South-South Development Cooperation and the changing dynamics of Development Assistance

A study of Brazil’s positioning and identity as a partner for development

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Abstract

This thesis looks at Brazil as a development actor in the framework of South-South Development Cooperation. By using a qualitative method of document analysis it aims at exploring how Brazil understands and presents its own position, with a focus on outlining basic conceptions, principles, and how their position relates to the international development community and partnering countries. The analysis is conducted deriving from theoretical tools and concepts of rhetoric, legitimacy, identity and a rights based approach to development. The conduction of a rhetorical analysis has highlighted the Brazilian claim for a different approach to development. In this context we find that the Brazilian position is motivated from a stance of perceiving existing development to be insufficient, and argued for in principles of e.g. solidarity, equal partnership and respect for sovereignty, but at the same time as a desire for expanded influence on an international arena. When analyzed in relation to identity and legitimacy the guiding principles for Brazil’s SSDC portrays a dynamic and twofold position in which Brazil cannot be identified fully to the South nor the North, but at the same time shows affinities, desire and capacity to relate with both. The findings further demonstrate that the Brazilian approach aligns to many of the essential elements of a rights based approach to development, while also pushes the understanding of the concept of ownership further in the aim to distance themselves from traditional donor-recipient relationship. In sum this thesis sheds light on some gaps in the debate on emerging donors, were Brazils engagement can be understood as standing as a perceived trustworthy partner in a rather silent but significant push for a new ways of development cooperation.

Keywords: Brazil, South-South Development Cooperation, Emerging Donors, Development Aid, Rhetorical Analysis, Identity Construction, Legitimacy, a Rights Based Approach
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## Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Accra Agenda for Action</td>
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<td>ABC</td>
<td>Agencia Brasileira de Cooperação (Brazilian cooperation agency)</td>
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<td>CNPq</td>
<td>National Council for Scientific and Technological Development</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Institute for Applied Economic Research</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
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<td>MCT</td>
<td>Ministry of Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Ministry of External Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAE/PR</td>
<td>Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEAIN</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning’s Department for International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>South-South Cooperation</td>
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<td>SSDC</td>
<td>South-South Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCDC</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation in Developing Countries</td>
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<td>TT-SSC</td>
<td>Task Team on South-South cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Committee on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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1 Introduction and background

Today's international agendas on economy, politics, security and development are seeing discussions and changes triggered by the presence of countries together often referred to as emerging powers. These countries represent a group of fast growing developing economies that by their efforts to extend space and influence are pushing forward a rearrangement of the world order dynamics. The increased influence of this group of countries is already widely established, yet the dynamics and effects of this change are still discussed without a unified understanding. This change in the global context is closely related to the greater involvement in development cooperation. These countries seem determined, of course to various extents, to broaden and deepen the commitments towards developing countries. In addition, this context further entails new sources of resources, influence and opinions.

Brazil has without question become an active participant of this group, but is at the same time somewhat shadowed by other countries like China and India, whose development initiatives has caused more drastic opinions in international debates. Brazil’s position in this debate and global structure is understood to be marked by different factors; aware of its hybrid position between the North and the South, and external perceptions that identify Brazil as an important and crucial country for regional stability and development, Brazil actively projects a global identity as a “voice” for the developing world. In this context, Brazil actively distance themselves from the epithet donor, and rather identifies to an epithet of being a partner for development and states its own construction and method of cooperation, deferring from the international Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards.

1.1 The agenda on aid effectiveness

While the modalities of different donors might differ from each other, there is also an expressed common interest from many countries in ensuring that all assistance is effective and that it contributes to development objectives at the global and partner-country levels;

“The nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South cooperation differ from those that apply to North-South co-operation. At the same time, we recognize that we are all part of a development agenda in which we participate on the basis of the common goals and shared principles” (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 2011)
DAC can be seen as a normative setting body, as the biggest source of aid statistics and an important platform for definitions and goals, therefore of high importance when talking about an international development assistance arena. Through DAC, donors have tried to operationalize the experiences and concluded decisions to reach a common approach on how effective aid and development cooperation should be organized.

The discussion on aid effectiveness can be understood as culminating in the 2005 Paris Declaration. While the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) have had meaning for the content and operationalising of the overall goal of poverty reduction, the Paris declaration has been of importance in relation to the methodology and processes of development cooperation (Odén & Wohlgemuth 2010:4). The three main elements of the aid effectiveness agenda can be summarized as: ownership, alignment, and harmonisation, each emphasising results (Ibid).

The first element assigns to respect the right, and responsibility, of the partner country to establish a development agenda. The second commits donors to depend on and align their actions with the development priorities and systems set out by the partner country, whereas partnering countries should strive to improve them. The third assigns the implementation of good practices in aid delivery, harmonizing donors’ policies and practices (Rogerson 2005:4f).

In the light of the Paris Declaration it has also been highlighted that the aid effectiveness agenda furthermore includes specific demands on and goals for the donors, which is a “new” phenomena in line with the emphasis on partnership (Odén 2006:170). This turn shifts the debate to obligations rather than “charity” and as this thesis will show can in much be seen as aligning with a rights based approach to development.

1.2 The concept of South-South Development Cooperation

This thesis will use South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) as a term for all bilateral development assistance between developing countries. The use of SSDC is as such by the authors seen as a way of bridging the many different understandings of development cooperation and South-South Cooperation (SSC), this as we have found that our material uses these terms in different ways, often mixing them but rarely having outlined definitions. We thus believe SSDC to be a more inclusive option than SSC.

This choice derives from our aim to focus on the overall principles that Brazil has for their engagement with developing countries, in order to explore Brazil’s approach and identity as an aid and development actor. In the case of Brazil, we have found it challenging to draw clear limits between different categorizations of this engagement. Brazil sometimes distinguish between SSC, development cooperation, technical and financial cooperation, and trade and investment (Schläger 2007:5). However, the development policy is described essentially as a component of the SSC approach to all foreign policy (Ibid). SSC can thus in our understanding in much be seen as a term encompassing the overall approach of Brazil’s development assistance, especially when it comes to a principal and theoretical level rather than the actual actions of implementation. There are also some international definitions that
explains SSC as a broad term, such as; “a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South, in the political, economic, social, environmental and technical domains” (United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2012). With regards to securing an inclusive term aligning with the UNDP definition of SSC, and further avoid excluding any type of cooperation, we have chosen SSDC as more appropriate for this thesis.

1.3 The debate on emerging donors development engagement

The growing influence of development engagement by emerging powers has by the international community been met with both despair and excitement. A great interest has been sparked and a lot has been written about emerging donors and how essential conceptions regarding voice, domain and global economic governance are being re-examined in light of their presence (Roy 2010). But there has also in many ways been a simplified ongoing debate, portraying the landscape of discussion as polarized between two main claims; that emerging donors with “new” ideas and instruments are undermining norms and standards of the existing aid architecture; or of emerging donors bring viable alternatives to the DAC donors (Xu 2011:1) . SSDC as understood in this thesis is often characterized by the principle of “non-interference”. DAC donors, by contrast, come from traditions of applying conditionality to their actions. Both approaches have been criticized in line with the polarization of the debate: the former for disregarding key social and environmental standards and perspectives beyond the governmental sphere; and the latter for overriding national democratic ownership and priorities by imposing conditions (Davies 2012:12).

On the harshest side of the spectrum, writers such as Moisés Naím, Editor of Foreign Policy magazine, calls aid from China, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela “toxic”, arguing that non-democratic countries “have begun to undermine development policy through their activist aid programs” (Naím, 2007: 96). He furthermore targets the motivations of emerging donors as “money, access to raw materials, and international politics” (Ibid:95) Similar to this understanding Deborah Brautigam, Professor and Director of the International Development Programme at Johns Hopkins University, argues in her book The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (2009), that China and other donors are undermining progress of governance in their cooperation. She further states that this in turn will “stifle real progress while hurting ordinary citizens” (Brautigam 2009:3 cited in Pickup 2012). As these two examples may seem specific and harsh they are important as portrayers of opinions shaping the current debate.

One noteworthy aspect on how emerging donors are presented in this debate, especially among critics, is a common thread where there is an implicit or explicit contrast with traditional aid that suggests the success of traditional donors. To further point this out one can for instance turn to a comparison of the OECD’s DAC and non-DAC donors in humanitarian aid, were Manning (2006) concludes that non-DAC donors bring costs to aid practices by using multilateral channels less and have a higher proportion of their aid tied. This may indeed be significant findings, but could also be misleading if the implicit assumption done
when reading these results is that DAC donors always have done better in upholding certain standards. Kragelund (2008:577) notes that there in this lies an underlying presumption that DAC donors have never used aid as a political tool, thus masking reality and skewing the debate and the possibility of making proper comparisons.

The other extreme of the debate on emerging donors describes emerging donors as providers of real alternatives to aid practices, especially from a recipient perspective. Their presence have been seen as putting competitive pressure on the aid system, meaning that more traditional donors are forced to improve the quality of their own aid as recipients have more to say in who they accept aid from (Woods 2008:1219f). Woods further argues that the emerging donors as a phenomenon are a manifestation of recipient countries’ dissatisfaction with the traditional development assistance (Ibid:1212). Moreover, the optimists say that this presence of emerging donors is changing the global architecture in a more inclusive direction (Malhotra 2010:8), increasing the inflows of resources, facilitating technology transfer as well as providing the recipient countries with important know-how and competencies in a number areas ranging from renewable energy to biotechnology (UN LDC IV 2011:6). Manning, who we see as positioned somewhere between these two extremes, observes that although emerging donors allow poorer countries increased aid access and a wider range of options, the advent of new donors has introduced three main risks: greater access to aid may once again condemn recipient countries to unsustainable debt; governance reform proposed by traditional donors in exchange for aid may be unduly postponed; and, the absence of careful investment appraisals may result in the proliferation of over-ambitious or unproductive capital projects (Manning 2006:381f). Manning emphasizes that these risks must be met by heightened contact and dialogue. Chandy and Kharas (2011:744ff) argue that traditional and emerging donors often have different approaches even if the goals are common. In their view, the largest obstacle in relation to developing common principles around aid effectiveness is the absence of either group to create room for the other. DAC donors might see the inclusion of emerging donors as weakening hard-won targets, while the non-DAC donors see the DAC as biased in favor of a “western agenda” (Ibid).

There is thus on both sides of the debate a tendency to talk about emerging donors as what they are not, rather than what they actually are. Entering this area of discussion, this thesis argues that both sides tend to obscure at least two features; first, the heterogeneity among both traditional and emerging donors, thus blurring that there are both similarities and particularities both within and between this group categorization, leading to a dichotomous either-or approach, emerging or traditional, and second; furthermore creating a homogenization of the understanding of emerging donors which compels us to lump them into a single group, as if they are the same, acting upon a shared foundation of values.

It would though be a further simplification to not say that there are signs of a more nuanced debate within this polarized debate, which is where both this thesis comes in and has gotten is inspiration. Some themes that have emerged regarding emerging donors include the emphasis on partnership, aid that is of mutual benefit often labeled under a win-win concept, the importance of self-interests, a lack of coordination of aid, and the decentralization of aid (Rowland 2008; Manning 2006; Kragelund 2008).
1.4 Brazil - an advocate of a South-South approach

Brazil’s engagement as a provider of foreign assistance is not new in the sense that the country’s appearance as a development partner dates back to the 1970s (Schläger 2007:5). Yet, over the past few years, its cooperation with developing countries and emerging donors has seen the volume of resources and number of partners and projects increase significantly.

As today practiced by Brazil, SSDC should be understood within the above described context of global transformation, particularly as Brazil strongly seeks to project itself in the configuration of a South-South agenda. These efforts can be seen as linked to changes in Brazil’s international positioning, motivated by widened international ambitions, aiming to increase the country’s presence on the international arena and influence over several global agendas. When turning to Brazil, the country’s approach furthermore stands out with the current development of their own method to cooperate with developing countries. Within this context, they denounce themselves of the epithet “donors” and puts forward that there is time for change on the development arena; a change that they are prepared to stand up for and want to be an advocate for.

Brazil’s growth as a development partner has occurred as the country’s position as an aid recipient has diminished, and this has thus allowed Brazil to more freely express its criticism of traditional donor principles and processes. In this context Brazil is among the few countries that have not signed the Paris Declaration1. Brazil argues that these principles do not put forward the interests and perceptions of developing countries and that United Nations (UN) agencies such as the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) are more suited to lead the debate on international assistance for development (Hirst 2011:33). In this thesis the resistance that Brazil expresses towards the Paris principles is interpreted as a criticism of the ways DAC-donors traditionally have operationalised the principles rather than a critique of the principles themselves.

Despite this active engagement, Brazil can be seen as progressing quite uncriticised and silently. Furthermore, there seem to have been few attempts to link up Brazilian cooperation experiences with ongoing debates on international development (Cabral & Weinstock 2010b:14). Engagement with international debates is understood to be essential for Brazil’s establishing as an international reference on SSDC, as well as for the debate in general to widen its spectra of aspects. At the same time, Brazil was dubbed an “anchor country” by the German Development Agency (John de Sousa 2008:1). The current foreign engagement can according to Hirst (2012:31) be summed up in diverse set of goals aimed at “ensuring i) greater influence in the design of a multilateral global architecture; ii) an expanded role in scenarios of post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian crisis and natural disasters according to legitimate multilateral norms and institutions; iii) an attuned and amplified capability in

137 countries and territories adhere to the Paris Principles and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). Current list of signatories can be reached at http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/countriessignatoriesandorganisationsadheringtoparisdeclarationandaaa.htm
South-South cooperation; and iv) a strong regional role on peace, stability and sustainable development and cooperation”. All of these aims come together and can in general terms be seen as part of a broader advocating for a South-South approach.

1.5 Problem statement

The current debate on SSDC, in much, not only masks the blurring boundaries between so-called traditional donors and emerging donors. It also homogenizes the picture of these “emerging donors” as if they are the same, acting upon a shared foundation of values, making both the concept of SSDC and the concept of “emerging donors” rather elusive. This suggests the importance of not only further exploring the concept of SSDC, but also the need to look at the specific actors individually. This in order to avoid neglecting the heterogeneity of actors involved, and thus bypassing that different grounds for action set forward different possibilities, dilemmas and outcomes. At the same time such an exploration can also show important similarities and alignments between actors.

Both the gap in the current debate on the particularities of Brazilian SSDC, as well as that the debate has focused on emerging donors as a whole or on other emerging donors such as China, and the fact that Brazil wants to put forward its own model of approach and practices, motivates this thesis choice to do a case study on Brazil. As Brazil often both is seen and sees themselves as a potential model for other developing countries, considering its recent development and economic progress, it is also interesting to further outline the basic conceptions and foundations of their approach, what this means in terms of identity and legitimacy, and how it stands in relation to a global agenda on a right based approach to development.

1.6 Purpose and research questions

Against the background of the above presentation the aim of this thesis is to describe and discuss how Brazil understands and positions itself as a development actor and explore how their approach relates to the international development community and partnering countries. The aim is described more precisely through the following four research questions:

- How is Brazil’s South-South development engagement presented in official documents and upon what principles is it said to be based?
- What are the motivations for this engagement? As presented by Brazil themselves and as understood in the international debates.
- How, and in what way is this engagement legitimized and convinced?
- How does this approach defer and align to the notion of a rights based approach despite Brazil’s reluctance to the DAC-norms?
1.7 Delimitations

It could be argued that one way of exploring the approach Brazil sets forward would be to look at specific projects and the impact in and for beneficiary countries. However, as Brazil does not follow the DAC-norms and a new or differentiated way of assessing the quality of development assistance is not yet established, this approach would/could be greatly obstructed by the lack of quality analyses and evaluations of Brazil’s efforts. As such nor does this thesis aim to evaluate or judge Brazil or their efforts as a development actor. Excluding an approach like this has therefore been an active choice and delimitation. Moreover, within the scope and time limitations of this thesis, bringing in other actors as points of research would not be desirable as it would compromise depth in favor of reach. This is seen as being in line with the choice of a qualitative method that aims to look at various aspects of a specific case rather than briefly on many cases or actors. Therefore this thesis will put forward its discussion on a macro level, not looking at the outcome of specific projects, but rather exploring understood conditions and the context where these projects take place. Whereas the aim is to explore how Brazil positions itself in the field of SSDC and draw conclusions based on mainly Brazil’s own perceptions and rhetoric rather than only emanating from external viewpoints.

1.8 Disposition

This paper will focus on Brazil’s international role as a development partner and its expanded engagement in development assistance through a South-South approach. By the end of this first chapter we hope to have established an introduction and brief background to the subject and to have described the aim and purpose with this thesis as well as its delimitations. In the following two chapters the theoretical understandings shaping the analysis and the methodological choices and procedure are outlined. These chapters are seen as laying the foundation for the thesis, creating an understanding and transparency for how it has been done and in such being part of ensuring validity.

The main results and analysis is presented throughout chapter four to seven. The findings and discussions are thus intertwined. The first of the four sections aim to paint the scenery of Brazil's development engagement with focus on recent foreign policy changes, how foreign policy and development policy is interconnected and further gives an overview of the institutional setting. Moving on to chapter five the thesis moves into one of its core parts; describing Brazil as a development actor through their own words using a focus on rhetoric in reports and documents from Brazilian actors of the area. In this part what can be seen as key principles and understandings are explored and the construction of identity and ways of convincing their approach are illustrated. Moving on from this, chapter six problematizes some important understandings of the worldview that is put forward by Brazil. This chapter further tries to describe and discuss the building of Brazil’s identity in relation to other actors and international context. Following on this the last chapter moves on to exploring how the found identity and approach can be understood through the lens of a rights based approach. This chapter thus focuses on how Brazil's approach relates to some important international understandings and concepts that forms the current debate on development assistance. It is in
this section that some possibilities and dilemmas of the Brazilian approach are illustrated and discussed.

Chapter eight summarizes and outlines the main findings of this thesis. The conclusions are described and formulated to answer the aim and research questions as well as to present a short discussion with a few final considerations. Following on this the chapter will in closing present some final thoughts on further research.
2 Theoretical grounds

This chapter will present the different theoretical areas of importance to this thesis. The aim is to outline important starting points and terms used to understand and analyze the empirical material of the thesis. As such, some elements of discussion and debate of conducted research within these areas will also be presented with the purpose of strengthening the understanding from where, and with which knowledge, the analysis enters the topic and discussions. The chapter do not give fully outlined presentations of the theoretical perspectives but rather focus on the elements used and of importance for this specific thesis.

2.1 Social Constructivism

Social constructivism will be used as an ontological framework on which we base our understanding of reality and knowledge production. It will provide a particular view, a lens which allows us to interpret the Brazilian position and approach in distinctive ways and will guide us throughout our different theoretical understandings.

The constructivist approach can be described as being based on the notion that “human agents do not exist independently from their social environment, and its collectively shared systems of meaning” (Risse 2004: 7). As such it aims to answer the question concerning how social contexts affect our knowledge (Wenneberg 2001:29) and view of what is real. Reality and “the real” are not preexisting, nature given facts, but rather products of social action and actors. Anderson and Baym (2004:602) argues that ontology is shifted “from the material and biological to the domain of language” and the real is seen as something socially constructed and dependent upon communicative contexts; thus, making another basic tenet the notion that language contributes to socially constructing our knowledge. In understanding social behavior, we arguably need to take words, language, and communication into account. This requires an attempt to explore how language is put to use by actors as they construct their world (Risse 2004). Wenneberg explains it further with the facts that we gain knowledge by the use of language and linguistics, and that language is something inherently social, which together supports the notion that knowledge is construction (Wenneberg 2001:29). Within the relation to words and language, the entry point is that there is no natural preexisting connection between the words in a language and the things they are used to describe. Rather
focus is being put on that the meaning of words is sprung from the way in which the words are used.

Another fundamental focus of social constructivism is to uncover the ways in which social phenomena are created and institutionalized. This is according to Wenneberg done by applying different theoretical explanations of how reality and specific phenomena are structured and how they work (Wenneberg 2001:69). With this understanding, different theoretical approaches are applied to our social constructivist entry point and used as the analytical framework for this thesis.

2.2 Identity

The term identity is multidimensional and can be looked upon from different perspectives. In view of the concept as socially constructed where identity is not primarily intrinsic, but rather something that is created in a social and cultural context, a definition of identity is something that occurs when people share, or are presumed to share, some features, qualities or affiliation (Stier 2003:18). To further catch the essence of the term Catarina Kinnvall proposes a simple but rather illustrative question; how do we look upon ourselves in relation to how others look at us? (Kinnvall 2003:11).

A phenomenon that often is underlined in the creation of identity, and has been found useful for our thesis, is the processes of the social construction that happens in relation to external actors. This use of what is often referred to as “the other” thus become central in many theoretical approaches to the construction of identity. To find and approach this process of “othering” can thus be seen as key to the own identity (Wagnsson 2003:79).

The most simple way of understanding who the other is would be to say that the other is “not us” (McIver 2003:44). Deriving on Iver B. Neuman and his book Uses of the Other (1999), integration and exclusion are two sides of the same coin, where exclusion is a natural consequence of integration. But how this exclusion and thus differences come to expression can be very different in the context of identity (Neumann 1999:7). A common assumption in the research on identity is that identity happens in polemic with a negative other. This thus means that the self requires a counterpart and furthermore that we cannot know who we are without delimiting oneself against what you are not, thus “the other”. The relation between we and them is therefore essential to how identity is constructed. The knowledge of our existence and our identity does as such not come from a isolated self-reflection but forms in a mutual relation to the other, hence to the context within which we take part (McIver 2003:45). In contrast to the negative counterpart there is also the positive identification as “the other”. The positive identification happens when two groups have a “positive exchange” and the process confirm the differences rather than binds them together. Confirmation as such can strengthen the own group, which further indicates that the need of positive counterparts can be as important for the process of identity as negative ones (Wagnsson 2003:79). The other can also be understood as a “significant” and is as such still “a threat” to the own identity, but is
important for the self and the political identity. As such, one could talk about “the other” in terms of a necessary player in the process of identity (McIver 2003:50).

Another relevant aspect is that the discourse within the own group also can be seen as affecting “the other”. The process of identity can thus be understood as consisting of two dimensions and that the own group as such is forced to take into consideration how they are presumed by “the other” as the ongoing process of identity are shaped continuously in this relation (Ibid:53).

2.3 Legitimacy

The definition of legitimacy used in this thesis comes from the studies of Mark C. Suchman. Deriving from earlier scholars definitions of legitimacy he adopts a broad definition stating that;

“Legitimacy is a [...] perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” (Suchman 1995: 574)

Suchman argues that there is conformity between how a legitimate entity acts and the collective beliefs of a specific group, thus pointing out that this can be seen as a reflection of that legitimacy is socially constructed. Showing legitimacies dependence on a collective audience, but at the same time its independence of individual observers. He further illustrates this with an example stating that if an organisation deviate from the values of some individuals, they can still maintain legitimacy if such a deviation does not come with observers disapproval from a wider public (Ibid:574)

2.4 Identity as a way towards legitimacy

Several scholars point towards the necessary link between identity and legitimacy, and as Dobbin and Pedersen (2006:897) argue, the formation of identity through uniqueness and construction of legitimacy through uniformity are two sides of the same coin. The above understanding of legitimacy can be seen to have some similarities to the studies of Dardanelli (2008). Dardanelli puts forward three basic features in his idea of legitimacy: i) A certain authority must acquire power according to rules ii) These rules must be justifiable in terms of common beliefs and values, and iii) There must also be evidence of consent to this exercise of power (Ibid:2). Whereas Dardanelli outlines all three features as interacting, the second one is of particular interest with regards to this thesis aim, as it is there that Dardanelli argues the interaction between legitimacy and identity takes place. This second feature relates to two different levels according to Dardanelli. The first level is the need to justify the rules to which power is acquired and exercised in a society by embedding them in the values and beliefs of a common political culture. This political culture is defined as common in the sense of being
shared by both the governing and the governed. The second level is to satisfy citizens’ need to belong to, and to identify with, a political system. The act of justification in the first level, and the need of belonging in the second connect the two concepts of legitimacy and identification. Dardanelli argues that if these two levels are combined, a concept of a community sharing a common culture, bound together by collective memories were realities of the past, present and future are embodied, emerges (Dardanelli 2008:3).

2.5 Rhetoric

The area of rhetoric is believed to be an important aspect of trying to understand how actors create understanding of both themselves and their surrounding contexts through the expression of the written or spoken language. Taking Brazil’s active emphasis on what words should be used to describe the dynamic of their development work into account this thesis has chosen to further look at rhetoric as an entry point for understanding how they position themselves and what conceptions of relations and society this brings up front.

Studies of rhetoric as a theoretical tradition are usually seen as developed by Romans and Greeks during antiquity (Boréus 2011a:136). Classic rhetoric studies turn to speeches and texts looking at the argumentation but going beyond what today is categorized as argumentation analysis by further focusing on attempts to convince. Rhetoric was seen as a mean for human beings in forming values and establishing norms for the collective behavior in society (Gripsrud 2002:193ff).

Trying to capture an understanding of rhetoric today, one could say that rhetoric at large is all the ways that we use when trying to affect each other’s thoughts and behavior. Consciously or not, we use symbols in our communication with others that say something of how we understand the world and our place in it. These symbols can be seen as extending the written word and could also include everything from pictures to gestures. Such aspects are though not used in this particular study. But with this there can be understood to be a rhetorical dimension to all communication were elements of convincing are used (Ibid:196ff). Rhetoric can further be understood as natural in the expression that most human communication in one way or the other is about influence (Karlberg & Mral 1998:10). We influence and are influenced by others continuously, and are daily confronting situations where we most often try to come to decisions about what is appropriate or not, right or wrong.

This thesis in sum sees rhetoric as core of the relation between construction of language and the understood “reality” as well demonstrated by Bitzer (1968:4):

“In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action. The rhetoric alters reality by bringing into existence a discourse of such character that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it becomes mediator of change. In this sense rhetoric is always persuasive.”
2.5.1 Three means to convince

This thesis will use the three dimensions of analysis put forward first by Aristotle's and still widely used in studies of rhetoric in speeches, texts and pictures.

The first dimension, **logos**, is the rational content of the argument. Logos can be best discovered by interpretation of what is stated and how different statements are connected in a structure (Boréus 2011a:137). Logos arguments are often anchored in controllable facts, such as scientific studies or statistics (Renberg 2007:33). You then turn to **ethos**, how the actor portrays itself (Boréus 2011a:137). To convince through ethos is often seen as creating trust, credibility and stating character through e.g. values and norms. The analysis of ethos can also further be strengthened by understanding the surrounding context, what lies outside of the text, e.g.; who the actor is, who it turns to and what the portrayed is in relation to (Ibid:146f).

The third dimension, **pathos**, aims to how the actor tries to convince through connecting to the “receiver’s” feelings. While in speeches this can be done by using different tones and gestures, one could in writing turn to what figures of speech and emotional expressions that are used and what relations and tensions that they are related to. In the analysis one can thus ask what is used as means to further enhance the power of convincing for the logical arguments (Ibid:137).

2.4 A rights based approach to development

The theoretical perspective of development as a right can be traced back to the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the preamble of each of the International Covenants on Human Rights (Sengupta 2002:838). In time, as the debate on development heard voices calling for an increased role in their own development, the concept of right to development was raised by developing countries. Several international events during the 1950s, 60s and 70s like the Bandung Conference, the establishment of United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the Non-Alignment Movement and the conceptualization of a New International Economic Order, can all be seen as indicating a route for change of “northern” concepts of development (Sengupta 2002:834).

The 1970s was a decade of crisis, rethinking and innovation, paving way for these significant discursive changes in development thinking (Odén 2006:73). One line of thought was based on the dependency theory strategy of “self-reliance” and delinking from the rich countries portrayed as representing a capitalist system (Ibid:140f). Anchored in the debate of dependency theory, which in much started in Latin America, developing countries argued their right to development with emphasis on solidarity and collective rights as key to address the imperialist economic structure and global policies (Manson Meier & Fox 2008:318). Developing countries called for reparations, transfer of capital, technology, goods and services, to be given as entitlements rather than as gifts on the act of charity (Udombana 2000:763). Together with this, the idea of SSDC through aid, trade and investment were envisioned by several developing countries, Brazil among others. Developing countries can thus be understood to have a prominent role historically in the support of a rights based
approach. This makes it further interesting to explore how developing countries, when emerging as donors, approach rights based principles.

With this background, the rights based approach was further developed and refined as adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986 and reaffirmed by the 1993 Vienna Declaration (Manson Meier & Fox 2008:322). The right to development outlined as a concept intends to be comprehensive and holistic in the sense that the focus should be as much on the processes towards right fulfillment as on the outcome and realization (Sengupta 2002:873f). Qualities such as participation, non-discrimination, accountability, transparency and equitable development processes was set out as “manners” in line with this (Ibid:871).

A rights based approach can hence be seen as a shift in the way the aid architecture is dealing with the processes and actions in development work. With this entry, the debate on development work has in some way left behind its former focus on needs. While fundamental human needs build the basis of human rights there are some notable differences between needs and rights. Rights trigger obligations and responsibilities, whereas needs do not in the same explicit way. Rights cannot be addressed without raising the question of who has obligations in relation to these rights (Kirkemann Boesen & Martin, 2007:10). The rights based approach thus sets out obligations for a variety of actors, including states; as article 3 of the UN Declaration affirms, “states have the duty to cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development” (Udombana 2000:767f).

Furthermore, a twofold element can hence be understood, aiming to enhance the capabilities of those responsible for human rights to live up to their obligations, as well as enhancing rights-holders possibilities to claim their rights (UNDP Sweden 2012). This assertion of correlative obligations are often referred to in the terms of duty bearers and rights-holders, the former mainly referring to the state and the latter to individuals and groups as the owners of unalienable rights (Mcpherson 2009:264).

2.4.1 Concerns and criticisms

In terms of aid, the role of the international community as duty bearers of the right to development has not been firmly established in international law. However several scholars have pointed out that rather than whether or not this right can be seen as legally based, the debate should be focused on the importance to outline what type and scope of obligations extended beyond the national state territorial jurisdiction that a right based approach gives rise to. Without this outlining a diffusion of responsibility among actors can lead to a situation where actors are unsure of their obligations, only sure that they have them. Mustaniemi-Laakso (2007 citied in Pickup 2012) has described the current situation in terms of that states are only required to take steps toward ensuring the rights; in other words, states must guarantee “best efforts” rather than certain outcomes.

This debate, particularly in respect to its implementation, has among scholars offered different opinions and views of the importance of this limitation. There has been pointed out that there is a considerable resistance to the attempt of implementing legally binding obligations as aid
has typically been seen as discretionary (Mason Meier & Fox 2008). Still, obligations can as mentioned be established normatively, and given the longevity of the understanding that aid is a tool worthwhile for development, it appears that one can talk about some degree of consensus already existing regarding that some aid should be given. Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2004:2) though argue that a stronger foundation for rights-holders to make demands on their states in regards to the claiming of their rights could be obtained by dictating a set of norms, norms which are agreed on internationally and backed up by international law. Again, for others specific responsibilities may not today be justifiable, but the creation of norms can be seen as a powerful way of invoking the rights in itself. In principle, the achievability of specifying obligations would rest on actors operating coordinately in accord to a program of action put forward by an international institution (Sengupta 2002:884). This relays essentially on the creation of a community among donors, like the DAC, that can adopt consensual policies and solutions that are further widely accepted (Sano 2007 cited in Pickup 2012). In addition, this fosters the debate also to relate to new donors, like Brazil, and their stance towards DAC-norms and working on a common international ground. Kim and Lightfoot (2011:712f) note how strong the reactions are to the activities of emerging donors, and that this is particularly interesting given that the current DAC standards are only “soft law”. This can be interpreted as speaking to the power of norms in establishing communities, but does on the other hand not necessarily guarantee that the norms are met. To conclude, the rights to development do not clearly establish, legally or normatively, what characteristics exactly would render aid compatible with rights based principles.
3 Methodology

This chapter describes the methodological techniques used, and aims to give an understanding and motivation of the chosen approaches and methods. The theoretical methods are presented first, describing our overall approach, followed by a description of the methodological technique used to collect the necessary data, the analytical procedure used to draw conclusions based on this information as well as a discussion on validity. Finally the used material is presented.

3.1 Methodological approaches and procedures

This thesis can be seen as being on the first hand explorative, in the sense that it aims to give a fundamental knowledge and understanding of a specific problem area or phenomena. However a descriptive purpose cannot be excluded, seeing that part of the aim also is to map how Brazil positions itself in the landscape of SSDC, and how this can be understood. Thus, the methodological approach is not aimed at finding absolute connections or correlations, but at collecting and presenting knowledge that forms a snapshot of current realities, which in turn may be perceived in many different ways. To reach conclusions throughout the analysis we have inductively approached our material through means of interpretation. The inductive choice is by the authors seen as aligning with the qualitative approach that for example Szklarski (2002:1) calls “the path of discovery” and not the path of evidence, which has opened up for an open approach rather than the testing of hypothesis.

3.1.1 Qualitative document analysis

Two different procedures have been used in the analysis process in order to address and respond to the aim and research questions. The first is a rhetorical analysis that pays attention to how Brazil presents their view on SSDC and to the ways used to convince by Brazil themselves. This was done with the belief that the use of language can uncover opinions and forces changing and shaping discourses, and was thus intentioned to collect particularities that paints a picture of how Brazil positions itself. In addition, the concepts of identity and legitimacy were applied as a way of showcasing how Brazil’s identity as a development actor
is constructed and made credible. The second part of the analysis then moves to further look at the relationship forwarded by Brazil’s SSDC and how it relates to a broader development agenda through the theory of a rights based approach. This in order to explore to what extent the Brazilian approach and position aligns to this important concept in the current development debate.

The primary method used to generate empirical material has been by conducting a qualitative document analysis. The method has been to systematically choose, review, re-read and evaluate the content of different documents with the aim of uncovering and register information that could be relevant and fruitful for what we had set out to research. As noted in the book *Metodpraktikan* (2007), when working with qualitative document analysis it is essential to do a thorough reading of the documents that constitute the material. This in order to determine what is important in the material, taking in account the texts as a whole, their various parts as well as the context in which they are submerged (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson and Wångnerud 2007:237). Document collection and the material analyses were done in a parallel manner throughout the research process, meaning that the content of the thesis thus also has been modified and refined according to continuously discovered sides of the empiric material. Further giving the thesis an open research focus in that the examining and interpretation of one source often led to another. However, although the material was approached with openness, it does not mean that the collection of material was done impartially. Rather it was built on a thorough pre-study of relevant literature on the chosen field of research. A literature and document study, to get the general background information concerning SSDC in the global development discourse and in Brazilian development policy as well as to understand theoretical backgrounds related to concepts of development, was thus done as a first phase.

Part of the collection process entailed the act of categorizing our material. The outlining of what we found to be protruding and relevant in our material allowed us to put our material into categories. Categories in which certain aspects or themes were grouped together after being identified as sharing affinities. This was particularly helpful in our rhetorical analysis, which will be described more in depth further down in this chapter. This part of the process is where the interplay between document collection and data analysis became particularly evident, as these categories helped us to assess what documents could be useful for our further analysis.

The focal point of our analysis has been in line with a qualitative approach and derives from the idea that the questions asked can best be answered through a qualitative approach. This seeing that a qualitative analysis allows a focus on the various qualities of the specific subject studied with the aim of capturing an in depth view rather than reach. The analysis was carried out by doing a document content analysis in which, as noted above, the use of categories has been an essential element. The use of these categories helped us build a base for developing and clarifying concepts used in our chosen material and in relation to the context in which they are emerged. The process also included analyzing the outlined categories and what they entail through the use of our theoretical concepts “identity” and “legitimacy”. In addition to this, two important elements can be named as used in order to address and respond to the aim and research questions, namely: rhetorical analysis and the application of a theory on a rights
based approach. The former aimed to capture in what way Brazil presents their view on SSDC and through their rhetoric’s tries to convince and also influence an existing development agenda. This was done based on the social constructivist belief that the use of language can uncover opinions and forces changing and constructing reality and was thus intentioned to collect particularities that paints a picture of how Brazil positions itself. A noteworthy methodological distinction is that it was not only the actor in itself that was subjected to the analysis but there was also a focus on the ideas they put forward (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson and Wängnerud 2007:246f). The latter part, aimed to draw conclusions on the results derived from the rhetorical analysis from the lens of a right based approach. Moreover, a rights based approach added a comparative element to looking at how the relationship forwarded by Brazil’s SSDC relates to a broader development agenda.

A key element in the presentation of our analysis has been the use of quotations, a technique which is especially prominent in our rhetorical analysis. There, quotes were used to outline, explain and exemplify arguments and reasoning’s, concepts and categories, which is in line with what Grønmo (2006:336) explains as a common qualitative method for presenting the analysis. Collectively these quotations contribute to describe the phenomena that have been analyzed in the material.

3.1.2 Rhetorical analysis

Originating from the reasoning of Bo Renberg (2007:9), the rhetorical analysis has here been used as a way of shifting the perspectives. An actor using rhetoric’s in order to construct a well-founded depiction of its position, may, according to Renberg, also be subjected to an examination of its production by another actor. This by analyzing the depiction using the same tools used to construct it (Ibid). This reasoning has for our purposes made the rhetorical analysis into a tool used to explore the ways in which Brazil tries to argue and construct a position.

In the first reading of our material the focus was to systemize the thoughts and argumentation of our chosen texts. For us the systematization of the material was a way of organizing the content, in order to arrange them into different categories. Categories which in turn were used to outline which concepts and structures of thought are important for Brazil in the social debate on SSDC. The second reading and step two of the analysis process focused on finding the “conception” put forward in our material. Finding this “conception” is by Renberg described as the first step of a rhetorical analysis, and is to be understood as a way to outline the key opinions that Brazil wants people to embrace. By doing this, the arguments used to convince can then be separated and highlighted (Ibid:30f) Step three, which was conducted in a somewhat parallel manner to step two, was to determine what basic strategies are used by Brazil in their argumentation. Which connects us to our theoretical outline of the earlier discussed means to convince; ethos, pathos and logos. As Renberg notes, these are in practice often interlinked, but may be separated in the rhetorical analysis in order to get a clearer view on how they affect the depiction/text as a whole (Renberg 2007:26).
3.2 Validity and methodological consideration

The concept of reliability often doesn’t have the same meaning in qualitative research as it does in quantitative ones (University of Linköping 2011). High reliability in a quantitative research is dependent on the possibility of being able to re-do a research using the same methods and get the same results as last time (Thurén 2008:26), whereas reliability in a qualitative research more often is seen against the backdrop of the unique situation prevailing at the time of the study (University of Linköping 2011). Capturing a unique situation and variations, through the questions asked, is more important than that the same answer always is obtained (Ibid). In this thesis a broader discussion about validity has therefore been prioritized over one on reliability.

An important fact to keep in mind during the process of analysis in the field of qualitative research is that it is an interpretive process. This means that our personal experiences, values and pre-understandings naturally have some effect on our interpretation of the material. Keeping in mind that all qualitative interpretation to some extent is subjective, we don’t deem this to be a problem, but rather a noteworthy point to make from a scientific point of view. Our thesis gains its internal validity from what we consider to be a relevant connection made between chosen theories and the analysis. Harmony between questions, methodology and interpretation (Ibid) has been aimed at. Furthermore, the fact that we leave our research questions both answered and connected to our theories, means that we have explored what we set out to explore. This is in line with what Thurén (2008:27) notes about the connection between validity and the objective of the study, where validity can be claimed if the objective of the study has been reached.

An initial concern of ours was that we in much relied on quite a narrow base of sources, consisting of the same authors and scholars. However as the process carried on their credibility was deemed high as they were often cited in other scientific papers and articles regarding our chosen field. There has also been an emphasis on source evaluation. All sources used, especially the ones that have been used in larger extent have been thoroughly looked up, this in terms of scholars titles, connections to universities and the scientific world, in order to further ensure both their credibility and authenticity. This has been an important aspect, as the qualitative document analysis approach for us has meant that many sources have worked as gate-openers to other documents. It is thus essential that our initial documents were deemed credible as they lead the way to other sources.

This in combination with the fact that our narrow base of sources represented different types of authors, some being academic researchers, and others representing organisations such as Overseas Development Institute (ODI), UN and the World Bank further diminished our initial concern with the geographical spread also taken into consideration. To be able to search for documents using our proficiencies in Portuguese and Spanish has further strengthened the scope of representativeness in our utilized sources, being able to use first hand material to a high extent. Although our initial concern regarding chosen sources in the end was deemed less
problematic than anticipated, we consider this something that should be lifted, as we regard our discussion of methodological choices and concerns as a way of providing transparency to the thesis.

3.3 Material

This thesis empirical material can be understood as divided into two categories. The first category is the material that has been used to capture Brazil’s own standpoints, views and understandings on the South-South engagement. Thus, being official available reports and documents written and published by sources representing the Brazilian state and its development institutions. This material forms the foundation for our rhetorical analysis, on which the following analysis and discussion draws and should hence be understood as key for this thesis findings. Considering this importance, the used reports and documents are presented in the table below to give the reader insight to upon what our analysis is based. The selection of these sources was based on what we found to be of great importance, namely variation. These sources can be seen as varied in terms of through which channels and platforms Brazil has been allowed to express their standpoints on SSDC, ranging from OECD questionnaires and UN symposiums to their own governmental websites and their few own available publications. In addition to this, and equally important has been the variation in terms of who can be seen as the intended “receiver” of the publications. Whereas one document quite obviously seeks to attract the attention of African actors, the others can be seen as adhering to a demand from the international development community of putting forward a more formalized description of what constitutes the Brazilian development engagement.

Secondly, the other category of sources includes articles, documents and writings from scholars, researchers and institutions that all treat SSDC in different ways. Further, this category can be separated into the sources that treat the debate on SSDC as a whole, discussing its existence, effects and implications and other sources that concentrate on Brazil, its position, development and current initiatives. As noted before, and as is part of the motivation of this thesis, the latter sources are available to a much more limited amount that the former. In general, we have found this second category of sources to be quite shattered, in the sense that we have found many analysts scratching the surface of what this thesis tries to grasp, but few that contribute with more in-depth conclusions. As this has been the case, we have relied on a number of authors and sources that all contribute with understandings of specific matters, rather than with overall lines of reasoning. Instead of doing a separate overview of this research, we have tried to describe research as it comes up in relation to treated subjects throughout the text. In addition, we find it important to note that since the chosen subject is quite new, gaining increased attention in the last years, the availability of sources in the form of hardcopy books is scarce. Thus, both categories have as mentioned instead relied on official reports, published articles and to a minor degree webpage’s.
### 3.3.1 Table over material used for the rhetorical analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Published</th>
<th>Description and Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian cooperation for international development 2005-2009</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>This report on Brazilian cooperation for international development produced by the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic (SAE/PR), the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA); a federal public foundation linked to the Brazilian government, the Ministry of External Relations (MRE) and ABC. Published in November 2011 and prefaced by the former Brazilian president Lula, this 65 page report describes the scope of Brazil’s role in international cooperation, with other countries and international organizations. This report has been one of the key documents as it is, up until the writing of this thesis, the only available official development report on Brazil’s development cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa. South-South partnering for growth</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>This document is a 116 page report on the collaboration between IPEA and The World Bank which discusses the growing connections and potentials for partnering between Brazil and Africa. By reviewing the outlining of the task team for this report, it shows that IPEA and Brazilian researchers have been the main contributors, and the World Bank is described as giving general support. The extent of this report on describing Brazil’s approach, external relations and visions, has made this a key document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Southern Effect: Critical reflections on Brazil’s engagement with fragile states</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>This document is a discussion paper put forward by OECD and UNDP, which discusses the Brazilian engagement in fragile states. Although not representing a Brazilian actor, it partly builds on correspondence with Brazil’s former president, during 1995-2003, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. As such, this rapport has been fruitful for our rhetorical analysis looking at the quotes of the former president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program for decentralized South-South technical cooperation</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Found on the Brazilian government’s website, www4.planalto.gov.br, this document describes South-South technical cooperation in general terms, as well as describes the launching of a “program for Decentralized South-South International Cooperation Projects seeking to increase their role in promoting this international initiative of Brazilian states and municipalities”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trends in development cooperation: South-South and triangular cooperation and aid effectiveness. The Brazilian experience.</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>This material is the notes from a High Level UN symposium in Cairo 2008 presented by the Federal Republic of Brazil. Describing the Brazilian experience in terms of scale and scope, main modalities, results and lessons learned, challenges ahead and future scenarios of the Brazilian technical cooperation. This document has been of importance as an example of how Brazil presents itself in a debate with other actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaire for South-South Cooperation</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>This document is an OECD produced questionnaire with questions regarding South-South Cooperation, which is filled in and answered by Brazil. This document has been relevant as it has allowed Brazil to in brief terms summarize their development politics, and at the same time putting their politics in relation to the OECD.</td>
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4 The scenery of Brazil’s development engagement

The following chapter aims to paint some important modalities of the landscape within which Brazil’s development engagement take place. Starting with recent shifts in the foreign policy and then moving on to the development policy, an understanding of the twos connection is portrayed, the contextual scenery is explored and some of the drivers and motivations of Brazil’s engagement are highlighted. This is complemented by a brief overview of the institutional setting with focus on the involved actors and focus areas of the engagement.

4.1 Recent shifts in Brazilian foreign policy

As touched upon in the introduction Brazil has in recent years put forward a more ambitious foreign policy. Under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as and therefore also from here on called Lula, Brazil built and cultivated new and stronger ties with both developed and developing countries. Under his administration the country also prioritized the inclusion of the social agenda as a component for strengthened bilateral ties. This was done drawing on domestic experience of creating inclusive social policies and the increasing capacity of delivering social goods. This line of action shows how the domestic experience guides parts of the foreign policy strategies.

The strengthened bilateral ties have been combined by an increased focus on SSDC and stronger international presence as an advocate of cooperation among South. The two most outstanding examples of foreign policy initiatives aligning with such focus is the involvement in the creation of the IBSA and the BRICS coalitions. The joining of forces with India and South Africa to set up the “India-Brazil-South Africa” (IBSA) forum, 2003, was an idea launched by South Africa, in which Brazil took the initiative to turn IBSA into a South-South inter-state cooperation based largely on soft-power assets (Hirst 2011:32). The group serves as a forum for the articulation of common goals, positions and values in world politics and economies. It further also aims to encourage the importance of development cooperation on global agendas, to underline the significance of developing countries’ understanding of democratic rule and values, and to serve as a force of pressure on the reform of major multilateral forums like the UN, IMF and the World Bank as advocates for the developing world (Ibid). Through Lula’s initiative of the IBSA he showed will to foster South-South cooperation with a new and influential dynamic, while at the same time he has been able to operationalize his expressed concern with multilateral South cooperation (Schläger 2007:4). Brazil further assumed the chair within the G20 in the framework of the WTO Doha
Development Round (Ibid), which can be seen as a demonstration and a strengthening of its bargaining power in the world trade area.

In 2001, a Goldman and Sachs economist labeled Brazil, Russia, India and China with the acronym BRIC, as a way of referring to these four growing economies. Although the concept was created in 2001, it was not until 2007 that the first high-level intergovernmental meeting took place (IPEA & World bank 2011:17). In 2010 South Africa was invited to join, leaving behind the concept of BRIC, and the current group known as the BRICS was formed. While it started out as a market oriented group it has evolved into also profiling itself in world politics and security matters, and by such contributing to strengthening the influence of emerging powers in global governance (Hirst 2011:32). This group has also been argued as being important for Brazil as a platform to deepen ties with China, putting together commonalities on South-South multilateralism with the most recent expansion of bilateral economic relations (Ibid).

The increased engagement in peace and security by stepping up the country’s participation in UN missions is another example of a visible expression of Brazil’s aspirations. Since 2004 Brazil holds the military command of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (Hirst 2011:32). Together with Chile and Uruguay, Brazil supplies the UN with the majority of all soldiers on the ground (Muggah & De Carvalho 2009:6). At present Brazil counts as the 11th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping, participating in 7 other missions than Haiti, and were registrated as the second largest troop contributor in 2010 (Hirst 2011:32f). This is part of Brazil's foreign policy becoming concerned with questions of legitimacy of the use of force in international interventions as well as humanitarian impact of military action and as such the importance of solutions sought in equilibrium between peace, solidarity and development (Ibid:32). An important driver for Brazil is in general thought to be the country’s insistence on the need for a conceptual revision of global governance institutions, in particular the UN Security Council (UNSC). Arguing a greater role for developing powers in the inner circle of international politics (Ibid:32f).

Brazil has also become a crucial player as a stabilizing force in South America, focusing on finding political solutions that avoided US-led securitized interventions, particularly during the Bush administration (Ibid:32). In the same direction, diplomacy became particularly active in promoting political governance in South America (Ibid). The government has specified that it aims to offset the asymmetries close to Brazil and that doing so is a strategic objective for its national security, since safety is considered weakened next to “unhappy neighbors” (Pereira da Fonseca 2008)

These above examples are some of the initiatives that represent Brazil’s recent foreign policy focus. Without outlining all they can though be seen as reflecting the vision guiding Brazil's foreign policy and mirror a will to actively be part of the international order. We understand that Brazil’s foreign policy, more than just contesting a general global power structure, criticizes the distribution of power in specific agendas; the need of multilateralism in world affairs, with emphasis on the need of reforming governance of the UN and the international finance architecture.
4.2 The close link between the foreign policy and the global development engagement

Traditionally, Brazil’s foreign policy has always been linked to its development agenda. This link is often seen as further strengthened and intensified during the Lula administration. The significant expansion of Brazilian foreign development engagement started in 2003, and can in much be seen as reflecting the country’s rise on the international scene at the same time. This is often connected to Brazil’s condition of being an emerging economy characterized by considerable growth, strong ability of attracting investment and a sizeable domestic market (Ayllón Pino 2010:2). But it can also be seen through the lens of Brazil’s engagement to peaceful conflict-resolution, the commitment to multilateralism and of Brazil’s own success in fighting poverty through innovative social programmes and technologies such as Bolsa Família and Fome Zero. Which in turn projects and recognizes Brazil’s political and institutional stability, its South American leadership and role as a regional stabiliser (Ayllón Pino 2010:2).

The foreign policy shift to give priority to cooperation with developing countries also meant a mirrored focus of the country’s rising profile in development engagement. This focus in the foreign policy is thus essential for the development policy, as they can be understood as interdependent. Indeed, as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former president, has put it; as “Brazil consolidates its democratic institutions and its emerging role as a player [sic] the global economy it is quite natural that it increases its participation as a provider of development cooperation” (Muggah & De Carvalho 2009:4). In recent years Brazil has accordingly undertaken steps to both professionalize its development policy and give it greater political (foreign policy) relevance (Schläger 2007:5). The development policy is as pointed out in the introduction seen as a component if its overall SSDC approach to foreign policy. Brazil has since this shift defined principles that will steer its actions, including a constitutional mandate (article 4) whereby “the international relations of the federative Republic of Brazil are governed... by cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind” and that aid will be provided in alignment with commitments established during international visits by the President and Foreign Minister as an instrument of foreign policy (Ayllón Pino 2010:2). As such, the focus of Brazil’s SSDC can be seen as deriving primarily from the pledges and obligations made by the president or foreign minister on the occasion of official visits (Schläger 2007:5).

Development engagement is also a mean to strengthen relations with developing countries that are accorded priority within the country’s national and foreign policy interests. Thereby increasing prestige and influence, while at the same time contributing to the construction of a South-South coalition (Schläger 2007:5; Ayllón Pino 2010:3). This is the reason why Agencia Brasilera de Cooperação (ABC), set up in 1987, is a anchored part of the foreign ministry, known as Itamaraty, as an autonomous working unit. The fact that ABC is still a direct part of Itamaraty underlines the close relationship of its activities to foreign policy.

Quite a few analysts state that there is a connection between Brazil strengthening its ties with developing countries through SSDC and their search for support for its candidacy to a
permanent position on the UN Security Council. Or, strengthening ties is seen as a means for promoting multi-polarity, democracy and peace, and the development of a better position for Brazil, South America and other developing regions (Ayllón Pino 2010:3). Moreover is Brazil’s expanded presence in international markets, their efforts to distribute domestic technology in the global production of biofuels, the sale of resources and equipment produced by national companies noted as being other important underlying explanations for the country’s SSDC (Ibid).

Thus in many of the existing analyses, development engagement does not appear to be an aim in itself, but is instead part of the larger foreign policy picture comprising strategic objectives for Brazil’s increased international, political and economic presence. As Hirst explains (2011:34) the development engagement channeled through SSDC represent a valuable tool, “a genuine soft power asset”, for Brazil’s foreign policy as it allows the articulation between development assistance, strengthening of institutions and peace promotion. In general, we believe that the SSDC of Brazil should be understood within the context of global transformation were Brazil seeks to project itself as an influential actor in the configuration of the South-South agenda. As noted in this chapter, these efforts are linked to recent changes in the countries international projections and appearances in global agendas. It should though be mentioned that the aim of Brazil’s SSDC is to deliver cooperation untied to economic or political motivations (Ibid).

4.3 Institutional setting and focus areas

Brazil’s initiatives in development through cooperation can be seen as carried out as part of an ongoing process of “internationalization” of its governmental structure aligning with the strengthening of Brazil’s role as a global actor (IPEA & World Bank 2011:34). With a range of actors gaining capacity to engage in foreign policy matters, the central position held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in foreign policy decision-making has, arguably, been somewhat weakened. To a notable extent, this is by many understood as a decentralisation process that explains why Brazil’s development assistance landscape is marked by fragmentation in terms of procedures and institutional setting (Cabral & Weinstock 2010a:2). Hirst furthermore describes the profile of the Brazilian administrative federal structure as almost inevitably leading to these processes of a fragmented logic in the operationalisation of SSDC (Hirst 2011:35).

While ABC in many aspects is the most central actor, with a focus on transfer of technical expertise from Brazil to developing countries, there are several other important focal points in Brazil’s structure for assistance programs, including: the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), linked to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT); and the Ministry of Planning’s Department for International Affairs (SEAIN). Furthermore several ministries such as health, education and agriculture also play highly important roles, as well as a range of other institutions that would need to be included in a full organizational description.
The key areas of expertise offered by Brazilian agencies can be summed up as health, agriculture and food security, and education. The learning process of building South-South partnerships is based on the idea of reciprocity, and can arguably be seen as a major motivation behind the programs in these areas (Hirst 2011:34). As touched upon before, this thus means that Brazil’s extended engagement in cooperation is a projection of its domestic strengthening of state institutions and capabilities in social inclusion, technical skills and technical innovation. Technical cooperation constitutes a cornerstone in Brazil’s SSDC and can be understood as the transfer, adaptation or facilitation of ideas, knowledge, technologies and skills to foster development (Cabral & Weinstock 2010b:2). The concept and focus on Technical Cooperation in Developing Countries (TCDC) has been promoted since the 1960s (Costa Vaz & Aoki Inoue 2007:2). TCDC programs and projects represent the largest component of Brazil’s cooperative activities in developing countries and are, as mentioned, based on Brazilian scientific and technological advances (Ibid). Apart from technical cooperation, Brazil’s development assistance can also be seen as a source of humanitarian relief, concessional financial assistance, as well as technological and scientific cooperation (Cabral & Weinstock 2010b:2).

The significant increase in cooperation initiatives in recent years, with a growing number of both countries and projects has triggered the above development of a growing number of Brazilian state agencies involved in SSDC, especially in international technical assistance, and has also meant a functional and budgetary expansion of the ABC (Hirst 2011:34). Brazil has been active with Latin American countries, particularly the countries of Mercosur, and with the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa. This geographic focus is tough expanding beyond these categories and currently, at the bilateral level, Brazil acts as a partner of more than 70 countries (IPEA 2011:10). Many recent cooperative ventures have further been in alignment with the tripartite arrangement of IBSA. The importance of China as a partner should also not be forgotten. Additionally, Brazil is also engaged in many multiparty relationships with Japan, Canada, and several European countries (Costa Vaz & Aoki Inoue 2007:3).
5 Brazil as a development actor - in their own words

This chapter moves into describing how the Brazilian actors, namely ones representing the state and its development institutions, themselves talk about and understand SSDC, in order to explore the role and character they ascribe to SSDC. The chapter is divided into three parts, where Brazil's argumentation and rhetorical use is explored. The first part focuses on Brazil's role and position by outlining the key conception put forward and some of the important aspects underpinning this understanding. Secondly, the chapter outlines key principles set out as constituting and guiding Brazil’s foreign development activities. The last and third part summarizes and discusses the outlined means to convince in terms of Ethos, Pathos and Logos. These parts will together serve to demonstrate Brazil's approach from their own angle and analyze how Brazil as a development actor tries to convince and argue to get the key conception across and conveyed to the “audience”.

5.1 Brazil's role and position

As part of Brazil’s argumentation around their development engagement, in published documents and reports, the Brazilian development actors constantly paint their own image of what they consider development cooperation should be. In turn also constructing their vision on what they think should be, and are, the guiding principles for development cooperation. By doing this they furthermore also paint an image of their own identity, role and position in this context, and at the same time reveal some important central understandings that are fundamental for this view of reality.

5.1.1 The conception put forward

When looking at central material produced by Brazil’s development actors, it becomes rather obvious that the overall key conception forwarded by Brazil is that there is a need for a new and different approach in the field of development, and that Brazil sees themselves having the recipe for this. The report “Bridging the Atlantic” (2011) states that Africa as a major receiver of aid is

“disappointed with existing aid mechanisms, either because commitments go unfulfilled or because conditions imposed on aid skew policy choices. South-South partnerships avoid the policy conditions associated with aid from traditional donors.” (IPEA & World Bank 2011: 20)
The following can also be found in the same text “...aid remains one of the main sources of development support in several countries on the continent, and transfers and exchanges of knowledge are still urgently needed” (Ibid:2). In Brazil’s report of its development cooperation 2005-2009 (2011) they furthermore write; “The paradigms that guided the international cooperation in the second half of the twentieth century proved insufficient to overcome the structural causes of poverty and hunger in the world” (IPEA 2011:9). They continue with pointing out that the progress of emerging powers; “in recent decades and their increasingly assertive role within the different strands of international cooperation confirm that time has come to review old concepts and strategies” (Ibid). With this pointed out they conclude that; “International cooperation is an activity that, to preserve its relevance, must be continually renewed given the dynamics of international relations” (Ibid).

These quotes showcase at least two things; one is that the existing mainstream agenda on development is considered insufficient, second that Brazil’s has a “new” way that offers what the old approaches lack. They also point out that the changing international power dynamics is a reason that gives Brazil and other emerging powers legitimacy to engage in the formulation of the global development agenda. This conception put forward is sometimes explicitly stated in the material, while at other times it is implied and underlying. Having rather a descriptive character of the state of things, parts of the conception become more an underlying unspoken conclusion (Renberg 2007:31). For example; by pointing towards aid receivers’ disappointment, the need for a new way of conducting development work can be seen as implied. This way of not explicitly stating opinions is further exemplified when Lula writes “In fact, the collaboration granted by the country (Brazil) does not impose conditionalities, nor aims at immediate political goals.”(IPEA 2011:9), thus indirectly implying that other aid and development actors aim is the ensuring of political goals, and again pointing towards the considered insufficiency of other actors at the international development arena. From a theoretical perspective on rhetoric, this can be explained by the fact that Brazil wants to use their own good examples as a way of strengthening their position and thus become more successful in their argumentation. In turn it may be argued that they through this want to strengthen their own credibility – a common rhetorical strategy. Lula furthermore points out that; “rather than acting as witnesses, developing countries need to assume the responsibility of proposing new ways for international cooperation” and by this describes developing countries as passive rather than the active actors they could be. By pointing out that “.the promotion of development is a collective responsibility” (Ibid) he changes the tone from that actors should engage, to touching upon that they have an actual responsibility to do so. This is furthermore confirmed by the following written on the same subject: “Lula pointed out that Brazil, as the strongest Lusophone economy in the world, has a ‘historical debt’ to Africa (BBC 2003). From this perspective, Brazil–Africa relations constitute a ‘political, moral and historical obligation’” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:40).

The “critique” of other actor’s development strategies is not limited to the mainstream agenda of the OECD-donors, but the review of material also shows Brazil distancing themselves from the group of “emerging donors”, that they often are lumped together with. Albeit, the importance of working together with the other BRICS countries is highlighted, the emphasis
on their own approach is not masked in the texts; “the BRIC nations are only loosely constituted, and they do not follow a common set of principles or act as a single player on the world stage” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:18) Following the same rhetoric of distancing themselves from others, the text goes on by stating that “The fundamental divides run deep – from their historical and cultural differences to their political systems and the ways they participate in the world economy!” (Ibid). The statement that “Brazilian cooperation in development initiatives reinforces the new paradigm of South–South cooperation, unlike the tied development assistance typically provided through North–South mechanisms” (Ibid:36); and that “The Brazilian Cooperation for International Development seeks, therefore, to contribute to the movement for the renewal of the development agenda in the twenty-first century” (IPEA 2011:8) further points towards the assumption that Brazil is doing something different in comparison to other actors, OECD-donors and other emerging powers alike. By the following: “...meeting the real needs of these countries, without the imposition of conditionalities, constitute the main references for the mobilization of physical, human, technical and technological resources on a global scale.” they further make the stance that they can provide new forms of assistance clear, by using the formulation of “meeting the reel needs”, insinuating that other forms of assistance neither have nor does meet these needs. “The reel needs” can be considered a quite harsh choice of words since everything that is thus not fulfilling the “reel needs” is clearly undermined as inadequate and as such removing other actor’s legitimacy.

By projecting an image of the other side to their development engagement, they also show their understanding of themselves. “In fact, during his eight years as the head of government, Lula was able to share a strong political message with his counterparts in the global South, especially in Africa: Brazil should be seen as a trustworthy partner and not simply as another donor” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:34). As the above quotations have showed, Brazil holds a South-South approach and partnership idea as the central “new” proposal to what they offer to the international development arena. The emphasis of partnership can thus be understood as key to this overall conception that they are trying to get the observer to take to heart. The identity construction were they themselves paint the picture that they should be seen as “trustworthy” and as “not simply as another donor” are thus important dimensions of the genuine partnership notion they want to convey. This furthermore can be seen as a means to create an image of a uniqueness that should “attract” developing countries to engage in cooperation with Brazil.

5.1.2 Representation

As previously described, Brazil perceives the space for developing countries, especially emerging powers, to be narrow and insufficient in relation to global influence. When looking back at the development of the last decade they write that it in much has been focused upon finding; “...new spheres of political articulation for an intermediate power such as Brazil. According to this world vision, the traditional decision-making centers did not represent the developing world—not even its emerging economies. Consequently, new arrangements were
needed so that emerging players could be more active and exert more influence when dealing with themes of global interest” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:15).

They furthermore state the continuation of this strive after influence, and its connection to how they are perceived in terms of representation; “Brazil needs to strengthen its own position in global governance, and it can do so by giving—and receiving—support from less-developed countries that see Brazil as a genuine representative of the global South” (Ibid:40). As this shows, Brazil sees the possibility of being a ‘voice for the developing world’. The fact that this is also strategically positive for Brazil's influence at an international stage is not something that is hidden but rather openly stated. This understanding of themselves is in reports used descriptively by formulations such as; Brazil is also concerned with strengthening its role as a representative of the global South (Ibid:19). It is furthermore outlined that for both South America and Africa; “South–South connections significantly increase the region’s bargaining power in other international negotiations” (Ibid:16). Bargaining power at an international area is as this indicates used as an important dimension, apart from SSSC providing conditions for domestic economic, social and environmental development, to convince that Brazil’s approach to cooperation and development is beneficial at both a national and regional level in relation to a wider global arena.

5.1.3 Hybridity

When expressing their own position, Brazil seem to underpin their understanding in relation to how they can relate to a wide spectrum of countries through their history as a country under colonial rule, their path as a developing country and today, as also belonging to the developed world. This hybridity can be seen as implicitly understood to be fundament of their identity, but has also been explicitly stated; “Brazil belongs simultaneously to both the industrialized and the developing worlds, where modernity and backwardness live side by side” (MRE 2006). On the one hand Brazil actively seeks to be a representative of the global South, but at the same time emphasizing that it should get the influential position among developed countries it deserves. The former as showed above and the latter showed throughout their foreign policy focus on the need of a conceptual revision of global governance institutions. This is a position of being intermediary between weak and strong that seems to be part of Brazil gaining recognition and trust as a partner of a wide range of countries. As such, this position seems to open up for both developing and developed countries to perceive Brazil as a rather “like-minded ally” and hence accord to it a central role on the international stage. By this position, Brazil can also strengthen the case that they uphold a uniqueness and as such a special potential when it comes to development cooperation.

5.1.4 Building on own experience

In the report Bridging the Atlantic the following is written: “Brazil has made a strong effort to avoid some of the mistakes and biases it observed as an OECD aid recipient” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:36), which, by highlighting “mistakes made”, further strengthens the above
outlined view that a new approach is needed. But, it also highlights an aspect of the Brazilian approach as one being based on “own experience”. An argument that is used throughout reports and documents produced by Brazilian development actors themselves. This depiction of own experience is twofold, in the sense that it refers to both their own experience of in the past being aid recipients, as well as referring to their experiences in creating economic growth, successfully reducing poverty and maintaining food security in the last two decades. Emphasizing this duality of experiences as such, align with, and serves as an argument for, the idea of Brazil having “the recipe” for a successful development approach.

To engage with countries facing similar problems as those that Brazil themselves as a developing country has dealt with or overcome, can thus be seen as one of the fundamentals guiding Brazil in its development engagement. Further underscoring the fact that Brazil’s own policy experiences are relevant to their development processes; “Brazil has made use of the solutions created and developed domestically... to support countries facing similar difficulties in overcoming obstacles to their development”(IPEA 2011:8). In a questionnaire by OECD Brazil further states that “We strongly believe that partner countries can benefit from an effective transfer of knowledge, and from the exchange of experiences previously developed under similar socioeconomic realities”(OECD 2009:1). The experience that countries have is accordingly of high importance determining which countries can or should engage in cooperation with Brazil.

Embedded in this, lies the assumption that other countries can learn something from Brazil by transferring models that have been successful in the Brazilian context. IPEA and the World Bank state that the “economic growth, its increasing role as a global player, its success in narrowing social inequality, and its development experience offer lessons for African countries” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:3). This quote further shows the opinion that other countries can learn from their ways of handling “problems”. The domestic success may hence be understood as a key point for the legitimacy of Brazil’s foreign activities. The success at home is understood to be something of a guarantee for the success in other similar contexts. Also as earlier mentioned in terms of hybridity, the experience of being both a recipient and a donor of assistance constitutes a means to convince from the perspective that it arguably makes Brazil have a “better understanding” than many other actors, lacking that experience.

5.2 Principles guiding Brazil’s development engagement

The following principles emerge both as the guiding principles set forward by Brazil themselves through their own speech and writings about their development engagement. They themselves express that no single policy can be said to fully govern Brazil’s development cooperation, but several guiding principles and characteristics can be found and outlined (IPEA & World Bank 2011:36). Although, with the element of rhetorical analysis, these principles have in this thesis also emerged as prominent topics which have formed the basis for a classification of categories. Categories which by us are treated, and should be understood as, arguments used by Brazil to convince and convey the key conception presented above.
5.2.1 Common Heritage

Among the means to convince there is a dimension of shared cultural affinities that is often stressed in many documents and reports. The use of a common heritage as a reason for involvement becomes very clear in the report Bridging the Atlantic, where Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa are “natural partners, with at one point a shared geography and later a shared history” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:1). As such, the report emphasises that there is a “cultural, political, and social history that binds Brazil and Africa” (Ibid:3) in a rather special relationship. That Brazil has this special bond for engaging is further expressed; “Brazil’s intensified engagement with Africa demonstrates both geopolitical ambition and economic interest, but its strong historical ties and affinities with Africa set it apart from the other original BRIC countries (Ibid). The term “natural partners” is a quite strong statement which, with the following illustration of how they call upon their ties and common heritage, that others lack, clearly shows a way of trying to convince the reader of the “appropriateness” of the activities and relationship. Stating that it’s natural, can suggest that their activities are more legitimate than other actors, and therefore may make them exempted from further evaluation or scrutiny. Brazil further describes how they by publishing this specific report “…instead of concentrating on links between the “center” and the “periphery”, examines the historical background of South-South relations between Brazil and Africa. It illuminates the connections, cultural identities, and common patterns created by the long-term experiences of Africa in Brazil and of Brazil in Africa” (Ibid:25). Here they confirm the importance of a common heritage but also point at an assumption that Brazil and Africa furthermore have a shared experience of being the periphery rather than the center of a larger global discourse. They also state that while “north-south studies have contributed to an understanding of Brazil and Africa in an international context, they have also distorted the cultural, political, and social history that binds Brazil and Africa, including the legacy of transatlantic slave trade” (Ibid). The connection and link that they try to make us see has as such also been undermined by earlier studies and therefore have not been understood properly. By furthermore describing this relationship of “unique historical, cultural and geographic aspects of the Brazil-Africa case” in terms of bringing out both the willingness of Brazil to share its success and the interest and openness of African countries to learn from Brazil (Ibid:7), it can thus be noted that the perception of sharing contextual opportunities and having a common heritage, in the eyes of Brazil, should be seen as building a strong fundament for establishing effective and “real” partnerships.

5.2.2 Partnership

As touched upon, the notion of partnership is by Brazil in much perceived as the foundation upon which all cooperation should be based. It is furthermore a key principle to which many of the other discussed principles are interdependent, sometimes one could even understand it as if they are found within the broader concept of partnership, thus making partnership the entrance point to how Brazil perceives SSDC as a real alternative to other forms of aid relations. How Brazil's ways of partnership is unique and constituting this concrete option is
throughout Brazil’s own material constantly pointed out as of high importance; “Brazil has been developing its own way of cooperating with developing countries” (IPEA 2011:8), emphasizing precisely that it is unique by pressing on it being its “own way”. The Brazilian government writes that it “believes that cooperation for development is not limited to the interaction between donors and recipients: we understand it as an exchange between equals” (Ibid). This once again shows the assumption that Brazil’s activities goes beyond what can be understood as unequal relationships that do not constitute “real partnerships”. The idea of partnership is thus underscored by the “faith in South-South cooperation, which is a partnership among equals” (MRE 2012).

In this context Brazil rejects the notion that some countries are ‘donors’ and others ‘recipients’, with its strong rhetorical use of the term partnership. As they point out that; “Consistent with the broader South–South framework and the country’s own approach, Brazil’s position is more of a partner than a donor” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:99), they portray that this is important for their position and identity as a development actor. The idea of partnership is both explicitly and implicitly used throughout the material from Brazilian actors and are understood as constituting the core of the understanding of their own activities. The avoidance of the terms of donors and recipients can be interpreted as a way of underlining that they are believed to be stigmatized and prejudiced terms that represent subtle ways of questioning the equality of the developing countries, and are furthermore thus not appropriate terms to use within a partnership.

5.2.3 Mutual benefit

The relationships of these partnerships are furthermore portrayed as “with mutual benefits and responsibilities” (IPEA 2011:8). As such they are looked upon as a two way relation that should bring benefits to both partners, not just to what in a traditional aid partnership would be the recipient country. This furthermore implicates that the relationships initiated should always bring something to Brazil, and is thus understood as an exchange where both partners have resources of some kind. This notion of mutuality in partnerships is sometimes also painted in terms of a “Win-Win” situation that should forge concrete partnerships that will generate win-win outcomes (IPEA & World Bank 2011:vii). It is also spoken about partnership as an exchange that by materialising mutuality do benefit; “not only partner countries, but also the Brazilian institutions involved, since everyone has always something to learn, as well as teach” (IPEA 2011:33).

Mutual benefit as a principle can thus be related to SSDC and the idea of partnership entailing responsibilities. The aspect of responsibility has been mentioned earlier, but is here important in reviewing what is implied and assumed in the notions of mutuality and benefits. This raises questions on how these benefits are materialised in terms of distribution and equality - where does one draw the limit of when something is actually mutual, and what types of benefits are included in this? Defining mutual and which types of benefits we are actually talking about would be speculations rather than something that can be explicitly derived from the material. But one could state that it does means something important in terms of activity, touching upon
the aspect of both sides of a partnership being active rather than spectators or witnesses as Lula has put it. The aspect of mutual benefits is further outlined in the following quote, talking about Brazilian corporations and business in Africa; “The Brazilian presence stands out because of the way Brazilian corporations do business. They tend to hire a local workforce for their projects, favoring the development of local capacity” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:6) suggesting that the creation of work opportunity for locals could be regarded as a potential benefit. The argument that the Brazilian approach offers mutual benefit is also again shown as anchored in an identity of being different, from whom or what is not explicitly stated, but can be seen as implied by the chosen words. The use of the phrase “stands out” raises the question; stands out from what, or from whom? It may thus be seen as indirectly implying a comparison to someone else, perhaps doing the exact opposite, and thus further playing along with the assumption that Brazil is on to something “new, or at least different, in which mutual benefit is seen as an important aspect/argument.

5.2.4 Horizontality

The term horizontality or horizontal cooperation is often used by Brazil as an operational description of its cooperation philosophy embodied in SSDC and often more specifically within the notion of partnership. Horizontal cooperation is even found and used synonymously with SSDC, especially with technical cooperation (IPEA 2011:33). In other words, the Brazilian discourse on SSDC can be seen as underlining the idea that horizontal relationships, based on equality rather than hierarchy, thus horizontal rather than vertical, represents a valuable instrument to pursue mutual interests of developing partners. The mutuality can hence be understood as enhanced by an horizontal approach, leaving behind traditional North, South development channels in favor of more horizontal channels between developing countries (IPEA & World Bank 2011:14).

As many of Brazil’s other guiding principles, horizontality may be seen as a reason in itself, highlighting why Brazil’s development assistance has a different focus, but is with the words of former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso also connected and underpinned by Brazil’s specific context and also by shared experiences and cultural affinities with their partner countries; “Indeed, Brazil’s identity as a diverse multicultural society ‘adds value to its dialogue with countries of the South and facilitates the building of more horizontal platforms of collaboration, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa’” (Muggah;Szabó de Carvalho 2009: 5).

5.2.5 Solidarity

Solidarity is portrayed as one of the fundamental values of the Brazilian nation (IPEA 2011:9). The former foreign minister under Lula, from 2003-2011, Celso Amorim used to talk about solidarity in terms of “nonindifference”, a view that remains a legacy of his time” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:36) and is a principle that still “inspires and drives the Brazilian Cooperation for International Development”(IPEA 2011:8). Solidarity with other developing countries is hence by Brazil put forward as one of the main drivers and motivators for its
SSDC, and this is confirmed by the reviewed material analyzed in this thesis. SSDC is further expressed as an active “act of solidarity between southern countries” in its nature, since it is between developing countries also facing problems on their own but who chooses to cooperate (Planalto 2012:1f). In much solidarity is as such portrayed as related to the feeling of being able to relate to other developing countries, and in being a developing country, the countries share something that make their relationship distinct from other “North-South” relationships that accordingly lack such a mutual understanding. This portrays the solidarity as arguably more “genuine” or at least different from the feeling of solidarity that occur in the traditional aid relationships. This relates to, and is put in a concrete context by the following:

“Two convergent discourses of solidarity are available to justify Brazil’s new rapprochement with Africa. The first emphasizes the direct cultural and historical affinities with the black people of the African continent and cultural transfer. The second emphasizes the ethnic and cultural affinities with the Lusophone countries of Africa” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:27)

A statement that again points towards Brazil validating their actions by a inherent connection that other development relationships lack. At the same time it is in several documents stated that “In its international relations, Brazil must follow the principle of “cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind,” set out in the Federal Constitution (Article 4, IX)” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:37). This could be interpreted as an obligation to always work, in spirit of solidarity, to all human beings, without importance of common features or not. The exchange of experiences and knowledge is understood by Brazil as materializing “the feeling of mutual solidarity among peoples” and benefiting “not only partner countries, but also the Brazilian institutions involved, since everyone has always something to learn, as well as teach” (IPEA 2011:33).

5.2.6 Non Conditionality

Conditionality is a term that Brazil takes an active stance against; “As a rule, conditions are not imposed on South-South activity planned or implemented by the Brazilian government “(IPEA & World Bank 2011:37); Brazil intends to share successful practices in areas demanded by partner countries, without impositions or conditionalities (IPEA 2011:33). Like other concepts that traditional aid relations include, for instance the dynamic of the terms donors and recipients, conditionality is seen as not just a stigmatizing and prejudicing term but also as a concept that fundamentally does not align with Brazil’s notion of partnership. It can hence be understood to a way of undermining sovereignty, ownership and equality. With statements like “South–South partnerships avoid the policy conditions associated with aid from traditional donors” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:20) the use is twofold; both as a way of distancing itself from traditional donors, while the lack of conditionality in their own approach is used also as a way of enhancing its genuineness in regards to other principles like respect for sovereignty and ownership. The non-conditionality approach is as such a key point were Brazil stresses its unique stance that offer alternatives to developing countries seeking help to meet their challenges.
5.2.7 Sovereignty and self determination

Respect for sovereignty is a constant cornerstone of the Brazilian approach and is put forward as a must for successful development. Attention to the demands of developing countries is described by the words; “This principle is key to Brazilian diplomacy, reflecting other guiding principles set out in the Constitution, such as national independence, self-determination of the peoples, and equality among states (Article 4: I, III, and V); in Brazil’s South-South cooperation approach, these principles are reflected by the fact that demands and needs are identified in partnership with national counterparts” (IPEA & World Bank 2011:37).

Sovereignty is further talked about in a way that implies an understanding that it is of even more relevance and importance when working with extreme poverty and weakened institutions that easily leads to asymmetry in the distribution of power and resources. The emphasis on sovereignty is used as way of showcasing the sincerity in the solidarity and respect of the partners being equals. The government writes that they always try to balance “the respect for sovereignty and the defense of self-determination” in alignment with that they do “not impose conditionalities, nor aims at immediate political goals” (IPEA 2011:9). They have furthermore been “particularly careful to act based on the principles of respect for sovereignty and nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other nations” (Ibid:33). Brazil does not regard the ways traditional donors operate as compatible with respect for sovereignty and the possibility for each country to steer its own development. This emphasis on sovereignty could be seen as raising questions regarding that it directly refers to the state rather than individuals as the most important actors of development. In the light of this it can become problematic when trying to understand how Brazil would take stance in cooperation were the state and governance of a country is questionable.

5.2.8 Ownership

Brazil holds the principle of ownership in alignment with the understanding of the importance of respect for sovereignty and self-determination as showed above. The Brazilian government states that “There is no real South-South cooperation without clear local ownership and leadership” (Federative Republic of Brazil 2008:6), making ownership an essential aspect guiding their development engagement. As shown, Brazil perceives its development assistance not as aid but as “a demand-driven process, based on the solidarity between developing countries, with non-profit purposes, and aimed at helping our partners to strengthen their institutions and human resources” (OECD:1). Also in the same document, that is a questionnaire from OECD filled out by Brazil, they further state that the “main goal of the Brazilian South-South cooperation is capacity development” (Ibid). In which they make a connection to ownership; Strengthening human capacity not only increases ownership, but also creates links that go beyond the governmental sphere and, as a consequence, are not vulnerable to changes in political dynamics (IPEA 2011:38). These quotations show that the
emphasis on ownership entails dimensions regarding capacity building and the need for development assistance to be demand driven.

When reviewing the material, other dimensions in connection with local ownership emerge. For example; Brazil’s SSDC is as also understood to be “participatory, given that it includes partner countries right from the stage of negotiation, adapting and contextualizing actions to local reality” (Ibid:8). Adding a focus on participation, this can be seen as the other side of the coin, showing that Brazil’s development assistance also requires the recipient’s active role in asserting ownership. This is further stressed by the following statement “the Brazilian policy consists of stimulating local response, whatever it may be, rather that offer a black box and turn the beneficiaries into mere spectators” (Federative Republic of Brazil 2008:5). A statement that also highlights an important dimension of inclusiveness in SSDC. The statement also follows the line of rhetoric’s in which Brazil by the use of words positions itself in relation to an “other”, and such an actor’s actions. To “offer a black box” insinuates that this is what other actors do, and by pointing towards what they are not, and what they don’t do, they simultaneously paint a picture of the themselves as well as “the other” in regards to development engagement.

**5.3 Ethos, Pathos, Logos**

Even though it should be noted that the three means to convince, ethos pathos and logos often are used intertwined in both written and spoken material (Renberg 2007:26), it is not hard to draw the conclusion that there is a clear tendency of using ethos arguments in Brazil argumentation. Throughout the material, and as can be seen described above, the concepts that are said to drive Brazilian development engagement are values and principles, and in a large extent an appeal to ethics. Many of the categories outlined above, and their dimensions adhere to this; solidarity, equality and inclusiveness, to name a few, can all be seen as value based opinions used to state and portray character, and in other words having a strong normative dimension. Moreover, much of the key conception that Brazil puts forward is argued through the means of ethos and the ascribing of character. A concrete example of this is showcased above in the statement in which Lula talks about their “historical debt” to Africa. By talking about moral obligations (IPEA & World Bank 2011:40), the statement suggests that Brazil engages in development assistance because they consider it to be the right thing to do, and thus assigning themselves with a character of righteousness and virtue. This value based approach is in line with the convincing through ethos - a way of stating character and portraying themselves as legitimate and making their vision of development cooperation seem appealing. However, focusing on portraying character through values and principles can also in a way be seen as corresponding to pathos arguments. Especially the word “solidarity” may be seen as a way of portraying their development assistance as based on altruism rather than say political motives. Thus calling on emotional reasoning towards why actors should engage in aid and development work aimed towards less developed countries. This can, in line with pathos argumentation, be seen as a way adhering to their “audience” feelings.
Deriving from the understanding of logos in our chapter on theory, the key conception as well as the principles that Brazil puts forward are in some instances also in line with logos arguments. They in much adhere to logic conclusions, in the sense that they argue using controllable facts and what could be described as inductive argumentations. The two following examples shows how this is done; one is connected to the same statement from Lula about their debt to Africa. There he points out that it is because Brazil is the strongest Lusophone economy in the world that they owe Africa, using a controllable fact (Brazil being the strongest lusophone economy) in order to underpin their engagement in Africa. A second example is shown in the discussion about the “building on own experience”. By again using controllable facts such as Brazil’s proven success in poverty reduction they argue that they are appropriate partners in the field of development assistance. This last example can furthermore be seen as having traces of ethos argumentation in the sense that the arguments put forward work as a way of proving Brazil’s credibility as a development actor.

Coming back to the use of ethos and the willingness to attribute oneself, or what you represent, with a certain character, the dimension of common heritage creates a linkage between this and the theoretical understandings of legitimacy and identity. Common heritage above described above showcases how Brazil uses the strategy of using historical and cultural affinities as a way of creating a shared identity (or the belief of a shared identity), in order to portray themselves as the most appropriate and legit actors. Within this constructed system of shared values and beliefs inherent in their “common heritage” the actions of Brazil will be seen as desirable. A heritage which in turn, influenced by Dardanellis (2008:3) terminology, is based on remembrances of the past and shared realities of the present.
6 Building character and identity in relation to the world order

This chapter presents some important understandings of the worldview that is put forward by Brazil in relation to their construction of identity. The first parts brings up and problematizes some queries brought about by the rhetorical analysis, in regards to what can be seen as an uneven terrain in the field of SSDC, in terms of resources, power relations and differences within the South. The second part addresses how Brazil builds and portrays the countries identity in relation to other actors. Lastly, by applying the theoretical concept of identity, the chapter is summed up showcasing features of the construction of Brazil’s identity where a twofoldness emerges in the process of othering.

6.1 Exclusion and inclusion in a ambiguous South

The Brazilian approach and many of its key principles can somewhat be seen to obscure certain aspects of the relations and positions among countries in the current world order. As some scholars have already noted (Ladd 2010:5), one could talk of a progression to a South within the South, showcasing the different positions of Brazil and many of its partners, not compared to the North, but compared to each other. This also questions the term of South-South itself, or at least illustrates that the use of it does not acknowledge the differences among this group that is lumped together in the term. Whereas the North-South terminology obviously showcases a difference, the epithet South-South suggests a homogeneous group, hence masking that there are in fact divisions and differences in the South as well. This also becomes apparent when Brazil in the SSDC framework is considered part of the South, and as such in one way equalizing itself with other Southern countries that may in fact be far from Brazil’s position, development vice. This suggests SSDC as a framework of relations that are more unequal than what they are portrayed to be. With this in mind, to what extent South-South relations truly can be equal and mutually beneficial, solely by being relations between this grouping of countries, is therefore a query that should be discussed. This especially as one of the key arguments of the equality of South-South relations appear to be that they do not include the hierarchical differences as North-South relations, often with a colonial past of oppression, are portrayed to have. Thus implying that there is a “natural” equality aspect between South countries because of what they are not rather than addressing what they are.
As noted, Brazil talks about themselves as representatives of the developing world, and within the concept of hybridity they play on an identity of being a developing country. However, what constitutes a developing country seems to be quite loosely defined in the reviewed material, or rather, not defined at all. This meaning that term “developing countries” again is used in a homogeneous manner; also making the concept of “the South” elusive and expelling the dimension of differences within the South. There are in fact a number of countries of the South that for several years have been leading world economic growth and compared to high-income countries developing countries as a whole grew more than twice the rate during the period of 2001–2008, at least in economic terms. But as Malhotra (2010) states, this is not true for all developing countries. For example, many Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are, rather than joining this scenario, being left behind in their long-term economic growth and development prospects (Malhotra 2010:7). This puts Brazil, with its development in the last decade, quite far from some other developing countries. Thus making the attempt to equalize themselves to developing countries problematic and raising questions such as how Brazil can be a “voice” for such a wide range of countries without excluding some of the different needs that arguably exist. But, likewise one could say that there are no explicit and clear relation between sharing contextual conditions and being able to speak in representation of others, but this becomes interesting especially as Brazil raises the importance of shared experiences and a common heritage.

Furthermore, many of Brazil’s outlined partners sit at the bottom of HDI ranks, have small economies and weak institutional capacities (Chidaushe 2010:24), leaving them with lesser possibilities of making significant contributions to the ideal SSDC partnerships. This can be seen as constituting an other side of setting mutual benefit as a criterion, and raises the concern whether Brazil’s development work really reaches the countries that need it the best; does a lack of resources or offsets aiming towards mutual benefit automatically disqualify them as partners, thus excluding countries in great need of assistance and collaboration? This understanding would give the Brazilian SSDC an excluding dimension. Perhaps more importantly, does this further put these countries at the risk of being undermined by the bigger and stronger economies with which they are partnering, and also making them less attractive as partners – excluding them from taking part of the partnerships in the first place? If drawing this to an extreme, a SSDC that teams up the strongest amongst the weak, could with this understanding risk becoming a forum for a new “southern elite” rather than the genuine alliance that strengthens the week that Brazil wants to convey. Without saying that this is the case, this is an important aspect when turning to possible implication and outcomes. The emphasis on ownership, SSDC being demand driven and the fact that Brazil aims to respond to all calls for help and collaboration (Hirst 2011:33) may though be seen as indicators pointing at Brazil working against such an exclusion.

With the understanding that hegemony can be understood as “social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant group” (Merriam-Webster 2012), which further is sustained “not through force, but through the elaboration of a particular worldview” (University of Oregon 1998), then Brazil can be seen as through SSDC constructing and demonstrating a hegemonic aim. This as they not only consider themselves representatives of
the developing South, they also highlight the fact that they are the biggest Lusophone economy in the world, and with the argumentation that they hold a unique position, the attempt to construct and show a hegemonic character, especially in the South American region, becomes hard to deny. In this context Chidaushe (2010) argues that the current SSDC framework is lacking and is in need of strengthening to ensure the fostering of a SSDC agenda that is used in an equitable manner. This to avoid the undermining of weaker members and furthermore the formation of a “new” dominant world view concealed under a “pseudo-SSDC partnership agenda.”(Ibid: 30).

6.2 Development engagement as a competitive market

While pointing at the importance of the geopolitical dimension of the Brazil-Africa relationship, Brazil states that their actions already have led to some important victories for themselves on the world stage (IPEA & World Bank 2011:100). These “victories” are illustrated by their future hosting of the Olympics and the World Cup, and they also lift the recent election of a Brazilian, José Graziano da Silva, as director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, as another example. By moreover pointing out that African countries in all these cases overwhelmingly voted in favor of Brazil they make the connection that the two arenas (IPEA & World Bank 2011:100), Brazil’s development engagement and Brazil’s “popularity” on the world stage, are interlinked. The focus on the former has had a causal effect on the latter, thus confirming an existing understanding that they perceive development engagement as a mean to also “gain something”. In this context it additionally states that it leverages its relationships with other countries in forums such as WTO and the UN, with the explicit goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Ibid).

Even if this is explicitly stated and conformingly a part of the description of the foreign policy, and also often mentioned in a wider debate, it can be seen as illustrating an important aspect of how Brazil understands its involvement and the context in which it acts. Thus saying something of how it perceives the world besides the often mentioned dimension of uncovering of motivations. Accordingly, this can be seen as an understanding where they by their choice of focus and arguments construct a view of development engagement as being a “market” where the “laws” of supply and demand, and competition steers the progression of this same market.

This can also be observed in the way Brazil portrays its relation to other actors. An example of this is the description of the relation it has to other BRIC countries, one that particularly in the case of China is stated as complicated and multifaceted; On the one hand they state that China has become Brazil’s largest and most important trading partner (Ibid), while at the same time writing that China is a “competitor” and “rival” on the “battleground” that Africa constitutes when it comes to “winning” markets and resources (Ibid). Considering that this is written under the heading of Brazil’s development engagement, the painting of a market of such area is arguably quite clear. This view is strengthened by other statements of Brazil’s pride in its “comparative advantages” as a development partner (IPEA & World Bank
As such, they draw a direct connection to the partnerships of SSDC as where this battle is fought and using traditional economics as forms of explanation of their understanding of how the world of development cooperation works.

It is also important to lift this aspect as it in some ways can be seen as contradicting the picture that Brazil paint through the emphasis on solidarity, a common heritage and other aspects that appeal to another dimension of Brazil as a development actor. The normative component of creating a new world order based on values as equality, equity and solidarity somewhat fades while a more harsh identity forms, and a concept of “winners” and “losers” emerges.

6.3 A twofaced identity

Throughout this chapter and in the rhetorical analysis, we have touched upon how Brazil forms and creates the own identity and role in relation to a process of othering. By describing the other they thus both construct the vision of the world as well as describe their understanding of themselves. This construction happens in relation to a sometimes unnamed other, while most often the other takes the form of “the North”. Brazil presses on the differences between North and South but further also contrast themselves to different actors within this rather portrayed dichotomy of the world into two distinct camps. Thus, while the world is painted in colors of black and white, “the other” also takes the form of other emerging powers when talking about the South, as when while talking about the North Brazil distances themselves from the entire concept or break it down to “the other” being DAC-donors, traditional donors or implicitly sometimes former colonial powers. All of these constellations of the other seem to be most commonly used in negative terms, further legitimating the engagement of Brazil in that the pointing to the shortcomings of the other draws out the own potential of doing better. In full, this can with the market view showcased above be understood as a creation of comparative advantages that deepens the conviction of Brazil as a legitimate partner and actor of development. There can be understood to lie a twofold feature in their relation to the North, as Brazil on the one hand distance themselves from the entire North but on the other hand push for participation and influence of what can be understood to be North spaces of power.

As showed, Brazil’s identity is further formed with a hybrid position in mind. With the position in between the developing and developed world bonds to both worlds are created, identifying the country to both but at the same time emphasizing Brazil’s uniqueness. By breaking down the other two groups within the North and South Brazil creates a position where they cannot be fully identified with anyone but able to relate partly to many, hence making their own position really their own and unique. The emphasis on solidarity, equality and the importance of a common heritage further construct an identity that entail qualities such as being genuine, sincere, trustworthy, innovative and maybe most important as understanding more than other development partners. The bonds created with the South could in our understanding be perceived to be both a feature that distances themselves from the
North, but is at the same time a mean towards coming closer to the North and increasing their influence within North fora as a representative of the South, which could be understood as a process of becoming part of the North. This is further seen in what has been described above regarding the masking of difference in the South. By portraying reality in this manner, where South is South and North is North the boundaries of the South are maintained and in turn the North can in this instance be the counterpart that the South requires. Or rather that Brazil requires in order to identify with the South.

As this process of constructing the own identity revolves so much around the other, conformingly the other can also be seen as important for the existence of the self. By identifying what Brazil is not, the own profile is strengthened and Brazil as a development actor is presented as a better and different alternative. The self of Brazil furthermore continuously forms depending on the development of the other’s different formations. The representative identity, were the understanding, common heritage and experiences are entry points, can be understood to be dependent on that developing countries confirm this identity and show the support to Brazil in some way. If this for some reason would change, and developing countries would object to the representative role, the legitimate role Brazil presses on today would fall short. As such, this could be understood to mean that changes among the many different constellation of the other would implicate that Brazil’s identity would change, and so would the points of legitimating. From this we understand that Brazil’s identity is not constant or absolute but something that dynamically changes both depending on themselves and the surrounding world. One central thought that here comes up is how long Brazil can identify themselves with developing countries if their own development continues, deepening the differences among the categorization of the countries today perceived as belonging to the South. While this should not be assumed as something that becomes a shortfall for their current approach, it is rather interesting to speculate how it will change the argumentation and means of convincing Brazil’s engagement.
7 Brazil’s engagement through the lens of a rights based approach

This chapter focuses on how Brazil, through the expression of a development approach, aligns and defer with a rights based approach to development. The following parts discusses the findings of the former chapters and tries to put them in relation to central understandings and concepts found in the international debate on development as a right.

7.1 Solidarity with obligations and responsibilities

From a historical point of view, a rights based approach has always involved the element of “solidarity”. As mentioned, developing countries, Brazil included, argued the right to development underlining solidarity and collective rights. As outlined, Brazil’s SSDC continues these thoughts on solidarity, and in this sense very much aligns with elements of a right based approach. Additionally, in our understanding Brazil can also be seen as pushing this a step further by changing the tone towards a talk about “debt”. As already touched upon, Brazil argues that not only should development cooperation be driven by the act of solidarity, but it should also be done so because of obligation. This sense of obligation to “pay” for a debt furthermore seems to derive both from a historical point of view but also from the understanding that as Brazil is shifting position from a developing country to a developed country, the responsibility to help developing countries reach the rights to development emerges.

From the early stages of the appearance of a right based approach, Brazil can be seen to have distinguished the role of development cooperation as an answer to the call from the developing countries for reparations, transfer of capital, technology, goods and services as entitlements rather than as gifts based on charity (Udombana 2000:762). Seeing that Brazil maintain their development assistance to be about offering just this, services such as technology and knowledge transfer, Brazil’s SSDC can be seen as adhering to these early calls made in the context of a right based approach. But perhaps even more noteworthy, they in their rhetoric’s, where they denounce themselves from the epithet of “donor”, further align with the notion of entitlements rather than as they put it “doing charity”. A notion that is at the core of a rights based approach, where the talk of needs has been diminished in favor of the talk about rights as something you are entitled to.
These aspects sides the Brazilian approach even more with a rights based approach, both in the terms that the understanding of rights has an inherent character of triggering obligations, but also in the terms of the obligations connected to both right-holders and duty-bearers. Brazil can with the emphasis on representing both the developing countries as well as being a global key player, be seen as equally addressing the obligations of duty-bearers as well as rights-holders. Brazil’s development engagement aligning with a right based approach becomes rather a question of how to develop its aim and processes, than one of its overall existence. This since the understanding that to have an obligation towards developing countries makes it harder to question the engagement, than if it were seen to be based on more voluntary terms. However, connecting this to a context of partnership between supposed equals, where the differences between partners often fades out of focus, the line making the distinction between who is the claimer of rights and who is the upholder of them becomes blurred. The division of duty-bearers and rights-holders can be seen as demanding a clear distinction regarding who belongs to which group, in order for actors to live up to the respective roles. A strong emphasis on partnership and equality thus makes the identity of these roles quite confusing and not fully aligning with such a clear division.

Related to the discussion on the need to establish a rights based approach in international law or not, this confusion of the roles would make it harder for countries like Brazil to fit into such a establishment of laws if such laws do not take into consideration the new aspects to development cooperation that SSDC means. We thus understand, in line with many scholars, that the normative aspects of a rights based approach as motivation enough on its own, can be considered more compatible with the theoretical understandings available as they in our opinion lacks the incorporation of partnership and equality aspects. Another thought is that the dimension of solidarity as a motivator, on which Brazil presses upon as a key point of legitimacy, might fade with the establishment of such laws. This considering that the argumentation of the obligation because of laws would be enough, and the need of solidarity to convey could be perceived as lesser.

### 7.2 Multifaceted aspects of ownership

Brazil makes the point of deferring to needs raised by the partnering country before determining SSDC projects, as do the other BRIC countries. With the above analysis of Brazil’s approach in mind, this may be rooted in a resentment of the donor interference of the past, or as Rowland’s (2008:8) state when talking about the BRICS as a group; it could be “simply because they are less dogmatic about trying to engineer particular domestic political, social and economic structures”. As noted throughout this thesis, SSDC problematizes the idea of donor and recipients interests as separate concepts when viewing the relationships as with win-win interests. The interests thus become intertwined rather than separate as what the one part gains stands in relation to what the other part can put forward, also meaning that the interests cannot be totally predefined before finding and connecting with the partnering country.
As embedded in the very rhetoric of being either donor or recipient, traditional development assistance relations can be argued to have a hard time escaping a power imbalance between these two roles. Brazil and SSDC in general, through the example of Brazil, has potential to avoid such a imbalance. This considering that they can realize ownership through the initial negotiations happening between political leaders of the country to set priorities and potential points of collaboration. This raises the thought that ownership over the SSDC process could be understood as shared rather than something lying with solely one of the partners. We thus believe that it would be accurate to widen the term of ownership to be able to talk about “shared ownership”. Moreover the dimension of the partnerships mutuality could be seen as aligning with the avoidance of power imbalances in the aim for a win-win relationship that are based on horizontal rather than vertical expressions of relations. In this lies at least the attempt to strive away from a relationship where power is channeled in just one direction, lying with one actor or simply being that one actor feels less influence over the process and outcome. It should also be noted that an alignment and active concern of these ownership aspects should not be understood as meaning that power is considered abstracted from these relationships. As has been discussed the equality of SSDC partnerships are complex and can be discussed from many aspects. The overall using of the concept of South entails problematic dimension of similarities and differences that points out this understanding.

Furthermore, as recognized by the Task Team on South-South cooperation (TT-SSC) (2010), the prevalence of political dialogue in the opening process of the partnerships can risk happening at the expense of actual practitioners working in the field of development matters. In other terms meaning a risk of weakening ownership as important knowledge, needs and understandings could get bypassed. The noted fragmentation of the Brazilian institutional structure, which could also be talked about in terms of decentralization, can in this regard thus be seen as something quite positive in the sense that it means that different agencies, organizations and persons are engaged in the negotiations depending on the type of project, to a wider extent than what would be the case if the structure would be more centralized. In line with this understanding Rowland (2008:9f) also notes that Brazil in comparison to other SSDC actors can be considered to be flexible in adapting high-level decisions to the implementation context. Interestingly, while right-based values like equality can result from placing emphasis on ownership, this may also be understood as central to the question of ownership in the first place. This as the understanding of shared experiences and common heritage that Brazil highly value, on the other hand seem to build rather strong foundations for partnerships by creating bonds and a shared identity who seemingly creates trust, but at the same time becomes problematic if it results in shortcuts to development by assuming the success of models and solutions that have worked in Brazil and thus maybe not placing enough emphasis in creating locally developed solutions that would capture the local dynamic and needs even further. If the latter happens one could with the assumption that the importance of local ownership is connected to the sustainability of the development, understand that the sustainability thus become weakened if the Brazilian models are transferred without careful consideration to the local context of where it is to be implemented.
As noted, Brazil has priority countries, currently in South America and Africa, but doesn’t have as strong priorities when it comes to specific thematic areas for their projects. Instead, potential partners come to Brazil for cooperation and a negotiation follows where the potential benefits and capacities are discussed. With this in mind the local capacities of Brazil are arguably boosted and as the TT-SSC (2010) notes, SSDC also seems to have improved the quality of ownership as subtle peer pressure can help the development of democratic governance. Within this context it is also interesting to note the possibility of that the emphasis on partnership make countries like Brazil more sensitive to criticism within the frame of their engagement. This considering that Brazil seems to identify themselves to some extent with the partnering country, and as such the created bond could make it harder for partnering countries to in this situation express criticism that could turn into tensions and discomfort. If the bond created in SSDC partnerships is understood in terms of that a trust is built, the breaking of this trust seems to become something that would be harder to do than if this “trustworthy” identity of Brazil wasn’t as strong. But, this should be noted as a speculation rather than observation of the authors, and should furthermore not be understood as negative as one would first has to put this in relation to what positive aspects this same trust creates. We for one thing believe that the creation of trust between partnering countries would be key if one were to explore the noted dimension of a “shared ownership” further.

7.3 Participation and the focus on structure

Certain aspects of Brazil’s principles focus more on governmental spheres than others; such as particularly noninterference and sovereignty. But in general one could understand that Brazil’s approach to development focuses on the state as the main actor and provider of development. The state as such becomes the main duty bearer of the right to development. Also, this shows a focus on structures rather than individuals. While this becomes problematic when partnering with countries of weak governance structures, or with states that do not recognize democracy or human rights, it also points to an understanding were focusing too much on individuals could prevent the attainment of development as a collective right, realized through the lifting of structural constraints.

Coming back to the emphasis on the state, the pushing of sovereignty could be seen as meaning that the ownership of development ends up with the state. This again meaning that the fulfillment of a rights based approach to development becomes problematic if the partnering state stands on a non-democratic foundation in regards to their own country. This could then be observed as the ownership dimension being deprived from the citizens of the country, even though one could possibly still talk about the realization of ownership if turning to the understanding that the governmental sphere solely is the important one. When talking about ownership, we thus find it of importance to identify where and how it should be realized for ownership to be considered fulfilled.

The strong focus on the state and sovereignty also raises the concern that countries with governments who prioritizes other than the development of their country and citizens, will
stand with a population derived from the right to development simply because of their
governments. Conformingly, as the basis for all Brazil’s cooperation is that other states come
to Brazil for cooperation, rather than Brazil seeking up other states, this could end up in a
situation where countries are being left behind in development because of how the process of
Brazil’s partnerships are initiated. This connects to the already brought up thought of whether
Brazil’s approach to development really channels the assistance to the places where it is most
needed. However this is a concern that doesn’t become alarmingly significant as long as
SSDC is a complement to other types of development engagement that reach these countries.
But the effect of development assistance in relation to the global needs should in general, not
only with emerging donors, be discussed. Especially since situations where the line between
sovereignty and need for development are not easy to draw if the government structure in the
partnering countries are not able to live up to the right of development but do not want or
open up for other countries to cooperate or help. In the context of this problematisation, the
fact that Brazil doesn’t recognize the term and concept fragile states (Hirst 2011:33) could
further hinder a discussion on the importance of such aspects in the dynamic between
partnering countries. This also making the term of developing countries even more
homogeneous and the differences further diminished. In other words; it becomes rather hard
to take into consideration or discuss differences that are sometimes not recognized in the first
place. Moreover, in regards to the twofold element of a rights based approach where the latter
is about enhancing rights-holders possibilities to claim their rights, it becomes of importance
who participates in the SSDC partnerships and who does not. What consequences the
selection process of partnerships leads to thus gets interesting when talking development, not
just within the specific partnering countries, but looking at the wider spectra of a global
development in terms of equality.

7.4 The challenges of transparency and alignment

The lack of evaluation of SSDC projects can be seen as stressing the fact that even though
there is alignment with a rights based approach, how eventual outcomes fit in with
development as a right is still in much uncertain. As outlined in our theoretical chapter, the
formulation of a rights based approach today requires states to guarantee best efforts rather
than guaranteeing certain outcomes. Seeing that many of Brazil’s projects still lack elements
of evaluation, it can be argued that Brazil’s focus lands in this exact scenario where best
efforts trumps guaranteeing specific outcomes. While this is problematic in terms of
evaluation and ensuring quality of the outcomes, it can be seen as rather in line with a right
based approach focus on the process towards fulfillment in the belief of this creating a holistic
and comprehensive approach. The lack of evaluation and reporting of outcomes can
furthermore be seen as deferring to the quality of transparency, in that it makes insight harder,
which are believed to be important in a right based approach. The transparency also being
arguably made less with the fragmentation of the institutional setting, or at least making it
harder for onlookers to gain insight. For the facilitation of both local and international debates
the access to information can be seen as key, which also means that it is of importance for the
development of the current practices and understandings.
This may additionally be seen from the point of view of accountability, the lack of reports and evaluation makes it harder for people to hold someone accountable for a situation, a specific action or a result. Meaning that the rights-holders capacity to claim their rights to some extent gets weakened or undermined. This may as such be seen as one point where Brazil is currently not realizing fully what is understood to be a key quality for a rights based approach. This may however be seen as a point where Brazil could develop without moving away from their current drivers and principles. We thus understand Brazil’s approach as not deferring to but, rather challenging to live up to the quality of accountability. But one point that could be raised to this discussion is the strength of the bonds and trust created in the partnerships and such the potential of creating a feeling of accountability. At the same time the fact that each partnership is negotiated could be seen as laying a foundation for a feeling of accountability to be fostered.
8 Conclusions and ending discussion

In this chapter the main findings of this thesis are discussed and summarized. The conclusions drawn from the analysis are presented to answer the research questions and carry out the overall aim described in the introduction. The chapter finishes with few final considerations on the contribution of this thesis to the current debate and a short discussion on future research.

8.1 Main findings

The Brazilian position can be seen as originating from, together with the search for international space and influence, a stance of disappointment and perceived insufficiency of development mechanisms, and thus a claim that development cooperation is in need of a remake. Brazil’s position, as described by government actors, is characterized by uniqueness, doing something that no one else is. Brazil clearly states the will to be a voice for the developing world, a representative for South America, and an influential force to be reckoned with on the global political arena. Giving, and receiving support in a development context is by Brazil mentioned as a way of obtaining these diversified goals. When expressing the own position, Brazil seem aware of how they can relate to a wide spectrum of countries through their history as a country under colonial rule, their path as a developing country and today, as also belonging to the developed world. These experiences, both of in the past being aid recipients, as well as being creators of economic growth and successfully reducing poverty numbers, highlights their hybridity and is a fundamental feature of their intermediary position.

In the context of putting forward a new approach to development we in sum understand the Brazilian position as rather conveniently caught in a juncture where they can portray themselves both as belonging to and understanding, the South, the emerging middle and the North, where they play on the concepts of representation, hybridity and own experience.

Throughout the studied material we have found eight principles and characteristics to be salient. Firstly the emphasis on a common heritage is understood in terms of cultural, political and social historic affinities creating a strong fundament for engaging in partnership. This seems to be a particular point of persuasion of legitimacy in the relation to African countries. Secondly, Brazil presses on the value of understanding development assistance in terms partnership. Partnership is believed to be the key of moving away from inequality deriving from the use of stigmatized and prejudiced concepts like “donor” and “recipients”. Within this
understanding we found our forth principle, saying that all engagement are to have a “win-win” approach, landing in mutual benefit for partnering countries. As such, there should be an exchange rather than a transfer, further arguably meaning that both parties are to have resources of some kind. Moreover, the fourth principle binds the former two together saying that all cooperation should be conducted through horizontality, seen as a symbolization of mutuality and equality that a vertical approach is understood to lack. Fifthly, Brazil emphasizes solidarity, a principle argued to be anchored in the shared identity that the common heritage entails, in turn meaning that the shared affinities strengthen the feeling of solidarity in a way that countries that lack such common heritage cannot reach. With this rationale comes the sixth principle of non-conditionality, further aligning with the attempt to distance Brazil from other traditional DAC providers of development assistance. Not putting conditionalities is understood as essential to ensure ownership and equality. This notion can also be seen as closely related to the seventh principle of respecting sovereignty and self-determination. We understand the emphasis on sovereignty as arguably used to showcase their genuine solidarity combined with seeing the partners as equals, fully able to solely decide their path of development without the imposing of demands and solutions that creates power asymmetries and hinders equality. Lastly, the eighth principle of ownership is emphasized and by Brazil seen as achievable only in relation to the above principles of non-conditionality and respect for sovereignty. Brazil argues ownership as embodied in capacity building and furthermore key to creating participation and an inclusiveness that foster true partnerships. In sum, all of these principles are interconnected and as understood by Brazil, together offering a new approach to development assistance.

Even though the SSDC rhetoric by much is focused on attempts to distance the development engagement from North-South approaches, an entry point to understanding the drivers and motivations is arguably that the same sort of mixed motivations exist among both traditional and new approaches. In alignment with other scholars, we find that statements of solidarity in some ways tend to mask this dynamic. We have found that on the one side Brazil’s foreign policy drivers of expanding the own space and influence on the global area is openly stated. Arguably, motivations of self-interest are thus hard to ignore together with the understanding that the development engagement is a mean for these interests. One the other side the analysis has also shown that factors such as solidarity, respect and trust are highly valued by Brazil, creating a rather contradictory dynamic. Moreover though, we believe that the fact that Brazil has self-interests is hard to criticize when this can be seen as a rather natural thing if considering that they openly emphasize the principle of mutual benefits. From the analysis we thus argue that mutuality, as used by Brazil, opens up for that both parts can gain from the partnership without meaning that the solidarity motives should be diminished automatically. Thus maybe ending up in an understanding that SSDC, as understood by Brazil, illustrates a link between development assistance and national interests, and that this further may be perceived in positive terms rather than negative.

Our rhetorical analysis has highlighted, through the classification of the Brazilian approach into the categories described above, that a common way for Brazil to convince is by adhering to normative dimensions, leaning on values and principles and in a large extent appealing to
ethics. Many of the guiding principles, such as solidarity, equality and inclusiveness, can all be seen as value based understandings used by Brazil to state and convince of their character. We further understand this active attributing of traits of character to correspond with the Brazilian attempt to link themselves to developing countries by appealing to a common heritage. In our understanding it is within this attempt that the connection between the Brazilian position and our theoretical concepts of identity and legitimacy has been shown as especially evident. By pointing towards historical and cultural affinities they have created a notion, real or perceived, of sharing an inherent identity with their partners, in order to portray themselves as the most desirable, appropriate and rational choice for partnership. However the construction of identity has not only been done in terms of pointing towards similarities, but also rather by doing the quite opposite. An active resistance towards being identified with traditional donors is striking. This disassociation from traditional donors, also allows Brazil to distance themselves from the failures and perceived inequalities demonstrated in these donors development engagement, hence further legitimizing their own actions and ideas. We thus argue that the analysis has shown that the construction of identity can be understood as a mean for Brazil to obtain legitimacy, credibility and trustworthiness in promoting an approach towards development engagement that is not aligning fully with the work of anyone else. However, we find it somewhat problematic that the credibility through this construction is based rather upon what Brazil is not, and what the approach aspires to be, than upon outcomes and effects that the approach in practice creates. This since we believe that it is hard not to acknowledge that there in many development assistance projects tends to have laid a gap between rhetoric and actual practice. But as outlined, this thesis has tried to show how Brazil’s SSDC is understood, rather than practiced. Further, as the analyses have shown, the world as conceived by Brazil is divided in rather distinct groups, creating a quite undifferentiated worldview. We have though found this worldview to be quite necessary for Brazil, since many of the key arguments for the country’s position, situation and development engagement directly derive from this understanding.

Even though Brazil explicitly states reluctance to the Paris Principles, the approach can be seen as embodying some of the key qualities of a rights based approach to development. The analysis have shown that Brazil has a historic connection to the understanding development as a right, this through dependency theorists claims of collective rights and expression of development assistance as entitlements rather than charity. This central understanding that constitute the heart of a rights based approach have further been found present in the material analyzed, in the portraying of obligations of developed countries. Moreover, the emphasis of ownership is found in various aspects of the development engagement and can be seen as a strong point of alignment. It is central in the understanding of development being demand driven, based on mutuality, equality and self-determination, and by the concept of countries coming to Brazil rather than the opposite. At the same time these aspects of the analysis have shown that current views on ownership is challenged as a consequence of the leap away from the distinct roles of donor and recipient, of duty-bearer and rights-holder, by their use of partnership. We hence argue that the alignment with ownership appears in a dynamic of “shared ownership”, meaning that ownership cannot be regarded as something lying solely with one part as Brazil’s approach blurs the boundaries of who are donor and recipient. We
have though observed that there is a risk of jeopardizing ownership and sustainability if the transfer of Brazilian development models is not done with careful consideration to the local context and put in relation to other local grown options. In addition, the focus on sovereignty, structures and the central role of the state becomes problematic if it comes at the expense of the fulfillment of individuals rights when involved with countries with for example undemocratic governments. The current lack of evaluations and reports is moreover understood to undermine the possibility of people claiming their rights and can further weaken ownership aspects. In regards to transparency and accountability Brazil hence falls rather short. As such, we in sum find Brazil to align with key understandings of a rights based approach but also differing from such in regard to what “manners” this approach implicated, in other words not agreeing on ways of implementation and what it means in practice. Also, as we have found Brazil's approach going beyond the differences between donors and recipients, their approach blurs the boundaries and somewhat make it hard to fully apply a rights based approach since it brings ambiguity to the distinction of who is to be hold responsible and who is the claimer of the right. A rights based approach, to be able to be compatible with Brazil's approach, does therefore have to take this change of dynamic between actors into consideration, the conclusion being that it is currently missing to do so and therefore excludes much of the current development on the global agenda that we see Brazil as an example of.

8.2 Further research and final remarks

SSDC is in the authors’ opinion a multifaceted and highly interesting subject that holds many dimensions that invites to several suggestions for further research. Some dimensions have been briefly touched upon while others in many ways can be seen as stones unturned. As noted and motivated in our delimitations Brazil and their efforts has not in this thesis been researched in order to give a judgment of their capability or success as a development actors, but has rather offered a discussion and speculations of possible outcomes of the Brazilian approach. With this said we want to put forward the opinion an evaluation require the study of outcomes and results of different activities, as noted currently rather difficult due to the lack of available information. Suggesting in addition that it would be further interesting to look Brazil’s development actions through the eyes of the receiver. In other words for example doing a case study in one of Brazil’s partnering countries.

As our conclusions have shown, the rhetorical analysis has identified a number of elements of how the Brazilian identity is constructed, which in turn highlight the Brazilian position in relation to other actors. While we in this context briefly discussed power balances, a suggestion is that a more in-depth research using power theories can elaborate on how power channels in negotiations, the implementation of projects and other aspects of SSDC partnerships, perhaps allowing conclusions to be drawn on how this affects partnering countries.

Furthermore we find the implications of Brazil's partnership approach a critical point for future research. Does it mean that some LDC countries are excluded, is the development
channeled to where it is most needed, what consequences does it have on the development of countries with weak democratic governments, or countries classified as fragile states? As also lifted as a conclusion, the emergence of a shared ownership is something that we believe showcases the need to widen the concept of ownership. Further research on such would be interesting in relation to the weight of ownership as a concept in current debates on aid effectiveness.

Lastly, while this thesis have tried to fill some of the knowledge gaps on the Brazilian approach and contribute to shedding light on differences and similarities both among emerging donors and between traditional and emerging donors, we believe that further research on such is needed to help unpack the still elusive concepts of emerging donors and SSDC. Arguably the presence of new donors is more likely to keep expanding rather than diminish, as a result the different views and approaches will accordingly have to be explored to foster development globally to the best outcome possible. Regardless if SSDC is looked upon as a continuation of the same old game or as a new paradigm of development assistance, SSDC should be regarded as an important space for innovation in cooperation and development, in that it involves a wide range of actors, opens new channels of communication and also contributes to learning processes and fostering new thoughts and ideas.
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