges the widespread view that the composition of aid does not matter.

For authoritarian regimes a political change in a democratic direction is a serious threat to their survival, but for a democratic regime the support to democracy implies the strengthening of the regime. Therefore it is argued that, while authoritarian regimes will try to obstruct the programs, democratically elected leaders will be willing to implement democracy aid in order to prevent outside forces from threatening democracy. Moreover, democracy aid should also be assumed to prevent threats to democracy from the inside of the regime, so called autocoups; the recipient government, similarly to authoritarian leaders, knows that, if it does not accept democracy aid or engages in overt undemocratic behavior, there is a risk that their funds, also for other types of aid programs, may be withdrawn.
On the basis of this theoretical argument it is assumed that democracy aid does not foster democratization in authoritarian regimes, but does prevent democratic breakdown in existing democracies.

In fact, the paper shows empirically, employing survival analyses on worldwide aid-recipient democracies and dictatorships, over the period 1973–2007, that democracy aid has only limited effects on regime change. The results show that democracy aid has no effect on democratization in authoritarian regimes but does prevent democratic breakdown in existing democracies. The results are robust to control for important factors explaining regime change and different measures of democratization and democratic breakdown.

Hence, the positive effects of democracy aid on democratic development found in previous studies seem to be restricted to changes in democracy levels within regimes rather than regime change.

Paper III. Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs

Aid to strengthen public sector institutions has become an important part of development cooperation programs. Democratic governance programs are of particular importance, since, firstly, the strengthening of the state is vital for developing countries’ development; secondly, because the state infrastructure is also important for the implementation of other types of aid programs; and thirdly, in terms of these types of programs it is not a viable option for international cooperation agencies to use parallel implementing units for the execution, as those channels will not alter the basic modus operandi of the public sector functions.

This paper contributes to the understanding of aid implementation by studying, both theoretically and empirically, how certain features of the recipient public administration affect the execution of these types of aid programs. In particular, this paper develops a theoretical argument for how the instability of human resources in aid-recipient state institutions obstructs the implementation of aid programs.

The theoretical framework developed in this paper suggests that high turnover rates in the public administrations of aid-recipient countries present a challenge to the implementation of democratic governance aid and this is in part related to how the public administration is structured.

If high turnover rates are a result of individuals’ search for better opportunities due to labor market conditions, it will affect the public administration primarily through lack of experience and shorter time-horizons among civil servants. However, if high turnover rates are due to
political appointment of personnel, there is an additional negative factor that will affect the implementation of the program: the reluctance to engage in old projects. Hence, high turnover rates negatively affect the implementation of democratic governance programs, especially if caused by political appointment.

Another important contribution of this paper is to link the institutional environment of the political administration to the political situation of the recipient country. This link is not only in relation to elections, but also in relation to political instability and changes in political power that may occur more often than elections.

Interviews with recipients and donors of aid, in Peru and Bolivia, are used to show how the theoretical mechanisms play out in practice. In the interviews it becomes clear that the implementers of aid – both on the donor and the recipient side – claim that the lack of bureaucratic stability caused by the constant renewal of personnel creates a significant impediment to the implementation. Informants cited all three factors, lack of experience, short time-horizons and reluctance to engage in old projects, as being important explanations for how high turnover rates affect the implementation of these programs.

The prospects of implementing future development-cooperation projects with public sector institutions may depend on the extent to which donors and recipients are able to address these high turnover rates and their causes.

(Forthcoming. Accepted for publication in Governance and available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/gove.12037)

**Paper IV. Administrative Structure and Democratic Survival (with Victor Lapuente)**

Probably the most solid finding to date in the literature on democratic survival is that socioeconomic development is an important assurance against democratic backslide. Yet, even if democratic survival may partially be the result of a society’s level of socioeconomic development (i.e. factors with a low margin of human agency), are there perhaps some other institutions with a greater potential for human agency that help explain why some democracies survive longer than others?

From our point of view, the existing literature on institutional factors, in relation to democratic survival, pays disproportionate attention to analyzing the impact of institutions involved in policymaking, while the role of those institutions in policy implementation is neglected. This literature has overlooked the impact of the incentives structure on those workers in state institutions below the top policymaking sphere.
This paper presents a novel hypothesis for understanding democratic survival: the higher the number of public employees who are directly accountable to elected officials, the lower the chances of democratic survival. The mechanism is as follows: the more people whose professional careers depend directly upon which party wins the elections, the more likely the government will propose and pass opportunistic actions aimed at their surviving in office at any cost (i.e. policies benefiting core supporters). In turn, this fosters the opposition taking preemptive actions that could go as far as military coups or rebellions. However, in democracies with meritocratic administrations incumbents are credibly constrained, by autonomous civil servants, from undertaking opportunistic biased policies.

The paper offers empirical illustrations from different democratic experiences to substantiate the theoretical arguments. We also test the hypothesis worldwide on democracies from 1822, using a newly created data set of administrative structures. Survival analyses show that democracies with an autonomous bureaucracy (versus administrators directly accountable to incumbents) survive longer. This result is robust also when controlling for the main prevailing explanations in the literature on democratic survival. Several checks for robustness, with alternative proxies for administrative structure and democratic survival, also exhibit similar results.

This paper’s implications partially contest the importance of the unity of national elites for democratic survival. We show, conversely, the positive effects of what could be defined as a systematic “disunity” at the heart of successful state institutions: the members of the political class and the members of the administrative class cannot be united by a common chain of accountability.

Moreover, the findings of this paper challenge the negative connotation that an autonomous bureaucracy has had among influential scholars in democratization theory.

Unlike sequencing scholars, we do not argue that premature democratization is doomed to fail. In the light of our findings, we suggest that promoters of democracy should devote their efforts to administrative policies geared towards creating large autonomous bodies of bureaucrats hired for merit and unaccountable in any direct or personal way to elected officials.