Sport Has Never Been Modern
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Abstract

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Sport has often been understood as a set of formalised physical contests, and moreover as something inherently modern. New conceptions of the term implicates that sport ought to comprise all physical activity. However, the studies and approaches that describe the range and tension between those positions are lacking. The thesis addresses this lacuna and suggests that the aforementioned conceptions could be inquired as the narrow (physical contest) and the broad (physical activity) understanding of sport.

The work presented in this thesis sets out to outline a theoretical and methodological framework that could comprise the different conceptions of sport. This framework is laid out with inspiration from Bruno Latour's symmetrical anthropology. The empirical material was collected from an array of sources with a broad range of ethnographical methods. Four sporting practices (break time football, parkour, eSport, and company table tennis) that embody the tension between the broad and the narrow are inquired into in the articles. The comprehensive framework that the thesis seeks to outline takes form in shape of the different concepts (“dromography,” “minor sport,” and “the art of tracing”) constructed within the articles.

It is concluded that the broad understanding of sport threatens to hollow the term. However, the narrow understanding of sport tends to downplay the material dimension of modernity. It is argued that the connection between the material and the social dimension of sport, with regards to categories such as age and gender, mustn’t be neglected in the study of sport. Furthermore, it is argued that the competitive element of modern sport is related to modern science in an unexpected way that adds new understanding to the ontology of modernity in general.
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My family.
I dedicate this book to my parents, Inger and Nils.

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   Articles 1-4
1. Sport understood broadly or narrowly

“Sport” means all forms of physical activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical fitness and mental well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition at all levels (European Commission, 2007, p. 2).

The specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules … [are] separate competitions for men and women, limitations on the number of participants in competitions, or the need to ensure uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve a competitive balance between clubs taking part in the same competitions (ibid., p.13).

What is sport? The following thesis investigates influential theories of sport, and especially conceptions of so called “modern sport”. “Modern” as an adjective of sport often points to the competitive physical cultural practices of the type that can be seen in the Olympic Games. However, the White paper on sport (ibid.), with its extremely broad and also very narrow comprehension of sport, seems to be in favour of defining sport as physical activity in general. In his urge for a more comprehensive look on physical culture, David Andrews (2008) even claims that “in what the poststructuralists among us would refer to as a sea of empty signifiers, sport is arguably one of the most highly contested and least useful nouns with which to frame an area of study” (ibid., p. 50).

The present thesis is written under the aegis of Idrottsvetenskap, which, for lack of a better term, could be translated as “sport science.” The Scandinavian term idrott is a larger term than sport and thereby potentially also harbours – or engulfs – the tension between both meanings of sport displayed in the White paper on sport: sport as either
phyysical activity in general, or as physical competition in particular. One could perhaps maintain that the present thesis emanates from the anxiety, tension and expectation that arise when a new discipline is being born. As the French philosopher Michel Serres (Serres & Latour, 1995) wittily puts it, “[o]ne has only to invent an entrance exam, and the corresponding science will exist” (Serres & Latour, 1995, p. 35).

So what, and how, do we study when we conduct research on sport? Is sport to be understood broadly, i.e. as all physical activity improving fitness, well being, social relationships, and competition, as suggested in the White paper on sport above? Or, is sport to be understood more narrowly, as being all about competition? Influential scholars of sport such as Allen Guttmann (1978), Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning (2008), Sigmund Loland (2002) and Henning Eichberg (2010) seem to agree, if not on the value of sport, then at least that the narrow understanding of sport is to be equipped with the adjective “modern,” while the broad understanding perhaps is to be treated as a “sport for all” (ibid.). How is this tension to be understood and dealt with in the systematic study of sport?

In the context of sport as a subject for systematic studies and research it is also interesting to note the different ways in which sport is utilised as an intellectual tool. Elias and Dunning (2008) use association football as a general model for group dynamics. Serres (Serres & Latour, 1995) suggests that the passing of the ball in rugby is a good model for demonstrating how he understands a ‘relation’. Those examples show how sport could inform intellectual labour, but the inverse has also been suggested. In his outlining of a moral norm system of fair play in sport, Loland (2002) applies an analogy that stages sport competitions as scientific experiments. Steven Connor (2011) frames such attempts poignantly when he proposes that sport could be seen “as an anagram of human life in general” (ibid., p. 14). How does this relate to the broad and narrow, or modern, senses of the term?
1. SPORT UNDERSTOOD BROADLY OR NARROWLY

This thesis concerns precisely the social study of sport in both the ontological (what) and the epistemological (how) senses of the term. Below, the core theoretical understandings of sport will be investigated and problematised. The purpose of the study is to outline a theoretical and methodological approach that might grapple with the inherent tension in the term “sport.” In doing so, the goal is to address and inform the theoretical discussion of the social study of sport by creating concepts that could endow the “empty signifier” of sport with fresh meaning. This is not least interesting in and for the Swedish context, in which the discipline of *Idrottsvetenskap* is about to get established, but also on a doctoral level. The thesis is an attempt to offer a deepened understanding of sport both as social phenomenon and as an academic subject of study. More precisely, the following questions will be answered: *What characterises both the narrow and broad understandings of sport? Which are the central components of those ideas? What are their limits of scope and application? How can they be addressed theoretically and methodologically in a unified framework of research? What does “modern” mean in relation to sport? What might be the contribution of the social study of sport to knowledge and science in general?*

In order to answer such questions, good “vantage points” (Murdoch, 2005, p. 97) must be found or constructed. Each of the four studies does this by investigating a practice on the threshold of sport. There might, of course, also be instances of sport that aren’t comprised at all in the senses suggested here. By playing on the inherent tension of the term, positions and standpoints might be observed and unpacked. Thus, attention will be turned toward the practices of break time football in article 1 (Jonasson, 2010), parkour in article 2 (Jonasson, 2011), eSport in article 3 (Jonasson & Thiborg, 2010) and company table tennis in article 4 (Jonasson, under review). Article 1 is a licentiate thesis published in its entirety (around 200 pages). Even if it is longer than the other articles, and would hardly be described as an article in other contexts, this is the terminology that will be used here.
The following chapter (2. *Understanding of sport*) presents the understandings of sport in the previous research (Guttmann, 1978, 2004; Elias, 2008; Eichberg, 2010; Loland, 2002). In the third chapter (3. *The territory of modernity*) the central concepts of the articles will be explicat-ed, including both those that guide the studies and the ones developed within them. Even if the different facets of the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, (1986, 1987) with their understandings of power, space and movement, and of the French science scholar Bruno Latour, (1993; Serres & Latour, 1995) with his conception of modernity, are the only notions that are explained, this doesn’t exhaust the list of perspectives displayed in the single studies. In the fourth chapter (4. *Investigating the thresholds of modern sport*) the methodologies will also be discussed. The perspectival umbrella of the present thesis is the symmetrical anthropology of Latour (1993), and in particular the philosophical (ibid.), rather than the sociological (Latour, 2005) branch of it. Furthermore, conceptual construction as a philosophical technique will be mentioned (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994; Massumi, 2002). Summaries of the articles are to be found in the fifth chapter (5. *Article summaries*). In the sixth chapter (6. *Dromography and minor sport*), “dromography” (article 1), and “minor sport” (article 4), i.e. the constructed concepts with the most relevance for the purpose, will be discussed. In the philosophical conclusion of the seventh chapter (7. *Sport has never been modern*), Latour’s (1993) statement that “we have never been modern” (ibid.) together with his nonmodern agenda is the point of departure. After this the introduction is concluded with a list of references. Finally, facsimiles of articles 1–4 can be found.
2. Understandings of sport

In this chapter the understandings of sport that are discussed within the articles will be presented. In article 1, we will take a look at the theories of Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, (2008) who see modern sport as both a civilising agent and a metaphor for societal dynamics, which we will discuss specifically in relation to an inquiry into break time football. In article 2, parkour is posed as a physical culture organised in opposition to modern sport. In article 3 (Jonasson & Thiborg, 2010), Allen Guttmann’s (1978) ideal-type of modern sport is applied to the practice of competitive computer gaming (Jonasson, submitted). In article 4, Sigmund Loland’s (2002) view of competitive sport as an arena for human flourishing is contrasted with Henning Eichberg’s (2010) verdict on competitive sport as something socially degrading. All of the articles are presented as reactions and/or answers to hypotheses and/or perceived lacunae in the understandings of sport mentioned in this chapter. These reactions/answers are explained in relation to the perspective each one responds to.

The German sociologist Norbert Elias and the British sociologist Eric Dunning have articulated a theory in which the development of modern sport is seen as part of the “civilising process” of western industrialised societies. According to them, sundry sports serve as “mimetic battles” that offer relief and release from the tedious quotidian life of overly formalised, mechanised and industrialised societies. Historically, practices of sport were materialised expressions of the refinement as well as the nobility of the French court in the 17th century, as the non-violent conflicts within the landed gentry in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries of Great Britain. “The ‘parliamentarisation’ of
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the landed classes of England”, Elias (2008, p. 17) writes, “had its counterpart in the ‘sportisation’ of their pastimes.” Not only can this ‘sportisation’ of games, such as sundry types of medieval folk football (cf. Dunning & Sheard, 1979), be seen as a motor of civility, but also as a kind of laboratory where group dynamics could be conceptualised (Elias & Dunning, 2008, pp. 189–202). By describing the “tension equilibrium” that ties together and is consolidated by the relations between players, both on the same and the other team, and between teams, Elias and Dunning claim to have formulated the conditions for figurational dynamics. The most important aspect of this is that figurations are not that dependent on the specific intentions of the persons it consists of, as they write:

How far this is true of other figurations of people need not to be discussed here. But one can say that even state organisations, churches, factories, and other figurations of the more serious kind, whatever the aims of people who form them, are at the same time ends in themselves with dynamics of their own. What, after all, are the purposes of nations? It is not entirely frivolous to say that even they resemble a game played by people with one another for its own sake. To neglect this aspect, by focusing attention in the first place on their purposes, means overlooking the fact that, as in football, it is the changing figuration of people itself on which at any given time the decisions, the purposes, and the moves of individuals depend. This is particularly so in the case of tensions and conflicts. They are often explained only in terms of the intentions and aims of one side or the other. Sociologists would perhaps be better able to contribute to an understanding of those tensions and conflicts which have so far proved uncontrollable if they would investigate them as aspects of the purposeless dynamics of groups (ibid., p. 202).

This implies that an analysis of sport could furnish us with concepts for comprehending society in general. Hence, article 2 (Jonasson, 2010) contains an investigation of the figurational dynamics of break time football, which will be illuminated via Elias and Dunning’s reading of civilisation, sociality, modernity and sociology.
2. UNDERSTANDINGS OF SPORT

The American sport scholar Allen Guttmann (1978) has created a compelling theoretical framework for understanding sport (cf. Woodward, 2012, pp. 8, 12). By building on influential theories of games and play (Huizinga, 1955; Caillois, 2001), Guttmann sets out to encompass the entire field of physical games. His typology enables him to define sport as formalised, competitive and physical play. The physical character is what distinguishes sport from “intellectual contests” such as chess. This definition enables him to paint a rich picture of such practices throughout the history of man, with examples from all over the globe. But modern sport is, according to him, unique. While vividly describing everything from the antique martial art of pankration to the bloody jousts of the Middle Ages, Guttmann contends that no assembly of formalised physical contests displays the same characteristics as modern sport. These characteristics are secularisation, rationalisation, bureaucratisation, specialisation, quantification, equality, and the quest for records. Perhaps this is the meaning he refers to when he states that there is “a rough consensus about the characteristics of modern sports” (Guttmann, 2004, p. 323). Modern competitive sport is understood as heavily relying on rigorous formalisation. Guttmann could be said to operationalise the formalisation of modern competitive sport by looking into the processes it has been subject to: bureaucratisation, specialisation, quantification, rationalisation, and the quest for a level playing field and records. Moreover, Guttmann (ibid.) denounces the existence of anything like postmodern sports. Surely, new “Californian” sports have emerged, but according to Guttmann they are bound to undergo the same processes as their modern counterparts. He doesn’t, however, attend to competitive computer gaming, a.k.a. eSport, which, it must be admitted, is hard to pose as an either intellectual or physical contest. Thus, article 3 looks into this globally emergent movement by applying Guttmann’s ideal-type of modern sport.
The tension – in fact the tension between tension and equilibrium itself – that Elias and Dunning (2008) ascribe to sport is recognised by other sport philosophers as well. The Norwegian philosopher Sigmund Loland (2002), for instance, understands sport as something that ideally produces a “sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome” (ibid., p. xv). Like Elias and Dunning, Loland is interested in being able to analyse sport without taking into account the full variety of intentional goals among participants. Loland does so in order to lay out the conditions and imperatives of a moral norm for “fair play” in sport. His argument is that for sport to be just and beautiful (two senses of fair), athletes must play to win. Only then could the “sweet tension” emerge which, in turn, renders sport an arena for “human flourishing,” what Aristotle coined as *Endaimonia* and proclaimed as the moral goal for all human endeavours. If athletes play to win, eventually, they are likely to find opponents residing on a decently equal level of performance. Once athletes are on a level playing field, sport competitions are likely to be saturated with sweet tension and “playfulness.” But what if the practice of ‘doing one’s best’ isn’t directly orientated toward finishing a competition? The act of playing defensively, for instance, slightly skews the moral norm of playing to win. By balancing the tension between cherishing competition (Loland, 2002) and criticising it (Eichberg, 2010), this conundrum is investigated through an autoethnography of table tennis in article 3.

Playfulness and process at the expense of competition as pivotal elements of physical culture, are precisely what the German sport scholar Henning Eichberg (2010) emphasises in *Bodily Democracy: Toward a philosophy of sport-for-all*, his programmatic declaration for a normative shift in the view of sport. The social study of sport has to stop looking solely at the world of modern competitive sport. Rather, Eichberg wants sport scholars to recognise and theorise the plethora of body cultures that anthropologists have long paid attention to. In his sketch for a philosophy of sport-for-all, the term sport is pre-
emptied from being applied to modern competitive physical culture, and polemically labelled “sport-for-not-all.” By describing indigenous games such as ‘mouth pull’ or ‘arse pull’, and defining what distinguishes them from modern competitive sport, Eichberg traces the rationale of the latter to capitalism, rationalisation and bureaucracy:

An ‘International Mouth Pull Federation’ would sound strange. The ‘unserious’ features of popular laughter and grotesque carnivalism stand in the way of consequent sportification. And though the tugging and or tearing-off of nose, ear and mouth may appear as ‘extreme’, it does not even fall under what has become the actual fashion of ‘extreme sports’ either. It is just by their non-sportive configurations that mouth pull and tug-of-war constitute illustrations of what the configuration of sport is. Sport is not bodily movement and a competition as such, but follows a specific pattern of production […]. Sportive activity produces an objective ‘it’. Sport displays in ritual forms the productivity of industrial capitalist society (Eichberg, 2010, p. 187).

Whether it should be called sociology, anthropology or philosophy, Eichberg’s agenda, the study of sport for all, is best understood as a body-centred type of cultural studies. It is however paradoxical that he promotes a program of “sport for all,” since he is so critical of the very term “sport.”

These understandings all have a common understanding of the characteristics of sport, which is often referred to as just “sport”. While there are differences regarding the worth and meaning of (modern) sport, there is a rough agreement on what modern sport is, when and where it emerged, and what its components are. To conclude, then: sport, according to these understandings, is a set of modern formalised physical contests among human beings. Where they differ concerns the effect of sport on humans. The next chapter will be dedicated to discussing the human and its other, the nonhuman. Since this distinction is, according to Bruno Latour (1993), central to the collectives and societies known as modern, the notion of modernity will be the point of departure in what follows.
3. The territory of modernity

The previous chapter presented influential, though not uncontested, understandings of the social study of sport. The present chapter introduces the main theoretical perspectives of this thesis. Rather than offering a complete list of the perspectives, which condition the four different articles of this thesis, the chapter will consist of sections in which the most decisive concepts, those of modernity and territorialisation, are explicated.

3.1. Modernity

This section will deal with the notion of modernity. First, some general conceptions of modernity will be noted, and then, briefly, we will glance at Guttmann’s (1978) understanding of modern sport, which is also done in article 3. Before presenting Latour’s (1993) take on modernity, the understandings of sport laid out in the previous chapter will be illuminated with Roland Barthes’s (2007) description of sport. The remainder of this section will then revolve around Latour’s (1993) pioneering comprehension of modernity.

In lay usage, the term “modern” denotes something that is contemporary, fashionable and not out-dated. In academia, modernity refers both to a certain time-span, which roughly stretches from the 18th century to the end of the 20th century, and to particular ways of organising societies that are associated with that period. Whether they are symptoms or impetuses of modernity, the industrialisation and urbanisation that followed the Enlightenment in Europe are major modernizing processes. The Enlightenment, which could be seen as the event when science and reason were substituted for religion and
superstition, is thus seen as the cradle for the types of democracy and humanism that emerged around the North Atlantic nation states during this period.

As Guttmann’s (1978) ideal-type of modern sport demonstrates, modernity has heralded processes of rationalisation throughout society; and even, as part of those rationalisation processes, the emergence of the very concept of society (Latour, 1993). Given Guttmann’s (2004, p. 323) denial of the fact that there would be anything inherently specific about postmodern – literally, that which comes after modernity – sport, the specifics of his ideal-type of modern sport are put to the test in article 3 (pp. 289–292), which treats a new-comer in the family of sport: competitive computer gaming, a.k.a. eSport. Since the article concludes that eSport, according to Guttmann’s ideal-type, could well be seen as a modern sport, it can be argued that it is imperative to apply new conceptions of modernity in the social study of sport. Since this theoretical test that testifies to eSport’s ‘sportiveness’ doesn’t have a counterpart in reality, where eSport has a hard time being validated by sport NGOs (and publically as well), new perspectives of how modern sport is to be understood must be developed. Is eSport too sedentary, and too technological a practice to count as sport? In eSport, where are the humans in motion?

In light of eSport’s alleged failure to demonstrate human prowess, and before our overall perspective of modernity has been scrutinised, a detour via Roland Barthes (2007) might be worthwhile. In his short, yet pregnant treatise What is sport? (Barthes, 2007), Barthes ponders the eponymous question of the book:

Sport answers this question by another question: who is best? But to this question of the ancient duels, sport gives a new meaning: for man’s excellence is sought here only in relation to things. Who is the best man to overcome the resistance of things, the immobility of nature? Who is the best to work the world, to give it to men … to all men? […] What is it then that men put into sport? Themselves, their human universe. Sport is made in order to speak the human contract (ibid., pp. 63, 65).
3. The territory of modernity

Barthes’s perspective may shed light on the understandings of sport elaborated in the present thesis. What is the human principle in the ideas of sport that were presented in the previous chapter? In Guttman’s understanding of sport the human factor is taken for granted. After all, this is not so strange, since sport is, very tangibly and materially, about human beings and their performances. However, Guttman makes an interesting comparison between sport in antiquity and sport in modernity. According to Guttman, the quantification and records of modern sport lack an equal in Antiquity since, to paraphrase the Greek philosopher Protagoras, man was in those days the measure of all things. In relation to both humans and nonhumans, Loland (2002) also stresses precise measurement of human performance as decisive for sport to foster fair play and human flourishing. Loland uses an interesting metaphor to describe how the human element is brought forth in sport. By suggesting an analogy between scientific experiments and sporting competitions, the human input in the form of performance is what is measured in sport (an interesting symmetry with Latour’s (1993) understanding of natural science as a practice that measures nonhuman performance). But bodies and performances are not the only human things that are enacted in sport. According to Elias and Dunning (2008), sport, and more precisely football, could be seen as a blueprint for social dynamics in general. Steven Connor rephrases this view when describing sport as a “weirdly coherent parallel universe, which is not so much a mirror for as an anagram of human life in general” (Connor, 2011, p.14). To complete the recapitulation of the understandings of sport from the previous chapter, Eichberg (2010) sees modern sport as an inhumane and asocial practice. What the human is/becomes in modern sport is, at best, a contested category, and, at worst, a blind spot in the social study of sport. Thus, this study stresses the human as an unavoidable category that must be taken into consideration when inquiring into modern sport. Precisely because modern sport is an anthropocentric practice,
the ability to distinguish between human and nonhuman ought to be a
decisive operation in athletic competition. And, as an apt introduction
to the final paragraphs of this section, according to Latour (1993),
keeping humans and nonhumans apart is exactly what modernity has
excelled in.

Latour’s basic argument is that humans have always been the same.
Surely, there have been widely differing mores and chores in human
collectives, but those of the latest centuries, which Latour calls “the
moderns,” do not differ essentially from their predecessors. Latour
undergirds this claim by contending that humans have always formed
networks with things. This distribution or exchange he refers to as the
“work of translation”! (ibid., p. 12). From these arguments follows the
uncanny postulate that “we have never been modern,” which is also
the title of Latour’s (ibid.) seminal treatise on modernity. This piece of
work is revisited in article 1 and 2, but also, briefly, in article 4. It is
not so farfetched to discuss Latour’s understanding of modernity in
relation to eSport, the subject of article 3 (cf. Hutchins, 2008). It
might seem contradictory to talk of the effects of modernity while at
the same time denouncing that there has ever been such a thing as
modernity; indeed, to suggest, as does the title of the thesis, that sport
has never been modern! This paradox is the key to comprehending
Latour’s provocative thoughts.

To acknowledge modernity, to perceive oneself as modern, is, ac-
cording to Latour, to posit a rupture in time, roughly occurring
around the time of the Enlightenment. Before this rift, human beings,
according to the moderns, did not know how the world was constitu-
ed, whereas afterwards they did. The moderns thereby also distin-
guished themselves from the premoderns, the so-called primitives,
who were situated on the wrong side of the rupture, and whom so
called anthropologists among the moderns eventually set out to study.

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1 Latour uses the terms “translation” and “mediation” interchangeably, whereas, in this text, only
the former will be used. However, some quotes from texts by Latour may use the latter.
According to Latour, science was the most decisive practice in establishing this world order. Instead of dedicating themselves to the work of translation of the premoderns, the moderns, in all aspects of their collectives, practiced the “work of purification” (ibid.). That which moderns claimed to have purified is no less than the fundamental dichotomy of nature and society. The sphere of humans – represented by Thomas Hobbes’s social contract, a concept which in itself is interesting to ponder in light of Barthes’s (2007) claim that “[s]port is made in order to speak the human contract” (ibid., p. 65) – was from this point on increasingly treated as a reserve for humans only. This is the society that sociology has described; a society and a sociology that, for instance, Elias and Dunning (2008) muster by applying football as a metaphor. Indeed, a field with 22 mobile humans, and only one mobile nonhuman (the ball) is like a caricature of what Latour (2005) calls “sociology of the social”, i.e. a sociology comprised of humans only. In article 1, both the Hobbesian bellum omni contra omnes (war of all against all) and Elias and Dunning’s simulation of society in the tense figurations of football are revisited and contested. Modernity, seen as the time and space in which humans and nonhumans were conceptually and practically partitioned in uncanny ways, wavers in the practice of break time football.

In Figure A – with the apt look of a staring, shaggy alien (cf. Bogost, 2012) – Latour’s understanding of the moderns is visualised. It is noteworthy that the first dichotomy in the model is only first from the viewpoint of the moderns, since the absolute distinction between nature and culture (society) represents how they look upon their collectives, the world and reality. The second dichotomy, the one between the two types of work, reveals what the moderns cannot see, i.e. that they dedicate themselves to both works at the same time, and also that these works are interconnected according to the following principle: the more the moderns purify, the more impure hybrids multiply below the horizontal line of the model.
Latour sees reality as the area marked 3 in the model. This ontological statement guides the present thesis. Reality is a complex assembly of networks that are constituted by heterogeneous elements. However, this view doesn’t totally disqualify the effects of the work of purification. Latour has actually never set out to denounce science. The work of purification, as practiced by both natural and social scientists, i.e. what the moderns call unveiling truth, is just one specific form of the work of translation. The act of purifying nature in laboratories, revealing all sorts of substances, quickly leads to technological innovations, which have an impact on – i.e. translate nature to – society. Large-scale changes all of a sudden became abundant. The moderns call this “progress.” But even if the intention is to purify the two separate spheres of nature and society, the work of purification paradoxically leads to an even more intense translation between them. And this is the source of their power: whereas their predecessors had to seek advice from the spirits when intervening in the social world, and the
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delders to intervene in the natural world, the moderns mobilise both nature and society at their own will. Precisely because the moderns set out to purify, they create a way of translating more thoroughly than any collective has done before. And in the work of translation we find the new heterogeneous networks emerging. Latour compares the simultaneous division and inseparability of the material, social, and semiotic aspects of networks with the Kurdish people:

The tiny networks we have unfolded are torn apart like the Kurds by the Iranians, the Iraqis and the Turks; once night has fallen, they slip across the borders to get married, and they dream of a common homeland that would be carved out of the three countries which have divided them up (Latour, 1993, pp. 6–7).

The primary difference between moderns and the rest is a matter of gradients. According to this theory, nature, society, humans and non-humans aren’t the starting point for analysis, but the outcome of it. Reality is not divisible into nature and society/culture; rather, nature and society are its satellites. Back on Terra, networks pulsate, proliferate, and whither like so many corals on a reef.

3.2. Territorialisation

The challenge for the present thesis is to try to comprehend both human and nonhuman aspects of sport. In this section, the concept of territorialisation will be explicated. Firstly, an explanation for broadening this particular perspective in relation to Latour’s conception of modernity will be offered. Although a paradoxically underdeveloped feature, space is also a conceptual key to unlocking Latour’s notions of heterogeneous networks of modernity (Kärrholm, 2004). Spatial aspects of sport have also been identified as decisive for the development of the social study of sport (Friedman & van Ingen, 2011; Bairner, 2012). Thus, such aspects, in the form of territorial practices, are precisely what the remainder of this section will be about. By using
the term “territorialisation,” a conceptual platform that might answer to that challenge is laid out. In three of the articles (1, 2 & 4), the theories of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are evoked as a means to this end.

Deleuze and Guattari describe the stabilisation of anything – be it identities, nations or objects – as a process of “territorialisation”. But just as Latour’s heterogeneous networks are constantly reconfigured, so territories are likewise under constant negotiation. On the one hand, the process of confirming and re-enacting such a territory is called “reterritorialisation”, and on the other, dissolving the boundaries and properties of such a territory is an act of “deterриториalisaton.” In article 1, the deterritorialising and reterritorialising movements of and in break time football is analysed. Deleuze and Guattari deterritorialise their own concepts by giving them new names and moving their demonstrations to new contexts. Thus, they use the concepts of “striated space,” a synonym for reterritorialisation, and “smooth space,” a synonym for deterritorialisation, to generalise their theory and make use of it in both mathematics and cultural aspects of the use of textiles. More specifically, these two textural qualities are applied in the analysis of break time football, since they aptly represent the flow/disruption dynamics of movement. In article 2, Deleuze and Guattari are barely mentioned, despite in some passages of freedom of movement, while still being highly active. The reason for doing this originates from a dilemma that anyone who applies Deleuze and Guattari must face: in order not to fall into the trap of making the territory of their conceptual apparatus arid and rigid, i.e. stifling its possibility for deterritorialisations, one mustn’t reference their names and concepts too often. To put it simply: to do what Deleuze teaches, one mustn’t use Deleuze. Article 2 tries to grapple with this aporia by applying someone who acknowledges the fruitfulness of Deleuze and Guattari’s approach without applying their concepts. Michel Serres (Serres & Latour, 1995) does that. He also deterritorialisises, almost
promiscuously, by moving between widely differing phenomena. The remarkable thing about Serres is that he changes his vocabulary when he moves the focus to new areas. Article 2 thus explores the similarities and differences, or, rather, traces, between Serres and parkour. In article 4, again, reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation are actualised with a new pair of synonyms: “major” reterritorialisation, and “minor” deterritorialisation (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986). Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.) talk of both a minor literature and a minor science, both of which are related to (a minor) sport in a discussion of playing defensively in table tennis. Since article 3 isn’t analysed from the perspectives of Latour, Deleuze and Guattari, the last chapter of the introductory part of the thesis will at least suggest how eSport could be understood from their point of view.
4. Investigating the thresholds of modern sport

In this chapter, the methods that have been used in the studies will be presented. Different methodological considerations, ethical *inter alia,* will also be discussed. Since the methodological framework is largely dependent on the theoretical, the way the latter informs the former will be addressed in the section that follows. A great deal will be paid to the use of metaphors, which is also something that article 2 specifically addresses.

4.1. Symmetrical anthropology

In the interviews that Latour conducted with Serres (Serres & Latour, 1995), the establishment of the former’s ontological position can actually be discerned towards the end of the book. Some of Latour’s central arguments in *We Have Never Been Modern* (Latour, 1993), which was published only one year after the interviews with Serres in France, are tried out on the master who, almost like one of Socrates’s straw men, acknowledges what the pupil has learned.

BL Yes, in fact, I believe your anthropology of the sciences resolves this question. For you being modern means not repeating Kant’s work of purification. So, that means that you have never been modern in the sense that I propose […].

MS All right.

BL The fact that you innovate, that you take so many risks, is a result of this position. So, you are not antimodern, archaicizing (at least it’s not your prin-
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cipal theme); you are obviously not postmodern; you are not modern in the sense of modern criticism, which definitely separates nature and culture, past and present. I'm tempted to say that you are amodern, or nonmodern, meaning that in retrospect you see (and we see through your books) that we have never been modern [...]..

MS Right (Serres & Latour, 1995, p. 146, italics added).

In a seemingly paradoxical way, Latour, in his attempt to decentralise the human in social science, puts his hope in anthropology – literally: the study of man. Anthropology emerged from the intuition of the moderns that they were different from their predecessors, i.e. that they could part nature and culture. In the tropics, the anthropologist describes the other, literally as well as symbolically, in all his splendour. Drawing from the observations of the premoderns, the anthropologist writes an all-encompassing book: as much about nature and culture, as about language. Writing about her own habitat, however, the anthropologist would have to give her testimony under the aegis of different disciplines and departments and in three different texts. Because this is precisely what the moderns see when looking in the mirror: nature, culture and language as three distinct realms. The modernist’s difficulty in keeping the spheres apart hinders them from seeing the networks organising them. Latour therefore urges scholars to do exactly the same as they would do in distant, exotic tribes, viz. to describe and unfold those networks. To retrace the steps of the moderns, Latour (1993) presents his method as a “symmetrical anthropology.” This name was actually a part of the original title in French that has been lost in the translation to English. Since Latour is convinced of the essentially insignificant differences between the modern world and the premodern world, the way of assembling truth in the former isn’t valued any higher than in the latter. So, what does this imply for the present thesis?
4. INVESTIGATING THE THRESHOLDS OF MODERN SPORT

The ethnologist of our world must take up her position at the common locus where roles, actions, and abilities are distributed – those that make it possible to define one entity as animal or material and another as a free agent; one as endowed with consciousness, another as mechanical, and still another as unconscious and incompetent (Latour, 1993, p. 15).

The articles are rather different with regard to empirical material and methods. If they share anything in common it is the qualitative approach. An array of methods from the ethnographical repertoire is used. A perspective akin to Latour’s symmetrical anthropology can be found in Nigel Thrift’s (2008) “non-representational theory.” These perspectives constitute a turn away from anthropocentric matters, which are sometimes referred to as “the nonhuman turn.” To move away from what things represent is a way of, albeit speculatively, suggesting what they really are. We cannot guarantee access to anything, literally: any thing. But to place human beings and their symbolic systems in the centre of gravity of all social and cultural analysis (yes, the moment we mention them, those very words start to pull us back in precisely that direction!), must according to the nonhuman perspective be avoided, for both scientific and political reasons. For science, an analysis that doesn’t attend to the nonhuman dimension is incomplete, whereas, for politics, precisely the unwillingness to acknowledge nonhumans leaves them out of our constitution, all the while they grow under our radar (as visualised by area 3 in Figure A above).

However, this leaves the researcher in an awkward position, where she has the responsibility to give voice not just to the human beings, but also to the nonhuman beings that ‘cross the way’, which literally means: being the object (“thrown against”) of a method (“after the way”). One solution that might appear dubious, and rightfully so (in that it is far from the only and even the best variety of this), is to not give voice to the human beings in the study, since the nonhuman beings are not able to express themselves in the tongue of man. This doesn’t mean that human beings are silenced completely in the articles
of this thesis, but that little attention is given to how they reflect on events and matters of concern during reflexive practices, such as systematised interviews, and rather to how they react to things and events, *in medias res*. This doesn’t mean that the analyses are indifferent to subordinated positions such as those of children, women, and the elderly. On the contrary, by looking at how nonhumans contribute to the fabric of situations, we are in a better position to describe and unpack such hegemonic power relations. At least, this is the lesson Deleuze and Guattari (1987) teach us by discussing the interrelation between “macropolitics,” which could be seen as the accumulation and systematisation of social categories, and “micropolitics,” which could be understood as navigating (in) assemblies of heterogeneous components.

The thing that the analysis wants to be in the middle of, and to give voice to, is modern sport itself. Is this possible? How is sport to be given a voice itself? In the next section, we will offer suggestions for how to deal with this problem.

### 4.2. Methodological considerations

A broad repertoire of methods are utilised in the articles. In article 1, for instance, several methods are used: Newspaper article analysis (pp. 28–32), ethnographic observations (pp. 70–165), and conceptual construction from secondary sources such as folk football (pp. 70–86). In article 2, and in the same vein as the theory-developing overview in article 1 (pp. 70–86), parkour literature is read alongside the philosophical methodology of Serres (Serres & Latour, 1995). This synchronous reading of theory and literature is what article 1 sets out to describe, viz. the stance that is coined, explicated and understood as “the art of tracing.” This stance will be discussed further below in relation to metaphor as a philosophical asset. In article 3, data is gathered from the Internet, and more precisely from web pages, through which eSport is organised, negotiated, and communicated. In article 4,
ethnographic observations are the primary data. The observations in article 1 display the personal feelings of the author, but not to the extent that this is done in article 4, in which this reflexive position is elevated to a so-called “autoethnography” (Ellis & Bochner, 2006), i.e. a story-oriented description of people from the perspective of the self.

The strategy of downplaying the importance of the voices of the participants of the study is a crude attempt at getting behind intentions, intentionality and reflexivity, i.e. beyond phenomenology as Latour portrays it (1993, 1999). Phenomenology for Latour, unfortunately, functions as a straw man, i.e. as a silent and willing target vaguely resembling what is really addressed. There is, however, a way of giving this straw man a voice, and it is connected to object-oriented ontology (OOO) (Harman, 2009; Bryant, 2011; Bogost, 2012; Morton, 2013), a philosophy that has taken Latour’s metaphysical standpoints seriously. Other than to Latour, OOO owes a great deal to phenomenology. One main argument of this strand is that which articulates the paradoxical urge that even if we humans can’t avoid placing ourselves at the centre of attention, we must never give up on finding ways of doing so. To grant all actors, objects, units, and things a voice, one solution is not to privilege human enunciations (while of course not silencing them completely).

But one problem (among many) still remains: how can an analysis fail, how can theory be overturned, how can informants surprise the researcher if she is the master of the material? Uncertainty must be present in the process, and in that sense modern science and modern sport actually share a decisive element in their respective foundations. The final result is always a reduction of that complexity, and in that way, all authors are puppeteers of their own texts. Still, article 4 contains an attempt of the author to control the events of the research as an experimental part of the method. That for which control is sought in the study is the element of competition itself and this is done by asking whether social criticism is possible from within the procedure.
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of the sport practice itself. Of course the attempt to take control fails, which in no way ends up with an uninteresting result. Uncertainty, in any case, abounds. Autoethnography, the method of article 4, as a hyper-subjective stance might also be accused of being unable to fail, since it depends so much on the whim of the author. This is why the story-telling benefice of autoethnography is coupled with the Deleuze-Guattarian “schizoanalysis” in the article. This move makes it possible to turn a personal trait (not being able to smash in table tennis), inside and out, in order to explore what this autobiographical idiosyncrasy might implicate for sport in general. Many possibilities for failure, of course, emerge along the way.

The articles lean toward ethnography and philosophy, even if that does not exhaust the list of approaches. If the methods aren’t extraordinary, then it is possible that the range of differences between the articles, and also the relation between the analysed practices and modern sport, are. Precisely by analysing the components of differing sporting practices – understood as humans and nonhumans and their relations and interactions – in the outskirts of modern sport (sport played by children or the elderly; sport with little formal organisation; sport without competition; sport where one is sedentary; sport that is primarily recreational, etc.), modern sport is evoked and, literally, outlined. This mob of practices posits itself right outside the house of modern sport to make it react, to force it to talk. Mustering this mob, or, rather, this band of skirmishers, is a strategy laid out in order to lend sport a voice, i.e. by simulating different challenges to modern sport.

4.3. Science as a metaphor for sport
The concepts developed in the articles all deal with the problem of theorising the world of sport as seen from the viewpoint of symmetrical anthropology. The theoretically informed methodological operationalisation of this endeavour amounts to finding ways of accounting
4. Investigating the Thresholds of Modern Sport

for both humans and nonhumans as constitutive of the social in situations in which sport is the central practice. In Alien Phenomenology (Bogost, 2012, pp. 61–84), Ian Bogost speculates about what it is like to be a thing. Bogost, as someone inspired by Latour, shares with Serres (Serres & Latour, 1995, pp. 64–68), as someone who has inspired Latour, the taste for metaphor as a tool of inquiry. He suggests the use of metaphor as a way of approaching how things perceive and interact. Bogost’s thoughts in this line of argumentation are based on Harman’s (2009) claim that no object, be it human or nonhuman, can interact directly. Objects withdraw from each other. The withdrawal of objects is itself a conceptual extension of Latourian metaphysics. By indirect allusions, such as metaphors, a necessarily distorted and impoverished version of the thing that one pays interest to emerges.

The metaphorical exchange in this thesis will be between sport and science. Science here is to be understood in the broadest sense as: different ways of inquiring, gaining and gathering knowledge, whether it concerns experimenting, modelling or simulations. As in the articles, and the understandings of sport that they discuss, science is used in different ways as a metaphor for sport. In article 1, Elias and Dunning’s (2008) way of posing football as a social scientific asset is scrutinised by staging break time football as a contrasting example. In article 2, parkour is posed as an investigative stance in the same vein as Michel Serres’s (Serres & Latour, 1995) non-critical philosophy. By carefully placing parkour and Serres side by side, the article outlines “the art of tracing.” In article 4, Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of “minor science” is applied to cast light upon the experimental and creative qualities in sport competitions. This article also discusses Lolland’s treatise of fair play, which, interestingly enough – although not explicitly investigated in the article – suggests scientific experiments as a fruitful analogy for understanding sport competitions.

All of these examples, both in the articles and in the understandings of sport they relate to, suggest that there are relations between
human movement and human knowledge that ought to be addressed more systematically. To stage science, as a pivotal practice in modernity, as a metaphor for sport, another central feature of modernity, is an attempt at outlining this strand.

4.4. Philosophy as conceptual construction
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that philosophy is tantamount to the creation of concepts (a term they lament having been usurped by advertising). Their own eclectic and esoteric writings boil over with the emergence of concepts, some of which are explicated and utilised in the present thesis (major/minor, reterritorialisation/deterritorialisation, striated/smooth, etc.). A philosophical concept does not immediately reach a heaven of pure ideas. Forged in and dependent on the place and time it was constructed, the concept, rather, is a very specific tool. In article 1 (pp. 64–67), conceptual construction is discussed further in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) call for a history written, not from the viewpoints of sedentary people (pun intended), but from nomads.

Brian Massumi (2002) is more allowing than Deleuze and Guattari, when he urges cultural theorists to create concepts as testimonies of the study in process. Firstly, one doesn’t have to be a philosopher, but could well “dabble” in other disciplines and still be working philosophically (cf. Serres & Latour, 1995, p. 126). This “dabbling” actually is quite close to what in article 4 will be discussed as the art of tracing. A concept is that which is constructed underway in order to make the researched more workable. There is a crux, however: Massumi warns theorists of reusing the concepts they invent. A concept is vitalised by discussion, and will inevitably die if one person stands for the complete biography of its use and application.

In particular, two concepts will be utilised: dromography and minor sport. The reason that these two concepts are paid extra attention is two-fold: both are constructed in relation to an (1) ethnographic
4. Investigating the Thresholds of Modern Sport

material of (2) practices that are associated with the umbrella term of modern sport football and table tennis. These two elements make them a good starting point for developing a symmetrical anthropology of sport. Notwithstanding, the diverse composition of players are able to reveal how relations between humans are connected to relations between nonhumans and humans.

4.5. The art of tracing

As it was presented in the two previous sections, philosophical tools (metaphors) and methods (conceptual construction) accompany the ethnographic material of the thesis. By initiating a discussion about critique, construction, metaphors, and the affinity between movement and thinking, article 2 serves as a bridge between the philosophical and anthropological parts. It revolves around the composition of a philosophical stance and sensibility, which is called “the art of tracing.” This conceptual stance is composed from two sources: first, a research overview of studies of parkour, and, second, from an unpacking of the philosophical methodology of Serres (Serres & Latour, 1995). The purpose of the essay is to present an alternative, or rather a supplement, to the critical analytical stance (cf. Latour 2010), which, in turn, was identified as taken for granted within cultural analysis, and therefore worthy of questioning. On the one hand, critique – with literal meanings such as judging and parting – divides and labels materials, actors and identities, while, on the other hand, the art of tracing mends and tinkers with heterogeneous materials to see how they fit. By synchronically laying out the “non-critical” (Mörtenbäck, 2005; Latour, 1989) ways of parkour and Serres, the demonstration, per se, aims to perform and embody tracing. Metaphor is originally a Greek term that stands for ‘I carry across’ which is apt for parkour and Serres, as for the art of tracing in general.

The art of tracing is about building bridges between purportedly separate domains, i.e. making connections where such were thought
impossible. On the one hand, parkour displays this through a bodily
defragmentation of the ‘hardware’ of the urban realm, while Serres, on
the other hand, weds sources from science, myth, literature, fable and
philosophy (cf. Serres, 2008).

Concerning the name, “tracing” is a reference to both traceurs, the
practitioners of parkour, and Latour’s description of Serres’s legacy,
which lays out “tracings, not tracks” (Serres & Latour, 1995, p. 105).
Rather than the hunter or detective, who follow the traces of a prey or
a suspect, the tracer lays out traces (which simultaneously emerge and
dissolve). As an ontological and epistemological sensibility, the art of
tracing is a response to Latour’s (1993) call for a sensibility among
scholars of the relation between human and nonhuman.
5. Article summaries

5.1. Summary of article 1

*Klungan och barndomens sociala rum: socialt gränsarbete och figurationer i rastfotbollen*


This article is a licentiate thesis in pedagogy on the role of football among pupils in the school context. The concept of break time football is illuminated from multiple angles. Between 2006 and 2008, ethnographic fieldwork was carried out in three schools in Malmö, Sweden. The focus of the study is the element of football in children’s “peer cultures” (Corsaro, 2005). Observations during break time constituted the lion’s share of the data. However, in order to shed light on the material conditions for playing football in school, a pilot study was conducted in which articles from Swedish newspapers treating football pitches in or adjacent to Swedish schools sketched a background. The pilot study and earlier research showed that most Swedish schools have access to a football pitch. According to the observations, football is a central trait among pupils. Some of the games mimic regular football, while others are variations with juggling or kicking the ball against a wall. Mostly boys contribute to the production of what the article calls “football peer cultures”. This latter term designates

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2In the English summary of article 1 (pp. 190-196), the terminology differs to some extent from the one in this introductory part. What is here referred to as “break time football” is called “schoolyard football” in the named summary. Also, what is called “the clump” below goes under the name of “the scrum” in the named summary. The reason these are renamed is that they are found to be more accurate translations of their Swedish counterparts *rastfotboll* and *klungan*. 

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nates the playing of football, the talking about football, and the dressing in top-level football merchandise (boots and jerseys) among peers.

Whereas the inquiry is informed by the perspectives of the social study of childhood (James & Prout, 1990; Qvortrup, 1994; Corsaro, 2005; Prout, 2005) in the fieldwork, the spatial concepts of the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) were applied on the level of analysis. Thus the spatial coding of the playing of football during break times is enveloped. Three decisive types of formation or styles of play are identified: the random and highly fluctuating play of the *clump*; the structured and role-laden play of *soccer*; the artistic and skilful performances of *jogo bonito*. Seen from a gender perspective, a division between girls and boys is produced even within the seemingly pattern-less and tumultuous windings of the clump. This latter finding was possible because of the social analysis of movement, dromography, developed in the article.

The article opens up a new field of study, which has been neglected so far, viz. the interface between the social study of childhood and the social study of sport. By combining Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning’s view of the transition from folk football to association football as a token for a burgeoning civilising process with the view of children as social actors, cultural creatures and human beings in their own right, as is promoted by childhood scholars such as Alan Prout and Allison James, the study suggests that break time football is a better metaphor for society than association football. This latter line of reasoning follows the concepts and understandings of Latour, Serres, Deleuze and Guattari. The eligibility of having football as a metaphor for society, collective and group dynamics is problematised from a feministic point of view.
5. ARTICLE SUMMARIES

5.2. Summary of article 2

An alternative to critique? Concerning parkour, Michel Serres and “the art of tracing” is a review article with theoretical ambitions. Studies on parkour tend to emphasise its subversive qualities and reformulation of urban spaces. Scholars that pay interest to parkour often apply concepts from continental philosophy to discuss their data. This essay is no exception from this tradition. Other than getting a grip on parkour studies, and as a way of doing precisely that, the methodological repertoire of the French philosopher Michel Serres as it appears in a series of interviews (Serres & Latour, 1995) is scrutinised. By synthesising the methods of Serres and parkour, an investigative mode is outlined whose purpose is to complement and sometimes substitute a well-known stance of scientific practice: the critical analytical stance. This mode or stance, coined as the art of tracing, borrows its name from parkour, whose practitioners sometimes are referred to as tracers, traceurs. By mending rather than splitting up, and by affirming rather than negating, the tracer approaches his objects and subjects of study with naivety, curiosity, care and speed. The tracer’s specialty is not some particular topic other than his or her own ability (and agility) to associate between alleged incommensurable phenomena – an associologist, if you will. In parkour this is demonstrated by the traceurs’ effort to make new use of predefined urban materials and in Serres’s philosophy this is evident in his swift travel between widely differing
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themes such as information theory, La Fontaine’s fables, thermodynamics, Moliére, and parasites (cf. Serres, 2008).

The article points to interesting revelations to be made in the conjoined analysis of movement and knowledge. It also deals with the question of the possibility of a critique of critique itself. The art of tracing, it is concluded, is about suggesting new directions and connections between practices and entities, and therefore this stance is best utilised as a complement to the critical analytical stance, rather than its substitute.

5.3. Summary of article 3

Electronic sport and its impact on future sport


The article treats the “sportification” of electronic sport, a.k.a. eSport, and the future of sport. eSport, popularly defined as competitive computer gaming, is today an influential practice all over the world that decisively impacts cultures, societies, economies and politics. The growth of eSport depends partly on the launching of the World Wide Web, partly on the development of first person shooter (FPS) software and hardware that could harbour those games. Methodologically, the web pages of eSport organisations and communities are analysed. Since eSport is a fundamentally virtual and electronic practice, the discussions between its practitioners and stakeholders of its existence and future were held in public, meaning comment threads in several forums. Theoretically, eSport is investigated as a modern competitive sport. Allen Guttmann (1978, 2004) holds that what distinguishes modern physical contests (sport) from their ancient varieties is that they are characterised by a high degree of secularisation, bureaucratisa-
5. ARTICLE SUMMARIES

tion, rationalisation, equality, specialisation, quantification and quest for records. Kalle Jonasson is the main author of the article and more specifically wrote the part in which eSport is displayed as a modern competitive sport in Guttmann’s sense of the term. The article is concluded with three speculative scenarios on what the future might hold for eSport and sport in relation to each other. Jesper Thiborg is the main author of this part. The three scenarios are counterculture, part of culture, and hegemonic culture and are first laid out as distinct scenarios, and then as a chronology. The article shows how difficult it is to delineate a set of practices, such as sport.

5.4. Summary of article 4

Competitive atmospheres: Toward a minor sport

Submitted to Emotion, Space and Society

The article is an autoethnographic (Ellis & Bochner, 2006) and philosophical inquiry into the mechanics of modern competitive sport. Between 2009 and 2011, participant observations were conducted in a company sport table tennis league. The findings and field notes from this autoethnography are discussed in relation to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s (1986, 1987) conceptual pair major and minor. They apply these terms to literature and science. That which is minor could shortly be described as the revolutionary condition in a practice, while that which is major is the conserving force that relies among other things on the establishment of clear categories of identity and predictable displacements. Whereas that which is minor experiments and scatters, that which is major repeats and assembles. Specific interest is paid to the defensive of playing in table tennis since this way of playing prolongs rallies and therefore the competition itself. The process that emerges when the ball is constantly returned – i.e. a process that
isn’t primarily aimed at ending the rally – is understood as a deterritorialisation of the competitive logic of sport. Company sport is especially interesting since the composition of practitioners is diverse with regard to age and sex. Normally, competitive sport is conditioned so that the practitioners are of homogeneous composition. According to Sigmund Loland (2002), such conditions depend upon the need for guaranteeing a “level playing field,” which alongside the moral norm system of “fair play” is required for sport to be an arena for “human flourishing.” According to Henning Eichberg (2010), this openness to all groups makes it an apt venue for the flourishing of a “sport for all.” Sport for all, in Eichberg’s usage of the term, is a movement (in every sense) that could serve as a strong building block for bottom-up democracy. Eichberg sees competitive sport, and elite sport in particular, as opposed to sport for all, in that it gave rise to aggressive emotions and atmospheres. Precisely by looking at atmosphere and by combining the insights from the autoethnographic observations, Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of revolution and Loland’s call for a fair play-ideal, the concept of “minor sport” is outlined. This concept reveals the borders of sport, and also how and if such boundaries could be modified. The article concludes that the element of competition is foundational for modern sport: for its longevity, for its production of creativity of movement, and for its specific building of community (which doesn’t exhaust the possibilities of other physical cultures, in their own idiosyncratic ways, to produce creativity of movement and community building).
6. Dromography and minor sport

In this chapter, Latour’s call for a symmetrical anthropology will be addressed. This ‘discipline’ is a theoretical and methodological platform that considers how both humans and nonhumans are constitutive of the social, of relations, and of collectives. The two most decisively symmetrical anthropological concepts of the articles, dromography and minor sport, will be presented and discussed as responses to Latour’s agenda. After each concept has been presented it will be put to the test by applying it in a context in which it did not originate. Even if conceptual construction was discussed in the chapter on methodology in relation to Massumi’s (2002) claim that authors shouldn’t reuse their own concepts, precisely this move will be made here. This is possible, it is argued, since the concepts were constructed locally in the articles and are made to interact only here, in the introductory part of the thesis. Notwithstanding, it shows how conceptual construction might be approached in the study of sport. The chapter will be concluded with a revisiting of the discussion of the broad and narrow sense of sport.

6.1. Dromography

In article 1 (pp. 143–165), the concept of dromography (“the writing of courses, routes and directions) was developed, with the purpose of observing and analysing movements in sport. This methodological tool was informed by Paul Virilio’s (2005) arguments about speed as a decisive element of power in any collective, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s (1987) conception of power, space and movement, and Michel Serres’s (Serres & Latour, 1995) “philosophy of prepositions”
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(ibid., pp. 101–102, 105–106, 127, 197, 202). The latter philosophical stance is an argument for considering prepositions, rather than the conventionally emphasised verbs and substantives, as the linguistic keys to understanding human interactions.

For the study itself, dromography was an asset both for the ethnographic observations of the pupils playing football, and for analysing how the in situ relation between humans and nonhumans was translated into human identity politics. In particular, this method made it possible to reveal the gender politics of informal forms of football in the school context. On the level of analysis, it was demonstrated, using this schema, that gender construction was tied to movements, codes, positions, and spatial settings and elements. In the analysed excerpts, girls tended to be taken up by or join reterritorialising trajectories, which – as was concluded in the first stage of the analysis in article 1 (pp. 87–102) – are connected to the regular form of football. Boys tended to take part in the reterritorialisation, which they dominated, and also in the deterritorialisation, which was a male prerogative.

This finding was used to discuss (ibid., pp. 162–165) the affinity between masculinity and philosophical discourses that stress the “death of the subject” (Asdal et al., 1998, p. 217), and to reflect on the research process undertaken in connection with the study. Alongside other “figurational” (Elias & Dunning, 2008) patterns that were sketched out in article 1, such as “the clump” (pp. 70–86) and “jogo bonito” (pp. 103–129), the existence of regular association football, “soccer” (pp. 87–102), was detected and theorised in the first part of the study. So, even if the expositions of these figurational rationales aren’t performed under the umbrella of dromography, they were part and parcel of the conceptual construction that nominally adhered to the term.

Dromography is a resource when movement and speed are to be assessed in a collective. In article 1, dromography was used to investi-
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gate the relations emerging from the encounter between different nonhuman and human actors. According to Virilio (2005), speed is an asset of power, and this is what he means by dromocracy. If speed is to be regarded as power in dromographic analysis, then movement perhaps should be seen as agency. Even if agency/structure isn’t a dualism that Latour (1993) favours, his concept of actor-networks is not so distant from the idea that actors exist in a larger collective that simultaneously constrains and liberates them. One could say that actor-network relates to agency/structure as Latour’s view of the local relates to his denouncement of the global. To say that “[e]ven a longer network remains local at all points” (ibid, p. 117) implies that actor-networks could be seen as agency-structures in a local and material sense; structures that enable as well as stifle certain acts and practices.

Thus, article 2 is also a dromography, although this time about parkour. Surely, the demonstrations aren’t ethnographic as in article 1, but since movement and speed is such a crucial aspect of Michel Serres’s philosophy – which parkour is compared to in the article – the tracings between the phenomena could be treated as a dromography. The routes described in the article are those between allegedly incommensurable positions; between different disciplines or between locations in the urban realms that normally don’t harbour connections. Speed is of the essence in the art of tracing. If seen from the viewpoint of dromography, tracing equals the scrutinizing of a certain line: a passage, an improbable connection, or, if you will, a bridge over troubled water. What the tracer does, is that s/he animates, actualises, and embodies a distance, and thereby transforms it to a proximity. It is as if the dyad, i.e. the generic two-person relation that Michel Serres (2008) understands as always being distorted by a third party (be it parasite or noise), is inverted in the art of tracing. The tracer is a human that posits herself among nonhumans in a manner that resembles the position nonhumans have had among humans in the modern collective. Virilio’s own method, dromoscopy, portrays inanimate
objects as if they were animated by a fierce displacement. Inverted, this is a perfect description of what tracing is about: to move swiftly in order to explore what it is to be a thing. Disciplines, walls, poems, and rooftops are transformed into so many dyads, between which the tracer is the hyphen. To trace is to ephemerally materialise as the tie that binds. If nonhumans are the ultimate others of modern collectives, the ones that work unnamed but not unnoticed in the shadows, then to trace is to take on that role. One enters the opaque realm of relation when one traces. From a dromographic perspective, the art of tracing, then, is a practice that wields power outside of networks. The high speed needed for performing the connections – i.e. for becoming a relation – is what makes the tracer less of a parasite. High speed in this case equals care.

Whether cognitive or physical, tracing is always risky, and this is important from a methodological point of view. If a scientific method cannot fail is it then really to be sorted under the aegis of research? To connect in the unknown sounds risky but how is it to be assessed? As science, art or philosophy? Surely, to distinguish between science, philosophy and art isn’t always easy, although the outcomes of those chaos-relating practices ideally are quite distinct from one another (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Tracing is taking place outside the proverbial box, but only to acknowledge that there is a new box. In comparison with business discourse clichés, the perimeter of the new box is outlined when traced, and not made invisible, as is the outcome in the former cases.

Dromography is a novel approach to power and agency that might reveal both hegemonic ways of approaching space and possible practices of resistance in the analysed collective. But what about when human and nonhuman are already connected, when no displacement takes place? In article 3, eSport is investigated and discussed in relation to prevailing views of modern sport. If dromography aims at describing how the nonhuman and human interactions connect to
human identity negotiations and politics, then what could be said when an actor-network has already melted into one unit, as appears to be the case with the human cyberathlete connected to the nonhuman computer?

Firstly, there are complex and skilful displacements going on in eSport. Action per minutes (APM) in a game are always kept track of, and, as is stated in article 3, “no sport requires such a diversified coordination of the fingers as eSport” (p. 290). But is it really the interaction between the fingers and the keyboard that makes this practice so interesting? The mere movement of the fingers is interesting as a point of reference to the action that is taking place on the screen, but not as the main act, since the outcome cannot be visualised or interpreted judging from this view alone, neither by the practitioners nor by the audience. In comparison with other types of sport, the finger-athleticism of eSport is equivalent to the camera-views of the insides of vehicles in motor sports, or focused marksmen in a given projectile sport. However, the really specific characteristic of eSport isn’t the quality of displacements in the flesh, but rather that the representations on the screen of eSport competitions aren’t representing anything but themselves. This is what led Murdoch (2008) to claim that eSport is not sport IN media, but sport AS media. As with other cybernetic sports – indeed, a doubly apt term – there is, theoretically, a better chance for power asymmetries relating to gender, age, ethnicity to be challenged in eSport.

Secondly, as is argued in article 1, eSport might point to what was problematic with folk-football, with its turbulent ruckus over the moors of yore, from the viewpoint of the moderns: imprecise boundaries between humans and nonhumans that unsettle the “modernist settlement” (Latour, 1999). So, from this point of view both break time football and eSport are reminders that “we have never been modern” (Latour, 1993). Modern sport, then, really seems to be modern in Latour’s sense of the word: i.e. that a main organisational prin-
ciple within it is performing distinctions between human/and non-human.

To claim that non-, a-, pre-, and, perhaps even, postmodern sport distinguishes poorly between human and nonhuman is congruent with Connor’s (2011) historicising of sport. He suggests that at the turn of the 20th century, before sport began to be associated solely with human performance, it denoted hellishness first and then hunting – phenomena circling around nonhuman uncertainty. As so many testimonies have lately shown, the human phase of sport is now challenged by hybrid entities and cases (gene doping, prostheses, chromosomes, eSport, etc.); from the caprices of Hell to the blood of Hunt, from the hygiene of Humans to the impurity of Hybrids. Following this interpretation, modern sport can really be seen as the historical parenthesis that Eichberg (2010) claims and wants it to be. However, the difference between the statements of Eichberg and the present text lies in how this parenthesis should be understood. Whereas his position is in stark opposition to the parenthesis of modern sport, this thesis shows the beauty, importance, and dynamism of the same phenomenon.

In article 1 and 4, two physical cultural contexts in which the sexes play together are investigated. The dromography of break time football shows how the interpretation, negotiation and performing of social categories is connected to the local distribution of nonhuman and human actors. In article 4, company table tennis is portrayed as a physical cultural practice in which gender differences aren’t emphasised by the play itself. A dromography of that empirical might thus show that the distribution of nonhumans and humans doesn’t primarily serve to stabilize categories of identity such as gender, generation and social class. However, there are categories of identity that will break through in company table tennis: winners and losers, for instance. The prolonging of the rally obstructs the production of the roles of the winners and losers – dispositions that are certainly deci-
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In modern collectives. Dromographically speaking, the slow advent of the winner is executed by keeping nonhumans and humans in limbo. A mirror image of the fleshy human bridges traceurs build in the city, the rally is a nonhuman bridge that crumbles apart the moment the defensive stance fails. There are, furthermore, other dromographically noteworthy inversions of the art of tracing and minor sport. The absolute opposition to contest in tracing is exchanged in minor sport for an absolute need for the competitive element. Also, the required swiftness of tracing is converted to the slow, yet still intense, defensive strokes of minor sport. Whether swift or slow, these are examples of how the control of movement and speed is connected to the distribution of agency and power.

Articles 2 and 3 focus on recently emerging sports. Both eSport and parkour, for instance, have expanded massively since the turn of the third millennium. Given their constitutive elements, those practices ought to be able to show a greater mix among practitioners, and compared to older sports, such as football and table tennis, they ought to actualise this blending also within their practices. Sports such as football and table tennis almost always organise their competitions so that men and women, boys and girls, young and old, disabled and nondisabled never encounter each other. In the articles of the present study, the ethnographies of article 1 and 4 show what happens in settings where such boundaries are weak. Dromography has been presented as a tool for elaborating how social categories like gender are constructed in the meeting of nonhuman and human actors.

Even if specific investigations of the practitioners of parkour and eSport aren’t undertaken in article 2 and 3, those practices have, judging from the few studies that have addressed these issues, proven to be dominated by young males (Taylor et al., 2009; Maric, 2011). This is interesting if one judges the question from the viewpoint of what constitutes them materially. Parkour is all about moving economically and efficiently, which are principles that ought to be adjusted accord-
ing to age, body and ability (cf. O’Grady, 2012). Also eSport ought, at least theoretically, anyway, to be able to transcend the organisational compartmentalisation of people based on their bodies, just as sport, is infamous for (cf. Thiborg & Carlsson, 2010). Still those practices seem to exhibit what modern sport has been accused of, viz. that it is a soil in which fraternal machismo flourishes, and thus a symbolically decisive arena for the exemplification of patriarchy. This extrapolation demonstrates two things: firstly, the construction of social identities and categories has a material dimension that shouldn’t be overlooked, and, secondly, the competitive element taken by itself cannot explain all aspects of the compartmentalisation of the sexes and ages in sport.

6.2. Minor sport
In article 4, competition was investigated as a vital element of modern sport. By, once again, tracing between an ethnographic empirical and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986) philosophic demonstrations, the concept of minor sport was sketched out. More precisely, the author’s defensive way of playing table tennis was compared with Kafka’s way of positing a critical and submissive prose, which Deleuze and Guattari define as minor literature. Minor, together with its counterpart major, do not constitute separate phenomena. Instead they are better seen as two uses of the same system. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1986), Kafka created a minor literature because he, as a double minority, chose to write neither in Yiddish, nor in Czech, but in German, which was the language of officials and bureaucrats in Prague of that day. Minor practices are investigations of the borders – or, as Deleuze and Guattari phrase it, the revolutionary condition – of a system or structure. The specific temporality and spatiality of table tennis makes it a curious member of the sport family. Racquet sports, in themselves, are interesting because the definite end of competition in such sports is not connected to a certain amount of temporal (football) or spatial (track sports) measure. Potentially, then, a table tennis match
could go on forever. The so-called ‘expedite system’, however, is an instance on the elite level of table tennis set out to obstruct this. And, surely, the horizon of all sport is inevitably exhaustion (Connor, 2011).

This setting is investigated practically, since the author’s table tennis skills are mainly focused toward a defensive repertoire. The prolonged rally is understood as a deterritorialisation, and as such something that thrives on, without overhauling, the ideal of fair play in sport (Loland, 2002). The revolution in question is not a complete take-over of the venue, but a slight turning of the tables. Competition is understood as a creative, rather than as a destructive force of sport. Major sport in relation to this is the establishment of a winner, while the minor is that which thrives on the process that takes place before getting to the inevitable point when a winner is decided.

In article 1, the resistant and revolutionary properties of break time football are investigated. Football differs greatly from table tennis in that its duration is relatively fixed. Even if break time football has another duration, which usually coincides with the starting and ending of its namesake, a constant prolonging of regular (major) football isn’t possible. The figuration that was called “the clump” was compared with the tumult of folk football and conceptualised through the notion of the “war machine” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). As with the minor stance sketched in article 4, both the clump and “joga bonito” deterritorialise, i.e. obstruct the spatial distribution of the major sport of “soccer.” But in this setting it is rather soccer that is in the position of the minority, since the usage of this strategy isn’t necessarily an advantage. The girls’ forming and never leaving of ‘the perfect line of defence’ is probably the most defiant practice in all of the observations (Article 1, pp. 100–101, 151–153, 187). But can such reterritorialising acts, concerning both the territory of patriarchy and the modern sport of football, be described as minor? It seems unlikely, given the certainty with which Deleuze and Guattari couple deterritorialis-
tion and resistance/revolution. Is this a testimony of the limits of the normative connotations of their understanding of territories? Aside from this, the creative and innovative deterritorialisations of joga bonito, rather than the clumsy and messy displacements of the clump, are reminders of the revolutionary discourse of contemporary capitalism, as demonstrated by so many commercial ads in which male top football players testify to playfulness as the kernel of “the beautiful game” (ibid., pp. 103–129).

Joga bonito flirts with a contemporary capitalist discourse of flow and freedom, while the art of tracing balances on the cusp of entrepreneurial jargon, with buzzwords such as innovation, inventiveness, and creativity. Before reaching the limit of innovative bracketing in the concepts of a thesis, and to paraphrase a much worn-out term of management glossary: the haphazard me(a)nd(er)ing(s) of the art of tracing is a sort of (t)hi(n)king outside the box. So is it even minor? Yes, parkour has, after all, been interpreted as an urban guerrilla practice, and, as such, it is resistant to and revolutionary against all sorts of processes. It has even been described as oppositional to sport itself (understood, that is, as physical contest). Although competitions are taking place right next door to parkour (such as free running, etc.), the exclusion of competition tout court disqualifies it as a minor sport (in the narrow modernist sense stipulated in this thesis). If parkour is minor, then it is minor in relation to city planning. According to the dromographic analysis of parkour above, its ephemeral fleshy bridges and pathways is a sort of “minor architecture” that simultaneously confirms and challenges the demarcations of urbanity.

What parkour does testify to is further confirmation that there are two variables that must be surveyed in the assessment of the major and minor qualities of a sport. Both relate to competition. First, the legitimate hindrance of the deciding of a winner is understood as a vector toward a minor sport. Second, the lingering uncertainty regarding the contribution toward the final outcome in competition of hu-
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mans, or respectively, nonhumans, is likewise a step in the direction toward a minor sport. So for sport to be major – which in the case of the present thesis is synonymous with modern sport, or sport in the narrow sense – two distinctions must be made: winner/loser and human/nonhuman. Surely, as argued in article 4, a pure minor sport isn’t possible, if sport is understood as oriented toward deciding a winner (the narrow understanding of sport, i.e. modern sport). If it were possible with a pure minor sport, parkour would have been the perfect example of it, with its never ceasing deterritorialisations (even if specific places become definite new territories).

eSport stands out among the investigated practices, and not only because of the different framework accompanying it, but because it already appears to be an inextricably interwoven techno-social and/or natural-cultural hybrid. Thus, dromography and minor sport are constructed to conceive the still prevailing uncertainty of the undecided boundaries between human and nonhuman in sport. In eSport, this already seems to be decided. First, human and nonhuman are already interinvolved, and, second, the trial has moved into an area of computer networks and servers where human flesh cannot reside. So, even if eSport resembles shooting and archery, in the target area where human flesh isn’t present when outcomes are decided, the immersion of human flesh into the space of eSport trials would not only harm humans, but also disintegrate the matches.

In this vein, Brett Hutchins (2008) claims that we cannot see eSport from the viewpoint of either sport studies or media studies; eSport is not another case of sport IN media, but a case of sport AS media. To develop that thought, one might, with Latour, add that eSport is not another case of sport technology, but sport AS technology. With Latour one could also say that eSport operates with an accelerated modern rationale, according to which the work of purification has been inverted. Now, humans are excluded from the inside of the area of trials. And perhaps, this aggregated logic of modernity is
only logical, since eSport in its organisational attempts has been rather explicit with the ways in which it emulates sport (compared to parkour, which sometimes has explicitly been posed as an antisport). Other than in its own right, eSport could, thus, be seen as preservative of the object of modern sport. In order for modern sport not to be corrupted, eSport competitions preserve it through so many animated dioramas purified of human components.

6.3. The broad and the narrow sense of sport revisited

In this chapter two concepts have been added to the repertoire of the symmetrical anthropology of sport. ‘Dromography’ is a theoretically informed methodological tool, which is meant to be helpful in analyses of power relations in connection to the movements, materials and social categories of sporting practices. Deleuze and Guattari were the main theoretical inspiration of this concept, but also Latour and Serres. ‘Minor sport’ developed further the normative claims of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of territorialising practices.

If to be minor amounts to challenging the central practice of the modern constitution, i.e. the partitioning of humans and nonhumans, all practices in the articles seem to lean against such a stance: spatial enclosures are not taken so seriously in the clump; traceurs build fleshy bridges in urban architecture; cyber-athletes are already modified cyborgs, i.e. inseparable from the technological devices that make their feats possible; and the defensive stance in table tennis prolongs the rally in order to extract more joyous tension from the competitive element.

A minor position means working within a certain perimeter in a way that challenges the spatial and social distribution of a place and/or practice. The soccer acts in break time football demonstrate how brittle any structure or system really is, and therefore also how decisive such practices have been among the moderns. This questions Deleuze and Guattari’s self-ascribed association between deterritoriali-
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sation and revolutionary practice. Could that which they call “minor” emerge within fundamentally open and undefined structures? Totally neglecting spatial boundaries doesn’t equate to an act of revolutionising, much as the proverbial ‘thinking outside the box’ doesn’t equate to thinking the new. If dromography, minor sport, and even the art of tracing, as concepts, are to be revitalised, the normative connotations of movement (in Deleuze and Guattari) must be questioned, or, at least, discussed further.

Rather, such breaches of enclosure conceal both the perimeter of the new territory, and where the power resides in it. Or, is the concept of revolution itself the problem? Latour (1993) claims that thinking of modernity as the time and space of repeated revolutions (technological, industrial, social, etc.) is in itself typically modern. Perhaps, then, the most revolutionary thing to do is to refuse revolution altogether. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) ponder this in their analysis of Kafka. They speak of the becoming-revolutionary as someone who doesn’t aim at overthrowing centres of power, but at succumbing to them, by accelerating or magnifying their rationales. Major/minor sport could therefore not be translated as “sport for not all”/”sport for all,” “sport in the narrow sense”/“sport in the broad sense,” or “modern sport”/”postmodern sport.” This conceptual couple is thus only applicable as a complement to already extant understandings of modern sport. What this thesis does, then, is that, rather than oppose modern sport to other sporting clusters (adventure, lifestyle, ubi-, etc.), it adds nuances to it. This is a gift to modern formalised physical contests among human beings; an armour against the most naïve critique that denounces modern sport on the basis of its competitive element.

By doing this, it is hoped, some situations could be avoided in which different physical cultural practices, which adhere to the term sport, are normatively weighed in relation to each other. In an academic sport department that is organised according to the broad sense of sport, the risk is always that there will be a normative bias, which
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discursively cherishes the non-competitive, aesthetic practice (such as dance) at the expense of the competitive practices (while the lion’s share of external funding might still go to research on such matters). Nobody profits from this state of affairs. The first thing a critical scholar would want to avoid is getting stuck in a position that she didn’t choose for herself. Whether or not this is an accurate description of contemporary sport in academia will have to be decided empirically. However, if true, it doesn’t seem that readymade programs of opinions meet the gold standards of a critique of sport. Physical cultural practices, as Michael Silk and David Andrews (2011) convincingly argue, always revolve around assemblies of power and conventions, which are to be analysed rigorously, regardless of the position of the practice in the hierarchy of the family of sport.
7. Sport has never been modern

 Whereas the anthropological implications of the thesis were laid out in the previous chapter, this chapter ponders what the findings imply philosophically. After a short summary, Bruno Latour’s (1993) normative and redistributive agenda from *We Have Never Been Modern* will be presented. Further, the concept of modern sport will be discussed in relation to Latour’s notion of modernity as a time, space, and collective characterized by uncanny attempts at keeping humans and non-humans separate from each other. In a joint analysis of modern science and modern sport, it will be argued that sport fails to be modern, but succeeds in being nonmodern. The claim that sport has never been modern then forms the grounding of a new normative approach to sport that defends it from an ontological point of view.

7.1. Summary

*Sport Has Never Been Modern* is a philosophical and anthropological study on the subject of (modern) sport. The purpose of the thesis was to outline a theoretical and methodological approach to the debated term “sport.” The emergence of a broader understanding of sport was posited as something that has accelerated the hollowing out of the term. In order to grapple with this tension, a comprehensive framework was warranted. The different understandings of sport that the thesis departed from shared a rough consensus about the characteristics of modern sport. Philosophical, historical and sociological understandings of modern (competitive) sport were emphasized. Whether or not modern sport was seen as something beneficial or detrimental, the voices were at least unanimous concerning the time and place of
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its origin. If one were to generalise those understandings, then sport could be described as a set of modern formalised, physical contests among human beings. Latour’s (1993) symmetrical anthropology and concepts of work of purification and translation were identified as perspectives that suited the purpose of grasping sport broadly. His view of reality as networks with material, collective and discursive components was presented as applicable to sport. However, in order to operationalise movement (which seems to adhere to all three categories), Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986, 1987) concepts of territorialisation were applied.

The construction of new concepts was necessary for the task, concepts that were able to simultaneously analyse the material (natural/technical), collective (social/cultural), and discursive (symbolical/textual) aspects of sport. With a broad range of philosophical and anthropological perspectives and methods, many facets of sport were made to appear in the articles. The art of tracing, a concept developed in article 2, was posed both as an example of the breadth of sport, and as a tool to make connections between the different themes, disciplines, sports, perspectives, and concepts mustered in the thesis. Four studies of different threshold sports (articles 1–4) were carried out: break time football, parkour, eSports, and company table tennis. Some of the perspectives (primarily Latour’s) from within those studies were magnified to guide a comprehensive understanding of the studies, and of sport itself. By looking at modernity from Latour’s point of view when inquiring into physical cultural practices that challenged and evaded those understanding of modern sport, a sketch was drawn of the material, social, and symbolic boundaries of modern sport. In other words: by observing the outside of modern sport, its inside became visible. In the previous chapter, the symmetrical anthropology of sport was equipped with two concepts: dromography and minor sport. These concepts were constructed from ethnographies of different physical cultural practices: break time football (dromography) and
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compny table tennis (minor sport). In order to be able to validate, generalise and synthesise the findings, the concepts were applied to the subjects of the other articles.

7.2. Redistribution

The most puzzling claim in *We have never been Modern* (Latour, 1993) is that the moderns’ skill in partitioning nature and society must be retained in Latour’s program of the nonmodern world that is to come. This is startling because after having spent the whole essay convincing the reader why this distinction isn’t credible and moreover harmful, Latour proclaims that it mustn’t be discarded. This paradox has its solution in the conceptualising of the different works at play in the modern constitution: the work of purification and the work of translation. At first, it might seem that Latour conducts a classical postmodernist deconstruction of the work of purification by unmasking the dupes of modernity and their beliefs in absolute truth. This is not the case. What Latour does is to show that to be modern is to continuously repeat and re-enact the distinction between nature and society, without admitting that this act blurs the boundary between those realms all the more. Thus, the work of purification actually is the most powerful work of translation ever performed. As satellites to the modern collective, nature and society have really proven to be efficacious as organising agents and as instigators of change. However, despite wanting to retain the work of purification – as the work of translation *par excellence* – Latour doesn’t want to keep the belief in the absolute ruptures of modernity, viz. those between nature and society, moderns and premoderns, modernity and premodernity. On the one hand, Latour thinks of the moderns that:

Their daring, their research, their innovativeness, their tinkering, their youthful excesses, the ever-increasing scale of their action, the creation of stabilized objects independent of society, the freedom of a society liberated from objects – all these are features we want to keep (Latour, 1993, p. 133).
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On the other hand, Latour phrases the following imperative about the premodern condition:

Let us keep what is best about them, above all: the premoderns’ ability to differentiate durably between the networks and the pure poles of Nature and Society, of signs and things, their certainty that transcendences abound, their capacity for conceiving of past and future in many ways other than progress and decadence, the multiplications of types of nonhumans different from those of the moderns (ibid.).

The paradox that emerges thus seems to admit the following:

But the sorting seems impossible and even contradictory in the face of what I have said above. […] Worse still how could I reject from the premoderns the lasting nondifferentiation of natures and societies, and reject from the moderns the absolute dichotomy between natures and societies (ibid.)?

The solution to the seeming paradox is composed to mire the advantages from both modern and the premodern condition:

Yet this is precisely the amalgam I am looking for: to retain the production of a nature and of a society that allow changes in size through the creation of an external truth and a subject of law, but without neglecting the co-production of sciences and societies. The amalgam consists in using the premodern categories to conceptualize the hybrids, while retaining the moderns’ final outcome of the work of purification – that is, an external Nature. I want to keep following the gradient that leads from unstable existences to stabilized essences – and vice versa. To accomplish the work of purification, but as particular work of mediation (ibid., p. 134, italics in original).

These are the normative statements, and their concomitant theoretical and methodological implications were translated to the concepts of dromography and minor sport in the previous chapter. Before discussing the findings of the present inquiry in light of Latour’s redistributive agenda, the metaphorical ground between sport and science will be tended to.
7.3. Sport as science’s ‘running mate’ in modernity
Throughout the articles different suggestions of how sport, movement, and physical culture are instructive for different intellectual tasks are assessed, but also suggested. In article 1, the tradition initiated by Elias and Dunning, i.e. the one that claims that football could illuminate how sociality forms, is picked up. According to Richard Giulianotti (1999), Elias’s analysis of football demonstrates that this sport is a blueprint for sociological dichotomies such as individual and collective, and agency and structure. This conclusion is confirmed but extended, in that such sociological terms, according to Latour (1999), adhere to modernist sociology. This discipline has been successful in creating a terminology, which revolves around humans and their power games only. Polemically, Latour claims that society, from the viewpoint of modernist sociology, consists of naked calculating apes. So if association football aptly demonstrates central concepts of modernist sociology, break time football is suggested as a better metaphor for Latour’s symmetrical anthropology. The brittle constitution of football, and its reliance on nonhuman actors such as lines and goal posts, was attested to in the different schoolyards of article 1.

In article 4, some reference is made to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of as “nomad science.” The characteristics of this “minor” science are: that it is constantly driven by problems (rather than theorems), that it treats fluidity as the normal state of reality (essence is the exception), and that it never stops to verify. “Major,” or “royal,” science is dependent on the outbursts of minor science, which the former captures, tames, and channels as evidence, facts, and truths. If sport is akin to science, the defensive stance of the minor athlete, which will be explained in the paragraphs below, is similar to the role of the minor scientist who works with and investigates the exchanges and relations between heterogeneous materials: table tennis balls, the element of competition in company sport, and a diverse group of players with regard to age, sex and social class. Deleuze and Guattari’s
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minor science is also comparable with what is referred to as “science no. 2” in article 1 (p. 90). The discussion in article 4 applies some of Loland’s (2002) thoughts on the ideal of fair play in sport. In relation to the discussion here about the metaphorical exchange between science and sport, Loland’s analogy between scientific experiments and sport competitions is worthy of notice. Even if it isn’t explicitly a part of the article, it is an interesting figure of speech that perhaps could enrich the conclusion below.

So what can a metaphor do? When a metaphor is reiterated it becomes institutionalised and ceases to point to the unknown. Instead, then, metaphor becomes performative of the relation it was initially designed to describe. Metaphor thus might not be the first strategy for navigating inside existing structures, in which relations have been fairly stabilised (such as modern sport). The art of tracing fails when it mistakes itself for the relation repeatedly. What must be kept in mind is that metaphors are leaps of faith that accompany, but never substitute, critical analysis.

Quintessentially, an outcome purified of humanness is what modern scientific experimental practice aims at (Latour, 1993, 1999). Latour has compellingly demonstrated that the success of the moderns stems from their view of and tinkering with reality through the practice of science. Modern science and modern sport have only been circulated and referenced second-hand thus far (and also in the studies), and not yet investigated empirically. However, the purpose of the thesis was to find ways to address sport as a contested term. The studies in different ways addressed and described the tension of the notion of sport. Now, the time has come to tend to the relation between modern science and modern sport, (i.e. sport in the narrow sense which hitherto only indirectly has been addressed). Hopefully, modern sport has been sufficiently alluded to by now, so that we can approach it from another angle.
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The understandings of sport scrutinised and laid out in this study were largely congruent in that modern sport is a set of practices which are organised as formalised physical competitions between human beings. Of these five features of sport (modern, formalised, physical, competitive, human), it is the three in the middle that have been most well researched. The first, “modern,” is rather unproblematic as a “matter of fact” although not as a “matter of concern” (cf. Latour, 2010) in the social study of sport. And the same is true for the “human” element. These two, “modern” and “human” are, along with the corresponding category of the “nonhuman,” the characteristics that the present study has been most occupied with. It was shown in the articles that those terms could waver as much as ever with regard to sport.

In an attempt to fixate those categories long enough to say something new about them, and to make a final attempt to populate the metaphorical ground between sport and science, sport competitions will here be compared with scientific experiments. Loland (2002) develops this thought en passant in his treatise of fair play:

Imagine that sport competitions are scientific experiments in which we want to measure, compare and rank participants based on the ‘variable’ of athletic performance (ibid., p. 45).

The main output of science is composed of statements, which qualify as facts, and of which it could be said that they are valid, reliable, and, in the best of worlds, true. If science aims to produce truths and facts about the properties of natural objects, modern sport aims to produce results, which reveal something about human performance and properties. However, some sports, such as different ball-sports, seem to elude the proposed analogy. Compared with the exact measurement of long jump, for instance, the result from a football game tells us next to nothing about what a body can do. Let us just establish that in order for scientific facts and sport results to be legitimate, we must be
certain that they are correct. Moreover, science is fundamentally experimental. To lay claim to truth, the result of the experiment must not be known beforehand. Sport and science are both constitutionally experimental, or to put it in terms of certainty/uncertainty: as certain as the outcomes of sport and science are sought for, so the methods of both are just as uncertain in leading to their respective outcomes. In other words, in order for sport and science to be good sport and valid science the result, if anticipated, must not, on the other hand, be known beforehand. Indeed, Loland (2002, p. 149) holds that the greatness of sport stems from its ability to produce a “sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome.” This uncertainty is, however, not unconditional. The spatial arrangements must be well defined and the interference of actors must be controlled in both practices. For truths to be produced by it, science must take place in an environment in which what and who enter and leave are totally controlled. Both the lab and sport ground are closed and controlled spaces. Only when these conditions are clear and certain, observers will be able to assess properly the outcome of the specific trials taking place there; whether it is the behaviour of a fruit fly or the somersaults and twists of a competitive diver.

A gust of wind from an open window easily spoils the samples of the lab. A wind-assisted lab report won’t make it to the academic journals. On the other hand, wind isn’t abjured in sport. Then again, how could it? The “indoorsisation of outdoor sports” (van Bottenburg & Salome, 2010) could be seen as an active strategy of eliminating the impact of wind and weather in general. However, wind must be accounted for in athletics. A heavily wind-assisted time may win a contest, but couldn’t qualify as a record. Here the nonhuman interference doesn’t spoil the result entirely. A wind-assisted win is split between human and nonhuman; a win-wind situation. Sport thereby admits that nonhumans create humanness differently, something that science, conversely, doesn’t brag about.
The experiments conducted by scientists aim to decide absolutely the properties of objects. In laboratories, small snippets of nature are set into play. Substances are purified. The result of a scientific experiment, if it is to be pronounced valid, should be repeatable. Human interference in the outcome must therefore be minimized. If human-borne bacteria and viruses from scientists have contaminated the samples, the inquiry is ruined. But whereas substances are sought and promoted in science, the inverse relationship prevails in sport. Here substances, called illegal, are sought and shunned. It all boils down to a view of how uncertainty corrupts the true, right, valid and legitimate outcome. Whereas uncertainty created by humans is taboo in the lab, uncertainty caused by nonhumans in sport is abjured. Even if humans are an inevitable part of science, and nonhumans are an inevitable part of sport, both these sets of variables must be thoroughly assessed and staged in each practice. Trained and professional researchers construct valid facts and thereby decide scientific truth. Scientists and referees (judges) decide when results are legitimate. None of the present observers must interfere spontaneously in the practice about to take place there. However, the equivalent of a referee obstructing the course of the ball in football (which doesn’t cause the play to stop) is hard to think of in science. Moreover, we find a lot more observers present in sport in the form of spectators.

Whereas scientific experiments purify nonhuman substances, sport competitions purify. In track and field the wind must be accounted for. A winning result with the aid of the wind is legitimate to a certain degree. It cannot count as a world record, but it doesn’t disqualify the competition. It is still sport. The search for substances in science is curiously mirrored in sport as a ban on substances. The prosthetic legs of Oscar Pistorius came up as disturbing impure hybrid of human and nonhuman. The shark suits that were introduced in the Sydney Olympics later on became banned. Yet, sport changes. Pistorius did make it to the Olympics, for instance. We are already, here, in the Hybrid
phase of sport. New ways of producing humanness emerge by the minute. Therefore, negotiations must always be undertaken when a new hybrid or actor enters the collective. Sport takes the task of naming hybrids seriously, which is rarely done among the moderns. And of course, horrifying treatment of people must always be avoided, as when Caster Semenya’s heightened testosterone levels, as a new set of variables in the collective, not only got her banned from many competitions, but also questioned her as a human being.

In team-sports, measurement isn’t as rigorous as in track and field and aquatics. Rather, maximising the number of mobile human actors and minimising the nonhuman actors constitute the work of purification in such sports. So it appears that sport and science have not been “not modern” in the same way. Nonhumans are required in sport, but they aren’t fully relegated. To become human in and through sport depends on one’s interactions with nonhumans. A heavier hammer or javelin will probably shorten the throw of the athlete, thus creating a different form of humanness. Still, sport is organized around this very modern type of thinking and organizing, i.e. the separation between human and nonhuman, although not in absolute terms. Sport confirms the greatness and efficaciousness of the modern way of organizing life, while not yet fully succumbing to the metaphysical conclusion that is drawn from it.

There are many similarities between science and sport. Nonetheless, the asymmetries are just as interesting. There are the arbitrary results of ball-sports and aesthetic sports (figure skating, competitive diving etc.). As “inscriptions” (Latour, 1999) such results aren’t as instructive of human objects as those of track & field and aquatics. The football referee who obstructs the course of the ball and the presence of spectators – unqualified observers in comparison with scientists – are proof that sport competitions aren’t as exclusive as scientific experiments. The development of sport seems to harmonize with and inform the development of science in modernity. However,
sport differs from science in crucial respects, respects that disqualify it as a fundamentally modern practice (in Latour’s understanding of the term).

Despite its temporal disposition in the midst of modernization, sport is not typically modern. Rather it’s nonmodern. This is because, whereas science, or rather scientism, often reinforces an absolute rupture between nature/society, object/subject, and thing/man, modern sport – although setting out to produce purified humanness – admits that things/objects are inextricably connected to this practice.

Sport is a decent way of distinguishing humans from nonhumans. However, the twist is that humanness in sport competitions is not an *a priori*, but an *a posteriori*. Now, what could be said about the range of the different modern sports? Team-sports differ greatly from athletics. Loland’s analogy doesn’t cover the first set of sports, either. Is the purification of humanness in modern sport primarily observable in practices such as swimming and track and field? Not necessarily. If we follow the likes of Elias and Dunning (2008) in their staging of football as a societal laboratory, the “naked calculating citizens” (Latour, 1993, pp. 26–28, 31, 84, 111, 143–144), whom Hobbes invented, suddenly surface. If record-striving sports are more like scientific experiments, aiming to test the athletic performance of naked *calculated* citizens, football, for instance, rather resembles social science.

In football, as well as in social science, the stage is set in a large container, with a maximum of humans and a minimum of nonhumans. In football, spectators find their truth about humanness exemplified; projecting all sorts of properties on their favourite teams and players. “How football explains the world” (Foer, 2005). Could we even talk of a soc(cer)iology? It is also interesting if one adds to this picture Serres’s (2008; Serres & Latour, 1995) description of the rugby ball as a weaver of the collective, i.e. as a nonhuman actor necessary for humans to understand themselves as humans. Actually, those three ways (Loland, Elias, and Serres) of allegorising between sport
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and science seem, somehow, to correspond with Latour’s model of the works of the moderns, with one natural, one social/cultural, and one hybrid area.

Could it be that modern sport in some way fills the experimental void of the social sciences? For sure, it is not the typical features of human beings that are measured in modern sport: morality, intention, consciousness, rationality, free will, etc. Even if such characteristics aren’t lacking in modern sport they are not decisive in the definite result and outcome of modern sport. Part of their logic is precisely that they cannot be absolutely measured, ranked and compared. Another form of human than humanistic human is brought forth in modern sport.

In any event, modern sport alludes to the scientifically experimental method of producing a distilled form of pure nature, without retaining the claim that we moderns differ totally from our predecessors. Therefore, modern sport has influenced modern collectives on a deeper level as well. The influence modern sport has had on health, colonialism, military, capital, and patriarchy since its emergence has been well documented by a range of scholars of sport. However, its profound philosophical meaning has hitherto not been acknowledged. More convincingly than art, philosophy and science, sport has established methods of accurately distinguishing specifically human features without finally parting us from the non-human side of the world. Is the qualifier of “minor” always impossible – when applied to cinema, theatre, theory, literature, science, etc. – or is it just in sport that it doesn’t fit so well? Perhaps, modern sport isn’t possible to revolutionise in the modern sense because it, while surely celebrating the modern idea of the absolute distinction between humans and nonhumans, already acknowledges the messiness of things. Technological inventions wait to be tried out in the world of sport, not in order to emphasise the gap between nonhumans and humans further, but in order to suggest new modes of being human. For, as Serres (Serres & Latour,
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1995, p. 166) suggests, “Humanity begins with things. Animals don’t have things.” Paradoxically, modern sport, then, is more “amodern” (Latour, 1993) than any other form of sport.

This argument is based on the insight that while modern sport tends to purify its competitions from uncertainty created by nonhumans, it never neglects the fact that the production of the human in sport always depends on the performance of nonhuman actors. To put it simply: what characterises human beings has never been certain in sport. In modern sport the human is that which is to be explained and nonhumans help us to do this. In modern sport the human being is an „à posteriori. Modern sport thus, it is concluded, is one of those rare practices, thriving in the midst of the moderns, dedicating itself to the work of purification, while simultaneously acknowledging the work of translation.

Academically and socially, sport is often treated normatively, and its summoning of the human body is reason enough to keep this convention. This, however, shouldn’t stop new layers of normativity from being added. A normative discussion of sport cannot be the property solely of modernist critical sociology. This means that the value of sport shouldn’t be assessed exclusively by its ability to either challenge or reinforce sociological concepts such as society, community, power, gender, etc. This is not to say that such issues are unimportant, and indeed, in the articles in this thesis, these notions are addressed in relation to sport. A normative approach to sport that focuses on how it affects categories of identity such as ethnicity, gender, nationality, (dis)ability, social class, and generation should perhaps, after Latour (2005), be called a modernist sociological approach. The approach that should be added to the modernist sociological approach is one that assesses sport’s contribution to the modern constitution, i.e. to the mere possibility of having a modernist sociology revolving around terms such as society and power. If modernity is specific in some way, modern sport possibly has had a part to play in establishing the condi-
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tions for those specifics. This thesis ponders the role of modern sport in the ontological foundation of modernity.

Sport safeguards the wonders of science without retaining the claim that we moderns differ totally from our ancestors. To paraphrase the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973): sport is the story the moderns tell themselves about themselves. The conclusion that sport plays a decisive role in modernity is not suggested here because of its benefits for public health and socialisation processes, or for its reinforcement of imperialism, colonialism, patriarchy, capitalism, racism, and fascism; sport is important in modernity because it lies at its very ontological foundations. The loosely formalized threshold cases of this thesis challenge in different ways the ontological support that modern sport has given to the general understanding of reality and the organisation of the world. The implications of this are that we as scholars mustn’t be too dazzled by the seemingly innocent, playful, spontaneous physical cultural practices.

From the reading of sport through Latour, via loosely formalised practices described in the articles, the following conclusion is drawn: modern sport has been a balance to the checks of modern science. But we mustn’t totally disenchant the dichotomies of modernity (as worked out in the practice of science). Timothy Morton (2007) succinctly reminds us, as theorists, that it might be counterproductive to strive to immerse ourselves in, or even to become, the ultimate Other of modernity, the nonhuman. As he writes:

We must deal with the idea of distance itself. If we try to get rid of distance too fast, in our rush to join the nonhuman, we will end up caught in our prejudice, our concept of distance, our concept of “them”. Hanging out in the distance may be the surest way of relating to the nonhuman (ibid., p. 205).

As a practice that recognises the whole of the modern constitution, sport stands out; no set of practices, so utterly associable with modernity, has had such an ability to see double, i.e. to acknowledge the
joint effect of the works Latour has coined. The normative argument of this thesis is therefore to promote and preserve modern competitive sport, not because it socialises, but because it teaches us about the modern concept of socialisation. Conversely, modern sport shouldn’t be discarded because it is dehumanising; modern sport should be defended because it is one of the most developed ways of distinguishing human from nonhuman, without forgetting how the former depend on the latter. This confirms Eichberg’s (2010) claim, even if the normative implications of it are altered, that:

Sport is not bodily movement and a competition as such, but follows a specific pattern of production […]. Sportive activity produces an objective ‘it’ (ibid., p. 187).

The produced humanness, however, is not an industrial production, but a fragile and ephemeral one. Surely, the production of athletes in the former Eastern bloc showed similarities with industrial production, but the objective ‘it’ referred to in the present argument is rather the flickering form of humanness emerging in and from competitive practice itself (and not through the political usage of sport). Perhaps the question of doping could be approached anew from this point of view? Doping obstructs the emergence of the fragile and futile forms of humanness of modern sport. Sport competitions and results are beacons of an undecided humanness that again and again have been calling home the diffused modern cadre of workers of purification from their progressive and revolutionary work in the fields.

Latour means that it is typically modern to alternate between either society or nature as the absolute determinant of events. However, it is not typically modern to admit that one fluctuates between those positions, and particularly not to express these views in the same sentence. Also, it’s not especially modern to admit the work of purification and translation at once, since they seem to contradict each other. Curiously, this is precisely what sport does. Sport synchronically confirms the
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dichotomy between nature and society and the complex work of translation that creates those distinct categories. Rather than copying (experimental) science, i.e. creating an exact mirror of its practice, sport alludes to it, while at the same time demonstrating its fickleness, fragility and (not socially) constructed nature. Ontologically, sport affirms the beauty, efficacy and necessity of scientific practice in modernity, without ever forgetting the strenuous and uncertain path that must be trod for reaching this beneficial position.

The main conclusion of this thesis is that sport has never been modern. However, it stands out among the modern practices since it has simultaneously reproduced and contested the view of the world heralded in the modern constitution. Quite literally, then, sport has been science’s ‘running mate’ in modernity: a parallel, supporting, yet slightly different dimension of the great power of the modern constitution. To acknowledge modern sport as an allegory of modern science is to point to its ontologically underrated importance during the last centuries.
8. Sammanfattning

*Sport Has Never Been Modern* behandlar idrott/sport som kulturellt och samhälleligt fenomen. Avhandlingen försöker orientera sig mellan olika förståelser av idrott. Två extrema poler stipuleras: en bred förståelse av sport/idrott som omfattar all fysisk aktivitet, samt en smal förståelse som betecknar formaliserad fysisk tävlan. Den senare förståelsen stipuleras som ”modern” – ett i synnerhet centralt begrepp i avhandlingen.


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2006-2008 (elever, F-6, som spelar fotboll) och 2009-2011 (korpbord-tennispelare).


I genomgången av tidigare forskning presenteras en rad centrala tänkare i det samhällsvetenskapliga studiet av idrott. Allen Guttmann har med sin idealtyp av den moderna idrotten presenterat en gångbar modell för att särskilja mellan äldre tiders kroppsövningar och dem i vår samtid. I det centrala arbetet From Ritual to Record skisserar Guttmann de karakteristika som kan tillskrivas den moderna idrotten. För det första skapar han en typologi över idrott, där denna sägs tillhöra lek/spel-familjen, och att den därvidlag är en organiserad, tävlingsinriktad samt fysisk variant av detta. De kännetecken som utmärker den moderna idrotten är sekularisering, specialisering, byråkratisering, rationalisering, kvantifiering, rättviseidealet, samt jakten på rekord.

Sigmund Loland upprätthåller sig vid vissa av dessa aspekter, och närmre bestämt de som kan kopplas till fair play-idealet i idrott. Loland menar att idrott potentiellt är en ”arena för mänsklig blomstring”, alltså en verksamhet där personer kan upptäcka och utveckla
sina kvaliteter, samt förvärva och förfinna färdigheter. För att detta skall kunna ske måste emellertid det så kallade fair play-idealet råda. Genom att förutsättningar gör så likvärdiga som möjligt för deltagarna och att dessa sedan gör sitt bästa, genom att spela för att vinna, så kan det moraliska normsystemet som upprätthåller fair play-idealet sägas vara aktivt. Det som kan utvinnas om allt detta uppfylls är, genom att idrottare på så vis kan finner jämbördigt motstånd, är vad Loland kallar ”den ovissa utkomstens ljuva spänning”.


Henning Eichberg har som antropolog, filosof och sociolog länge verkat för att det samhällsvetenskapliga studiet av idrott skall rikta om sökljuset från tävlingsorienterad idrott till folkliga lekar och spel. Enligt Eichberg kan tävling, och i synnerhet den som anordnas inom ramen för så kallad elitidrott, verka nedbrytande på såväl sociala band som på de kroppar som deltar i den. Aggressivitet och animositet förstas på så vis som några av den moderna elitidrottens främsta utkomster. Om bara kroppen, leken, flytet och det folkliga samspelet, det vill säga det som Eichberg samlar in under paraplybegreppet idrott för alla, fick större utrymme på bekostnad av tävlingsorienterad idrott
så skulle demokrati kunna byggas upp mer ändamålsenligt: bottom-up, snarare än top-down.


För avhandlingens vidkommande undersöks förvisso snarare idrottnens periferi än dess absoluta centrum, i vilket sådana sällsamma sam-

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mansättningar tenderar att återfinnas. För att undersöka den moderna idrottens gränser används Deleuzes och Guattaris förståelse av territorialisering. När ett territorium upprättas så är det för att kunna urskilja identiteter, roller och positioner som är tydliga och möjliga att repetera. De handlingar som, å ena sidan, bekräftar och syftar till att återskapa ett territorium räknas till det som Deleuze och Guattari beskriver som ”reterritorialisering”. Det som, å andra sidan, destabiliserar och utmanar en ordning förstår de som en ”deterritorialisering”.

Man skulle initialt kunna säga att varje anspråk på att bekräfta uppdelningen av människor klasser baserat på kön, ålder, funktion och förmåga som är aktiv inom den moderna idrotten är en reterritorialisering. Vinnare och förlorare är två sorter identitet som produceras den moderna idrottens territorium. Ett territorium förstås i avhandlingen som någorlunda stelnade centra i vilka komplexa nätverk av såväl mänsklig som ickemänsklig härkomst sorteras och distribueras.

Ovanstående perspektiv erbjuder något av en ontologisk grund för förståelsen av avhandlingen och är självfallet inte fränkopplade de epistemologiska ståndpunkterna. Även om epistemologi inte är ett begrepp som vare sig Latour håller så högt, har den bild av verkligheten han tecknar implikationer för vilken kunskap man kan bilda sig om saker och ting. I egenskap av en av Michel Serres beundrare har Latour länge intresserat sig för gränslandet mellan olika discipliner, företrädesvis de mellan de så kallade hårda och mjuka vetenskaperna. I en rad intervjuer som Latour gör med Serres, och som används på olika sätt i avhandlingens studier, framstår den senares metodologi som en vetenskapsantropologi. Det är Serres symmetriska bedömning av kunskapsvärdet i såväl myt som vetenskap som bidrar till att Latour kom att beteckna den metod han förordrar i studiet av de moderna som ”symmetrisk antropologi”. I operationaliseringen av denna metodologi, vänds blicken, liksom i fallet för ontologin ovan, från Latour till Deleuzes och Guattaris eklektiska filosofi, och närmre bestämt till deras tankar om att filosofi med fördel ägnar sig åt konstruera be-
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grepp. Dessa grepp är inte gudagivna och istenhuggna lagar om verkligheten. Snarare är de iscensättningar av det sociala som är betingade av den tid och plats som de springer ur.

De grepp som utvecklas i avhandlingen syftar främst till att beskriva idrottens gränsland och detta genom att förnimma hur människor och ickemänniskor uppdras och distribueras för att kunna konstituera det som intuitivt och instinktivt förstås som idrott/sport. På så vis görs begreppen modernitet och territorialisering, såsom de förklarats ovan, rättvisa.

I artikel 1 utvecklas ett analytiskt förfarande, sett till både observation och tolkningen av denna, som får namnet ”dromografi”. Begreppet är inspirerat av Deleuzes och Guattaris användning av filosofen Paul Virilios begrepp dromokrati och dromoskopii. Dessa båda grepp beskriver och används för att beskriva hur kontrollen av hastigheter är avgörande för var makten är placerad i ett kollektiv. Dromografi skulle på grekiska kunna förstås ungefär som ”beskrivandet av rutter och riktningar”. Med detta perspektiv kan de figurationsmöns ter som kännetecknar den tumultartade rastfotbollen skönjas. Därutöver används dromografin för att urskilja genuskonstruktion i den tillsynes ostrukturerade villervallen som rastfotbollen utgör.

I artikel 2 diskuteras Serres syn på kunskap genom att jämföra hans filosofiska metodologi med den urbana förflyttningskonsten parkour. Det som kännetecknar både Serres metodologi och traceurers, det vill säga parkourutövares, sätt att ta sig fram i olika miljöer, är att de ägnar sig åt det som i artikeln kallas ”konsten att spåra”. Denna metodologiska hållning konstrueras som ett alternativ, eller snarare som ett complement, till det, inom samhälls- och kulturtveten skapen förgivettagna, kritiskt analytiska förhållningssättet. Istället för att, som greppen kritik och analys denotera, dela och stycka upp kännetecknas konsten att spåra av att koppla samman; att bokstavligen finna och skapa associationer där sådana ansetts vara omöjliga.
8. SAMMANFATTNING

I artikel 3 används Guttmanns idealtyp av den moderna tävlingsorienterade idrotten för att förstå tävlingsbaserat datorspelande, så kallad eSport. De karakteristika som Guttmann avgränsar sitt studium med, det vill säga de av den moderna idrotten, uppfylls i eSporten. Denna slutsats diskuteras i kappan som ett kvitto på att det ”moderna” elementet i modern idrott inte får tas för givet. I föreliggande text nyanseras moderniteten med hjälp av Latours begrepp.

I artikel 4 föreslås det att man skulle kunna se modern tävlingsorienterad idrott som en balansering av de element som Deleuze och Guattari kallar ”mindre” och ”större”. Det som de i sin analys av Kafka som en minoritetsförfattare, och närmare bestämt som en tjekisk jude som skriver på tyska, förstår som en ”mindre litteratur” diskuteras utifrån autoetnografiska observationer av korpbordtennis som en ”mindre sport”. Författarens sätt att spela kännetecknas av en välutvecklad defensiv som inte tillnärmelsevis motsvaras av den samma offensiv. En spelare vars offensiva slag inte förtjänstfullt övertrumfar detta försvår medför att bollen pågår tills någon spaknar, snarare än genom skicklighet avslutar den. Uppskjutandet av produktionen av vinnare och förlorare diskuteras som både en utmaning och bekräftelse av den moderna idrottens fair play-ideal.

9. References


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9. REFERENCES


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